Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955-1965: Selected Speeches and Documents 9780773591202

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
Preface
Abbreviations
I. The United Nations
A. Peace-Keeping
1. The Political Situation in the Middle East –Export of Military Equipment
2. Creation of UNEF
3. The Anglo-French Suez Expedition-The Canadian Position
4. The Middle East and Hungary
5. The Hungarian Situation
6. Soviet Colonialism
7. Canadian Participation in the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the Situation in Hungary
8. Functions of UNEF
9. Canada and the United Nations
10. United Nations Standby- Force
B. The CONGO
11. Canada and the Congo Situation
12. United Nations Finances
C. CYPRUS
13. Participation in UNFlCYP
14. Peace Keeping: Some Prospects and Perspectives
D. DISARMAMENT
15. Canadian Disarmament Policy
16. Toward the Cessation of Nuclear Tests
17. A Plea lor Renewed Disarmament Talks
18. Mankind's Greatest Problem-Disarmament
19. Limitations oj the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
20. Canada at the Geneva Disarmament Table
E. The Environment
21. The Threat of Atomic Radiation
22. Canada Regulates its Coastal Waters
F. The General Welfare
23. Canada’s Views on the UN Technical Assistance Programme
24. The UN Conference on Trade and Development
G. Admission of New Members
25. Admission of New Members
H. The Structure of the United Nations
26. Enlarging the Security Council and ECOSOC
II. NATO
27. Soviet Objectives and NATO
28. NATO and Western Unity
29. NATO Heads of Government Meeting December 1957
30. A Canadian View of NATO
31. Berlin
32. A Milestone in Atlantic Partnership
33. The Need for Atlantic Partnership
34. NATO: The State of the Alliance
III. Continental Defence
35. The Distant Early Warning Line
36. NORAD
37. White Paper on Defence: 1959
38. The Norstad Press Conference
39. Reversal of Nuclear Weapons Policy
40. Canada's Nuclear Defence Policy
41. United States and Canadian Negotiations Regarding Nuclear Weapons
42. Defence Policy and Foreign Policy
43. Civil Emergency Planning
44. White Paper on Defence: 1964
A. The Cuban Missile Crisis
45. Hemisphere and Global Problems: Canada and Cuba
46. Crisis in Cuba
IV. Canada-United States Relations
47. American Investments in Canada
48. Great Issues in the Anglo-Canadian-American Community
49. Canada-United States: Problems and Prospects
50. Effects in Canada of U.S. Anti-Trust Laws
51. The Chicago Diversion
52. Borders and Bridges: Trade and Energy Problems
53. Canada-United States Relations: The “Hyannis Port Communique
54. Columbia River Development
55. The Columbia River Treaty: A Provincial Veto
56. The Economic Price of Canadian Independence
57. Canadian-United States Relations
58. Automotive Products
59. Canada-United States Defence Production Sharing
V. The Commonwealth
60. Agreement on the Canada-India Colombo Plan Atomic Reactor Project
61. Canada-United Kingdom Trade Talks
62. Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, 1958
63. The Montreal Conference-Results
64. The Commonwealth Scholarships
65. Britain and the Common Market
66. Military Training Assistance
67. Co-operative Economic Development in the West Indies
A. Canada. South Africa. and the United Nations
68. Race Conflict in South Africa
69. Meeting of Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth
70. The Canadian Stand on Rhodesia
VI. The Far East
A. INDOCHINA
71. The International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam
72. The Serious Situation in Indochina
73. Canada's Membership in the International Commission
B. CHINA
74. Relations with Communist China
75. Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World
76. Announcement of Sale of Grain to China
C. Japan
77. Japan­Our Neighbour on the Pacific
78. Japan and Canada-- Pacific Neighbours
79. Fisheries: The North Pacific Treaty Negotiations
VII. International Economic Policy
80. Canada-Soviet Trade Agreement
81. Free Trade Area in Western Europe
82. Trade Access to the EEC
83. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
84. Canada's Trade in a Changing World
85. Devaluation
86. Trade and Tariff Policy
87. Kennedy Round Preparations and Initial Position
88. The “Kennedy Round”-An Interim Report
VIII. The Provinces and Foreign Policy
89. Politique Extérieure du Quebec
90. Prime Minister Pearson's Visit to France
91. Technical Training
92. France-Quebec Education Entente
93. Politique Extérieure du Québec
94. France-Canada Cultural Agreement
95. France-Quebec Cultural Entente
96. The Provinces and Treaty-Making Powers
97. France-Canada Relations
Suggested Reading

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CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1955-1965: Selected Speeches andDocuments

Edited by Arthur E. Blanchette Lightning Source Digital Printing Proof copy

The Carleton Library No. 103 Published by McClelland" and Stewart in association with -the Institute of Canadian Studies, Carleton University

"-

THE CARLETON LIBRARY A series of original works. reprints and new collections of source material relating to Canada. issued under the editorial supervision of the Institute of Canadian Studies of Carleton University. Ottawa. DIRECTOR OF 11IE 1NS1TJ'UTE

Davidson Dunton GENERAL EDrroR

Michael Gnarowski EXBCUTIVE EDITOR

James H. Marsh EDrroRIAL BOARD

B. Cannan Bickerton (History)

Denni$ Forcese (Sociology) David B. Knight (Geography) J. George Neuspiel (Law) Thomas K. Rymes (Economics) Derek G. Smith (Anthropology) Michael S. Whittington (Political Science)

C 1977 McClelland and Stewart Limited AU.. RIGHTS RESERVED

ISBN 0-7710-9804-9

The Canadian Publishers McCielland and Stewart Limited 2S Hollinger Road, Toronto

Printed and bound in Canada

TO MARCEL CADIEUX AND RALPH COLLINS

CONTENTS Preface xxi Abbreviations xxv I. THE UNITED NATIONS A.

PEACE-KEEPING

1

Editorial Note 1.

The Political Situation in the Middle EastExport 0/ Military Equipment: Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, in the House of Commons, January 24, 1956. (Extracts) 2

2.

Creation 0/ UNEF: Statement made on November 2, 1956, at an Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. L.B. Pearson. 9

'3.

The Anglo-French Suez Expedition-The Canmlian Position: Telegram from Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent to Sir Anthony Eden, November 1, 1956.

4.

The Middle East and Hungary: Address by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent on the International Situation, November 4, 1956. 14

5.

The Hungarian Situation: Statement by Dr. R.A. MacKay, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, in the debate on Hungary in the General Assembly of the United Nations, November 9, 1956. 19

13

· viii Contents 6.

Soviet Colonialism: Address by Ptime Minister John O. Diefenbaker before the United Nations General Assembly, September 25, 1960. (Extracts) 20

7.

Callildian Participation in the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and the SitutJlion in Hungary: Speech from the Throne and excerptS from the statement by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, November 26, 1956. 22

8.

Functions 0/ UNEF: Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, at the United Nations General Assembly, November 23, .1956. (Extracts) 29

9.

Catulda and the United Nations: Statement by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker in the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 23, 1957. 30

10.

B.

United Nations Stand-By Force: Statement in the House of Commons on February 26. 1959, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Sydney Smith. 31 11fE CONGO

33

Editorial Note 11.

Canada and the Congo Situation: Statement by the Deputy Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. Wallace B. Nesbitt, to the United Nations General Assembly, April 4, 1961. 33

12.

United Nations Finances: Statement at the United Nations General Assembly, May 23, 1963, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin. 41

C.

CYPRUS

42

Editorial NOle 13.

Participation in UNFlCYP: Speech made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul

Contents ix Martin, to the Ottawa Branch of the United Nations Association, at the International House, Ottawa. May 4, 1964. (Extracts) 42

14.

D.

Peace Keeping: Some Prospects and Perspectives: Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, to the McGill Conference on World Affairs, Montreal. November 21, 1964. 46 DISARMAMENT

52

Editorial Note 15.

Canadian Disarmament Policy: General statement on foreign policy to the House of Commons by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, February 11, 1960. 53

16.

Toward the Cesstition 0/ Nuclear Tests: Statement by General E.L:M. Bums, Representative of Canada on the First Committee of the United Nations, October 30, 1961. 57

17.

A Plea lor Renewed Disarmament Talks: Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Howard C. Green, to the First Committee of the United Nations, November 24, 1961. 63

18.

Mankind's Greatest Problem-Disarmament: Statement to the Geneva Conference on Disannament on March 19, 1962, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Howard C. Green. 67

19.

Limitations oj the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, at the International and Athletic Day Luncheon, Canadian National Exhibition, Toronto, August 24, 1963. 75

20.

Canada at the Geneva Disarmament Table: Statement to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, March 26, 1964, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin. 77

E.

11IE ENVIRONMENT

85

x Contents Editorial Note 21.

22.

F.

The Threat of Atomic Radiation: Statement by Mr. Paul Tremblay, Canadian Ambassador to Chile and Canadian Representative on the Special Political Committee of the United Nations, October 16, 1961.

85

Canada Regulotes its Coastal Waten: Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, in the House of Commons, May 20, 1964. 88 TIm GENERAL WELFARE

96

Editorial Note 23.

CanadD·s Views on the UN Technical Assistance Programme: Statement by Mr. Benjamin Rogers, Canadian Representative on the Second (Economic and Fmancial) Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, November 5, 1957~ (Extracts) 97

24.

The UN Conference on Trade and Development: Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, March 24, 1964. (Extracts) 100

G.

ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS

105

Editorial Note 25.

Admission of New Members: Extract from Canada and the United Nations 1954-55, Ottawa, DBA, pp. 29-31. 106

H. mE STRUCTURE OF nm UNITED NATIONS

109

Editorial Note 26.

Enlarging the Security Council and ECOSOC: Statement by Mr. Arthur R. Smith, Canadian Representative on the Special Political Committee, November 7, 1960. (Extracts). 109

Contents xi

n.

NATO

Editorial Note 27.

Soviet Objectives and NATO: Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, in the House of Commons, January 31, 1956 (Extracts). JJ5

28.

NATO and Western Unity: Address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, to the American Council on NATO. Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, January 29, 1957 (Extracts). 119

29.

NATO Heads 0/ Government Meeting December 1957: a) Statement by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker in the House of Commons, December 21, 1957. b) Text of the Communique. 124

30.

A Canadian View 0/ NA TO: Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Howard C. Green, to the NATO Council, October 28, 1959. 131

31.

Berlin: Statement by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, in the House of Commons, September 11, 1961. (Extracts) 134

32.

A Milestone in Atlantic Partnership: Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, in the House of Commons, May 27, 1963.

138

33.

The Need lor Atlantic Partnership: Remarks by Prime Minister L.B. Pearson, to the Opening Session of the Tenth Annual Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Onawa, September 14, 1964. 142

34.

NA TO: The State 01 the Alliance: Speech by the Secretary 'of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, at the International Day Meeting of the Rotary Club, Windsor, Ontario, November 23, 1964. 145

m.

CONTINENTAL DEFENCE

Editorial Note 151

xii Contents 35.

The Distant Early Warning Line: Statement by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent in the House of Commons, April JI, 1956. 152

36.

NORAD: a) Statement by Mr. Sidney E. Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on tabling the Exchange of Notes . concerning NORAD, House of Commons. May 19. 1958. b) Texts of Notes exchanged by the Governments of Canada and the United States. 155

37.

White Paper on Defence: 1959 (Extracts): Issued under the authority of General E.R. Pearkes, Minister of National Defence. 162

38.

The Norstad Press Conference: Statements made by General Lauris Norstad, NATO's retiring Supreme Commander, during a farewell caJ) to Ottawa January 3, 1963, on relinquishing his command. 166

39.

Reversal ofNuclear Weapons Policy: Repon of an address by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. L.B. Pearson, Toronto Globe and Mail, January 14, 1963. 170

40.

l;anada's Nuclear Defence Policy: Statement by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker to the House of Commons, January 25, 1963. (Extracts) 171

41.

United SlDtes and Canadian Negotiations Regarding Nuclear Weapons: United States Depanment of State Press Release, January 30, 1963.

177

42.

Defence Policy and Foreign Policy: Statement by Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Special Committee on Defence of the House of Commons, July 25, 1963. 179

43.

Civil Emergency Planning: Statement by the Minister of Defence Production, Mr. C.M. Drury, to the Special Committee on Defence, June 18. 1963. (Extracts) /93

44.

White Paper on Defence: 1964: White Paper on Defence tabled in the House of Commons, March 25, 1964, by Mr. Paul T. Hellyer, Minister of National Defence. (Extracts) 194

Contents xiii A.

TIlE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

208

Editorial Note 208 45.

Hemisphere and Global Problems: Canada and Cuba: Address by Prime Minister John O. Diefenbaker, Kiwanis International Convention, Toronto, July 3, 1961. 209

46.

Crisis in Cuba: a) Statement by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker in the House of Commons, October 22, 1961, following the television broadcast by U.S. President. J.F. Kennedy. b) Further statement October 23. c) Further statement October 25. d) Statement by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker concerning the decision of Mr. Krushchev to remove the Soviet missiles recently installed in Cuba, and Mr. Kennedy's response to this announcement. 210

IV. CANADA-UNITED STATES RELATIONS Editorial Note 218 47.

48.

American Investments in Canada: Statement by Mr. C.D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce. to the Canadian Club of Chicago, October 15, 1956. 219 Great Issues in the Anglo-Canadian-American Community:

Statement by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, September 7, 1957. (Extracts) 224 49.

Canada-United States: Problems and Prospects: Statement by Mr. Gordon Churchill, Minister of Trade and'Commerce, to the Economic Club of New York, October 20, 1958. 227

so.

Effects in Canada 0/ U.S. Anti-Trust Laws: Notes for a·speech by Mr. B.D. Fulton, Ministet of Justice, to the Anti-Trust Section of the New York State Bar Association, New York, January 28, 1959. (Extracts) 230

51.

The Chicago Diversion: Notes exchanged between the Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., and the State Department of the United States on April 9 and June 12, 1959, respectively. 232

xiv Contents 52.

Borders and Bridges: Trade and Energy Problems: Speech by Mr. Donald Fleming, Minister of Fmance, to the Economic Club of Chicago, February 14, 1961. 235

53.

Canada-United States Relations: The "Hyannis Port Communique": Text of joint cominunique, May 11, 1963, summarizing talks held at Hyannis Port by Prime Minister Pearson and President ~ennedy. 249

54.

Columbia River Development: Joint statement by Prime Minister Pearson and President Johnson, January 22, 1964, on the occasion' of the signing of the Columbia River agreements. 253

55.

The Columbia River Treaty: A Provincial Veto: Statement in the House of Commons, June 4, 1964, by Mr. Andrew Brewin, M.P. 255

56.

The Economic Price of Canadian Independence: Speech by Mr. Walter L. Gordon, Minister of Fmance, to the Sixth An-

nuallndustrial and Municipal Relations Conference, Peterborougb, Ontario, October 28, 1964. 257 57.

Call1ldilm-United States Rellltions: Statement by Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary ot State for External Affairs, to a joint Session of the Canadian Public Relations Society and the Public Relations Society of America, Montreal, November 9, 1964. (Extracts)

262

58.

Automotive Products: Agreement concerning automotive products between the Government of Canada and the Govern4 ment of the United States, January 16, 1965. 265

59.

Call1UiQ-United StlJtes Defence Production SlUIrlng: Statement by the Minister of Defence Production, Mr. C.M Drury, to the Special Committee on Defence, July 30, 1963. (Extracts)

268

V. nIB COMMONWEALTIl Editorial Note 274 60.

Agreement on the Canada-India Colombo Plan Atomic

Contents xv Reactor Project: Final Text as signed in New Delhi. April 28. 1956. 277

61.

Canada-United Kingdom Trade Talks: Statement issued on October 4, 1957. at the conclusion of trade talks held in Ottawa by United Kingdom and Canadian cabinet ministers following the meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers. 279

62.

Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference, 1958: Statement made at the Commonwealth Trade Conference. Montreal. September 18, 1958. by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker (Extracts) 282

63.

The Montreal Conference-Results: Statement by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker. to the Commonwealth and Empire Industries Association at the Royal Albert Hall. London, November 4. 1958. 285

64.

The Commonwealth Scholarships: Speech delivered to the opening session of the Commonwealth Education Conference. Oxford, July IS. 1959, by Mr. George Drew, Canadian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom and Leader of the Canadian Delegation to the Conference. 290

65.

Britain and the Common Market: Statement by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, December 7, 1961, Hamilton. Ontario. (Extracts). 292

66.

Military Training Assistance: Statement by Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs. to the Special Committee on Defence, House of Commons, July 25, 1963. (Extracts). 295

67.

Co-operative Economic Developme~t in the West Indies: a) Note from the Prime Minister of Canada to the Prime Minister of the West Indies. October 18, 1958. b) Statement of principles agreed between the Government of Canada and the Government of the West Indies for the Canada-West Indies Aid Programme. 296

A.

CANADA. SOUTH AFRICA. AND mE UNlTED NATIONS

Editorial Note 298

298

xvi Contents

68.

Race Conflict in South Africa: Statement by Dr. R.A. MacKay, Permanent Canadian Delegate to the United Nations, to the Ad Hoc Political Committee, November 9, 1955. 299

69.

Meeting 01 Prime Ministers 01 the Commonwealth: Report by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbalcer on the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, House of Commons, May 16, 1960. 302

70.

The Canadian Stand on Rhodesia: Statement by Prime Minister L.B. Pearson, House of Commons, November 11, 1965. 307

VI. TIlE FAR EAST

A.

INDOCHINA

309

Editorial Note 309 71.

The International Supervisory Commission lor Vietnam: Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Howard C. Green, June 2, 1962. 310

72.

The Serious Situatiom in Indochina: Statement to the Standing Committee on External Affairs andDefence by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, House of Commons, July 9, 1964. (Extracts) 312

73.

Canada's Membership in the Intemat;onal Commission: Address by Mr. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Board of Evangelism and Social Service of the United Church of Canada, Toronto, February 18, 1965. (Extracts) 314

B.

CHINA

316

Editorial Note 316 74.

Relations with Communist China: Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Sydney Smith, House of Commons, February 26, 1959. (Extracts). 317

Contents xvii 75.

Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Statement to the House of Commons, May 22, 1964, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin. (Extracts) 322

76.

Announcement of Sale of Grain to China: Statement by Mr. Alvin Hamilton, Minister of Agriculture, House of Commons, May 2, 1961. 324

C.

JAPAN

326

Editorial Note 326 77.

Japan--Our Neighbour on the Pacific: Statement by Mr. C.D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, to the Women's Canadian Oub, Montreal, December 3, 1956. (Extracts) 327

78.

Japan QIId Canoda. PaCific Neighbours: Address by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker to the JapanCanada Trade Council, Tokyo, October 28, 1961. (Extracts) 330

79.

Fisheries: The North Pacific Treaty Negotiations: a) Statement by Mr. H.J. Robichaud, Minister of Fisheries, House of Commons, June 10, 1963. (Extracts) b) Statement by Mr. H.J. Robichaud, Minister of Fisheries, House of Commons, October 1, 1964 (Extracts), and comment by Mr. J.A. MacLean, M.P. 334

VIT.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POUCY

Editorial Note 341 80.

Canada-Soviet Trade Agreement: Statement by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C.D. Howe, April 18, 1956, in the House of Commons. 342

81.

Free Trade Area in Western Europe: Statement by Prime Minister L. St. Laurent, November 13, 1956. 351

82.

Trade Access to the BEC: Statement by Mr. H.B. McKinnon, Chairman of the Canadian Delegation to the 19~61 GATT

xviii Contents Tariff Conference, at the Opening Session, September 1, 1960. 353

83.

Organization lor Economic Co-operation and Development: Statement to the House of Commons, December 16, 1960, by the Minister of Finance, Mr. Donald Fleming. 355

84.

Canada's Trade in a Changing World: Speech by Mr. Donald Fleming, Minister of Finance, to the Canadian Club of Winnipeg, January 19, 1962. 357

85.

Devaluation: Statement by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, House of Commons, October 2, 1962. (Extracts) 367

86.

Trade and Tariff Policy: Statement by the Minister of Finance, Mr. Walter Gordon, House of Commons. March 16. 1964. (Extracts) 374

87.

Kennedy Round Preparations and Initial Position: Statement by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. Mitchell Sharp, House of Commons, April 14, 1964. (Extracts) 375

88.

The "Kennedy Round"-An Interim Report: Statement by Mr. Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Trade and Commerce, in the House of Commons, May 11, 1964. 380

VIII.

THE PROVINCES AND FOREIGN POLICY

Editorial Note 382 89.

Politique Exterieure du Quebec: Allocution prononcee it Paris par M. Jean Lesage, Premier ministre. lors de I'inauguration de la Maison du Quebec. Ie 5 octobre 1961. 384

90.

Prime Minister Pearson's Visit to France: Joint communique issued at the conclusion of the visit, Paris, January 17, 1964. 387

91.

Technical Training: Exchange of letters between Quebec and France, January 3, 1964. 389

92.

France-Quebec Education Entente: 's) Text of entente

Contents xix signed at Paris, February 27, 1965. b) Exchange of letters. 393

93.

Politique Exterieure du Quebec: Allocution prononcee par M. Paul Gerin-Lajoie, Ministre de l'Education, a Quebec, Ie 22 avril 1965, devant une delegation d'universitaires belges, fran~is, et suisses. (Extraits) 396

94.

France-Canada Cultural Agreement: Text of agreement signed at Ottawa, November 17, 1965. 400

95.

France-Quebec Cultural Entente: a) Text of entente signed at Quebec. November 24, 1965. b) Exchange of letters. 404

96.

The Provinces and Treaty-Making Powers: Statement issued by the Secretary of State for External .. Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, Ottawa, April 23, 1965. (Extracts)

97.

409

France-Canada Relations: Statement by Mr. Jean-Luc Pepin, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Trade and Commerce, to the French Chamber of Commerce in Canada, Montreal, March 26, 1965. 411 Suggested Reading 421

Preface This volume is a sequel to Dr. R.A. MacKay's Canadian Foreign Policy: 1945-1954.* It seeks to document the main course of Canada's external relations during the immediately following decade. By 1955, Canada had become established as the leading middle power of the day. Our influence in world affairs was astounding, considering our population of only 16 million. The attempt of a numerically small country to play such a role is the basis for this documentary study of a most engaging period in Canada's diplomatic history. For many of us the middle years of the twentieth century are the Golden Age of Canadian diplomacy. Canadians were involved in one way or another in every major diplomatic and military issue since 1940, and contributed in no small degree to the maintenance of peace throughout the world after World War Two. Canadians participated in every United Nations peace-keeping operation and, indeed, were ·at the origin of one of the most important of them, UNEF, in 1956. Canada was a pillar of NATO and a leader in the Commonwealth. Canadians were members of the Indochina Commissions, and pioneers in the Law of the Sea. Our counsel was sought during this period and our advice, given perhaps somewhat homiletically at times, was listened to. Canada's feats of diplomacy during the mid-I 950' s were in part owing to a number of unusual factors. Canada emerged from the Second World War with a vastly increased industrial base, much .expanded trade relations, and a growing economy. We were the third trading nation in the world at the time and one of its greatest industrial producers. The defeat of such formerly powerful states as Germany, Italy, Japan, prevented them from bringing their full ·MacKay, R.A., Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents, Carleton Library No. 51 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971). Henceforth this work is referred to as "R.A.M."

xxi

xxii Pre/ace weight to bear on international affairs. France likewise had suffered heavily during the war and had difficulty in finding her way during the post-war period. By the late 1950's, however, this situation was changing. The European countries were well on the way to recovery and were exerting an influence on the world stage commensurate with their increasing strength. The same was true of Japan and other Asian countries such as India. It was not so much that Canada had become weaker as that others had become stronger. During the first two and one-half years covered by this book, those primarily responsible for Canadian foreign policy were Prime Minister Sf. Laurent and his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson. For the first few months after the elections of June 1957, Mr. Diefenbaker was his own Foreign Minister until he appointed Dr. Sydney Smith, fonnerly President of the University of Toronto, to that Cabinet post in September. Dr: Smith died of a heart attack in March 1959. He was succeeded by Mr. Howard C. Green in June, who remained External Affairs Minister until April 1963. The change of government in June 1957 did not result in any drastic change in Canada's international outlook. The UN, NATO, the Commonwealth, the United States remained the main focal points of Canada's external relations under Mr. Diefenbaker's administration as under that of his predecessor. In some areas, the new government did notable pioneering work, for instance, trade with China, the opening of the first Canadian diplomatic missions in French-speaking Africa, military training assistance programmes in Ghana, Nigeria, and elsewhere, relations with Cuba, and the Law of the Sea. Problems with the United States over the deployment of nuclear warheads in Canada were solved in 1963, when the Liberal Party returned to office as a minority government under Mr. L.B. Pearson, who appointed Mr. Paul Martin to the post of Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Martin held that ponfolio until 1968. On the official level, the Department of Exterilal Affairs was headed during the first part of the period by Mr. Jules Uger, now Governor General. He was followed by Mr. Nonnan Robertson who, in 1958, returned as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs after an"absence of some 12 years. Mr. Marcel Cadieux took over from him in 1964. Mention should be made here of the key liaison role between the Department and the Prime Minister's Office canied out during the Diefenbaker years by Mr. BasH Robinson, now Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. John Holmes, Assistant Under-Secretary untH 1960, made notable contributions to policy on Far Eastern and Middle Eastern affairs, as did Mr. Ralph Collins, who was appointed Assistant Under-Secretary

Pre/ace xxiii in 1965 after having headed the Department's Far Eastern and Middle Eastern Divisions for some years. There were of course many other influential protagonists: Mr. C.D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce and Mr. J. W. Pitkersgill, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration until 1957; Mr. E.D. Fulton, Conservative Minister of Justice, who played an important part in the Columbia River negotiations and his colleague, Mr. Donald Fleming, Minister of Finance. Both Mr. Fleming and his successor, Mr. Walter Gordon, were much concerned about the financial aspects of our relations with the United States, as was Mr. Mitchell Sharp, Minister of Trade and Commerce in the first Pearson government and later Finance, and External Affairs Minister. Finally, to complete the cast, a word should be said about its provincial component. The Duplessis era in Quebec politics came to an end in June 1960 with the defeat of the Barrette government by Mr. Jean Lesage, Leader of the Liberal Party. Both he and his Education Minister, Mr. Paul Gerin-Lajoie, began to play an increasingly active role in asserting Quebec's interest in external relations, notably with the French-speaking world. In selecting material from this period, the editor used the same guidelines (and abbreviations) as those listed in Dr. MacKay's preface. As in Dr. MacKay's book, the speeches and other documents included here are virtually all from official sources, but the scope of these has been broadened. For the first time in this series, provincial government documents are included; toward the end of the decade the provinces, notably Quebec, were showing increased interest in Canada's external relations. A few of these documents appear in the French language. Statements and speeches by Quebec ministers are not always available in English, and to avoid possible misinterpretations through translation, it was decided to leave them in the original French. In addition, none of the many United Nations resolutions mentioned in the documents has been included because their substance is outlined in the text. Moreover, they are readily available in UN and other sources. Canada was so heavily engaged in such a broad range of diplomatic activity during the decade that. the editor soon found himself facing an emba"DS de rlchesses. So many were the statements and so few the pages on which to present them, if this book was to be kept to a manageable size. Severe winnowing, compression, and pruning were thus required. While no two editors would make exactly the same selection of documents, this one can say that he at least looked at every major statement on the subject by Canadian

xxiv Pre/ace ministers during the decade. In reviewing the record, the editor sought not only to document policies and events important at the time, but also to show the background and evolution of international problems still facing Canada today. As in the case of Dr. MacKay's volume, many significant speeches had to be cut or dropped from this one also. Likewise, some subjects had to be omitted altogether: for instance, those which Dr. MacKay described as being on •'the fringes of foreign policy", e.g., immigration; or those where basic policy had been amply documented in the 1945-1954 volume and where no fundamental policy .changes bad occurred, e.g., atomic energy, aid. Cenain imponant geographical areas-Australasia, Scandinavia, Latin America-are again unmentioned mainly because no conflict of interest or change in relations occurred to make a policy shift necessary. There are of course several ways of organizing documents for convenient.chapter presentation. The two main ODes which come to mind are the political, or area, approach and the functional, or subject, approach. There are other ways, for instance, achronological presentation. Given the many foreign policy interests dealt with, the editor opted for the area approach. although the volume does contain cenain functional chapters. The area approach was chosen because it helped to pull together a variety of topics stemming from a particular area or political connection and involving a broad range of Canadian foreign policy interests. In any event. it is the document rather than the editorial technique which is important. For the sake of ready reference. each statement has been listed at the outset of the volume, along with its date-and place of delivery. and author or orator as the case may be. Selections 'for further reading. grouped under the various chapter headings. can be found in the bibliography at the end of the volume.

Acknowledgments In compiling this volume. the editor accumulated many

d~bts.

Professor Michael S. Whittington of Carleton University was a source of wise counsel as the work progressed. Mr. James Marsh. Executive Editor of the Carleton Library Series. was a pillar of strength in the production stages. Dr. Donald Page of the University of Saskatchewan, now Deputy Director of the Histori~al Division of the Department of External Affairs, made many valuable suggestions regarding the organization and presentation of the book's contents. Their helpful advice is lIJuch appreciated. The staff of the External Affairs library. notably Mesdames Abols. Adams, and

· Pre/ace xxv Noonan of the Reference Section displayed a good deal of imagination and dedication in helping to track down texts. and it would be remiss not to mention ·this. A special word of thanks and appreciation is due to Miss Anna Laycock. a senior departmental librarian. recentiy retired, who produced an extremely useful index for the Department's collection of Statements and Speeches at about the time work on this book was starting out. The coincidence could hardly have been more propitious and the editor is much in her debt for the amount of time that her index saved him. Mention should be made of Dr. Page's Bibliography 0/ Works on Canadian Foreign Relations, 1945-1970. which was also a great time-saver. Professor J. L. Granatstein's crisp, pithy, annotated bibliography on "Foreign and Defence Policy" in Canada since 1867-A Bibliographical Guide was a helpful tool and those' interested in the defence policy and external relations of canada should not fail to consult it: A particular word of thanks is due to Miss Mary Lashley and Mrs. Roberta Gilmour, who worked with great patience on a difficult manuscript.· The editor of this book is a foreign service officer. The selection of documents in this volume and the opinions conveyed in the introductory notes to its various chapter and section headings are, of course, his alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of External Affairs. It is hoped that the doc).ll11ents and editorial notes will be helpful to all who are interested in one of the mos~ important periods in the conduct of Canada's external relations. Arthur E. Blanchette Ottawa, November. 1975.

Abbrevilltions for main sources

CHCD Canada, House of 'Commons Debates Canada Treaty Series CTS SS Statements and Speeches published by the Department of External Affairs DEA Department of External Affairs

I.

THE UNITED NATIONS

- The United Nations is an organization of sovereign states, having no powers of enforcement of its own. It mirrors the world, reflecting the world's ideals and its seUisbness, its qualities and its faults. In an all too human world one should not expect the United Nations to be super-human, nor for thai matter even wise. The United Nations of 1955 still reflected the conditions and values which had led to its creation a decade earlier, and this is evident in the following pages. By 1965. however, many fundamental changes had occurred: the rise of China, decolonization in Africa and Asia, the emergence of the Third World, the recovery of Japan and of other defeated powers. Today, the United Nations is tending to bog down. 'Ibis is partly because the organization remains basically unchanged, while the realities of power on which it was built and the issues it was designed to cope with have changed a good deal. The great powers of 1945 or even 1955 are not necessarily the most significant ones today. Anoth~r factor is the growing confrontation between the industrialized states of the world and the developing nations. With their supporters, the group of 77-as the developing countries are now called in UN circles-is approaching a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, where membership now stands (1975) at 144. Yet, for all its frustrations and weaknesses, the United Nations is still an essential safety-valve. 1bere is no alternative forum today where the nations of the world can ma1c:e their views known on such a wide stage so conveniently. To paraphrase Voltaire: "Si l'ONU n 'existait pas it faudrait I'inventer". -

A.

Peace-Keeping

- In some fields the United Nations has had more success than in others. Success has usually occurred where narrow national interests, especially those of the great powers, have not been at play. Peace-keeping is one of these fields. 1

2 CanaduJn Foreign Policy, 1955/1964 Established to maintain world peace and to promote international security, the United Nations has been rather more successful at

peace-keeping than peace-making. Anned conflicts have been distressingly numerous over the past three decades, and the United Nations has managed to contain only those local conflicts involving . lesser powers mainly. Nevertheless, the United Nation's role should not be belittled for all that, since some local conflicts, in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, for instance, could easily have escalated into major wars. Logically, peace-keeping should lead to peace-making, but this has rarely been the case. Separated by United Nations peacekeepers, local antagonists have usually found it easier to put off peace-making, and conflicts have tended to perpetuate themselves: witness for instance, Kashmir, Cyprus, the Middle East. Canada has participated in every peace-keeping operation since 1948, both under the United Nation's umbrella, and in non-UN settings, such as Indochina. Canada's peace-keeping activities between 1955 and 1965 carried our influence in world affairs to a peak. Nevertheless, this has been a thankless, costly, and frusttat- . ing task. Satisfaction at the thought of being the world's most experienced peace-keeper is perhaps somewhat jaded now. Because of space limitatioDS, only the major peace-keeping operations in .which Canada took pan will be dealt with here. (Indochina is covered in Chapter VI). United Nations peace-keeping operations in Lebanon and Yemen were relatively modest and short-lived. Kashmir-the ancestor of them all-has required comparatively little deployment of resources. The primary focus is on the Middle East. The violent birth of the State of Israel in 1948, left an unhealed wound in the Middle East. An uneasy truce ensued and it was only a question of time until large-scale fighting would break out again. The first major eruption occurred during the autumn of 1956. Others, in 1967 and 1973, are beyond the time-frame of this book and will be documented in the next volume. -

1. THE POLmCAL SITUATION IN TIlE MIDDLE EAST -EXPORT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Statement by the Secretary oj State Jor External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, in the House oj Commons, January 24, 1956. (Extracts) I propose this morning to discuss first the question of the export of .military equipment to the Middle East and secondly-and this I

The United Nations 3 hope will put the first question in perspective-the political situation in that part of the world. with particular reference to the relations between Israel and her Arab neighbours. As to the first question. I wish to outline the principles which govern the policy of the Government in this matter and then give particulars regarding the application of those principles and that policy, both as to the procedures that are followed and the results in terms of shipments over the last two years. Now. what are the principles, the rules governing the shipment of military equipment from this country? These principles are the result of careful consideration and are, I think. sound and reasonable. The decisions based on them are made only after studying the relevant factors in every case submitted to us. The system of controls and checks through which policies and decisions are carried out is as effective as that of any other free country. The basis of our control system is the Export and Import Permits .Act of 1954. which superseded the Export and Import Pennits Act of 1947. Incidentally. both these acts were discussed in the House and the earlier one was referred to a committee, and in all the discussion of these two acts no reference was made at that time by the hon. members opposite to the question of arms shipment. Under the act of 1954 it is illegal to export or attempt to export to any destination affected any item included in an export control list except under an export permit issued by or under the authority of the Minister of Trade and Commerce. The exporter must present this pennit at the time he clears his shipment through Canadian customs at the port. The Minister of Trade and Commerce has the power to amend, suspend or to cancel permits if changing circumstances should render this necessary after issuance of a permit and before a shipment is made. The act provides severe pen8Ities for those convicted of offences. The powers for enforcing the controls, imposing severe penalties, and revoking pennits if circum~tances so require are provided in that act. Shipments are, of course, checked by the customs authorities at the ports and action can be taken then as weD as at the pennit stage if required. Procedures are also laid down to prevent diversion and there is co-operation with many governments in the free world to ensure that so far as possible such procedures are effective. There was published in the Canada Gazette on May 27, 1954, the export control list established in accordance with the provisions of the act. Group 8 within the list is headed, "Arms, Ammunition, Implements or Munitions of War; Military, Naval or Air Stores". The list of arms, aircraft, etc., specifically includes parts of these variC?us items. So much for the legislative basis of our policy.

4 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955/1964

The following principles govern the policy of the Government in carrying out this act. (1) In the case of certain allied and associated states. for example. NATO and most Commonwealth countries there are no restrictions on the export of military equipment exceptand the exceptions are important-those of supply of domestic requirement and of security. (2) No shipment of any kind to the Sino-Soviet bloc is permitted. (3) Shipments of any significance are made to other areas only after consideration and approval at cabinet level. according to a procedure which I will later describe. Special attention is given-and special care shown-in respect of areas of tension or strife or what we call sensitive areas. A list of such areas, they are now 34 in number. is kept and. naturally. is modified from time to time as conditions change. (4) Arms shipments are made only to the defence depanment or regular military establishment of the country concerned; and the recipient government may be required to give appropriate assurance regarding re-export. (5) Shipments are not permitted if, in our opinion, they exceed the legitimate defence requirements of the state in question or which would themselves constitute a threat to neighbouring countries. (6) Shipments are not permitted to sensitive areas of arms of such a character that they might increase any temptation to commit an aggression or begin a preventive war.

It is not, however, our policy to put a complete embargo on arms shipments except to the Sino-Soviet bloc. or to other countries, if any. who are a threat to our own security or where the United Nations has declared an embargo. An embargo on all shipments in other cases, if it became general international policy and practice in the free world, might frustrate the right of nations under the United Nations Chaner to defend themselves; or it might drive them wholly into the arms of Russia and its satellites as the only sowce of supply. It might perpetuate inequalities between states. in respect of their defensive capacities, thereby creating fear and insecurity; and encouraging aggression. One state might, for instance, have its own defence industries. and another-its neighbour-might be wholly dependent on imported defence equipment. An embargo could not possibly operate fairly in such cases, and might indeed encourage armed conflict over dis-

The United Nations 5 puted territory. I can assure you that this is no hypothetical argument. Let us see, for instance, how such an embargo-if it could have been agreed on and' enforced internationally-would have operated in the Middle East in respect of Israel and its Arab neighbours. I gather from observations made in this House and outside that this is the policy that is advocated.by at least certain members of opposition parties. This area has been one of tension and unrest and indeed danger from the very day that the State of Israel was created. That creation-it should not be forgotten-was the result of a United Nations decision which Canada supported. If the embargo principle . had been adopted, Israel would have been completely powerless to defend her very existence; unless she had agreed in desperation to throw herself into the arms of communist suppliers. If it had suited their purposes, and for a price-and it would have been a high price-the Moscow government which controlled these suppliers would have been quite happy to arrange such a deal. An alternative would have been to permit certain quantities and types of military equipment to go to Israel during this period of tension and to allow nothing whatsoever to go to any Arab state in any circumstances. That would, of course, have been considered as an unfriendly policy by those states with which Canada has normal diplomatic relations. Neither this policy nor that of the complete embargo for both sides has, so far as I know, been adopted by any country. Indeed a policy of control which has been adopted by the United Kingdom, the United States and France, the policy which has been accepted by the free world, is that which we ourselves are now following. Another important principle which we have followed is that of consultation and exchange of information about orders and requests-except those of no significance in quantity or naturewith certain governments who have special responsibilities in this field. We do that"so that one country may know what the others are doing and thereby ensure that so far as possible the principles that I have mentioned above are adhered to. If. for instance, we are asked to supply some ammunition for 2S-pounders for a particular country-and we have been asked for that, and it is still before Cabinet-we try to find out. before taking any action, not only whether such an order would be excessive having regard to the number of guns involved, and existing stocks. but whether orders for this ammunition have also been received by other governments. The responsibility for the decision, however, is of course ours.

6 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955/1964

Now, what is the procedure by which this policy is carried out? Under the law, as I have said, the export pennia must be given by the Minister of Trade and Commerce. Before doing so, if the . destination is one of those 34 sensitive areas where consultation is required, he consults with both the Departments of National Defence and External Affairs and acts only after agreement with those'two departments. H the application is a particularly significant one, either in quantity or because of the political circumstances surrounding it, and eyen though the three ministers may have agreed to the pennit, the matter is referred to the whole Cabinet. In the case of shipments to NATO or most Commonwealth countries, the Minister of Trade and Commerce may act after consultation only with the Department of National Defence, in order to make sure that security and supply factors are considered as well as our own defence requirements. In all cases where government surplus supplies are involved, the matter must also go to the Treasury Board for approval. Even after there has been ministerial agreement on an export pennit, that board, a committee of the Cabinet, may also ask the full Cabinet to reconsider a decision taken. What are the results of this policy in respect to arms shipments to the Middle East? An impression may have been created that Canadian arms were flowing into that area in great quantities. That is not the case. The amounts involved are small and do not contravene the principles which I have outlined as governing our policy. The impression may have also been given that we were releasing modem and dangerous weapons whose capabilities could disrupt the nillitary balance among the countries in that region and encourage all-out agression or an arms race. That also is not the case. There are certain figures I should like to give and I give these figures although similar figures are not given in respect to arms shipments by other countries. In 1954 export pennits for military equipment to the value of $735,574.60 were granted for Israel; for Egypt the figure was only $296; for all other Arab states, none. In 1955 the figure for Israel was $1,332,110.59; for Egypt, $770,825; for all other Arab states, $70. The figures for the two years were ,2,067,685.19 for Israel, and $771,121'for Egypt. I should like to tum now to the political situation in the area in order to give the background to the question we have been discussing. It is a situation which has been disturbing and unsettled, as I have already said, since the very foundation of the State of Israel. It is becoming increasingly clear that some solution must be found for the problem of the relationship between Israel and her Arab neighboUrs if that situation is to improve. H it does not imp~ove it

The United Nations 7 will get worse and the danger of conflict will increase. This is especially the case because there are governments which are cynically hoping to obtain political advantage from keeping the Arab- . Israeli dispute burning without .any concern for the damage that this wo.uld cause the Israeli and Arab people, or the danger to peace that might result. I think there would be no contribution on our part to improving the chances of peace in that area by cutting off all shipments of defence equipment to the State of Israel, if that is the policy of my hone friends opposite. It is the realization of this danger, the danger of conflict, which prompted Western statesmen recently to offer the assistance of their governments and themselves in helping Israel and the Arab States find a solution for their disputes and problems. We in this government are very much in accord with the spirit of such pronouncements which point to the necessity of a settlement based on conciliation, understanding and compromise, which alone can afford a real basis of security and prosperity for both the Arab and Israeli peoples. The difficulties are great and the dangers are very real, as they always are when passions are high and feelings are deep. We can sympathize with and understand the fear felt in Israel when they hear across their borders threats of destruction; and, of course, the United Nations did not establish the State of Israel in order to see its obliteration. Similarly, we can understand the feelings of Arab peoples at the alienation of land which was occupied by Arabs for centuries; we can sympathize with the sufferings of the many thousands of Arab refugees who have been made homeless. But surely to both sides the advantages of a confirmed and secure peace, instead of the present condition of precarious armistice, are so great both economically and politically that a negotiated settlement should not be impossible. The important question is, however, how can an honourable and satisfactory solution be brought about? The main issues are now commonly known. It seems clear Ibat both sides, if they recognize the desiraJ>ility of a settlement, must give something to achieve it, must make some compromise. There can never be a negotiated settlement where one side or the olber remains adamant. Each must enter into negotiations prepared for some sort of give and take aIlbough, of course, no one would expect one of the sides to make prior or unilateral concessions. It seems to me that an essential, indeed, a first requirement, is that Ibe Arab states should recognize the legitimate and permanent existence of the State of Israel. That, as I see it, necessitates abandonment by them of the impractical stipulation that we must return to the United Nations resolutions of 1947 which provided for

8 Canadian Foreign Policy•. 1955/1964 a divided Palestine. The Arab states took up arms to prevent these resolutions becoming effective and I do not see how they can claim the right to have them accepted now as the price of peace in that area. The people of Israel have the right to know that their national existence is not at stake. That seems to me to be fundamental. Efforts to bring peace and all its benefits to the Middle East will be of no avail unless Israel and the people of Israel are released from the overhanging fear which naturally envelopes the country as a result of the threats of destruction and of the political and economic warfare directed against it by its neighbours. Surely it is essential. therefore, that this basic cause of fear must be removed if there is to be a solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Just as we should like to see Israel freed from the fears and economic pressures which are being imposed on her, we must also hope that the Arab populations will be enabled to move forward toward their goals of economic betterment and social progress. There have, indeed, been concrete proofs that this is the hope of the West. It may perhaps be said that there is fear also on the part of the Arab states lest they should be attacked. But so far as I am aware, the 1950 tripartite declaration of the three leading Western powers is still valid, that they would oppose the changing of borders by force. Moreover, the United Nations is dedicated to the prevention of aggression and the House will be aware of the fact that only recently the security council of the United Nations, in considering a most regrettable development of the Arab-Israeli dispute, gave unanimous evidence of its determined opposition to the resort to aggressive force. These I maintain, are no incon~iderable safeguards. They would be even stronger if there were permanent frontiers settled by negotiation. The Arab states on their part are, however, entitled to certain assurances. There must be a fair and honourable solution to the problem of Arab refugees. The unhappy plight of these refugees is of serious concern not only to the Arab countries and to Israel because it poisons their relations but also, for humanitarian and political reasons, to the whole free world. These unfortunate people have largely been maintained by the United Nations, and Canada has contributed its share toward their support. But that cannot go on much longer. Shelter and a dole are pitiful substitutes for a permanent home and opportunities for gainful work. As I see it. some compensation should be paid these refugees by Israel for Joss of land and home. But it is clear that so large a number cannot return to.their former land, which is now in the State of Israel whose total population is less than two million;. nor in all probability would many

The United Nations 9 desire to live in what would now be to them an alien country. A limited amount of repatriation might be possible such as that which would be involved, for example, in the reuniting of families. For the rest, resettlement as an international operation, to which Israel among others would make a contribution, seems to be the only answer. But even more important is the question of boundaries. There are at {)resent armistice demarcation Jines. They are therefore Jines which have not been finany determined by a peace settlement. I believe that they could be susceptible to readjustments. This, of course, is by no means to suggest onesided concessions of territory or any such thing as the "truncation" of Israel which would be crippling to the new state. But perhaps certain boundary rearrangements could be made so as to' produce mutually acceptable permanent borders. There is no doubt, in my mind at least, that if the permanent borders could be agreed upon in this way the United Nations would be deeply interested in the maintenance of their security. In return for the international guarantee which might result from this interest,. with security and stability in the area which would result, I should think both the State of Israel and the Arab States would ~ willing at least to discuss such readjustments at a peace conference table. It seems to me also that any state which would refuse to discuss peace at such a conference table-and on some such basis of principles as that outlined above, although sketchilywould be taking on a very heavy responsibility indeed. I share. however. the optimism of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is now visiting this area on a mission of conciliation and peace that such an uncompromising attitude will not be adopted by anyone and that a settlement based on justice and security will be found. Please God it may be so that this tense and tom area, the Holy Land of so many millions, may become again a land of prosperity and of peace.

2. CREATION OF UNEF

Statement made on November 2 at an Emergency SpeciDl Session of the United Nations General Assembly by the Chairman of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. L. B. Pearson. (The statement was made in explanation of Canada's vote on a resolution, adopted by the Assembly, calling on all parties involved in hostilities to agree to an immediate cease-fire and to halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area).

10 Canadian Foreign Policy. 1955/1964

I rise not to take part in this debate. because the debate is over. The vote has been taken. But I do wish to explain the abstention of my delegation on that vote. It is never easy to explain an abstention. and in this case it is particularly difficult because we are in favour of some parts of this resolution. and also because this resolution deals with such a complicated question. Because we are in favour of some parts of the resolution, we could not vote against it, especially as, in our opinion, it is a moderate proposal couched in rea.sonable and objective terms, without unfair or unbalanced condemnation; and also, by referring to violations by both sides to the armistice agreements, it puts, I think, recent action by the United Kingdom and France-and rightly-against the background of those repeated violations and provocations. We support the effort being made to bring the fighting to an end. We support it, among other reasons. because we regret that force was used in the circumstances that face us at this time. As my delegation sees it. however. this resolution which the General Assembly has thus adopted in its present fonn-and there was very little chance to alter that form-is inadequate to achieve the purpose which we have in mind at this Assembly. These purposes are defined in that resolution of the United Nations under which we are meeting-resolution 377(V), uniting for peace-and peace is far more than ceasing to fue, although it certainly must include that essential factor. This is the first time that action has been taken under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, and I confess to a feeling of sadness, indeed even distress, at not being able to support the position taken by two countries whose ties with my country are and will remain close and intimate; two countries which have contributed so much to man's progress and freedom under law; and two countries which are Canada's mother countries. I regret the use of military force in the circumstances which we have been discussing. but I regret also that there was not more time, before a vote had to be taken, for consideration ot the best way to bring about that kind of cease-fire which would tlIiave enduring and beneficial results. I think that we were entitled to that time. for this is not only a tragic moment for the countries and peoples immediately affected, but it is an equally difficult t~me for the United Nations itself. I know, of course, that the situation is of special and, indeed, poignant urgency, a human urgency. and that action could not be postponed by dragging out a discussion, as has been done so often in this Assembly. I do feel, however, that had that time, which has always, to my knowledge, in the past been

The United Nations 11

permitted for adequate examination of even the most critical and urgent resolution, been available on this occasion, the result might have been a better resolution. Such a short delay would not, I think, have done harm, but, in the long run, would have helped those in the area who need help most at this time. Why do I say this? In the first place, our resolution, though it has been adopted, is only a recommendation, and its moral effects would have been greater if it could have received a more unanimous w.te iIi this Assembly-which might have been possible if there had been somewhat more delay. Secondly, this recommendation which we have adopted cannot be effective without the compliance of those to whom it is addressed and who have to carry it out. I had ventured to hope that, by a short delay and in informal talks, we might have made some headway, or at least have tried to make some headway, in securing a favourable response, before the vote was taken, from those governments and delegations which will be responsible for carrying it out. I consider that there is one great omission from this resolution, which has already been pointed out by previous sPeaJcers--more. particularly by ~e representatiye of New Zealand, who has preceded me. This resolution does provide for a cease-fire, and I admit that that is of first importance and urgency. But, alongside a ceasefire and. a withdrawal of troops, it does ~t provide for any steps to be taken by the United Nations for a peaCe settlement, without which a cease-fire will be only of temporary value at best. Surely, we should have used this opportunity to link a cease-fire to the absolute necessity of a political settlement in Palestine and for Suez, and perhaps we might also have been able to recommend a procedure by which this absolutely essential process might begin. Today we are facing a feeling of almost despairing crisis for the United Nations and for peace. Surely that feeling might bave been harnessed to action or at least to a formal resolve to act at long last and to do something effective about the underlying causes of this crisis which bas brought us to the very edge of a tragedy even greater than that which has already taken place. We should then, I think have recognized the necessity for political settlement in this resolution and done something about it. And I do not think that, if we had done that, it would have postponed action very long on the other clauses of the resolution. Without such a settlement, which we might have pushed forward under the incentive of fear, our resolution, as I see it, may not make for an enduring and real peace. We need action, then, not only to end the fighting but to make the peace. I believe that there is another omission from this resolution, to which attention has also already been directed. The armed forces of

12 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955/1!64 Israel and of Egypt are to withdraw, or if you like, to return to the annistice lines, where presumably, if this is done. they will once again face each other in fear and hatred. What then? What then. six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? Are we to return to the status quo? Such a return would not be to a position of security or even a tolerable position. but would be a return to terror, bloodshed. strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion which the United Nations annistice commission would be powerless to prevent and possibly even to investigate. I therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolutionand this has been mentioned by previous speakers-authorising the Secretary-General to' begin to make arrangements with member governments for a United Nations force*large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out. I regret exceedingly that time has not been given to follow up this idea, which was mentioned also by the representative of the United Kingdom in his first speech, and I hope that even now, when action on the resolution has been completed. it may not be too late to give consideration to this matter. My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force; a truly international peace and police force. We have a duty here. We a1so-or, should I say, we had-an opportunity. Our resolution may deal with one aspect of our duty"an urgent, a terribly urgent, aspect. But, as I see it, it does nothing to seize that opportunity which, if it had been seized, might have brought some real peace and a decent existenCe, or hope for such. to the people of that part of the world. There was no time on this . occasion for us to seize this opponunity in this resolution. My delegation therefore felt because of the inadequacy of the resolution in this respect. that we had no alternative in the circumstances but to . abstain in the voting. I hope that our inability to deal with those essential matters at this time wiD very soon be removed and that we can come to grips with the basic core of this problem. ** *00 November 7, Prime Minister St. Laurent announced in Ottawa that the Canadian Government had agreed to offer a Cana-

dian contingent of battalion strength to the international United Nations force for the Middle East. ** The Crisis in the Middle East, October-December. 1956 and January-March 1957, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957). provide a factual summary, with useful background, of the crisis. followed by

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3. THE ANGLO-FRENCH SUEZ EXPEDmON-THE CANADIAN POSmON Telegram from Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent to Sir Anthony Eden·

Ottawa at 11:30 AM, I November 1956: Thank you for your message of yesterday, which reached me at five o'clock our time, in the afternoon. I understand, of course, that in view of the rapidity with which your government and that of France felt it was necessary to act, it could not be otherwise; but the first intimation I had of your government's intention to take certain grave steps in Egypt was from the press reports of your statement in the House of Commons. I must add that without more infonnation. and information different from that which we now have, about the action of Israel, we cannot come to the conclusion that the penetration of its troops into Egypt was justified or that the probable resistance of the Egyptians necessitated the decision of the UK and France to post forces in the canal zone. No doubt, however, your own information is much more complete than ours. We now await developments, and information concerning them, ~ith most anxious interest. In the meantime, we have suspended all shipments of arms to Israel and will endeavour to shape our course in confonnity with what we regard as our obligations under the Charter of and our membership in the United Nations. We are never unmindful, of course, in our own decisions, of the very special relationship of close friendship" and intimate association which we have with the United Kingdom and with your government. Nor do we forget the vital importance of the Suez Canal to the economic life of the United Kingdom. You will not be surprised when I tell you that, apart from the danger of a war which might spread, there are three aspects of this distressing situation which cause us particular anxiety. Our misgivings in this respect have already been communicated to some of your colleagues "througb our High Commissioner, who may have passed them on to you. an account of UN actions. They also provide the text of the principal documents. ' *Quoted, with the permission of the Depanment of External Affairs, in Mike, II, the memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), p. 238.

14 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955/1964 The first is the effect of the decisions taken on the United Nations, of which the United Kingdom has been such a staunch and steady supporter. The fact that the action which you took was taken while the Security Council was seized of the matter is, I think, most regrettable, and the result of the Security Council vote last night equally regrettable. There is also the danger-and I am sure that you are even more conscious of this than we are here-of a serious division within the Commonwealth in regard to your action, which wiD prejudice the unity of our association. The statement which the Government of India issued this morning is significant evidence of this danger. Fmally, and this is a matter of deep and abiding interest to Canada, the deplorable divergence of viewpomt and policy between the United Kingdom and the United States in regard to the decisions that have been taken, and the procedure followed, is something that will cause as much satisfaction to the Soviet Union and its sup- . porters as it does distress to all those who believe that AngloAmerican co-operation and friendship is the very foundation of our hopes for progress toward a peaceful and secure world. That cooperation and friendship, which you yourseH have done so much to promote, has now served the world well for many years. It would be a tragedy beyond repair if it were now to disappear, or even to be weakened. It is hard for a Canadian to think of any considerationother than national survival or safety-as more important. This aspect of the situation is very much in our minds here at the moment, as I know it must be in yours. I have no desire, of course, to add by any words of mine to the heavy burdens you are already carrying, but I know that you would like me to tell you frankly, and as a friend, of my worries; and this I . have tried to do.

4. THE MIDDLE EAST AND HUNGARY

Address by Prime Minister Louis St. lAurent on the International Situation, CBC, November 4, 1956. (Extracts) I think jt my duty to speak to you tonight about the very grave events of the last two weeks. I should like first to talk about the Middle East crisis. I would like to explain to you the Government's recent actions in the context of our general policy in the Middle East. For the last few years peace bas been precarious in this area, especially around the borders of Israel, whose creation as a state was recom-

The United Nations 15

mended by the United Nations General Assembly with Canada's support in November 1947. While the tensions arising out of the situation in the Middle East have continued. Canada has steadily encouraged efforts to secure a fair settlement based on the principle that Israel should live and prosper-but not the principle that it should expand at the expense of its Arab neighbours. A recent communist intervention in the Middle East has contributed directly to the present crisis. * By supplying offensive weapons in large quantities to Egypt the Communist world threatened to upset the balance of power between Israel and its Arab neighbours. In order to help redress this potential imbalance Canada agreed a few weeks ago to authorize the export of 24 F-S6 jet fighter planes to Israel over a six-month period. We realized however that a permanent settlement betWeen Israel and its neighbours arranged by the United Nations was the only way in which peace could be preserved in the long run. Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company increased the dangers inherent in the Middle East situation. The Egyptian action introduced a threat to the trade on which the economic life of many countries depends. It placed the control of shipping in the Canal in the hands of a government which for some years has been denying access to the Canal for Israeli ships in defiance of a Security Council resolution. In the crisis which resulted from the nationalization of the Canal Company the Canadian Government has followed a definite and consistent policy in public statements and in private discussions with the nations concerned. We have advocated that a settlement of the issues relating to the Canal which directly affect so many countries should be achieved under th~ auspices of the United Nations and that there should be no resort to force. The Canadian Government welcomed the IS-power proposals agreed to at the London Conference in August as a sound basis for negotiating a settlement. We have stated our belief that this settlement should· respect the legitimate sovereign rights of Egypt. It should also safeguard the right of ships of all nations to pass through the Canal. At the same time it should protect the international waterway from arbitrary and unjustified intervention by any country. including Egypt. We have stated our belief that this setllement should be embodied in co-operative arrangements with which the United Nations should be associated in an appropriate manner.

*An exchange of arms for cotton between Czechoslovakia and Egypt.

16 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955/1964 Because we believe that a permanent settlement of Israel's relations wiah its neighbours and of the future of the Suez Canal should be reached by peaceful negotiations under the aegis of the United Nations, the Canadian Government regrets that Israel proceeded last week to use force against Egypt, although we recognize ahat Israel has been subject to grave threats and provocations during the last few years. Though we recognize the vital importance of the Canal to the economic life and international responsibilities of the United Kingdom and France, we could not but regret also that, at a time when the United Nations Security Council was seized of the matter, the United Kingdom and France felt it necessary to intervene with force on their own responsibility. Your Government has acted promptly in this crisis. We have taken immediate steps to further the safety of Canadian civilians in the Middle East. We have suspended the shipment of jet interceptor aircraft to Israel. The Canadian Government voted for consideration of the Israeli attack at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on November I which was called after Security Council action was made impossible by the negative votes of two of its permanent members. A United States resolution was introduced which called for an immediate cease-fire, the prompt withdrawal of forces and the end of military shipments to the area. On Friday morning this resolution was carried by 64 votes in favour to 5 against, including the United Kingdom and France. Canada and five other nations abstained in the vote on this resolution. In explaining the reasons for this abstention, I should like to quote part of what Mr. Pearson said in the General Assembly: I regret use of military force in the circumstances which we have been discussing but I regret also that there was not more time, before a vote had to be taken, for consideration of the best way to bring about that kind of cease-fire which will have enduring and beneficial results. He later added: I therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution . . . authorizing the Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements with member governments for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out . .;. We have swiftly followed up this suggestion. At another special

The United Nations J7

session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York last night Mr. Pearson introduced a resolution on behalf of Canada which requests the Secretary-General to submit within 48 hours a plan for a United Nations force to secure and to supervise the cease-fire arrangements which were referred to in the United States resolution. Mr. Pearson explained that no members of the United Nations are to be asked to provide forces without their previous consent. The Canadian Government is ready to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force if it is to be established and if it is thought that Canada could playa useful role. The Canadian resolution was passed by the General Assembly early this morning without a single dissenting vote although there were a number of abstentions. At the same time the General Assembly passed a resolution sponsored by 19 nations; it reaffirmed the United States resolution about cease-fire arrangements and authorized the Secretary-General to arrange with the nations concerned the implementation of this resolution and asked him to repon on their compliance. " The establishment of the United Nations force will be to ensure an effective cease-fire in the affected area. The governments of the United Kingdom and France have signified their willingness, under certain conditions. to suspend their military intervention if a United Nations truce force is given responsibility. According to present information, Israel and Egypt have stated their willingness to accept cease-fire arrangements provided other parties also co-operate. We have strong reason to believe that a United Nations command will be established within the 48 hours set in the Canadian Resolution. This is only the first step toward a permanent settlement of Middle East problems. In the General Assembly last night the United States introduced two new resolutions which seek to establish United Nations committees "to consider the future of Israel's relations with its neighbours and the future of the Suez Canal. We believe these resolutions represent a constructive approach to these problems. We will actively participate in efforts to make progress on the lines which the Assembly has· approved. We have spent anxious days of late and I am sure you all share our anxiety. The present crisis has strained both the Western alliance and the bonds of the Commonwealth more than any other event since the Second World War. If we can use it as the opportunity to dissipate the black cloud which has hung over the Middle East these many years, the present danger and strains may prove to have been a price worth paying. I have spoken at length about the momentous events in the Middle

18 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955/1964 East, but I must refer also to the grave and tragic events which have led to turmoil and bloodshed in Eastern Europe. For the first rime since the end of the war a real hope appeared, in the last two weeks, that some at least of the countries which have contributed so much to the civilization of the world might secure some measure of independence from Moscow. . In Poland, a fonn of national communism has been established which appears determined to demand as a minimum the right to develop along its own lines, and not according to a Moscow pattern. Not least encouraging was the release of the Roman Catholic Primate of Poland. We were also encouraged by a statement from Moscow which said that the Soviet leaders were prepared to negotiate their relations with Eastern Europe on the basis of equality and non-interference in their neighbour's internal affairs. Even before this announcement, the brave Hungarian people had risen to demand the freedom so long denied them. The Hungarian revolution was a passionate and significant outburst of national feeling, both strongly anti-Russian and anti-Communist. We rejoiced in the release of Cardinal Mindszenty and other religious leaders and we shared the hopes, as well as the anxiety, of our fellowcountrymen of Hungarian origin. Today, these hopes seem to have been shattered. Soviet action has made a mockery of Soviet statements. According to the latest reports, Soviet anned might is being applied against the gallant and practically unarmed people of Hungary. Moscow has announced that it will crush the Hungarian revolt and re-impose its will on Hungary by brute force. Last night, in an emergency session, the Security Council met in response to an appeal from the Hungarian Government and considet.ed a U.S. resolution condemning Soviet military interference in the internal affairs of Hungary. The resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The matter was then referred to a special session of the General Assembly which is now meeting and which provides the opportunity of condemning in the most forthright tenns the callous disregard by the Soviet Union of the elementary rights of the Hungarian people. Our aim is diat the people of Eastern Europe should be free to choose their own fonn of government, a basic human right they have not enjoyed for years. The Soviet Union's resort to military force against a neiglibouring nation is a most serious threat to the peace which we have solemnly pledged ourselves to preserve and defend in signing the Charter of the United Nations. .

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5. mE HUNGARIAN SITUATION Statement by Dr. R.A. MacKay, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, in the debate on Hungary in the General Assembly of the United Nations, November 9, 1956.

My intervention wilI be very brief. Within the past two days this Assembly has been heartened by the replies received from the governments recently engaged in military operations in the Near East. A cease-fire and withdrawal have been agreed' to by all concerned. They have agreed to ·the entry of a United Nations force, pending a general settlement. What a contrast to the situation in Hungary. Not all tJte facts of the situation in Hungary are available, but more than enough to prove the continued brutal interference by force of arms of one great country in the internal affairs of a small neighbour. I would ask once again the questions asked of the Soviet delegation by the Honourable L.B. Pearson. earlier in this debate. For obvious reasons I address these questions to the Soviet delegation rather than to the delegation which purports to represent Hungary. Will the Soviet Union give similar undertakings for a cease-fire and withdrawal. I repeat. and withdrawal. with respect to Hungary? Second. will the Soviet Government and the Hungarian Government admit a United Nations Mission of observers to report back to the Assembly as approved in the Resolution of this Assembly of the 4th of November? Further. United Nations machinery appropriate to the situation in Hungary is no less required than is United Nations machinery in the Middle East. Where. except from the United Nations can an impartial and disinterested authority be obtained to hold the ring and thus enable the Hungarian people to form the kind of free national government they desire. without fear or reprisal? Is the Soviet Government prepared to accept any such solution for' Hungary? Here is its chance. perhaps its last chance, to prove its good faith. I regret that I can find no evidence in the statement of the Representative of the USSR in this moming's debate that his Government has any intention of permitting the Hungarian people any freedom of choice or that it has any intention of withdrawing its forces from Hungarian territory. This from the Government that has made such loud protestations these last few days about intervention by other Governments in the Middle East. With respect to the draft Resolution put forward by Cuba. Ireland. Italy. Pakistan and Peru (Document A/3316) my Delegation can do no other than vote in favour.

20 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955/1964 We shall also support the Resolution just now introduced by the Representative of the United States (Document A/3319). This Resolution is solely concerned with the humanitarian aspects of the situation in Hungary. Surely this purpose, and this Resolution, can be supported by all Delegations genuinely interested in human welfare and the relief of suffering. In this connection, I have been authorized to state that Canada is ready to give priority to applications for immigration from Hungarian refugees; to contribute an additional $ I 00,000 to the High Commissioner for Refugees, specifically for the aid of Hungarian refugees, and to contribute a further $100,000 to the Canadian Red Cross for Hungarian relief. *

6. SOVIET COLONIALISM

Address by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker before the United Nations General Assembly, September 26, 1960. (Extracts)** I wish now to speak of the present Assembly. To some observers the Assembly in the past week gave the appearance of being a circus and a drama of personalities. Whatever their views, this fact stands out. that this is the most important and most representative gathering of the world and national leaders in all history. This meeting symbolizes the bringing together of the cultures and philosophies of all races. It is our responsibility to ensure that out of this meeting shall come a testament to the capacity of rational men to achieve rational relations, to bring about the attainment of peace and to practise brotherhood and the raising of standards everywhere in the world. To the new members I say this. As one coming from Canada. I say that the United Nations constitutes the greatest hope for the middle and small powers, for the new and weaker states, indeed, for all the nations of mankind of every social and political system. I tum now to a subject dealt wi~ at great length by the ~rman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R .• the subject of colonial.See CHCD, November 26. 1956. for an account of the immigration aspects of the Hungarian crisis as a result of which some 35.000 Hungarian refugees were admitted to Canada. ··See also SS 62/4 of November 22, 1962. by Mr. Diefenbaker on Soviet colonialism and SS 62/14 of Nov. 23, 1962 by Mr. Heath MacQuarrie. Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart. 1963), pp. 259-261, describes some of the domestic political aspects of this question.

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ism. He asked for and advocated a declaration at Ibis session for "the complete and final elimination of colonial regimes". I think it would be generally agreed that, whatever the experience of Ibe past, there can no longer be a relationship of master and servant anywhere in Ibe world. He has spoken of colonial bondage, of exploitation and of foreign yokes. Those views, uttered by the master of the major colonial power in the world today, followed the admission of fourteen new member nations to the United Nations-all of them fonner colonies. It seems that he forgot what had occurred on the opening day. Since the last war, 17 colonial areas and territories, comprising more than 40 million people, have been brought to complete freedom by France. In the same period 14 colonies and territories, comRrising half a billion people, have achieved complete freedom within the Conunonweallb. Taken together, some 600 million people in more Iban 30 countries, most of them now represented in this Assembly, have attained their freedom-this with the approval, the encouragement and the guidance of the United Nations, the Commonweallb and France. There are few here that can speak with the authority of Canada on the subject of coloni~ism, for Canada was once a colony of both France and the United Kingdom. We were the first country which evolved over 100 years ago by constitutional proeesses from colonial status to independence without severing the family connexion. Indeed, in this Assembly the membership is composed in a very considerable measure of the graduates of empires, mandates and trusteeships of the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth and other nations. I pause to ask this question: How many human beings have been liberated by the U.S.S.R.? Do we forget how one of the postwar colonies of the U.S.S.R. sought to liberate itself four years ago, and with what results? I say that because these facts of history in the Commonwealth and other countries invite comparison with the domination over peoples and territories sometimes gained under the guise of liberation, but always accompanied by the loss of political freedom. How are we to reconcile the tragedy of the Hungarian uprising in 1956withChainnanKhrushchev'sconfident assertion of a few days ago in this Assembly? Mr. Khrushchev said: "It has been and always will be our stand that the peoples of Africa, like those of other continents sttiving for their liberation from the colonial yoke, should establish orders in their countries of their own will and choice.•• That I accept-and I hope that those words mean a change of attitude for the future on the part of those he represents. What of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia? What of the freedom-loving Ukrainians and many other Eastern European peoples w,hich I shall

22 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955/1964 not name for fear of omitting some of them? Mr. Khrushchev went funher and said: "Complete and final elimination of the colonial regime in all its fOnDS and manifestations has been prompted by the - entire course of world history in the last decades . . ." There can be no double standard in international affairs. I ask the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to give to those nations under his domination the right of free elections-to give them the opportunity to determine the kind of government theywant under genuinely free conditions. If those conclusions were what his words meant, for they must apply universally, then indeed will there be new action to carry out the obligations of the United Nations Charter; then indeed will there be new hope for all mankind. My hope is that those words of his will be universally acceptable and that he will give the lead towards their implementation here and now.

7. CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE IN TIlE MIDDLE EAST AND mE SITUATION IN HUNGARY

Speech from the Throne and excerpts from the statement by Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, November 26, 1956. Speech from the Throne Delivering the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the Fourth (Special Session) of the 22nd Parliament, the Governor General said: Honourable Members of the Senate: Members of the House of Commons: You have been summoned at this time because of the serious international situation arising out of hostilities in the Middle East and the events -in Hungary. Members of the House of Commons: You will be asked to provide expressly that the provision for defence expenditures in the Appropriation Act No.6, 1956, be used for the purposes of Canada's participation in the United Nations Emergency Force for the Middle East in fulfillment of our country's obligations to the United Nations Organization under the Charter. You will also be requested to authorize the provision of relief for the victims of the recent tragic events in Hungary.

The United Nations 23 . Honourable Members of the Senate: Members the House of Commons: May Divine Providence continue to protect this nation, and to guide the Parliament of Canada in all its deliberations. Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent: . . . Originally there was this motion proposed which has been construed, and I think righdy so, as placing some blame .on the Israelis, some blame on the French and some blame on the British for having taken the law into their own hands when what had to be dealt with was already before the security council of the United Nations. These gentlemen who utter these high-flown phrases seem to forget that the nations of the world signed the charter of the United Nations and thereby undertook to use peaceful means to settle possible disputes and not to resort to the use of force. I have been scandalized more than once by the attitude of the" larger powers, the big powers as we call them, who have all too frequently treated the charter of the United Nations as an instrument with which to regiment smaller nations and as an instrument which did not have to be considered when their own so-called vital interests were at stake. I have been told, with respect to the veto, that if the Russians had not· insisted upon it the United States and the United Kingdom would have insisted upon it, because they could not allow this crowd of smaller nations to deal. decisively with questions which concerned their vital interests. An Hon. Member: Wby should they? Mr ..St. Laurent: Because the members of the smaller nations are human beings just as are their people; because the era when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world has and is coming pretty close to an end. Mr. Ferguson: Throwing Canada to the slaughterhouse. Mr.. St. Laurent: Perhaps the hon. gentleman would do better to listen than-I will not attempt to qualify them-to make that kind of remark. I think it would be better for his own reputation if he did. It has been said that Canada has been humiliated by the action of Colonel Nasser and has been made to submit to the requirements of Colonel Nasser. That is just one of those wild assertions for which there is absolutely no foundation in fact. The original resolution provided that the United Nations in its efforts to make peace in the world would not start their efforts to make peace by making war. It was going to introduce a police force to supervise the observance of the cessation of hostilities, but it was going to do that with the consent of.the country in which those forces were going to operate. It was not going to fight its way into that country: That was the

of

24 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955/1964

resolution which was adopted without any opposition, although with'a certain number of abstentions. At that time the secretary general of the United Nations gave us the chance to participate in this force, and gave it to those who were willing and anxious, as we have been willing and anxious since 1945, to have a United Nations force ready to deal with recalcitrants in the fulfilment of their obligations under the charter. The ~u8Bes­ tion was made that each nation should supply something like a battalion or other self-contained unit. We consider that every battalion in the Canadian forces would feel it an honour to be called upon to perform this duty, but there was one battalion which was next in line in the rotation of service in connection with the Canadian contingent to the NATO forces in Europe, and that was the Queen's Own. It seemed to us that all the other battalions would recognize that that battalion, having been groomed and being on the point of being called upon to replace another battalion in Europe, would naturally be the one which we would consider and which we would think of first to take on this new duty in pursuit of the objectives of the United Nations. That battalion happened to be the Queen's Own Rifles. It was suggested, I am told, although we were not present at the negotiations, that Colonel Nasser said that that would be regarded by the Egyptians as being a battalion of the Queen of England. An Hon. Member. What is wrong with that? Mr. Green: What about the Queen of Canada? Mr. SI. Laurenl: In my view nothing is wrong with it except it is the Queen of Canada's Own Rifles. No Colonel Nasser nor anything that is said here, unless it amounts to a successful vote of no confidence in this government, or anything published in the papers which are trying to belittle the actions of Canada in this instance. is going to persuade us that we have no right to have that glorious battalion continue to be called the Queen's Own Rifles. Some Hon. Members: Ob. ob. Mr.' St. Laurent: N9 one is going to make me admit that it is not the Queen of Canada's Own Rifles that bear that glorious tide. Some Hon. Members: Oh, ob. Some Hon. Members: Hear. hear. Mr. SI. Laurent: Now. we felt that the sending of a battalion over into the Sinai desert was not just the right thing to do for men who had the training and who were anxious to perfonn the service for which we were sending them there. We did not think we should . dump 900 or 1.000 men into a desert and think they were going to be looked after properly and were going to be kept in fit condition to perfonn the services for which they were going there. So we

The United Nations 25

decided at once that in readying the Queen' s Own Rifles for that expedition there would be added supplementary forces that could ensure for them the establishment that would be necessary for them to carry out their functions properly and, to make assurance doubly sure, we said we would have the Magnificent loaded with provisions, that we would have a hospital unit on it and that it would serve as a floating base so our men would be sure that until proper army services were organized on a land base in Egypt there would be the possibility for them to get the right kind of treatment, the treatment n~essary in order to enable them to fulfil their mission. It was pretty effectively demonstrated, in spite of what has been said by hone gentlemen in some parts of the house about a lot of money having been spent on our forces with nothing to show for it that within a very short time we were able to move everything required to put a battalion in the field, and indeed, we could put several battalions in the field it it were necessary to do so.... The original resolution provided that there had to be consent of the government of the country where the United Nations force was going to operate. But that is all that requires the consent of the government of the country where the force is to- operate. It is a United Nations operation. It is the United Nations that is going to determine the composition of the force going there. It is the United Nations that will determine where in that country the force will be stationed and when and how long it will be there. Having accepted the condition in the resolution, it is our view, and I think the view of practically everyone at the United Nations, that the other modalities of the operation of this force are things to be determined, independently of Colonel Nasser or of anyone else in Egypt, by the United Nations on its responsibility to discharge the undertaking it has assumed in the interests of peace in the world. The amendment before us reads in part as follows: ... this house regrets that Your Excellency's advisers (I) have followed a course of gratuitous condemnation of the action of the United Kingdom and France which was designed to prevent a major war in the Suez area ... There has been no gratuitous condemnation of the action of the United Kingdom. On the first resolution that was introduced by the United States and supported by a very large number of members of . the United Nations, the Canadian delegation ab~tained and declared . it was abstaining because it was an insufficient resolution. It provided merely for a cease-fire and nothing more. That was not good enough, because just as soon as that might become spent we would

26 CDntldian Foreign Policy, 1955/1964 be back in the same position we were in before. There was abstention by the Canadian delegation because there was applied there something which hon. gentlemen opposite have very violently resented when it was applied here in a very modified form. The United Nations assembly applied closure and determined that there would be three speakers supporting the resolution, three speakers opposing the resolution and that the vote would then be taken. As we were neither supporting nor opposing the resolution, we could not be one of tho~ three; and there was no move to amend the resolution. . . . On that resolution there was no gratuitous or other condemnation by Canada but there has been an expression of regret that certain members of ~ United Nations had felt it necessary to take the law into their own hands when the matter was before the security council; and there was an expression of regret that what took place in the Middle East was used as a screen to obscure the honible actions, the horrible international crimes, that were being committed in mid-Europe at the same time. Events in the Middle East made it more difficult to marshal world opinion in unanimous and vigorous condemnation of what was taking place in Hungary at that very moment. That is what we regretted. We feel that there can come out of this situation one that will be better than that which existed previously. It is our hope and it has bee~ our objective to get all those in the western alliance to which my hon. friend referred working together toward the common objective of a settlement of the mid-Eastern situation that will be lasting and that win involve the recognition of the existence of Israel as a state set up by the United Nations and something which the United Nations is in honour bound to defend and to see mainqrlned. It is our hope that there will be some kind of a lasting settlement-I will not say a permanent one because permanence is rarely found in any human activities or human achievements-though it is difficult to find with whom in all those Arab nations a settlement could be made that would take into account the real interests of the population of each of those countries. It is difficuJt to find anyone who can form the kind of a government which would take the over-all broad view of the interests of the whole population and not the interests of a small group of the popuJation. . .. . Mr. Howard C. Green: ... Feelings on these questions raised by the Suez crisis, Mr. Speaker, are running very deep in Canada, far deeper I believe than the government has the slightest conceptIon. Listening to the Prime Minister I could not help but think he has been living in some oth"er land altogether so far as public

The United Nations 27 reaction to these issues is concerned, and particularly reaction to the attitude of the Canadian government. This attitude has come as a great shock to millions of Canadian people. In Vancouver the story broke in the headlines on October 31, and I must admit that even I was shocked, although the stand taken was just.in line with the stand this government has been taking for the last 10 years. It has been going steadily in the direction of the stand taken on this occasion. This time they happened to get caught. They spoke off the cuff before they had a nice, cover-up explanation prepared. Here we have the headlines, •'Canada Turns Her Back on U.K. "-it should have been the U.K. ~d France-"Supports U.S. ". This' is a dispatch by Mr. Leiterman and it begins this way: With a wrench that will make history, Canada turned her back on Great Britain Tuesday night. . . . Then he went on to point out the iIl-concealed annoyance shown by the minister for external affairs when he was interviewed on this particular day. Mr. Leiterman had this to say: .

Mr. Pearson had three possible courses. He could have supported Britain. He could have supported the U.S. or he could, like Australia.in the security council, have abstained and said nothing at all. Hesitantly, almost as if surprised at his own boldness he chose in effect to desert Britain and "associate" Canada with the United States. That was on October 31. Mr. Pearson: May I ask the hon. member a question? Would he tell me to what he is. referring in reading that newspaper, what vote? Mr. Green: I am referring to a report of a press conference or an interview by the minister with the press, and the date of the report in the Vancouver Province is October 31. This was only the beginning. The minister went down to the United Nations, I believe it was on November 2, after the United Kingdom and France had vetoed the resolution brought into the security council, and he voted with Russia and the United States against the United Kingdom and France to put this question on the agenda of the assembly. Mr. Pearson: Everybody else did, too. Mr. Green: Let the minister and the government laugh it off. This afternoon the Prime Minister was very careful not to refer to that. He had not a word to say about that particular vote. He talked about.

28 Canadian Foreign Policy. 1955/1964 Mr. St. Laurent: He very firmly approves of that vote. Mr. Broolcs: That does not make it right. Mr. St. Laurent: And the fact that you say it is wrong does not make it wrong. Mr. Green: The Prime Minister had an opportunity to make his speech this afternoon. and perhaps he will allow me to make mine. This afternoon the Prime Minister said that when the vote came up about the cease-fire, then Canada abstained. He did not explain that while the minister for external affairs abstained. in his speech the minister showed very clearly that he was condemning the United Kingdom and France. The Prime Minister should have made that clear. This has been the course fonowed by this government right down through the peace since this serious situation first arose. Again, just two days ago in the assembly of the United Nations when the second resolution about the cease-fire was under discussion the minister got up and said that this was all wrong, there had already been a resolution passed and the United Kingdom, France and Israel were complying with it. They had already taken steps to comply with the resolution and this second resolution should not be passed. Then the Canadian government did not have the courage to get up and vote against it. Only the United Kingdom. France. Israel. Australia and New Zealand voted against that foolish and provocative resolution. The Canadian government, representing the land of courageous people, did not have the backbone to get up and vote against that resolution; they were so busy currying favour with the United States. The feature of the speech the Prime Minister delivered today, Mr. Speaker, was the anger, almost the hatred he showed in his remarks. I wish the Canadian people could have been here to watch him. Mr. St. Laurent: So do I. Mr. Green: He made a violent attack on the big nations. Mr. Garson: It is too bad they cannot hear you. Mr. Green: He talked about the use of the veto. The veto was written into the United Nations charter because the big nations have to carry a great de8I of responsibility. But the Prime Minister pushed that aside and talked about the life of a person in a small nation being as valuable as in a big nation. Mr. Hosking: Is that not rrue? Mr. Green: It is just dragging a red berring across the trail. Then he went on to talk about the United Kingdom and France taking the law into their own bands, and in effect the Prime Minister lumped the United Kingdom and F-:ance with Russia in his condemnation. Mr. St. Laurent: Ho~ silly can you be? Mr. Green: Then be made this amazing statement. He said,

The United Nations 29

"The era of supermen in Europe is coming to an end" . I suppose he considers that all the supermen are in the Canadian government. If they are not all in the Canadian government, then I presume the opinion of this same Prime Minister is that they are in the tJnited States government. Here you have the prime minister of France and Prime Minister Eden of the United Kingdom. They do not'claim to be supermen. I am amazed at the Prime Minister of Canada making slurring remarks of that kind this afternoon. Those men in the United Kingdom and France are simply doing the best they can for their people; they are trying to give good leadership. I suppose the Prime Minister of Canada sn~rs at Sir Winston Churchill as a superman and includes him in his nasty. biting remarks this afternoon. His whole attitude this afternoon was one of bitterness. Mr. Pickersgill:'We have one doing that right now. Mr. Green: The Uncle Louis kissing babies went out the window this afternoon; so smug, so full of self-righteousness, so hypocritical.

8. FUNCTIONS OF UNEF Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L.B. Pearson, at the United Nations General Assembly, November 23, 1956. (Extracts)

What are the functions of this United Nations Emergency Force? Those functions and the task-and it is a very difficult task indeed which confronts the Force-have been laid down by resolutions of the General Assembly and they are found also in the SecretaryGeneral's second and final report, which has been approved by the Assembly. * The basic resolution for these purposes is that which we adopted on November 4-S (AIRES/394) which states that the function of this Force is "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all" -and I emphasize the word "all"- "the terms of the resolution of the General' Assembly of November 2" (AIRES/390). In that latterresolution, as representatives will remember, provision is made for a cease-fire, for a prompt withdrawal of forces, and also-and this is not the time to forget this

*Action in the United Nations General Assembly at the special emergency session dealing with the Middle East crisis was based on the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of 1950, which gave the Assembly certain functions and duties in case of a deadlock in the Security Council.

30 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1955/1964 provision-' 'that all member states refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution". And in Para. 4 of that resolution we have this provision, namely, that upon a cease-fire, steps are to be taken to re-open the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation. 9. CANADA AND THE VNITED NATIONS

Statement by Prime Minister John G. Diefenbalcer in the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 23, 1957.· (Extracts) In the last few months mere has been a change of government in our country, but I hasten to assure the Assembly at once that, as in all democratic counlries dedicated to peace, this does not mean that there has been any change whatsoever in fundamental international principles or attitudes. I say that because I have been asked on a number of occasions where Canada now stands with regard to the United Nations. My appearance here gives public evidence of Canada's stand. Indeed, it is the first time in twelve years that a Prime Minister has been present with our Foreign Minister, which is evidence of the fact that we stand on this question now where Canada has always stood since April 1945, and, I emphasize this, with the support of the party which is now in power. So far as Canada is concerned, support of the United Nations is the cornerstone of its foreign policy. We believe that the United Nations will grow stronger because it represents the inevitable struggle of countries to find order in their relationships and the deep longing of mankind to strive for and attain peace and justice. And.I say with all the sincerity that I can bring to my words that . we in Canada, in the strategic position in which we are, are willing to go to the utmost limit of safety and survival to bring about disarmament. What value is there in the undertaking of the Soviets not to use atomic or hydrogen weapons for a period of five years unless full inspection is possible and provided for? I do want to say something, however, in connection with one other matter that is of vital importance today-the United Nations Emergency Force. The United Nations Emergency Force has had a stabilizing and tranquillizing influence in the mideast. I am not a newly convinced convert to such a force, for I brought tlle suggestion for it before the House of Commons of Canada in January of 1956. I argued at that time, that such a force could prevent the

The United Nations 31 outbreak of war in the area in question, which today is served by that Force. The Canadian Government is naturally deeply gratified that United Nations Emergency Force has had so large a measure of success in its endeavours, and Canada is willing to continue its contribution as 1001g as it is considered necessary by the United Nations. Canada is not unaware of the fact that Canadian troops make up some 1,200 of the total personnel of 6,000. I repeat what I said a moment ago: Canada will continue to be a strong supporter of the continuance of United Nations Emergency Force until its work is done. We then come to the question of expenditures. The question of providing the necessary monies for the continuance of the Force suggests that an assessment among all nations of the United Nations would be in keeping with the service to peace to which this Force has contributed so much and with the declarations of the Charter of San Francisco. I go further and say that out of the experience of United Nations Emergency Force it should be possible to evolve a system by which the United Nations will have at its disposal appropriate forces for similar services where ever they may be required. The creation of United Nations Emergency Force has provided a pilot project, if I may use that expression, for a permanent international force. Malignant diseases, however, are not cured by tranquillizers. and for that reason I still hold the view that only by the establishment of a permanent United Nations force-and I realize the uncertain and faltering steps thar-must be taken to achieve this-