Canadian Foreign Policy, 1977-1992: Selected Speeches and Documents 9780773580954

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
Documents
I: THE UNITED NATIONS
A. IMPROVING THE UN SYSTEM
B. PEACEKEEPING
C. REGIONAL CONFLICTS: AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, MIDDLE EAST, GULF WAR, CENTRAL AMERICA
D. HUMAN RIGHTS
II: SECURITY AND PEACE
A. THE CRUMBLING OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE
B. BASIC DEFENCE POLICY
C. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
D. THE TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE
E. MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS
F. CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
G. MEMBERSHIP IN NATO
III: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
A. THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
B. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
C. FOREIGN INVESTMENT
D. ENERGY
E. DEFENCE
F. ENVIRONMENT
G. FISHERIES
H. ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY
IV: THE FAR EAST
A. CANADA AND THE PACIFIC RIM
B. JAPAN
C. CHINA
D. HONG KONG
E. KOREA
F. ASEAN
V: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY
A. BASIC ECONOMIC POLICY: THE TOKYO AND URUGUAY ROUNDS
B. BASIC TRADE POLICY
C. THE ECONOMIC SUMMITS
D. COUNTERTRADE
E. THE CANADIAN DOLLAR SINCE 1977
VI: NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES
A. BASIC AID POLICY: STRUCTURE AND FOCUS OF CIDA
B. AID AND TRADE
C. UNCTAD
D. NARCOTICS
E. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
F. THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN
G. SOUTH AFRICA
H. NAMIBIA
VII: THE ENVIRONMENT
A. LAW OF THE SEA
B. FUR SEALS
C. OVERFISHING
D. OUTERSPACE: BASIC POLICY - INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
E. PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER
F. THE EARTH SUMMIT: RIO DE JANEIRO, 1992
VIII: IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES
A. BASIC IMMIGRATION POLICY
B. BASIC REFUGEE POLICY
C. TERRORISM
D. ARRANGEMENTS WITH QUEBEC
IX: THE PROVINCES AND FOREIGN POLICY
A. BASIC FEDERAL POLICY
B. ONTARIO'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
C. QUEBEC'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
D. LA FRANCOPHONIE
E. PROVINCIAL AGENCIES ABROAD
F. FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL COORDINATION OF EXPORTS
G. ALBERTA AND OPEC
H. MEECH LAKE 1987
APPENDICES:
APPENDIX 1: THE REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 1982
APPENDIX 2: THE FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 1985-1986
SUGGESTED READING

Citation preview

Canadian Foreign Policy 1977-1992 Selected Speeches and Documents

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CANADIAN

Foreign Policy 1977-1992

Selected Speeches and Documents

EDITED BY

Arthur E. Blanchette

CARLETON LIBRARY SERIES #183

Carleton University Press Ottawa, Canada 1994

© Arthur E. Blanchette 1994 Carleton Library Series # 183 Printed and bound in Canada Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main entry under title: Canadian foreign policy, 1977-1992 : selected speeches and documents (The Carleton library; 183) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-88629-242-5 (bound) ISBN 0-88629-243-3 (pbk.) 1. Canada—Foreign relations—1945- . I. Blanchette, Arthur E II. Series. FC602.C37 1994 F1034.2.C36 1994

327.71

Carleton University Press 160 Paterson Hall Carleton University 1125 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6 (613) 788-3740

C94-900436-7

Distributed in Canada by: Oxford University Press Canada 70 Wynford Drive Don Mills, Ontario M3C 1J9 (416) 441-2941

Cover Design: First Image Interior: Xpressive Designs - typeset in 10/12 ITC Clearface Acknowledgements Carleton University Press gratefully acknowledges the support extended to its publishing programme by the Canada Council and the financial assistance of the Ontario Arts Council. The Press would also like to thank the Department of Canadian Heritage, Government of Canada, and the Government of Ontario through the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Recreation, for their assistance.

The Carleton Library Series A series of original works, new collections and reprints of source material relating to Canada, issued under the supervision of the Editorial Board, Carleton Library Series, Carleton University Press Inc., Ottawa, Canada. General Editor Michael Gnarowski Editorial Board Syd F. Wise (Chair and History) Bruce Cox (Anthropology and Sociology) W. Irwin Gillespie (Economics) Robert J. Jackson (Political Science) Peter Johansen (Journalism) Iain Wallace (Geography)

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To Marcelle

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CONTENTS xi xv xvii xix

Preface Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations Documents

I THE UNITED NATIONS A. IMPROVING THE UN SYSTEM B. PEACEKEEPING c. REGIONAL CONFLICTS: AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, MIDDLE EAST, GULF WAR, CENTRAL AMERICA D. HUMAN RIGHTS II SECURITY AND PEACE

1 1 6 10 26 35

A. THE CRUMBLING OF COMMUNISM

IN EASTERN EUROPE B. BASIC DEFENCE POLICY C. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT D. THE TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE E. MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS F. CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE G. MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

III CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES A. THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT B. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

c. FOREIGN INVESTMENT D. ENERGY E. DEFENCE F. ENVIRONMENT G. FISHERIES H. ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY

Vll

36 41 43 48 49 51 54 59 59 63

65 69 71 73 75 77

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Contents

IV THE FAR EAST A. CANADA AND THE PACIFIC RIM B. JAPAN c. CHINA D. HONG KONG E. KOREA F. ASEAN

V INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY A. BASIC ECONOMIC POLICY: THE TOKYO AND URUGUAY ROUNDS B. BASIC TRADE POLICY

c. THE ECONOMIC SUMMITS D. COUNTERTRADE E. THE CANADIAN DOLLAR SINCE 1977

VI NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES A. BASIC AID POLICY: STRUCTURE AND FOCUS OF CIDA B. AID AND TRADE C. UNCTAD

D. NARCOTICS E. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES F. THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN G. SOUTH AFRICA H. NAMIBIA

VII THE ENVIRONMENT A. LAW OF THE SEA B. FUR SEALS C. OVERFISHING D. OUTERSPACE: BASIC POLICY - INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS E. PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER F. THE EARTH SUMMIT: RIO DE JANEIRO, 1992 VIII IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES A. BASIC IMMIGRATION POLICY B. BASIC REFUGEE POLICY

c. TERRORISM D. ARRANGEMENTS WITH QUEBEC

81 82 85 85 88 89 90

91 91 95

96 98 99 101 102 104 105

106 107 109 109 114 117 117 118 120 121 122 124 127 128 129

131 133

Contents

ix

IX THE PROVINCES AND FOREIGN POLICY A. BASIC FEDERAL POLICY B. ONTARIO'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS c. QUEBEC'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS D. LA FRANCOPHONIE E. PROVINCIAL AGENCIES ABROAD F. FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL COORDINATION OF EXPORTS G. ALBERTA AND OPEC H. MEECH LAKE 1987

137 137 139 141 144 147 148 149 151

APPENDICES: APPENDIX 1: THE REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 1982 APPENDIX 2: THE FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 1985-1986

153

SUGGESTED READING

162

153 156

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PREFACE

Each of the three previous volumes in this series: Canadian Foreign Policy: 1945-1954 by R.A. Mackay; and Canadian Foreign Policy: 1955-1965 and 1966-1976 by the current editor, covered a time span of ten years. (These books are henceforth referred to as RAM. and A.E.B. I and II). This volume covers a period of 15 years (1977-1992) in order to include such important developments as the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the progress made in the field of nuclear disarmament, the entrance into force of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the growing authority of the United Nations and corresponding increase in peacekeeping operations around the world. So as to accommodate the extra five years and to keep the book manageable in size, greater use has been made of notes and comments introducing and summarizing chapter headings and sections than in the past. The same chapter sequence as in the previous volumes was followed as closely as evolving circumstances allowed. Two new chapters have appeared: Immigration and North-South Issues, which has absorbed international development. That chapter also includes such topics as conditions in South Africa and membership in the OAS. Conversely, one chapter has disappeared: the Commonwealth, which no longer looms as large on the Canadian foreign policy horizon as it once did. Some new subjects, for instance, international drug trafficking and terrorism, which would have been virtually unthinkable in Canadian foreign policy terms not so long ago, are covered. Also, some developments just beyond the time frame of the book, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the results of the Uruguay Round of Tariff and Trade Negotiations under the GATT, have been included owing to their importance. Some chapters continue to stand out, for instance, Relations with the United States, owing largely to the Free Trade Agreement with its profound implications for the future of Canada, as well as to joint environmental and other problems of concern to both countries; also that on the United Nations, because of its growing authority in world affairs resulting to a large extent from the rising number of regional conflicts it is being called upon to deal xi

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with and the consequent peacekeeping and other initiatives in which it has become involved and in which Canada has played an active role. The same editorial principles and techniques have been applied in this volume as in the previous ones. In addition, it has been closely integrated with its predecessors so as to show, whenever possible, the outcome of a question or problem documented in earlier volumes. Again, a suggested list of books and articles for reference or further reading has been provided. The period under study was an important and lively one, both at home and abroad. It witnessed the end of the Cold War, the final phases of apartheid in South Africa, the return of calm in Central America, the first rays of a peaceful dawn in the Middle East, genuine progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. Canada was involved in one way or another in all these issues and made effective contributions to the settlement of many of them. Offsetting this great progress, regional conflicts continued to proliferate around the world, as in Cambodia, Namibia, ex-Yugoslavia, the Persian Gulf, Somalia. The peacekeeping operations which ensued placed a considerable strain not only on the international community, but on the Canadian armed forces as well. Closer to home, the Free Trade Agreements with the United States and, subsequently, with Mexico, environmental problems such as acid rain, fur trapping, overfishing, the ozone layer, became paramount and, in some cases, highly controversial issues in Canadian foreign policy as the decade of the 1980s advanced. The period witnessed several changes of government. During the first half, that is, from 1977 to 1984, the Liberal Party was in office under Prime Minister Trudeau, except for a brief interlude between June 1979 and February 1980, when the Progressive-Conservatives held office under Mr. Joe Clark. Mr. Trudeau expended a great deal of time and effort on North-South issues and on the subject of disarmament while in office. During the second half, from 1984 to the end of the period covered by this book, the Progressive-Conservative Party under Prime Minister Mulroney was in charge. The Mulroney government concentrated primarily on relations with the United States, which became much closer than in the past. Indeed, many might say too close. There was a considerable succession of Secretaries of State for External Affairs during the period. Those who were the longest in office were: Mr. Allan J. MacEachen during the mid-1970s and again towards the end of the Trudeau government, when he was also Deputy Prime Minister; Mr. Don Jamieson at the end of the 1970s and Dr. Mark MacGuigan in the early 1980s. For most of the latter half of the period, Mr. Joe Clark was Minister, until he was assigned to the Constitutional portfolio. During his long tenure in office, he proved to be one of Canada's better Foreign Ministers. He was followed by Mrs.

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Barbara McDougall. Under the Clark government of 1979-1980, Ms. Flora Macdonald, headed External Affairs. In 1982, the Department's structure and functions were radically altered as a result of the new External Affairs Act approved by Parliament. It brought the Trade Commissioner Service of the former Department of Trade and Commerce under its wing. In the process, it acquired a new name: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, as well as two junior ministers reporting to the Secretary of State for External Affairs: one for International Trade and the other for CIDA and la Francophonie. Provincial activities abroad were somewhat quieter and more routine during this period, despite the advent of the Parti Quebecois to power in 1976. The arrangements set up in the early 1970s for provincial involvement in the international aspects of subjects under their constitutional jurisdiction were on the whole respected and there were no battles of the type witnessed during the late 1960s and early 1970s between Quebec and Ottawa. A rapid spurt in the number of provincial offices abroad occurred between the recessions of the early 1980s and the early 1990s, as the provinces sought to take advantage of the trade and investment opportunities made possible by improved economic conditions abroad. However, by 1993 as an economy measure Ontario, for instance, had abolished all its agencies abroad and Quebec had dropped some of its smaller ones while reducing staff in many others. In retrospect, the period covered by this volume is one of the most influential, significant, and consequential in terms of Canadian foreign policy since the Second World War, particularly the sharp switch in direction towards the United States, which took place during the mid and late 1980s. Nevertheless, the basics established after the Second World War are still in place. As Mr. Clark stated at the outset of the Foreign Policy Review: 19851986, inviting Parliamentary and public consideration of its recommendations: "Not everything is open to question. Canada is a democratic society and this Government is committed to the protection of our values: hence our membership in NATO and our cooperation with the United States in the defence of North America. We intend to play an active, constructive role in the management of international affairs, in the Economic Summits, at the UN and its economic and social institutions, in the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and the OECD. We intend to do our part and more in preserving peace and bringing arms, especially nuclear arms, under control. We are determined, as well, to alleviate the poverty and hunger of those less fortunate than we and to help to eradicate human rights abuses." The post-war pioneers, Louis St. Laurent, L.B. Pearson, Paul Martin, C.D. Howe, and even such later ones as Howard Green, a prophet in the field of disarmament, would not have demurred.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

1 he editor is again very much in the debt of Professor Michael Gnarowski, Director of the Carleton University Press, for his encouragement and continuing support of this series on Canadian Foreign Policy, which now covers the period going back to 1945. The technical knowledge and expertise of Cheryl Cadrin of the Carleton University Press is evident in the text's smooth editorial flow. Dr. David Murray, Professor of History at the University of Guelph, reviewed the project and made many helpful suggestions regarding its general approach and contents. Two External Affairs colleagues, Ross Francis and David Bryce Wilson, were good enough to vet the notes and comments introducing the book's various chapter headings and sections, which were much improved by their suggestions. The Department of External Affairs has been extremely generous and supportive of the project since the outset by making available its extensive resources and facilities, which greatly eased the editor's task. Its Library, under the capable direction of Camrose Burdon, is an extraordinarily rich source of reference material and general documentation on Canadian international relations. In particular, Al Kay of the Library staff was extremely cooperative, knowledgeable, effective, indeed tireless, in his efforts to track down elusive material. The bibliographic knowledge and sources of David Milne, also of the Library staff, were put to good use and are much appreciated. Without the timely intervention of my friend and neighbour, Mr. Michael Darwood, an aeronautical engineer and computer expert, who solved a considerable snag in the initial computerizing of its text, this book would have been hopelessly delayed. Christina Thiele, Carleton Production Centre, put professional polish and order into what was originally a very amateurishly computerized text. The editor has now retired from the Canadian Foreign Service after a series of fascinating postings that took him to every continent in the world, except Australia. He is of course responsible for the selection of documents in this volume, which are entirely in the public domain. The views expressed in the notes and comments introducing the various chapters and sections of the book are his alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Arthur E. Blanchette Ottawa, March 15,1994 XV

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations for main sources PM SSEA HC DEA DND EC PCO PMO SCEAND

Prime Minister Secretary of State for External Affairs House of Commons Department of External Affairs (See note below) Department of National Defence European Community (now known as the European Union) Privy Council Office Prime Minister's Office Standing Committee of the House of Commons on External Affairs and National Defence. (Later, with the change in the Department's structure as a result of legislation in 1982, this committee became known as the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade: SCEAIT)

NOTE: The name "External Affairs" was changed to "Foreign Affairs" after the elections of 1993. Since the department was known as External Affairs throughout the period covered by this book, the abbreviations DEA and SSEA have been retained throughout.

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DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER I: THE UNITED NATIONS 1. Suggestions for improving the UN's performance: Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Don Jamieson, to the UN General Assembly, New York, September 26, 1977. (Extracts) 2. The UN System—the view in 1985: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the Canadian UNICEF Committee, Toronto, June 22,1985. (Extracts) 3. UN Reform—1986: Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the UN General Assembly, New York, September 24,1986. (Extracts) 4. The UN in 1989: Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the United Nations Association, Toronto, January 30,1989. (Extracts) 5. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding: Statement to the HC Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) by the SSEA, Mrs. Barbara McDougall, Ottawa, February 17, 1993. (Extracts) 6. Afghanistan: Communique issued by the SSEA, Ms. Flora Macdonald, Ottawa, December 28,1979. (Extracts) 7. Afghanistan and the Canadian Olympic Team of 1980: Speech by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, HC, Ottawa, April 22,1980. (Extracts) 8. Iran: Statement by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, to the HC Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND), Ottawa, June 10,1980. (Extracts) 9. The Arab Economic Boycott of Israel: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Don Jamieson, at the Annual Policy Conference of the Canada-Israel Committee, Ottawa, February 14,1979. (Extracts) 10. Proposed move of the Canadian Embassy to Jerusalem: Comments by the SSEA, Ms. Flora Macdonald, Ottawa, June 7,1979. 11. Canada's views on the Israeli invasion of Lebanon: Statement by the Canadian delegate to the Seventh Emergency Session of the UN General Assembly, Mr. Michael Kergin, New York, June 26,1982. (Extracts)

XIX

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Documents

12. Official contacts with the PLO: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, Ottawa, March 30,1989. (Extracts) 13. The Effect of Sanctions on Iraq: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the HC Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT), Ottawa, December 10,1990. (Extracts) 14. Central America and Canadian Foreign Policy. Address by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, to the University of Toronto Law Faculty, Toronto, March 31,1982. (Extracts) 15. Canadian support for the peace process in Central America: Press Release by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, Ottawa, August 5,1987. 16. Canadian initiatives in Central America: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, HC, Ottawa, December 12,1987. (Extracts) 17. Report of the HC Special Committee on Central America: Response of the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, HC, Ottawa, September 26,1988. (Extracts) 18. Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy: Address by the SSEA, Mr. Don Jamieson, to a joint meeting of the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, the Canadian Council on International Law, and the Canadian Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Ottawa, October 26, 1977. (Extracts) 19. Canada and Human Rights: Speech by the Minister for External Relations, Mr. Jean-Luc Pepin, to the Seventh Annual Conference on "Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy", Canadian Human Rights Foundation, Ottawa, March 26,1984. (Extracts) 20. Securing Democracy and Respect for Human Rights: Good Governance. Extracts from "Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities, 1991-1992", DEA, Ottawa. 21. Le Statut de la Femme et les Droits de la Personne: Allocution prononcee par le PM, M. Brian Mulroney, lors du Sommet de la Francophonie, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, le 19 novembre, 1991. (Extraits)

CHAPTER II: SECURITY AND PEACE 22. Canada, the West, and Eastern Europe: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the Department of Political Science and Economics, McGill University, Montreal, February 5,1990. (Extracts) 23. Task Force on Central and Eastern Europe: Joint Message by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, and the Minister of International Trade, Mr. John Crosbie, Ottawa, Spring 1992. (Extracts) 24. Canada, NATO, and Eastern Europe—The Challenge: Speech by the SSEA, Mrs. Barbara McDougall, to the Universal Speakers' Group, Toronto, April 16,1992. (Extracts)

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25. Challenge and Commitment—The Defence White Paper—1987: Policy paper issued by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Perrin Beatty, June 5,1987. (Synopsis) 26. Defence and the 1989 Budget. Extracts from "Budget in Brief," Department of Finance, Ottawa, April 27,1989. 27. Disarmament—The problem of organizing the world community: Speech by the PM, Mr. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, to the UN Special Session on Disarmament, New York, May 26,1978. (Extracts) 28. Disarmament Priorities Reaffirmed'. Statement by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, on the occasion of Disarmament Week, October 24,1980. (Extracts) 29. International Security and Disarmament Statement by the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. A. R. Menzies, to the HC Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND), Ottawa, February 2, 1982. (Extracts) 30. In pursuit of peace: Speech by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, to the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control, Ottawa, October 31,1985. 31. Banning chemical weapons for all time: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, at the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons, January 8, 1989. (Extracts) The Trudeau Peace Initiative: Note 32. The End of'the MBFR Talks: Communique issued by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, Ottawa, February 7,1989. 33. Open Skies and "Glasnost": Statement by Mr. John Noble, head of the Canadian Delegation to the official portion of the Open Skies Conference, Ottawa, February 27,1990. (Extracts) 34. Family Reunification: Closing statement by the Minister for Multiculturalism, Mr. Norman Cafik, to the CSCE conference, Belgrade, March 9, 1978. (Extracts) 35. The improved view from Vienna: Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, at the conclusion of the CSCE conference, Vienna, January 19, 1989. (Extracts) 36. NATO—Leaving its alliances is no choice for Canada: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, special to "The Gazette", Montreal, April 3,1986. (Extracts)

CHAPTER III: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 37. The Free Trade Agreement—highlights: Speech by the Minister of International Trade, Mr. John Crosbie, to the National Citizens' Coalition, Toronto, October 18,1988. (Extracts)

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38. The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement—Synopsis: Monograph published by the International Trade Communications Group, DEA, Ottawa. Effective January 1,1989. 39. The Free Trade Agreement: Timetable. Extracts from the "Synopsis". Effective January 1,1989. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): Note 40. The Canadian Perspective on Foreign Investment: Statement by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, to the Centre for Inter-American Relations, New York, September 30,1981. (Extracts) 41. New Climate for Investment in Canada: Speech by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, to the members of the Economic Club, New York, December 10,1984. (Extracts) 42. Canadian Perspective on Energy Questions: Statement by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, to the Centre for Inter-American Relations, New York, September 30,1981. (Extracts) 43. New Climate for Energy in Canada: Speech by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, to the members of the Economic Club, New York, December 10, 1984. (Extracts) 44. Extension of the NORAD Agreement: Communique issued by DEA, Ottawa, May 12,1980. 45. Canada's position on testing Cruise Missiles: Open letter from the PM, Mr. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, to Canadians, Ottawa, May 9,1983. (Extracts) 46. Star Wars: Remarks by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, during a press conference, September 7,1985. 47. Acid Rain—A serious bilateral issue: Speech by the Minister of the Environment, Mr. John Roberts, to the Air Pollution Control Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, June 21,1982. (Extracts) 48. The Quebec Summit: Joint Statement on the environment by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, and the President of the United States, Mr. Ronald Reagan, March 18,1985. 49. Canada-U.S. Fisheries and Boundary Agreements: DEA communique, Ottawa, March 29,1979. 50. Gulf of Maine Boundary Case: Opening Statement by the Minister of Justice, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, to the International Court of Justice, The Hague, April 2,1984. (Extracts) 51. Gulf of Maine Case—International Court's Decision: DEA communique, Ottawa, October 12,1984. (Summary) 52. Voyage of the "Polar Sea": DEA communique, Ottawa, July 31, 1985. (Summary)

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53. Policy on Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, HC, Ottawa, September 10,1985. (Extracts)

CHAPTER IV: THE FAR EAST 54. Canada: A Pacific Rim Country: Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the Asia Pacific Foundation, Vancouver, October 22,1988. (Extracts) 55. Canadian partnership in Pacific 2000: Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the Corporate Higher Education Forum, Edmonton, May 16, 1989. (Extracts) 56. Canada and Japan: Statement by Mr. R. L. Rogers, Director General, Asian and Pacific Affairs, DEA, Ottawa, to the Canadian Committee of the Pacific Basin Economic Council, April 4,1977. (Extracts) 57. Canada and China: Speech by the Minister of International Trade, Ms. Pat Carney, to the Canada-China Trade Council, Vancouver, December 12,1986. (Extracts) 58. Situation in China: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, during an Emergency Debate on the Situation in Chir-d, HC, Ottawa, January 5, 1989. (Extracts) 59. Trade Action Plan—Hong Kong: News Release by Ms. Pat Carney, Minister of International Trade, at the Annual Meeting of the Hong KongCanada Business Association, March 1,1988. (Extracts) 60. Canada and Korea: Speech by the Minister of International Trade, Mr. James Kelleher, to the Canada-Korea and the Korea-Canada Business Councils, Vancouver, October 3,1985. (Extracts) 61. Canada and ASEAN: Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, during the "SixPlus-One" meeting of the ASEAN post-ministerial conference, Jakarta, July 28,1990. (Extracts)

CHAPTER V: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY 62. The Tokyo Round—Canada's Objectives: Synopsis, DEA, Ottawa, 1979. 63. The Uruguay Round—Canada's Objectives: Statement by the Minister of International Trade, Ms. Pat Carney, to the National Press Club, Ottawa, March 27,1987. (Extracts) The Results of the Uruguay Round: Note 64. Canadian Trade Policy for the 1980s: Discussion Paper published under the authority of the Deputy PM, Mr. Allan J. MacEachen, and the Minister of State for International Trade, Mr. Gerald Regan, Ottawa, 1983. (Summary)

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65. The Economic Summits: Speech by the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Allan Gotlieb, to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Winnipeg, April 9,1981. (Extracts) 66. Countertrade Primer for Canadian Exporters: Booklet issued by DEA, Ottawa, December 1985. (Extracts) The Evolution of the Canadian Dollar Since 1977: Note

CHAPTER VI: NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES 67. "Charter"—Official Development Assistance: CIDA, Ottawa, 1987. (Summary) 68. "Sharing Our Future": Booklet issued by CIDA, Ottawa, 1987. (Extracts) 69. Aid and Trade—The Challenge of Exportation: Statement by the Minister of State for External Relations, Mr. Pierre De Bane, to the Montreal Chamber of Commerce, February 23,1982. (Extracts) 70. UNCTAD: Canadian policy: Statement by Mr. L. A. H. Smith, Head of the Canadian delegation, UNCTAD V, Manila, May 9,1979. (Extracts) 71. Narcotics—The International Component of the National Drug Strategy: News Release by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, Ottawa, May 28, 1987. (Summary) 72. Canadian membership in the Organization of American States: Address by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, at the Meeting of Hemispheric Leaders, San Jose, Costa Rica, October 27,1989. (Extracts) 73. Canada and CARICOM—Trade and Cooperation Agreement: News Release, DEA, Ottawa, January 20,1979. (Extracts) 74. Apartheid—A violation of fundamental human rights: Speech by the Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN, Mr. Stephen Lewis, to the UN General Assembly, New York, November 20,1984. (Extracts) 75. Canada's measures against apartheid: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, HC, Ottawa, September 13,1985. (Extracts) 76. End of State of Emergency in South Africa: News Release, DEA, Ottawa, June 7,1990.

CHAPTER VII: THE ENVIRONMENT 77. Canada signs the Law of the Sea Convention: Communique, DEA, Ottawa, November 22,1982. 78. The European Community's decision on the seal hunt: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Allan J. MacEachen, Ottawa, March 1,1983. (Extracts) 79. Fur Trapping: Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, at the Official Opening of the 1990 International Fur Fair, Montreal, May 2,1990. (Extracts)

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80. European overfishing in Canadian waters: News Release, DEA, Ottawa, October 6,1988. (Extracts) 81. France-Canada Fisheries Dispute—Settlement: News Release, DEA, Ottawa, June 10,1992. (Extracts) 82. The Canadian Space Programme Plan—1982-1985—International Aspects: Booklet issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology, Ottawa, December 1981. (Extracts) 83. The Changing Atmosphere: Speech by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, at the opening of the International Conference on the Changing Atmosphere, Toronto, June 27,1988. (Extracts) 84. Earth Summit Conference—Rio de Janeiro: Address by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, June 12,1992. (Extracts)

CHAPTER VIII: IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES 85. Basic Immigration Policy—New Regulations: Statement by the Minister of Employment and Immigration, Mr. Bud Cullen, HC, Ottawa, March 8, 1978. (Extracts) 86. Revised Selection Criteria: Special Report to Parliament, June 27,1985. (Summary) 87. Basic Refugee Policy: Statement by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, to the National Symposium on Refugee Status Determination, Toronto, February 21,1982. (Extracts) 88. Air India Disaster: Communique, DEA, Ottawa, June 24,1985. 89. Canada, ICAO, and Terrorism: Speech by the Minister of Transport, Mr. Donald F. Mazankowski, to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Montreal, June 27,1985. (Extracts) 90. Canada, India, and Terrorism: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, Taj Mahal Hotel, New Delhi, February, 7,1987. (Extracts) 91. Ottawa-Quebec Immigration Agreement: Summary of official text, signed at Montreal, February 20,1978.

CHAPTER IX: THE PROVINCES AND FOREIGN POLICY 92. Basic Federal Policy: Letter from the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the Provincial Premiers, December 7,1984. (Extracts) 93. Ontario's International Relations—Objectives and Priorities: Booklet issued by the International Relations Branch, Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Toronto, April 1986. (Extracts) 94. Les relations internationales du Quebec—Extraits de "Quebec, terre d'avenir": Brochure publiee par le Conseil executif, Gouvernement du Quebec, 1979.

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95. Le Quebec et VIndependance—Elements d'une politique d'affaires Internationales: Brochure publiee par le Ministere des Affaires internationales, Quebec, 1991. (Extraits) 96. Canada and La Francophonie: Statement by the PM, Mr. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, to the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation, Paris, November 10,1982. (Extracts) 97. Le Canada et la Francophonie: Allocution prononcee par le PM, M. Brian Mulroney, lors du Sommet des Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement de la Francophonie, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, le 19 novembre 1991. (Extraits) 98. Provincial offices abroad: List prepared by DEA, Ottawa, December 1992. 99. Federal-provincial coordination of exports: Extracts from the booklet "Annual Conferences of First Ministers", Halifax, November 28-29,1985. 100. Alberta and OPEC: Question period, HC, Ottawa, March 20,1986. 101. Strengthening the Canadian Confederation: The Constitutional Amendment, 1987. International Aspects. (Extracts)

APPENDICES 102. An Act respecting the Department of External Affairs—1982. (Extracts) 103. Competitiveness and Security—Directions for Canada's International Relations: Foreign Policy Review—1985-1986, presented by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark. (Extracts) 104. Canada's international relations: Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, HC, Ottawa, December 4,1986, on the occasion of the tabling of the Government's response to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons regarding Competitiveness and Security.

I

THE UNITED NATIONS

-rVt the outset of the period under review, the United Nations had become bogged down in rhetoric, procedural complexities, countless unrealistic and inapplicable resolutions, which left many countries, including Canada, impatient and frustrated. This situation was a reflection of the uneasy state and generally uncooperative relations prevailing between the UN's two most powerful members at the time: the Soviet Union and the United States. It was also complicated by the delays of the two countries, among others, in making annual quota payments to its budget: a problem still besetting the UN. Appeals for more realistic objectives, better performance, regular budget payments, fewer and more effective staff, characterize Canada's approach to the UN system during the early years of this period. Some ten years later, the situation had changed a great deal. The end of the Cold War, as exemplified by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the liberation of Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s, the successful conduct of disarmament negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union and its successor state, the emergence of the United States as the main world power and its growing interest in UN peacekeeping operations, all contributed to the UN's increasing assertiveness on the world stage. The rapid rise in the number of UN peacekeeping forces in various parts of the world recently provides a good example of growing UN authority and effectiveness. In 1987, the total number of peacekeepers was 9,800; by 1991, it had reached more than 90,000. As will be seen in the following documents, Canadian policy not only reflected this evolving situation, but was also instrumental in helping it along its way.

A. IMPROVING THE UN SYSTEM 1. Suggestions for Improving the UN's Performance Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Don Jamieson, to the UN General Assembly, New York, September 26,1977. (Extracts) Like others who will participate in this debate, I have received much advice on what I should say that might be helpful in solving the many problems we face. It has been a frustrating experience. 1

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I have concluded that I could read my last year's speech again, word for word, and no one would notice the repetition! The sad truth is that every serious issue I and many others raised last year remains unresolved, and some now pose a greater threat to peace and security than they did 12 months ago. It has not been a good year for the United Nations. Small wonder that our deliberations have so little relevance for our public back home or for the many millions round the world whom we are committed to help. I make these judgments with regret. No country has been more consistent than Canada in supporting the principles of the United Nations. We do not have to apologize for our record here or for the attitude of the Canadian people in accepting responsibilities for peacekeeping, for leadership in the "North-South dialogue" and for making a fair contribution to all UN initiatives. If we are to make progress here, there must be an end to the sterile debates of recent years where the outcome is always a foregone conclusion. If the vitality of open debate is not restored to the UN, then increasingly the important decisions will be made elsewhere. Two of the main issues that will come before us at this session are the situations in the Middle East and in southern Africa. Last year we passed 20 resolutions on the Middle East and no fewer that 34 on questions related to southern Africa. To what purpose was all that time and effort, not to mention money, expended? The answer is surely 'Very little," since many of those resolutions simply expressed moral judgments and were devoid of practical proposals for action. Moreover, everyone knew that they had little, if any, prospect of being implemented. Yet, the vast and increasingly expensive machinery of the UN ground on, not only through the 50-odd resolutions that I have mentioned, but through 200 more, many in the same category and thus destined to suffer the same fate. Already gathering dust is the 400page compendium of these resolutions, most echoing almost word for word the deliberations of previous years. Security Council: As a member of the Security Council about once each decade, Canada has accumulated some experience, but has also had a chance to take a fresh look at its activities every time we return. So far this year, the Council has debated several significant issues in a sensible, restrained fashion. None of us would claim, however, that it has done much to enhance its position as the UN organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. I propose that the Security Council begin meeting regularly at ministerial level. Fifteen ministers meeting together could give a new sense of life and political purpose to the Council. Instead of following a formal agenda, they could have a free discussion of major issues of international peace and security, based on a special report by the Secretary General. Such meetings should be held once or twice each year rather than once every 25 years. The

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first meeting might well be devoted to finding ways to make the Council more relevant to the major issues of peace and security. ECOSOC: When I spoke last year, I suggested that the Economic and Social Council should be given a more significant role. At its spring and summer sessions, that Council considers a bewildering variety of issues. It has even less success in what should be its central work—setting priorities and coordinating the work of the family of organizations in the economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields. My delegation believes the Council should have more frequent and shorter sessions. At each one of these it could deal thoroughly with one group of subjects covering all of its agenda over a two-year period. From time to time the Council should also meet at ministerial level. Specialized agencies: We must also work for an improvement in the work of the Specialized Agencies. Many of these have a distinguished record. But our method of controlling the system as a whole has been unsatisfactory. We have been good at devising new programmes, but less so at identifying ones that are obsolete or at preventing duplication. One result has been an escalation of costs, which have doubled recently in five years. A second problem has been the extent to which they have been turned from their main purpose to deal with the political issues that are the responsibility of the Assembly. Canada is determined to resist this process. We have been particularly concerned about the International Labour Organization (ILO). We value the ILO for its record of achievement on human rights and its contribution to the UN system as a whole. We are anxious to preserve the impartiality and authority of its procedures so that a member state will not be condemned without investigation. These proposals deal principally with improvements in our procedures. If implemented (and I am by no means sanguine that they will be) they would put us in a better position to deal with the important issues, but the complexity of the issues themselves will not be lessened. I have spoken critically of some aspects of our past performance and present practices. I have not done so out of any desire to weaken the organization but because Canada is convinced that, without a marked change of attitude on the part of members and without the reforms that are so clearly necessary, the erosion of the effectiveness of the United Nations will continue. 2. The UN System: the view in 1985 Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the Canadian UNICEF Committee, Toronto, June 22,1985. (Extracts) Canada is currently working to improve the effectiveness of the UN in the following ways: First, by supporting the Secretary General in his efforts to help to solve difficult political problems around the world, such as Cyprus, Iran/Iraq,

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Afghanistan and, most recently, the taking of hostages in Beirut. But his actions must support, and not be a substitute for actions by the Security Council. Second, by ensuring that multilateral negotiations and discussions, under the UN, spur on and complement bilateral efforts to make progress on nuclear issues and other vital questions of arms control and disarmament. Third, by improving the UN General Assembly's performance in its consideration of political issues. It cannot just be a safety valve to let governments blow off steam. We must ensure that the same ritualistic debates are not repeated each year. Fourth, by exposing irresponsible management wherever it appears in the UN system, including urgently UNESCO. We must not allow politicization to frustrate the UN's essential work.1 3. UN Reform: 1986 Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the UN General Assembly, New York, September 24,1986. (Extracts) When we gathered last year to celebrate the 40th Anniversary, a sad irony faced us. The United Nations was becoming more necessary and less effective. Who among us cannot list many issues that should be addressed and resolved here, but are not? We need reform on two fronts—financial and political. This Session starts its deliberations with the consideration of the Report of the Group of High Level Experts on the administration and finances of the UN. There are some recommendations with which Canada might quibble. But this is not the time for quibbling. The recommendations should be accepted without change and applied as soon as possible. They would reinforce the significant measures of financial reform already undertaken by the Secretary General. The key area that requires further discussion—the planning and budgetary process—is profoundly contentious. We are obviously divided, but we must find common ground. The budgets are swollen by the accumulation of outdated and misguided programmes. A thorough review would free resources for meeting needs that have long been relatively neglected, in particular the promotion of women and of human rights in general. We must also deal with the question of arrears and withholdings. At present, these amount to a total of $400 million. This shortfall has severely strapped the organization. A fixed schedule of repayment, allowing for some flexibility, would provide a solution to the arrears problem. But even more important is the question of withholdings which, as you know, threatens to cripple the organization financially this year. The adoption of the report of the Group of 18 and the settlement of arrears and withholdings would address half the problems. The other half is more basic.

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We are in danger of becoming a caricature of the hopes expressed in 1945. This was to be a forum in which difficult decisions were to be taken; it has become a means to avoid them. When there is a crisis, we have endless debate. When there is a need for hard compromise, we draft resolutions which defy agreement. The place to start is with administrative and financial reforms. Obviously, putting our house in order won't put the world in order, but it will protect and strengthen the only organization that can. Canada is a strong friend of the UN, but Canadians who are making sacrifices at home do not want to subsidize inefficiency here. None of us pretends that even a fully reformed UN will extinguish racism, unleash a global economic boom, or put an end to every regional conflict. Yet we all know the kinds of contributions that UN agreements can make to international peace, prosperity, and social advancement. Resolution 242 (on the Middle East), the Law of the Sea, and the declaration and covenants on human rights, are but three that come immediately to mind.

4. The UN in 1989 Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the United Nations Association, Toronto, January 30,1989. (Extracts) Support for the United Nations has not always been automatic or easy. Just a few years ago the UN seemed to be in disarray, if not in full retreat. It appeared unable to contribute to resolving regional disputes or to contribute to the resolution of the problem of excess armaments. Several areas of the UN family—notably UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and indeed the Secretariat generally—were becoming increasingly ineffective. A budgetary crisis loomed. We have pursued our reform agenda on four tracks: First, to address the UN budgetary crisis, we devised a comprehensive set of budgetary systems and procedures to improve budgetary and financial practices that promise the UN greater financial stability and monetary effectiveness. Second, through our membership in the Committee of Programme and Coordination, we have pressed for the adoption of new priority-setting and decision-making processes. Third, we have been instrumental in having ECOSOC take on a full review of UN activity in the social and economic areas, a review designed to result in more simplified and rationalized operations. Finally, we have taken the lead in the Specialized Agencies, such as UNESCO and the FAO to improve programmes, to control expenditures and to set new and effective direction to their activities.

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Canadian Foreign Policy 1977-1992

B. PEACEKEEPING Peacekeeping has long been one of the UN's major and more successful activities. Canada has taken part in peacekeeping exercises, whether under UN or other auspices, since the beginning of such activities in 1947. Some 80,000 Canadian soldiers and civilians have participated in these operations. On an average, over the years, Canada has provided about 10% of the UN's peacekeeping forces.2 The basic policy, that is, a willingness to provide personnel and equipment for peacekeeping purposes, has not changed. However, the objectives and emphasis have changed a good deal since 1977, especially since 1990, as the United Nations became increasingly assertive in the task of maintaining world peace following the end of the Cold War. Its growing role and influence are analysed in the immediately following document. However, as a result of operations in Somalia and ex-Yugoslavia, peacekeeping is now so complex militarily, burdensome financially, and overwrought politically, that a number of countries have been re-thinking their approach to the concept. 5. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding Statement to the HCSCEAIT, by the SSEA, Mrs. Barbara McDougall, Ottawa, February 17,1993. (Extracts) Canadians are the most experienced peacekeepers in the world. Since the first United Nations peacekeeping forces were sent out 45 years ago, our forces have always been in demand. Ten percent of all peacekeepers now on duty in the world are Canadian. Canadians have always seen peacekeeping as a reflection of Canadian values, as a way of promoting our international objectives—peace and security, respect for human rights and democratic freedoms, and a say in decisions that shape the world. The specific challenges that face us, however, have changed dramatically in the last five years. The end of the global Cold War has been followed by outbreaks of conflicts in many parts of the world. These conflicts are very different one from the other—just compare the situations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, for example—and the range of diplomatic and military tools needed to deal with them has correspondingly expanded. At the same time, the sheer volume of demand for international crisis management is now overwhelming. More such UN operations have been authorized in the last five years than in the previous forty. Partially as a way of sharing the burden, more and more regional organizations have also become involved such as the Organization of American States (OAS) in Haiti, the Commonwealth in South Africa, or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the European Community (EC), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in former Yugoslavia. There are

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many situations where traditional peacekeeping, based on the consent of all parties, will not lead to a resolution of the conflict. We are faced with situations where the consent of all parties cannot be obtained, or where effective authority does not in fact exist. The use of force has had to be considered more often, as other measures have failed. If you work closely with the UN, you cannot fail to observe the extreme pressure on the crisis management system, which has built up since its creation. This system threatens to become seriously overloaded, not just in terms of the management of all these crises, but also in terms of the personnel and financial resources needed to deal with them on the ground. The UN budget for peacekeeping operations jumped from $700 million in 1991 to $2,8 billion in 1992. Associated financial and personnel costs have begun to stretch the resources of even major powers. It is against this background that I would like to focus on six instruments for crisis management. These derive from \hzAgenda for Peace issued last summer by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. Taken together, they reflect a spectrum of ways to handle potential or actual conflict situations. At one end of the spectrum, we find preventive diplomacy: the attempt to head off the outbreak of hostilities by dealing with the underlying problems. It includes such measures as early-warning mechanisms to ensure that potential conflicts can be anticipated, perhaps in time to head them off; fact-finding missions and monitoring; confidence-building measures, such as mutual military inspections; warnings to potential combatants; sponsorship of consultations; and offers to mediate. Canada is already active in this area. In the former Yugoslavia, Canadians have taken part in a wide range of initiatives, including the EC-led CSCE monitoring mission, the Canadian-led CSCE fact-finding mission last June on the military situation in Kosovo and subsequent CSCE conflict-prevention missions in other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Canada also provided logistical and expert support to the fact-finding mission of the CSCE chairmanin-office to Nagorno-Karabakh, and will shortly be participating in the CSCE mission to Estonia. This is intended to stabilize relations between the Estonian majority and the large Russian minority in Estonia. A related option in the crisis management spectrum is preventive deployment or preventive peacekeeping. This involves the deployment of peacekeeping forces before hostilities break out for purposes such as the separation of forces, the observation of frontiers and the creation of demilitarized zones. A recent example is the UN decision to send such a force to the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. Canadians in the UN Protection Force II (UNPROFOR) were asked to establish this operation pending the arrival of a Scandinavian force.

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Canadian Foreign Policy 1977-1992

Next is peacemaking following the outbreak of conflict. This can include, for example, large-scale international peace negotiations like the ones in Cambodia, which resulted in the Paris accords of 1991. In this process, Canada chaired the key First Committee on Peacekeeping. Another example would be the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, co-chaired by the UN and the EC, in which Canada participated. Also included under peacemaking are indirect means of exerting pressure on recalcitrant parties, without actually engaging in military action. One well-known method is, of course, sanctions and embargoes. Canada has participated in the naval embargo on Iraq and supplied a ship last year to the Adriatic sanctions monitoring fleet organized by NATO. A Revenue Canada customs officer leads the mission in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, which is helping to implement sanctions on Serbia. Let me draw your attention to another such form of pressure: the establishment of an international court or tribunal for the consideration of criminal charges under international humanitarian law. Canada urged that this be set up to hear charges arising out of the situation in the former Yugoslavia. A team of war crimes investigators and a leading legal expert have been provided to the UN Commission of Experts that is compiling and analysing the evidence of atrocities. Peacekeeping, as generally understood, occurs in an environment where the parties to a dispute agree to a cessation of hostilities. This has been the case in Cyprus, the Golan Heights, and the first UNPROFOR operation in Croatia. Peacekeeping has evolved to incorporate objectives over and above supervising a cease-fire. In the case of Somalia, for instance, the initial goal was the protection of humanitarian assistance under conditions of on-going conflict. In El Salvador, in Central America, the peacekeeping mission was essentially political and human-rights related. There were at times more civilians and police officers in place than military. In Namibia, from 1989 to 1990, operations involved overseeing the creation of a new state and, in Cambodia, essentially managing the country while competing factions shift from military to political competition. We currently have 4,700 men and women with UN operations, plus RCMP and civilian personnel. Should peacemaking or peacekeeping fail, the fifth option is peace enforcement. Enforcement has been sanctioned by the UN under Chapter VII of the Charter only as a last resort—Korea, the Congo, the Gulf War, and Somalia being the main examples so far. Canada has taken part in these UN enforcement actions; our largest current contingent is in Somalia, where we have 1,300 military personnel. The main emphasis in Somalia, as in many enforcement actions, has been to establish a secure environment in which civil peace can be restored and humanitarian relief operations carried out. Enforcement has also been discussed in the case of former Yugoslavia.

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However, the situation there is radically different from that in Somalia and it is widely recognized (most recently by the new U.S. Administration) that imposing a political settlement by military force is unlikely to achieve a viable long-term solution. Finally, the UN Agenda for Peace raises the concept ofpeacebuilding. It is not always enough simply to end a conflict, whether by peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement. The society in question must often be assisted to heal itself and rebuild, whether in political, social, or economic terms. Some aspects are military, such as helping local armed forces to reshape for democratic conditions or clearing mines, which Canada is doing in Cambodia and the Iraq-Kuwait border area. More dramatic examples ofpeacebuilding involve long-term nation building as envisaged by the UN in Namibia and Cambodia, or in its original plan for Somalia. I am speaking here of measures that run the gamut from refugee relief to resettlement operations and from free elections to restoration of civil administration. Peace does not automatically continue once the troops leave, but it can be maintained if there is an opportunity for a better life. The idea that international security has roots in development and democracy has, of course, long been part of Canadian policy. Each of these options involves a different basic approach, different strengths and constraints, and different types and levels of resource commitment. Clarity of objective is fundamental. When we are contemplating action to handle a current or potential conflict, it is important to know whether we are sending troops for preventive deployment, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement. Each involves different risks and costs, training, equipment, and rules of engagement. This being said, real life is not political science. Realities on the ground rarely lend themselves to definitions as clear as the six foregoing options. Conditions in Bosnia, for example, have never been those of a classic peacekeeping operation and yet Canada is participating because the reality of human suffering is so compelling. As well, situations evolve. Somalia (like the Congo) began as a peacekeeping operation and moved to enforcement when that was judged necessary by the UN Security Council. Experience has made it clear that one kind of action used in isolation may well lead to partial, short-term, or ineffective conclusions. Canada has been peacekeeping in Cyprus for almost 30 years, without a political solution coming noticeably closer: peacekeeping has become a permanent fixture there rather than the means to an end. This is one reason for Canada's announcement that it would no longer contribute forces to this operation. Peacekeeping is not an end in itself. The international community is seeking new approaches to crisis management. We have at our disposal a full range of potential actions, but we need to apply them more coherently. Better early-warning mechanisms, triggering

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Canadian Foreign Policy 1977-1992

earlier international responses, should be a priority. In this context, we are addressing how Canada can best support and contribute to international efforts to prevent or resolve conflicts. For example: Are there ways in which we can help the international community to improve its early-warning capabilities? What are the most effective Canadian contributions? Should we be concentrating, for example, on military tasks or on civilian activities? Can we better assist the UN in efforts to strengthen its own crisis management capabilities? These are not theoretical questions. Our answers will affect the futures of men, women, and children around the world. Also, we must ensure that Canada's limited resources—political, diplomatic, civilian, and military— are used in the most effective way possible.

C. REGIONAL CONFLICTS An increasing number of regional conflicts has come to trouble world peace since 1977 such as Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Central America, Iran, Namibia and southern Africa, Somalia, the Gulf War, ex-Yugoslavia, in addition to the long-standing difficulties in the Middle East Canadian policy has invariably favoured constructive and peaceable measures to overcome such problems, either through the United Nations or such regional organizations as the Commonwealth and the Organization of American States. Where peacekeeping forces became necessary, Canada provided assistance, whether civilian or military, police or humanitarian, as required. In only one instance, documented below, did Canada act entirely on its own: the successful evacuation of American Embassy personnel, who had been given refuge in the Canadian Embassy in Teheran in 1979. It is not possible in a volume of this size to document Canadian involvement in all these operations. It is hoped that the following selection will provide a useful picture of the general approach. 6.

Afghanistan Communique issued by the SSEA, Ms. Flora MacDonald, Ottawa, December 28,1979. (Extracts) The Canadian Government was informed on December 27 by the Soviet Ambassador, acting on instructions from his government, that the Soviet Union had decided to send limited military contingents to Afghanistan to counter what are alleged to be continuing acts of external aggression against that country. The Canadian Government cannot accept the reasons cited by the Soviet Union for its military intervention. It can find no evidence for the contention that Afghanistan has been the object of external aggression.

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The situation in Afghanistan, in the view of the Canadian Government, is one of civil war based on the resistance of a substantial part of the Afghan population to the policies of a regime which seized power by means of a coup d'etat in April 1979 and whose tenure was marked by increasing internal dissent. The military intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan is therefore an intervention in a situation of internal conflict and not of external aggression. The Canadian Government accordingly rejects the view that the situation in Afghanistan is such as to justify action under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 7. Afghanistan and the Olympic Games of 1980 Statement by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, in the HC, April 22, 1980. (Extracts) The Soviet Union's move into Afghanistan at the turn of the year caught the world by shocked surprise. The depth of international opposition can be measured by the strength of the vote in the emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly called to deal with the question in early January: one hundred and four governments cast their votes in condemnation of the Soviet move. There has been broad agreement internationally that the Soviet action can only be met by concrete measures. These measures are not and cannot be uniform; nor can they secure the removal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. They do however reflect a full range of national reactions. For its part, and in full consultation with its allies and friends, Canada adopted a broad spectrum of measures under the previous government, which have been reaffirmed by the present government. Visits to the Soviet Union by ministers and high-level officials have been cancelled. Similarly, a wide range of exchanges in education, culture, and sport, along with a wide variety of exports of manufactured goods and agricultural products, have been halted. Thus, Canadians in a broad spectrum of fields of endeavour such as artists, sportsmen, farmers, academics, and businessmen, to name a few, have been called upon to make sacrifices. In the framework of the government's reaction to the invasion, one issue has remained undecided: participation in the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. The government believes that the international situation brought about by Soviet aggression makes it wholly inappropriate to hold the Olympics in Moscow. We have said from the beginning that an Olympic boycott would be advisable only if effective. Our policy therefore has been to work actively towards an effective boycott. In the course of the last several weeks, we have canvassed our friends in the western alliance and Third World states to determine whether a boycott of the Moscow Olympics would be an effective

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instrument of displaying our abhorrence of the actions of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The results of these consultations have convinced the government that the criteria for an effective boycott are now clearly present. I expect similar announcements of an effective boycott by other governments within the next few days. The Canadian Olympic Association has requested a firm indication of the government's position in the matter. The government has considered the situation thoroughly. We have decided that the circumstances leave us no choice but to urge the Canadian Olympic Association to inform the organizing committee for the 1980 Olympics that Canadian athletes will not be participating in the Games. Finally, we ask Canadian athletes and Canadians generally to support this important decision which has been taken in the national interest. We all recognize the sacrifice which this represents for our athletes who have trained so hard and for whom we have so much respect3 8. Iran Statement by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, to the HCSCEAND, Ottawa, June 10,1980. Canada deplores the detention, since November 4,1979, of 53 members of the United States embassy staff in Teheran. All Canadians were pleased that our officials were able to aid six of the U.S. Embassy personnel to leave Iran safely. Since that time, Canada has maintained no diplomatic staff in Iran. On April 22, the Government announced a number of measures taken by the EC countries, Australia, and Japan. On May 22,1 announced a full embargo on exports to Iran and introduced legislation into Parliament. This legislation, whose urgency should be recognized by all parties, will permit the enactment of other measures in the draft Security Council Resolution of January 10, dealing with sanctions. Again, this action will reinforce the decisions of the EC countries, Australia, and Japan. Canada has supported these actions against Iran because we believe that such violations of the basic conditions of peaceful intercourse between states cannot be sanctioned. At the same time, we recognize the complexity of the internal situation in Iran, in which the U.S. Embassy personnel are as much the hostages of internal factions manoeuvring for power as they are the hostages of the Iranian Government. This situation calls for patience. We shall continue to help in whatever way we can.

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SSEA Mark McGulgan {extreme left) with advisors attending a UN conference in 1981. (Courtesy Dr. McGuigan, Federal Court of Canada)

THE MIDDLE EAST A considerable breakthrough occurred in the long-standing conflict in the Middle East with the signing of an agreement in Washington, D.C., on September 13,1993, by the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization whereby each formally recognized the other and Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip and West Bank town of Jericho was sanctioned. Canada was present at the ceremony, in recognition of the continuing Canadian commitment to the pursuit of peace in the Middle East since 1948 and also because of active participation in the peace process which helped to lead to the agreement, as chair of the Working Group on Refugees in the Middle East. During the late 1970s and 1980s, however, the record was not nearly as smooth. Problems continued, despite the progress inherent in the Camp David Accords of September 1978 between Egypt and Israel, achieved under the direct auspices of President Jimmy Carter of the United States, whereby the Sinai Peninsula (occupied by Israel since the 1967 war) was returned to Egypt4

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Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and its troops reached Beirut after considerable fighting. When it withdrew from the area around Beirut, its armed forces remained in occupation of a buffer zone in southern Lebanon as a protective measure. The Arab economic boycott of Israel continued, indeed intensified, with consequent difficulties for Canadian companies, made more complex by the Progressive-Conservative Party's announcement during the election campaign of 1979 that, if elected, it would be prepared to move the Canadian Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Its change of position once in power is outlined below. Violence mounted as the 1980 decade advanced, particularly in the Gaza Strip, as manifested by the intifada. A state of constant and rising tension prevailed throughout the region, made even more critical by Iraq's missile attacks against Israel during the Gulf War and the PLO's decision to side with Iraq during those hostilities. The protagonists proclaimed their need, their desire for peace and stability, their yearning for an end to the violence. Yet peace remained elusive. Terrorism and retaliation intensified. As a Chinese sage might have put it: they were in the same bed, but were having different dreams. However that may be, a change of government in Israel in 1992, whereby a Labour coalition under Yitzhak Rabin replaced the less flexible Likud government of Yitzhak Shamir, set the stage for the beginnings of a settlement between the two. Nevertheless, the Middle East generally remains a problem area despite the recent progress between Israel and the PLO. There is considerable opposition from extremists, both within Israel and among Palestinians, to the arrangements regarding the Occupied Territories. Conditions in the whole region are far from settled and instability is widespread. The Islamic fundamentalist movement is gathering strength; rivalries among the Arab states continue. The future of an eventual Palestinian state; the problem of Iraq; the fate of the Kurds; the evolution of the situation in Iran; relations between Israel, Jordan, Syria, on the one hand, and their respective relations with the PLO, on the other, complicated by extremists on all sides, will bear close watching by the international community for some time to come. 9. Arab Economic Boycott of Israel Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Don Jamieson, at the Annual Policy Conference of the Canada/Israel Committee, Ottawa, February 14, 1979. (Extracts) I would like to begin with my statement of policy of October 21,1976.1 said then that the types of activity that the Government found unacceptable were those which would, in connection with any boycott,

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require a firm to engage in discrimination based on the race, national or ethnic origin or religion of any Canadian or other individual; refuse to purchase from or sell to any other Canadian firm; refuse to sell Canadian goods to any country; or refrain from purchases from any country. Over the past two years, I have been pleased with the widespread support this statement of principles has attracted. Nevertheless, it became apparent that there was public concern about its effectiveness in some areas. There were those who pointed out that the policy as originally announced called for reporting all boycott requests. As a result of useful consultations, the Government's policy was modified and, I believe, considerably improved. As announced last August: (1) Negative certificates of origin (for example, that goods being supplied were not of Israeli origin) are no longer acceptable under Canadian policy; (2) Statements of fact (for example, that a company does not trade with Israel) must be accompanied by a statement in the contract—or whatever document the statement of fact appeared in— confirming the company's intention to abide by Canadian policy; (3) The Government will enact legislation to require compulsory reporting of all boycott requests. This is an important step, and brings implementation in line with my statement of policy of October 1976. I think that Canadian policy on international economic boycotts stands as a good example for other countries. And I think that the legislation on the boycott, covering as it does the question of reporting boycott requests, benefits all concerned with the Arab boycott of Israel.

10. Proposed Move of the Canadian Embassy to Jerusalem Comments on Jerusalem by the SSEA, Ms. Flora MacDonald, Ottawa, June 7,1979. During the recent election campaign, my party stated that it would be prepared to move the Canadian Embassy from Tel Aviv to the western part of Jerusalem. That statement stands and there is no intention to go back on it. The statement has prompted a good deal of comment and questions and continues to do so. I believe it would be useful if I were to put it in its proper perspective. Let me say that we are not working to any deadlines. There are a number of high priority issues on which the Government will want to concentrate in the next few weeks and months. The timing of what we contemplate will be determined by recommendations we have asked officials to make on what other policies will be necessary to bring our goal within reach of achievement. In the course of our analysis, it is clear that a number of considerations will have to be taken into account. As the Prime Minister has already

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indicated, one such consideration will be the views expressed to us by friendly countries, including those in the Arab world. Another will be any possible impact on Canada's role as a peacekeeper, to which my party has always attached the very greatest importance. Our goal, as is implicit in Mr. Clark's original statement of April 15, is not simply to settle the question of Jerusalem as far as Canada is concerned but to contribute, if we can, to a broader resolution of this most sensitive of the outstanding issues between Israel and the Arab countries. Our intention, then, is to explore the best circumstances in which to bring our stated plans into effect. This is going to involve analysis and consultation. We do not have it in mind to act either precipitately or without deliberation. When we have arrived at our conclusions, the Government will indicate to the Canadian public and to Parliament how it will move ahead on the undertaking that has been made.5 11. Canada's Views on the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon Statement by the Canadian delegate, Mr. Michael Kergin, to the Seventh Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assemblyf New York, June 26,1982. (Extracts) Canada views the present hostilities in Lebanon with profound sadness. We should not minimize the complexities of the situation; we recognize that Lebanon is an integral part of a region which itself is in the grip of a longstanding conflict. We are not confident that Lebanon can emerge completely from its present anguish unless wider issues in the Arab/Israeli dispute and the problems of the Palestinians are addressed and resolved. Canada has spoken out on the recent events in Lebanon. On June 9, the Canadian Prime Minister, in a public message to the Prime Minister of Israel, said the following: With Israeli air-raids in Lebanon and rocket attacks on Northern Israel already in progress, my letter to you on June 5 counselled restraint to avoid the dangers that further military action would bring. In that same letter I said that we deplored and condemned as heinous crimes acts of terrorism against targets in Israel and elsewhere; but I also said that it was important to avoid actions which fuel rather than dampen the flames of violence and hatred in the Middle East. I am dismayed by the subsequent escalation of the conflict represented by the massive movement of Israeli forces into Lebanon. Great human suffering is being caused; and the rapid northward expansion of Israeli operations is posing an increasing risk of a wider war. We, in Canada, understand your natural concern for Israeli lives in the Galilee, and believe that acts of violence against Israel and its citizens, as well as against all others in the area, must cease. But we cannot accept the proposition that the present military activities are justified or that they will provide the long-term security which

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you seek for the Israeli people. I appeal to you to respond favourably to the unanimous Security Council resolution by agreeing to a cease-fire and withdrawing immediately and unconditionally from Lebanese territory so that the difficult but necessary task of working for reconciliation in the area can begin again. In the present critical and rapidly evolving situation in the Middle East, my delegation calls on all parties to exercise maximum restraint in their actions to prevent further deterioration or widening of this conflict.

12. Official Contacts with the PLO Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, Ottawa, March 30,1989. (Extracts) We have come to certain conclusions in this matter, in accordance with the objectives of Canadian governments over the years. The fundamental principles have long been: Support for the security, well-being, and rights of Israel as a legitimate, independent state in the Middle East; Support for a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement based on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories as enunciated in Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967; Recognition that for there to be a just peace, the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be realized, including their right to play a full part in determining their future; Insistence that for the PLO to play a role in Middle East peace negotiations, it must accept Israel's right to exist within secure and recognized boundaries. Over the past year and a half, developments in the Middle East have altered Israel's assumptions about the nature of the peace process. The intifada in the Occupied Territories has demonstrated that Palestinian nationalism is a reality that must be taken into account. King Hussein's recent withdrawal from Jordan's former responsibilities for the West Bank acknowledged this fact and served notice that Jordan would no longer speak for the Palestinians. In recent months, constructive and helpful statements by the Palestinian National Council and by Chairman Arafat have addressed some of the basic Canadian concerns about the PLO. I welcomed these developments at the time. After careful consideration, we have concluded that the changes in PLO positions largely addressed the reservations that Canada has expressed. We have therefore decided to lift as of today our existing restrictions on contacts with representatives of the PLO. This action will allow us to continue to encourage constructive actions by the PLO. I want to take this occasion to reiterate that Canada does not recognize the Palestinian state proclaimed last November. However, the proclamation of a state does cast a different

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light on the question of Palestinian self-determination. Canada has long accepted the right and need for Palestinians to play a full part in negotiations to determine their future. We have been concerned that the phrase "self-determination" was being used as a code-word for an independent state and that Canadian endorsement of the principle would be interpreted as Canadian advocacy of an independent state. That interpretation is no longer possible, because an independent Palestinian state has been declared, and not recognized by Canada. That allows Canada to endorse the principle that the Palestinians have the right to self-determination in accordance with the International Human Rights Covenants. That right must be exercised through peace negotiations in which the Palestinians play a full part. These negotiations may lead to an independent state, or to a federation with an existing state, or to some other result. The Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations will meet with a representative of the PLO mission to the United Nations. Other contacts will take place elsewhere as appropriate, as a part of the ongoing pursuit of Canadian foreign policy objectives.6 13. The Gulf Wan the effect of sanctions on Iraq Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, before the HC SCEAIT, Ottawa, December 10,1990. (Extracts) Sanctions are one part of a concerted world policy, working through the United Nations, to cause Iraq to withdraw peacefully from Kuwait. Other measures include the presence in the Gulf of military forces from 29 countries. They also include Security Council Resolution 678, adopted a week ago today, which combines the authorization of force with what Mr. Gorbachev calls "a pause of goodwill" to allow time and incentive for a peaceful solution. In addition, several countries, including Canada, are pursuing initiatives to resolve this crisis peacefully and to prepare for the challenges of the postcrisis period. Different elements of this concerted policy support one another. For example, one important reason sanctions work against Iraq is because the naval blockade allows enforcement. As of December 3, Canadian ships alone had intercepted 1,085 vessels in the Gulf and boarded nine to help to maintain the naval embargo. Sanctions are of course notoriously hard to have respected and, so far, the Iraq embargo has been one of the most successful the world has known. But all our evidence is that it has been more successful on the outside than on the inside. Iraq has diverted the effects of sanctions away from its military capacity and its political leaders. There is no evidence that sanctions are persuading Iraq to comply with the Security Council resolutions and withdraw from Kuwait. The question is now whether the combination of sanctions, plus the authorization of force, can lead together to a peaceful solution. We believe

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that this combination offers the best prospect for a peaceful withdrawal from Kuwait. To save time I will circulate, but not read, information available to Canada, and which we believe to be reliable, respecting the effect of sanctions on particular sectors of the Iraqi economy and society.7 What has been the result of the collective decision to impose economic sanctions on Iraq? Sanctions are, unquestionably, having an impact on economic conditions and living standards within Iraq. But there is no evidence that they have caused the Government of Iraq to have a change of heart regarding Kuwait. There is no reason to believe that sanctions alone are going to bring the Iraqi economy to its knees or be sufficient in and of themselves to force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait All the available evidence suggests that it would be a considerable time before sanctions had a truly decisive effect on Iraq's economy and military machine. Iraq's trade links have been severed. Its funds abroad have been frozen. Iraqi and stolen Kuwaiti vessels and aircraft have been denied port and airport facilities. The only authorized exceptions to the sanctions are for the import of medical supplies and, in humanitarian circumstances, for foodstuffs delivered through appropriate humanitarian agencies, as well as the transport of released hostages. All Iraqi government assets are frozen. Financial transfers are prohibited. Trade with Iraq and occupied Kuwait is banned and all permits to export controlled goods to Iraq and Kuwait remain suspended. Canadian exporters have suffered considerable losses, particularly grain exporters, since Iraq was Canada's fourth largest market for grain. An air embargo is in place for Iraqi aircraft. Exceptions have been made for humanitarian reasons on several occasions, for example, refuelling of Iraqi aircraft carrying freed hostages. Effective enforcement measures are being taken by Canadian enforcement agencies, including the RCMP and Revenue Canada Customs and Excise. Close international cooperation is being maintained. To date, no violations have been reported in Canada and no prosecutions are pending. A committee of the Security Council, co-chaired by Finland and Canada, monitors implementation of the sanctions. The question that has been repeatedly asked is: "Why don't we simply wait until sanctions force Saddam Hussein to withdraw?" That question involves two assumptions: first, that sanctions will ultimately work; and second, that time is neutral, and that nothing else will happen while we wait. Time is not neutral, and not cost-free. Every day the sacking of Kuwait continues. Time is not neutral for the people of Iraq. Saddam Hussein is not noted for his compassion towards his

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own people. The economic impact of uncertainty, and high oil prices, is costly everywhere, including Eastern and Central Europe where it threatens economic reform, but its impact is most cruel on the developing world. Finally, this is the most volatile and heavily-armed region in the world. An accident could trigger a tragedy. Sanctions, in sum, are necessary but not sufficient to meet our declared objective: the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of its sovereignty and legitimate government. Now is the time for resolve. Collective action stopped Iraqi aggression at the Saudi border. The Government intends to hold to the full range of policies which we have helped to fashion in the Security Council. A comprehensive approach based on all the UN resolutions, including Resolution 678, represents the best hope of a peaceful outcome to this crisis.8

CENTRAL AMERICA The situation in Central America became quite messy during the 1980s as hostilities mounted in El Salvador and Nicaragua, especially, but also in Guatemala, involving neighbouring states in the turmoil malgr£ eux. Central America also became enmeshed in East-West rivalries with Cuban, Soviet, and United States participation in one way or another. The situation improved considerably with the end of the Cold War as the decade closed. The Canadian public reacted vigorously and pointedly to the widespread and tragic human rights violations occurring almost daily among the protagonists. Canada played an important role in the crisis, mainly behind the scenes. Also Canadian observers were sent to the area on several occasions to participate in the supervision of elections in El Salvador and Guatemala, for instance. While the UN was less involved in Central America than in other regional conflicts, the subject is included here because of its topicality; it was one of the most prominent and absorbing conflicts of the 1980s. 14. Central America and Canadian Foreign Policy Address by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, to the University of Toronto Law Faculty, Toronto, March 31,1982. (Extracts) I would like to address certain aspects of Canadian policy, in particular towards El Salvador. Before doing this, I want to make some general remarks about the legal and international setting in which events in Central America are unfolding. International law is not comfortable in dealing with the sort of situation in Central America today. The various international instruments, and the United Nations Charter itself, provide the clearest guidance when dealing with threats on the use of force by one sovereignty against another. International

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law makes clear distinctions in this regard between civil wars and international wars. International law is most difficult to apply, and unclear, in situations where armed political violence takes place within the borders of a single state, but which involves outside powers in the conflict. Under these circumstances, international law tends to become the ally of both sides to any dispute. It may also cease to be law. It becomes part of the rhetoric used by each side to bolster its case both domestically and internationally; in other words, it becomes an instrument of public opinion. I believe that we have to have clearer international norms and workable international machinery to deal with current circumstances. To take one key challenge: Can international law and international institutions contribute to preventing the spread of East-West rivalries into the Third World? Central America is a case in point. Canada takes Soviet expansionism in the Third World and in this hemisphere very seriously. However, we are realistic enough not to be surprised that East-West rivalries see targets of opportunity in unstable Third World situations, particularly situations of extremes where the grinding poverty of the many is co-located with the extreme wealth of the few. In many parts of Central America, and particularly in El Salvador, we see widespread violations of elementary human rights, atrocities, torture, massacres, and murder on an appalling scale. The Canadian government continues to protest against this wave of violence. But we cannot understand political terror in Central America, nor hope to resolve it simply by blaming a clash of ideologies or great power interests. Here to me is the crux of the problem. Instability in Central America is not a product of East-West rivalry, it is a product of poverty, the unfair distribution of wealth, and social injustice/Instability feeds on poverty and injustice. East-West rivalries flow in its wake. I believe that the states in Central America have the right to choose to follow whatever ideological path their peoples decide. I do not believe that when a country chooses a Socialist or even Marxist path, it necessarily buys a "package" which automatically injects it into the Soviet orbit. This, I think, is where our views and those of the United States may diverge. The internal systems adopted by countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, whatever these systems may be, do not in themselves pose a security threat in this hemisphere. Canada has adopted a flexible approach in this regard. For example, we have not shifted our aid programmes or our support because a regime has moved to the left in internal affairs. To give another example, Canada continued aid to Cuba up until the point when Cuba decided it could afford the luxury of despatching expeditionary forces to Africa. Clearly, it then had no more need for Canadian aid, given its new priorities. Consequently we stopped our aid.

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What the Canadian government is saying is this. Let countries choose their own paths for their own development. If they keep their social and humanitarian obligations to their people in the forefront of their actions, they will have Canada's help. But, if their priorities are such that they put a premium on destabilizing their neighbours or using their territory to inject East-West rivalries into the region, they must be viewed as detracting from the security of the hemisphere. The current focus of world attention in Central America is the conflict in El Salvador. One of the focal points of the crisis in El Salvador had been the determination of the Duarte government to hold elections for a constituent assembly. These elections were held three days ago. Perhaps now is the appropriate time to review the Canadian government's position, its actions, and to make several remarks on possible directions in the future. First of all, what has Canada done to promote a peaceful solution to the conflict? I met twice with representatives of the revolutionary leadership to urge negotiations with a view to a democratic solution. I offered Canada's good offices to provide a site in Canada or abroad at a Canadian Embassy for such negotiations. These offers were rejected. They preferred direct access to power, whether through negotiations or by force of arms. Canada continues to favour a peaceful settlement brought about by the Salvadoreans themselves. We are ready to seize any opportunity to play a constructive role with the agreement of all the parties concerned. Second, Canada has announced greatly increased aid levels, over half a billion dollars, for the Caribbean Basin countries. This reflects our conviction that the answer to tension there is social and economic development rather than the force of arms. Within a greatly expanded aid programme to Central America Canada will consider restoring bilateral aid to El Salvador if conditions there permit. With regard to aid to Nicaragua, we have clearly expressed to the Nicaraguan government our concern at what may be a growing tendency by them to depart from their own stated principles of political pluralism and non-intervention in the affairs of other countries. What, in Canada's view, would represent the principles which should govern a wider solution to conflict in the region? These should include: First, recognition that the problems of the regions are rooted in social and economic conditions; Second, the urgent need to foster economic growth and social reform, the benefits of which must be distributed more widely amongst the population. That is the heart of the problem; Third, the right of each country to enjoy genuine independence, nonalignment, .and stability without the threat of outside interference; Fourth, a recognition of hemispheric security needs and agreement to exclude the introduction of expeditionary forces and offensive weapons.

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The challenge is to produce the outlines of a solution in Central America which is acceptable to the countries of the region and to all those who share an interest in pluralism and human rights. 15. Canadian Support for Peace Process in Central America Press release by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, Ottawa, August 5,1987. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, sent—on August 4—a special message to the Central American foreign ministers. It conveyed Canada's support for the Costa Rican peace initiative and for Latin American efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the crisis in Central America. The text is as follows (extracts): The main item on the agenda of your meeting, August 6-7, in Guatemala, will be the peace plan proposed by President Arias of Costa Rica. In your discussion of this proposal, the Government of Canada supports your efforts to find common ground and the necessary collective political will that is required if there is to be progress. We have no illusions that an agreement will be easily reached. However, we hope that the enormity of the challenge will not dissuade you from meeting and that this initiative can serve to revitalize the process of dialogue. President Arias has made clear that his proposal falls within the spirit and framework of the Contadora process, which Canada has long supported as the most appropriate vehicle for a peaceful settlement in the region.9 16. Canadian Initiatives in Central America Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the HC, December 2,1987. (Extracts) I want to report to the House on my conversations and meetings last week in Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica and, in particular, to discuss the peace process agreed unanimously by the five Central American presidents during their August meeting in Esquipulas. That agreement seeks to achieve "the climate of liberty that democracy ensures" and it sets forth the conditions with which all five governments must comply. Two characteristics invest this agreement: it is unanimous and it is indigenous. It is my impression, after talking to each president, that all intend to keep the word they gave. Canada's interest and involvement in Central America is relatively recent, but our standing is high. Over the last five years, we have tripled our bilateral aid to over $105 million and, on a per capita basis, our aid to Central America is second only to what we do in the Caribbean. In that period, total direct Canadian assistance amounted to nearly $170 million, including support for Canadian non-governmental organizations active throughout the region. Obviously, another question in Canada concerns the public position we should take regarding support by the United States of the contras, and the

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support of the Soviet Union and Cuba for the Sandinista government and guerrilla activity in El Salvador. We oppose third-party intervention in Central America, whatever the source, and have made that position clear to both superpowers. Some Canadians argue sincerely that our Central American policy should concentrate more on public criticism of the United States. I believe that such a policy would reduce, and not increase, whatever real influence we might have in Washington on this question. It could, in addition, impede our ability to play other more active roles in support of the peace plan. The five governments of Central America are in no doubt about the difference between Canadian and U.S. policy, and our conduct should be guided by what makes us most effective in Central America itself. I expressed at the outset my views of the importance of creating an active, informed, and dispassionate Canadian public opinion, whose interest and judgment might encourage compliance with the peace plan. I think it appropriate that the House of Commons pursue more formally the interest that several individual Members have already shown in the region and peace process. At the Government's request, House Leaders have begun discussions on the appropriate parliamentary committee to allow this House to monitor and encourage the peace process in Central America. 17. Report of the Special Committee of HC on Central America Response of the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the report of the HC Special Committee, September 26,1988. (Extracts) Summary: The report's principal recommendations concern Canadian support for verification and control measures for the peace process, contributions to and support for human rights and democratic development, economic and humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic representation in the area. Included in the Government's response was a commitment to increase, substantially over the next six years, funding for economic development and reconstruction. (Italics in the original). Mr. Clark expressed the Government's agreement with the main thrust of the report including most of its recommendations. On verification and control measures for the peace accord, Canada remains ready to participate in the Auxiliary Technical Group for the design of appropriate peacekeeping mechanisms. Turning to human rights and democratic government, it should be noted that no outside government has been asked to involve itself in the political aspects of the negotiations. If asked, Canada would consider offering technical assistance requested by the Five, for example, for the more effective cooperation of the National Reconciliation Commissions. We would also agree, if requested, that Canada should offer assistance in the development of institutions and conditions which will guarantee human rights: that is,

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technical assistance for the judiciary; advice on the administration of elections; technical assistance to auditors. One of the principal themes of the Committee's report is the central importance of economic development. The Government fully supports this view. Since the early 1980s Canada has substantially increased economic assistance to the region. We have played an important role multilaterally in focusing the attention of the international community on the need for both more effective coordination of and clearer priorities for economic assistance and for extraordinary additional help for economic reconstruction. We have responded consistently and generously to the plight of thousands of refugees and displaced persons through contributions to the UN High Commission for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as admitting to Canada almost 21,000 Central American refugees over the last five years. The Government accepts the Committee's recommendation that $100 million, in addition to currently planned expenditures, be allocated to assist Central American reconstruction and economic development We will make the commitment for the six-year period: 1988-1994. The full implementation of this commitment could, of course, be affected by developments in the peace process. Finally, we agree with the Committee on the need to strengthen diplomatic representation in the region. By this autumn, we will have opened aid offices in Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These offices, in conjunction with our Embassies in Costa Rica, Guatemala, will ensure that our aid programme will have a physical presence in all countries in the region. In addition, honourary consuls have recently been approved for Tegucigalpa and Managua, and a recommendation has been made for an honourary consul in San Salvador. The recommendation to open miniembassies in Managua, San Salvador, and Tegucigalpa cannot, however, be endorsed at this time in view of personnel and financial resource constraints. The work of the Special Committee and its visit to the region took place at a time when the peace movement had greater vitality and better shortterm prospects than it does now. Since then, the Sandinista-con/ra talks have stalled. There has been an escalation in tensions between Managua and Washington and between Honduras and Nicaragua. Sadly, the last meeting of Central American foreign ministers broke down at the end of June and no agreement was reached to proceed with verification and control. This does not in any way invalidate the work of the Special Committee, since its task was to see how Canada could continue to promote the peace process. Many observers have already dismissed the current negotiation process as moribund. Since the inception of the Contadora movement over five years ago, on many occasions, the peace process has been pronounced

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dead. In spite of their differences, however, I think that all five countries of Central America still share a unity of purpose in their desire for peace. It is significant that no party has renounced the process.

D. HUMAN RIGHTS The subject of human rights has always been an important aspect of Canadian foreign policy, going back to the late 1940s, when Canada was an active contributor to the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved by the UN General Assembly in 1948. Canada also participated vigorously in the meetings of the CSCE, which began in 1973, at Helsinki.10 The subject achieved even greater prominence in Canada's external relations during the last 15 years. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, fighting in Central America, mounting opposition to apartheid in South Africa, events in Iran, the Gulf War, all contributed to bringing the Canadian public more widely and actively into the picture. Both Liberal and Conservative governments during the period under study reflected public opinion and Canadian foreign policy was uniform in its stand against human rights violations throughout the world. There were, however, differences of emphasis. The Conservatives tended, somewhat more than the Liberals, to stress the need for real improvement in the position of women as an objective of Canadian foreign policy, especially aid policy in the Third World. In addition, towards the end of the 1980s, the Mulroney government began to link Canadian aid programmes abroad with "good governance" and improved records in the field of human rights generally. 18. Canada and International Human Rights Address by the SSEA, Mr. Don Jamieson, to a joint meeting of the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, the Canadian Council on International Law, and the Canadian Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Ottawa, October 26,1977. (Extracts) Canada has been active over the years in supporting the development of international norms of human rights and is now encouraging broad adherence to them. We also support the development of standards in fields not yet dealt with: the elimination of religious intolerance, the elimination of torture, and the promotion of the status of women. In the long run, the most effective means of promoting human rights internationally on a broad basis will lie through multilateral action under UN auspices. Canada has been trying to expand UN mechanisms and to make them more effective. We believe that UN action should be taken almost automatically, on the basis of a sound analysis of information received regarding violations of human rights in given countries.

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Over the past decade, the UN's performance in dealing with gross abuses of human rights has been dismal. There has been a lack of common will to take action in many serious situations. Action has been taken only in a few situations where the UN majority considered that the political situation as well as the human rights situation warranted action. How should the government intercede when human rights are violated in other countries. The question is not easily answered. No country has an unblemished human-rights record. As a priority, we must seek international action and consider bilateral action when there is reliable evidence that the grossest human-rights violations are systematically perpetrated, for instance, genocide, mass murder, and widespread repression. Apart from these extreme cases, there is also a place for Canadian action in serious human-rights situations of direct concern to Canadians. A careful judgment must be made as to the results that can be achieved. In some instances, a bilateral expression of Canadian concern may bring about positive change; in others it may cause a negative reaction. At times, it is useful to make public the fact that we have interceded with a government. At others, it is counter-productive. We have had some limited success I might note in dealing bilaterally, and in the context of the Final Act of the CSCE, with Eastern European countries in humanitarian matters relating to the reunification of families. On the other hand, our efforts on broader human-rights issues, when dealt with bilaterally or within the CSCE, have met with minimal success. Action in the United Nations cannot be divorced from action outside the UN. Canada's relations with some countries are limited or, indeed, non-existent and there are therefore few possibilities for quiet diplomacy. I have in mind the cases of Uganda and Cambodia. We are keeping a close watch on these and, as a member of the UN Human Rights Commission, will continue to seek a full investigation and corrective interim measures. The Canadian Government, with strong support from the Canadian people, has always played a full part in contributing to international emergencyrelief operations. It has supported the efforts of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to bring about the resettlement of refugees. Since the Second World War, Canada has resettled more than 350,000 of these persecuted and displaced persons. Canadians often complain to me that the government is not doing enough to help individuals in countries where they have relatives or friends. They frequently call upon the government to cut all existing ties—economic, cultural, political—with the country in question. Generally speaking, this is not desirable. To attempt to make any impression bilaterally on the attitudes of other governments we must be able to exert influence. We cannot do so by rhetoric alone. We can sometimes do so more effectively by making use of existing ties.

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Our development-assistance programme is designed to help to meet the basic human needs of the poorest people in the poorest countries. Those living in countries whose human-rights standards are low are usually helpless to change the situation or regime that governs them. Our programme is, therefore, governed by humanitarian and developmental criteria. Humanrights considerations are, nonetheless, a factor in determining levels of aid and the orientation of programmes. We must also consider in each case whether a country with an extremely poor record in terms of human rights has the will or is in a position to implement aid programmes in accordance with Canadian objectives. Thus, on a few occasions when the human-rights situation in a country has deteriorated to a stage where the effective implementation of the aid programme is made extremely difficult, Canadian assistance has been suspended or not renewed. I turn now to the question of trade and trade-related operations of the Canadian Government. In considering the impact human-rights considerations can have on these, it is important to recall that Canada is a trading nation. The economic welfare of our own citizens is at stake. For this the Canadian Government has not traditionally used unilateral economic measures as a tool to put pressure on a given country. Our policy takes into account not only the economic interests of Canadians, but also the fact that in few countries is Canadian trade critical to the regime. Therefore, Canada trades in peaceful goods with all countries, except any against which the UN Security Council has imposed sanctions. Human-rights considerations do not enter into the question of Canadian arms sales. We do not export arms, either to countries where there is an immediate threat of hostilities or to regimes considered wholly repugnant to Canadian values. This is especially true where the equipment in question could be used against civilians. Last December, the government announced that we were phasing out our government-supported commercial activities in South Africa, withdrawing our trade commissioners from South Africa, and instituting visa requirements for South Africans. We were, furthermore, in consultation with Canadian corporations, drawing up a code of conduct to govern the activities of Canadian interests operating in South Africa. It was an exceptional decision and one taken after many years of consideration. South Africa is a case unique in the present-day world. It is the single country in which racial discrimination has been institutionalized as a basis for the entire social, political and economic system. For more than 30 years, the UN has been attempting to persuade the recalcitrant government of South Africa to accord its citizens rights, privileges, and responsibilities without distinction of race. The international community as a whole has come to conclude that both multilateral and unilateral measures against South Africa are desirable. The intent is to increase pressure on the government of South Africa to change its policies.

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I have described an international-human rights situation that at present is difficult and trying. I have, I hope, clearly indicated that the Canadian Government is very much concerned about this situation and is using its best efforts, both multilaterally and bilaterally, to alleviate difficult situations wherever they occur. 19. Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy Speech by the Minister for External Relations, Mr. Jean-Luc Pepin, to the Seventh Annual Conference on Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy, Canadian Human Rights Foundation, Ottawa, March 26,1984. (Extracts) This year, Canada will be completing a series of three successive terms—a total of nine years—of membership on the UN Commission for Human Rights. It is mainly in this Commission that agreement must be reached on the definition of international standards in human rights, and where new ways of encouraging the practical attainment of these standards must be developed. During these nine years, Canada has been among the most active members of the Commission. What has Canada been able to achieve in the Commission over our years of membership? This year, for instance, the Commission produced a draft Convention on Torture, which has been high among Canada's objectives and to which our delegations devoted much effort. As a result of a Canadian initiative, the Commission will annually receive and consider a report on possible human-rights implications of states of siege or emergency which may exist in various countries. Canada has supported proposals which have strengthened the continuing operations of the Commission in the field of Disappearances and Summary Executions. Canada successfully launched initiatives in the Commission regarding Prisoners of Conscience and on the rights of the Disabled and obtained a general consensus of support for continuing efforts to improve ways to deal with and, if possible, to prevent mass exoduses of people from any state as a result of violations of human rights. Looking back now over the past nine years, I think that Canada can be proud of what it has been able to contribute to advancing human rights through the work of the Commission. Much of our contribution has been a multitude of small efforts to improve the operation of some procedure or to make some resolution a little less political and more constructive in keeping with our general belief that these matters are best pursued in a moderate, balanced, and constructive fashion, with a force that draws its strength from basic humanitarian convictions rather than political ideology.

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One of the main ideas Canada has promoted in these nine years is the thematic approach to human rights violations, an approach which deals with particular types of violations on a global basis. This approach, with its initial focus on sin rather than the sinner, has undoubtedly led to a more reasonable and comprehensive examination of such difficult matters as "summary executions" and "disappearances" that would not have been possible if cases had been raised separately with regard to particular tastes. In addition to its continuing activity in multilateral forums, Canada has also been expanding and consolidating its efforts to give full expression to human-rights factors in its bilateral relations with other states. It has, for some time, been established practice for Canadian diplomatic missions abroad to keep abreast of the human-rights situation in the countries to which they are accredited, and to report regularly to Ottawa on any significant developments. It has been our objective to integrate human rights into our whole system of relationships. In our bilateral relations, our main efforts continue to be persistent expression, most often privately, of Canadian concern over particular cases in which individuals may be subjected to abuse. A typical case would be one in which one of our embassies is asked to make enquiries of the host government about the condition of some prisoner detained for what we consider political rather than criminal reasons. Such enquiries will be made on simple humanitarian grounds, because Canada has some more specific interest arising, for example, from the concern of relatives living here or from publicity generated by concerned non-governmental organizations. Cases of particular significance may be raised in private talks by Canadian ministers and their foreign counterparts on the occasion of visits. It is hard to assess the precise effects of this rather "quiet diplomacy," but I know that it produces results in many cases and that over time it serves to keep the government concerned fully aware of Canadian views. The government is often told to limit development assistance to those developing countries in which the human-rights situation gives cause for concern. We resist the invitation most of the time. By decreasing our bilateral assistance to express displeasure with the conduct of existing regimes, we might well indeed be prolonging or even adding to the hardship of the people we seek to assist But there are times when we feel compelled to suspend our bilateral assistance, as was done most recently in the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador. Similar considerations must apply to Canada's voting for or against development programmes and projects of the World Bank or other international development and financial institutions, with the added consideration that these organizations are generally bound by their charters to consider only economic and technical, not political criteria. It has been our policy to respect that rule, sometimes with regret, and with the consolation that projects can take a long time to become realities, time which may allow for

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behavioural changes prompted by other or internal influences. I think we must continue to follow this policy, if only to keep the international institutions from becoming battlegrounds for conflicting political pressures.11 20. Democracy and Respect for Human Rights: Good Governance Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities: 1991-92. Update. Booklet issued by DEA, Ottawa. (Extracts) Summary: Encourage respect for human rights, the rule of law, and fundamental democratic principles; Encourage good governance and sound economic policies in partner countries; Maintain commitment to policies aimed at poverty reduction; Retain a strong and active commitment to humanitarian assistance. The values of democracy and respect for human rights have triumphed not only in the revolutionary transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, but also in the more evolutionary process of democratic change in much of the developing world. The increasing acceptance of these values by people around the globe is a strong endorsement of the fundamental values which have driven Canada's foreign policy for the past 50 years. A new and hopeful international consensus is building: a consensus that may be the finest legacy of the 20th Century—a consensus of democratic, universal human rights. Our foreign policy, including development assistance, should continue to make clear our abiding commitment to respect human rights, the rule of law, and economic and political freedom. Sustainable economic growth, led by the private sector, is necessary for all societies to improve the quality of their citizens. Economic conditionality will remain central to evaluating requests for official development assistance and debt relief, with ongoing consultations among donor countries on how this can be best achieved. Good governance considerations must also play a role in allocating development assistance. Good governance includes: respect for human rights, democratic development, probity in government, basic social programmes accorded priority, poverty alleviation, acceptable levels of defence spending, and market-based economies.12 21. Le Statut de la Femme et les Droits de la Personne Allocution prononc£e par le PM, M. Brian Mulroneyf le 19 novembre 1991, lors du Sommet de la Francophonie, Palais de Chaillot, Paris. (Extraits) Nous presenterons aussi un projet visant a combattre les injustices et eliminer les obstacles que rencontrent encore trop de femmes dans le monde.

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Les femmes, par exemple, forment la moitié de la population mondiale, mais elles fournissent les deux-tiers des heures de travail. Elles produisent la moitié de la nourriture de la planète, mais ne reçoivent qu'un dixième de la rémunération et ne possèdent qu'un pourcent des biens. La Francophonie est une famille et si un seul de ses membres est brimé dans ses droits, toute la famille s'en trouve appauvrie. Les droits de la personne, ce n'est pas une notion juridique abstraite ou une théorie politique en vogue dans les pays industrialisés. Ce n'est pas un produit de luxe, mais un outil essentiel de développement. Le Canada estime logique et juste que son aide au développement doit être de plus en plus canalisée vers les pays qui s'efforcent de respecter et qui travaillent à développer les droits de la personne chez eux.

Former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Flora MacDonald, Canada's representative atNamibian pre-Independence Elections, 1991, with a group of young activists. (Courtesy Flora MacDonald)

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Notes 1

2

3

4 5

6

7

Canadian policy regarding UNESCO, which was experiencing severe management and other problems at the time, is outlined in the statement by the Deputy PM and SSEA, Mr. Allan J. MacEachen, to the Empire Club, Toronto, March 22, 1984. Essentially, the government's position was that "Canada should work from within in order to get UNESCO back to the priorities of its mandate" rather than withdraw, as several countries, such as Britain, the United States, Singapore, eventually did. This policy was applied by the Mulroney government also. See RAM. (Chapter V) and also Chapter I in A.E.B. I and II for background. A full list of Canadian peacekeeping operations can be found in Issue No. 20, spring 1993, Disarmament Bulletin, published by DEA, Ottawa. Regarding other sports boycotts, Press Release No. 85/103 issued by DEA, Ottawa, July 8, 1985, provides details regarding the restrictions on sporting contacts between Canada and South Africa. SeeA.E.B. II, pages 6-17, for background. A special commission was set up under the former leader of the Conservative Party, Mr. Robert Stanfield, to study the matter and make recommendations about it. The Clark government fell in December 1979. Its Liberal successor, elected in early 1980, did not pursue the issue; nor did the Conservative government under Mr. Mulroney, elected in 1984. As for the status of Jerusalem itself, the Canadian government publicly denounced the validity of Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem in August 1980. See DEA press release No. 62 of August 1, 1980, for details. The agreement signed on September 13, 1993, by Israel and the PLO does not of course sanction the creation of a fully independent Palestinian state. It consists essentially in mutual recognition by the two parties, accompanied by gradual Palestinian self-rule in, along with phased Israeli withdrawals from, the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Nor does it deal with the status of Jerusalem or that of other Occupied Territories, e.g., the Golan Heights. However, it is hoped that—in time—the agreement will lead to arrangements reflecting the wishes of the Palestinians for full independence. This statement by Mr. Clark gave rise to comments by Prime Minister Mulroney, in London, expressing caution about improved relations with the PLO and that "Canada was not trying to jump on anybody's bandwagon." The Globe and Mail, Toronto, March 15, 1989, gives an account of Mr. Mulroney's remarks. See "Background Notes on the Effect of Sanctions on Iraq," attached to Issue No. 93 of DEA's Statements and Speeches series, Ottawa, December 10,1990.

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8

Canada participated actively, albeit modestly, in all aspects of the Gulf War— naval, air, and ground—when hostilities broke out on January 16, 1990, after the Security Council's deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait had expired.

9

The Contadora peace initiative, under the leadership of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela, got under way in 1983. It took its name from the site of the first meetings of the group. Canada supported the initiative from the outset as being the best means of negotiating a peaceful settlement of the problems of the region. It also had the backing of several Latin American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay.

10

See RAM., pages 162-169, and also A.E.B. II, pages 43-45, for background. The CSCE aspects of Canada's human rights policy are documented in Chapter II. In January 1988, DEA published a compendium of statements and speeches, entitled Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy, covering the period from 1977 to 1988. It was timed to coincide with the 40th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is available for consultation at the DEA library, Ottawa.

11

This general approach to aid, trade, and human rights was taken up—in almost identical terms—by SSEA Joe Clark, after the Conservative victory in the elections of 1984. See his speech to the Ninth Annual Conference on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, Canadian Human Rights Foundation, Ottawa, March 21,1986. However, notable changes of emphasis in Conservative policy began to take place at the beginning of the 1990s, as outlined in the two documents immediately following this one. "Foreign Policy Themes and Priorities" was prepared by the Policy Planning Staff, DEA, Ottawa, and published under the authority of SSEA Barbara McDougall in December 1991. It is available from DEA, Ottawa. Mrs. McDougall re-affirmed these themes and priorities in her address to the Empire Club, Toronto, November 12,1992.

12

II SECURITY AND PEACE 1 he end of the Cold War brought about by the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe, at the end of the 1980s sharply influenced Canada's traditional defence patterns, set during and shortly after the Second World War. They also altered those of its Western partners. Indeed of the entire world. As a result, defence considerations in the usually accepted sense became somewhat less pressing. In addition, the severe economic recession that struck Canada and its allies at almost the same time as Communism's demise had a serious impact on defence. By the end of the 1980s, the emphasis was on restraint, budget cuts, base closings, and personnel reductions throughout the Armed Forces. However, at the outset of the period under study, the Cold War was still in full sway. NATO and NORAD were the anchors of Canada's defence policy. The Trudeau government did attach rather less importance to defence than its predecessors. It reduced Canadian contributions to NATO in 1969-1971. It tended to renew NORAD for shorter periods. Its defence budgets received less generous consideration than those of earlier years. Nevertheless, the traditional pattern remained intact.1 The break-up of the Soviet Empire took place mid-way during the Mulroney government's second term of office. During its first mandate, it had conducted—in 1987—a defence policy review that reflected continuing Cold War considerations. It emphasized three-ocean defence, notably Arctic defence. Nuclear submarines were a major priority. However, by 1989, the world's political situation was rapidly changing. Also, the recession had begun to bite. This turn of events had direct and drastic repercussions on Canadian defence policy and budgets. Concomitant with the fall of Communism, increasing attention began to be paid to the ways and means whereby the process of democratization and the growth of market economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union could be promoted. Canada was one of the earliest to move ahead in this field.

35

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A. THE CRUMBLING OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE 22. Canada, the West, and Eastern Europe Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the Department of Political Science and Economics, McGill University, Montreal, February 5, 1990. (Extracts) Late last November, during one of the many massive demonstrations which filled Prague's Wenceslaus Square, a sign was posted by a young Czech protestor. That sign told a story: Poland 10 years Hungary 10 months East Germany 10 weeks Czechoslovakia 10 days And, five weeks later, he could have added: Romania 10 hours The pace and scope of change in Eastern Europe has been truly remarkable. Literally no one predicted what has happened. And, more to the point, no one knows what will happen next. The story is just beginning. It is only the opening act in a long drama whose plot we do not yet know. What is happening in Eastern Europe is not just a change in current events, but a change in history. And we Canadians have an important place in that history. What is at stake in Europe is nothing less than the successful replacement of the brittle post-war order, which we have endured since 1945. For 45 years we have presided over a partial peace, a peace which has denied freedom to half a continent. It was a peace based on the constant threat of a new war. We are presented today with the prospect for the first time in two generations of a Europe prosperous and free. Who are the authors of this opportunity? The first is Mikhail Gorbachev, whose vision and purpose led him to openly acknowledge the abject failure of the 70-year Soviet experiment, and to act forcefully upon that realization at home and abroad. Abroad, by re-writing Soviet foreign policy, by making Moscow a responsible and reasoned great power in many corners of the globe and on most international issues. At home, by challenging the Soviet system, and the Soviet people, to discard the failed machinery of the command economy, to accept the challenge of building a new system based on self-reliance, initiative, and openness. Glasnost throughout the East has been an unprecedented success. But Mr. Gorbachev's domestic message has gone well beyond the Soviet border. That message was also received by the people and ultimately the governments of Eastern Europe. Mr. Gorbachev has done what we in the West would never have expected of a Soviet leader. He has accepted—even

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encouraged—the dissolution of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe. The other authors of this great change are the peoples of Eastern Europe. From Berlin to Bucharest they have risen in an unprecedented demonstration of the power of the popular will. The reaction there, and the reaction here, to this remarkable revolution have been one of euphoria. But the time of euphoria is over. It is time to consolidate the gains and to render real and enduring what has been, until now, hope and promise. The opportunity is immense, but so too are the challenges. The countries of the East are embarked on an unprecedented two-track process of reform. One track is political—the abandonment of single party structures, the construction of democracy. The other is economic— discarding the crippling constraints of the command economy and introducing a more open and free market. Eastern Europe is attempting to do in a matter of months—peacefully—what has taken us centuries to achieve. What is the role of the West in all this? Our role relates to the attitudes and principles we bring to this historic challenge, as much as it does to concrete initiatives. The first requirement is an attitude of support for the reform efforts under way in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A related requirement is patience. The road ahead will be rocky. There are bound to be developments which Canadians will judge disappointing, or unsettling, even offensive. Rather than to rush these judgments, we must give reform every chance to succeed. The third principle is a clear recognition of what we in the West can, and what we cannot do. We, in the West, cannot solve the problems facing the East. Ultimately, it is the peoples and governments of these countries who will make democracy and the open market work. But we do have an important role. We can offer help when it is sought. That cooperation can be of an emergency nature—as with the $12 million in food aid Canada is giving to Poland or the $30 million we have contributed to supporting the Polish currency as they move towards an open market. That cooperation can also be of a longer-term nature—helping Eastern European governments to develop the expertise to run a democracy and a modern economy. Such things as management training and statistical assistance are important. So too is gradual integration into the Western financial system, as demonstrated by Canada's proposal that the USSR be given observer status at the GATT, advocacy of a meeting between Mr. Gorbachev and the Host of the Economic Summit, and Canada's intent to join the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Finally, there is a fourth principle which is as important, or even more important, than any of the preceding three. It is the requirement for stability and I do not mean simple military stability. I mean stability politically and economically, as well as in the security field.

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The requirement for stability extends to security arrangements. Even Mr. Gorbachev, who once called for the abolition of NATO, now accepts its desirability as a framework of certainty in a period of great change. NATO, for example, is the only security organization whose membership encompasses both North America and Western Europe. NATO's arms control agenda—in the conventional and nuclear fields—must be pursued now with the same vigour. But there is even more required. The definition of security should be expanded well beyond the accumulation of soldiers and arms into verification and confidence building. The old NATO was based largely on a stark military mission. The new NATO will be based on a definition of security which goes beyond arms to the psychology and politics of security relations. NATO's long-term relevance will hinge on its ability to supplement its military role with a political mission. Stability also requires that we use existing institutions with a comprehensive membership to lay the framework for political and economic cooperation across Europe. I refer here to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The CSCE must become the drafting board for the new European architecture. I would like to speak briefly about the re-unification of Germany. Canada, along with NATO, has always supported the peaceful re-unification of Germany. Accomplished peacefully, democratically, and in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, a united Germany can be a force for peace and prosperity throughout Europe. Some may wonder what Canada's particular interest is in all this. What of Europe does Canada seek? A new Europe which is free, governed by principles of selfdetermination and non-interference; A new Europe which is democratic in its politics and committed to an open market in its economics; A new Europe which is imbued by a universal respect for the rights of the individual; A new Europe which is based on mutual security. What is Canada's role in this? We have unique characteristics to apply. Our experience with federalism, and with the challenge respecting different cultures, has created expertise and insight. We are a country with a strong economy, whose strength in various sectors—telecommunications, transportation, resources, management training, is world class. Let me also emphasize the multicultural reality. Many Canadians know the languages of Eastern Europe, understand the customs, and are familiar with their societies. That familiarity is a business advantage and something Canada can contribute to the East. A Europe at peace with itself—prosperous, whole and free—is the goal of every Canadian. It will sustain our security; support our prosperity; and fulfil our values.

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23. Task Force on Central and Eastern Europe Joint Message by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, and the Minister for International Trade, Mr. John Crosbie. Spring 1992. (Extracts) Canada's Task Force on Central and Eastern Europe is a major element in our response to the struggle for political and economic freedom in the region. It brings together public and private resources in Canada in support of what is an irrepressible push towards democracy and private enterprise in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Task Force will support and encourage investment by Canadian business in the region and will provide technical assistance in such areas as agriculture, environmental protection, finance, and telecommunications. The programme will also provide Canadian expertise in such key areas as election procedures, law reform, human rights, and free media. A periodic newsletter will be published so that Canadians will know what we are doing in the area. Responding to the new Europe: The Government established a $72 million programme to assist Poland and Hungary last year, which included food aid, short-term export credit insurance, support for the Polish Stabilization Fund, and $10 million for economic development. The move towards market economies: The Task Force administers assistance to the countries of the region and serves as the framework for the Government's response to political and economic change in Central and Eastern Europe. It does so by coordinating public sector and private sector initiatives, administering the $40 million programme of financial assistance for Canadian projects and initiatives. Broadly speaking, the financial assistance package involves the following: a $30 million Economic Development Fund and a $10 million Political Cooperation Fund. The Economic Development Fund has two programmes: one aimed at market-oriented reforms and training; the other to assist Canadian companies to increase their trade and investment in the region. Securing democracy: The Political Cooperation Fund provides grants and contributions to foster dialogue in order to encourage democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD): International agreement has been reached on the establishment of a regional bank to foster the transition towards market-oriented economies. The bank's initial capital base will be 10 billion ECUS (roughly Cdn $14 billion). Canada will be contributing Cdn $30 million each year for the next five years to the Bank's Capitalization Fund. We have a seat on the board of directors. The Canadian Counterpart Fund (CFA): The CFA will be used to finance local costs of jointly agreed upon projects in Poland, resulting from the sale

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of Canadian food aid shipped to Poland last winter. It has been agreed that the CFA will focus on agriculture and rural development. Protection for Canadian Investments: Foreign Investment Protection Agreements (FIPA) have now been signed with Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Currently, one is being negotiated with Hungary. What do FIPAs do?. They extend protection reciprocally to foreign investment through such provisions as: a) national treatment of foreign investors (foreign investors are guaranteed the same treatment as national investors); and b) most-favoured-nation treatment, that is, treatment no less favourable than that extended to investors of any third country; and c) a consultation and dispute mechanism. Reaching out: It is the aim of the Task Force to include as many Canadians as possible in its programmes.2 24. Canada, NATO, and Eastern Europe: the challenge

Speech by the SSEA, Mrs. Barbara McDougall, to the Universal Speakers'Group, Toronto, April 16,1992. (Extracts) We in Canada have a direct interest in the region, in its stability and prosperity, not only through direct ties of family and friendship, but as potential new trading partners and allies. Canada and Canadians are already very active in the new Eastern Europe. At the same time, these countries are caught up in a spiral of rising expectations. The free flow of information has jolted people out of their isolation. They want everything the West has to offer, but their leaders cannot often deliver even the most basic of services. Many Canadians probably do not recognize the innovative nature and magnitude of our assistance efforts to date, nor the leadership we have shown to other Western countries in the rationale and mechanisms for our assistance. Canada has provided and is providing assistance to Eastern Europe worth about $4,5 billion through a creative mix of debt relief, balance of payments support, currency stabilization, commercial credits, technical assistance, humanitarian aid, and business incentives. Helping to transform Eastern European economies is not only good for peace and stability, it is also good business. Commercial credits, for example, are a key element in our assistance because they induce and reward economic change, foster private sector relationships and have a number of multiplier effects—including the stimulation of direct trade with Canada, something that is of considerable importance to Canadian industry and Canadian workers. Commercial credits and/or direct financial assistance have been extended to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Romania, the Baltic states, Russia, Ukraine, and Poland. Humanitarian assistance has been provided in the form of medical supplies, medicines, to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, the Baltic states, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

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Technical assistance has been committed—one of the largest commitments proportionately of any of the G-7 nations. A wide-ranging programme of management training and of "training the trainers" is in place. The underlying message of all of our technical assistance programmes is that market-driven economies are the fairest and most efficient way to achieve prosperity.3 Our approach has already paid dividends on the political side by the inclusion of the emerging nations in established international peace and security institutions. For example, the association of the new republics with NATO in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council brings them into a North American community of values. Their membership in the CSCE obliges them to accept and implement the Helsinki principles on human rights and the treatment of minorities. We intend to hold these countries to their commitments as new partners. Should they abandon democracy, they will also abandon our assistance. B. BASIC DEFENCE POLICY Shortly after the Trudeau government won the elections of 1968, it conducted a review of Canada's foreign policy, as well as its defence policy. Not long after it was elected in 1984, the Mulroney government did likewise. Plus cela change, plus c'est la meme chose? Nevertheless, initially at least, the emphasis in the 1987 defence policy review was a good deal more assertive than that of the previous one some 15 years earlier. Although changes were beginning to take place in the Soviet Union, Cold War conditions still prevailed generally between East and West when the White Paper was being drafted and its terms reflected those conditions. With the government's emphasis on "three-ocean defence," especially Arctic defence, the Canadian Navy came out best by far among the Armed Forces, with the prospect of nuclear submarines and new frigates in the offing. However, the euphoria was short-lived and the new defence policy did not survive the 1989 budget. The cuts were drastic. The proposed acquisition of nuclear submarines was dropped. Army base closings were announced. Basic defence policy had, by the stroke of a budget, been effectively torpedoed. 25. Challenge and Commitment: the Defence White Paper Booklet issued by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Perrin Beatty, June5,1987. (Synopsis)4 To create a three-ocean navy by: 1. Building six new frigates in addition to the six currently under construction, and the four destroyers being modernized; 2. Acquiring a fleet of 10 to 12 nuclear-powered submarines to operate in the Atlantic, the Pacific and the Arctic;

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3. Installing a modern, fixed, under-ice surveillance system in the Arctic; 4. Developing new sonar systems and acquiring detection array towing vessels for better underwater surveillance; 5. Building mine-sweepers for the Naval Reserve; 6. Acquiring new shipborne anti-submarine warfare helicopters. To reinforce surveillance by: 1. Purchasing at least six new long-range patrol aircraft; 2. Modernizing the existing fleet of medium-range patrol aircraft; 3. Maintaining the strength of CF-18 aircraft and arming them effectively; 4. Promoting research, development, and deployment of space surveillance systems; 5. Investigating the installation of synthetic aperture radar in existing aircraft. To strengthen territorial defence by: 1. Expanding the Canadian Rangers, improving their equipment, training, and support; 2. Creating new Militia brigades; 3. Providing new equipment and training for territorial defence; 4. Creating, within the Militia, a military vital point guard to secure key installations across the country; 5. Establishing a northern training centre in the High Arctic; 6. Setting up a regional command structure. To improve the credibility of Canada's contribution to alliance deterrence in Europe by: 1. Cancelling our unsuitable commitment to send a brigade group and two fighter squadrons to northern Norway, in order to consolidate our commitments on the central front into land and air divisions; 2. Pre-positioning equipment and supplies for the Canada-based brigade group which in time of crisis would join the brigade group permanently stationed in southern Germany; 3. Pre-positioning equipment and supplies for the Battalion Group assigned in time of crisis to Northern European Command; 4. Re-equipping our armoured regiments with new main battle tanks; 5. Assuring sustainment of the army division by 1 Canadian Brigade Group and the new Militia brigades; 6. Increasing the personnel strength in Europe to provide land and air Divisional elements and larger logistics and medical support cadres; 7. Providing additional airlift capability. To revitalize the reserves by: 1. Introducing a Total Force Concept, reducing the distinctions

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between the Regular and Reserve forces; 2. Assigning the Reserves specific wartime tasks; 3. Improving the quality and quantity of training and equipment; 4. Increasing the Reserves to 90,000 personnel over time; 5. Investigating the reactivation of university Reserve officer training programmes; 6. Improving Reserve pay and benefits. To build a firmer foundation for future defence by: 1. Providing equitable opportunities in both official languages in the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence; 2. Expanding the role of women in the Canadian Forces; 3. Ensuring that the composition of the Regular and Reserve Forces more adequately reflects the ethnic diversity of Canadian society; 4. Strengthening defence industrial preparedness; 5. Enhancing the contribution of the Canadian Forces to foreign disaster and humanitarian relief; 6. Broadening and extending the Military and Strategic Studies programme; 7. Replacing the War Measures Act with new emergencies legislation; 8. Introducing legislation to establish Emergency Preparedness Canada, the agency responsible for coordinating the civil aspects of government-wide mobilization planning. 26. Defence and the 1989 Budget Budget in Brief: Booklet issued by the Department of Finance, Ottawa, April 27,1989. (Extracts) National Defence: Previously planned spending increases will be restrained to save a total of $2,7 billion over the next five years. The basic parameters of the White Paper remain government defence policy, but that policy will need to be implemented more slowly. As a result of these decisions, the government will close or reduce in size 14 military bases and stations across the country. The government is not proceeding with acquisition of nuclearpropelled submarines.5 C. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT It is clear, if only in terms of the number of statements made on the subject, the documents issued, the initiatives undertaken during its term of office, particularly during the later years, that arms control and disarmament were major preoccupations for Prime Minister Trudeau and his government. Nevertheless, Canada could only be on the sidelines of an issue involving primarily the two superpowers and was not of course a party to their negotiations, as embodied in SALT I and II, START I and II, the INF.6

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Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, then President of the USSR (1990), being greeted at Ottawa International Airport by Mr. Vernon Turner, Canadian Ambassador to Moscow. (Courtesy PMO. Photo: Bill McCarthy)

These were the crucial talks and, until the two superpowers could reach an understanding, there was not really much that third parties could do about the nuclear-arms race except to exhort and plead. They could certainly not play a decisive role. Even the UN found itself rather marginal and unproductive on the issue, despite the great amount of attention it paid to the subject. It convened three Special Sessions on Disarmament (UNSSOD) during the period covered by this book, none of which was particularly successful. The real breakthrough came with the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev on the scene in Moscow. His policies oiglasnost and perestroika opened up the U.S.S.R. They also set it on a course which he may not have fully foreseen or intended, culminating eventually in the liberation of Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union. As well, they made possible the great reductions in the armaments of the two superpowers, beginning with the INF Treaty in 1987 and, eventually the START Treaties. For this, and for many other things, the world is in his debt. Canadian preoccupations and concerns about the nuclear-arms crisis were both genuine and pressing. They were shared, in equal measure, if

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not always in equal intensity, by the governments in power in Ottawa during the period covered by this book. Their frequent exhortations and reminders, proddings and pushings, acquired the characteristics of a crusade. It was as if Canada had become the conscience of the world. 27. Disarmament: the problem of organizing the world community Speech by the PM, Mr. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, to the UN Special Session on Disarmament, New York, May 26,1978. (Extracts) Canada takes its place in a world discussion on disarmament as an industrial country, geographically placed between two heavily-armed superpowers, with an obvious stake in the prevention of war in a nuclear age. We are a member of a regional defensive alliance that includes three of the five nuclear-weapon states. We are, nonetheless, a country that has renounced the production of nuclear weapons or acquisition of such weapons under our control. We have withdrawn from any nuclear role by Canada's armed forces in Europe and are now in the process of replacing with conventionally-armed aircraft the nuclear-capable planes assigned to our forces in North America. We were thus not only the first country in the world with the capacity to produce nuclear weapons that chose not to do so; we are also the first nuclear-armed country to have chosen to divest itself of nuclear weapons. We have not, for more than a decade, permitted Canadian uranium to be used for military purposes by any country. We are a country that maintains strict controls over exports of military equipment and does not export any to areas of tension or actual conflict. We are, on the other hand, a major source of nuclear material, equipment, and technology for peaceful purposes. It has been an assumption of our policy that countries like Canada can do something to slow down the arms race. But, obviously, we can do a great deal more if we act together.7 28. Disarmament: priorities reaffirmed Statement by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, on the occasion of Disarmament Week, October 24,1980. (Extracts) As profound Canadian experience since 1945 has taught, arms control and disarmament are a long process. However, Canadian priorities remain unchanged. They are: (1) To encourage the continuation of the SALT process; (2) To promote the realization of a comprehensive multilateral test ban treaty; (3) To assist in the preparation of a chemical weapons convention; (4) To promote the evolution of an effective non-proliferation regime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

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(5) To participate actively in negotiations to limit and reduce conventional forces; (6) To strive, step by step, to ultimately achieve general and complete disarmament consistent with the legitimate security needs of states. 29. International Security and Disarmament Statement by the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. A. R. Menzies, to the SCEAND, Ottawa, February 2,1982. (Extracts) A significant source of instability in the world lies in the irregularity of the cycle of armaments modernization in the major military powers. Prime Minister Trudeau spoke of this instability in his speech in 1978 to UNSSOD I. He said What particularly concerns me is the technological impulse that continues to lie behind the development of strategic nuclear weaponry. It is, after all, in the laboratories that the nuclear arms race begins. The new technologies can require a decade or more to take a weapons system from research and development to production and eventual deployment. Mr. Trudeau spoke of the philosophy of disarmament, of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, of the need for restraint in the export of conventional military equipment, about peacekeeping and security. The part of his speech which attracted most attention dealt with the "strategy of suffocation". In this regard, he proposed four interlocking measures which, if agreed, would arrest the dynamics of the nuclear arms race at the laboratory stage. These were: (a) A comprehensive test ban agreement; (b) An agreement to stop all new strategic delivery vehicles; (c) An agreement to prohibit all production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; (d) An agreement to limit and then progressively reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear-weapons systems. All these measures had been proposed before. What was new was the proposal that they be interlocking or mutually reinforcing. It should also be observed that Mr. Trudeau did not propose unilateral action but the negotiation of verifiable agreements. When the strategy of suffocation was put forward, the conclusion of SALT II and a comprehensive test ban treaty looked very likely. Although SALT II was signed in 1979, President Carter did not press the U.S. Senate to ratify it because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1978. The Comprehensive Test Ban trilateral negotiations were recessed in November 1980. Since UNSSOD I the validity of the strategy of suffocation has been reaffirmed repeatedly, not least during the foreign policy debate in the House of Commons last June. In the less propitious international atmosphere today, special Canadian emphasis has been placed on the desirability of early resumption of the Soviet-American dialogue on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.

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Canada's security policy has traditionally been based on three foundations of peace: (a) The deterrence of war through the collective security arrangements of NATO and NORAD; (b) The persistent search for equitable and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements; (c) Active participation in and support for the peaceful settlement of disputes and a collective effort to resolve the underlying economic and social causes of international tensions and disputes. Broadly speaking, Canada is confronted by the following types of disarmament problem: (a) The nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, including the interface with the other three nuclear states; (b) The conventional forces balance in Central Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; (c) Conventional wars and confrontations in the developing countries, too often fuelled by big power intervention; (d) The risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries. 30. In Pursuit of Peace Speech by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, to the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Ottawa, October 31,1985. (Extracts) Shortly after assuming office, I said that Canada would work relentlessly to reduce tensions, to alleviate conflict, and to create conditions for a general and lasting peace. Within the field of arms control and disarmament, our government has six specific objectives: (1) Negotiated radical reductions in nuclear enforcement and the enhancement of strategic stability; (2) Maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime; (3) Negotiation of a global chemical weapons ban; (4) Support for a comprehensive test ban treaty; (5) Prevention of an arms race in outer space; (6) The building of confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere.8 31. Banning Chemical Weapons For All Time Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, at the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons, January 8,1989. In April 1915, Canadian soldiers in Flanders were among the first to suffer the terror, pain, and death inflicted by chemical weapons. Of those who recovered from exposure to poison gas, many suffered on for their remaining years. As a result, at least three generations of Canadians—parents,

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children, and grand-children—became acutely aware of the cruel and horrible effects of the use of such weapons. It is a tragic part of Canada's national memory. Canada's goal is to have all nations ban all chemical weapons: to get rid of them everywhere and forever. We seek a comprehensive ban that prohibits not only the use but the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. That will not happen overnight and will require a reliable means of verification. Specifically, we can condemn the use of chemical weapons and commit ourselves not to use them. We can reaffirm the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and call on other states to adhere to it. We can strengthen the capacity of the Secretary General of the United Nations to investigate allegations of chemical weapons use. As a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, Canada has accepted fully its obligations on chemical weapons use. Our policy is clear. Canada does not at any time intend to initiate the use of chemical weapons. Canada does not intend to develop, produce, acquire, or stockpile such weapons, unless these weapons are used against the military forces or the civil population of Canada and its allies. What does this mean? First, it means that Canada is applying its obligations under the Geneva Protocol to parties and non-parties alike. Second, we have adopted a firm policy of non-production to help to achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Third, Canada has already advised other nations of the destruction of the bulk of useable chemical warfare agents which it had stockpiled during the Second World War.9

D. THE TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE As a conclusion to this section on disarmament, attention might be drawn to the initiative in favour of international arms control, which Prime Minister Trudeau carried out during the late fall of 1983 and early winter of 1984. He took his message urging early and comprehensive disarmament personally to a number of world leaders, both East and West, as well as nonaligned. Most appear to have received him politely, but non-committally. In any event, his initiative got caught up in domestic politics in Canada. An election was in the offing. He resigned and left office not too long after undertaking his travels. The Liberal Party was defeated at the polls and the matter was not pursued further. Mr. Trudeau made three major statements about his initiative. They are: 1) Reflections on Peace and Security, which he announced at the University

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of Guelph, Ontario, October 27,1983; (2) A Global Initiative to Improve the Prospects for Peace, which was delivered at a Liberal Party gathering in the Queen Elizabeth Hotel, Montreal, November 13, 1983; and (3) Initiative for Peace and Security, HC debates, February 4, 1984. They are available from DEA, Ottawa.

E. MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR) The MBFR Talks in Vienna went on, rather unproductively on the whole, for many years. Canada took part in the negotiations from the outset in 1973.10 The background against which the MBFR talks had begun some 15 years earlier, when Cold War conditions prevailed, was beginning to change by the mid-1980s. The CSCE negotiations also were becoming involved in some aspects of the issue. In particular, the results of the CSCE conference in Stockholm in 1986 established important confidence-building measures that did much to open the way for a new approach to conventional arms discussions in Europe. A consensus was forming that a new forum would be preferable. It took the name of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The CFE talks began in Vienna on March 9,1989. They are divided into two parts: one dealing with Confidence and Security Building Measures; and the other with a Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The CFE Negotiation is not a CSCE conference as such, but it is taking place within the CSCE framework. Canada is a charter member of the CFE. Signed on November 10,1990, the CFE provisions did not enter into force in their entirety until July 17, 1992. Briefly, the CFE restricts the NATO alliance and states that belonged to the now-defunct Warsaw Pact (or their successors) to equal holdings of Treaty-limited equipment. It also requires exchanges of information to record where this equipment is located and to whom it belongs. The CFE also requires the destruction of Treaty-limited equipment that exceeds national entitlements, although limited quantities of some equipment can be converted to non-military uses. Extensive on-site inspection provisions permit signatories to monitor whether other parties are fulfilling their obligations. Following entry into force in mid-1992, states began an intensive programme of verifying the initial exchanges of military information. By 1993 good progress was being reported, although participants had discovered that CFE arms procedures and associated verification activities were proving to be more costly than anticipated. Within the CSCE and CFE context, Canada has promoted a measure, an Open Skies regime, documented below.

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32. The End of the MBFR Talks Communique issued by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, February 7, 1989. The SSEA today took note of the final plenary meeting, in Vienna, of the Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe. The decision to conclude these negotiations was taken by the participating states in the light of the agreement to open the new Negotiation on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), in March of this year. Canada, as a participant in the MBFR Talks, will play a full role in the new Negotiation. The MBFR negotiations, which began in 1973, have provided a valuable multilateral forum for the discussion of proposals aimed at strengthening security in Europe, although there has been insufficient common ground to the conclusion of a treaty. However, the experience gained in this pioneering attempt to arrive at conventional arms control measures will serve us well in the new Negotiation. 33. Open Skies and Glasnost Statement by Mr. John Noble, head of the Canadian delegation to the official portion of the Open Skies Conference, Ottawa, February 27, 1990. (Extracts) In recent years, a new word has entered the English language. Like so many, it comes from another language. That word is glasnost. The emergence rf this word into common usage, and the concepts behind it, repres: . the fundamental changes that have led to the improvement in East West relations. Initially, some of us in the West spent a lot of time debating whether the term meant "openness" or "transparency" and that debate seems rather odd now since glasnost has come to be a much larger concept. It has been a Canadian conviction that it was possible to put the spirit of glasnost into practice that led us to become such fervent promoters of "Open Skies." We believe that the time has come to create a confidencebuilding regime on a much greater scale than anything tried in the past The Open Skies regime that we have supported is much more open than what we have accomplished up until now in the framework of the CSCE. The regime will apply to an area three times larger than the territory covered by the Confidence and Security Building Measures talks. If this negotiation on Open Skies is to succeed, we must have an early commitment by all participants to the following essentials: (a) No limitations to the territory overflown, except as required by air safety; (b) A high frequency of overflights to provide full coverage of the territory of the overflown country; (c) The use of sensors capable of operating in all weather, day and night;

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(d) Full control over the aircraft and sensors by the overflying country. n

F. CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (CSCE) The CSCE discussions began in 1973. At the time, the U.S.S.R. sought to confine the discussions to security and economic issues. The West insisted on including human rights. The upshot was the Helsinki Final Act, signed in 1975, whereby the 35 participating countries recognized Europe's post 1945 boundaries and in addition made solemn, although not legally-binding, promises on: security and human rights, known as "Basket I"; economic cooperation, "Basket II"; and human contacts, "Basket III". The 35 states included the NATO and Warsaw Pact states, the balance being a group of 12 non-aligned European countries. Early CSCE meetings were not particularly productive. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not of course help matters very much. However, none of the parties sought to kill the process.12 Things began to improve in 1986 with the first East-West agreement, at Stockholm, to cover conventional military forces throughout Europe, providing rules, for instance, on the notification of large-scale troop movements and the right to observe them, as well as on verification procedures, that is, ways of checking that each side is in fact respecting the rules. By the time of the Vienna meetings (1986-1989), the atmosphere had started to clear a good deal. Vienna produced a mandate for Conventional Stability Talks on reducing non-nuclear forces, as well as more precise pledges of respect for human rights than those found in the Helsinki Final Act, with appropriate verification measures also included. By then, also, the CFE Negotiation was getting under way and the current relationship between East and West had set in. Human rights and, in particular, family contacts involving visits or reunification, have been the prime focus of Canada's approach to CSCE deliberations since the beginning. 34. Family Reunification Closing Statement by the Minister of State for Multiculturalism, Mr. Norman Cafik, to the CSCE conference Belgrade, March 9,1978. (Extracts) Canada has never had illusions about the obstacles which lie in the way of full implementation of the Final Act. Our review has confirmed only too clearly that after two and one half years we are indeed a long way from improving security and improving cooperation in Europe within the full measure of our capacities. But we have also discovered that there is a deep-

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seated concern on the part of all participating states to seek progress on those parts of the Final Act of special interest to them. It is evident from our statements over the past months what improvements in implementation Canada hoped to see emerge from Belgrade. There is the vital matter of improving security. In an effort to build on the experience we have gained in the past years, we tried with others to develop and refine Confidence Building Measures relating particularly to military manoeuvres and movements. Our efforts, while commanding broad support, did not gain the consensus required. The importance of halting the arms race and establishing more stable relations, particularly in Europe where major military potentials are concentrated, as well as seeking progress on arms limitation and disarmament measures, were addressed by the conference. Canada continues to believe that every opportunity must be seized to decelerate the arms race as an essential approach towards the building of greater confidence. From the beginning Canada has placed particular emphasis on the humanitarian dimension of our work. We see this as a fundamental, unique, and indispensable contribution to the CSCE process to the development of detente. Most of us do not regard such issues as family reunification as being of secondary importance. In approaching this question, Canada proceeded on the basis that relations between States cannot remain unaffected where respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is seen to be deficient. In this specific area of human contacts, we tried to get acceptance for the idea that the provisions of the Final Act should be applied in such a way that family contacts—whether involving visits or reunification—would be viewed as a normal routine so that such cases no longer would have to be the subject of individual negotiations between governments. We also tried to get agreement that governments would facilitate normal communication of ideas and information between individuals through the freer flow of printed material. For a country like Canada with its close links with Europe, this is a matter of direct and practical relevance.13 We regret that our efforts to achieve a document of substance on these issues have been unavailing. Certainly, Canadian interest in them will not cease just because this meeting is ending. Our commitment to these goals will be vigorously maintained. 35. The Improved View from Vienna: 1989 Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, on Conclusion of the CSCE meeting in Vienna, January 19,1989. (Extracts) When this conference began in 1986,1 said in my opening statement that our task would not be easy. The problems seemed intractable. Our world has changed since we began this negotiation and has generally changed for the

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better. For the first time in history, there is an agreement to abolish a whole class of nuclear weapons. Some regional conflicts have been resolved or are in the process of resolution in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Mr. Gorbachev has offered unilateral force reductions in Eastern Europe. Our political environment has become more positive, more hopeful. From the beginning of this meeting, Canada raised the fundamental issue of compliance with CSCE commitments. Canada has played an active role in all three CSCE Baskets. When the Vienna meeting opened, we had just succeeded in the Stockholm Conference in establishing a set of Confidence and Security Building Measures that carried considerable political and military significance, but what we did not know then was how these measures would work out in practice. Since 1986, we have seen gratifying progress. Canada wholeheartedly supports the establishment of negotiations on such measures to build upon the work of the Stockholm Conference. Other specific elements of this Concluding Document are very important to Canada. We have achieved firm commitments that will improve the conditions under which business people and entrepreneurs can perform their central role in economic cooperation. We have sharpened the commitment to promote contacts between business people and potential buyers and end users, and to publish useful, detailed, and up-to-date economic information and statistics. Canada is particularly pleased with the agreement to promote direct contacts between scientists and institutions and to respect the human rights of scientists. We are encouraged that the importance of environmental protection has been recognized. We think that the progress on tourism is important. Eliminating minimum exchange requirements makes tourism more attractive, and easing contacts between tourists and the local population (including permitting them to stay in private homes) will offer greater human contact and understanding. In the section on principles, we have adopted a firm statement on terrorism and have made a breakthrough in acceptance of the principle of thirdparty involvement in the peaceful settlement of disputes. In the field of human rights, long a focal point of Canadian policy at CSCE meetings, some of the accomplishments of special interest to Canada are: The commitment to respect the rights of all citizens to associate together and participate actively in the protection and promotion of human rights, without discrimination against those who exercise these rights; The undertaking to ensure freedom of religion and to allow communities to have places of worship, to participate in public dialogue, and to have contacts with believers elsewhere;

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The commitment to protect the human rights of national minorities; We have committed ourselves to ensuring that no one is subject to arbitrary arrest, detention, and exile, as well as improving the treatment of prisoners; We have undertaken to respect the right of people to move within and between countries; A range of measures to remove obstacles to family reunification and travel has been agreed to; We have undertaken to respect the privacy and integrity of postal and telephone communications and to allow people to listen to radio from outside the country and to receive, publish, and disseminate information more freely. There are many, many, more provisions on human rights and humanitarian cooperation in the Vienna Concluding Document. Canada considers all of them important. Together, they are a great achievement. In most cases, they are clear and unequivocal. We recognize that there is still room for improvement, but what is in this Document will—if fully implemented by all participating States—lead to great changes in the lives of millions of people.

G. MEMBERSHIP IN NATO 36. Leaving its alliances is no choice for Canada Statement by SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, special to "The Gazette", Montreal, Aprils, 1986. (Extracts) Gwynne Dyer (March 15) argues that Canada should leave NATO and the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) to make "nuclear war ... less likely to happen." He believes we could become a Canadian Finland.14 Both his assumptions are wrong. Leaving the Western alliance would make nuclear war more likely. The Soviets might be emboldened by a break in the West. NATO would be weakened and some of its members might be driven into hawkish demonstrations of strength. The atmosphere that led to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit could be shattered and the road closed again to negotiated arms control. Second, Canada could never be Finland. The Finns are an estimable people, shaped by their own nature and history. But their nature and history are different from ours. We are proud of our role as an international peacekeeper, a moderate and reasonable country. But moderation is a means, not an end. Our purpose is to enlarge freedom. We prefer to do that by advocating peaceful settlements of disputes. But we have always been prepared to defend our values, by force of arms if necessary.

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Geography is not the paramount reason we belong in NATO or NORAD. Freedom is. These alliances, with all their imperfections, defend a system of free societies and—by maintaining strength in the face of Soviet strength— help to keep the peace. It demeans Canadians, and misreads our history, to suggest that we stay in NATO because of the United States. We are in NATO because we belong there. Indeed, Canada played a key role in the invention of NATO. Mr. Dyer suggests that Canada's quitting NATO would inspire Poland to leave the Warsaw Pact. Almost certainly, the opposite would happen. The disarray we would cause in NATO would undoubtedly inspire the Soviet Union to insist on even greater solidarity within the Warsaw Pact. What is more curious about Mr. Dyer's proposal is its timing. Two years ago the world was worried by both an increase in arms and a decrease in contacts. Now, at least there is contact between Soviet and American leaders, negotiators, and populations. The movement has been substantial on both sides. There is the real possibility of progress in reducing overall numbers of arms. The two leaders have agreed to meet regularly, and are appearing on one another's televisions. While progress will, inevitably, be slow there is more hope now than for several years. These negotiations are happening, in part because the Soviet Union was left with no doubt about Western solidarity. Attempts failed to divide NATO over Afghanistan, over missile deployment in Europe, or over the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or Star Wars. Indeed, the resumption of negotiations between the superpowers makes NATO and NORAD even more important. While only two countries are at the table, the world's peoples are affected by the results. NATO provides Canada, and other allies, with direct access to the details of these negotiations. In the past, we have proposed specific initiatives the Americans could consider raising at the table and have seen our proposals accepted. Surely, we would wish to be able to do so again. Notes 1

See A.E.B. II, pages 45-57.

2

The full text of the Task Force booklet is available from DEA, Ottawa.

3

Mrs. McDougall's statement provides many examples of Canada's assistance, accompanied by figures both in dollars and in personnel, which cannot be reproduced here owing to space considerations. In her remarks she noted the cooperation of a number of Canadian provinces in these assistance programmes.

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4

5

6

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Canadian Foreign Policy 1977-1992

The full text of the White Paper, from which this summary has been extracted, is available from DND, Ottawa. The decision to restrain previously planned spending increases to save a total of $2,7 billion over the next five years had widespread practical effects on DND, affecting the size of the Regular Forces, the Reserves, and the brigade in Europe, as well as the acquisition of new battle tanks, and so on. For instance, between 1986-87 and 1993, the average strength of the Armed Forces dropped by roughly 9,000 (from 84,500 to 75,500 in round figures) without, however, a proportionate drop in DND's civilian personnel. Actually, civilian strength rose somewhat during the period despite the cuts. Service personnel reductions hit the lower, rather more than the senior ranks, and the Armed Forces continued to be quite top-heavy in the upper echelons with (according to DND Public Affairs, Ottawa) 117 officers of general rank and 361 in the rank of colonel in 1992. SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks); START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks); INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty). A.E.B. I, pages 20-22, gives the early background on SALT I. The SALT II Treaty was signed by the U.S A and the U.S.S.R. in Vienna on June 18, 1979. Although it was never ratified, and therefore did not formally come into force, both powers agreed to abide by its terms. SALT I and II were eventually overtaken by START, when the two powers began negotiations aimed at drastically reducing the number of their strategic offensive arms. START I was signed on July 30,1991. In resume, it limits the parties to a maximum of 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, including inter-continental ballistic missiles. It also restricts the number of sea-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. It further limits each party to 6,000 "accountable" warheads. START II was signed on January 3, 1993. It calls for further reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals, to a level of between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads each by the year 2003. This represents a cut of about 70% from 1993 levels. Canada warmly welcomed both treaties. In the words of SSEA McDougall on January 3, 1993: START II "represents the single greatest reduction in destructive power ever mandated by an arms control treaty." INF was signed on December 8, 1987. It provides for the elimination of all intermediate-range nuclear weapons, also for on-site inspections initiated by the two powers on July 1,1988. Owing to space considerations, it is not possible to give the full text of Mr. Trudeau's speech to UNSSOD I, extracts of the first paragraphs of which have been conveyed in Document 27, since they provide a good outline of Canada's basic position on nuclear affairs. In his statement, Mr. Trudeau proposed a "strategy of suffocation" as the most effective way of dealing with the nuclear arms race, that is, to suffocate it in the laboratories. He returned to this theme of suffocation in his remarks to UNSSOD II on June 18, 1982. The full text of both his speeches is available from DEA. Mr. Menzies' statement, carried in

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Document 29, provides a summary of the Prime Minister's remarks to UNSSOD I, and also an outline of the suffocation strategy, which he put forward during that meeting. 8 In this speech, Mr. Mulroney also refers to his government's decision not to participate on a government-to-government basis in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which is dealt with in the following chapter. 9 After several years of negotiation, agreement on the text of a Chemical Weapons Convention was reached in September 1992. Once fully implemented, it will prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, retention, and use of chemical weapons and their precursors. SSEA McDougall welcomed the accord in these terms: "This Convention represents one of Canada's major arms control objectives. Ever since Canadian soldiers first came under gas attack in Ypres 77 years ago, Canada has advocated a total abolition of chemical weapons." 10 See A.E.B. II, pages 40-43, for background information. The basic Western position at the CFE negotiations in Vienna is given in the Disarmament Bulletin Vol. 10, Spring-Summer issue, 1989, pages 13-14, available from DEA, Ottawa. 11 A second conference on Open Skies was held in Budapest in April-May 1990. From it and subsequent meetings there emerged an Open Skies Treaty. An Open Skies Consultative Commission has come into being. It deals primarily with the technical issues involved in the Treaty. Canada is actively engaged in the work of the Commission and chaired its first sessions in 1992. 12 Canada has taken part in all CSCE meetings since the first one, which sanctioned the Helsinki Final Act, August 1, 1975. (See A.E.B. II, pages 43-45). The sequence of the general CSCE meetings since then, which have reviewed the entire Helsinki process, is as follows: Belgrade, October 1977 to March 1978; Madrid, November 1980 to September 1983; Vienna, November 1986 to January 1989. A 10th Anniversary meeting took place in Helsinki in 1985. A meeting on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament was held in Stockholm, January 1984 to September 1986. A special meeting on Human Rights was held in Ottawa, May-June 1985. 13 At the general conference of the CSCE in Madrid, the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, took up these themes in much the same terms. See his statement of November 12,1980. He also re-affirmed Canadian policy in his speech to the Ukrainian Canadian Congress in Winnipeg, October 11,1980. 14 Mr. Dyer is a well-known Canadian journalist, who specializes in international relations and defence questions. Mr. Clark's text was published by and is available from DEA, Ottawa. Despite the NORAD Treaty's formal change of name to North American Aerospace Defence Command, it is still known as NORAD. See Chapter III below, noting the timing and reasons for the change in name and also A.E.B. I, pages 155-162, for early background regarding NORAD.

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Ill

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

Canadian relations with the United States are now and have always been— even well before Confederation—the most important and pervasive aspect of Canada's external relations.1 Today, relations with the United States affect almost every aspect of Canadian life: from matters of broad policy such as the Free Trade Agreement, foreign investments, defence, air and water pollution, and so on, to matters directly touching on the personal every-day life of most Canadians, such as automobiles, meat, fish, lumber, beer and wine, cigarettes and tobacco, to mention but a few. It is not possible in a book of this size to deal with all aspects of Canada's relations with the United States, but all major issues are included, beginning with such paramount economic matters as the Free Trade Agreement. A. THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT The Free Trade Agreement has been a very controversial subject It did not have the support of the majority of Canadians during the 1988 elections. Both the Liberals and NDP—whose combined share of the national vote was higher than that of the Conservatives—opposed it. Several provinces, likewise, were sceptical about it. Nevertheless, with a comfortable majority (169 out of 295 seats) in the House of Commons, the government went ahead with its project, secured parliamentary approval, and put it into effect on January 1,1989, as scheduled. The Mulroney government began its campaign to secure a Free Trade Agreement with the United States not long after the elections of 1984. The rationale or philosophy behind the move was to seek to protect Canada from growing trade protectionist pressures in the United States: In other words, to shelter and protect Canadian trade with the United States and, in that respect, one of the most important provisions of the Agreement is its mechanism for the adjudication of disputes. The Free Trade Agreement (henceforth the FTA) is an extremely voluminous and complex document, which took many months of intense effort to negotiate and complete. It contains more than 2,000 thousand articles. At 59

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the time of writing, its results have been mixed. Jobs, particularly in the manufacturing sector in Canada, have certainly been lost. On the other hand, job gains in other sectors have occurred and Canadian trade with the United States has undeniably risen. How much of that is due to the FTA or to the shrinking Canadian dollar is arguable. In any event, the Agreement still has several years to run. It can be amended, as provided for in the Agreement. The final deadline for new trade-remedy rules is January 1, 1996. It thus remains to be seen what the ultimate outcome of the Agreement will be. 37. The Free Tirade Agreement: highlights Address by the Minister for International Trade, Mr. John C. Crosbie, to the National Citizens'Coalition, Toronto, October 18,1988. (Extracts) Let me outline for you ten of the major benefits of the Free Trade Agreement: (1) Increased and more secure access to our major export markets in the U.S., that accounts for almost 80% of Canada's overall exports; (2) All tariffs will be eliminated on trade with the U.S. by 1998 (Article 401), helping Canadian exporters to sell into the U.S. and reducing prices for Canadian consumers; (3) This will mean greater opportunity for further resource processing in Canada: for example, the current tariff of up to 25% on processed fish exports will be eliminated opening up new jobs for value added in places like Newfoundland; (4) The FTA establishes free access for Canadian red meat exports and removes the threat of quotas (Article 704). Australia and New Zealand recently agreed to restrict beef exports to the U.S., faced with the threat of U.S. quotas; (5) It will be much easier for temporary entry for Canadian business people and service personnel (Article 1502); this is especially important for small and medium-sized businesses, including those in the service industries; (6) Canadian businesses gain access to an additional $3 billion in U.S. federal procurement contracts (Article 1304); (7) The FTA greatly limits the threat of quantitative restrictions and the U.S.'s ability to use these to force Canada to adopt "voluntary" export restraints, such as for steel (Article 407); (8) The U.S. will give Canadian energy products secure access to the U.S. market; this is important for oil, gas, electricity and uranium (Articles 902 and 905); (9) Canada will no longer be hit by U.S. global safeguard actions aimed at others (Article 1102); (10) The dispute settlement procedure will protect against politicallyinspired misuse of U.S. trade laws, to prevent the repetitions of decisions like that on softwood lumber (Chapter 19).

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Chapter 14 of the FTA deals with services. It lists the services that are covered by the obligations in the Agreement. If a service is not on the list, then it is not covered. Neither our publicly-provided health care system, nor other services provided by the government is included. (For that matter, privately-provided health care is not on the list either). The services chapter of the FTA does cover commercially-provided health care management services. However, there is no obligation under the FTA for governments in Canada to permit any such commercially-provided management of health care services, for instance, contracting for a private company to manage purchasing for a hospital. Of course, the FTA is not yet in place, but I am confident that in the electoral contest now underway, Canadians will support the government, in part because of Free Trade. 38. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Synopsis Monograph published by the International Trade Communications Group, DEA, Ottawa. Effective January 1,1989. (Extracts) NOTE: The Synopsis is a comprehensive summary (61 pages) of the FTA. In order to avoid duplication with the immediately preceding document, the following extracts deal with some of the important items in the FTA not covered in Mr. Crosbie's address. (The monograph is available for consultation in the DEA library). Part Seven Chapter 20: Other provisions. During the course of the negotiations, the two governments worked on an overall framework covering the protection of intellectual property rights (trademarks, copyright, patents, industrial design, and trade secrets). The two governments agreed to continue to cooperate and work towards better international intellectual property rules. From the beginning of the negotiations, Canadians expressed concern that an agreement might erode the government's capacity to encourage and help Canada's cultural industries (film and video, music and sound recording, publishing, cable transmission, and broadcasting) and thus contribute to the development of Canada's unique cultural identity. In order to remove any ambiguity that Canada's unique cultural identity remains untouched by the FTA, the two governments agreed in Article 2005 on a specific provision indicating that nothing in the FTA affects the ability of either Party to pursue cultural policies. Other provisions, in resume: New businesses in Canada or the United States will operate under rules for domestic investors. A panel of two Canadians, two Americans, and a mutually-acceptable fifth person, will adjudicate disputes over unfair subsidies of goods and review antidumping and countervailing duty decisions, based on applicable Canadian

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or U.S. legislation. The two parties will negotiate definitions of fair subsidies. The combined effect of the bilateral review of existing law and the development of a new set of rules will be to ensure that, by the time all tariffs are removed and other aspects of the Agreement are phased in, Canadian firms will have not only more open access but also more secure and more predictable access. 39. The Free Trade Agreement: Timetable (Extracts from: Synopsis) Effective January 1,1989 The FTA and its rules covering such issues as procurement, services and investment, and border measures come into effect after both countries exchange Instruments of Ratification, when the first round of tariff reductions will begin. For those sectors ready to compete now, tariffs will be eliminated; other goods will begin phasing out their tariffs over a 5 or 10 year period. The first tranche will cover about 15% of all goods traded between the two countries including: computer and related equipment some pork some unprocessed fish fur & fur garments leather whiskey yeast animal feeds unwrought aluminum ferro alloys vending machines & parts needles airbrakes for railway cars skis skates warranty repairs some paper-making machinery motorcycles Both nations will end any direct export subsidies to agricultural products going to the other partner. The embargo on used-vehicles imports (those less than 15 years old) from the U.S. will be lifted in stages. Cars more than 8 years old will be allowed entry to Canada duty-free immediately. The age limit will drop about two years every 12 months, until 1994. The embargo on used aircraft parts will be lifted. Buy-Canadian and Buy-American government procurement policies will be eased. The Canadian markup difference beyond normal commercial considerations on U.S. wines will begin to be phased out. The differential markups on imports of U.S. distilled liquor will be eliminated entirely. The federal government will only review direct U.S. takeovers of Canadian companies worth more than $25 million, up from the current $5 million. For indirect takeovers, review will be set at assets of $100 million, up from $50 million. Improved temporary entry for business people is implemented in both countries. U.S. uranium enrichment restrictions cease. October 1,1989 Tariffs on exports to the U.S. of specialty steel products will be lifted in stages.

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January 1, 1990 Tariffs will drop another fifth or tenth depending on the schedule. January 1, 1991 Foreign investment review for direct takeovers rises to $100 million; for indirect takeovers, $500 million. Tariffs will continue to drop; the 35% U.S. duty on Canadian shakes and shingles is scheduled to come off. January 1, 1992 Tariffs will have been lifted on another 35% of dutiable goods, including: subway cars telecommunications printed matter engineering paper & paper products furniture paints hardwood plywood explosives aftermarket auto parts chemicals, including resins some meats, including lamb but excluding drugs & cosmetics The embargo on the import of used cars ends, as does the U.S. curb on lottery materials. January 1, 1994 U.S. customs user fees and duty drawbacks in other countries will end. U.S. foreign trade provisions will change to Canada's benefit. New regimes on countervail and antidumping should come into effect. January 1, 1995 Tariffs take another drop. January 1, 1996 There will be another tariff cut. This is the final deadline for Canada and the U.S. to agree on new trade-remedy rules. Production-based duty waivers for production in the auto industry will end. January 1, 1997 Another tariff reduction. January 1, 1998 Tariffs will have ended on remaining goods: most agricultural products steel textiles and apparel appliances softwood plywood beef pleasure craft tires The snapback provisions on vegetables and fresh fruits will remain for another decade. B. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) NAFTA is just beyond the time frame of this volume but, owing to its importance, mention of the Agreement is being made here.

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The three countries concluded their negotiations in August 1992. The Agreement was approved by Parliament at the end of 1992 and by the Congresses of Mexico and the United States at the end of 1993, for implementation as from January 1, 1994. It is basically a Mexican idea and President Salinas de Gortari lobbied particularly vigorously in its favour. Several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean area have expressed an interest in joining. Like the FTA between Canada and the United States, which it closely resembles, NAFTA is an extremely voluminous document containing more than 2,000 articles. In short, the Agreement when fully implemented will eliminate trade and investment barriers among the three countries. It provides for the eventual disappearance, in tranches of five and ten years, of most tariffs on Canadian, Mexican, and United States goods produced by the NAFTA partners and traded among the three countries. While tariffs on some Mexican goods were eliminated on January 1,1994, others will be phased out in five or ten equal annual stages, as provided in the Agreement. A five-year extension to 15 years of tariff protection for certain sensitive products, mainly agricultural, was approved. In the financial services field Canadian and United States banks, for instance, will be able to gradually expand their operations in Mexico and all restrictions will be eliminated within ten years. Tariffs on goods traded between Canada and the United States will continue to be eliminated at the rates negotiated under the FTA, but could be eliminated faster under the NAFTA accelerated tariff elimination process. NAFTA protects the cultural industries of both Canada and Mexico. Canada's Auto Pact with the United States remains intact. Social and health services, as well as the large-scale exportation of water, are exempt from its provisions. Mexico's nationalized petroleum industry is also exempt, on constitutional grounds, although its petro-chemical and related industries are included. Incidentally, in the energy sector, the provisions of the FTA remain unchanged regarding Canada's energy relations with the United States, particularly its stipulation that Canada continue to supply oil and natural gas to the United States in times of emergency or shortages. The Liberal government, elected in the fall of 1993, sought to obtain the same energy protection as Mexico under NAFTA, but was unable to get the United States to agree. Instead, the new government issued a unilateral declaration that Canada would interpret and apply NAFTA's provisions in a way that maximizes energy security for Canadians. However, it did secure an undertaking from the United States to negotiate clear definitions of fair government subsidies and unfair export pricing or dumping within two years. Like the FTA, it contains provisions for the settlement of disputes. The Agreement was strongly opposed in Canada and the United States by groups worried about Mexico's environmental and labour practices and

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procedures, particularly its lower labour costs. With that in mind, as regards the environment, NAFTA allows Canada and the United States to maintain stringent standards, including the right to prohibit imports that fall short of those standards. In addition, as regards labour, in order to protect against actual or threatened injury from increased imports, the Agreement permits the temporary re-imposition of higher pre-NAFTA tariff rates.2 The three-way merchandise trade flows involved in the Agreement are impressive. The 1992 statistics of imports and exports to and from Canada, the United States and Mexico are as follows: Exports (to) Canada Mexico USA (From) Canada $771 million $125.5 billion Mexico $2.8 billion $42.5 billion U.SA $96.6 billion $48.6 billion In Canada, Ontario was vehemently against NAFTA. Quebec, on the other hand, was strongly in favour.

C. FOREIGN INVESTMENT The FTA establishes the parameters prevailing in this field currently. They reflect a political and economic outlook considerably different from that of the Trudeau government, which was a good deal more nationalistic vis-a-vis the United States as regards not only foreign investment, but also energy. Actually, in terms of policy, energy was very closely linked with foreign investment by both the Trudeau and Mulroney governments, the Conservative approach being the less nationalistic. The Trudeau government established a Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) in 1974 to screen foreign investment. It was aimed primarily at the United States.3 Shortly after the elections of 1984, the Mulroney government transformed FIRA into Investment Canada, whose mandate to encourage foreign investment reflected the more pro-American approach of the Conservatives. NOTE: Often, the same statements deal with both investments and energy. To facilitate reading and research, each subject is dealt with separately: foreign investments here and energy in the immediately following section. 40. The Canadian Perspective on Foreign Investment Statement by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, to the Centre for InterAmerican Relations, New York, September 30,198L (Extracts) In 1974, the government established a foreign investment review process, whose task is to screen investment for significant benefit to Canada. You will

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notice that I used the word "screen," not "block." As of August 1981, the Canadian government had an approval rate of applications by American investors of 90.5%, hardly grounds for suggesting that they have been subjected to harsh treatment. In view of the litany of complaints about FIRA, I would like to point out a few facts. Even now, after seven years of the FIRA regime, foreign ownership figures in Canada are at a level which I am sure you will agree would simply not be tolerated in the United States. For example, according to the latest available figures (1976) foreign investment in the U.S. accounted for 5% of the mining industry and 3% of the manufacturing sector. The comparable Canadian levels are 37% and 47%. The contrast is stark. Furthermore, in 1978, non-residents controlled about 30% of all nonfinancial industries in Canada. The comparable U.S. figure was about 2%. Finally, while only two of the 50 largest firms in the United States are foreign-controlled, 19 of the 50 largest firms in Canada are foreign-controlled. I regret bombarding you with these statistics, but I believe that the reason for Canadian action on foreign investment must be clearly understood. No country could allow these levels of foreign investment to continue indefinitely. No country ever has. The essential point is that, having determined that the levels of foreign ownership and control were a concern, Canada chose to deal with the problem totally in accordance with our international undertakings. There has been no question of nationalization, confiscation, or forced sale. Foreign investors have simply been told the conditions under which they would be welcome. And I should emphasize the notion of welcome. Canada needs and wants foreign investment which will benefit all parties concerned. 41. New Climate for Investment Address by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, to the Members of the Economic Club, New York, December 10,1984. (Extracts) My government has embarked on a new direction, which I want to talk to you about tonight. It is my fundamental belief that the challenge to our two countries is to improve and strengthen the mutual benefits from our roles as friends and partners. In 1983, there was a national convention of my party, at which I sought the party leadership. During the campaign that preceded the convention, and in my speech to the convention, I pledged to re-establish that special relationship of trust with the United States and with all our allies. Three months ago, there was a general election, in which I repeatedly stated my intention as head of a new government to restore harmony and cooperation with the United States. The statements that the new government has made were overwhelmingly endorsed by the people of Canada.

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Many U.S. citizens are aware of the similarities between our two countries, a common heritage of individual liberty, shared democratic values, vast commercial links, an immense geography spanning a continent with an open and undefended border. Today, the most noteworthy measure of our relations is in our economic ties—in investment, in trade, in technology flows. Almost one fifth of your exports go to Canada. Canada is the largest trading partner of the United States. The United States is the largest market for Canadian goods, services, and investment. In 1983, total trade between Canada and the United States exceeded $90 billion (U.S.). That amount exceeds by more than $27 billion (U.S.) your trade with Japan. In 1984, Canada-U.S. trade is likely to exceed $110 billion (U.S.). In fact, your trade with Canada exceeded total American trade with Germany, France, and Great Britain by almost $34 billion (U.S.) in 1983. To put it somewhat differently, Canada is the leading trading partner of the United States, and your second largest trading partner is not Germany or Japan, but Ontario, a province of Canada. The restoration of good and sound relationships between our two countries is clearly a top priority. So how should we manage our bilateral affairs. I have suggested several initiatives, both to President Reagan and to his cabinet colleagues. The most important one is yearly meetings between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada: a process already begun. Second, regular meetings of senior ministers to be held alternately in the U.S. and Canada. Third, we favour an accelerated rhythm of bilateral parliamentary and congressional meetings to cover a wide range of topics of interest to our two countries, from steel imports to acid rain. Fourth, our provincial governments can and should meet more frequently with their geographical counterparts in the state governments. During the years preceding the advent of my government, Canada turned inward and interventionist, at a time when the world economy was becoming more interdependent and open. In 1974, we started down that costly path with the Foreign Investment Review Act and, in 1981, we continued this approach with the New Energy Programme. At the same time that Canada was turning inward economically, we were also giving other signals that led our friends and allies to question our commitment to the international agenda. Our support for NATO dropped to an embarrassingly low level, to the point that only tiny Luxembourg was contributing less on zper capita basis than Canada. So these are the main reasons why my government is so committed to rebuilding Canada's image in the world. Our new government has embarked on a fundamental change in our economic direction. Our first priority and most immediate challenge is to restore fiscal responsibility in the federal government. Rising deficits have

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been recorded in each of the last 10 years. Restoring fiscal flexibility will require difficult decisions. And we have begun that process. After only two months in office, we were able to announce expenditure savings and revenue enhancement measures of over $4 billion on an annual $100 billion budget. This is a beginning. The second part of our strategy for economic renewal is that we intend to redefine the role of government itself. Traditionally, government has had a much more activist role in Canada than in the United States. Today's reality, however, is that government in Canada has become much too big. It inhibits and distorts entrepreneurial activity. Some industries are over-regulated; others are over-protected. Getting the economy back on course means that we must adopt an approach that rewards entrepreneurship and risk-taking, and facilitates adjustment to the changing realities of markets and technologies. The third part of our strategy is that we must adopt policies that foster higher investment. One immediate contribution is to change the Foreign Assessment Review Agency. My government has just introduced legislation, the specific purpose of which is to close down the old Foreign Investment Review Agency and to put in place a new body called Investment Canada, whose mandate will be to encourage and facilitate investment in Canada.

Vice-President George Bush in the Speaker's Gallery, HC, Ottawa, 1982, with the Speaker, Hon. Lloyd Francis. (Courtesy Ambassador Francis)

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Investment Canada will be governed by two fundamental operational objectives: first, to facilitate investment in Canada; and second, to limit government intervention in the foreign investment area. Our message is clear: Canada is open for business.

D. ENERGY 42. The Canadian Perspective on Energy Questions Statement by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, to the Centre for InterAmerican Relations, New York, September 13,1981. (Extracts) A succession of Canadian governments have placed great store in conducting relations with the United States on a business-like and case-by-case basis. The emphasis has been on dealing with most bilateral difficulties in a direct and low-key manner. Over the years, the United States has welcomed this rational, problem-solving approach and the state of the relationship reflected this. There have been difficulties. I think of 1971 when the U.S. took a number of national economic policy decisions directed towards trade, the so-called "Nixon shock," which were nothing short of traumatic for Canadian policy-makers at the time, and which subsequently reinforced Canadian determination to strengthen national control over our economy. In the energy field, the cause of much recent anxiety has been the New Energy Programme (NEP). The NEP is founded on three basic principles: security of supply and ultimate independence from the world oil market; opportunity for all Canadians to participate in the energy industry, particularly oil and gas, and fairness, with a pricing and revenue-sharing regime which recognizes the needs and rights of all Canadians with respect to the development of all of Canada's regions. One aspect of the NEP which has been much misunderstood is "Canadianization". The Canadianization objective is really very simple: it is to increase the share of the oil and gas industry owned and controlled by Canadians to 50% of the industry a decade from now. In the strategy adopted to achieve this utterly legitimate objective, the emphasis is on making room for Canadian oil and gas companies in the industry in Canada, not on forcing out foreign companies. We are dealing with an extraordinary situation. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, non-residents owned nearly 80% and controlled over 90% of Canadian oil and gas assets. They also controlled nearly 100% of the assets involved in refining and marketing operations. Canada did not have a single multinational oil company, not even a small one. We did not have a vertically-integrated domestic company, until Petro-Canada acquired Pacific Petroleum in 1978. No other country faced this predicament. Indeed, as I look around, such high levels of foreign ownership are a predicament tolerated by no country,

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period. By 1980, the 74% foreign-owned and 81.5% foreign-controlled Canadian oil and gas industry generated almost a third of all the non-financial sector profits in Canada. Without changes, enormous power and influence in Canada were destined to fall into a few foreign hands. We simply decided that we had to act and act now. But, unlike other countries, Canada has preferred the carrot to the stick. The operations of foreign firms in Canada are still very profitable and, to the extent that they increase Canadian ownership, they can now be even more so. I want to dispel any impression that the NEP has suddenly made the role of foreign firms in the Canadian hydrocarbon industry uncertain and unpredictable. Certainly, the rules of the game have changed from 10, 20, or 30 years ago. Perceptions change; needs change; situations change. Where do they not change? But the changed rules are clear. They can be ignored to the detriment of future balance sheets. Or they can be used advantageously by foreign-owned corporate citizens of Canada who are sensitive to the Canadian environment and to the opportunities there for profitable investment. Many foreign-controlled companies are quietly rearranging their affairs in Canada to take advantage of the NEP and, in so doing, to continue to grow and prosper in Canada 43. New Climate for Energy in Canada Address by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, to the members of the Economic Club of New York, New York, December 10,1984. (Extracts) I would now like to say a few words about the directions we will be taking in the energy sector. The goals of the NEP are commendable: its methods and its results clearly are not. Simply put, the NEP has failed to meet its three stated objectives: fairness, security of supply, and Canadianization. Our immediate objective is to build a dynamic and growing energy sector. We want to reassure investors that Canada's energy sector offers outstanding opportunities to do business. We believe in the discipline of the marketplace.4 We are undertaking now the consultations necessary to remove controls on oil prices in Canada. The same philosophy is being applied to our energy exports. Since November 1st, for example, natural gas has been moving south at market-oriented prices set by the buyers and the sellers, not the government We want to make changes in the back-in, the Crown interest provision which reserves 25% of all interests in Canada lands for the government. Canada was not built by expropriating retroactively other people's property. This practice is odious and shall not be followed by the new government of Canada. Finally, in view of the major changes in the energy price outlook, we will be undertaking a comprehensive review of federal energy taxation. Our

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objective is the ensure that appropriate investment incentives are provided in the taxation system. Canadianization remains an objective. But the system must be fair, and it shall be.

E. DEFENCE Relations with the United States in this sector were on the whole cooperative and friendly during the period under review, particularly from 1984 onwards. The Trudeau government's more nationalistic outlook towards the United States did have some repercussions on defence. For instance, it tended to renew the NORAD agreement for shorter periods of time than the usual five years. It also maintained its opposition to participation in the United States Anti-Ballistic Missile System.5 But it did enter into an agreement with the U.S. to allow the testing of Cruise Missiles in Canada: a policy continued by the Mulroney government. An offer by the Reagan administration to take part in its Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), which became more commonly known as Star Wars, was not taken up by the Mulroney government. The Strategic Defence Initiative, as originally planned, succumbed to tight budgets and high technological costs in the United States, but especially to the reduced military tensions of the Gorbachev era, although research in this sector is continuing. 44. Extension of the NORAD Agreement Communique issued by DEA, Ottawa, May 12,1980. The Acting SSEA today tabled in the HC an Exchange of Notes constituting an agreement between the Governments of Canada and the United States to extend the current North American Air Defence Command Agreement (NORAD) for one year.6 45. Cruise Missiles: Canada's position on testing Open Letter from the PM, Mr. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, to all Canadians, May 9,1983. (Extracts) In recent months I have received a great number of letters and petitions protesting against the possible testing of Cruise Missiles in Canadian territory. In recent years, the Soviet Union has deployed hundreds of new SS-20 missiles, each equipped with three nuclear warheads, capable of reaching all the great cities of Western Europe. That the Soviet people have not protested against this action of their leaders surprises no one. What is surprising, however, is that those in the West who are opposed to nuclear weapons have remained relatively silent about the installation of the SS-20s. In contrast, they are now taking to the streets to oppose the possible deployment of American Pershing II and Cruise Missiles to protect Europe against the Soviet nuclear threat.

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What is particularly surprising in Canada is to see protesters opposing the possible testing of Cruise Missiles in Canadian territory, but not opposing the fact that similar missiles are already being tested in the Soviet Union, as was confirmed in December by General-Secretary Andropov. Because people in the free world feel powerless to influence the leaders of the USSR, there is a great temptation to direct the whole force of their anguish and their protests against the only decision-makers who are sensitive to public opinion, namely the leaders of the democratic countries. Because the strategy of suffocation I proposed at UNSSOD I, in the name of Canada, was rejected by the Soviet Union as evidenced by the continued deployment of the SS-20s, there was no question of its acceptance by the NATO countries alone. That is why we allied ourselves with the "two-track" strategy of our NATO allies. Those two tracks are to seek to negotiate the removal of the SS-20s and, at the same time, to prepare for the deployment of new American missiles in Europe so as to pressure the Soviet Union towards serious negotiations. I hope that my explanation of our policy will have established that, were we able to collaborate in testing the guidance system of the Cruise Missiles, it would be because of our solidarity with the other Western democracies, in a world which had turned a deaf ear to our suggested strategy of suffocation. Having supported the two-track strategy, Canada should bear its fair share of the burden which that policy imposes on the NATO alliance.7 46. Star Wars Summary of introductory remarks by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, during a press conference, September 7,1985. On March 26, the United States invited Canada and other friendly countries to participate directly in research under the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). After careful and detailed consideration, the government has concluded that Canada's own policies and priorities do not warrant a government-to-government effort in support of SDI research. Although Canada does not intend to participate on a government-to-government basis in the SDI research programme, private companies and institutions interested in the programme will continue to be free to do so. As stated in the HC on January 21, by the SSEA, this government believes that SDI research by the United States is both consistent with the ABM Treaty and prudent in light of significant advances in Soviet research and deployment of the world's only existing ballistic missile defence system. I conveyed the government's decision to the President of the United States today and informed him of this. I had discussed it, as you might imagine, with my caucus and my cabinet. And that is our position with regard to this particular item.

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F. ENVIRONMENT Acid rain and water pollution, affecting the Great Lakes and other shared waterways, were the main environmental preoccupations which governments, whether federal or provincial, addressed particularly vigorously since 1977 in Canada's relations with the United States. The Reagan administration's rather detached approach to environmental concerns, which tended to drown acid rain, for instance, in scientific and statistical studies, did not of course make matters easier for Canada. So it is pleasant to note that the Bush government was more mindful of the problem and willing to do something about it. The United States Clean Air Act was signed into law by President Bush on November 15,1990. Mr. Mulroney and he signed the Canada-United States Air Quality Control Accord on March 13, 1991. This bilateral accord builds on the Clean Air Act and on the Canadian Acid Rain Control Programme of 1985. In addition to the control of acid rain precursors, the Accord provides for the prevention of air quality deterioration from transboundary air pollution, as well as the protection of parks and wilderness areas. This legislation has done much to improve matters regarding trans-border air quality problems generally. Likewise, there is progress to be reported since 1977 regarding water pollution. The quality of Great Lakes water is improving, thanks in great part to the Great Lakes Water Quality Treaty and the vigilance of the International Joint Commission. Several problems documented in earlier volumes, such as the Garrison Diversion, the flooding of the Skagit Valley, have been solved or are well on the way to being so. However, the Chicago Diversion, as well as East and, particularly West Coast, pollution by oil tankers, are still matters for concern. Nevertheless, progress has been such that at the outset of the 1990s much less is heard about the environment as shared with the United States than at the outset of the 1980s. 47. Acid Rain: A serious bilateral issue Address by the Minister of the Environment, Mr. John Roberts, to the Air Pollution Control Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, June 21, 1982. In Canada we are deeply disappointed with the state of negotiations between my country and the United States on acid rain. The foot dragging and interference in the development of scientific information has reached frustrating proportions. The Reagan Administration's rejection of our proposal to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions in eastern North America by 50% by 1990 and a clear indication that it may be some considerable time before it will be able even to begin to discuss control actions are a bitter pill for us to swallow.

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Remarks I made some time ago in favour of acid rain control were encapsulated in an October 16, 1981 editorial in the Washington Post: . . . Enough is known about acid rain to put an end to the debate over whether the phenomenon is real, man-made, and damaging. It is all three. The important area for action now is how best to go about reducing sulphur and nitrogen oxide emissions, and how fast. Yet, incredible as is may seem to you scientists and experts in the field, there are those who still insist that acid rain poses no immediate threat, and that it should be a subject merely for further research, not quick action. Are we justified in taking immediate action. The answer can only be yes. Canada is already doing a lot to curtail acid rain. Of course we must do a lot more, and we are prepared to do so. In February of this year, my provincial colleagues and I committed ourselves to reduce sulphate deposition by 20 kilograms per hectare a year by 1990. We urged the United States to initiate control programmes also. I will be the first to admit that Canada does not have clean hands when it comes to acid rain. Yet in Canada, as a whole, 50% of our acid rain originates in the United States. In Ontario, as much as 75%. On the Canadian Shield, the area most sensitive to acid rain, tourism is a $700 million a year industry. Tourists do not like dead fish and dead lakes. In eastern Canada damage to buildings and other structures caused by corrosion from acid rain is conservatively estimated at $500 million annually. Our fresh water fisheries, our eastern forest products industry, are all seriously threatened by acid rain. This, very briefly, is the Canadian case against acid rain. The gravity of the problem has been recognized by both our countries and the need for swift action has been embodied in the U.S./Canada Memorandum of Intent. This document, if lived up to, will set us well on the way towards eliminating cooperatively the threat in the only way that matters: reducing—at source— the pollution that causes it. Canadians are disappointed with developments in the United States. We find that regulations in the United States are being relaxed, with two excuses. First, that ambient air quality standards are being met or improved. But air quality is by definition, local. It is not a standard relevant to longrange pollution transportation. Second, we are told that existing regulations permit exemptions. That is not what we expected when we signed the Memorandum of Intent.

48. The Quebec Summit Joint Statement on the Environment: March 18,1985 During their tete-d-tete, the President and the Prime Minister discussed environmental matters at some length. They took note of the 75-year history

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of environmental cooperation between the two countries as exemplified by the Boundary Waters Treaty, the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, and the recent Skagit River-Ross Dam Treaty. They expressed their determination to continue to deal with U.S.-Canadian environmental issues in a responsible and cooperative spirit. In the spirit of cooperation, and in recognition that the actions of one country are of concern to the other, there was agreement that a high level Special Envoy would be appointed by each government to examine the acid rain issue and report back to the President and Prime Minister by their next meeting. The Envoys will: a) Pursue consultation on laws and regulations that bear on pollutants thought to be linked to acid rain; b) Enhance cooperation in research efforts, including clean-fuel technology and smelter controls; c) Pursue means to increase the exchange of relevant scientific information; and d) Identify efforts to improve the U.S and Canadian environment.8

G. FISHERIES Maritime boundaries and fishing problems with the United States were centered mainly in the Georges Bank area of the Gulf of Maine. They stemmed largely from the extension in 1977 by both countries of fisheries jurisdictions from 12 to 200 miles, as sanctioned by the UN Law of the Sea Convention. This extension of jurisdictions caused two problems. The first was how to draw the boundaries between the fishing-zones of the two countries and how to deal with fishing in the disputed area pending an agreement on the boundaries. The second resulted from the fact that large areas that had previously been high seas, where both countries had fished, now fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of either Canada or the United States. Despite fisheries and boundaries agreements signed by both countries in 1979, settling most problems, it was not possible to reach an understanding on the Gulf of Maine boundaries. The parties agreed to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice in The Hague for a binding settlement Its decision was announced in October 1984. Both the agreements with the United States and the Court's decision are documented below. 49. Canada/U.S. Fisheries and Boundary Agreements DEA communique, Ottawa, March 29,1979. Four agreements will be signed with the United States this afternoon: two relating to the Atlantic Coast and two concerning the Pacific Coast.

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The East Coast Fishery Resource Agreement establishes a Canada-U.S. Fisheries Commission and provides for cooperative management, and for access and entitlements, to specific stocks of mutual concern. The Treaty to submit the delimitation of the maritime boundary of the Gulf of Maine to binding dispute settlement and the Special Agreement provide for the submission of the dispute to a five judge Chamber of the International Court of Justice for a final decision on the placement of the boundary. The two Pacific Coast Agreements include a Protocol to the International Pacific Halibut Convention, which will permit continued Canadian access to halibut off the coast of Alaska for the next two years and an Exchange of Notes giving the United States access to groundfish off British Columbia for a similar period. 50. Gulf of Maine Boundary Case Opening Statement by the Minister of Justice, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, to the IJC, The Hague, April 2,1984. (Extracts) Canada has claimed less than half of the Georges Bank, since it first began to issue oil and gas permits in the Gulf of Maine area in 1964. The United States has claimed the whole of the Bank since 1976. The difference in the extent of the claims of Canada and the United States is thus more than a simple quantitative difference. Whatever may be the outcome of the present proceedings, the United States will not cease to be present on Georges Bank, since the Canadian claim leaves more than half the Bank to the United States. If the Court were to accept the U.S. claim, however, the result would be Canada's eviction from the Bank as a whole. The boundary proposed by Canada for the Gulf of Maine is a reasonable and balanced one whose origins date back to 1964. It results from the application of the law to geography. Its equitable character is confirmed by nongeographical relevant circumstances that are rooted in legal principles proper to the zones to be delimited. The conduct of the parties attests to these facts.9 51. Gulf of Maine Case: International Court's decision Summary of DBA communique, October 12,1984. Although the full implications for Canada of the Court's decision are still being examined, the Ministers concerned with the case have noted with satisfaction that the boundary confirms Canadian jurisdiction over a substantial part of Georges Bank. In accordance with the terms of the Special Agreement, both parties have accepted that the decision of the Court is final and binding. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans is currently notifying Canadian fishermen of the geographical coordinates of the new boundary.

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The case centered in a dispute over the rich fishery resources and the potential hydrocarbon resources of Georges Bank, a large detached bank lying seaward of the Gulf of Maine off the coasts of Nova Scotia and Massachusetts. H. ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY There is one particular problem in Canada's relations with the United States, which is of very long standing but rather spasmodic occurrence: transit through the Northwest Passage. The United States does not recognize Canada's sovereignty over these waters. For Canada, they are internal waters. The United States claims that they are international waters and every so often sends a ship through. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the United States tanker Manhattan and two icebreakers went through, the Trudeau government dealt with the issue by passing legislation which made it clear that the Northwest Passage was open for the passage of shipping of all nations, but subject to conditions required to protect the delicate balance of the Canadian Arctic.10 In 1985, when the U.S. Coast Guard vessel Polar Sea went through, the response took a rather different turn. The Mulroney government opted inter alia to build a Polar Class 8 icebreaker, the largest of its kind in the world, to assert sovereignty over the Passage by keeping it open.11 52. Voyage of the Polar Sea Summary ofDEA communique, Ottawa, July 31,1985. The SSEA announced today that Canada had authorized the United States Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea to conduct a voyage through Canada's Arctic archipelago between August 1 and 15,1985. The voyage will proceed with Canadian support and participation. Canada and the United States have consulted closely regarding plans and arrangements for the voyage. The Government of Canada was informed of plans for the proposed voyage by the Government of the United States on May 21. In conveying this information, the U.S. proposed that the entire voyage proceed on a cooperative basis with Canadian participation on board the Polar Sea. While the United States has made known that it does not share Canada's view regarding the status of these waters, it has assured the Government of Canada that the purpose of the voyage is solely operational. The United States has also advised that the transit and preparations for it are without prejudice to the position of either country regarding the Northwest Passage. It is on this basis that consultations and the exchange of information proceeded and that Canada agreed to cooperate in the voyage. At the same time, however, the Government of Canada expressed to the United Sates its deep regret that the United States over a period of many years has been unwilling to accept Canada's sovereignty over the waters of the Arctic archipelago.

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53. Policy on Canadian Sovereignty in the Arctic Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, in the HC, September 10,1985. (Extracts) The voyage of the Polar Sea demonstrated that Canada, in the past, had not developed the means to ensure our sovereignty over time. During that voyage, Canada's legal claim was protected, but when we looked for tangible ways to exercise our sovereignty we found that our cupboard was nearly bare. The policy of this government is to maintain the natural unity of the Canadian Arctic archipelago. Arctic sovereignty has long been upheld by Canada. No previous government, however, has defined its precise limits or delineated Canada's internal waters and territorial sea. This government proposes to do so. In summary, these are the measures we are announcing today: 1) Immediate adoption of an Order-in-Council establishing straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago, to be effective January 1, 1986; 2) Immediate adoption of a Canadian Laws Offshore Application Act; 3) Immediate talks with the United States on cooperation in Arctic waters, on the basis of full respect for Canadian sovereignty; 4) An immediate increase of surveillance overflights of our Arctic waters by aircraft of the Canadian Armed Forces, and immediate planning for Canadian naval activity in the Eastern Arctic in 1986; 5) The immediate withdrawal of the 1970 reservation to Canada's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the IJC; 6) Construction of a Polar Class 8 icebreaker. Notes 1

Chapter I of Canada's Department of External Affairs (The Institute of Public Affairs of Canada and McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990) gives an excellent account of Canada's relations with the United States before 1909.

2

The handiest summary of NAFTA is contained in DEA's News Release No. 165 of August 12,1992. DEA also published two useful booklets about it in 1992. They are NAFTA: At a glance and NAFTA. What's it all about? The trilateral trade figures are from the latter publication and are based on data from Statistics Canada and the U.S. Department of Commerce. A.E.B. II, pages 93-99; documents the Foreign Investment Review Act creating FIRA. The Trudeau government also paid a good deal of attention to the European Community at this time, with which it entered into a Framework Agreement (in force in 1976), seeking to encourage investment and trade from that source in order to strengthen the Canadian economy and offset dependence

3

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upon the United States. (A.E.B II, pages 225-226, provides background regarding the Framework Agreement). It derived from its "Third Option." (See A.E.B. II, pages 106-112). The Third Option did not produce the hoped-for results, nor did the Framework Agreement with the EC. Canada's trade with Europe has not kept up since then with that with the United States, either in terms of size or overall proportion. 4 In 1991, the government sold 30% of its holdings in Petro Canada to the public, in keeping with its policy of privatizing Crown corporations. 5 See A.E.B. II, pages 82 and 99-103. 6 A.E.B. I, pages 155-162, gives the basic terms of the NORAD Agreement. NORAD was renewed in 1981,1986,1991 and runs currently until 1996. On the occasion of the renewal of NORAD on March 11, 1981, the name "North American Aerospace Defence Command" (NORAD) was adopted as better reflecting the defence situation facing the two countries today. Incidentally, the 1986 agreement dropped a clause which specified that Canada's NORAD role excluded participation in an anti-ballistic missile arrangement. 7 An agreement between Canada and the U.S. for testing Cruise Missiles in Canadian territory was signed on February 10, 1983. DEA communique of July 15, 1983, provides details about the agreement and testing stipulations. A useful booklet Cruise Missiles: Background, Technology, and Verification, was published (undated, but probably 1989) by and is available from DEA. 8 Foot-dragging of this sort prevailed until the end of the Reagan administration, despite persistent efforts by SSEA Clark and the Canadian Embassy in Washington to get things moving. 9 During his address, Dr. MacGuigan presented a detailed historical, legal, and technical justification of Canada's position at this point, citing many precedents and authorities. Owing to space considerations, it is not possible to give the full text of his lengthy address. It is available from DEA, Ottawa. 10 See A.E.B. II, pages 280-285. 11 The icebreaker project, an extremely costly initiative, did not survive subsequent budget cuts.

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IV

THE FAR EAST

Oince 1977, trade has continued to be the main thrust of Canada's relations with the Far East. This has been true of Japan for many years and, currently, also of the rapidly emerging industrial states of East and Southeast Asia, colloquially known as the Tigers. Ten of Canada's top export markets are now Asia-Pacific economies. Canada trades as much with Japan today as it does with Britain, France, and Germany combined. In 1985, Japanese direct investment in Canada reached $5,7 billion and its holdings of portfolio investments amounted to $49 billion. Both have since increased. Despite vigorous efforts by ministers, officials, the business community, the pattern of Canadian trade with the Far East has not changed much over the years. For the most part, Canada is still exporting raw materials to Japan, while importing finished products. Generally, the same pattern holds true of our trade with Hong Kong, Korea, and the six countries forming ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Canadian imports from Japan and other Asian countries are largely labour-intensive. Most Canadian exports to Asia are not. While basic Canadian policy is aimed at increasing exports to all Pacific Rim countries as much as possible, it is constantly accompanied by reminders that the trade mix should change: that a higher proportion of Canadian manufactured goods and technological products, for instance, should be imported and not just our wheat, coal, or lumber. A particular problem with Japan during this period was its exports of automobiles to Canada. The importation of Japanese automotive vehicles became the subject of regular, often annual, "understandings," whereby it was mutually agreed that exports of Japanese passenger cars to Canada would not exceed a set number of units over a given period of time, usually one year. As for China, trade is also a dominant feature of the relationship, although not on the same scale as Japan. Towards the end of the 1980s, it had become seriously affected by human rights considerations as the authorities in Beijing cracked down on what it branded as "dissidents." They were mainly students and other young people who were seeking to foster the development of democratic practices and institutions in their country. 81

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A. CANADA AND THE PACIFIC RIM 54. Canada: a Pacific Rim Country Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the Asia Pacific Foundation, Vancouver, October 22,1988. (Extracts) Asia is on the move. For Canada, the changes are real, fundamental, and of direct national concern. Canada is a Pacific Rim country. Today, the Asia-Pacific region accounts for some 43% of our non-USA trade, compared to 34% for Europe. Five years ago, the figures were reversed. A full fifty percent of our immigration now comes directly or indirectly from Asia. Investment from Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan is growing rapidly: in the automobile industry, in resources, pulp and paper, in electronics and advanced technologies. It results in more jobs, new technologies, and a more promising future for our children. Japanese tourists have increased by some 450% over the past five years. They are the highest-spending visitors we have. The Government is responding actively to the opportunities that Asia offers to Canada: We have developed and implemented national strategies for managing our relations with Japan, China, and India; We have opened new offices in Osaka, Shanghai, Bombay, and Auckland; We have applauded the opening of the Taiwan trade office of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce; We have established effective mechanisms for cooperation with ASEAN; In Japan, we have pursued new initiatives in financial services and investment promotion, in scientific collaboration and technology transfer. In 1986, we signed a science and technology agreement with Japan; We have embarked on a programme to open up new air services to the Asia-Pacific region. There are five broad areas where we should be developing new programmes aimed at making Canada an important economic and political partner to Japan and other key countries in the Asia-Pacific region. First, we must improve the teaching of Asian studies in Canada, particularly languages and culture. That includes every aspect of Asian society: history, culture, economics, language, politics, the way they think and the way they act. In Australia, today, more than ten times as many young people are studying Japanese as in Canada. The U.S., Britain, France, Germany, outpace us as well. Second, we need more effective scientific and technological cooperation.

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Third, we must strengthen the trade and investment efforts that we began with the National Trade Strategy.1 Fourth, we need more programmes to help Canadians learn about Asia and vice-versa. For example, we should encourage and assist research on Asia-Pacific issues by our universities and foundations; fund visits to Canada by young Asian leaders and prominent journalists; support internships by young Canadians in Japan and vice-versa. The final element, I believe we should be pursuing is the question of Pacific institutionalization. There is no Pacific equivalent to the network of North Atlantic organizations and institutions that link the European and North American countries politically, economically, and in the preservation of peace. 55. Canadian Partnership in Pacific 2000 Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the Corporate Higher Education Forum, Edmonton, May 16,1989. (Synopsis) The Pacific 2000 programme comprises: a) A Trade Strategy designed to maintain and improve our market share; b) A Japan Science and Technology Fund; c) An Asian Languages and Awareness Fund; and d) A Pacific 2000 Projects Fund, which will offer support to Canadian activities in the region. Canada's objectives as a player whose trans-Pacific economic, political security, and cultural links are expanding dramatically are: a) Mustering support for liberalized global trade; b) Promoting common disciplines and rules on trade, investment, technology transfer, and intellectual property; c) Research and analysis of regional economic growth; d) Engaging in scientific cooperation in areas of common interest; and e) Ensuring that the Pacific Rim countries are integrated into the international economy. The responsibility to meet the challenges which the Asia Pacific region offers belongs to all of us: Government, private sector, and academic community.

B. JAPAN 56. Canada and Japan Statement by Mr. R. L. Rogers, Director General, Asian and Pacific Affairs, DEA, Ottawa, to the Canadian Committee of the Pacific Basin Economic Council. April 4,1977. (Extracts) Policies designed to improve the standard of living and to increase economic opportunities in the Pacific area have been fundamental to Canadian efforts.

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Political, economic, and commercial cooperation is being promoted bilaterally. On the multilateral front, organizations established to assist in promoting greater stability, such as the Asian Development Bank, are being supported by the Canadian Government. In order to realize Canadian objectives in the Pacific, our efforts include the following: 1) Intergovernmental consultations on a range of issues; 2) Expansion of trade relations; 3) Encouragement of investment and joint ventures; 4) Refinement of development assistance programmes. Specifically, in the case of Japan, the policy centrepiece was the signing by Prime Minister Trudeau and Prime Minister Miki, in Tokyo, in October 1976 of the Framework for Economic Cooperation. The Framework is intended to facilitate bilateral economic cooperation rather than simply attempting to redress the pattern of the trade "mix" between the two countries. The provisions of the Framework are quite similar in nature to those of the Contractual Link with the European Community.2 They fall under three main headings: 1) The development of trade; 2) The development of economic cooperation; 3) Consultative arrangements. Under the "development of trade" heading, the two governments affirm their commitment to promote the development and diversification of commercial exchanges, to expand trade and to minimize the problems of supply and market access. The "development of economic cooperation heading" is from Canada's point of view the key element of the document. It calls on the two parties to encourage and facilitate: 1) Cooperation between their respective industries, for example, joint ventures; 2) Cooperation in the development and marketing of resources and processed and manufactured goods, including those with a high technology content; 3) Greater stability in the production and supply of agricultural products; 4) Increased and mutually-beneficial investment. The "consultative arrangements" provide for the establishment of a Joint Economic Committee, composed of ministers and senior officials, who would normally meet once a year to review the progress of the Framework's implementation and to discuss economic issues of a bilateral and multilateral nature of interest to both. The signing of the Framework has created a cooperative atmosphere in which officials and businessmen can now conduct their activities, but it

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should be stressed that it is basically a framework and it will be up to the private sector, in particular, to give it substance. Provincial governments must also be involved and considerable effort is being expended to secure their cooperation.

C. CHINA 57. Canada and China Speech by the Minister for International Trade, Ms. Pat Carney, to the Canada-China Trade Council Vancouver, December 12,1986. (Extracts) When the new government took power in 1984, we were determined to turn Canada's economy around. Canada is a trading nation and we naturally focused on expanding international markets as the main engine of our economy. We therefore undertook a series of discussions with the provinces and the private sector and established the National Trade Strategy. Its objective is to revitalize the Canadian economy and to create more jobs in Canada by increasing Canada's success in the international market place. As part of the Strategy, we determined that we should focus our efforts on priority markets. The first of these is, of course, the United States, our largest trading partner. The expanding economies of the Pacific Rim represent the other priority focus of our trade policy. Canada is a Pacific Rim nation. In 1985, for the first time, our total exports to the region were greater than those to West and East Europe combined. This trend has continued, making it our second most important market area. There are four messages that I bring to you today. The first is that our policy of expanding trade relations with China is an integral part of the government's focus on trade. The second is that we have established some major new tools to help the private sector in trading with China. The third is that the market in China for British Columbia remains exciting. The fourth is that China is a tough market to penetrate, but attention to some basic guidelines will help. China has been chosen as a priority market within our Trade Strategy. Why China? The reason is simple. China is our fifth largest export market. Of all the countries seeking to ensure themselves a place in the Chinese market, Canada is the first largest supplier to that country. In order to provide more tools and a better framework for our commercial success in China, we have expanded contacts at the highest levels in both governments. Senior Chinese ministers have provided us with some advice for Canadian firms wishing to increase their relations with China. I would like to pass them on to you:

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Canadian firms do not appreciate the huge size of the Chinese market for power projects. Canadians do not understand the cut-throat nature of international competition in China. Canadian firms will not be able to sell to China without the support of the Canadian Government to put forward a Canadian team approach to China. We have taken a number of steps to encourage a team approach to China and to ensure that competitive tools are available. We have decided to provide financing for projects in China. We have concluded a double taxation agreement with China. We have funded studies by Canadian firms on projects in China where downstream benefits can create jobs in Canada. Some of these are already paying off in the hydroelectric and industrial fields. We have put these tools in place to make Canada more competitive in China, and the emphasis is on competition. What we have done is necessary but not sufficient It ensures that the door to China is as open to us as to others. We are fifth in China, and fifth has to try harder, to be more active in pursuing the market, to have the right technology and products, and to offer the best price. There is another requirement. We must work closely together. China is a difficult, but not impossible market. The keys to opening it up are: preparation, approach, perseverance, and patience. Do your homework in advance. Try to understand the inter-relationships of Chinese organizations of interest to you. Find out where the decision-making authority is. Use all the contacts you can. City and provincial "twinning links" have proven helpful. Be willing, indeed eager, to include existing Chinese capabilities and components in your bids. Be ready to make available some technology transfer and training. The Chinese are in a hurry to develop.

58. The Situation in China Statement in the by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, during an Emergency Debate on the Situation in China, January 5,1989. (Extracts) We have watched a country's armed forces turn on its citizens in an indiscriminate and brutal fashion. We have seen unarmed students and citizens gunned down and over-run by tanks. How could this have happened? We had hoped and believed that China was on the road to extensive and fundamental reform. During the past few years we have seen welcome change on the political front, even if the depth of political reform has been somewhat less than in the economic area. We have seen more freedom of the press, more freedom of speech, more freedom of travel and of association, more flexible policies on emigration, and even some tentative signs of willingness to accept legitimate political expression through vehicles other than the Communist Party. Indeed, the last few weeks of political difficulty were in some ways a great signal of the strides China had seemed to have taken.

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Trade (later External Relations) Minister Jean-Luc Pepin with Premier Chou En-lai of China. (Courtesy Hon. J.-L. Pepin)

When the tanks and troops moved into Tiananmen Square on Saturday night, it was clear that the forces of darkness—not of light—had triumphed. Canada has not been alone in calling on the Chinese leadership to stop the carnage and to return to peaceful methods to resolve their political crisis. Most Western governments, governments from around the world, even Communist parties in other countries, have joined in condemning the brutality of the methods chosen to clear Tiananmen Square. In assessing the action which should accompany our condemnation of the violence and killings, we must bear in mind the need to safeguard Canadian lives. At the time of the outbreak of violence, there were approximately six hundred Canadians resident in China. In addition, there were a number of business visitors and tourists scattered around the country. Our first concern, because of the violence, has been the security of Canadians in the capital. We have put in place arrangements whereby aircraft can be made available to us at short notice for evacuating Canadians to nearby Asian cities and onward transportation arrangements are being explored.

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With respect to bilateral actions, we have already deferred or cancelled all events planned for the immediate future. We have postponed the signing of a series of memoranda of understanding on development assistance projects. We are advising the provinces and non-governmental organizations with planned consultations with Chinese counterparts to follow suit. We have suspended nuclear cooperation consultations. High-level visits will be deflected to more appropriate times. At the multilateral level, Canada fully supports the statement issued by the Secretary General of the United Nations today calling for Chinese moderation and restraint. With respect to the large numbers of Chinese students in Canada—I believe there are some forty-five hundred here at the moment—we will be sympathetic to any requests for extending their stay until calm returns to their homeland. Some countries have announced the suspension of programmes of bilateral military cooperation and military sales to China. Canada does not have any such formal arrangements. I can assure you, however, that the government would not grant export permits for military sales of any sort in the current situation. And I have asked that the modest programme of defence relations between the Canadian Armed Forces and the People's Liberation Army be suspended immediately.

D. HONG KONG 59. Trade Action Plan for Hong Kong News Release by Ms. Pat Carney, Minister for International Trade, March 1,1988, at the Annual Meeting of the Hong Kong/Canada Business Association. The Trade Action Plan has four main objectives: 1) To increase Canadian awareness of the size, openness, and Western style business environment present in Hong Kong; 2) To encourage Canadian exporters to take advantage of the active Hong Kong re-export market as a gateway to many major Asian markets; 3) To position Canadian businesses in Hong Kong in order to enhance our trading prospects with China; and 4) To increase business relationships with Hong Kong entrepreneurs. Hong Kong is the third largest import market in Asia, as well as the world's busiest container port and sixth most active air freight terminal. In 1987, Hong Kong recorded 12% growth in GNP and a 40% growth in imports. In 1986, Canada ranked only 23rd among suppliers to the Hong Kong market, although since 1977 Canadian exports to Hong Kong have increased more than seven-fold, to an annual total of nearly $500 million in 1988.

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E. KOREA 60. Canada and Korea

Address by the Minister for International Trade, Mr. James Kelleher, to the Canada-Korea and the Korea-Canada Business Councils, Vancouver, Octobers, 1985. (Extracts) I am very pleased to note that over the past year the Korean Government has launched a number of measures to open up its market for foreign investment. The recent revisions in its Foreign Capital Investment Act, providing for new investment incentives and tax benefits, were particularly welcome. Let me touch on some of the opportunities for Korean investors in Canada. You are all aware that we have scrapped FIRA, the old Foreign Investment Agency, and replaced it with Investment Canada. The mandate of the new Agency is to attract new investment and the opportunities are broad. They range from entrepreneurial immigration through joint venture production to corporate investment. Corporate investment can of course serve a variety of strategic purposes: the simple acquisition of equity, securing long-term supplies of raw materials, or business development to gain export access. We encourage them all. Industrial cooperation, in fact, is an important element of our export development strategy for Korea, as is clear from the recently signed Joint Industrial and Economic Understanding between the two governments. This will mean that both Canada and Korea will allocate more resources to support private sector efforts to take advantage of the opportunities made possible by the Joint Understanding. And now is the time to do so. There is a push on in Korea to diversify the economy into high technology and export-oriented products. So let me call on Canadian companies to make their own push into this market. Another exciting possibility is cooperation in the construction of nuclear reactors in third countries. However, the subject of trade imbalance between our two countries is a matter for concern. It has now grown to proportions that can no longer be defended. Korea has argued in favour of improved access in the Canadian market for automobiles, footwear, textiles and clothing. We have argued for improved access in Korea for Canadian products where we are particularly competitive. We are waiting expectantly for results. In total frankness, it will become increasingly difficult to look favourably on Korea's further commercial aspirations in the Canadian market unless Canada can be encouraged by new inroads in some of the sectors we are trying hard to penetrate, sectors in which we are totally confident that we can compete. Let me mention some specifics. Korea now applies a 20% tariff on softwood lumber. There is a 40% tariff on canola seeds. There is also an outright

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embargo on canola oil. There is a de facto import ban on alfalfa. For Canada, penetration of these markets, and for the markets for many of our manufactured goods, is essential to restore the imbalance in our trade and to increase the ratio of value-added products in our exports to Korea. R ASEAN 61. Canada and ASEAN Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, during the "Six-plus One"meeting of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, Jakarta, July 28,1990. (Extracts) Both Canada and ASEAN can be very pleased with the efforts of our private sectors in advancing trade and investments between us. Bilateral trade reached $3 billion in 1989, more than double the level of 1986. Bilateral investments present a similar picture. The value of Canadian investment in ASEAN reached $1,5 billion in 1989, up from $800 million in 1980. I am particularly disappointed that we have not seen more ASEAN investment in Canada, despite the opportunities resulting from the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement. What governments do best is to develop frameworks for trade and investment. Canada initiated bilateral trade consultations with ASEAN governments in the spring, focusing particularly on market access issues with the multilateral trade negotiations now going on. The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round offers the best means of advancing long-term prospects of greater trade between Canada and ASEAN.3 Notes 1

2

3

Document No. 99, below, gives a summary of the Mulroney government's National Trade Strategy. See A.E.B. II, pages 221-226, for background and details regarding Canada's commercial and other arrangements with the European Community (now known as the European Union). ASEAN Foreign Ministers began, in 1980, to invite Canada along with certain other "dialogue countries" to attend their Post-Ministerial Conference, an annual meeting of consultation between the ASEAN Foreign Ministers and their counterparts from "dialogue countries" or "partners": hence the "Six-plus-One" formula. The formula can vary, depending upon the number of dialogue countries or "partners" present. Currently, there are seven dialogue countries: Australia, Canada, the European Community, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the United States.

V

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY

1 he Free Trade Agreements with the United States and Mexico, documented above, have of course dominated the Canadian economic horizon recently. However, Canada's trade and investment interests are world-wide and go well beyond the limits of North America. In this respect, two developments of major importance for Canada took place during the period covered by this book. Both stemmed from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), namely, the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of multilateral tariff and trade negotiations. A. BASIC ECONOMIC POLICY: THE TOKYO AND URUGUAY ROUNDS The Tokyo Round of multilateral tariff and trade negotiations was launched in Tokyo in 1973. It was concluded on April 12, 1979. It was a sequel to the Kennedy Round of similar GATT negotiations, which began in the early 1960s.1 The general objective of both Rounds was to achieve the expansion and greater liberalization of world trade, including better rules and procedures against unfair trading practices. The negotiations focused on both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, and on agriculture and fisheries, as well as industrial products. Provincial governments and the private sector participated in the preparations for the negotiations, notably as regards agriculture, fisheries, and industry. Labour, business, and consumer groups were also consulted. Generally, the results of the Tokyo Round represented a significant step forward at the time in dealing with tariff and non-tariff barriers. New and expanded trade opportunities were opened up. Canadian tariffs were gradually reduced for most products in such a way as to ensure the competitive strengths and potential of the Canadian economy. The Tokyo Round led the way, eventually, to the Uruguay Round, launched at Punta del Este in Uruguay in September 1986 after the recession of the early 1980s. The Uruguay Round sought to further improve its predecessor's results in many of the same sectors and encountered many of 91

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the same difficulties, notably, in the field of agriculture, but also in certain new ones, such as services and intellectual property. 62. The Tokyo Round Synopsis produced by DEA, Ottawa, in 1979.

Canada's objectives in the Tokyo Round were: General 1) To influence the outcome in directions which would favour the development of Canadian agriculture, industry, and fisheries, and the growth of national income through broader, more profitable, and more certain export opportunities, while ensuring that an appropriate level of Canadian tariff protection was maintained and that Canada would be able, consistent with international rules, to deal adequately with unfair or disruptive import competition. 2) Through a successful round of negotiations, to help to avoid a breakdown in international trading arrangements and the consequent rise in protectionism and trade restrictions. 3) To work towards an improved and more certain trading framework, including a better set of arrangements with developing countries. Specific 1) To secure a substantial further reduction in the level of foreign tariffs facing Canadian exports and potential exports. 2) To secure an enlargement of the area of trade where Canadian products can enter foreign markets duty-free, including the United States. 3) To eliminate, reduce, and progressively bring under control non-tariff barriers inhibiting Canadian exports. 4) To achieve through reductions in foreign tariff and non- tariff barriers enhanced opportunities for investment and production in Canada of more highly-processed materials and foodstuffs as well as manufactured goods. 5) To make reductions in the level of Canadian tariffs on end products, materials, and intermediate goods as appropriate to a more competitive international environment. 6) To limit tariff concessions in areas of particular employment and import sensitivity such as textiles and footwear. 7) To ensure that agreed reductions in Canadian protection would be phased in over a sufficiently long time period to permit orderly adjustments to the new trading environment. 8) To achieve desirable changes in international trading rules with respect to countervailing duties, antidumping duties, and emergency action against imports. 9) To achieve a mix of gains in foreign markets and concessions in Canadian tariff and non-tariff barriers which would represent a reasonable result from the point of view of the different Canadian provinces and regions.2

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63. The Uruguay Round: a summary of Canadian objectives Statement by the Minister for International Trade, Ms. Pat Carney, to the National Press Club, Ottawa, March 27,1987. (Extracts) Canada's objectives in the Uruguay Round can be summarized as follows: 1) We want to stop the drift of protectionism and the use of predatory trade practices; 2) We want improved access to foreign markets; 3) We want reform of the rules for agricultural trade, particularly as regards subsidy practices; 4) We want to tighten up the use of trade-remedy laws; 5) We want to strengthen the effectiveness of the GATT as an institution; 6) We want to ensure that the GATT adapts to changes in world trade. It must address such new issues as services, intellectual property, and investments. Canada approaches this round with a sense of urgency. One way to push things along has been to form strategic alliances on specific issues. The most notable one in the Uruguay Round has been the Cairns Group of 14 developed and developing agricultural traders, who met at Australia's initiative at Cairns, in Queensland, last August.4 The Cairns Group of countries was particularly influential in helping to get the Uruguay Round started and, especially, in promoting its common goal of agricultural trade reform.

THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND5 NOTE: The Uruguay Round of world tariff and trade negotiations was completed in Geneva on December 15,1993, after long, arduous, and at times extremely acrimonious sessions. Although just beyond the time frame of this volume, a summary of the results and benefits is given here owing to their importance. The following points are considered to be of particular significance for Canada. World market access, generally, is improved since the deal commits all members to tariff cuts on most products by at least one third within five years and to deeper cuts in some areas of special interest to Canada, including certain agricultural, resource, and industrial commodities. Grains, in particular, will benefit from better market access, especially in Europe, as well as from less competition from unfair export subsidies. On the other hand, Canada's supply management system for dairy and poultry products (the marketing boards) was not accepted and will have to be replaced by tariffs as the basic means of protection. Board quotas must be converted to tariffs and gradually reduced. Initial tariffs will be high in order to provide time for adjustment. Implementation will begin in mid1995.

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SSEA Barbara McDougall with the President of the African Development Bank during a visit to Ottawa, 1991. (Courtesy DEA)

For the first time, the subsidies permitted under international trade rules have been defined and a clear set of rules on subsidies and countervailing duties (penalties in retaliation for unfair subsidies) emerged. A series of modifications to existing antidumping practices was agreed to. Those were important Canadian objectives. For the first time, also, international rules on the conduct of international trade in services have been established: another important Canadian objective. In the textile and apparel sector, a key result is their return generally to the GATT under improved rules. Criteria for resolving trade disputes were approved. The Uruguay Round developed a separate agreement that establishes a Multilateral Trade Organization (MTO), an idea first proposed after the Second World War (the stillborn ITO: International Trade Organization of the late 1940s), which was not accepted at the time and which eventually led to the GATT. The proposed date of entry into force of the MTO is July 1,1995.

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B. BASIC TRADE POLICY

The broad trade objectives of the Trudeau and Mulroney governments were much the same: the promotion of a strong domestic economy and the development of an international trading environment favourable to Canadian firms. In pursuing these objectives, the Trudeau government chose its Third Option and a Contractual Link with the European Community. The Mulroney government concentrated on North America, where the great bulk of Canadian trade takes place, and concluded the two Free Trade Agreements which have set the basic pattern of Canada's trade policy from the late 1980s until well into the 21st Century. These have been documented in Chapter III above. To round out the trade policy picture, the Liberal government's view of Canada's trade policy in the early 1980s is provided in the immediately following document. 64. Canadian Tirade Policy for the 1980s: a discussion paper Booklet produced under the authority of the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Allan J. MacEachen, and the Minister of State for International Trade, Mr. Gerald A. Regan. (Summary) The broad objectives of Canadian trade policy can be summarized as follows: The development of a more efficient, productive, and competitive domestic economy and the promotion of a more stable and open international trading environment within which Canadian and foreign firms alike are encouraged to plan, invest, and grow. To a large extent Canadian trade policy has been, and will continue to be, developed as a trade-off between the objective of improved access to foreign markets, the need to promote efficiency and competitiveness, and the need to provide protection for those Canadian industries subject to intense competitive pressures, but considered important in terms of national or regional interests. Within this broad context, more specific export trade policy objectives are: continuing to develop the adjacent U.S. market, while reducing the tendency towards the development of regional groupings through reductions of trade barriers on a non-discriminatory basis; advancing Canadian industrial development through expanding Canadian export opportunities for further processed food and industrial materials; and promoting long-term and stable markets for Canada's primary exports (agricultural, fisheries, and industrial). On the import side, Canadian trade policy objectives are to provide an international framework which will facilitate the development of a competitive domestic economy, including specifically, an appropriate level of protection against injurious competition, as well as reasonable measures to safeguard Canadian agricultural producers.

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Taking the export and import sides together, Canadian trade objectives seek to achieve a balanced development of trading opportunities which take into account regional and sectoral interests.6

C. THE ECONOMIC SUMMITS The first economic summit took place at Rambouillet, near Paris, in 1975, at the initiative of the President of France, Valery Giscard d'Estaing. Canada was not present at the first one, but after an intense lobbying campaign was invited to attend the second one and has since been an active member of the group. Participants are known, in this context, as the G7 countries. Summit meetings take place annually. The summits started out well, with substantive discussions among the seven heads of state or government whose countries, taken together, account for more than half of the world's trade and industrial output. Lately, the president of Russia has been invited to be present as an observer. During the 1980s, the meetings were not always as substantive or as effective as earlier ones. They seemed to have become media events, taken over almost entirely by the television networks, particularly during the years that President Reagan was in office. An aura of frustration tended to surround them. Recently, things have improved, but there may be some truth to the old Japanese saying that "there are two kinds of fools in this world: those who have never climbed Mount Fuji and those who have climbed it twice." 65. The Economic Summits Speech by Mr. Allan Gotlieb, Under-Secretary, DEA, to the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Winnipeg, April 9,1981. (Extracts) In considering why the meetings began, we must go back to the situation in 1975. Two years after the Yom Kippur War and the ensuing fourfold increase (by December 1973) in oil prices by the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC), it was painfully evident that the industrialized countries had not coped well or cohesively with the fall-out. They were confronting major and pressing economic problems (recession and unemployment, accompanied by inflation), many of which indeed originated before the oil shock, arising in part out of the persistent current-account deficits of the United States. When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Interim Committee in June 1975 failed to agree on how to approach major monetary issues (exchange rates, quotas, gold), the French President, Val6ry Giscard d'Estaing, elected to his seven-year term little more than a year earlier and himself a former Finance Minister, suggested a monetary summit on the ground that it was largely the floating exchange rates which were destabilising the monetary system and causing the major economic problems.

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After some hesitation, the other leaders agreed. They went to Rambouillet in November 1975, but only after agreement that the agenda should provide for consideration of over-all economic policies as well as monetary issues, and also look at North-South problems as well. The Summit was to take a policy-oriented, rather than a narrowly technical, approach. The emphasis was on coordination. The leaders felt constrained to consult together, to try to work together more closely, and to be seen to be doing so. If we stand back and look at successive Summits, one is struck by a number of points: The main economic problems identified by the leaders as requiring their attention have largely been the same mix over the years: low growth, inflation, unemployment, protectionist pressures, energy, the North/South dialogue. There has been a growing appreciation of the degree of inter-dependence among developed countries, so much so that domestic policies in any major country have a growing effect on others and thus no one country can regulate its own economy alone. Accordingly, problems such as interest rates, economic stimulus or restraint, have to be tackled in concert. There has been a shift from the more short-term specific issues of earlier Summits to the long-term outlook current today. Also, the Summits have extended their purview beyond the basic economic issues. Terrorism and hijacking have been such issues, as well as refugees. At a minimum, looking ahead, I find it hard to imagine that Summits in some form or another are not here for the foreseeable future. Indeed, if Summits did not exist, they would probably have to be invented. In my view, they are here to stay. For our part, in Canada, we attach a good deal of importance to the Summits. They should continue to be available to do the sort of things they do now. They might even begin to take what I call the macro-political approach. Somehow, I believe, we in the industrial world need a manageable locus for concerting our views and objectives, our policies and activities. It is particularly important, from a Canadian point of view, that this kind of consultation and concertation be effectively taking place among our closest friends, since we are placed in a very delicate position in the case of persistent and major unresolved differences, say, between the United States and the European Community countries, or Japan. We are accordingly anxious to overcome the current differences on economic and political strategy among the industrialized democracies and believe the Summits could be helpful in doing so.

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D. COUNTERTRADE 66. Countertrade Primer for Canadian Exporters Booklet issued by DBA, Ottawa, December 1985. (Extracts) Countertrade includes barter arrangements, advance purchases and counterpurchases, offsets, buybacks, and bilateral agreements. Counterpurchases are the most common form of countertrade, in which the exporter undertakes to purchase goods or services from the importer to a given percentage of his sales contract. This may vary from 5% to 100%. Offsets are normally found in large capital projects where there is substantial government procurement. They are normally required of the exporter in such cases so that some incremental industrial or economic benefit, e.g., coproduction, is derived from the expenditure. Buyback, for instance, is most commonly found in the sale or modification of capital plant and equipment. Barter arrangements commonly entail payments in kind, sometimes involving third parties. While countertrade may amount to about 10% of world trade, Canadian exports have been minimally affected to date. The key factors which have kept this impact minimal include the following: 1) The dominance of the U.S. and other OECD countries in export markets for Canadian goods. 2) The predominance of food and raw materials exports in Canada's exports which, to date, have not been subject to extensive countertrade pressures. After applying the estimates of 20% countertrade in East-West trade and 6% in North-South trade, and applying our knowledge of the countertrade experiences of Canadian exporters, it is estimated that about $600 million of Canada's 1984 exports involved some form of countertrade, especially as regards transportation equipment, telecommunications equipment, mineral extracting machinery, agricultural and forestry equipment, engineering and consulting services. The total of $600 million amounted to about one-half of one percent of total Canadian exports that year. From a multilateral policy perspective, Canada has traditionally adopted the view, in international forums and in concert with our major trading partners, that countertrade is a regressive trade practice which distorts the multilateral flow of goods and services; which prejudices the export opportunities of small and medium-sized firms; which deals inefficiently with the economic and financial restraints that it seeks to solve; which manifests a regrettable trend towards bilateralism in trade; and which undermines the GATT. From a bilateral relations viewpoint, it has always been made clear to trading partners that the Government of Canada will not become directly involved in countertrade deals. It has been the government's position that

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the initiative and responsibility for entering into countertrade deals rests with exporters alone. E. THE CANADIAN DOLLAR SINCE 1977

This period has been characterized by sharp fluctuations in the value of the Canadian dollar, from highs around $1.05 U.S. just before the Parti Qu&b6cois came to power in Quebec in 1976 to its deepest low to date of .6913 U.S. during the winter of 1985-1986. It began a slow rise through 1986 to reach .7550 U.S. about a year later. It continued to move up and, by the time of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States, it was hovering around .8500 U.S. Late in 1991 it reached .8934 U.S. By 1993, however, it was back down to around .7500 U.S. and occasionally lower, reflecting foreign investor uneasiness about the domestic political situation and high government deficit levels across the country. The decline of the Canadian dollar vis-a-vis the United States dollar tells only part of the story. Its drop against other major currencies has been far more drastic. The Bank of Canada has been tracking the record of the Canadian dollar vis-a-vis other currencies for many years, e.g., the German mark, Swiss franc, Japanese yen. Between 1971 and the end of 1993, for instance, the Canadian dollar—based on averages of noon spot rates—declined in value nearly 400 percent against the Swiss franc, roughly 280 percent against the German mark, and more than 400 percent against the yen (1971: $1.00 Canadian). During that period, it remained fairly firm against the French franc and fluctuated a good deal vis-a-vis the pound sterling.7 The fluctuations in the value of the Canadian dollar were accompanied by rises and falls in the Bank of Canada's interest rates, They reached highs between 11% and 14% at the time of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional proposals, partly to stem falls in the value of the dollar and, also, as a facet of the Bank's anti-inflation policy. By 1992-1993 they had dropped to lows in the vicinity of 4% as inflation fell. Recently, the rate of inflation has been hovering around l%-2% per annum. High interest rates encouraged foreign investment in Canada of course and resulted in considerably lower inflation levels as well. However, this tight monetary policy and the recessions at the beginning of the 1980s and 1990s, which hit Canada particularly hard, contributed to rising levels of unemployment (recently stuck at around 11%). One result was a situation of ever growing financial severity and complexity, not only for individuals, but also for companies forced to restructure and downsize in order to remain costeffective and competitive in difficult trade and financial circumstances. In addition, the Bank of Canada's high interest rates also contributed to the growing deficit problems of the federal and provincial governments, which were borrowing heavily in domestic and foreign markets.

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Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6 7

See A.E.B. I, pages 374-381, and A.E.B. II, pages 192-198, for background on the Kennedy Round. This Synopsis was part of a study outlining, among other things, the objectives that Canada would be seeking to achieve when the negotiations first began. It was produced in 1979 at the end of the Round: hence the past tense of the text. Happily, from the Canadian point of view, most of these objectives were attained. See DEA communique No. 110 of July 19,1985, which gives Canada's objectives in greater detail. The Cairns Group comprised: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. DEA news release of December 15,1993, gives a good summary of the Uruguay Round from the Canadian viewpoint. It comes with a Backgrounder, which analyses the results of the agreement in considerable detail. The booklet, issued in August 1983, is available from DEA. See the Bank of Canada Revfew, Spring issue, 1994, Section 1,1, for the record since 1980 and earlier issues of the Review for data going back to 1959. The Review is available from Publications Distribution, Secretary's Department, Bank of Canada, Ottawa, K1A OG9, or in university and public libraries across Canada. For the evolution of the Canadian dollar against the United States dollar before 1977, see A.E.B. II, pages 214-215.

VI

NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES

Jti/arlier volumes in this series (1945-1965) dealt with international development as an aspect of Canada's relations with the United Nations or with the Commonwealth as a facet or extension of the Colombo Plan. However, the Trudeau government's decision to concentrate more on development and to broaden its range and scope, as evinced by the creation of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 1972, warranted a separate chapter on foreign aid in the immediately preceding volume in this series. Until the late 1980s, when federal funds became less available, aid budgets increased almost every year and programmes grew, both in range and complexity.

President Mugabe of Zimbabwe with PM Mulroney at Government House, Ottawa, (1990) after a visit to the Governor General. (Courtesy PMO) 101

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Foreign aid is now a much broader area of public and private sector activity than 15 years ago. It continues to include such traditional subjects as emergency and food aid, scholarships, technical and other training, industrial cooperation, certain types of capital projects, now usually accompanied by environmental studies. Currently, however, it is also used as an instrument in financing trade, in assisting developing countries in dealing with their foreign debts, in helping the under-privileged living in particularly difficult political situations, e.g., South Africa, with educational and other training. It is also applied in the cause of advancing human rights considerations of special concern to Canada, for instance, the status of women, and generally taking into account the human rights performance of recipient countries. The environmental impact of capital projects is now a basic aspect of Canadian aid policy. Aid budgets are also used in the government's campaign against international drug trafficking. In short, Canadian international development policy and programmes currently reflect most North-South issues in one way or another: hence the title of this chapter. A. BASIC AID POLICY: STRUCTURE AND FOCUS OF CIDA The Strategy for International Development outlined by SSEA MacEachen to the members of the diplomatic corps in Ottawa, on September 2, 1975, embracing the next half decade, remained the basic policy for Canadian aid to developing countries during the last years of the Trudeau government.1 In 1987, its successor made public a new strategy: Sharing Our Future, based on its Official Development Assistance "Charter," which maintained much of the previous government's basic policy, but added several new concepts and approaches. 67. Charter: official development assistance Text issued by CIDA, Ottawa, 1987. (Summary) The primary purpose of Canadian development assistance is to help the poorest countries and people of the world. Canadian development assistance aims to strengthen the ability of people and institutions in developing countries to solve their own problems in harmony with the natural environment. Development priorities must prevail in setting objectives for the aid programme. As long as these priorities are met, aid objectives may take into account other foreign policy goals. Partnership is the key to fostering the links between Canada's people and institutions and those of the Third World. This basic policy approach entails environmentally sound development, sociologically sustainable development, the environmental impact assessment of all capital projects, and support for environmental strategies.

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The Charter specifically includes: -food security, agricultural research, production, extension, post-harvest technology, transportation, and marketing. Energy availability, the development of existing resources, research and development of sustainable alternatives are also included. Poverty alleviation, improved access to health, family planning, nutrition, education, employment and decision-making are stressed. The structural adjustment of economies to cope with debt and reduced export earnings, and also to improve economic management, are mentioned in the Charter, as are human rights, the increased participation of women in programmes and projects to promote generalized economic growth and social change, as well as programmes specifically aimed at women. 68. Sharing Our Future Booklet issued by CIDA, Ottawa, 1987. (Extracts) Based on the principles contained in the Charter, we have created a new "eligibility framework" for our official development assistance (ODA). The new framework provides flexibility so that we can achieve the goals to which we are committed and ensure that our aid policies are focused and more relevant. The new framework makes it easier to take into account the human rights performance of various countries when deciding on the nature and scope of our assistance. We have decided to divide the aid programme into two distinct parts, each having one half of the aid budget. The first part is the "partnership programme" and will be for initiatives and programmes shaped by our Canadian and international partners in development. The second will support Canada's "national initiatives programme" of bilateral assistance and other contributions to development carried out mainly on a government-togovernment basis. To improve programme delivery, significant numbers of aid personnel will be decentralized to existing overseas posts and in four new regional field offices. Many new initiatives will be put forward, including one to double the number of CIDA-sponsored students and trainees, both in Canada and in the Third World. New initiatives for the private sector include the doubling of CIDA's budget for its Industrial Cooperation Programme and issuance of general lines of credit in up to 20 countries, with more flexibility in their use. Canada's non-governmental organizations and institutions are among the world's leaders in international development To enhance their contribution, numerous new initiatives will be proposed along with an increase in the amount of official development assistance allocated to supporting their efforts.

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President Soglo of Benin being greeted during a reception by Hon. Marcel Masse, then President of CIDA (1990). (Courtesy Embassy of Berlin. Photo: Andre Sima)

Canada remains committed to a strong and vital multilateral aid system and we will continue to strive for renewal and revitalization. To facilitate access to aid programmes by Canadians and to raise levels of public awareness, an extensive public education programme will be undertaken.2 B. AID AND TRADE

69. The Challenge of Exportation Statement by the Minister of State for External Relations, Mr. Pierre De Ban6, to the Montreal Chamber of Commerce, February 23,1982. (Extracts) The government actively supports trade development. We work closely with the trade development departments of provincial governments. Federal trade officers abroad, in Ottawa, and in the regions are prepared to help in the identification of markets and potential buyers. We have created export assistance programmes, such as the Programme for Export Market Development

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(PEMD) and the Promotional Project Programme, with budgets for trade development and for participation in trade fairs and missions abroad. We are also adapting programmes as required to meet changing world conditions. An Export Trade Development Board has been established to advise the government on all matters relating to exports. My comments would not be complete without mentioning the crucial role of export financing. Last year, the Export Development Corporation (EDC) helped exporters to conclude sales of $1,4 billion through their export insurance and loans programmes. The government does not support the predatory financing that has been offered by some competitor countries. However, we are prepared to offer a blending of commercial and aid funds, if there is evidence that foreign competitors are offering credit mixte financing in order to secure trade deals.3 C. UNCTAD Since the first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Canadian policy and objectives have remained constant: support for multilateral institutions such as the GATT, the IMF, the World Bank; substantial contributions to international development to hasten economic and social progress in the world; the promotion of economic development through financial and technical assistance; the removal of restrictions on imports from developing countries, and similar programmes.4 These themes recurred during all UNCTAD meetings since 1977, e.g., Manila, 1979, Belgrade 1983, Geneva 1987. The extracts from the statement made at Manila in 1979 are given below, as being typical. 70. Canadian Policy Regarding UNCTAD

Statement made by Mr. L. A. H. Smith, Leader of the Canadian Delegation to UNCTAD V, Manila, May 9,1979. (Extracts) The objectives of Canadian policy are to promote more rapid economic growth in those countries which need it, to encourage broadly-based participation in the development process, and to contribute to the orderly evolution of the economic system through a variety of policy instruments. Only programmes that are practical and efficient will serve effectively the interests of both developing and developed countries. In our view, the most important choice is to identify areas where developed and developing countries share common interests and then to promote those changes which will produce global benefits. We continue to believe than an open and dynamic system provides the most promising environment for economic growth and social progress.

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Canada is committed to strengthening and improving the capacity of all countries to participate effectively in the international economy. Our substantial development assistance expenditures of more than $1 billion annually are oriented primarily to the poorer countries. In trade matters, we continue to work through the GATT and elsewhere to resist protectionism, to promote differential treatment according to trade needs of particular groups of countries, to elaborate a code on the use of safeguard measures which will clarify their application and reduce uncertainty and which will accommodate developing country interests. We have been attempting to broaden and improve techniques for bilateral economic cooperation with developing countries. Recently, for instance, an agreement on trade and economic cooperation between Canada and the members of CARICOM (the Caribbean Community Economic Market) was signed.

D. NARCOTICS 71. The International Component of the National Drug Strategy Communiqud by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, May 28,1987. (Extracts) In general, the National Drug Strategy is aimed at solving domestic problems. However, illicit trafficking is an international industry and it is clear that Canada cannot solve its drug abuse and trafficking problems in isolation. Many of the drugs consumed in Canada, such as cocaine and heroin, are brought into our country illegally by well-organized trafficking networks based overseas. In 1985, the RCMP and Customs seized 62 kgs. of heroin, 1090 kgs. of cocaine, and 19,000 kgs. of hashish. These are the last statistics available and probably understate the dimensions of the problem today. Furthermore, Canadian territory often serves as a transit point for narcotics being sent by these trafficking networks to other countries. In addition, illicit psychoactive substances are produced in Canada to feed the addictions of citizens of other countries. Clearly, we must act to stem this traffic, not only because Canadians are its victims, but also because we have a role to play as responsible citizens of the world. Drug abuse is not new, but its dimensions are. As early as 1909, Canada helped to prepare an international Convention to control the traffic in Opium. We also played a leading role in drafting the 1971 Psychotropic Convention and we continue to play a prominent role in organizations such as the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Yesterday, Canada was elected to that important commission, which in the past has concentrated on reducing the supply of drugs. Canada and other countries have introduced a new focus on the other part of the problem: trying to reduce demand.

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We are also seeking to take account of the new sophistication of international networks trafficking in drugs, whose tentacles now stretch around the world. The government is now working internationally on three fronts: 1) The UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control, which sponsors projects to assist producer countries to develop and finance programmes to help farmers to move away from drug production; to improve local standards of living; and to train local police to deal with the extremely well-organized drug traffickers. Canada, through CIDA, has made substantial contributions to this body's general fund. That is a new policy direction for CIDA, since 1985. As well, we will continue to consider on a case-by-case basis, requests from narcotics-producing countries for development assistance. 2) Our contribution, through CIDA, to the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control will be raised to $500,000 this year and to $1 million by 1991, to demonstrate our commitment to international cooperation. 3) We are expanding the Consular Awareness Programme in External Affairs, to make Canadian travellers more aware of the dangers of drug purchase, possession, trafficking and use abroad. More Canadians are in prison abroad for drug offenses than for any other crime. E. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

(OAS)

This is a very old story, going back nearly 100 years. When the PanAmerican Union—the ancestor of the OAS—came into being at the turn of the century, Canada was fully expected to join. Among the chairs made especially for the executive board table at the time, one was set aside for Canada with its name on it. The names of the heroes of the Americas engraved on the walls of its headquarters building in Washington include that of Champlain along with those of Bolivar and San Martin, among others. Canada's Coat-of-Arms a mart usque ad mare adorns one of its facades. In 1942, Canada was invited to the Rio conference of the Pan-American Union, but found its participation vetoed by President Roosevelt. Canadian governments since then were understandably wary about joining.5 Canada opted for the status of Permanent Observer at the OAS in 1972, as a feature of the Trudeau government's foreign policy review Foreign Policy for Canadians. The issue was finally resolved in 1990, when the Mulroney government's decision to seek full membership in the OAS was unanimously accepted by hemispheric governments.

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PM Trudeau being greeted on arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., 1977, by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and the editor of this volume, then Permanent Observer of Canada to the OAS. (Courtesy OAS) 72. Canadian Membership in the OAS Address by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, at the Meeting of Hemispheric Leaders, SanJos£, Costa Rica, October 27,1989. (Extracts)

The Government of Canada has concluded that the time has come for Canada to occupy the vacant chair at the Organization of American States that has been reserved for us all these years. On behalf of the Government of Canada, I am pleased to announce that I have instructed the Permanent Observer of Canada at the OAS formally to notify the Secretary General that Canada is prepared to sign and ratify the Charter of the Organization. I hope you will welcome us. In an age of interdependence, the well-being of the peoples of this Hemisphere is indivisible. We realize that Canadians' rights will not be secure while the rights of others are denied; that Canadian prosperity will not be assured while the prosperity of others is diminished; that Canada's environment will not be safeguarded until the environment of everyone is protected; and that

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Canadian society will not free itself from the evil of drugs while others remain in its grip. On all these issues, hemispheric cooperation is integral to Canada's interests and the OAS holds the key to that cooperation. Canada's presence here today signals a new departure in our relations with Latin America. We recognize that our interests are directly engaged here. We will no longer be apart. Our decision to join the OAS symbolizes our determination to be full and constructive citizens of the Americas. F. THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN 73. Canada and CARICOM: Trade and Cooperation Agreement

DEA communique, January 20,1979. A Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement between Canada and the Governments of the Caribbean Economic Market (CARICOM) was signed today in Kingston, Jamaica. The new agreement replaced the Canada-West Indies Trade Agreement of 1925. It includes sections on trade and on financial, technical, and industrial cooperation, with an entirely separate protocol on industrial cooperation. It is hoped that the separate protocol on industrial cooperation will lead to increased transfers to CARICOM states of the necessary human and other resources required for the development and diversification of their economies and will produce benefits for the Canadian economy as well. It is also hoped that the agreement will lead to the identification of business opportunities and cooperative ventures in the Caribbean in sectors such as agriculture, fisheries, light manufacturing, as well as trade, financial, and service industries. In the trade field, the new agreement provides for the exchange of mostfavoured nation treatment and the facilitation of two-way trade. The financial and technical cooperation section contains provisions relating to Canada's development assistance to CARICOM states individually and to the region as a whole. The industrial cooperation section, together with the protocol, provides for the transfer of technology. The agreement also provides for consultation in each of these fields and envisages a Joint Trade and Economic Committee, which will meet annually.

G. SOUTH AFRICA The basic political and socio-economic approach of successive South African governments, embodied in the policy of apartheid, remained largely unchanged between 1977 and the late 1980s. While some of the pettier aspects of apartheid, viz., racial segregation on public transport, in restaurants

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and hotels, in public parks, and so on, were eased, the basic tenets of racial segregation and discrimination, of political inequality based on colour, continued in full force.6 However, a combination of rising opposition and violence within South Africa, along with mounting pressure, sanctions, and other forms of disapproval from outside South Africa, notably from Canada and other Commonwealth countries, made maintenance of the status quo increasingly difficult. By the late 1980s the South African government, particularly under President F. W. de Klerk, became convinced that abandonment of apartheid and a drastic change in the country's political system were necessary. These fundamental decisions, leading to inter-racial negotiations based on the premise of political equality and multiracial elections for a new government opened up the prospect of majority participation in government by South Africa's black population for the first time in the country's history. Regrettably, progress towards democratic majority government has been marred by a great deal of violence. This has stemmed in part from the jockeying for power in the new political spectrum, which has been going on among

SSEA Joe Clark with Mr. Nelson Mandela, Ottawa, Summer 1991. (Courtesy DEA)

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both black and white elements in South Africa, but especially from the longstanding and bitter tribal rivalries between the largest black groups, notably the Zulus led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the Xhosas. Mr. Nelson Mandela, head of the African National Congress, is of Xhosa background. Mounting bloodshed in many parts of the country has caused growing uneasiness among all elements of the population about the prospects for a smooth transition to democratic government and for future peace in South Africa. Canada exerted continuing and mounting pressure against South Africa during the 1980s in a broad range of activity, both public and private, encompassing commercial, financial, political, and cultural measures, including sports. Mr. Clark, in particular, was in the forefront of this campaign, whether at the UN or within the Commonwealth, during his term of office as SSEA. 74. Apartheid: a violation of fundamental human lights Statement by Mr. Stephen Lewis, Permanent Representative of Canada, to the UN General Assembly, New York, November 20,1984. (Extracts) Allow me briefly to list the measures which the Canadian government has taken to reflect our opposition to apartheid: 1) Canada does not recognize the governments of the so-called independent "homelands"; 2) The Canadian embargo on arms and military equipment to South Africa goes back to 1963; 3) Canada has ended active trade promotion in South Africa and has closed its trade offices in Johannesburg and Cape Town; 4) Special preferential tariff arrangements for South Africa in the Canadian market have been terminated; 5) A Code of Conduct for Canadian companies was adopted in 1979 concerning their employment practices in South Africa; 6) South African athletes and sporting officials are not allowed to enter Canada to participate in events on a nationally-representative basis; 7) No government funding is provided for Canadian athletes participating in nationally-representative competitions abroad which involve South Africa. The Canadian government's support for peaceful change in South Africa goes beyond statements of opposition to apartheid. To put it bluntly, we have put our money where our mouth is, by providing funds for educational opportunities and assistance for self-help projects. For instance, $25,000 for the UN Trust Fund for South Africa; $250,000 for the UN Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa; $141,000 to Canadian non-governmental organizations to assist in self-help community projects; $618,000 for black or integrated labour union training projects via the Canadian Labour Congress.

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In addition, we have doubled the allocation of funds for small self-help projects within South Africa to a total of $300,000 and we are also allocating $1,5 million for a special education project providing scholarships for training within South Africa. 75. Canada's Measures against Apartheid Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, in the HC, Ottawa, September 13,1985. (Extracts) I am guided in this statement by two realities: first, that Canadians are offended by and abhor the practice of institutionalized racism by a society that claims to share our values; and, second, that Canada's influence is limited, but real. I will be reviewing today the actions Canada has taken, and announcing some new initiatives. Before doing so, I think it would be helpful to indicate some of the changes we seek to bring about, which would prove that South Africa is moving away from apartheid. In terms of broad principles, we would look for the introduction of common citizenship in South Africa; an end to the laws which classify South Africans according to race and colour; freedom for all South Africans to live, move, and work unimpeded by arbitrary restrictions; and independence for Namibia under UN Resolution 435. None of these is as important, however, as the final principles that I would cite, which are the release of political detainees and prisoners and the release of the African National Congress and the United Democratic Front leaders; the initiation of a process of consultations and negotiations with the leaders of the blacks, coloureds, and Indians; and finally the initiation of a process of reform based on consent, not opposition or coercion. Canada's contribution in helping to bring about change has been significant. Our policy, through several administrations, has been one of consistent opposition to apartheid. On July 8,1 issued a statement of policy on behalf of the government, introducing ten steps including certain economic sanctions to strengthen our opposition to apartheid and two measures to foster peaceful change. We ended the Programme for Export Market Development in South Africa (PEMD) and the global insurance policies written by the Export Development Corporation (EDC) in so far as they apply to South Africa. We have broadened and tightened application of the UN arms embargo so as to include a broader range of high technology items, including computers. We have been the only government to announce the abrogation of our double taxation agreement with South Africa. We drew the attention of Canadians to the UN Security Council's resolution prohibiting the sale of kruggerrands and sales in Canada have come virtually to a halt.

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We developed and clarified policies on sporting contacts and official contacts and cooperation. We announced the assignment of an officer, charged with responsibility for labour affairs, to our embassy in South Africa, to maintain direct contact with South African workers who are agents of reform. That officer will be chosen in consultation with the Canadian Labour Congress. We more than tripled the funds available for education and training for the black community, including the award of 40 scholarships in the current fiscal year. Other levels of government in Canada have also sent strong signals. A number of provinces have seen this as a special case and have taken steps within their jurisdictions to oppose apartheid. Private companies have voluntarily announced that they will no longer purchase South African goods. Canadian labour has consistently spoken out against apartheid. We are taking a number of further measures: First, I am meeting a group of representatives of Canadian business and finance in order to examine areas of cooperative action against apartheid. I believe that there is a very real possibility that, where governments may not have influence on some levels of the business community and the bureaucracy of South Africa, Canadians active in business and financial circles could well have the influence that could do what governments, parliaments, and public officials are trying to do. Second, the government is introducing a voluntary ban on loans to the government of South Africa and its agencies. We are asking the Canadian banks to apply such a ban. Some have already acted on their own and we have welcomed that. Third, I am announcing the appointment of Mr. A. F. Hart as administrator of the Canadian Code of Conduct for the employment practices of Canadian companies operating in South Africa. Mr. Hart has had a distinguished career in the Canadian foreign service, including assignments as High Commissioner to Ghana, with simultaneous accreditation as ambassador to several nearby states. Fourth, the government will apply a voluntary ban on the sale of crude oil and refined products to South Africa. Fifth, we are bringing in an embargo on air transport between Canada and South Africa. It will cover both freight and passenger flights, particularly charter flights, since there are no regularly scheduled flights between the two countries. Sixth, a register has been opened for the voluntary measures which Canadian provinces and municipalities as well as private institutions, organizations, and firms have taken against apartheid. Thousands of Canadians have acted quietly on their own.

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Seventh, in view of the increasing numbers of arrests of non-violent opponents of apartheid in South Africa, an additional $1 million will be allocated on humanitarian grounds to assist the families of political prisoners and detainees.7 76. End of the State of Emergency in South Africa DEA News Release, June 7,1990. SSEA Clark applauded President F. W. de Klerk's decision to end the fouryear old State of Emergency in three of South Africa's four provinces, but expressed regret that it would remain in force in Natal. This is an important and constructive step and a welcome signal of the South African government's commitment to dialogue and negotiations. By ending the State of Emergency in most parts of the country, the South African government has removed one of the most significant obstacles to negotiations towards a non-racial democracy. Mr. Clark also noted that other obstacles to negotiations were also being addressed in the context of the joint ANC-South African government working group set up after the talks between President de Klerk and ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, last May. These include the return of political exiles, the release of political prisoners, and the revision of security legislation. "We look forward to the results of the working group and hope that all the remaining obstacles to formal negotiations will soon be eliminated. Canada stands ready to assist, in any way, the process of negotiations in South Africa and we look forward to discussing the issue with Mr. Mandela during his forthcoming visit to Canada."

H. NAMIBIA NOTE: Attention should be drawn here to Canada's role in the emergence of Namibia as an independent state in April 1990, although because of space considerations it is not possible to document the record. Canada was one of the initiators and drafters of the UN settlement plan for Namibia in 1978. Both the Trudeau and Mulroney governments followed the issue closely and maintained pressure on the international community generally to implement UN Resolution 283, which recommended that countries end commercial activities related to Namibia. Constant pressure from Canada, both bilateral and through the Commonwealth, as well as at the UN, was also directed against South Africa to implement Resolution 435 aimed at Namibia's independence. Canada also took part in UNTAG (the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia: 1988-1991) with troops and police. Observers and equipment for the Namibian elections were provided, as well as training and technical assistance on that occasion.

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Notes 1 2

3

4

See A.E.B. II, pages 265-271. Sharing Our Future was published in 1987 and is available from DEA or CIDA. Its annex (pages 91-94) entitled "Putting the Strategy into Action: 42 steps to better cooperation" provides a useful summary of its basic principles and priorities, aid levels and targets, programme delivery, etc. One of its main administrative measures—the creation of regional offices abroad and the decentralization of personnel and spending authority (up to certain limits) to the field—was not too well received by Canadian businessmen or the aid community generally/Also, decentralization proved to be very expensive and did not survive the federal budget trimming which took place during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Another measure of interest: tied aid was to be reduced from 80% to 50% in the case of Sub-Saharan countries and to 66 2/3 percent for other developing countries. Eligible Sub-Saharan countries, and other developing countries, were to benefit from ODA debt forgiveness under certain conditions. CIDA's scholarship programme was to double to 12,000 per year over a 5-year period and food aid was to grow by 5% per year. France was an early user of credit mixte: hence the term. It is a device that can take many configurations and forms, but is basically a combination of commercial and aid funds for financing trade deals. Generally, it entails a mix of export development loans from public sources, e.g., the EDC, and on occasion private corporations such as the major banks, along with a component involving funds from aid agencies. These may vary in amount, according to the size of the deal, and may involve interest-free or reduced-interest funding, accompanied by varying periods of grace and time-frames for repayment, and so on. Credit mixte or variations thereof are widely used by many countries today. Canada has been consistently opposed to the use of credit mixte and has applied it mainly to defend its interests when necessary. See A.E.B. I, pages 100-105.

5

Gringos from the Far North by Prof. J. C. M. Ogelsby (Toronto, Macmillan, 1976) gives a detailed account of the early history of Canada and the Pan American Union.

6

A.E.B. I, pages 298-307, and A.E.B. II, pages 165-167, provide details regarding the background.

7

Since 1985, Canada took over 50 distinct steps designed to oppose apartheid and to encourage dialogue with South Africa, culminating in the two decisions announced by Mr.Clark on February 27, 1987, in Montreal to the Canadian Council for International Cooperation: (1) "If Canada is to exert real influence

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against apartheid, our bottom line position has to be clear: if nothing else works, we will end our diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa"; and (2) "Canada's influence against apartheid can be better employed by building steady international pressure than by suddenly and dramatically ending our relations."

VII

THE ENVIRONMENT

1 his chapter deals with environmental concerns affecting Canada beyond the immediate confines of North America. Environmental problems with the United States have been considered in Chapter HI. A. LAW OF THE SEA

Canada has been a pioneer in this field going back to the 1950s, as documented in earlier volumes in this series.1 Law of the Sea questions culminated in the Third Law of the Sea Conference of the United Nations, which began in 1973 and ended in 1982 when the UN Law of the Sea Convention was adopted on April 30 of that year by a vote of 117 states (Canada) in favour and four against (Israel, Turkey, the United States, and Venezuela). The Convention was opened for signature on December 10, 1982, at Montego Bay, Jamaica, when 119 states signed. By December 1984, 159 states had signed. 77. Canada Signs Law of the Sea Convention DEA communique, Ottawa November 22,1982. The SSEA, Mr. Allan J. MacEachen, announced today that Canada will sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, when it is opened for signature at the final session of the Third Law of the Sea Conference in Jamaica from December 6 to 10. In making the announcement, Mr. MacEachen underscored the important role which Canada played in the Conference in providing leadership and in generating ideas to resolve the vast range of laws which the Conference had before it. These included: the limits of the territorial sea; the establishment of exclusive economic zones providing coastal state control over important fishing stocks; the limits of the continental shelf; marine scientific research; protection of the marine environment and deep seabed mining.2 Canada as a leading coastal state is a major beneficiary of the Conference, having obtained recognition of its right to control offshore living and nonliving resources, as well as to take measures for the prevention of marine pollution, particularly in Arctic waters. 117

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The Convention, in its 320 articles and nine annexes, provides a clear set of rules for the management of ocean affairs, for the protection of the interests of developing as well as developed states, and for the resolution of disputes which might arise. A major benefit of the Convention is the important contribution it can make to world peace and security.3 B. FUR SEALS

This became a highly emotional issue during the late 1970s and early 1980s, particularly in Canada's relations with the countries of the European Community (EC). Europe was the traditional market for most furs from Canada. Under mounting pressure from ecological groups, both in Canada and in Europe, the outlook on furs as a fashion and on the annual hunt for young seals was changing. In seeking solutions to the problem, the main issues related to: (1) the accuracy of the scientific data regarding the actual threat posed by the annual hunt to the survival of the seal population and the effects that a culling ban would have on fish stocks; and (2) the humanity, morality, and economic need for the hunt 4 The federal government lobbied vigorously—both at home and abroad— to save the industry, which contributed to improving the living conditions of several thousands of people in the Maritime Provinces, Newfoundland, and Quebec. The environmental lobby argued equally vigorously against the hunt as being inhumane and unnecessary. Striking scenes of the hunt appeared frequently on television screens around the world. At one point the French actress, Brigitte Bardot, entered the fray. Many thought at the time that it was her intervention that really killed the hunt. 78. The European Community's Decision on the Seal Hunt Statement by the SSEA, Mr. Allan J. MacEachen, March 1,1983. (Extracts) The SSEA announced today that he was disappointed to learn that the Council of Ministers of the EC is considering the imposition of a Community-wide ban on imports of the products of young harp and hooded seals on October 1, 1983. He also regretted that the Council had decided to maintain measures currently in place restricting trade in these products. He noted, however, that the ban was contingent on further investigation into the scientific aspects and consequences of the culling of harp and hooded seals and that the Council has asked the European Commission to continue to seek, in the context of further contacts with Canada, solutions which would make the restrictions on imports unnecessary. Canada remains fully prepared to cooperate in these investigations, but must insist that they be rigorously scientific and that their results be interpreted without bias.

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Speech by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, at the Official Opening of the 1990 Canadian International Fur Fair, Montreal, May 2,1990. (Extracts) One of the realities of the modern world is that foreign policy is not foreign any more. Actions that countries take at home can have serious implications for their interests abroad. That reality is clear to Canadians. Our prosperity depends on trade with the world. That means that we must be alert to changes in attitudes, changes in public opinion around the globe. One of those changes is the new priority which international consumers assign to respect for the natural environment. Increasingly, consumers are demanding that the products they buy must not be damaging to the environment. It is these two factors—the requirement to trade and the requirement to satisfy environmental concerns—that have presented your industry with its greatest challenge recently. Very few industries are affected more by foreign events than the fur industry. Decisions in other countries pose a direct and serious threat to what you do. That threat is based on the sentiment in some parts of the world that your industry is inhumane and that it breaks the balance of nature. The arsenal of the opponents of the fur industry is based on emotion. We cannot shout them down or declare war on those countries which are taking action against your industry. What is needed is rational argument and purposeful action to bring the industry more in line with public expectations. That has been the strategy of the Canadian Government in Europe and elsewhere. We have told them that this industry, particularly its trapping component, is important to Canadians. We have told them that it is especially important to remote communities and often to lower-income groups, including native Canadians. We have told them that the industry contributes over 100,000 jobs to the Canadian economy and generates $600 million in business. We also told them that 50,000 aboriginal Canadians are involved in the fur business. We won that battle and we won it through sensible argument, high level political action, and persistence. But this battle was replaced by another one—this time with the European Community. The EC has attempted to label furs caught in leg-hold traps. The government won that battle by agreeing to implement more humane trapping standards and methods by 1996. But this is a temporary measure. There is a deadline in place. It is my view that the future health of this industry depends on a sincere and concerted effort to come to an agreement on these standards by 1996. We have an opportunity here. Canada is the world leader in research and development of humane trapping standards. We also chair Technical Committee No. 191 of the International Organization of Standardization. These activities and

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institutions provide us with the raw material to move forward to meet the requirements posed by the 1996 challenge. This effort is part of the broader battle. Those of you who market furs have an intimate dependence on those who harvest them. In terms of consumer attitudes, that relationship will become increasingly intimate in the years ahead. C. OVERFISHING Overfishing, particularly in waters off the Atlantic Coast, has domestic and international aspects. In recent years, both Canadian and international interests have overfished there and stocks have become seriously depleted. This section deals only with the international facets of the problem, particularly with fishing by European Community countries on the Grand Banks just beyond the 200-mile limit. The EC countries mainly concerned have been Spain and Portugal, but others have been involved as well. So too have Russia, for instance, and some of its neighbours, and also several Far Eastern states. Until 1986, the allocations set by the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) were generally accepted, but by 1988 things had gotten out of hand. Quotas were no longer being respected and catches were rapidly declining. A particular problem for Canada internationally is that overfishing has been occurring in waters just outside its jurisdiction and fish have no respect for international boundaries. The possibility of securing early agreement to extend control beyond the currently-accepted 200-mile limit has little hope of support or success. Few coastal states have such a prolonged continental shelf as Canada. Another international fishing problem facing Canada much closer to home was the France-Canada maritime boundary dispute regarding jurisdiction over waters just south of Newfoundland, involving the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. This dispute was settled in 1992. 80. European Overfishing in Canadian Waters DEA News Release, Ottawa, October 6,1988. The Canadian Government is committed to stopping foreign overfishing. All NAFO country members, with the exception of the EC, have agreed once again to abide by NAFO conservation decisions and quotas. Canada wants to persuade the EC to accept its environmental responsibility. The 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission) issued a warning on the dangerous effects of overfishing and concluded that overexploitation threatens not only many stocks as economic resources, but also the communities and people who depend upon them.

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Since 1986, the EC has consistently rejected NAFO conservation decisions and fished at levels far in excess of the quotas set by other NAFO members. This overfishing is a major factor leading to recent declines in key stocks. The information campaign will be directed at European Fisheries Ministers, EC Commissioners, the EC Council, and the European Parliament. Others who will be contacted include members of national parliaments, European industry leaders, European environmental organizations, and the European media. Europeans will be told about the damaging consequences of overfishing and the disastrous effects that this overfishing has had on fishermen on both sides of the Atlantic.5 81. Canada-France Fisheries Dispute DEA News Release, Ottawa, June 10,1992. An International Court of Arbitration, established by Canada and France to resolve the Canada-France maritime boundary dispute, rendered a decision today in New York City confirming Canada's jurisdiction over disputed waters located south of Newfoundland and St. Pierre and Miquelon. At issue were the fishing and potential oil and gas resources in a zone known as the 3Ps, as well as St. Pierre Bank, a large detached bank that is a part of the Grand Banks. The Court awarded France very little of the area that it had claimed. France had claimed an area, outside the 12-mile territorial sea of 13,703 square nautical miles, but was awarded only 2,537 square nautical miles. A portion of this is in the deep waters of the Laurentian Channel, which contains virtually no fisheries resources. To ensure an orderly implementation of the Court's ruling, Canada and France have agreed that fishing vessels will be given 45 days to adjust to the new boundary.6

D. OUTER SPACE : BASIC POLICY—INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS 82. The Canadian Space Programme Plan for 1982-1985 Booklet issued by the Ministry of Science and Technology, Ottawa, December 1981. (Extracts) Cooperation with foreign partners in space activities, whether on a bilateral basis, for instance, with the United States or on a multilateral basis, viz., with the European Space Agency (ESA) is an integral part of Canadian space policy. All of the government's major space projects have been conducted jointly with other nations. This cooperation has permitted Canada to pursue its objectives in space at reduced costs and has provided access to important technology. This international involvement in space has become a significant

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element in Canada's foreign policy as space activities gain in international importance and as trade in space-related products increases at a rapid pace. This policy is being extended through closer involvement with the European Space Agency with participation in several of its large-scale satellite programmes. By joining these programmes, Canadian industry will be able to develop commercial relationships with European industry. Substantial follow-on export sales are expected to result from our participation in these programmes. Canadian cooperation with the United States, spanning two decades, has provided advantages to both Canada and the U.S. Prime examples are the joint space science programme. Our participation in several large-scale satellite programmes, and Canadarm for the NASA Space Shuttle.

E. PROTECTION OF THE OZONE LAYER Protection of the ozone layer from chemicals, especially chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), has become a major issue in the field of environmental diplomacy. Lack of ozone exposes the planet and its inhabitants to greater risks from cataracts, leukemia, and skin cancer. It can also affect plants and plankton. In addition, the accumulation of carbon dioxide and methane in the atmosphere, which is trapping solar energy reflected from the earth, the so-called "green-house" effect, is a matter for international concern. One of the basic documents on the protection of the ozone layer is the Protocol that emerged from the international conference held in Montreal in 1987, whereby it was agreed to set up a fund to help poor countries to deal with this problem; to tighten the timetable for phasing CFCs out; and to add two new substances to the list of restricted chemicals. In particular, it was agreed that rich countries would halve CFC use by 1998. It has now been accepted to phase CFCs out entirely by the year 2000. 83. The Changing Atmosphere Speech by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, at the opening of the International Conference on the Changing Atmosphere, Toronto, June 27,1988. (Extracts) The world is coming to recognize what we believe in Canada to be selfevident—that economic development and environmental protection are mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive. Our economic activity must be increasingly compatible with today's environmental facts of life. We are faced with climate shifts, desertification, flooding, droughts, ozone

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depletion, and acidification. These are major global issues. Consider the so-called "greenhouse effect." Carbon dioxide from fossil-fuel burning and methane from modern agricultural and industrial practices are accumulating in the atmosphere and trapping solar energy reflected from the earth. Canada is committed to taking the necessary action to protect the environment. We endorsed the Brundtland Report at the United Nations. I am pleased to advise that our key legislative instrument required to implement all phases of the Montreal Protocol, the new Canadian Environmental Protection Act, will soon receive royal assent. We will then ratify the Protocol, becoming the third of the signatories to do so. Heeding the warnings of science that an 85% reduction is necessary, we will advance regulations to ban all non-essential uses of CFCs and halons. Another plank in our international atmospheric legal framework, a protocol for the control of nitrogen oxides, will likely be signed by European and North American countries next fall. We need international legal mechanisms to forge global cooperation to protect and restore our atmospheric life-support system. Your deliberations on such international legal regimes will be crucial. The outcome of your work will form the basis for the follow-up meeting, to be hosted by Canada early next year, of international legal and policy experts on the law of the atmosphere—with particular focus on climate change. I want to say a word about the threat of global climate change and the need to develop an equitable resolution of Third World debt. It is not just altruism. It is in our self-interest. If the debtor nations of the tropics stopped stripping their rainforests to generate export earnings to service their debts, the industrialized countries would benefit. The slowing of carbon dioxide build-up would give the developed world much needed flexibility in adjusting our energy mix to reduce reliance on fossil fuels. Canada is committed to working with developing countries to find solutions to their staggering debt. Last year, we forgave $670 million in development assistance-related debt to the poorest nations of Africa. Structural adjustment programmes should be considered, along with debt-rescheduling and/or concessional financing undertaken with the goal of sustainable development in mind. Canada is also supporting a feasibility study into a World Conservation Bank to work in concert with the World Bank. This innovative recommendation of the Brundtland Commission deserves serious consideration. We, in Canada, believe that there are no limits to economic growth, but we do recognize that there are real limits to natural systems and resources. This is not just about the atmosphere, it is not just about the environment, it is about the future of the planet itself.

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F. THE EARTH SUMMIT: Rio DE JANEIRO, 1992 84. Canadian Policy Address by the PM, Mr. Brian Mulroney, at the Earth Summit, Rio de Janeiro, June 12,1992. (Extracts) I am proud to sign both Conventions on behalf of Canada. These agreements are welcome additions to the growing body of international environmental law. Canada supports the extension of international environmental law to cover the world's forests. Countries have a right to manage their forest resources and humanity has a right to expect that those management decisions will be ecologically wise. Canada also supports the strengthening of international environmental law to prevent overfishing on the high seas. In Atlantic Canada overfishing beyond our 200-mile zone has created an ecological disaster. This is why for Canada a global agreement to prevent overfishing is quite simply crucial. We have made good progress here, but the success of Rio will not be found in the minutes of this conference or the eloquence of its speakers. Success will come from converting our agenda, Agenda 21, into concrete accomplishments. To capitalize on the momentum of Rio, Canada advocates five crucial steps: First, all countries need to develop their own plans for sustainable development, what we in Canada call our Green Plan. Canada's Green Plan is a $3 billion action plan with targets and timetables on a wide range of projects. Second, the agreements on climate change and biodiversity require urgent and constructive follow-up. For our part, we undertake to ratify both Conventions this calendar year. Third, the requisite resources are needed to ensure that developing countries can play their important roles. Canada has spent $1,3 billion for sustainable development in developing countries over the past five years. Fourth, multilateral institutions must be a part of the solution. Institutions that have a global perspective have a pivotal role to play. We will promote action on the results of this conference by the UN General Assembly this autumn and we will endorse the creation of a Sustainable Development Commission. With this in mind, the mandate of the acclaimed Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC) will be broadened so as to deal specifically with the environment and related concerns. Fifth, the idea of an Earth Charter of Environment Rights and Responsibilities, which has slipped beyond our grasp at Rio, should be revived. We propose 1995, the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, as a target date for completion of the Earth Charter.

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Notes 1 2

3

4

5

6

See A.E.B. I, pages 85-95, and A.E.B. II, pages 280-296. As a result of Conference negotiations, Canada declared a 200-mile fishing zone on January 1, 1977. A four-page annex accompanying the communique provides details about the Convention's benefits for Canada under the following headings: territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, deep seabed mining, and settlement of disputes. It is available from DEA, Ottawa. See Seals and Sealing in Canada for details. This report was published in 1986 by the Royal Commission on the subject after two years of study. The News Release comes with a Backgrounder outlining the problem in detail and providing a useful chronology of events. A handy portfolio of documentation, with maps and a chronological survey of the question, was put together by DEA shortly after the Court issued its decision. It is available from DEA, Ottawa. It analyses the French and Canadian positions on the subject. The maps are particularly good.

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VIII

IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES

ll/arlier volumes in this series did not deal directly with Immigration, partly because of space considerations and partly also because it was not at the time the salient feature of Canada's foreign relations which it has since become. During the period covered by this book, governments maintained the traditional policy of encouraging migration to Canada, with ups and downs in the numbers of immigrants received annually depending on economic conditions in the country. They also continued to provide humanitarian asylum, on an increasing scale, to large groups of refugees, reflecting the unsettled conditions prevailing in many parts of the world. Tens of thousands of refugees from widely-separated areas were resettled in Canada: Tamils, Sikhs, the Vietnamese "boat people", Central Americans, Somalis, and others. Thousands of Canadians, and many Canadian families and institutions, were involved in the process of providing food, shelter, language and other training, as well as health care and other services and facilities, required to give the refugees a decent start. Times change and the source and mix of immigrants to Canada also changed during the period. Traditional migration from Europe dropped substantially, to be replaced by immigrants from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Middle America. This has contributed not only to a growing number of socioeconomic complexities domestically, especially in the large cities, but has at times caused political problems internationally as well. Some immigrant and refugee groups, with considerable grudges against political and at times religious opponents whom they left behind at home, have continued from Canadian soil to seek to achieve their political aims and ambitions in their countries of origin. Others have on occasion sought to retaliate, in Canada, against opponents whom they view as encouraging outrages against compatriots overseas, especially in the Middle East. The activities of these various groups, not always legal, have affected Canadian relations not only with their countries of origin, but with others as well.

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A. BASIC IMMIGRATION POLICY 85. Immigration Regulations New immigration regulations, tabled in the HC, Ottawa, March 8, 1978, by the Minister of Employment and Immigration, Mr. Bud Cullen. (Extracts) Canada's new Immigration Act and Regulations will be tied to population and labour market needs. The new Act will link the number of immigrants to long-term demographic planning and the needs of the labour market through changes in selection criteria and the establishment of a closer working relationship with the provinces. The new Act: 1) States for the first time in Canadian law the basic principles underlying immigration policy—non-discrimination, family reunion, humanitarian concern for refugees, and the promotion of national goals; 2) Links the immigration movement to Canada's population and labour market needs; 3) In consultation with the provinces and other groups, provides for an annual forecast of the number of immigrants Canada can comfortably absorb; 4) Establishes a family class allowing Canadian citizens to sponsor a wider range of close relatives; 5) Confirms Canada's commitment and responsibilities to refugees under the UN Convention and establishes a new refugee class; 6) Requires immigrants and visitors to obtain visas or authorizations abroad and prohibits visitors from changing their status in Canada; 7) Introduces security measures to protect Canada from international terrorism and organized crime; 8) Safeguards the civil rights of immigrants and visitors through an improved inquiry and appeal system; 9) Provides less drastic alternatives to deportation for cases involving minor violations of immigration law; and 10) States in specific terms the powers granted to the Government and its officers. The selection criteria or point system will be revised whereby, in order to be admitted to Canada, every immigrant must achieve a minimum number of assessment points. For instance, entrepreneurs must have at least 25 points; assisted relatives must earn 25 to 30 points, depending on how they are related to the Canadian resident who has promised to help them. All other applicants rated under the point system must achieve 50 points, out of a possible 100, before they can be issued immigrant visas. In addition, applicants must meet certain mandatory requirements regarding job experience and occupational demand factors.

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86. Revised Selection Criteria Summary of special report to Parliament, June 27,1985. These revisions may be seen as the latest in a series of on-going measures which ensure that newcomers to Canada are selected against criteria which mirror the economic and social requirements of the day. At the same time, it has become necessary to introduce new elements into the system to meet changing circumstances, for instance, the decline in total immigrant landings from 143,000 in 1980 to just over 88,000 in 1984 and in selected worker landings from 21,000 in 1981 to 6,500 in 1984. Five principles, or premises, guide the development of the changes required in the selection criteria: 1) The criteria should support the decisions of the Federal Government respecting the size and composition of future immigration levels; 2) All applicants are to be assessed against the same criteria and will be required to satisfy the same pass mark; 3) There should continue to be a preference accorded to applicants with relatives already in Canada, who are prepared to guarantee on-going support until the new arrivals are self-sufficient; 4) Occupational groups for which applicants would be eligible should be identified to ensure that Canada's labour market needs are met; and 5) The changes to the selection criteria should be clear and understandable to the Canadian public, potential candidates abroad, and those who are responsible for administering the programme. B. BASIC REFUGEE POLICY 87. Canada and Refugees Statement by the SSEA, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, to the National Symposium on Refugee Status Determination, Toronto, February 21, 1982. (Extracts) The refugee problem is of major interest to Canada for two reasons, both of which form a fundamental part of our foreign policy: first, our traditional humanitarian policy towards disadvantaged people; and, second, our interest in an international order that is stable and just. Canada's response to the refugee situation covers a wide-range of government activities. We play an active and leading role internationally through local integration and resettlement, humanitarian assistance, support for multilateral institutions, and initiatives in the United Nations. Canada's overall refugee policy and response are developed through an ongoing process of consultation within and outside the government. The process ensures an openness of the decision-making process to a range of views on these complex questions.

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There is no hard and fast rule that determines Canada's approach to a given refugee situation. We generally follow internationally-accepted guidelines. The ideal situation for refugees is voluntary repatriation to their homeland when conditions permit a safe return. In such situations, emergency relief and humanitarian assistance are usually the chief requirements. This is the situation, for example, of Afghan refugees, most Central American refugees, and the vast majority of African refugees. Should repatriation prove impossible, local integration is the next preferred solution. For example, the "boat people" of Vietnam. The provision of humanitarian assistance to refugees is a major commitment for Canada. Such assistance is crucial in most refugee situations to provide basic necessities such as food, shelter, and medical aid. I would not wish to characterize one refugee situation as worse than another, but the Government must establish priorities based on the finite financial resources at its disposal. In 1981, Africa—where there are presently 5 million refugees—was one of Canada's highest priorities. Elsewhere, we made contributions to Palestinian, Central American, and Indochinese refugees. In these very serious cases of mass exodus, the refugee problem extends far beyond its humanitarian impact. Emergency aid is therefore not, in itself, enough. It is not enough to treat the symptom of the problem; if we wish to cure the disease, we must work towards preventing it. What are the root causes of these refugee situations? How, if at all, can they be prevented? There are a variety of causes: natural disasters, for instance, such as earthquakes, floods, droughts; and also 'man-made disasters' such as wars, civil disturbances, human rights violations. The question of refugees and human rights violations is of particular concern to Canada and I believe we are well-placed to raise this matter internationally. Canada has a long and close involvement with the UNHCR; we are a major contributor to humanitarian assistance; our local integration and resettlement record in the last few years is, on a per capita basis, the best in the world. Concern for human rights has been an element of our foreign policy for decades. At its most basic level, the refugee problem is a complex, difficult, and often politically-charged issue. Canada certainly does not expect that solutions will be easily found nor that the refugee problem will disappear overnight. The various aspects of the question must be approached realistically if we are to make effective progress. The Government remains committed to pursuing its traditional and active humanitarian role in refugee questions and will continue to search for solutions to this problem that afflicts so many millions of people around the globe.

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C. TERRORISM 88. Air India Disaster DEA Communique, Ottawa, June 24,1985. The SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, today expressed his shock over the many lives lost in the Air India Flight No. 182 disaster off the coast of Ireland. Air India Flight No. 182 originated in Toronto on June 22. He expressed sympathy and condolences to the families of all passengers and conveyed to Indian authorities Canada's deep dismay over this tragedy. Mr. Clark condemned the terrorist bombing at Narita International Airport, which took the lives of several Japanese citizens and wounded others. An explosive device appears to have been included in baggage coming off CP Air Flight No. 003 originating in Vancouver. The sympathies of the Canadian Government have been conveyed to the Japanese authorities.1 Canadian officials are investigating these tragic events in cooperation with authorities of several other countries. 89. Canada, ICAO, and Terrorism Speech by the Minister of Transport, Mr. Donald F. Mazankowski, to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Montreal, June 27,1985. (Extracts) In the days since the Air India and CP Air tragedies, many ICAO and international aviation experts have said that the security measures at Canadian airports are among the best in the world. These are heartening words, but they do not erase the fact that these disasters have claimed 331 lives. The Prime Minister has ordered our Security and Intelligence Committee to examine all aspects of airport and airline security. As an immediate measure, we have enhanced security precautions at our airports, providing additional screening measures for passengers and baggage, as well as a 24-hour quarantine on non-perishable cargo. However, we cannot protect ourselves alone from the rot of terrorism. We cannot build an enduring solution, unless we build a common solution. ICAO is a major forum for such building; Today, I would like to offer a number of proposals to ICAO, the purpose of these being the enhancement of airport security: 1) I propose that ICAO undertake an urgent review of its established aviation security standards to consider what improvements can be made; 2) I propose that ICAO expand its programme of monitoring the implementation of security measures in world airports; 3) We should consider establishing as a part of ICAO a group of civil aviation security experts to investigate, on request, serious breaches of security;

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4) ICAO should develop a model clause on security that could be used in the bilateral air agreements that govern the exchange of traffic between countries; 5) ICAO should consider how best to encourage all its member states to ratify the Tokyo, The Hague, and Montreal Conventions for the suppression of unlawful acts against civil aviation. In addition to these proposals there are a number of initiatives which Canada will undertake without delay. Our government will be considering the need for more defined security standards including, for example, training levels for all aviation personnel. A critical aspect of these standards will include measures to prevent unauthorized access to any commercial aircraft from the tarmac, runway and bridge areas of airports. We also intend to focus attention on improvements to the security of baggage handling and the need for more advanced technology to permit airlines to quickly identify—before take-off—all baggage checked by any passenger who does not board the flight. This situation appears to have occurred on CP Air Flight No. 003 to Tokyo. Air carriers must be able to locate and remove such baggage before the flight is allowed to proceed. Two other areas will be examined by Canada: The first is the development of on-board detection devices that would permit aircraft crew to detect any foreign devices which a passenger has managed to bring aboard even after the airport security check. The second is the development of a "last point detection system" for checked baggage. This would permit a final security check of baggage at the moment it passes into the fuselage. Have we come to a point where we are forced to reassess whether airline services should be continued to destinations where an adequate level of security is not maintained? 90. Canada, India, and Terrorism Address by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, Taj Mahal Hotel, New Delhi, February 7,1987. (Extracts) Everything I have said today regarding foreign policy and Canadian relations with India has been couched in terms of contacts between governments. But foreign relations are also supported by public diplomacy, by informed media, and by people-to-people contacts. The involvement of private citizens in foreign relations can at times have a dark aspect. Tensions in an area such as South Asia can be directly reflected into Canadian life and this can lead to suspicion and violence. Here, the link between regional security and Canadian domestic concerns is particularly stark. The Canadian Government is absolutely determined that Canada shall not be used as a haven for terrorists. The number of newcom-

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ers from India intent on using violence to achieve political aims in their country of origin is small. Nevertheless we take those people very seriously and the threat they represent has become one of our major security priorities. The Extradition Treaty which your External Affairs Minister and I signed yesterday exemplifies joint Indo-Canadian determination to fight terrorism. People who commit serious crimes should not be able to escape punishment through gaps in the law. This treaty tightens the rule and reach of the law and fills this gap.2

D. ARRANGEMENTS WITH QUEBEC 91. Ottawa-Quebec Immigration Agreement: 1978 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Gouvernement du Quebec (sic) with regard to cooperation on immigration matters and on the selection of foreign nationals wishing to settle either permanently or temporarily in Quebec." Montreal, February 20,1978. (Summary)3 The Governments of Canada and Quebec Considering that Section 95 of the British North America Act recognizes the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and provincial legislatures in immigration matters, Have agreed to the following provisions: I. Purpose: 1) The contracting parties will cooperate fully in all areas relating to their migration movements and demography; 2) The contracting parties will participate jointly in the selection of persons who wish to settle permanently or temporarily in Quebec. II. Cooperation on Migration: 1) A Joint Committee on migration is established in accordance with Article I. 2) The objective of the Joint Committee is to ensure continuing cooperation on the subject by the two governments. The functions of the Joint Committee are: a) to harmonize the economic, demographic, and socio-cultural objectives of the parties with respect to the migration movement; b) to coordinate the application of the policies of the two governments with respect to the migration movement and immigration levels. (There follows at this point a series of clauses spelling out the details of the Joint Committee's coordination role, its membership, the frequency of its meetings, and so on). III. Selection A. Independent immigrants 1) Criteria a) The selection of foreign nationals who wish to settle permanently in Quebec will be carried out on a joint and equal basis,

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according to separate sets of criteria for Canada and for Quebec. (At this point, a series of technical clauses define the selection criteria). B. Implementation a) The selection of immigrants destined to Quebec will be the result of a joint process of decision, based upon the assessment of every applicant by each party according to its criteria. b) The landing of an independent immigrant in Quebec requires Quebec's prior agreement. (The agreement then spells out the modalities of implementation, such as methods and procedures governing inter-communication and exchange of information by the parties, conditions of pre-selection of applicants, etc.). Clauses B, C, D of Article III on the Selection of Independent Immigrants apply mutatis mutandis the foregoing principles and requirements to relatives, refugees, visitors such as seasonal workers, students, teachers. IV. Implementation committee The purpose of the Implementation Committee is to coordinate the application by the contracting parties of the provisions of Articles III and V of the agreement and to carry out any other mandate assigned to it by the Joint Committee. (Its membership, frequency of meetings, and functions, which are largely administrative, are then given). V. General Provisions This article deals with the date of entry into force of the agreement (1978), its term of validity (three years), its renewability unless terminated by either party on written notice of six months, its languages (French and English: both equally authentic). The agreement carries two annexes. The first spells out the conditions and procedures governing the selection, arrival, and employment of temporary workers. The second lists in considerable detail the administrative and financial arrangements governing the status of agents abroad of the Minist&re de ^Immigration du Quebec (sic), as well as the provisions for the presence of Quebec officials in missions abroad of the federal government. NOTE: This agreement is known as the Cullen-Couture agreement, from the names of the federal and Quebec ministers of Immigration, respectively, who signed it in 1978. It has since been renewed.

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Notes 1 2

3

CP Air (Canadian Pacific Airlines) is now Canadian International Airlines. See DEA communique', Ottawa, February 6, 1987, for details about the treaty. Also to be consulted is the Report of the Special Senate Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety, issued by the Department of Supply and Services in Ottawa, June 1987, which goes into the question of terrorism in considerable detail. It also analyses Canada's immigration policies and procedures in the context of terrorism. The report carries a useful bibliography. Mr. Clark's speech in the HC on March 10,1988, concerning a letter he had sent to provincial premiers about certain Sikh organizations in Canada provides a useful indication of certain other aspects of the subject. In that letter he sought their cooperation in avoiding participation in events and activities that could be perceived as supporting Sikh organizations aimed at the creation of an independent state in India, called Khalistan. His remarks provide an overview not only of Sikh terrorist activities, but also those of other groups and individuals in Canada. Quebec is so spelled in the text of the agreement and the provincial government is referred to as the Gouvernement du Quebec.

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IX

THE PROVINCES AND FOREIGN POLICY

Direct provincial activity abroad during the period covered by this book experienced a considerable ebb and flow. The ebb was caused to a great extent by the recessions of the early 1980s and especially the early 1990s, which resulted in a good deal of retrenchment in the presence abroad of all provincial governments. Indeed, Ontario—as an economy measure—closed all its agencies abroad in 1993; while Quebec dropped some of its marginal ones and reduced staff in many others. The flow reflected two basic developments: (1) as regards Quebec, the advent of the Parti Qu£becois to power under Premier Rene Levesque (1976-1984) and its growing push towards France, both culturally and economically, as well as towards Francophone Africa in the aid field; and (2) as regards all the provinces, the rapid growth of the Canadian economy between the two recessions, which prompted just about all of them, but especially Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec to greatly increase their foreign representation and activities in order to stimulate trade and investment. The basic relationship between the federal government and the provinces as regards international relations is documented in the two preceding volumes in this series.1 Between 1977 and 1984, the arrangements agreed upon earlier by the two levels of government remained pretty much unchanged. However, the tone of the relationship towards the end of the Liberal regime had become a good deal harsher, owing not so much to provincial activity abroad as to the constitutional climate at home. One of the first priorities of the Mulroney government in this sector was to soften the tone of the relationship between Ottawa and the provinces and to seek to improve the dialogue generally. A. BASIC FEDERAL POLICY 92. Ottawa and the Provinces

Letter from the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, to the provincial premiers, December 7,1984. (Extracts)

Among the most important objectives of the new government is the improvement of the atmosphere of federal-provincial relations so as to 137

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facilitate a more useful and productive process of consultation and dialogue between the two levels of government. To this end, the government has addressed itself to a series of measures to reduce the number of irritants in federal-provincial relations. Some of the measures taken have been announced by the Ministers concerned or will be in due course. Approval has also been given to several important steps to reduce irritants in the area of foreign relations. These relate to the following subjects. 1. Federal-provincial consultations on development of a National Trade Strategy. Discussions have been initiated at the senior official level with all provinces. It is my hope that they will lead to the formulation of a viable trade strategy with the full support of all eleven governments. 2. Contacts between provincial premiers and foreign dignitaries. There is a general view that there have not been satisfactory procedures to facilitate contacts between provincial leaders and foreign governments. It has been decided to acknowledge that private meetings between visiting dignitaries, such as a head of state or government, and provincial premiers may be held in Canada, in return for a commitment from provincial authorities to provide an account of such meetings to the Department of External Affairs. Abroad, in keeping with accepted practice, premiers will be accompanied by Canadian heads of mission when making courtesy calls on foreign heads of state or government. 3. Preparation of visits to the provinces by foreign dignitaries. I have asked my officials to involve provincial authorities in the preparations for such visits as early in the administrative planning cycle of such visits as possible. 4. Visits of Ottawa diplomats to the provinces. Since I continually urge Ottawa diplomats to get out and visit the country, I would not wish to require that the established practice which has arisen of direct contacts been High Commissions, Embassies, and the provinces be re-routed through the Department of External Affairs. On the other hand, I know that some provinces appreciate the screening function provided by the Department for such visits and that many smaller foreign missions which do not have consulates in other Canadian cities prefer to coordinate their visits through External Affairs. My intention is to streamline the processing of such visits and I would welcome your comments on further improvements which you feel could be made. 5. Provincial participation on Canadian delegations to international conferences.

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The Federal Government is responsible for the designation of Canadian delegations to international conferences, including the UN specialized agencies, dealing with issues of interest or concern to the provinces. It pays the expenses of delegates to such meetings, many of whom are of course employees of provincial governments. It is my desire that the Department of External Affairs be as forthcoming as possible in including provincial representatives on delegations of this sort. At the same time, I would ask for your cooperation in seeing that Canadian delegations do not become so overloaded with provincial representatives as to occasion logistical difficulties, unnecessary expenses or protocol embarrassments for conference organizers. In outlining these measures, I wish to emphasize that the government recognizes that provinces have legitimate interests in areas of international relations and that there is an increase in discussions at the international level of social issues which fall within provincial jurisdiction. At the same time, I should also mention that provincial participation on the international scene must be coordinated so as to avoid a diffusion of the image of Canada abroad, with adverse consequences for all Canadians.2

B. ONTARIO'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 93. Objectives and Priorities Summary of a booklet issued by the International Relations Branch, Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Toronto, April 1986. Jurisdiction over international affairs, being an essential attribute of sovereignty, is primarily the responsibility of the Government of Canada. A province cannot, therefore, enjoy a full international personality in the legal sense. The Canadian federal system, however, allows provinces to play a significant role in defining and pursuing their international interests, to the extent that those interests do not conflict with Canada's foreign policy directions and objectives. Ontario's role Ontario's role in international affairs is motivated by three main factors: 1) The responsibility to pursue internationally, activities which fall under provincial jurisdiction, either exclusively, i.e., education, or partially, e.g., trade, culture, environment. 2) The need to protect and promote Ontario's particular interests. Ideally, the federal government, in its conduct of foreign relations, should represent the national interests of all Canada. In fact, in a country as diverse as Canada, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the federal government to define "a national interest" which would take into consideration all the particular interests of each province or region. As a result, Ontario has to

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pursue its own international interests, as a necessary complement to federal efforts. 3) The need to participate more actively in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. Ontario, as the industrial heart of the country, is more likely to be affected by federal policies than any other province. Consequently, Ontario must influence those foreign policy directions with a view that they take into consideration its interests. A current example of this need can be found in the context of the Canada-U.S. negotiations for trade enhancement between the two countries. For these reasons, effective coordination of federal and provincial activities is required to ensure that the international interests of provinces can be expressed without compromising Canadian sovereignty. Although the system has proved satisfactory in certain areas, there is still a lack of adequate information from the federal level regarding some directions of Canadian foreign policy, such as the crucial field of relations with the United States. Ontario's objectives The main goal of Ontario's involvement in international relations is the enhancement of the province's economic and social development. To achieve this goal three main factors should be taken into consideration: a) economic interests; b) role of supporting activities; and c) need for a corporate approach. a) Economic interests: There is no question that the primary reason for Ontario's involvement in international relations is the pursuit of economic interests, e.g., promoting trade and attracting investment. Selling abroad, either goods or services, is therefore the main priority of current international activities. b) Role of Supporting Activities: Developing international trade depends not only on export marketing efforts, but also on the ability to sell an image of Ontario as a modern, sophisticated society, attractive to foreign investment and capable of producing goods and services which are competitive with the best available in the international market. An "image-building" strategy is being increasingly used by industrialized countries to promote the interests of their business communities. Main examples of these are Australia, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany. c) Need for a Corporate Approach: Consequently, a multitude of activities of an international nature, or internationally-related, are being pursued by Ontario and are of interest to several ministries and government agencies. While each has the responsibility for pursuing its particular interests, the ultimate objective of the Ontario government as a whole is to achieve the best possible results from its international activities. A well-coordinated approach with regard to defining objectives and setting priorities and a wellcoordinated input from all interested ministries and agencies are therefore

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essential. A committee of deputy ministers of ministries involved in international activities is the most appropriate and least complex structure to provide central coordination of and direction to Ontario's international relations. Relations with foreign governments Most of Ontario's relations with foreign governments take place in conjunction with the federal government or under its auspices. However, direct contacts with foreign governments are also increasing through the activities of Ontario Houses abroad. Priority areas of interest The United States, Europe, and the Pacific Rim are the areas of first priority. Other areas of interest are the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean. In the context of the multilateral agencies, participation in the meetings of such international organizations as UNESCO, the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, is important, and also participation in conferences related to education, health, human rights, and labour. Input to the Canadian position in organizations with an important economic impact, e.g., GATT and OECD meetings, is crucial.

C. QUEBEC'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 94. Quebec, terre d'avenir, brochure du Conseil executif, Gouvernement du Quebec, 1979. (Extraits) L'ouverture sur le monde Meme si, a Pheure actuelle, le Quebec est & peu pr&s absent de la scfcne internationale et que, sauf exceptions comme dans le cas de la France, il ne peut entretenir de relations directes avec d'autres fitats il a su, depuis maintenant plusieurs annees, ouvrir des brfcches dans les frontieres a l'int£rieur desquelles—que ce soit dans les domaines economique, social, culturel ou politique—il a amorce son dialogue avec le monde. Une nouvelle entente avec le Canada permettrait au Quebec souverain d'6tablir librement avec ses voisins, proches ou lointains, des rapports aussi nombreux que feconds. Si les relations Strokes que le Quebec entend conserver avec le reste du Canada s'inscrivent dans la r6alite ggographique et tiennent compte de facteurs & la fois historiques, strategiques, et 6conomiques, il en va de meme a regard des autres partenaires privil£gi6s qu'il entend choisir: les fitats-Unis et la France, puis a un autre niveau les pays membres de la CommunautS europSenne, le Japon, et certains pays francophones d'Afrique, le Mexique, le Venezuela, et la Colombie, certains pays arabes comme PAlgSrie et 1'Arabie Saoudite, et a long terme la Chine. La politique etrangfere du Quebec sera fondle sur les grands principes qui regissent les relations entre les peuples: droits de la personne, rfcglement

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pacifique des différends, refus de recourir à la force, non-ingérence, etc., tels qu'ils sont énoncés dans la Charte des Nations-Unies et repris dans l'Acte final d'Helsinki. Le Québec entend assumer sa modeste part dans l'établissement d'un nouvel ordre mondial dans les domaines tant économique que stratégique et politique. Ce qui n'exclut pas que, dans le cadre du traité d'association avec le Canada, le Québec mette—s'il le désire—en commun avec le Canada l'exercice de certaines de ses responsabilités envers les pays étrangers. La défense La politique de défense du Québec s'articulera autour de trois préoccupations: sa sécurité intérieure, la sécurité du continent nord-américain et de l'Occident, et sa participation aux missions de paix ou d'arbitrage de l'ONU. Le Québec entend remplir ses engagements envers NORAD. Quant à l'apport du Québec à la sécurité collective par sa participation à l'OTAN, il se justifie par le fait que l'avenir du Québec est lié au sort des démocraties européennes et américaines. La coopération au développement Le Québec ne saurait, en effet, être insensible à l'évolution du dialogue entre les pays du Nord et du Sud. Heureusement, le Québec possède déjà, dans l'aide directe aux pays en voie de développement, une tradition qui remonte à plusieurs décennies: dans les secteurs de l'éducation et de la santé en particulier. Depuis la Conférence des ministres de l'Éducation nationale des pays francophones au Gabon en 1968, le Québec a progressivement organisé et structuré son intervention dans le domaine de la coopération, en assumant la direction de certains projets en Afrique francophone, en assistant financièrement certains organismes internationaux de développement et en apportant son soutien aux organismes québécois non-gouvernementaux de coopération internationale. Le gouvernement du Québec entend, au départ, consacrer des sommes qui, par rapport à son produit national, représenteront au moins l'équivalent de la contribution actuelle du Canada.3 95. Le Québec et l'Indépendance: le monde pour l'horizon— Éléments d'une politique d'affaires internationales. Brochure du Ministère des Affaires internationales. Gouvernement du Québec, 1991. (Résumé) Les principaux objectifs La présente politique d'affaires internationales du Québec poursuit cinq grands objectifs; Premier objectif: Conduire les affaires internationales comme un instrument important de développement économique et socio-culturel. Pour atteindre cet objectif, le gouvernement verra à: 1) développer sa capacité d'analyse de la scène internationale et de son impact sur le Québec;

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2) faire connaître et valoir à l'étranger les principales caractéristiques économiques, socio-culturelles et institutionnelles du Québec actuel; 3) favoriser la participation des Québécois aux débats sur les enjeux internationaux; 4) poursuivre, dans le cadre de la Francophonie multilatérale, l'objectif central du renforcement du potentiel des pays membres; et 5) établir, dans le cadre des relations bilatérales et en priorité avec les principaux interlocuteurs avec lesquels le Québec partage des intérêts géopolitiques, économiques et socio-culturelles, des rapports suivis centrés sur les principaux enjeux communs. Deuxième objectif: Établir un ordre de priorité dans les activités internationales, soit, le développement économique, la coopération scientifique et le développement technologique, le développement des ressources humaines et le développement culturel. Troisième objectif: Favoriser sur le plan interne le partenariat comme mode d'action préférée, en privilégiant: 1) une concertation suivie entre le gouvernement, les institutions publiques et parapubliques, les entreprises et les universités; 2) en associant de façon plus systématique les différentes institutions régionales; et 3) en stimulant la participation des communautés culturelles aux relations du Québec avec l'étranger. Sur le plan externe, dans sa recherche de partenariat, le gouvernement du Québec voudra: 1) au sein de la Francophonie multilatérale, consacrer des efforts soutenus au travail en commun au sein des réseaux de coopération reliant les institutions de divers pays membres; et 2) développer des rapports bilatéraux suivis avec l'Amérique et l'Europe, certains pays d'Asie et certains pays en développement, notamment francophones. Quatrième objectif: Développer une approche intégrée dans la conduite des affaires internationales du Québec en établissant sous l'égide du ministre des Affaires internationales un plan d'action annuel intégrant les activités internationales convenues avec les divers ministères et organismes concernés. Cinquième objectif: développer une stratégie axée sur la recherche de l'effet multiplicateur en favorisant: 1) le respect de l'autonomie des intervenants; 2) l'identification d'objectifs partagés par les divers intervenants; 3) la recherche de la synergie des efforts soutenus; 4) l'appui aux leaders, aux percées; et 5) la recherche d'un effet d'entraînement. Il faut aussi: a) soutenir le renforcement de l'action internationale des chefs de file québécois capables d'affronter la concurrence et d'entraîner d'autres entreprises et institutions dans leur sillage; et b) renforcer le rôle international du Grand Montréal. Le rôle du gouvernement fédéral Dans le cadre constitutionnel actuel, les Québécois versent des impôts et des taxes à Ottawa qui, de son côté, consacre quelques $3,8 milliards à ses ministères et organismes ayant une vocation internationale explicite

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(Affaires extérieures, ACDI, SEE, etc.), ce qui ne comprend pas les activités internationales des autres ministères et organismes fédéraux. Le gouvernement du Québec cherchera d'une part à s'assurer que ses intérêts, tels qu'il les définit lui-même, sont dûment pris en compte dans les politiques et programmes de ces ministères et organismes et lui assurent des retombées réelles appropriées; et, d'autre part, qu'il est à même de jouer son rôle d'acteur international en pouvant compter sur la collaboration effective du gouvernement fédéral. D. LA FRANCOPHONIE The bases of Canadian participation in la Francophonie were set in the early 1970s, when arrangements were agreed upon by Ottawa and the governments of the provinces most interested: Quebec and New Brunswick. As a feature of Canada's participation, they were granted the special status of gouvernements participants in the Agence de coopération culturelle et technique (ACCT), thé operating arm of la Francophonie with headquarters in Paris. Ontario and Manitoba also take part in meetings as members of federal delegations. The budget shares determined at the time to defray Canada's participation in the Agence still prevail. Its budgets continue to be relatively small.4 Reflecting the growth of la Francophonie—now more than 40 countries—and its usefulness to member states, particularly in the fields of language and culture, but recently the environment also, the Heads of State and/or Government of la Francophonie have—since 1986—been meeting regularly (in theory, every two years). The first such meeting took place in Paris; the second in Quebec. Like large-scale conferences in other contexts, those of la Francophonie have at times been characterized more by rhetoric than by substance. 96. Canada and la Francophonie Statement by the PM, Mr. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, to the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation, Paris, November 10,1982. (Extracts) I readily accepted your invitation to participate in this meeting because the French language, which is spoken by some 6 million Canadians almost throughout Canada, is an integral part of Canadian life and, because internationally, the Agency is a major instrument of Canada's francophone policy. The Agency is the latest incarnation and one of the essential elements of this same idea, which is now known as la Francophonie internationale. What objectives, after 10 years of activity, do we in Canada feel that it should concentrate on in coming years? Canada is prepared to make available to its partners in la Francophonie the considerable knowledge, experience, and technical resources that it has

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acquired through its vocation as a bilingual country. Wishing to serve with fairness its French-speaking population in Quebec and outside it, and to harmoniously blend North American culture and the French language, Canada realizes that it is in a privileged position to help other multicultural countries to adopt the French language to suit their needs. But it is the Agency that must plot an original course suited to la Francophonie in this area. This cannot be accomplished overnight. The second objective that I wish to discuss with you is the immense area of under-development in all its forms, including cultural under-development Combating under-development involves so much and the needs are so great that the Agency will have no difficulty finding a place for this cause, provided that it very carefully determines in advance the role that it can play. Under the present circumstances and for some time to come, it is obvious that the Agency will not have the resources that the large organizations now working within the international community have. However, it could rank with any of them in terms of quality, efficiency, and adaptation of activities to specific needs. This is the objective that I propose. Imaginativeness, innovation, and a careful approach can compensate for modest resources. This seems to be the route that we should take. It is not an easy one, but it has the advantage of being within our reach. 97. Le Canada et la Francophonie Allocution du PM, M. Brian Mulroney, lors du Sommet de Chaillot, Palais de Chaillot, Paris, le 19 novembre 1991. (Extraits) Le Sommet de la Francophonie revient a Paris, d'ou il a jailli il y a a peine cinq ans. La France qui nous accueille est le berceau de la liberty la merepatrie des droits de la personne. Et ce retour aux sources devrait nous etre d'autant plus salutaire que nous prenons de plus en plus conscience que, sans democratic veritable, il ne peut y avoir de d^veloppement durable et que, sans developpement soutenu, il ne peut y avoir de democratic solide. Democratisation: Nous devons faire en sorte que la Francophonie exprime, defende, et approfondisse les valeurs democratiques. Nous devons nous donner les moyens a Paris d'appliquer nos convictions. Nous aurons 1'occasion au cours de ce Sommet d'adopter une declaration sur la democratisation et le dgveloppement. Pour 1'appuyer, le gouvernement du Canada, de concert avec le Quebec et le Nouveau-Brunswick, proposera egalement la creation d'une unite de soutien de la democratisation et de 1'information sur les droits de la personne. La Francophonie et la condition de la femme: Nous presenterons aussi un projet visant a combattre les injustices et eliminer les obstacles que rencontrent encore trop de femmes dans le monde. Les femmes, par exemple, forment la moitie de la population mondiale, mais elles fournissent les deux

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tiers des heures de travail. Elles produisent la moitié de la nourriture de la planète mais ne reçoivent qu'un dixième de la rémunération et ne possèdent qu'un pour-cent des biens. La Francophonie est une famille et si un seul de ses membres est brimé dans ses droits, toute la famille s'en trouve appauvrie. Les droits de la personne, ce n'est pas une notion juridique abstraite ou une théorie politique en vogue dans les pays industrialisés. Ce n'est pas un produit de luxe, mais un outil essentiel de développement. Droits de la personne et développement: Le Canada estime logique et juste que son aide au développement doit être de plus en plus canalisée vers les pays qui s'efforcent de respecter et qui travaillent à développer les droits de la personne chez eux. Ce qu'il nous faut donc viser, ce qu'il faut absolument atteindre, c'est la justice et le développement, la démocratie et le progrès. L'endettement des pays en développement: En même temps que nous recouvrons avec fierté l'universalité des valeurs fondamentales, nous devons assumer aussi des responsabilités communes. L'endettement croissant des

PM Mulroney congratulating the newly-elected Secretary General (1989) of the Agence de coopération culturelle et technique, M. Jean-Louis Roy, of Montreal. (Courtesy PMO)

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pays en développement, par exemple, nous appauvrit tous et nous devons ajuster nos politiques et nos objectifs pour corriger cette grave distorsion des rapports économiques. Le Canada fera bien sa part. L'environnement. La dégradation de l'environnement est aussi un problème mondial qui appelle des solutions. Nous avons les instruments appropriés à ces tâches. Nous en tenons présentement un entre nos mains: le Sommet de la Francophonie, qui mobilise nos ressources, inspire notre solidarité, et canalise nos efforts. Nous sommes à pied d'oeuvre sur le chantier de l'avenir.

E. PROVINCIAL AGENCIES ABROAD In 1977, there were 35 provincial agencies abroad. By 1992, the total had grown to 73. This number was considerably reduced in 1993, when Ontario closed all its offices abroad and Quebec discontinued some of its marginal ones while reducing the staff of many others.5 98. Provincial Agencies Abroad List prepared by DEA, Ottawa, December 1992. Alberta

Hong Kong London Tokyo

New York Seoul

British Columbia

Munich Hong Kong London Los Angeles Taipei

Seattle Tokyo Singapore Seoul (Canadian Embassy)

Manitoba

Hong Kong

London

New Brunswick

Hamburg

Boston (Canadian Consulate)

Newfoundland

Hong Kong (Canadian Commission)

Nova Scotia

London Essen Paris

Boston Portland

Ontario

Atlanta Bangkok Boston Chicago Dallas

New Delhi London Los Angeles New York Paris

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Frankfurt Hong Kong Milan Nanjing

Singapore Tokyo Stuttgart Seoul (Canadian Embassy)

Prince Edward Island Hong Kong Quebec

Atlanta Los Angeles Bogota Mexico Boston Milan Brussels New York Caracas Paris Chicago Port-au-Prince Dusseldorf Rome Hong Kong Singapore Tokyo Stockholm London Washington (Tourist Office) Abidjan* Seoul* * (Canadian Embassy)

Quebec Immigration offices co-located in Canadian missions: Damascus Bangkok Rabat Cairo Vienna Port-au-Prince Saskatchewan New York Minneapolis (Canadian Consulate)

F. FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL COORDINATION OF EXPORTS Federal and provincial trade ministers normally meet once each year to discuss economic issues, including foreign trade. These meetings usually coincide with meetings of the First Ministers, but sometimes are held independently. They have been going on for several years. 99. Annual Conference of First Ministers Report of meeting, Halifax, November 28-29,1985. (Extracts) Background: Canada lives on trade. Thirty percent of Canada's national income comes from trade. Three million jobs depend on trade. In November 1984, the government's Agenda for Economic Renewal identified the specific trade challenges facing Canada. Federal and provincial ministers of trade met formally the following month. Their objective was to improve export performance as a means of generating jobs. The trade ministers noted that the global economy was still recovering from the worst recession in more than 50 years, which left in its wake declining demand, reduced opportunities for trade, and much-intensified

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international competition. In parallel, high unemployment rates had produced increased protectionist tendencies in many markets. Ministers were particularly concerned about protectionism in the United States. Ministers resolved to fashion a National Trade Strategy to mobilize the private and public sectors to meet the export challenge. Basic objectives: A Canadian Trade Strategy comprises a coordinated approach to meet three fundamental objectives: 1) Secure and enhanced access to world markets; 2) Improved trade competitiveness; 3) More effective international marketing. Routes towards a more secure and enhanced access to world markets point to the prospect of a new round of multilateral trade talks and the possibility of a new trade agreement with the United States. Trade ministers recognized that competitive export financing is a prerequisite for securing sales in developing markets. Some $900 million will be made available between 1986 and 1990 through CIDA to provide exporters with competitive export financing support, while also contributing to Canada's international development objectives. In order to ensure more effective international marketing, several initiatives to strengthen the federal-provincial partnership in trade development are already underway. A new on-line computer system will improve information on high level visits and on federal and provincial trade promotional programmes, including participation in trade fairs and missions. Similarly, a pilot programme to accommodate provincial trade representatives in federal missions abroad is about to be concluded. Ministers of Trade also stressed the need for a results-oriented approach to trade development, one that is more narrowly targeted on specific opportunities. Of particular importance in this connection are the United States and the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The federal government has also undertaken major promotional events in close cooperation with the provinces and private sector associations to increase the number of active exporters. A fully-integrated federal/provincial network of Canadian agri-food exporters is being developed and a federal/provincial international fishmarket intelligence network is being established.6

G. ALBERTA AND OPEC Western Canadian oil producers became very active in the Middle East beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, especially in Libya after Colonel Moammar Khadafi expelled the American oil companies that had been working there for many years. The Libyans sought replacement equipment and personnel in Western Canada, owing to our knowledge of American oil technology.

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When the editor of this volume was on posting to Tunisia and Libya in the early 1980s, the number of oil men in the area from Alberta rose substantially, from virtually nil in the late 1970s to some 1,200 a few years later. He recalls that in Tunisia, Western Canadians in the oil business were known as les Arabes awe yewc bleus. 100. Alberta and OPEC—Crude oil Reported offer to cut production in Alberta, HC debates, March 20, 1986. Mr. Russell MacLellan (Cape Breton-The Sydneys): My question is directed to the SSEA. Premier Don Getty of Alberta in a telephone conversation with the Saudi Arabian Oil Minister, Sheik Yamani, has offered a cut in the production of Alberta oil to try to halt the world decline in crude oil prices. Was this telephone call made with the prior approval of the federal government, and what is the federal government's position with respect to the offer Premier Getty has made? Right Hon. Joe Clark (SSEA). Mr. Speaker, I spoke to Premier Getty this morning after I had seen those reports. Premier Getty fully understands that the Government of Canada speaks for Canada on international questions. It may be, Mr. Speaker, that members of the Liberal and the New Democratic Party think that someone else should speak on international policy for Canada. We believe it is the responsibility of this governemt, and we do it. I want to assure the Hon. Member, and through him others who are interested, that Canada will continue to coordinate our approach to international energy issues with other members of the international energy agency. OPEC countries

Mr. Russell MacLellan (Cape Breton-The Sydneys). I would like to ask the SSEA if Canada has received any requests from any of the OPEC countries to cut oil production, and what Canada's position would be if such a request were received. Mr. John McDermid (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources). In reply to the Hon. Member, the answer is "no," we have not had that request NOTE: Later, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. John Turner, in comments outside the HC, observed that the correct procedure for Alberta would have been to proceed through the Federal Government. The production of oil is a provincial matter, he said, the international sale and market price are a federal matter. Mr. Turner did not think that Canada could exert much influence on the market, Canada—in his view—being somewhat marginal among world oil producers.

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H. MEECH LAKE 1987 The Constitutional Amendment agreed to by the First Ministers at Meech Lake on June 3, 1987, touched briefly on two subjects with foreign policy implications: immigration and international trade (through provisions dealing with the economy). Neither Meech Lake, nor its successor—the Charlottetown Accord—came to pass. Nevertheless, the manner in which these subjects were dealt with is interesting and worth a brief mention. 101. Strengthening the Canadian Confederation The Constitutional Amendment, 1987. Booklet issued by the PCO, Ottawa. (Extracts) Economic Conferences: Federal-provincial conferences on social and economic issues have long been an important forum for meshing the policies of the two orders of government. The Constitutional Amendment 1987 breaks new ground in making sure that First Ministers meet at least once a year to discuss the state of the Canadian economy and such other matters as may be appropriate. (Section 148). Immigration: Clause 2 requires the federal government to conclude as soon as possible an agreement with Quebec to incorporate the principles of the Cullen-Couture Agreement of 1978. Clause 3 stipulates that nothing in the Constitutional Amendment should be construed as preventing the negotiation of similar agreements with other provinces relating to immigration. However, the federal government will keep supreme authority over national standards and objectives, like family reunification and over total numbers of immigrants admitted each year. Notes 1

2

3

4 5

A.E.B. I, pages 383-411, and A.E.B. II, pages 310-327, document these basic arrangements, including the respective budget shares of the parties. Thanks are extended to DEA, Ottawa, for permission to print extracts from this letter. Published by the Levesque government in 1979, these proposals were not of course implemented owing to the results of the Referendum. They are given here as an example of what Quebec's foreign policy might have been if sovereignty had won at the polls and independence had come about. AE.B. II, pages 319-328, provides background. A list of provincial offices abroad in 1977 is given in A.E.B. II, page 302.

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Many of these subjects recur regularly on the agenda. For instance, at the meeting at Quebec in May 1987, it included: Canada/U.S. trade relations; export opportunities for Canadian products in Europe and the Pacific Rim countries, especially Japan and China; the global crisis in agricultural trade; federal/ provincial cooperation in international trade.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 THE REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: 1982 A former United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, once said that "reorganizing the State Department was like performing an appendectomy on a man carrying a piano up a flight of stairs!" While the reorganization of External Affairs, which stemmed from the legislation of 1982, was perhaps somewhat less nerve-wracking, it did produce some extremely complicated and cumbersome results. The Act originated with the government's decision to apply the strategies for national economic renewal outlined in Economic Development for Canada in the 1980s, issued with the budget on November 12, 1981. It was a part of the general reorganization of the major economic departments, which the government had decided upon. This restructuring entailed the creation of a new super-Ministry of State for Economic and Regional Development (abolished by PM Turner just before the elections of 1984). A Cabinet Committee on Economic and Regional Development was established and a new department, Regional Industrial Expansion (the result of the amalgamation of the former Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce with that of Regional Economic Expansion), was set up. The mandate of External Affairs was radically altered by the restructuring, whereby it absorbed the Trade Commissioner Service of the former Department of Trade and Commerce. As a result of this amalgamation, External Affairs came to resemble the Department of State in Washington in structure. The idea behind the changes affecting External was not a bad one, at least on paper, that is, to bring under one wing all matters with a foreign policy impact or external implications, whether cultural, political, trade, or other. For a while, the departmental mandate included Immigration, but this was hived off in 1992 to return to its former home. Initially, as a result of the centralization process, it was hoped that in terms of power and influence in the governmental apparatus the Department might become a Central Agency in the foreign affairs field, like the

153

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Treasury Board in the administrative and financial sectors, or the Privy Council Office, but this did not come to pass. The new Act created two new Ministers reporting to the SSEA, one of whom would have responsibility for international trade and the other for international development and Francophonie affairs. Also to be appointed were three Associate Under-Secretaries, reporting to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. One of these would become Deputy Minister for International Trade and the other would be Deputy Minister for Political Affairs. A Coordinator, International Relations, with the rank and status of Deputy Minister, was to be appointed as well. This triangular structure at the top was accompanied by a panoply of Assistant Under-Secretaries (15, at one point, heading the Department's area and functional bureaux) and, on occasion, Senior Assistant Under-Secretaries. A corresponding complement of Directors General, Deputy Directors General, Directors of Division, Deputy Directors of Division, Special Advisors, etc., shored the structure up.1 Incidentally, it should not be thought that this inflation of hierarchies and structures was exclusive to External Affairs. It was not. Similar developments were taking place in other government departments as well, but not to the same extent. One result of the reorganization was built-in delay in the Department's work as memoranda, telegrams, recommendations, originating as drafts in a division moved through this array of hierarchical barricades on their way up to the Minister. It could sometimes take three or four days before an agreed text reached the Minister. At a time when the pace of international relations and telecommunications was rapidly expanding, this was rather incongruous. As a result, the SSEA would seek quicker advice from his or her own staff, which (for reasons other than strictly departmental) grew considerably during the 1980s, particularly under the Mulroney government, which created the function of ministerial Chiefs of Staff, who begat staffs of their own. The one in External Affairs was quite large and duplicated many departmental services and functions. Another result of the reorganization was a built-in complexity in the Department's decision-making and policy-recommending processes, since such a large number of senior officers, including the two new ministers, were involved (depending on the subject), or had to be consulted before recommendations or decisions could be finalized. Also, the process became enmeshed in a growing number of advisory committees and special committees, task forces, study groups and working groups, buttressed by advisors, special advisors, and senior advisors, who had to be consulted along the way when concerned with a particular question or problem. A third result was the lack of cooperation or smoothness manifest at times in the trilateral relationship among the ministers concerned, as turfs and personalities became involved in the process.

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Some departmental clients, businessmen especially, viewed the changes with a considerable degree of scepticism and uneasiness. In particular, they believed that, buried in a much larger unit, the Foreign Trade Service would no longer be able to serve their interests as effectively as in the past or provide the tailored services to which they had become accustomed. There was some truth to this, at least at the outset, but less was heard about it following the appointment of senior cabinet ministers to the International Trade portfolio. The upshot of all this, however, was that the power and influence of the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office in the foreign affairs field continued to expand at External's expense. 102. An Act Respecting the Department of External Affairs (Extracts) 2. (1) There is hereby established a department of the Government of Canada called the Department of External Affairs, over which the SSEA shall preside. (2) The SSEA, referred to in this Act as the "Minister" has the management and direction of the Department in Canada and abroad. 3. A Minister of International Trade shall be appointed to assist the Minister. 4. A Minister for External Relations may be appointed to assist the Minister. 7. The Governor in Council may appoint an officer called the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs as deputy head of the Department. 8. (1) The Governor in Council may appoint three Associate Undersecretaries, each of whom shall have the rank and status of a deputy head of a department. 9. (2) The Governor in Council may designate one of the Associate Undersecretaries to be Deputy Minister for International Trade and one to be Deputy Minister for Political Affairs. 10. (2) In exercising his powers and carrying out his duties and functions under this Act, the Minister shall: (a) Conduct all diplomatic and consular relations on behalf of Canada; (b) Conduct all official communication between the Government of Canada and the government of any other country and between the Government of Canada and any international organization; (c) Conduct and manage international negotiations as they relate to Canada; (d) Coordinate Canada's international economic relations; (e) Foster the expansion of Canada's international trade and commerce; (f) Have the control and supervision of CIDA;

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(g) Coordinate the direction given by the Government of Canada to the heads of Canada's diplomatic and consular missions; (h) Have the management of Canada's diplomatic and consular missions; (i) Administer the foreign service of Canada; (j) Foster the development of international law and its application in Canada's external relations; and (k) Carry out such other duties and functions as are by law assigned to him. 11. The Minister may, with the approval of the Governor in Council, enter into agreements with the government of any province or any agency thereof respecting the carrying out of programmes related to the Minister's powers, duties, and functions. APPENDIX II THE FOREIGN POLICY REVIEW 1985-1986

A review of Canadian foreign policy was conducted under PM Clark by SSEA Flora Macdonald during the summer and fall of 1979. It was not implemented, since the government was defeated in the February 1980 elections.2 Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations, as the 1985 review was called, was thus effectively the first one since Foreign Policy for Canadians, issued by the Trudeau government some 15 years earlier. The 1985 review was aimed rather more at Parliament than the previous one had been. It described the principal changes which had taken place in the global economic and political systems since 1970 and drew the implications of those changes for Canada. It selected some of the main areas where questions about policy should be raised and suggested lines of enquiry for Parliament. The main thrust of the 1985 review was economic. A Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons was established. Its lengthy report Independence and Internationalism, comprising 121 recommendations, was submitted to Parliament in June 1986. The Government's response to these recommendations entitled Canada's International Relations was made public in December 1986. The review, the Special Joint Committee's report, and the Government's response, got caught up in subsequent budget cuts and were never really fully implemented. Also, many recommendations became overshadowed by the free trade and environmental agreements with the United States, NAFTA, and the effects of the momentous changes which took place shortly thereafter in Eastern Europe.

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103. Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations Foreign Policy Review 1985-1986, presented by the SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark. (Extracts) This paper has been prepared as an aid to the public review which Parliament is about to begin on the future directions of Canada's international relations. The paper is thus not a traditional foreign policy review. In brief, it is designed to illustrate the dramatic changes which have taken place in the world and to raise some of the principal questions which Canadians need to consider at this time. It does not try to answer these questions or select particular options. That is for later. The Government hopes that the Parliamentary review will examine thoroughly those areas of Canada's international relations where important decisions for Canada are ahead. Not everything, however, is open to question. Canada is a democratic society and this government is committed to the protection of our values: hence our membership in NATO and our cooperation with the United States in the defence of North America. We intend to play an active, constructive role in the management of international affairs; in the Economic Summit; at the UN and its economic and social institutions; the Commonwealth; la Francophonie; and the OECD. We intend to do our part and more in preserving the peace and bringing arms, especially nuclear arms, under control. We are determined, as well, to alleviate the poverty and hunger of those less fortunate than we and to help to eradicate human rights abuses. But not everything is possible. We do not have the resources to do all we would like in international affairs. In fact, reduction of the budget deficit may require further retrenchment in some of our international activities. Priorities will have to be established; difficult choices will have to be made. Objectives and Policies: In framing our policies we are pursuing objectives that derive from our values and aspirations: Unity, sovereignty and independence, justice and democracy, peace and security, economic prosperity, the integrity of the national environment.

There are linkages between these objectives: balances must be struck. The emphasis we place on them shifts from time to time. At the beginning of the 1930s, for example, our preoccupation was the economy. By 1939, it was security. Today, it is both. Policy in a global context: Canada pursues its interests within two broad systems: (a) the international economic system; and (b) the international political and security system. International economic issues: International economic stresses are now felt more dramatically and quickly than before. Canada has a vital stake in the

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continuing development of international economic cooperation, particularly with the United States. For Canada, protectionism poses great dangers. Our competitiveness in the world economy is vital to our influence in the world as an economic power. Our traditional comparative advantage in natural resources can no longer be counted on to ensure our prosperity to the extent it once could be. The lessening trend of our productivity growth in manufacturing is a cause for concern. Expenditures on research and development (R & D) are an imperfect indicator, but what they suggest is not reassuring. It is in the area of military capability that our power has been most markedly in decline. A new Canada-U.S. trade regime, incorporating expanded mutual trade obligations, could provide a stable, long-term solution to Canada's vital objectives of secure export market access and enhanced international competitiveness. There are four broad options for securing and enhancing our trade access to the United States: 1) the current approach; 2) a framework agreement; 3) sectoral or functional agreements; 4) a comprehensive trade agreement. The government is seeking the views of all interested Canadians on this issue. Multilaterally, there are two crucial, related Canadian policy objectives: to enhance our companies' existing access to markets and to preserve the integrity of the GATT system. International peace and security issues: Our security interests are extensive and expanding, while our resources are limited. Control over national territory, airspace and coastal waters is essential for our sovereignty and security. Europe remains the most critical military region in the world. There is a need for a revitalized UN, particularly in the security field. Canadian interests in regional conflicts need careful scrutiny before we commit scarce resources. Summing up: The messages are clear. Our economic interests require us to be competitive we must trade if we are to prosper. Our security interests demand that we play our part in Western defence and in arms control and disarmament. Our values dictate that we help the poor, the hungry, and the politically abused. At the same time, reality establishes the limits, including the financial limits, of our ability to act. 104. Canada's International Relations: The Government's response Statement in the HC by SSEA, Mr. Joe Clark, on the occasion of the Tabling of Canada's International Relations: the Government's response to the Report and Recommendations of the Special Senate and House Committee, December 4,1986. (Extracts) The Government accepts the great majority of the Committee's 121 recommendations, conveyed in its report on Canada's International Relations, and has already carried out some of them. There are a few which we are

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unable to accept, sometimes because the remedy suggested is not the best available, sometimes for financial reasons. The Government agrees with the Committee that Canada has an important contribution to make in the area of peacekeeping. The Committee urged that Canada work in concert with the international community to combat terrorism. We are doing that. The Committee attached especially high priority to making the Canadian economy more competitive internationally. The launching of the new round of multilateral trade negotiations (the Uruguay Round) and the bilateral negotiations with the United States hold out the prospect of improving access to our most important markets. The Government is also doing everything possible to meet the Committee's recommendations in the area of aid and development. The Government shares the Committee's belief that foreign students constitute an important asset for Canada as well as for developing countries. We intend to increase substantially the number of CIDA scholarships and we are seeking to develop, in consultation with the provinces, a national strategy to make it easier for foreign students to study in Canada. The Government today affirms what so many Canadians told the Committee: that the international promotion of human rights should be a fundamental and integral part of our foreign policy. The Committee attached great importance to the northern dimension of Canadian foreign policy. The Government is determined to act vigorously in exercising control of our north. We have affirmed that Canadian sovereignty extends to all waters of the Arctic archipelago and have announced regulations establishing baselines around the perimeter of the archipelago. In addition, we are committed to construct an Arctic class icebreaker. The Government fully shares the Committee's conviction that Canada can and should play a significant role in multilateral institutions. We are working hard to strengthen the UN. Canada has an especially important role to play in the Commonwealth and la Francophonie. Few countries are better placed than Canada to make a significant contribution to international order and development. That being said, we must find room for realism, perspective, and humility. Canada is not a superpower. Internationalism calls for a great deal of understanding and perseverance, and a lot of plain, hard work. Notes 1

Recently, the titles "Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs" and "Assistant Under-Secretary" were changed to Deputy Minister and Assistant Deputy Minister in order to conform with the nomenclature used in other government departments.

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The Clark-Macdonald review—Canada in a Changing World—was tabled in the SCEAND by SSEA MacGuigan on June 10,1980, for information. The text was published in two booklets: (1) Global Framework; and 2) Aid Policy. They can be consulted in the DEA Library, Ottawa, or the CIDA Library in Hull, Quebec.

SUGGESTED READING

BIBLIOGRAPHIES To the bibliographies mentioned under Suggested Reading in A.E.B. I and II should be added: Barrett, Jane and Jane Beaumont, comps. A Bibliography of Works on Canadian Foreign Relations: 1976-1980. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1982; and Barrett, Jane, Jane Beaumont, and Lee Anne Broadhead, comps. A Bibliography of Works on Canadian Foreign Relations: 1981-1985. Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1987. These bibliographies continue those undertaken earlier for the CIIA by Don Page under the same title.

PERIODICALS The regular publications of the CIIA, such as its InternationalJournal, and those of its counterpart—Le Centre quebecois de relations internationales—in particular its bilingual Chronique des relations exterieures du Canada (published quarterly since 1979 in cooperation with DEA) are basic sources of information on Canada's external relations. The Chronique is available from the Foreign Policy Communications Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa. The CIIA's "John Holmes Library," in Toronto, and the Library of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa are doubtless the richest collections of documentation readily available on Canada's external relations. The Department's Press Release and Statements and Speeches series are a particulary helpful tool for research on the basis of information and records available in the public domain. Both are well-organized for ready reference. Canadian Foreign Policy/La Politique etrangere du Canada, published by the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, is a valuable source on Canadian views regarding current international issues. Its Research Bibliography Section provides useful information on Working Papers and Other Research of Government Departments, Universities, and Research Institutes. 161

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GENERAL WORKS Among the comprehensive books covering the period, Granatstein, J.C., and Robert Bothwell. Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy. Toronto: 1990, should be consulted. Andrew, Arthur. The Rise and Fall of a Middle Power. Toronto: Lorimer, 1993. A lively and engaging, if rather nostalgic, treatment of the subject. Vehemently anti-FTA. Dewitt, David B. and John J. Kirton. Canada as a Principal Power. Toronto: 1983. General coverage of policy and events during the first half of the period covered by this volume, particularly on Immigration and Space. English, John, and Norman Hillmer, eds. Making a Difference? Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order. Toronto: 1992. A collection of essays and papers presented during the meetings held in Toronto in December 1991 to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the Statute of Westminster. MacNeil, Robert. Modern Media and International Affairs. Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, O.D. Skelton Lecture, Halifax, N.S., November 1993. A thoughtful essay about the impact of the media on foreign policy, including Canadian foreign policy, notably that of the TV networks such as CNN. Molot, Maureen Appel and Harold von Riekhoff, eds. Canada Among Nations 1994. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994. Essays on a wide-ranging selection of topics. This is an on-going series (from 1984) and should be consulted. Nossal, Kim Richard. The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy. Scarborough: 1985, provides valuable insights into how foreign policy was made during the period under review and earlier years.

CHAPTER I: THE UNITED NATIONS Conference on Civilian Aspects of Peacekeeping. Civilian Aspects of Peacekeeping: Proceedings. Ottawa: July 9-10, 1991. Working papers. (Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security). Gardam, John. The Canadian Peacekeeper. Burnstown, Ontario: General Store Publishing House, 1992. Each peacekeeping operation in which Canada has taken part (that is, in fact, all of them to date) is dealt with individually, including the Indochina Commissions set up outside UN auspices in 1954. Mahoney, Kathleen, E. "Human Rights and Canadian Foreign Policy." InternationalJournal. Toronto: CIIA (Summer 1992).

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Morrison, Alex, and Susan McNish, eds. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking or War: International Security Enforcement. Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1991. Robinson, Svend. "Justice and Human Rights: Inspiring Canadian Foreign Policy." Canadian Foreign Policy-La politique etrangere du Canada. The Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, Ottawa: Carleton University (Winter 1992-1993).

CHAPTER II: SECURITYAND PEACE Granatstein, J.L. "Preparing for the Millennium: The Trudeau and Mulroney defence and foreign policy reviews." In Canada on the Threshold of the 21st Century: European Reflections upon the Future of Canada, edited by C. H. W. Remie and J.-M. Lacroix. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamin, 1991. See also Jockel, Joseph T. "Canada and Northern Europe," in the same publication. Hampson, Fen, Harald von Riekhoff, and John Roper, eds. The Allies and Arms Control. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. Deals with arms control policy, including nuclear weapons, the peaceful uses of outer space, NATO, the CSCE. Holmes, John W., "Canada, NATO, and Western Security." In No Other Way: Canada and International Security Institutions, Toronto: 1986. Legault, Albert and Michel Fortmann. Une diplomatie de I'espoir: le Canada et le Desarmement: 1945-1988. Quebec: 1989, Deals not only with disarmament and Canada's role on the international scene in this field, but also with such subjects as chemical and biological weapons. Letourneau, Paul. Le Canada et I'OTANapres 40 ans. Quebec: Centre quebecois de relations internationales, 1992. Nossal, Kim Richard. "Un pays europeen? L'histoire de TAtlantisme au Canada." In La politique etrangere canadienne dans un cadre international en mutation. Quebec: Centre quebecois de relations internationales, 1992. Stewart, L.R. Canadian Defence Policy: Selected Speeches and Documents, 1964-1981. Kingston: Queen's University, 1982.

CHAPTER III: CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES Cameron, Duncan and Mel Watkins, eds. Canada Under Free Trade. Toronto: 1993. It has chapters, not only on the Free Trade Agreement, but also on NAFTA and GATT, the provinces and free trade, and the potential effects of the FTA on government procurement, the environment,

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culture, intellectual property, labour, investment, textiles, the automotive industry, and continental-hemispheric economic integration. Castle, Geoffrey. "Air, Water, and Political Fire: Building a North American Environmental Regime." In Canadian Foreign Policy and International Economic Regimes, edited by Cutler A. Claire, and Mark W. Zacher. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992. Doran, Charles F., and John H. Sigler, eds. Canada and the United States. Scarborough, Ontario, and Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1985. Provides an overall view of relations with the United States, including the cultural, economic, defence dimensions. Globerman, Steven, and Michael Walker, eds. Assessing NAFTA: A Trinational Analysis. Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1993. Covers much the same subjects as Canada Under Free Trade, above, but with particular emphasis on NAFTA. Granatstein, J. L., and Norman Hillmer. For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States in the 1990s. Toronto: 1991. Molot, Maureen Appel, ed. Driving Continentally: National policies and the North American Auto Industry. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993. Munton, D. Dependence and interdependence in transboundary environment relations. International Journal. Toronto: CIIA (Winter 1980-81); Canada-U.S. Environmental Issues. In Canada Among Nations 1987. Molot Maureen and Brian Tomlin, eds. (Lorimer, Toronto, 1988); Air, Water, and Political Fire: Building a North American Environmental Regime (with Geoffrey Castle) in Canadian Foreign Policy and International Economic Regimes, Cutler A. Claire and Mark W. Zacher. eds. (Vancouver, UBC Press, 1992). Nixon, Alan, and Thomas Curren. Add Rain. Current issue reviews. Chronology and Bibliography. Ottawa: Research Branch, Library of Parliament, 1993. Randall, Stephen J., ed. North America Without Boundaries? Integrating Canada, the United States, and Mexico. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1992. Siddiqui, Fakhari, ed. The Economic Impact of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991 . This book is a comprehensive account of the proceedings of a meeting on the subject at Bishop's University, March 20-21,1990. It includes articles on adjustment, effects, employment, finance, dispute settlement, subsidies, fisheries, competition policy, technical standards, economic growth, as well as on Atlantic Canada fisheries, Japan, and Mexico.

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CHAPTER IV: THE FAR EAST MacMillan,Charles J. Bridge across the Pacific: Canada and Japan in the 1990s. Ottawa, 1988. Pringsheim, Klaus. The Car Wars Between Canada and Japan. Toronto: 1983. Roy, Patricia. "Has Canada made a difference? North Pacific Connections". In Making A Difference?, English, John and Normam Hillmer. eds. (Toronto, 1992). Succinct coverage of the difference Canada has made in the Orient in such fields as missionary activity, trade, investments, and post-war diplomacy.

CHAPTER V: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND TRADE POLICY Conklin, David. "The Canada-U.S.and GATT Trade Negotiations: Implications for Information Technology." In Canada's Information Revolution, Institute for Research on Public Policy. Conference Paper, Toronto: 1992. Cutler, A. Claire, and Mark W. Zacher, eds. Canadian Foreign Policy and International Economic Regimes. Vancouver: UBC Press, 1992. Stone, Frank. Canada, the GATT, and the International Trade System. Halifax: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1992. It includes chapters on GATT and the Canada-U.S. FTA, GATT trade policy, the environment, as well as a bibliography. Warren, J. H. "Multilateralism and Regionalism: A North American Perspective from a Canadian Viewpoint." In Trilateral Commission Working Group Papers 1991-1992. New York: Trilateral Commission, 1992.

CHAPTER VI: NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES Casson, Robert, et al. Does Aid Work? Oxford: University Press, 1986. This book is a report to an Inter-Governmental Task Force on the subject. It was commissioned by 18 member governments of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and is probably the most comprehensive study of aid ever undertaken. While it does not deal with Canadian development policy or programmes as such, it presents a good analysis and discussion of aid generally, its impact, shortcomings, problems. Its answer to the question posed in its title is far from positive: Aid does work, but not as well as it might or, conversely, without aid things would be considerably worse. Dosman, Edgar J. "Canada and Latin America: The New Look." International Journal. Toronto: CIIA (Summer 1992).

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Hubert, Jean-Paul. Le Canada a I'Organisation des £tats americains. Ottawa: Bout de Papier, Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers, Spring issue 1992. Klepak, Hal P. Canada and Latin America: Strategic Issues for the 1990s. Ottawa: DND, 1990. This book includes a bibliography. Lemko, Jonathan. Canada and the Crisis in Central America. New York: Praeger, 1991. With bibliography, McKenna, Peter. "How is Canada doing in the OAS?" In Canadian Foreign Policy. Ottawa: Carleton University (Spring 1993). McNicoll, Andre. Drug Trafficking: A North-South Perspective. Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1983. Miller, Robert, ed. Aid as Peacemaker: Canadian Development Assistance and Third World Conflict. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992. Mutual Legal Assistance—Narcotics: Agreement between the Governments of Canada and Hong Kong. Canada Treaty Series 1991/18. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1991. Signed in Hong Kong, November 14, 1990. In force February 17, 1991. This reference is given as an example of intergovernmental cooperation in this field. Rossignol, Michel. South Africa: The Struggle for Reform. Current issue reviews. Ottawa: Research Branch, Library of Parliament, 1993. A bibliography is included. (See also his study on NORAD in the same Library of Parliament series).

CHAPTER VII: THE ENVIRONMENT The law and economics of environmental regulation in the Canada-U.S. context. (1992, Cleveland, Ohio). Proceedings of conference conducted under the auspices of the Canada-United States Law Institute and Case Western Reserve University, School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio, April 2426, 1992. Issue No. 18 (1992) of the Canada-United States Law Journal carries the Proceedings, including such subjects as "Key environmental issues for the 1990s and beyond in Canada and the U.S.". It also contains "The Great-Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin from the point of view of the International Joint Commission (IJC)" by James G. Chandler and Michael J. Vechsler. Doern, Bruce. Green Diplomacy: How environmental decisions are made. Policy Studies 16. Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 1993. With bibliography. Legault, L. H. A. "A line for all uses: The Gulf of Maine boundary revisited." InlnternationalJournal. Toronto: CIIA (Summer 1985). Riddell-Dixon, Elizabeth. Canada and the international seabed: domestic determinants and external constraints. Kingston, Ont. 1989. Extensive bibliography.

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CHAPTER VIII: IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEES Adelman, Howard, ed. Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States. Toronto: 1991. The papers of a conference at Glendon College, Toronto, May 27-30,1990, sponsored by York University. See also "Refuge or Asylum: A Choice for Canada" in the same book. Hathaway, James C. The Law of Refugee Status. Toronto: 1991. Shenstone, Michael. "Canadian Immigration Policy and Refugee Policy." In Canada Among Nations 1993-1994: GlobalJeopardy, edited by Fen Hampson and Christoper Maule. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993. Young, Margaret. Canada's Immigration Programme. Background Papers. Ottawa: Library of Parliament, Research Branch, July 1992. The Research Branch has also published Background Papers on the Constitutional Issues of Immigration (1991); the Canada-Quebec and QuebecCanada Immigration Accord (1991); and on Canada's Refugee Status Determination System (1992). The spring 1993 issue of t\\e InternationalJournal (Toronto, CIIA) deals almost exclusively with the subject of "Migrants and Refugees" and is well worth consulting.

CHAPTER IX: THE PROVINCES AND FOREIGN POLICY Sabourin, Louis. Passion d'Etre, Desir d'Avoir: le dilemme Quebec-Canada dans un monde en mutation. Montreal: Boreal-Dimedia, 1992. Extensive bibliography. Jacomy-Millette, Anne-Marie. Canadian Provinces and Foreign Relations. Background Papers. Ottawa: Library of Parliament, Research Branch, 1990. Munton, Don, and Tom Keating, eds. The Provinces and Canadian Foreign Policy. Toronto: CIIA, 1985. The proceedings of a meeting at the University of Alberta, Edmonton, 28-30 March 1985. Comprehensive treatment of the subject. McNiven, James D., with Dianna Cann. Canadian Provincial Trade Offices in the United States. Proceedings and discussion papers of a conference on international business, July 1991. Halifax: Centre for International Business Studies, Dalhousie University, 1991. Includes bibliography.

FOREIGN SERVICE: LIFE, TIMES, CAREER ASPECTS Hantel-Fraser, Christine. No Fixed Address. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. The wife of a career officer gives a good account of what it is like to live and work in the Foreign Service abroad.

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Kneale, John G. Foreign Service. N. York, Ontario: Captus Press, 1993. An insider's view of the subject by a serving officer with considerable experience, both at home and abroad, particularly on the trade side.