Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954: Selected Speeches and Documents 9780773595255

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Dedications
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction- The Post-war Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy
I. The Establishment of the United Nations
1. Postwar International Organization: The Functional Principle
2. Functional Representation and the Proposed Security Council
3. Canadian Views on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, 1945
4. Resolution in Parliament on Invitation to San Francisco
5. Statements on the Resolution by the Prime Minister, Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King
6. Statement by the Prime Minister at the San Francisco Conference, April 27, 1945
7. Canadian Amendments on the Economic and Social part of the United Nations Charter
8. Report to Parliament on the San Francisco Conference
II. Peacemaking in Europe
1. Canada’s Right to Participate in Peace-Making
2. Canada’s Interest in the Peace Settlement
3. The Italian Treaty
4. Extracts from the Debate in Parliament on the Paris Peace Conference
5. The Issue of Canadian Participation in a Peace Settlement With Germany
6. Canadian Submission on the German Peace Settlement
7. Recognition of the Federal German Republic
8. Proclamation of Termination of State of War With Germany: July 21, 1951
9. Canadian Statement on the Proposed Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria
10. Canadian Views on Trieste
11. Submission on Disposal of Former Italian Colonies
III. Post- War Economic Policy
A. Reconversion
1. Employment and Income with special reference to the initial period of reconstruction
C. The General Assembly and the Maintenance of Peace and Security
6. Establishment of an Interim Committee of the General Assembly
7. Statement on "Uniting for Peace” Resolution
D. Control of Atomic Energy: Disarmament
8. Joint Declaration on A tomic Energy
9. Comments on the Joint Declaration
10. United Nations Resolution on the Establishment of a Commission to deal with the Problems raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy
11. The Veto in the Atomic Energy and the Disarmament Commissions
12. Comparison of United States and U.S.S.R. Plans
13. The Canadian Position
14. Canadian Reply to Soviet Proposals for Disarmament
15. Progress of Disarmament as of 1953
V. The United Nations: Pacific Settlement Of Disputes; Promotion of The General Welfare
A. The Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
1. A Middle Power in the United Nations
B. Palestine
2. Canadian Policy
(a) Canada Votes for Partition
(b) Suspension of the Partition Plan
(c) Conditions of a Settlement
C. The Indonesian Question
3. Canadian Policy
(a) Extract from DEA, Canada and the United Nations 1948
(b) Extract from DEA, Canada and the United Nations 1949
D. Kashmir
4 (a) Kashmir - Canada’s Concern in the Dispute
(b) Canada's Policy
5. Canadian Policy in the Security Council in Retrospect
E. Race Relations
6. The Colonial Issue
7.Race Relations in South Africa
F. Human Rights
8. Human Rights
9. Human Rights- Canadian Views on the Draft Covenants
G. Economic and Social Council
10. Canadian Administrative Procedure on United Nations Matters
VI. From Collective Security to Collective Defence: N.A.T.O.
A. Retreat from Europe
1. Withdrawal of Canadian Forces from Occupational Duties, 1946
(a) Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, March 3,1947
(b) Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King, March 10,1947
B. Towards Collective Defence
2. The Brussels Treaty
3. Canada and Collective Security
4. Need for a New Security Organization
5. From the Brussels Pact to the North Atlantic Treaty
6. Signing the Treaty
7. North Atlantic Treaty
C. Build-Up and Expansion of N.A.T.O.
8. The Canadian Contribution to the Military Build-up of N.A.T.O.
10. Article 2
11. Accession of Greece and Turkey
12. Canada’s Stake in N.A.T.O.
D. The Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany
13. Debate in Parliament
(a) Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, January 20, 1955
(b) Opposition Leaders and Private Members
VII. Continental Defence
A. Defence Objectives
1. Statement by the Minister of National Defence, Mr. D. C. Abbott, August 19, 1946
2. Canada's Defence Policy, 1947
3. Canada's Defence Programme 1949-50
4. Canada’s Defence Programme 1951-52
B. The Documentary Basis of Joint Defence with the United States
5. Joint Statement by the Governments of Canada And The United States of America Regarding Defence Co-Operation Between the Two Countries and Statement by the Prime Minister Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King
6. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence
C. Specific Arrangements for Joint Defence
7. Proposed Establishment of Weather Stations in the Arctic
8. Armed Forces in Churchill
9. Standardization and the Role of Canada’s Forces
10. Reciprocal Defence Purchasing
11. Collaboration in Civil Defence
12. The “Pine Tree” Agreement
13. After the Russian Thermo-Nuclear Explosion
14. Joint Announcement by the Governments of Canada and the United States on the Mid-Canada and Distant Early Warning (D.E.W.) Lines, November 19, 1954
D. Newfoundland and North America Defence
15. Revision of the Leased Bases Agreement of 1941 as applying to United States Bases in Newfoundland
E. Canada and United States Defence Policy
16. Reaction to the Dulles Policy of Massive Retaliation
17. Continental Defence Attitudes and United States Commitments
VIII. The St. Lawrence Seaway And Power Development
1. Canada Prepared to Undertake the Seaway Alone
2. Parallel Applications to the International Joint Commission
3. Lapse of Agreement of 1941
4. Construction of Iroquois Dam and Other Works
5. Modification of Agreement of June 30, 1952
6. The Case for Joint Construction
IX. The Far East And South-East Asia
A. Peace-Making with Japan
1. Proposals for a Peace Conference
2. Commonwealth Conference on Japanese Peace Problems at Canberra
3. Soviet Attitude on Procedures
4. Comment on the Treaty
5. The Fisheries Convention
6. The Trade Agreement with Japan
B. Korea
7. The Issue of Participation to Meet Aggression
(a) Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, June 28, 1950
(b) Comments of Private Members in Parliament
(c) Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, June 30, 1950
8. Exchange of Correspondence on Contribution of Forces
(a) Acting Permanent Delegate of Canada to the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, July 12, 1950
(b) Telegram from Secretary-General to Acting Canadian Permanent Delegate, July 14, 1950
(c) Acting Permanent Delegate of Canada to Secretary-General, August 11, 1950
(d) Permanent Representative of Canada to Secretary- General, August 14, 1950
(e) Secretary-General to Permanent Representative, August 21, 1950
9. Implications of Aggression
10. Issues During the War
(a) On crossing the 38th parallel and on branding Communist China as an aggressor
(b) Limited military objectives and the position of Formosa
11. The Search for a Settlement
(a) General objectives
(b) Points in dispute in the armistice talks
(c) Participants in a Political Conference
(d ) Proposals fora Peace Conference
12. United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
13. The Question of a Pacific Pact
C. The Geneva Conference 1954
14. Korea - Communist Proposals; Canadian Policy
15. Failure of the Geneva Conference on Korea
16. Indochina — Canadian Views on a Regional Solution
17. Indochina - Membership on International Commissions
(a) Invitation from the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954
(b) Reply to invitation, July 27, 1954
18. Statement on Canadian Membership on the International Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, July 27, 1954
D. China Policy
19. Canada’s Relinquishment of Extraterritorial Rights
20. Repeal of Chinese Immigration Act
21. The Communist Takeover
22. Recognition of Communist China
(a) Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, March 25,1954
(b) Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, for the “Peoples School”, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, N.S., November 7,1954
24. The Formosa Straits
X. Commonwealth Relations
A. The Nature of the Commonwealth
1. Consultation between Commonwealth Governments
2. The Meaning of Consultation
3. Commonwealth Representation in a World Organization
4. Consultation about India
5. The Commonwealth as a Bridge between Asia and the West
B. Independence of India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma
6. Independence within the Commonwealth
7. A Republic within the Commonwealth
8. Comments on the Prime Ministers’ Conference on India
C. The Colombo Plan
9. Commonwealth Meeting on Foreign Affairs at Colombo January 9-14, 1950
10. Commonwealth Consultative Committee on Economic Aid to South and South-East Asia
11. Canada and the Colombo Plan
Co-operative Economic Development of Pakistan
D. The Monarchy and the Commonwealth
13. Proclamation of Accession of Elizabeth II
14. Communique from Commonwealth Conference on the Queen’s Style and Titles, December 19, 1952
15. The Royal Style and Titles in the Commonwealth
16. Proclamation of the Queen’s Title, May 28, 1953
E. Removal of Constitutional Anomalies
17. Letters Patent constituting the office of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of Canada
XI. The Foundations of Canadian Policy In World Affairs
An address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent, inaugurating the Gray Foundation Lectureship at Toronto University, January 13, 1947
Index
Note on Author

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CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1945-1954 S e le c te d S p e e c h e s a n d D o c u m e n ts

Edited and with an Introduction by R. A. Mackay

&

The Carleton Library N o. 51 McClelland and Stewart Limited Toronto/Montreal

Copyright © 1971 by R. A. MacKay A L L R IG H T S R ES E R V E D

The Canadian Publishers McClelland and Stewart Limited 25 Hollinger Road, Toronto 374 P R IN T E D AND BO U N D BY

FC [pO ) The United States suspends for five years exercise of rights of jurisdiction over United States civilian personnel and all other rights conferred by article IV of the bases agree­ ment, subject to revival on notice thereafter or in event of war or other emergency; (c) The Canadian government will seek to amend the Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act to permit of com­ pulsory attendance of witnesses at United States courtsmartial; (d ) The Canadian government will seek legislation to protect security interests of the United States forces in Canada, as required under the bases agreement. The recommendation that the United States give up or suspend jurisdictional rights under article IV of the bases agreement is conditional upon the Canadian government, with the concurrence of the Newfoundland government, giving to the United States government assurances that the new arrangements will in practice give United States officials in Newfoundland a degree of jurisdic­

252 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

tion comparable to that which they have in fact exercised up to now. The attorney general of Newfoundland has been consulted and he advises that there will be no difficulty about giving these assurances because, in fact, the United States officials have exer­ cised in a reasonable manner their jurisdictional rights under the bases agreement. They have not, for example, attempted to exer­ cise the jurisdiction over Canadian citizens which the bases agree­ ment gave them. What the condition and the assurances mean is that, in prac­ tice, members of the United States forces in Newfoundland will generally be dealt with by United States service courts, which is a reasonable and sensible arrangement in the circumstances. Cor­ responding treatment is in fact given to Canadian forces which may be stationed from time to time in the United States. The board’s recommendation will provide the occasion for the extension of the Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act as revised to Newfoundland and remove what is perhaps the most objectionable feature of the bases agreement, namely, the right of jurisdiction by United States courts over Canadian citizens. Referring to the recommendation as a whole, it meets most of the specific requests which the Canadian government originally put forward. Obviously a negotiation of this kind required a will­ ingness on both sides to give and take. In the view of the Canadian government, the recommendation removes the features, most ob­ jectionable to us, of the taxation and jurisdictional rights con­ ferred by the leased bases agreem ent. . . . It is proposed to add to the Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act a new section under which the governor in council would have authority to provide by regulation for compulsory attendance of witnesses before United States courts-martial, in the same manner as now applies to courts-martial of the Canadian forces. This amendment will, for convenience, be included in a Canadian forces bill which will deal with a number of other sub­ jects related to defence. Of the five proposed legislative measures, only one will refer expressly to United States forces, and that is the amendment to the Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act. When the time comes to examine the other four it will, I think, be agreed that quite apart from the recommendation of the permanent joint board on defence, they are useful and possibly necessary measures to enable Canada to discharge obligations under the North Atlantic treaty. The government believes that on consideration, hon. members will agree that the solution which has been recommended by the board is a reasonable compromise in an admittedly unprecedented situation.

Continental D efence 253

E . C a n a d a a n d U n ite d S ta te s D e fe n c e P o lic y 16. REACTION TO THE DULLES POLICY OF MASSIVE RETALIATION Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the National Press Club, Washington D.C., March 15, 1954 (extract) (DEA, S and S, 54/16). Even if there were no cold war, no international tension, no free world coalition with the United States as leader and Canada as a member, our mutual problems, in a strictly bilateral sense, would almost certainly have increased in difficulty and complexity, be­ cause, as I have just said, of Canada’s growth in strength and im­ portance as a North American and Atlantic power. If you could look at the present calendar of specifically Canadian-American problems that face the two governments, you would see what I mean; problems of continental defence, problems of trade, in­ cluding those arising out of agricultural stocks in both countries, of investment, of communications, including the St. Lawrence Seaway, of border crossing and of internal security. These prob­ lems would exist, though not perhaps in exactly the same form, if there had never been a Russian Revolution or a Communist In­ ternational. They are a challenge to the good sense and good neighbourliness of the two countries, but I’m sure the challenge will be met by solutions which will be fair and just. That is the way we try to do business with each other. But there is another important aspect of our relationship; that which arises out of your position as the leader of a great coalition, determining issues which may mean peace or atomic war. Canadian-United States relations, in this sense, are merely part of the relations between members of a coalition of which by far the mightiest member is the United States, but in which Canada is now strong enough to make a contribution of some importance; one which we think entitles us to an appropriate share in the responsibility of making those collective decisions which affect us. Though only 15 millions of people, with the job of opening up and developing half a continent, we devote some ten per cent of our gross national product, and about forty-five per cent of our budget to defence. We have troops in Korea and in Europe an army brigade and an air division of 300 first line jet fighters. We are also co-operating actively with you in the development of defence installations for the direct protection of this continent. We realize, of course, that by far the greatest share of the burden of protecting what peace we have is borne by this country;

254 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

that American power will be decisive in defeating aggression just as its power and its policies are of primary importance in prevent­ ing it. Consequently we recognize that there have been and will be occasions when, in case of difference, the views of the United States should prevail in the councils of the coalition. There are other times, however, when we may feel that we have to differ and speak out in support of our own policies. Being North Americans, we will do so with frankness but I hope with restraint and responsibility. I know from some experience that it is not always easy to maintain this nice balance, so essential in the operation of a coalition, (unless it is a communist one), between silence in the interest of the unity which is so important and open advocacy of your own views and your principles which, in certain circumstances, public opinion in your own country would expect. Then there is always that feeling, which I have already men­ tioned, and which so profoundly affects current Canadian atti­ tudes, that not only are we always under the shadow of your in­ fluence and power, but that we cannot escape the consequences of any decision which you make whether we approve it or not, whether we are consulted in advance or not. This is not said in any spirit of irritation or criticism. I am merely stating one of the, for us, inescapable facts of power and of international life. Canadians realize that we are very fortunate in that the shadow over us is an American and not a communist one; that our re­ lationship is one of free partnership and not that of communist master and servant. We know also that when the United States has to make decisions that affect its friends, it will always do its best to consult with those friends. But that doesn’t completely remove our anxiety over our present position, as a junior member of a coalition in a world poised uneasily on the very edge of an atomic abyss. Nor is this to be expected. Canada’s whole history as a self-governing nation has been one of reaction to the pressure - and the attraction - exercised on her by a more powerful friend to which she was closely attached. While we were achieving our present national position, and while the United States was concerned more with avoiding European entanglements than leading Atlantic alliances, that powerful friend and mentor in those days was the United Kingdom, whose imperial interests and commitments at times worried us; or at least those of us who were not content to be mere colonial followers. Now the mantle of world power has been transferred to our neigh­ bour and our anxiety, as well as our admiration, is directed south­ ward. A distinguished Canadian editor, Mr. George Ferguson, refer­ ring a few weeks ago to the assertion that there has recently been a change in Canadian relations with the United States, had this to say:

Continental Defence 255

It is a fact that opinions, attitudes and policies have changed in the United States most remarkably. Our own change has been a reaction to this American change. It is not that we have sud­ denly developed a rush of nationalism to the head and have become a difficult neighbour . . . What we are doing is what we have always historically done. We are reacting against the pressure we most immediately feel. Put yourself in our place and you will see what I mean. The pace of political events today is almost as fast as the progress that is being made in the science of total destruction. In 1914, the United States had three years to prepare for the decisions which had to be made on peace or war. In 1939, there were two years before Pearl Harbour made a decision unnecessary. Next time, there will be no gradual and individual wading into the cold waters of total war. It is more likely to be, for allies, a dive in together from the spring board of collective action. Indeed, that is the very purpose of n .a .t . o ., to ensure that in defence we act together and act at once, in the hope, founded on the lamentable experience of the past, that we may thereby not have to act at all. Mr. Dulles, in a speech on January 12, which may turn out to be one of the most important of our times, announced, as a basic principle for defence planning, a Washington decision, and I quote from his speech, " . . . to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means, and at places of our choosing.” The key words in this sentence, as I see it, are “instantly,” “means,” and “our.” This statement has aroused intense interest in this country. That interest is hardly less among your friends in other countries; especially, I suspect, among those whose territories are only a few hundred miles from those great communist armies who could also act as an instrument of retaliation. From our point of view, it is important that the “our” in this statement should mean those who have agreed, particularly in n . a . t . o ., to work together and by collective action, to prevent war or, if that should fail, to win it. Indeed, an earlier part of Mr. Dulles’ statement gives that wise interpretation, when he said: “The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.” But what effect will that have on the other words “instantly” and “means”? Collective action means collective consultation, but that must be reconciled with the necessity for swift and effective decision. This reconciliation is not always easy, even within a single government. It is less easy between governments.

256 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

I want to emphasize that I am not criticizing this new defence concept which may turn out to be the best deterrent against aggression. It does, however, I think make diplomacy not less but even more important; especially when we contemplate the “means” — including atomic - that may have to be used, the occasions when this should be done, and the effect - explosive possibly in more respects than one - it may have. Diplomacy includes two things; first the effort, patient and per­ sistent, to settle differences with those whom we rightly fear, though at times, with a fear that seems to freeze us into diplomatic immobility or fire us at other times into something almost like panic. Secondly, there is the other kind of diplomacy, now also more important than ever: the search for agreement between friends on policies and tactics and timing, so that “our choosing” will mean an agreed collective decision, without prejudicing speedy and effective action in an emergency. Indeed, such agree­ ment, after consultation and discussion, is to put it bluntly, necessary if this policy of preventing aggression by the threat of immediate and overwhelming retaliation, is to work collectively. The stakes are now higher than ever, and the necessity for co­ operation and consultation greater than ever. It is essential that we work together in any new defence planning and policy - as we have already been working together in n . a .t .o . - if the great coalition which we have formed for peace is not to be replaced by an entrenched continentalism which, I can assure you, makes no great appeal to your northern neighbour as the best way to prevent war or defeat aggression, and which is not likely to pro­ vide a solid basis for good United States-Canadian relations. We have that basis now, I think, in a common devotion to free­ dom, law and justice; in a common belief in the supremacy of the individual over the state, and in a common fear of totalitarian tyranny, of subversive doctrines harnessed to the might of a great and aggressive communist empire which threatens to destroy those things in which we believe. On that basis I hope we can erect and maintain a solid struc­ ture of friendship and even closer co-operation. If our two coun­ tries so close together in so many ways cannot do this, there is in­ deed little hope for peace and progress in the troubled world of today.

Continental D efence 257

17. CONTINENTAL DEFENCE AND UNITED STATES COMMITMENTS Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, to the Canadian Club, Toronto, March 14, 1955 (extracts) (DEA, SandS, 55/8). But how about our other boundary, our last frontier, the North? This brings up the question of continental defence, and here, I can assure you, there are Canadian-American problems aplenty, and they will increase. In this connection it is useful to remind ourselves how things have changed, and are changing, in the field of defence, so far as Canadian-American relations are concerned. Twice in this century Canada has been involved in a major war, a life and death struggle, for periods of two years or more before our American neighbours came in. Today, I think that the neutrality of either of us, if the other were engaged in a major war in which its very existence were at stake, would be unthinkable. That is a tremendous change, and one which must affect all our policies and relations with the United States. Our position in this regard is something that we should never forget when we say, and correctly, that certain United States commitments, those, for instance, covering help to Chiang Kaishek, in Formosa and certain Chinese coastal islands, have not been accepted by us. But that is not the same thing as saying that they may not involve us. And it is certainly not the same as saying that they do not concern us. There is a difference in these matters between legal commit­ ment and political concern. That is why we and other friendly countries at times find it necessary to state our views clearly and frankly, confidentially through government channels, publicly through Parliamentary and other channels, on matters which, in a strict legal sense, may not be our concern, but which are most assuredly our concern in every other way. In Canada, our co­ ordinated and inter-related continental defence arrangements with the United States would alone make such concern inevitable and special. One of the new factors in this defence field, and one of grow­ ing importance, is that North America itself, and its main centres of population and industry are, for the first time, vulnerable to direct and devastating attack by an enemy. It is, therefore, the course of prudence for us to try to deter such an attack, by build­ ing defences against it - diplomatic and military. In each case these defences must be collective and co-operative. Obviously, continental defences are matters of common effort and concern. On the military side, the resources needed for such things as early warning lines and air defence installations to give the greatest

258 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

practicable safety to our two peoples, and to maintain the deter­ rent effect of certain and massive retaliation, may involve sub­ stantial economic effort and the stationing of increased forces in Canada; especially air forces. This is a joint United States-Canadian problem - indeed it is also a n .a .t . o . problem - and can best be solved by joint and agreed action of the two n . a . t . o . mem­ bers from this continent. That, therefore, is how we are tackling it. But there is nothing easy or automatic about it. It is difficult and complicated. But this does not, of course, mean that Canada would not have still greater problems, indeed insoluble problems, in trying to provide defences in our half of this continent if we did not have the Americans to co-operate with us in the enterprise.

V III. T H E

ST. L A W R E N C E

SEA W A Y A N D PO W E R

D E V E L O PM E N T '

~ Development of the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes Waterway for large ocean-going ships long fascinated both Americans and Cana­ dians, but it was not until the 1950s that the dream became a reality. Meantime long stretches of the Waterway had been im­ proved for navigation on a piece-meal basis, partly by Canada, partly by the United States. With the construction in the 1920s of a new Welland Canal, the barrier of the Niagara escarpment had been overcome; a deep water channel had been dredged along the St. Claire River; the barrier between Lake Huron and Lake Superior had been surmounted by construction of a canal and locks; and a deep water channel had been dredged between Montreal and the Atlantic. There remained the section of the St. Lawrence between Prescott and Montreal. Of this the international rapids section of some eighty-six miles between Prescott and Cornwall was the most formidable barrier, although a fourteen-foot channel including locks had been developed along side. During the 1920’s various engineering studies had been done on the possibilities of developing power in the international section, as well as navigation works. In 1932 a draft treaty was worked out between the two countries, but the long depression had set in and the costs seemed prohibitive. The draft treaty was never ratified by either party. After the outbreak of war the enormous expansion of industry increased the demand for power and interest revived in the St. Lawrance as the only large source of undeveloped hydro power in the region. Under the United States construction a treaty requires approval by two-thirds of the Senate which promised to be very difficult to obtain. The procedure of an executive agreement between the two governments, which would have required only a majority vote in congress, was now attempted. Further, it was agreed that development of the whole St. Lawrence-Great Lakes 1 For history of negotiations since the eighteenth century see Willough­ by, W. R., The St. Lawrence Waterway; A Study in Politics and Diplomacy (Madison, Wis., 1961). For documents on negotiations since the Second World War see the St. Lawrence Seaway Manual, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1955 (Senate Document No. 165, 83rd Congress, second session).

260 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

Basin would be treated as a single entity for purposes of cost and control. A draft agreement was accordingly worked out in 1941, but it failed to pass congress and the project was dropped until it was revived again by Canada in the late 1940s. The issue that brought matters to a head was again the shortage of new sources of hydro electric power for Ontario which was undergoing tremendous post-war expansion. Canada now proposed that the international rapids section be jointly developed as a source of power which would be divided equally between the two countries and the costs divided accordingly. The development of dams and other control works for power pur­ pose would deepen waterway channels, thereby lessening costs of development of deep water navigation channels. Canada further offered to-construct and pay for the seaway itself which would, of course, be mainly on the Canadian side of the border. It was agreed by the two governments that the arrangements proposed in the draft agreement of 1941 was preferable, but failing approval of the agreement in Congress, President Truman agreed to support con­ struction of the seaway by Canada (doc. 1). There remained the problem of securing approval. Under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 either of two procedures for handling proposed obstructions or diversions of the boundary waters was possible: a special agreement outside the treaty could be agreed to by the parties; or the parties could request the International Joint Commission, set up under the treaty, to approve a project. In its approval the Commission could attach conditions to protect the public interest of either party, as well as private interests. In view of the difficulty of securing congressional approval the two govern­ ments agreed to approach the International Joint Commission for approval which was now done (doc. 2). The Commission issued its order of approval within a few months. Meantime Canada had designated the Hydro Electric Power Commission of Ontario as the Canadian authority responsible for the development of power. The United States later appointed the New York State Power Authority as the appropriate American authority. Canada now notified the United States that in view of the approval by the i . j .c . the agree­ ment of 1941 had lapsed (doc. 3). Under repeated prodding by the President the Congress finally awakened to the fact that Canada was fully prepared to go ahead with constructing an all-Canadian seaway. One consideration that impressed Congress was the approaching exhaustion of high-grade iron ore in Wisconsin and the early need for Labrador ores to supply American industries in Lower Great Lakes region. Legis-

St. Lawrence Seaway 261 lation was hurriedly passed to establish a United States Seaway Development Corporation and to require it to provide all naviga­ tion works needed for the seaway on the American side. In effect, two seaways were now authorized, one on each side of the boundary.' Neither party was quite prepared to face a situation in which com­ plete control of the Seaway would rest in the other’s hands, as con­ struction on one side of the river alone would have permitted. Two sets of works in particular were involved - those for a deep-water channel around Barnhart Island, and those for sumounting the great Iroquois power dam. Canada had already let contracts for this construction. After prolonged negotiations each side eventually agreed to modify its stand. Canada insisted on building the Iroquois lock, but agreed not to proceed further with constructing a route on the Canadian side of the international rapids section unless traffic conditions, or interference with the existing route, warranted. It also agreed to consult the United States before undertaking such development. The United States in turn agreed not to construct, for the time being, works to parallel the Canadian lock at Iroquois. The United States would also construct the seaway around Barnhart Island, and in the Thousand Island section (doc. 4). The Seaway thus runs partly through Canadian and partly through American territory. The Canadian case for joint development of the seaway, as opposed to an all Canadian route is set out in Document 5. A striking feature of the Seaway agreement is that there is no overall formal treaty providing for construction or operation. In­ stead much of the legal foundation consists merely of exchanges of correspondence. Nor is the seaway managed by any single adminis­ trative authority: instead each partner administers the part that runs through its territory. This required an unusual degree of coopera­ tion and consultation at the construction stage, as it does in the operational stage.~ 1. CANADA PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE THE SEAWAY ALONE Exchange of Notes, January 11, 1952 (St. Lawrence Seaway Manual, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Docum ent No. 165, pp. 113-15). C a nadian E m bassy ,

No. 35 Washington, D.C., January 11, 1952. Sir, I have the honour to refer to the discussion of the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project between the Prime Minister of Can­ ada and the President of the United States which took place in Washington on September 28, 1951.

262 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

A t that time, the President and the Prime Minister agreed on the vital importance to the security and the economies of both countries of proceeding as rapidly as possible with both the sea­ way and the power phases of the project. The Prime Minister in­ dicated that the Canadian Government would be willing to con­ struct the seaway as a solely Canadian project if it is not possible to have the joint development undertaken on the basis of the 1941 Agreement. The President agreed to support this Canadian action if an early commencement of the joint development did not prove possible. The Canadian Parliament has recently passed legislation pro­ viding on the one hand, for a power development on the St. Lawrence River, to be undertaken by the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario and an appropriate agency in the United States, and on the other hand, for the establishment of the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority to construct the seaway either in co­ operation with the United States, as provided for in the 1941 Agreement, or as a solely Canadian undertaking. This legislation may now be brought into force at any time by proclamation. The Canadian Government is prepared to proceed with the construction of the seaway as soon as appropriate arrangements can be made for the construction of the power phases of the St. Lawrence project as well. Failing approval of the 1941 Agreement by the Congress, it will be necessary to refer the project to the In­ ternational Joint Commission for approval. In order to proceed as rapidly as possible with the project, which the President and the Prime Minister have agreed is of vital importance, the co­ operation of the United States Government in preparing con­ current applications for approval of the project to the Inter­ national Joint Commission is requested. Such a preparatory step would in no way prejudice the possi­ bility of proceeding with the project on the basis of the 1941 Agreement in the event that the Congress should approve that Agreement. On the other hand, it is desirable to seek the approval of the International Joint Commission as soon as practicable in order to avoid any further delay in the event that the Congress does not approve the 1941 Agreement early in the present session. It is proposed that appropriate officials of our two countries discuss the steps to be taken in proceeding with a reference of applications to the International Joint Commission for the con­ struction of the project. A series of meetings beginning the middle of this month, either in Washington or in Ottawa, would be most appropriate for this purpose. Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest considera­ tion. , H. H. WRONG.

St. Lawrence Seaway 263 D epa rtm en t

of

St a t e ,

Washington, January 11, 1952. Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of January 11, 1952, concerning the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. My Government notes with gratification that the Canadian Parliament has passed legislation providing, on the one hand, for the construction of the power phase of the project to be under­ taken by the Hydro-Electric Commission of Ontario and an ap­ propriate agency in the United States; and on the other hand, for the establishment of the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority to con­ struct the seaway, either in cooperation with the United States as envisaged in the 1941 Agreement, or as a solely Canadian under­ taking. As you know, the President hopes that the Congress of the United States will approve, at an early date, the 1941 Agreement providing for joint construction of the St. Lawrence Project. Should the Congress, however, not approve the 1941 Agreement at an early date, the Government of the United States is prepared, in order to avoid further delay in the construction of the St. Law­ rence Project, to cooperate with the Government of Canada in referring the project to the International Joint Commission for approval on the understanding, as expressed in your note, that your Government is prepared to proceed with the construction of the Seaway as soon as appropriate arrangements can be made for the construction of the power phases of the St. Lawrence Project as well. In order that there may be a minimum of delay in the construc­ tion of the project, which the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada have agreed is of vital importance to the security and the economies of both countries, my Govern­ ment is ready to cooperate with your Government in undertaking such preparatory steps as may be advisable in presenting concur­ rent applications to the International Joint Commission. On be­ half of my Government, I accept your proposal that appropriate officials of our two countries discuss the steps to be taken in pro­ ceeding with the reference of such applications. I agree that a series of meetings to be held either in Washington or in Ottawa, or at such other place as may be convenient, would be the most appropriate method for implementing this proposal. Although it is not possible for me now to propose an exact date, I expect that my Government will be prepared to begin these discussions some­ time this month. I shall inform you as soon as my Government is ready to join in the discussions which you have proposed. Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest con­ sideration. DEAN ACHESON.

264 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

2. PARALLEL APPLICATIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION Exchange of Correspondence, Canadian Ambassador in Washington and Acting Secretary of State, June 30,1952 (DEA, External Affairs, July, 1952, pp. 245-48). June 30,1952 Sir, I . 1 have the honour to refer to our exchange of notes of January II,1 9 5 2 , relating to the St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project. In my note to you, I informed you that the Canadian Government is prepared to proceed with the construction of the Seaway as soon as appropriate arrangements can be made for the construction of the power phase of the project as well. 2. I have been instructed by my Government to inform you that, when all arrangements have been made to secure the com­ pletion of the power phase of the St. Lawrence project, the Cana­ dian Government will construct locks and canals on the Canadian side of the International Boundary to provide for deep-water navigation to the standard specified in the proposed agreement between Canada and the United States for the development of navigation and power in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin, signed March 19, 1941, and in accordance with the specifications of the Joint Board of Engineers, dated November 16, 1926, and that such deep-water navigation shall be provided as nearly as possible concurrently with the completion of the power phase of the St. Lawrence project. 3. The undertaking of the Government of Canada with respect to these deep-water navigation facilities is based on the assump­ tion that it will not be possible in the immediate future to obtain Congressional approval of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Agreement of 1941. As it has been determined that power can be developed economically, without the Seaway, in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River and as there has been clear evidence that entities in both Canada and the United States are prepared to develop power on such a basis, the Canadian Government has, with Parliamentary approval, committed itself to provide and maintain whatever additional works may be re­ quired to allow uninterrupted 27-foot navigation between Lake Erie and the Port of Montreal, subject to satisfactory arrange­ ments being made to ensure the development of power. 4. Canada’s undertaking to provide the Seaway is predicated on the construction and maintenance by suitable entities in Can­ ada and the United States of a sound power project in the Inter­ national Rapids Section. The features of such a power project are described in Section of the joint applications to be submitted to the International Joint Commission by the Governments of Can­

8

St. Lawrence Seaway 265

ada and the United States. They are also described in the Agree­ ment of December 3, 1951, between the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario, forming part of the International Rapids Power Development Act, Chapter 13 of the Statutes of Canada, 1951, (Second Session), a copy of which is attached hereto. The Canadian Government wishes to make it clear that, even were the Seaway not to be constructed, Canada would not give its approval to any power development scheme in the Inter­ national Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River which omitted any of the features so described. 5. However, in order to ensure that construction of both the power project and the deep waterway may be commenced without any further delay and notwithstanding (a) that the power-developing entities would be required, if power were to be developed alone, to provide for con­ tinuance of 14-foot navigation (such provision was indeed made in the 1948 applications by the Province of Ontario and the State of New Y ork), and that the Canadian Gov­ ernment’s commitment to provide concurrently a deep waterway between Lake Erie and the Port of Montreal does not alter the basic principle that any entity develop­ ing power in boundary waters must make adequate pro­ vision for the maintenance of existing navigation facilities, and (b ) that, in view of the clear priority given to navigation over power by Article V III of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, provision of channelling to the extent specified in the Annex to the 1951 Canada-Ontario Agreement re­ ferred to above is reasonable and in conformity with Can­ adian practice, the Canadian Government is now prepared to agree (a) that the amount to be paid to Canada, as specified in the agreement of December 3, 1951, between Canada and Ontario, in lieu of the construction of the power-develop­ ing entities of facilities required for the continuance of 14-foot navigation, be excluded from the total cost of the power project to be divided between the Canadian and the United States power-developing entities, in consideration of the fact that actual replacement of 14-foot navigation facilities will be rendered unnecessary by reason of the concurrent construction of the deep waterway in Canada, and (b ) that the authority to be established pursuant to the pro­ visions of the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority Act, Chap­ ter 24 of the Statutes of Canada, 1951 (Second Session),

266 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

contribute $15 million towards the cost of the channel en­ largement which the power-developing entities must undertake in the St. Lawrence River, as set out in Para. 4 of the Annex to the Canada-Ontario Agreement of De­ cember 3,1951, and in Section of the applications to the International Joint Commisson, in consideration of the benefits which will accrue to navigation from such channel enlargement. . I understand that your government approves the arrange­ ments outlined in this note and that it is further agreed, subject to the modifications outlined in the preceding paragraph, that the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States will request the International Joint Commission to allocate equally between the two power-developing entities the cost of all the features described in Section of the applications to the Inter­ national Joint Commission and in the agreement of December 3, 1951, between Canada and Ontario. Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest considera­ tion. H. H. WRONG.

8

6

8

June 30, 1952 Excellency: . I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of June 20, 1952, in which you inform me tiiat your Government, when all arrangements have been made to ensure the completion of the power phase of the St. Lawrence Project, will construct locks and canals on the Canadian side of the International Boun­ dary to provide deep-water navigation to the standard specified in the proposed agreement between the United States and Can­ ada for the development of navigation and power in the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin, signed March 19,1941, and in accord­ ance with the specifications of the Joint Board of Engineers, dated November 16, 1926, and that such deep-water navigation shall be provided as nearly as possible concurrently with the completion of the power phase of the St. Lawrence Project. 2. My Government approves the arrangements set forth in your note and, subject to the modifications there proposed and outlined below, agrees to request the International Joint Com­ mission to allocate equally between the power-developing entities the cost of all the features described in Section of the applica­ tions to the International Joint Commission and in the Agreement of December 3, 1951, between the Government of Canada and Ontario. 3. These modifications arc:

1

8

(a) The amount to be paid to Canada, as specified by the

St. Lawrence Seaway 267

Agreement of December 3, 1951, between Canada and Ontario in lieu of the construction by the power-develop­ ing entities of facilities required for the continuance of 14-foot navigation, be excluded from the total cost of the power project to be divided between the Canadian and United States power-developing entities, in consideration of the fact that actual replacement of 14-foot navigation facilities will be rendered unnecessary by reason of the concurrent construction of the deep waterway in Canada, and (b ) that the authority to be established pursuant to the pro­ visions of the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority Act, Chap­ ter 24 of the Statutes of Canada, 1951 (Second Session), contribute $15 million toward the cost of channel enlarge­ ment which the power developing entities must undertake in the St. Lawrence River, as' set out in Section of the Applications to the International Joint Commission and Paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Canada-Ontario Agree­ ment of December 3, 1951, in consideration of the bene­ fits which will accrue to navigation from such channel enlargement.

8

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest con­ sideration. DAVID K. E. BRUCE.

3. LAPSE OF AGREEMENT OF 1941 Note from Canadian Ambassador, Washington, to Secretary of State, November 4, 1952 (DEA, External Affairs, November, 1952, pp. 390-91). I have the honour to refer to the project for the development of power in the International Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River, which has now been approved by the International Joint Commission in its order dated October 29, 1952, in accordance with the applications submitted to the Commission by the Gov­ ernments of Canada and the United States on June 30, 1952. You will recall that, when the St. Lawrence development plan envisaged in these applications was first proposed to the Presi­ dent of the United States by the Prime Minister of Canada on September 28, 1951, the President agreed to support this plan if an early commencement of the plan envisaged in The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin Development Agreement of 1941 was not possible. On April 14 last, when the Secretary of State for Ex­ ternal Affairs and the Minister of Transport discussed the St. Lawrence development with the President of the United States,

268 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

it was agreed that the Governments of Canada and the United States would submit applications to the International Joint Com­ mission for a St. Lawrence power project as a necessary prelimi­ nary step toward the implementation of the plan proposed to the President in September 1951. The applications were submitted on the understanding that both Governments would be ready, however, to revert to the 1941 Agreement and withdraw the ap­ plications if the Congress approved the 1941 Agreement during the time that the applications were under consideration by the International Joint Commission. Since these discussions, the Con­ gress of the United States has not approved the 1941 Agreement which, after eleven years, still remains unratified. The approval by the International Joint Commission of the applications of the two Governments for a power project now brings the St. Lawrence development to the point where construc­ tion can begin, both on the seaway and the power project, as soon as a duly designated entity has been authorized to construct the United States part of the power project. Legislation to implement the plan envisaged in the applications to the International Joint Commission has already been enacted by the Parliament of Can­ ada and by the Legislature of Ontario, and Canada has already taken certain preliminary steps with respect to the construction of the seaway. The Canadian Government, accordingly, has con­ cluded that it would no longer be practicable to revert to the terms of the 1941 Agreement or to place that Agreement before Parlia­ ment for approval. The Canadian Government, therefore, con­ siders that Agreement as having been superseded and does not in­ tend to take any action to have it ratified. I should like to express the gratitude of my Government for the co-operation which has been received from the United States Gov­ ernment in preparing for the construction of the St. Lawrence project, which is so urgently needed in the interests of the econ­ omic development and defence of both our countries. On behalf of my Government, I should also like to request the continued co­ operation and support of the United States Government in com­ pleting the arrangements for proceeding with this project. Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest considera­ tion. H. H. WRONG, Ambassador.

St. Lawrence Seaway 269

4. CONSTRUCTION OF IROQUOIS DAM AND OTHER WORKS Exchange of Correspondence, August 17, 1954 (CTS, 1954/14). O tt a w a , August 17, 1954.

Note No. X-214 D on C. B liss, Esquire, Charge d’Affaires ad interim, United States Embassy, Ottawa. Sir, I have the honour to refer to the Exchange of Notes of June 30, 1952, between the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and the Acting Secretary of State of the United States in which it was agreed that the Canadian Government would, when all arrange­ ments had been made to ensure the completion of the power phase of the St. Lawrence Project, construct locks and canals on the Canadian side of the International Boundary to provide for un­ interrupted 27-foot navigation between Lake Erie and the Port of Montreal. With the co-operation of the Government of the United States, arrangements were made to ensure the completion of the power phase of the Project by the Power Authority of the State of New York and the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario. In the meantime, the Congress of the United States enacted and the President approved on May 13, 1954, Public Law 358 which created the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation and authorized and directed it to construct 27-foot navigation works on the United States side of the international section of the St. Lawrence River. A t the request of the United States Government, representa­ tives of our two governments held meetings in July and August of this year to discuss the need for modification of the Notes ex­ changed on June 30, 1952 in the light of Public Law 358. Al­ though the Canadian Government is ready and willing to complete the works necessary for 27-foot navigation in the St. Lawrence Seaway on the Canadian territory, it understands the desire of the United States to participate in the Seaway Project by con­ structing certain navigation works on United States territory. Accordingly the Canadian Government is prepared to modify the arrangements set forth in the Notes of June. 30, 1952, to the ex­ tent that the Canadian Government will be relieved of the obliga­ tion towards the United States Government to provide forthwith the navigation works in the general vicinity of the Barnhart Island on Canadian territory and in the Thousand Islands section. (a) The Canadian Government wishes to state, however, that it

270 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

will construct forthwith a canal and lock at Iroquois and that in addition it intends, if and when it considers that parallel facilities are required to accommodate existing or potential traffic, to com­ plete 27-foot navigation works on the Canadian side of the Inter­ national Rapids Section. (b) Before undertaking these latter works in the general vicinity of Barnhart Island, the Canadian Government agrees to consult the United States Government, and understands that, should the United States Government intend to build on United States terri­ tory in the International Rapids section navigation works in addi­ tion to those provided for in Public Law 358, it would similarly consult the Canadian Government. The Canadian Government reserves the right to decide whether and in what manner it will continue 14-foot navigation works through the International Rapids section but agrees to consult the United States Government on the question of levying tolls in con­ nection with such works. (a) It is recognized that it is of great importance to Canada and the United States that the St. Lawrence Seaway be used to the maximum extent required by the needs of commerce. It is under­ stood therefore that both Governments will use their best en­ deavours to avoid placing unreasonable restrictions on the transit of passengers, shipping, or trade in the international section of the St. Lawrence Seaway. (b) It is further agreed that each Government will consult the other before it enacts any new law or promulgates any new regu­ lation, applicable in the respective national parts of the inter­ national section of the St. Lawrence River, which might affect Canadian or United States shipping, or shipping of third-country registry proceeding to or from Canada or the United States, respectively. (c) Similarly, with respect to any laws or regulations now in force in either country which affect the shipping interests of the other country in the international section of the St. Lawrence River, the Government affected may request consultation con­ cerning such laws or regulations and the other Government shall accede to requests for consultation.' (d) The foregoing undertakings are in addition to the treaty obligations now in force between Canada and the United States affecting shipping in the St. Lawrence River and canals, particu­ larly Article I of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. I should be glad to receive your confirmation that the United States Government agrees with the modification of the Notes of June 30, 1952, proposed in paragraph 3 and with the reciprocal undertakings set forth in paragraphs 4 (b ) and of this Note. The Canadian Government looks forward to the fruitful de­ velopment of this great Seaway Project in constructive and har­

6

St. Lawrence Seaway 271

monious co-operation with the United States and is confident that this joint enterprise will add to the strength and prosperity of our two countries. Accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. L. B. PEARSON, Secretary of State for External Affairs. U n it e d St a t e s E m bassy ,

Ottawa, August 17, 1954. Note No. 38 The Honorable L e s t e r B. P ea r so n , Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Sir :

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Note No. X-214 of August 17,1954, in which you inform me that the Can­ adian Government agrees to certain modifications in the arrange­ ments set forth in the Notes of our Governments of June 30,1952, in the light of the changed circumstances with respect to the St. Lawrence Seaway Project brought about by the enactment by the Congress of the United States of Public Law 358, approved by the President on May 13, 1954. The United States Government has called the attention of the Canadian Government to the provisions of Public Law 358 authorizing and directing the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation to construct certain canals and locks on the United States side of the International Rapids section of the St. Lawrence River as its part of the St. Lawrence Seaway Project. As the Can­ adian Government has been informed, it is the intention of the United States Government to participate in the St. Lawrence Sea­ way Project by constructing these navigational facilities. The United States Government agrees with the requirements of consultation between the two Governments set forth in paragraphs 4 (b ) and and agrees to relieve Canada of its obligation of June 20,1952, as referred to in paragraph 3 of your Note No. X-214 of August 17, 1954. My Government notes the declarations contained in your Note as to the intentions of the Canadian Government with respect to other matters relating to the St. Lawrence Seaway Project. The United States Government wholeheartedly shares the view expressed by the Government of Canada concerning the benefits to be anticipated from this joint enterprise and welcomes this new opportunity for constructive and harmonius co-operation between our two countries. Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest considera­ tion. DON C. BLISS

6

272 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

5. MODIFICATION OF AGREEMENT OF JUNE 30, 1952 Exchange of Correspondence, February 21 and 22, 1955 (St. Law­ rence Seaway Manual, pp. 173-74). U n it e d S t a t e s E m bassy ,

Ottawa, Canada, February 21, 1955. No. 107 The Honorable L. B. P ea r so n , Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa. Dear Mr. Pearson: I refer to conversations which were held recently between your­ self, Mr. Howe and Ambassador Heeney and, on our side, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Anderson, and myself, on our respective plans for St. Lawrence seaway construction. In the light of these conversations, and of the exchange of notes of August 1954, we understand that the Canadian Government under present conditions will not construct navigation facilities which bypass the power dams in the Cornwall-Bamhart Island areas. It is further understood that while the Canadian Govern­ ment intends to acquire land now in that vicinity to provide such facilities at some future date, such construction will not be initi­ ated until after discussions between the two Governments. The United States Government has, as you know, a statutory obligation under Public Law 358, 83rd Congress, to construct facilities for 27-foot navigation in the vicinity of Rockway Point, N.Y., opposite Iroquois, Ontario. However, since the Canadian Government has awarded a contract for construction of facilities for 27-foot navigation at Iroquois, we will seek congressional action at an appropriate time to be relieved of this statutory obligation for such construction and, thereafter, will not initiate such construction until after discussions between the two Govern­ ments. Under these arrangements the Canadian canal and lock at Iroquois will be the exclusive means for navigation to bypass the power project control dam at that point. Similarly, the Long Sault Canal, with two locks near Massena, N.Y., to be constructed by the United States, will be the exclusive means for navigation to bypass the dams in the Cornwall-Bamhart Island area. These arrangements eliminate uneconomical duplication of navigation facilities for 27-foot or lesser draft on opposite sides of the St. Lawrence River to bypass the power and control dams in the International Rapids section, and retain the development on a joint basis of this common undertaking of our two countries,

St. Lawrence Seaway 273

consistent with the principles of St. Lawrence seaway legislation of both countries. I would appreciate your confirming that this letter represents the views expressed in our meetings. Respectfully yours, R. DOUGLAS STUART

T h e S ec re ta r y

of

Sta te

for

E x ter n a l A f f a ir s , C anada ,

Ottawa, February 22, 1955. His Excellency R. D ouglas S t u a r t , Ambassador o f the United States of America, Ottawa. My Dear Ambassador: In reply to your letter of February 21, 1955, on our respective plans for the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway, I wish to confirm that your letter represents the views expressed in our meetings. Yours sincerely, L. B. PEARSON

6. TH E

CASE FOR JO IN T CONSTRUCTION

D E A M e m o ra n d u m , A u g u st 2 6 , 19 5 4 (extract) (St. L aw rence Sea­ w ay M a n u a l Appendix B, pp. 202-03).

6.

An important fact to remember is that there cannot be a 27-foot seaway in the international section of the river unless dams across the river are constructed in addition to the canals and locks at Barnhart and Iroquois. Although the canals and locks could be built by either country on its own side, the dams can­ not in any circumstances be built without full agreement and friendly co-operation between the two Governments. This co­ operation has been forthcoming and the dams will be built jointly by the power authorities of Ontario and New York State. The point to remember is that the construction of the power dams which are absolutely essential to the seaway - rests on voluntary and continuing co-operation between Canada and the United States. 7. There have been criticisms to the effect that Canada might have started much earlier to build the navigation works in the International Rapids section and thereby have presented the United States with an accomplished fact before the Wiley Act was passed in May, 1954. The simple answer is that Canada could not commence any 27-foot navigation works in the International

274 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

Rapids section until it was certain that the power dams would be built. The dams are essential to the seaway. Because the legality of the power license issued to the New York State Power Authority was being tested in the United States courts, no one could be certain of the power dams until the Supreme Court of the United States upheld on June 7, 1954, the validity of the license. Nothing practical could be done about starting the navi­ gation works (i.e., the seaway) until after June 7, 1954, even if Congress had not adopted the Wiley Act in May, 1954. . From the immediately practical and legal point of view it should be borne in mind that (if the construction of the power dams is assured) Canada can no more prevent the United States from constructing a full set of navigation works in the inter­ national section of the river in United States territory than the United States can prevent Canada from constructing parallel works in Canadian territory. In other words, under the treaties and domestic laws that govern our two countries it would be legally and physically possible for Canada and the United States to build at the same time parallel works on either side of the river at Barnhart Island and at Iroquois. The dredging in the Thousand Islands section is another matter since this is to be done in the bed of the river partly on the Canadian side of the river but mainly on the United States side. The main question the Canadian Govern­ ment had to decide was whether we should go our own way and build Barnhart on the Canadian side immediately, paralleling the Barnhart works which the United States has decided to build. The construction now by both countries of parallel 27-foot navigation works throughout the international section would obviously not be in the best interests of either country. In the first place it is estimated that the volume of waterborne traffic in the St. Lawrence seaway will not be sufficient in the immediate future to warrant the construction of two canal systems. Even if traffic were now sufficient, however, there would be no economic purpose served in constructing duplicate navigation facilities in the international section unless other facilities in the seaway were also duplicated at the same time. Present estimates are that duplication of these facilities would involve expenditures of approximately million at Welland and $40 million at Lachine, over and above those already planned by Canada for the next 5 years. 9. It is hoped and expected that the traffic situation will be quite different some years after the seaway has commenced oper­ ation (planned for the end of 1958). No one can be certain now whether it will take 5, 10, or 15 years of operation, but it is con­ fidently expected that the growth of traffic will justify the com­ pletion of parallel works on both sides of the river at Barnhart and Iroquois. When that time comes, the Canadian Government will build a set of Barnhart works in Canada and the so-called all-

8

$100

Si. Lawrence Seaway 275

Canadian seaway from Montreal to Lake Erie will be complete. The phrase is not, however, an exact one because, even when there is a complete set of canals and locks on Canadian territory, there are still places in the international section where the natural channel for ships winds back and forth across the international boundary line. 10. There were sound practical reasons for the Canadian Government’s decision to delay - for a period which may prove to be short - the building of parallel Barnhart works in Canada. There was also another reason. Canada and the United States are good friends and neighbors, bound together in peace and war in a multitude of great projects. Although there are often differences of opinion, even disputes between us, it is the deep desire of the peoples and governments of both countries, regardless of party affiliation, to try to settle common problems by consultation and agreement, rather than by unilateral competing decisions. Once the people and Congress of the United States resolved to partici­ pate in the seaway by building works in the international section, a Canadian decision to “go our own way” and to build now the Barnhart works in Canada without any regard to the decision of the United States, however late in the day that decision may have been taken, would have been a blow to good relations, and would therefore have done damage to Canada’s broad national interests.

IX .

F A R

EA ST A N D

SO U T H

E A S T A S IA

A . P e a c e m a k in g W ith J a p a n 1 ~ Hostilities in the Second World War ceased in Europe early in May, 1945, with the military surrender of the German forces but they continued for some three months longer in the Pacific area. Meantime the Japanese forces were being pressed back on all fronts and the allied forces were preparing for the invasion of the Japanese homeland. On July 26, President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, meeting in Potsdam, issued a proclamation calling upon the Japa­ nese to surrender, if they wished to avoid the utter destruction of their country, and setting forth surrender terms. The terms were harsh but the Allies did not refuse to deal with the existing govern­ ment, as they had done in the case of Germany, nor, although they contemplated fostering a democratic system of government in Japan, did they demand the abdication of the Emperor. This proved to be important, both in expediting surrender and in carrying out the terms afterwards. A t first the Japanese government was deadlocked over surrender, but new catastrophes were impending. On August the first atomic bomb was dropped over the city of Hiroshima; two days later the U.S.S.R. formally declared war against Japan; on August 9 an atomic bomb was dropped over Nagasaki. The cabinet was still deadlocked but accepted the advice of the Emperor to surrender. After frantic efforts to get the best terms possible, Japan surrendered unconditionally on the fourteenth. On September 2 the Instrument of Surrender was signed on board the u.s.s. Missouri in Tokyo Bay. All states actively at war with Japan including Canada were invited to be represented and to sign the Instrument of Surrender. Since the surrender in Europe, Canada had been rapidly organiz­ ing a force to participate in the war in the Pacific but no units had been sent forward before the Japanese surrender. The Canadian Government decided against participating in the occupation of Japan on the ground that it had commitments in Europe, and the Pacific Force was accordingly disbanded on September 1. In 1946,

6

1 For further reading see: Angus, H. F., Canada and the Far East 1940-1953; Spencer, R. A., Canada in World Affairs 1946-49, pp. 48-55; Keirstead, B. S., Canada in World Affairs 1951-53, pp. 124-8.

Far East and South-East Asia 277

by arrangement with the United States whose forces were in occu­ pation of Japan, Canada sent a civilian liaison mission to Japan to maintain contact with the occupation authorities and to look after Canadian commercial and other interests. After the surrender Japan was immediately occupied by Ameri­ can forces under General MacArthur thereby forestalling division of the country into separate occupation zones as had happened in Germany. Although the U.S.S.R. pressed for a share in occupation, this was avoided. Unlike Germany, Japan was never without a government after defeat, and the United States from the first held the Japanese government responsible for carrying out the terms of surrender instead of attempting to set up a military government as had been done in Germany. A Far Eastern Advisory Commission, on which all the powers that had signed the surrender terms were to be represented, was established in Washington, but the U.S.S.R. refused to participate since the Commission had only advisory powers. Within a few weeks, however, at a conference in Moscow of the foreign ministers of the Big Four (the United States, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, China) it was agreed that the Com­ mission should be given powers of decision subject to the veto of any of the Four as in the Security Council of the United Nations. The U.S.S.R. then joined. An allied Council representing the Four was also established in Japan, to advise the Supreme Commander on the implementation of the Armistice terms. The United King­ dom, Australia and New Zealand agreed that the Commonwealth countries concerned should be represented as a group. Canada, however, declined to participate in this arrangement but would have welcomed separate representation. Canada played an active role on the Far Eastern Commission which was the authoritative interAllied body on policy and which normally met in Washington. In 1947 the United States proposed a peace conference, the members of which would be the states represented on the Far Eastern Commission. Decisions were to be taken by a two-thirds majority vote (doc. 1). A Commonwealth conference met shortly thereafter in Canberra to discuss problems of the peace treaty and its members agreed generally with the United States proposals. Canadian views about the proposed peace settlement are summed up in document 2. The U.S.S.R., however, took the stand that the treaty should be drafted by the Great Powers alone and that the other allied powers should be brought in afterwards to approve the draft (doc. 3). This was essentially the procedure followed for peace treaties with the lesser enemy states in Europe. A stalement ac­ cordingly developed.

278 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

No further progress was made until the Korean war, when it seemed essential for the West to have the good will of Japan. The United States accordingly took the initiative in preparing a draft treaty, circulating it for comment, and calling a conference at San Francisco The Conference approved the draft treaty with minor amendments. Canada, although not entirely happy with the pro­ cedures, approved generally of the treaty (doc. 4) which was more liberal than had been foreshadowed in the terms of the surrender. When it came into force on April 28, 1952, on ratification by the United States, Prime Minister St. Lam ent and Prime Minister Yoshida exchanged greetings and it was announced that full diplo­ matic relations were being resumed between the two countries Two questions of special interest to Canada remained unsettled by the peace conference. The first issue was, whether Japan would respect the conservation measures worked out by the United States and Canada for the protection of certain fisheries in the North Pacific. This problem was met by a special Fisheries Convention to run for five years which was developed between the United States. Canada and Japan (doc. 5). A second issue was whether Japan, which would have to depend on external trade to a greater degree than before the war in order to feed its people, could be counted on to observe fair trade practices. This problem was met by Japan becoming associated with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which was progressively working out a code of fair practices in international trade and to which Canada and most other trading nations belonged. A third problem, that of trade relations between Canada and Japan, called for concessions on both sides. Japan was already Canada’s third most important market, Canadian exports being largely in raw or partly finished materials such as wheat, metals, and forest products, The terms of trade were, however, so greatly in Canada’s favour that Japan was finding great difficulty in paying for its purchases. A trade agreement was eventually worked out whereby Japan was given most favoured nation treatment under the Canadian tariff, which meant greater access to Canada for many Japanese manufactured goods, especially textiles (doc. ). ~

.1

.2

6

1 The problem of which China to invite was shelved by not inviting either. 2 Text in External Affairs, IV, 5, May 1952, p. 176.

Far East and South-East Asia 279

1. PROPOSALS FOR PEACE CONFERENCE Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs Mr. L. S. St. Laurent (CHCD, December 19, 1947, p. 494). The first proposal for the convening of a Japanese peace confer­ ence was made by the United States government on July 11 of this year. It suggested that a conference of representatives of the eleven states, members of the F ar Eastern Commission, namely Australia, Canada, China, France, India, The Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the U.S.S.R., should be convened as soon as practicable to discuss a peace treaty for Japan. Such an eleven-power conference was advocated because it would provide a broad representative basis of participation to include all those nations with a primary interest in Japan. It was the view expressed by the United States government that other states at war with Japan might be given an opportunity to present their views while the peace treaty was being drafted and that after drafting had reachcd a sufficiently advanced stage it should be considered by a general conference of all the states at war with Japan. It was proposed that decisions at the preliminary eleven-power conference should be adopted by a simple two-thirds majority. The Canadian government welcomed these proposals made by the United States government and viewed with satisfaction the provision that the eleven powers primarily interested in the settle­ ment with Japan participate fully from the beginning in the pre­ paration of the treaty. Canada noted with approval the suggestion that voting should be by a simple two-thirds majority. Australia, France, India, The Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines and the United Kingdom also accepted the United States’ proposal without any important reservations. China and the U.S.S.R. did not agree to the procedure suggested. The Soviet Union took the view that the question of convening a conference for drawing a peace treaty with Japan should be pro­ visionally examined by the council of foreign ministers, composed of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China only. 2. COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE ON JAPANESE PEACE PROBLEMS AT CANBERRA Statement by the Leader of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. Brooke Claxton (DEA, S and S, August 26, 1947). Holding the Conference in Canberra fittingly recognises the part played by Australia in the Pacific war. The attendance of the Canadian Delegation is an indication of Canada’s interest in

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Pacific affairs. Canada’s strategic position as a Pacific Power Canada has a long Pacific coastline - and our interest in foreign trade as the third largest trading nation of the world, make the establishment of political and economic stability in the Far East a matter of vital concern to us. Before the war, Canadian ship­ ping, insurance, Christian missions and trade played major roles in Japan’s contacts with the outside world. The province of British Columbia, bordering on the Pacific, is one of the richest provinces in Canada, and Victoria and Vancouver are far closer to Yoko­ hama and Tokyo than are the West Coast cities of the United States of America. The great circle route from North America to the Far East follows the Canadian coastal islands around the Aleutians. Canada is thus about the same distance from Japan as is Brisbane. A t this Conference representatives of the Commonwealth countries can freely and frankly exchange views on the proposed Japanese treaty. Matters which will be discussed include the pro­ cedure to be followed in making the treaty; territorial, military and economic provisions; and machinery for enforcement. The work of the Far Eastern Commission of the eleven Powers meet­ ing at Washington has shown that there is substantial agreement on the basic objectives. General MacArthur, Supreme Com­ mander of the Allied Powers, has rendered excellent service in connection with the work of the occupation and demilitarisation of Japan. The U.S.A. has now summoned a conference of the Powers represented on the Far Eastern Commission to begin the actual work of drafting a treaty. Canada, like other countries represented here, has welcomed the American initiative. We can see no reason why it should not be possible to arrive at the terms of a treaty sometime in 1948. Indeed, we can see every reason why that should be done as soon as it properly can be done. Un­ certainty and disorder will disturb the world as long as the state of war existing between the Allies and their defeated enemies is not brought to an end. Neither peace nor prosperity can be built anywhere so long as some countries are at war and others are at peace. Prolonged uncertainty plays into the hands of those who profit from disorder. The peoples of the world cannot know hap­ piness, prosperity and peace, so long as they are divided into those on one side or another of an iron curtain, those who are at peace or at war, or, indeed, those who use hard currency or soft cur­ rency. Isolation is out of date. Failure to end these divisions would bring disaster. Let us turn to the basic objectives of the settlement we have met here to discuss. They can be put briefly: First, the settlement must guarantee security against aggression; peacemaking nations must never again feel either the threat or the fact of Japanese aggres­ sion. Secondly, there must be the earliest possible restoration of

Far East and South-East Asia 281

conditions which will permit the extension of commerce and will foster economic construction and recovery in the Far East. Desperate situations sometimes call for desperate measures, but we should not allow ourselves to be misled into thinking that a con­ tinuation of a division of the world into friends and enemies, free people and slaves, those who can trade and those who may not trade, will lead to anything but depression, poverty and unem­ ployment at home, with fear and insecurity stalking abroad. The settlement with which we are concerned is one means of tackling the problem of catching up with the reality that this is, in fact, one world. This is a Conference of members of the free communities whose voluntary association together makes up the British Common­ wealth of Nations. “Free institutions are its lifeblood, free co­ operation is its instruments.” The fact that we share similar tradi­ tions and institutions lead us to have similar views on many sub­ jects. We speak each other’s language - or we think we do. We recognise each other’s right to have his own views. No one has stated that more forcibly than Dr. Evatt has done. The Conference should be useful in giving us an opportunity to exchange views in a free and non-committal way. I daresay that no one here is in a position, even if he so desired, to commit his government to a course of action until an opportunity has been given to hear the views of other nations with interests in the Pacific. That is the position of members of the Canadian Delegation, and I assume that is the position of other delegates also . . . .

3. SOVIET ATTITUDE ON PROCEDURES Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent (CHCD, April 29, 1948, p. 3441). As far as peace with Japan is concerned, the views of the Can­ adian government have already been made clear in the review which I gave the House on December 19 of the discussions which had taken place with regard to a Japanese peace conference. It has since then been made clear that the U.S.S.R. seeks to prevent countries other than the great powers from participating in any effective manner in preparing the Japanese treaty, and that pro­ cedures similar to those advocated by the U.S.S.R. for the peace settlement in Europe, should, in the Soviet view, be adopted for Asia. These proposals we of course regard as unacceptable. It is the view of the Canadian government that an equitable settlement in the far east, reflecting the views of all the principally interested states, can be prepared only in a broadly representative confer­ ence where one or two countries do not have the power to block

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the wishes of the great majority. It is also the view of the Canadian government that the immediate menace of communism in the far east should not be met by the restoration of Japan to a position of such power that she can once again become a threat to peace.

4. COMMENT ON THE TREATY* Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson (extracts) (CHCD, April , 1952, pp. 1298-1301).

8

The treaty is a generous one. It has been represented by one of its main architects as a treaty of reconciliation, and that, I think, is what it is. Last October, when we were discussing this matter I referred to it as a good treaty, and I still believe it is a good treaty. It is, of course, not a perfect one, but I doubt if we had had months of discussion at San Francisco that we would have made it a better one. It restores Japanese sovereignty, but that sovereignty will be confined to the four main islands of the Japanese empire. It places no restrictions on Japan’s economy or on Japan’s ability to defend itself. Most important of all, the treaty sets Japan free to pursue a peaceful destiny, as we all must hope, and gives her an opportunity to contribute to the security and stability of the whole Pacific area. The treaty was negotiated, as I explained last October, through diplomatic channels rather than through the more normal confer­ ence procedure. That was unusual procedure admittedly, but it was one which was made necessary by the circumstances. As early as 1947, the United States government had proposed to its allies a conference for the signing of the Japanese peace treaty in the usual way. This procedure was impossible because of the attitude taken at that time and subsequently by the Soviet union, which insisted that any such treaty should be negotiated not by a confer­ ence where all those who participated in the war against Japan would be present, but in the presence of the council of foreign ministers which would have given the U.S.S.R. and other mem­ bers of the council a veto. To avoid this procedure and the use of the veto in this connec­ tion, in September 1950 I believe it was the President of the United States initiated diplomatic discussions with the other countries represented on the Far Eastern commission with a view to negotiation by such discussion of a treaty, the final text of which we have before us today. The Canadian government participated in those discussions and was given ample opportunity to express its opinions on the various drafts as they were presented. These ‘ Text in CTS, 1952/4.

Far East and South-East Asia 283

opinions of ours were not always accepted, Mr. Speaker, but the text which we have before us now does not represent the com­ plete views of any one country which participated in those dis­ cussions, and is essentially a compromise document. The Soviet union was kept fully informed of these discussions while they took place, but contributed little to them except abuse. When the conference was called in San Francisco to put the finishing touches on this process, not to negotiate a treaty but to sign one and go over the text of the draft which we have before us, the Soviet union and its satellite states were represented. As hon. members know, they refused, as indeed some other countries refused, to sign the draft. The territorial adjustments are outlined in the treaty. The Potsdam proclamation . . . provided that Japanese sovereignty would be limited to the four major islands and such minor islands as the allied powers would determine. Chapter II of the peace treaty carries out those surrender terms. Japan renounces all rights, title and claim to Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores, the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin. In addition she renounces any rights she had with respect to the islands which she had under the terms of a league of nations mandate. Under article 3 of the treaty Japan retains residual sovereignty in the Ryukyu islands and other islands to the south and southeast of Japan which were after the surrender of Japan under United States administration. Japan has agreed to concur in any proposal to place those islands under United Nations trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority. It might have been better, and it certainly would have been neater, if the final disposition of the former Japanese territories had been defined precisely in the treaty, but it was not possible for the allied powers to reach agreement on this score. It was decided, therefore, in order that the peace treaty should not be further delayed, to have Japan simply renounce her rights in these territories, as she was required to do, and to leave to future inter­ national agreement the final disposition of the territories in question - including, incidentally, Formosa. In addition to our general Canadian interest in a peace settle­ ment which would return Japan to normal and friendly relations with the free world, Canada had certain special concerns which were made known at every stage of the negotiations and indeed at San Francisco itself. My colleague the Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Mayhew), who was with me at the San Francisco conference, gave the house a full account on March 11 last of the - as we think it to be - successful agreement on North Pacific fisheries which was reached with Japan and the United States in December of last year. Under article 9 of the treaty of peace Japan undertook to

284 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so de­ siring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.

'

The promptness with which Japan entered into these negotia­ tions is, I think, an encouraging evidence of Japan’s interest in living up to the trust which has been placed in her by this treaty of peace. I think it is also a good sign for future CanadianJapanese relations which will be entering a new chapter when this treaty is ratified. I do not intend to go into the substance of this convention since the house has already been given the details concerning it by my colleague the Minister of Fisheries. I would remind the house, however, that until the peace treaty comes into.effect Japan will not be in a position to sign the fisheries convention. We can, therefore, by ratifying the peace treaty, assist in enabling Japan to sign and ratify this important convention. A further question in which Canada was especially interested was that of Japan’s undertaking with respect to commercial prac­ tices and agreements. I made clear the views of the Canadian government on this important matter in my statement in San Francisco. Possibly it would be desirable if I now put on the record what I then said. A t the San Francisco conference I said: Japan agrees in the treaty to conform to internationally accepted fair trade practices. It is the confident hope of my government that Japan, in the future conduct of its commercial relations with other countries, will avoid certain pre-war prac­ tices which were widely condemned at that time by other trading nations. Canada has no wish to see any discrimination against or any unnecessary obstacles to normal Japanese trade. On the contrary, as a trading nation ourselves we wish to see Japan develop its full trading possibilities. It is only common sense for us to wish for a prosperous rather than a poor Japan. Such prosperity, however, can never, in the long run, be estab­ lished or even assisted by trading practices considered unfair by other countries and against which those countries have no alternative but to protect themselves if unhappily they should be adopted. The peace treaty itself, as hon. members no doubt know, is not designed to settle questions of commercial policy but leaves this policy to be decided by the individual signatories of the treaty and Japan. Canadian attitudes and Canadian policy with respect to future commercial relations with Japan will, to a large extent, be influenced by whether or not Japan adheres to the declaration made in the preamble to the treaty of her intention, and I quote from that preamble:

Far East and South-East Asia 285

. . . in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices. Another important section of the treaty deals with reparations. Critics of the treaty of peace in some countries have concentrated their attentions on the reparations clauses which represent an attempt to make this treaty an important step toward breaking the vicious cycle of “war-victory-peace-war.” The allied powers recognize in the treaty that Japan should in principle pay repara­ tions for the devastation and suffering she caused during the war. They recognize in addition, however, that Japan lacks the physical capacity to recompense her former victims if at the same time she is to achieve a viable economy and contribute to the economic health of the Pacific area. For certain nations represented at San Francisco, who had not only lost property valued in billions of dollars but also countless lives, as a result of Japan’s military activities, the very limited reparations clauses could not but appear unsatisfactory. For others it was easier to understand that the exaction of even just reparations might impose such an economic burden on the defeated state as to vitiate the objectives of the treaty as a whole. In the treaty Japan undertook to compensate those allied powers whose territories she had occupied, and I quote from article 14 of the treaty: . . . by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work. Negotiations are already under way at the present time on this matter between Japan and Indonesia and Japan and the Philip­ pines. Japan further agreed in the treaty to make available certain of her assets to indemnify members of the allied forces who had suffered undue hardships while prisoners of war of Japan. This matter is covered in article 16. The details of this scheme are at the present time being worked out between the allied govern­ ments concerned and the international committee of the Red Cross which is to be responsible for the distribution of the funds in question. Finally, the treaty provides that Japan shall return all allied property which she held during the war years upon application to be made within nine months of the coming into force of the treaty. A highly important section of the treaty deals with security. Under article 5 of the treaty Japan undertakes to settle its inter­ national disputes by peaceful means, to refrain in its international relations from the threat or the use of force and to give the United Nations every assistance in action taken in accordance with the charter. In return, the allied powers recognize Japan’s sovereign right of individual or collective self-defence. Article provides for the termination of the occupation not

6

286 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

later than 90 days after the treaty comes into force. However, it is stated explicitly in the treaty that there is nothing in this pro­ vision to prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japan under the terms of any agreement made between Japan and one or more of the allied powers. The peace treaty simply recognizes for Japan the principle which article 51 of the charter of the United Nations recognizes for all sovereign states. Hence, on the very day of the signature of the peace treaty, a security treaty between the United States and Japan was signed under the terms of which Japan granted to the United States the right, upon the coming into force of the treaty of peace, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. That is an exceedingly important provision. These forces are to be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the F ar East and indeed to the security of Japan itself against an armed attack. A United States-Japan adminis­ trative agreement implementing this security treaty was signed last month in Tokyo . . . .

5. TH E FISHERIES CONVENTION* Statement by the Minister of Fisheries, Mr. R. W. Mayhew (CHCD, March 11, 1952, pp. 312-14). For some time it was thought that there would be something in the peace treaty with Japan referring to fisheries, not only on the west coast of Canada, but in other parts of the Pacific as well. Early in the spring of 1951, the deputy minister, Mr. Stewart Bates, and I were invited to Washington to discuss with Mr. John Foster Dulles this problem. Soon after we met him and began talking about the problem we were convinced that an attempt to include a fishery agreement in the peace treaty itself would mean endless work and delay. It would mean a separate agreement be­ tween Japan and all our allies, particularly in the Pacific. We were convinced after our talk with Mr. Dulles that he was right and that our best plan was to work out a separate fisheries agreement. Again after a great deal of consideration and after discussing it with the fishing industry and fishermen of the west coast, it was thought that a tripartite agreement with Japan and the United States and Canada was the only really sensible sort of agreement. His Excellency the prime minister of J&pan had already indicated by letter to Mr. Dulles that he would enter into a fisheries agree­ ment with us and other nations promptly after the signing of the main peace treaty . . . . I think it is advisable for me at this point to indicate why an ♦For text of Convention see CTS 1953/3.

Far East and South-East Asia 287

agreement of any sort was necessary. Those living on the Pacific coast have for a good many years been very deeply concerned about the danger of Japanese fishermen coming to British Colum­ bia to fish our salmon, halibut and herring. The Japanese expedi­ tion to Bristol Bay before the war demonstrated that this was possible and that they were actually thinking along this line. This trip also created a great deal of resentment against the Japanese fishermen. While the Japanese fishermen had never fished along our coast, yet there was no reason why they could not, and very sound reasons as to why they would do it. For many years Japan has been the leading country in the world as far as fisheries are concerned, taking first place in the volume of her catch before the second world war. In addition to that, Japan needs what she gets from the sea to feed her people, probably more than any other nation. I understand that about eighty per cent of her protein is harvested from the sea. She also needs some of the other valuable species such as salmon and tuna for export purposes, and her fisheries have been considerably reduced as a result of the recent war, since Russia is now in command of the very valuable salmon fisheries formerly enjoyed by her. It was therefore necessary, if we wanted to add stability and security to the fishing industry on the British Columbia coast, to make some agreement with Japan. The basis of this agreement involved two questions of principle which were difficult to reconcile: the right of all nations to the freedom of the seas and the reverse of that, to restrict Japan from fishing near Canadian or American shores. However, the solution to the problem was readily available. Canada and the United States both have a long history of conservation of certain species salmon, halibut and herring - and it is quite true to say that these fisheries would probably have been lost to the world’s food supply had we not over the years taken very rigid conservation methods. For many years we have restricted our fishermen as to the time they could commence seasonal fishing, when they would cease fishing, restricting all fishing for two or three days a week, regu­ lating the length of their nets and the size of the mesh, and on many occasions leaving idle fishing gear and plants while these regulations were being applied. In addition to that, the govern­ ment of Canada has spent large sums of money year after year for the scientific study of these species. Industries locating on our rivers were obliged to prevent pollution and to construct, at their own expense, dams and fishways to meet our regulations in order to provide easy ascent to the spawning grounds and safety in the spawning grounds. Likewise, the taxpayers of Canada have paid for both river and sea patrols to see that these regulations were carried out. We have also made international agreements between the United States and Canada for the conservation and propaga­ tion of the sockeye salmon on the Fraser river as well as for the halibut fishery, so that Canada as a whole, and the fishermen and

288 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

fishing industry of British Columbia in particular, had a capital investment in the three species - salmon, halibut and herring. The fact that we had been doing this work for years made it compara­ tively easy and gave us a reasonable argument to use with Japan as to why they should waive their rights, not to the freedom of the high seas, but to fish these species in the waters of the east Pacific. In gaining this concession, we obtained for the fishing industry of British Columbia what it has been most anxious to obtain and what it has been insisting on for some years. It was obtained not as a punitive measure nor because Japan was a defeated nation. It was obtained because it was a reasonable and fair request to make, one that in the same circumstances we would be ready to grant to any other nation in the Pacific. Some of those who are opposing this agreement, and I believe others who are not opposing it but have not given it very serious consideration have asked the question, and I might say we have asked the question ourselves - why not just a simple agreement between Japan and Canada, each agreeing not to fish within a certain radius or area of each other’s shore line? That sounds very simple and I am sure quite reasonable to a lot of people. But I would ask you to take just a second look at it. If you do you will see that such an agreement would mean the zoning of the Pacific ocean. Both Japan and ourselves would have to enter into separate agreements with other nations on a similar basis, and what would be the result? . . . You would probably be surprised to know that the mileage of the coast line of Japan is approximately five times that of the coast line of British Columbia from point to point. If the whole of the Pacific area was divided up as suggested, Canada would suffer since she has one of the shortest shore lines of any country in the Pacific basin. Others claim that this is by no means a perfect agreement as far as Canada and the United States are concerned. With that we agree, because it is not an agreement with the United States at all. It has not changed our relationship with the United States and we enjoy all the rights and privileges that we have ever had with that country. This is expressly stated in our agreement, and in this agreement we used the same wording as was used previously in the convention for the northwest Atlantic fisheries. I quote: Nothing in this convention shall be deemed to affect ad­ versely the claims of any contracting party in regard to the limits of territorial waters or to the jurisdiction of a coastal state over fisheries. We have made no concession whatever to the United States. However, the United States and Japan realized and so stated that the stocks of fish on the North American coast are so inter­ mingled that it would be impossible to segregate them in any way

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that would be practical of administration. Therefore the confer­ ence agreed that under no condition would Canada and the United States be asked to abstain from fishing any species of fish from and including the gulf of Alaska southward to the gulf of Mexico. That is a recognition which is very valuable to the Can­ adian fisherman . . . . In this agreement we have established a principle that can easily be applied to a fourth, fifth or any other number of nations that want to accept it. I cannot say that this has been secured without cost. It has been secured at the cost of many millions of dollars, the millions of dollars which we have spent in conserva­ tion in the past, but it is certainly costing us no additional money or rights at this time. In that connection, if we had not been engaged in conservation and propagation on the west coast we would not have had this basis for asking the Japanese to waive any rights. T hat is the only cost. There is no new cost. All three countries are firmly convinced that the conservation of the fish­ eries on the high seas is a necessity, and that more and more the nations of the world will come to depend on the sea for more of their food. This agreement will allow the maximum of exploita­ tion and at the same time a sustained yield of fish.

6. THE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN* Statement by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. C. D. Howe (CHCD, May 12, 1954, pp. 4648-50). Japan has already become our third largest customer. It seems probable that Japan will continue in the future to increase in importance as a market for our exports . . . . This new agreement provides, among other things, for the exchange of most-favoured-nation treatment. This is the normal and established treatment which we extend to other friendly countries with which we trade. Quite clearly, we could not con­ tinue for much longer to withhold most-favoured-nation treat­ ment from a country such as Japan, which is one of our largest customers. In recent years we have been imposing the high rates of our general tariff upon imports from Japan. In consequence, we have imported very little from there, even though we have been selling large and increasing amounts of our exports to that coun­ try. It has become more and more difficult in these circumstances to justify the fact that we were not extending most-favoured­ *For text of Agreement, see CTS, 1954/3.

290 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

nation treatment to Japan. In the new trade agreement we are now proposing to correct this anom aly.. . . In negotiating this new agreement, we set out to obtain and consolidate advantages in the Japanese market, and at the same time to safeguard in a reasonable way the position of our own Canadian manufacturers in our home market. The negotiations were carried on in Ottawa, over a considerable period of time, with representatives of the Japanese government. A t each stage, the various aspects were given careful consideration by my cabinet colleagues and myself. The negotiations were recently concluded in a friendly way and both sides regarded the results as satisfactory. Good trade relations and effective trade agree­ ments are based on the willingness of countries to recognize each other’s difficulties. They are based also on the desire to make well-balanced arrangements which will operate to the advantage of all concerned. Let me give a short outline of the essential features of the agreement, and I will then go into some explanatory details. Briefly, there are three important ways in which this agreement will facilitate the access of Canadian goods to the Japanese market. In the first place, our exports will be guaranteed mostfavoured-nation treatment in Japan. Secondly, we will be assured that there will be no discrimination whatsoever against Canada and in favour of any other hard currency country with respect to quantitative restrictions, exchange controls, or any other mat­ ters. Thirdly, with respect to a list of nine important Canadian export products, Japan undertakes not to discriminate against Canada in favour of any other country regardless of its currency position. This list of products includes wheat, barley, woodpulp, flaxseed, primary copper, lead in pigs, zinc spelter, synthe­ tic resins and milk powders. These are all very important con­ cessions to have received. I shall return to these points a little later, to explain them more fully. On our side, we undertake to make certain concessions to Japan. The agreement provides that Canada will extend mostfavoured-nation treatment to Japanese goods. This means that imports from Japan will be entered under our most-favoured­ nation rates of duty, which are generally applicable to the non­ commonwealth countries with which we trade. This will involve reductions in the duties on imports from Japan, which have hitherto been subject to the much higher rates set forth in our general tariff. It is, of course, to be predicted that imports from Japan will increase under these new arrangements . . . . Canadian imports from Japan have increased in value as compared with pre-war years, but they are still relatively small. Last year, they included a range of items such as iron and steel, toys, oranges, pottery and chinaware, silk and other fabrics, tuna

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fish and a variety of manufactured products. Only in two items did our imports from Japan amount to as much as $1 million. Aside from these items, the value of individual import items from Japan was in each case considerably below a half million dollars. . . . In case injurious competition should materialize for particular Canadian industries out of such imports, careful safeguards have been provided in the agreement. We have been mindful of the fact that a sudden influx of low-priced imports might seriously affect some particular Canadian industry. In the agreement Canada therefore reserves the right to apply special duties on Japanese goods in legitimate cases of emergency where, as a result of increased imports, there is a serious threat of injury to domes­ tic producers. I hope, however, that Canadian trade with Japan will develop in such a way as not to create serious problems for Canadian industry, Japan, like ourselves, is vitally dependent on foreign trade. The Japanese government is no doubt fully aware of the fact that no lasting trade relations can be built up except on the basis of mutual good will and of adherence to fair trade prac­ tices. It is reasonable to expcct that Japanese exporters will try to avoid creating problems which would undermine good re­ lations. Japan has in recent years instituted a comprehensive system of control and inspection for its exports, in a positive effort to prevent dumping of goods, misrepresentation of trade marks and patents and other undesirable methods, and to abide by internationally accepted fair trade practices . . . . In fact, Japan, with her 85 million population and with her highly developed industries, is one of the world’s largest markets for foodstuffs and raw materials, and for other products which we can supply. The maintenance of high levels of exports of these products is of fundamental importance to the whole Canadian economy. It is of,direct benefit to our agriculture, our forest and our mining industries. By contributing to a buoyant economy and a prosperous domestic market in Canada, it is of vital importance to our own manufacturing industries which sell their products in the Canadian market. We have no monopoly on the supply of such products, of course, and other countries are also anxious to expand their share of the Japanese market. Ratification of our agreement should open a new era of fruit­ ful trade relations between Canada and Japan. Our two economies are to a large degree complementary and have much to gain from close and constructive co-operation. We are happy^ to play our part in helping Japan to take her place as a partner’in the world trading community.

292 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

B . K o re a ' ~ For centuries Korea was a vassal state of China, although China interfered little in its internal affairs. With the advance of Russia to the Pacific in the late eighteenth century and the rise of Japan in the late nineteenth, Korea became the focus of rivalry among the three powers. Control of Korea was the basic issue of the SinoJapanese War of 1894-5; at its close China was compelled to recog­ nize the “independence” of Korea with Japan as its protector. Rivalry between Japan and Russia for economic concessions and control followed and the refusal of Russia to recognize Japan’s hegemony over Korea became in turn a basic issue of the RussoJapanese War of 1905. In the Treaty of Portsmouth which ended the War, Russia recognized Japan’s paramount interest in Korea, and Korea’s independence became a polite fiction. It was formally annexed by Japan in 1910. The Cairo Declaration of December 1943, issued by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek declared “The . . . three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea are determined that in due course Korea shall be free and independent.” The three powers also undertook to ensure the future security, independence and economic well-being of Korea. This pledge was re-affirmed by the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, and subscribed to by the U.S.S.R. when it entered the war against Japan. A t the close of hostilities Korea was occupied jointly by American and Soviet forces, Russian forces occupying the North and Americans the South, with the 38 th parallel as the agreed dividing line between them. A t the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in Decem­ ber, 1945, a four-power trusteeship was planned for Korea and a joint United States-Soviet Commission was set up to work out plans. The Commission, however, was unable to agree and the temporary division of Korea along the 38th parallel continued. Since no progress was being made by direct negotiations, the United States brought the issue of Korean independence to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1947 and proposed

1 F o r further reading see: Keirstead, B. S., Canada in World Affairs 1951-53; Harrison, W. E. C., Canada in World Affairs 1949-50', M asters, D. C., Canada in World Affairs 1953-55', D E A Canada and the Korean Crisis (O ttaw a, 1950); D E A Documents on the Korean Crisis (O ttaw a, 1951).

Far East and South-East Asia 293

that elections should be held throughout all Korea under u.N. auspices not later than March 31, 1948, as a step towards the establishment of a national government and the independence of Korea. The Soviet government countered with a proposal that both United States and Soviet forces should be withdrawn in order that the Korean people might establish a national government. The General Assembly, however, decided to establish a Temporary United Nations Commission which was to go to Korea to ensure that the elections were not being controlled by the military author­ ities. Canada had not been consulted about the war-time and post­ war arrangements but was involved as a member of the United Nations and accepted membership on the Temporary Commission The Commission, as was widely expected, was refused admission to the communist-occupied area north of the 38th parallel, but it was decided that the Commission should observe and report on elections held in the zone occupied by the United States. Canada, however, dissented on the grounds that such action was contrary to the instructions of the General Assembly of the United Nations which had established the Commission. Elections were held in South Korea on May 10, 1948, and the Commission shortly there­ after declared that the result was a valid expression of the free will of the electorate. A government based on the newly-elected as­ sembly was speedily formed and was promptly recognized by the United States, China, the Philippines and by several other members of the United Nations. The new government, which was duly recog­ nized by the United Nations Assembly as the lawfully constituted government of the Republic of Korea, applied for membership in the United Nations, but the application was vetoed by the U.S.S.R. Meantime, the U.S.S.R. had announced that an election had been held in the Soviet zone and that a government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had been established. There were now in fact two Koreas, although neither was prepared to accept the division as permanent. In December, 1948, the United Nations Assembly under United

.1

1 Membership on the Commission was apparently accepted on the responsibility of Mr. Ilsley, Minister of Justice, who was heading the Delegation to the General Assembly, and of Mr. St. Laurent, who was Acting Prime Minister in the absence of Mr. King, who later proved to be strongly opposed and endeavoured to have the decision reversed. Mr. King, however, acquiesced when Mr. St. Laurent suggested that the alternative was his own resignation. [Dale C. Thompson, Louis St. Laurent: Canadian (Toronto, 1967), pp. 221-4.]

2 9 4 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

States leadership resolved that a Commission should be established to continue the work of the temporary Commission, the membership of the new Commission to remain the same as the temporary Com­ mission. The Canadian Government, however, was reluctant to accept membership and on its initiative Canada and the Ukraine, which had been elected to the temporary Commission but had refused to serve, were dropped. The new Commission proceeded to Korea but served little practical purpose except to verify the depar­ ture of the United States troops, and later to report directly to the United Nations about aggression by North Korea. Offers of the Commission to the U.S.S.R. to observe the departure of Soviet troops from the Soviet zone were ignored, although it seems that they were virtually all withdrawn by the end of 1949. On June 25, 1950, South Korea was suddenly invaded on a large scale by North Korean forccs. The United States promptly informed the Secretary General of the United Nations and requested an emer­ gency meeting of the Security Council. When the Council met at 2:00 p.m. the same day, it had before it a telegram from the Korean Commission reporting on the situation. Russia was at the time boycotting the United Nations because it had not recognized the Communist Government of China and was thus unable to veto ac­ tion by the Security Council. The documents which follow continue the story. ~

7. THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPATION TO MEET AGGRESSION (a) Statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson (extracts) (CHCD, June 28, 1950, pp. 4251-3). Mr. Speaker, perhaps I might be permitted to report to the House on certain developments that have taken place in the last forty-eight hours with respect to the situation in Korea, and to outline the attitude of the Canadian Government. The House will recall that at its meeting on Sunday the Security Council of the United Nations termed the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea as a breach of the peace, and called upon the Communist forces to withdraw to the 38th parallel. It soon became apparent that this appeal would be without effect on the Communist government of North Korea. Their forces continued to advance on Seoul, the capital of Korea. The United Nations Commission on Korea reported that they were convinced that North Korea would pay no heed to the resolution of the Security Council.

Far Last and South-East Asia 295

When the Charter of the United Nations was drawn up, it was intended that such an act of aggression would be met by the dispatch of forces put at the disposal of the Security Council by member governments as the result of prior agreements. However, the Security Council has never been able to negotiate such agree­ ments, for reasons which I need not go into now. In these circum­ stances, with one link missing in the chain which has been designed to hold agression in check, it was impossible for the Security Council itself to take effective action to provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea. If help w’ere to be given, the respon­ sibility would have to be shouldered by individual members of the Security Council acting within the terras of the Charter, but on their own initiative. In this case the United States recognized a special responsibility which it discharged with admirable dispatch and decisiveness. As hon. members will know, President Truman yesterday an­ nounced that the United States would send air and sea forces to give the Korean Government’s troops cover and support. I feel sure that all members of the House will applaud and support this act of high courage and firm statesmanship on the part of the Government of the United States . . . . I should like to point out, if I may, that although the United States Government has taken this step on its own authority, it is acting not only in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations, but also in pursuance of the resolution which was adopted by the Security Council on Sunday. This resolution, it will be remembered, called on all members of the United Nations to render every assistance in regard to its execution. It should also be borne in mind that the United States has accepted responsibility generally for the maintenance of inter­ national peace and security in the Pacific area, and specifically for the maintenance of the security of Japan as the power respon­ sible under international agreements for the occupation of that country. Those specific responsibilities, as well as the respon­ sibilities which are shared by all of the members of the Security Council - and indeed by all members of the United Nations for maintenance of international peace and security have no doubt contributed to the decision by the United States to come at once to the aid of Korea. If any further international authoriza­ tion were needed for the prompt and vigorous action which has been taken by the United States, it has been provided by the further resolution of the Security Council which was passed last night recommending that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area concerned. That resolution was passed by a vote of seven in favour, one against, and two dele­

296 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

gations non-participating because they had not at that time re­ ceived instructions in regard to this matter . . . The Government of Yugoslavia, which had produced a reso­ lution of its own in this matter, voted against the United States resolution. The representatives of India and Egypt had not at that time last night received instructions. I understand they expect those instructions during the course of the day. The U.S.S.R., of course, took no part in the meeting, and the other delegations voted in favour of the resolution . . . . As hon. members know, Canada is not now a member of the Security Council and therefore no decision on our part was required yesterday in regard to this resolution; but I am sure that the House will support, as indeed does the Government, the action taken by the Security Council, because it represents col­ lective action through the United Nations for peace. It is the firm hope of the Canadian Government, as I am sure it is the firm hope of all members of this House and of the Canadian people, that this action which has now been taken by the Security Council and by the United States Government in conformity with the resolutions of the Security Council will soon end the war in Korea and thereby make possible a fresh attempt to compose the differences which have long kept that country in a state of tension and unrest, and which have led to the present outbreak of hostilities. (b) Comments of Private Members in Parliament (CHCD, June 28 and 29, 1950). Mr. John G. Diefenbaker1: The people of Canada will want to know whether it is the interpretation of the government that, if the United Nations asked for material or manpower assistance, our responsibility under the United Nations could be discharged by the government without parliament. They will want to know whether or not parliament will have to be reassembled. Mr. Howard C. Green-: It is impossible today for the security council to tell Canada what part she should play. This parliament should remember the unique position of Canada with regard to the United Kingdom and the United States. We are in a position such as is no other nation in the world with regard to these two great powers. We have the most friendly relationships with both of them, and in times of crisis like this we should be extremely careful to play our part so that that relationship will not be weakened in any way.

1 Progressive Conservative, (CHCD, p. 4390). 2 Progressive Conservative, (Ibid., p. 4398).

Far East and South-East Asia 297

Mr. Stanley H. Knowles3: The emphasis I urged yesterday and I repeat it today - is our complete support of the principle of collective security, and our readiness to carry our support of that principle into all it may involve. I am sure the Secretary of State for External Affairs is right when he says that the government has the concurrence of all groups in this house in its readiness to support action taken by the United Nations. That is clearly our obligation, and that way alone lies hope. . . . Mr. Solon E. Low i : The party that I represent and for whom I am now speaking will back the minister and the government in anything that they undertake to do to discharge Canada’s respon­ sibilities to the full in an effort to contain the trouble within Korea and to restore that republic to its former territory. Mr. Jean-Frangois Pouliot5: What are we going to do about it? What interest do we have in Korea? There may be a few Canadian missionaries of various denominations in that place, but how many Canadians are there in South Korea? If Canada is going to support the security council’s decision regarding Korea, what form will that support take? It could not be platonic; that is impossible because it is a serious matter. . . . Sir, there is another thing we should realize. It is that the United Nations has completely failed, and two of the big powers have decided to act independently of the security council on which they sit to help it give the lead to others. With all due respect I do not think the Canadian minister for external affairs should have communicated with the security council to ask them what to do. We are supposed to receive a call for help. It was not our duty to run after it. If they need us, let them say so. If they do not need us we shall be left alone - not alone in the sense of being abandoned, but alone in the sense of enjoying peace. Sir, the desires of all are for peace. I hope that the Canadian people will be in a position to breathe after the excitement about Korea is over. We need it because the Canadian people suffered so much during the last war. We should not get into it again on account of the stupidity of the men who are on the security coun­ cil, and who have been unable to prevent a situation like the one that exists. Mr. Maurice Boisverta: I want the committee to know that we from the province of Quebec will be like brothers with those from other provinces in our readiness to support the govem3 C.C.F., (Ibid., pp. 4385-6). * Social Credit, (Ibid., p. 4377). 8 Liberal, (Ibid., p. 4388). 0 Liberal, (Ibid., p. 4392).

298 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

ment and to make it strong in the presence of conditions which none of us want but which must be faced. (c) Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. L. S. St. Laurent (CHCD, June 30, 1950, p. 4459).

Mr. L. S. St. Laurent: Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a further brief report to the House with regard to our relationship to the present situation in Korea. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs [Mr. Pearson] said yesterday, our responsibility in this matter arises entirely from our membership in the United Nations and from our sup­ port of the resolution of the Security Council passed on Tuesday last, part of which reads as follows: The Security Council. . . Recommends that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. Any participation by Canada in carrying out the foregoing resolution - and I wish to emphasize this strongly - would not be participation in war against any state. It would be our part in ^ co llectiv e police action under the control and authority of the United Nations for the purpose of restoring peace to an area where an aggression has occurred as determined under the charter of the United Nations by the Security Council, which decision has been accepted by us. It is only in such circumstances that this country would be involved in action of this kind. The House, I think, has already approved this position. '— I would add, however, that if we are informed that a Canadian contribution to aid United Nations operations, under a United Nations commander, would be important to achieve the ends of peace, which is of course our only purpose, then the Government wishes Parliament to know that it would immediately consider making such a contribution. It might, for instance, take the form of destroyers to operate with other naval units of the United Nations, though our destroyers could not in any event reach Korean waters in less than about three weeks’ time, because after all it is more than six thousand miles from Esquimalt. Hon. members will recall that our naval units there were to proceed to European waters for summer exercises. These arrange­ ments will be suspended, and the move will now be made into western Pacific waters, where the ships would be closer to the area where they might be of assistance to the United Nations and Korea if such assistance were required. If the situation in Korea or elsewhere, after prorogation, should deteriorate and action by Canada beyond that which I have indicated should be con­ sidered, Parliament will immediately be summoned to give the new situation consideration.

Far East and South-East Asia 299

Meanwhile the Government, within the mandate which the atti­ tude of the House in the last two days has given it, will do its full duty, within the measure of its power and ability, as a member of the United Nations, in common with other members, to make the collective action of the United Nations effective, and to restore peace in Korea. 8. EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE ON CONTRIBUTION OF FORCES (a) Acting Permanent Delegate of Canada to the United Nations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations July 12, 1950 (DEA, Canada and the Korean Crisis, Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1950). With my letter to you dated June 30 I enclosed the text of a statement which was made by the Right Honourable Louis S. St. Laurent, Prime Minister of Canada, in the House of Commons in Ottawa on June 30. In the course of that statement Mr. St. Laurent declared that if we are informed that a Canadian contribution to aid United Nations operations under a United Nations Com­ mander would be important to achieve the ends of peace which is, of course, our only purpose, then the Government wishes Parliament to know that it would immediately consider making such a contribution. 2. General MacArthur has now been designated by the United States as the Commander of the forces of the United Nations for the defence of the Republic of Korea, in accordance with the Security Council’s resolution of the 7th of July. The Canadian Government has, furthermore, been informed that destroyers can be of assistance in United Nations operations for the defence of Korea. 3. Three Canadian destroyers sailed last week from the Pacific coast of Canada for western Pacific waters. These vessels are hereby made available to the United Nations and appropriate action is being taken by the Canadian Government to place them at once under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chicf of the forces made available by members of the United Nations for the defence of the Republic of Korea against the aggression committed by North Korean forces. 4. The Commanding Officer of these vessels is being instructed to report to the headquarters of General MacArthur and is being authorized to use the United Nations flag, in accordance with the Security Council’s resolution of the 7th of July. 5. It would be appreciated if you would bring this decision of the Canadian Government to the attention of General MacArthur as quickly as possible.

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(b) Telegram from Secretary-General to Acting Canadian Perma­ nent Delegate July 14,1950 I have the honour to acknowledge your reply of 12 July 1950 regarding the Security Council resolution of 27 June 1950 and wish to express my appreciation for the decision of the Canadian Government, under the terms of the resolution, to make avail­ able to the United Nations three Canadian destroyers which have sailed for Western Pacific waters. Your reply has been trans­ mitted to the Security Council, to the Government of the Repub­ lic of Korea, and to the Unified Command (USG). I have been informed that the Government of the United States which, under the resolution of 7 July 1950 has been given the responsibility for the Unified Command, is now prepared to engage in direct consultation with your Government with regard to the co-ordination of all assistance in a general plan for the attainment of the objectives set forth in the Security Council resolution. In this connection I have been advised that there is an urgent need for additional effective assistance. I should be grateful, therefore, if your Government would examine its capa­ city to provide an increased volume of combat forces, particularly ground forces. Offers of military assistance should be com­ municated to the Secretary-General in terms leaving detailed arrangements for subsequent agreements between your Govern­ ment and the Unified Command (USG). (c) Acting Permanent Delegate of Canada to the Secretary-General August 11,1950 I have the honour to refer to my message No. 29 of July 21, 1950 concerning additional Canadian assistance to the forces operating in Korea under the authority of the Security Council’s Resolution of June 27. In that message I informed you that the Canadian Government had decided to make available to the United Nations a long-range air transport squadron, including ground crews, of the Royal Canadian A ir Force, for assistance in the Pacific air-lift. I am instructed to inform you that the Canadian Government has now decided, with the co-operation of Canadian Pacific Air­ lines, to make available, at once, to the United Nations, the com­ plete passenger facilities of the regular Canadian commercial air service between Vancouver and Tokyo, operated by Canadian Pacific Airlines, on two flights a week west-bound and the equiva­ lent of one flight a week east-bound. The detailed arrangements for the participation of these air­ craft will be made with Unified Command established under the authority of the Security Council.

Far East and South-East Asia 301 (d) P erm a n en t R ep resen ta tive o f C anada to th e Secretary-G eneral A u g u s t 14, 1 9 5 0

The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada requested me, on my departure from Ottawa last week, to deliver to you immediately upon my arrival in New York the text of a statement of August 7, 1950, by the Prime Minister. You will observe that in the course of this statement Mr. St. Laurent announced that the Government had authorized the recruitment of an additional army brigade, to be known as the Canadian Army Special Force, which will be specially trained and equipped to be available, amongst other things, for use in carrying out Canada’s obligations under the United Nations Charter. The Prime Minister stated that this brigade would, subject to the approval of the Parliament of Canada, be available for service in Korea as part of the United Nations forces, if it can be most effectively used in that way when it is ready for service. I am enclosing for your information a full copy of the text of Mr. St. Laurent’s address on August 7. (e) Secretary-G en era l to the P erm anent R ep resen ta tive o f C anada A u g u s t 2 1 , 1950

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the communication of the Acting Permanent Representative of Canada dated 11th August 1950 and your own dated 14th August 1950 concerning additional effective assistance to the Unified Command (USG) in Korea. I wish to convey to you and through you to your Gov­ ernment my sincere appreciation of the further assistance pro­ vided by the Government of Canada by making available to the United Nations the complete passenger facilities of the regular Canadian Air Service between Vancouver and Tokyo and of the Canadian Government’s decision to authorize recruitment of an additional army brigade which will, subject to the approval of Par­ liament, be available for service in Korea as part of the United Nations Forces. Understand that detailed arrangements for the participation of the aircraft and for the use of the Canadian Army Special Force will be made with the Unified Command (USG). The text of your Government’s communications have been trans­ mitted to the Unified Command and the Security Council. 9. IMPLICATIONS OF AGGRESSION B roadcast o ver the C B C b y th e P rim e M inister, M r. L . S. S t. L aurent, A u g u st 7 ,1 9 5 0 (D E A , Canada a n d th e K o rea n Crisis, Ottawa: King’s

Printer, 1950).

I would like to talk to you tonight about recent serious inter­ national developments, and of the relationship of our country to

302 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

them. I am thinking - as you are - more particularly of the Com­ munist aggression in Korea. But we have to be even more con­ cerned with the menacing implications of this aggression. There was, of course, nothing really new about the Communist aggression in Korea: the same kind of thing had happened though not in the same way - over and over again since the end of the war in 1945. What was new was the prompt action of the United Nations, led by the United States, in resisting the Com­ munist attack on Korea. The action of the United Nations in Korea is not war; it is police action intended to prevent war by discouraging aggression. That is why Korea is so important to all of us who want to avoid another world war; and that is why the government at once pledged Canada’s support to the United Nations action in Korea . . . . It is going to be hard for nations hungering for peace and not yet recovered from six years of total war, once again to give first place to re-armament. But events force us to be realistic. If we are to avert the danger which threatens the free world, we must marshal and increase the resources available to resist aggression; we must build up military strength backed by industrial-strength; we must accept the economic and financial policies which will enable us to maintain our strength . . . . We in Canada took our stand with the United Nations against this Communist aggression. Three Canadian destroyers were at once despatched to Far Eastern waters, and placed under the United Nations command. And we know they are giving a good account of themselves. The government at once considered what other effective im­ mediate help Canada could give in response to the appeal to all the United Nations to contribute to the necessary collective strength. On the 19th of July I was able to announce that Canada was providing a long-range r . c . a . f . transport squadron for immediate service in the Pacific air-lift at a time when transport planes were urgently needed. As you know, the squadron is already engaged in that difficult and essential task. We decided at that time to announce only what we could do at once. As to future effective action, we have been giving urgent and constant consideration to every possibility. Everyone knows that ground troops trained and ready for immediate action with the existing United States forces would be of assistance. The government considered whether any part of the Canadian army should be despatched to Korea for immediate action. Having in mind other obligations for the employment of Canadian ground forces and the uncertainties of the whole world situation, we reached the conclusion that the despatch, at this

Far East and South-East Asia 303

stage, of existing first line elements of the Canadian army to the Korean theatre would not be warranted. I announced that de­ cision on July 19 and that remains the view of the government. Let me tell you why. Since our wartime forces were demo­ bilized we have not attempted to maintain, in the Canadian army, a fully trained expeditionary force available for immediate action outside Canada. We wanted to get the best value we could for the Canadian tax­ payers’ defence dollars; and for the army, the first requirements were for our immediate territorial defence and for a basic train­ ing establishment. We have developed an air-borne brigade group highly trained for operations in the North and designed to share in the immediate protection of this continent. We have also main­ tained an establishment for the rapid expansion of the Canadian army in the event of a general war. But, at this time, we have no expeditionary force in being. More­ over, before the aggression in Korea, no definite plans existed for the creation of a United Nations force. And that was certainly not the fault of Canada. As early as 1946 I myself stated to the assembly of the United Nations that the people of Canada were anxious to know what military contribution they would be expect­ ed to make to the international forces to be established under the United Nations Charter. But, in spite of its obligations under the Charter, the Soviet Union, by its wilful obstruction, prevented an international force from being set up. The action taken by the United Nations in respect of Korea is in fact its first effective attempt to organize an international force to stop aggression. In consequence, the government and the people of Canada were faced with two questions. First, how much and in what way should we contribute to the United Nations police action in Korea and, secondly, how much and in what way could we increase our ability to participate in other common efforts, either under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty. We have considered several possible courses. It was not too difficult to decide that some courses would certainly be unwise, but it has been much less easy to determine what positive course is likely to be most effective. I have already said we could not send the trained brigade group, or any worthwhile part of it, to Korea without dangerously weakening our own immediate defences. There has been talk of a United Nations Police Division of Volunteers and this may in time work out, and be of value for areas other than Korea. If and when such a division is formed along lines considered practicable, the government will recom­ mend appropriate Canadian participation. But we feel the present situation calls for something more

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immediate. The government has therefore authorized the recruit­ ment of an additional army brigade which is beginning on Wed­ nesday. This brigade will be known as the Canadian Army Special Force and it will be specially trained and equipped to be avail­ able for use in carrying out Canada’s obligations under the United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Pact. Naturally, this brigade will, subject to the approval of Parliament, be avail­ able for service in Korea as part of United Nations forces, if it can be most effectively used in that way when it is ready for service. The way in which it could be used in the United Nations force is being discussed with the Unified Command. F or this new brigade the army wants young men, physically fit, mentally alert, single or married, particularly, just as many vet­ erans of the Second World War as possible. The brigade will, of course, include infantry, artillery and other elements. The infantry units will be organized as second battalions of the Royal Cana­ dian Regiment, of the Princess Patricia’s and the Royal 22nd. The association of the new brigade with these historic regiments will have numerous advantages. In accordance with the policy announced on July 19, we are also pressing on with recruiting for the other active forces of the Army, for the Navy, and the Air Force which are all being expanded, and for the reserve forces which form such an import­ ant part of the defence system of Canada. We are accelerating the production of our new all-weather two-seater jet fighter, the c f - 1 0 0 , now known as the “Canuck.” Its tests have exceeded expectations. This week will see the test flight of the first of the f - 8 6 Sabres manufactured in Canada. We are greatly expanding our capacity to produce the Orenda jet engine. A t the same time, we are stepping up our production pro­ gramme for naval vessels, armament, ammunition, radar and other types of equipment. We are working in the closest co-operation with the United States to the end that our joint resources and facilities are put to the most effective use in the common defence effort. We have in Canada a capacity for defence production far greater than we need to meet our own defence requirements, heavily increased though these will be. We are looking forward confidently to an acceleration and an intensification of our joint production efforts. To this end, the Joint United States-Canada Industrial Mobilization Planning Committee is meeting in Ottawa tomorrow. On the closing day of the last session of Parliament, I said that if the situation in Korea or elsewhere should deteriorate and further action by Canada be considered, Parliament would be summoned. The situation in Korea has deteriorated, and the

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expansion and accelerating of our defence programme will require Parliamentary action. The government has, therefore, decided that Parliament should be summoned as soon as it is possible to gather the fuller information and to formulate the specific plans we will wish to lay before Parliament. It is now felt that the date is apt to be six or seven weeks hence, though naturally Parliament will be called earlier if it appears that an earlier meeting is re­ quired by international developments or would expedite effective action. 10. ISSUES DURING THE WAR (a) O n crossing th e 3 8 th parallel a n d on branding C o m m u n ist C hina a s a n aggressor - S ta te m e n t by th e Secretary o f State fo r E xtern a l A ffa irs, M r. L . B . Pearson (C H C D , February 2, 1951, pp. 55-60).

The decision to authorize the United Nations forces to cross that line [the 38 th parallel] could not be taken lightly, and it was not taken lightly. There were strong reasons at that time for giving such author­ ization. Although the North Korean forces had been badly de­ feated by General MacArthur’s skilful campaign, large elements had escaped, and those remnants could not be made harmless unless the United Nations commander had the opportunity of pursuing them into North Korea. If they were not overpowered, the risk would remain that, after they had regrouped and been re-equipped, they might once again fall on Southern Korea after the United Nations had been withdrawn. Moreover, as I have stated already on a number of occasions, the United Nations itself had passed resolutions in favour of a united and independent nation in Korea. The members of the Canadian delegation were impressed by these arguments, and by certain military information given to us, and we agreed, along with a great many other delegations, with the resolution proposed in the United Nations assembly authorizing the United Nations forces to take any action which was necessary to unify the whole of Korea. We, along with others, realized that risks would be involved, and efforts were made in the United Nations to reduce those risks to the minimum. For that purpose we proposed sending a mission which would have been the last appeal to the North Korean Government to give up the fight before the line had been crossed, but we were not successful in establishing communications for that purpose. After that line had once been crossed, the possibility of an early settlement depended on the campaign in North Korea itself. During the discussions which were had on the crossing of the parallel we had reason to believe that it was not the intention of

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the unified command to pursue the North Korean forces right up to the Manchurian border. We had reason to believe that a defen­ sive line could be established across the narrow waist of North Korea, and that the two northern provinces of Korea would be left, for the time being at least, as a kind of unoccupied frontier area. That scheme seemed sensible to us, and we hoped it could be carried out. With many other delegations, including indeed the delegation of the United States of America, we felt that very great care should be taken to avoid offering any unnecessary provocation to the Chinese government at Peking. At the same time we realized, on this and on other occasions, that the unified command was responsible for the operations of a force which was very largely composed of soldiers of the United States. That command and those soldiers were bearing the brunt of the responsibility and of the fighting, and they had the full right to make the military decisions within the limits of the authority given them by the United Nations. When those decisions turned out well, we all rejoiced with them. When they were wrong, I think it would have been improper and ungrateful to be unfairly critical and empha­ size our own lack of responsibility. However, all of us who sup­ ported the action of the United Nations in Korea had not only the right but the duty to make our views known to the Unified Command through the positions we took at Lake Success, and also through our contacts with the United States delegation there. In this connection it will be recalled that on October 5 last the foreign minister of the Chinese people’s government, Mr. Chou En-lai, stated that his government would not stand aside if the United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel. That warning came to us through the Indian ambassador in Peking. We ourselves did not think it a sufficient reason for refusing the United Nations commander permission to complete the task which had been assigned to him; but many delegations, including our own, consider it to be a good reason for conducting military operations in North Korea, with, shall I say, great circumspection. So when we began to receive indications that it was intended to carry the campaign to the Yalu river, we ex­ pressed our misgivings confidentially to the United States authori­ ties in Washington as early as November 6. It may also be re­ called that I publicly made clear the position of the government on this matter when I spoke in Windsor on November 15. On that occasion, after stating that the marches where the free world rubbed together with the Soviet world were obviously the most critical points, I went on to voice this hope: T h o se prim arily responsible fo r safeguarding the security of such areas o f th e w orld should c arry o u t th eir m ission in as ste ad y a n d unpro v o cativ e a w ay as possible.

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In keeping with this point of view we supported, in private discussions at the United Nations, the proposal that a buffer state should be left along the northern boundary of Korea in order to avoid giving any excuse for suspicion on the part of the Chinese government that its legitimate interests might be in danger. . . . During the time that [the] cease-fire discussions were going on, proposals to name the Chinese communists formally in the United Nations as aggressors had remained in abeyance. As soon as the first reply, that of January 17, was received from Peking, the United States, considering that reply to be wholly unsatisfac­ tory, pressed the other members of the United Nations to pro­ ceed without delay with such condemnatory action. T hat pre­ sented our delegation with the fourth and final issue of critical importance about which I wish to say something, especially in view of the amendment to the address in reply submitted yester­ day by the leader of the c . c . f . party. We felt at that time, as in­ deed the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar [Mr. Coldwell] said yesterday, that the passage of such a formal resolution of con­ demnation in the United Nations at that particular moment, when we had just received the second reply from Peking, would be both premature and unwise. If it were not followed by some action against China, it would throw into high relief the sharp limitations of United Nations’ resolutions. On the other hand, if it were followed by the imposition of sanctions, however modest, against China, the risk of the west becoming involved in a war with China would be increased; and we were and are determined, along with other delegations, to do everything we can to prevent a war with China, whether limited or unlimited. We were all also loath at that moment to support a formal condemnation of China in the United Nations because we felt that the clarification which had come from Peking afforded some possibility of satisfactory nego­ tiation with that regime. There was also a real danger at that time that a resolution of condemnation in the United Nations, in the terms of the United States’ resolution as it stood at that time, would unnecessarily highlight and exaggerate differences of view between the Asians and the western members of the free world and indeed bring about a formal division between the members of the western world in the United Nations. Nevertheless there could be no doubt that the Chinese communists had engaged in aggression and had attacked the forces of the United Nations; and in the last resort we could not refuse, as I saw it, to recognize that situation in a resolution of condemnation if that resolution were pressed to a vote, if it stated the actual position fairly, if it were not couched in unnecessarily provocative terms, and if it included within it provision for negotiation. In all of my discussions with the Indian delegate at the United Nations - and I have had a great many with him in the last two or three weeks - I made that

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position perfectly clear to him; and he at no time was under any misunderstanding or misapprehension about the Canadian posi­ tion. Last week we had two resolutions before us at the United Nations. . . . The second resolution was submitted by the United States. We had been unsuccessful in our efforts to secure postponement of that resolution. We had been successful in our efforts to get that resolution changed and also to get it clarified and interpreted by the United States delegate, which interpretation removed most of the doubts we had had with regard to it at the beginning. Our first objective, postponement, was not successful. Our second objective, to get the proper kind of resolution voted on, I think was reasonably successful. We were anxious to make clear be. yond any possibility of doubt that any resolution which the United Nations passed on this subject would be exceedingly clear indeed on the following points. We were anxious that it would not establish any new aggression but would emphasize that the Chinese Government at Peking had merely participated in an old aggression and therefore was guilty of that but not of starting a new aggression in any other part of Korea. We were also anxious that the paragraph of condemnation should be couched in un­ provocative terms, and it was. That paragraph does not brand anybody as an aggressor. It is a finding of fact that, by assisting the aggressors in Korea and by invading North Korea from China, the people’s government in Peking had itself engaged in aggres­ sion. That was a finding of fact which we certainly could not deny. The third point we were anxious to make clear was that the collective measures committee set up by this resolution and as to which many delegations had grave doubts, would not be a vehicle for rash and unwise action but might indeed become a brake on such action; and that this collective measures committee, far from jumping into resolutions and reports on sanctions at once, should not even report to the United Nations general assembly as long as there was any possibility of the good offices committee completing its work satisfactorily. That was made clear by an amendment to the United States’ resolution proposed by the dele­ gate for Lebanon. Fourth, we were anxious to make it quite clear in this resolution that the work of mediation and conciliation could go on after the resolution passed, and indeed that that work would be given priority over any enforcement. We wanted to make it clear beyond doubt that, so far as the United Nations was concerned, we had not slammed any doors on anybody. And then finally we want to make it quite clear that this resolution did not give anybody any authority to take any action which he did not already possess. It certainly does not give the United Nations, or any agent of the United Nations in Asia, any power or right to

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use United Nations forces to liberate Asia from communism. The mandate of the United Nations in this operation remains the same, namely, to defeat aggression in Korea, and nothing else----Having had these amendments put forward, and having re­ ceived these clarifications from the United States delegation, which removed most of our doubts, we fe lt. . . that to vote against this resolution, or to abstain in regard to it, would have been to refuse to accept as true the statement that the Chinese govern­ ment had participated in aggression - something we had no right to do without denying the justice of United Nations action in Korea. Furthermore, it would have meant breaking the unity of the western nations on an issue of timing and tactics. We did not take that course. We voted for the resolution, and I think we were right in doing so. Forty-four other countries, including every member of the north Atlantic alliance, agreed with us. (b) L im ite d m ilita ry o b jectives a n d th e position o f F orm osa - Sta te­ m e n t b y the S ecreta ry o f S ta te fo r E xtern a l A ffa irs, M r. L . B . Pearson (C H C D , May 7, 1951, pp. 2755-6).

Since the United Nations objective in Korea, then, is to defeat aggression, it follows, I think, that the methods used should be designed to limit and localize the conflict and not to spread it. As long ago as August 31, 1 9 5 0 ,1 said in this house that it was not the purpose of this government to support any course of policy which would extend the scope of the present conflict in Korea, a conflict which should be confined and localized if it is in our power to do that; also that United Nations policy should be to avoid giving anyone else an excuse for extending the conflict. Mr. Speaker, that is still our view. One way by which the conflict could be spread would be by authorizing the United Nations commander in Korea to conduct aerial bombing of China. As I said on April 26 last in the house, it is possible to visualize a situation in which immediate retalia­ tory action without prior consultation might be unavoidable in pursuing enemy bombers back to, and in attempting to destroy, the Manchurian air bases from which they came. It is our view, however, that the bombing, as well as the blockading, of China should, if at all possible, be avoided, since such action would in­ volve grave risk of extending the fighting without, as we see it, any corresponding assurance that such extension would end the war. The history, the position, the social and economic organiza­ tion, and the political situation in China would not seem to give much hope for any such decisive result from such limited action. Indeed, it may be felt, on the contrary, that this limited action which has been suggested would inevitably develop into unlimited action against China, about the possible result of which the

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Japanese perhaps are best fitted to give testimony. One result we can, however, expect with some certainty, and that is great satis­ faction in Moscow over such a development. It may be that the Chinese communists, by indulging in massive air activity over Korea, will make some kind of retaliation necessary. They have, however, not yet taken such action, and in that sense have not yet conducted an all-out war against the United Nations forces in Korea. As General Bradley put it in an address in Chicago on April 17: Communist air intervention has not been a factor in the ground action to date. Neither has it been any serious threat to our air force. If the Chinese communists change that situation, the responsi­ bility for the consequence would rest entirely with them and not with the United Nations forces. I am, of course, Mr. Speaker, aware that this policy of restraint in which all the governments who have forces in Korea concur to the best of my knowledge, may complicate the problems facing the United Nations commanders in Korea. These problems, how­ ever, in the opinion of many, would be immensely more compli­ cated if the fighting were extended to China. The question, I think, above all other questions at the moment, is, in short, whether aerial bombardment of points in China, together with a naval blockade and the removal of all restrictions from Chinese forces in Formosa, would be sufficient to bring China’s participation in the war in Korea to an end without bring­ ing about intervention by the forces of the Soviet union. It was felt by many last November that if United Nations forces advanced to the very borders of Manchuria and cleared north Korea of the enemy, the war would then end; that there would be little risk of communist China intervening, or, that, if it did, the intervention could be contained and defeated. As we know, and as I said last February in the house, it did not work out that way, for one reason or another. In the light of that experience, we should, I think, before we take any new decisions which will extend the war, be reasonably sure that this extension will have compen­ sating military and political advantages.. . . Another way in which the conflict could be extended, in the hope that it would be ended sooner, would be by facilitating and assisting the return to the mainland of China of the forces at present in Formosa under the command of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. We should remember, of course, that these forces, or forces under the same commmand, have been driven from China by their own countrymcn. The question to be answered, there­ fore, is this: Is there any reason to believe that these Chinese nationalist forces now in Formosa would have greater success in

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China than they had previously, unless they were supported by troops and equipment from other countries which could ill be spared for such a hazardous venture, with all its possible longdrawn-out consequences? . . . May I now say just a word in conclusion, Mr. Speaker, about our v iew s-I have been asked about this in previous statements in the house - on the situation in Formosa. I believe that this island should be neutralized while fighting is going on in Korea. I have expressed that view previously. Certainly the United States of America cannot be expected to permit the Peking government to take over Formosa while that government is defying, and fight­ ing against, the United Nations. It does not follow, however, that if and when the Korean conflict can be ended satisfactorily, we should refuse to discuss the future of Formosa within the context of international agreements that have already been reached con­ cerning it, and indeed within the context of the United Nations charter. Any other course would, I think, result in implacable hostility between the United Nations and whatever government was in control of China at the time the war ended. Until that war ends, however, and China abandons her attack against the United Nations in Korea, there can be, I think, no question of even discussing whether Formosa should be handed over to the Peking regime; at least that is our view. The same, I think, applies to recognition of that regime in Peking. There can be no question even of considering it while the Chinese defy the United Nations in Korea and fight against our forces there. 11. THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT (a) General objectives - Statement by the Secretary of State for Ex­ ternal Affairs, Mr. L. B. Pearson, in plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 27, 1950 (extracts) (DEA, Documents on the Korean Crisis, Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1951, pp. 2-3). Events - and United States and British soldiers - are rapidly demonstrating in Korea that aggression does not pay. It will soon be necessary for the United Nations to show with equal vigour and resourcefulness that it can deal with the problems of the post­ aggression period in Korea. The political and economic life of that country must be established on a basis which will enable the Korean people to fulfil the destiny that has been promised them. As hostilities draw to a close in Korea, and the Assembly takes up its new responsibilties there, it seems to our delegation that certain specific principles should govern its decisions and that we should embody these principles at once in an Assembly resolu­ tion. In the first place, the general objective as we see it of the

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United Nations in Korea should be to fulfil now the purposes which have repeatedly been stated at previous Assemblies - a united Korea, a free Korea, a Korea which the Korean people themselves govern without interference from outside. This should be achieved by United Nations action and not through decisions reached by certain of its members. Secondly, the United Nations must assist the people of Korea to establish peace and order throughout their territory as the firm foundation for democratic institutions and free self-government. It is our hope that the people of Northern Korea, having been forced into perilous and disastrous venture by their communist rulers, will now themselves repudiate these rulers and co-operate with the United Nations in bringing to Korea the peace and unity which its people desire. This is the time for the aggressors to cease fire, to admit defeat. If they do, it may not be necessary for United Nations forces in Korean territory to advance far beyond their present positions. The United Nations must, however, leave its forces free to do whatever is practicable to make certain that the communist aggressors of North Korea are not permitted to re­ establish some new base in the peninsula from which they could sally forth again upon a peaceful people. Third, the Korean people - once peace has been restored must be assured that no nation will exploit the present situation in Korea for its own particular advantage. This of course means a Korea without foreign bases and free-of foreign military domina­ tion; it means a Korea which will be responsible for its own de­ fence within the framework of our collective security system. Above all, it means a Korea which will not be divided and dis­ turbed by subversive communist elements directed from outside Korea. The fourth principle should be that nothing shall be done in the establishment of a united, free Korea which carries any menace to Korea’s neighbours. There have been comments in the press and elsewhere about the role which the Korean peninsula has played in invasians of the Asiatic mainland. Nothing must be done in Korea, as indeed nothing will be done, which holds the least suggestion that any member of the United Nations has any purpose whatever in Korea, other than to establish that country under the full sovereignty of its own people. Korea does not menace any of its neighbours, though in recent years it has had reason to fear the menace of at least one of those neighbours. My fifth principle is that the free governments of Asia should take a major share of the responsibility for advising the Korean people upon methods of government which they should adopt and procedures which they should follow in establishing these methods of government. The countries of Asia and of the Western Pacific have made an outstanding contribution to the work of the

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United Nations. I think we should now make sure that we gain full advantage of the judgment of these states in charting a course for the future in Korea in the difficult days ahead . . . (b) P o in ts in d isp u te in th e a rm istice talks - S ta te m e n t by th e Secre­ tary o f S ta te fo r E xtern a l A ffa irs, M r. L . B . P earson (C H C D , M arch

21, 1952, pp. 664-5).

Mr. L. B. Pearson: Speaking the other day in this house, the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar expressed the view that as the military armistice talks had bogged down in non-military dis­ cussions, the Canadian government might take the initiative in suggesting that a political conference might be called without waiting for the conclusion of an armistice. I think that was the burden of his observations on this point at that time. Mr. Speaker, if that suggestion were adopted it might lay Canada open to the kind of criticism which is sometimes levelled against some schools of thought in the United States; we might be accused of seeking to submerge the problems of a military armistice into the larger problems of a political conference, just as some want to submerge the military problem of Korea into the much larger and more difficult problem of a war with China. The supplementary report of the United Nations group on cease-fire in Korea, which was made public on January 11, 1951, clearly proposed that the F ar Eastern situation should be dealt with in three stages. The first, cease-fire in Korea; the second, the settlement of the Korean question, and the third, the settlement of other Far Eastern questions. All western dealings with the enemy in Korea have been based on this three-stage program, and we cannot now reasonably expect to ask our allies, particu­ larly the United States, to abandon this procedure. Therefore I suggest we must continue to try to get the armistice first and then political talks afterwards. On the point which was made by the hon. member for Rose­ town-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) that the armistice talks have already strayed into the political and non-political field, I would merely point out that the three main points still in dispute are, first, prisoners of war - a complicated and a very difficult question the second, airfield construction and repair, and third, supervision of the armistice. The exchange of prisoners of war is a legitimate subject to discuss in military armistice talks, and indeed was one subject which the United Nations command insisted should be in­ cluded in the military agenda. It would be hard now to accept the argument that the subject is non-military. Points two and three are plainly within the military field. In­ deed, the only really political subject on the agenda of the armistice talks is point five, recommendations to the governments

3 1 4 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

concerned on both sides, which has been settled quickly and effectively, and which has resulted in agreement, at least in prin­ ciple, that political discussions should take place over the Korean political setdement. Certainly, all governments, and that includes the Canadian government, with forces in Korea, agree as to the desirability of bringing that war to an end as quickly as possible; but, as I have said before, on honourable terms which do not betray the pur­ pose we had in intervening there in the first place. That purpose was - and remains - to defeat aggression there, nothing more. And we have not done that yet. It is for that reason that the government supports as a possible first step to peace and the defeat of aggession, the armistice nego­ tiations now being carried on. But also, Mr. Speaker, we must realize that if these negotiations fail, or if the armistice is success­ fully concluded and then a further aggression is committed by the communists, a new and possibly a very dangerous situation will arise. (c) P articipants in a p olitical conference - S ta te m e n t by th e A c tin g C h airm an o f D elegation to th e G eneral A sse m b ly , M r. P aul M artin in the P olitical C o m m ittee , A u g u s t 19, 1953 (D E A , S and S , 5 3 /3 4 ).

So far as my Delegation is concerned, therefore, our understand­ ing of the position is as stated by Admiral Joy on behalf of the United Nations Command, that our “side” in this conflict is the United Nations itself. The central problem before us is the ques­ tion of which countries should participate in the Political Confer­ ence. The resolution we have co-sponsored makes it clear that we feel that each member of the United Nations who has contributed forces to the Unified Command has earned its right to a place at the Conference table, should its government wish to exercise that right. Our objective is to make sure - and how we do this is not the important point - that we get to die Conference those countries who should be there if the Conference is to have its best chance of achieving successful results in terms of the future peace and security of the area. As a matter of convenience we are proposing to do this by means of three resolutions rather than one. So far as my Delegation is concerned, we do not so much care whether you call it a round table or a cross table conference or a polygonal conference; the important thing is to get those who must be there around a table. The composition of the Conference is all the more important, in our view, because we now have, it seems to me, a unique opportunity not only for settling an issue which for the past three years has threatened at any moment to touch off a general conflagration, but for reducing, as a direct

Far East and South-East Asia 315

consequence of any success in Korea, dangerous tensions in Asia and other parts of the world. It goes without saying, therefore, that my Government thinks the U.S.S.R. should participate in the Political Conference be­ cause it would be quite unrealistic to hold a conference such as we have in mind without the Soviet Union which should take her full share of responsibility not only for peace-making but for peace-keeping. My Government also believes that the great and growing im­ portance of India in Asian affairs and the leading role which she has played in and out of this Assembly in efforts of conciliation, which have greatly facilitated the achievement of the armistice we are now celebrating, entitle her to participate in the Political Conference . . . . I find at least two major difficulties in the Soviet resolution in its present form and for these reasons, among others, I cannot accept it. The first major difficulty is that the final paragraph of the Soviet draft would seem to exclude the Republic of Korea from those whose consent must be given to all agreements reached at the Conference. As this is to be a Korean Political Conference, it is, I think, essential that the rights of the Republic of Korea should be protected and I have already shown how we on our side propose that this should be done. My second objection is - if I may say so - that Canada is not included on Mr. Vyshinsky’s invitation list. I should have thought that it was consistent with what has already been agreed by the Military Commanders and presumably, therefore, not unaccept­ able to the U.S.S.R., if it were admitted by the other side that any belligerent in Korea has the right to participate in the conference. Canada’s role in Korea, on any yardstick of comparison, entitles us, I believe, to participate in the Political Conference. Allow me to remind the Committee, that Canada has contributed to the Unified Command the fourth largest number of armed forces in­ cluding Koreans and that we have made the third largest cash contribution to Korean relief and rehabilitation. If it is suggested that Canada is a long way away from Korea, let me say only that I never heard that argument used when the United Nations was appealing to all member states to help the hard-pressed Republic of Korea. (d) Proposals fo r a Peace C o n feren ce: R elease o f P risoners o f W ar S ta te m e n t b y th e Secreta ry o f S ta te fo r E xtern a l A ffa irs, M r. L . B. Pearson (C H C D , January 29, 1954, pp. 1588-90).

Mr. L. B. Pearson: Since I last spoke in the house on this subject an armistice agreement has been signed1 there which ended on 1 Signed July 27, 1953.

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acceptable terms more than three years of fighting by the United Nations in resisting the unprovoked aggression launched against the republic of Korea. With that aggression repelled, the military purpose of this great collective resort to armed force has been accomplished but, of course, only at a cost to our own forces, and great cost to those of the United States and those of Korea which bore the brunt of the struggle. We remember that cost as we talk about Korea today. This armistice marked die end of the first step towards a peace­ ful settlement in Korea. The next step has been to try to convert that armistice into a peace settlement through the convening of a conference. The United Nations assembly, last summer and last autumn, long and carefully considered how that conference could be brought about. As a result, as most hon. members know, when the general assembly last summer closed at the end of August it had, by formal resolution, made provision for the United Nations side of the Korean political conference. These decisions did not meet in full our own wishes but they were those of the United Nations and we accepted them and respected them as such. More­ over, we thought that those decisions, even though they were not perfect from our point of view, were good enough to provide a basis for a Korean political conference if the other side wanted such a conference. Then, as hon. members will recall, last autumn discussions began at Panmunjom with the communist side in an effort to work out the details for this conference. Those discussions are theo­ retically still going on, although they have been suspended for the time being. As these discussions were taking place in Decem­ ber last they removed some of the pressure at the assembly, which was meeting then, from continuing its deliberations into January. As hon. members will recall, at that time a resolution was passed making provision for recall of the assembly if a majority of the members so desired if the president of the assembly, Madame Pandit - who has been acting in that position with such skill and distinction - should decide that the time had come or should be asked by any member to recall the assembly. Such a request has now been made by the government of India. Our reply to that request has just been sent today to the Secretary General of the United Nations for transmission to the president. This reply was made after a great deal of consideration and exchange of views between ourselves and the Indian government, the British govern­ ment, the United States government and other governments. Possibly I might put this reply on the record, Mr. Speaker. It is as follows: Please inform the secretary general as soon as possible that the Canadian government has given very sympathetic con­

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sideration to the request of the president of the general assem­ bly that the present session be reconvened on February 9. The Canadian government appreciates the desire of the govern­ ment of India to report to the United Nations general assembly on the discharge of its responsibilities as chairman and execu­ tive agent of the neutral nadons repatriation commission in respect of the prisoners of war placed in its custody under the provisions of subparagraph 51(b) of the Korean armistice agreement, but considers that in present circumstances it would be inadvisable to reconvene the general assembly for discussion of the general Korean question of which the assembly is seized. In view of the Canadian government a session on this subject That is on the general Korean question. - might more usefully be reconvened at a later date in March or April. We took that position, Mr. Speaker, because of developments in Panmunjom where steps are now being taken to bring about a resumption of the talks, and we hope that these steps will be successful within the next few days; because of developments in Berlin where Far Eastern questions have been put on the agenda; and because we came to the conclusion, after the inquiries we made, that it would not be possible, if the session opened on February 9, to restrict its deliberations merely to the action of India and the neutral nations repatriation commission. It should have been possible before now at Panmunjom to work out a satisfactory plan for the Korean political conference. Differences of viewpoint occurred at once, of course, as one would expect, between the negotiators from the two sides on this question. But on their face, none of those differences were im­ possible or even difficult of reconciliation. Indeed I think a solu­ tion might have been found if the communist representatives had not turned from negotiation to abuse, thus indicating that if their principals wanted a conference at all, they did not want one at that time. Hence the negotiations were suspended. As I have said, steps are being taken - which we hope will be successful - to bring about their resumption. The present situation in Korea is simply that there is no fighting, but there is no peace. Our service­ men in that area, while they remain at the alert, have for more than five months, however, been spared the tragic consequences of actual conflict. T hat is a blessing which we would all do well to remember. One other issue out there has now been disposed of in the prisoners-of-war question. I do not intend to go into details of that matter inasmuch as they will be familiar to most hon. mem­ bers. We have taken the position as a government that the action

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of the United States commander in releasing and returning to civilian status the prisoners of war under his jurisdiction when they were returned to him by the neutral nations repatriation com­ mission was not only legally correct but morally sound and quite consistent with the terms of the armistice agreement itself. It seems to us that no other course was open to the United Nations commander at that time. Our own position in regard to this matter has been, I think, quite clear and consistent from the beginning. We have not believed nor do we now believe that any prisoner should be compelled by force to return to what was once his home­ land. The provisions of the commission’s terms of reference were drafted to prohibit enforced repatriation, and those of us who took part in the long, complicated and difficult negotiations to that end will recall this very clearly. But that prohibition would have little meaning if the only alternative facing a prisoner was indefinite captivity. Therefore the terms of reference in the armi­ stice agreement made clear provision for the final release of prisoners to civilian status 120 days after their being placed in the custody of the commission. In the words of General Hull, The plain intent of paragraph 11 of the terms of reference is to prevent either party to the agreement from frustrating the basic purpose of avoiding indefinite captivity for the prisoners. We subscribe to that position.

12. UNITED NATIONS KOREAN RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY S ta te m e n t b y th e A c tin g C hairm an o f th e C anadian D elegation, M r. P aul M a rtin , in th e F irst C o m m itte e o f th e G en era l A sse m b ly , M arch 9 ,1 9 5 3 (DEA, S u p p . Paper, 53/9).

The Korean Reconstruction Agency was established by General Assembly Resolution 410A (V ) ofDecember 1,1950, with power “to p la n . . . and carry out a broad programme of relief and recon­ struction in Korea.” The Canadian Government has given its whole-hearted support to the Korean Reconstruction Agency and has done all in its power to enable the Agency to carry out the pur­ poses for which it was established. From the outset of the Korean conflict, the Canadian Govern­ ment recognized that there were essential aspects to the problem other than those concerned with the military action undertaken by the United Nations in defence of the Republic of Korea. Now . . . we, along with other members of the United Nations, were at once conscious that there would be a progressive need by co­ operative action of giving economic assistance to the Korean

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people to repair the ravages of war, an eloquent and distressing account of which we heard from the Korean spokesman here last Friday. Who can fail to sympathize deeply with the Korean people in their sufferings or to be convinced of the necessity to give all practical aid to prevent their being overwhelmed by econ­ omic destruction. I venture to state . . . that we in Canada have responded to this need of the Korean people for economic assistance. As of Febuary 15 of this year it will be seen from one of the Agent-General’s Reports that more than $205 million had been pledged to the Agency by various governments. Of this amount, somewhat less than $45 million had, as of that date, been paid in. The Canadian Government, at an early date in the operations of the Agency, pledged $7V4 million. The full amount of this pledge was paid to the Agency on March 31, 1951. The amount pledged by my country is, I believe, the third largest amount pledged by any government. The amount paid in by Canada is the second largest amount paid in by any government up to the present time, and the first pledge to be paid in full. As further indication of our support of the Agency, I might perhaps mention that Canada is one of the five members of the Advisory Committee set up to advise the Agent General under the 1950 resolution. The other members of that Committee are, of course, India, the United Kingdom, the United States and Uruguay. Let me now refer briefly to the operations of the Agency. During the first year following the establishment of the Agency, a good deal of uncertainty existed about the role which the Agency might play in the absence of an armistice in Korea. It was necessary for agreement to be worked out among the various authorities responsible for both military and civilian activities in that country. During this period of uncertainty the operations of the Agency were inevitably not very extensive. I might add in this particular regard that the functions of the Korean Relief Agency have heretofore been hampered not only by the necessary prac­ tical limitations imposed by the conditions of war but also obviously by the refusal of the Communists to recognize its good intentions or to participate in or facilitate its work. Is it too strong (I am sure it is not) to say that they have shown the same ob­ structive attitude, for example, towards the United Nations Com-, mission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, that other body which we, the United Nations, have set up to help the Korean Republic in our name? I feel impelled at this point to say a word of commendation to this Commission, which has worked faithfully and hard in difficult circumstances to carry out its duties both to Korea and to the United Nations . . . . Now, a welcome development occurred in November of last

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year. In that month the Advisory Committee approved a $70 million programme submitted by the Agent-General for the year ending June 30, 1953. This consisted of specific projects which had already been approved by the Unified Command and the Korean Government. This programme, we are pleased to note, included reconstruction and rehabilitation items such as transport, communications, power, housing, health and education. It is most encouraging to learn from the Report of the Agent-General that it has been possible for him to make progress in implementing this $70 million reconstruction programme . . . . We wish to emphasize that in our view the long-term recon­ struction of the war-damaged Korean economy is and should con­ tinue to be the main function of the Agency. We fully realize, of course, the importance in emergencies of providing relief to alleviate immediate personal distress in Korea. However, we would hope, that current relief measures would be adequate to meet this problem . . . . I make this assertion because it is our view that in the end capital reconstruction constitutes the only solution to the great economic problems which are faced in Korea both by the Govern­ ment of Korea and by the United Nations. For this reason, my delegation wishes to place on record its hope that the Agency will remain primarily concerned with reconstruction rather than with civilian relief. My Government would not de disposed to approve any tendency to transform that Agency from its main purpose of reconstruction into a relief agency.

13. THE QUESTION OF A PACIFIC PACT S ta te m e n t b y th e Secreta ry o f S ta te f o r E x te rn a l A ffa irs, M r. L . B. P earson * (C H C D , February 11, 1953, pp. 1853-4).

I should like to say a few words about the concept of a security arrangement in the Pacific along the lines of the Atlantic Pact - a concept which we usually embody in the words Pacific security pact. I have told the house on a number of occasions that, in my view, the time was not yet ripe for a Pacific pact along those lines. I believe that that is still the case. On June 20, 1952, when I last mentioned the subject in this house, I said we were in agree­ ment with the views of Mr. John Foster Dulles, who had said that he did not think it feasible on any quick time-table to associate the countries of Asia in a security pact in the same way as the countries of the Atlantic were associated. Mr. Dulles is, of course, * F o r Opposition views see C H C D , pp. 1885-6.

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now the United States Secretary of State. We continue to agree with these views which he then expressed and which I believe he still holds. I hope those who hold other views on this subject will produce concrete and impressive evidence in support of them, so we may be given an opportunity, on the basis of that evidence, to consider whether we should change our minds and not merely reiterate that we should have a Pacific pact and that we should do more in that respect in the Pacific. As I see it, there are three fundamental difficulties which re­ main - and I have mentioned them before - in the way of the early realization of a Pacific pact on a multilateral basis. The first difficulty - and it is a basic one - is which Pacific states should be included and which should be left out; the second is how to get the various countries which might participate to agree to team up with other potential members; and finally there is the lack of community of interest and purpose and policy among some of the potential members. Until these problems are solved, and they are certainly not solved yet, a Pacific pact which attempted to be the counterpart of the North Atlantic pact would, I think, inevitably be an artificial creation and might well do more harm than good. The Pacific, however, is by no means a security vacuum. The United States has security arrangements with Canada, of course, but also with Japan, with the Philippines, with Australia and with New Zealand. It has been suggested by some . . . that Canada might adhere to the tripartite security treaty, now known as the a . n .z . u . s . pact, between the United States, Australia and New Zealand. On April 1, 1952,1 expressed . . . the opinion that the objections to broad­ ening this arrangement at this time into a general Pacific pact, or indeed the objections to including any additional states in this arrangement, were accepted as overriding by certain countries whose suport for such broadening would be essential; and that certainly means first of all the United States. That opinion has subsequently been reinforced by the communique issued on August 7, 1952, by the a . n . z .u .s . council itself, at the conclusion of its first meeting. That communique reads in part as follows: It would be premature at this early stage in its own develop­ ment (that is the development of a .n .z . u . s . ) to establish rela­ tionships with other states . . . As the a . n . z .u .s . Council itself has taken that attitude not par­ ticularly or especially in relation to Canada but in relation to other countries as well, including countries which have a deep and abiding interest in such a pact, I do not think it would be appropriate for us to press for membership at this time . . . . We obtained, I think, quite adequate information on which to

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base the policy which we have followed. So I repeat. . . that while we are not members of a Pacific security pact along the lines of the North Atlantic pact, and while we are not now members of the a . n . z . u . s . association, we are just as much concerned with security in the Pacific as we are with security in the Atlantic; because security, like peace itself, is indivisible. But that does not mean, as I see it, that the expression of this concern must be through the same type of collective security machinery everywhere.

C . T h e G e n e v a C o n fe re n c e 1 9 5 4 ~ After prolonged negotiations an armistice in Korea was agreed to in July 1953, but since there were several political issues unsettled the Armistice Commission recommended the calling of a political conference within three months. However no agreement was reached on the details of the conference, including what countries should be invited to attend, (docs. 1lc, 1 Id) and the three months passed with­ out a conference being called. In January, 1954, the Foreign Minis­ ters of the “Big Four” met in Berlin to consider ways of lessening international tension. No progress was made on European issues, but they did agree on a conference to consider Korea and Indochina where a bitter war between the French and Nationalist and Com­ munist forces was in progress. It was further agreed that for the Korean part of the Conference, Communist China, the two Koreas, and u .n . members that had participated in the war in Korea should be invited to attend; and that for the sessions on Indochina, only the three emerging states of Indochina - Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Communist China should be invited to meet with the Four Great Powers. There were thus in effect two Geneva Conferences. No progress was made on Korean issues in the Conference; nor in the fifteen years since has there been much progress. United States and South Korean forces still stand on guard on one side of the cease-fire line along the thirty-eighth parallel, and the North Koreans on the other. Canada took an active part in the sessions on Korea, as she had done in the United Nations. Canadian comments on the Communist proposals at the Conference are set out briefly in document 14, as well as Canadian proposals which followed very closely those already agreed upon in the United Nations.1 1 For an interesting account by a Canadian participant see Holmes, J. W., “Geneva 1954,” International Journal, XXII, No. 3 (Summer, 1967), p. 457 ff.

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On Indochina, however, considerable progress was recorded. The French were anxious to withdraw from Indochina and unilaterally recognized the three Indochina states as independent. An armistice for each was agreed to subject to the establishment of international supervisory commissions in each case.2 In Vietnam, where fighting was still in progress when the conference met, a temporary dividing line, roughly along the seventeenth parallel, was agreed to as a temporary arrangement, pending evacuation of French and Vietnam forces from the North and of Viet Minh (that is, North Vietnamese) forces from the South, and decision by the people of Indochina by a free vote on the question of unification. Canada had not been invited to the sessions on Indochina and evidently did not press for an invitation lest it lead to further com­ mitments in South East Asia. However, the Canadian Government had views about the desirability of a regional solution in the long run, although realizing that it could not be achieved at once (doc. 16). Although anxious to avoid further responsibilities in South East Asia Canada readily accepted the invitation from the co-chairmen of the Conference, Eden and Molotov, to serve, along with India and Poland, on the International Supervisory Commissions (docs. 17, 18). ~

14. KOREA - COMMUNIST PROPOSALS; CANADIAN POLICY S ta te m e n t b y th e Secreta ry o f Sta te fo r E xtern a l A ffa irs, M r. L . B . P earson (extracts) (C H C D , M ay 28, 1954, pp. 5186-87).

Mr. L. B. Pearson: The communist delegations at the Korean conference spoke as one. They spoke in the same vein and indeed often in the same words in their accusations and attacks largely directed against the United States. I do not think it is an exaggera­ tion to say that 90 per cent of the content of their speeches con­ sisted of propaganda and polemics. We got the same distortions of recent developments in Korea to which we have been accus2 T he U nited States was not happy with this arrangem ent. Before the Conference started, the Secretary o f State, M r. Dulles, had proposed to Britain th at military assistance be given to the French in Indochina to stiffen their resistance, but Britain declined to go along and the proposal fell through. However, the U nited States declined to approve the final settlement, though urged not to oppose it. See S ir A n th o n y E d e n ’s M em o irs: F u ll Circle, p. 108 ff.; M asters, D . C., C anada in W o rld A ffa irs, Vol. V III, 1953-55, pp. 70-96.

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tomea at the United Nations, and we got the same falsification of fact and of history. It was interesting to note that the dialectics and diatribes of the new communist delegations were just about the same as that of the old hands. The delegates on the United Nations side, though anxious to get on with the business of negotiating a Korean settlement, have not allowed these unfounded accusations to go unanswered. To reply to the slanderous attacks and abusive propaganda which form such a depressing proportion of the communist speeches at meetings of this kind is a time-consuming and unpleasant task, but when the eyes of the world are focused on a conference it is a task which I think we cannot afford to forgo lest it should be supposed in any part of the world, especially in this case in the Asian part of the world, that silence may indicate some kind of consent. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, in my own intervention in the gen­ eral debate on the Korean question at Geneva I attempted on May 4 to follow the course which had already been laid down by others in dealing with some of these communist charges, and particularly I ventured to point out that, contrary to the asser­ tions of Mr. Molotov, who took it upon himself to speak for Asia, we in the west did understand, and fully accepted, the significance of what has been taking place in Asia over recent years, and that we were indeed sympathetic in the march of the peoples of Asia toward national freedom and greater human wel­ fare. I added, however, that the right to be free did not include the obligation to be communist, nor did “Asia for the Asians”, which is a phrase Molotov and others had used, mean Asia for the cominform. I also pointed out, Mr. Chairman, that our own national experience in Canada refuted completely the wild charges which were levelled by communist delegations to the effect that the people of the United States were either aggressive or imperialist in their outlook. Now, Mr. Chairman, I should explain in a few words what the communist peace plan for Korea was as put forward at the Geneva conference. In principle it involved the repudiation of United Nations plans on which we had previously agreed, and if it had been carried into effect it would also have necessitated the exclusion of the United Nations as a belligerent from the substance and the supervision of the peace settlement. It would have required us on our side to accept the fact of United States and republic of Korea aggression, and of the charge that the United Nations in this matter had merely acted as the victim and the tool of United States imperialism. Obviously any proposal based on these premises was not

Far East and South-East Asia 325

acceptable to the United Nations delegations. There were also other details which made this plan unacceptable. The two governments of the republic of Korea and North Korea were to be considered on the same political, legal and moral level, and acceptance of this was to be recognized in an all-Korean commission with equal representation of the north and south, though the south in population is probably five or six times greater than the north. This all-Korean commission was to work out plans for all-Korean elections, free from out­ side supervision except - and this has been an additional pro­ posal of the communists since I left Geneva - by what they call a neutral commission. We are not quite clear about this neutral commission but it is certainly to be divorced from the United Nations. Its function is to assist the all-Korean commission, and its composition would presumably exclude all United Nations members who have par­ ticipated in Korean military operations. It could, however, in­ clude such neutrals - and I use that word in a Pickwickian sense - as Poland or Czechoslovakia. Then also under this plan all foreign forces were to be withdrawn within six months. The powers directly interested in Korea - and it was made clear that they would include communist China and the U.S.S.R. were to assist in Korean development as a democratic state. The United Nations, however, was to keep out. Even cursory examination of a plan of this kind makes its unacceptability quite obvious. It looked to us like a snare and a delusion. Indeed we wondered whether it was really meant to be accepted, at least in that form. It is certainly unrealistic to the point of absurdity to think that two sides which fear and hate each other as much as do North Korea and South Korea, after fighting each other viciously if indecisively for years, should sit down amicably and work together through an all-Korean commission, on a fifty-fifty basis, with each side having a veto over the decisions of the commission and in that way produce a new Korea by free elections. Of course we pointed out the weakness and indeed the impracticability of this plan, but the questions which we addressed to the other side were unanswered. Indeed it is clear that this is a scheme designed to provide for the establishment of an interim government, along the pattern of the communist proposals in Germany, in which the communist representatives would hold the power of veto. In other words, the commission would operate as the communist members wished it to operate or not at all. We all know, of course, that this is the familiar first step in the establishment of communist dictatorship through the perversion of democratic procedures. We might have accepted the impossibility of this scheme with­ out any further argument and, pinning the responsibility squarely

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where it belongs, namely on the communists who were putting forward this scheme, called the conference off on that issue. But most of the United Nations delegations - indeed, I think all of them - felt that they should put forward their own proposals and their own views as to what would constitute a good Korean settlement. For that purpose, Mr. Chairman, I should like to put on the record the Canadian views of what should be done to reach that desirable objective, or in other words the basic principles which we think should underlie any agreement for a free, demo­ cratic and united Korea. If I may just enumerate them briefly, those principles are as follows. First, a unified Korea should preserve the state structure for Korea which has been endorsed by the United Nations, with such constitutional changes as might be necessary to establish an all-Korean government. Second, the people of Korea should be given an opportunity to express their views as to their future government and for that purpose there should be held, with a minimum of delay, free and fair elections for a national assembly and possibly also for a president. Third, the conditions for such elections should include equit­ able representation by population over the whole of Korea. Fourth, to ensure that such elections should be fair and free, they should be supervised by an international agency agreed on; if possible, by the Geneva conference but acceptable to the United Nations. In order to ensure maximum objectivity - and that is going quite a long way to meet the views of the other side - we felt that this supervisory agency might consist of nations which do not belong to the communist bloc and which did not participate in military operations in Korea. Fifth, arrangements should be made for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea by stages, that withdrawal to be com­ pleted in a short period, to be fixed by the conference, after the post-election all-Korean government had begun effectively to function; in other words, withdrawal might begin at once by both sides and be completed within a short time after the Korean government had begun to function. Sixth, a reaffirmation of international responsibility under the United Nations to participate in the relief and rehabilitation of Korea through economic and material assistance. Finally, an international guarantee under the auspices of the United Nations of the territorial integrity of unified, free and democratic Korea. It was hoped that some kind of proposal based on principles of that nature might be put forward as coming from all sixteen powers. That procedure has not yet been possible, Mr. Chairman, but we are very close in our views. Indeed, as a result of negotia­ tions between the delegations on our side, all sixteen powers are

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very close together now on what constitutes the principles for a good Korean settlement. 15. FAILURE OF GENEVA CONFERENCE ON KOREA S ta te m e n t b y th e C anadian R epresentative, M r. D a vid M . Johnson, in the F irst C o m m itte e o f th e G eneral A sse m b ly , D ece m b er 3, 1954 (D E A , S u p p . Paper, 5 4 /3 8 /U N 9 /15).

My delegation regrets very much that it has been necessary for those member states represented at Geneva to report failure. The differences which existed between the proposals of the North Koreans and the minimum conditions which we consider neces­ sary to protect the democratic rights of Koreans in the process of reunification were so broad that we had no alternative but to admit the failure of the negotiations. Certain concessions were made during the course of the Conference but the conditions on which the North Koreans insisted remained unacceptable. This being the case, the Canadian Delegation at Geneva agreed that it was far better to acknowledge our differences than to mislead the public of the world by merely suspending our discussions or by pretending that there had been agreements in principle. In our view, the Geneva negotiations lasted longer than the North Koreans had any good reason to expect or deserve. The demo­ cratic countries represented there showed infinite patience in considering all the proposals put forward by the North Koreans and by the Chinese and Soviet representatives. The Canadian Delegation among others did its utmost to explore all possible methods of conciliation and agreement in accordance with the responsibility we had accepted under the General Assembly resolution of August 28, 1953. As any objective analysis of the record will show, it was not the fault of our side that agreement could not be reached. We and our associates have carried out our duties under the Assembly resolution. Nevertheless, my delegation does not con­ sider that every effort to achieve peaceful reunification has been exhausted. We ourselves are quite prepared to try again. We are quite prepared to see further negotiations of any kind which may have a possibility of success. We do not think, however, that any useful purpose would be served by resuming the Geneva Conference at this time and we are by no means certain that the best method of renewing negotiations is to reassemble that parti­ cular Conference at any future time. The Soviet Delegation, however, now calls on us to support a resolution which would convene another conference, along the lines of the Geneva Conference, in the immediate future. How­

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ever, there has been no indication whatsoever that those who were responsible for the failure of the Geneva Conference have moved from the position regarding freedom which caused that failure. If there had been any indication from the Communist side that their position had altered sufficiently to make a real negotiation possible, we should be only tob happy to support immediate resumption of negotiations. A t the present time, how­ ever, there is no indication of any change whatsoever from the positions established last June in Geneva. We earnestly hope that the opportunity may come soon.

16. INDOCHINA - CANADIAN VIEWS ON A REGIONAL SOLUTION E x tra c t fr o m R e p o rt to P a rlia m en t on progress o f G eneva C o n fe r­ en ce b y th e Secreta ry o f S ta te f o r E xtern a l A (fairs, M r. L . B . Pearson ( C H C D , May 28, 1954, p. 5190-92).

An understanding of these needs and these differences will assist, indeed I think will be essential in finding the right regional solu­ tion to the problem of security in that part of the world, once it is agreed that such a solution is necessary to supplement and make more binding the general application of the United Nations charter. Any such regional solution, I think, might well embody the following principles: First: Arrangements reached must be consistent with the pro­ visions of the United Nations charter. If they could be associated in some form with the United Nations, so much the better. Second: They must be divorced from anything that could be callcd colonialism and not designated to maintain regimes, colon­ ial or national, that have little or no popular support. Third: It should be recognized that the problem cannot be dealt with effectively in military terms alone, and that no more military agreement is likely4o be satisfactory or enduring. Indeed military aggression of the conventional sort is not likely to be the main danger so much as communist imperialism exploiting those forces within the state - and not always unworthy forces - in order to bring about subversion, civil war and the forcible installation of communist regimes. It should also be recognized that, as President Eisenhower said on May 12, no country can be saved from communism unless it wants to be saved. Then, fourth, as I see it, any solution must not be, or suscep­ tible to the interpretation as being, a purely “western” one, or one from which free Asian countries feel that they have been excluded. Surely we must recognize that, whether we agree with

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all their policies or not, little of a substantial or permanent charac­ ter is likely to be achieved in establishing peace and security in Southeast Asia, or any other part of Asia, without the advice, co-operation and assistance of the free Asian countries. I think it is most important - and I am sure the house agrees with me that those countries should feel that, even if they are not mem­ bers of it, any collective security arrangements in southeast Asia that may be worked out should be in their interest, and have taken into consideration their interests. If not enough Asian states feel that way, the foundation of any Southeast Asian security organization will not be very firm. In this connection, the commonwealth association can play and has played a valuable role. And that is one reason why, in my opinion, it was helpful and wise to keep the Asian members of the Commonwealth informed, as they were kept informed, closely and continuously, of Geneva developments. It is also one reason why I regret that India, or some similar Asian state or states, was not a member of the Geneva conference. The working out of an arrangement which would be based on the considerations I have ventured to mention will not be easy, and I think that it will take time. But there is a dilemma here, in that time may be against those who desire to build up a security system to deter aggression in southeast Asia. After all, there is a war going on there. It is not easy, in diplomacy, to reconcile considerations of defence urgency with the necessity for careful political preparation and of securing general and wholehearted agreement. There can be danger both from over timidity and from over zcalousness. There can also be trouble between friends if there is doubt about timing, about exactly what is being planned, about what we are trying to secure, and about what we are trying to prevent. We should certainly be clear on that last point - what we are trying to prevent. Is the united action which it is desired to bring about to be against communism as such, regardless of the means, military or otherwise, which it adopts to secure its ends in any particular Asian country; or is the commitment for collective action against military aggression only? If it is to be the first, then we should realize that arrangements to achieve this end will be interpreted as a declaration of implacable and fixed hos­ tility, with all action short of general war, and even at the risk of such war, against Asian communism. The other concept is that which is embodied in n .a .t . o . Here the commiment for action, in contradistinction to consultation, is clear and explicit. And it comes into operation as' soon as a military aggression has been committed by one state against another - but not sooner. I do not think it will do any service to the unity of those who

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are working together for peace if there is not a very clear under­ standing on this point, and if any negotiations are not based on that understanding. Now, if I may close by referring a little more specifically to the policy of the Canadian government in respect to the questions we have been discussing at Geneva, and which are still under discussion there . . . . So far as Indo-China and southeast Asia are concerned, we recognize that Canada has a very real interest in what is hap­ pening there, and what is likely to happen there. As a country with hundreds of miles of exposed coast on the Pacific, Canada is naturally concerned with problems affecting security in the Pacific and in Asia. Moreover, we know from the experience of two world wars that peace is indivisible and that a threat to peace anywhere can soon cover the whole world. Our inevitable concern for developments in Southeast Asia is increased by our close relationship to the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the three Asian members of the Commonwealth. The growing anxiety of these latter three over hostilities going on so near to their homelands can be readily appreciated, since their security would be very seriously threat­ ened if an aggressive communist nation took control, either by internal subversion or by direct military intervention, of one after another of the countries in the area. Added evidence of our concern for the security and well-being of the nations of south and southeast Asia is to be found in our active participation in the Colombo plan, whereby we have sought to associate ourselves with the area’s economic develop­ ment. In so far as accepting special political and defence commit­ ments is concerned, there is of course a limit to what a country of Canada’s population and resources can do. We have limited strength, in both men and materials; and our commitments, Mr. Chairman, are already heavy. Existing undertakings, such as those under n a t o , are such as to circumscribe what Canada can and cannot undertake, militarily and otherwise, not only in southeast Asia but elsewhere. And therefore, while it is true that if peace is threatened by communist aggression anywhere, it is threatened everywhere, it is also true that Canada cannot be expected to accept special or regional defence commitments in every part of the world where collective arrangements may be advisable. We have of course, through membership in the United Nations, accepted the pro­ visions of the charter. Canada has, therefore, already definite, if general, obligations in the maintenance and restoration of peace and security in all areas where these are in danger. In this con­ nection, it should be realized that the situation in Indo-China,

Far East and South-East Asia 331

with all its consequences to the peace and security of southeast Asia, has not yet been brought to the United Nations, and is not before the United Nations at the present time. If or when that position should change, Canada’s policy, like those of other member states, will of course depend upon the nature, the pur­ poses and the scope of any action which might be recommended by the United Nations. Any action involving an extension of Canada’s present commitments would be placed before parlia­ ment. 17. INDOCHINA - MEMBERSHIP ON INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS (a) Invitation from the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954 (D E A , E xtern a l A ffa irs, August, 1954, pp. 257-60.)

We have the honour to address you as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference on Indochina which concluded its work on July 20th 1954. The Conference took note of agreements ending hostilities in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and organizing inter­ national control, and the supervision of the execution of the pro­ visions of these agreements. In particular it was agreed that an international commission should be set up in each of the three countries for control and supervision of the application of the provisions of the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina. It was further proposed that these commissions should be composed of an equal number of representatives of Canada, India and Poland, presided over by the representative of India. 2. On behalf of the Conference, we accordingly have the honour to invite the Canadian-Indian Government in consulta­ tion with the Governments of Canada-India-Poland to designate representatives to form the International Supervisory Commis­ sions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as envisaged in the agree­ ments on the cessation of hostilities, and on supervision in those three countries. 3. It is hoped that the three International Supervisory Com­ missions can be established on the spot as soon as possible from the date on which the cease-fire comes into force. 4. The text of the final declaration adopted by the Conference, and of all other agreements and declarations concerning the ces­ sation of hostilities, and the organization of supervision in the three countries of Indochina will be transmitted to you as soon as possible. 5. We have the honour to request an early reply which we shall at once transmit to the members of the Conference. Signed: Anthony Eden V. Molotov

332 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (b) Reply to invitation, July 27, 1954 (Ibid.) I have the honour to acknowledge your message of July which you and Mr. Molotov sent in your capacity as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, containing the invitation to the Canadian Government to designate, in consultation with the Governments of India and Poland, representatives to form the International Supervisory Commissions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as envisaged in the agreements on the cessation of hostilities, and on supervision in those three countries. Conscious of the grave responsibilities which the task will im­ pose, but in the hope that it can contribute to the establishment of peace and security in Indochina, the Canadian Government accepts this invitation. The Canadian Government has been in touch with the Government of India concerning preliminary arrangements and intends to send representatives to New Delhi in the immediate future to consult with Indian and Polish officials on the setting up of the International Supervisory Commissions provided for in the agreements drawn up by the Geneva Con­ ference. The Canadian Government would be grateful if you would transmit the text of this reply to the members of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, whose continuing interest and support will be required if the Commissions are effectively to carry out their functions and if the agreements on the cessation of hos­ tilities arc to be successfully implemented. 18. STATEMENT ON CANADIAN MEMBERSHIP ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSIONS FOR VIETNAM, LAOS AND CAMBODIA (DEA, Press Release, July 27, 1954.) The Canadian Government has today (July 27) transmitted to Mr. Anthony Eden, co-chairman, with Mr. Molotov, of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, its acceptance of the invitation forwarded by him on July 21 to designate representatives to form, with India and Poland, the International Supervisory Commis­ sions for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Officials are being sent to New Delhi this week to take part in preliminary organizational discussions, prior to the actual establishment of the Commissions in Indochina. The Canadian representatives on the Commissions will be named shortly. The Government has decided to accept this invitation only after detailed study of the cease-fire and armistice agreements which are to be supervised by the International Commissions, and

Far East and South-East A sia 333

with full knowledge and appreciation of the responsibilities and difficulties that will go with membership. There are no illusions about the magnitude and complexity of the task. Canada is geographically remote from Indochina and her col­ lective security responsibilities in Southeast Asia are limited to those that arise from membership in the United Nations. We know from experience, however, that just as local conflicts can become general war, so conditions of security and stability in any part of the world serve the cause of peace everywhere. If, there­ fore, by participating in the work of these Indochinese Commis­ sions, Canada can assist in establishing such security and stability in Southeast Asia, we will be serving our own country, as well as the cause of peace. While it is a matter of regret to us that the settlement in Indo­ china and the supervision of that settlement are not directly under the aegis of the United Nations, the Government is satisfied that Canadian participation will be fully in harmony with our respon­ sibilities as a member of the world organization. It should be emphasized that acceptance of membership on these Commissions does not mean that we have been called upon to guarantee or enforce the Indochina cease-fire. Nor does it involve any new military or collective security commitments for Canada. The actual execution of the cease-fire agreements is the respon­ sibility of the two sides directly concerned, functioning through Joint Commissions established by the Armistice Agreements. The International Commissions themselves have no enforcement obli­ gation or responsibility. Their function will be solely supervisory, judicial and mediatory. Under Indian chairmanship, the Commis­ sions will be responsible for supervising the proper execution of the provisions of the agreements by the parties directly concerned, will assist these parties with the interpretation of those provisions; will be available to settle disputes; and, in cases where disputes cannot be settled, will report the matter to the members of the Geneva Conference. India, Poland and Canada are also expected to asume responsibility at a later stage, for supervising elections. In carrying out their tasks the International Supervisory Com­ missions should be able to function more effectively than the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea which, be­ cause of equal Communist and non-Communist representation, very often had effective action blocked, and which could report only to the two military commands. The Indochina Commissions will each consist of three mem­ bers - Indian, Polish and Canadian - and in most cases will be able to take decisions by majority vote. In those special and designated cases where unanimity is required by the cease-fire agreements but cannot be obtained, the commissions will submit

334 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

majority and minority reports to the Geneva Conference powers. It will then be the responsibility of those powers to deal with the matter. In addition to providing representatives for each of the three Supervisory Commissions, India, Poland and Canada will supply a number of military officers for the fixed and mobile inspection teams which will supervise the execution of the cease-fire agree­ ments in the field, under the direction of the Supervisory Com­ missioners. A study of the information available has led us to the conclu­ sion that the Commissions have a reasonable chance of operating effectively and of making a constructive contribution to the suc­ cessful implementation of the cease-fire agreements, and hence to peace in Southeast Asia. If our expectations unfortunately prove ill-founded, and the Commissions are frustrated by ob­ struction, then, of course, no useful purpose would be served by continuing their existence. The exchange of views which we have had with those powers with whom we are especially closely associated in efforts to main­ tain peace and strengthen security, has confirmed our conviction that we ought to accept this onerous but honourable assignment. Finally, we have been conscious of the serious consequences which might follow if we were to decline the invitation, since tins could delay and complicate the implementation of the cease-fire agreements with unhappy, and possibly even serious results. We have no illusions that the task we are undertaking will be either easy or of short duration, but we take satisfaction from the fact that in performing it Canada will be playing a worthy and respon­ sible part in an effort to strengthen peace.

D . C h in a P o lic y 19. CANADA’S RELINQUISHMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS S ta tem en t b y th e P rim e M in ister, M r. W . L . M a c k e n zie K in g (C H C D ,

April 17, 1944, p. 2065). Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King: Mr. Speaker, I desire to table three copies of the treaty between Canada and the Republic of China concerning the relinquishment of extra-territorial rights and the regulation of related matters, with exchange of notes, signed at Ottawa on April 14, 1944.1 1 C T S , 1944.

Far East and South-East A sia 335

With respect to the treaty which I have just tabled, it is similar in its terms to the British extraterritorial treaty concluded on behalf of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and India on January 11, 1943, and to the United States treaty with China, concluded on the same day. On the coming into force of the treaty, all international agree­ ments which authorize British or Canadian authorities to exer­ cise jurisdiction in China over Canadian nationals are abrogated. The government of Canada agrees to co-operate with the govern­ ment of the Republic of China, to the extent that any Canadian interest may be involved, in arrangements for the abandonment by foreign governments of special privileges hitherto held by them in Peiping, Shanghai, Amoy, Tientsin and Canton. The relinquishment of extraterritorial rights does not affect existing rights of Canadian nationals with regard to real property in China. It is agreed that Canadian property in China will be subject to Chinese laws concerning taxation and national defence. Real property held by Canadian nationals in China may not be alienated to the government or nationals of a third country with­ out the consent of the government of China. The Chinese gov­ ernment agrees to apply this restriction on alienation in an equitable manner, and undertakes to take over the property in question and pay adequate compensation therefor, if the right to transfer is refused. Canadian nationals in China are to be accorded the right to travel, reside and carry on trade in China. Each country is to endeavour to accord to nationals of the other, treatment not less favourable than that enjoyed by its own nationals in regard to legal proceedings, the administration of justice and the levying of taxes. Consular officers of each country may reside in such places as are agreed on. They are to have the right to interview and to communicate with nationals of their country, are to be informed whenever any such nationals are under arrest, and may visit such nationals and receive communications from them. The treaty provides that, not later than six months after the cessation of hostilities, the two governments will enter into a comprehensive modern treaty of friendship, commerce, naviga­ tion and consular rights; meanwhile, questions affecting the rights of Canadian nationals in China and questions affecting the sovereignty of the republic of China, which are not covered by this or previous treaties, will be decided in accordance with gen­ erally accepted principles of international law.

336 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

20. REPEAL OF CHINESE IMMIGRATION ACT S ta tem en t b y the M in ister o f M in e s a n d R esources, M r. J. A . G len (C H C D , February 11, 1947, pp. 307-8).

Mr. J. A. Glen: The other and most important section of the bill1 deals with the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act. Since the war ended there has been considerable agitation in the minds of many people in Canada, editorial writers and the like, and organizations of various kinds throughout the country who have made representations to the government for the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act. They contend that the act is dis­ criminatory, that it singles out a nation which has been a friendly ally in the war, that the provisions of our Immigration Act work a hardship on the Chinese who reside in Canada, and that cer­ tainly is not a matter that Canada can lightly overlook. Since the war, in the deliberations of the united nations, principles have been enunciated and the Canadian delegation have put them­ selves on record with regard to matters such as are contained within the Chinese Immigration Act. On this whole question I find so many opinions expressed throughout the country that I feel we ought not to make hurried proposals in this regard. There are as many opinions on the sub­ ject as there are writers and commentators, but all do not seem to realize the responsibility involved. Our law is of a most com­ plex nature, and the subject is so important that we must proceed surely and steadily and not allow ourselves to be hurried in deal­ ing with the matter. There are so many factors involved that at the moment I simply make this statement to the country in gen­ eral terms, that the whole matter of immigration is under review daily at all times, and we hope that as a result of these delibera­ tions such amendments may be made to our policy that it will not only commend itself to the people of Canada but be conson­ ant with the best interests of our whole economy and the destiny of this nation. After all, it must be realized that the immigration we now take into Canada will have a great effect on the destiny of our country; therefore we must be sure that our ground is sound before we proceed. Many have expressed the view that the Chinese Immigration Act is detrimental to the interests of the Chinese in Canada, and that in view of our position in the united nations and the demo­ cratic way in which we live, we are not justified in maintaining it. Therefore it was felt that as a first step toward an ultimate policy of immigration we ought to repeal the Chinese Immigra­ 1 Bill 10 to amend the Im m ig ra tio n A c t and to repeal the C hinese I m ­ m igration A c t.

Far East and South-East Asia 337

tion Act. We have come to the conclusion that that act should now be repealed. The consequence of its repeal will be that Chinese, citizens of this country, who have resided here will be able to bring their wives and children to this country. Shortly that is what it means. What the effect will be in numbers of those admitted cannot be definitely stated at the moment. The informa­ tion I have is that there are Chinese bom in Canada to the num­ ber of 6,694, and naturalized subjects to the number of 2,055, making a total of 8,749. The remainder, approximately 26,000 Chinese in this country, are not in that position, and many thousands of them are over forty years of age. They may have wives in China, but they are not citizens of this country. The effect of the legislation which the house is being asked to decide upon would be that Chinese who are not citizens of Canada would not have the rights conferred upon those who are Canadian citizens to bring to this country their wives and children under eighteen.

21. THE COMMUNIST TAKEOVER S ta te m e n t b y th e Secreta ry o f S ta te fo r E xtern a l A ffa irs, M r. L . B. P earson (C H C D , N ovem ber 16, 1949, pp. 1838-9).

Mr. L. B. Pearson: This brings me to the present situation in China, a matter which is of course of very great interest, I am sure, to all hon. members. I do not try to minimize the gravity or the magnitude of the recent events in China. A small revolu­ tionary party there, espousing an alien philosophy, looking to the Soviet Union as the author and interpreter of that philosophy and as a guide in international relations, has seized military and governmental power throughout the greater part of China. It has done so, I believe, by riding in on the crest of a wave of a peasant revolt begun more than a hundred years ago in the great Tai-ping rebellion; by building a tough peasant army during the war of resistance to Japan; by exploiting the failures of the national government and by shrewd political manoeuvering in the Chinese manner. The “Central Government of the People’s Republic of China,” as it is called, was proclaimed in Peking on October 1, 1949. Other co-operating parties and individuals are represented in that government, but effective control is held by the Chinese communist party. The new regime has invited recognition from foreign governments on a basis of equality, friendship, respect for territorial integrity and withdrawal of recognition from the national government. The Soviet government and its satellites promptly accorded recognition on this basis. No other state has yet done so.

338 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

What should be our attitude in the face of these profound changes in China? Well, it is not an easy matter to talk about. One must speak of it with a certain amount of hesitation and with I think reservation, as conditions change, and may change again, quickly in that part of the world. But I suggest to you, Mr. Speaker, that the first thing we should do is to try to under­ stand what has happened. We must understand that today China is under the control of a communist party, which professes Marxist-Leninism as its social philosophy, and which has pat­ terned its government on that of the new “popular democracies” of eastern Europe. It will set about, I assume, the introduction in China as soon as it can, of what it will call socialism. This kind of socialism will not be, however, the liberal democratic socialism of western tradition, but the kind called for in com­ munist doctrine. China, as the greatest eastern country to come under com­ munist control, has become significant as a testing ground for the adaptation of Marxist-Leninist principles to the Asian scene and as a base for further pressures against the rest of Asia. Of course we in Canada reject completely the Marxist-Leninist principles espoused by the Chinese communists, but we cannot reject the fact of China and its 450 million people. For seventy-five years Canadians have been in direct contact with the Chinese people. We respect their ancient and humanitarian culture. We admire the cheerful industry of the Chinese peasant. We accept the Chinese as good neighbours across the Pacific with whom we would live on terms of friendship and respect. We are interested in the welfare of the Chinese people as an end in itself and not as a means to somebody else’s end. We know that the problems and sorrows of China cannot be confined within the borders of that ancient land. There is also the continuing friendship by the people of Canada for the people of China which has been expressed in a variety of ways for so many years. We have been asked to recog­ nize the new communist government in Peking which does in fact control a large part of that country. Recognition, of course, does not imply or signify moral approval, it is simply an acknowl­ edgment of a state of affairs that exists. If the fact of communist control of China is demonstrated and an independent - I stress the word “independent” - Chinese government, able to discharge its international obligations, is established there, which is accepted by the Chinese people, then in due course and after consultation with other friendly governments . . . we will . . . have to recog­ nize the facts which confront us. If we indicate, in the future, recognition of the Chinese government, that will not indicate approval of communism in China any more than our recognition of the communist states of eastern Europe indicated approval of

Far East and South-East Asia 339

their form of government. It should, however, safeguard the maintenance of contact between the Canadian and Chinese people, of which I have spoken already. I think it would be inappropriate to leave this subject without saying something about the national government of China, some­ times called the nationalist government - although I hope that all Chinese governments will continue to be nationalist in the broadest and best sense of that word. It is a fact of political life, either domestic or international, that the loser is often made the scapegoat. Whatever the shortcomings of the national govern­ ment of China may have been, whatever were the inadequacies of individual officials to shoulder the grave burdens, and they were grave, that were thrust upon them, we would be wanting in com­ mon decency if we did not acknowledge that that government stood strongly by us as allies in the last war and that they have professed and proclaimed the ideals of our own democratic way of life.

22. RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA (a) S ta tem en t b y th e P rim e M inister, M r. L . S. S t. L a u ren t ( C H C D ,

M arch 25, 1954, pp. 3334-5).

Mr. L. S. St. Laurent: It may be that something more perman­ ent than this cessation of firing across the no-man’s-land between the two forces that are still there will come out of the Geneva conference. If that comes out of the Geneva conference, it may indicate that by negotiating with the same people other causes of world unrest and of uncertainty about the future can be elimi­ nated. So long as that is the only government on the mainland of China, it is only through discussions with that government that any results can be achieved. Now, when will there be sufficient results achieved to make it desirable to consider whether there should be what amounts to diplomatic recognition? That is something this government is not considering at this time . . . . Under present conditions I do not see any reason why we should consider diplomatic recognition of China. But those con­ ditions may change and I think it would be most unfortunate . . . to tie ourselves down by declarations and commitments that would make it impossible for us at any time to come to the conclusion that even the diplomatic recognition of China would not be helpful to peace and security in the world. We are not in that position at the present time, and when I said there was no consideration being given by the government to that kind of recog­ nition at this time I did not mean, as I saw suggested in at least

340 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

one newspaper, that it was just something that had not yet come officially before the cabinet as a cabinet. I meant that I was not thinking of it and I did not know of any of my colleagues who were thinking in terms of diplomatic recognition of China under present conditions. But I felt that none of us were thinking in terms that would make it impossible for us to make the right kind of a decision when, under changed circumstances, a decision had to be made. Of course, that decision would have to be made in such a manner as would not involve flouting the opinion of our allies. We have many allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and we have others whom we can, I think, regard as allies, in the United Nations. It would be something of world concern. I would hope the position taken by Canada would be a position that would be of benefit to the peace and stability of the whole world. We should not attempt to make decisions that do not have to be made. The position at this time is that we are not, under present conditions, contemplating diplomatic recognition of China. We have not, and I do not think we should say at this time or at any other time that there may not be a situation in the future when a government we do not like, a government the complexion of which is quite contrary to all our democratic ideals, and a gov­ ernment which according to the information we have obtained by hearsay - of course we have to rely for our information on what we get by hearsay - seems to have been guilty of many things that we would not condone, may nevertheless have to be recognized. There are other governments with whom we have at the present time diplomatic relations who we think, have done things we could not condone. But they are the governments of those lands and the only governments with whom any dealings in respect of their populations can be had. I think we all hope that there will be, even between these apparently incompatible worlds, the free world and the world made up of countries with communist regimes, some kind of a modus vivendi which will in fact allow us to live, and allow them to live. That would take place, without our interference, without our approval, without our responsibility in any way in the lands we regard as unfortunate, because they are under such regimes. If we do not look upon that as possible, we then have to look upon this state of cold war as something of very long duration, with always the possibilities of its flaring up into something worse than a cold war. . . . the policy of the Canadian government at the present time is to keep an open mind as to whether or not at any time, under any conditions which may develop in the future, there should be recognition of the government which at that time will exist as a matter of fact in China. T hat again is something that I should not

Far East and South-East Asia 341

have put in exactly that language. We should keep an open mind as to when if ever conditions may be such that it will be in the interest of peace and stability in the world to recognize diplo­ matically whatever government happens to be in control of the forccs of China. That I think is the preferable position; but in the meantime whenever there does appear to be an opportunity to remove some of the tension from the international situation by discus­ sions, by meetings and by discussions like that which are called for April 26 in Geneva, I think it is only realistic to feel that the government which is in fact in control of affairs in China has to be there if there is going to be anything accomplished that will produce beneficial results. (b) S ta tem en t b y th e S ecretary o f S ta te fo r E xtern a l A ffa irs, M r. L . B. P earson fo r th e “P eo p le’s S ch o o l” St. F rancis X a v ie r U niversity, A n tig o n ish , N .S ., N o v e m b e r 7 ,1 9 5 4 (DEA, S a n d S , 54/49).

Since the Communist regime was established in Peking on Octo­ ber 1, 1949, the question of its recognition has received wide dis­ cussion in Canada, with honest differences of opinion vigorously expressed. First of all, what is the meaning of this word “recognition”? According to international law, the p r in c ip a l condition which a government must fulfil in order to qualify for diplomatic recogni­ tion is that it exercise effective control over its national territory and have a reasonable prospect of permanence. But there are im­ portant additional factors, such as the extent to which the govern­ ment commands the obedience of the bulk of the population and its willingness to honour its international obligations. To be eligible for recognition a government need not be either demo­ cratic in our sense, or even fully representative of its people. Applying these criteria fourteen countries, outside the Soviet bloc, and including the United Kingdom, have recognized the Peking regime. We are all agreed, I think, that the Communist Government does control the actions of a majority of the Chinese people, whether we or they like it or not. But have the Chinese Commu­ nists shown up to now that they are prepared sincerely to assume the duties and responsibilities of membership in the international community? Furthermore, armed intervention by the Chinese Communist forces in Korea against the United Nations has, to say the least, raised grave doubts as to their peaceful intentions. For these reasons, the Canadian Government has taken the position that unless and until there is some evidence of a genuine disposi­ tion to follow the rules of acceptable international behaviour the Chinese Communist Government has no claim to our formal

342 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

recognition. To specify in advance and in detail the conditions which would have to be met before such recognition could be given is difficult. Indeed, to try to do so would, as I see it, be neither entirely logical or wise, in view of the traditional policy of this and most other free democratic countries of recognizing in our own interest certain Communist and other totalitarian re­ gimes whose democratic and foreign policies are not more to our liking than those of Peking. I would also stress that any recognition of the Peking Govern­ ment does not have to include a commitment to support the hand­ ing over of Formosa to the control of that government. What is involved in this question of recognition is not a simple moral judgment; whether we think the Communist regime is good or bad. So far as I am concerned, I think that any totalitarian re­ gime allied to or working with the international Communist con­ spiracy is bad or worse! There are, however, conflicting con­ siderations which must be carefully calculated in order to deter­ mine what is in the best interests of Canada and of the democratic world; and, indeed, of the subjugated peoples in the Communist countries themselves, who are the first victims of this kind of rule. Up to the present, it has seemed to us that recognition, though it might have certain advantages, would encourage the aggressive tendencies of the Chinese Communists with whom - we should not forget - we have not yet made peace in Korea. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore one very important fact. When problems arise which directly concern China, we have now to deal with the gov­ ernment which is in effective control of the Chinese mainland. It so happens that at this time this effective government of China is the Peking Communist regime. In order to find a solution to the problem of peace in the Far East we have to accept the fact of Communist power in China, just as we accept that fact in the Soviet Union. We recognized, for instance, at Geneva that Korea could not be unified peacefully except through negotiation with the North Korean and Chinese Communist Governments. That is why a Chinese Communist delegation was officially present at that conference. I would say therefore that if the Communist Chinese were sin­ cerely to co-operate in the achievement of peaceful and honour­ able settlements to Far Eastern problems, and were to respect the agreements reached, then formal recognition, which however would not in any sense imply approval, of their Government by Canada could be looked at again. I do not think that we should go further than that in present circumstances. But equally, I do not think that we should tie ourselves down to any rigid commit­ ments that never will we recognizc any Communist Government in China.

Far East and South-East Asia 343

23. TH E FORMOSA STRAITS S ta te m e n t b y the S ecretary o f S ta te fo r E xtern a l A ffairs, M r. L . B. P earson ( C H C D , January 25, 1955, pp. 498-9).

Mr. L. B. Pearson: The President of the United States yesterday sent to Congress an important message dealing with the situation in the Formosa straits. The President’s proposals in this message are, of course, a matter of United States policy. The United States has particular commitments of its own in this area. These, and the effect of the President’s message on them, will now be under con­ sideration by Congress and it would not, of course, be appropriate for me, or for any member of this government, to comment on this aspect of the matter. Although we are not involved in United States commitments in this area, we are of course deeply concerned over the dangerous situation existing there and we, with other free governments, are anxious diat steps should be taken to bring to an end the fighting which has now been taking place for some time along the China coast. In this message the President of the United States referred to the possibility of action by the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire. The United Nations has, in Indonesia, Palestine and in other parts of the world, been successful in bringing to an end fighting which might have had dangerous consequences, and if it could achieve similar results in this case it would be a cause, I am sure, of great satisfaction to us all. If the question is raised in the United Nations - and there are reports that it will soon be raised - this would presumably take place in the security council of which Canada is not at present a member. However, we are being kept informed of developments in regard to the possibility of such a reference, and we are watch­ ing the matter with great interest and some concern. Incidentally, an essential party to any cease-fire of this kind would be the com­ munist government of China, which, though a non-member of the United Nations, would have to be invited, I assume, to participate in the security council deliberations if they were to have any chance of success. Whether this particular government would accept such an invitation is another matter. While it is not proper for me to comment on United States policy in this matter which is now being considered by congress, I think I can say that any move or proposal within the United Nations or through diplomatic channels which could serve to achieve the purpose as stated in the President’s message “to im­ prove the prospects of peace in the area” will be warmly wel­ comed by the parliament and by the people of this country. Before the Korean armistice I expressed on more than one

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occasion in this house the view of the Canadian government that Formosa should be neutralized as far as possible while hostilities continued in Korea. We thought then, and we think now, that the final disposition of Formosa should be a subject to be discussed at a conference on Far Eastern problems which at that time we thought might be held after the cessation of fighting in Korea. That was the view adopted by the political committee of the United Nations general assembly on January 13, 1951. Despite developments since then, it remains the view of the government that the final disposition of Formosa should be dealt with by in­ ternational negotiation, at a conference, if you like, on Far Eastern problems, if one could be held. Certainly, in any decision regard­ ing the future of Formosa the wishes of the people there, which are often forgotten in discussions of this matter, should be a primary consideration. Pending such a decision I think that a strong case can be made for the neutralization of Formosa both in order to prevent any assault upon it by communist forces and also so that it will not be used as a base for invasion of the main­ land. In this area of tension and danger a distinction can validly be made between the position of Formosa and the Pescadores and the islands off the China coast now in nationalist hands. The latter are indisputably part of the territory of China; the former, For­ mosa and the Pescadores, which were Japanese colonies for fifty years prior to 1945 and had had a checkered history before that, are not. I suggest therefore that the considerations which recom­ ment the neutralization of Formosa and the Pescadores do not necessarily apply to the coastal islands so close to the mainland and a hundred miles or so away from Formosa. Therefore, I wel­ come that part of the President’s message which looks to the re­ deployment of the nationalist forces which are now in these islands. “Some of these forces,” the President’s message states, “are scattered throughout smaller off-shore islands as a result of historical rather than military reasons directly related to defend­ ing Formosa.” My understanding of the basis of a truce or cease-fire is that neither the nationalists, the government of China which we recog­ nize, nor the communists need be asked to give up their claims on the territory now held by the other side. What they would be asked to give up of course is the use of military means to achieve their aspirations. In other words, negotiations for a cease-fire need not involve any question of the final disposition of the terri­ tory in dispute; for in our view this is a suitable matter for inter­ national negotiation at a later date through the United Nations or otherwise. I am sure this house will particularly welcome the closing para­ graph of the President’s message which is as follows:

Far East and South-East Asia 345

Our purpose is peace. That cause will be served if we de­ monstrate our unity and our determination. In all that we do we shall remain faithful to our obligations as a member of the United Nations to be ready to settle our international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

X . C O M M O N W E A L T H R E L A T IO N S ’

A.

T h e N a tu re o f th e C o m m o n w e a lth

~ The principle of autonomy of Commonwealth members in exter­ nal as well as internal affairs was well established before the outbreak of war in 1939, even if there was still some tidying up to do on procedure. In the early stage of Commonwealth development, not­ ably in peace negotiations in 1919, an effort had been made to preserve the diplomatic unity of the Commonwealth by developing procedures for the collective control of foreign policy, at least in major issues of world affairs, but the autonomist school, of which Mackenzie King was a conspicuous leader, won out. Separate representation of the Dominions in the League of Nations had been established from the outset; in this and other areas the Dominions were developing separate foreign policies, as well as separate diplo­ matic services, before the Second World War and, indeed, when war broke advice was tendered the crown separately by the Dominion governments - advice from the Irish Government being that Ireland would remain neutral. During the war the principle of autonomy of Commonwealth members in foreign policy tended, however, to be obscured by the practice of summit conferences of the Big Two (or Three or Four as the case might be) where major issues of policy were decided and the lesser allies subsequently informed. As we have seen (Chapters I and II) the war-time practice of decision by the Big Powers was carried on into peace-making, and it coloured the thinking in some quarters about the Commonwealth’s position in the post-war world. In January, 1944, Lord Halifax, British Ambassador in Washington and formerly Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a notable speech in Toronto raised the issue: If in the future, Britain is to play her part without assuming burdens greater than she can support, she must have with her in peace the same strength that has sustained her in this war. Not 1 F o r further reading see: Mansergh, Nicholas, D o c u m e n ts and Sp eech es on B ritish C o m m o n w ea lth A ffa ir s 1931-52, Vols. I, II; S u rvey o f B ritish C o m m o n w ea lth A ffa irs 1931-52.

Comm onwealth Relations 347

Great Britain only, but the British Commonwealth and Empire must be the fourth power in that group upon which, under Provi­ dence, the peace of the world will henceforth depend.2 Lord Halifax was careful to state that he did not suggest any return to the colonial era, but rather that every effort should be made to achieve a common policy, “in foreign policy, in defence, in economic policy, in colonial questions, and in communications.” Mackenzie King was shaken by the speech which seemed to re-open a battle over centralization of the Commonwealth that he thought he had won years before. He told the Governor General, If it were not for the war, I would this evening be asking for a dis­ solution of Parliament to appeal to the people on this issue.3 But he contented himself with answering Lord Halifax obliquely a few days later in Parliament (doc. 1). The issue was raised again by Churchill in the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers which met a few weeks later in London when discussing representation of the Commonwealth in the council of the proposed world organization. It was again shot down by King who seems to have had general support from other Prime Ministers, especially from General Smuts (doc. 3). It was to be raised again in the Canadian Parliament in the debate on the proposed United Nations, but it had little support.4 ~

1. CONSULTATION BETWEEN COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS S ta te m e n t b y the P rim e M in ister, M r. W . L . M a c k e n zie K in g (ex­ tracts) (C H C D , January 31, 1944, pp. 39-42).

A t that conference [Prime Minister’s Conference, 1937] I made a statement of Canada’s position in regard to imperial con­ ferences, and the place that they occupy in settling matters of policy. I will read it to the house because it is the position which, if I were attending a conference of prime ministers later in the year, as I may, I would wish to maintain at that time. The task of an imperial conference has been well defined as that of considering whether the several governments represented, while preserving their individual rights of decision and action, can co-ordinate their various policies in such a way as to assist 2 Pickersgill, J. W., T h e M a c k e n zie K in g R ecord, Vol. I, p. 637. 3 Ib id ., p. 638. 4 See above, C hapter I, doc. 4.

348 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

one another, and help forward the cause of peace. Its function is not to formulate or declare policy. The value of this, as of other imperial conferences, lies mainly in the free exchange of informa­ tion and opinion; in furnishing the representatives of the several governments with more adequate knowledge of the problems, the difficulties, the aspirations, the attitudes of other members of the British commonwealth of nations; and in giving that direct and immediate understanding of the national and personal factors in the situation which cannot well be obtained by correspondence or indirect communication. With this further knowledge in their possession, the representatives of each government, in consulta­ tion with their colleagues and their respective parliaments, are in the best of positions to formulate policies on questions where co-operation is required. It will be seen that at all the conferences I have mentioned, it was clearly stated that the governments and parliaments of the different countries represented would formulate and decide their own policies, that the conferences were for purposes of consulta­ tion to help to make co-operation more effective in the co­ ordinating of policies. It was not for the conferences to formulate policies. I wonder very much whether those who are speaking about more effective consultation, co-operation and co-ordination, be­ gin to appreciate how much has been achieved in that direction, how completely there are existing throughout the British com­ monwealth of nations today most effective means of consultation and of co-operation in everything that affects policy, whether it is foreign policy or defence, or communications, or any other par­ ticular matter. Let me very quickly mention just what some of those means are. In the first place there is the communication which takes place between the governments of the different countries. This govern­ ment receives every day several communications from the Secre­ tary of State for Dominion Affairs bringing to our attention mat­ ters that are of concern to the different nations of the common­ wealth. Our government communicates every day more or less, I think I can say every day, and sometimes sends several messages in a day, to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs giving our views in these matters. There is direct communication between the prime ministers of the different nations of the commonwealth. The Prime Minister of Great Britain communicates direct with the Prime Minister of Canada, as he does with the Prime Minister of Australia and other nations of the commonwealth, and I com­ municate direct with him or with them when the situation is im­ portant enough to have these direct communications in addition to the messages which are sent through the Department of Ex­ ternal Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

Comm onwealth Relations 349

Then there is present in Ottawa a representative of the British government in the person of the high commissioner, formerly a very distinguished member of British cabinets. The high com­ missioner of the United Kingdom is in a position to communicate direct with the members of the government, with myself person­ ally, as he does very frequently, or with officials of the Depart­ ment of External Affairs, on matters on which it is desirable to have fuller information than that which is likely to come in formal dispatches. But more than that we have also our high commisioner in Great Britain, and our high commissioner is in a position to bring to the attention of the Prime Minister and other ministers of Britain matters on which we feel we should like to give fuller information than is contained in more formal communications. The practice has grown up during the present war of having the high commissioners of all parts of the British empire resident in London meet daily with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. He has present with him on most occasions a representa­ tive of the foreign office, and at these interviews which take place between the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, who has been sitting in the cabinet at Downing street, there is communi­ cated to the high commissioners what is important in reference to interimperial relations and matters of common concern with re­ spect to the war. A complete system of representation by high commissioners in different parts of the empire has grown up since the beginning of this war. Canada has had her high commissioner in Britain for many years, and we received the high commissioner from Great Britain for the first time in 1928. Since the outbreak of war, Can­ ada has appointed high commissioners to all the self-governing dominions. We have our high commissioners in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland and Newfoundland. These coun­ tries (except Newfoundland) have their high commissioners here in Ottawa. In addition to that we have ministers or ambassadors in a num­ ber of the leading capitals. Our ministers are in touch with the ministers or the ambassadors there from other parts of the com­ monwealth and are in a position to gather a great deal of informa­ tion which is communicated to the government at Ottawa, mat­ ters of common interest and concern; therefore, in all of these particulars there is from day to day the fullest and most complete kind of consultation. I should add that in addition to all of these communications which take place over the wires there are frequent visits by minis­ ters from different nations of the commonwealth, particularly from Great Britain to Canada and frequent visits by our ministers to Great Britain. Scarcely a month goes by that we have not the honour of meeting either here or in Washington or elsewhere a

350 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

minister of the British government who is on this continent on some important mission. Take the relations between Mr. Churchill and myself. I have had several meetings with Mr. Churchill since the war began, some of them at Washington, some in England and some here in Canada. All of this is a very much changed con­ dition from what existed prior to the war. Means of travel have been so perfected that a minister can cross from Canada to Britain or vice versa in less than a day, and when any question comes up on which we feel it is necessary to have immediate personal con­ sultation we arrange to see that personal consultation is brought about here or overseas. I should add in addition to that what I think is most important of all, and it is an answer to those who talk about having some imperial council that is going to decide commonwealth policies. We have today a continuing conference of cabinet councils of the commonwealth, a continuing conference of cabinets of the com­ monwealth dealing with matters of common concern. Let me ex­ plain what I mean. When any question comes up that is of com­ mon concern to the commonwealth in whole or in part, a com­ munication comes, say from London, if that is the source at which the question arises, to our government. A similar communication is sent to the premiers of other governments of the commonwealth. Immediately I am in a position, as Prime Minister, to take that particular question before my colleagues in the cabinet; and when I give advice to the British government on any matter I am not giving advice by myself alone, in the atmosphere of London, but I am giving advice based on what judgment I am able to form after consulting with the members of the government from all parts of Canada, each of whom has his immediate responsibility to this parliament of Canada which has its responsibility to the people of Canada. I ask: how can conferences between cabinets be carried out more effectively than that? The objection I have to going over to London to imperial con­ ferences to try to settle policies, if that should be the object, is that I am at a complete disadvantage in those circumstances; and when I speak of myself it is quite impersonal; I am referring to anyone who holds the office of Prime Minister of Canada. The Prime Minister attending in London meets an entire cabinet. He may be entirely alone. He has not with him all his colleagues; he has with him very few colleagues, unless the business of his own country is to be neglected while he is away. More than that, how­ ever, he is without his expert advisers, who are much needed in dealing with great questions of peace or war. On the other hand every minister of the cabinet in London has his expert advisers, when a certain issue is up for discussion, either seated beside him or in an adjoining room, and he is in a position to command their views on any suggestion that may be made. Further, he is in a

Comm onwealth Relations 351

position to confer with all his colleagues and make his statement to the conference based upon opinions formed in that way. As I say, unless one is prepared to take with him colleagues and ex­ perts, and to allow the government of Canada to be carried on minus these responsible ministers and officials while an imperial conference is being conducted, one is not in a position to discuss matters as they should be discussed, and in the light of the re­ sponsibilities of the situation, as one would wish to discuss them. But when, as today, we have this system under which every question brought up is discussed fully in the cabinets of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Great Britain; when views are interchanged within a very short time, what more effec­ tive means could possibly be found of obtaining a consensus of view, an approach toward common policy, and a co-ordination of policies? I am one hundred per cent for close consultation, close co-operation and effective co-ordination of policy on all matters of common concern between the different nations of the British commonwealth. By all means let us within the British common­ wealth be as united as we possibly can in thought and action, but let us seek in regard to other countries also to effect a closer co-operation and co-ordination of policies, which will make for the sort of world organization we hope to see prevail in future in this world . . . . A concrete issue in external policy has been raised in recent speeches delivered by Lord Halifax and Field Marshal Smuts. It relates to the domination of certain great powers. Both speeches expressed the view that the future peace of the world depended on the attainment of an equal partnership in strength and influence between the great powers among the united nations. Both took the position that the resources and man-power of the British isles were too small to enable the United Kingdom to compete with the United States and the Soviet Union in power and authority after the war. Both, therefore, argued that it was necessary that the United Kingdom should have the constant support of other countries, in order to preserve a proper balance. Field Marshal Smuts thought that this might be achieved by a close association between the United Kingdom and “the smaller democracies in western Europe” ; he had little to say of the place of the British commonwealth as such. Lord Halifax on the other hand declared: Not Great Britain only, but the British commonwealth and empire, must be the fourth power in that group upon which, under Providence, the peace of the world will henceforth de­ pend. With what is implied in the argument employed by both these eminent public men I am unable to agree. It is indeed true beyond question that the peace of the world

352 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

depends on preserving on the side of peace a large superiority of power, so that those who wish to disturb the peace can have no chance of success. But I must ask whether the best way of attain­ ing this is to seek a balance of strength between three or four great powers. Should we not, indeed must we not, aim at attaining the necessary superiority of power by creating an effective inter­ national system inside which the co-operation of all peace-loving countries is freely sought and given? It seems to me not to be a matter of matching manpower and resources, or, in other words, military and industrial potential, between three or four dominant states. What we must strive for is close co-operation among those great states themselves, and all other like-minded countries. Behind the conception expressed by Lord Halifax and Field Marshal Smuts there lurks the idea of inevitable rivalry between the great powers. Could Canada, situ­ ated as she is geographically between the United States and the . Soviet Union, and at the same time a member of the British com­ monwealth, for one moment give support to such an idea? The Moscow declaration on general security forecast a system which would involve for its effectiveness, firm commitments by all peace-loving states to do their share in preserving peace. Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union were all represented at the Moscow conference. What would seem now to be suggested is that the prime Canadian commitment should be to pursue in all matters of external relations - “in foreign policy, defence, econ­ omic affairs, colonial questions and communications,” to cite the words of Lord Halifax - a common policy to be framed and executed by all the governments of the commonwealth. I main­ tain that apart from all questions as to how that common policy is to be reached, or enforced, such a conception runs counter to the establishment of effective world security, and therefore is opposed to the true interests of the commonwealth itself. We are certainly determined to see the closest collaboration continue between Canada, the United Kingdom and other com­ monwealth countries. Nothing that I am saying should be con­ strued as supporting any other view than this. Collaboration in­ side the British commonwealth has, and will continue to have, a special degree of intimacy. When, however, it comes to dealing with the great issues which determine peace or war, prosperity or depression, it must not, in aim or method, be exclusive. In meeting world issues of security, employment and social standards we must join not only with commonwealth countries but with all likeminded states, if our purposes and ideals are to prevail. Our commitments on these great issues must be part of a general scheme, whether they be on a world basis or regional in nature. We look forward, therefore, to close collaboration in the in­ terests of peace not only inside the British commonwealth, but also with all friendly nations, small as well as great.

Comm onwealth Relations 353

2. THE MEANING OF CONSULTATION S ta te m e n t b y the P rim e M in ister, M r. W . L . M a c k e n zie K in g (ex­ tracts) (C H C D , June 4, 1947, p. 3772).

I think it is important that the house should understand exactly what is expected of dominion governments in matters of consulta­ tion with the government of the United Kingdom . . . Commonwealth governments keep each other informed on matters of foreign policy in accordance with the practice described by Mr. Attlee, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, in the House of Commons in London, on May 8, 1946___ He said: It is our practice and our duty as members of the British commonwealth to keep other members of the Commonwealth fully and continuously informed of all matters which we are called upon to decide but which may affect Commonwealth in­ terests. The object is to give them an opportunity of express­ ing their views in confidence, if they so desire. These views are taken fully into account, but the decision must be ours, and the other governments are not asked, and would not wish, to share the responsibility for it. Dominion governments follow the same practice.

3. COMMONWEALTH REPRESENTATION IN A WORLD ORGANIZATION M r. M a c k e n zie K in g o n discussion in th e P rim e M in isters’ C o n fer­ ence, 1 9 4 4 (J. W. Pickersgill, T h e M a c k e n zie K in g R eco rd , Vol. I,

pp. 678-9).1

Mackenzie King did, however, attend two important meetings with the other Prime Ministers during this week. The first was on May 9 when Eden spoke on post-war settlement and Churchill put foward a paper which he had drafted. We had a very important dis­ cussion. Churchill stressed very strongly the desirability of a United States of Europe and Regional Councils in Asia and America. Eden put more emphasis on central organization and other regional councils evolving from them. I spoke out em­ phatically about the danger of beginning with Regional Coun­ cils as in all probability leading - certainly in the case of America - to the continent taking more or less an isolationist position, being concerned with its own affairs. To keep the world as united as possible, the emphasis must be on a central 1 Quoted by kind permission o f author and publisher.

354 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

organization. I also spoke of the need of giving small nations recognition in some way, and not merely to Great Powers, and hinted at the desirability of Britain being represented in her own right at the Central Council, but not as representing the entire Commonwealth and Empire. All of this ran, of course, counter to Churchill’s own wishes. I had previously mentioned to him privately that I did not think Canada should represent Britain on any Council in North America. That she should have her own representation. The other meeting was on the morning of the day (May 11) he addressed the British Parliament. This session was devoted to world organization which involved the “important issue of whether representative on World Organization was to be of British Empire and Commonwealth as Churchill was anxious to have it, or Britain alone. I had myself to assert that the United Kingdom should be represented - be entitled to representation on the World Council of itself. I used the parallel of what was going on in the war. We had acccptcd the leadership of Churchill and Roosevelt but had been in consultation, etc. We would wish to have our own right of representation, if not as one of the big three or four, at least as one of the medium powers that would be brought into the World Organization in some relation which would recognize that power and responsibility went together and recognize our in­ dividual position. “When all were assembled in the Council Chamber,” Mackenzie King wrote, it looked for a while as if no one would wish to say anything. Churchill rather hesitated to begin discussion. Eden did not wish to open up particularly. There seemed to be some doubt as to just what was to be discussed. Finally both Curtin and Fraser spoke of having prepared some written statements which would set out their respective positions on the memorandum regarding world organization, whereupon I at once chipped in and said I also had a statement. As someone had indicated I should begin the discussion, I started in and read the statement through from beginning to close. A t the end of it, Churchill asked me if he could have the statement to be printed. He stated there were parts of it which ran counter to his views. What he is most concerned about is establishing a United States of Europe as a Regional Council. He has evidently brought in the Council of Asia and America to help balance what he has in mind. He spoke very eloquently of the necessity of Europe saving itself and not being a perpetual chaos; of trying to get Russia in with the rest of Europe, saying quite frankly that he did not want the polar bear coming from the white snows of the steppes of Russia to the white cliffs of Dover. T hat he greatly

Commonwealth Relations 355

feared this possibility and the total destruction of Europe, un­ less, in some way, Russia could be brought into a European United States. He saw great difficulties but he spoke very deeply and earnestly of the appalling dangers in the position which will follow the war. He mentioned, among other things, not only the power and military genius of Russia but also their inventive genius. Said they had gone as far as the British in their inventions. I know what he had in mind, and if any de­ velopments continued on those lines, there would be nothing left but the most terrible of wars within another generation. He is anxious to have Germany in such a United States; though it might be terrible to say, he would like this within five years. Curtin and Fraser each made their contributions, but what pleased me most of all was that Smuts followed immediately after what I had said and backed up what I had said as to the necessity of each part of the Commonwealth maintaining its own identity and being represented in its own right, the danger of anyone speaking with a single voice for the Empire and Commonwealth. It was the hardest battle of the Conference thus far because it required very straight and direct talking to and differing from Churchill on the things he feels most deeply about. The truth is, as he speaks of Communism, etc., being a religion to some people, the British Empire and Commonwealth is a religion to h im .. . . I think Eden was very pleased with what I said. I think all of those who are liberal-minded in matters of trade were equally so. Churchill himself and die-hard Tories and others like Amery will be unmoved and disappointed. However, while Curtin did say a few words about the need of there being some­ thing like an Empire policy, on the whole, he and Fraser were with me, Fraser particularly so.

4. CONSULTATION ABOUT INDIA Statement by the Prime Minister, Mr. XV. L. Mackenzie King (ex­ tracts) (CHCD, June 4, 1947, pp. 3771-2). Mr. Gordon Graydon: May I ask the Prime Minister if he is in a position to give the house a full statement with respect to the situation in India? . . . Right Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King: May I say to my hon. friend that I would hesitate very much even to pretend to be able to make a full statement with respect to the situation in India. I believe it is one of the most critical and delicate situations existing in any part of the world today. However I was asked yesterday by the press if I had any comment to make with respect to the statement of the

356 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom as to what was proposed between the British government and India. I did give the press a statement, and I think perhaps I could not answer my hon. friend’s question better than to give the house just what I said at that time. I said this: The peoples of India may be assured of the sympathetic understanding and good will of the government and people of Canada in their efforts to achieve self-government. It is of the utmost importance to the future peace and pros­ perity of other countries, as well as of India, that this end should be peacefully achieved. It may be taken for granted that once the Indian people as well as their leaders, have reached agreement on their future political status, they will find Canada generously predisposed towards self-government. The result may be to enlarge the number of states within the British commonwealth. Mr. M. J. Coldwell: Mr. Speaker, I think the house should associate itself with that sentiment, which says in effect that Can­ ada would be pleased to do everything she can to welcome into the family of the commonwealth the nation which we hope will now emerge in India. Mr. T. L. Church: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask a question of the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs. An answer was given on Monday with respect to this same matter. I was told by the Secretary of State for External Affairs that we had a representative in India now, and that we would be informed if anything happened. Now we find that every, thing was consented to by the government of Canada; is that cor­ rect? Is the statement made by the minister at page 3708 of Han­ sard a correct statement? - because at that time the minister indi­ cated the government had no knowledge of the matter at all. Surely the government must appreciate that the House of Com­ mons cannot know anything about it unless it is informed. Mr. Mackenzie King: I have no doubt my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for External Affairs [Mr. St. Laurent] may wish to say a word about this. If I understood my friend the hon. mem­ ber for Broadview correctly he said there had been a statement to the effect that everything that had taken place in respect of de­ velopments in India had been consented to by the government of Canada. He wishes to know, as I understood him, whether that is correct and, if so, why the house was not informed. May I reply by saying our government was kept informed by the government of the United Kingdom with respect to certain negotiations be­ tween the government of the United Kingdom and representatives from India. After what has now been made public as the agree­ ment reached between them, our government was asked if we

Comm onwealth Relations 357

wished to make any comment. It would not be correct to say that we had been consulted during the negotiations because we were not consulted, but we were asked if we wished to make any com­ ment. I have no exception to take to that method of procedure, because I do not think any other method would have been possible in the circumstances. The reply which I have just given to the house will indicate the attitude which our government took in replying to the govern­ ment of the United Kingdom as to what Canada’s position would likely be in the event of new dominions being formed in India as a result of the negotiations that have been taking place.

5. THE COMMONWEALTH AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN ASIA AND THE WEST T e x t o f broadcast fr o m L o n d o n by th e P rim e M in ister, M r. L . S. S t. L a u ren t, on January 10 , 1951 (extracts) (D E A , S a n d S , January

10, 1951). The Commonwealth is not a political unit. It is not an alliance. It has no common policy. The nations of the Commonwealth make their own separate decisions in world affairs and none of them is prepared to give up that right. But they have, none the less, a com­ munity of interest on matters that really count. All the nations of the Commonwealth have a common attachment to certain political ideals, such as the maintenance of a large measure of freedom for the individual within the community, and the up­ holding of genuine control by the citizens over their Governments. Underlying both these conceptions is the view that nations, large or small, have a right to order their own affairs in their own way, so long as they do not menace the freedom or existence of their neighbours. There is nothing exclusive about these Common­ wealth ideals. They are , in fact, ideals which could, with advan­ tage to the world, be extended to all other nations. Indeed, I be­ lieve the Commonwealth relationship has created in all its mem­ bers a habit of understanding and co-operation which makes it easier for our nations and our Governments to work with other nations and other Governments, whether inside or outside the Commonwealth, to further whatever common interest they may have. It follows that there is no conflict between membership in the Commonwealth and membership in the United Nations and in the North Atlantic Alliance. While only two nations of the Com­ monwealth belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization there can be no question that the success of our efforts in this alliance will benefit every nation of the Commonwealth and that its existence is a source of strength to the Commonwealth.

358 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

In the years since the close of the second world war, the Com­ monwealth has undergone a profound change. Up till the war, the Commonwealth was composed of nations, apart from the United Kingdom, geographically outside Europe but predomi­ nantly European in their origins and in the basic character of their institutions. Since 1945 three great Asian nations have been in­ cluded within the Commonwealth circle as absolutely equal part­ ners. Now we can see that one of the aims of world communism is to stir up strife between Asia and the western world and there­ by to gain control of the forces of nationalism for its own pur­ poses. Within the Commonwealth, on the other hand, we are seek­ ing, on a basis of complete equality and mutual respect, to estab­ lish and maintain friendship, understanding and co-operation between Asia and the west. If we succeed in making the Common­ wealth a genuine bridge of understanding between the east and the west, the day may come when we will look back on the achievement of the freedom and independence of India, Pakistan and Ceylon as the greatest event in Commonwealth history. Free­ dom and independence for all the nations of Asia must be encour­ aged and supported if there is to be any hope of peace and security in our generation. We in the west must prove by our actions as well as by our words that we genuinely recognize the equality of all nations, Asian as well as western. That, I am convinced, is the only foundation on which we can build a stable relationship, and that, I am sure, is the most important task of the Commonwealth in the world today. The building of a new bridge of understanding between the east and the west is of the utmost importance not only for the Commonwealth but for the whole world, and all of us in the Com­ monwealth, with our historic associations, can do much to remove dangerous misunderstandings which so obviously do exist be­ tween the east and the west. These meetings of Prime Ministers of the nations of the Commonwealth, which I am attending now, are giving those of us from the western countries an opportunity to explain, in a friendly atmosphere, our real aims and the real motives behind our policies. They also give us the opportunity to learn from the Prime Ministers of the Asian members of the Com­ monwealth what are the real motives and implications of their aims and their policies.

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B . T h e In d e p e n d e n c e o f In d ia , P a k is ta n , C e y lo n , a n d B u rm a ~ By 1939 India, Ceylon and Burma were well on the way to selfgovernment. After the Japanese over-ran Burma and consequently threatened India, the British Government sent a mission headed by Sir Stafford Cripps to India with an invitation to the Indians to set up a Constituent Assembly as soon as the war was over to draft a constitution for a fully autonomous India. The Cripps mission was not well received by the Indians who wanted immediate action. Due to the exigencies of war, no further progress was made until 1945. As a sequel to the war, nationalism reached a high peak in Asia. In India the situation was further complicated by intense friction between Hindus and Muslims. After various unsuccessful attempts to reconcile the views of the Congress Party and the Muslim League, and the consequent failure of a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution for all India, the British Government in 1947 transferred power to two successor authorities (India and Pakistan) on a Dominion status basis. This transfer did not prejudice the right of the Indian Constituent Assemblies to decide whether or not the part of India in respect of which they will have authority will remain within the British Commonwealth. Independence formally came to four Asian states when the British Parliament passed three independence acts - the Indian Independ­ ence Act (1947) which set up the separate dominions of India and Pakistan, the Ceylon Independence Act (1947) and the Burma Independence Act (1947). Only Burma elected to leave the Com­ monwealth; the others accepted dominion status within the Com­ monwealth. Canada welcomed these changes although carefully avoiding any responsibility for them (docs. 4, 6). It soon became apparent, however, that although India wished to remain in the Commonwealth, the Indian Constituent Assembly would adopt a constitution that would make India a republic. This posed the problem as to how republican status could be reconciled with allegiance to the Crown - the one common constitutional principle which had heretofore united the member states of the Commonwealth. This problem was happily resolved by a Conference of Prime Ministers in 1949 where an agreement was reached by which India could remain a full member; although under the new constitution allegiance to the crown would cease, India freely accepted the King as the symbol of the free association of the

360 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

independent member nations of the Commonwealth and, as such, the Head of the Commonwealth. Canada was in accord with these decisions (docs. 7, 8). ~

6. INDEPENDENCE WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH S ta te m e n t b y th e S ecretary o f S ta te f o r E x te rn a l A ffa irs, M r. L . S. S t. L a u re n t ( C H C D , April 29, 1948, pp. 3441-2).

Mr. L. S. St. Laurent: Our relations with the United Kingdom and the other nations of the commonwealth, will, we always assume, and with good reason, be characterized by what is lacking in the world today, mutual confidence and understanding, frank­ ness and good will. Constitutional issues, once of major import­ ance in commonwealth relations are now virtually things of the past. The principles of equality and complete autonomy are now the accepted postulates of policy for all member states of the commonwealth. The present status of all members is in fact well described in the phrase, now often used as “independence within the commonwealth.” The commonwealth relationship has, however, never been and cannot remain static. The dangers and uncertainties of the world situation have compelled Canada to assume greater responsibili­ ties as a North American nation. For the same reasons the United Kingdom has boldly assumed the leadership in reorganizing the security and increasing the economic stability of western Europe. Australia and New Zealand are likewise greatly concerned about security in the south western Pacific. Yet the assumption of special regional responsibilities by commonwealth nations has not weakened their general and close association. The strength of this commonwealth association rests not in exclusive defence or economic arrangements among its members. Indeed in time of peace formal defence arrangements have been singularly lacking. The greatest strength of the commonwealth bond is the adherence of its members to its common ideals, their common political heritage which assures mutual understanding without the necessity of formal instruments of association; their common interest in promoting and defending their democratic way of life. These ties persist in spite of all changes in the world situation. Common dangers serve but to strengthen them. The commonwealth has twice proved its worth as a powerful instru­ ment for the preservation of freedom for its members and for mankind. As such it remains. A most significant change in membership in the common­ wealth has occurred during the past year. What was once the empire of India has disappeared. In its place are three new

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nations of the commonwealth, India, Pakistan and Ceylon; while a dependency of the late Indian empire, Burma has severed formal ties and became a separate republic. I think the good relations will continue. The India Independence Act and the Ceylon Independence Act passed last year, as members know, were but the final steps in the transfer to Indian peoples of the right of self-government which began many years ago. It is a matter of rejoicing among men of good will everywhere that the final stage was accom­ plished, not only without resort to violence, but with such evident good will and respect on either side. History scarcely affords a parallel of an imperial power abdicating sovereignty over sub­ ject peoples so generously and so speedily as Britain has done in India. . . . Under the Indian Independence Act, India and Pakistan have the right to leave the commonwealth if they so desire. We hope that they will not choose to do so, though the choice is solely theirs. The people of Canada esteem their membership in the commonwealth not merely for reasons of sentiment or tradition, but for its positive advantage. In a world in which the values and virtues of our civilization are in jeopardy, this association of free nations is both a moral and a material bulwark against the forces of disorder and oppression. It is to be hoped that the peoples of India and Pakistan, like the people of Canada, will continue to find the commonwealth a worthwhile club to which to belong. But whatever their decision we wish them well, in the great future that is unfolding for them. We wish to be their friends.

7. A REPUBLIC WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH S ta te m e n t b y the P rim e M in ister M r. L . S . S t. L a u re n t (C H C D ,

April 27, 1949, pp. 2654-5).

During the past week the Prime Ministers of the United King­ dom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs have met in London to exchange views upon the important constitutional issues arising from India’s decision to adopt a republican form of constitution and her desire to continue her membership of the commonwealth. The discussions have been concerned with the effects of such a development upon the existing structure of the commonwealth and the constitutional relations between its members. They have been conducted in an atmosphere of goodwill and mutual under­ standing, and have had as their historical background the tradi­ tional capacity of the commonwealth to strengthen its unity of

362 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

purpose, while adapting its organization and procedures to chang­ ing circumstances. After full discussion the representatives of the Governments of all the commonwealth countries have agreed that the con­ clusions reached should be placed on record in the following declaration: The Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Aus­ tralia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon, whose countries are united as members of the British com­ monwealth of nations and owe a common allegiance to the Crown, which is also the symbol of their free association, have considered the impending constitutional changes in India. The Government of India have informed the other govern­ ments of the commonwealth of the intention of the Indian people that under the new constitution which is about to be adopted India shall become a sovereign independent republic. The Government of India have however declared and affirmed India’s desire to continue her full membership of the common­ wealth of nations and her acceptance of the king as the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the head of the commonwealth. The governments of the other countries of the common­ wealth, the basis of whose membership of the commonwealth is not hereby changed, accept and recognize India’s continuing membership in accordance with the terms of this declaration. Accordingly, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan and Ceylon hereby declare that they remain united as free and equal members of the commonwealth of nations, freely co-operating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress. 8. COMMENTS ON THE PRIME MINISTERS’ CONFERENCE ON INDIA S ta tem en t b y th e Secretary o f Sta te fo r E xtern a l A ffa irs, M r. L . B. P earson ( C H C D , N ovem ber 16, 1949, p. 1834).

The meeting of prime ministers this April was solely concerned with the important constitutional issues arising from India’s decision to adopt a republican form of constitution, and its desire to continue membership in the commonwealth. These two issues were important and were difficult. But I feel sure all members of this house and the great majority of the Canadian people will be glad to learn they were satisfactorily resolved in London by the adoption of that kind of compromise which, on more than one occasion, has not only prevented the commonwealth from dis­

Commonwealth Relations 363

solving but has actually strengthened it. I hope that this will prove to be true in this case also. In the new commonwealth those of us who wish to retain allegiance to His Majesty can do so with such allegiance un­ impaired. At the same time it has proved possible for a republic to remain within the group by the acceptance of the King as the symbol of the free association of the members of our common­ wealth of nations, and as such the head of the commonwealth. In this connection possibly it would not be inappropriate to refer to a former member of the commonwealth which has adopted the republican form of government and which has followed a course opposite to that chosen by India. I refer, of course, to Ireland, a country which gave the ultimate proof of the independence and freedom which exists in the commonwealth by exercising its right to leave it. Inasmuch as the members of the commonwealth recognize the full sovereignty of each other and the authority of each to conduct its policy in both its domestic and external affairs in the manner of any other foreign state, no member of the commonwealth would, I think, seek to criticize in any way the action taken by the government of the republic of Ireland. At the same time, Mr. Speaker, I think most Canadians were disappointed at the decision that the Irish government found it necessary to take to break those special formal ties which Ireland had with Canada and with the other members of the common­ wealth. There is, of course, no need for us to assure the Irish people of the continuing warmth of the friendship the Canadian people have for them or to assure the Irish government of the desire of the government of Canada to co-operate with it in any useful manner. The changes that have now taken place within the common­ wealth naturally give rise to questions concerning their effect on its future. To the citizens of other countries, Mr. Speaker, it must often seem difficult to appreciate the organization or what might more accurately be called the lack of formal organization of the commonwealth. Certainly, the commonwealth of today is vastly different from the British empire of not so many years ago. I believe most people feel the difference is an improvement. Political and economic factors have produced many changes which, in my own opinion, have not only been to the advantage of the individual members but of the commonwealth as a whole. For example, no longer can there be any suggestion that the public opinion of the vast subcontinent of India is denied full expression in our commonwealth. Now, each Asian member of the commonwealth, and there are three, speaks through its own independent, democratically chosen government. In this way alone, not only has the composition of the commonwealth changed, but so has the nature, if you will, of its institutions, and

364 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

the very nature of its being in a sense. But the change has pro­ vided a bridge between the east and the west and has given us an opportunity of being of great service to the world. Once again, the commonwealth has proven its ability to adapt itself to these changing conditions, something I venture to think - there may be disagreement over this - it could not have done if it had, in earlier times, decided to organize its activities in a fixed, formal and centralized manner.

C . T h e C o lo m b o P la n ~ The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia originated at a meeting of Common­ wealth Foreign Ministers held at Colombo in 1950. A t first it in­ cluded only Commonwealth countries (United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon) but it was quickly joined by the United States, which has been the largest donor, and by non-Commonwealth countries of South-East Asia. Although originally projected for a six-year period it is still in operation (1969) and, indeed, has been greatly expanded. Although called a “plan,” the scheme does not provide for any centralized direction or control of funds. Aid is arranged bilaterally, and is normally either for capital assistance in the form of loans or grants for specific projects or for technical training and assistance. Limits of space prevent including material on the working of the plan over the years covered by this volume. We are concerned rather with the relation to Canadian foreign policy. Documents 9 and 10 cover its origins. Document 11 discusses Canadian policy. Document 12 is a typical bilateral agreement between Canada and a recipient country. ~

9. COMMONWEALTH MEETING ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT COLOMBO JANUARY 9-14 1950 F in a l C o m m u n iq u e January 14, 195 0 (extract) (ed. N. Mansergh D o c u m e n ts a n d S p eech es on B ritish C o m m o n w ea lth A ffa irs 1931-52,

II, p. 1053).

The greater part of this time has been spent in a comprehensive review of the current problems of South-East-Asia, both political and economic.

Comm onwealth Relations 365

It was recognized that in the changing conditions brought about by recent developments in this area, progress depends mainly on the improvement of economic conditions. The Conference was impressed by the magnitude of the con­ tribution which the success of progressive policies in this area could make to the peace and prosperity of the world. Executive decisions are not taken at Commonwealth meetings of this kind, but as a result of the valuable exchange of views which has taken place, recommendations for the furtherance of economic development in South and South-East Asia will be sub­ mitted to Commonwealth Governments for their consideration. These recommendations include a proposal for the establish­ ment of a consultative Committee representing Commonwealth Governments. The Australian Delegation proposed that the first meeting of this Committee, when set up, should be held in Australia . . . . 10. COMMONWEALTH CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AID TO SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA F in al C o m m u n iq u e M a y 1 9 ,1 9 5 0 (Ib id ., pp. 1053-5).

A t the invitation of the Australian Government, a meeting of the British Commonwealth Consultative Committee was held in Sydney between the 15th and 19th May, 1950 and was attended by the representatives of the Governments of Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. The Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Honourable P. C. Spender, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, con­ sidered ways in which they might assist in the development of the countries of South and South-East Asia in co-operation with other interested Governments. This was the important task en­ trusted to them by the Commonwealth Meeting on Foreign Af­ fairs held in Colombo in January 1950, which recommended that steps should be taken urgently to raise living standards and pro­ mote social welfare amongst the peoples of South and South-East Asia, thus enabling this area with its vast potential resources to play an increasing part in fostering human well-being and further­ ing world prosperity. 2. In pursuance of the objectives of the Colombo Conference, the Committee decided that the most effective method of tackling the vast and intricate problems facing the peoples of South and South-East Asia and of meeting their urgent need for economic development would be to start immediately a programme based on action by the Commonwealth Governments which have parti­ cipated in the discussions.

366 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

3. The Committee emphasized the importance of keeping the urgent economic requirements of the area under continuous re­ view. Action to meet these requirements is already being taken by Commonwealth Governments and the Committee would welcome further action which individual Commonwealth Governments might be able to take. In addition recommendations are being made to Governments as follows: (a) development should proceed by progressive stages under a plan covering a period of six years taking account of the needs and resources of individual countries. To this end, a realistic and comprehensive statement of its economic situation and development programme should be prepared by each country by 1st September, 1950. (b ) these statements of the various countries should be con­ sidered at meetings of Governments in London in Septem­ ber 1950. A comprehensive report would then be pre­ pared setting out the needs and resources of countries in the area. The object would be the introduction with the least possible delay of comprehensive plans for a develop­ ment programme of gathering momentum based on all the resources which can be mobilized by the countries concerned and others interested in the area. (c) a Commonwealth technical assistance scheme for the area should be inaugurated within the next few months to organize technical assistance between Governments. The aggregate of assistance involved would be £ , sterling over a period of three years. A Commonwealth Bureau should be set up at Colombo to co-ordinate the work. While it is recognized that there is already a con­ siderable flow of technical assistance through private and governmental channels to the area and that valuable assistance has already been received from the United Nations, the Specialized Agencies and their regional organizations, it is considered that their existing resources in the area require to be supplemented immediately. (d) a formal approach should be made to governments of non-Commonwealth countries in South and South-East Asia informing them of the Committee’s deliberations and of the course of action now contemplated. These govern­ ments should be informed that their full association in the enterprise would be welcomed by the Commonwealth Governments.

8000,000

4. These discussions at Sydney have shown that in the four months since the Colombo meeting much thought and study have been given by Commonwealth Governments to means by which the Colombo resolutions can be translated into a constructive plan

Comm onwealth Relations 367

to deal with the many complex economic problems with which the countries of South and South-East Asia are now faced. All Delegations came to Sydney impressed with a sense of the urgency of the task before them, fully aware that a great co­ operative effort was called for by the countries which have the interests of the people of the area at heart and determined that all efforts should be inspired by the principles of self-help and mutual help, of friendship and equality among the countries.

11. CANADA AND THE COLOMBO PLAN S ta te m e n t b y th e S ecretary o f S ta te fo r E xtern a l A ffa irs, M r. L . B. P earson (C H C D , February 21, 1951, pp. 537-8).

A little over a year ago the Foreign Ministers of the common­ wealth countries met in Colombo to consider many of the urgent political and economic problems then facing Asia. Out of their discussions a consultative committee on south and south-east Asia was created which was charged with examining economic problems of the area and preparing appropriate recommenda­ tions. This committee, which drew its original membership from seven countries, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Canada, met in Sydney last May and in London last September. Its most recent meeting, in Colombo, Ceylon, ended yesterday [Tuesday]. The United States, with the unanimous agreement of the seven original members, recently joined the consultative committee. In announcing his government’s acceptance of this invitation, the Secretary of State in Washington, on January 24 of this year, said that it afforded his country the opportunity “for further co­ operation with the countries of south and south-east Asia in their efforts toward economic and social development.” Representa­ tives of the following non-commonwealth countries also attended the recent meeting in Colombo: Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. During 1950, when the United States was continuing to carry such a heavy burden of foreign aid, it was, I think, appropriate that the commonwealth countries should examine together some of the pressing economic problems of south and south-east Asia. These were not new problems, but they were ones to which the free world had not previously given adequate attention. The commonwealth countries did good work, therefore, in bringing together in one report an analysis of the needs of the countries which comprise four-fifths of the area of south and south-east Asia. Since the Plan was drawn up there have already been significant

368 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

economic changes which are bound to affect its progress, at least in its initial stages. The burden of rearmament, which the western countries have been forced to take on, is having major economic consequences. The prices of many of the raw materials produced in south and south-east Asia have gone up sharply. This advant­ age has been offset to some extent by the rising cost of the goods which the Asian countries must import. Even more serious are the difficulties in obtaining delivery of critically needed goods. Most regrettable, there has been a serious faffing off in India’s food supply owing to drought in some regions, floods in others, and locusts in still others. This has imposed a very real human and economic problem on India. The Colombo Plan calls for a capital development programme in commonwealth countries of south-east Asia totalling about $5 billion over a six-year period starting this year. Of this $5 billion it billion will be raised internally and about is expected that about $3 billion will come from external sources. Private capital is one source, though in the present international situation it cannot be as important as it should be. We also hope that the International Bank will be another source for financing some of the larger pro­ jects. So far as government contributions are concerned, the United Kingdom has announced that its contribution over the six-year period will take the form of sterling balance releases, at a high and fixed rate, grants for colonial development, and loans floated in London, amounting to well over 300 million pounds or more than 900 million Canadian dollars. Australia has announced that it will provide 7 million pounds sterling, that is nearly 21 million Canadian dollars, in the first year; and that over the six-year period its contribution will be not less than 25 million pounds sterling, that is, nearly 75 million Canadian dollars. The Canadian government has been giving very serious con­ sideration to the course of action which should be recommended to parliament. We have been conscious that Canadians, as in­ dividuals - and this has been clearly reflected in the press from one end of the country to the other - wish to contribute to the success of this plan. This desire of the people of Canada, to extend assistance, has also been clearly shown in the debate on the speech from the throne. It was reflected by the remarks of the leader of the opposition, (Mr. Drew) when he expressed his confidence that members of the house would support all prac­ tical measures which will bring hope and encouragement to those who are in such great distress in so many parts of the world. It was reflected also in the remarks of the member for RosetownBiggar, (Mr. Coldwell) when he called the Colombo plan the most imaginative ever adopted by the commonwealth countries. The government therefore authorized Mr. David Johnson, our high commissioner in Pakistan and our delegate to the recent

$2

C omm onwealth Relations 369

meeting of the consultative committee, to state that the Canadian government would ask Parliament to appropriate $25 million as its contribution to the first year of the Plan, provided that it was clear that other contributing countries would be making appro­ priate contributions so that the broad objectives of the Colombo Plan might be realized. The United States representative at the Colombo meeting said that his government welcomed the initiative of the countries participating in the Colombo plan; that the plan itself appeared to offer a basis for genuine economic progress and that the United States intended to co-ordinate to the greatest extent possible the programme it had undertaken, or might undertake, in the area with those programmes under the Colombo plan. I should also inform the house that we are immediately opening discussions with the Indian government to see whether they would wish that some of the funds we provide this year under the Colombo plan should be spent on Canadian wheat for their famine-stricken country. As yet, we do not know exactly what types of wheat, available in Canada, will be of use to India, nor, of course, do we know what next year’s crop will be. However, it is our hope that some wheat may be provided to the govern­ ment of India in connection with the plan. This wheat, I imagine, would be sold by the Indian government to the people of India under its rationing system, where possible and the money so raised could then be devoted to capital developments. In the Colombo Report it is clearly recognized, especially in the case of India, that imports of food as well as imports of capital goods may serve in attaining the objectives of the plan. A t the same time as we open discussions with the Indian authorities we shall open parallel discussions with the Pakistan authorities. In conclusion, . . . perhaps I might read to the house the last sentence of the Colombo report which summarizes so eloquently our hopes for the success of the Colombo plan. In a world racked by schism and confusion it is doubtful whether free men can long afford to leave undeveloped and imprisoned in poverty the human resources of the countries of south and south-east Asia which could help so greatly, not only to restore the world’s prosperity, but also to redress its con­ fusion and enrich the lives of all men everywhere.

370 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

12. CO-OPERATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF PAKISTAN Exchange of Notes, September 10, 1951 (CTS, 1951/18).

I The High Commissioner for Canada in Pakistan to the Deputy Minister for Finance and Economic A (fairs of Pakistan O FFIC E OF TH E HIGH COMMISSIONER KARACHI,

September 10, 1951. S ir ,

I have the honour to refer to recent discussions between the officials of our two governments concerning the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and SouthEast Asia. The officials reached agreement on the general prin­ ciples under which all Canadian assistance to the Government of Pakistan under the plan should be made available. As you know, it is the practice of the Parliament of Canada to vote funds on an annual basis and the amounts provided must be reviewed from year to year. For this year certain funds have been provided for the Colombo Plan and the Government of Canada now wishes to establish agreed principles to guide the activities of our respective governments in the furtherance of the plan. For this purpose I attach a “Statement of Principles agreed between the Government of Canada and the Government of Pakistan for Co-operative Economic Development in Pakistan.” If the attached statement is agreeable to your Government, this note and your reply to that effect will constitute an agree­ ment on this subject, effective from the date of your reply. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, DAVID M. JOHNSON, High Commissioner for Canada. September 10, 1951. COLOMBO PLAN

Statement of principles agreed between the Government of Canada and the Government of Pakistan for cooperative Economic Development of Pakistan. The Governments of Canada and Pakistan, together with other governments, took part in London in 1950 in drawing up the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia. The Governments of Canada and

Commonwealth Relations 371

Pakistan now desire to co-operate for their mutual benefit, and in particular for the achievement of the purposes of the Colombo Plan, by promoting the economic development of Pakistan. Therefore the Governments of Canada and Pakistan now wish to establish agreed principles under which economic aid from Canada will be provided to Pakistan for the purposes of the Colombo Plan, and according to which supplementary agree­ ments may be made to cover specific programmes. The Governments of Canada and Pakistan agree to the estab­ lishment of the following principles: 1. All economic aid supplied by the Government of Canada to the Government of Pakistan under the Colombo Plan shall consist of goods and services in accordance with specific pro­ grammes agreed upon from time to time between the two govern­ ments. Similarly, agreement will be reached on the methods of procurement and transfer. 2. In order that Canadian aid may cover different types of projects, different forms of financing may be used; in particular, Canadian aid will be available on either a grant or a loan basis, depending on the nature of each specific programme and the uses to which the goods and services supplied under it are put. 3. The particular terms of each specific programme will be a matter for agreement between the two governments, subject to the following general provisions: (a) Grants: In any specific programme under which goods financed by grants from the Canadian Government are sold or otherwise distributed to the Pakistan public “counterpart funds” will normally be set aside. The Pakistan Government will set up a special account for these funds and will keep separate rccords of the amounts placed in the account in connection with each specific programme. It will pay into this account the rupee equiv­ alent of the Canadian expenditures on goods and services supplied under any such programme. The Government of Pakistan will from time to time report to the Government of Canada the position of this account and will supply a certificate from the Auditor General of Pakistan. The two governments will from time to time agree on the economic development projects in Pakistan to be financed from this account. (b) Loans: For the specific programmes which are agreed to be appropriate for financing by means of loans the terms of the loans will be determined by the two governments. These terms will relate primarily to the commercial character of the particular project in question, to its anticipated earnings, and to its anticipated effects on the foreign exchange position of Pakistan.

372 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

II The Deputy Minister for Finance and Economic Affairs of Pakistan to the High Commissioner for Canada in Pakistan. M INISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

September 10, 1951. S ir ,

I have your note of today with regard to the recent discussions between representatives of our two governments for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the general principles under which all Canadian assistance to the Government of Pakistan under the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia should be made available. I am glad to confirm that the “Statement of Principles” annexed to your note is acceptable to my Government. Your note and my reply will, therefore, constitute an agreement between our two govern­ ments on this subject. Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consid­ eration. I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, GHAYASUDDIN PATHAN, Deputy Minister for Finance and Economic Affairs.

D . T h e M o n a rc h y a n d th e C o m m o n w e a lth ~ Before the Statute of Westminster 1931, succession to the Throne was governed by statute of the British Parliament and the Royal Style and Titles by prerogative instruments issued on the advice of the United Kingdom Government. In accordance with an agreement reached at the Imperial Conference of 1930 the Statute of West­ minster declared: It is meet and proper to set out by way of preamble to this Act that, inasmuch as the Crown is the symbol of the free association of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and as they are united by a common allegiance to the Crown, it would be in accord the established constitutional position of all the mem­ bers of the Commonwealth in relation to one another that any

Comm onwealth Relations 373

alteration in the law touching the Succession to the Throne or the Royal Style and Titles shall hereafter require the assent as well of the Parliaments of all the Dominions as of the Parliament of the United Kingdom . . . The first change came in 1936 with the abdication of Edward vm; the Abdication A ct was approved by legislation of Dominion parlia­ ments as well as by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. A t the subsequent coronation of George vi a new Coronation Oath, which recognized the King as Head of each of the Commonwealth govern­ ments by name, was administered. This procedure was approved by the individual governments. No further change was made during the war, but the settlement of the question of India’s membership altered the title as far as India was concerned. The accession of Elizabeth n early in 1952 brought matters to a head and at the Prime Ministers’ Conference of that year a new flexible title permitting some variation for each member state of the Commonwealth was agreed to and adopted by legislation and appropriate prerogative instruments. The Royal Style and Title adopted by Canada and the procedure followed are indicated by documents 13, 14, 15, and 16. The statement by Prime Minister St. Laurent discusses the significance of the new title in Commonwealth relationships (doc. 15).

13. PROCLAMATION OF ACCESSION OF ELIZABETH n T e x t o f A ccessio n P rocla m a tion in C anada ( C anada G a zette Febru­

ary 9, 1952).

Whereas it hath pleased Almighty God to call to His Mercy our late Sovereign Lord King George the Sixth of Blessed and Glorious memory by whose decease the Crown of Great Britain, Ireland and all other His late Majesty’s Dominions is solely and rightfully come to the High and Mighty Princess Elizabeth Alexandra Mary, now know Ye that I, the said Right Honourable Thibaudeau Rinfret, Administrator of Canada as aforesaid, assisted by Her Majesty’s Privy Council for Canada do now hereby with one voice and consent of tongue and heart publish and proclaim that the High and Mighty Princess Elizabeth Alexandra Mary is now by the death of our late Sovereign, of Happy and Glorious memory become our only lawful and right­ ful Liege Lady Elizabeth the Second by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the seas Queen, Defender of the Faith, Supreme Liege Lady in and

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over Canada, to whom we acknowledge all faith and constant obedience with all hearty and humble ailection, beseeching God by whom all Kings and Queens do Reign to bless the Royal Princess Elizabeth the Second with long and happy years to Reign over us.

14. COMMUNIQUE FROM COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE ON THE QUEEN’S STYLE AND TITLES ( C o m m o n w ea lth S u rv ey, No. 112, Decem ber 19, 1952.)

The Prime Ministers and other representatives of Common­ wealth countries assembled in London for the Commonwealth Economic Conference have considered the form of the Royal Title. They recognized that the present Title is not in accord with current constitutional relations within the Commonwealth, and that there is need for a new form of Title which will, in particular, reflect the special position of the Sovereign as Head of the Com­ monwealth. They concluded, after full consideration, that in the present stage of development of the Commonwealth relationship, it would be in accord with the established constitutional position that each member country should use for its own purposes a form of Tide which suits its own particular circumstances but retains a substantial element which is common to all. They agreed that the various forms of the Title should, in addition to an appropriate territorial designation, have as their common element the description of the Sovereign as Queen of Her other Realms and Territories and Head of the Commonwealth. The representatives of all the Commonwealth countries con­ cerned have agreed to take, at the earliest convenient opportunity, such action as is necessary in each country to secure the appro­ priate constitutional approval for the changes now envisaged. Her Majesty will then be advised to exercise Her Prerogative power by the issue of Proclamations giving effect to such changes in the Title as may be recommended. It is contemplated that the Proclamations will be issued simultaneously in all the countries concerned. ~ It was also announced that the following were the forms of Title which it was proposed to use in each country: ~ United Kingdom. Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith.

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Canada. Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, Canada and Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith. Australia. Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, Australia and Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith. New Zealand. Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith. South Africa. Elizabeth the Second, Queen of South Africa and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth. Pakistan. Elizabeth the Second, Queen of the United Kingdom and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Common­ wealth. Ceylon. Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Ceylon and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.

15. THE ROYAL STYLE AND TITLES IN THE COMMONWEALTH S ta te m e n t b y th e P rim e M in ister, M r. L . S . St. L a u re n t (C H C D , F e b ru a ry 3, 1953, p p . 1 5 6 6 -8 ).

This is a bill that I consider to be of great importance and I think that it should receive attentive and serious consideration by every hon. member. Section 1 of the bill is to provide that the assent of this parliament is given to the issue by Her Majesty of a proclamation establishing for use for Canada the royal style and title set out: Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, Canada and Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith. That is the text that was agreed to at the prime ministers’ con­ ference held in London last December. There was a general desire to have the royal style and title accord with the constitu­ tional position of the various members of the commonwealth and to have it, in so far as might meet the conditions of the various members of the Commonwealth, as uniform as possible. With respect to some members of the commonwealth there was some difficulty. For instance, with respect to Pakistan it was found that the form that would be acceptable to the people of the

376 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

United Kingdom would be apt to create difficulties with the population of Pakistan. It was also found that such was the case with respect to the population of the Union of South Africa. With respect to Australia, New Zealand and Canada an effort was made to agree upon the acceptance of a form that would be uniform with the exception of the use of the name of the country - in each one. That was finally agreed upon and there was agreement - 1 will not say at whose suggestion; I think it was almost simultaneously suggested by the representatives of the three countries, Canada, Australia and New Zealand - that it would be desirable to retain in the style and title as used in our countries something that would indicate that it was the Sovereign of the United Kingdom who was recognized as the Sovereign of our countries, and that it would be preferable to have that indication appear in the royal style and title rather than to have it merely name each one of our respective countries and to have all the rest of the common­ wealth described as the Queen’s other realms and territories. It seems to me that that is in accord with the historical develop­ ment of our constitutional relations. Her Majesty is now the Queen of Canada but she is the Queen of Canada because she is the Queen of the United Kingdom and because the people of Canada are happy to recognize as their sovereign the person who is the sovereign of the United Kingdom. It is not a separate office. It is the recognition of the traditional development of our in­ stitutions; that our parliament is headed by the sovereign; and that it is the sovereign who is recognized as the sovereign of the United Kingdom who is our sovereign and who is loyally and, I may say, affectionately recognized as the sovereign of our coun­ try. We all felt that it was desirable to have that recognition retained in the title as a proclamation of the historical, traditional link between this country and the United Kingdom; and the same feelings were entertained by the other two prime ministers with respect to their countries. The question then arose whether it would be proper to have in the title we would use the traditional words, “by the grace of God, Sovereign.” We felt that our people did recognize that the affairs of this world were not determined exclusively by the volition of men and women; that they were determined by men and women as agents for a supreme authority; and that it was by the grace of that supreme authority that we were privileged to have such a person as our sovereign. Then perhaps the rather more delicate question arose about the retention of the words “defender of the faith.” In England there is an established church. In our coun­ tries there are no established churches but in our countries there are people who have faith in the direction of human affairs by an all-wise Providence; and we felt that it was a good thing that the civil authorities would proclaim that their organization is such

Comm onwealth Relations 377

that it is a defence of the continued beliefs in a supreme power that orders the affairs of mere men, and that there could be no reasonable objection from anyone who believed in the Supreme Being in having the sovereign, the head of the civil authority, described as a believer in and a defender of the faith in a supreme ruler. . . . The procedure that was discussed was that we would each of us ask our parliaments to acquiesce in the issue of pro­ clamations by Her Majesty herself. It is Her Majesty who will determine, who will announce by proclamation what her Royal style and title will be for each one of the several realms of the commonwealth. It is hoped that these proclamations may be issued simultaneously in the various realms of the commonwealth and in the other parts of the commonwealth that recognize Her Majesty not as their Queen but as the head of the commonwealth. The developments of modern times have been that the sov­ ereign does not exercise the royal prerogative that has come down through the centuries without being sure of the acquiescence of parliament. And it is for the purpose of expressing in advance that our parliament will acquiesce in such a proclamation that this bill is now before the house. In going over the elements of the royal style and title I made no special reference to the head of the commonwealth. I think it is fortunate that, in spite of local situations that appear to make it necessary for the most populous part of the commonwealth no longer to recognize the sovereign of the United Kingdom as the sovereign of its state, but felt that it was necessary for it to adopt a republican form of government with a president as the head of the state, neverthless it wished to maintain the close relation­ ship with the other members of the commonwealth and remain in the commonwealth. I think that the real link between the various members of the commonwealth is their common ideals, their memories of asso­ ciation in the past, their intimate conviction that that association in the past has been for the benefit of their people, and their desire to conserve that association in the future for the benefit of their people. I do not think that we are being presumptuous or conceited when we believe, and even when we express the belief, that this commonwealth group not only works for the benefit of its own peoples but is an effective instrument for the good of free mankind throughout the world. I know that my predecessor had an influential part in the decision that was reached that, in spite of the fact that the situa­ tion in India required the constitution of a republic for that great country, India would remain a part of the commonwealth. I think that the influence he exercised at that time was in the right direc­ tion and that the result was something beneficial to us, beneficial

378 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

to India and also beneficial to free men throughout the world, and that the conservation and development of that feeling of com­ mon ideals, common purposes between the great Republic of India and the other members of the British commonwealth will continue to be of service to free mankind. And it is I think something for which the realistic genius of the British people has reason to be proud, that it can accommodate itself to the require­ ments of new situations in the lives of men and can conserve the essentials without having to conserve forms that to some appear to have become so outmoded that they can no longer be accepted. I think it is a magnificent thing that the peoples of India and the peoples of the Occident can look upon each other as human beings equal in every respect; and I was not going beyond what the fact requires when I said in Ottawa to Mr. Nehru that we hoped and trusted that in spite of the many more centuries of their social experience and civilization there would never be any indication by their own people that they looked down upon us as their inferiors, and that I hoped and trusted that in spite of our rapid development of the industrial processes and industrial know-how there would never be any feeling among the people of India that we thought that because of that we were human beings in any way superior to the millions who inhabited their country. We all know from our own Canadian experience that unity between us, unity between all the elements of our population, is and must be based upon that recognition by us all that we are all equal to each other and that all have the same rights to Canadian citizenship, and that Canadian citizenship gives us equality in every respect with all our fellow-citizens, whatever their origin, their traditions and their cultures may be. It is because our fore­ fathers had the wisdom to recognize that it was not going to be necessary in this Canadian nation to pour all the elements into the same mould that we now have a Canadian nation. We are all proud of being Canadian citizens because we can be so and can exercise all our rights as such without forgetting our racial origins, our ancestral traditions, and without there being any effort by any of our fellow citizens to make us over into any other kind of Canadian than we happen to be because of our racial origins and with our ancestral traditions. That is also something which is now working out in this commonwealth of free peoples. I think it is a solid foundation upon which there can develop and rest equal pride of all of us in our allegiance to a common sovereign. There are those of us who recognize the sovereign of the United Kingdom as our own sovereign. There is a common loyalty between us and the group of which that sovereign is the head only as the head of the com­ monwealth because in their countries the situation that exists does not make it convenient to have a monarchal form of con­ stitutional set-up.

C omm onwealth Relations 379

I believe firmly that what we are doing here today and what others are doing in their respective parliaments will further that ideal of unity of purpose and desire to co-operate that charact­ erizes us at this time and which was so touchingly evident at the meeting of prime ministers which it was my privilege to attend a month and half ago in the city of London.

16. PROCLAMATION OF THE QUEEN’S TITLE MAY 28 1953 ( C anada G a zette, M ay 29, 1953.)

E L I Z A B E T H R. CANADA

ELIZABETH THE SECOND, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas QUEEN, Defender of the Faith. TO ALL OF WHOM these Presents shall Come or whom the same may in anywise concern, GREETING A PROCLAMATION

STUART S. GARSON, WHEREAS the Prime Ministers A ttorney General, and other representatives of ComCanada monwealth countries assembled in London in the month of December, in the year of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fifty-two, considered the form of Our Style and Titles, and, recognizing that the present form is not in accordance with present constitutional relations within the Commonwealth, concluded that, in the present stage of development of the Commonwealth relationship, it would be in accord with the established constitutional position that each member country should use for its own purposes a form suitable to its own particular circumstances but retaining a substantial element common to all; AND WHEREAS the said representatives of all the Common­ wealth countries concerned agreed to take such action as is neces­ sary in each country to secure the appropriate constitutional ap­ proval for the changes then envisaged; AND WHEREAS, in order to give effect to the aforesaid con­ clusions, the Parliament of Canada, under and by virtue of An Act respecting the Royal Styles and Titles, assented to on the eleventh day of February, in the year of Our Lord One thousand nine hundred and fifty-three, has assented to the issue by Us of Our Royal Proclamation under the Great Seal of Canada estab-

380 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

lishing for Canada the Style and Titles hereinafter set forth in lieu of the Style and Titles at present appertaining to the Crown NOW KNOW YE that by and with the advice of Our Privy Council for Canada We do by this Our Royal Proclamation establish for Canada Our Royal Style and Titles as follows, namely, in the English language:

:1

Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, Canada and Her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith And in the French language: Elisabeth Deux, par la grace de Dieu, Reine du RoyaumeUni, du Canada et de ses autres royaumes et territoires, Chef du Commonwealth, Defenseur de la Foi. OF ALL WHICH Our Loving Subjects and all others whom these Presents may concern are hereby required to take notice and to govern themselves accordingly. IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF We have caused these Our Let­ ters to be made Patent and the Great Seal of Canada to be here­ unto affixed. GIVEN the Twenty-eighth day of May in the Year of Our Lord One thousand nine hundred and fifty-three and in the Second Year of Our Reign. By Her Majesty’s Command, LOUIS S. ST LAURENT,

P r im e M in is te r o f C a n a d a GOD SAVE THE

QUEEN

E . R e m o v a l o f C o n s titu tio n a l A n o m a lie s ~ Before 1939, complete autonomy and equality of member states of the Commonwealth was firmly recognized in principle and largely so in practice. Autonomy in external affairs was achieved mainly by changes in the conventions of the constitution rather than by changes in statute law, but many matters of internal affairs were governed by law emanating from the Imperial Parliament. The S ta tu te o f W e s tm in s te r 1 9 3 1 empowered Dominion parliaments to amend or

1The Act of the Canadian Parliament referred to here ((1-2 Elizabeth

II, c. 9) is not printed since its substance is covered in the above Proclamation.

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repeal any law of the Parliament at Westminster in so far as it extended to the Dominion concerned, but an exception has been made at Canada’s request in the case of the British North America Acts. In the decade after the Second World War all Dominion parliaments took advantage of their new powers to remove various constitutional anomalies. The principle steps taken by Canada are listed below. Since these measures are concerned with the constitution rather than with the substance of foreign policy it was thought sufficient to list them without supporting documents, except in the case of the last item, the Letters Patent constituting the office of the GovernorGeneral. (a) The Canadian Citizenship A ct 1946 (10 Geo VI, c. 14) This Act defined for the first time who are Canadian citizens and how Canadian citizenship might be acquired or lost. The Act also provided for the continuance of the historic status of British subject which applied to all subjects of His Majesty, wherever they might be. The Act was in general agreement with the report of a Special Committee of the Imperial Conference of 1937 and was broadly similar to Acts passed by other Commonwealth Parliaments. (b) Abolition of Appeals to the Privy Council. Appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council rested largely on a statute of the British Parliament, The Judicial Committee A ct of 1844. Until the Statute of Westminster of 1931 no legislature in Canada could amend or repeal this act. In 1938 a bill was introduced in the Canadian Parliament to abolish appeals to the Privy Council and make the Supreme Court of Canada the final court of appeal in all cases. The bill was referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council for its opinion which was delivered in The Attorney General of Ontario v. The Attorney General of Canada, 1947 A.C. 27 where the Privy Council held that in view of The Statute of West­ minster and of Section 101 of the British North America A ct 1867 the bill was within the powers of the Canadian Parliament. A similar bill was accordingly passed by Parliament in 1949 (13 Geo VI, c. 37). (c) Amendment of the Canadian Constitution. No provisions for the amendment of The British North America A ct 1867 were made in the Act, except that a provincial legislature was empowered to amend the constitution of the province, save as to the office of the Lieutenant-Governor (sec. 92.1). Moreover The Statute of West­ minster expressly reserved amendment of The British North America Acts from the broad grant of power extended to the Parliament of Canada.

382 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

In 1949 the Parliament of Canada approved a bill, which was subsequently approved by the Parliament at Westminster and which thus became an amendment of T h e B ritish N o r th A m e r ic a A c ts , ( B r itis h N o r th A m e r ic a ( N o . 2 ) A c t , 1 9 4 9 . 13 Geo. VI, c. 81) authorizing the Parliament of Canada to amend the Act except with respect to the powers of provincial legislatures, religious and langu­ age rights of minorities as protected by the Act of 1867, and with respect to the duration of Parliament. This Act failed to cover important areas of the Constitution, especially the division of juris­ diction between the federal parliament and provincial legislatures, for the amendment of which no agreed procedure was reached. Nor has it been reached at the time of writing (January 1969), despite repeated efforts on the part of both provincial and federal authorities, ( d ) L e tte r s P a te n t C o n s titu tin g th e O ffic e o f th e G o v e r n o r G e n e ra l

Historically, the office of a Governor of a British colony was constituted by a prerogative document known as the Letters Patent which was issued under the Great Seal of the Realm. This document was supplemented by another crown document, the Royal Instruc­ tions, which was issued under another seal, the Royal Sign Manual and Signet. The Governor was appointed by another document, the Commission, also issued under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet. This procedure carried over into the appointment of the GovernorGeneral but it became increasingly out of line with constitutional realities. The Parliament of Canada passed T h e S e a ls A c t 1 9 3 9 (3 Geo VI, ch 22) authorizing use of the Great Seal of Canada in place of the Great Seal of the Realm, the establishment by the Crown on advice of the Canadian Ministers of such other seals as were necessary and their use in place of United Kingdom seals, and the counter signature of prerogative documents by a Canadian Minister in place of a United Kingdom Minister. In 1947 changes in the prerogative instruments governing the office of Governor General were made by the issuance on the advice of Canadian Ministers, of new Letters Patent constituting the office. To this document was affixed the Great Seal of Canada, and the document was signed by the Prime Minister of Canada (C a n a d a G a z e tte , Oct. 11, 1947). The document also authorized issuance of the Commission to the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada. This document parallels the S ta tu te o f W e s tm in s te r in that it removes the last vestiges of imperial control over the executive arm of government as the Statute did for the legislative arm In a positive

.1

1 Excepting the B.N.A. Act.

Com m onwealth Relations 383

sense it brings formal procedure into line with accepted practice and assures that formally the powers of the Crown in and over Canada will be exercisable only on the advice and responsibility of its Canadian Ministers (in practice, the Prime Minister). In the vast majority of cases advice will be tendered to the Governor General, but there is nothing to prevent its being tendered directly to the Monarch as is done in practice on matters in which the Monarch is personally concerned, (for example, the appointment of the Governor General) or when the Monarch is present in Canada (for example, the Queen assented personally to certain bills on the advice of her Canadian Minister when she visited the Parliament of Canada). ~

17. LETTERS PATENT CONSTITUTING THE OFFICE OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF CANADA ( C anada G a zette, October 11, 1947.)

GEORGE R. [L.S.] CANADA GEORGE THE SIXTH, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas King, Defender of the Faith, TO ALL OF WHOM these Presents shall come, g r e e t in g

:

WHEREAS by certain Letters Patent under the Great Seal bear­ ing date at Westminster the twenty-third of March, 1931, His late Majesty King George the Fifth did constitute, order and declare that there should be a Governor General and Commander-in-Chief in and over Canada, and that the person filling the office of Governor General and Commander-inChief should be from time to time appointed by Commission under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet: AND WHEREAS at St. James’s on the twenty-third day of March, 1913, His late Majesty King George the Fifth did cause certain Instructions under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to be given to the Governor General and Commander-in-Chief: AND WHEREAS it is Our Will and pleasure to revoke the Let­ ters of Patent and Instructions and to substitute other provi­ sions in place thereof: NOW TH EREFO RE We do by these presents revoke and deter­ mine the said Letters Patent, and everything therein contained, and all amendments thereto, and the said Instructions; but

384 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

without prejudice to anything lawfully done thereunder: AND We do declare Our Will and pleasure as follows: I. We do hereby constitute, order, and declare that there shall be a Governor General and Commander-in-Chief in and over Canada, and appointments to the office of Governor General and Commander-in-Chief in and over Canada shall be made by Com­ mission under Our Great Seal of Canada. II. AND we do hereby authorize and empower Our Governor General, with the advice of Our Privy Council for Canada or of any members thereof or individually, as the case requires, to exer­ cise all powers and authorities lawfully belonging to Us in respect of Canada, and for greater certainty but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing to do and execute, in the manner aforesaid, all things that may belong to his office and to the trust We have reposed in him according to the several powers and authorities granted or appointed him by virtue of the British North America Act, 1867 to 1946, and the powers and authori­ ties hereinafter conferred in these Letters Patent and in such Commission as may be issued to him under Our Great Seal of Canada and make such laws as are or may hereinafter be in force in Canada. III. And We do hereby authorize and empower Our Governor General to keep and use Our Great Seal of Canada for sealing all things whatsoever that may be passed under Our Great Seal of Canada. IV. And We do further authorize and empower Our Governor General to constitute and appoint, in Our name and on Our be­ half, all such Judges, Commissioners, Justices of the Peace, and other necessary Officers (including diplomatic and consular officers) and Ministers of Canada, as may be lawfully constituted or appointed by Us. V. And We do further authorize and empower Our Governor General, so far as We lawfully may, upon sufficient cause to him appearing, to remove from his office, or to suspend from the exer­ cise of the same, any person exercising any office within Canada, under or by virtue of any Commission or Warrant granted, or which may be granted, by Us in Our name or under Our authority. VI. And We do further authorize and empower Our Gover­ nor General to exercise all power lawfully belonging to Us in respect of summoning, proroguing or dissolving the Parliament of Canada. VII. And Whereas by the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1946, it is amongst other things enacted that it shall be lawful for Us, if We think fit, to authorize Our Governor General to appoint any person or persons, jointly or severally, to be his Deputy or Deputies within any part or parts of Canada, and in

Commonwealth Relations 385

that capacity to exercise, during the pleasure of Our Governor General, such of the powers, authorities, and functions of Our Governor General as he may deem it necessary or expedient to assign to such Deputy or Deputies, subject to any limitations or directions from time to time expressed or given by Us: Now We do hereby authorize and empower Our Governor General, subject to such limitations and directions, to appoint any person or persons, jointly or severally, to be his Deputy or Deputies within any part or parts of Canada, and in that capacity to exer­ cise, during his pleasure, such of his powers, functions, and authorities, as he may deem it necessary or expedient to assign to him or them: Provided always, that the appointment of such a Deputy or Deputies shall not affect the exercise of any such power, authority or functions by Our Governor General in person. VIII. And We do hereby declare Our pleasure to be that, in the event of the death, incapacity, removal or absence of Our Governor General out of Canada, all and every the powers and authorities herein granted to him shall, until Our further pleasure is signified therein, be vested in Our Chief Justice for the time being of Canada, (hereinafter called Our Chief Justice) or, in the case of the death, incapacity, removal or absence out of Canada of Our Chief Justice, then in the Senior Judge for the time being of the Supreme Court of Canada, then residing in Canada and not being under incapacity; such Chief Justice or Senior Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, while the said powers and authorities are vested in him, to be known as Our Administrator. Provided always, that the said Senior Judge shall act in the administration of the Government only if and when Our Chief Justice shall not be present within Canada and capable of ad­ ministering the Government. Provided further that no such powers or authorities shall vest in such Chief Justice, or other judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, until he shall have taken the Oaths appointed to be taken by Our Governor General. Provided further that whenever and so often as Our Governor General shall be temporarily absent from Canada, with Our permission, for a period not exceeding one month, then and in every such case Our Governor General may continue to exer­ cise all and every the powers vested in him as fully as if he were residing within Canada, including the power to appoint a Deputy or Deputies as provided in the Eighth Clause of these Our Letters Patent. IX. And We do hereby require and command all Our Officers and Ministers, Civil and Military, and all the other inhabitants of Canada, to be obedient, aiding, and assisting with our Gover­

386 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

nor General, or, in the event of death, incapacity, or absence, to such person as may, from time to time, under the provisions of these Our Letters Patent, administer the Government of Canada. X. And We do hereby declare Our pleasure to be that Our Governor General for the time being shall, with all due solemnity, cause Our Commission under Our Great Seal of Canada, appoint­ ing Our Governor General for the time being, to be read and published in the presence of Our Chief Justice, or other Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, and of members of Our Privy Council for Canada, and that Our Governor General shall take the Oath of Allegiance in the form following: ‘I — , do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty King George the Sixth, His Heirs and succesors, according to law. So help me God’; and likewise he shall take the usual Oath for the due execution of the Office of Our Governor General and Commander-in-Chief in and over Canada, and for the due and impartial administration of justice; which Oaths Our Chief Justice, or, in his absence, or in the event of his being otherwise incapacitated, any Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada shall, and he is hereby required to tender and administer unto him. XI. And We do authorize and require Our Governor General from time to time, by himself or by any other person to be authorized by him in that behalf, to administer to all and to every person or persons, as he shall think fit, who shall hold any office or place of trust or profit in Canada, the said Oath of Allegiance, together with such other Oath or Oaths as may from time to time be prescribed by any Laws or Statutes in that behalf made and provided. XII. And We do further authorize and empower Our Gover­ nor General, as he shall see occasion, in Our Name and on Our behalf, when any crime or offence against the laws of Canada has been committed for which the offender may be tried there­ under, to grant a pardon to any accomplice, in such crime or offence, who shall give such information as shall lead to the con­ viction of the principal offender, or of any one of such offenders if more than one; and further to grant to any offender convicted of any such crime or offence in any Court, or before any Judge, Justice, or Magistrate, administering the laws of Canada a pardon either free or subject to lawful conditions, or any respite of the execution of the sentence of any such offender, for such period as to Our Governor General may seem fit, and to remit any fines, penalties, or forfeitures which may become due and payable to Us. And We do hereby direct and enjoin that Our Governor General shall not pardon or reprieve any such offender without first receiving in capital cases the advice of our Privy Council for Canada and, in other cases, the advice of one, at least, of his Ministers.

C omm onwealth Relations 387

XIII. And We do further authorize and empower Our Gover­ nor Geneal to issue Exequaturs, in Our name and on Our behalf, to Consular officers of foreign countries to whom Commissions of Appointment have been issued by the Heads of States of such countries. XIV. And whereas great prejudice may happen to Our Service and to the security of Canada by the absence of Our Governor General, he shall not quit Canada without having first obtained leave from Us for so doing through the Prime Minister of Canada. XV. And We do hereby reserve to Ourselves, Our heirs and successors, full power and authority from time to time to revoke, alter, or amend these Our Letters Patents as to Us or them shall seem meet. XVI. And We do further direct and enjoin that these Our Letters Patent shall be read and proclaimed at such place or places within Canada as Our Governor General shall think fit. XVII. And We do further declare that these Our Letters Patent shall take effect on the first day of October, 1947. IN WITNESS WHEREOF We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent, and for the greater testimony and validity thereof, We have caused Our Great Seal of Canada to be affixed to these presents, which We have signed with Our Royal Hand. GIVEN the eighth day of September in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and Forty-Seven and in the Eleventh Year of Our Reign. By His Majesty’s Command, W. L. MACKENZIE KING, Prime Minister of Canada

X I. T H E F O U N D A T IO N S C A N A D IA N IN W O R L D

O F

P O L IC Y A F F A IR S

A n address b y th e Secreta ry o f S ta te fo r E xtern a l A ffa irs, M r. L . S. St. L a u ren t inaugurating th e G ray F oundation L ectu resh ip at T o ro n to U niversity, January 13 , 1 9 4 7 (DEA, S a n d S 47/2).

~ The Gray Foundation was begun by a legacy from a former student of the University of Toronto, John Gray, who was killed in the Second World War. John Gray and his brother Duncan, when in university, spent their vacations with a family in Quebec in order to achieve a better understanding of French Canada. The purpose of the Foundation is to promote mutual understanding between French and English speaking Canada. ~ I.

Introduction

TH E NEED TO EXAMINE TH E BASIS OF CANADIAN EXTERNAL POLICY

From what we know of Duncan and John Gray it is clear that they had a high ideal for this country. So also did the thousands of young men from this and other universities who turned aside from the peaceful and constructive pursuits which are the normal interests of our youth and went willingly to war. I think we must now inquire what it is in the life of this nation which they cherished so greatly and which we must protect and nourish in our policies. In particular, we must consider the role in world affairs which they would wish us to play. During the war in which they fought, there was won for this nation an enviable reputation as a military power. There now rests with us the opportunity to show the same degree of competence, the same readiness to accept responsibilities, the same sense of purpose in the conduct of our international affairs. For this reason I propose to make this lecture an enquiry into the foundations of Canadian policy in world affairs. I think this is in keeping with the purposes of the Gray lectureship. We in Canada, of English and French origin, have embarked on the joint task of building a nation. One aspect of our common enter­ prise is our external relations. The subject is one of special inter­ est to me because of my present responsibilities in the Govern­ ment. The founder of this lectureship has said - “If we discover and dwell upon what binds us together, we shall accept our dif­ ferences as the members of a true family accept their differences

The Foundations o f Canadian Policy 389

without losing sight for a moment of the things which hold them together in a vital unity.” It is in keeping with this spirit that I propose to discuss the background of our external policy. A policy of world affairs, to be truly effective, must have its foundations laid upon general principles which have been tested in the life of the nation and which have secured the broad sup­ port of large groups of the population. It is true that differences of opinion about foreign policy must continually be reviewed in discussion and debate inside and outside of Parliament. Such discussions, however, can result in constructive conclusions only if they take place against the background of a large measure of agreement on fundamentals. It may be objected that we are not old enough as a nation to have worked out such agreed principles. But let us not forget that much which forms the basis of our agreement in that respect is the result of circumstances over which we have had little if any control. The century old struggles between France and Eng­ land, their rivalry in the New World, the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, the Treaty of Paris of 1763, the revolt of the Thirteen Colonies, the wave of more liberal thinking unleashed by the French Revolution, the geography, the climate, the kind of natural resources of our country all tended to create conditions for our ancestors and tend to create conditions for our own gener­ ation which lead to almost inevitible results. They have forced French-speaking and English-speaking men and women to live side by side as members of the same community. They have inspired them to work together to obtain an ever in­ creasing measure of self-government; they have tempered the resistance of the metropolitan government to this healthy develop­ ment; they have made natural and easy the creation of an economy productive of large surpluses of certain kinds of com­ modities and lacking in certain other kinds and thus dependent in an extraordinary degree upon exchange and trade to get some benefit out of the surpluses and to secure the commodities not available from our own production. We are now within close range of two significant anniversaries in the life of this nation. It is almost exactly a century since the decision was taken that the affairs of this part of the world should be conducted upon the principles of responsible government. For a hundred years, therefore, French speaking and English speaking people living in the valley of the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes, together with their fellow countrymen else­ where across this continent have been engaged upon the experi­ ment of building, on their own responsibility and under their own direction, a modern nation. It is, as it had to be, a nation con­ structed on the foundation of two cultures and two languages. A century ago the Canadian people in winning responsible gov-

390 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

eminent staked their future on the political principles which had been defined in Lord Durham’s famous report. They staked their future equally on a denial of Durham’s assertion that the coun­ try could not survive with two cultures. They said that this could be a free country, notwithstanding that it had also to be a coun­ try with both English and French culture. For a hundred years now they have been shown to be right. The second anniversary of which I would remind you is that of “Confederation” eighty years ago. It was then that the chal­ lenge was accepted to build into a single state the scattered communities which stretched across the northern half of this continent. We have therefore been working together on this task of nation building for some considerable time. It is not too soon to look back and determine what principles have had to be and have become generally acceptable throughout this country in the conduct of our relations abroad. When we have defined these principles, we may examine the manner in which we have habitually embodied them in our relations with other states where our associations are especially close. We may also consider them with respect to the international organizations of which we are or have been members. II. a)

The Basic Principles NATIONAL UNITY

The first general principle upon which I think we are agreed is that our external policies shall not destroy our unity. No policy can be regarded as wise which divides the people whose effort and resources must put it into effect. This consideration applies not only to the two main cultural groups in our country. It applies equally to sectionalism of any kind. We dare not fashion a policy which is based on the particular interests of any economic group, or any class or of any section in this country. We must be on guard especially against the claims of extravagant regionalism no matter where they have their origin. Our history has shown this to be a consideration in our external policy of which we, more even than others, must be perpetually conscious. The role of this country in world affairs will prosper only as we maintain this principle, for a disunited Canada will be a powerless one. b)

POLITICAL LIBERTY

Second amongst the ideas which shape our external policy I will place the conception of political liberty. This is an inheritance from both our French and English background, and through these parent States it has come to us from the whole rich culture of western Europe. It is a patrimony which we ourselves have enlarged by working out on our own soil the transition from

The Foundations o f Canadian Policy 391

colony to free community. These are days in which the vocabulary of political thought has been so debased that there are many familiar coins that one hesitates to lay on the counter. I make no apology, however, for speaking to a Canadian audience of political liberty because I know that this phrase has content for us. I know, also, that we are all conscious of the danger to our own political institutions when freedom is attacked in other parts of the world. In the complex series of events which twice in a generation has led us into war, we have been profoundly in­ fluenced in our decisions by the peril which threatened the democracies of western Europe. From our joint political inherit­ ance, as well as from our common experience, we have come as a people to distrust and dislike governments which rule by force and which suppress free comment on their activities. We know that stability is lacking where consent is absent. We believe that the greatest safeguard against the aggressive policies of any gov­ ernment is the freely expressed judgment of its own people. This does not mean that we have even sought to interfere in the affairs of others, or to meddle in situations which were obviously outside our interest or beyond our control. It does mean, however, that we have consistently sought and found our friends amongst those of like political traditions. It means equally that we have realized that a threat to the liberty of western Europe, where our political ideas were nurtured, was a threat to our own way of life. This realization has perhaps not been comprehended or expressed by every group and every individual in the country with as much clarity and coherance as, looking back on the events, we should like, I have no doubt, however, that for the young men of our Universities who fought in this war, it was a part of our national inheritance which they well understood. c)

TH E RULE OF LAW IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

In the third place respect for the rule of law has become an integral part of our external as of our domestic policy. The supremacy of law in our own political system is so familiar that we are in constant danger of taking it for granted. We know, however, that historically the development of this principle is a necessary antecedent to self-government. The first great victory on the road to freedom was the establishment in early modern times of the principle that both governments and peoples were subject to the impartial administration of the courts. Only then could the further step be taken by which the people gave their consent to the laws by which they were governed. Within the past decade we have been reminded by the hideous example of the fascist states of the evil which befalls a nation when the government sets itself above the law. Beneath the

392 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

spurious efficiency of such a state, we have perceived the helpless plight of individuals who have been deprived of the primary right of an impartial administration of the law. We have seen also the chaos which is brought to world affairs when lawlessness is practised in the field of international relations. The development of an international code of law is still in its early stages. The past decade has done much to delay and distort this growth. I feel sure, however, that we in this country are agreed that the freedom of nations depends upon the rule of law amongst states. We have shown this concretely in our willing­ ness to accept the decisions of international tribunals, courts of arbitration and other bodies of a judicial nature, in which we have participated. There can be no doubt that the Canadian people unanimously support this principle. d)

TH E VALUES OF A CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION

No foreign policy is consistent nor coherent over a period of years unless it is based upon some conception of human values. I know that we live in an age when it is fashionable to speak in terms only of hard realism in the conduct of international affairs. I realize also that at best the practice of any policy is a poor approximation of ideals upon which it may be based. I am sure, however, that in our national life we are continually influenced by the conceptions of good and evil which emerged from Hebrew and Greek civilization and which have been transformed and transmitted through the Christian traditions of the Western World. These are values which lay emphasis on the importance of the individual, on the place of moral principles in the conduct of human relations, on standards of judgment which transcend mere material well-being. They have ever influenced our national life as we have built a modern state from East to West across this continent. I am equally convinced that on the basis of this common experience we shall discern the same values in world affairs, and that we shall seek to protect and nurture them. e)

TH E ACCEPTANCE O F INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN KEEPING W ITH OUR CONCEPTION OF OUR ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS ‘

There is a fifth basic principle which I should like also to men­ tion before considering the background of our relations with par­ ticular countries. That is willingness to accept international responsibilities. I know that there are many in this country who feel that in the past we have played too small a part in the development of international political organizations. The growth in this country of a sense of political responsibility on an inter­ national scale has perhaps been less rapid than some of us would like. It the nevertheless been a perceptible growth; and

The Foundations o f Canadian Policy 393

again and again on the major questions of participation in inter­ national organization, both in peace and war, we have taken our decision to be present. If there is one conclusion that our com­ mon experience has led us to accept, it is that security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of inter­ national organization. I have been speaking of certain general principles which I think underlie the conduct of our external policy. These are principles which have been defined and articulated in the practice of relations with other countries over many decades. In this application of our principles, too, we have reached certain gen­ eral conclusions on which we are all agreed, and which serves as a guide to policy. III. Jlh e Practicaljip p lic ation a)

TH E COMM ONW EALTH W HICH W E OURSELVES HAVE FASHIONED FO R ACHIEVING T H E ENDS W E DESIRE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

We have never attempted to define in precise terms our re­ lations with the Commonwealth. They are nevertheless a basic consideration in the external policy of this county. In discussing them I will recall two aspects of this relationship concerning which I am sure there will be no disagreement. In the first place the Commonwealth is a form of political association which is unique. There has never been anything like it before in history. There is no parallel to it in the contemporary world. It is the only case on record of a Colonial Empire being transformed to an association of free nations by experiment, by compromise, by political evolution. I have no doubt that, whatever its future, it will be regarded by the historians of another age as one of the great constructive political achievements of our time. The other fact that I would call to your mind is that the Commonwealth is in a very real sense an achievement in which Canadians can take special pride. We Canadians perhaps more than other of its members, have contributed to its development. We have regarded it as an instrument which, in co-operation with like-minded people, we could use for our common purposes. It has, therefore, the vitality of a living, functioning organism which has been and which can continue to be used for good, according to the wisdom and foresight of our policies. It is now only twenty years since the term “Commonwealth" came into popular use as a result of the Declaration which was adopted by the Conference of 1926. Even in that short period the meaning of the word has changed. There are already import­ ant differences between the Commonwealth of today and that described in Lord Balfour’s famous statement. Even while this

394 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

change was taking place however, there has been further com­ pelling demonstration of the fact that we are members in an association of free nations, capable of common action in an emer­ gency, greater and more striking than that of any formal military or diplomatic alliance that the world has ever known. Even though they are not precisely defined, the principles on which we act in regard to the Commonwealth may be clearly discerned. We seek to preserve it as an instrument through which we, with others who share our objectives, can co-operate for our common good in peace as in war. On the other hand, we should continue to resist, as in the past, efforts to reduce to formal terms or specific commitments this association which has demonstrated its vitality through the common understanding upon which it is based. We should likewise oppose developments in our Com­ monwealth relations which might be inconsistent with our desire to participate fully in the task of building an effective inter­ national organization on a wider scale. Within the Commonwealth, our relations with the United Kingdom have, of course, a very special value and significance. We shall not forget in our history, the imaginative collaboration of British and Canadian leaders who, a century ago, laid the political foundations for the modern Commonwealth. Nor can we fail to be influenced by the fact that our political institutions are those of the British Isles, and that we now share with other parliamentary democracies the responsibility for preserving and developing this system. We shall not forget either the peril in which we shared, together with other Commonwealth countries, but especially with the United Kingdom during the dark days of 1940. This was an episode which threw in dramatic relief the measure to which we have common interests and the degree to which we are alike concerned in the establishment of a world order based on principles of freedom. b)

TH E U NITED STATES - TH E SETT LEM EN T OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BY NEGOTIATION AND COMPROM ISE

It is not customary in this country for us to think in terms of having a policy in regard to the United States. Like farmers whose lands have a common concession line, we think of ourselves as settling, from day to day, questions that arise between us, with­ out dignifying the process by the word “policy.” We have travel­ led so much of the road together in close agreement that by com­ parison the occasions on which our paths may have diverged seems insignificant. There has, however, been more to our relations with the United States than mere empirical neighbourliness. For the century during which we have been building this nation, we have kept

The Foundations o f Canadian Policy 395

company with an adjoining state vastly more powerful, more self-confident, more wealthy than we. It is a state with purposes and ambitions parallel to ours. One by one, the major areas of disagreement have been reduced. Our common border has long since been defined to our mutual satisfaction. The people of this country have taken a final decision to remain outside the United States. There is no longer any body of opinion in this country which looks towards annexation. The people of the United States on their part, have come to a parallel conclusion that they will not extend their boundaries beyond their present limits on this continent. On both sides the fact has been accepted that there shall be a free and independent federation in the north­ ern part of this continent. None of this has been achieved, how­ ever, without reflection and forethought, nor will it be main­ tained without constant watchfulness. I do not say this because I think there is the slightest intention on either side to move away from the present happy state of our relations. I say it merely because even the simplest relationship between human beings requires the constructive action of both parties. The relationship between a great and powerful nation and its smaller neighbour, at best, is far from simple. It calls for constant and imaginative attention on both sides. Defined more precisely, our policy in regard to the United States has come with the passage of years to have two main characteristics. On the one hand, we have sought by negotiation, by arbitration by compromise, to settle upon the basis of mutual satisfaction the problems that have arisen between us. As I sug­ gested a moment ago, this has been far more than the unimagina­ tive clearing away of parochial questions. It has succeeded pre­ cisely because it is based on the determination of both nations to conduct their affairs, as a matter of policy, on this basis. The other aspect of our relations with the United States which I shall emphasize is our readiness to accept our responsibility as a North American nation in enterprises which are for the welfare of this continent. In support of this assertion, there is a long and creditable record of joint activity. In making it, however, I must add that it has never been the opinion of any considerable number of people in Canada that this continent could live unto itself. We have seen our own interests in the wider context of the western world. We have realized also that regionalism of any kind would not provide the answer to problems or world security. But we know that peoples who live side by side on the same continent cannot disregard each other’s interests, and we have always been willing to consider the possibility of common action for constructive ends.

396 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 C ) FRANCE - A TRADITION OF COMM ON INTERESTS

With France also our relations rest upon principles that have emerged clearly from our history. We have never forgotten that France is one of the fountainheads of our cultural life. We realize that she forms an integral part of the framework of our inter­ national life. We have so much in common that, despite the dif­ ferences between the French political system and our own, we connot doubt for a moment that our objects in world affairs are similar. We in this country have always believed in the greatness of France, even at times when her future seemed most obscure. During the war, we were confident that France herself would play a major role in her own liberation. We gave our support to those leaders of the French people whom the French themselves were prepared to follow. We are aware of the heavy burden which invasion twice in a generation has laid upon France. We shall support her recovery not merely out of sympathy, but because we know that her integrity is a matter of great consequence to us. d)

TH E SU PPO RT OF CONSTRUCTIVE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

I shall not endeavour to discuss in detail the question of our relationship with other states. Rather, I shall turn now to our attitude towards international organizations. As I suggested when I was discussing the general principles which underlie our policy, we have been ready to take our part in constructive international action. We have, of course, been forced to keep in mind the limitations upon the influence of any secondary power. No society of nations can prosper if it does not have the support of those who hold the major share of the world’s military and economic power. There is little point in a country of our stature recom­ mending international action, if those who must carry the major burden of whatever action is taken are not in sympathy. We know, however, that the development of international organiza­ tions on a broad scale is of the very greatest importance to us, and we have been willing to play our role when it was apparent that significant and effective action was contemplated. We have already given good evidence of this willingness by the record of our international activities since the war. We sent a strong delegation to the Conference at San Francisco, and I had every reason to be gratified with the delegations which accom­ panied me to the first part of the General Assembly in London and second part in New York. We were elected to membership on the Economic and Social Council, and have tried to show by the attention we have paid to that body the measure of import­ ance we attached to its creation. We have taken part in the forma­ tion of the World Bank and Fund, of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization, of the World Health Organization,

The Foundations o f Canadian Policy 397

of UNESCO, of the International Refugee Organizaton, of the Food and Agriculture Organization and of the projected Inter­ national Trade Organization. We have continued to support the International Labour Organization, as we did before the war. We have played a prominent part in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and of the Peace Conference in Paris. This list is not exhaustive, but it indicates the measure of our activity. We have not found it easy to provide delegates and advisers for all the conferences which the task of creating a new structure of world organizations has required. I think, however, that we may take pride in the work of our representatives, and that if you had observed them at any of these gatherings, you would have seen them doing competent energetic and constructive work. I think you would find, also, that they had regularly won the respect and confidence of their colleagues from other countries. In economic as well as political affairs we have put our shoulder to the wheel of post-war reconstruction. Our contri­ bution to UNRRA was more than 150 million dollars, and Canadian food and equipment have been shipped into devastated areas all over the world. We supplied goods freely to our allies during the war under Mutual Aid Legislation, and we have since provided export credits on a vast scale to help in rebuilding the economic life of Europe and of China. We have done this as a matter of policy, because we believe that the economic recon­ struction of the world must go hand in hand with the political reconstruction. We are aware, too, that economic revival is a matter of great importance to us. We are dependent on markets abroad for the large quantities of staple products we produce and cannot consume, and we are dependent on supplies from abroad of commodities which are essential to our well-being. It seems to me axiomatic, therefore, that we should give our sup­ port to every international organization which contributes to the economic and political stability of the world. e)

TH E D EV ELOPM ENT OF AN EFFEC TIV E DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

Seen in the light of these historic developments, the recent expansion of the diplomatic service of this country is a natural development. We are preparing ourselves to fulfil the growing responsibilities in world affairs which we have accepted as a modern state. We wish the Commonwealth to be an effective instrument of co-operation, and we have, therefore, appointed High Commissioners in the capitals of every Commonwealth country. I am glad to say that within recent weeks this process has been completed with the appointment of a High Commis­ sioner to India. I earnestly hope that through his mission there and through the High Commissioner for India in Canada, who

398 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

will soon be appointed, we may experience the same informal and helpful co-operation which has been characteristic of our relations with the Commonwealth countries. We have also multiplied rapidly our diplomatic representa­ tion in foreign countries. Before very long, we shall have pro­ vided ourselves with diplomatic representation in the capitals of every major country in the world. We have not taken this step merely through a desire to follow a conventional practice, or to advertise ourselves abroad. We have done so because our geo­ graphy, our climate, our natural resources have so conditioned our economy that the continued prosperity and well-being of our own people can best be served by the prosperity and well-being of the whole world. We have thus a useful part to play in world affairs, useful to ourselves through being useful to others, and to play that part we must have our own spokesmen amongst our neighbours. It is not only in our foreign service that this expansion is taken place. We are trying also to construct a Department in Ottawa which will build upon the activities of our representatives abroad. Our own national interests compel us to take a creditable part in the international conferences which are now determining the nature of the post-war world. We are, therefore, constructing a service which can provide strong and well informed advisers for the delegations which we must send to these gatherings. This is no easy task. It will, of course, make demands upon our financial resources. I am strengthened, however, in my determination to recommend the continuation of this policy because it is no transi­ tory experiment. It is the natural result of a long historic process, and I feel that it will be supported by all sections of our people. And that is as it should be. Canadian policy in its external relations should not be allowed to become a matter of party poli­ tical controversy at home. Of course the government in office must take full responsibility for each one of its actions as well as in Canada’s external relations as in the conduct of purely domes­ tic Canadian affairs. But in its external relations the Government in office should ever strive to speak and to act on behalf on the whole of Canada and in such manner as to have the support of all the Canadian peoples regardless of party affiliations at home. IV.

Conclusion

A few moments ago I said that we must play a role in world affairs in keeping with the ideals and sacrifices of the young men of this University, and of this country who went to war. How­ ever great or small that role may be, we must play it creditably. Wc must act with maturity and consistency, and with a sense of responsibility. For this reason I return in conclusion to the point

The Foundations o f Canadian Policy 399

at which I began. We must act as a united people. By that I mean a people who, through reflection and discussion, have arrived at a common understanding of our interests and our purposes. In this Lectureship you have at your disposal an instrument which can help us greatly to achieve this end. You may be confident that, as you plan the Gray lecture from year to year, you will be contributing to that mature conception of our national interest which is the characteristic of a united people. A former High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Canada, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, speaking to a Canadian audience before his departure, referred to Canada as “a unity, a harmony, a nation - a people with national sentiment pursuing national aims.” He added these words; “there is a sanity, a wisdom, a true statesmanship about the Canadian oudook and policy in international affairs which is uncommon.” These are words of great praise. In repeating them to you may I add a comment about them which I have made previously: “May Canada never be less deserving of them than she has been during these few recent troubled years.”

400

A NOTE ON THE EDITOR Bom in Ontario, Robert A. MacKay served for three years in the Canadian Army before taking his first degree from the University of Toronto in 1920. Four years later he obtained his doctorate from Princeton, later teaching there and at Cornell University before becoming Eric Dennis Memorial Professor of Government and Political Science at Dalhousie University in 1927. He occupied this position until 1947, interrupting it once to serve on the Royal Com­ mission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (the Rowell- Sirois Com­ mission) and later to become a Special Assistant in the Department of External Affairs during the Second World War. He joined the Department on a permanent basis in 1947, holding in succession the posts of Associate Under-Secretary of State, Permanent Representa­ tive to the United Nations and Ambassador to Norway and Iceland. T h e U n r e fo r m e d S e n a te o f C a n a d a , first published in 1926 and revised for the Carleton Library in 1963, established Dr. MacKay’s reputation as an authority on Canadian political institutions. His other publications include T h e M o d e r n W o r ld (with S. A. Saunders); C a n a d a L o o k s A b r o a d , written in collaboration with E. B. Rogers; and N e w fo u n d la n d : E c o n o m ic , D ip lo m a tic a n d S tra te g ic S tu d ie s , in which he was editor and a contributor. In 1961 Dr. MacKay became Visiting Professor of Political Science at Carleton University. He was awarded the Medal of Service of the Order of Canada in 1970.

401

INDEX A tom ic Energy Commission, Am erican plan, 110-11, 11922; Canadian views on control o f atom ic energy, 122-24; es­ tablishm ent of, 109; Joint Dec­ laration on Atom ic Energy, 112-15; Soviet plan, 110, 11922; u.N. resolution establish­ ing, 116-17; veto in, 117-19 Attlee, Prim e M inister, consulta­ tion with Com monwealth gov­ ernments, 353 A ustralia, 277; a . n . z . u . s ., 32122; C anberra Conference, 27981 A ustria, Canadian submission on peace settlement, 44-46; peace treaty with, 24-25 Bases Agreem ent o f 1941, 22526, 248; revision of, 250-52 Berlin Blockade, 178n, 181, 196 Boundary W aters T reaty (1909), 260 Brussels, Treaty of (Brussels P a c t), 181, 182-83, 186 Bull, W. F., 77-79 Canada, abolition o f appeals to Privy Council, 381; adminis­ trative procedures on u.N. m at­ ters, 170-76; agreem ent on principles for economic co­ operation with U.S.A., 86-87; am endm ent o f constitution, 381-82; and Colom bo Plan, 367-69; and Commission on K orea, 294; and U.S. defence policy, 253-58; attitude to Com munist takeover in China, 337-39; Canada-U.S.A. Minis­ terial Committee, 89-90; C iti­ zenship Act (1 9 4 6 ), 381; civil defence collaboration, 242;

Commonwealth role, 393-94; contribution to Korean W ar, 301-05; co-operative economic development of Pakistan, 37072; exchange o f weather infor­ m ation with U.S.S.R., 236; foundations o f policy in world affairs, 388-99; Joint D eclara­ tion on Atom ic Energy, 11215; Joint Industrial Mobiliza­ tion Com m ittee, 84-85; joint ra d ar defences, 242-46; Joint Statem ent on D efence Co­ operation (1 9 4 7 ), 228-29; Joint U nited States-Canadian Com mittee in T rade and Eco­ nom ic Affairs, 88-89; m em ber­ ship on International Control Commissions for Indochina, 331-34; office of the GovernorG eneral, 382-87; policy on Indonesia, 146-48; policy on K orean settlement, 326-27; post-war trade with U.S.A., 77-79; proclam ation of acces­ sion of Elizabeth II, 373-74; proclam ation o f Queen’s title, 379-80; question o f a Pacific Pact, 320-22; reciprocal de­ fence purchasing, 241; recog­ nition o f Com munist China, 311, 338-42; relations with France, 396; relations with Japan, 278, 283-84, 286-89, 289-91; relations with U.K., 394; relations with U.S.A., 394-95; relinquishm ent of ex­ tra-territorial rights in China, 334-35; St. Lawrence Seaway, 273-75, S ee also Ch. V III; stake in n . a .t . o ., 208-11; sup­ port fo r u .N . K orean Recon­ struction Agency, 318-20 C anberra Conference, 279-81

402 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954

Chevrier, Hon. Lionel, 124-27 China, People’s Republic of, aggression in Korea, 306-11; recognition of, 311, 338-42 China, Republic of, and Korea, 292; relinquishment of extra­ territorial rights, 334-35 Chinese Immigration Act, repeal of, 336-37 Churchill (Manitoba), 237-40 Churchill, Sir Winston, 347, 35355

Claxton, Hon. Brooke, 241, 24546, 279-81; Canadian contri­ bution to n . a.t .o ., 198-202; defence of Canadian position at Paris Peace Conference, 2829; Defence Policy (1947), 222; return of Canadian forces to Europe, 202-04 Colombo Plan, 364-67, 367-69 collective security, Canada’s role in, 184-89 Commonwealth Conferences,

can defence, 247-49; radar agreements, 242-47; use of Churchill base, 237; weather stations, 235; See also Ch. vi, especially on n . a . t . o . disarmament, Canadian reply to Soviet proposals for, 124-27; Canadian stand, 128-29; prog­ ress of (1 9 5 3 ), 127-29; Rus­ sian resolution (1946) on, 10910; U.K. proposal (1948), 127 Disarmament Commission, 110; Canadian stand, 128-29; prog­ ress in (1953), 127-29; Soviet proposal (1948), 111, 124-27; veto in, 117-19 Dulles, John Foster, Canadian reaction to massive retaliation policy, 253-56; Fisheries Con­ vention, 286; Pacific Pact, 320-21

Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, 1, 2, 3, 16, 21; Canadian views on, 6-10

187, 353-55, 362-67, 374-75

Commonwealth of Nations, and Indochina settlement, 329, 330; Canada’s role in, 393-94; Canberra Conference, 279-81; consultation about India, 35557; consultation between gov­ ernments, 347-53; inclusion of a republic, 361-64; independ­ ence of India, Pakistan, Cey­ lon, and Burma, 359-61; peace with Japan, 277; royal style and titles in, 375-79; See also Colombo Plan, Commonwealth Conferences, Monarchy defence, Canada and U.S.A. pol­ icy, 253-60; evolution of post­ war policy, 220-24; defence purchasing, 241; joint defence with U.S.A., 225-28; Joint Statement of 1947, 228; New­ foundland and North Ameri­

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 196-97, 199-200, 202

Elizabeth II, proclamation of ac­ cession, 373-74; proclamation of title, 379-80; styles and titles, 374-80 Far Eastern Advisory Commis­ sion, 277, 279, 280 Formosa, disposition of, 343-45; in Korean War, 310-11; renun­ ciation of rights by Japan, 283; See also China, Republic of France, 212, 396 functional representation, 2, 3, 4-10, 20-21, 97-99

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( g . a .t .t . ) , 78, 8083; association of Japan, 278 Geneva Conference 1954, 322-28 German Federal Republic, acces­

Index 403 sion to n . a . t . o ., 212-13, 21319; recognition of, 42 G erm any, C anadian views on G erm an peace settlement, 3042; occupation of, 177; term i­ nation of war, 43 G overnor G eneral, office of, 38387 G ray Foundation, 388 Greece, accession to n . a . t . o ., 198, 206-08 Halifax, Lord, 346-47, 351-52 Howe, Hon. C. D., CanadaU.S.A. Ministerial Committee, 90; g . a .t . t . , 81-83; T rade Agreem ent with Japan, 28991; w eather stations in the A rctic, 235-37; white paper on reconstruction, 52-55 H um an Rights, draft covenants on, 165-68; Universal Declara­ tion of, 162-65 H yde Park D eclaration of 1941, 58-59, 86; reaffirmation of, 5558 Ilsley, Hon. J. L., cessation of M utual Aid, 61-62; loan to United Kingdom, 65-70; loans for E uropean reconstruction, 63-65; vote for partition of Palestine, 136-39 India, as a Com monwealth re­ public, 361-64, 377-78; Com ­ m onwealth consultation on, 355-57; com plaints about apartheid, 157; independence of, 359-61; International Su­ pervisory Commissions for In ­ dochina, 331, 332, 333, 334; K ashm ir dispute, 149-53; role in Korean W ar, 307, 317 Indochina, 323; and U.S.A., 323; C anadian views on a regional solution, 328-31; International

Supervisory Commissions for, 331-34 Indonesia, 146-48 International Bank o f Recon­ struction and Development ( i . b . r . d . ) , 53, 80 International Joint Commission ( i . j . c . ) , 260; approval of St. Lawrence Seaway and Power, 262-68 International M onetary Fund ( i .m .f .), 53, 80 International Supervisory Com ­ missions for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, 323; Canadian m em bership on, 331-34 Iroquois Dam , 269-71, 272-73 Israel, establishm ent of, 135; rec­ ognition of, 145 Italy, disposal of form er colonies, 25, 47-50; peacem aking with, 25; Trieste, 25,46-47 Japan, Fisheries Convention, 278, 283-84, 286-89; peacemaking with, 276-78, 282-86; repara­ tions, 285; surrender of, 23, 276; T rade Agreem ent with C anada, 289-91; trade with C anada, 278, 284 Johnson, D . M., 127-29, 327-28 Joint D eclaration on Atom ic Energy, see Atomic Energy Commission Joint Industrial Mobilization Committee, establishm ent of, 84-85 Joint Statem ent o f 1947 on D e­ fence, 227-28; text, 228-29, 234 Joint U nited States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Eco­ nomic Affairs, 88-89 Kashm ir, 149-53 King, Rt. Hon. W. L. M., Com ­ m onwealth representation in

404 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 a world organization, 353-55; M id-Canada Line, 235, 246-47 consultation about India, 355- M onarchy, the, and the Common­ 57; consultation between Com ­ wealth, 363, 372-73; See also m onwealth governments, 347Elizabeth II 53; functional representation, M ontgom ery, Mrs. K. G., 165-68 2, 3, 4, 11-12, 13; joint Moscow Conference o f Foreign Canadian-U.S.A. defence, 225; M inisters (1945), 292 Joint D eclaration on Atom ic M utual Aid Agreements, 71-72; Energy, 114-15; Paris Peace cessation of, 61-62; to n . a .t . o . Conference, 29; peacem aking countries, 198 in Europe, 26-27; relinquish­ m ent o f extra-territorial rights N etherlands, The, 146-48, 186 in China, 334-35; San F ran­ N ew foundland, defence co-oper­ cisco Conference, 10-14; single ation with Canada, 247, 248voice theory o f C om m on­ 49; revision of Bases Agree­ wealth, 12; W estern Union, m ent, 250-52; union with 181, 182; withdrawal o f C ana­ Canada, 249; U nited States dian occupation forces, 178-80 bases in, 248 K orean W ar, 294, 301-11; G e­ N orth Atlantic T reaty, Article 2, neva Conference 1954, 322, 197, 204-06; background of, 323-28; history, 292-94; ob­ 190-91; C anada’s support for, jectives for post-war period, 187-89; development o f insti­ 311-13; points in dispute in ar­ tutions and procedures under, mistice talks, 313-14; political 196-97; signing of, 191-92; conference, 314-17 text, 192-95 N orth Atlantic Treaty Organiza­ Luxem bourg, 199-200 tion ( n .a .t . o . ) , accession of Federal Republic o f Germ any, M acKay, R. A., 160-62 212-13; accession o f Greece Marshall Plan, 181 and Turkey, 198, 206-08; Can­ M artin, H on. Paul, collaboration ada’s stake in, 208-11; Cana­ in civil defence, 242; partici­ dian contribution to, 198-204 pants in a political conference on K orea, 314-15; u . n . Korean Reconstruction Agency, 318- occupation, o f G erm any, 177; of Japan, 276-77, 285-86; with­ 20 draw al o f Canadian forces, Mayhew, Hon. R. W., Fisheries 177-80 Convention, 286-89 M cN aughton, G en. A. G . L., Ogdensburg Agreem ent, 226 C anadian policy on Kashm ir, Ontario, Canada-Ontario Agree­ m ent on St. Lawrence power 152-53; Canadian position on projects, 265, 266 control of atom ic energy, 12224; m ediator in Kashm ir dis­ pute, 150; Perm anent Joint Board on Defence, 230-34; suspension of Palestine P arti­ tion Plan, 139-42

Pacific Pact, Canada’s attitude to, 320-22 Pakistan, economic aid, 370-72; independence of, 359-61;

Index 405

Kashmir dispute, 149-53; royal Treaty, 191-92; u.N. obliga­ style and title in, 375 tions in Korea, 294-96; “Unit­ Palestine, 134-36, 139-45; Cana­ ing for Peace” resolution, dian support of Partition Plan, 107-09; Universal Declaration 136-39; refugees, 136 of Human Rights, 163-65; Paris Peace Conference, 27-29 views on a regional solution in peacemaking, in Europe, see Indochina, 328-31 Austria, Germany, Italy; with Permanent Joint Board on De­ Japan, 23, 276-77, 279, 282fence ( p .j .b .d .), 226-28, 237, 86; Potsdam Conference, 23 249; history and objectives, Pearson, Rt. Hon. L. B., accession 230-34; responsibilities, 229; of Federal Republic of Ger­ revision of Bases Agreement of many to n . a . t .o ., 213-16; ac­ 1941,250-52 cession of Greece and Turkey Pine Tree system, 235; agreement to n . a . t . o ., 206-08; Article 2 on, 242-44 of North Atlantic Treaty, 204- Potsdam Conference, 23, 276, 06; Canada and the Colombo 283, 292 Plan, 367-69; Canada’s stake in n . a .t . o ., 208-11; Canadian Rasminsky, Louis, 74-77 policy in the Security Council rearmament, of n . a . t . o . allies, in retrospect, 153-56; colonial 197,199 issue, 157-59; Commonwealth Roosevelt, President F. D., 225 Conference on India, 362-64; Royal Canadian Air Force Communist China as aggressor ( r c a f ) , Arctic defence, 239; in Korea, 305-09; Communist contribution to n . a .t . o ., , takeover in China, 337-39; 203-04; Pacific Air Lift, 300, conditions of a Palestinian 302 settlement, 142-45; continental Royal Canadian Army, Arctic defence and United States defence, 239; Canadian Army commitments, 257-58; Geneva Special Force, 301, 304 Conference 1954 (Korea), Royal Canadian Navy ( r c n ) , 323-27; limited military objec­ Arctic defence, 239; contribu­ tives in Korea, 309-10; objec­ tion to n . a . t . o ., ; naval tives in settlement of Korean units to Korea, 298, 299-300, War, 311-13; peace treaty with 302 Japan, 282-86; position of For­ mosa, 310-11; prisoners of war St. Laurent, Rt. Hon. L. S., a (Korea), 317-18; proposals for republic (India) within the Korean Peace Conference, Commonwealth, 361-62; Brus­ 315-17; question of a Pacific sels Treaty, 182-83, 189-90; Pact, 320-22; reaction to Canada’s concern in Kashmir Dulles policy of massive retali­ dispute, 151-52; Canada’s re­ ation, 253-56; recognition of sponsibility in Korea, 298-99; Communist China, 338-39, Canada’s role as a middle 341-42; recognition of Federal power, 131-33; Canadian par­ Republic of Germany, 42; ticipation in a peace settlement signing of North Atlantic with Germany, 30-33; Cana-

201

201

406 Canadian Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 dian views on Trieste, 46-47; Com m onw ealth as bridge be­ tween Asia and the West, 35758; establishment of an Interim Committee o f the General Assembly, 105-07; failure of Security Council, 95-97; foun­ dations o f Canadian policy in world affairs, 388-99; func­ tional principle, 97-99; impli­ cations o f aggression in K orea, 301-05; independence within the Com monwealth, 360-61; Joint Statem ent o f 1947, 232; m ilitary forces for Security Council, 93-94; N orth Atlantic T reaty, 190-91; Peace C on­ ference with Japan, 279, 281 82; recognition o f Communist China, 339-41; responsibilities o f Security Council m em ber­ ship, 99-103; revision o f Bases Agreement with U.S.A., 25052; royal style and titles in the Com monwealth, 375-79; San Francisco Conference, 17-22; veto in Atom ic Energy and D isarm am ent Commissions, 117-19; withdrawal of C ana­ dian occupation forces, 177-78 St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project, C anada prepared to undertake Seaway alone, 26162; case for joint construction, 273-75; construction of Iro­ quois dam , 269ff; U.S.A. fail­ ure to ratify treaty of 1941, 261; historical sum m ary of early negotiations, 259-61; lapse of draft treaty o f 1941, 267; modification of A gree­ m ent of 1952, 272; reference of power project to i .j .c ., 26264 Saint Lawrence Seaway Develop­ m ent C orporation, 261, 270, 271

San Francisco Conference, 2, 3,

10-22 South Africa, apartheid, 158-59, 160-62

157,

Taiwan, see Form osa, China, Republic of T rum an, President, 181, 260, 276, 295 Turkey, accession to n . a . t . o ., 198, 206-08 United Kingdom, and W estern Union, 181; Bases Agreement of 1941, 248; Canadian rela­ tionship with, 394; consulta­ tion with Commonwealth gov­ ernments, 353; independence o f India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma, 359-60; Joint D eclara­ tion on A tom ic Energy, 11214; loan to, 65-70; policy on Palestine, 134, 140-41; pro­ posal on disarm am ent, 127; royal style and titles in, 374 United Nations, Canadian ad­ m inistrative procedures on u . n . affairs, 171-76; Commis­ sion on Indonesia, 146, 148; Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa, 16162; Economic and Social Council, 15-17, 169-70ff; Ko­ rean Reconstruction Agency, 318-20; Relief and Rehabili­ tation Adm inistration (u .N .r . r . a . ) , 60; Special Committee on Palestine ( u . n . s . c . o . p . ) , 134, 137, 139-41, 142-43; Tem porary Commission on K orea, 293-94; Trusteeship Council, 156-58 — C harter, Canadian am end­ ments on e c o s o c , 15-17; hu­ m an rights, 162; security ar­ rangem ents, 183, 193, 210-11; settlement o f international di?

Index 407 putes, 130, 295; trusteeship and colonialism, 157-59; veto power in am endm ent, 22 — General Assembly, and South A frican apartheid, 159; com ­ mission for K orea, 292-93, 294; functions, 96, 103; I n ­ terim C o m m ittee , 103-07; res­ olution on Com m unist Chinese aggression, 307-09; “Uniting for Peace” resolution, 104-05, 107-09 — Security Council, 91, 153-56, 295, 298; Canadian m em ber­ ship on, 99-103, 132-33; fail­ ure of, 95-97, 105-06; func­ tional representation, 4-7, 10, 20; relations with a.e .c ., 116; the veto in, 1, 18-19, 92; use of m ilitary forces, 21, 91, 93-94 — veto, am endm ent o f Charter, 22; Canadian objections to, 18-19, 96, 101; code for use of, 94-95; in A tom ic Energy and D isarm am ent Com m is­ sions, 117-19; Y alta form ula, 1, 18-19 U.S.A., and Colombo Plan, 367; and Indochina, 323; Bases Agreem ent of 1941, 248, 249, 250-52; Canada-U.S.A. Minis­ terial Committee, 89-90; civil defence collaboration, 242; Dulles policy of massive retali­ ation, 253-56, 257-58; Fish­ eries Convention, 278, 283-84, 286-89; H yde Park D eclara­ tion o f 1941, 55-59; Japanese Peace Conference, 278-80; joint announcem ent o f MidC anada and D.E.w. Lines, 246-47; Joint D eclaration on Atom ic Energy, 112-14; Joint Industrial Mobilization C om ­ m ittee, 84-85; Joint Statement on D efence Co-operation

(1 9 4 7 ), 228-29; Joint United States-C anadian Committee on T rade and Economic Affairs, 88-89; K orean W ar, 295-96, 300, 317-18; Perm anent Joint Board on Defence, 226-28, 230-34; plan for control of atomic energy, 110- 11 , 11 9-22; post-war trade with Canada, 77-79; principles for economic co-operation with Canada, 8687; reciprocal defence pur­ chasing, 241; St. Lawrence D e­ velopment, see St. Lawrence Seaway and Power Project; V andenburg resolution, 19091 U.S.S.R., and Disarm am ent Commission, 111, 124-27; and Japanese Peace Conference, 277, 279, 281-83; and Korea, 293,315, 323-25; and u . n . e . f . , 105; A rctic weather stations, 236; boycott of Security C oun­ cil, 104, 108; plan for control o f atomic energy, 110, 119-22, 123; resolution on disarm a­ m ent (1 9 4 6 ), 109-10; therm o­ nuclear explosion, 245-46; threat to W estern Europe, 189 V andenburg, Senator, 190-91 w eather stations, in Arctic, 23537 W estern European Union ( w .e .u .) , 212-13 W estern Union, 181, 183, 186,

212 W estminster, Statute o f (1931), 372-73, 380-81, 382-83 Wilgress, L. D ., 27-28, 80n Y alta Voting Form ula, 1, 18-19; C anadian objections, 19

THE

1.

lord

CARLETON

Du r h a m ’s r e p o r t ,

LIBRARY

edited and with an Introduction by

Gerald M. Craig 2.

THE CONFEDERATION DEBATES IN TH E PPOVINCE OF CANADA,

1865,

edited and with an Introduction by P. B. Waite 3.

l a u r ie r : a s t u d y in

C a n a d ia n p o l i t i c s

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CHAMPLAIN: THE LIFE OF FORTITUDE

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edited and with an Introduction by S. R. Mealing Du r h a m ’s m i s s i o n t o C a n a d a by Chester New, edited and with an Introduction by H. W. McCready 9. t h e r e c i p r o c i t y t r e a t y o f 1854 by Donald C. Masters, with a new Introduction by the author 10. POLITICAL UNREST IN U PPER CANADA, 1815-1836 by Aileen Dunham, with an Introduction by A. L. Burt

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14.

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MONEY AND BANKING IN CANADA,

compiled and with an Introduction by E. P. Neufeld 18. FRENCH-CANADIAN SOCIETY, V o lu m e 1, compiled and with an Introduction by Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin 19. TH E CANADIAN COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION, 1845-1851 by Gilbert N. Tucker, edited and with an Introduction by Hugh G. J. Aitken 20. JO SEPH HO W E: VOICE OF NOVA SCOTIA, compiled and with an Introduction by J. Murray Beck 21. LIFE AND LETTERS OF SIR W ILFRID LAURIER, V o lu m e 1, by O. D. Skelton, edited and with an Introduction by David M .L .F arr

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26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

compiled and with an Introduction by Tom McFeat L IFE AND TIM ES OF SIR ALEXANDER TILLOCH GALT by O. D. Skelton, edited and with an Introduction by Guy MacLean A HISTORY OF CANADIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS, V o lu m e I, by G. P. deT. Glazebrook, revised by the author A HISTORY OF CANADIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS, V o lu m e II, by G. P. deT. Glazebrook, revised and with a Bibliographical Essay by the author t h e r a c e q u e s t i o n i n Ca n a d a by Andre Siegfried, edited and with an Introduction by F. H. Underhill n o r t h a t l a n t i c t r i a n g l e by J. B. Brebner, with an Introduction by D. G. Creighton a p p r o a c h e s t o Ca n a d ia n e c o n o m i c h i s t o r y , compiled and with an Introduction by W. T. Easterbrook and M. H. Watkins CANADIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE: A STATISTICAL PROFILE, Compiled and with an Introduction and Commentary by John Porter CHURCH AND STATE IN CANADA, 1627-1867: BASIC DOCUMENTS, compiled and with an Introduction by John S. Moir w e s t e r n o n t a r io a n d t h e a m e r i c a n f r o n t i e r by Fred Landon, with a new Introduction by the author

35.

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36.

a

compiled and with an Introduction by G. A. Rawlyk HISTORY OF j o u r n a l i s m i n C a n a d a (a n o r ig in a l p u b lic a tio n )

by W. H. Kesterton, with an Introduction by Wilfrid Eggleston 37. THE OLD PROVINCE o f Q u e b e c , V o lu m e I , by A. L. Burt, with an Introduction by Hilda Neatby 38. TH E OLD PROVINCE o f Q u e b e c , V o lu m e II, by A. L. Burt 39. GROWTH AND TH E CANADIAN ECONOMY, edited and with an Introduction by T. N. Brewis 40. DOCUMENTS ON TH E CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, edited and with an Introduction by G. P. Browne 41. E s k i m o o f t h e Ca n a d ia n a r c t i c , edited and with an Introduction by Victor F. Valentine and Frank G. Vallee 42. THE COLONIAL REFORMERS AND CANADA, 1830-1849, edited and with an Introduction by Peter Burroughs. 43. A NARRATIVE, by Sir Francis Bond Head edited and with an Introduction by S. F. Wise 44. JO H N s t r a c h a n : d o c u m e n t s a n d o p i n i o n s , edited and with an Introduction by J. L. H. Henderson 45. TH E NEUTRAL YANKEES OF NOVA SCOTIA by J. B. Brebner, with an Introduction by W. S. MacNutt 46. ROBERT LAIRD BORDEN: HIS M EM OIRS, V o lu m e I, edited and with an Introduction by Heath Macquarrie 47. ROBERT LAIRD BORDEN: HIS M EM OIRS, V o lu m e II, edited by Heath Macquarrie

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48.

by John W. Holmes 50. LAMENT FOR ANATION: THE DEFEAT OF CANADIAN NATIONALISM, by George Grant, with a new Introduction by the author 51. CANADIAN FOREIGN policy, 1945-1954, edited and with an Intro­ duction by R. A. MacKay. 52. monck: letters and journals, edited and with an Introduc­ tion by W. L. Morton. 53. HISTORICAL essays on the prairie provinces, edited and with an Introduction by Donald Swainson. 54. THE CANADIAN ECONOMY IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION by A. E. Safarian. 55. Canada’s changing north, edited and with an Introduction by William C. Wonders. 56. the development of Canada’s staples, 1867-1939, edited and with an Introduction by Kevin H. Burley.