Canadian Bilingual Districts : From Cornerstone to Tombstone [1 ed.] 9780773575929, 9780773531024

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the canadian bilingual districts

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The Canadian Bilingual Districts From Cornerstone to Tombstone dan i e l b o u r g e o i s

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2006 isbn-13: 978-0–7735-3045-4 isbn-10: 0-7735–3045-2 (bnd) isbn-13: 978-0–7735-3102-4 isbn-10: 0-7735–3102-5 (pbk) Legal deposit third quarter 2006 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper. This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Institute for Research on Public Policy and Public Administration. McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (bpidp) for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Bourgeois, Daniel, 1960– The Canadian bilingual districts: from cornerstone to tombstone/Daniel Bourgeois. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn-13: 978-0–7735-3045-4 isbn-10: 0-7735–3045-2 (bnd) isbn-13: 978-0–7735-3102-4 isbn-10: 0-7735–3102-5 (pbk) 1. Language policy – Canada–History. I. Title. fc145.l3b69 2006 306.44c971 c2005-907879-0

This book was typeset by Interscript in 10/13 Sabon.

This book is dedicated to André Laurendeau, the instigator, co-chair, and leader of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Ton peuple est toujours là, André.

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Contents

Table and Maps Foreword Preface

ix

xi

xiii

Introduction

3

1 Policy Formulation

15

2 Policy Adoption 44 3 Policy Specification: The First Effort

73

4 Policy Specification: The Second Effort 5 Policy Termination 198 6 Policy Analysis

215

7 Policy Relevance Conclusion Notes

273

275

Bibliography Index

259

321

313

113

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Table and Maps

Table 5.1 The matrix of bilingual regions and public services

211

Map 1.1

The fifty-four bilingual districts identified by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism according to census divisions (1961) 31

Map 3.1

The thirty-seven bilingual districts recommended by the Duhamel Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, 1971 90

Map 4.1

The thirty bilingual districts recommended by the Fox Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, 1975 149

Map 5.1

The existing bilingual regions

212

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Foreword

This is an important book for several reasons. First, author Daniel Bourgeois brings back to life an important period in Canadian history. In doing so, he sheds new light on how Ottawa sought to deal with the national unity crisis of the 1960s and 1970s. He documents that this would be done by creating a new perception of Canada, one that established in policy the fact that nearly one million francophones live outside Quebec. The book is also important because it examines how major policy shifts are conceived and generated. It reviews the work of a royal commission, examines its recommendations, and then provides an account of how these recommendations are dealt with inside government or where the rubber hits the road. In addition, the book is important because it goes behind the scenes to give the reader a sense of the political and bureaucratic tensions that invariably exist when new public policies are being shaping. Lastly, the book speaks directly to one of the most important theoretical questions in modern representative democracy: the role of civil servants in shaping and implementing public policies. Given the above, this book will be of strong interest to a large audience, including students of Canadian politics, public policy, public administration, and those with an interest in Canadian federalism, language policy, and relations between the majority and minority groups. In brief, one of the book’s most important contributions is that it brings a multidimensional perspective to the study of politics and public administration. Daniel Bourgeois attaches considerable importance to symbols. The book itself is symbolic. Daniel is a graduate of the Université de Moncton,

xii

Foreword

a university that was born while the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was going about its work. He lives in the only province in Canada that has formally embraced official bilingualism and in a city that has only recently taken the same step. Canada is still waiting for Ottawa, its capital, to do what Moncton did. Moncton, it will be recalled, was torn over language tensions in the 1960s and 1970s. Both the city and the province have come a long way in promoting greater understanding between two language groups. Finally, it is with a sense of pride that I sign this foreword. Daniel was one of my students in the mid-1980s. I saw in him tremendous potential as a student of public policy. He went on to complete a doctorate at a leading Canadian university and to produce this book. He also recently succeeded me at the research institute that I founded at the Université de Moncton. Daniel is typical of a growing number of young, confident, and dynamic Acadians. The much-talked-about Moncton economic miracle is due in no small measure to Daniel’s generation. The federal government, as he documents so well in this book, may have given up on a policy of promoting bilingual districts in Canada. But something highly positive flowed out of Ottawa’s efforts to promote national unity, and this book is but one example. Donald J. Savoie Canada Research Chair in Public Administration and Governance

Preface

This book would have suffered the same complex and ironic fate as its subject, the bilingual districts, were it not for Donald J. Savoie. In June 2004, Donald put up half of the book’s publication costs through the Canadian Institute for Research on Public Policy and Public Administration. Without those funds, McGill-Queen’s University Press could not have afforded to publish the book. This is because the Aid to Scholarly Publication Program rejected my request for funds on “academic grounds,” even though three of the four peers who reviewed my manuscript thought the contrary. Donald encouraged me not to give up, assuring me that the academic publication process did not always make sense. He deserves my gratitude for both his financial and moral support. Merci. The book would not have been written at all were it not for my wife, Anne, and our two sons, Alexandre and Jérémie. They lost sight of me for countless hours on weeknights and weekends. They also lost thousands of dollars from the family pot so I could complete the research and writing. I hope they will one day value our mutual sacrifice as a contribution to their country, language, culture, and identity. Merci! Et soyez fiers. I also express my sincere gratitude to the fifty interviewees who granted me their precious time and a lot of patience. Finally, a word of gratitude to the anonymous peers who assessed my original manuscript and the competent staff at McGill-Queen’s University Press, notably Judith Turnbull, who revised and edited it. Their suggestions greatly improved the final version. I nevertheless remain accountable for the end product.

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the canadian bilingual districts

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Introduction

In the 1960s, “Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact, [was] passing through the greatest crisis in its history,” a crisis that, according to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (B and B Commission), “could destroy” the country (rcbb 1965, 13). A growing number of Québécois sought secession from the rest of Canada because “the principal institutions in the country are frustrating their desire to live their lives fully as French Canadians” – a situation “they could no longer allow … to continue” (109; emphasis in original). To resolve the crisis, the commission recommended 150 measures, of which the creation of bilingual districts was the “cornerstone” (rcbb 1967, 116). This book examines the concept of bilingual districts and explains why none were ever implemented. To explain the cornerstone’s demise, I must put bilingual districts in their historical and political contexts. In the 1960s, secession became a popular option in Quebec because a growing number of Québécois perceived that the French language and culture were being abused or neglected in Canada (rcbb 1965, 23). The ensuing sociolinguistic crisis was the product of symbolic actions and inactions, and any resolution to the conflict required symbolic interventions. The crisis was fuelled by “half-truths and untruths” held and advocated by francophones and anglophones about each other (rcbb 1965, 143). This led to mutual ignorance of, and prejudice towards, the other official language group (87, 109), producing “widely differing conceptions of the Canadian state and society” (45). The anglophone majority did not

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Canadian Bilingual Districts

understand the importance of the issue and consequently did not see the need for major reforms. Francophones, a minority in Canada but a majority in Quebec, thought the issue justified significant reforms or, if these could not be achieved, secession. On one side, “the great majority of English-speaking Canadians misunderstand the nature of the problems raised by contemporary French Canada” (rcbb 1965, 125). Furthermore, anglophones did not see why the francophone minority should seek an “equal partnership with the majority” (125). Essentially, anglophones tended to be ignorant of the country’s geolinguistic reality. Some thought francophones resided only in Quebec (97). Others believed that francophones represented only “10 or 12 per cent of the population” and that the “French population has been decreasing continuously since 1867” (97). In fact, at the time of the B and B Commission, francophones represented 28 per cent of Canadians and had quintupled their total since Confederation, reaching five million (rcbb 1967, 20). Some anglophones believed that all Québécois were bilingual (rcbb 1965, 113), although only 25 percent of Québécois spoke English in 1961 (rcbb 1967, 100). Others believed that Quebec was “an archaic, rural society” (rcbb 1965, 79), but in actuality it was “more urbanized than Canada as a whole” (79–80). “These incorrect propositions could only reinforce [anglophones’] views about the supreme position of the majority” (rcbb 1965, 97). During the B and B Commission’s regional hearings in Calgary, for example, one anglophone pointed to an English version of the Bible and said, “If [English] was good enough for Christ, it is good enough for me.“1 Others stated that the Battle of the Plains of Abraham had settled French-English relations “once and for all” (123): the conquest of 1759 had created “One Canada,” and “if people want to stay in Canada, let them learn English” (53). If assimilation failed, the Québécois could be dispersed throughout Canada (98) to solve the “Quebec problem” (93). Thus, anglophones “did not in general show themselves particularly eager to agree to any extensive changes,” not even in regard to bilingual public services (73),2 although the “great bulk of English-speaking opinion seemed … to be moderate” and open to reforms (125). For francophones, however, significant changes were necessary. They remembered that the first century of Confederation had witnessed numerous anti-French policies in the nine anglophone-dominated provincial governments. The abolition of official bilingualism in Manitoba in 18903 and the government of Ontario’s adoption in 1912 of Regulation 17,4 are the most obvious examples. Regulation 17, dubbed “the

Introduction

5

harshest language law ever enacted in Canada” (Reid 1993, 53), prohibited the use of French in Ontario classrooms after grade 2 (Gervais 1996). Policies such as these, which were intent on nurturing English Canadian nationalism – “one language and one nationality” (Aunger 2001) – also nurtured French Canadian nationalism (Bock 2003). All the while, the federal government, guardian of Confederation, refused to use its powers of disavowal, and in its own spheres of jurisdiction, it procrastinated until forced to adopt a fifty-dollar bonus for bilingual civil servants in 1888, bilingual postage stamps in 1927, bilingual currency in 1936, and bilingual cheques in 1962. Such piecemeal interventions increasingly disappointed, rather than pleased, many Québécois, who saw secession as the only alternative. Even the positive, yet reactive, motto Maîtres chez nous seemed insufficient. These inequities were compounded by the fact that numerous Québécois, especially separatists, also ignored Canada’s geolinguistic reality. Some believed that very few anglophones living in Quebec spoke French (rcbb 1965, 85), yet 29 per cent of Quebec anglophones were bilingual (86). Others believed that francophones outside Quebec were assimilated beyond salvation. Consequently, many separatists argued that the secession of Quebec was the only way to protect the French language and culture on the North American continent: “[T]hese French-speaking minorities are doomed because of the attitude of the English Canadians, and … the French Canadians should therefore devote all their efforts to the development of a unilingual Quebec”(39). The commission concluded that “unawareness on one side, and strongly rooted feeling on the other” would break up Canada unless “a major operation” were performed on the “whole social body” (rcbb 1965, 133). In other words, “important changes in attitudes” on both sides were “vital prerequisites” to solving the crisis, because change would only be effective if, “on each side, there is an insistent, driving desire to understand the other, and to consider the common good” (137). The major operation was first and foremost sociopsychological: rectify Canadians’ erroneous geolinguistic perceptions. The bilingual districts were the most effective tools to that end, and this explains their status as the commission’s chosen cornerstone in the foundation of Canada’s official bilingualism and biculturalism structure, buttressing the other recommendations and ensuing measures. They were the means to ensure “the equal partnership of all who speak either language and participate in either culture,” the goal of the sociolinguistic

6

Canadian Bilingual Districts

policy (rcbb 1967, 39). But they were more than means. In addition to their structural purpose of buttressing other stones, cornerstones have a second architectural purpose: being visible at eye level, they have a symbolic function. Thus, as cornerstones, bilingual districts would be the daily manifestations of official bilingualism and biculturalism for most Canadians. Bilingual districts were to be administrative service areas with a dual purpose – one administrative, the other symbolic. While both purposes were of “major importance” (90), their symbolic purpose was ultimately more important. In 1967, bilingual services at the federal level were limited to Quebec and a few contiguous areas, whereas bilingual services were only rarely provided by provincial and municipal governments. But times were changing, and the need for more widespread bilingual services had become clear. Bilingual districts were seen as the vehicle that would extend such services to the numerous francophone areas of Canada that had been neglected since 1867. Their boundaries would delineate the areas of Canada wherein the federal, provincial, and municipal governments would be obligated to provide their public services in both French and English. However, bilingual districts would also limit this expansion to those areas where francophones had a sufficient critical mass. In the B and B Commission’s opinion, bilingual districts should be established where the minority represented at least 10 per cent of an area’s population. They would expand official bilingualism and biculturalism throughout Canada, but not in every office of every institution in every area of the country. This limited kind of territorial expansion for bilingualism presented many advantages. By expanding the official status and use of French throughout Canada, bilingual districts would please francophones both inside and outside Quebec. By limiting such an expansion to the most viable areas of the country, they would make official bilingualism and biculturalism palatable to anglophones outside Quebec. Territorial limits would also please the francophone majority in Quebec because they would restrict bilingual services in that province to the few areas that warranted them. At that time, English-language services were prevalent throughout Quebec, even in areas where few anglophones lived, but French-language services were not available in many areas of the province. The new version of territorial bilingualism would represent “the minimum of what French-speaking Canadians consider as vital, and the maximum that English-speaking Canadians will accept” (rcbb 1965, 137). Bilingual districts would also alter the administrative

Introduction

7

status quo. Instead of forcing small and isolated minority areas to repeatedly justify, when possible, the allocation of bilingual services in their communities according to bureaucratic criteria such as “significant demand”, bilingual districts would compel federal, provincial, and municipal institutions to adapt their service-delivery mechanisms to the geolinguistic reality of the country. Administrative structures would be turned on their head to serve the sociolinguistic minorities in their “homelands.”5 The administrative purpose of bilingual districts, then, was more concerned with the bilingualism side of the B and B coin. Bilingual districts would circumscribe the areas of the country where public services should be provided, on a daily basis, in both official languages, irrespective of the culture espoused by the citizen requesting the service. For instance, an Acadian moving to Saint-Boniface could obtain her services in French in this proposed bilingual district without having to adopt the Franco-Manitoban culture. The symbolic purpose of bilingual districts focused more on the bicultural side of the B and B coin. It entailed, for example, the official recognition of the Franco-Manitoban homeland of Saint-Boniface. The administrative/linguistic/individual and symbolic/cultural/collective sides were interdependent, just as “the problems of bilingualism and biculturalism are inseparably linked” (rcbb 1967, 30). The symbolic/cultural/collective aspect of the cornerstone was, however, its most important element. Symbolically, bilingual districts were territorial markers intended to create a new geolinguistic perception of the country. They would officially recognize the existence of francophone homelands outside Quebec, reduce the official presence of English within Quebec, and help guarantee federal, provincial, and municipal services in both official languages. Ultimately, bilingual districts would reflect and nurture the true geolinguistic reality of Canada. This reality shock treatment would be central in the fight against Quebec secession, combatting erroneous perceptions nurtured since 1867 that had led many Canadians to believe that the French language and culture were limited to Quebec. Territorial segregation, the commission believed, would lead to Quebec’s secession. Bilingual districts, on the other hand, would correct the mistaken beliefs and invalidate the ensuing arguments and solutions by demonstrating that Canada was in fact a mosaic of francophone and anglophone communities scattered throughout all ten provinces. The French language and culture were thus “not confined to Quebec” (rcbb 1967, 97). Indeed, bilingual districts would prove

8

Canadian Bilingual Districts

that 850,000 francophones lived in francophone communities outside Quebec despite a century of assimilationist provincial policies. The commission identified at least thirty significant francophone areas within at least seven of the nine provinces outside Quebec. Bilingual districts would provide a significant adrenaline boost to these minority francophone communities by officially recognizing their existence within their anglophone province. The designation of “bilingual” meant “French spoken here,” a significant achievement in the 1960s. Conversely, bilingual districts would establish the proper geolinguistic reality of Quebec by demonstrating that the English language and culture, then perceived as omnipotent and omnipresent in Quebec, were significant in only a few areas of la belle province and that their dominance in Quebec was anachronistic. In limiting the English language and culture to specific areas, bilingual districts would allay the fears of Quebec separatists. They would demonstrate that the French language and culture were not restricted to Quebec, nor would they be in the near future, and that the English language and culture in Quebec were to be officially limited to Montreal, the Outaouais, the Eastern Townships, and a few small and isolated communities elsewhere. Bilingual districts would lay the foundations for an alternative to Quebec secession, as advocated by a growing number of sovereignists, or assimilation, as proposed by a number of francophobes throughout the country. The alternative policy was official national bilingualism and biculturalism. This option argues that since francophone and anglophone communities coexisted de facto throughout Canada, the language, culture, and communities of both language groups could and should coexist de facto and de jure under symbolic and practical societal equality, albeit limited to bilingual districts that would reflect, demonstrate, and nurture this geolinguistic reality. The true geolinguistic reality should be symbolically proclaimed: “The implicit must become explicit” (rcbb 1967, 91). As noted above, the symbolic purpose of bilingual districts was concerned with biculturalism. The districts would officially recognize the presence of communities rather than languages. They would enable francophones outside Quebec (and even in parts of Quebec) to live a full life in a French society. By officially recognizing minority communities and making them equal to their neighbouring majority communities, bilingual districts would symbolize a more formal arrangement

Introduction

9

than a mere verbal commitment: “The regional recognition of its language is very important to the minority, who will thus feel more accepted, settled, and stronger. The granting of clear, indisputable language rights to a minority beyond the jurisdictional limits of a municipality or school board will increase the vitality of the minority’s culture” (rcbb 1967, 106). It was through the granting of such rights and through the symbolic recognition of francophone communities outside Quebec and the symbolic attrition of the English language and culture in Quebec that bilingual districts would contribute to the policy’s ultimate goal – “the equal partnership not only of the two peoples which founded Confederation but also of each of their respective languages and cultures” (34–9). Beyond correcting erroneous perceptions and officially recognizing minority homelands, bilingual districts had a third symbolic value: they would guarantee public services in both official languages. Their proclamation would force governments (and large private firms) to ensure both symbolic and practical sociolinguistic equality by, among other things, providing public services in the minority language within the communal homelands. Minority schools, the most important public service, would thus be based on bilingual districts. Cultural and linguistic equality would be guaranteed by two symbolic measures: an official languages act at the national level and bilingual districts at the local level. The official recognition of minority homelands and the provision of public services in the minority’s language were necessary because governments had a significant role to play in the minority communities’ survival and vitality: “The language used by the individual in his dealings with the three levels of government has both a great potential importance and a definite symbolic value. And governments, by their attitudes, often set examples for everyone” (rcbb 1967, 145). The B and B Commission thus not only rejected the options of Quebec secession or assimilation but also the province-based territorial variation of official bilingualism and biculturalism. According to this variation, a federated country can be officially bilingual and bicultural if one (or more) of its subunits (i.e., provinces) has the minority language as its official language and all other subunits have the majority language as their official language. In contrast, the territorial principle in a unitary state involves cutting up the country into administrative areas along linguistic lines. The commission felt that the province-based territorial variation was regressive because it would reduce the anglophones in

10

Canadian Bilingual Districts

Quebec to the second-rate status then given to francophones outside that province (rcbb 1965, 118). It also believed that such a policy would, sooner or later, lead Quebec to secede. The commission also refused to base its solutions on the personality principle. This principle holds that a government must serve every one of its citizens, no matter where they live, in the language of his or her choice. Most multilingual countries, such as Switzerland, Belgium, and Finland, respect this obligation at the national level in terms of publications and responses to enquiries, for instance, but they adopt the territorial principle at the subnational level. Moreover, local circumstances, such as the critical mass of the minority, would determine the number and type of bilingual public services. Switzerland is a federation that uses the canton-based variation of the principle; Finland is a unitary state that uses the communal-based variation; and Belgium is a unitary state that uses a regional variation. Only South Africa provided all of its public services in both official languages at the local as well as the national level. This was because South Africa’s White population was proficient enough in the two official languages – Afrikaan and English – to make the personality principle work. Given Canada’s sociolinguistic reality – in particular, its vast territory and its limited number of bilingual citizens (12 per cent in 1961) – the personality principle was in itself impractical. Canada would thus have to adopt the territorial principle espoused by most multilingual countries, albeit after tailoring it “to its own nature and needs … [and] to its federal system” (rcbb 1967, 84) – in other words, a blend of territorial and personality principles. The commission concluded, however, that, because of Canada’s “geographical distribution of language groups,” the territorial principle should dominate (84). The commission nevertheless recognized that the personality principle should be applied in Canada for some services. For instance, judicial proceedings in the language of the accused and telephone or written responses by government head offices to enquiries in the language of the citizen making the request should not be limited by geographical considerations (rcbb 1967, 84). The national capital and the central offices of federal institutions should ensure the sociolinguistic equality of francophone and anglophone citizens according to the personality principle. However, their regional and local offices, as well as provincial and municipal institutions, should ensure the equality of their communities according to the territorial principle. The commission gave priority to the territorial principle because it would have more impact on the daily interactions of citizens.

Introduction

11

“The symbolic significance of changes would be great,” the commission argued (rcbb 1967, 118), “but the practical results could be just as important,” since bilingual districts would force all three levels of government – federal, provincial, and municipal – to allocate their public services in both official languages within their respective jurisdictions. More precisely, this “linguistic reorientation of a number of institutions in the three levels of governments” would “noticeably alter the living conditions of the minority in a defined area” (106). At the provincial level, in particular, bilingual institutions and services guaranteed by bilingual districts were of major importance because provincial services were more crucial than federal services to the minority’s linguistic and cultural survival (90): “The provision of federal government services in both official languages would be useful, but such measures would be incomplete if the many vital responsibilities of provincial and local governments were disregarded.” Provincial governments, for instance, often in collaboration with their municipalities, were responsible for education, health, and social services. A sociolinguistic policy that disregarded these key services could therefore not achieve the goal of linguistic and cultural equality from coast to coast (94). The symbolic and administrative purposes of the bilingual districts would complement the federal public services already provided within the “bilingual regions” that had been created by statutes and regulations since 1938. The symbolic purpose of bilingual districts would publicize the bilingual administrative regions that the federal civil service had given a low profile since 1938, ensure that the number and size of these regions were designated by public proclamation rather than secretive administrative fiats, and guarantee that all public services were provided in both official languages within bilingual districts, rather than be allocated according to administrative whim. Their administrative purpose would increase the number and expand the boundaries of these federal bilingual regions, increase the federal services provided within them, and add within their boundaries bilingual services from the provincial and municipal spheres. In essence, the bilingual districts’ federal administrative purpose (providing more services in more areas) was secondary to their symbolic purpose (recognizing homelands), while the provincial administrative purpose was essentially practical (making crucial provincial services available in the minority language within bilingual districts). Provincial administrative districtification6 would nevertheless provide the minority a substantial symbolic “moral effect” as well (rcbb 1967, 97).

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Canadian Bilingual Districts

Symbolic and practical purposes; federal, provincial, and municipal services; and linguistic and cultural equality would be pursued by these “special areas within which a defined language régime would be established” (rcbb 1967, 106). While bilingual districts were not the sole or ideal solution to Canada’s sociolinguistic conflict, they were recommended as vital to the country’s sociolinguistic policy because they were the best tool to give official recognition to minority homelands from coast to coast and to frame and guarantee the allocation of federal, provincial, and municipal public services in the minority language. These accomplishments would rectify, reveal, and nurture the geolinguistic reality of the country. They would also underlie the most appropriate sociolinguistic policy option to counter Quebec secession or assimilation. Indeed, official bilingualism and biculturalism from coast to coast, albeit practically limited to areas where numbers warranted, would be the result of this symbolic and administrative districtification. Nevertheless, although the concept of bilingual districts became the cornerstone of Canada’s Official Languages Act, none were ever established. The bilingual district concept suffered execution thanks to fourteen threads binding together to form a solid hanging rope. The most important thread was the bureaucratic deviation performed by the Treasury Board Secretariat (tbs) in May 1976, when it replaced a memo to Cabinet recommending thirty-one bilingual districts with a memo recommending that the program be aborted. Bilingual districts were ‘sabotaged’ by tbs because its managers did not want to erase the administrative system they had put in place in 1973 to provide bilingual services in the bilingual regions of the country while they had waited for Cabinet to proclaim bilingual districts. tbs’s temporary and secretive bilingual regions, which were almost identical to the low-profile federal bilingual regions established since 1938, replaced the permanent and symbolic bilingual districts recommended by the commission. tbs justified its action with four basic arguments: first, bilingual regions were already in place; second, it was difficult to trace adequate boundaries for bilingual districts; third, bilingual districts did not have a significant symbolic value; and fourth, bilingual districts had become “a red rag to a bull.”7 The first two arguments are contradictory: it is just as difficult to delineate borders for bilingual regions as for bilingual districts. The last two are also contradictory: if the symbolic value of bilingual districts was negligible, how could the districts be red rags to a bull? The fourth argument is also ironic: a symbolic red rag was precisely what bilingual districts were meant to be. Although they were intended

Introduction

13

to provide a geolinguistic symbol that would help preserve Canadian unity, bilingual districts were terminated because they represented (or were perceived to represent) a symbolic threat to that unity. The context had changed in the decade between the commission’s decision to make the bilingual districts its cornerstone recommendation and the tbs deviation, but this contextual evolution did not lead to the tbs deviation. Indeed, these key changes occurred after the May 1976 deviation. The preceding paragraphs outline the irony of the bilingual districts’ demise, yet they do not fully reflect that irony or the complexity of the story. Pointing the finger at bureaucratic deviation is too simple. A more complete explanation is required. In a nutshell, the tbs bureaucrats focused on the bilingual districts’ administrative purpose and neglected their symbolic purpose. Their bureaucratic environment kept them from “thinking outside the box.” They did not fully understand the B and B Commission’s reasons, both philosophical and political, for making bilingual districts the cornerstone of its policy. tbs put administrative feasibility ahead of symbolic sociolinguistic measures that were intended to correct past torts. The commission had, ironically, explicitly advised the federal government not to let tbs assume responsibility for the bilingual districts, particularly because of tbs’s use of bureaucratic solutions to political and sociological problems. As it turned out, the transfer of responsibility from the proactive Secretary of State to the bureaucratic tbs led the bilingual districts down a complex and fatal path, just as the commissioners had predicted. This book seeks to describe and explain the bilingual districts’ complex and ironic fate. Chapter 1 outlines the districts’ origins: the research, analysis, and reports of the B and B Commission. The second chapter describes the federal government’s efforts to provide bilingual services prior to the 1969 adoption of the Official Languages Act, the same government’s elaboration of the 1969 statute, the constitutional negotiations that were intended to solve Canada’s sociolinguistic unity problems and incidentally modified the gist of bilingual districts, and the federal legislative process that eventually modified and adopted the Official Languages Act and the bilingual districts therein. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the efforts made by two advisory boards and the federal Cabinet to specify the size, number, and location of bilingual districts. Chapter 5 identifies the political and constitutional factors that forced Parliament to terminate the bilingual districts. The program was abandoned de facto by the federal Cabinet in December 1976, but it did not

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Canadian Bilingual Districts

disappear de jure until July 1988, when Parliament adopted the second Official Languages Act, designed to conform to the requirements of the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Chapter 6 ties up the fourteen strings of the hanging rope that together answer my research question: why were bilingual districts abandoned? This chapter also provides conceptual and theoretical lessons. Finally, chapter 7 argues that bilingual districts should be reconsidered in light of recent developments and research. Alternatively, they should be given a proper burial.

chapter one

Policy Formulation

To resolve Canada’s sociolinguistic crisis, the federal Cabinet established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism on 19 July 1963.1 The idea of a royal commission came from the pen of Le Devoir’s editorialist André Laurendeau,2 who became the commission’s co-chair and spiritual leader. Nine other prominent Canadians were appointed to the B and B Commission. The commission’s broad mandate was “to inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution” (rcbb 1967, 173). Tackling its mandate with vim and vigour, the commission spent seven years and $9 million studying the causes and effects of the crisis.3 In a final report comprised of six volumes, buttressed by more than 120 studies and numerous public consultations and briefs, the commission proved itself the most productive royal commission Canada had ever known. My synthesis of the commission’s work has four parts.4 The first presents the commission’s analysis, which is found throughout its reports but is featured in the preliminary report and the first volume. The second focuses on the bilingual districts, the cornerstone of all six volumes. The third presents an overview of the commission’s recommendations. The final part describes the winding up of the commission.

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Canadian Bilingual Districts

1 th e a n a l y s i s : p r o b l e m s and assumptions for intervention The preliminary report, published on 1 February 1965, did not present recommendations, but it did outline two specific and interrelated political solutions. First, as a “distinct society” (rcbb 1965, 111) Quebec should be awarded a “special status” within the British North America (bna) Act (92), so it can “end the inferior status of French in Quebec” (39). Second, “the actual and the symbolic importance of the French minorities” outside Quebec should be recognized in order to diffuse Quebec’s “separatist tendencies” by convincing it “to think of itself as maintaining a vital solidarity among its dispersed parts,5 although centered in Quebec,” instead of as being “an exclusively Quebec society” (119). The commissioners believed that “the way these minorities were treated in their respective provinces [is] ... one of the tangible indications of refusal or acceptance, by English-language Canadians, of the duality of Canada” (119). Recognizing francophone minorities outside Quebec, who represented the “link between Quebec and the other Canadian provinces” (119), would counter the perception, both within and outside Quebec, that Canada consisted of a single francophone province (Quebec) surrounded by nine anglophone provinces. This corrected perception would in turn counter the separatists’ argument that the French language and culture could be better maintained through independence than through remaining in an English Canada (49). The two alternatives to Quebec secession – maintaining the status quo (139) or establishing “two unilingual areas in the country” (86) – would both lead to Quebec secession. Both of the B and B Commission’s proposed political solutions make the assumption that Quebec secession could be prevented through the elevation of the status of French both inside and outside its borders. In the commission’s analysis, the need to protect the French language and culture, especially in Quebec, was the fundamental reason behind the quest for independence (rcbb 1965, 63). And this secessionist threat, which had surfaced repeatedly since Confederation,6 especially because of assimilationist policies adopted with regard to francophones outside Quebec, had now reached the boiling point because “the traditional conflict between a majority [anglophones] and a minority [francophones]” had been replaced by a “conflict between two majorities: that which is a majority in all Canada, and that which is a majority in the entity of Quebec” (135). In other words, the Québécois had come to realize that their

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majority status within their province gave them some form of control over their political, social, and economic institutions, facilitating the fulfilment of their particular aspirations (111–13). Majority rule could play in their favour within Quebec. Indeed, Quebec’s political institutions could finally favour the French language and culture. In short, erroneous geolinguistic perceptions had fuelled the flames of secession, but the secessionist movement was turning these perceptions into self-serving ammunition. In its preliminary report, the commission also sowed the seeds of symbolic territorial bilingualism and biculturalism that would lead to the cornerstone recommendation. Indeed, it advocated the symbolic recognition of francophone communities outside Quebec and the allocation of “regional administrative services ... [in French] wherever there is a reasonable number of people who speak that language” (rcbb 1965, 74, 65). But the full force of such measures would have to await the final report. In the general introduction (the “blue pages”) to the first volume of its final report, published on 8 October 1967, the commission reiterated that Canada still faced a sociolinguistic crisis that could break up the country (rcbb 1967, 17, 47). In fact, the crisis had worsened, as terrorists had claimed victims and spread fear.7 The commission also reiterated that mutual understanding and cooperation between francophones and anglophones was the most important prerequisite to solving the crisis: “The most ingenious reforms are of no avail unless they are undertaken in friendship, the soul of all valuable association (52).” The commission then presented a complex yet coherent philosophical framework to justify its 150 interrelated and encompassing recommendations. This framework rested on four basic assumptions that revealed its communitarian tilt. First, bilingualism and biculturalism were advantages rather than causes of division, especially in the increasingly multicultural global village. Second, official bilingualism and biculturalism was the foundation to the necessary partnership between the two main, distinct, and equal sociolinguistic societies. Third, official bilingualism and biculturalism and the entailing equal partnership between the two main sociolinguistic societies must be based on reality and realism. Finally, official bilingualism and biculturalism and the entailing equal partnership between the two societies offered the best way to avoid Quebec secession. The commission asserted that bilingualism and biculturalism were advantages or, more precisely, that in states like Canada that are comprised of two or more “distinct societies,”8 official bilingualism and biculturalism9 should be seen as valuable characteristics rather than as “causes of division” (rcbb 1967, 30). Recognizing that the planet “is

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becoming a unit,” especially through modern technology, while at the same time various communities are creating “a veritable explosion of nationalisms,” the commission concluded that “Canada is well equipped to communicate with the world and to assert its presence [because its] two languages and two principal cultures link it with all parts of the world where English and French are in current use” (51). It pointed out, however, that until Canadians created “a certain equilibrium between the two communities” (42–6) they would not reap the benefits of the global village and would suffer social unrest because of linguistic and cultural inequality favouring anglophones. In other words, a formal partnership was needed between the anglophone and francophone societies. These equal societies were distinct and should be kept distinct, at least to the extent necessary to ensure the survival and vitality of the minority language and culture. National unity was necessary, but integration without protection would jeopardize minorities. To coexist and collaborate effectively, the two societies should both have the opportunity to “exist and flourish” (rcbb 1967, 34). Each should thus have, “in a real sense, the means to live” (29). Each should possess its particular institutions, its proper representation within the shared national institutions, and the opportunity to conserve and express its culture (34). In other words, there must be “cultural duality” (43). Francophones and anglophones, at least where their numbers warrant, should obtain a “degree of self-determination” within the national state (45; emphasis in original). From this stems the commission’s basic thesis: equality between francophones and anglophones means “the equal partnership not only of the two peoples which founded Confederation but also of each of their respective languages and cultures” (39) – that is, the equality of sociolinguistic communities (43). Linguistic and cultural equality thus defined is as systemic and holistic as society itself. Language accompanies culture; private and public spheres interweave; individual and collective rights go hand in hand. It is important to explore these three elements. First, language and culture are interdependent: “the problems of bilingualism and biculturalism are inseparably linked” (rcbb 1967, 30). This is important for the bilingual districts’ dual purpose of allocating public services in both languages and symbolically recognizing minority homelands. The commission explained that language played two roles in society, its communicative role (it “makes possible social organization”) and its symbolic role (“the core of the intellectual and emotional life of every personality”) (29). Language is “the most evident expression of a culture,

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the one which most readily distinguishes cultural groups even for the most superficial observer” (30); it is “the natural vehicle for a host of other elements of culture”; it conveys “the notions and modes of expression which are part of a culture”; and it is “the means by which a cultural group discovers and assimilates new elements originating outside it” (34–5). It is because “language is the main instrument of social consciousness ... [and] defines group boundaries and excludes outsiders … [that] the main language boundaries and political boundaries have so often coincided” (9). By linking history, geography, identity, and power, language has an “explosive character”: Language itself is fundamental to activities which are distinctively human. It is through language that the individual fulfils his capacity for expression. It is through language that man not only communicates but achieves communion with others. It is language which, by its structure, shapes the very way in which men order their thoughts coherently. It is language which makes possible social organization. Thus a common language is the expression of a community of interests among a group of people. It is not surprising, then, that any community which is governed through the medium of a language other than its own has usually felt itself to some extent disenfranchised, and that this feeling has always been a potential focus for the political agitation. Moreover, like skin colour, language is an easily identifiable badge for those who wish to take issue with a different group, and thus it provides them with a rallying sign even for contests which are basically not those of language or race. (rcbb 1967, 29)

The commission’s principal sociolinguistic argument held that language bonded the other elements of a culture, just as mortar bonds the bricks of a foundation. In the words one of its researchers, language is, “foremost, the foundation of a particular culture, the prerequisite of its survival, and the vehicle of its propagation.” Consequently, “[r]ather than language being ancillary to other ends, these ends may become ancillary to the conservation of language.” Therefore, “for a linguistic minority, the preservation of its judicial and political institutions is meaningful only within the more encompassing goal of cultural selfpreservation” (Sheppard 1971, 101–2). However, language and culture were not interchangeable or synonymous: “[T]he vitality of the language is a necessary condition for the complete preservation of a culture, but it is not at all the sole condition” (rcbb 1967, 37; emphasis in original). Customs, habits, and experiences are among other essential elements. This is why, in spite of

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“the importance of the language question,” language is not the only underlying cause of “division between Canadians”: “In certain respects the problem of cultural duality is even deeper, and the political question has many components besides linguistic difficulties” (30). Nevertheless, the commission admonished anglophones who believed “that each group is quite free to preserve its culture, and that this is even a very good thing provided, however, that the use of English for practically every aspect of social life is willingly accepted” (38). Language and culture could not easily be separated. Since “language is much more than a simple means of communication, and culture is much more than the persistence of a few psychological traits or expressions of folklore” (rcbb 1967, 38), “the problems of bilingualism and biculturalism are inseparably linked” (30). Equal partnership meant equality of the two languages and the two cultures: (rcbb 1967) “The life of the two cultures implies in principle the life of the two languages … [;] at the practical level, an attempt to make every possible provision for cultural equality is primarily an attempt to make every possible provision for linguistic equality (38)”. Equal partnership also involves distinct societies: “Just as bilingualism should not lead to a blend of two languages, so Canada’s cultural duality cannot be taken to mean a mixture of the two cultures; each has its own existence” (31). Because the existence of both cultures throughout Canada will make or break the country (44), the equal partnership must be recognized officially a mari usque ad mare, albeit practically implemented only where numbers warrant. With respect to the second element, equal partnership between the two communities should be reflected in “the place occupied by each of the two dominant languages and cultures in both the private and public sectors” (rcbb 1967, 44). Work must provide cultural socialization and a degree of economic self-determination to both societies. On the one hand, “[m]ost people spend a great part of their waking hours at work, and if the environment in which they earn their living is not hospitable, inevitably they are dissatisfied. It follows that full participation by both English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians in the institutions of the working world is an important element in an equal partnership” (44). On the other, “[n]ot only must individual Anglophones and Francophones feel that there are no linguistic or cultural barriers to their progress in commerce and industry; they must also feel that as a linguistic and cultural group they share in the direction of economic life, in making those decisions which so largely determine everyone’s

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future living conditions. The presence or absence of a strong representation from each language group in the strategic posts of command … will do much to determine whether a sense of partnership exists” (44), in both the private and public sectors. Finally, with respect to the third element, equality should be applied to both individuals and communities (rcbb 1967, 40). However, collective equality is more important because (1) “languages and cultures are essentially collective phenomena”; (2) “a given language as a means of communication and expression exists to permit the individual to communicate with others, and to express himself and make himself understood”; (3) “a given culture expresses a common background of experience and attitudes and it can flourish only if the individual lives with others who share in this common background”; and (4) “a culture will be fully experienced only within its own complete society” (43). Therefore, even if individuals are the sole bearers of linguistic and cultural rights, they cannot exercise these rights on an individual basis. Such rights are collective, since they are claimed because of a distinct, shared existence and present and future needs, and can only be exercised with the participation of other individuals who share the same language, culture, and needs. Indeed, “where numbers warrant” implies a multitude of linguistic and cultural peers, and linguistic and cultural rights are not intended to help an individual per se but as a member of a community needing protection. In short, these rights protect languages and cultures rather than individuals: Individual equality can fully exist only if each community has, throughout the country, the means to progress within its culture and to express that culture … [It follows that] the political dimension … covers the possibilities for each society to choose its own institutions or, at least, to have the opportunity to participate fully in making political decisions within a framework shared with the other community. The collective aspect of equality is here still more evident; it is not cultural growth and development at the individual level which is at stake, but the degree of self-determination which one society can exercise in relation to another … [and] the extent of the control each has over its government or governments … [based on] the constitutional framework in which the two societies can live or aspire to live. (rcbb 1967, 44– 5; emphasis in original)

Individual rights were not disdained by the commission; rather the commission felt that “individual human rights are unquestionable, and hold for all Canadians without exception” (rcbb 1967, 39). But it favoured community rights in the short term to ensure individual rights

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in the long term. This was because it saw the crisis as systemic rather than as the result of individual actions, and as pitting one society (Quebec) against another (English Canada) rather than individual francophones against anglophones. The commission’s recommended sociolinguistic policy ([minority] societal identity, collective language rights, symbolic recognition of minority homelands, and public services to minorities based on their geolinguistic critical mass) put it on the communitarian side of the liberal balance. Only when such a policy was in place could francophones feel accepted in Canada, the secessionist threat be quelled, and the national crisis abate. In the medium term, the majority of anglophones would stop perceiving that the French fact was limited to Quebec and that the crisis could be resolved by giving more constitutional powers to that province. Once collective equality was in place in political, social, and economic institutions and was accepted by the anglophone majority, individual equal opportunities could finally be effectively provided to individual francophones throughout the country. Collective rights were thus a prerequisite to individual sociolinguistic rights. The equality of sociolinguistic communities and the equal partnership between them involved the two sides of the three essential elements of a successful sociolinguistic policy: language and culture, private and public, and individual and collective. The commission was less interested in correcting past torts than in developing a will to collaborate on present and future joint endeavours: “For us, the principle of equal partnership takes priority over all historical and legal considerations, regardless of how interesting and important such considerations may be” (rcbb 1967, 39). Because equality required eliminating inequalities and the francophone minority was the victim of existing linguistic and cultural inequalities, francophones should obtain more (40). The commission did not argue for compensation because of historical grievances but for prospective reasons: “We must work to develop and consolidate existing situations where they provide the possibility of establishing a certain equilibrium between the two communities” (46). Francophones, especially those living in viable communities outside Quebec, were to receive Frenchlanguage public schools and public services and the right to work in French, among other things, foremost to help the minority survive and to develop the bilingual and bicultural advantages of the country: The majority must realize that the minority, though fellow-citizens, do not share all their characteristics, and both sides must show respect for each other.

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The majority whose language is not in danger has nothing to lose and much to gain by contributing to the support of bilingualism in proportion to its superior numbers. This often lessens the penetration of the majority language into the daily lives of the minority. Mutual interest in each other and the sharing of experiences that can be shared will ensure that the linguistic groups, while remaining separate, will have a unity of purpose. Whenever a bilingual state preserves the integrity of its language groups, the tensions that might arise are neutralized to the extent that each of the groups within the state has a sense of cultural security. When a country fails to provide this sense of cultural security, the minority, seeing its language threatened, often tends to harbour feelings of hostility toward the majority and to look for other solutions, including various forms of “national” self-determination outside the framework of the bilingual state.” (rcbb 1967, 14)

Francophones thus needed a major transformation of Canada’s institutions (rcbb 1967, 41). The equal partnership between the francophone and anglophone societies should have as its foundation a national policy officially reflecting and promoting bilingualism and biculturalism. The commission proposed “a new charter for the official languages of Canada” founded on the concept of equal partnership between the two societies. This charter would eliminate “one cause of the present crisis in Canada” – the “impossibility of living a full life in French outside Quebec” (145). French life would be made possible throughout Canada once the Canadian economic, social, and political institutions reflected and nurtured the societal equality between the French and English languages, cultures, and societies. Governments would lead the other segments of society by example (145). A new sociolinguistic charter was needed because the old charter (sections 93 and 133 of the bna) did not adequately promote “a fully developed linguistic régime expressing the bicultural character of the country as a whole and based on well defined and fully accepted legal rights” (rcbb 1967, 69). Section 93, for example, made it possible for some provinces to declare English as “the official language of instruction” (68), and it cultivated the “unwillingness of the English-speaking majority to recognize the right of French-speaking parents to educate their children in French” (122). As a result, many francophones were “deprived of the right to an education in their mother tongue” (121). Further, section 133 was limited in scope (52–74). It did not encompass federal regulations, rules, orders, bylaws, proclamations, ordersin-council, and ordinances. Nor did it force courts, quasi-judicial

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boards, and commissions to be bilingual. It was silent on the language to be used in the actual conduct of government and administration, the linguistic composition of the civil service, and language rights of citizens in their contacts with the federal and provincial governments. Finally, it imposed no provincial or municipal obligations. “In short, the Constitution does not ensure that the public affairs of any given jurisdiction (federal, provincial, or local) must be conducted in either language” (54). For francophones in Quebec, an official bilingualism and biculturalism charter should recognize that the province is not “like the others” (rcbb 1967, 47). Francophones outside Quebec should receive “generous treatment” through “political wisdom” and the “principle of equality”: Since the principle of equality applies to two linguistic and cultural communities, one much larger than the other, it automatically implies the acceptance of the concept of a minority as something worthy of respect; it also leads us to make the most of existing situations. The principle of equality implies respect for the idea of minority status, both in the country as a whole and in each of its regions. Within the provinces or smaller administrative entities, both Anglophones and Francophones live in some cases as a majority, in some cases as a minority. (rcbb 1967, 46)

In other words, sociolinguistic equality should be obtained by treating the unequals (francophones) more than equally. The commission nevertheless warned that an official national policy on bilingualism and biculturalism must respect “the most elementary realism” (rcbb 1967, 42). Implementing the policy would take time: “[P]olitical decisions cannot rapidly or radically change a long-standing state of affairs or old ways of thinking” (42). Moreover, the policy should be limited to areas where the minority was viable: “[I]t will never be possible for the members of the two main cultural groups to enjoy the [same] advantages … throughout the country on an equal footing”(42). In short, “wherever similar conditions are found, similar services will be offered” (43). This meant bilingual administrative districtification: “[T]he equality of which we speak is not absolute, but begins to be realized almost automatically as soon as it is feasible in a given area … If the minimal conditions are present, the linguistic systems automatically assure that equality will be realized in concrete situations” (43). The commission presented examples of such conditions: fifty families should justify a kindergarten; 5,000 people should warrant a radio station; and 20,000 should obtain a television station (43). “Number is a determining factor in such cases,” it concluded (43).

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The commission was nevertheless more preoccupied by the symbolic value of official bilingual districtification. Where numbers warrant would obviously determine the practical feasibility of allocating public services in the official language of minority communities, but a similar administrative bilingual districtification had already been established in 193810 and strengthened by the 1961 Civil Service Act,11 the 1967 Public Service Employment Act,12 and the 1967 Public Service Employment Regulations13 (rcbb 1969a, 117–20). The commission deplored the fact that “this de facto bilingualism is very fragile,” as it “is often at the mercy of intolerance on the part of local or regional majorities” (rcbb 1967, 87) as well as on the part of the federal bureaucracy (rcbb 1969a, 118). The commission’s goal was thus to add symbolic value to existing bilingual districtification and thereby ensure that the policy’s symbolic purpose became more important than its administrative purpose. The existing bilingual districtification was sufficient to meet the administrative purpose, but it needed an official proclamation to meet the symbolic purpose of limiting the official use of English in Quebec,14 officially proclaiming francophone homelands elsewhere, and guaranteeing the allocation of bilingual services by forcing the administrative structures to adapt to the geolinguistic reality of the country. In short, the equality between the two sociolinguistic societies would be achieved by recognizing the viable minority communities as bilingual districts and guaranteeing the allocation of public services in their mother tongue therein. As the commission explained, “the essential decision is to recognize the official-language minorities wherever their relative importance justifies it” (rcbb 1967, 116). Once that recognition was made clear through the official proclamation of bilingual districts, the other measures would fall into place. An official national policy promoting bilingualism and biculturalism, implemented by bilingual districts based on the geolinguistic reality of the country, would ultimately ensure, de jure and de facto, the equal partnership between the anglophone and francophone societies in Canada. This third philosophical assumption implied that not only must official bilingualism and biculturalism be based on the geolinguistic reality of the country, but it must also combine realistic symbolic and practical means. An official languages act, adopted by the national parliament, was the most obvious symbolic gesture. Proclaiming bilingual districts was the second symbolic gesture. The third symbolic gesture was the official proclamation of bilingualism and biculturalism in Ontario and

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New Brunswick through the expansion of section 133 of the bna Act (rcbb 1967, 95–7). But even in these three provinces, bilingual districts would be the main tool to ensure official bilingualism and biculturalism. Official bilingualism and biculturalism would thus encompass a triumvirate: (1) the national government; (2) the three provinces where the vast majority of the official-language minorities reside (Quebec, Ontario, and New Brunswick); and (3) bilingual districts throughout the country. Recognizing Quebec as a distinct society was the fourth symbolic gesture, but the commissioners could not agree on the specific constitutional modifications that would translate “special status” into practical considerations (45). In short, the commission recommended a combination of the individual principle (services from the national and provincial head offices), the province-based territorial principle (Quebec, Ontario, and New Brunswick would have particular sociolinguistic regimes), and the nation-based territorial principle (bilingual districts). These four symbolic gestures were essential because they would lead to practical measures that would be “just toward members of an official-language minority, without imposing too heavy obligations on the majority” (106). But symbolic gestures, necessary per se, must mean something in the daily lives of the individuals and communities that make up the official anglophone and francophone societies. The equal status of the English and French languages and cultures must produce tangible benefits if they are to ensure that the respective societies survive and prosper. Bilingual districts bridged the symbolic and the tangible. The cornerstone recommendation would recognize minority homelands and guarantee bilingual services as well as the use of French in the work world. It would link the official policy that symbolically ensured the equal partnership between anglophone and francophone societies with the practical means that would ensure their equality in daily life. An official bilingualism and biculturalism policy such as this made the implicit explicit, but bilingual districts also made the explicit practical. As the cornerstone, bilingual districts buttressed most of the other 150 recommendations of the official bilingualism and biculturalism policy and the equal partnership between the two societies. An examination of the 150 recommendations follows shortly, but first we return to the fourth assumption that supports the B and B Commission’s philosophical framework. As the manifestation of the equal partnership, official bilingualism and biculturalism, though limited to the national capital, three provinces, and

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bilingual districts, would convince the Québécois to stay in Canada. The “Postscript” of the first volume of the B and B Commission’s report outlines the commission’s political arguments (rcbb 1967, 145–6), couching them in terms of justice (“Linguistic equality will exist in Canada only if Francophones are treated in other provinces as Anglophones now are in Quebec”) and democracy (“Majorities generally can and do effectively assert their interests and defend themselves, and governments have to listen to them. Minorities are always liable to be overlooked, even in a régime of equality. The minority needs legal protection – fair play demands it”). Governments must intervene because they are responsible for the public institutions that increasingly affect the survival of the minority sociolinguistic society: “It is in these institutions – at school, at work, in every situation where there is communication between people – that the future of English and French in Canada is to be decided. In fact, it would be more accurate to speak of the future of French language and culture, for English is in a position of strength in North America. French language and culture will flourish in Canada to the extent that conditions permit them to be truly present and creative.” This is why the ultimate goal of the national policy – “Living in French must be made possible in every part of Canada where there are enough French-speaking people” – depends on bilingual districts: “In recommending measures of a general nature we have tried to take into account their impact on the daily life of the individual Canadian. This is one of our main reasons for recommending the creation of bilingual districts, because it is on the district level that our proposals will most directly affect people’s day-to-day lives.” Consequently, official bilingualism in Canada, Quebec, Ontario, and New Brunswick and symbolic and administrative districtification throughout the country were the pillars on which rested the official bilingualism and biculturalism policy. In short, the B and B Commission recommended a three-step reform process: (1) governments should immediately adopt and implement symbolic bilingualism and biculturalism across the country and symbolic and administrative bilingual districts where warranted; (2) they should recognize Quebec as a distinct society; and (3) they should ensure the dominance of the French language and culture in Quebec. This would correct the erroneous geolinguistic perceptions fuelling sociolinguistic tensions. In the mid-term, governments should implement the other recommendations, such as French immersion, a bilingual national capital, and French-language units in the public and private work world. In the long-term, reforms undertaken immediately and in

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the mid-term should encourage the equality between the two societies, including constitutional accommodations for Quebec’s distinct society.

2 b i li ng ua l d i s t ri c t s , the cornerstone recommendation The B and B Commission adopted bilingual districts as its cornerstone recommendation on 1 September 196615 because they were seen as the best means to fuse the three essential elements of a successful sociolinguistic policy: language and culture, private and public, and individual and collective. Bilingual districts would give official recognition to the most significant minority homelands and ensure individual rights, even if only in some of these areas. They would frame and guarantee the allocation of federal, provincial, and municipal services. They would reflect and nurture the geolinguistic reality of the country, thereby correcting misperceptions that had fuelled the secessionist threat. They were the best administrative mechanism to ensure the application of the territorial principle, the commission’s preferred approach. The commission believed that if the allocation of public services in both official languages were restricted to bilingual areas of the country, bilingual districts would be acceptable to both the majority and the minority in each region they were established and throughout the country (rcbb 1967, 106). They would thus provide “a just, flexible, and realistic system which does not impose rigid rules and unjustified obligations on anyone” (116). The commission was backed in this belief by the many briefs that recommended bilingual districtification,16 by Ontario’s adoption of similar regional administrative mechanisms (rcbb 1967, 124), and by the federal government’s existing bilingual administrative districtification (rcbb 1967, 87; rcbb 1969a, 110). It was nevertheless the commission’s exhaustive research – over 120 studies, essays, and surveys – that established the value of the symbolic and administrative bilingual districts. Yet the commission nearly neglected bilingual districts altogether. When it set up, in the summer of 1964, its comparative research program of the sociolinguistic regimes in other countries, only Belgium, Switzerland, the Soviet Union, and South Africa were on the study list. Ken McRae, the head of the commission’s comparative studies program, convinced the members that Finland’s bilingual districts – a subject he had researched the previous year were also worthy of study. He hired Toivo Miljan to research the

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Finnish model and submit a report to the commission. In addition to Miljan’s exhaustive two-volume study (Miljan 1966), another submission to the commission recommended the implementation of the Finnish model in Canada (Morin 1966). The Finnish model is based on constitutional rights and statutory administrative districtification. Its purpose, according to Miljan (1966, 125), was to “satisfy the political pressures of the Swedo-Finn minority” (Finland had been a Swedish colony from 1150 to 1809) and, where possible, to symbolically “protect the language of this minority” (11 per cent in 1922, 7 per cent in 1966). The model was “not primarily designed to protect individual rights regardless of language” (Miljan 1966, 125). In brief, limited territorial districts were deemed more politically and administratively appropriate than a system whereby rights and services would be provided to every individual throughout Finland. Section 14 of Finland’s constitution guaranteed that all national services to the public would be provided in either Finnish or Swedish, depending on the requesting citizen’s mother tongue. However, this national guarantee was limited by the territorial principle. Finland is divided into 547 communes (cities, towns, rural areas), and section 1 of the 1922 Languages Act stipulated that communal public services would be provided in the official language of each commune. However, since section 50 of the constitution had required that communal borders be drawn according to the geolinguistic reality of Finland, communes and administrative districts usually coincided. In fact, 500 of the 547 districts were either unilingual Finnish or unilingual Swedish in 1966. To accommodate the citizens in the remaining 47 communes, bilingual districts were established. The linguistic status of each district was determined by the government according to the decennial census of each commune. Section 2 of the Languages Act stipulated that the minority must either represent at least 10 per cent of the communal population or contain 5,000 members to warrant a designation of bilingual district. If it did not, the commune was designated as either unilingual Finnish or unilingual Swedish. According to section 3 of the Languages Act and section 14 of the constitution, the minority is determined according to mother tongue. Miljan, however, mistakenly indicated that the calculation was based on the official language “spoken” by the citizens (1966, 112). The B and B Commission consequently suggested that Canadian bilingual districts be determined according to data on “spoken” language (rcbb 1967, 18). Miljan’s error was insignificant, however, because the commission had

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known that “mother tongue” had been used in the Finnish legislation (rcbb 1967, 76 n1), but more importantly, it favoured “language of use” data in any case (18). The discrepancy between “languagespoken” and “mother-tongue” data would nevertheless confuse the federal Cabinet as it studied the report submitted by the first Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, whose task was to specify the number, size, and location of the initial bilingual districts. It would also confuse the second advisory board. A second difficulty, faced by both boards, stemmed from the discrepancy between the B and B Commission’s recommendations and the 1969 Official Languages Act in regard to the elimination of a bilingual district once the minority population dipped below a significant level. In Finland, a bilingual district becomes unilingual if the minority population drops below 8 per cent or 5,000 citizens. The commission recommended reducing the minimal proportional criterion to 7 per cent (rcbb 1967, 112), but it did not specify a minimal numerical criterion because most numbers would have been too stringent for small francophone areas in Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, where the total French-speaking population numbered 3,150 and 7,958, respectively. The Official Languages Act, in contrast, stipulated that once established, a bilingual district would remain a bilingual district. As it turned out, the draft legislation respected the commission’s wish, but the final text did not. The difficulty faced by the two advisory boards was nevertheless negligible. While the perennial status of bilingual districts caused confusion among the board members, it did not seriously affect their work. It did, however, complicate Cabinet’s endeavour. The commission members knew that the specification of bilingual districts would not be easy. They tried but could not agree on their exact number, size, and location. They even commissioned two studies on the matter. The first suggested twenty bilingual districts; these corresponded to counties where the minority population reached 25 per cent of the population and to urban areas where the minority group represented 15 per cent of the population (Smiley 1966). The second study recommended twenty-one bilingual districts; these corresponded to urban areas where the minority was significant (MacNaught 1967). Unable to agree and pressed for time on other issues, the members left the arduous task of specifying the initial list to the federal and provincial governments and subsequent lists to a bilateral advisory board. Since the commission was unable to specify the exact number, size, and location of bilingual districts, it treated these and other specification

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Map 1.1 The fifty-four bilingual districts identified by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism according to census divisions (1961) Source: Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, The Official Languages (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1967), 108.

details rather superficially. Hindsight would arguably force the commission to hold an additional meeting to recommend a specific list of initial bilingual districts. Instead, the commission simply identified fifty-four census divisions (Map 1.1) that met the 10 per cent criterion at the time (rcbb 1967, 107–8) and recommended that “negotiations between the federal government and the provincial government concerned define the exact limits of each bilingual district” (110), and that, once established, their number, size, and location be re-examined after each decennial census by “a federal-provincial review council whose main duties would be: a) to recognize as bilingual districts or as parts of bilingual districts new areas where the official-language minority attains or surpasses 10 per cent, and b) to remove from officially bilingual districts those areas

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Canadian Bilingual Districts

where the numerical importance of the official-language minority has substantially decreased … [to] 7 per cent” (112). Practically, then, the federal and provincial governments were to immediately create and specify more or less fifty-four joint bilingual districts and to establish a joint advisory board after the 1971 census to review the initial list. If provincial governments refused to establish joint bilingual districts immediately, the commission recommended that the federal government, “acting in its own right, immediately declare officially bilingual, for its purposes, areas which it has itself delineated” (rcbb 1967, 112). The commission was not recommending a single specification strategy, as bilingual districts did not have to be part of a joint program. The initial provincial and federal bilingual districts were to be proclaimed under a joint agreement, while additional bilingual districts would be specified by a joint advisory board, but each government could proceed independently. The districts’ number, size, and borders should coincide, but there could be slight variations. And most importantly, although the official proclamations of the federal and provincial districts should occur simultaneously, one government could move faster than the other. In suggesting that the bilingual districts program could be established “over a set period,” the commission showed that it was “more concerned with the idea of bilingual districts and their language régimes than with the necessary arbitrary methods for their establishment” (rcbb 1967, 116). It assumed that the devilish details of establishing bilingual districts would be resolved by popular goodwill, political common sense, and the administrative rationality that would flow from a renewed friendship between the two sociolinguistic societies. The commission erred. The commission nevertheless outlined four steps to guide the specification process (rcbb 1967, 110–11). First, identify the census subdivisions that met the 10 per cent criterion. Second, delineate the boundaries of bilingual districts so that they coincide as much as possible with existing federal, provincial, and/or local administrative districts, thereby avoiding the “forest of non-coinciding administrative divisions.” Third, consult local authorities. Fourth, formally proclaim and create joint bilingual districts through “a federal-provincial agreement.” Advisory boards would subsequently be established to perform the first three tasks after each census, but they would also be asked to recommend additional bilingual districts and modifications to, or the elimination of, existing bilingual districts if the minority populations therein fell below 7 per cent.

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The commission also warned against six potential specification problems (rcbb 1967, 111–15). First, “the size of the bilingual districts … will obviously vary considerably.” Thus, “it will frequently happen that an administrative region will be larger than the bilingual district, and the regional office will be located outside the limits of the bilingual district.” The commission suggested that “the jurisdiction involved would have a choice of establishing a new administrative sub-region to coincide with the bilingual district, or arranging that services provided by the larger administrative region to the bilingual district would meet the necessary standards.” Such adaptive restructuring was supposed to ensure that the location of the administrative units and offices would not really matter. The location of “principal offices” nevertheless complicated both specification efforts. Second, “some municipalities in the immediate area may not meet this [10 per cent] population criterion.” As much as possible, “the districts should be formed so as to avoid including municipalities in which the minority is below 10 per cent.” If the boundaries could not avoid including unilingual municipalities, “arrangements should also be made for such municipalities to carry on their distinctly municipal operations in only one language while still being included in the district for other local, provincial, and federal government services.” Third, the linguistic minority in a province could represent the vast majority in specific areas. For instance, francophones in Madawaska County, New Brunswick, represented almost 95 per cent of the regional population. The area should thus be designated a unilingualFrench district. However, the commission argued that, unlike in Finland, there should be no unilingual-minority district. Indeed, all bilingual public services should “be available locally in the language of the provincial majority and also in that of the local majority” (rcbb 1967, 103). Fourth, “very small local government units, where important services are often provided by a tiny staff with limited language skills and a small budget,” may find themselves included in the regional bilingual district. The commission suggested that these units “combine forces with other units facing the same difficulties.” Fifth, several major urban centres of the country would contain thousands of minority members but would nevertheless fail to meet the 10 per cent criterion. Toronto, Edmonton, and Quebec City were cases in point. These cities, as with less-populated areas of the country that did not meet the proportional criterion, would thus not be awarded

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Canadian Bilingual Districts

any symbolic recognition or bilingual public services, except those from the head offices according to the personality principle. However, the commission urged the federal and provincial governments to collaborate in the construction and funding of “educational facilities” and “cultural centres” in these neglected cities. And sixth, there could be misperceptions about the proposals, and it was important to “ensure that [they] are well understood.” The governments that created bilingual districts should “explain carefully in advance, especially to the majority, the meaning and the scope of their action” and refute “a constantly recurring objection: that a bilingual area is one in which everyone must speak both languages.” The commission warned that failure to properly explain the meaning of a “bilingual institution” may encourage the inhabitants of an area declared bilingual to “bitterly oppose the imagined obligation to speak both languages.” The consultations conducted by both advisory boards revealed some opposition to bilingual districts, but not because the program was misunderstood. On the contrary, proponents and opponents to bilingual districts fully understood their symbolic importance. Finally, the commission outlined the administrative regime for bilingual districts (rcbb 1967, 112–17). Municipal council deliberations, bylaws, and regulations should be in both official languages, as should court proceedings, forms, and decisions from all spheres of government. Signs, forms, notices, information sheets, and so on would be bilingual in the national capital area, the capitals of Quebec, Ontario, and New Brunswick, and in the bilingual districts. Finally, oral and written responses would be given in French and English by all municipal governments located in a bilingual district (unless the minority population therein did not represent 10 per cent) and by all the local offices of the federal and provincial governments “located in” bilingual districts (113). In this last regard, the commission introduced another variation on the territorial principle, suggesting that even the central offices of nonofficially bilingual provinces should communicate with residents of the bilingual districts in both languages (rcbb 1967, 116). The personality principle would guarantee public services from the head offices of provincial departments, but only to minority members residing in bilingual districts (the territorial principle). The territorial principle would thus dominate. The commission believed that this multiple layering of administrative requirements would raise no major problems. In fact, it believed that “after they have equipped themselves to serve the minorities in their bilingual districts, governments can extend their help to the minorities

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outside the districts at very little extra expense” (115). Bilingual districts would force administrative structures to adapt to the geolinguistic reality of the country, but the requirement for bilingual staff to serve specific bilingual districts would enable governments to allocate the required bilingual services beyond the bilingual districts. At least two provincial governments would later oppose joint bilingual districts because they could not meet the ensuing generous administrative obligations, even if they were under no obligation to do so. The matter of locating federal and provincial offices in the bilingual districts would prove difficult and would confuse the commission’s territorial principle. The commission had clearly stated that administrative structures had to be adapted to the geolinguistic reality of the country in order to ensure services “within the [minority] communities” (rcbb 1967, 105). However, in adding that such services would be allocated by offices located in bilingual districts, the commission gave precedence to the bureaucratic approach of bilingual districtification it wanted to overturn. The legislators also failed to notice this discrepancy. Section 9 (1) of the 1969 Official Languages Act would thus stipulate that only the “principal offices in a bilingual district” (my emphasis) would be obliged to allocate their services in French and English. As McRae (1978, 348) correctly noted, “linking services to the location of federal offices rather than of clients” would affect the specification endeavours. But he incorrectly attributed this link to “the Official Languages Act.” Indeed, the Act simply reproduced the commission’s apparent intent. McRae also exaggerated the importance of this variation in the bilingual districts’ demise. On the one hand, the complications that ensued were of relative significance; on the other, other sections of the Act corrected the bureaucratic approach. Bilingual districts were introduced, explained, and justified in volume 1 of the final report. They also resurfaced frequently in subsequent books, especially in volumes 2 (Education) and 3 (The Work World). Since they buttress the commission’s basic recommendations and dealt with numerous elements of society, bilingual districts were indeed the cornerstone recommendation.

3 a n ov e rv i e w o f t h e 1 5 0 r e c o m m e n dat i o n s The B and B Commission scattered 150 recommendations over six volumes of related themes: official languages, education, the work

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world, the contribution of other ethnic groups, the federal capital, and voluntary associations. Since the commission did not make any recommendations on the “important constitutional questions,” as promised, and gave “the problem of the status of the official languages priority over the others” (rcbb 1967, 18), I argue that the fourteen recommendations in the first volume of the final report are the most important.17 Indeed, implementing the remaining recommendations would be of no avail without first ensuring the symbolic and practical equality of the French and English languages and cultures throughout Canada, in Quebec, Ontario, and New Brunswick (and any additional province where francophones represented 10 per cent of the population), and in the bilingual districts (including the federal capital, which was recommended as a special “bilingual district”). In fact, many recommendations depended on the bilingual districts. These guarantees would have been strengthened by constitutional modifications, some of which were outlined by the commission in its first volume, but the Official Languages Act recommended in that volume was sufficient for immediate federal purposes. The recommendations concerning education and the work world follow the official languages recommendations in importance. In its initial consideration of education in the first volume, the commission recommended modifying section 93 of the bna Act to force every province to “establish and maintain elementary and secondary schools in which English is the sole or main language of instruction, and elementary and secondary schools in which French is the sole or main language of instruction, in bilingual districts and other appropriate areas” (rcbb 1967, 134). It also recommended that “the right of Canadian parents to have their children educated in the official language of their choice be recognized in the educational system, the degree of implementation to depend on the concentration of the minority population” (123). Distinct schools and parallel “educational régimes” would ensure an equal partnership between the two societies for two reasons (122–3). First, schools are “the basic agency for maintaining language and culture”; without them, “many Francophones outside Quebec have been steadily losing their language.” Second, the unity crisis was in great part fuelled by “the unwillingness of the English-speaking majority to recognize the right of French-speaking parents to educate their children in French.” The country’s linguistic polarization would continue unless the minority francophones could obtain their own schools, especially in the three officially bilingual provinces and in the bilingual districts.

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Similar analyses and recommendations are elaborated upon in the second volume of the final report – Education (rcbb 1968, 21). Minority schools were necessary for both pedagogical and cultural reasons (8–9). On the one hand, “[c]hildren can only be taught if they understand the language of instruction”; on the other, “[l]anguage is also the key to cultural development.” Minority schools were also necessary for symbolic reasons: “They would symbolize in a concrete way the principle of equal partnership in areas where the existence of the other cultural group is easily overlooked. Such schools, in addition to the direct benefits to their students, would give the minority-language group a sense of being fully accepted despite their differences, and would give the majority a greater awareness of the minority language and culture” (22). Consequently, the commission made forty-six recommendations to ensure the equality of francophone and anglophone societies in the field of education. The two most significant were dependent on bilingual districts (rcbb 1968, 142–3): (1) “We recommend that public education be provided in each of the official minority languages at both the elementary and secondary levels in the bilingual districts”; and (2) “We recommend that the normal language of instruction in schools for the official minority-language group in bilingual districts be the mother tongue.” Other recommendations encouraged the teaching of both official languages and federal financial assistance to the provinces, and outlined the administrative structures necessary to implement the recommendations and measures. For instance, the commission recommended that the three officially bilingual provinces have distinct and parallel education systems, although both would fall under a single provincial department. However, the commission shied away from complete educational institutional self-determination for the minorities, believing that separate educational systems did “not provide equivalent educational opportunities” (10). In other words, the smaller Francophone communities could not by themselves afford the same quality education that the majority communities could. The commission also used bilingual districts to buttress its recommendations related to the work world, examined in volume 3. Bilingual districts would identify where viable minority communities existed, thus facilitating the quest of private and public organizations to reflect and nurture the country’s duality. Having already dealt with the cornerstone recommendation and services to the public in the first volume, the commission, in the third, lauded the proposed official languages act and

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focused its attention on issues like the “underlying social and economic aspects of equality” that must complement the more important “formal rights for the two languages” (rcbb 1969a, 3). Again, the reforms were to follow a chronological sequence, starting with national and regional symbolic recognitions, proceeding to practical actions in the public sphere, and concluding with actions in the private sector (3–5). The third volume had two parts. The first addressed the “means for establishing French as a language of work in the Public Service” (rcbb 1969a, 285). The recommendations argued for more francophones in the civil service, especially at the top levels, as well as the integration of the French culture in federal organizations, especially the armed forces. This was because “French has never enjoyed the full status of an official or practised language in the Public Service” (261). Indeed, “the Public Service is overwhelmingly an expression of English-speaking Canada” (263). The commission’s argument was blunt: “The possibility of national disintegration has forced a re-examination of the linguistic policies of the Public Service. The debate is no longer about efficiency, merit, patronage, and representation, but rather between thorough-going reform and schism. Change is imminent and no institution requires reform more urgently than does the federal administration” (95). French-language units were the basic tool to ensure “the bilingual and basically bicultural character of the federal administration” (rcbb 1969a, 265). The commission argued that a “viable partnership between two groups presupposes the organizational existence of each, rooted in its own language and cultural milieu … In our opinion, there can be no equal partnership in the federal Public Service without it, despite the ability of the federal administration to provide service to the public in both official languages as a matter of right” (291). flu s had both symbolic and practical purposes: they would “change the work environment of the Public Service by ensuring that French is fully recognized as a language of work – and even more important – is fully used in both internal and external communication” (265–6). flu s were to be implemented in the bilingual districts, “in Ottawa, in Quebec, and in other communities where the French language and Francophone culture are viable or potentially viable” (rcbb 1969a, 267). However, since flu s were recommended for internal purposes while bilingual districts were recommended for external purposes, the location, size, and scale of flu s should “depend primarily on existing administrative structures; specific application will be tailored to the individual conditions of each department” (268). In the case of flu s,

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therefore, the bilingual districtification approach was bureaucratic rather than adaptive. The commission did not address the potential incompatibility of the resulting regional flu s and bilingual districts. In addition to the flu s, the commission recommended the creation of a “horizontal” public service language authority and a language bureau within each federal department and agency, as well as the extension of the authority of the Commissioner of Official Languages to include “the language rights of public servants” (287). The commission outlined the administrative structure needed to implement the sociolinguistic policy in the public service. First, it categorically rejected the idea of entrusting the administration of the policy “to an existing body such as the Treasury Board, the Public Service Commission, or the department of the Secretary of State” (rcbb 1969a, 285) because “the implementation of institutional bilingualism will be such an arduous responsibility [that] the body chosen would be in danger of allowing itself to be diverted from its present objectives ... [or] the burdens of its present functions might prevent such a body from addressing itself to its new task with sufficient speed and vigour.” But “once the régime has been implemented throughout the Public Service and the administrative machinery is operating effectively, the administration of the régime may be entrusted to a presently existing body such as the Treasury Board.” A member of the (Glassco) Royal Commission on Government Organization (rcgo) had made a similar recommendation in 1962 (rcgo 1962, 76).18 The B and B Commission conceded that “the actual implementation of the system will not be easy, and it must be carried out with sensitivity to the feelings and interests of those concerned,” and recognized that the “goals of any new administrative order can be subverted by those who are concerned only with meeting the letter of new regulations rather than with realizing the spirit of the plan itself,” but it warned that these problems should not distract the public and the federal government: “Until their partnership takes these tangible forms, many people in one or the other of the two language groups will increasingly regard the federal government as ‘a foreign government,’ and look elsewhere for their source of political leadership. If the Public Service is to counteract this tendency, it must be, in the fullest sense, equally accessible to the two societies which it is called upon to serve” (rcbb 1969a, 292). In the second part of the third volume, the commission presented similar arguments for the private sector, arguing for “institutional bilingualism” based on the same organizational arrangements: French-language

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units within private companies with significant operations in Quebec and in the bilingual districts outside that province (rcbb 1969a, 521– 31). If “certain key groups of institutions in some regions of the country … develop or expand a bilingual form of organization,” they would ensure that “two linked unilingualisms” could coexist (522). The commission established the ultimate target of the policy as “equal opportunities for Francophones in institutionally bilingual work settings in various parts of Canada, and particularly in officially bilingual provinces and districts” (523). This implied two specific measures. First, would be established French “as the principal language of work at all levels within the Québec economy” (524). The rationale here was that Quebec deserved “prior consideration,” since “the problem is of present and pressing concern and … the potential for immediate change is greatest” (523). Second, the language rights of francophones would be recognized outside Quebec, “most notably [in] northern and eastern Ontario and northeastern New Brunswick” (525). Consequently, the governments of Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick should establish provincial task forces to ensure the progressive use of French in the work world (525– 30). Indeed, “in these bilingual districts, appropriate provisions should be made for the use of French as a language of work within enterprises that are major employers of labour” (530). Bilingual districts once again were central to the recommendations, as the one concerning Ontario further attested: “We recommend that the government of Ontario establish a task force charged with preparing a program of action with the objective of ensuring the progressive introduction of French as a language of work in enterprises in bilingual districts, on the basis of a co-operative and concerted effort by government and industry” (530; my emphasis). One of the commissioners, F.R. Scott, wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that his colleagues had strayed from a nation-based territorial bilingualism towards a province-based territorial bilingualism in regard to the private sector: “So the principles differ depending on the provincial boundaries. This is a virtual acceptance of the territorial principle. My idea of ‘equal partnership’ is that it operates in similar fashion all across Canada, ‘wherever the minority is numerous enough to be viable as a group’” (rcbb 1969a, 565). Scott’s claim that the commission “rejected the [nation-based] territorial principle” was an exaggeration (565), for he failed to distinguish between the commission’s nationbased territorial bilingualism (bilingual districts) and the rejected province-based territorial bilingualism (Quebec as a unilingual-French province, the other provinces as unilingual-English). He also failed to

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note that the commission had earlier accepted a variation of provincebased territorial bilingualism when it recommended that three provinces (Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick) become officially bilingual and that bilingual districts incur different administrative arrangements in these three bilingual provinces, thereby “applying different principles depending on the provincial boundaries.” Scott nevertheless correctly noted that the commission was trying, “consciously or unconsciously,” to lay down different rules for Quebec (565). He agreed with “the proper objective of increasing the use of French as a language of business in Quebec,” but feared that asymmetrical principles would “strengthen the hands” of Quebec secessionists (566). Scott’s argument would have been stronger had he admonished his colleagues for assuming that the government of Quebec “can be regarded as the principal architect of the supporting institutional framework of the Francophone community … [since] it is in a position to be an effective agent in the stimulation and encouragement of the profound social changes required by a fast-moving world” (rcbb 1969a, 556–7). The other members would have been unable to explain how the Quebec government could have contributed in any way to the use of French in the work world outside the province. They would thus have been forced to dilute their pro-Quebec recommendation that saw the work world as a way to promote the French language, culture, and society from coast to coast according to symbolic bilingual districtification. Scott would then have been able to argue convincingly that his colleagues’ province-based territorial bilingualism vis-à-vis the private sector could lead to incoherent recommendations. But he did not use this argument to help his cause. The second part of volume 3 was also significant in regard to the specification of bilingual districts. Indeed, two sections of volume 3 indicated solutions to specification problems eventually faced by both Bilingual Districts Advisory Boards. First, even though volume 1 had suggested that New Brunswick be cut up into specific bilingual districts, the second part of volume 3 suggested a single bilingual district for the entire province. Since Acadians were largely concentrated in the northern and eastern counties of the province, where anglophones often represented a less significant population than the francophones living in the excluded city of Saint John, “a purely literal implementation of our recommendation on the establishment of bilingual districts would not reflect this equilibrium throughout the province” (rcbb 1969a, 528). Second, the commission’s opinion on bilingual districts in

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Quebec was given clear expression in Scott’s dissenting opinion in volume 3 (566). On the one hand, Quebec should be treated like the other provinces in regard to the number, size, and location of bilingual districts. There should be no asymmetry. On the other hand, “Montreal is the most important [bilingual district] in Canada.” That city should definitely become a bilingual district. Thus, cut up Quebec and create a limited number of bilingual districts therein, including Montreal. Both advisory boards struggled with the specification of bilingual districts in New Brunswick and Quebec. The first board ignited a significant controversy by recommending a single district for Quebec, while the second created a similar controversy by minimizing bilingual districts in that province and excluding Montreal. After reading these two sections of volume 3, one would be hard-pressed to recommend anything other than (1) a single bilingual district for all of New Brunswick and (2) a number of bilingual districts, including Montreal, in Quebec, according to similar criteria used elsewhere. Both boards succeeded on the first front, albeit with difficulty, but failed on the second front. Finally, volume 4 (The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups) and volume 5 (The Federal Capital) both included recommendations that were contingent on bilingual districts or similar provisions. But these were secondary in comparison to recommendations on official languages, education, and the work world.

4

th e c o m m i s s i o n c o m e s t o a n e n d

On 31 March 1971, the Trudeau government dissolved the B and B Commission. This decision came at the request of the commission members, who could not agree on specific constitutional and political solutions to the country’s sociolinguistic tensions.19 In fact, the members believed that the recently established federal-provincial constitutional conferences could deal more effectively with such matters. The commissioners ended their Herculean effort without publishing a volume on the arts or the mass media; nor did they provide a synthesis of their analysis, conclusions, and recommendations (as they had promised in the first volume). André Laurendeau’s death on 1 June 1968 took the wind out of the commission’s sails. Still, the commission’s work was almost completed by then, and more importantly, the Trudeau government had already begun drafting an official languages act that would reflect the commission’s principal recommendations.

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The commission did not complete its work as Laurendeau would have liked, but it definitely helped to “raise the level of public understanding [on the sociolinguistic crisis] and [acted] as a catalyst in the process of searching for solutions” (Frith 1973). It also proposed a national sociolinguistic policy that, though stripped of some key elements, has withstood the test of time. As a member of the commission observed: “Few reports of royal commissions can have been as little read and yet so quickly, with general public concurrence, acted upon” (Frith 1973). The Commissioner of Official Languages added, twenty years after the publication of the preliminary report, that it “may not be holy writ, but it remains surprisingly relevant. It presented us with a table d’hôte menu which governments have tended to use à la carte.”20 Some argue that the commission’s work, “in spite of its incompleteness, merits rediscovery in the search for a new coherence” (Oliver 1993, 331 – see also Lalande 1987; Reid 1993; McRoberts 1997). If the commission’s analysis merits rediscovery, this book may offer important insights.

chapter two

Policy Adoption

This chapter places the bilingual districts in their statutory, constitutional, and administrative contexts. Although distinct, these contexts interwove constantly between 1968 and 1969. The chapter contains four sections. The first presents the federal government’s administrative districtification efforts between 1938 and 1967. The second describes how the B and B Commission recommendations were translated into the 1969 Official Languages Act. The third overviews the 1968–69 federal-provincial constitutional negotiations. The final section presents the legislative process that modified, then adopted, the Official Languages Act in 1969.

1 federal administrative districtification, 1938–1967 Section 133 of the bna Act states that French and English are the official languages of the Parliament and courts of Canada, but it took seventy years before Parliament, through the 1938 Lacroix amendment to the Civil Service Act, recognized the necessity of two languages in the federal civil service (rcbb 1969a, 105). The amendment, however, was never fully respected, and measures like bonuses for bilingual civil servants and public services in French in some areas of the country were irregular and without guarantee (118). The 1938 amendment to the 1918 Civil Service Act1 established the administrative districtification of bilingual services. Although proposed

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by Wilfred Lacroix, it culminated of years of effort undertaken by Ernest Lapointe to make competence in French a qualification for employment in the federal civil service (rcbb 1969a, 105) in order to ensure public services in French. The amendment required that federal civil servants working in local and regional offices master the official language of the majority within their administrative area. Federal public servants had to be able to communicate in French in most areas of Quebec and in a few areas outside that province.2 The Civil Service Commission took four years to adopt the appropriate regulations giving deputy ministers the power to determine language qualifications for positions in these areas.3 More importantly, the federal civil service, a virtual bastion of anglophones (rcbb 1969a, 98; Franks 1966, 76), did not follow these marching orders. Nor was it forced to by its political masters. In fact, the opposite occurred. After a group of Liberal members of Parliament from Quebec complained to Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King about the lack of French services in their ridings, ten years after the Lacroix amendment, King asked the group to disband and ignored their complaints. Thus, when the (Glassco) Royal Commission on Government Organization published its final report on 18 July 1962, little had changed in bilingual services within the federal civil service. Francophones, even where they were the majority, could not count on federal services in their official language. The Glassco Commission paid little attention to the issue. It did note that bilingualism in the federal public service was a “perennial dilemma” (rcgo 1962, 28), and also argued that the Lacroix amendment, where it was applied, limited the use of French to a few areas of the country and did nothing to promote its use in Ottawa. But overall, the commission concluded that section 47 of the 1961 Civil Service Act would adequately improve the bilingual districtification requirements initiated in 1938 (29). That section asked all departments to appoint a sufficient number of employees with knowledge of the official languages spoken in the service area of their local offices.4 The 1961 Act improved the existing mechanism because it did not limit the allocation of bilingual services to areas where the minority represented the majority of the local population. The Glassco Commission argued that local federal offices serving a significant number of minority members, as well as all federal offices in the national capital area, should provide services in both French and English (rcgo 1962, 28). Federal services should thus be available in French in Ottawa and in

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the areas outside the national capital where francophones represented a significant group, not only the majority. However, the Glassco Commission did not specify any demolinguistic criteria. To be fair, it should be acknowledged that the Glassco Commission dealt with the internal management of the civil service rather than with the allocation of external services to the public. In regard to the latter, it simply noted that to be effective the public service had to be “representative” of both sociolinguistic groups (rcgo 1962, 265), and recommended that the federal government “adopt active measures to develop bilingual capacities among its employees on a selective basis” and “intensify its efforts to attract and retain more of the highly qualified young people of French Canada capable of advancement to senior ranks” (267). But the scant attention paid to bilingualism in the federal civil service – as a symbolic reflection of the country’s duality, as a requirement for the allocation of public services to minorities, or as a qualification for employment and promotion – irked the single francophone member of the Glassco Commission. Eugène Therrien chided the 1961 Act and his two colleagues for replicating unkept promises. His separate eleven-page statement on “Bilingualism in the Federal Administration” was three times longer than the full commission’ statement on the subject. André Laurendeau’s editorials and columns echoed Therrien’s statement. Therrien argued that bilingualism in the federal civil service had been “reduced to the single question of translation” and no longer represented “the co-existence of (a) two cultures and (b) two languages” (rcgo 1962, 68). This is the main reason why francophones were under-represented in the federal public service and the armed forces: “French Canadians cannot feel at home all over Canada as long as the co-existence of their language goes unrecognized, not only in written texts, but in fact. They refuse to be regarded by the federal administration as second-class citizens” (69–70). Therrien accused the civil service of not being “sufficiently concerned with seeking solutions” to “this problem” (68). He even suggested that it ignored the problem: “The administration itself does not even realize its own weaknesses and shortcomings, nor will it fully admit that they exist. It does not avail itself of the means at its disposal to find solutions of immediate or long-term benefit” (71); and it intentionally neglects the “duality of language and culture in Canada”: “The Canadian federal administration, in the matter of bilingualism, has not so far conformed to the spirit and the letter of the confederation pact, nor to efficiency in the fullest sense of the word” (77).

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After comparing the linguistic policies of Switzerland, Belgium, and South Africa, Therrien came to three general conclusions: (1) “bilingualism is not treated as it should be” in the federal civil service, “that is, as an efficient instrument of administration”; (2) the number of francophone public servants “at the higher level of the federal administration is insufficient”; and (3) the civil service’s language policy “is wasteful both of energy and of money” (rcgo, 1962, 72). For our purposes, two other comments stand out: (1) “Bilingualism [should be] an essential qualification for all employees who deal with the public in bilingual towns and districts”; and (2) “The co-ordination of bilingualism in the federal administration, in my opinion, should be placed under the jurisdiction of the Treasury Board which represents the general and central administrative authority” (rcgo 1972, 73, 76). The Diefenbaker government would create the Office of Government Organization on 20 December 1962.5 Lester Pearson’s Liberals, who won the general election of 8 April 1963, would stay the course but accelerate the pace. Pearson had promised a royal commission on bilingualism and biculturalism during the electoral campaign, but his Cabinet, opting not to wait for the recommendations of the yetto-be-created commission, decided to take immediate “concrete steps” to address Therrien’s statement.6 The president of the Privy Council, Maurice Lamontagne, declared in the House of Commons on 12 June 1963 that his government was “preparing a comprehensive plan, to be put into force by stages as soon as it is completed.” The plan would involve “the necessary reforms in the government organization.” Specifically, a special Cabinet committee, complemented by the federal civil service hierarchy, would study key components of the issue – language courses, recruitment, language training, promotions, bonuses, documents, the armed forces, a federal institute on bilingualism, and bilingual units within each department and agency – and then recommend measures to Cabinet. The eventual B and B Commission would be able to “criticize the measures” in its report. Two weeks later, Lamontagne added that the program would pursue two related objectives, one having to do with the internal workings of government and the other with services to the Canadian public: “perfect equality for the two official languages, not only with regard to verbal or written communications with the public, but within every department.”7 On 1 February 1966, the Civil Service Commission announced that knowledge of both official languages would henceforth become “an additional asset” for appointments and promotions in the federal civil

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service, at least in Ottawa and in the areas of the country where the minority numbered 10,000 and represented 10 per cent of the regional population.8 The commission’s new staffing manual identified eightytwo administrative “bilingual districts,” all of them located in the bilingual belt linking Moncton, New Brunswick, and Sudbury, Ontario.9 On 6 April 1966, Pearson announced his government’s policy on bilingualism in the public service.10 He subsumed its specific objective – to “make the public service of maximum benefit to the people of Canada by attracting to it the most competent and qualified Canadians available in all parts of Canada … having regard to the character of our country” – under its fundamental objective – to promote and strengthen “national unity on the basis of the equality of rights and opportunities for both English speaking and French speaking Canadians.” Pearson presented the four specific goals of the policy: (1) “oral and written communications within the service [will] be made in either official language at the option of the person making them”; (2) “communications with the public will normally be in either official language having regard to the person being served”; (3) “the linguistic and cultural values of both English speaking and French speaking Canadians will be reflected through civil service recruitment and training”; and (4) “a climate will be created in which public servants from both language groups will work together toward common goals, using their own language and applying their respective cultural values, but each fully understanding and appreciating those of the other.” Pearson described how the goals could be reached if six principles were respected. First, where “the need for bilingualism clearly exists in practice, above all in the national capital, it should be recognized as an element of merit in selection for civil service positions.” Second, in “conformity with the merit system, which must remain unimpaired, the requirement for bilingualism should relate to positions, and not only to individuals.” Third, bilingualism “must be introduced gradually over a period of years in a manner which will not lead to injustice or misunderstanding”; thus, the “various measures should be integrated into a well defined, long term program.” Fourth, “in areas where a need for bilingualism exists, civil servants and prospective recruits must be provided with adequate time and opportunity to adapt themselves to new conditions in the service in a way that will increase their own possibilities for a successful and satisfying career.” Fifth, for “similar reasons of equity, the careers of civil servants who are not bilingual and who have devoted many years of their lives to the service of their country must

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not be prejudiced in any way by measures to develop bilingualism.” And sixth, the government “will consult from time to time with civil service associations concerning its policy on bilingualism in order to obtain their point of view, and to provide them with all reasonable assurances and remove any possible misunderstandings in regard to measures being proposed.” Pearson’s language policy was incorporated into the 1967 Public Service Employment Act.11 Section 20 of the new Act modified the vocabulary of section 47 of the 1961 legislation, but it did not alter its approach or specify any geolinguistic criteria.12 On 13 March 1967, the Civil Service Commission adopted regulations to respect the new legislation.13 Section 4 specified the staffing requirements and the geolinguistic criteria for the specification of the two types of local or regional bilingual units of the federal civil service. In the first type, “where forty per cent or more but less than sixty per cent of the public served by the unit” are of either French or English mother tongue, “every employee in the unit shall be sufficiently proficient in both those languages to permit the functions of the unit to be performed adequately and effective service to be provided to the public served.” In the second type, “where ten per cent or more but less than forty per cent of the public served by the unit” are of either French or English mother tongue, “the minimum number of employees in the unit who are sufficiently proficient in both those languages to permit the functions of the unit to be performed adequately and effective service to be provided to the public that in the aggregate the number is in the same proportion to the total number of persons on the staff of the unit as the said percentage is of the total number of persons comprising the public so served.” For instance, if the francophones of an area represented 20 per cent of the population, 20 per cent of the unit staff would be able to understand, speak, read, and write French. Administrative units would thus not have to hire or designate bilingual employees in areas of the country where the minority represented less than 10 per cent of the population. However, the regulations did not explain what federal departments and agencies should do in areas where the minority represented more than 60 per cent of the population. Section 4 was mute on how many employees should be proficient in French to serve the Madawaska county of New Brunswick, for example, where the francophone population reached the 95 percentile mark. Contrary to its February 1966 regulations, the Public Service Commission abandoned its numerical requirements (10,000 minority members)

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in favour of proportional requirements (10 to 40 per cent, 40 to 60 per cent). However, since it did not identify the specific areas of the country that met these new criteria, it is impossible to identify the 1966 “bilingual districts.” Members of the B and B Commission were well aware of the federal government’s administrative districtification of bilingual services. They noted the bilingual districtification launched by the Lacroix amendment, the amplified efforts of the 1961 Civil Service Act, Therrien’s statement, the Pearson government’s plan, the 1967 Public Service Employment Act, and the Civil Service Commission regulations of 1966 and 1967 (rcbb 1969a, 104–20). Administrative bilingual districtification was not a novelty. However, the very fact that formal briefs submitted to the commission by a number of individuals and associations had recommended an existing system revealed how generally unknown it was. It was thus necessary to add a symbolic value to bilingual districts to make the implicit explicit. Only an official proclamation could give a symbolic value to the existing bilingual districtification and enable this administrative system to recognize minority homelands outside Quebec and limit the use of English in Quebec. And only such a proclamation and the subsequent public awareness could guarantee the allocation of bilingual services. The federal government would nevertheless face difficulties in translating the commission’s cornerstone recommendation into legal text.

2

tr a n s l a t i n g t h e b a n d b r e c o m m e n dat i o n s i n to t h e o f f i c i a l l a n g ua g e s ac t, 1 9 6 7 – 1 9 6 9 On 5 December 1967, one week after receiving the B and B Commission’s first volume, Pearson’s Cabinet asked its Committee on FederalProvincial Relations to undertake a detailed analysis and recommend appropriate action.14 The study, which was done by civil servants rather than the elected committee members, dissected the bilingual districts with respect to five key administrative considerations.15 First, while 10 per cent was an appropriate critical mass, this criterion should be applied generously to permit the creation of bilingual districts in areas where the minority fell below 10 per cent. Second, census divisions and subdivisions were not always appropriate units, and additional administrative areas should be used. Third, while Ottawa should make every effort to convince the provincial governments to create joint bilingual

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districts, it should create its own bilingual districts if it failed to obtain provincial cooperation. Fourth, each province should create its own bilingual districts advisory council, to which the federal government would appoint its delegates. And fifth, bilingual districts should not be eliminated once a minority fell below a minimum percentage. No arguments were presented to explain this rejection of the B and B Commission’s suggestion. The report added that it was “vital” to ensure bilingual services in Canada’s large urban areas where the minority did not represent 10 per cent of the total population, but the committee did not suggest how this could be done. Seven weeks after the positive federal-provincial constitutional negotiations of 6 February 1968, Pearson asked Cabinet for permission to create a committee of civil servants to draft an Official Languages Act.16 The draft would be based more on the positive provincial reactions to the B and B report than on Cabinet’s internal study of the B and B recommendations. Pearson admitted that the commission would publish additional volumes but that these would have no bearing on the Act.17 He predicted, as an example, that the commission would recommend federal assistance to provinces for minority education, then suggested that such measures should be settled by a federal-provincial agreement rather than through constitutional reform. He added that constitutional reform could take years to bear fruit, if ever. The Act should therefore not wait until the commission completed its work or until the end of constitutional negotiations. Cabinet granted Pearson’s request on 26 March 1968.18 The committee of civil servants included Privy Council Secretary Gordon Robertson, Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice Donald Thorson, the Secretary of State’s Max Yalden, and the justice department’s legal council Brad Smith.19 Their memo replicated the report of the Committee on Federal-Provincial Relations, a report that Cabinet members never read, but made four significant changes. First, they rejected the initial report’s call for a flexible application of the 10 per cent criterion; bilingual districts would be proclaimed only if the minority represented at least 10 per cent of a district’s population. Second, they rejected the perennial status of bilingual districts, resuscitating the B and B Commission’s suggestion; once the minority dropped below 7 per cent, the government would rescind the area’s official status. Third, they rejected the creation of an additional mechanism to ensure the allocation of bilingual federal services in the major urban areas where the minority represented less than 10 per cent of the

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population. And fourth, they advised that bilingual districts and the advisory boards be federal only; this modification reflected the premiers’ refusal of 6 February 1968 to make bilingual districts a joint program, at least in the immediate future. The committee, however, forgot to address a fundamental question: what should be the initial set of bilingual districts? The B and B Commission had suggested fifty-four census divisions, give or take a few contiguous subdivisions (rcbb 1967, 107–8), and insisted that an initial list be proclaimed as soon as possible by the federal and provincial governments, either separately or jointly (112). Subsequent advisory boards were only supposed to specify the additional bilingual districts that met the 10 per cent criterion and eliminate the bilingual districts that no longer met the 7 per cent criterion after the 1971 census. The committee neglected this aspect of the government’s initial responsibility by delegating this task to the eventual advisory board. This was especially unfortunate because the federal-provincial conference had concluded that it could proceed immediately and on its own. The program would thus have to wait at least one year before Parliament adopted the legislation, another year before the advisory board submitted its report, and another three months before Cabinet could proclaim the initial set of bilingual districts. Despite provincial opting out, the committee did all it could to draft a statute that would enable provincial cooperation down the road. This effort respected the B and B Commission’s concession that specification be allowed to proceed at different speeds in different provinces (rcbb 1969a, 142). Section 15 (2) encouraged the advisory board to negotiate, on behalf of the federal Cabinet, “a draft agreement with the government of a province for the purpose of ensuring that, to the greatest practical extent, the limits of any area that may be established as a bilingual district under this Act will be conterminous with any area similarly established or to be established in that province by such government.” Section 15 (3) asked the board to trace the borders of federal bilingual districts so that they would coincide, as much as possible, with those of “all the federal, provincial, municipal and educational services.” Finally, section 15 (3) encouraged the board to “recommend to the Governor in Council any administrative changes in federal services in the area that it considers necessary to adapt the area to a provincial or municipal bilingual area, for the greater public convenience of the area or to further the purposes of this Act.” The federal government could therefore create federal bilingual districts but modify

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them afterwards to coincide with provincial bilingual districts or bilingual municipalities. Federal bilingual districts would thus be created as soon as possible, and everything would be done by the advisory boards and the federal Cabinet to facilitate eventual provincial cooperation. The committee also made five additions to the draft legislation. First, section 9 specified that the allocation of bilingual federal services would be limited to those services that were provided to “members of the public.” Research laboratories that did not deal with the public, for instance, would not be forced to provide their results in both official languages. This stipulation stemmed from Pearson’s April 1966 declaration that bilingual services would be limited to “communications with the public” and from the B and B Commission’s key argument that bilingual districts would force the federal government to “deal with people” (rcbb 1967, 93). Second, according to section 9(1), only the principal offices of the federal government located in the bilingual districts would be forced to provide services in both official languages. Offices located outside bilingual districts, as well as secondary offices located within them, would thus be exempt. This stipulation stemmed from the Civil Service Commission’s March 1967 regulations stating that federal bilingual services would be allocated by the administrative “unit” located within the country’s bilingual areas. This bureaucratic approach was contrary to the adaptive approach based on the geolinguistic reality favoured by the B and B Commission. The administrative purpose of bilingual districts was indeed to force the federal and provincial governments to adapt their administrative system to the country’s geolinguistic reality (rcbb 1969a, 284–8). The commission nevertheless inadvertently complicated matters by requesting that bilingual services be allocated by “the central provincial administrative offices and in branches located in bilingual regions” (rcbb 1967, 102; – my emphasis), even if it clearly favoured the adaptive approach. The commission’s penchant for the adaptive approach is most obvious in its argument that the absence of government offices in a bilingual district should force the governments either to establish a new administrative subunit to fit the bilingual district or to make other arrangements for the provision of bilingual services in the proclaimed area (111). The location of the offices should thus have been a trivial matter. Giving precedence to existing administrative units and principal offices over the minority’s geolinguistic reality did not respect the commission’s intent.

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On the other hand, the third new stipulation, in sections 13 (1) and 15 (3), somewhat countered the bureaucratic approach inherent in the concept of principal offices. The committee managed this by giving the advisory board greater flexibility in adapting the federal apparatus to the minority’s geolinguistic reality. Section 13 (1) added four new territorial administrative units as specification criteria – “a local government or school district, or a federal or provincial electoral district or region” – to the census district. This provision stemmed from a B and B Commission suggestion (rcbb 1967, 110–11) that had been borrowed from civil servants’ initial study. Section 15 (3) allowed the board to suggest modifications to the borders of the federal administrative units so that they would overlap the minority homelands as much as possible. Sections 13 (1) and 15 (3) thus favoured the commission’s adaptive approach, but principal offices would remain an enigma for both advisory boards. Fourth, the draft specified the advisory board’s tasks. Section 15 (1) stated that the board shall, with all due despatch, conduct an inquiry into and concerning the areas of Canada in which one of the official languages is spoken as a mother tongue by persons who are in the linguistic minority in those areas in respect of an official language, and after consultation with the government of each of the provinces in which any such areas are located, prepare and submit to the Governor in Council a report setting out its findings and conclusions including its recommendations if any concerning the establishment of bilingual districts or the alteration of the limits of any existing bilingual districts in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

The board would submit its report to Cabinet, which then had to present it to Parliament “within fifteen days” (section 17). Cabinet could then, according to section 12, “from time to time by proclamation establish one or more federal bilingual districts … and alter the limits of any bilingual districts so established.” Cabinet was thus responsible for the creation of bilingual districts. However, it could refuse to proclaim any bilingual district or to modify the number, size, and location of the bilingual districts recommended by the advisory board as long as such a decision respected statutory geolinguistic and administrative criteria. The final innovative stipulation provided guarantees to the anglophones in Quebec and came from the generous minds of the civil servants serving on the committee. Section 13 (3) ensured that there would

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be no regression in existing bilingual services even if the minority already receiving such services no longer (or even had never) represented 10 per cent of the area’s population: “[T]he area may be established as a bilingual district if before the coming into force of this Act the services of departments and agencies of the Government of Canada were customarily made available to residents of the area in both official languages.” This section thus granted a special “acquired right” to Quebec’s anglophones. Indeed, the committee knew full well that existing federal bilingual services were provided almost everywhere in Quebec (rcbb 1967, 87) and would therefore be reduced by bilingual districts (108), and that bilingual services were allocated in only a few areas outside Quebec, areas that would undoubtedly be declared bilingual districts in any case (107–8). The memo thus failed to support the commission’s wish that bilingual districts reduce the official use of English in Quebec to a limited number of areas so as to ease the separatists’ fear of English omnipresence and omnipotence. In the committee’s defence, the commission had not clearly expounded this symbolic goal. Notwithstanding this innovation, the draft legislation respected the spirit of the B and B report and synthesized its contents with feedback from the federal-provincial constitutional meetings. But the draft was unable to synthesize the report and feedback with existing federal administrative bilingual districtification. There is indeed a contradictory co-existence of sections that adapt the federal administrative structures to the geolinguistic reality (sections 13 (1) and 15 (3)), and sections that force the bilingual districts to adapt to the principal offices of the federal government (section 9). The former reflected the B and B Commission’s analysis and recommendations, while the latter reflected the federal government’s efforts since 1938. The adaptive approach nevertheless superseded the bureaucratic approach in the draft legislation, even in section 9. Indeed, the advisory board would recommend the number, size, and location of bilingual districts according to the geolinguistic reality; then every federal department, once bilingual districts were created by Cabinet, would be obliged by section 9 to ensure that “members of the public [could] obtain available services from and [could] communicate with … each of its principal offices in a federal bilingual district.” Departments and agencies would thus have been compelled to adapt their administrative system to the bilingual districts serving a viable minority. More importantly, the draft legislation was unable to express the bilingual districts’ symbolic purpose. The committee’s memo to Cabinet

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noted the symbolic recognition of minority communities as a parallel purpose to administrative bilingual districtification, but the draft legislation did not mention the symbolic value. The committee did not know how to translate this symbolic value into legislative verbiage and believed, rightly, that the symbolic purpose of bilingual districts would only appear with their proclamation by Cabinet, not with their adoption by Parliament. The symbolic and chronological precedence of bilingual districts over bilingual regions created under section 9 (2) would be respected by both advisory boards, but many actors, including the Commissioner of Official Languages hired to oversee the implementation of the Act, would confuse the issue. Bill C-120 (An Act respecting the status of the official languages of Canada) was read in the House of Commons for the first time on 17 October 1968.20 According to Prime Minister Trudeau, “this bill is of the greatest importance in promoting national unity.”21 A “totally new Official Languages Act based on the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism [was required] to further the objective of a united Canada” in order to ensure Canada’s long-term goal of “a just society.”22 After the initial reading, generally lauded by the media,23 the Trudeau government pursued two distinct roads to ensure the adoption of the policy and the legislation. First, it submitted the bill to a parliamentary committee for study. Second, it undertook federal-provincial negotiations on language rights; indeed, the Speech from the Throne of 12 September 1968 argued that constitutional reform “remains the best long-term guarantee of Canadian unity.” The parliamentary study was delayed by these negotiations. Some have argued that Trudeau altered his predecessor’s course by giving priority to individual constitutional language rights over the collective and cultural accommodations preferred by Pearson (McRoberts 1997, 15). But Trudeau may have done this because he believed the Official Languages Act would solve most of the other sociolinguistic problems; in that respect, he was clearly following Pearson’s course. Pearson had asked his colleagues, including Trudeau, to draft the Act first, then to proceed with minority education and constitutional reform. He feared that it would be years before constitutional reform produced results, if ever, and thus he gave the Act chronological precedence. Trudeau agreed. After the Act was in the works, he undertook constitutional reform to ensure, in particular, education rights for francophones outside Quebec. The fact that Trudeau gave priority to constitutional rights (1968, 48) does not

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mean that he did not promote the adoption and implementation of the Official Languages Act and the bilingual districts therein. On the contrary, he advocated similar measures to complement constitutional rights (49). The legislation would thus take chronological precedence but could later be modified to respect any constitutional agreement.

3

negotiating language rights w i t h p rov i n c i a l g ov e r n m e n t s

Between 1968 and 1971, the federal and provincial governments met on several occasions in order to repatriate and modify the bna Act. The most important and controversial modifications concerned language rights. The final wording of the Official Languages Act, especially the sections pertaining to bilingual districts, reflected these modifications. Since the Act only pertained to federal responsibilities, bilateral negotiations continued after its adoption in 1969. Provincial linguistic responsibilities, for their part, came to a head at the Victoria Conference in June 1971. The federal government took every possible measure to ensure provincial collaboration in the successful implementation of the national sociolinguistic policy. Not only did it modify a federal statute according to provincial wishes, it also enticed the provincial governments to add linguistic rights to the Canadian Constitution, provide French-language instruction, and establish bilingual districts. Lester Pearson initiated the federal-provincial conferences on 15 August 1967 when he invited the premiers to discuss amendments to the Constitution that would add a charter of rights, especially linguistic rights.24 In his letter to the premiers, Pearson observed that the existing federal charter of rights had no great value, since it could be modified by Parliament on a whim and did not impose any obligations on the provinces. Language rights, he argued, were especially needy of protection from both a whimsical Parliament and the provincial governments.25 The premiers agreed to meet Pearson in early 1968, and between the invitation and the February 1968 conference, they met in Toronto to discuss five key issues, including language rights. The premiers’ Confederation for Tomorrow Conference, held on 27 November 1967, addressed six key sociolinguistic reforms: charter of language rights, French schools, bilingual court services, coast-to-coast radio and television services for minority francophones, a bilingual national capital, and bilingual public services.26 In regard to the last, bilingual districtification was seriously considered.27

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The premiers failed to reach a consensus on sociolinguistic reform. The provincial status quo demonstrated the differences in sociolinguistic perceptions. For instance, in his reply to Pearson’s invitation, Alberta’s Ernest Manning argued that it was not necessary to discuss rights favouring francophones, since section 133 of the bna Act already provided such rights. He did not see the need to apply this section beyond Quebec.28 He added that language rights did not need to be included in the existing Constitution, since language was already well protected in Canada. Manning believed that incorporating such rights in the Constitution would forever tie the hands of the federal and provincial legislative assemblies. He was right on this last count, but such constitutional guarantees were necessary, as the B and B Commission demonstrated, because he was wrong on the first two counts. Language rights, even in their minimal version under section 133, had not been protected, either in Quebec or, especially, outside Quebec (rcbb 1967, 69). They needed formal and constitutional protection. For their part, the other premiers were in favour of sociolinguistic rights and the bicultural and bilingual reality of the country.29 The publication of the B and B Commission’s first volume, on 17 October 1967, provided ample food for thought during the conference of 5–7 February 1968. Although the balance of powers, regional disparities, and constitutional reform were on the agenda, the most important of the seven items discussed was official languages. Pearson believed that solving the problem of sociolinguistic inequities was the priority. In his address to the February conference, he stated that if French Canada’s dissatisfaction with its place in Confederation was “allowed to continue without remedy, it could lead to separation and to the end of Confederation.”30 Canada needed “a great new act of accommodation” from its leaders.31 This meant that all governments had to ensure that “French-speaking Canadians … feel that every part of this country is their homeland.”32 Specifically, government leaders should review the Constitution “so that Quebec and French Canada may have the largest possible scope for the development of its own society, its own destiny, and its own culture in Canada.”33 Distinct institutions and self-determination were the best ways “to provide a firmer, wider and more secure basis for the freedom of all Canadians as people, not only as people and as individuals but also as members of particular societies within a larger unity.”34 Pearson also stated that the search for solutions was over. He praised the B and B Commission for studying the issue at length and presenting

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a coherent set of recommendations: “[T]he Conference could best demonstrate the urgency and importance that it attaches to measures to meet the central problem by agreeing to implement all the recommendations and also by agreeing that the substance of action on none will be allowed to wait upon whatever delays there might be in constitutional change.”35 In other words, although adding language rights to the Constitution was a key element in the sociolinguistic policy, federal-provincial constitutional negotiations should not delay the most important element, the implementation of the B and B report. Preaching by example, Pearson announced that during the next session of Parliament his government would introduce a bill making English and French the official languages of Canada.36 And to entice the premiers to act immediately in their jurisdictions, he promised federal funds if they gave francophone parents the right to a French-language education for their children, translate the debates of their legislative assemblies and create bilingual districts.37 Some premiers were enthusiastic, others not. New Brunswick’s Louis Robichaud shared Pearson’s vision wholeheartedly.38 At the other extreme, Alberta’s Ernest Manning repeated that the “constitutional or legalistic approach” would not bear as much fruit as “efforts designed to stimulate and encourage English-French bilingualism on the basis of its cultural enrichment to individual citizens and to Canadian society at both community and national levels.”39 In the middle, Ontario’s premier, John Robarts, asserted that each province should study the B and B report and implement the recommendations that applied to them according to their own needs and abilities.40 Quebec shared Pearson’s vocabulary and conclusions. Daniel Johnson agreed to a constitutional review that would “federate territories … [and] associate in equality two linguistic and cultural communities, two founding peoples, two societies, in other words two nations in the sociological sense of the word.”41 In the end, Pearson and the ten premiers unanimously agreed to adopt the principles of symmetrical institutional bilingualism recommended by the B and B Commission: (1) “Recognition by this Conference that as proposed by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and as a matter of equity French-speaking Canadians outside Quebec should have the same rights as English-speaking Canadians in Quebec”; and (2) “Recognition, as the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism has recommended, of the desirability of proceeding by governmental action as speedily as possible, in ways

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most appropriate in each province and without diminishing existing rights, recognized by law or usage.”42 The leaders disagreed, however, on whether to translate these principles into a constitutional declaration or implement the practical recommendations beforehand. The most important decision, for our purposes, was the premiers’ refusal to create joint federal-provincial bilingual districts. In their opinion, they were not ready for such a system. John Robarts’s refusal in particular, however, was ironic in that he championed similar improvements in Ontario: “All government departments will be encouraged to provide bilingual services in those field offices located in areas where there is a sufficient concentration of French-speaking persons.”43 Daniel Johnson opposed “mathematical bilingualism,” in reference to bilingual districts, fearing it would limit the allocation of bilingual services to Quebec anglophones: “[T]hey would be denied certain rights that they now enjoy.”44 The symbolic purpose of bilingual districts in Quebec was thus clear. Although an ardent nationalist, Johnson preferred a more generous mechanism and suggested constitutional rights to ensure the anglophone minority’s right to federal and provincial services in English: “[E]ntrench the rights of the English speaking in Quebec’s constitution to make sure that they are not tampered with by the whim of a passing majority of a single house in any crisis.”45 Pearson went home empty-handed in regard to joint bilingual districts. The program would be only federal, although the provincial governments could collaborate down the road. The B and B Commission had accepted this alternative, since “at least part of the officiallanguage minority would have some government services in its language” (rcbb 1967, 112), but it warned that bilingual districts were “inconceivable without the co-operation of the [provincial] authorities and the local population” (117). Pearson realized that Parliament must adopt an official languages act to force the federal government to adapt its administrative system to the sociolinguistic reality of the country. The provinces might eventually follow suit. Pearson would leave the door open. At the follow-up constitutional conference, held 10–12 February 1969, similar themes were discussed but within a different context. Trudeau had replaced Pearson as prime minister in April 1968, and he differed from his predecessor in his perception of the country’s sociolinguistic tensions and the solutions he proposed. In simple terms, Trudeau preferred individual constitutional rights based on ideals, disdained the “two nations” concept, and rejected the bicultural side of the B and B

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coin, whereas Pearson, like Laurendeau, preferred pragmatic accommodations based on the geolinguistic reality, believed that Canada was as much a partnership between two nations as between ten provinces, and gave predominance to biculturalism over bilingualism. Moreover, the federal government had already introduced Bill C-120 in the House of Commons. Nevertheless, the conference would give the premiers an opportunity to react to the federal bill before its third reading in the House. This second federal-provincial conference would alter bilingual districts in particular, but its results were similar to those of the initial conference: bilingual districts would be uniquely federal. In his opening statement at the 1969 conference, Trudeau outlined the bill’s purpose: “We want to respect the languages of our two main linguistic communities.”46 Only when this respect is a reality will all Canadians of both languages feel that the whole of Canada is their country: “[E]ither we recognize these languages in all parts of Canada, or we create a climate of mutual suspicion and mistrust which could lead to the disintegration of this country.”47 In practice, however, official bilingualism and biculturalism would be limited by the territorial principle: “[E]very Canadian will have access to public education in either official language, and will be free to use either language in dealing with the Federal Government and other public bodies in all areas of the country where the size of the minority justifies it.”48 Thus, while the principle of equality would be applied throughout Canada, its practice would be limited to the symbolic and administrative bilingual districts. There is no region in British Columbia where it applies. There is one region in Alberta; one in Saskatchewan. Four, I believe, in Manitoba. This is far different from supposing that everywhere, everyone to be a federal servant will have to speak both languages. We are talking of regions where the number of citizens of the official language (whether it be in Quebec or the rest of Canada) is sufficient to justify such bilingualism and such bilingual institutions.49

Trudeau was referring here to the B and B Commission’s fifty-four census divisions and, especially, to the exclusion of Newfoundland and British Columbia; his words would later haunt the specification efforts. Both advisory boards would surprise the Newfoundland and B.C. governments notwithstanding B and B Commission predictions [rcbb 1967, 109] by identifying a potential bilingual district on their turf. The importance of Trudeau’s statement, for our purposes, is that it reflected his acceptance of the symbolic value of bilingual districts

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and the territorial limits of their benefits. It also suggested that individual rights were not sacrosanct in Trudeau’s conception. The premiers split in their reaction to the federal bill. The western premiers opposed the bill on three fronts: it was unconstitutional, dangerous, and unnecessary. The premiers of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba were so convinced of the bill’s unconstitutionality that they asked Trudeau to submit it to a judicial review.50 If the courts deemed the bill constitutional, they would not oppose it even if it created more problems than some other plan based on “a voluntary basis.”51 They argued that “this kind of Bill making both languages official for all federal purposes, we fear will divide rather than unite the Country.”52 Finally, they believed that the bill was unnecessary because “such a program could be implemented as a matter of policy without the necessity of such an Act.”53 In short, a discrete administrative districtification would be just as effective as a symbolic districtification to achieve the goals of the Act. Nevertheless, the government of Saskatchewan conceded that “all government offices, at all levels, should provide for the services of one or several bilingual employees especially in those towns or communities where there is a great number of French-Canadians.”54 The six other premiers supported the bill, and most of them supported linguistic and cultural equality. New Brunswick’s Louis Robichaud declared himself “100 per cent behind the Federal Bill,”55 and Prince Edward Island Premier Alex Campbell stated: “I wholeheartedly endorse the Federal proposals.”56 The premiers of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland also lauded the federal effort, although important reservations were expressed by the premiers of Nova Scotia and Quebec. The former, G.I. Smith, feared that “there might be some substantial difficulties in establishing the actual boundaries.”57 He also argued that bilingual districts would cause havoc in Nova Scotia if they forced his government to provide provincial services to its Acadian minority: “[T]here is thus the danger, unless the situation is made very clear, that the mere establishment of bilingual districts will be considered by those whom they are intended to benefit as a promise of immediate [provincial] fulfillment which cannot be met for a very considerable time.”58 The premier of Quebec understood the symbolic value of bilingual districts, but they were not a priority. Jean-Jacques Bertrand unequivocally stated that “Quebec supports bilingualism within federal institutions,”59 but he scolded the federal government for reducing language to a mere

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mode of expression,60 insisting that individual language rights were insufficient. In his opinion, individual linguistic equality could only be achieved through collective cultural equality.61 This meant a constitutional recognition that “Quebec is not a Province like the others,”62 because “Quebec is the place where the aspirations and needs of four out of five French-speaking Canadians can be satisfied.”63 Bertrand had “certain reservations” concerning bilingual districts and what they represented, both within and beyond Quebec, to the francophones of his province.64 First, the grandfather clause in section 13 (3) would not only discriminate in favour of the English language and culture within Quebec, but would contradict the districtification principle: “[S]ince, in fact, all federal services, with very few exceptions, are already available in both languages in all those locations where Englishspeaking Canadians are to be found in any number and, indeed, … even if the minority involved is less than 10 per cent …, in practice the entire Province of Quebec will be a bilingual district.”65 Outside Quebec, bilingual districts would create “reserves” or “ghettoes,” thereby compromising “the mobility of French-speaking Canadians.”66 In this context, he meant the mobility of Québécois. Bertrand nevertheless concluded that since “realism” convinced him that “the application of this principle of equality must be done progressively,” governments “should begin by providing services in the two languages in all those places where we find Canadians belonging to the two language groups.”67 Bilingual districtification was thus an acceptable short-term measure. However, he hoped that the territorial principle would eventually be replaced by the personality principle: “[L]ittle by little, all Canada – as far as federal institutions are concerned – will have to become bilingual.”68 At the conclusion of the discussion of the bill and the bilingual districts and in order to allay some of the premiers’ fears, Trudeau repeated that bilingual districts would be limited to only a few areas of the country, even in Quebec. He agreed to consult the provincial governments before proclaiming federal bilingual districts in order to avoid deciding “the districts on our own,” even though he “understood from the discussion that a Federal Bill should not be discussed as to policy by provincial governments.”69 He consequently promised that his Minister of Justice, John Turner, would consult them within a few weeks to discuss the wording of the modifications made to the bill as a result of their input. Trudeau also suggested that the premiers join him in an effort to “decide such districts or draw them.”70 However, there was no subsequent provincial effort to make bilingual districts a

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joint endeavour, and Trudeau did not ask his Cabinet to decide upon or draw bilingual districts for federal purposes. The Act left that task to the first Bilingual Districts Advisory Board. Turner’s consultations with the hesitant provincial governments were held over the next ten days. The attorney generals of the four western provinces expressed four concerns during their meeting of 17 February 1969.71 First, “Why force us into bilingualism by legislation when by gradual consent it can be achieved in due course?” Turner’s response was unequivocal: “Rights can only be protected by law,” and the Act was “a matter of converting symbols into reality.” Second, the Act would result in an “additional cost” to Canadian taxpayers. Turner replied that “the cost of bilingualism is part of the price of being Canadian.” Third, “There will be a great many technical difficulties involved in implementing it.” Turner assured the attorneys general and the House that “the obvious flexibility in the bill itself gives time for a gradual process in its implementation.” And fourth, the Act created “second-class citizenship … [for] Canadians who were neither of British nor French descent.” Turner’s answer was again unequivocal: “This bill does not deprive them of any of those rights or any of those historic, traditional, family advantages.” Turner quoted section 38 of the Act: “Nothing in this act shall be construed as derogating from or diminishing in any way any legal or customary right or privilege acquired or enjoyed either before or after the coming into force of this act with respect to any language that is not an official language.” During his meeting with Bertrand a few days later, Turner presented a draft modification (section 9 (2)) that would enable the federal government to extend its bilingual services beyond bilingual districts, especially in major urban areas where francophones were numerous but did not represent 10 per cent of the population – that is, where there was “a significant demand.” Bertrand agreed to the modification.72 Turner assured the House that Cabinet did “not want to create linguistic ghettos,” but he insisted that bilingual districts were the “best way to protect minorities wherever they may be.”73 According to Turner, there was a significant difference between paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 9. The first paragraph enabled the federal government to create bilingual districts where the minority represented at least 10 per cent of the population located within a census subdivision, a federal electoral district, a provincial electoral district, a school board, or a municipality. The same paragraph then forced the federal government to adapt its administrative structures (principal offices) to

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the geolinguistic reality of the country in order to convert symbols into reality and protect the minority’s right to services in its official language. The second paragraph, as noted, enabled the federal government to provide its public services in both official languages in regions of the country beyond bilingual districts where the minority made a sufficient number of demands for such services. Paragraph (1) was based on the adaptive approach to bilingual districtification, whereas paragraph (2) was based on the bureaucratic approach. Indeed, paragraph (2) put the onus on minorities to make demands on existing structures. Bilingual regions created under paragraph (2) complemented bilingual districts created under paragraph (1). Bilingual districts would be officially proclaimed by Cabinet, while “significant demand” could change on administrative whim. Bilingual districts were symbolic, whereas secretive bilingual regions did not have a symbolic purpose. Turner presented another amendment following his meeting with Bertrand. A new paragraph in section 13 – (4) – would make it impossible to eliminate a bilingual district once it was created, even if the minority no longer satisfied a minimal percentage of the bilingual district’s population. This paragraph would give francophones living outside Quebec the same type of acquired rights that paragraph (3) of the same section gave anglophones living in Quebec. In other words, if a minority expanded its numbers and homeland, the federal Cabinet could expand the borders of the bilingual district to recognize this homeland and guarantee its bilingual services, while conversely, if a minority shrunk within a bilingual district, Cabinet could reduce its borders but only to a minimal size. This new amendment would ensure that once a bilingual district, always a bilingual district. It was this amendment that likely led one analyst to conclude that “the bilingual districts were intended to be ratcheted upwards both in size and number, serving as tools by which the state could gradually turn the Canadian people into the bicultural supermen envisioned by Trudeau” (Reid 1993, 133). A better understanding of Canada’s sociolinguistic reality – especially of the high rate of assimilation of francophones outside Quebec between 1867 and 1961 – would have produced a more astute conclusion: that is, bilingual districts outside Quebec would eventually have become smaller, not bigger. In fact, while the 1961 census indicated that fifty-four census divisions could have been proclaimed as bilingual districts in 1969, the 2001 census indicates that only twenty-eight census divisions meet the 10 per cent criterion today. It is hard to imagine how the initial list would have been ratcheted upwards.

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A generous interpretation of section 13 (3) within Quebec could have covered almost the entire province because of existing federal bilingual services. This is arguably why Quebec Conservative mp Martial Asselin immediately asked Turner to ensure that his amendment would not eventually make the whole province of Quebec “one single bilingual district.”74 The bureaucrats’ generous and innovative allocation of acquired rights to Quebec anglophones was thus complemented by a similar political arrangement for francophones outside Quebec. However, similar does not mean identical. The symmetrical implementation of paragraphs (3) and (4) of section 13 would depend on the generosity of the federal Cabinet in its proclamation of the initial series of bilingual districts. Indeed, if Cabinet considered that, in Bertrand’s words, “the entire Province of Quebec will be a bilingual district … since, in fact, all federal services, with very few exceptions, are already available in both languages in all those locations where English-speaking Canadians are to be found in any number and, indeed, … even if the minority involved is less than 10 per cent,”75 it could maximize the number and size of bilingual districts in Quebec by adopting a generous interpretation of paragraph (3). However, Cabinet could not maximize the number and size of bilingual districts elsewhere because objective criteria forbade such a generous interpretation. Specification was limited by the geolinguistic criteria of five administrative units wherein the minority represented 10 per cent of the population. For paragraphs (3) and (4) to be symmetrical in practice, the Cabinet would have had to ignore paragraph (3) and minimize the number and size of bilingual districts in Quebec by applying for Quebec anglophones the same geolinguistic criteria it would for francophones outside Quebec. Paragraph (3) was thus either discriminatory or useless. Adding paragraph (4) to section 13 was well intended but did not correct the favouritism inherent in paragraph (3). Fortunately for the advisory boards, this inequity did not hamper their specification of bilingual districts. Nevertheless, considerable debate emerged during the specification stage concerning the symmetrical implementation of the statutory geolinguistic criteria. I will return to the ironic redundancy of sections 9 (2) and 13 (4) in chapter 6 (pages 217–19).

4

a do p ti n g t he o ff i c i a l l an g uag es act

Seven months after its first reading and following an important federalprovincial conference, Bill C-120 could finally proceed, going through

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its second reading on 16 May 1969.76 Secretary of State Gérard Pelletier presented the bill in eloquent terms.77 The bill touched “the very foundation of Canadian unity.” Its recognition of “the equality of our two official languages” would reflect the fact that “linguistic duality … has always characterized the whole of Canada” and that “our common life is expressed through two official languages and has always been based on two distinct cultures.” However, since this basic fact had been neglected by governments since 1867, thereby awarding privileges to anglophones that were refused to francophones, the federal government believed it had to correct the imbalance for the sake of national unity. Indeed, the bill was one way of “leaving the past behind us” and fighting separatism. The “statutory recognition of language rights” was therefore “imperative”: “They must be recognized by the law of the land.” In practice, the bill “will make available to French-speaking minorities throughout the country services in French which hitherto all too often have been lacking, and, conversely, to make the same services available in English to isolated English-speaking minorities.” The purpose of the bill was thus to establish “institutional bilingualism.” In other words, it would “ensure that [citizens] may address the federal government agencies in the official language of their choice.” These rights would be guaranteed by bilingual districts: “It is … in the bilingual districts that the system defined by the bill can be applied in its entirety.” However, because of the “great deal of controversy” that had arisen since the idea was launched, Pelletier subtly challenged the provincial governments and the other critics: “Bilingual districts constitute simply a means and not an end. If better methods are suggested to us, we shall be only too happy to examine them.” During the debates on the second reading, from 21 to 27 May, Conservative mp s took Pelletier’s bait but could not come up with a viable alternative. They presented twelve critiques on bilingual districts. Three were of a general nature and stemmed from a particular interpretation of the districts’ symbolic value: bilingual districts would tear the country and communities apart;78 the creation of “special language reserves” would transform the Quebec nationalist slogan from “Masters in our own house” to “Masters in yours, too”;79 and the bill would be worthless without provincial participation.80 Melvin McQuaid was the most vociferous critic, arguing that the bill was merely “window dressing” because “[e]verything it suggests can be done … under the present administrative powers of the federal government,”81 without symbolic legislation. A fourth critique was a repetition of the western provinces’

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opposition to the constitutional infringement by the federal government.82 The latter two critiques were contradictory, for if the Act was unconstitutional, its measures could not be implemented “under the present administrative powers of the government.” The eight other critiques were related to the eventual specification, delimitation, and implementation of bilingual districts. First, an overgenerous federal government could spread a bilingual district until its majority members constituted 90 per cent. For example, once a community of 100 francophones was recognized, the bilingual district could be stretched until it included up to 900 anglophones in the surrounding area. Second, it was ridiculous to guarantee the perpetual status of a bilingual district once the minority disappeared altogether. Third, there was no definition of “mother tongue” in the bill, and thus, fourth, the statutory demolinguistic criterion could not be applied, since many citizens “change their mother tongue in the midstream of life in a practical way.”83 This last argument was invalid because the bill referred to a statistical definition: moreover, it is impossible to lose the “first language learned and still understood” (my emphasis). Fifth, bilingual districts were useless because they would cover rural areas, whereas principal offices were located in urban areas. Sixth, the bill did not oblige the advisory boards to consult citizens affected by the proclamation of a bilingual district. Seventh, the bill did not allow the creation of bilingual Ukrainian-English districts. And eighth, the addition of the second paragraph to section 9 would enable the federal government to spread its bilingual services from coast to coast according to the demand. The Conservative mp s did not form a common front in this last regard. Some argued that paragraph (2) rendered bilingual districts unnecessary, while others argued against its inclusion because the districts would at least limit the government’s generosity. Another Opposition critique is worthy of mention. British Columbia Social Credit mp Robert Simpson seriously doubted the reliability of Trudeau’s statement, made during the federal-provincial conference of February 1969, that there would be no bilingual districts in British Columbia and only a handful in the other western provinces.84 In his opinion, this statement was only valid for the 1961 census divisions and might no longer apply once the 1971 data were revealed, especially if the four other administrative units were used for specification purposes. The 1971 census would prove him correct: one francophone community in British Columbia (Coquitlam) and another in Newfoundland (Port-au-Port) met the demolinguistic criterion to qualify as

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bilingual districts. Trudeau’s statement would complicate the first advisory board’s endeavour, but it was not a significant problem in the end. The vast majority of the House – the Liberals and New Democrats, in particular – wholeheartedly supported the bill. In fact, 197 mp s voted in favour of the bill after second reading on 27 May 1969, while 17 voted against it.85 Canadians generally also supported the bill. Gallup polls conducted in March and May 1969 revealed that almost 60 per cent of Canadians supported the bill, while almost 40 per cent opposed it.86 I found no survey that specifically measured their attitude towards bilingual districts. The bill was then submitted to a parliamentary committee for final revisions before third reading and adoption. The Special Committee on the Official Languages Bill included six Liberal members, three Conservatives, two New Democrats, and one Social Credit mp. At this point, bilingual districts no longer seemed controversial, at least not as controversial as during the media-reported debates of the House. Committee members spent much more time discussing sections 19 to 34, which dealt with the powers of the Commissioner of Official Languages, than all other sections combined. However, they did discuss – though rarely – sections 9 to 18, which dealt with bilingual services and districts. While these latter discussions raised important considerations about bilingual districts, they also confused many Opposition mp s, particularly those dealing with the maximum size and perennial status of bilingual districts. During one session Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice Donald Thorson explained that no sections determined the minimal or maximal size of bilingual districts,87 but he immediately added that section 13 (1) clearly stated that five types of administrative units could be used to delineate the borders of a bilingual district. With a few exceptions, the largest bilingual districts would coincide with federal electoral ridings, while the smallest would coincide with a village (municipality). Then, during another session, Deputy Minister of Justice D.S. Maxwell stated that a province could also be proclaimed a single bilingual district, but only “if there was an understanding of some sort between the two governments as contemplated in Clause 12 of the Bill.”88 According to section 12, Cabinet “may from time to time by proclamation establish one or more federal bilingual districts … in a province, and alter the limits of any bilingual districts so established,” as long as it respected “the terms of any agreement” that it formally entered into “with the government of a province as described in section 15." Section 15 (2) enabled the advisory board to negotiate, “on behalf

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of the Governor in Council, … a draft agreement with the government of a province for the purpose of ensuring that, to the greatest practical extent, the limits of any area that may be established as a bilingual district under this Act will be conterminous with any area similarly established or to be established in that province by such government.” In sum, Cabinet could establish a single bilingual district for an entire province but only if the provincial government agreed. The members of the parliamentary committee seemed confused on this issue. The issue that most confused committee members was the perennial status of bilingual districts. Justice adm Thorson first assured the committee that the Act did “not provide any mechanism whatsoever for the total abolition of a district that has been established in the past.”89 Pelletier explained that the perennial status guaranteed by paragraph (4) of section 13 was added to complement paragraph (3) of the same section in order to provide francophone minorities the same acquired rights as those given to Quebec anglophones.90 However, Pelletier then stated that a bilingual district could be eliminated if “there is a total disappearance of the population and you have no demand whatsoever.”91 Thorson corrected the minister’s error, saying that even if the minority population disappeared, a bilingual district would still exist.92 He added: “Under the terms of the bill only Parliament can abolish that district as a bilingual district.”93 The leader of the New Democratic Party, David Lewis, stepped in to correct the discrepancy.94 Still confused, Melvin McQuaid argued that the Act should “provide for the elimination of those districts when it is just not feasible or necessary to provide the bilingual services to them.”95 No such amendment was proposed. The committee did, however, propose an amendment that would clarify the stipulation concerning the bilingual districts’ perennial status. The amended section 13 (4) stated that any modification to the size of bilingual districts should “continue to comply with the requirements of this section respecting the establishment of bilingual districts under this Act.”96 Cabinet could alter the borders of an existing bilingual district but on the condition that the minority would still represent at least 10 per cent of the population within at least one of five statutory administrative units used to delineate such borders. The committee also adopted an amendment concerning the size of bilingual districts and the location of federal offices therein. According to the amended section 9 (1), federal agencies, departments, and Crown corporations had to provide services in both official languages in their “head or central offices in Canada if outside the National Capital

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Region.”97 The initial wording of section 9 (1) only compelled these bodies to provide bilingual services if their headquarters were located in Ottawa. The committee adopted thirty-six additional amendments, but eleven were minor modifications and fifteen simple clarifications of statutory vocabulary. Section 36 (2), for example, was modified to define “mother tongue,” in accordance with the census questionnaire, as “the language first learned in childhood by such persons and still understood by them, as ascertained by the decennial census taken immediately preceding the determination.” The two most important modifications to Bill C-120 were the additions of paragraph (4) to section 13 and paragraph (2) to section 9. Both were consequences of the deal struck between Turner and Bertrand to guarantee bilingual federal services outside bilingual districts under section 9 (1) and to ensure that francophones outside Quebec would obtains acquired rights similar to those enjoyed by anglophones in Quebec under section 13 (3). Turner stated that the amendments “did satisfy the province of Quebec” in this regard98 and that the 30,000 francophones in Toronto could now receive bilingual federal services, even if they did not represent 10 per cent of the city’s population. Although important, these two amendments would contribute, albeit accidentally, to the eventual rejection of the bilingual districts concept. Despite the numerous amendments, the Conservative mp s returned to the House feeling that they had failed to improve the bill on three fronts. First, they had wanted the advisory boards to have twelve members, not ten, in order to ensure representation from all provinces and territories.99 Pelletier had convinced the other members of the committee to reject such an amendment, arguing that the board had a specific administrative function and was not akin to a constitutional conference, where equitable representation was required.100 Second, the Conservative members had wanted the Commissioner of Official Languages to designate the bilingual districts.101 Pelletier had argued persuasively that it was best to delegate such a technical function to an advisory board: “Their work is quite specific. It is not to discuss general questions or language policy in Canada but to set up bilingual districts and determine their frontiers.”102 And third, the Conservative members had wanted the advisory board to hold a public meeting to consult the population living within a recommended bilingual district.103 Pelletier had refused, arguing that such consultations would give the “intolerant majority” a golden opportunity to prevent creation

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of a bilingual district in their backyard, thus keeping their minority from receiving bilingual services.104 Pelletier had added that the federal government would not organize “separatist meetings”: “[I]f we are forced to hold a meeting, we would be organizing separatists in all parts of the country.”105 Here Pelletier implicitly recognized the symbolic value of bilingual districts. Having failed within the committee, the Conservative members decided to propose most of their amendments in the House. They failed in the House as well, both before and after the third reading on 3 July 1969.106 By that time, much of the earlier confusion had subsided and the rejected amendments of importance had been abandoned. Nevertheless, a handful of Conservative mp s fought on passionately until the end. For instance, Don Mazankowski saw the Act as “yet another in a series of concessions to Quebec” and complained vigorously that in his riding of Vègreville, “where the population is made up of approximately 50 per cent Ukrainian, 30 per cent English, 7 per cent French and the balance of other ethnic origins, we are going to have a bilingual district.”107 No one bothered to inform Mazankowski that 7 per cent would not warrant a bilingual district. John Turner lamented in the House over the numerous misunderstandings concerning the bill in spite of the fact that no other bill had been “the subject of so much consultation across the country.”108 On 7 July 1969, Bill C-120 was adopted unanimously, although many of its critics did not attend the vote.109 The next day, the Senate proceeded to the first and second readings of the bill.110 After a brief debate in the Senate and an equally brief review by the Senate’s Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, the Senate adopted the bill after third reading on 9 July 1969.111 The same day, the governor general gave royal sanction to the bill. The Official Languages Act officially came into force on 7 September 1969.112

chapter three

Policy Specification: The First Effort

After the Official Languages Act came into effect, the federal Cabinet asked ten Canadians to specify the number, size, and location of the country’s initial bilingual districts. The first Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, chaired by Roger Duhamel, performed its work in twelve months. Its report was studied by a committee of civil servants, a Cabinet committee, then Cabinet itself, before it was put aside to accommodate a second advisory board and the more recent (1971) census data. The second board, chaired by Paul Fox, toiled for almost three years. Its report was also studied by a committee of civil servants, a Cabinet committee, then Cabinet itself, before it too was put aside, this time in favour of a plan involving Treasury Board’s bilingual regions. Each specification effort delineated roughly the same number, size, and location of bilingual districts, but section 9 (1) was abandoned in favour of section 9 (2). This chapter has two main sections. The first describes the Duhamel Advisory Board’s specification efforts undertaken in March 1970 and completed in March 1971; the second describes the federal Cabinet’s efforts between April 1971 and May 1972.

1

th e d u h a m e l b o a r d , 1 9 7 0 – 1 9 7 1

Five months after the Official Languages Act was proclaimed, the federal Cabinet created the first Bilingual Districts Advisory Board. On 12 February 1970, it named the following ten prominent Canadians to

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the board:1 Roger Duhamel, a francophone from Hamilton and formerly the Queen’s Printer, was awaiting a civil service appointment; Paul Fox was a professor of political science at the University of Toronto; Roger Saint-Denis, a native Montrealer, was president of the Collège de Saint-Boniface in Manitoba; Justice Alfred Monnin sat on the Manitoba Appeals Court; Lawyer Adélard Savoie was president of the Université de Moncton; Leonore McEwen, a professor of chemistry at the University of Saskatchewan, chaired the Canadian Institute of International Affairs; Murray Balantyne was a writer and a resident of Montreal; Harry Hickman was a professor of French at the University of Victoria; Harry Smith was Nova Scotia’s ombudsman; and Madeleine Joubert resided in Montreal, where she was director of the Canadian Institute for Adult Education. Order-in-Council 1970-294 designated Duhamel as the board’s chair.2 The government also hired nine staff members to assist the board in its tasks. Neil Morrison, the former secretary to the B and B Commission, assumed the same role for the board. Roland Morency was hired as administrative officer. One cartographer, three secretaries, two clerks, and a typist completed the staff. The specification process performed by the Duhamel Board followed three steps. First, it analysed the demographic and geographic data from the 1961 census in order to determine the regions of the country that met the statutory criteria to qualify as bilingual districts. Then, the board members visited these regions, consulted residents and government officials, and analysed the federal services and principal offices within them in order to determine their feasibility as bilingual districts. It was in this way that the board undertook, “with all due despatch, [to] conduct an inquiry into and concerning the areas of Canada in which one of the official languages is spoken as a mother tongue by persons who are in the linguistic minority in those areas in respect of an official language,” as outlined by section 15. In other words, not all administrative units that met the 10 per cent criterion would be automatically proclaimed bilingual districts. Specifically, the board had to “have regard to the convenience of the public in a proposed bilingual district in respect of all the federal, provincial, municipal and educational services provided therein” (section 15 (3)) and hold “public hearings, if any, as it considers necessary” and “consultation[s] with the government of each of the provinces in which any such areas are located” (section 15 (1)) before producing “a report setting out its findings and conclusions including its recommendations if any” relating to bilingual districts. Finally, the board met

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to put together its recommendations to Cabinet. However, the sequence of these steps sometimes varied. Also, the board did not visit the regions of Quebec. The following paragraphs describe the principal chronological steps taken by the board.

a)

The Regional Consultations

After receiving the 1961 census data on mother tongue in the various statutory administrative units, the Duhamel Board decided to visit all the areas that met the 10 per cent criterion. The goal was to get a subjective pulse of the area by discussing the benefits and feasibility of a bilingual district with the minority and majority residents. These discussions were complemented by board-member visits to the federal offices serving the area. Most of the regional consultations lasted from two to three hours and were conducted in the language of the minority. In almost all cases, a board member living in the province in question explained the Act’s purpose, the bilingual districts, the board’s mandate, and the purpose of the meeting. Presentations were enhanced by maps and charts indicating demolinguistic data for the area. After this introduction, the member then asked the local people a series of specific questions. Between 2 April 1970 and 21 February 1971, the board visited seventytwo bilingual areas, some more than once, covering every province except Quebec. The board members met approximately 400 local minority members, more than 50 local majority members, and 10 members of Parliament potentially affected by the proclamation of a bilingual district. They also met over 50 officials representing, respectively, each of the ten provincial governments. Throughout the country, with no exception, the minority francophones strongly supported the creation of a bilingual district in their area. The symbolic importance of bilingual districts was fully understood. Indeed, almost all minority members throughout the country wanted there to be a bilingual district in their region for the boost it would give their local causes, such as the reception of Radio-Canada programs and provincial public services. Federal services were needed but were considered secondary. And where the minority group already received these federal and provincial services, such as in eastern and northern New Brunswick and Ontario, bilingual districts still received the minority’s approval because of their symbolic recognition of “French spoken here.” Moreover, the vast majority of discussions between the

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board members and the minorities invited to the regional consultations dealt with the symbolic consequences of bilingual districts. In fact, many of the minority members feared a local anglophone backlash.3 They asked the board to delineate bilingual districts with tact, but they were split between a minimalist and a maximalist approach. Some wanted their local bilingual district to exclude, as much as possible, the anglophone communities in their area. This was especially the case in New Brunswick,4 Windsor (Ontario),5 Chéticamp (Nova Scotia),6 Edmonton (Alberta),7 and Saint-Boniface (Manitoba).8 Others, notably in southwest Nova Scotia9 and Prince county (Prince Edward Island),10 wanted their bilingual district to be as vast as possible in order to avoid sacrificing small and isolated Acadian communities. The minority members in the rural areas surrounding North Battleford (Saskatchewan) even disagreed among themselves on the issue. Some argued that the city should be included in the bilingual district because the federal offices serving the area were located there, even if this meant diluting the strong local francophone population to barely 11 per cent of the larger regional population.11 Others argued that anglophones and other ethnic groups in the area would resist the proclamation of a vast bilingual district.12 Despite different contexts, significant distances between their respective communities, and relative ignorance of each other, the minority members shared three major preoccupations concerning the administrative purpose of federal bilingual districts. First, they sought clarification on the concept of principal offices. In almost all cases, the minority members complained that this concept was inadequate to serve them in their normally rural communities, since almost every principal office was located in neighbouring cities that did not meet the statutory criteria and could not be included in their local bilingual district.13 Winnipeg was the best example of this scenario: while thousands of francophones lived in Saint-Boniface, easily qualifying the suburb for bilingual district status, most of the federal services provided to the local francophones were allocated from offices located in Winnipeg, which did not have enough francophones to qualify for bilingual district status. The second concern involved the types of services offered in bilingual districts. In Coquitlam (British Columbia), for instance, the only federal services were the post office and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (rcmp).14 The minority members there, well aware of the symbolic importance of bilingual districts, nevertheless concluded that the proclamation of a bilingual district in their area would not translate into public services essential to their survival, such as

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French-language schools and French radio services. Third, the minority members were skeptical about the validity of the census data. Some believed that the 1961 census data underestimated their numbers.15 Others feared that the migration since 1961 of many local francophones to neighbouring cities would reduce their opportunity to obtain a bilingual district.16 Acadians in New Brunswick shared a particular concern: should the entire province be proclaimed a bilingual district, since francophones represented a third of its population, or should only the areas meeting the demolinguistic criteria be so proclaimed? The latter option would avoid an anglophone backlash but would create an Acadian nationalist backlash, since the predominantly English areas would be unilingual while the predominantly French areas would be bilingual.17 For example, in Madawaska County, where francophones represented 94 per cent of the population, bilingual district status would ensure Englishlanguage services for the 600 anglophones in the county, but in Saint John, where anglophones exceeded 90 per cent, there would be no bilingual status and the 6,000 francophones living in the city would be neglected. The B and B Commission had noted this inequity but had argued that the county should nevertheless be considered bilingual: “All services offered to the public of a province must be available locally in the language of the provincial majority and also in that of the local majority” (rcbb 1967, 103). This was conditional on New Brunswick becoming officially bilingual, as it did on 18 April 1969.18 The commission added that “even if the linguistic minority of a province finds itself in the majority in some region of the province, no part of Ontario or New Brunswick should be considered solely Frenchspeaking, just as no part of Quebec should be regarded as solely English-speaking” (103). This symmetrical application of the territorial principle, arguably intended to further alleviate the Quebec secessionists’ fear of the English language and culture in their “distinct society,” seemed unjust to New Brunswick Acadians, who had created their own “distinct society.”19 The board members correctly responded that the Act did not permit a unilingual-French district outside Quebec.20 However, the Act did permit a bilingual district for an entire province if its government agreed. Proclaiming all of New Brunswick a bilingual district would present three advantages.21 First, such a federal bilingual district would coincide with the provincial Official Languages Act, which made French and English “the official languages of New Brunswick for all purposes

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to which the authority of the Legislature of New Brunswick extends” and gave them “equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use for such purposes.” Second, a province-wide bilingual district would avoid isolating numerous francophone communities located in predominantly anglophone counties. And third, it would ensure bilingual services to the francophones living in Saint John and Fredericton, in spite of the fact that their thousands of members did not meet the statutory criteria. Neither the minority members nor the board seemed aware that Fredericton was located in Sunbury County, a census division wherein the minority represented more than 10 per cent of the population in 1961 (rcbb 1967, 107). Nor did they seem aware of the arguments presented by the B and B Commission in volume 3 – The Work World – that justified a single bilingual district for the entire province (rcbb 1969a, 528). Saint John would thus have been included. For their part, almost every one of the fifty local majority members consulted – municipal councillors, school principals, religious leaders, business owners, university professors, and newspaper editors – favoured the proclamation of a bilingual district in their area. The mayors of Digby (Nova Scotia) stated that the local anglophone majority would be disappointed if their area was excluded from the regional bilingual district.22 The mayor of Prince Albert (Saskatchewan) provided the board with identical feedback.23 More significantly, the mayor of Coquitlam24 and the majority members consulted in Portau-Port (Newfoundland)25 persuaded the board members that their local residents would fully accept the proclamation of a local bilingual district, even if bilingual districts had never been foreseen for their area and such a proclamation were unexpected. The mayor of Halifax, visited out of courtesy by the board members, expressed his regret that the capital of Nova Scotia could not be designated a bilingual district because of the vast number of federal services and offices located within the city.26 A large majority of the ten members of Parliament consulted supported the idea of a bilingual district in their backyard. As could be expected, this was the case with the Liberal mp s from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia,27 but it was also the case with David MacDonald, the Conservative mp for Egmont, P.E.I. MacDonald became the bilingual districts’ strongest proponent, favouring a vast bilingual district covering all of his riding over a district limited to the strongly Acadian Évangéline region.28 He argued that the maximalist approach would include the 2,000 francophones in the Tignish area, who would stand

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to benefit the most from the boost to the French language and culture provided by a bilingual district designation. He even assured the board members that the federal civil servants working in the federal offices serving his riding would not suffer as a result of a bilingual district proclamation because most of them did not provide services directly to the public. The four New Brunswick Conservative mp s consulted were not as positive as MacDonald. They had no problem with bilingual districts in the predominantly francophone areas of the province but were opposed to the proclamation of the entire province.29 They disagreed, however, on the potential anglophone backlash to such a proclamation: some believed that New Brunswick anglophones would not oppose the maximalist proclamation, while others feared otherwise, especially if federal civil servants lost their jobs as a consequence. Finally, during its regional consultations, the board met some fifty provincial officials, including over thirty civil servants, three members of provincial assemblies, fifteen Cabinet ministers, and five premiers: G.I. Smith of Nova Scotia, Louis Robichaud and Richard Hatfield of New Brunswick, Robert Bourassa of Quebec, and Edward Schreyer of Manitoba. Six of the ten provincial governments – Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Manitoba – expressed enthusiasm for the proposed federal bilingual districts in their respective provinces. The Ontario representatives even encouraged the board to superimpose the federal bilingual districts on the recently created provincial “bilingual districts.”30 They expressed regret that the numerous francophones living in the Toronto area would not receive federal services in French. Two of these provinces, however, expressed concern about some of the details related to the implementation of the districts. Prince Edward Island’s representatives cautioned the board against including the Tignish area in a bilingual district, since only a few senior citizens still spoke French in that area and the provincial government did not have enough funds to build a French-language school there, as requested by the local Acadians caught in the middle of a major provincial schoolconsolidation effort.31 Nova Scotia officials, for their part, feared that bilingual districts would entice local Acadians to request bilingual services from the provincial government as well.32 The governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan did not oppose the creation of federal bilingual districts in their province, but they told the board that they had no intention of creating provincial bilingual districts and that some ethnic groups would oppose their proclamation.33

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A Fransaskois member of the Saskatchewan Cabinet, Lionel Coderre, indicated that his compatriotes did not want bilingual districts,34 although minority members consulted in Saskatchewan said the opposite.35 Coderre’s colleague Clifford McIsaac urged the board to recommend changes to the Official Languages Act so that bilingual services would be allocated from the federal offices serving the areas designated as bilingual districts instead of from the principal offices located within the bilingual districts.36 The board did not act on McIsaac’s suggestion. British Columbia and Quebec opposed the creation of bilingual districts on their turf. The Attorney General of British Columbia admitted to the board that “B.C. had gone along with this on the assumption that there would not be any bilingual districts in the province.”37 Leslie Peterson’s government, now informed that a bilingual district could be proclaimed in British Columbia, contrary to what the B and B Commission and Trudeau had suggested, opposed its proclamation in Coquitlam. Peterson argued, erroneously, that the board could not recommend a bilingual district for a municipality, adding that the proclamation would entice the francophones of Coquitlam to request provincial services in their mother tongue, a request his government was unable to meet. He implored the board to delay its report until the 1971 data were available, convinced that his province would then no longer meet the statutory requirements. He accused the board members of putting at risk the sensitive constitutional negotiations scheduled for Victoria in June: “You will jeopardize the possibility of agreement on the constitutional amendment.”38 The Quebec government’s opposition was less vehement than British Columbia’s, but for two reasons the board dealt with that province with more tact. First, the provincial civil servants adamantly opposed any bilingual district on Quebec soil and told the board members that their political masters were of the same mind.39 They repeated JeanJacques Bertrand’s critique of bilingual districts to justify their opposition, neglecting to add that the former premier had finally agreed to the federal amendments to the Official Languages Act. In their opinion, bilingual districts were not only useless, since the English language and culture did not need their protection, but were also dangerous, since they would probably undercut the Quebec government’s eventual sociolinguistic policy favouring the French language.40 They felt that the board should respect the Gendron Commission’s efforts.41 If it felt compelled to recommend bilingual districts in spite of provincial policy,

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Montreal was the only justifiable bilingual district in Quebec; on this point, the civil servants later expressed a different point of view.42 The sensitive political situation in Quebec was the second reason the board treated that province with more tact. The Bourassa government came to power on 29 April 1970 and later that year was caught up in the October Crisis. Two kidnappings, one ending in death, by members of the Front de libération du Québec prompted the federal government to impose the War Measures Act. When the board finally met Bourassa in Montreal on 16 November 1970, it had completed its analysis with regard to the rest of the country and faced the dilemma of symmetrical or asymmetrical recommendations in Quebec. Duhamel explained to Bourassa that the board had four options.43 First, it could refuse to recommend bilingual districts in Quebec because bilingual services were already available throughout the province. The board had obviously overlooked the symbolic purpose of bilingual districts in Quebec, which was to limit the official presence of the English language and culture to areas where it was demographically justified. This was why, for Quebec, the B and B Commission recommended as potential bilingual districts only twenty-four census divisions (rcbb 1967, 108), almost all of them in the Montreal area, along the Outaouais River, and in the Eastern Townships. Duhamel added, however, that the board members thought it would be illegal not to recommend any bilingual districts, since the Act did not permit exceptions on a provincial basis. The second option consisted of applying the statutory criteria in the same way the board had done elsewhere. This would create approximately thirty bilingual districts in Quebec, Duhamel observed, and in some cases would stir “unfavourable reactions” within some nationalist circles.44 The third option involved waiting for the 1971 census data before recommending any bilingual districts in Quebec – the board had thus far refused to “play Pontius Pilate.”45 The fourth was to declare the entire province a bilingual district. Duhamel did not convey any negative opinion on this last option, even though the B and B Commission had rejected this maximalist specification (rcbb 1969a, 566). Four months later, in a letter to Duhamel, Quebec Cultural Affairs Minister François Cloutier wrote that it would be premature to state the Quebec government’s position on federal bilingual districts before the Victoria Constitutional Conference of June 1971.46 Since the conference would deal effectively with the language rights of Canada’s two principal ethnic groups, Cloutier urged the board to delay its

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report until the conference produced its results.47 It was too late: the board had already submitted its report to the Queen’s Printer.

b)

The Advisory Board’s Analysis and Decisions

The first advisory board met in Ottawa on seven occasions between 16 March 1970 and 12 March 1971. During the initial meetings, board members analysed census data, geographical maps, and related provincial statutes; interviewed some of the civil servants who had drafted the Official Languages Act; and consulted the proceedings of the Special Committee on the Official Languages Bill and the House of Commons, as well as various reports and political declarations. They neglected to study the third volume (The Work World) of the B and B Commission, which would have helped them with specification difficulties in regard to Quebec and New Brunswick. The second set of meetings was spent elaborating and adopting non-statutory specification criteria to complement the demolinguistic criteria outlined in the Act. In the third set of meetings, the board members tried to find appropriate solutions to the problems faced during their mandate. The board’s duties were straightforward: (1) to identify the various administrative units wherein the minority represented at least 10 per cent of the population; (2) to analyse the feasibility of bilingual districts for each case; (3) to exclude from the initial list the areas where a bilingual district was not feasible; and (4) to make appropriate recommendations to the federal Cabinet. However, as Duhamel explained to Southam News, “It can’t be done with figures and a map.”48 In fact, it could, but there was never any intention of proclaiming bilingual districts in every area of the country that met the statutory criteria. The board was thus charged with inventing arguments and subjective measures to justify the exclusion of areas from the initial list. The board used a total of twenty-five subjective criteria. Three were of a geographical nature: (1) the board tried to adopt a minimal and a maximal size for bilingual districts; (2) it tried to superimpose federal bilingual districts over provincial administrative units to facilitate eventual joint bilingual districts; and (3) it agreed to recommend distinct bilingual districts whenever a contiguous minority area saddled provincial borders. Eight criteria were of a sociological nature: (1) the superficial nature of local bilingualism (e.g., it served tourists rather than residents), (2) the presence of historical or “symbolic” justifications,49 (3) the presence of the minority language on commercial signs,

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(4) the “linguistic vigour” of the local minority,50 and the presence of minority (5) cultural, (6) religious, (7) social, and (8) media facilities. Four criteria were demographic in nature: (1) the assimilation rate, (2) the homogeneity of the minority population, (3) the migration rate of young minority members to nearby cities, and (4) the minority’s urbanization rate. Five criteria were of a political nature: (1) the local majority’s attitude towards bilingualism, (2) the opinion of the provincial government, (3) the opinion of local mps, (4) the presence of minority members on municipal councils, and (5) the symmetry of the recommendations throughout the country (“The same general considerations or criteria could not apply uniformly everywhere and special conditions or peculiarities need to be singled out”).51 The final five criteria were of an administrative nature: (1) the administrative unity of the area (e.g., the Ontario townships of Tiny and Tay were included in the same bilingual district because they formed a single administrative territory), (2) the location of the federal government’s principal offices, (3) the existing bilingual services provided by the federal government, (4) the existing bilingual services provided by local businesses and by provincial and municipal governments, and (5) the existence of minority-language schools in the area. The last three criteria suggested that the board did not fully understand that bilingual districts were recommended to enhance the bilingual public services provided by all institutions, rather than to be contingent on their availability. These criteria were intended to help the board determine the feasibility of the proposed bilingual districts. However, they were never applied systematically within an evaluative matrix. In fact, the members used different criteria during their deliberations, some of them contradictory. Neil Morrison, for example, following his exploratory mission to Tignish, P.E.I., requested that the board sacrifice the assimilated areas, since the francophone minority were too assimilated to reap any symbolic or practical benefits from bilingual districts,52 but after a similar visit to southern Manitoba, he made a request in favour of the inclusion of assimilated areas, saying these were precisely the types of communities that would reap the greatest benefits from bilingual districts.53 Some members of the board suggested applying uniform criteria across the country, but others favoured treating each province according to its particular circumstances. The board decided to delay considering uniform criteria until the end of the regional consultations,54 but in the end never discussed the issue further, in spite of repeated requests from Paul Fox for “rules of thumb.”55 Not surprisingly, many members corrected

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Roger Duhamel’s declaration during their final meeting that the board had followed a similar approach in every case.56 There had been a difference of approach and it was most evident in Quebec. The board members had difficulty reaching agreement on recommendations for Quebec. They were unable to resolve the dilemma of symmetry versus asymmetry: how could the board treat Quebec fairly yet respect the statutory objectives and criteria when it was the only province where francophones were the majority yet suffered anglicization? It is true that factors beyond the board’s control complicated its task – the provincial elections, the October Crisis, the tardiness in the Bourassa government’s response, and the transfer of the file from one provincial minister (Gérard D. Lévesque) to another (François Cloutier) (bdab 1971, 43) – but the board, and especially its chair, complicated matters further. Duhamel treated Quebec “unlike the others” from the start.57 He initially delayed the regional consultations in Quebec58 and then intentionally neglected them altogether.59 When the time finally came to specify bilingual districts in Quebec, on 3 October 1970, the members realized that they were facing the most delicate problem of their mandate.60 However, while the board treated Quebec with greater diplomacy because of its distinct characteristics, it nonetheless adopted an extreme yet simple solution: it recommended that the entire province be a bilingual district. The deliberations leading to this recommendation, however, were far from extreme and simple. The board struggled over many meetings before reaching what they believed was an adequate solution.61 Had they been reminded that the B and B Commission had argued for specific bilingual districts in Quebec (rcbb 1969a, 528), they could have avoided the dilemma altogether. The board discussed at length the four options that Duhamel presented to Bourassa. Duhamel tried to convince the other members that Quebec should become a single bilingual district, refusing Saint-Denis’s request that the province be cut up because the result would mean more bilingual districts in Quebec than elsewhere.62 Morrison offered two innovative suggestions in support of the third option (delay any recommendations concerning Quebec until after the 1971 census data became available): the board should avoid exacerbating sociolinguistic tensions in Quebec and instead seek a satisfactory way to resolve these tensions, and it should protect the French language in Quebec because the English language dominated the Québécois, Canadian, and North American societies.63

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The majority of the board agreed that Duhamel’s option would provoke the separatists but would not offend most Québécois, since there was no widespread consensus in Quebec on the appropriate federal and provincial solutions to sociolinguistic tensions.64 They were more critical of Morrison’s suggestions, arguing that a delay in Quebec would fuel opposition elsewhere and a delay throughout Canada would represent a “fatal” blow to francophone minorities outside Quebec.65 Although difficult, the board’s work must also be done in Quebec, and that province should not become the board’s stumbling block.66 And although the results (bilingual districts covering half the province) would provoke separatists, most board members believed that the same criteria should be applied in Quebec as elsewhere.67 Savoie also argued against recommending the entire province of Quebec as a bilingual district, saying it would be “a monumental error.”68 Nevertheless, Duhamel drew the “consensus” that the entire province should be recommended as a bilingual district.69 The board adopted a provisional decision to that effect in order to move on, but it also agreed to delay its final decision on the matter until its next meeting and subsequent to Duhamel’s meeting with Robert Bourassa, which was scheduled for 16 November 1970.70 On 5 December, the board learned that Bourassa would probably not respond to the four options.71 Monnin made a motion to designate the entire province as a bilingual district.72 The chairman seconded the motion. Morrison put forth four arguments to justify the board’s decision:73 (1) the federal government already considered Quebec as a bilingual district for its administrative purposes; (2) it was difficult to cut up the province for the board’s purposes; (3) section 13 (3) protected the anglophones’ existing bilingual services; and (4), the B and B Commission considered Quebec as the example to follow (rcbb 1967, 100, 104, 112). He neglected to mention that the commission had carved out twenty-four bilingual districts in Quebec (108) and had explicitly excluded Quebec City because the large number of anglophones only constituted “a relatively small proportion of the population” (115). The commission had taken this direction because it wanted to limit the official use of English in Quebec and eliminate “the inferior status” of the French language in the province (xxx). It also suggested that all provinces be cut up into bilingual districts according to similar criteria (rcbb 1967, 85; 1969a, 566), but this suggestion was ignored by legislators and specificators. The board did not vote on Monnin’s motion, and the members simply decided to table it until the next meeting.74 The chairman never put the issue on the

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agenda, and the other members never brought it up again. The provisional consensus drawn by Duhamel on 3 October 1970 became, by default, the board’s final decision. The board faced two other major problems, though neither was as significant as the first. One problem was that they did not know whether it was best to recommend all of New Brunswick as a bilingual district or to cut up that province according to the statutory criteria. Savoie, the New Brunswick member of the board, convinced his colleagues to opt for the former. Although he initially opposed the maximalist approach, he changed his mind following the regional consultations.75 He used seven arguments to persuade his colleagues:76 (1) the premier and the provincial government favoured this option; (2) it would be difficult to carve out bilingual districts because the whole province was officially bilingual; (3) the mp s favoured this option; (4) there would be no significant public opposition to a provincial bilingual district (if any, it would be similar to the Acadian opposition to specific bilingual districts in only their areas); (5) this option would avoid the creation of two classes of citizens in the province, bilinguals and unilinguals; (6) it was the only way to include Fredericton and Saint John, where thousands of francophones resided and dozens of principal offices were located; and (7) the board should not treat New Brunswick like Quebec, where a single bilingual district would be “a monumental error.”77 Some of Savoie’s arguments were weak. For instance, contrary to his second argument, the B and B Commission had succeeded in drawning eight bilingual districts in New Brunswick (rcbb 1967, 107). Also, contrary to his third argument, the province’s four Conservative mp s were opposed to a province-wide bilingual district.78 And contrary to his sixth argument, Fredericton could have been included in a bilingual district; indeed, in 1961, francophones represented 10.5 per cent of the population of Sunbury County, in which Fredericton was located (107). However, only his second argument was refuted,79 and in the end, he convinced the board to recommend all of New Brunswick as a bilingual district.80 The board failed to consider the essential question raised by Neil Morrison in one of his numerous memos: did the Act permit the designation of an entire province as a bilingual district?81 The Act did permit it, but only if the provincial government signed an agreement on the matter. New Brunswick’s government expressed its approval of such a proclamation, but it was not invited by the board to negotiate a

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formal agreement. The B and B Commission had approved a single bilingual district in New Brunswick, as F.R. Scott’s dissenting statement suggested (1969a, 528), but the board did not seem aware of this. The other secondary problem faced by the board concerned the reliability of the opinions offered during the regional consultations. The members believed that they were reliable,82 but Morrison raised a serious doubt, stating that the minority leaders consulted were biased and that the “ordinary people” did not have the same desire for bilingual districts.83 His unsubstantiated objection was overruled.84 The board’s acceptance of the minority’s opinions as reliable, however, did not mean that it always agreed with them. While it often concurred with the minority’s opinions and arguments, it also adopted many decisions that went against the minority’s preferences. In the two most obvious examples, the board refused to minimize bilingual districts in northern Alberta85 and Cape Breton,86 in spite of the request by some minority members to exclude the anglophone communities as much as possible. Another example illustrates the board’s independent thinking: after agreeing to recommend a vast bilingual district in southern Saskatchewan following a meeting with local minority members,87 the board reversed its decision after hearing persuasive contrary arguments from the provincial Fransaskois association.88 These examples illustrate that local and provincial minority leaders wanted bilingual districts but did not always agree on their size and location, and that the board could thus not follow the contradictory desires of the supposedly biased – both pro and con – minority members. Finally, the board faced nine minor problems. Three were related to the statute. First, the regional consultations were complicated by the fact that the Act was not well known or understood. For instance, many minority groups thought that French-language schools would be an automatic consequence of the proclamation of a federal bilingual district.89 Second, numerous sections were vague, particularly those concerning principal offices and significant demand.90 Third, in spite of their number and variety, the five statutory administrative units were not as flexible as the board had hoped. For example, the board had to eliminate numerous communities in the Windsor (Ontario) and Port Hawkesbury (Nova Scotia) areas from their respective proposed bilingual districts, even though hundreds of francophones resided in them, because it could not trace a curved line across the various census subdivisions.91 The board members obviously forgot that section 15 (3) allowed them to recommend that the federal system undertake “administrative changes” in

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order to adapt to the geolinguistic reality of minority communities. The fourth problem stemmed from the lack of credibility of the 1961 census data. The data, for example, were nine years old and neglected the issue of language of use.92 Almost all the minority members consulted questioned their validity, since migrations and anglicization would have reduced the minority’s numbers, and census takers further underestimated them.93 Consequently, the board’s recommendations could be proven inappropriate in a few months. Fifth, the proposed changes in municipal and education borders in Ontario and Manitoba could jeopardize the board’s work.94 Sixth, the board could not obtain a definitive response from the governments of British Columbia and Quebec before the Victoria Constitutional Conference.95 The board nevertheless decided that its work was independent of constitutional negotiations.96 Moreover, the negotiations could end without results. The seventh problem was the October Crisis. Not only did it delay the board’s meeting with Bourassa, it also heightened sociolinguistic tensions. Duhamel even hinted publicly that the crisis could jeopardize the board’s work,97 but the other board members disagreed.98 The last two problems had only a trivial impact on the board’s work. First, the board, along with the federal government and the Commissioner of Official Languages, was sued by a former justice who claimed that the Act was unconstitutional (the court eventually ruled that the Act was constitutional).99 And second, sociolinguistic tensions arose in Bonnyville (Alberta) after a group of Franco-Albertans raised a sign at the city hall proclaiming the city as a bilingual district.100 Citizens of Ukrainian descent opposed the action, thus dividing the community.101 The matter came before the House of Commons when the area’s mp asked the Secretary of State Gérard Pelletier to ease the sociolinguistic tensions created by certain sections of the Official Languages Act.102 Pelletier simply responded that Bonnyville had not yet been proclaimed a bilingual district.103 In short, the board frequently had difficulty performing its straightforward tasks. And although it was often guided by the B and B report and the Official Languages Act, it had to verify the royal commission’s cornerstone theory. This theory proved valid – indeed, if nothing else, the regional consultations demonstrated the symbolic value of bilingual districts. However, the theory also proved problematic in the devilish details of its specification. The board could not simply apply statutory criteria; it also had to invent and use complementary criteria to enable a coherent application of the statutory requirements. Specifically, it had to

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invent arguments to justify the non-qualification of certain bilingual areas as bilingual districts. This was expected of the advisory board; otherwise, statisticians could have submitted to Cabinet a list of the five administrative units that met the 10 per cent criterion and let Cabinet eliminate the bilingual areas it deemed insufficiently feasible. But somehow the board neglected the minimal suggestions of the B and B commission. Indeed, the commission had strongly urged the “adoption of uniform criteria” (rcbb 1967, 85) and the exclusion of “municipalities in which the minority is below 10 per cent” (111) when specifying bilingual districts, the designation of the entire province of New Brunswick as a bilingual district (528), and specific bilingual districts in Quebec (108). Consequently, the board both faced and created political and technical problems. In particular, it did not conduct regional consultations in Quebec and made a subsequent controversial recommendation. The B and B Commission had rejected the idea of a bilingual district for the entire province of Quebec, arguing instead for the proclamation of twentyfour bilingual districts covering approximately one-tenth of the province and serving approximately 70 per cent of the provincial population and 95 per cent of Quebec’s anglophones (108). The board’s final report would deal with its problems as best as it could, although it only addressed the most significant ones and most often only in passing.

c)

The Final Report

On 19 April 1971, the Duhamel board submitted its report to the federal Cabinet.104 It recommended thirty-seven bilingual districts and presented a succinct argument in favour of the concept: “[T]he proclamation of bilingual districts, apart from leading to definite and immediate goals, will also have a symbolic value of considerable meaning, even if it is still premature to determine exactly its significance” (bdab 1971, 18). The board recommended at least one bilingual district in each province: one in Newfoundland (Port-au-Port), two in Nova Scotia (Antigonish/ Inverness/Richmond and Digby/Yarmouth), one in Prince Edward Island (Egmont), one in New Brunswick (the entire province), one in Quebec (the entire province), twelve in Ontario (Carleton, Cochrane, Glengarry, Prescott, Midland/Penetang, Renfrew/Nipissing, Russell, Stormont, Sudbury, Temiskaming, Welland/Port Colborne, and Windsor/Essex/Kent), eight in Manitoba (Ellice/Saint-Lazare, Saint-Georges/Powerview, SaintBoniface, Sainte-Rose and the school districts La Montagne, Red River, Seine, and Cheval Blanc), seven in Saskatchewan (Battleford, Assiniboia/

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Map 3.1 The thirty-seven bilingual districts recommended by the Duhamel Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, 1971 Source: Compilation of various maps in Recommendations of the Bilingual Districts Advisory Board (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971).

Willow Bunch, Gravelbourg/Shaunavon, Prince Albert, Prud’homme/ Vonda, Storthoads/Reciprocity/Antler, and Zenon Park/Arborfield), three in Alberta (Legal/Morinville/Saint-Albert, Donnelly/Falher/Girouxville/ Peace River, and Saint-Paul/Bonnyville/Lac LaBiche), and one in British Columbia (Coquitlam). The smallest bilingual district, Prudhomme/ Vonda, included 667 francophones out of 2,310 residents. The largest district was the province of Quebec, where 697,402 anglophones represented 13 percent of the 5,259,211 residents. With few exceptions, especially Quebec, the recommendations were irreproachable. Indeed, francophones represented at least 20 per cent of the population and numbered at least 5,000 in twenty-eight of the thirty-six bilingual districts outside Quebec. Map 3.1 indicates the size and location of the proposed districts.

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The report did not explain its recommendations in great detail. Its arguments, contained in less than ten pages, were not very explicit. Port-au-Port should be proclaimed a bilingual district because “life has through the years retained a certain French character” (bdab 1971, 31). One bilingual district covered all of New Brunswick so as not to overlook Fredericton and Saint John. Since the province of Quebec was “a very special case,” the report explained, “there was nothing to be gained by selecting certain geographic regions as was done in most of the other provinces of Canada” (43–4). Specific bilingual districts in Quebec “might have been both paradoxical and illusory” (44). In Ontario, where the minority is “usually concentrated in definite regions where people have already established homogenous institutions and where they evince active concern for safeguarding their own ethnic and cultural identity,” it recommended “very large bilingual districts in the north of the Province as well as in the east” but small bilingual districts in the southern half of the province (47). In Manitoba, the board decided to overlap its recommendations with established school districts because “the authorities in Manitoba took into account both ethnic and linguistic distributions” (59). Alberta and Saskatchewan, where “the minority populations are scattered in small groups,” the board preferred “to recommend a fairly large number of relatively small bilingual districts” (59). Finally, it recommended a bilingual district in Coquitlam, British Columbia, to reward “the firmness of purpose demonstrated over a period of several years by the Frenchspeaking residents of that district” (89). On a more general scale, the report insisted that census data “are indispensable but they do not tell the whole story; they are mute witnesses, they remain silent about many of the essential historical and especially sociological realities that characterize living populations” (bdab 1971, 14). Moreover, these data may be out of date. Since “population changes have inevitably taken place” since 1961, the board “preferred to follow a prudent course which would safeguard the future” by not recommending certain areas where the minority “comprised only a very small number of individuals” and, instead, by including them in “secondary recommendations” to be considered by the next advisory board (16–17). The report also noted three statutory problems. First, there exist “scarcely any federal services within certain sparsely populated bilingual districts which are situated far from large centres” (bdab 1971, 17). Second, “the large Canadian cities, particularly the provincial capitals

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[where] there lives a very active linguistic minority which strives to preserve its own culture and to improve its language,” such as SaintBoniface within the recently amalgamated City of Winnipeg, do not meet the statutory requirements to qualify as bilingual districts (19). Ignoring the provisions of section 9 (2), the board expressed the fear that this anomaly “may distort the whole functioning of bilingual districts” (20). Finally, the report drew attention to the potential “source of confusion and controversy” caused by interpreting “principal offices” (21). The board’s work officially ended after the press conference of 4 May 1971. The conference was held following the tabling of the board’s final report in the House of Commons and focused on that report. Roger Duhamel repeated that the board’s work was strictly advisory and that the federal Cabinet could accept or reject its recommendations, in part or in totality.105 He nevertheless indicated that bilingual districts contained “an indubitable symbolic value”106 that should not be neglected. Duhamel also noted with satisfaction the recent decision by the Ontario government to allocate bilingual services in both official languages in areas almost identical to the bilingual districts recommended by his board to the federal Cabinet. Premier Bill Davis had announced Ontario’s linguistic policy in the Legislative Assembly the previous day.107 The goal of the policy was “to expand the provision of bilingual services, both verbal and written, as quickly as possible.” This included official documents, recruitment of bilingual personnel, municipal services, traffic signs, and judicial services. The most important measure was the following: “[A]ll departments and agencies of the government of Ontario will be directed to give attention to the provision, wherever feasible, of a full range of bilingual services, beginning in those areas of Ontario where there are concentrations of French-speaking people.” This meant “in the counties and districts of Stormont, Glengarry, Prescott, Russell, Carleton, Nipissing, Timiskaming, Cochrane, Sudbury and Algoma [as well as the municipalities of] Penetanguishene [and] Welland and in parts of the counties of Essex and Renfrew.” Davis nevertheless took great care in not calling these areas “provincial bilingual districts”: “The government of Ontario does not believe that it will be necessary for Ontario to establish bilingual districts for provincial purposes.” Ontario thereby officially refused to implement the B and B Commission’s crucial recommendations requesting that the province of Ontario become officially bilingual (rcbb 1967, 97) and proclaim joint federalprovincial bilingual districts (110).

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th e f e d e r a l c a b i n e t ’ s e f f o r t , 1 9 7 1 – 1 9 7 2

The federal Cabinet’s own specification effort, like the board’s, was straightforward. Cabinet received the Duhamel report, then asked a committee of civil servants to analyse it and prepare a memo outlining various actions the government could take in response. After Cabinet received and analysed the bureaucrats’ report, the minister responsible consulted the Liberal caucus and the ten provincial governments, as promised during the 1969 federal-provincial conference. Cabinet then approved the proclamation of twenty-eight bilingual districts. However, an additional step – the comparison of the 1961 and 1971 census data – convinced Cabinet to put aside the Duhamel report in favour of one prepared by the second Bilingual Districts Advisory Board. The following section will detail this overview.

a)

The Initial Analysis

On 8 April 1971, eleven days before the Duhamel report was submitted to Cabinet, Pierre Trudeau asked Secretary of State Pelletier to prepare a memo to Cabinet analysing its content. Four weeks earlier, Cabinet had transferred the responsibility for bilingualism in the civil service from the Secretary of State to Treasury Board.108 Pelletier had requested the transfer because his department, unlike Treasury Board, could not impose guidelines and orders on federal departments and agencies.109 The B and B Commission, after reviewing a thorough study of bilingualism in the federal civil service and at Treasury Board (Franks 1966), had come to an identical conclusion: “Because of its role and its authority over the whole Public Service, it is particularly important for the Treasury Board to take the lead in establishing institutional bilingualism” (rcbb 1969a, 288). However, it also concluded, as had Franks (1966, 75), that the Treasury Board Secretariat (tbs) should only manage the government’s policy after it was specified by another organization (rcbb 1969a, 285). Indeed, the sociolinguistic crisis could not be handled only by the bureaucratic hierarchy of the federal government, where bilingualism was perceived as a less important qualification than bureaucratic effectiveness (rcbb 1969a, 95). Treasury Board had become the government’s management head after Parliament adopted, in 1967, the Act modifying the Financial Administration Act.110 The modifications had stemmed from the Glassco report. Treasury Board had been a special Cabinet committee comprised of five

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ministers, but its statutory authority increased considerably when it became a department in 1966.111 In fact, the establishment of the Treasury Board Secretariat, in 1966, was the key motor behind the board’s increase in power. Its management of the federal government’s human, material, and financial resources, as well as its authority to adopt regulations to ensure the effective and efficient coordination of federal department and agencies, gave Treasury Board as much power as the Cabinet’s Committee on Policy and Priorities and the Privy Council Office, the government’s policy head. And because of its Kafkaesque complexity, its administrative controls often dictated the “real” government policy (Johnson 1971; Veilleux and Savoie 1988). For those reasons, the B and B Commission recommended simultaneously that Treasury Board manage the bilingualism policy, to ensure its widespread respect throughout the federal civil service, and that it not specify and evaluate its own management of the policy (rcbb 1969a, 285). But since the commission’s recommendation for a new and independent language authority (286) was not implemented, tbs became the logical choice as the federal body responsible for the policy. Bilingual districts would suffer the consequences. Thus, on the eve of the publication of the Duhamel report, Treasury Board took over the main responsibilities of the federal government’s bilingualism policy from both the Secretary of State and the Public Service Commission. While Pelletier was still responsible for the advisory board’s work,112 this was only temporary. Once the board’s report was studied and Cabinet proclaimed the bilingual districts, the file would fall into Treasury Board’s hands for implementation. Pelletier would establish the second advisory board as a follow-up to Cabinet’s decision to shelve the Duhamel report, and his successor, Hugh Faulkner, would supervise the initial work of the second board. Faulkner would eventually hand over the complete file to tb President Jean Chrétien, after the passage of the 1973 parliamentary resolution on official languages in the public service. The Secretary of State was therefore temporarily responsible for section 9 (1) of the Official Languages Act, while tbs was responsible for section 9 (2). Since Cabinet did not proclaim any bilingual districts following the submission of the Duhamel report, the March 1971 transfer of authority would contribute to the demise of bilingual districts. Once the March 1971 fusion under tbs of the specification and implementation responsibilities for both the bilingual districts and the bilingual regions came into effect, tbs was given the opportunity to bureaucratize the symbolic cornerstone recommendation. The department

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did not pass up this opportunity. If the addition of Section 9 (2) was the first thread in the bilingual districts’ hanging rope, the second was the 4 March 1971 transfer of responsibilities to tbs. The memo to Cabinet113 on the Duhamel report was prepared by a committee of civil servants chaired by the Secretary of State’s assistant deputy minister, Max Yalden, one of the Act’s initial draftsmen. The memo concluded that “there would seem to be merit in proceeding with the establishment of the bilingual districts on the basis of the Board’s recommendations,” albeit after a thorough analysis of each recommendation. It added that Cabinet should proclaim bilingual districts “at the earliest opportunity,” specifically, “the end of July 1971.” The memo noted that this option was better than the alternative – delaying the creation of bilingual districts until after the second board performed its work based on the 1971 census data. The preferred option – immediate proclamation of the bilingual districts – had three disadvantages. First, the Duhamel recommendations relied on antiquated 1961 data. The memo noted that the governments of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island had requested that the board use the 1971 data instead. Second, the option could harm the upcoming Victoria constitutional negotiations because some provincial governments confused bilingual districts and constitutional language rights. The memo noted that the government of Quebec had requested that the board wait until the Victoria Conference before recommending any bilingual district. The committee appended François Cloutier’s letter of 19 March 1971 to Roger Duhamel indicating his government’s position on the board’s recommendations. And third, a few provincial governments might oppose bilingual districts in their backyard. The memo noted that the government of British Columbia categorically opposed the creation of any bilingual district on its turf. It nevertheless indicated that the other provinces were in favour of the recommended bilingual districts on their soil. The alternative to the immediate proclamation of bilingual districts presented even more serious political and administrative inconveniences. Delaying the creation of bilingual districts would embarrass Cabinet by demonstrating its hesitation or procrastination. The Act was already two years old and waiting for the availability of 1971 data would mean at least two more years before any bilingual districts could be established. Furthermore, a delay would demonstrate that Cabinet had erred on one of two fronts, either in its statutory verbiage and public declarations indicating that it would use the 1961 data or in its

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hasty creation of the first board before the 1971 census data were available. And finally, abandoning the preferred option at this stage could seriously undermine Cabinet’s credibility and its entire language policy if the 1971 data were to prove to be not significantly different from the 1961 data. The memo, however, did not recommend the immediate proclamation of bilingual districts. It only recommended that the government receive the Duhamel report and table it in the House with few comments, and that “measures be taken to ensure that when the Report is tabled, accurate information is made available to press and public on the Board’s recommendations.” It also recommended that the report be scrutinized by a committee of officials “to determine whether all of the districts proposed are well founded and recommendations be made by the Secretary of State on the extent to which the districts proposed by the Board might appropriately be proclaimed,” and that “a Bilingual Districts Advisory Board be appointed in accordance with the provisions of the Official Languages Act early in 1972 to develop proposals for bilingual districts based on 1971 census.” The memo also asked Cabinet to discuss three related issues: (1) the perennial status of bilingual districts; (2) the controversial recommendations concerning the Coquitlam bilingual district and province-wide districts in Quebec and New Brunswick (the memo noted that Bertrand had approved a single bilingual district in Quebec); (3) the financial implications of hiring additional staff to serve the minorities in the bilingual districts until the regular staff were sufficiently trained in their second language to ensure adequate bilingual services. The memo was submitted to Pelletier on 14 April 1971. Six days later, it came under the scrutiny of Cabinet’s committee on Science, Culture and Information. The committee accepted all four recommendations and asked the Privy Council to submit the memo to Cabinet for approval.114 On 29 April, Cabinet studied the Secretary of State’s memo and the committee’s accompanying request. Cabinet unanimously accepted the recommendations.115 The government then consulted the premiers, tabled the report in the House, and set up an interdepartmental committee to study each recommendation.

b)

Consulting the Provincial Governments

As promised by Trudeau during the February 1969 constitutional conference, his government consulted the ten provincial governments on

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the recommendations of the Bilingual Districts Advisory Board. On 30 April 1971, Trudeau sent a copy of the Duhamel report to all ten premiers and asked them in the accompanying letter to respond with their “comments on the recommendations contained in the Board’s Report with particular reference to their implications”116 in their respective province. Three premiers responded within a week. Newfoundland’s Joey Smallwood approved the recommendation for his province but feared that some federal civil servants could lose their jobs in the area because of their unilingualism and that his government would be unable to provide public services in French in the area.117 Alberta’s Harry Strom complained that the absence of Albertans on the board and the board’s refusal to hold public hearings demonstrated unwarranted federal intervention in provincial affairs.118 And Prince Edward Island’s Alex Campbell requested an immediate meeting between his civil servants and their federal counterparts to determine the potential impact of the board’s recommendation to make Egmont a bilingual district.119 The other premiers did not respond to Trudeau’s request.120

c)

Reactions to the Duhamel Report

The federal government tabled the Duhamel report in the House on 4 May 1971.121 Reactions to the report were varied. “Most leaders favor bilingual districts,” concluded the Montreal Star.122 The premiers of New Brunswick and Ontario approved of the board’s recommendations.123 So did the minority francophone press throughout Canada.124 But the report did not receive unanimous support, especially in the House of Commons, where opposition mp s criticized a number of specific recommendations. One mp argued that no bilingual districts should be proclaimed in Port-au-Port because the “very small group of people who live in that district who have been assimilated over the years … no longer aspired to a distinct culture or anything of this nature.”125 An Acadian mp from Nova Scotia added that bilingual districts were ghettos that were opposed by “the majority of Acadians” in his riding.126 Moreover, the report’s opponents were very vociferous, especially those in Quebec, where the recommendation making a bilingual district out of the entire province was soundly criticized. Numerous labour groups chastised the Duhamel Board and the Trudeau government for forcing Québécois to choose between assimilation and separation.127

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The Fédération des travailleurs du Québec (ftq) called the bilingual districts a “powder keg,” the Duhamel report “an absurdity,” and the recommendation to make the entire province a bilingual district “the worst insult to Québécois” since the “Conquest” of 1763.128 The ftq added that such a recommendation was especially difficult to bear because the federal government was led by a prime minister “with a French name.”129 Parti québécois leader René Lévesque called bilingual districts “absurd,” “degrading,” and “unjustified” “reserves” for francophones outside Quebec,130 although he conceded that Montreal justified such a proclamation.131 Other separatists chastised the federal government for adopting a sociolinguistic policy favouring the equality of the French and English language in Quebec at a time when the provincial government was adopting a sociolinguistic policy favouring the former.132 The Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste stated that Quebec should be proclaimed a “district français,” but conceded that bilingual services should be available in certain areas “where the anglophone population is sufficiently dense to justify it.”133 For its part, the Bourassa government simply stated in the National Assembly that bilingual districts must be considered in the broader context of the more important constitutional negotiations on language rights and the province’s sociolinguistic policy.134 It added that institutional bilingualism already existed in Quebec, thus making bilingual districts superfluous. According to François Cloutier, bilingual districts would not change anything in Quebec, except to provide a symbolic “institutional consecration to a factual situation,”135 which did not seem too important to the Bourassa government. An article in Le Devoir stated that the Duhamel report did not recommend any significant changes to existing practice, and an editorial argued that only Montreal justified a bilingual district.136 The editorial suggested that the federal government should wait until the province adopted its own sociolinguistic policy before determining what, if any, bilingual districts were warranted. La Presse criticized the “absurdity” of the federal sociolinguistic policy underlying the Duhamel report.137 Its editorial of 7 May 1971 stated that while Montreal is bilingual, the rest of Quebec is “a unilingual-French milieu.”138 It was thus ridiculous to extrapolate the situation in Montreal to all of Quebec.139 A cartoon accompanied the critical editorial.140 Three other reactions to making all of Quebec a single bilingual district deserve attention. First, columnist Charles Lynch called the recommendation a political “cop-out.”141 The board should have respected

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the wishes of the B and B Commission and used the same criteria in Quebec as elsewhere. Second, B and B Commission member Paul Lacoste condemned the recommendation because it would perpetuate the inequality between the French and English language and culture throughout the country. Almost all of the francophone areas of the country would be bilingual while the vast majority of Canada’s anglophone areas would be unilingual English.142 He added that this “provocation” went against the wishes of the B and B Commission, which refused to “impose bilingualism where it was not necessary.”143 It was to avoid this inequality that the commission wanted French to be the dominant language in Quebec and recommended that only a few areas of Quebec should be proclaimed bilingual districts.144 And third, Pelletier made a number of contradictory statements to the media concerning the Duhamel report and the federal government’s subsequent efforts. He initially supported the controversial recommendation, arguing that there was nothing to be gained by removing the acquired rights granted to Quebec anglophones,145 but then rejected this “nonsensical” recommendation: “I don’t believe in gestures which don’t make much sense.”146 Moreover, he had initially refused to delay the proclamation of the initial bilingual districts until after the 1971 census data were considered,147 but then argued that it was necessary to wait because “the new census could change the data considerably.”148 He ultimately stated that the government would not wait for the 1971 census data, since the delay would be too long between the adoption of the Official Languages Act and the proclamation of the initial bilingual districts.149 However, in the meantime, “the government can still decide in what areas it can provide its services ‘in the language of the customer’ without formally designated bilingual districts.”150

d)

The Victoria Constitutional Conference

After three years of federal-provincial consultation, the stage was set for the Victoria Conference. From 14 to 16 June 1971, the prime minister and the ten premiers met in British Columbia’s capital city to repatriate and modify the Constitution. They were ready, willing and able to adopt an amending formula, redistribute some powers from the federal to the provincial spheres, and insert a charter of rights. The Charter would recognize the Canadian duality and guarantee bilingual services, which would be similar to those recommended by the B and B Commission. The federal proposal paid homage to the commission by

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admitting that the linguistic rights it was seeking “follow the general pattern of, and do not derogate from, the language rights recommended by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.”151 The federal proposal nevertheless shied away from reproducing verbatim the B and B recommendations for two reasons. First, the Trudeau government did not think it was feasible to translate all of the commission’s constitutional and legislative requirements “into a declaration of individual rights.”152 Second, it did not want to intervene in provincial affairs by proposing that “bilingual services also be provided by local governments in bilingual districts.”153 Such reticence here, however, did not prevent the Trudeau government from proposing linguistic rights in other provincial matters, such as education. Indeed, the federal government was able to specify 10 per cent when dealing with provincial services in a constitutional declaration of rights, but was somehow unable to translate “substantial proportion” into 10 per cent for identical constitutional purposes when dealing with other provincial and federal services.154 In spite of this incoherence, the territorial principle was explicitly espoused by the Trudeau government in June 1971. Administrative bilingual districtification would thus be one of the basic elements of the Constitution, but the bilingual districts concept would only be recognized by the Official Languages Act. Trudeau proposed five specific individual language rights: (1) the right to use either French or English in the Houses of Parliament of Canada and in the provincial legislatures; (2) the right to have access to records, journals, and enactments of the Parliament of Canada, the legislatures of New Brunswick, Ontario, and Quebec, and the legislatures of any province in which each language is the mother tongue of at least 10 per cent of the population or where both languages are declared official; (3) the right to use his or her mother tongue when before the courts; (4) the right to “instruction in publicly supported schools in areas where the language of instruction of his choice is the language of instruction of choice of a sufficient number of persons to justify the provision of the necessary facilities”; and (5) the right to communicate in his or her mother tongue “with the head office of every department and agency of the Government of Canada, with the head office of every department and agency of the governments of New Brunswick, Ontario and Quebec, with the head office of every department and agency of the government of any province in which each language is the mother tongue of at least ten per cent of the population, with the head office of every department and agency of the government of any province in which the legislature

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had declared that English and French are the official languages of the province, and with the principal offices of every department and agency of the Government of Canada, or the principal offices of every department and agency of the government of a province, in any area where a substantial proportion of the population has the language of his choice as its mother tongue.”155 Individual rights did not prevent the establishment of bilingual districts. On the contrary, they depended on that cornerstone. Without peers in the community, a person could claim individual language rights but could not exercise them. In other words, Trudeau’s proposal may have neglected collective rights but it conceded that individual rights could only be exercised collectively. Trudeau noted that bilingual districts were “not referred to as such in this proposition,” but added that the “general principle of the ‘substantial proportion’” that was stated in the paragraph meant the same thing.156 He added that “a constitutional declaration of rights may not be able to go any farther in attempting to provide for the mechanics of applying the basic principle.”157 In other words, bilingual districts and all other means were too specific to be included in a more generic constitutional bill of rights. Their importance would nevertheless be ensured by subordinate legislation. The Victoria Charter that was eventually adopted by Trudeau and the ten premiers did not provide as many or as significant rights as Trudeau had proposed.158 It recognized Canada’s duality, but many premiers had rejected some elements of the federal proposal. The premiers of Alberta, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia, for example, refused to let elected representatives use French in their provincial legislature, and only the provincial courts of Quebec, Newfoundland, and New Brunswick would allow proceedings in French. Bilingual public services would be provided by “the head or central office of every department and agency of the Government of Canada and of the Governments of the Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland.” Article 17 entrenched federal bilingual districtification in the constitution: “A person has the right to the use of the official language of his choice in communications between him and every principal office of the departments and agencies of the Government of Canada that are located in an area where a substantial proportion of the population has the official language of his choice as its mother tongue, but the Parliament of Canada may define the limits of such areas and what constitutes a substantial proportion of the population for the purposes of this Article.” These limits were already defined in the federal Official Languages Act.

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Although there were variations, the Charter resembled the B and B Commission proposals. The sociolinguistic crisis provoked by Quebec’s quiet revolution seemed finally about to be settled, in spite of differences that persisted, such as the federal government’s symmetrical approach, Quebec’s wish for the decentralization of powers so that it could more effectively protect the French language and culture, and Quebec’s insistence that biculturalism was as important as bilingualism. The euphoria was short-lived. One week after the successful meeting, Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa announced that his government rejected the Victoria agreement. Quebec wanted more control over social programs, specifically “the power to limit the authority of the Federal Government to make income security payments such as old age pensions and family allowance.”159 The constitutional negotiations crumbled. They would only reopen after the Parti québécois won electoral power in November 1976. And they would consume five more years before bearing fruit. On 5 November 1981, the governments of Ottawa and nine of the ten provinces (Quebec refused) agreed to repatriate the bna Act to Canada, agreed on an amending formula, and agreed to include a charter of rights and freedoms in the new constitution.160 This agreement became the Constitutional Act of 18 April 1982.161 By then, Quebec had lost its constitutional veto power, had not obtained any more control over social programs, and had failed to gain any of the powers it had agreed to in Victoria. Had Robert Bourassa and his Cabinet colleagues foreseen the failed attempts to modify the 1982 Constitution to officially reinsert Quebec into the Canadian fold, they would undoubtedly have enthusiastically accepted the Victoria agreement of 1971. Quebec, the francophone minorities outside that province, and the entire country missed a golden opportunity in June 1971. The failure of the Victoria Conference meant business as usual for the bilingual districts. Indeed, the cornerstone recommendation was now the key program in effect within the federal sphere, complemented by the new office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, language training for federal civil servants, and federal assistance for minority language education. The requests by the governments of British Columbia and Quebec to delay the proclamation of bilingual districts until the conclusion of the constitutional negotiations were no longer valid. The Trudeau Cabinet now had no other choice but to turn its immediate attention to the proclamation of bilingual districts.

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The Final Analysis

Cabinet asked the Secretary of State, on 29 April 1971, to establish an interdepartmental committee to “determine whether all of the districts proposed are well founded.”162 This was in accord with the second of four recommendations made by the committee of civil servants established by Pelletier at Trudeau’s request after Trudeau received the Duhamel report. Max Yalden chaired this second committee of civil servants, and Neil Morrison was one of its members. The committee immediately set out to determine which of the thirty-seven bilingual districts recommended by the Duhamel Board were “most in keeping with the spirit of the government’s bilingualism policies,”163 and to eliminate those that could “give rise to serious political controversies.” Their report offered a simple solution: to apply to the initial list the more stringent demolinguistic criterion of 25 per cent. Although the rejection of a province-wide bilingual district in Quebec meant the addition of many bilingual districts to the list, the new criterion reduced the final number to twenty-eight. There were nine in Quebec: Île de Montréal/Île Jésus, Chambly, Châteauguay, Stanstead, Vaudreuil, Argenteuil, Huntingdon, Brome, and Pontiac (nobody noticed that anglophones represented 19 rather than 25 per cent of the population in Chambly). In Ontario, the number dropped from twelve to eight: Carleton, Cochrane, Glengarry, Prescott, Russell, Stormont, Sudbury, and Temiskaming. Instead of eight, Manitoba had five: Saint-Boniface and the school divisions of La Montagne, La Seine, La Prairie du Cheval Blanc, and La Rivière Rouge. Saskatchewan lost five of its seven bilingual districts, leaving Gravelbourg/Shaunavon and Prince Albert (nobody noticed that Prince Albert’s francophones represented only 17 per cent of the local population). Peace River was the only one of the three Albertan bilingual districts to meet the more stringent criterion. Nova Scotia lost its Cape Breton bilingual district; only Digby/Yarmouth survived the cut. Nothing changed in New Brunswick, where the entire province was once again recommended as a single bilingual district, or in Prince Edward Island, where Egmont remained a bilingual district. Both Newfoundland and British Columbia lost their single bilingual district. The committee recommended that the second advisory board reconsider the excluded areas in light of the 1971 census data and that, until this study was done, the federal government allocate its bilingual services within these rejected areas according to the significant demand provisions stipulated in section 9 (2).

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In its report, the committee gave five reasons why immediate proclamation of the twenty-eight obvious bilingual districts was the preferred option: (1) “the government would be publicly manifesting its concern to implant bilingualism without delay”; (2) it “could avoid establishing bilingual districts which, over the long term, would not truly reflect the existence of minority groups using either of the official languages”; (3) it would “be possible to reconsider the advisability of proclaiming bilingual districts in Newfoundland and to determine the appropriateness of creating all the bilingual districts recommended in a number of other provinces,” namely Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, Alberta, and Quebec; (4) “the government could allow the new Board to determine, on the basis of the 1971 census, where most of the bilingual districts should be created, thus establishing a firm foundation for true, longterm bilingualism”; and (5) “it would provide an opportunity to consider appropriate measures for deriving greater profit from the government’s language teaching programme by increasing the possibilities for persons who have become bilingual to make greater use of their linguistic knowledge.” The report nevertheless presented three other options for Cabinet consideration: (1) “accept the [Duhamel] Report in its entirety now and … proclaim each of the districts proposed by the Board”; (2) “reject the Report and its recommendations as such”; and (3) “decide not to proclaim the bilingual districts until the new Board can undertake a new, detailed study based on statistics from the 1971 census and, in the meantime, take appropriate steps to ensure bilingual services wherever there is a sufficient demand for them.” Accepting the Duhamel report would demonstrate the government’s willingness to implement its sociolinguistic policy. However, this first option could also “compromise the very effects of the government’s bilingualism policy” by establishing bilingual districts that no longer reflected the geolinguistic reality. This problem would be compounded by the fact that such dubious bilingual districts would be permanent. In other words, such proclamations could stir political controversy. The second option (reject the Duhamel report) presented two advantages: it would “satisfy the hopes of some of the provinces and thus somewhat attenuate a number of political disputes,” and it would not hinder federal efforts to allocate bilingual services according to “any other measure,” such as section 9 (2). But the second option also presented three inconveniences: (1) it could be “interpreted as a rejection by the government of one of the chief recommendations of the Report

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of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission and, more broadly, of its very bilingualism policy”; (2) the government could be perceived as wasteful and badly managed if it discarded a report after so much time and money had been spent on its preparation and publication; and (3) it “would produce great disappointment among a number of minority groups for whom the creation of bilingual districts promised a measure of protection of their linguistic rights.” The third option (wait for the 1971 census) would avoid the proclamation of permanent bilingual districts that no longer met the statutory criteria and avoid the opposition of some provincial governments. However, it would present “a major drawback”: “it could not help but lessen the impact of the government’s implementation of its bilingualism policy and be interpreted as hesitancy on the part of the government, particularly in cases where the proclamation of bilingual districts would bring immediate benefits.” The delay would also mean that at least four years would pass before bilingual districts would be established. The report of the second committee was signed off by Pelletier on 14 July 1971 as a memo to Cabinet. It included a map of the thirtyseven bilingual districts recommended by the advisory board and a list of the twenty-eight bilingual districts that met the 25 per cent criterion.

f)

The Initial Decision

On 27 July 1971, the Cabinet Committee on Science, Culture and Information mulled over the Secretary of State’s memo on bilingual districts. Pelletier, the chair of the committee, explained why the government could not accept the Duhamel report as it was, reject it altogether, or delay action on the issue.164 First, some Duhamel recommendations were unacceptable. Second, many minority members would not let the government delay action any longer. And third, the government had known full well, when it adopted the Act in 1969 and when it established the advisory board in 1971, that the 1961 data were old and would cause problems. Delaying the proclamation of bilingual districts until 1973, at the earliest, and allocating bilingual services by administrative fiat according to section 9 (2) of the Act, therefore, would boost the Opposition’s claim that bilingual districts were not necessary. In Pelletier’s opinion, the cornerstone was still the best solution. Cabinet had to proclaim bilingual districts immediately to show its resolve, but should proclaim only those districts that qualified without question to show that it was acting with prudence and intelligence.

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The Cabinet committee adopted three recommendations for Cabinet’s consideration.165 First, it asked Cabinet to consult the provincial governments on the proclamation of bilingual districts according to a more stringent demolinguistic criterion and the allocation of federal services in the major urban centres. Second, it recommended that the minority rate be reduced from 25 to 20 per cent of the regional population and asked the Secretary of State to reconfigure the list of bilingual districts accordingly. And third, the committee recommended that Cabinet decide if the provincial consultations should be conducted by the administrative hierarchy of the Privy Council Office (pco) or the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State would subsequently present a new memo to Cabinet describing the results of the provincial consultations and the application of the new demolinguistic criterion. On 29 July 1971, Cabinet considered the Secretary of State’s memo and the accompanying recommendations made by its Committee on Science, Culture and Information.166 Cabinet accepted all three recommendations and decided that Pelletier, rather than pco officials, should consult the provincial governments. It also decided to establish another interdepartmental committee on the issue to reconfigure the bilingual districts according to the 20 per cent ratio. Pelletier’s consultation with the provincial governments lasted from November 1971 until mid-January 1972.167

g)

Cabinet’s Ultimate Decision

Gérard Pelletier’s subsequent memo, submitted to Cabinet on 24 January 1972,168 recommended that “Cabinet give approval for the establishment of the federal bilingual districts” and ask the Secretary of State “to prepare a submission to the Governor-in-Council for an Order-in-Council authorizing the proclamation of those districts.” The recommended bilingual districts in his memo, which were based on the 20 per cent ratio, were almost identical to those based on the more stringent 25 per cent ratio. Once again, Newfoundland and British Columbia were bypassed, the entire province of New Brunswick was recommended as a single bilingual district, and the two bilingual districts in Saskatchewan were kept intact. Prince Edward Island and Alberta each kept their bilingual district, although these were slightly reduced in size for no apparent reason. And Ontario maintained eight bilingual districts, although Nipissing replaced Carleton. But there were now three bilingual districts in Nova Scotia instead of one, and eight bilingual districts in Quebec instead of nine.

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Montreal was excluded from the final list, in spite of easily meeting the 20 per cent criterion; the memo argued that the metropolitan area could easily justify bilingual federal services under the less controversial section 9 (2) until the 1971 census data became available, at which time the exact size, number, and location of bilingual districts in the urban area could be determined. “Significant demand” would also be used for the other major urban areas and in the rest of the country. Montreal and the province of Quebec received special consideration in Pelletier’s memo. Although the Quebec government accepted that the eight counties outside Montreal “should be proclaimed bilingual districts for federal purposes,” it stated that “Montreal posed much more difficult problems and that further consideration would be required in an effort to find a reasonably satisfactory and acceptable solution.” The memo presented four options to Cabinet. First, declare Montreal as a major urban centre under section 9 (2). This represented “the simplest solution and in practice the one least likely to create administrative difficulties or political problems.” The memo added that section 9 (2) “would provide a firmer guarantee of services in the area in both languages … by virtue of the size of the official language minority there.” Second, proclaim the entire metropolitan area as a single bilingual district. Third, cut up the area into a number of bilingual districts. And fourth, combine the first and third options so that section 9 (2) would apply “to the whole area with a limited number of selected areas or municipalities to be officially proclaimed bilingual districts.” Pelletier’s memo outlined the reactions he received from the other provincial governments. Most were very positive. The governments of Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Manitoba approved of the bilingual districts recommended for their province and the designation of their urban centres under section 9 (2). Nova Scotia and Manitoba even suggested adding excluded bilingual districts to the final list. The government of British Columbia agreed with the designation of Vancouver as an urban centre under section 9 (2), while the Newfoundland representatives did not comment on the designation of St John’s as such. The governments of Saskatchewan and Alberta “did not oppose bilingual districts” but expressed “reservations” on their size and number in their province. In addition, they “were concerned about expectations for other services which bilingual districts would arouse and which would be difficult for the provincial government to meet.” The government of Nova Scotia expressed similar concerns about such symbolic “obligations.”

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Pelletier’s memo made six other recommendations. First, Cabinet should “declare November 1st, 1972 as the date on which federal bilingual districts will become effective.” This would avoid any confusion with the work of the second advisory board, which should be established soon afterwards. Second, Cabinet should “agree that a policy announcement in the House of Commons concerning the establishment of bilingual districts and the provision of bilingual services in major centres be made by the Prime Minister after the approval of the Orderin-Council, to be followed as soon as possible thereafter by the publication of the official proclamation of districts in the Canada Gazette.” Third, “a programme of publicity [should] be undertaken at the time of the policy announcement in the House to acquaint the general public with the location of the districts and the list of major centres and the implications of these decisions for provision of services in both official languages.” Fourth, “prior to the public announcement the President of the Treasury Board [should] acquaint the staff associations with the government’s intentions and explain to them the implications for public servants in the regions concerned.” Fifth, Cabinet should inform the provincial governments of the final decision. And sixth, Cabinet should order federal departments and agencies to “provide bilingual services in the major centres” according to section 9 (2). Pelletier added that the Liberal caucus should be informed of Cabinet’s decision before the official announcement in the House. On 4 February 1972, the Cabinet Committee on Science, Culture and Information reviewed the Pelletier memo. After a brief discussion on the exclusion of Montreal, the committee decided to meet again on the issue the following week.169 On 9 February, the committee decided to present nine recommendations to Cabinet and ask it to discuss the political consequences of the proclamation.170 Seven of the nine recommendations were verbatim reproductions of the seven in Pelletier’s memo. The first new recommendation (“that further consideration should be given to proclaiming the municipality of metropolitan Montreal as a federal bilingual district”) suggested that many members of Cabinet wanted to proclaim Montreal as a bilingual district in February 1972. The second (“that the approved federal bilingual districts should become effective twelve months after the official date of proclamation”) meant that the implementation of bilingual districts would be delayed until March 1973, at the earliest. One month later, Cabinet discussed the memo and its committee’s recommendations.171 In his oral presentation, Pelletier spoke of the

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provincial governments’ positive response to the proclamation of twenty-eight bilingual districts based on the 20 per cent criterion. He added that each bilingual district would respect the statutory criterion of 10 per cent after the 1971 census. His initial list would thus be beyond reproach. He also discussed the timing of the proclamation, rejecting the idea of waiting until the 1971 census data were known or the 1972 federal election campaign was over, arguing that “the government would be worse off if no proclamation were made.” Cabinet should therefore proclaim bilingual districts as soon as possible. The timing of the proclamation was one of the two issues debated by Cabinet on 9 March 1972. Some ministers agreed with Pelletier, arguing that the alternative would delay the proclamation of bilingual districts until 1974. In their view, an immediate proclamation would show the government’s resolve and thus increase its credibility. Others countered that an immediate proclamation would confuse the public in every region of the country and enable people to accuse the government of rushing things. They referred their colleagues to the opinion of the Commissioner of Official Languages, Keith Spicer, who believed that the public’s most serious concern in regard to the federal policy was its overzealous implementation. In the opinion of these ministers, it would be better to rely on section 9 (2) until the 1971 census data were available and the second advisory board had performed its work. They added that it would be dangerous to proclaim permanent bilingual districts in Windsor, for example, where the francophones probably no longer represented 10 per cent of the population. No one pointed out to them that Windsor was not one of the twenty-eight bilingual districts being considered for proclamation. In fact, Windsor was included among the seventeen cities designated as urban centres to be served by the federal government in both official languages under section 9 (2) because such areas did not meet the 10 per cent criterion. The second issue debated by Cabinet was the exclusion of Montreal from the list of bilingual districts. Some ministers disagreed with the exclusion, arguing that the entire province of Quebec, much like New Brunswick, should be designated a single bilingual district. Others supported a bilingual district in Montreal, since almost half a million anglophones lived throughout the metropolitan area. They explained that there was a significant difference between Quebec and New Brunswick because the latter’s premier agreed with a province-wide bilingual district, while the government of Quebec opposed the idea. These ministers

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added that, according to the Act, it was impossible for the federal government to proclaim an entire province without the expressed written consent of the provincial government concerned. Not a single minister argued against a bilingual district in the Montreal area. In the end, Cabinet simply resolved to study the issue further. The ministers asked Pelletier to study the efforts undertaken by the Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs to establish an administrative system similar to bilingual districts, to think of the advantages and inconveniences of establishing a second advisory board to start working immediately on the 1971 census data, and to harmonize the recommendations concerning Quebec and New Brunswick as much as possible. This latter could be performed under three options: (1) the “significant demand” stipulation in section 9 (2); (2) the proclamation of both provinces in their entirety; and (3) the proclamation of specific bilingual districts within each province. Two months passed before Cabinet resumed its deliberations on bilingual districts.172 Pelletier initiated the discussions of 5 May 1972 by informing his colleagues that the members of the Liberal caucus, whom he recently consulted, strongly insisted on an immediate proclamation. In their opinion, Pelletier explained, any negative reaction to the proclamation of bilingual districts would not be as bad as the uncertainty stemming from no proclamation. The prime minister informed Cabinet that the pco had received a copy of the 1971 census data on language of use, and that these data invalidated many of the thirty-seven bilingual districts recommended under the 10 per cent criterion. Pelletier responded to this by telling Cabinet that none of the twenty-eight bilingual districts he was recommending under the 20 per cent criterion would be put in doubt by the 1971 data, even if the data on language of use rather than data on statutory mother tongue were used. Cabinet nevertheless decided to postpone its final decision until its next meeting. In the meantime, Pelletier consulted his civil servants on the validity of the twenty-eight bilingual districts according to the 1971 census data. On 11 May 1972, Pelletier informed his peers that his civil servants had calculated that “considerable changes” had occurred between 1961 and 1971,173 and that even some of the twenty-eight bilingual districts recommended on the basis of the 20 per cent criterion no longer qualified. Pelletier concluded that the government could not proceed as planned, even if this meant that five years would pass between the adoption of the Official Languages Act and the implementation of its cornerstone. His colleagues agreed and adopted the following decision:

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In the light of the changed situation revealed by the 1971 census, the Secretary of State should take no action in regard to the existing recommendations for proclamation of federal bilingual districts based on the 1961 census, but should proceed immediately with the issue of a press release describing in appropriate terms the changed situation and announcing the government’s intention to proceed at the earliest date possible with the establishment of a new bilingual districts’ advisory board in accordance with Section 14 of the Official Languages Act.

Pelletier issued the press release on 15 May 1972.174 Pelletier’s officials had overestimated the impact of the 1971 data. The changes were not considerable, as the Fox Advisory Board would later demonstrate (bdab 1975, 19). Only two of the bilingual districts on the final list no longer qualified, Chambly (Québec) and Prince Albert (Saskatchewan). As we have seen, both areas should not have been on the final list at all, as they did not meet the 20 per cent criterion. It would have nevertheless been unlikely that anyone would have questioned the proclamation of a bilingual district in Chambly, because the anglophone population increased by 24 per cent (from 35,164 to 43,743) between 1961 and 1971, making it the third most minoritypopulated bilingual district on Pelletier’s list. Bilingual districts suffered a serious setback on 11 May 1972. Federal ministers and officials have admitted that Cabinet would have proclaimed the twenty-six viable bilingual districts – if not all twenty-eight – in May 1972 had the ministers not been told that “considerable changes” had made them unviable.175 The civil servants’ error had gone unnoticed by the Secretary of State, pco officials responsible for proofreading memos to Cabinet, members of the Committee on Science, Culture and Information, and members of Cabinet, in spite of numerous revisions and meetings. Faced with apparently significant statistical changes, Cabinet opted to wait and ensure that the minority in the initial list of bilingual districts would represent at least 10 per cent of the regional population after 1971. The second board’s recommendations, Cabinet hoped, would be irreproachable. The board would not only have more up-to-date data, but could also compare these with the 1961 data. It could even compare data on mother tongue and language of use. And it would benefit from the first board’s experience. Finally, naming members of the first board to the second board would ensure that it did not have to start from scratch. A third thread was woven into the program’s hanging rope. The six-year hiatus between the adoption of the Official Languages Act and the publication of the Fox report would not in itself be detrimental to

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bilingual districts. Indeed, the federal government still promised to proclaim approximately thirty bilingual districts when it tabled the second board’s report in the House of Commons in November 1975. But the delay would allow another thread to intertwine with the hanging rope. Cabinet’s refusal to proclaim bilingual districts and its decision to allocate federal services in both official languages in the bilingual areas and the major urban centres of the country forced Treasury Board to establish a bureaucratic and administrative bilingual districtification system based on section 9 (2). This would ultimately prove fatal to the symbolic and adaptive bilingual districts, because the bilingual regions created by tbs while it waited for bilingual districts to be proclaimed eventually replaced the bilingual districts they were supposed to complement. The Secretary of State’s transfer of responsibility for bilingualism in the civil service to Treasury Board, on 4 March 1971, compounded by Cabinet’s delay in proclaiming an initial list of bilingual districts on 11 May 1972, and its preference, in the meantime, for an allocation system based on significant demand, would lead to the tbs deviation. This is the ironic fate that awaited the bilingual districts when the Fox Board was created in May 1972.

chapter four

Policy Specification: The Second Effort

The second effort was supposed to take advantage of the first advisory board’s work and the new census data to produce more robust recommendations in a short period. But it took the second board three years to submit a report that in the end would also collect dust in the National Archives. The problems encountered and created by the Fox Board between June 1972 and October 1975 are the focus of this chapter’s first main section. The second describes Cabinet’s specification efforts between November 1975 and December 1976.

1

th e f o x b o a r d , 1 9 7 2 – 1 9 7 5

On 25 May 1972, Cabinet approved the list of appointments to the second Bilingual Districts Advisory Board. Four members had been on the first board: Paul Fox, Harry Hickman, Alfred Monnin, and Adélard Savoie. The six new members were Léopold Lamontagne, professor of French in Ottawa; Father Albert Régimbald from Sudbury; Jane Carrothers, a Calgary teacher; Eleanor Duckworth, a pedagogical psychologist from Halifax; William Mackey, a Université Laval professor of sociolinguistics; and Yvonne Raymond, the director of the Montrealbased Fédération des oeuvres de charité canadienne-française. Order-inCouncil 1972–1125 called on Paul Fox to chair the board.1 Neil Morrison and Roland Morency returned, respectively, as secretary and administrative officer. They were joined by eight other

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employees: a researcher (Donald Cartwright), a statistician, a cartographer, an administrative assistant, an assistant to the secretary, two typists, and one messenger. The second board refused to follow the beaten path. Instead of using the first board’s analysis, it revisited all the regions of the country where the minority had represented at least 10 per cent of the population in 1971 and adopted its own subjective specification criteria to eliminate unviable areas. It thus rejected the Secretary of State’s request simply to revise the first report according to the 1971 data. The board also spent a considerable amount of time debating the “Quebec problem.” And its report was more detailed in the hope that it would not collect dust like the Duhamel report. Indeed, at the request of the federal government, the board produced a voluminous report. Finally, while the first board avoided as much as possible external events beyond its control, such as the build-up to the Victoria Conference, the second board embraced most of these events, in particular Quebec’s Bill-22. All this would prove futile; its report suffered the same fate as its predecessor.

a)

The Initial Analysis and Consultations

The board spent its first four meetings analysing census data and related reports, reviewing proceedings in the House and the parliamentary committee, and meeting with key federal civil servants. At its first meeting, on 28 June 1972, the board was told by Secretary of State officials Jules Léger and Max Yalden that census data would not be available before the fall.2 While the Secretary of State no longer expected the board to produce its report before June 1973, Léger and Yalden insisted that the board take advantage of the first board’s endeavour.3 At the same meeting, the justice department’s legal counsel, T. Brad Smith, asked the board to define “principal offices” and take into consideration sections 15 (3) and 9 (2) in order to specify bilingual districts that were acceptable and useful.4 Smith added that the first board’s report was in great part modified by the federal Cabinet because of the recommendations making the entire provinces of Quebec and New Brunswick single bilingual districts. Smith concluded that “the same purpose could be achieved by naming individually in a proclamation all the census divisions or all the federal or provincial electoral districts in the province which together comprise the whole of the territory of New Brunswick.”5 He also told the board that Cabinet

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had refused to proclaim the whole of Quebec as a single bilingual district but had accepted the same recommendation for New Brunswick. At this first meeting, the board faced a serious dilemma:6 should the members start anew or simply revise, as Secretary of State officials suggested, the Duhamel report according to the 1971 data? In particular, should they revisit the seventy-two regions or save their time? Some members, notably those who had sat on the first board, argued that revisiting the regions would waste resources because the data would not change the minority’s opinion within eighteen months and it would be impossible to conduct such regional consultations and also write the report within the one-year time frame requested by the Secretary of State. They were willing to reconsider the census data but not the regional consultations. The others disagreed, William Mackey arguing that a new census required a clean slate. In the end, the board let the members from each province decide which areas, if any, they should visit to conduct their statutory business. The board then embarked on a round of consultations that would seek feedback not only from minority members, majority members, federal mp s, and provincial governments, but also from experts and stakeholders. Indeed, 800 people would be consulted by the Fox Board, twice as many as by the Duhamel Board. The Fox Board visited almost every bilingual region of the country that the Duhamel board had visited, visiting seventy three bilingual areas between 13 November 1972 and 8 November 1973 and consulting 650 minority members, 100 majority members, and 47 members of Parliament. The new board members also visited regions that had been neglected during the first effort, especially in Quebec. On the downside, two members of the first board – Adélard Savoie and Alfred Monnin – refused to repeat their consultations in New Brunswick and Manitoba, respectively, but this did not hamper the board’s work. As they had done during the first board’s visits, minority members expressed a strong desire for bilingual districts in their area. Some were even more adamant the second time around. In Coquitlam, francophones insisted that only the Maillardville ward be proclaimed a bilingual district, since the entire city no longer met the statutory criterion.7 And in Saint-Boniface, they complained that the exclusion of Winnipeg from the local bilingual district would prevent them from obtaining federal services in French from the principal offices located in the city.8 As during the first board’s visits, some of the minority members consulted were divided over whether their anglophone neighbours should be included

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within or excluded from the regional bilingual district. In the Chéticamp area, for instance, the minority opted for a small, predominantly francophone area,9 while in the Thunder Bay area, the minority requested a single bilingual district covering all of Northern Ontario.10 For the first time, some minority francophones expressed doubt about the value of bilingual districts. This was the case in Bonnyville, where a few francophones claimed indifference towards bilingual districts after the January 1971 controversy over a regional bilingual district.11 They feared another backlash from their fellow citizens of Ukrainian descent. Nevertheless, the majority of the Bonnyville francophones consulted expressed a strong desire for a bilingual district in their community. In a letter to the board, they argued that a local bilingual district, because of its official proclamation, would make it easier for them to know their rights, would protect them, would guarantee bilingual services at all times, and would give them a symbolic boost, especially in their quests for bilingual services and French schools from the provincial government, as well as for radio and television services in French from Radio-Canada.12 They understood the program’s symbolic value. Two other groups of francophones outside Quebec opposed bilingual districts for the first time. The francophone associations of British Columbia13 and Ontario14 did so because bilingual districts would limit the availability of bilingual services. In their stead, the associations requested that bilingual services be available in every federal office throughout Canada. They thus rejected the territorial approach in favour of the personality principle. Moreover, some Franco-Ontarian leaders in Toronto and St Catharines expressed indifference towards bilingual districts and argued for guaranteed bilingual services in their area instead.15 For their part, anglophones from Quebec were supportive of bilingual districts in their region. Almost every one of those consulted in Montreal, the Gaspésie, and the Côte-Nord confirmed the need for a regional bilingual district.16 Lamontagne reported to the board that representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, the Board of Trade, the Jewish community, the English Catholic community, and the Protestant School Board unanimously requested that Montreal become a bilingual district.17 They argued that the city contained a sufficient number of anglophones, that Montrealers were too mobile to make practical the dissection of the urban area into numerous small bilingual districts, that bilingual services were already provided by both the federal and the provincial

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governments throughout the area, and that the decision to make Montreal a single bilingual district would avoid costs and controversy. Mackey’s report to the Fox Board told a different story. In his opinion, Montreal anglophones strongly opposed a bilingual district in the metropolitan area because they feared a “violent reaction” by Québécois separatists.18 He concluded that a bilingual district was either too restrictive (it would limit the allocation of bilingual services in the urban area to a few specific communities), or too redundant (bilingual services were already provided throughout the urban area). He opined that anglophones in Montreal would be served just as effectively by section 9 (2) because they represented a “significant demand” for services in English. According to Lamontagne, then, the allocation of bilingual services made Montreal anglophones want a bilingual district, while according to Mackey, such services made them oppose districtification. Mackey’s interpretation would eventually supersede Lamontagne’s reports, but only because Yvonne Raymond’s arguments supported Mackey’s version. The majority of the citizens consulted by the Fox Board once again supported the proclamation of bilingual districts in their backyard. For instance, the mayors of Fredericton (New Brunswick)19 and Digby (Nova Scotia)20 insisted that the board include their municipalities within a bilingual district even if their local Acadian population did not reach 10 per cent. Also, the francophone-dominated Pontiac County Council unanimously demanded that the federal government proclaim its county, wherein the anglophones formed the majority, a bilingual district.21 And the mayor of Sherbrooke strongly supported a bilingual district in his area.22 Nonetheless, a few majority members, notably in Peace River,23 Montreal,24 and Sherbrooke,25 opposed a bilingual district in their area. Most of the federal civil servants consulted during the regional meetings opposed bilingual districts in their region,26 usually for the same reason: bilingual districts would reduce career opportunities for unilingual anglophone civil servants. Federal civil servants in the Digby area added that the local Acadians did not ask for bilingual services.27 Many Acadians had complained to the board of the lack of bilingual services in the area;28 it is probable that Acadians were not in the habit of asking for services in French because they knew such services were not available. The responses of provincial government officials consulted the second time around – fourteen civil servants, eleven ministers, and three

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premiers (Newfoundland’s Frank Moores, New Brunswick’s Richard Hatfield, and Manitoba’s Edward Schreyer) – were much more positive than during the first board’s visits. The governments of Manitoba,29 Newfoundland,30 Nova Scotia,31 New Brunswick,32 Prince Edward Island,33 and British Columbia34 gave the board unconditional support for the creation of bilingual districts. The P.E.I. government even reversed its initial position on the Duhamel Board’s recommendation that the federal riding of Egmont be made a bilingual district. Its justice minister, Gordon Bennett, stated that his government “would look with favour upon such a proposal.”35 And Hatfield vehemently criticized the federal government’s “hesitations and inaction” in the matter, especially since his province had been consulted three times and had always been very supportive.36 He admitted that making the entire province a bilingual district without doing so for Quebec would encourage a few “extremists” to oppose the final report, but he strongly supported a single bilingual district in New Brunswick. Hatfield also asked the board to correct the Commissioner of Official Languages’ misconceptions about bilingual districts and reiterate their value. Commissioner Spicer’s second annual report to Parliament, published on 31 January 1973, seriously jeopardized the cornerstone program. Spicer had not discussed his critique when at his request he had met the board three weeks earlier. He had simply asked the board to “broaden the interpretation” of section 9 (2) and “reduce the number of small districts more or less viable.”37 His evaluation of the program, titled “The Bilingual Districts: Better Late than Never, or Not at All?”38 caught the board off guard. It presented eight reasons why bilingual districts should be proclaimed and eight why they should be abandoned. The positive reasons were as follows: (1) “bilingual districts would give official minority-language rights a clear legal underpinning”; (2) “districts offer isolated official-language communities a powerful symbolic recognition that the two official languages enjoy equal status on a national scale, however unequal they may be in fact at the provincial and municipal levels”; (3) “while thus making official-language minority groups feel more secure, districts can educate local linguistic majority groups to the minority’s rights, and perhaps encourage provinces and municipalities to provide bilingual districts or services of their own”; (4) “a number of federal agencies have begun to offer, or plan to offer, services in some proposed areas as if official districts already existed”; (5) “bilingual districts would probably require relatively few federal employees to become ‘functionally bilingual’

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[, thereby providing] better opportunities to more minority officiallanguage federal employees to work in their mother tongue”; (6) “from the public’s viewpoint, the 10 per cent yardstick for defining districts (made more flexible by section 13 (3)) seems a simple and reasonable, if arbitrary, standard for investing in extra linguistic services; and for administrators it represents a plausible ‘critical mass’ for justifying and putting to good use extra services”; (7) “clearly identified districts could avoid the danger that section 9 (2)’s standards of ‘significant demand’ and ‘feasibility’ might – in the absence of districts – be left to inconsistent, or even capriciously inadequate, interpretation by local management”; and (8) “from the Commissioner’s own viewpoint, new districts would clarify and confirm his duty to defend language rights within plainly marked ‘bastions.’” The first two arguments were the most important, even if Spicer seemed confused about the symbolic importance of bilingual districts. They offered a regional symbolic recognition, while section 2 provided a national symbolic recognition. The unfavourable reasons read as follows: (1) “many public administrators tend to view eventual districts … as ghettos – as limiting, ‘native reservations’ to which administratively inconvenient bilingual services can be confirmed”; (2) “as the Duhamel Report showed, it is extremely difficult to draw a map of bilingual districts which does not appear to many as chaotic, illogical and/or unjust”; (3) “districts may well lead isolated official minority-language groups living in them to a ghetto mentality – while heightening irritation among the local official majority-language group and intensifying the resentment of some third-language groups, including native peoples”; (4) “the ‘B. and B.’ Commission’s recommendation of matching provincial and municipal bilingual services in federal bilingual districts has not generally been met … [as] a result, the whole ‘B. and B.’ Commission concept of integrated, three-tiered bilingual services loses its impact and rationale”; (5) because section 9 (1) obliges “principal offices in a federal bilingual district” to offer bilingual services, instead of “principal offices serving a federal bilingual district … [,] serious anomalies arise around large regional headquarters cities such as Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto and Halifax”; (6) “bilingual districts may have less importance than originally thought because the cultural infrastructure supporting French-speaking communities outside Quebec is being substantially strengthened”; (7) “bilingual districts as a concept contain a built-in irritant in the statutory obligation to review their boundaries every ten years in the light of changing figures from each decennial census”; and (8) “bilingual districts may be unnecessary because of empirical

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evidence that the Act has protected language rights surprisingly well for two and a half years without them. The reason is simple, though widely ignored: Section 9 (2) … Indeed, far from entrenching language rights more securely, bilingual districts may theoretically shrink them” more than section 9 (2) would. Most of Spicer’s negative arguments are valid, but three of them falter under scrutiny. His first argument against bilingual districts is invalidated by section 9 (2), as Spicer himself conceded: “This restrictive outlook ignores, of course, the complementary stipulation of Section 9 (2) guaranteeing bilingual services anywhere in Canada where there exists ‘significant demand’ and ‘feasibility.’” 39 Indeed, the complementary allocation of services under section 9 (2) countered not only the civil servants’ defence of minority rights, noted by Spicer but absent in our research, but also his eighth argument stipulating that bilingual districts would shrink these rights more than section 9 (2) would. In other words, Spicer redundantly argued that section 9 (2) expanded bilingual services outside bilingual districts and bilingual districts would limit these services without section 9 (2). The provisos in the first and eighth arguments are thus contradictory. Moreover, it is difficult to understand exactly how both arguments are “against” bilingual districts. Spicer’s fourth negative argument is misleading. He is right to point to the non-fulfilment of the B and B Commission’s wish for “integrated, three-tiered bilingual services,” but the commission accepted uniquely federal bilingual districts if the provinces balked at the recommended joint program. It expressly recommended that the federal government proceed alone if the provinces opted out: “[A]t least part of the official-language minority would have some government services in its language” (rcbb 1967, 112). The commission also accepted a diachronous proclamation. Spicer should have added this information. He also neglected to note that the federal government had proceeded with the Official Languages Act and bilingual districts in spite of concerns expressed by some provincial governments during the February 1968 and February 1969 federal-provincial conferences. Finally, while Spicer’s fifth argument correctly noted that only “principal offices located in a federal bilingual district” would be obliged to offer bilingual services, he forgot to add that section 15 (3), in particular, enabled the advisory board and Cabinet to adapt the federal administrative structure to the minority’s geolinguistic reality. This was crucial information.

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Spicer avoided any definitive judgment, simply concluding that bilingual districts could be useful if they tended “toward consolidating regional minorities,” were rooted “in living sociological reality – never on symbolism or the self-deceiving nostalgia of reading ancient place names or gravestones,” and were established in “relatively large and viable cores … with sound economic and social, as well as cultural and linguistic, structures.” Spicer thus revealed his ignorance of the cornerstone’s symbolic value. He nevertheless stated his preference for section 9 (2) of the Act, arguing that federal civil servants knew how to interpret “significant demand” and allocate bilingual services according to “common sense, generosity and imagination.” Spicer thus implicitly dismissed the B and B Commission’s fear of Treasury Board. His preference for “significant demand” over bilingual districts added an additional thread to the rope that would eventually hang the bilingual districts. His public criticism of the program and the brevity of his favourable arguments (46 lines) compared with the space devoted to his unfavourable arguments (109 lines) represented bad news for bilingual districts. The minority francophone media outside Quebec attacked Spicer’s negative arguments. L’Eau Vive rebuked the commissioner for calling bilingual districts minority “ghettos.”40 The Fransaskois weekly’s editorial of 22 February 1973 concluded that bilingual districts were the opposite of ghettos (“tout le contraire d’un ghetto!”) because they would enable the minority francophones to “feel more secure.” It argued that similar geolinguistic criteria were used to specify minority school districts and no one denigrated them as ghettos. In other words, the symbolic beauty of bilingual districts was in the eye of the minorities they were intended to serve. Moreover, Spicer’s first and third arguments indicated that negative perceptions of bilingual districts might only belong to civil servants, third-language groups, Natives, and his office. Spicer had not bothered to use empirical data to substantiate his arguments. The francophone media in Quebec and the anglophone media elsewhere focused on the eight disadvantages,41 prompting the new Secretary of State, Hugh Faulkner, to send a note to the Fox Board assuring it that, in his opinion, Spicer did “not take a completely negative attitude towards [bilingual districts] as may have been implied in accounts that have been broadcast and printed.”42 But the Ottawa Citizen soon reported that an anonymous member of the Fox board feared the consequences of Spicer’s rather negative assessment: “The report could not have come at a worse time as far as we are concerned.”43 Roland

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Morency had spoken to the reporter on behalf of the board, trying to balance the media’s bias, but had inadvertently fuelled the fire. This was obviously why Hatfield asked the board to correct Spicer in public. The board would do so in its report. The other provincial governments consulted by the board viewed bilingual districts less favourably. Alberta reiterated its indifference towards them and its preference for the “significant demand” criterion.44 Ontario said the same, but its representatives admitted to using the Duhamel Board’s analysis to create provincial “bilingual district.”45 That admission was false, since the first board’s report was published after these provincial units were proclaimed. In fact, Premier Bill Davis had announced their creation on 3 May 1971,46 the day before the Duhamel report was made public. For its part, Saskatchewan did not want any bilingual districts, although it would not oppose the federal government if it proclaimed any on its turf.47 Quebec opposed the proclamation of any bilingual districts, but its opposition was confusing. François Cloutier vehemently opposed bilingual districts in front of the board but accepted them grudgingly in public. Before the board, he argued that provincial policy should take precedence over federal policy. According to Mackey, Cloutier said that proclaiming Montreal as a bilingual district would provoke a “general outcry” that would “put an end to Confederation!”48 He also warned that his government would denounce any bilingual district in Quebec. Publicly, however, Cloutier admitted that Quebec would establish its own bilingual districts and that federal and provincial bilingual services were readily available throughout Quebec.49 He hoped that Ottawa would “avoid confirming the administrative reality in public by proclaiming bilingual districts.”50 In other words, Cloutier feared the symbolic value of bilingual districts. Twenty-four of the forty-one members of Parliament consulted strongly supported a bilingual district in their riding; twelve mp s opposed their proclamation in their backyard; and five claimed indifference. Party affiliation played only a small part in the equation. While sixteen Liberal mp s supported bilingual districts, one opposed their proclamation and five were indifferent. The Conservatives were also split – eight in favour, eleven against. And once again, the bilingual districts’ most ardent defender was a Conservative mp from Prince Edward Island, David MacDonald. He publicly chastised the federal government for not having proclaimed Egmont as a bilingual district.51 In his opinion, a bilingual district would improve the lot of the

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5,000 Acadians in his riding. The delay also meant that Acadians could not exercise their right to communicate with the government of Canada in their mother tongue on an equitable basis. In addition, the five Conservative mp s from New Brunswick consulted by the Fox Board, unlike those consulted by the Duhamel Board, approved of a single bilingual district for the province.52 The five New Brunswick Liberal members, however, stated that they would withdraw their support for a province-wide bilingual district “if it would result in the requirement of bilingual services in the smaller offices located in the predominately English areas of the Province.”53 They did not say whether they would also withdraw their support if the proposal required bilingual services in the predominantly French areas of New Brunswick. Gérard Pelletier surprised the board members when he expressed indifference to bilingual districts.54 They had expected his unconditional support.55 But they were more surprised by feedback from the president of Treasury Board, Montreal mp Bud Drury. On 2 December 1973, Drury told the board that its members “had a most difficult job in attempting to fulfil a mandate for which the main reasons had ceased to exist.”56 He explained that Treasury Board had come up with a bilingual districtification system, based on the significant demand concept of section 9 (2), that would deal with the complexity of regional administrative borders with more flexibility than would bilingual districts. Consequently, Drury concluded, there was “no need for bilingual districts, in any area across the country” and the board “need not make a report at all!”57 On behalf of the board, Jane Carrothers argued in favour of bilingual districts. While she said it was difficult to determine significant demand, she claimed that some isolated areas of Quebec did not receive bilingual services from the federal government. Drury countered that his secretariat was quite capable of determining significant demand and that there was no reason for anglophones in Quebec to fear a reduction of federal services in their language. He added that the francophones in Quebec now saw bilingualism in negative terms: “[T]he idea had backfired.”58 The board was aware that the Treasury Board Secretariat was specifying bilingual regions in accordance with section 9 (2). Even before their first meeting of 28 and 29 June 1972, the board’s chair and secretary met with Al Johnson, secretary, and David Morley, deputy secretary responsible for the implementation of bilingualism in the civil service.59 Morley invited Paul Fox and Neil Morrison to brief the board on the administrative consequences of bilingual districts.60 He

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also indicated that tbs would be responsible for allocating bilingual services in the bilingual areas of the country until Cabinet proclaimed bilingual districts, as well as in the major urban centres outside proposed bilingual districts. tbs would use section 9 (2) to determine the significant demand for bilingual services in these areas. Fox and Morrison promised tbs that the board would “effectively take into account the implementation process and practical difficulties arising from our recommendations.”61 To help the board, they requested from tbs a list of the federal offices located in or serving the thirty-seven bilingual districts recommended by the Duhamel Board, a table indicating the number and categories of bilingual employees working in these offices, and a document indicating the existing capacity of these offices to offer oral and written services in French and English. Johnson accepted their request, and the board received the documents in the fall.62 The board was reminded of Treasury Board’s efforts on 12 October 1973. Again at the request of David Morley, the board met tbs officials to discuss the potential impact and administrative difficulties that the federal government could face after the proclamation of the board’s recommended bilingual districts.63 But this time, the Fox Board met with the managers responsible for the implementation of bilingualism in the civil service, Pierre Coulombe and Pierre Lefebvre. And this time, tbs was more intent on providing advice to the board than on informing them of tbs’s progress. In fact, Coulombe and Lefebvre were “anxious” to meet the board before it had a chance to adopt its final recommendations, because waiting another month would have been “too late.”64 Why? Because tbs was about to implement the bilingual regions it had announced on 29 June 1973 and it did not want the board’s recommendations to outdate its “incredible administrative mechanism” only a few months later.65 It was “a question of timing,” Coulombe explained to the board.66 tbs laid out its administrative mechanism in the Manual of the Official Languages Administrative System (olas), published jointly by Treasury Board and the Public Service Commission on 29 June 1973.67 Coulombe provided a copy to the board. The manual was the culmination of two years of analysis and planning that had begun when, on 4 March 1971, Pelletier asked Drury to take over the responsibility of bilingualism in the civil service. Only five days later, on 9 March 1971, Drury outlined the eleven objectives that would instil bilingualism in the public service.68 Two objectives dealt with bilingual districts: the fifth aimed to “ensure that the

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government and its agencies provide bilingual services to, and communicate as necessary in both languages with, the public in the National Capital Region, in federal bilingual districts and elsewhere where there is sufficient demand insofar as it is feasible to do so, as well as in dealing with the traveling public”; and the tenth targeted specific percentages of bilingual employees by category, “by 1975, among personnel in the National Capital Region and personnel serving the public of bilingual districts.” The document contained standard operating procedures to guide the implementation of the administrative bilingual districtification outlined in sections 2 and 9 of the Official Languages Act and section 20 of the Public Service Employment Act. Six weeks before the Duhamel Board published its report, tbs started preparing the federal departments and agencies for the work that would have to be done after the proclamation of the initial bilingual districts. At this time, tbs focused on the first two elements of the federal government’s internal bilingualism policy: the linguistic qualifications for the bilingual positions and the types and number of bilingual services to be offered in the bilingual areas of the country. tbs had yet to start working on the third element of the policy, the numbers involved in “significant demand.” But six months later, in September 1971, tbs informed Cabinet that the absence of bilingual districts was complicating the implementation of the internal policy. Specifically, the departments and agencies did not know where to allocate their bilingual civil servants, in spite of thirty-three years of statutory bilingual districtification. There was also “ignorance and confusion among public servants with regard to the Government’s bilingualism objectives.”69 tbs informed Cabinet that it was writing guidelines to help departments and agencies determine the types of bilingual services to be provided in the eventual bilingual districts. Everything would be in place by the time the proclamation of the initial bilingual districts came into effect, although minor modifications would likely occur if the bilingual areas identified by tbs did not coincide with the final list of bilingual districts proclaimed by Cabinet. The definition of “significant demand” would thus only be determined afterwards. It was only when David Morley was hired as head of bilingualism in the civil service, on 10 February 1972, that tbs undertook to define the “significant demand” criterion in section 9 (2).70 Before the end of the year, Drury outlined the government’s complete policy on bilingualism in the civil service. The culmination of internal efforts since Pearson’s April 1966 declaration, the policy introduced a greater degree of bilingualism

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in the federal public service, but subsequent to the Liberal quasi-defeat of 30 October 1972, it guaranteed that no existing jobs would be jeopardized and provided for a gradual implementation of the policy over the next five years. On 14 December 1972, Drury announced how the government was going to designate bilingual positions to serve the public in both official languages according to the Official Languages Act, section 20 of the Public Service Employment Act, and Pearson’s April 1966 declaration. This announcement was a more detailed document than the one Drury had published on 9 March 1971. In addition, he stated that tbs would create “bilingual regions” throughout the country as a temporary measure until Cabinet proclaimed bilingual districts.71 He added that the initial bilingual regions were based on the Duhamel report but also included the urban areas where the demand for bilingual services should become “important” according to section 9 (2). “Montreal, certain other parts of Quebec, parts of Eastern and Northern Ontario, and parts of Northern and Eastern New Brunswick” became the initial bilingual regions.72 Once the bilingual districts were established, the remaining bilingual regions would serve as the basis for the designation of areas where the demand for bilingual services was significant but the demolinguistic data were inferior to 10 per cent. On 1 June 1973, the Trudeau government asked the House of Commons to “approve the Government of Canada, and, in particular, the Treasury Board and the Public Service Commission, taking the measures required to give effect to” nine principles related to the government’s bilingualism policy in the civil service.73 The resolution sought parliamentary approval of administrative actions designed to “realize the objective of achieving, within the merit principle, full participation in the Public Service by members of both the anglophone and francophone communities.” The principles were in essence guidelines for the determination and filling of bilingual positions and qualifications for such positions. They added little to the existing legislation or to Drury’s statement of 14 December 1972. In fact, they were fuzzier than the statutory provisions. For instance, one can see in the second principle the vague reflection of administrative bilingual districtification established by section 9 of the Official Languages Act and section 20 of the Public Service Employment Act: “[P]ositions will also be identified where English is an essential requirement of the job, where French is essential, or whether either French or English may be used.” Disappointed by what they believed to be a vague reassertion of more

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specific legislation, some Opposition members from Quebec presented the following amendment to the second principle: “that, account being taken of geographical and demographical circumstances, everyone in Canada has the right to be served and administered in the official languages of his or her choice.” The original resolution was adopted without amendments on 7 June 1973.74 On 29 June 1973, Treasury Board’s new secretary, Gordon Osbaldeston, sent memo 1973–88 to the heads of all federal departments and agencies.75 The memo indicated that tbs would designate certain positions as bilingual in order to serve the national capital area, bilingual districts, principal offices, areas where there was a significant demand, offices serving the travelling public, and foreign offices. All positions, except for those in foreign offices, would be determined according to geolinguistic criteria. The memo included a list of bilingual regions, all of which were in the “bilingual belt” – certain areas of Montreal, certain areas of Quebec outside Montreal, northern and eastern Ontario, and northern and eastern New Brunswick. Drury’s statement of 14 December 1972 had included all of Montreal. The three elements of tbs’s language policy – the linguistic qualifications for certain positions, the types and number of bilingual services, and the demolinguistic and geographic criteria to determine significant demand – would form the basis of the olas manual presented by tbs officials to the Fox Board on 12 October 1973. The manual specified the criteria and standard operating procedures necessary for the identification, designation, and approbation of bilingual positions within the bilingual regions. Geographic and demographic criteria were the most important. A position was deemed bilingual if the clientele it served was significant within the unit’s administrative territory. The manual reproduced the list of bilingual regions contained in tbs memo 1973–88. Roland Morency, because he was on loan from tbs to the advisory board, fully understood the importance of the manual, of Drury’s statements, of the parliamentary resolution, and of tbs memo 1973–88. On 5 February 1973, he submitted a briefing note to the board members that enabled them to easily resolve the dilemmas posed by “principal offices” and “significant demand.”76 Morency stated that the federal government did not designate any “principal offices” because no such administrative term existed in the federal classification. He concluded that it remained for the board “to clearly define the meaning of ‘principal offices’ as they relate to the federal services in bilingual districts.” To help the board members,

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Morency urged them to protect the minority’s rights, extend the borders of bilingual districts as far as possible, and not permit federal departments and agencies to avoid their responsibilities for administrative convenience. Consequently, he suggested that the board define the concept of a principal office as the office that dealt with the public within the designated bilingual districts: “We recommend that the expression ‘principal offices’ be construed to mean all offices through which direct communications to or from the public are made, in whatever activity and at all administrative levels.” He added that all federal bodies already defined “significant” and “feasible” in order to guide the allocation of bilingual services, yet nothing came of it. He observed that francophones outside Quebec rarely received federal services in French, even after they “specifically request and insist, accept delays and intermediaries.” He warned the board not to rely on federal departments and agencies to be proactive in the allocation of bilingual services, or on Treasury Board, his employer, to force these institutions to do so. In Morency’s opinion, Keith Spicer was naive to believe that the federal civil service would interpret “significant demand” with generosity. The board should thus make sure that bilingual districts have priority over the significant demand criterion: “We therefore recommend [that] the existence of a bilingual district within the area of jurisdiction of any federal office be considered a significant demand as defined in section 9 (2) of the Act and that provisions of section 9 (1) be made to apply to the same extent as if the office was located within the bilingual district itself.” By using section 9 (1) to ensure a generous interpretation of section 9 (2), Morency hoped to force the principal offices that served a bilingual district to allocate their bilingual services throughout their entire service area, not only in the bilingual district located in that area. This is exactly what the B and B Commission had in mind when it argued that “after they have equipped themselves to serve the minorities in their bilingual districts, governments can extend their help to the minorities outside the districts at very little extra expense” (rcbb 1967, 115). Morency’s innovative recommendation integrated the most important concept, bilingual districts, with the secondary concepts of principal offices and significant demand without confusing the three in practice. Morency was also able to bridge the statutory and administrative languages. Indeed, his recommendations would have achieved the bilingual districts’ dual purpose. First, the bilingual districts would have symbolically recognized minority homelands, limited the official use of

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English in Quebec, and guaranteed bilingual services. Second, the principal offices serving bilingual districts would also have served the surrounding areas, where most of the excluded minority communities and most of the significant demand would have been. In other words, instead of specifying “significant demand” according to administrative and geolinguistic criteria in order to establish complementary bilingual regions outside bilingual districts, tbs could have relied on the entire administrative area covered by the principal office serving a bilingual district. Morency’s solution would have maintained the symbolic value of proclaimed bilingual districts, since the boundaries could have been limited to the most homogeneous minority areas, as well as increased the range of services provided to residents of bilingual districts. While his recommendation would not have covered every area of the country where demand for bilingual services might have been significant, it would have reduced such cases to rare exceptions. tbs would simply have had to add the isolated and neglected communities if their members made significant demands. Morency’s recommendation would thus have simplified tbs’s job. Morency’s foresight went nowhere, because most board members did not want to be bothered with the potential administrative considerations of their recommendations. After all, tbs officials had admitted that their administrative system was secondary to bilingual districts.77 As they saw it, bilingual regions were temporary and would be replaced in most instances once bilingual districts were proclaimed. One board member categorically rejected Morency’s recommendations, while all the others, save Paul Fox, thought tbs efforts of no direct importance to bilingual districts. They were right, but tbs eventually convinced the federal Cabinet to dump bilingual districts in favour of bilingual regions. Alfred Monnin and Adélard Savoie boycotted the meeting with Coulombe and Lefebvre. In their opinion, the board had clear chronological and statutory precedence over tbs and the sequence of events should have been as follows: (1) the board would recommend bilingual districts; (2) Cabinet would proclaim them; (3) federal departments and agencies would appoint, according to tbs guidelines, the appropriate number of bilingual employees to provide bilingual services within bilingual districts; (4) tbs would establish bilingual regions according to the significant demand outside bilingual districts; and (5) departments and agencies would appoint the appropriate number of bilingual employees to provide appropriate bilingual services within bilingual regions.78 The process would be repeated after each decennial census. tbs efforts were deemed irrelevant.

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Some of the other board members, however, reversed the sequence and tried to specify bilingual districts according to the bilingual regions established by tbs. Eleanor Duckworth, in particular, pursued this course, categorically rejecting Morency’s recommendations. She argued that designating all offices as principal offices would amount “to defining the real bilingual districts within the bilingual district.”79 Duckworth erred: Morency had not recommended that all offices be declared principal offices, only “all offices through which direct communications to or from the public are made” (my emphasis). Duckworth then urged the members to designate the principal offices within bilingual districts and avoid cases where every federal office, such as the post office in a unilingual area, would have to provide its services in both official languages because it was located within a bilingual district. Savoie sympathized with Duckworth but argued that the implementation of the board’s recommendations was beyond its control. He believed that federal departments and agencies would use “common sense” when designating the principal offices that would serve bilingual districts.80 The board decided to study the matter further.81 Meanwhile, Morency submitted a revised version of his briefing notes to the board.82 He described the administrative structure of the federal government, putting emphasis on the various hierarchical levels of its numerous field offices. Using an employment office as an example, he explained that local offices serving the public would be designated principal offices under his plan, whereas the regional office that coordinated the various local offices would not. Once again, the key to solving the administrative puzzle was the service to the public: “We recommend that the expression ‘principal office’ be construed to mean all offices through which direct communications to or from the public are made, in whatever activity and administrative level.” To reduce confusion, Morency no longer emphasized “all offices” and edited the last few words. He also reproduced verbatim his second recommendation, which subsumed “significant demand” under bilingual districts, in order to ensure that all federal offices serving an area within which a bilingual district was proclaimed would provide bilingual services throughout their administrative area. When the board resumed its deliberations on the matter on 20 July 1973, Savoie urged the members to ignore section 9 (2) altogether because their mandate was very simple: recommend bilingual districts.83 Others disagreed and chose to delay a final decision until they could

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confer with justice department officials.84 However, the explanations of one such official only confused the board members. Brad Smith agreed with Savoie’s interpretation that the board had “nothing to do with section 9 [2].”85 In Smith’s opinion, the board was mandated to recommend bilingual districts, which guaranteed rights, while “significant demand,” a “rather vague” concept, was left to tbs.86 However, Smith also argued that section 9 (2) would become more important than section 9 (1) in the long term: “[U]ltimately the services would be available country-wide and … [section] 9 (2) will ultimately take over and will become the criterion.”87 The reason for this, in his opinion, was that section 9 (2) was a better way to deal with the far larger number of complaints from francophones in Toronto than in rural Saskatchewan. Savoie immediately jumped on Smith’s “brainchild,” saying that section 9 (2) contained “inherent weaknesses that are so serious as to prevent us from giving it absolution without confession.”88 In the ensuing debate between lawyers, Savoie added that section 9 (2) depended on biased bureaucratic discretion. Smith conceded this point but assured Savoie that the Commissioner of Official Languages could ensure an appropriate application of “significant demand.” Savoie countered that Commissioner Spicer had no authority over the federal civil service. Smith admitted defeat, saying, “You can’t go to court with this.”89 Yet the debate remained unresolved. The board was further confused when Smith agreed with Morency that “principal office” should be defined as the office dealing with the public,90 then stated that the concept would depend on each bilingual district, department, and office: “[T]he concept of principal office is relative in the sense that it depends on factors in each district proposed.”91 Morency correctly reminded Smith that the factors were very limited. Indeed, “a department never has two offices that share the same jurisdiction” and “the public rarely has the leisure to communicate with two federal offices in the same location.”92 Consequently, every office that dealt with the public within a bilingual district must be declared a principal office. Smith conceded this point but explained that “it was never intended in the Act that there be an obligation to provide in every circumstance complete and equal services, even though that might be the ultimate goal,” and that bilingual services would only be provided “to the limit of the possible.”93 The members were also confused by Smith’s comments on two other matters. First, when asked if mother tongue or language-of-use data should be used, Smith combined the two alternatives into one, “the

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mother tongue spoken.”94 Second, he said that the board had “a fairly technical mandate to fulfil,”95 although earlier he had implored the members to interpret the statutory concepts and criteria to the best of their abilities, even though doing so was at their risk and peril.96 By the time the board finally decided how to deal with the concepts of principal offices and significant demand, one month later, it was more confused than ever.97 On 12 October 1973, motivated by the recent Coulombe-Lefebvre presentation on tbs efforts, Duckworth resuscitated her plea to abandon bilingual districts in favour of the significant demand criterion.98 She claimed that bilingual districts would become a burdensome administrative mechanism, whereas the implementation of the significant demand criterion would be more flexible. The majority of her colleagues disagreed.99 At the next meeting, on 9 November 1973, she again pleaded her case, saying that tbs efforts would incrementally improve the existing situation, while bilingual districts would bring drastic changes, which was contrary to what the board had been telling the participants during its regional consultations.100 Consequently, she argued, the board should limit its recommendations to the bilingual regions created by tbs. Once again, most of her colleagues disagreed. Savoie repeated that the board had statutory and chronological precedence over tbs and that section 9 (2) did not provide sufficient guarantees.101 The dispute continued, Duckworth wrote a minority report explaining her ideas, and Morency failed to convince the board that bilingual districts were meant to “effect changes in a situation admitted unjust.”102 In his opinion, “Whether the bilingual services are now available to the total satisfaction of the population, meets their need partially or not at all is for the government and the Commissioner of the Official Languages to decide. Where they are needed is the responsibility of the Advisory Board.”103 Be that as it may, the disputes over sections 9 (1) and 9 (2) would be a tempest in a teapot compared to the acrimonious debates on bilingual districts in Quebec.

b)

Deliberations and Problems

While most board members ignored tbs efforts, many paid heed to Quebec’s sociolinguistic policy. Their final decision on the latter would be adopted after passionate debates and close votes. The “Quebec problem” was by far the most serious difficulty faced by the board members.104 It was thrust upon them when the Gendron Commission published its final

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report on 31 December 1972 and intensified when Bill-22 (the Official Language Act) was proposed by the Bourassa government on 15 May 1974 and adopted on 31 July 1974. The problem was further amplified when the board stretched its work over three years and adopted conflicting subjective criteria to help it specify bilingual districts. Specifically, some board members tried to minimize bilingual districts in Quebec and maximize them elsewhere. Indeed, the Quebec members of the board – William Mackey and Yvonne Raymond – succeeded in convincing their colleagues that Quebec should be treated in a distinct manner. This was contrary to the Act and the B and B Commission’s symmetrical list of bilingual districts, which included twenty-four in Quebec (rcbb 1967, 108), based on its egalitarian argument that each official sociolinguistic group “would find the absence of its language more acceptable in one area if the rule were applied to the other official language in other areas” (85). On the other hand, the commission had opened the door to a measure of subjective specification of bilingual districts when it stated that “the necessarily arbitrary methods for their establishment” was not as important as their idea and the language regimes they implied (115), and hinted that bilingual districts should be specified according to data on language of use rather than data on mother tongue (18). As explained earlier, this rationale sprang from Toivo Miljan’s erroneous interpretation of Finnish legislation, although the commission also preferred the data on the “language each Canadian habitually uses” (17). The commission nevertheless reduced specification discretion elsewhere (110–12). Many of the board members followed its symmetrical logic, but the opposite arguments of Raymond and Mackey eventually prevailed. The Gendron Commission did not have a significant impact on the board’s work. Its final report recommended that French become the sole official language in Quebec105 and that the federal government collaborate with the province in the implementation of a joint policy favouring the French language within their respective jurisdictions in Quebec. On the surface, both measures should make anything “bilingual” anathema to the recommended policy. However, the commission conceded that this regime should only apply to provincial matters, thereby enabling an overlap of the federal bilingual policy and the provincial unilingual policy. The federal government should “ensure that all its civil servants serving the public in Quebec have sufficient knowledge of French,” and it should overlap its language policy with Quebec’s,106 thus ensuring that its services were provided in French throughout Quebec and, in English, were limited to the areas designated by the provincial policy.

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To facilitate this overlap, the Gendron Commission recommended a provincial bilingual districtification based on the same criteria as federal bilingual districts. In fact, it recommended that the provincial government allow “municipalities and school boards the right to publish their official documents in French only, unless anglophones represent more than 10% of the clientele.”107 It added that the provincial government should balance the principles of personality on the provincial level and territoriality at the local level in the allocation of bilingual services: “[E]nsure that communications with individuals occur in his [or her] language and that communications with the general public occur primarily in French, … [but also] in both languages if it can be justified by the presence of the anglophone minority … [where it is] sufficiently important.”108 The Gendron Commission’s bilingual districtification would, like its federal counterpart, be both symbolic and administrative in the sense that the “districts” would be created by legislation rather than by littleknown orders-in-council and regulations. However, the provincial units would not be legally designated as bilingual districts, since municipalities and regional bodies had their own sectoral terminology, and they would not be officially proclaimed. Both federal and provincial “bilingual districts” would guarantee bilingual services but would limit the official use of English within Quebec. Only the federal version would symbolically recognize minority homelands. Officially proclaimed federal bilingual districts could thus not represent a significant symbolic affront to provincial bilingual districts created for similar purposes, but they could be perceived as a symbolic territorial affront to an officially unilingual-French Quebec. The nuance was important. The subsequent Bill-22, presented by the Bourassa government to the National Assembly on 15 May 1974, declared that “French is the official language of the province of Québec.”109 Its preamble stated that “the French language must be the ordinary language of communication in the public administration … [and] must be in use at every level of business activity, especially in corporate management and in firm names, on public signs, in contracts pre-determined by one party and in consumer contracts.” But the bill also outlined the creation of provincial “bilingual districts.” While section 10 guaranteed that every Québécois “may address the public administration in French or in English, as he may choose,” section 9 limited this right in the following manner: “If at least ten per cent of the persons administered by a municipal or school body are English-speaking and it has been its practice

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to draw up its official texts and documents in English, it must draw them up in both French and English.” Also, section 13 guaranteed that “French and English are the languages of internal communication in municipal and school bodies in which the majority of the persons administered are English-speaking.” Quebec’s Official Language Act thereby created two types of provincial bilingual districts. First, municipalities and school boards where anglophones represented at least 10 per cent of the population within the service area would have to provide communications to the public in both French and English. And second, municipalities and school boards where the minority represented at least half of the population would also provide internal communications in both languages. The board spent considerable time over Quebec’s sociolinguistic policy. Paul Fox publicly declared that the board would have to delay its report to Parliament, already eighteen months overdue, because Bill-22 raised “a lot of implications as far as we are concerned.”110 But after studying the bill for weeks, Fox and Morrison concluded that the federal and provincial bilingual districts coincided.111 The other members agreed, having long before reached that same conclusion.112 The board’s conclusion was buttressed by the Bourassa government’s own arguments. One provincial Cabinet member publicly admitted that Bill-22 would create provincial bilingual districts that could be implemented without contradicting the federal legislation.113 The board thus found it unnecessary to use section 15 (3), as Morrison suggested, to recommend modifications to the federal administrative structure to ensure that federal bilingual districts fully coincided with Quebec’s bilingual districts.114 Despite reaching a consensus on the compatibility of the federal and provincial bilingual districts, Fox declared publicly that the adoption of Bill-22, on 31 July 1974, was somewhat responsible for the board’s “change [of] plans.”115 Neither the board’s minutes nor its report, however, indicate any such change of plans. In fact, the board had adopted its recommendations concerning Quebec on 17 December 1973,116 months before Bill-22 was tabled. Therefore, the board’s recommendations concerning Quebec must have been based on regional consultations and the consequential deliberations, not on any possible (in)congruity between its work and Bill-22. In the end, Raymond and Mackey convinced some of their colleagues to favour the provincial over the federal policy. But others fought them on every point. The acrimonious deliberations that

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followed led to controversial decisions that, in turn, formed the fourth thread in the rope that hung the bilingual districts. The board members were very familiar with the Quebec problem, especially the consideration of Montreal as a bilingual district. They thus decided to apply subjective specification criteria in a manner that would minimize the number and size of bilingual districts in that province. However, they had difficulty reaching this decision, particularly because of the varying subjective specification criteria adopted and their varying applications. The board’s interpretation of the Quebec problem and its use of different criteria to solve it proved to be its Achilles heel. Mackey and Raymond initially contended that bilingual districts were necessary and should be recommended throughout the country according to identical specification criteria.117 At that point, the board had applied thirty different criteria to justify the elimination of certain regions from the initial list of statutory units that had met the 10 per cent criterion in 1971. These included ten of the twenty-five criteria used by the first board, as well as twenty new ones, ranging from the bilingual district’s proximity to the United States and the importance of the minority language within the provincial economy to the symbolic importance of bilingual districts (they provided “an increased sentiment of cohesion and acceptation”118 and offered “protection of language rights”119). The board had also rejected some criteria – for instance, Léopold Lamontagne’s suggestion that the board use only municipalities and discard the other four statutory administrative units.120 In spite of Fox’s persistent requests,121 his board refused to adopt uniform criteria,122 just as the Duhamel Board had refused earlier. When Mackey and Raymond suggested using identical specification criteria throughout Canada, they did so to convince their colleagues to adopt the “principle of parity” inside and outside Quebec as the most important specification criterion123 in order to discard section 13 (3) of the Act. According to them, this section, which granted a perennial right to anglophones in Quebec, unfairly perpetuated “the inequities of the past.”124 Monnin and Savoie disagreed, arguing that if the legislators had awarded anglophones this right, it must be applied elsewhere where needed, fair or not.125 Their colleagues, however, adopted the principle of parity.126 Once the principle of parity had eliminated the anglophones’ preferential acquired rights in Quebec, Mackey and Raymond shifted their position and urged their colleagues to apply different criteria in Quebec. Mackey, for instance, encouraged them to use data on language of

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use in Quebec rather than data on statutory mother tongue.127 The other members refused.128 Alternatively, he asked his colleagues to apply the same criteria differently. For example, “the probability of community dissension” and “the minority’s desire” could not be applied in Quebec as elsewhere.129 Also, if the maximization approach was applied in Quebec as it was elsewhere, the result would be a multitude of bilingual districts covering almost all of the province. In Mackey’s opinion, this would fuel the flames of secession. Quebec should therefore be treated differently, since the secessionist threat was absent elsewhere. Most of his colleagues rejected his arguments, concluding that they had to use a symmetrical approach even if it meant a case of “chicken pox” in bilingual districts throughout Canada.130 Mackey would nonetheless use the arguments later on when recommending a minimal list of bilingual districts in Quebec. Despite their colleagues’ opposition, Mackey and Raymond pursued a minimization effort in Quebec to avoid fuelling the flames of secession. Consequently, they submitted exaggerated reports to the board and used different criteria or applied the same criteria differently. Their recommendations would thus counter the opinion of Lamontagne, as well as those of Hickman, Savoie, and Monnin. First, Mackey submitted reports that exaggerated, if not outright falsified, the opinions expressed during the regional consultations. His reports on the negative opinions of Montreal anglophones were the polar opposite of Lamontagne’s detailed reports. Lamontagne’s version was supported by Raymond and Fox,131 and the board’s report would contain an unequivocal admission that “some Anglophones were very outspoken in their support of a district” in Montreal (bdab 1975, 106). For some reason, Mackey’s report to his colleagues stated the contrary, and the board’s recommendations favoured his minimalist approach. Second, Mackey misled the board when he stated that the chair of the Gendron Commission was against bilingual districts.132 Mackey later recanted when corrected by Roland Morency, who had also attended the meeting with Jean-Guy Gendron. In fact, Gendron had requested that the board make its recommendations coincide as much as possible with Quebec’s own bilingual districts.133 Third, Raymond submitted misleading reports to the board. For instance, she reported that “the people of Quebec are not interested in bilingual districts” and that the anglophone minority “did not request” a bilingual district in Montreal.134 At that point, however, she had not yet begun her consultations. As noted above, she would later admit, after

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conducting such consultations in Montreal, that the local anglophones were weary of guarantees without bilingual districts. Finally, Raymond and Mackey imposed their minimalist approach by circumventing the board’s internal decision-making process. To simplify this process, the board had asked the member(s) living in a province to act as a subcommittee and draft recommendations for the full board’s consideration. The Board decided that in Quebec the committee would also include Fox, Lamontagne, Morrison, and Morency.135 Raymond and Mackey would nevertheless meet by themselves and submit their own report.136 Unable to convince the other members to apply asymmetrical criteria in Quebec after convincing them to apply symmetrical criteria throughout the country, Raymond and Mackey surreptitiously accomplished what amounted to the same thing by recommending a minimal list of bilingual districts for the full board’s consideration. In spite of vehement opposition from the members who had sat on the first board,137 Raymond and Mackey eventually rallied the majority. The exchanges between the members began to heat up on 25 May 1973. Raymond argued that the purpose of bilingual districts was to “make Canada a bilingual country”138 and thus the board had to “recognize the rights of the minority francophones and strengthen the only francophone province.”139 Most of her colleagues disagreed. But when Savoie proposed a bilingual district for the Sherbrooke region, Raymond argued against the motion because it would provoke the separatists.140 Savoie promptly criticized Raymond for introducing “political repercussions” as a specification criteria.141 And Hickman interjected: “[H]ow long [will] the rest of the country … postpone action by waiting for Quebec to [decide] on its language policy?”142 Raymond repeated that there should be “the least amount of bilingual districts possible in Quebec.”143 Most of the other members disagreed.144 To avoid a confrontation, Mackey suggested pursuing the debate at a later date.145 When the board met again, on 22 June 1973, Raymond presented a report on her consultations with Montreal anglophones.146 However, the report contained no comments or opinions from local anglophones, offering instead Raymond’s Four-point assessment of bilingualism in Quebec: (1) French is now recognized as the language of work in Quebec; (2) the French language lives or dies in Montreal; (3) English has always been a privileged language in Montreal; and (4) acquired rights should not be used to perpetuate bilingualism in Quebec. When pressed, she admitted that certain anglophones complained of the lack of bilingual services in Montreal.147

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Mackey came to Raymond’s aid by stating that only the Island of Montreal should be recommended as a bilingual district, although he later conceded that it would be absurd to cut up the metropolitan area for the specification of bilingual districts.148 Hickman immediately exposed this contradiction.149 Mackey suggested recommending experimental bilingual districts in Quebec,150 but the others rejected this idea, preferring symmetry, knowing full well that the board would “be damned if you do, and damned if you don’t.”151 Mackey and Raymond did not give up. They sent documents to their colleagues arguing in favour of a minimalist approach in Quebec. The most important of these “Vers une politique de base pour le Québec,” argued that the board had to reach a compromise between the unacceptable polar options of a province-wide bilingual district in Quebec and none at all.152 The document urged the board to make five recommendations in its final report: (1) that there be no bilingual districts in Montreal and Quebec City; (2) that these cities be treated just as the other major urban areas of Canada were; (3) that the bilingual districts be restricted as much as possible to areas of the province where anglophones were predominant, such as the Eastern Townships and the North Shore, and to regions where federal services were not readily available in English; (4) that French be the language of the federal workplace in Quebec; (5) and that the next board study Quebec in light of the fact that bilingual districts become permanent once created. Mackey believed that it was only through these five recommendations that the board could realize its objectives, which he considered to be the following: (1) to propose equitable solutions throughout the country; (2) to reassure the anglophones; (3) to reassure the francophones; and (4) to avoid a conflict with Quebec’s sociolinguistic policy. Mackey and Raymond pursued their battle at subsequent meetings of the board. When the board finally started to specify the number and size of bilingual districts in Quebec, on 14 September 1973, Raymond opposed bilingual districts in areas where anglophones already obtained federal services in English.153 Monnin and Savoie had had enough. As Savoie argued: “if the board wants to be logical and maintain its credibility, it must give to the minority anglophone population the bilingual districts it needs, in order to be able to do so as well for the francophone minority elsewhere.”154 Mackey replied that such an approach would create a multitude of bilingual districts in Quebec.155 Savoie corrected him: the board had intentionally been less generous in Quebec.156 It had recommended far fewer small and isolated minority areas in Quebec than it had elsewhere. But, Savoie added, the board could not possibly go further.

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Later, Raymond again argued that the board should not recommend bilingual districts for regions where anglophone residents already received federal government services in English.157 Morrison, who had shared Raymond and Mackey’s minimalist approach until that point, now changed his mind. He conceded that anglophones already received bilingual services, but added that many of them feared the effects of the upcoming provincial sociolinguistic policy.158 He suggested that federal bilingual districts be recommended to alleviate their fear. Raymond replied that anglophones had no reason to worry but even if their fears were realized, the next board could remedy their ills in a decade.159 Morency turned that argument on its head: the existence of federal bilingual services should be proof that certain regions needed a bilingual district.160 Besides, he added, the Act required the creation of bilingual districts in the most obvious regions of the country; if this was where bilingual services were already provided, he argued, so be it.161 As an employee loaned by Treasury Board and a member of the eventual interdepartmental committee of civil servants that would prepare the memo accompanying the board’s report to Cabinet, Morency warned the board that if it did not recommend these “obvious” regions as bilingual districts, the committee of civil servants definitely would.162 It would thus be better if the board did the deed itself; otherwise, the members’ credibility would be stained when Cabinet publicly disregarded the board’s report.163 The next day, Mackey referred to his rejected document on Quebec while arguing in favour of a “special” status for Quebec.164 Raymond added that the board had to “ensure the survival of French in Quebec.”165 The majority of the board disagreed. Father Régimbald, almost silent throughout the previous meetings, argued vehemently against a special status for Quebec,166 and Monnin argued that treating Quebec differently would destroy the board’s credibility and spell the death of bilingual districts and the federal sociolinguistic policy based on symmetrical institutional bilingualism.167 Raymond replied that bilingual districts were useless in Quebec, but she agreed to recommend a certain number, albeit limited, to show that Quebec was “an integral part of the country.”168 But Montreal would unravel any tacit agreement. Mackey, again referring to his non-numerical criteria, especially the (lack of a) request from the anglophones consulted, argued against a bilingual district in Montreal.169 Lamontagne and Fox, who had met with Montreal anglophones, corrected Mackey’s testimony: the anglophones consulted had

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indeed expressed the need and desire for a bilingual district in the metropolitan area.170 Mackey then went on the offensive: the anglophones of Montreal had said, “Leave well enough alone.”171 Fox and Savoie countered on another front: it would be very difficult to ignore the sizable number and proportion of anglophones living in Montreal.172 The final decision was put off until the next meeting. On 13 October 1973, the board resumed its deliberations on Montreal. The animosity between the members was now palpable. It was fuelled by the initial recommendations made to the full board by the Quebec subcommittee, which had somehow excluded Lamontagne, Fox, Morrison, and Morency. Mackey and Raymond argued against making the entire province a bilingual district, saying it would be discriminatory; if the board made such a decision, it should adopt a similar recommendation for Ontario.173 Their colleagues did not bother pointing out to them that unlike Quebec, the minority population of Ontario did not represent at least 10 per cent of the provincial population. This was probably because they had no intention of recommending a single bilingual district to cover the entire province. Raymond and Mackey recommended four large bilingual districts in Quebec: (1) Gaspé-est/Bonaventure, (2) Gatineau/Pontiac, (3) the North Shore, and (4) Argenteuil/Deux-Montagnes/Huntingdon/SaintJean/Missisquoi/Brôme/Stanstead/Compton.174 They “systematically” eliminated the “federal ridings where the minority represented less than 10 per cent” and where the number of anglophones had decreased between 1961 and 1971.175 All four recommendations received the unanimous consent of the board.176 No one asked why Chambly, a county that met the stringent requirements imposed by Mackey and Raymond, had been excluded. Board members nevertheless raised serious concerns about the exclusion of Montreal. Raymond and Mackey had excluded the metropolitan area of Montreal for three reasons: (1) federal services were already provided in English; (2) Montreal was the centre of the French life of North America; and (3) it was the only major urban centre in the country that would be declared a bilingual district.177 If the board was not pleased with their exclusion of Montreal, it could adopt an alternative recommendation: let a third advisory board study the case after the next census. Monnin argued passionately that such reasoning was unacceptable, unjust, and illegal, especially the idea that a region should be excluded because it already received federal services.178 A few members also opposed excluding regions whose minority population had decreased.179 Savoie

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proposed that the board maximize bilingual districts throughout the country and, in so doing, revisit their decisions concerning bilingual districts outside Quebec.180 But that did not sit well with his colleagues. Hickman proposed a compromise: apply a more stringent criterion (i.e., 20 per cent) in Quebec.181 The members refused, opting to pursue the deliberations further.182 Raymond and Mackey then insisted that Montreal be treated as Toronto was.183 Lamontagne disagreed, saying that Montreal, the bilingual district par excellence because of its substantial minority population, could not reasonably be compared to Toronto.184 Mackey countered that the recommendation of a bilingual district in Montreal would turn into a “symbolic provocation.”185 In his opinion, bilingual services were warranted in the metropolitan area but should be allocated discretely because of prevailing sociolinguistic tensions. Other members argued that “significant demand” would not provide the same guarantee as bilingual districts.186 Then Fox changed his mind: the significant number and proportion of anglophones in Montreal would meet any requirements for significant demand.187 Savoie slammed that idea: if 500,000 anglophones representing 22 per cent of the local population did not justify a bilingual district, no other region of the country should have one.188 Such a recommendation, in his opinion, would sacrifice the board’s credibility. Lamontagne agreed.189 Raymond then proposed that the metropolitan area not be recommended as a bilingual district, but the motion was defeated.190 Savoie immediately countered with the opposite motion, that the entire metropolitan area be proclaimed a bilingual district, but this too was defeated.191 The majority wanted one or many bilingual districts in the Montreal area, but not for the entire area. The decision on Montreal was once again put on hold.192 The members shifted their attention to the other bilingual districts within Quebec, but the deliberations were just as acrimonious. Although the members ultimately agreed to recommend five bilingual districts in the province, the decisions barely escaped five amendments and each one was adopted by the slimmest (i.e., 5 to 4) of margins.193 On 17 December 1973, the board finally decided to exclude Montreal. That decision was far from unanimous. In fact, the board defeated six initial motions on a bilingual district in the city or parts therein.194 Each motion was defeated by a vote of 5 to 4 – Fox abstained on each vote.195 Finally, Raymond and Mackey convinced three colleagues – Carrothers,

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Duckworth, and Lamontagne – to avoid an upheaval in Quebec by refusing to recommend a single bilingual district in Montreal.196 The 5 to 4 vote eliminated Montreal from the board’s list. Instead, the board recommended the application of the significant demand criterion in the allocation of bilingual services to the entire metropolitan area, just as it had done with other major urban centres throughout the country. Savoie and Monnin subsequently declared their intention to submit minority reports condemning the decision.197 If Mackey and Raymond ultimately prevailed, it was in great part due to their persistence but also to the fact that three colleagues changed their vote. Fox had initially supported a bilingual district in Montreal, but eventually he abstained from voting, arguing that the chair should remain neutral. Lamontagne had considered Montreal a bilingual district par excellence and had stated that the availability of bilingual services was an insufficient guarantee for the future, but in the end he voted against a bilingual district in the Montreal metropolitan area. The most important strategic voter, however, was Eleanor Duckworth. In spite of her ardent support of section 9 (2), she had supported a bilingual district in Montreal when the board began its deliberations on the issue, on 25 May 1973, but she changed her mind after the board’s meeting of 12 October 1973 with tbs employees. Duckworth embraced the tbs efforts and argued in their favour during the board’s deliberations on Montreal the next day,198 as well as at the board’s following meeting.199 In her opinion, “the symbolic idea” of bilingual districts was not the reason why they were the B and B Commission’s cornerstone recommendation;200 rather, their administrative purpose was the key. The board should give precedence to significant demand and principal offices and thereby avoid stirring up opposition from federal civil servants, who would ensure the daily implementation of the federal government’s overall bilingualism policy.201 Therefore, on 17 December 1973, when Mackey and Raymond argued against including Montreal as a bilingual district and opted instead for bilingual services according to significant demand, Duckworth was easily persuaded to change her initial vote. Her decisive strategic vote on Montreal and the tbs efforts were thus related. Except for Spicer’s second annual report, the tbs bilingual districtification efforts, and Quebec’s sociolinguistic policy, external events had little impact on the board’s work. Two public opinion surveys indicated the public’s approval of the federal sociolinguistic policy. The first poll, published on 19 July 1972, indicated that 59 per cent of Canadians

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supported the federal policy, in particular the government’s planned allocation of bilingual services in the bilingual regions of the country.202 The policy received popular support throughout the country, although by only a slim margin in the western provinces. The polling company nevertheless gave a misleading title to its press release: “Outside Quebec, Opposition to Bilingualism Is High.” The second survey, published on 20 June 1973, indicated that more Canadians (48 per cent) supported the policy than not (30 per cent).203 The board did not discuss these surveys. Nor did the board discuss the six demolinguistic census analyses by mathematician Charles Castonguay published in various newspapers. The board members nevertheless noted the analyses in their report’s bibliography (bdab 1975, 270–2). Castonguay, in short, argued that since francophones outside Quebec were being assimilated beyond the point of no return and the French language and culture were threatened within Quebec, the federal government should abandon its bilingual districts and opt for a province-based sociolinguistic policy favouring French in Quebec. The board, having a specific duty to perform, could not realistically follow Castonguay’s suggestion. But its neglect could also be attributed to its knowledge of an opposing analysis by sociologist Pierre Roberge, who noted that Quebec had turned the tide and for the first time in a century, had become proportionally more French-speaking.204 The board, however, never discussed Roberge’s analysis. The federal election of 30 October 1972 highlighted a backlash against the federal policy, especially in the Ottawa area where a significant number of federal civil servants, fearing job loss or demotion, voted against the Liberal candidates.205 The ensuing Cabinet shuffle saw Hugh Faulkner replace Gérard Pelletier as Secretary of State. And finally, the Supreme Court of Canada declared that the Official Languages Act was constitutional.206 Its decision undermined the credibility of those, like Moncton mp Leonard Jones and the four western provincial governments, who had argued that Ottawa did not have the authority to enact such legislation. Throughout its mandate, the board had “a predilection to side-step uncertain sensitive issues and to take the course of least resistance at the risk of non-solution.”207 It failed to solve the dilemma posed by principal offices, intentionally discarding Morency’s expert advice on the matter, Morrison and Brad Smith’s suggestion to use section 15 (3) to recommend structural modifications to the federal departments and

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agencies so that their principal offices served bilingual districts, and the Saskatchewan Cabinet minister’s perspicacious advice to ask the federal government to modify section 9 (1) so that it read “principal offices serving a bilingual district” instead of “principal offices located in a bilingual district.” The board members had even struggled with the very idea of bilingual districts. Some of them wanted to discard the idea altogether in favour of “significant demand.” Others wanted the board to abstain from some areas until the 1981 census data were available for the third board’s consideration. The board members also disagreed on whether the availability of federal bilingual services should justify or prohibit bilingual districts. And finally, especially in Quebec, they were unable to answer this question: “Are you to please the majority or help the minority?”208 Their final report would attempt to explain their problems and solutions, but the explanations were seriously put in doubt by the four dissenting reports attached as appendices.

c)

The Final Report

The report of the Fox Board was published on 1 October 1975. Its 272 pages made it two and a half times more voluminous than the Duhamel report. It achieved this length because the Fox Board elaborated its arguments, thereby heeding the 28 June 1972 request of the Secretary of State, but also because it delved into the various problems it had faced during its specification mandate. The board categorically concluded that “there still was a need for bilingual districts” (bdab 1975, 37). In other words, the concept of there being “selected areas within Canada in which the federal government is obliged to offer its services in both languages” (7) was still valid. Indeed, no other mechanism could adequately serve the purposes of the Official Languages Act, because only bilingual districts could “require the federal government to provide its services in both languages” (3), “be a symbol, strengthening the minority’s morale … [by affirming] the existence of the minority in that area” (19), and “enable the minority to secure recognition and additional services from other sectors of government” (19). Only bilingual districts could provide the federal government with “a geographic boundary” for administrative purposes and the sociolinguistic minorities a “cultural and social identity” and a morale boost for their self-preservation for symbolic purposes (19). Bilingual districts still deserved the title of “cornerstone” of the federal policy.

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The board, however, conceded that bilingual districts had four significant limitations. First, the concept entailed a uniform mechanism that did not easily enable “a variation in the application of criteria [to adapt to] the diversity of conditions in different parts of the country” (bdab 1975, 20). A straightforward approach would have produced “a large number of rather small bilingual districts scattered throughout the country,” thereby creating “a heavy superstructure” that might prove to be “unreasonably onerous” (26). To avoid such “a rash of measles” (22), the board opted for recommendations “that were consonant with the realities of administrative common sense and human interactions, particularly where the latter encouraged the community life of an official language minority” (24). It hoped “that common sense [would] be used in providing federal bilingual services and that public servants [would] take care to proceed slowly in achieving their objective without offending the local population” (65). Second, while “most of the official language minority groups which amounted by mother tongue to ten per cent or more of the local population were located in rural areas, … there were rather few federal offices” therein (26). Third, “there were a number of urban centres in which there were many thousands of residents belonging to an official language group which was in the minority … [but] few of these urban concentrations could be recommended as bilingual districts since the minority in the locality rarely amounted by mother tongue to at least ten per cent of the population” (27). The board added that this problem was “apt to grow more serious as time passes since the percentage of Canadians living in urban centres continues to increase rapidly and since a minority’s rate of retention of its language tends to be less in urban centres than in rural areas” (27). And fourth, in spite of overwhelming support from minority groups throughout the country and increased “acceptance of the principle of the Official Languages Act and the need for providing services in both official languages in many places” (14), many majority groups, especially in Quebec and the western provinces, opposed the creation of bilingual districts in their backyard and preferred, instead, the allocation of bilingual services according to section 9 (2). The board felt, however, that these limitations did not justify abandoning bilingual districts. The board consequently and categorically rejected Spicer’s allegation that “significant demand” was a better mechanism than bilingual districts. On the one hand, contrary to bilingual districts, section 9 (2) did not provide minority “bastions” or “a powerful symbolic recognition” (bdab 1975, 25). The board repeatedly drew attention to the symbolic

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purpose of bilingual districts.209 There was thus no doubt in the minds of the board members, especially after the regional consultations, that bilingual districts were administrative units with a fundamentally symbolic purpose. The B and B Commission may not have sufficiently explained the bilingual districts’ symbolic value and the draftsmen of the Official Languages Act may have been unable to translate their symbolic purpose in legislative terms, but the board, as well as the minority and majority language groups it consulted, knew full well that bilingual districts had a significant symbolic purpose. On the other hand, the board chided Spicer for believing that section 9 (2) provided the same “clear legal underpinning” as did section 9 (1) for the allocation of bilingual services: “Section 9 (2) is meant to be supplementary to 9 (1)” (bdab 1975, 24–5). Spicer was naive to believe that the federal bureaucracy would alter its practices to service the minorities, since, “by the Commissioner’s own admission,” it had not done so in the six years since the Act came into force (25). The concept of significant demand was too “dependent on elastic, arbitrary, and perhaps parsimonious definitions of the need for services” (37). In short, “it would be inadvisable to leave the provision of bilingual services solely to Section 9 (2) and the discretion of civil servants” (25). Most of the report’s recommendations were identical to those in the Duhamel report (bdab 1975, 42). Therefore, “although there had been changes from 1961 to 1971 in the relevant percentages of the language groups in many localities, the areas recommended as bilingual districts by the first Bilingual Districts Advisory Board were still for the most part the regions which qualified as bilingual districts” (19). The census changes feared by the federal Cabinet in May 1972 were thus not considerable. The Fox report recommended thirty bilingual districts, and their size and location covered, save Quebec, approximately the same territory recommended by the Duhamel Board four and a half years earlier. Two bilingual districts were recommended in Newfoundland (Portau-Port and Labrador-West), one in Prince Edward Island (Egmont), two in Nova Scotia (Antigonish/Inverness/Richmond and Digby/ Yarmouth), one in New Brunswick (the entire province), five in Quebec (Argenteuil/Deux-Montagnes, Gaspé/Bonaventure, Gatineau/Pontiac, Huntingdon/Compton, and the North Shore), five in Ontario (Cornwall/Hawkesbury, Laurentien, Midland/Penetang, Welland, and Windsor/Tilbury), six in Manitoba (Lawrence/Sainte-Rose, Saint-Boniface/ Rouge/Seine, Ellice/Saint-Lazare, Powerview/Saint-Georges, and the school districts of Prairie du Cheval Blanc and La Montagne), six in

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Saskatchewan (Zenon Park/Arborfield, Battleford, Gravelbourg/ Willow Bunch, Redvers, Prince Albert, and Prud’homme/Vonda), and two in Alberta (Falher/Peace River and Saint-Paul/Bonnyville). Prud’homme/Vonda was the least-populated bilingual district (580 francophones out of 2,230 residents), while New Brunswick was the most (215,730 Acadians among the 634,555 New Brunswickers). Quebec’s North Shore contained the most significant ratio of minority members (75.7 per cent of the population were anglophones), while Windsor/Tilbury had the smallest ratio (10.3 per cent). Seventeeen of the thirty bilingual districts contained at least 5,000 minority members, and the minority represented at least 20 per cent of the population in twenty-one of the thirty bilingual districts. Finally, 39 per cent of the 1,715,585 official language minority members were covered by the recommended bilingual districts: the twenty-five bilingual districts recommended outside Quebec contained 64 per cent (593,900) of the 926,400 minority francophones, while the five bilingual districts recommended inside Quebec contained 10 per cent (78,020) of the 789,185 Anglo-Québécois. The inclusion of Montreal would have raised the coverage from 10 to 68 per cent in Quebec. Map 4.1 indicates the bilingual districts’ size and location. The Fox report stated that although in many instances “the recommendations of the two Boards are identical, there are some major changes in regard to Quebec and British Columbia” (bdab 1975, 24). The most obvious was the second board’s refusal to recommend a single bilingual district for the whole of Quebec. The second important change was the exclusion of Coquitlam, B.C., from the list of recommendations. There was also a significant difference in the degree of agreement among the members of each board. While the Duhamel Board had reached unanimous decisions in spite of some differences of opinions, the Fox report included two minority reports (Duckworth’s and Monnin’s) and two minority declarations on specific recommendations (Savoie’s and Hickman’s). The Fox report also indicated that only seven of the thirty bilingual districts recommended received unanimous support: Egmont, Digby/Yarmouth, Argenteuil/Deux-Montagnes, Gatineau/Pontiac, the North Shore, Cornwall/Hawkesbury, and SaintBoniface/Rouge/Seine. Since these differences were arguably minor for the most part, one could conclude that, despite disagreements and significant differences in approaches and interpretations, the Fox Board had come to the same

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Map 4.1 The thirty bilingual districts recommended by the Fox Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, 1975 Source: Report of the Bilingual Districts Advisory Board (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975), 43.

general conclusions as the Duhamel Board. The issue of Quebec was the exception, of course, but this was expected once the Fox Board heeded the advice of the Secretary of State and refused to recommend a bilingual district for the entire province. Despite its clear preference for bilingual districts, the Fox Board conceded that “Section 9 (2) could be used on occasion either as an alternative to Section 9 (1) or as a supplement to it” (bdab 1975, 25). Thus, the board did not feel compelled to “apply exactly the same criteria to the determination of bilingual districts and to the provision of bilingual services” in Quebec as elsewhere (18). It presented a political argument justifying asymmetry in its specifications. Since its mandate was to ensure “the equality of treatment of the two languages in similar minority situations,” and since there was an “imbalance in the provision of services in

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the French language,” even in Quebec (18), the board decided to “compensate for past deficiencies in French language services and to provide for any continuing differential needs” (33). It consequently recommended ways to guarantee that the “French-speaking minorities would receive services similar to those which the English-speaking minority had traditionally received in Quebec” (18). The board decided “to be less exacting in recommending some bilingual districts which contained a French-speaking minority than in recommending some districts which included an English-speaking minority” (33). While it admitted that its approach “might not be endorsed everywhere,” the board believed that its explanations would convince the silent majority (36). “Alternative arrangements” to bilingual districts (bdab 1975, 34) were needed in Quebec because the language issue there was “unique” (73). Ironically, New Brunswick was also “unique” (66), and British Columbia was “not a province like the others” as far as the language question was concerned (163). The board identified four particular circumstances in Quebec, circumstances most obvious in Montreal. First, the minority had received federal services in its mother tongue in the past and “it was most unlikely that any federal government would diminish or eliminate such services in the future” (34). Indeed, the board “rarely, if ever, discovered a complaint or a case in which federal services had not been provided in English to the minority in Quebec” (17). The opposite was true: “We did discover many instances and received many complaints about the lack of provision of French services by federal departments, agencies and crown corporations in a number of localities in which French-speaking persons were in the minority” (17–18). Second, the other federal provisions for the protection of English in Quebec remained: “Section 93 of the British North America Act still guarantees the existence of denominational schools, which in Quebec are tantamount to English-speaking schools … [and] Section 133 of the same statute continues to sanction the use of English in Quebec’s legislature as well as in all federal courts and in all provincial courts in Quebec” (73). Such rights were not available to francophones outside Quebec. Third, “the English-speaking community [in Montreal] was on the whole strong, numerous, well-situated, and influential … [and thus had] little need for the added protection that would be afforded by a bilingual district” (34). Finally, “the existence of the French language is in jeopardy in Quebec” (35). “[A]lthough there are statistically an official language majority and minority in the province, the psychological reality is that there are two minorities and

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no majority” (36). Consequently, the board found it necessary to concern itself with “redressing the existing imbalance in the provision of services in the French language” (18). Specifically, “if equality were to be achieved and needs satisfied, the disparity would have to be rectified so that French-speaking minorities would receive services similar to those which the English-speaking minority had traditionally received in Quebec” (18). For instance, by relying on the significant demand criterion instead of bilingual districts in Quebec, the board was able to solve the Quebec dilemma and grapple “with the conflicting implications that emerged from applying the Official Languages Act throughout a country as diverse as Canada” (bdab 1975, 35). The board could thus balance conflicting factors – legal entitlement, parity, the different positions of the French and English minorities, the actual need for a bilingual district to ensure bilingual public services, alternative means to provide such services, and the existence of particular conditions (34). It was also able to accomplish four different objectives simultaneously in Québec: “to reassure the province’s English-speaking minority, to satisfy the Frenchspeaking majority, and to avoid contradiction with provincial policy while observing the precepts for the country at large” (73). The board’s reliance on significant demand in Montreal meant that the dangerous symbolic value of bilingual districts could be avoided. While the board concluded that bilingual districts were needed because no alternative, not even significant demand, could both guarantee bilingual services and provide a symbolic recognition of minority communities, it intentionally ignored the symbolic purpose of bilingual districts when specifying them in Quebec but amplified this purpose when specifying them outside that province. Although the board unequivocally sought the creation of bilingual districts throughout Canada, including Quebec, that would assist “isolated minority groups by providing them with a sense of cohesion and a symbol of their existence” (bdab 1975, 77), it refused to recommend a bilingual district in the Montreal area because the same symbolic value was not necessary for the very sizable anglophone minority residing there. And although it conceded that many anglophones believed “that English needs to be protected in Quebec” (73), it bowed to opposition from the government of Quebec, six local members of Parliament, and “the vigor with which most French mother tongue respondents objected to the creation of a bilingual district” in Montreal (106–8). Quebec’s francophone majority shared a common fear: “[A] bilingual district would encourage the use of English and thereby diminish

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the use of French, which was already in danger in Montreal” (bdab 1975, 106). Since “Montreal was a symbol of French culture,” the board argued, “Francophones would regard a bilingual district as a threat to the continuation of their culture” (108). Also, it would be “unacceptable to recommend a bilingual district in Montreal, the only metropolis in French-speaking Canada, when it was impossible, because of the lack of a minority amounting to at least ten per cent, to make a similar recommendation for any metropolis in English-speaking Canada” (109). The board added that “treating Montreal differently from the other large urban centres in Canada … would run counter to the intent of the Official Languages Act, which seeks equality of status between the two official languages” (109). Consequently, “it would be superfluous to make such a recommendation for Montreal since the minority there might be provided for in the same fashion as the minorities in other large urban centres in Canada” (34). In short, section 9 (1) would not be used in Montreal because of its symbolic purpose. Bilingual districts were thus discarded in Montreal, a particular city within a unique province, in favour of significant demand. The presence of “particular local circumstances” and “the differential needs of language minorities” in Montreal made it possible for the board to recommend “alternative arrangements” to ensure bilingual services without the recourse of “statutory right” and “parity in treatment” (35). A symbolic recognition was thus unnecessary for Montreal’s anglophones (35). The board excluded 62 census subdivisions containing 711,165 anglophones in Quebec, but only 45 subdivisions containing 332,500 francophones elsewhere. Minority communities living in these 107 subdivisions were excluded, even when they represented at least 10 per cent of the population, for three main reasons: (1) the minority population was too small; (2) the area was far from other minority areas; and (3) there were no principal offices located in the area. But in the case of Quebec, the board added a fourth general argument: the federal government already provided its services in English. For that reason, it recommended only areas of Quebec where “a district would afford the minority some additional advantage” (bdab 1975, 76). The board thus not only decided to ignore section 13 (3) guaranteeing acquired rights to anglophones in Quebec, it also decided to use the availability of federal services in both official languages as an argument against bilingual districts in that province. Moreover, in spite of claiming that “the essential factor in recommending the creation of districts was the

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need to ensure the provision of bilingual federal services in areas which met the requirements in the Act … [and] were consonant with the realities of administrative common sense and human interactions, particularly where the latter encouraged the community life of an official language minority” (24), the board abandoned this “essential factor” and “administrative common sense and human interactions” when dealing with Quebec. This was especially the case in Montreal. The board categorically refused to respect the B and B Commission’s wish for symmetrical specification (rcbb 1967, 85). The board adopted similar arguments to support its maximalist approach elsewhere, presenting five arguments in favour of a single bilingual district for the entire province of New Brunswick (bdab 1975, 63–4), which, like Quebec (73), had a “unique” sociolinguistic reality (61). First, drawing a diagonal line across the province between Edmundston and Moncton in order to make specific bilingual districts in the northern and eastern parts of New Brunswick “would create a situation in which the counties which were overwhelmingly Frenchspeaking were incorporated into a bilingual district while the counties in the south west which were preponderantly English-speaking were not recommended as a bilingual district.” This discrepancy, the board argued, “would be inequitable and injurious to the minority in the province.” Second, “such an arrangement would be incongruous … [because] the capital of a province which had passed its own official languages act to provide provincial bilingual services, would be excluded from a federal bilingual district whose purpose was to ensure the provision of similar federal services.” Third, the “confinement of bilingual districts to the north east would also exclude St. John, the principal industrial and commercial city in the province.” Excluding Fredericton and Saint John would not only prevent the francophones living in these cities from obtaining federal services in their mother tongue, but also enable the principal offices of federal departments and agencies located in those cities to avoid providing their services in both official languages. Fourth, a bilingual district might render the Acadians “a disservice in the long run by encouraging the process of assimilation to English … [in some of the areas in the north and east that] had populations that were one hundred per cent or nearly one hundred per cent of French mother tongue.” And fifth, recommending specific bilingual districts in the north and east would mean that “bilingual customs and immigration services at such strategic and very visible places as ports of entry to Canada” as Woodstock and Saint

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Stephen would not be allocated in French. The report did not add that the B and B Commission also suggested a single bilingual district for the entire province (rcbb 1969a, 528). The Fox report suffered from five minor errors in logic. First, although the board concluded that “the need for bilingual federal services prevails at all levels of government and administration” and not only at the “front desk” (bdab 1975, 17), it rejected Morency’s recommendation that principal offices “be construed to mean all offices through which the federal government, in any activity and at any administrative level, communicates directly with the public or receives communications from it” (21). According to the report, “such an interpretation would be too sweeping and too demanding an obligation to be recommended to the government”(21). But the board did not shy away from recommending more sweeping changes when it recommended that eight urban areas and all ten provincial capitals meet the significant demand criterion of section 9 (2). In fact, proclaiming bilingual districts and designating as bilingual major urban areas and the capital within a province, as it recommended, would have provided the same results as Morency’s simple recommendation. Moreover, it would arguably have implied more sweeping changes than Morency’s formula. Second, the board refused to respect section 13 (3) and rely on “custom to recommend the establishment of bilingual districts …, [since] it would apply much more frequently in Quebec than elsewhere, thereby perpetuating the inequalities that had existed in the past in the use of the two languages throughout Canada” (bdab 1975, 9), but it decided to rely on custom in not recommending a bilingual district in Montreal. Its basic premise was based on tradition: “[I]t was most unlikely that any federal government would diminish or eliminate such services in the future” (34). In short, custom both could and could not be used to recommend bilingual districts in Quebec. Third, the board modified its priorities throughout the report. On page 24, it stated that “the essential factor in recommending the creation of districts was the need to ensure the provision of bilingual federal services in areas which met the requirements in the Act … [and] were consonant with the realities of administrative common sense and human interactions, particularly where the latter encouraged the community life of an official language minority.” But on page 36, the report stated that “the criterion which the Board took as its prime concern … [was] the desirability of providing by some means federal services in their own language to all the official language minority

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groups of reasonable magnitude.” And on page 37, it stated that the board’s “first consideration” was “to ensure that bilingual services be provided by some means to as many members of the minority as possible.” In the first case, the board sought to ensure bilingual services in the areas that met the statutory requirements for bilingual districts; in the second, the board sought to provide bilingual services “by some means” where it was “reasonable”; and in the last case, it sought to ensure bilingual services “by some means” where it was “possible.” It appears that the board confused “bilingual districts” and “other means,” such as significant demand. Fourth, the board failed to tie up important loose ends. It admitted that it considered recommending “the relocation and dispersal of federal principal offices to places in New Brunswick [and Manitoba] which had such large proportions of both English and French mother tongue groups that they could constitute or be part of obvious bilingual districts” (bdab 1975, 64); yet it concluded that it would not “be advisable to recommend the relocation of federal offices” (142), because this “likely would create other difficulties” (64). It did not say what difficulties would arise or explain its refusal to “recommend the establishment of new sub-offices in bilingual areas for departments whose services were used extensively by the public” (64). The board gave two weak reasons for its refusal to take advantage of section 15 (3). It argued that it could only recommend administrative changes in federal services “if these alterations were necessary to adapt a federal bilingual district to a provincial or municipal bilingual area” (bdab 1975, 174). This was false, for while section 15 (3) did state that the board could “recommend to the Governor in Council any administrative changes in federal services in the area that it considers necessary to adapt the area to a provincial or municipal bilingual area,” it added immediately that the board could also recommend such changes “for the greater public convenience of the area or to further the purposes of the Act.” The board could therefore recommend the relocation of offices and the establishment of sub-offices in bilingual districts. The board also argued that “the problem of the location of federal offices was so substantial and complex that we believed it required much more study than we had been able to devote to it” (14). This argument is not convincing, since the board spent considerable time dealing with the more substantial and complex problem of specifying “significant demand” under section 9 (2), which was beyond its mandate. Why was section 9 (2) worth the effort but not section 15 (3)?

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And fifth, the report selectively interpreted the B and B Commission’s vision of bilingual districts. On page 38, the board quoted the commission in order to support its varied application of specification criteria within and outside Quebec: “Evaluation of the ‘circumstances’ will be the only problem; each case will need its own assessment. It should not be a matter of applying the principle blindly without taking account of any difficulties in particular instances” (rcbb 1967, 86). However, the Board failed to quote a more important passage from the B and B report: “The adoption of uniform criteria for defining these unilingual areas [and, by extension, the bilingual districts,] is a factor in treating the two official languages equally. We believe each group would find the absence of its language more acceptable in one area if the rule were applied to the other official language in other areas” (85). Yet according to another passage of the B and B report, “[i]f the minimal conditions are present, the linguistic systems automatically assure that equality will be realized in concrete situations. To view equality in this way does not mean that we think the two main linguistic groups will enjoy the same services everywhere; this would be absurd in practice. It does mean that wherever similar conditions are found, similar services will be offered” (x1iii). This last passage, along with the commission’s opinion that at least seven census divisions in the Montreal area satisfied the 10 per cent criterion to qualify as bilingual districts (108) and F.R. Scott’s appeal for symmetrical specification (rcbb 1969a, 566), counters the Fox Board’s logic. The board thus selectively picked one supporting passage from the B and B report but failed to reproduce four contrary passages. The Fox Board made four additional recommendations (bdab 1975, 171). First, it recommended “that services be provided, to the extent it is possible, in both official languages under Section 9 (2) and Section 10 of the Official Languages Act in all federal offices of any kind serving the public and located in large urban centres which had in 1971 at least 5,000 persons whose language most often spoken at home was the minority official language in the respective locality.” “Significant demand” would thus be defined according to geolinguistic criteria, although the critical mass would be based on “the figures for language most often spoken at home rather than by mother tongue” (29). Cities like Toronto, Winnipeg, Quebec City, St Catharines, Edmonton, Vancouver, Sherbrooke, and Montreal would satisfy this criterion. Second, it recommended “that services be provided, to the extent it is possible, in both official languages under Section 9 (2) and Section 10 of the Official

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Languages Act in all federal offices of any kind serving the public and located in each of the provincial capitals in Canada.” Five arguments buttressed this recommendation: (1) “provincial capitals deserve unique treatment because of their status and significance”; (2) they “are invariably the site of numerous and important offices of the federal government”; (3) they “are foci and transit points for travelers and visitors from other parts of Canada as well as from other parts of the province”; (4) they “are the sites and distribution points of important provincial services as well as certain municipal services”; and (5) they “are important symbols that should exemplify the principle of the Official Languages Act by portraying the image of a bilingual country” (31–2). Therefore, in addition to Fredericton, located in the bilingual district of New Brunswick, and the four capitals recommended under significant demand, federal departments and agencies should ensure that their principal offices in Halifax, Charlottetown, St John’s, Regina, and Victoria provided their services in both official languages. Third, the board recommended “that all federal offices supplying bilingual services announce this fact to the public by posting appropriate bilingual signs near the point of service.” The fourth additional recommendation was “that an independent agency be created as a full-time, continuing body composed of from three to five members, to conduct research and investigations in the fields of language policies and problems in Canada, to issue reports upon such activities, and to provide information and advice upon language matters.” As described above, the report included two minority statements and two dissenting minority reports. The minority statements written by Harry Hickman and Adélard Savoie approved the rest of the report but refuted the board’s argument that a bilingual district was not necessary in Montreal. Savoie even called the decision a “stupendous omission” (219). He chastised his colleagues for having “taken liberties with the interpretation of the Act” by giving precedence to section 9 (2) over 9 (1) (215). In his opinion, minorities “should be afforded the best protection available” because “custom is a shaky foundation for the right of a people” (215–16). Finally, he chided his colleagues for having fallen prey to the “political ideology” that claimed that French was in jeopardy in Quebec (219): the ideology, he warned, should not become a “dogma to which should be sacrificed such basic principles as justice and equity.” Monnin shared Savoie’s critique, but he thought the board’s exclusion of Montreal was such a “shocking” decision (236) that it warranted a dissenting report. Duckworth’s dissenting report was based on a different logic. Brushing aside the symbolic purpose of

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bilingual districts, she argued that contributing to “the self-esteem” of the minorities was “not the function of a bilingual district” (230). Its purpose was strictly administrative. Since bilingual districts outside the bilingual belt would become “a heavy mechanism, and a difficult one to dislodge” (230), they should only be proclaimed in the areas of the country “where it is possible to live fully in either of the two official languages” (234). However, she refused to recommend a bilingual district in Montreal, located in the middle of the bilingual belt and arguably the most obvious area of the country where the minority could live fully in its mother tongue. Instead, she recommended that the federal government allocate its bilingual services according to the provisions of section 9 (2). The Fox report, much like the acrimonious deliberations it tried to gloss over, was probably the Fox Board’s own worst enemy. Its minimalist approach in Quebec became just as controversial as the maximalist approach used by the first board. Its explicit argumentation opened as many doors for criticism as had the first Board’s lack of explanations. Its internal dissensions, drawn out by months of endless deliberations and highlighted by four minority statements and reports, discredited the report as much as the lack of deliberations had discredited the first board’s report. In the end, both reports would be shelved. Nevertheless, the Fox report’s limitations were not responsible for the demise of the cornerstone program. The federal Cabinet accepted the report almost in its entirety and, at the time of its publication, had no intention of abandoning the program. On the contrary, the Trudeau government publicly reaffirmed its commitment to bilingual districts, although it indicated that it would correct what it considered to be the board’s main errors before proclaiming at least thirty bilingual districts within months. In short, although a few of the Fox recommendations were shelved, most were accepted. The bilingual districts program was thus not terminated because of the report’s weaknesses, as some have suggested (Cartwright 1976; McRae 1978; Williams 1981; Cartwright and Williams 1982). Something significant happened between the publication of the Fox report, on 31 October 1975, and Cabinet’s ultimate decision to terminate the program, on 23 December 1976. That something was tbs’s “sabotage” of the program. But a series of events would be needed to make Cabinet accept tbs’s arguments and abandon the cornerstone of its own policy. These events occurred in the summer of 1976. They could not have happened at a worse time for the vulnerable bilingual districts. The program’s fate was sealed once Cabinet faced the ultimate decision.

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th e f e d e r a l c a b i n e t ’ s e f f o r t , 1 9 7 5 – 1 9 7 7

As was the case in 1971–72, the federal Cabinet’s effort followed standard operating procedures. First, it asked an interdepartmental committee of civil servants to analyse the Fox report and suggest decision options for Cabinet consideration. It also consulted the provincial governments on the Fox report. Subsequently, Cabinet took a final decision. However, as was the case with the Duhamel report, there were slight deviations from the norm in the handling of the Fox report. In particular, there were not one but two memos written for Cabinet consideration. The first, which recommended thirty-one bilingual districts, was shelved by tbs. The alternate memo, which recommended the termination of the bilingual districts program, was submitted to Cabinet. In between the shelving of the first memo and the submission of the second, a series of events aggravated sociolinguistic tensions. By the time Cabinet finally studied the surreptitious memo from tbs in December 1976, bilingual districts had become a symbolic “red rag to a bull.”210 Bilingual districts were the cornerstone of the B and B Commission reports and the Official Languages Act, yet this very symbolic purpose became a liability at the critical time.

a)

The Initial Analysis

On 13 November 1975, Cabinet met for the first time on the Fox report. On that day, it simply agreed with the accompanying recommendation made by the minister responsible, Treasury Board President Jean Chrétien, to set up a neutral interdepartmental committee whose mandate would be to study the report in depth with respect to three specific objectives.211 First, the committee should “review all recommendations of the report, including their impact on the federal public service, and (i) define the limits of each bilingual district which the government might proclaim across the country, and (ii) determine the extent to which the government should implement the report’s recommendations bearing on large urban centres and provincial capitals.” Second, it should “propose a programme of federal-provincial consultation related to the implementation of the report’s recommendations.” And third, it should “propose a detailed programme for the proclamation of bilingual districts, including an appropriate information programme.” Pursuant to a similar decision made on 7 November 1974, Cabinet also asked the tb president, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to

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“submit the resulting proposals to Cabinet at the earliest date possible.” At the time it received the Fox report, Cabinet clearly intended to proclaim bilingual districts. tbs never established the interdepartmental committee. The secretariat’s hierarchy obviously wanted the analysis of the Fox report to remain under its control from the moment Cabinet received its copy. Instead of an interdepartmental committee, tbs set up an internal task force and appointed Morris Miller as its chair.212 Neil Morrison and Roland Morency were two of the five other members of the tbs task force. The members worked separately on their respective tasks over six months, then Miller collected their texts and collated them into a draft memo for Cabinet’s consideration. The government tabled the Fox report in the House of Commons on 21 November 1975.213 Bud Drury, the acting president of Treasury Board, told the members of Parliament that the concept of bilingual districts would be retained and that the government “will proceed with the proclamation of bilingual districts.” In the government’s opinion, the thirty bilingual districts recommended by the Fox Board were “acceptable,” but the government would nevertheless proclaim additional bilingual districts in Quebec, because the board’s minimalist approach in Quebec was “not acceptable.” Drury promised that the government would “review all Quebec areas, including Montreal and Sherbrooke, and certain other areas as Rouyn-Noranda and Schefferville, using the same approach and principles that will apply to the final establishment of boundaries of bilingual districts in other parts of the country.” In short, “there will be one or more bilingual districts in the Montreal area, and there will be others across Quebec, according to the guidelines we intend to follow in other provinces.” Drury added that the maximalist approach used in New Brunswick would also be reviewed: “[S]pecial attention will be given to the recommendation that the entire province of New Brunswick be made into a federal bilingual district, in terms of the real needs of the various regions of that province.” Drury’s statement also responded to the four additional recommendations presented in the Fox report. The federal government agreed to designate the provincial capitals and the major urban areas as bilingual regions under section 9 (2). It also agreed to ensure a proactive offer of bilingual services by posting signs indicating the availability of such services. However, it refused to create a permanent research body. In a press release issued the same day, the government repeated its promise to proclaim bilingual districts. It added that, contrary to the

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Fox report’s assertions, section 9 (2) did not provide a better way to allocate bilingual services in Montreal, because “all the minorities in the country are entitled to receive the same precise statutory protection.”214 Consequently, the government would apply in Quebec “the same spirit and the same principles that will determine the final delineation of bilingual districts in the other provinces.”215

b)

The Reactions to the Fox Report

Four provincial governments responded to Trudeau’s letter of 21 November 1975 requesting their feedback on the Fox report.216 Alberta and Ontario repeated their arguments favouring a less symbolic mechanism but added that they would not oppose the proclamation of federal bilingual districts on their turf.217 New Brunswick once again supported the bilingual districts program and the proclamation of a single bilingual district for the entire province.218 And Newfoundland approved a bilingual district for Port-au-Port but warned that the considerable migration occurring in the Labrador-West area could make a permanent bilingual district in that area premature.219 The federal government obtained the Quebec government’s ambivalent reaction via the media. Quebec’s Minister of the Public Service, Oswald Parent, publicly warned the federal government that bilingual districts would attack the integrity of Quebec’s territory,220 and its Intergovernmental Affairs Minister, François Cloutier, who was personally opposed to bilingual districts, publicly admitted that the Bourassa government would not oppose the federal proclamations in Quebec because “it is a federal law that affects only federal institutions” and “will change nothing in Québec.”221 Consequently, Cloutier explained, Quebec “will accept bilingual services, but only at the federal level.”222 Moreover, as the Fox report pointed out (bdab 1975, 73–4) and Cabinet’s internal analysis previously indicated,223 federal and provincial bilingual districts were compatible. Federal and provincial language policies could overlap. In the House, the Opposition condemned the Fox report. A francophone Conservative mp from Alberta, Marcel Lambert, insisted that the federal government abandon the “way of thinking of central Canada” and the “linguistic reservations or ghettos” it generated.224 Quebec Social Credit mp René Matte agreed, arguing in favour of allocating bilingual services throughout the country according to the personality principle. Matte added that no one in Quebec seemed interested in bilingual

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districts and that a bilingual district in Montreal would stir up “huge problems” in Quebec.225 The Liberal members of Parliament did not speak on the issue. Media reactions were divided. Much of the anglophone media criticized the Fox report. For instance, the Ottawa Journal condemned the board for bowing to pressure from the Quebec government and including political considerations as specification criteria.226 On the other hand, some of the francophone media lauded the report. Le Droit, for example, applauded the board for having respected the B and B Commission’s quest for “equality between the official languages minorities,”227 even though it later criticized the board for using data on mother tongue instead of language of use.228 But other francophone media attacked the Fox Board. Le Devoir published a series of articles by mathematician Charles Castonguay, who claimed the board had “sacrificed reality” by failing to recognize that any bilingual district in Quebec would threaten the French language in that province.229 It appears that Castonguay missed pages 17–18, 33–6, and 106–9 of the Fox report. Le Devoir also published an analysis by demographer Hubert Charbonneau, who showed how Castonguay’s simplistic conclusions were not borne out by more detailed census data.230 Some of the media lauded the federal government’s response. Columnist Maurice Western congratulated the Trudeau government on its symmetrical stand and its rejection of the Quebec government’s “irrelevant” opposition.231 Columnist Charles Lynch also applauded the federal government’s refusal to implement an asymmetrical sociolinguistic policy and its courage in fighting the government of Quebec’s sociolinguistic policy.232 Other media, too, concluded that the federal and provincial policies were incompatible. Le Dimanche stated that the Fox Board, faced with the incompatibility of the two statutes, had to resort to political considerations rather than the “strict observation of the demographic situation.”233 Le Jour explained why the government of Quebec rejected the idea of territorial divisions along sociolinguistic lines within the province: bilingual districts are “repugnant to the spirit” of Quebec’s Official Language Act.234 Other media criticized the federal response as well. The Ottawa Journal squarely put in doubt the concept of bilingual districts, ignoring their symbolic purpose: “The federal government should quietly provide its services in both languages where justified and forget the elaborate apparatus of designating official bilingual enclaves.”235 Finally, the Acadian daily

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l’Évangéline advised the federal government to abandon its bilingual districts in favour of the personality principle from coast to coast.236 Public reactions to the Fox report were so rare that the Treasury Board president, Jean Chrétien, decided to test public opinion by leaking to the media a study recommending five bilingual districts in the Montreal area.237 Prepared by a Library of Parliament researcher for a committee of local Liberal mp s chaired by Chambly mp Bernard Loiselle,238 the study unequivocally defended the concept of bilingual districts against the significant demand option. Section 9 (2) did “not provide to the linguistic minorities the same guarantees of bilingual services nor the same security as section 9 (1)”; “it gave a large measure of discretionary power to the civil servants” responsible for its implementation; and it could not “favour Canadian unity”.239 Bilingual districts presented five significant advantages over significant demand: (1) their symbolic value would “undoubtedly fortify the [minority’s] sense of security and cohesion”; (2) they would “encourage the community life of an official language minority”; (3) they would constitute a de jure “recognition of the equal status of both official languages throughout Canada, in spite of their de facto inequality at the provincial and municipal levels”; (4) they would “encourage the other orders of government to offer services in both official languages to their minority”; and (5) they would “raise the awareness of the local majority concerning the minority’s rights.”240 The study also reiterated that section 9 (2) was a complement to bilingual districts, providing bilingual services beyond their reach. Excerpts of the study were published by Le Devoir on 7 and 9 February 1976,241 but the “huge problems” predicted by mp René Matte and anticipated by Chrétien did not ensue.242 Chrétien, in a move designed to quell the outcry that did ensue in southern Ontario, decided to participate in an extraordinary public meeting on bilingual districts in Welland. Since the publication of the Fox report, a few local citizens had opposed the board’s recommendation of Welland/Port Colborne. Some anglophones and the St Catharines Chamber of Commerce opposed the inclusion of St Catharines but agreed on a bilingual district that would serve the peripheral areas, while other anglophones opposed any proclamation in the area. An organized anti-bilingualism “backlash” group convinced local mp Gilbert Parent, a francophone, to ask Chrétien to explain the federal policy, bilingual districts, and their impact in the area.243 On 24 March 1976, Chrétien faced an agitated Welland crowd openly hostile to the Fox recommendation.244 Earlier that day, the media created

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a minor controversy by publishing an interview with the Fox Board’s cartographer, Donald Cartwright, in which he questioned the wisdom of the board’s recommendations outside the bilingual belt linking Moncton and Sudbury.245 Chrétien discussed the issue with tbs staff during his flight from Ottawa to Welland, but it did not hamper his defence of bilingual districts or the proclamation of a cornerstone in the area.246 In his typically straightforward manner, Chrétien conceded that the federal policy would increase federal expenditures, but he immediately added that these costs “are the price we all pay for keeping our country together. And despite what anyone tells you, the price is cheap. We are not throwing money away.” Bilingual districts were the most effective and efficient mechanism to ensure an appropriate implementation of the federal government’s sociolinguistic policy, which pursued honorable objectives: ensure that anglophones in Quebec and francophones elsewhere, wherever possible, could communicate with their federal government and obtain federal services in their own language.247 A bilingual district in the area, in his opinion, was very logical because the local francophones represented 17 per cent of the population, a rate much higher than the percentage of anglophones living in Sherbrooke, Quebec.248 One member of the audience then made a formal request: since the federal government had shelved the Duhamel report because of opposition in Quebec, could it extend the same courtesy to the other nine provinces and shelve the Fox report because of anglophone opposition? Chrétien refused, stating that the federal government would not abandon bilingual districts and would in fact proclaim many in the near future according to uniform criteria across the country: “If we create bilingual districts in Ontario, we will create them as well in Quebec, Bill 22 or not.”249 He guaranteed symmetrical specification: First, the rule will apply in Quebec as it applies everywhere. What the Quebec government will tell us, or not tell us, is not a factor. I’m committed to a rule that will apply equally to the minority of French in English-Canada, and the minority English in French-Canada. So don’t say that Quebec has objected, and that we are not going to do it. We are going to do it, objections or no objections. We will apply exactly the same rule. If there is no bilingual district in Quebec, there will be no bilingual districts in Ontario. There will be only one rule in my book.250

Chrétien had no intention of abandoning bilingual districts at this point, although his endorsement of the cornerstone was lukewarm. He

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had previously considered scrapping the program should the Fox Board recommended such a move, arguing publicly that his role was to ensure bilingual services “in every part of the country.”251 However, Chrétien had not considered this alternative after the Fox Board made no such recommendation and no backlash erupted against the possible proclamation of five bilingual districts in the Montreal area. A week later, the Commissioner of Official Languages, Keith Spicer, repeated his concerns. In his fifth annual report to Parliament, published on 31 March 1976, he lauded the Fox report as “a remarkably thorough and thoughtful document” (Spicer, 1976, 16). In summarizing his earlier assessment of bilingual districts, however, he stated: “[T]he political and psychological disadvantages of bilingual districts still probably outweigh their symbolic value and their arguable administrative convenience” (17). He provided an additional reason to favour significant demand: “[B]ilingual districts and the Board’s other proposed bilingual areas will occasion significant new expense [that do not justify] benefits in some cases largely symbolic, and perhaps with little net gain in better bilingual services” (18). But he also conceded that the symbolic value of bilingual districts had been underestimated: Thus the rather thoughtless, and sometimes inadvertently demagogic, word “ghetto” hardly applies, except perhaps ironically to indicate that Canadians living in bilingual districts will enjoy more clearly protected language rights than their countrymen elsewhere. Far from reducing anyone’s rights, indeed, bilingual districts add a specific, administratively practical guideline for formally extending the local majority’s established federal language rights to the local minority … Of course, the perception of benefit from bilingual districts varies greatly from a culturally secure French Quebecer to a culturally isolated French-speaker in Sudbury or Saint-Boniface. Probably for some remote or insecure official-language minorities, such districts are worth some investment in formal recognition of their identity. (18)

Consequently, Spicer suggested that the federal Cabinet start “gradually with a few districts, where practical as well as symbolic benefits are plain and costs fairly modest” (Spicer, 1976, 18). Indeed, “the realistic – indeed statutory – course now seems to urge an old college try at helping make bilingual districts work” (17). This would include a public awareness campaign: “The Government’s astonishing refusal to bother explaining bilingual districts to citizens directly affected has already encouraged a few small but noisy groups grotesquely to distort

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the districts concept” (18–19). Ironically, it was Spicer’s previous public criticism of bilingual districts as ghettos that particularly distorted the concept.

c)

The Miller Report

On 25 May 1976, Morris Miller presented the preliminary findings of his task force to Jean Chrétien, tb Secretary Gordon Osbaldeston, and tbs Director of Official Languages Bill McWhinney.252 Miller had requested the meeting because he wanted formal feedback before wrapping things up. The report was written as a memo to be submitted to Cabinet for final approval. Knowing that Chrétien was “a non-reader,” Miller made an audiovisual presentation to accompany the draft memo and added a four-page summary.253 The presentation included maps and tables. The forty-three page draft memo concluded that bilingual districts were a more appropriate mechanism than significant demand to support the federal policy.254 It presented three basic arguments to back its conclusion. First, “bilingual districts are symbolic”; they reinforce “the equality of status of the English and French languages” on a regional basis and represent “an encouragement to other jurisdictions to provide bilingual services.” Second, bilingual districts offer a more solid protection of minority rights because, therein, “the provision of service to the public in both official languages is ‘guaranteed,’ in the sense that it is not subject to administrative discretion as to what constitutes ‘significant demand’ or ‘feasibility.’” Indeed, the draft noted that the bilingual regions established since 1973 had “deficiencies”: section 9 (1) provided a “means for guaranteeing the provision of bilingual federal services” that section 9 (2) did not. And third, bilingual districts were the best administrative mechanism to adequately serve the four different “language zones” in Canada where one finds particular minority conditions and needs. The four zones are the bilingual belt between Moncton and Sudbury, the important francophone “islands” outside the bilingual belt, the Anglo-Québécois belt between Sherbrooke and Hull, and the important anglophone “islands” located outside the anglophone belt. In short, bilingual districts should be proclaimed in the obvious bilingual areas of the country, and they should be complemented by bilingual regions according to the significant demand in the less obvious areas. Significant demand was the best mechanism to allocate these services outside bilingual districts.

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The task force did not reach that conclusion easily. One of its members argued that the program should be abandoned because the provincial governments did not want to create joint bilingual districts: “[I]f bilingual districts are to be joint federal-provincial-local endeavours, as was envisaged by the B and B Commission, and as the Government and Parliament seemed to have contemplated when the Official Languages Act was drafted and enacted, such bilingual districts could only be established in New Brunswick and possibly Manitoba, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia.”255 Since such a move would be a “capitulation” to “pressures from provinces or special interest groups in this matter,” the federal Cabinet could include as “guidelines” for the proclamation of bilingual districts “the willingness of the provinces to co-operate actively not only in the determination of the boundaries of the districts but in ensuring that provincial and local services (including schools) are also made available in both languages in these districts.”256 Therefore, “it would be possible for the federal government to act consistently by not creating bilingual districts in a province that did not want them, while at the same time providing services in both official languages in areas where the size of the minority warranted it, as in any case it is required to do under Section 9 (2) of the Official Languages Act.”257 The draft memo lamented the absence of provincial cooperation but did not recommend making the proclamation of bilingual districts contingent on provincial approval.258 The draft memo presented five alternatives to Cabinet based on different demolinguistic formulae, ranging from the thirty-one bilingual districts that resulted from the second formula (10 per cent of the minority according to mother tongue) to thirty-three bilingual districts. The first formula – proclaiming the thirty bilingual districts recommended in the Fox report, in addition to bilingual districts in Montreal and Sherbrooke according to symmetrical specification – would serve 48 per cent of the 926,400 minority francophones and 82 per cent of the 789,185 minority anglophones. The other four formulae would use different numerical criteria intended to complement the proportional criterion of 10 per cent, although they also distinguished between mother tongue and languageof-use data. They were applied in areas where the minority represented 10 per cent of the population and either (1) 1,500 members of the minority mother tongue; (2) 1,500 members of the minority language of use; (3) 5,000 members of the minority mother tongue; or (4) 5,000 members of the minority language of use. The fourth formula is the most restrictive; it would only serve 37 per cent of the francophone minority and 76 per cent of the anglophone minority.

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The draft memo also concluded that Cabinet should proclaim, as soon as possible, thirty-one bilingual districts: one in Nova Scotia (Clare/Yarmouth), seven in New Brunswick (Westmorland, Kent, Northumberland, Gloucester, Restigouche, Madawaska, and Victoria), fourteen in Quebec (Island of Montreal, Île Jésus, Vaudreuil, Châteauguay, Chambly, Brossard, Beloeil/Saint-Hilaire, Deux-Montagnes, Huntingdon, Argenteuil, Stanstead, Brome/Missisquoi, Pontiac, and Gaspé), seven in Ontario (Niagara, Prescott/Russell/Glengarry, Stormont, Nippising, Temiskaming, Cochrane, and Sudbury), and two in Manitoba (Saint-Boniface/Saint-Vital and the Rivière Rouge school district). There would be no bilingual districts in Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, Alberta, or British Columbia. The thirty-one areas were similar to the Fox Board’s recommendations except for the inclusion of Montreal. As the task force noted, no territorial approach could cover every minority member and community. This was precisely why a second paragraph was added to section 9. The task force seized on this opportunity to extend bilingual services as much as possible outside bilingual districts and to solve the dilemma posed by limiting bilingual services therein to services provided according to the “ambiguous” concept of principal offices.259 The Miller report called this solution the “reasonable person” approach.260 Its implementation would translate into two specific results. First, all offices serving the public within a bilingual district would be considered the principal offices of that district. Roland Morency’s briefing notes, rejected by the Fox Board, had thus been resuscitated. Second, all departments and agencies of the federal government that did not have an office in a bilingual district would be obliged to provide public services in both official languages within the bilingual district: “[I]t is further recommended that arrangements be made so that appropriate bilingual services can be provided by a department or agency which does not have an office in a particular bilingual district even though it serves the district.”261 The suggestions made to the Fox Board by Clifford McIsaac (modify the Act so that bilingual services would be allocated from the federal offices serving the areas designated as bilingual districts, instead of by the principal offices located in the bilingual districts) and by Brad Smith and Neil Morrison (use section 15 (3) to force the federal departments and agencies to adapt their respective administrative structures to the geolinguistic reality of the country) also found their way out of the dustbins of the Fox Board archives, despite their explicit rejection by the board (bdab 1975, 64, 142).

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Miller concluded his oral presentation by urging Chrétien and his Cabinet colleagues to proclaim bilingual districts, select their number and size according to the particular specification formula they preferred, and implement them according to a reasonable person approach.262 Cabinet should thus take three steps: (1) adopt and proclaim a uniform mechanism (i.e., bilingual districts); (2) determine the types of federal services to be allocated to the minority in each of the bilingual districts within the four distinct types of language zones; and (3) designate the principal offices of each federal department and agency so that each department and agency would provide its services to the minority residing in each bilingual district. This layered complexity compensated for the Fox Board’s neglect of the administrative consequences of its recommendations. The inherent problems generated by limiting bilingual services within bilingual districts to the principal offices of the federal departments and agencies had been well documented, but Miller’s complex solution was sufficiently novel to motivate him to request what would be an extraordinary meeting with Chrétien before he completed the memo to Cabinet. Miller’s fears were confirmed when Chrétien did not initially understand the nuances stemming from a layered implementation. Indeed, Chrétien insisted on a uniform mechanism.263 Miller replied that a uniform mechanism was exactly what the task force proposed, even though its implementation would be complex. Chrétien proposed two other options, but in each case Miller responded, “Minister, you cannot do that. The Act does not allow you to do that.”264 Screening the relevant slides again, he demonstrated the various implementation scenarios of the uniform mechanism. Chrétien finally approved the plan and agreed to submit the memo to Cabinet.265 Immediately after the meeting, Miller, Osbaldeston, and McWhinney left Chrétien’s office together.266 Miller expressed relief that after seven years and two specification efforts bilingual districts would finally be established. But McWhinney said that Chrétien had not agreed with the draft memo and would not recommend the proclamation of bilingual districts unless there was uniform implementation. “That’s not what he agreed to,” Miller responded. McWhinney repeated that Chrétien preferred a uniform approach. Miller disagreed, saying that Chrétien accepted the uniform mechanism of bilingual districts, as well as its layered implementation. “No, he doesn’t,” McWhinney responded. Miller suggested going back and asking the minister himself, but McWhinney and Osbaldeston refused. Miller capitulated: “Then I quit

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this thing! This is a farce!” Turning to Osbaldeston, Miller added, “You are completely disregarding what the task force recommends. And you are ascribing to the minister something he didn’t say.” The Treasury Board Secretariat shelved the Miller report. In fact, there is no trace of the report in the tbs archives, even though tbs usually saved every document in its filing system. Osbaldeston then asked his staff to write an alternate memo for Cabinet. Over the summer months, two tbs officials drafted the final memo.267 They copied almost the entire content of the Miller report but recommended the termination of the bilingual districts program. This extreme conclusion would be difficult to recommend on 25 May 1976, six months after Cabinet categorically promised to create bilingual districts throughout the country, without conclusive arguments against the cornerstone of the federal policy. Moreover, tbs’s preferred option – bilingual regions rather than bilingual districts – would have to pass two major hurdles before it reached Cabinet. First, it would have to be approved by the Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers, created by Cabinet on 3 June 1976 to assess the entire federal sociolinguistic policy. This committee included the heads of Cabinet’s Federal-Provincial Relations Committee, the Privy Council, the National Capital Commission, Treasury Board, and the Public Service Commission. Second, the tbs option would have to survive the scrutiny of the Privy Council officials responsible for proofreading memos to Cabinet. tbs cleared both hurdles successfully, but it was aided by significant events over the summer months.

d)

The Summer of 1976

Before the memo was completed, two important events occurred between 21 June and 17 August 1976 that would alter the political climate and facilitate the tbs deviation, thus forming another thread in the rope that would hang bilingual districts. The air traffic controllers strike and the Bibeau report convinced Cabinet that the officially proclaimed bilingual districts had become “red rags” and that the more discreet bilingual regions were an adequate substitute. On 21 June 1976, air traffic controllers in Toronto, Calgary, Edmonton, London, North Bay, Moncton, and Gander went on strike for reasons of “security” in the skies of Quebec.268 In their opinion, the use of French in communications with pilots endangered the lives of passengers. The Globe and Mail stated that numerous near misses occurred

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over Quebec because of the use of French. Three days later, the same newspaper published an article explaining how the Canadian Air Line Pilots Association had manipulated public opinion with a false claim. According to the newspaper, the association opposed federal policy on bilingualism in the skies and had used scare tactics to frighten the public into convincing the federal government to abandon its policy.269 The crisis had been fabricated, but the damage was done. On 27 June, the federal government announced that French would only be permitted in communications between air traffic controllers and pilots over Quebec skies, but only if its newly appointed commission of inquiry into the matter decided that it was safe to do so.270 On 17 August 1976, the federal government published the Bibeau report. This report was written by a committee set up in November 1974 to evaluate the federal government’s language training programs for federal civil servants. Chaired by Gilles Bibeau, the committee’s overall assessment was “not very inspiring: it describes an imposing machine which has numerous deficiencies and whose overall perceptible yield is not very great.”271 The report recommended that Treasury Board overhaul its procedures for designating bilingual positions within the civil service, since there existed “significant and diverse deficiencies in a number of aspects of the programme.”272 The media would highlight the negative aspects of the report.273 The impact of these two events on how the Canadian public felt about bilingualism is inconclusive. Before the events, a Gallup poll had already revealed that anglophones were becoming apathetic towards the issue. On 19 May, the poll indicated that 54 per cent of Canadians thought that the federal government was giving bilingualism too much importance, while 22 per cent thought the opposite.274 Public opinion split along socilinguistic lines: while the vast majority of anglophone respondents thought bilingualism received too much attention from the Trudeau government, the vast majority of francophone respondents thought otherwise. After the events, the majority of Canadians still supported the allocation of bilingual federal services and 53 per cent supported bilingual districtification,275 a level of support similar to that expressed in the 1960s. However, the majority now seemed to favour a higher proportional criterion than 10 per cent. Although one out of ten Canadians favoured the statutory criterion, four times as many thought the allocation of bilingual services should be limited to the areas of the country where “a majority use the language.”276 This expression probably meant where a majority of the local population use the language of

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the minority, but it may not have been understood this way by the respondents. It is thus difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from this survey. Moreover, this reduction in support for official bilingual districtification was accompanied by an increase in support for the personality principle. Thirty-seven per cent thought bilingual services should be allocated throughout the country. The conclusions are thus tenuous. Former Cabinet minister John Turner nevertheless concluded, on 25 October 1976, that, “at the present time, instead of uniting the country, bilingualism has become a symbol of a series of frustrations.”277 Four months later, the situation had returned to normal. Public opinion once again supported the federal policy.278 The Parti québécois victory in November 1976 had shaken Canadians from their complacency on the sociolinguistic policy and their preoccupation with the devilish details of its implementation. Had Cabinet studied the tbs memo one month before the unsetting events of the summer of 1976, say when Miller presented his report to Chrétien in May 1976, or a month after it decided to abandon bilingual districts, say in February 1977, it might have come to a different conclusion. The timing of the summer of 1976 events could not have been worse. However, the tbs deviation occurred before the controversial events. Indeed, the secretariat shelved the Miller report before the air traffic controller crisis and the release of the Bibeau report. The deviation was the critical event in the bilingual districts’ demise.

e)

The Treasury Board Secretariat Deviation

The Treasury Board Secretariat deviated from the government’s policy on 25 May 1976. It had been planning the move since 13 November 1975, if not before; this is evident in its intentional neglect to establish the interdepartmental committee requested by Cabinet on that date. Instead, it immediately created its own internal task force. It then shelved the Miller report because, as one tbs official explained, “[w]e disagreed with [Miller’s] conclusion as to what should or could be done.”279 Finally, tbs facilitated its deviation by adding three tasks to the task force’s mandate. This last element deserves special consideration. At its meeting on the Fox report on 13 November 1975, as noted earlier, Cabinet decided that an interdepartmental committee should be set up to execute three specific tasks: (1) to review the Fox recommendations in order to define the limits of each acceptable bilingual district; (2) to propose a program of federal-provincial consultation

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related to the report; and (3) to propose a program for the proclamation of bilingual districts.280 The committee was asked to submit, via the president of Treasury Board and in consultation with the Secretary of State, the resulting proposals to Cabinet at the earliest date possible. The tbs memo reproduced the tasks as adopted, but stated that the interdepartmental committee “never met” and insinuated that it had been “replaced by the Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers [that] was established by the Cabinet decision of June 3, 1976 to review all aspects of the government’s official languages policies.”281 Consequently, tbs argued, the three tasks had been modified accordingly. I found no evidence that Cabinet altered its initial decision. The tbs memo slightly modified the first three tasks and added three more out of nowhere. The first of these additional tasks was to outline “the conceptual and practical problems related to selecting and proclaiming bilingual districts in the perspective of developments in official languages policies which have occurred since the Official Languages Act was proclaimed in 1969.” The second was to review “the options for and proposes lists of possible areas for proclamation as bilingual districts, selected on the basis of criteria applied consistently across the country.” And the third was to examine “alternative approaches related to the establishment of bilingual districts and/or the provision of bilingual federal services.”282 The mention of problems, consistent criteria and alternative approaches, all tbs additions, opened the door for the program’s demise. If that was not sufficient, the memo added a third set of three tasks. The frist was to consider “the question of the timing of proclamation of any bilingual districts which might be established.” The second was to examine “the financial implications related to the possible establishment of bilingual districts.” And the third was to propose “several recommendations.” The second of these tasks, notably, opened the sabotage door a bit further. Without these modified and additional tasks, it would have been difficult for tbs to recommend the cancellation of bilingual districts on the basis of the three original tasks and Cabinet’s initial position. The Privy Council Office, the Cabinet committee, and the full Cabinet never noticed the additional tasks. tbs was able to terminate the bilingual districts and undermine Trudeau’s rational policy-making system (Clark 1985). It avoided the creation of the originally recommended interdepartmental committee and instead created an internal task force to draft a memo to Cabinet critical of bilingual districts; it also eliminated the

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task force’s draft memo that recommended thirty-one bilingual districts, wrote its own draft memo, and added tasks to surreptitiously make possible a recommendation to abandon the program. The rational policy-making process more or less followed the appropriate steps, but the product that emerged respected only tbs’s internal preferences. Nevertheless, in spite of the additional and altered tasks, tbs did not believe it could convince Cabinet to abandon the program. It hoped that the Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers would do the deed. The initial draft of the tbs memo “did not repudiate the concept of bilingual districts but rather suggested that a wise policy might be to return to the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission’s spirit and recommendations on bilingual districts.”283 Indeed, it “sought to arrange and adjust [the recommendations of the Fox Board] in such a way as to make them as consistent as possible across the country.”284 To that end, the draft memo reproduced the Miller task force’s five options, noting, however, the administrative difficulties of bilingual districts. First, “in some of these districts there were very few federal offices beyond the most rudimentary post services.”285 Second, “under all options, there would be many areas where significant numbers of persons of the minority official language would be left out because their total number in a district did not meet the 10 [per cent] minimum criterion.”286 Third, public reaction, “to the extent that there had been any, was negative, both among the French-speaking and the English-speaking”287 (tbs did not add any empirical support). And fourth, “Quebec was opposed to the establishment of federal bilingual districts within its borders.”288 The tbs arguments in favour of bilingual regions over bilingual districts convinced the Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers to recommend that “the federal government [should] not go ahead unilaterally but [should] only create bilingual districts where the provinces were prepared to cooperate.”289 The provincial option was what tbs recommended to the steering committee,290 but it was not what it wanted. tbs wanted the steering committee to recommend the program’s termination. It thought that the limitation of bilingual districts to the only province that accepted to make them a joint effort (New Brunswick) would seriously undermine the program and convince the committee to terminate the program. In Ottawa, they call this a “non-starter” recommendation, one to be eliminated immediately; once it has been eliminated, the few remaining options seem rational. But the steering committee unexpectedly agreed with the non-starter recommendation and refused to recommend the program’s termination.

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tbs was caught at its own game, but its officials quickly recovered. They decided not to take the chance that Cabinet would endorse the committee’s provincial option, and thus their final memo to Cabinet rejected the recommendation. tbs gave three reasons why bilingual districts should not be created “only where the provinces are prepared to join with the federal government”: (1) “it would seem necessary to have at least the three principal provincial governments, New Brunswick, Québec, and Ontario prepared to act,” something that did not seem likely; (2) “it would lead to inconsistent treatment of official language minorities across the country”; and (3) it would “put the minority official language populations in the position of relying on the response of provincial governments to give effect to provisions of federal legislation.” Indeed, the memo argued that giving “a veto power over where and under what conditions the federal government would implement its own legislation would not seem to be an appropriate method of proceeding.”291 Somehow, these arguments were absent from the draft memo tbs submitted to the steering committee. tbs officials obviously wanted to terminate the program in May 1976. Why else would their final memo to Cabinet oppose the provincial option that their draft memo to the steering committee had recommended in the first place? tbs almost succeeded in convincing the steering committee to recommend the program’s termination. During its meeting on bilingual districts, half of the deputy ministers present believed that “the establishment of bilingual districts would not advance the cause of bilingualism and that, under the circumstances [Quebec’s opposition, the air traffic controller crisis, and the Bibeau report], the best solution would be not to create any.”292 The members repeated the usual critique, using words such as “ghettos,” “discrimination,” and “counter-productive,” saying that “Quebec would be singled out for scorn and blame” if no bilingual districts were proclaimed in that province and referring to the present inability of federal departments and agencies to meet minority demands.293 But in the end, taking into account the concerns expressed by the other half of the members, the steering committee recognized that this was “a matter on which a political judgement should be made by Cabinet.”294 This was obviously because a recommendation to terminate the program would have been seen as a drastic “about-face.”295 The steering committee then asked tbs to revise its draft for Cabinet’s consideration.296 Notably, it asked tbs to add a fifth option for Cabinet consideration: to “examine the possibility that no bilingual districts be declared.”297

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This fifth option gave tbs a partial success. It enabled the secretariat to make the fatal recommendation in its final memo. tbs even added that this recommendation was “considered by the Steering Committee on Official Languages and the majority support the recommendation.”298 For reasons that are not clear, tbs did not mention that the committee had recommended the provincial option and that only half of its members favoured the program’s termination. tbs also had to bypass the vigilant scrutiny of Privy Council officials charged with proofreading memos to Cabinet and pco committees. pco officials had been wary of tbs efforts to manipulate information to Cabinet on the federal sociolinguistic policy after Gérard Pelletier transferred the Secretary of State’s authority over bilingual districts to Treasury Board. An internal note, sent on 4 May 1976, had warned pco hierarchy that tbs was trying to bring the evaluation of the federal sociolinguistic policy under its management: “[I]t appears less than desirable to let Treasury Board evaluate such an important set of programs for which its own President is accountable.”299 The memo also warned officials that Gordon Osbaldeston was trying to gain pco’s permission to circumvent Cabinet’s decision by making all memos related to the government’s sociolinguistic policy fall under tbs control rather than the appropriate Cabinet committees.300 The same pco official also warned his superior, on 29 June 1976, that Osbaldeston would circumvent another Cabinet decision on the matter. He warned that the tbs secretary would not create, as directed by Cabinet on 13 November 1975, an interdepartmental committee on bilingual districts: “I fear that the [tb] Secretariat will simply wait until the last minute to establish an ad hoc committee to rubber-stamp its own propositions.”301 His foresight was dead on. Another note, written on 31 August 1976 by another pco official to his superior, warned that tbs was “asking Cabinet to modify an earlier decision [to proclaim bilingual districts] and, in effect, reverse a position taken publicly on its behalf last November by the Acting President of the Treasury Board …, without telling Cabinet that a reversal is involved.”302 The note added that the draft memo, dated 21 July 1976,303 erred in criticizing the Fox Board for “yielding to the temptation of ‘overcoming problems of consistency’ etc.” while tbs was itself unable to resist such temptation: tbs “is substituting cartographic neatness of questionable use to the requirement imposed by the Official Languages Act through Section 15 (3) on a Bilingual Districts Advisory Board.”304 The note added that it was impossible to know what specific districts

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tbs had in mind when it criticized the board for drawing “convoluted boundaries.”305 The note added that the Act clearly enabled the board to use discretion and subjective criteria to ensure that the administrative structures were adapted to the minority’s geolinguistic reality. The note concluded that “the Treasury Board Secretariat’s understanding of the provisions of the Official Languages Act regarding bilingual districts reflects a rather simplistic view of the spirit of that Act and of the wishes of government and Parliament.”306 The superior agreed with his subordinate’s arguments and opinions and added that tbs’s quest for consistency above all else was “a poor objective.”307 pco nevertheless distributed the final tbs memo without comment. On 14 September 1976, Robert Andras replaced Jean Chrétien as Chairman of Treasury Board.308 Andras would carry the bilingual districts to their de facto grave, although their de jure grave would only be sealed once Parliament adopted a new official languages act in 1988. A few days after Andras took the reins of Treasury Board, Bill McWhinney presented him with briefing notes on the bilingual districts.309 These notes would take the form of a memo to Cabinet from Andras on the issue. This was supposed to respect the decision made by Cabinet on 13 November 1975 to establish an interdepartmental committee to revise the Fox recommendations according to a symmetrical approach. The tbs memo used seventy-eight pages to explain why it recommended that “the Government not proceed with the establishment of bilingual districts” and instead “reaffirm its policy of providing appropriate bilingual services across the country and, in this connection, indicate its intention to review the adequacy and consistency of existing programs including notification to the public of the availability of such services”310 – in other words, why it should allocate its bilingual services according to section 9 (2) and significant demand. The tbs memo recognized that bilingual districts provided better guarantees, were “a symbol, strengthening the morale of official-language minorities,” and were “an instrument for official-language minorities to secure recognition and services from other levels of government.” But it recommended that Cabinet abandon the bilingual districts program because “the provision of appropriate bilingual federal services across the country can be best provided without resorting to the complicated process of establishing bilingual districts.” The tbs memo even stated that, in certain areas of the country, bilingual districts could not achieve some of the objectives of the Official Languages Act as effectively as bilingual regions: “[I]ndeed,

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depending on different areas, the specific creation of a district could well have negative consequences in terms of Government objectives.” The memo presented twelve “arguments against the establishment of bilingual districts.”311 1 It was very difficult to delineate adequate borders for bilingual districts: “[T]he concept of bilingual districts can not be satisfactorily applied in view of the geographic/linguistic realities of the country.” In other words, the geographic and linguistic realities of the country were too varied to justify the implementation of a uniform concept like bilingual districts: “[T]he geolinguistic factors of the official language minority populations make it difficult, if not impossible, to implement the Government’s stated policy of establishing bilingual districts ‘using the same approach and principles’ across Canada.” 2 The symbolic value of bilingual districts is negligible and is already provided by sections 2 and 9 (2): “[T]he additional legal and symbolic protection provided by a bilingual district would not appear to be crucial or essential, in view of the other existing legal and symbolic provisions in the Act, and the policies and practices of the federal Government and the Commissioner of Official Languages.” 3 “[O]fficial language minorities are more concerned about the questions of education, communication and employment than they are about the provision of bilingual federal services in general, or bilingual districts in particular.” 4 The legal guarantee provided by bilingual districts can always be abolished by an amendment to the statute: the “effectiveness and durability of the ‘guarantee’ is dubious since, if a government wished to reduce services, it could always find means to do so; and if it wished to renounce the guarantee, an amendment to the Official Languages Act could accomplish this.” 5 Significant demand can just as easily ensure bilingual services as bilingual districts: “[B]ilingual services to the public can be provided as effectively under Section 9 (2) of the Act.” The memo explained that bilingual regions provide a more flexible mechanism. 6 Bilingual services are already available in the areas recommended as bilingual districts: “[P]articularly since the Resolution on Official Languages of June, 1973, the Government has already established mechanisms for the provision of bilingual services across the country.” 7 The government will have to apply the significant demand criterion throughout the country in any case, whether as a complement to or a

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9 10

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replacement of bilingual districts: “[T]he Government would presumably wish to apply a consistent policy for the provision of bilingual services in terms of ‘significant demand’ and ‘feasibility’ regardless of whether or not there were bilingual districts.” “[B]ilingual districts, however drawn, would appear discriminatory: (i) between the two official language minorities since they would invariably ‘protect’ a higher proportion of the anglophone minority in Québec than the francophone minorities in other provinces; (ii) between members of the same official language minority (since, inevitably, some will not be included in areas in bilingual districts); [and] (iii) between the provisions for the official languages minorities and other ethnic groups.” Bilingual districts are perceived as ghettos. “[I]n the current climate, there is limited support for the establishment of bilingual districts.” The memo even argued that bilingual districts could oblige the use of French in communications between pilots and air traffic controllers throughout the country. The creation of bilingual districts “would likely lead to the standard criticism that the problem is not with the official languages policies, but with their implementation.” “[T]en years after the report of the B and B Commission, only one province is prepared to collaborate with the federal government in establishing bilingual districts.”

The last argument deserves special attention. As already noted, it was elaborated by one member of the Miller task force312 but was rejected by Miller because the Act called for federal bilingual districts. The argument nevertheless resurfaced verbatim in a memo submitted to the Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers, since the memo was written by the same pco official who assisted the Miller task force and later assisted the steering committee. The official’s memo argued that limiting bilingual districts to provinces that agreed to make them a joint program would not represent a “retreat on the part of the federal government in providing federal public services to citizens of the minority official language.”313 It suggested “that the bilingual district be used to the fullest extent possible where the provinces are willing to make available provincial, municipal and educational services in both official languages, and thereby serve as an instrument to further the cause of language justice at the provincial level, and to entrench the right to receive those services for generations to come for the citizen as a consumer of provincial and local services, and

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especially as a parent responsible for the education of his or her children.”314 An initial proclamation of joint bilingual districts would finally get them off the ground and demonstrate their value. The memo convinced the committee to accept tbs’s recommended provincial option, even if only one province was ready to create bilingual districts.315 Another pco official, however, opposed the provincial option and warned the deputy ministers against evaluating bilingual districts according to internal bureaucratic criteria. In this official’s opinion, the steering committee should only assess the program according to the three goals for which bilingual districts were adopted, namely, “(1) their role as instruments of pressure on provinces and municipalities, inviting them to offer their services in both official languages and demonstrating the ‘feasibility’ of the program; (2) their symbolic role for minorities (especially Francophones) who will see they are not abandoned by Ottawa, and (3) their role as leverage for the local minority when it requests federal assistance for their linguistic and cultural development.”316 In his opinion, limiting bilingual districts to provinces where they would become joint endeavours would not meet these goals. The official was right, although the third objective was not included in the B and B Commission’s report – it should have been replaced by “limiting the official use of English in Québec.” He also neglected to mention that bilingual districts had an administrative purpose as well. The official nevertheless stood the committee’s option on its head: instead of creating bilingual districts only where provinces agreed to make them joint units, the federal government should create them to encourage the provinces to follow suit. The provincial option would put federal bilingual districts at the mercy of provincial governments, while the B and B Commission’s goal was to encourage all governments to alter their administrative structures to fit the minority’s geolinguistic reality, and the federal statute, in great part, created beacons for provincial governments. The pco official’s suggestion was discarded by the steering committee317 but was used by tbs to reject the committee’s provincial option and, with it, bilingual districts. None of the tbs memo’s twelve arguments are valid. They are false, misleading, or contradictory. This should have raised concern in Cabinet and pco and motivated the ministers and pco officials to give the memo a second and more critical look. This did not occur. The first argument is contradicted by the fifth and sixth. If it was possible to delineate bilingual regions by tbs fiat according to significant demand, as the fifth argument implied, why was it difficult to delineate

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bilingual districts according to a more objective set of geolinguistic criteria and administrative units? In fact, the memo itself was able to delineate thirty-one bilingual districts, even though it also included the recommendation to scrap the program. If it was so difficult to delineate adequate borders, how did tbs delineate thirty-one bilingual districts? Also, since the bilingual regions created in 1973 were based on the Duhamel recommendations, how could tbs argue that it was difficult to delineate adequate borders when it had already done so according to the borders of the Duhamel recommendations? Since bilingual regions and bilingual districts were specified according to identical criteria, one cannot be easier to specify than the other. tbs and the steering committee both knew that bilingual regions were just as difficult to delineate as bilingual districts and that the principal offices issue was a common problem to both mechanisms: “There have been some operational problems related to [bilingual regions]; there is a lack of precision regarding the boundaries of these areas; and regional offices located outside the [bilingual regions] have found an added obligation to be responsive in the second official language to the requirements of the offices located within.”318 The tbs memo did not include this important information. Moreover, how was it possible to determine that bilingual regions already provided bilingual services in the areas recommended as bilingual districts, to repeat the sixth argument, if it was difficult to determine exactly where these bilingual districts were located? In other words, how could tbs conclude that bilingual services were already available in certain areas if it could not determine where these areas were located? This contradiction went unnoticed, yet eventually became the two reasons Robert Andras gave to justify the government’s termination of bilingual districts. The second part of the first argument is an unsubstantiated judgment call. No one knew for sure whether the geographic and linguistic realities of the country were too different to justify the implementation of a uniform concept like bilingual districts, since none were ever established. Only an actual implementation could have validated this assessment, although the Miller report did refute it. That report argued that bilingual districts were a better mechanism than bilingual regions to deal with such a complexity. It even concluded that the danger was not with the uniform mechanism – the bilingual districts – but with the uniform designation of principal offices in the various parts of the country to serve a variety of language zones with distinct geolinguistic needs

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and conditions. To stand the memo’s first argument on its head, one could easily argue that the bilingual regions established by tbs in 1973 were also a uniform mechanism needing complex implementation. In other words, the first argument is moot: since both bilingual districts and bilingual regions were uniform mechanisms that had to be implemented according to a complex set of variables in each area, bilingual regions had no advantage over bilingual districts. The latter, however, had a clear symbolic advantage over the former. The second argument is shown to be false by both the B and B reports and the advisory boards’ specification endeavours. The regional consultations of both boards left no doubt that the minority, as well as the majority, considered bilingual districts foremost as a symbolic recognition of the local minority homeland and a boost to the minority’s confidence to seek and obtain, among other things, bilingual services from the provincial and municipal spheres. The tbs memo provided no proof to back its opposing claim that the symbolic value was negligible. A more damning proof of the argument’s lack of validity can be found in the opposite claim made by the fifth argument. One cannot simultaneously argue that the symbolic value of bilingual districts is negligible and the bilingual regions created by significant demand are more flexible than bilingual districts. If bilingual districts no longer had the symbolic value for which the B and B Commission recommended them, how could they be less flexible than bilingual regions? In other words, how could bilingual districts be both void of symbolic value and difficult to establish because of their symbolic and statutory rigidity? Either bilingual districts have an important symbolic value, which makes them more resistant to statutory modifications, or they have no symbolic value, which makes them just as easy to establish as bilingual regions. They cannot be symbolically charged and symbolically void at the same time. Finally, the second argument is contradicted by its own second part – namely, that a symbolic value is already provided by sections 2 and 9 (2). If section 2’s official recognition of the equality of the French and English languages throughout Canada provided as much symbolic value as bilingual districts, bilingual districts would have as little or as much symbolic value as this section. In other words, how could the memo advocate sacrificing the bilingual districts’ symbolic value in favour of a general symbolic guarantee if these bilingual districts did not have a symbolic value in the first place? Section 2 had a very limited symbolic value: it was an expanded version of section 133 of the

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bna Act, which already recognized the equality of both languages throughout the country and within federal institutions. More importantly, section 2 provided a general guarantee that did not come close to the specific guarantee provided by bilingual districts. As the specification efforts indicated, the vast majority of minority members were more preoccupied with the local aspects of the federal policy, in particular the symbolic bilingual districts, than with general national symbolic recognitions. In short, while section 2 provided an expanded national symbolic recognition, it could not provide an adequate local symbolic substitute for bilingual districts. Nor could section 9 (2) and significant demand. This point was argued by the B and B Commission (rcbb 1967, 95), proven by the regional consultations conducted by both boards, and repeated in the Miller report. It was absent from the tbs memo. The third argument is misleading. While many of the minority members consulted indicated that education and media services were more important than bilingual districts per se, they nevertheless fully supported the proclamation of a bilingual district in their area because it would guarantee federal media services and boost their chances for education services. More importantly, only a few minority members put education and media services ahead of bilingual districts, since education and media services were already available in most of the areas recommended as bilingual districts. Therefore, the memo misled Cabinet by exaggerating the desire expressed by a handful of people in the few isolated communities that did not already receive education services in their language and were for the most part excluded from the bilingual districts recommended. In fact, the tbs memo gave no data backing its claim. Nor did it produce any data indicating that minority members were more preoccupied with employment in their language than with bilingual districts. Our data supports the opposite conclusion. The fourth argument is also misleading. While it is true that bilingual districts could be eliminated by a parliamentary amendment, the memo failed to add that it was much easier to eliminate or modify bilingual regions by tbs fiat. The legal guarantee provided by bilingual districts would be more solid than any guarantee provided by bilingual regions, since the former could only be abolished by a parliamentary amendment to the Official Languages Act, while the latter could be abolished at any time by a tbs memo. On a continuum of the difficulty involved in modifying policy tools, bilingual regions would have been closer to the “easy” pole, while bilingual districts, like statutes, would have been

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closer to the “difficult” pole. Since the comparison with bilingual regions was crucial, tbs’s convenient neglect seems manipulative. The fifth argument is false because, as just noted, bilingual regions created by significant demand could not ensure bilingual services as effectively as bilingual districts could. The statutory obligations of bilingual districts were clear, albeit limited by the principal offices factor, while the obligations of bilingual regions, if any, could be limited by a number of tbs conditions. This explains why both advisory boards agreed that significant demand did not provide an adequate guarantee. Nevertheless, the tbs memo correctly added that bilingual regions were more flexible than bilingual districts, but this was only because the former were not bound by the strict statutory criteria that the latter had to respect. It is in fact these same criteria that, spelled out in a statute, guaranteed the allocation of bilingual services to the bilingual areas of the country. As noted, this fifth argument also runs contrary to the second argument: it is impossible to argue simultaneously that the symbolic value of bilingual districts is negligible and that bilingual regions created by significant demand are more flexible than bilingual districts. Either both have a symbolic value that guarantees bilingual services or both have no symbolic value that ensures a flexible allocation of bilingual services. The memo misled Cabinet into thinking otherwise. The sixth argument is also false. Bilingual services were not already available in the areas recommended as bilingual districts. True, numerous bilingual services were provided by many federal departments and agencies in many of the bilingual areas along the bilingual belt, and bilingual regions created by tbs in 1973 were responsible for this success; but numerous bilingual areas were not served by bilingual regions. The Fox Board and the Miller report clearly invalidated this argument. Also, bilingual services would not be provided in the recommended bilingual districts for years to come.319 But the most damning proof of the argument’s falsity lies in the memo itself – the third argument invalidates the sixth argument. If bilingual services were “already available,” as the sixth argument stated, how could the memo also indicate that certain federal (media) services were “not available”? Either bilingual services were already available or they were requested by the minority because they were not. The seventh argument, too, is false. While it is true that the government had to apply significant demand in any case, whether as a complement to or a replacement for bilingual districts, it did not have to do so throughout the country. The proclamation of bilingual districts in the

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most obvious bilingual areas of the country would have limited the next task – the specification and application of significant demand – to a few isolated areas. In other words, significant demand would have been applied in only a few complementary areas outside bilingual districts after their creation. tbs exaggerated its claim, undoubtedly to convince Cabinet that bilingual districts would consume too much time and effort. However, significant demand would only have been applied throughout the country if bilingual regions replaced bilingual districts. This is precisely what the memo recommended. Therefore, the memo contradicted itself by simultaneously arguing that bilingual regions should replace bilingual districts and backing this conclusion with the argument that the government would have to apply significant demand throughout the country if it created bilingual regions instead of bilingual districts. The memo also contradicted itself by arguing in favour of a more strenuous and time-consuming effort to specify and implement significant demand throughout the country instead of in a few isolated areas outside bilingual districts, and stating, as it did in the fifth argument, that bilingual regions were a more flexible mechanism. In short, bilingual regions were more flexible but required more time and effort than bilingual districts. This contradiction also went unnoticed by Cabinet and pco. The eighth argument is confusing and misleading for four reasons. First, the memo correctly noted that bilingual districts excluded numerous minority members, but that was one of their purposes – to limit the allocation of bilingual services to the areas where it was feasible, even in Quebec (rcbb 1967, 115). Section 9 (2) was added afterwards to complement the bilingual districts. It was conceded that many minority communities would not justify the allocation of bilingual services, whether according to the statutory geolinguistic criteria or significant demand. This is still the case today and probably will remain so until the territorial principle gives way to the personality principle. And judging by exceptional cases, such as South Africa, the personality principle can only be applied if the vast majority of Canadians or their civil servants become bilingual. Since statistics indicate only a slight increase in the number of bilingual Canadians since 1961, such a situation will not occur any time soon. So, no matter how one allocates bilingual services according to the territorial principle, one will always exclude some minority communities and members. The argument is true but misleading. Moreover, bilingual regions would also exclude minority communities and members. They would exclude more minority communities and discriminate against more francophones and more non-official language

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groups than would bilingual districts. In fact, the thirty-one bilingual districts outlined in the memo would serve 63 per cent of the official language minorities, while bilingual regions would only serve 55 per cent. In other words, tbs used a comparative methodology to demonstrate the superiority of bilingual regions, but abandoned it when bilingual districts won the comparison. tbs did not inform Cabinet of the bilingual regions’ more limited coverage. Third, while the memo correctly noted that bilingual districts would discriminate against the francophone minority by serving more anglophones in Quebec, it failed to add that such discrimination was accepted by minority francophones. Our data indicate that minority francophones were happy to receive any symbolic recognition of their homeland and any federal and provincial service in their language. During the specification efforts, they expressed no concern that anglophones in Quebec received more than they did, and Quebec anglophones did not express any jealousy of the francophones outside their province. In fact, minority members, such as Alfred Monnin and Adélard Savoie, even defended the rights of anglophones in Quebec. The altruistic motive behind Savoie’s statement stands out: “If the Francophone minority to which I belong had been treated by the Board in the same manner as the Anglophone minority of Montreal, I would have raised the strongest possible protest. I do protest just as firmly for what has been done to the Anglophone minority of Montreal” (bdab 1975, 219). One could argue that such a strategy was selfish, because a maximalist approach in Quebec justified a similar approach in their own provinces, but the fact remains that Monnin and Savoie agreed to exclude numerous unviable francophone communities outside Quebec, thus sacrificing numerous minority communities for the sake of symmetry. Fourth, it is difficult to understand why the memo would note that bilingual districts discriminated against the other linguistic groups. The prefix bi- in bilingual districts implied two languages. All non-official languages were demographically insignificant. Both the B and B Commission and the Official Languages Act refused to recognize these languages because of their insignificant numbers and the dilution effect any recognition of third languages could have on the official recognition of the French language in the context of the sociolinguistic crisis. The commission and section 38 of the Act stated that there would be no discrimination against non-official languages. By noting a discrimination against non-official languages, tbs confused the goals of the sociolinguistic policy.

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The ninth argument – that bilingual districts were perceived as ghettos – presented another example of selective logic. Jean-Jacques Bertrand’s “ghetto” comment during the 1969 federal-provincial constitutional conference gave bilingual districts a negative spin. However, bilingual districts were lauded and requested by minority members, giving “ghettos” a positive spin. The Fransaskois weekly that demolished Keith Spicer’s criticism of bilingual districts as ghettos explained it best: the minority francophone community within would “feel more at ease.”320 Thus, “ghetto” was in the eye of the beholder. Also, Spicer himself indicated in his fifth annual report that the symbolic value of bilingual districts had been underestimated. The tbs memo should have added that “ghetto” had a positive connotation to many, including and especially minority members. The tenth argument is invalid. Almost every person consulted by the Duhamel and Fox boards supported the creation of bilingual districts. There were exceptions, but very few. It is therefore difficult to understand how the memo could conclude that few people supported their creation. In fact, while the demonstrations in Welland indicated some opposition, the government was well aware that the minority for which bilingual districts were intended overwhelmingly supported them.321 As one francophone from the Welland area explained to a local newspaper, “Most of the people are keeping quiet because it is somewhat difficult to speak out against the majority when you are a member of the minority.”322 The tbs memo, in its quest for the termination of bilingual districts, argued that the summer’s events were proof that bilingual districts would amplify existing sociolinguistic tensions. By itself, the argument was erroneous, since bilingual districts would only have guaranteed federal services to the public from principal offices. Air traffic communication did not reach the public, and air traffic control towers were not the principal offices of Transport Canada. The argument was obviously added after the fact to justify tbs’s deviation. Indeed, the air traffic controller crisis and the Bibeau report had dimmed the popularity of the federal language policy by the time Robert Andras read the tbs memo in October 1976. Bilingual districts had by then become “a red rag to a bull.” But a symbolic red rag was exactly what bilingual districts were supposed to be. This is why they were recommended by the B and B Commission and desired by minority members. The federal government had neglected that primary purpose in favour of its secondary (administrative) purpose ever since the Official Languages Act

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came into effect. It could no longer neglect it. In fact, as noted earlier, the draftsmen of the Act did not think it necessary to add a preamble about the bilingual districts’ symbolic value because this value would become apparent after proclamation, not after the adoption of the statute. The federal Cabinet also knew that the symbolic value would become evident in the end, but it could try to avoid the issue by abandoning bilingual districts in favour of the more subtle bilingual regions. Thus, while the argument was contradicted by the facts, it could nonetheless be accepted by Cabinet as a valid reason to abandon bilingual districts. The eleventh argument – that ten years after the publication of the initial B and B report only one province was ready to establish joint bilingual districts – is true but arguably irrelevant. The Official Languages Act created only federal bilingual districts, as the Miller task force concluded when rejecting the provincial option. The B and B Commission and the federal government had hoped bilingual districts would be joint efforts, but accepted that the provincial governments would not participate immediately. Both also hoped that provincial and federal bilingual districts would overlap, but both had also conceded that the respective specification and proclamation could proceed independently. The important thing, in the end, was to alter federal and provincial administrative structures so that they would coincide with officially recognized minority homelands and guarantee bilingual services therein. The Act made every effort to accommodate eventual and overlapping provincial bilingual districts. The federal government proceeded in spite of provincial opposition because it wanted to set the example, as requested by the commission. Cabinet hoped that the provinces would follow suit. It knew that Ontario and Quebec were planning bilingual districtification efforts that, they hoped, would coincide. The tbs memo could thus have better informed Cabinet by adding that these two key provinces had created their own “bilingual districts” since the federal Official Languages Act was adopted in 1969. This fact would not have countered the twelfth argument; rather it could have strengthened it by indicating that Ontario and Quebec still refused to make their bilingual districts a joint program in spite of overlapping units. This would mean that the B and B Commission erred in believing that existing or planned administrative districtification would support its cornerstone recommendation. In other words, Ontario’s establishment of bilingual districtification for provincial purposes, on 4 May 1971, did not entail a

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facile establishment of joint symbolic bilingual districts. In fact, Premier Davis took great pains to avoid calling his government’s efforts “bilingual districts.” And Ontario never agreed to make its provincial bilingual districtification a joint effort. However, Ontario’s refusal did not mean that federal bilingual districts would be unable to fulfil their dual purpose. On the contrary, the proclamation of federal bilingual districts that overlapped Ontario’s bilingual districts would have made both symbolic and administrative bilingual districts, albeit disjointed. With or without provincial participation, the federal proclamation alone would have officially recognized minority homelands. Joint or overlapping bilingual districts could finally be proclaimed, even if only by the federal government. The federal proclamation would also make provincial bilingual districts official. Once proclaimed and created, bilingual districts could persuade the Ontario government to adopt a joint program. An acknowledgment that Quebec and Ontario had provincial bilingual districts could thus have weakened the eleventh argument by indicating that a golden opportunity now existed for the federal government to proclaim federal bilingual districts that would coincide with their provincial cousins. In addition, as the pco official’s memo of August 1976 argued, bilingual districts would also have to be proclaimed in provinces where no provincial bilingual districtification existed. Only a federal proclamation could force provincial governments to follow suit. Since the symbolic value of bilingual districts would only occur after federal proclamation, as the statutory draftsmen had concluded, it would be premature to terminate the bilingual districts program before any were proclaimed and the provincial governments had a chance to appreciate their symbolic and administrative values. This argument was not included in the tbs memo. Finally, the mention of existing provincial bilingual districts could have weakened the eleventh argument further by indicating that the bilingual regions could not possibly offer the same golden opportunity. Those provincial governments that refused to create joint bilingual districts would not agree to create joint bilingual regions. The memo could thus have added that, seven years after the adoption of section 9 (2), no province was ready to establish joint bilingual regions either. Again, the memo abandoned its comparative methodology when it countered its recommendation. It is thus difficult to see how the well-known provincial refusal to establish joint bilingual districts before the adoption of the 1969 statute

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would all of a sudden justify their termination in October 1976. If the argument was valid, the federal government would have backed away from the entire bilingual districts program after the initial provincial refusal. By proceeding in spite of provincial opposition, the federal government could not logically accept the eleventh argument seven years later. The steering committee reached this very conclusion on 21 September 1976, before it suggested that the program be maintained but, ironically, only in the provinces where joint bilingual districts could be proclaimed.323 Some provincial opposition resurfaced during the specification efforts. The federal government nevertheless tabled the Fox report in the House in November 1975, promising to add a few bilingual districts in Quebec, the most recalcitrant province. Some provinces opposed bilingual districts, but Cabinet wanted to proceed. The eleventh argument is thus true but irrelevant. Finally, the twelfth argument – that the creation of bilingual districts would focus attention on the implementation problems of the federal policy – seems valid. There is no doubt that the establishment of bilingual districts would have focused attention on policy implementation. But this is redundant, since they would have been established during implementation. More importantly, there is little doubt that the public disliked some of the practical consequences stemming from the implementation of the federal sociolinguistic policy, as the Gallup survey demonstrated, although bilingual districtification was generally supported by public opinion. But if policies that risk provoking public opposition should not be implemented, very few policies would ever be acted upon. Abandoning policies after adoption because of opposition would put governments on the defensive, accused of not following through on their own convictions. Prior to the 1972 federal election, both Cabinet and the Liberal caucus concluded that it would be better to face the electorate after proclaiming the controversial bilingual districts than after having evaded their responsibilities. The same conviction motivated the federal Cabinet in November 1975. The federal government was aware of some public opposition to bilingual districts, but it proceeded nonetheless. In fact, there was no public uproar in February 1976 after Chrétien leaked a report recommending five bilingual districts in the Montreal area. However, the tbs memo of December 1976 assumed that the proclamation of bilingual districts and the administrative restructuring that would ensue could raise the ire of many citizens and federal civil servants. Yet as John Turner and Jean Chrétien concluded, seven

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years apart, Cabinet felt that tolerating devilish implementation details seemed a small “price to pay” to save the country. Had things changed so drastically? Did the federal policy succeed so well in preserving national unity that Cabinet no longer needed to fuss over a multitude of controversial implementation details – even details that might reignite sociolinguistic conflicts? Probably, which makes this argument seem valid. Indeed, the proclamation of bilingual districts would focus attention on the implementation problems of the federal policy. Consequently, bilingual districts would fuel the flames of the sociolinguistic tensions that had been reignited in June 1976. The last argument is thus valid: bilingual districts would have exacerbated political tensions. However, this argument only became valid after the air traffic controllers crisis and the Bibeau report. At the time of the tbs deviation, in May 1976, the argument would not have been valid. It was added by tbs at the last minute, once it became valid, to support otherwise shaky arguments. The chronology is important. Cabinet was thus misled by tbs. None of the twelve tbs arguments withstood scrutiny. The ultimate recommendation went against the grain of the B and B reports, the 1969 statute, and both specification efforts. It also countered the government’s public declaration of 21 November 1975 that it would proclaim at least thirty bilingual districts as soon as possible. pco officials had been wary of tbs efforts to manipulate the information on which Cabinet would base federal sociolinguistic policy. As already noted, one official even warned the pco hierarchy that tbs was refusing to create an interdepartmental committee to review the Fox report. In his words, “I fear that the [tb] Secretariat will simply wait until the last minute to establish an ad hoc committee on bilingual districts.”324 If nothing else, pco officials should have looked twice at the following statement in the tbs memo: “The proposed Interdepartmental Committee on Bilingual Districts never met and when the Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers was established by the Cabinet decision of June 3, 1976 to review all aspects of the government’s official languages policies, it included the question of bilingual districts within its terms of reference.”325 pco officials raised no concerns, and Cabinet abandoned the program without paying much attention to the details of the tbs memo. In spite of their incoherence, the arguments in the tbs memo buttressed tbs’s recommendation to abandon the program. But because the steering committee recommended the provincial option, the tbs memo had to include this fifth option. The memo nevertheless rejected

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the provincial option, the same one it had advocated to the steering committee a few months earlier. It also stated, erroneously, that the steering committee had approved the program’s termination. Moreover, to respect Cabinet’s initial decision, the tbs memo had to enable the establishment of bilingual districts throughout the country according to a symmetrical approach. But the memo clearly tried to discourage Cabinet. On the one hand, it reproduced the twelve arguments against bilingual districts; on the other, it urged Cabinet to proceed with caution (the reasonable person approach). The memo thus presented five proclamation options: the four formulae invented by the Miller task force and the original Fox recommendations. The memo concluded that there were numerous “conceptual and administrative problems” and “practical and political problems” associated with creating bilingual districts “on the basis of criteria applied consistently across the country.”326 Termination became a logical recommendation. The most stringent formula (5,000 minority members according to data on language of use) produced thirty-one bilingual districts327 that were almost identical to the thirty-one bilingual districts recommended by the Miller report. There were only three minor differences. Like the Miller report, the tbs memo did not recommend a single bilingual district in British Columbia, Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, or Alberta.

f)

The Final Decision

Between Andras’s agreement to submit the memo to Cabinet, in October 1976, and Cabinet’s consideration of it, in December 1976, three additional events would dampen the nation’s mood in relation to federal sociolinguistic policy. First, in the Speech from the Throne of 12 October 1976, the government conceded that some elements of the policy had not been successful and would be “modified.”328 It added that bilingual districtification would remain the cornerstone of the federal policy, but indicated that the cornerstone would henceforth be based on where “there is sufficient demand for such services.”329 The next day, James Richardson resigned from Cabinet because of his opposition to any constitutional entrenchment of the federal sociolinguistic policy. Specifically, he could not accept that French would be one of the country’s official languages, that sociolinguistic duality would be entrenched in the Constitution, and that Quebec would obtain a veto on constitutional amendments concerning language rights.330 Third

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and most importantly, the Parti québécois won the provincial election of 15 November. The victory caught most Canadians by surprise, including the pq. Jacques Parizeau, the pq’s first finance minister and third premier, would later admit that the victory was an “accident of history.”331 The pq’s promise to hold a referendum on Quebec sovereignty would, during the next generation, hang over the country like the sword of Damocles. During the six months between the air traffic controller crisis and Cabinet’s fateful decision, the window of opportunity for the proclamation of bilingual districts was closed. On 7 December 1976, the Cabinet’s Ad Hoc Committee on Official Languages Policy scrutinized the tbs memo.332 McWhinney made an oral presentation outlining the main points of the memo, and then Andras proposed that the committee focus on his recommendation that the government should abandon the program and that any discussions occur “only in the event of disagreement about this recommendation.” He added that “Sections (9) and (10) of the Official Languages Act adequately provided for bilingual services to the public” and that “the proclamation of bilingual districts would not result in improvements in these areas.” Furthermore, “the Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers had recommended against the proclamation of bilingual districts, although it had suggested the possibility of going forward on an ad hoc basis where provinces agreed.” Finally, Andras noted that the Fédération des francophones hors-Québec “had expressed indifference about bilingual districts, considering them unrelated to their immediate concerns.”333 In spite of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Minister Warren Allmand’s plea that “the Government should proceed with the proclamation of bilingual districts” and his concern about “the reaction of anglophones in Quebec if bilingual districts were not proclaimed,” the Committee recommended that “the Government not proceed with the establishment of bilingual districts” and instead “reaffirm its policy of providing bilingual services across the country, and, in this connection, indicate its intention to review the adequacy and consistency of existing programs including notification to the public of the availability of such services.” The committee nevertheless suggested “that if bilingual districts were not proclaimed, assurances should be provided that the provisions of services in both official languages would continue to be guaranteed to members of official language minorities.” Three of the points raised during the ad hoc committee’s discussions warrant special attention. First, Health Minister Marc Lalonde conceded that the proclamation of bilingual districts “would provide

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symbolic guarantees respecting services, and a response to the Quebec Official Language Act” in that province, but he added that “full guarantees respecting services were already provided for elsewhere in the Official Languages Act.” Lalonde forgot that the B and B Commission and the Duhamel and Fox boards had argued that significant demand under section 9 (2) did not provide the same guarantees as bilingual districts did under section 9 (1), and that the symbolic equality of the use and status of French and English throughout the country, recognized by section 2 of the Act, did not provide any symbolic equality on a regional basis, which was the reason that the bilingual districts were recommended and adopted under section 9 (1). Second, Lalonde stated that “if bilingual districts were not proclaimed, a symbolic reassurance would not be given, but a high federal profile on bilingualism in Quebec would also be avoided.” Indeed, bilingual districts would “risk precipitating another controversy over bilingualism,” especially in Quebec. The air traffic controller crisis, the Bibeau report, Richardson’s resignation, and the pq victory were resting all their weight on the bilingual districts, transforming them into a negative “red rag.” And third, tbs officials misled the committee. On the one hand, Osbaldeston informed the ministers that although “the proclamation of the districts was intended to provide some impulsion on other levels of government” to provide bilingual services, “subsequent experience had indicated that bilingual districts were redundant in ensuring the provision of bilingual federal services, and that the provision of these services had apparently not moved other levels of government to act.” Therein lay incoherent statements. Osbaldeston simultaneously argued that (1) the proclamation of bilingual districts would symbolically pressure the provinces into providing bilingual services, (2) bilingual districts had been replaced by bilingual regions, and (3) bilingual regions had failed to encourage the provinces to provide bilingual services in those areas. In one sentence, the tb secretary exposed his misunderstanding of bilingual districts. Indeed, while bilingual regions may not have “moved other levels of government to act,” this was because they were unknown both to the minority-language groups and to the provincial governments. How could unknown bilingual regions move provincial governments to follow the federal lead? Osbaldeston’s statement also proved that bilingual regions did not have the symbolic value of bilingual districts. Only a symbolic proclamation of bilingual districts could have encouraged the minority to lobby their provincial

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government and the provincial governments to provide bilingual services on their own volition. In other words, only public knowledge obtained through official proclamation could have motivated the minority to lobby its provincial and municipal governments to allocate bilingual services in an effort parallel to the federal bilingual districts. Osbaldeston’s statement also falters because the last part of his sentence does not logically follow the first. He should have concluded that the only way bilingual districts could ever impel provincial governments to take action was if they were officially proclaimed and established. He concluded the exact opposite. McWhinney added that “complications could result from their proclamation in that inequities would inevitably be perceived in terms of inclusions and exclusions, and in that bilingual services were now provided in some areas which could not possibly be included in any configuration of bilingual districts.” His statement is misleading. First, he failed to add that “exclusions” had been an intentional and integral part of the bilingual districts’ purpose from the beginning. Bilingual districts were intended to restrict bilingual services to viable communities rather than to every federal office in the country. These viable communities were the only areas where the symbolic purpose could be useful and where the anglophone majority could accept the extension of bilingual services beyond Ottawa. The less viable minority communities and the thousands of minority individuals scattered over the country would be served by section 9 (2). It may have seemed unfortunate to McWhinney and tbs, but bilingual districts were recommended to respect the most elementary realism. Second, McWhinney exaggerated the availability of bilingual services outside the recommended bilingual districts. I have not seen any document indicating such generous availability. It is possible that a postal worker in Rustico, Prince Edward Island, for instance, could have communicated in both official languages to her clients at that time, but that was the exception; the rule was that, as the tbs memo itself conceded, “there are undoubtedly inadequacies and inconsistencies in some areas” designated as bilingual regions under section 9 (2). The Fox report clearly contradicted McWhinney’s conclusion. So did the steering committee and each annual report of the Commissioner of Official Languages published since 1971. Third, McWhinney failed to add that, under section 9 (2), bilingual regions would cover less territory than the bilingual districts recommended in the Fox report. In other words, bilingual regions would exclude more minority members than bilingual districts would. Fourth,

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even if some “bilingual services were now provided in some areas which could not possibly be included in any configuration of bilingual districts,” these areas could still be served by the complementary bilingual regions according to significant demand. Finally, bilingual regions would not provide the same guarantees as bilingual districts. McWhinney did not offer this crucial information for the ad hoc committee’s consideration. On 23 December 1976, Cabinet decided that “the Government not proceed with the establishment of bilingual districts but … reaffirm its policy of providing bilingual services across the country, and, in this connection, indicate its intention to review the adequacy and consistency of existing programs including notification to the public of the availability of such services.”334 The decision overrode Allmand’s “disagreement with the main recommendation of the Committee,” his “substantial objections to some of the proposals,” his argument that bilingual districts offered “psychological advantages” to sociolinguistic minorities, and his request that “the Government should proceed with the proclamation of bilingual districts.”335 Cabinet simply asked Andras to meet with Allmand in private to reach an agreement on the issue, which the Cabinet colleagues later managed to do.336 Cabinet also asked Andras and Lalonde to “discuss with members of Caucus, particularly anglophone members from the Province of Quebec, and francophone members from the other Provinces.” Caucus accepted Cabinet’s decision without any discussion.337 Bilingual districts were dealt a fatal blow, but, as in Agatha Christie’s Murder on the Orient Express, the last blow may not have been as fatal as the previous ones. Cabinet waited nine months before announcing its decision. It procrastinated until it could balance the negative news of the bilingual districts’ demise with a positive announcement on their replacement. This announcement was being developed by the Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers. The committee’s report, submitted to Cabinet in April 1977,338 did not deal with bilingual districts and barely touched on services to the public, being more concerned with improving the government’s internal policy in regard to promotions and training programs for civil servants. Andras would also need time to consult the labour unions that represented the federal civil servants before announcing the cancellation of the bilingual districts program.339 One week before the tenth anniversary of their official birth, the bilingual districts were officially terminated. At the press conference of 30 September 1977, Andras presented two arguments justifying the

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government’s decision.340 First, “bilingual services are generally available in areas likely to be considered for inclusion in any bilingual districts.” Second, the government faced significant “difficulty of formally delineating boundaries which would result in a consistent and equitable treatment of minority official language populations.” No one noticed the incoherence: if one cannot delineate boundaries of the bilingual areas, one cannot determine if bilingual services are already available in these areas. Andras added that bilingual regions, established in 1973 and based on county borders, would replace bilingual districts as the administrative allocation mechanism of bilingual services.341 An accompanying document identified twenty-six bilingual regions located in the bilingual belt. In addition to the National Capital Region, there was one bilingual district in New Brunswick (the entire province), fifteen in Quebec (DeuxMontagnes, Island of Montreal/Île-Jésus, Laprairie, Vaudreuil, Bonaventure, Gaspé-East, Brome, Compton, Huntingdon, Missisquoi, Richmond, Sherbrooke, Stanstead, Argenteuil, and Pontiac), and nine in Ontario (Glengarry, Prescott, Russell, Stormont, Algoma, Cochrane, Nipissing, Sudbury, and Timiskaming).342 Andras noted that tbs would gradually create additional bilingual regions.343

chapter five

Policy Termination

Bilingual districts were abandoned de facto by Cabinet on 23 December 1976, but they were only abandoned de jure when Parliament adopted the 1988 Official Languages Act. The initial Act needed an overhaul, the government argued, because it did not respect the Charter of Rights and Freedoms adopted in 1982. This chapter will describe how the bilingual districts were officially terminated. Before bilingual districts were publicly abandoned by Robert Andras on 30 September 1977, the federal government reaffirmed its commitment to official bilingualism in a booklet issued on 21 June 1977 – A National Understanding – The Official Languages of Canada. But the document did not explain how bilingual districts were to be replaced. It was intended as a response to the Parti québécois’s asymmetrical vision of bilingualism and biculturalism as manifested in the Charte de la langue française (Bill-101).1 The pq legislation was similar to the Bourassa government’s Official Language Act of 1974 in its proclamation of French as the sole official language of Quebec, but unlike the initial statute, it did not award individual rights to anglophones to “address the public administration in French or in English, as he may choose,” nor did it state that municipalities and school boards “must” communicate in both languages where “at least ten per cent of the persons administered by” these bodies were English-speaking. Instead, the Charter stated that municipalities, school boards, and health corporations “could” (“peuvent”) communicate in English if “the majority speak[s] a language other than

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French.”2 The pq thus declared war on the federal policy, calling it a “smoke screen” that hid the fact that French was a minority language isolated in an anglophone continent. It ridiculed Ottawa’s policy of reducing the French language to a simple means of communications instead of acknowledging it as the foundation of a culture.3 A National Understanding reaffirmed the federal government’s preference for an officially bilingual country and symmetrical institutional bilingualism.4 The document rejected the pq’s preference for provincebased territorial bilingualism but nevertheless conceded that some statutory modifications were necessary after several years of trial and error. It did not, however, speak to the termination of bilingual districts. On 5 July 1977, the federal government established the Task Force on Canadian Unity, mandating it to provide advice on the renewed sociolinguistic crisis facing the country in the wake of the pq victory. After extensive consultations, the task force produced a three-volume report on 25 January 1979 proposing an alternative to the status quo or sovereignty-association.5 This alternative was comprised of two elements: duality and regionalism. The task force proposed that Quebec be considered the expression of duality and that the provinces be considered the expression of regionalism. The former meant that Quebec should be recognized as a distinct society, while the latter meant that all provinces were equal. For the task force, the “most difficult matter was federal language policy” (Cameron 1993, 341). In this regard, it recommended the constitutional entrenchment of “the equality of status, rights and privileges of the English and the French languages for all purposes declared by the Parliament of Canada, within its sphere of jurisdiction.”6 It reaffirmed the basic linguistic rights provided by the Official Languages Act but stipulated that bilingual districtification should be based on “significant demand, and to the extent that it is feasible to provide such services.”7 The task force also recommended that provincial health and social services be allocated in both official languages “wherever numbers warrant.”8 It did not explain the discrepancy between subjective feasibility and objective demolinguistic data. The task force’s work was ignored by the Trudeau government. This had become predictable once the task force issued a statement indicating that it would try to find an alternative to existing federal sociolinguistic policy. Soon after that, Trudeau made the following comment in the House of Commons on 19 October 1977: “I submit respectfully to everybody, including members of my own party and of the Pepin-Robarts

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Commission, that this third option business is a trap we should not fall into.”9 Perhaps it was because of the task force’s search for an alternative that Trudeau proposed the Constitutional Amendment Bill (Bill C-60) on 20 June 1978, right in the middle of the task force’s mandate.10 Trudeau’s proposal dealt with the gamut of issues raised by the sociolinguistic crisis, including the decentralization of powers to provincial governments. It also included a charter of rights that called for “a permanent national commitment to the endurance and self-fulfilment of the Canadian French-speaking society centred in but not limited to Quebec.” The proposal died once the premiers agreed to meet at a constitutional conference in November 1978. Since the federal government did not act on its promise to modify the Official Languages Act, as outlined in the 12 September 1976 Speech from the Throne, three Liberal mp s tried to force the government’s hand by proposing amendments to the Act.11 In the Speech from the Throne of 18 October 1977, the Trudeau government once again promised to modify the Act, “in order to make more specific its provisions respecting the language of work of federal employees, to strengthen the role of the Commissioner of Official Languages, and to clarify the role of the courts in safeguarding the equality of status of the official languages within the jurisdiction of the Government of Canada.”12 The government also promised new and comprehensive policies and programs to benefit official language minorities, including “specific initiatives to be taken in collaboration with the provinces,” such as “greater availability of education in both official languages to all Canadians.” The Official Languages Act nevertheless remained intact for another decade. The most ardent defender of bilingual districts after their de facto demise was also, ironically, the person who would force the federal government to abandon them de jure. Max Yalden, former assistant deputy minister to Gérard Pelletier, succeeded Keith Spicer as Commissioner of Official Languages on 5 August 1977. In his subsequent annual reports to Parliament, Yalden urged the federal Cabinet to reconsider its decision. His opinion was diametrically opposite to the one held by Spicer. Yalden argued that bilingual districts provided a better guarantee to minorities than the significant demand criterion: “[T]he long-anticipated decision not to proceed with [bilingual districts] has caused concern for a number of Francophone minority groups outside Quebec who, along with their English-speaking counterparts in Quebec,

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would have been the principal beneficiaries of the guarantees of bilingual services intrinsic to the concept of bilingual districts.”13 Unlike bilingual regions, bilingual districts “would, at the very least, specify those areas of the country where federal services would be fully available in both official languages independently of levels of demand.”14 Yalden added that “efforts to date have continued to be dogged by unnecessary haggling over a suitable definition of ‘significant demand’ … [because of] the absence of bilingual districts.”15 However, if the government still thought bilingual districts should be abandoned, Yalden argued, it should officially eliminate them from the Official Languages Act.16 Yalden’s pleas fell on deaf ears within the Trudeau government but did not go unnoticed by the other members of Parliament. On 20 May 1980, the House of Commons and the Senate established the Special Joint Committee on Official Languages. This committee was mandated to study the annual reports to Parliament of the Commissioner of Official Languages and recommend actions to Parliament. Its first effort was to assess federal sociolinguistic policy. To do so, the committee interviewed the Chair of Treasury Board, the President of the Public Service Commission, the administrative hierarchy of the federal government, and representatives from minority groups. Max Yalden was nevertheless the committee’s most frequent guest. On several occasions, Yalden drew the committee’s attention to bilingual districts. His intention was clear – to incite a parliamentary debate on bilingual districts before they were officially discarded by the government. He played devil’s advocate, arguing repeatedly that bilingual districts offered a better guarantee to minorities than significant demand, a concept that was at the mercy of civil servants. And he repeated his request that the program either be officially expunged from the Act or officially resuscitated, his preference: As a matter of principle, Mr. Chairman, I have always been in favour of bilingual districts; indeed, once a bilingual district is established under the law, there is no doubt any more. Service has to be made available in the language of the clients, in the language of the public. There is no mention of having to evaluate whether there is a significant demand, or to what extent it is possible to make service available. I am referring here to paragraph 9 (2). With respect to bilingual districts, I read in paragraph 9 (1) of the Law that service must be provided: it is an obligation under the Law. Especially for provinces such as New Brunswick and Ontario, with a sizeable minority, both in percentage and in absolute numbers, I

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have always felt that the provision of service should be guaranteed preferably in a constitutional instrument. Or then at least in a regular law if it is not feasible that the guarantee be given in a Constitution. In the case of the Official Languages Law, it appears to me that the best way to guarantee that service be made available is to establish the bilingual districts. I have always been disappointed by the fact that the government, for reasons of their own, in both cases decided that the bilingual districts would not be established … I am of the opinion that, as I have just told, bilingual districts would be a good idea, in certain provinces especially. Thus, I do not see any reason why these sections should be removed from the Official Languages Law.17

The committee seriously considered Yalden’s arguments. In fact, its first report to Parliament, dated 9 July 1981, reproduced most of his comments quoted above.18 But the Liberal-controlled committee refused to force the Trudeau Cabinet to change its mind. Therefore, in spite of Yalden’s pleas and arguments, the committee eventually reached the consensus that “the establishment of bilingual districts would not represent a satisfactory solution to the language-of-service issue,” because they would be “established on the basis of geographic guidelines which were too rigid” and “it would be unacceptable to abolish a bilingual district in the future if a census indicated that the minority official language population of a given region had declined to the point where it constituted less than 10% of the total population of that region.”19 The committee thus recommended that “the Official Languages Act be amended so as to remove all references to federal bilingual districts.”20 In its report to Parliament, however, the committee admitted that the allocation of bilingual services according to significant demand had not been exemplary, even twelve years after the adoption of the Act, noting that “few, if any, federal institutions are yet capable of meeting the Act’s requirements in a fully satisfactory manner.”21 Specifically, “departments and agencies are unable to guarantee that a full range of bilingual services are available to the public at all times and in all locations” within the bilingual regions.22 And in the areas located outside bilingual regions, “service in the language of the minority population is at best sporadic, at worst non-existent.”23 The committee added that this “deplorable situation” existed because tbs had not assumed its responsibilities under memo 1973–88: “They simply do not insist, do not push; they put out general guidelines in rather milquetoast-like vocabulary and then sit back and hope the departments will do something about it, and often they do not.”24

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However, instead of recommending a reconsideration of bilingual districts, a mechanism that guaranteed the allocation of bilingual services better than bilingual regions according to significant demand, the committee argued in favour of another means to “provide the official language minority population with a more concrete guarantee of service in its language.”25 Its solution was to define “significant demand” according to “where numbers warrant” and force the federal departments and agencies to make an “active offer of service” to their minority clients before measuring the significant demand criterion based on the numerical geolinguistic reality.26 In short, the committee favoured bilingual districtification based on a numerical rather than proportional criterion: “The concept of ‘where numbers warrant’ would retain the mathematical notion on which bilingual districts were to be based without being rigidly tied to the 10% population statistic intrinsic to bilingual districts.”27 Bilingual districts based on Canada’s (proportional) geolinguistic reality were to be replaced by bilingual regions based on the concept of significant demand, which was to be defined according to the (numerical) geolinguistic reality of the country. Bilingual districts had come full circle, although their symbolic purpose had been discarded. It is worth noting that “significant demand” and “where numbers warrant” had been rejected by the B and B Commission, which had argued that the former would impose too much on minorities and the latter would disadvantage many small minority communities (rcbb 1967, 98–9). The other part of the committee’s solution was to remove the specification of “where numbers warrant” and “significant demand” from Treasury Board’s hands and give this responsibility to “the Governor in Council upon recommendation by the Commissioner of Official Languages.”28 This was later approved by Yalden, who agreed to the committee’s recommendation in exchange for a statutory modification granting him the power to recommend the regulations specifying “where numbers warrant” and “significant demand.”29 In Yalden’s opinion, delegating this responsibility to civil servants, as was then the case, awarded “far too much latitude [to] those who have no desire to provide services to the minority” and presented “a great risk of misinterpretation.”30 In other words, Yalden abandoned one element of the symbolic purpose of bilingual districts (the official recognition of minority homelands) in favour of another symbolic element (the guarantee of services). Yalden was convinced that he could better ensure this latter guarantee than federal civil servants could.

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The federal government did not react to the committee’s report. Annoyed by Cabinet’s procrastination, Warren Allmand asked the committee not to eliminate bilingual districts from the Act. He caught the committee by surprise when he declared that “the government has not gone ahead on this because they just have not had the political will to do so, despite the fact that they presented the legislation and had it as part of the original legislation.”31 He even crossed the boundaries of Cabinet solidarity by rejecting the reasons given by Cabinet to shelve the Duhamel and Fox reports: “I never accepted the reasons of the government for rejecting the reports. I still do not.”32 First of all, he rejected the claim that it was too difficult to delineate appropriate borders for bilingual districts: “[J]ust as with redrawing our constituency boundaries, there is never complete satisfaction, but it is possible to get consensus and general agreement.”33 Second, he rejected the claim that bilingual districts were ghettos, arguing that it was simply a question of perception. In his opinion, bilingual districts were a positive rather than a negative symbol: “[I]t would be the opposite of a ghetto. The fact of life is that [there] are certain parts of Canada where the minority language groups do live … [Indeed,] bilingual districts would improve the situation for bilingualism across the country,” even in Quebec and Montreal, where there were “difficulties” in allocating bilingual services according to significant demand.34 The agreement Allmand reached with Robert Andras following Cabinet’s meeting of 23 December 1976 had unravelled enough to motivate him to give bilingual districts one last shot. Allmand’s plea had as little success as Yalden’s arguments. In its fifth report to Parliament, published on 29 March 1983, the year following the adoption of the Constitution Act and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the committee again requested that “the Official Languages Act be amended so as to remove all references to federal bilingual districts.”35 The committee argued that “the rigid geographic guidelines and mathematical formulae presently attached to the concept of bilingual districts … resulted in a failure to recognize substantial concentrations of Francophones located in large urban areas such as Edmonton and Winnipeg.”36 Obviously, “where numbers warrant” could better serve the numerically endowed but proportionally poor minority communities, but it could also neglect the numerically poor but proportionally endowed minority communities. The committee did not explain how “where numbers warrant” avoided rigid geographic guidelines and mathematical formulae. Nevertheless, its recommendation was .

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supported by the Fédération des francophones hors-Québec. The national lobby group for the francophone minorities preferred the idealist personality principle over the realist territorial principle.37 Once again, the federal government did nothing. In spite of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, it would take five more years before bilingual districts were eliminated from the Canadian panorama. In 1988, the government argued that a new act was necessary to fulfil the purpose of the 1982 Charter. The Charter had been Trudeau’s pet project ever since he took power in 1968. He had come very close to repatriating the bna Act to Canada and stapling to it a charter of rights, but Bourassa’s reneging of the Victoria Charter of 1971 had almost ended his quest. Ironically, it took the Parti québécois to get the ball rolling again. Its election in November 1976 had motivated the provincial governments to adopt the Saint Andrews Declaration in August 1977, thereby guaranteeing the same educational language rights to francophones outside Quebec as the anglophones enjoyed within that province according to bilingual districtification based on “wherever numbers warrant.”38 But the premiers were jolted back to reality when, despite their progress on the sociolinguistic issue, the pq organized a referendum on Quebec sovereignty, to be held on 20 May 1980. Sovereignty-association was defeated by a 58 to 42 per cent margin.39 After a brief round of constitutional discussions and a Supreme Court decision enabling constitutional agreements without Quebec’s approval, the federal government and nine of the ten provinces (Quebec refused to participate) agreed on an amending formula for the bna Act, the repatriation of the Act to Canada, and a charter of rights and freedoms.40 The agreement led to the Constitution Act, sanctioned on 29 March 1982.41 The Charter contains eight sections pertaining to language rights. Section 16 states that “English and French are the official languages of Canada and have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada.” Section 17 states that English and French can be used in debates and other proceedings of Parliament. Section 18 provides that statutes, records, and journals of Parliament are to be printed in both languages and shall have equal authority. Section 19 guarantees that citizens can use English or French “in any pleading in or process issuing from, any court established by Parliament.” Sections 16 to 19 include similar provisions for New Brunswick.42 Sections 21 and 22 state that nothing in sections 16 to 20 can abrogate or derogate from any right, privilege, or

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obligation with respect to the official languages that existed by any other provision of the Constitution of Canada, such as section 133 of the bna Act, or from any legal or customary right or privilege acquired or enjoyed either before or after the coming into force of the Charter. Finally, sections 20 and 23 guarantee to Canadians rights to public services in both official languages. For our purposes, section 20 deserves special attention. Section 20 is the only one to deal with federal public services. Section 20 (1) awards the following right to Canadians: Any member of the public in Canada has the right to communicate with, and to receive available services from, any head or central office of an institution of the Parliament or government of Canada in English or French, and has the same right with respect to any other office of any such institution where (a) there is a significant demand for communications with and services from that office in such language; or (b) due to the nature of the office, it is reasonable that communications with and services from that office be available in both English and French.

This right combines elements of the personality and territorial principles of institutional bilingualism. The personality principle applies to public services from the head or central offices of a federal body, while the territorial principle limits public services from other (regional, local) offices according to the significant demand criterion and the nature of the office. Section 20 (2) makes similar provisions for the province of New Brunswick, but is not as restrictive: “Any member of the public in New Brunswick has the right to communicate with, and to receive available services from, any office of an institution of the legislature or government of New Brunswick in English or French.” This includes services provided by municipal and regional bodies.43 The bilingual districtification outlined in section 20 goes against the recommendations of the B and B Commission in two significant ways. First, it would be determined by the significant demand criterion rather than by the country’s geolinguistic reality. Therefore, instead of making federal departments and agencies adapt their structures and services to the geolinguistic reality, section 20 forced the minorities to justify the allocation of public services in their language. Second, section 20 contains little symbolic value because bilingual areas would be published in regulations rather than proclaimed in Parliament and the media. On

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both counts, section 20 goes against section 9 (1) of the Official Languages Act. Consequently, the Trudeau government could no longer delay the appropriate statutory modifications. It could no longer brush aside the cornerstone of the Act. It had to modify the statute accordingly or adopt new legislation. Yet the Trudeau government did neither. Six years would pass between the adoption of the Constitution Act and the adoption of the second Official Languages Act, which eliminated bilingual districts. This closure was not of the Trudeau government’s doing. Federal elections would finally bring about the necessary legislative modifications. On 4 September 1984, the Progressive Conservatives ended two decades of Liberal sociolinguistic policy-making. Heeding the advice of the Special Joint Committee on Official Languages and the Commissioner of Official Languages, Brian Mulroney’s government tabled Bill C-72 in the House of Commons on 25 June 1987.44 The goal of the legislation was clear: to make the federal government’s sociolinguistic policy conform to the new constitution and charter of rights. The Mulroney government argued that bilingual districts “proved unworkable” and seemed “constitutionally suspect,”45 but it never brought them before the courts to confirm these arguments. An Act respecting the status and use of the official languages of Canada was adopted on 7 July 1988.46 It added five important elements to the initial legislation. First, it added a preamble stating the principal facts and reasons motivating the statute. Among other things, the federal government would foster “full recognition and use of English and French in Canadian society,” in particular by “co-operating with provincial governments and their institutions to support the development of English and French linguistic minority communities, to provide services in both English and French, to respect the constitutional guarantees of minority language educational rights and to enhance opportunities for all to learn both English and French.” Second, sections 34 to 38 awarded federal civil servants the right to work in the language of their choice, as long as the service to the public did not suffer, and established quotas for francophone and anglophone employees in the federal civil service based on the proportion of anglophones and francophones in the Canadian population. Third, sections 41 to 45 outlined the government of Canada’s commitment to enhancing the vitality of the English and French minority communities. Fourth, the Act delegated to Treasury Board and the Secretary of State authority over the implementation of statutory elements. Treasury Board would establish regulations, circulate memos, inform the

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public, evaluate the effectiveness of the policy elements, and submit an annual report to Parliament, while the Secretary of State (now Canadian Heritage) would contribute to the survival and development of the official languages minorities and help the provincial governments ensure education in both official languages. Finally, sections 76 to 81 enabled the Federal Court to hear complaints on federal policy. Two of the three pillars of the initial statute were reproduced almost verbatim. The official recognition of the equal status of both official languages in the country and in federal institutions was there. So was the Commissioner of Official Languages, with the attendant responsibilities, albeit broadened. Also included was the guarantee to provide federal public services in both official languages in the head or central offices, in the capital region, to the travelling public, and at diplomatic bureaus, as well as the obligation by any third party contracted by these institutions to provide its services to the public in both official languages. The guarantee of services beyond the head or central offices, however, was no longer based on officially proclaimed bilingual districts; instead, sections 21 to 33 guaranteed that Canadians could communicate with and receive services from federal institutions in their mother tongue “where there is significant demand for communications with and services from that office or facility in that language,” unless “the nature of the office” justified an exception to the territorial principle. Section 24 identified three criteria to determine the nature of the offices for this purpose: (1) “the health, safety or security of members of the public”; (2) “the location of the office or facility”; and (3) “the national or international mandate of the office.” Under the terms of the new Act, federal departments and agencies had to make an “active offer” of their bilingual services, mostly by signs and verbal communication, and to publicize relevant information in the media most likely to reach the minority communities before they attempted to determine whether the demand for bilingual services was sufficient. The elimination of the symbolic declaration of homelands and of the accompanying guarantee that all public services would be allocated in both official languages therein made the “active offer” necessary. Finally, to comply with the Act, the government had to consult the minority members in order to adopt appropriate regulations for implementation purposes. Since the Act no longer compelled federal institutions to adapt to the minority’s geolinguistic reality, the minority could at least have a say in how these institutions would determine and interpret “significant demand” and

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implement services accordingly. The government would nevertheless have the discretion to follow or ignore the minority’s opinion. This last modification was significant for two reasons. First, federal institutions no longer had to adapt their structure to the geolinguistic reality of the country. The significance of the demand would be calculated within the existing administrative areas served by regional or local federal offices. The regulations would thus be crucial in policy implementation. Second, the allocation of bilingual services was no longer dictated by the official proclamation of bilingual districts based on objective census data, but determined at the discretion of the Governor in Council. In fact, section 32 gave Cabinet wide discretion in “prescribing the circumstances in which there is significant demand.” Indeed, it barely limited this regulatory discretion by indicating that Cabinet “may” take into consideration five criteria: (1) “the number of persons composing the English or French linguistic minority population of the area served by an office or facility”; (2) “the particular characteristics of that population”; (3) “the proportion of that population to the total population of that area”; (4) “the volume of communications or services between an office or facility and members of the public using each official language”; and (5) “any other factors that the Governor in Council considers appropriate.” The Act did not specify the numerical or proportional demolinguistic criteria or the particular characteristics of the minority communities. The regulations, however, would be very specific, almost resuscitating the B and B Commission’s cornerstone. The federal government adopted two sets of regulations to guide the implementation of the new legislation. First, the Official Languages Regulations, adopted on 16 December 1991,47 provided eighteen circumstances under which the demands for bilingual services were significant. These circumstances were spread over five criteria: (1) the vocation of the office; (2) the type of service; (3) the number of demands; (4) demographic data; and (5) geographical limits. The most important circumstance under the vocation of the office (the first criterion) was the consideration as to whether or not the office in question was the only provider of a service in the area. This was reminiscent of the efforts undertaken by Roland Morency to define the “principal offices” stipulated in section 9 (1) of the 1969 Act. The most important type of service (the second criterion) was the “communications with and services to the public.” Bilingual services were to be provided by seven specific federal departments and agencies:

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(1) “services related to income security programs of the Department of National Health and Welfare”; (2) “services of a post office”; (3) “services of an employment centre of the Department of Employment and Immigration”; (4) “services of an office of the Department of National Revenue (Taxation)”; (5) “services of an office of the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada”; (6) “services of a detachment of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police”; and (7) “services of an office of the Public Service Commission.” No longer would any service be allocated by principal offices located in a bilingual district. The third criterion (significant demand) has in fact nothing to do with actual demands. Instead, it is determined by the number or proportion of the linguistic minority population in the service area of federal offices according to the latest census, the location of the office, the type of clientele (e.g., the travelling public), and the type of service provided (e.g. ship-to-shore communications). The federal government assumes that significant demand will occur in those areas and circumstances. It is interesting to note the overlap between the third criterion and the four others. With regard to the fourth criterion, there were three numerical criteria (5,000, 500, and 200 minority members) and two proportional criteria (30 and 5 per cent of the local population). And there were four principal geographical limits (the fifth criterion): (1) the metropolitan census areas; (2) the metropolitan suburbs; (3) census subdivisions; and (4) the respective area of service allocation for each local or regional office of every federal department and agency. The regulations also defined the sociolinguistic minorities in relation to “the province” in which they resided and according to “first official language spoken.” This census data, a combination of “knowledge of the official languages”, “mother tongue,” and “language spoken in the home,” replaced the “mother-tongue spoken” data used to delineate bilingual districts in the 1969 Act. The regulations were “designed to provide fair and reasonable access to federal services for all Canadians in their official language.” In March 1992, Treasury Board published Official Languages Regulations: Service to the Public.48 The document presented a map of the bilingual regions produced by the juxtaposition of the December 1991 regulations. It identified six types of bilingual regions: (1) census metropolitan areas containing at least 5,000 minority members; (2) census metropolitan areas containing less than 5,000 minority members; (3) census subdivisions containing at least 500 minority members representing at

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Table 5.1 The matrix of bilingual regions and public services Type of bilingual services Type of bilingual regions At least 5,000 minority members

At least one office of every department will allocate all its services in both official languages

At least one office of some departments will allocate key services* in both official languages

x

Less than 5,000 minority members At least 500 minority members and more than 5% of the population

At least one office of some departments will allocate all its services in both official languages

x

x

At least 500 minority members but less than 5% of the population

x

Between 200 and 500 minority members and more than 5% of the population

x

Less than 200 minority members and less than 30% of the population

x

* Key services are those provided by Canada Post, the Canada Revenue Agency, Canadian Heritage, the Public Service Commission, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Health Canada, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

least 5 per cent of the population; (4) census subdivisions containing at least 500 minority members representing less than 5 per cent of the population; (5) census subdivisions containing between 200 and 500 minority members representing at least 5 per cent of the population; and (6) census subdivisions containing less than 200 minority members representing at least 30 per cent of the population. For each type of bilingual region, certain offices would be obliged to provide some bilingual services to the public. For instance, employment services would be offered in both official languages in some types of bilingual regions but not in others. Table 5.1 presents a matrix showing the appropriate combination of bilingual regions and public services allocated therein. tbs thus determined the location and size of the bilingual regions according to sections 22 and 24 of the 1988 Official Languages Act. If tbs had been unable to delineate adequate borders for bilingual districts using the five administrative units of the initial statute, it could

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Map 5.1 The existing bilingual regions Source: Official Languages Regulations: Service to the Public (Ottawa: Treasury Board, March 1992), Appendix, n.p.

now choose among twenty-two administrative units to delineate adequate borders for bilingual regions. The existing units fell under five generic headings: (1) municipalities; (2) metropolitan census areas; (3) provincial administrative units; (4) Aboriginal communities; and (5) public land. Consequently, by determining the types of bilingual services to be allocated by specific offices of seven key federal departments and agencies located in different official languages communities, tbs wound up with hundreds of bilingual regions for the purposes of the Act. Map 5.1 indicates the location of existing bilingual regions. tbs was supposed to update the list once the 2001 census data became available, but there is no indication it has done so. The 1992 bilingual regions are thus still in effect.49

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There are significant differences between the existing bilingual districtification and the one recommended by the B and B Commission and enacted in the 1969 statute. The existing system follows the administrative bilingual districtification adopted by statute in 1938, 1961, and 1967, although the proportional criterion is more generous and the administrative units differ. This administrative system was used by the B and B Commission, which added a symbolic purpose and made it its primary value. Another distinguishing feature is that the regulations have reversed the bureaucratic approach found in the statutes of 1938, 1961, 1967, and 1988. Indeed, the federal government must now adapt its administrative structure to the geolinguistic reality of the country according to numerical and proportional demolinguistic criteria, rather than according to the statutory significant demand criterion within existing administrative units of federal institutions. In other words, bilingual districts based on geolinguistic reality and recommended to compel federal institutions to adapt to this reality were abandoned, de facto in 1976 and de jure 1988, in favour of bilingual regions based on significant demand within existing administrative areas. Now, however, bilingual regions are defined according to almost identical regulatory criteria, which obliges some federal institutions to adapt their allocation of bilingual services within their administrative areas. A more significant difference between the existing bilingual districtification and the one recommended by the B and B Commission and enacted in the 1969 statute can be found in the fact that while the administrative purpose of bilingual districts is in effect in bilingual regions, the symbolic purpose of the former has never been achieved. This is because the administrative process used to establish the existing bilingual regions is too secretive to be of any symbolic use to minorities. Indeed, the publication of a complex set of regulations specifying the eighteen circumstances and twenty-two administrative units that combine to form ten types of bilingual regions with the goal of helping tbs force seven federal institutions allocate different types of bilingual services from specific offices located in different types of minority communities does not provide the symbolic recognition of minority homelands that would have occurred with the official proclamation of bilingual districts. Also, bilingual regions are not officially proclaimed. Regulations have a statutory value, but so did the regulations adopted following the 1938, 1961, and 1967 statutes. This bureaucratic approach convinced the B and B Commission to give the

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system a symbolic purpose. Publishing the criteria used to determine bilingual regions in the Canada Gazette was not sufficient in the eyes of the B and B Commission. Instead, the government had to proclaim bilingual districts in the House and through the mass media. The symbolic proclamation was the key difference between bilingual districts and bilingual regions. Finally, the regulations do not guarantee bilingual services to the minorities. Numerous evaluations have concluded that gaps still exist in the allocation of bilingual services in the statutory and regulatory bilingual regions.50 This could also have occurred in bilingual districts, but because of their symbolic statutory proclamation and wide public awareness, bilingual districts would have had more clout than bilingual regions – the vast majority of Canadians remain unaware of the latter.51 The minority would have known that public services should be allocated in their mother tongue in the offices serving an officially designated bilingual district. This was the purpose of an official proclamation. It would thus have been easier for the minority to force the government to respect its statutory obligations. Since the vast majority of minority members do not know of the location of existing bilingual regions, they may also not know that they have the right to receive public services in their mother tongue from certain offices in their area. If they are ignorant of this right, they are unlikely to ask the government to respect it. Bilingual districts would have helped the minority in this regard by publicly circumscribing the areas where all public services were to be allocated in the minority language. For bilingual regions to be effective, their locations must be known. Since very few Canadians know where bilingual regions are located, their symbolic value is negligible.

chapter six

Policy Analysis

My case study contributes to public policy analysis and public administration in three ways. First, it presents the most comprehensive explanation of the bilingual districts’ demise. Second, it offers three conceptual nuances to debates on social identity, sociolinguistic policies, symbolic policies, nationalism, and minority rights and services. And third, it presents four theoretical contributions. This chapter is consequently divided into three parts.

1 explaining the death o f bi li n g ua l d i s tr i c ts Bilingual districts were terminated on 23 December 1976 because Cabinet wanted to avoid opposition, especially in Quebec. They had become a negative symbol that could have fuelled the flames of sociolinguistic tensions reignited by the summer’s events. This is much the same conclusion reached by McRae (1978), Castonguay (1976a), and Cartwright (1981). My research also adds empirical support to that conclusion; up until now, the conclusion was based solely on logical suppositions. My research also gives credence to two other conclusions found in the literature. The first was that the cornerstone program was opposed by civil servants anxious about their job security and prospects (Cartwright 1980), by the Commissioner of Official Languages (McRae 1978), and by the majority residing within some of the proposed bilingual districts

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(Williams 1981). The second conclusion was that the program was abandoned because the advisory boards made dubious assumptions and controversial recommendations (McRae 1978; Castonguay 1976b; Williams 1981, Cartwright and Williams 1982). These two conclusions are significant pieces to the puzzle, although they played a minor role in the ultimate decision. My research also adds other pieces, demonstrating that fourteen threads formed the rope that hung the bilingual districts: 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

The addition of section 9 (2) The perennial status of bilingual districts under section 13 (4) Provincial refusals to make bilingual districts a joint venture The March 1971 transfer of responsibility over bilingual districts from the Secretary of State to tbs The Duhamel Board’s controversial recommendation to designate the entire province of Quebec as a bilingual district The erroneous claim by Secretary of State officials that considerable changes jeopardized the twenty-eight bilingual districts recommended according to the 20 per cent criterion Cabinet’s decision to delay the initial set of bilingual districts until the second board’s report tbs’s efforts to specify the allocation of bilingual services according to the criterion of significant demand Spicer’s critique of bilingual districts The minimalist strategy pursued by Mackey and Raymond The Fox Board’s controversial recommendation to exclude Montreal The tbs deviation The events of the summer of 1976 Opposition from some quarters, most notably sovereignist Québécois and anti-bilingualism groups in Welland, Ontario

More importantly, my research demonstrates that one of those threads is the key explanatory variable: the tbs deviation. Indeed, the deviation makes all previous conclusions relative and incomplete. Were it not for the tbs deviation, Cabinet would have proclaimed bilingual districts in May 1976. On the one hand, the air traffic controllers crisis, the Bibeau report, and the pq victory only occurred after the deviation; on the other, Cabinet had dismissed the opposition of many provinces, civil servants, and Keith Spicer when it announced in November 1975 that it would establish at least thirty-one bilingual districts. The chronology of

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events thus gives more credence to my conclusion than all the others. Cabinet pulled the lever in December 1976, but the noose had already suffocated the cornerstone program by then. Nevertheless, I argue that at the time of the tbs deviation, in May 1976, the first eleven threads would not have been enough. Conclusions reached earlier are thus partial and of minor significance. The question now becomes: why did tbs sabotage the cornerstone program in May 1976? We may never know for certain, since the saboteurs may never explain their actions, but my data suggest the following simple answer: tbs did not want to overhaul its existing administrative bilingual districtification in favour of a symbolic bilingual districtification. Why? Because tbs did not understand the symbolic purpose of bilingual districts. The reasons for this lack of understanding are difficult to grasp. True, the B and B Commission’s reports and the Official Languages Act did not make the bilingual districts’ symbolic purpose evident, but the constitutional negotiations and both advisory boards’ regional consultations and reports clearly expounded their symbolic value. Bilingual districts suffered an ironic fate. They were supposed to correct the erroneous perceptions of Canada’s geolinguistic reality that had fuelled a national crisis, pushing more and more Québécois towards secession, but that very symbolic purpose put the cornerstone in jeopardy in 1976 because it could have stimulated significant opposition from Quebec secessionists. Two other ironies surround the demise of bilingual districts. First, they were replaced by bilingual regions. Districts were to be created according to the geolinguistic reality of the country, but they were replaced by regions established according to significant demand. The irony lies in the fact that significant demand is now determined by the geolinguistic reality. In addition, the administrative bilingual regions were supposed to complement the symbolic bilingual districts, but the former eventually replaced the latter. Bilingual regions, being unknown to the public, have no symbolic value. The second irony – the incompatibility of sections 9 (2) and 13 (4) – needs a more exhaustive description. Section 9 (2) was added after the February 1969 federal-provincial conference, during which Jean-Jacques Bertrand expressed concern that bilingual districts would become ghettos. Section 13 (4) was also modified following the conference to ensure that once a bilingual district was proclaimed, it could not be eliminated. This modification was made to be as generous to francophones outside

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Quebec as the “acquired rights” clause of section 13 (3) was to anglophones within that province. The irony lies in the fact that sections 9 (2) and 13 (4), in spite of their obvious independence, eventually prevented the initial proclamation of bilingual districts in May 1972. Section 9 (2) could have provided a safety net to catch the minority groups no longer served by section 9 (1). Thus, any region proclaimed as a bilingual district but where the minority no longer represented 7 per cent of the population, as the B and B Commission and the initial section 13 (4) proposed, could be stripped of its symbolic status but still be protected by section 9 (2). Section 9 (2) made it unnecessary to guarantee the perennial status of bilingual districts under section 13 (4). The adoption of section 9 (2) should have maintained the initial version of section 13 (4). Two examples help explain this fateful irony. First, francophones represented 17 per cent of the Prince Albert bilingual district in 1961, and as noted, the area should not have been on the final list submitted to Cabinet in May 1972 according to the 20 per cent criterion at that date. The coexistence of sections 9 (2) and 13 (4) would have enabled Cabinet to proclaim this area as an initial bilingual district without serious consequences. Had Cabinet proclaimed Prince Albert as a bilingual district in May 1972, along with the other twenty-seven initial bilingual districts under consideration, the initial section 13 (4) would have allowed Cabinet to avoid any anxiety posed by the perennial status of bilingual districts. Cabinet could have simply proclaimed the initial set of twenty-eight bilingual districts, then eliminated those where the minority no longer represented 7 per cent of the population after 1971. In fact, Prince Albert would still have met this criterion after 1971, but this is irrelevant to Cabinet’s decision of May 1972. What concerns us is that the initial version of section 13 (4) would have enabled such a decision without political anxiety and concern. The second example involves francophones in Coquitlam. This minority represented over 11.1 per cent in 1961 but only 6.6 per cent in 1971. Coquitlam was recommended by the Duhamel Board as a bilingual district but was eliminated from the final list submitted to Cabinet in May 1972 because the minority did not represent 20 per cent of the population. Cabinet could nevertheless have proclaimed Coquitlam as a bilingual district in May 1972 because it met the statutory requirements, and it could have eliminated this bilingual district following the Fox report, since francophones no longer represented at least 7 per cent of the population. The initial section 13 (4) would have eliminated this

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bilingual district, and section 9 (2) would have ensured a minimal number and type of bilingual services as long as the demand for such services was sufficient according to tbs standards. Cabinet would have eliminated the official status in 1975, but because of statutory obligations rather than political expediency. Consequently, Cabinet could have proclaimed twenty-eight bilingual districts in May 1972, confident that, had the original version of section 13 (4) been adopted, any bilingual district could be eliminated if the 1971 census indicated “considerable changes.” The initial section 13 (4) would have removed this burden from the shoulders of Cabinet and placed it on those of the minority. A controversial decision would have been averted by putting the onus on the census data and minority demands. If twenty-eight bilingual districts had been proclaimed in May 1972, tbs would not have sabotaged the Miller report in May 1976 and Cabinet would not have terminated the program in December 1976. The second additional irony suggests that federal policy-makers did not think sections 9 (2) and 13 (4) through. Both gestures of goodwill complicated the process. Again, the evolution of the file added to its complexity. Once the draft was modified to maintain established bilingual districts and to provide bilingual services in former bilingual districts, sections 9 (2) and 13 (4) became incoherent. In May 1972, the amendments combined to prevent, rather than facilitate, Cabinet’s decision to establish an initial set of bilingual districts. Nevertheless, that combination, as well as all the other threads save the tbs deviation, did not prevent Cabinet from proclaiming thirty-one bilingual districts in May 1976. In the end, that deviation remains the key explanatory variable. However, I have not been able to find any data that explains why tbs decided to sabotage the bilingual districts in May 1976. In fact, tbs officials denied neglecting to create the interdepartmental committee to study the Fox report in November 1975 and shelving the Miller report in May 1976. The answer may never be known, but I will nevertheless attempt an explanation. I will proceed by two steps. The first is to establish that the tbs denial of events is false. The second is to propose a hypothetical explanation based on the literature on bureaucratic deviation.

a)

Invalidating tbs’s Denial of Events

The hierarchy of the Treasury Board Secretariat disobeyed Cabinet’s 13 November 1975 request that it establish an interdepartmental

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committee to revise the Fox recommendations according to a symmetrical approach and recommend a list of bilingual districts for proclamation. I do not know for certain if this non-compliance was deliberate or accidental, but some data point to an intentional deviation. As noted, one pco official warned his superior that tbs was deliberately circumventing Cabinet’s request. He stated that tbs had not yet created, nor would it, the interdepartmental committee on bilingual districts. And he feared that tbs would “wait until the last minute to establish an ad hoc committee to rubber-stamp its own propositions.” The official was partly right: there was a committee established to rubberstamp the secretariat’s proposal to abandon bilingual districts in favour of bilingual regions. However, the Miller task force was not established at the last minute, but in November 1975. It was established to demonstrate the superiority of the bilingual regions over bilingual districts, and when the last minute came up without a memo from the non-existent interdepartmental committee, tbs would present the task force report as a substitute memo to Cabinet. Indeed, tbs even asked Morris Miller to draft his supposedly internal report in the format of a memo to Cabinet. The imposition of such stringent drafting requirements on an internal report demonstrated tbs’s intention to present the task force’s report to Cabinet from the moment it was created. However, when the Miller report recommended bilingual districts, tbs shelved it and wrote its own memo to Cabinet. This explains why tbs archives have no traces of the Miller report, even though tbs kept records of everything else pertaining to the program. Another note, written on 31 August 1976 by another pco official, warned that the tbs memo to Cabinet, presented in draft form to the Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers, was asking Cabinet to reverse its stated position of 15 November 1975 but was not telling it that a reversal was involved. The note stated that tbs was not only going against Cabinet’s wishes, but also doing so surreptitiously. It added that tbs’s understanding of the provisions of the Official Languages Act regarding bilingual districts reflected a “simplistic view” of the spirit of that Act and of the wishes of Cabinet and Parliament. Both notes indicate that tbs had planned the demise of bilingual districts before November 1975, when it established the Miller task force. I argue that tbs memo 1973–88 of June 1973 was indirectly the event that triggered the tbs deviation, and that the decision to abandon the

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program was adopted by tbs between 29 June 1973 and 13 November 1975. I do not know, however, the exact date, nor if this decision was formal or informal. The deviation had been planned before November 1975, but it was only conducted in May 1976, after Miller presented recommendations that did not respect tbs preferences. More importantly, both notes indicate that tbs intentionally planned the deviation and ignored Cabinet’s decision of 13 November 1975 to establish an impartial interdepartmental committee to review the Fox report in light of the government’s statement in the House and to outline an implementation program. In other words, the notes indicate that the tbs denial of events is false. I will now demonstrate that tbs officials eliminated the Miller report by proving that they falsely claimed that the Miller task force had never produced a report at all. Indeed, if I can prove that tbs lied about the Miller report, I can prove that it eliminated the report after Miller presented it to Jean Chrétien in May 1976. I could simply produce a copy of the supposedly non-existent Miller report to jeopardize the validity of the tbs denial and support my version of events. However, tbs officials provided a logical explanation for my copy of the report: Morris Miller wrote the report himself, in his spare time, after the task force was disbanded before it could produce a report.1 The document I obtained, according to this explanation, was thus a personal report fabricated by Miller a posteriori. I reject this explanation for five reasons. First, it would imply that Miller obtained a copy of the tbs memo to Cabinet, then spent weeks copying the secret memo and making it come to a diametrically opposite conclusion. For what motive? The tbs officials could not say. The most significant flaw in this explanation is that the tbs memo to Cabinet was sealed from the public for twenty years. Miller would have had to obtain a copy from pco officials or members of Cabinet, which is possible but improbable, and then spent his summer hours writing a report he knew would never be presented to Cabinet and would thus only collect dust in his attic. This is also possible, but also improbable. Second, I obtained testimonies from members of the task force ascertaining that they performed work on the Fox report and submitted their reports to Miller.2 While it is true that the task force never met, as tbs stated, it did perform its work. It is possible to argue, as tbs officials did, that Miller collated the respective work in his spare time after the task force was disbanded by tbs, but this strains credibility.

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Third, tbs officials plagiarized the Miller report when writing their memo to Cabinet. Copying the report proves it existed. Except for the conclusion and recommendations, the Miller and tbs memos are almost identical. For example, one section reproduced in both documents contains 407 words, 392 of which are identical.3 But this does not prove which document was plagiarized. Miller could thus have plagiarized the tbs memo. I can prove that the tbs memo plagiarized the Miller report by reproducing the memo’s introductory line: “As directed by Cabinet in its decisions of November 7, 1975 (#630–75 rd), the present memorandum reports on the review of the recommendations of the Second Bilingual Districts Advisory Board whose report was tabled in Parliament on November 21, 1975.”4 Cabinet minutes indicate that no such discussions on bilingual districts were held on 7 November 1975 and that decision 630–75 was taken on 13 November rather than 7 November 1975. Did the tbs memo simply confuse the dates? This is possible, but it would not explain why the tbs memo’s introductory line stated that there was more than one decision. Why was “decision” plural? This is where the Miller report comes in handy. Its introductory line reads as follows (my emphasis): “As directed by the Cabinet in its decisions of November 7, 1974 (# 569–74 rd) and November 13, 1975 (# 630–75 rd), the present memorandum reports on the review of the recommendations of the Second Bilingual Districts Advisory Board whose report was tabled in Parliament on November 21, 1975.”5 The Miller report pluralized “decisions,” and rightly so because there were two decisions. It also had the proper Cabinet decision-making references. The tbs memo copied the Miller report but accidentally deleted the italicized segment noting Cabinet’s decision 569–74 of 7 November 1974. The Miller report could not have invented and added the missing underlined passage, even if its authors had stolen and plagiarized the tbs memo, because the tbs memo neglected to mention it altogether. Conversely, tbs officials could have accidentally deleted the underlined section when copying the Miller report. Fourth, when presented with the obvious plagiarism and the supposedly non-existent Miller report, one tbs official panicked, turned red, and became agitated and defensive. My hermeneutic interpretation of that official’s suddenly erratic behaviour seems to invalidate the tbs officials’ denial of events. Fifth and most importantly, pco documents state that the task force completed its work. One pco document, dated 27 April 1976, stated that

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“Miller submitted [to Bill McWhinney] a draft memo on the matter.”6 If pco officials knew of the tbs internal task force and its report, tbs officials did as well. This invalidates tbs’s denial of the Miller memo. Combined, these five reasons prove that the Miller report existed and was submitted to tbs Chairman Jean Chrétien and his officials in May 1976. The tbs denial of its existence is thus a lie. By proving this, I can deduce that tbs eliminated the Miller report. In short, since it is clear that tbs officials received a copy of the Miller report recommending thirty-one bilingual districts, lied about the task force ever having produced a report, and failed to file it in their archives, it can be deduced that they eliminated the report surreptitiously. This demonstration that tbs lied about and sabotaged the Miller report, however, does not necessarily validate my version of events, but it does give my version significant credence. It also reduces the relative weight of previous explanations indicating that political opposition was the key explanatory variable in the bilingual districts’ demise. It is nevertheless insufficient; I must also demonstrate why my version is valid. I must present a plausible scenario that explains why tbs sabotaged the bilingual districts.

b)

Explaining the tbs Deviation

My thesis is simple: more than any other factor, the tbs deviation killed the bilingual districts program. Why? Since there is no admission of deviation by tbs officials, there exists no formal explanation. I can only deduce from my data the motive of the tbs officials. This motive is predicated on two facts. First, a bureaucratic deviation did occur, and it was performed by tbs. tbs did not establish an impartial interdepartmental committee to review the Fox recommendations and submit a memo to Cabinet for the purpose of proclaiming a list of bilingual districts according to a symmetrical implementation program. Instead, tbs established an internal task force to prepare a report that would be submitted at the last minute and would support tbs’s belief that bilingual regions could replace bilingual districts. However, when the task force recommended the proclamation of thirty-one bilingual districts, tbs officials shelved its report in favour of an internal memo recommending termination of the bilingual districts program. In fact, tbs’s initial draft suggested a “provincial option” and asked the steering committee to give its stamp of approval, but when the committee did so, tbs rejected the provincial option in its final

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memo. My data invalidate tbs’s denial of these events. They also demonstrate that tbs deviated from the government’s official policy. tbs officials also misled Cabinet and lied about their actions. Second, tbs was the federal agency responsible for the implementation of sections 9 (1) and (2) of the Official Languages Act. When Cabinet asked tbs, on 13 November 1975, to oversee the review by an interdepartmental committee of the bilingual districts recommended by the Fox Board, it was asking the organization that had invested a significant amount of time in establishing bilingual regions to become judge and defence of its own administrative bilingual regions and the more symbolic bilingual districts. The results were predictable, as pco officials had warned their superiors. Indeed, since tbs was deviating from the policy, interpreting it to suit its own propositions, and exerting its hegemony over the federal government’s implementation and evaluation of bilingualism programs in the public service and bilingual districtification, it was given the opportunity to prioritize its own interests. Consequently, bilingual districts were replaced by bilingual regions. This was the gist of the tbs memo to Cabinet. Had the Secretary of State kept the responsibility over the Fox report and Cabinet’s assessment of that report, the interdepartmental committee would undoubtedly have been established and would probably have presented a report that came closer to the Miller task force analysis and recommendations than those presented by tbs. Instead, tbs was given free rein to assess the vulnerable bilingual districts. tbs officials obviously believed that their bilingual regions could adequately replace bilingual districts, in spite of arguments mounted by the B and B Commission, the minority members, the two advisory boards, and the Miller task force, as well as the Trudeau government’s public defence of bilingual districts. How did tbs come to this conclusion? As Guy Peters explains, “over time the goals pursued by an agency generally come to mean what the incumbents of the roles want them to mean” (1995, 159). Bilingual districts were reduced to an administrative mechanism established to help the federal government determine the areas of the country where it was feasible to allocate bilingual services. One of the first decisions Gordon Osbaldeston made after becoming Treasury Board Secretary was to create bilingual regions; one of his last was to eliminate bilingual districts. This latter decision was not personal. The symbolic value of bilingual districts had never been a significant preoccupation of tbs. The secretariat was and is, after all, a “super” agency with numerous key

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management responsibilities that is foremost motivated by internal considerations rather than external requirements. tbs deals with other federal institutions and rarely with the public. The administrative bilingual districtification launched by the Lacroix amendment in 1938, amplified by the 1961 and 1967 Public Service Employment Acts, and formalized by tbs memo 1973–88 was its main focus. In tbs eyes, bilingual districts were a mere administrative tool. So were bilingual regions. One could be substituted for another. tbs neglected the bilingual districts’ primary purpose because symbols were not a serious management consideration in the 1970s. As pco officials feared, tbs put “administrative considerations” before policy goals.7 Consequently, I argue that bilingual districts were sabotaged to prevent tbs from replacing its bilingual regions with the more controversial bilingual districts. Bilingual districts would have cost time and money and raised a dangerous “red rag” over tbs efforts undertaken in 1973. The sabotage occurred for selfish reasons, to paraphrase Downs (1967, 84). Specifically, it was performed by tbs for reasons of “workload reduction or redesign” (Dunleavy 1991, 175). tbs had invested significant human and material resources since 1972 to allocate bilingual services in the areas of the country where the minority demonstrated a significant demand. tbs’s responsibility had been complicated by Cabinet’s refusal to proclaim twenty-eight bilingual districts in May 1972. tbs then used the Duhamel report as the foundation for its bilingual regions under section 9 (2), at least until Cabinet proclaimed bilingual districts. Drury announced the creation of bilingual regions in December 1972. tbs then synthesized its management of bilingual services under section 9 (2) and the government’s bilingualism policy in the civil service into an important operational manual, published with tbs memo 1973–88 on 29 June 1973. tbs efforts had been praised by the Commissioner of Official Languages, and tbs officials had been able to convince some members of the Fox Board that their important administrative mechanism warranted consideration when delineating bilingual districts. They had indeed been anxious that the board would disturb their plan. The board dismissed bilingual regions as a temporary and complementary measure to the more important symbolic bilingual districts. The Trudeau government agreed and assured the House of Commons, on 21 November 1975, that it would proclaim, as soon as possible, the thirty bilingual districts recommended by the board, albeit modified, and even promised to proclaim more areas than recommended by the board. Cabinet then asked tbs to establish an

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interdepartmental committee to revise the recommendations accordingly and submit a list of bilingual districts for proclamation. tbs did not follow Cabinet’s orders. Instead, it established an internal task force to demonstrate the superiority of bilingual regions over bilingual districts. When that strategy failed, tbs officials wrote their own memo to Cabinet recommending the termination of bilingual districts. They knew they were recommending a significant change of policy that they would have to justify. Luck fell on their side. Significant events, especially the election of the separatist Parti québécois in November 1976, had turned bilingual districts into a “red rag” by the time Cabinet studied the tbs memo in December 1976. But tbs also facilitated its deviation by altering the initial tasks ascribed to the interdepartmental committee, tasks that avoided raising pco and Cabinet concerns. The tbs deviation went unnoticed. That tbs would prefer its bilingual regions over bilingual districts should not come as a surprise, considering the significant amount of time and resources it invested in the matter between 1972 and 1976. That tbs could get away with its deviation under Cabinet’s nose should, however, raise concern, especially since one of its members, Jean Chrétien, had agreed to recommend thirty-one bilingual districts for Cabinet’s consideration only seven months earlier, and since another member of Cabinet, Warren Allmand, pleaded for their proclamation for symbolic purposes. Cabinet was obviously ready, willing, and able to abandon the program after the events of the summer of 1976 and the pq victory, but it needed more substantial arguments to avoid a potentially embarrassing about-face. An unreasoned retreat following the pq victory would have humiliated Trudeau. The tbs memo, with its twelve arguments, provided the required justification for abandoning bilingual districts. However, as explained, a closer scrutiny shows how fragile these arguments were. At the very least, a close scrutiny should have raised serious concerns in Cabinet particularly since Privy Council officials had been wary of a potential bureaucratic deviation by tbs for over six months. But no concerns were raised. tbs thus managed to avoid creating an interdepartmental committee to review the Fox report according to Cabinet’s decision of 13 November 1975, created an internal task force in its stead to argue in favour of bilingual regions and against bilingual districts, eliminated the task force report when it argued the opposite, wrote a memo recommending a change of policy, rejected the steering committee’s provincial option, even though this is what tbs recommended, and surreptitiously modified the interdepartmental committee’s tasks to justify its recommendation to

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abandon the program. tbs was able to breach the rational policy-making process developed by the Trudeau government in spite of the fact that the pco, guardian of that process, was concerned about tbs actions. This chain of events validates my conclusion and reduces the significance of rival hypotheses. It also indicates the limits of Trudeau’s rational policymaking process and the ability of tbs to undermine it to achieve its own preferences.8 However, that such events could occur at all could also indicate that the tbs deviation went unnoticed because it did not really deviate at all. According to this argument, as one of Trudeau’s Cabinet ministers told me, the tbs hierarchy shelved the Miller report because they were told to do so by Trudeau: “[O]n a very sensitive issue like that …, they were just presenting what, probably, Trudeau had come to a decision on.”9 If this was the case, Trudeau would have decided to terminate the program before Cabinet made its fateful decision on 23 December 1976. Indeed, the Speech from the Throne of 12 October 1976 stated that federal policy would henceforth be based on where “there is sufficient demand for such services.”10 In other words, the Trudeau government had decided that section 9 (2) would replace section 9 (1) before it officially terminated the bilingual districts on 23 December 1976. But did Trudeau come to that decision before May 1976? We may never know, but we do know that Trudeau refused, in March 1976, the request of a handful of Liberal mp s to delay the proclamation of bilingual districts until the 1976 data on language of use were available. The chronology of events suggests an even more telling question: did Trudeau come to that decision before November 1975? At that time, and in the House of Commons, the Trudeau Cabinet supported bilingual districts and promised to proclaim at least thirty of them throughout the country. When tbs set up the Miller task force instead of an impartial interdepartmental committee, Trudeau had not come to the fateful conclusion. In fact, he was in favour of bilingual districts.11 Thus, Trudeau may have come to the same conclusion as tbs before Cabinet made its fateful decision, but not before tbs performed its deviation. The chronology of events validates my analysis and conclusion.

2

c o nc e pt ua l n ua n ce s

My case study presents three important conceptual nuances. These nuances should facilitate theoretical debates on social identity, sociolinguistic policies, symbolic policies, nationalism, and minority rights and services.

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First, there is a distinction between the nation-based and the provincebased territorial principle. Indeed, one can only conclude that the B and B Commission “rejected territoriality in favour of the personality principle” (McRoberts 1997, 90) if one disregards this important distinction. In fact, the commission combined the personality principle (all services to all citizens from all federal head offices) with the province-based territorial principle (special status for Quebec; official bilingualism for Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick; French as the language of work in Quebec) and the nation-based territorial principle (bilingual districts). The nationbased territorial principle was nevertheless the cornerstone of the entire system. Bilingual districts would buttress and bridge the other policies and programs. It was on the symbolic and administrative bilingual districts that the societal equality of languages, cultures, and societies would be built. Bilingual districts were the epitome of the territorial principle. Second, there is a significant nuance between symbolic and administrative bilingual districtification. The official proclamation of bilingual districts would have provided a significant symbolic recognition of minority homelands, reduced the use of English in Quebec, and ensured the allocation of bilingual services, while the bilingual regions created by tbs fiat did not. Yet tbs argued that these two administrative tools were interchangeable. My case study confirms the significance of symbols and symbolic policies outlined in the literature (Edelman 1971, 1974; Elder and Cobb 1983; Klatch 1988). I will return to this topic below. Finally, there is a difference between bureaucratic (top-down) and adaptive (bottom-up) bilingual districtification. The former was implemented by bilingual regions, while the latter would have been implemented by bilingual districts. It would thus seem that, ironically, the bureaucratic approach has been implemented since 1992 according to adaptive criteria (the minority’s geolinguistic reality). This would make my distinction irrelevant. However, the bureaucratic-adaptive distinction is significant because the adaptive approach cannot easily be based on bureaucratic criteria. Although significant demand is presently based on communal rather than administrative borders, minority homelands are not determined by administrative considerations. More research is necessary to ascertain the value of my third conceptual nuance.

3

th e o r e t i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s

Finally, this chapter presents four theoretical contributions to the academic literature. In short, my case study suggests that (A) symbolic

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policies are crucial tools in the resolution of sociolinguistic conflicts, since symbols are significant sources of such conflicts; (B) political philosophies dictate public policies, although it is difficult to determine exactly how and why; (C) specification is a significant policy stage; and (D) the bureaucratization of federal sociolinguistic policy led to the demise of bilingual districts and their symbolic value. The data also suggest that these four conclusions are related, albeit some conclusions are more related than others. A) Symbolic policies are crucial tools in the resolution of sociolinguistic conflicts, since symbols are significant sources of such conflicts. My case study supports the conclusions reached by Edelman (1971, 1974), Elder and Cobb (1983), and Klatch (1988). Symbols and symbolic policies are important political tools. The public consultations conducted by the B and B Commission and the Duhamel and Fox advisory boards confirmed the significance of symbols and symbolic policies. However, my data suggest that symbols can simultaneously alleviate and stimulate crises. Symbols that are perceived positively can alleviate crises, while those perceived negatively can stimulate them. Finally, my data suggest that the same symbol can be perceived simultaneously in a positive and a negative light, sometimes by the same people but usually by different people. The final outcome of a policy may not depend on the symbol but on how people perceive it, how many people perceive the same symbol in a negative rather than positive light, and/or how vociferous the opponents of the symbolic policy are compared to the proponents. The B and B Commission learned from its public consultations that symbolic recognitions were in order. Some of the briefs it received also recommended official proclamation of the equal status and use of the minority and majority languages and cultures at national, provincial, and regional levels. Also, through its empirical analysis and sociological approach, the commission produced arguments in favour of symbolic policies to correct the erroneous perceptions of the country’s geolinguistic reality that fuelled the national unity crisis. It understood the significance of symbols as sources of the explosive character of sociolinguistic conflicts. Language, history, and territory, especially when they overlap, are significant symbols of minority identity that seem to reinforce one another. Symbols were needed to (re)establish the true geolinguistic reality and social cohesion. Government intervention had “both a great potential

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importance and a definite symbolic value” (rcbb 1967, 145). This is why the first volume of the commission’s report addressed the official status of French and English in Canada and recommended an Official Languages Act to recognize the equality of both languages, in terms of status and use, at the national and regional levels. The commission did not sufficiently expound the symbolic virtues of bilingual districts, but these were fully understood by the Trudeau government and almost everyone involved in the program, save tbs officials. The commission knew that symbols were short-term remedies that eventually must produce practical results, especially at the local level where sociolinguistic conflicts affect the daily lives of citizens (86). Nevertheless, it also knew that such practical results could only be achieved after geolinguistic perceptions had been corrected and the minority language had been symbolically recognized and protected. The official proclamation would provide previously neglected minority groups a symbolic recognition of their language and culture from outside, but it would also boost the minority’s morale from within by providing leverage to help them tackle other collective projects in the future to ensure their survival. Symbolic recognitions would facilitate concrete actions. In this sense, symbolic programs like bilingual districts cannot be considered a “non-decision,” as some policy analysts have concluded (Baxter-Moore 1987). One would have to distinguish between merely symbolic and significantly symbolic policies. The regional consultations conducted by both advisory boards validated the commission’s conclusion. Indeed, they confirmed that sociolinguistic and geolinguistic identities combine to form a significant fortress from which minorities can wage battles in the political arena. Numerous minority members requested bilingual districts because of the pride and leverage they would provide in the future. They understood the power of symbols. The few francophones who opposed a bilingual district in Bonnyville did so because bilingual districts were perceived as a negative symbol by the local Ukrainian-Canadian majority. But most of their colleagues asked for a bilingual district because of its symbolic value. The allocation of federal services in their mother tongue was secondary to the official status of their language in their homeland. Therefore, although bilingual districts were an administrative mechanism desired by the minority and adopted by the majority to provide public services in both languages, they represented first and foremost a symbolic tool that was both the product of minority struggles over the control of their homelands and the producer of future struggles. The symbolic purpose dominated.

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This was especially the case where territory, language, and identity coincided. Minorities could be placed on a continuum in regard to their position on bilingual districts: those who lived in relatively homogeneous communities felt much more positively towards bilingual districts, towards their restricted delineation, and towards their symbolic value, while most of the minority members who opposed bilingual districts lived in predominantly anglophone communities like Toronto and Vancouver, where no bilingual districts could be proclaimed. It should not come as a surprise that the minority members who opposed bilingual districts preferred the personality principle. They did not request bilingual regions either. Consultations revealed a strong correlation between the minority’s cultural homogeneity and its positive response to bilingual districts. The exact opposite can be said for the majoritarian response. Most of the consultations conducted by the commission and the advisory boards indicate that the rate of opposition to bilingual districts among majority members was higher in areas where one could be proclaimed in their backyard. In general, the majority, like the minority, favoured bilingual districts. However, the most significant opposition to the cornerstone came from anglophones living in a potential bilingual district. In fact, the strongest majoritarian opposition came from communities like Bonnyville, Welland, and Montreal, where bilingual districts were a likelihood, while the strongest majoritarian support came from communities like Digby and Halifax, where none could be proclaimed. The latter cannot be discarded simply as benign support, because the majority even made formal requests to be included in any proximal bilingual district. The majoritarian opponents were more numerous and vociferous where the symbol was requested the most by the minority. They understood the symbolic value of bilingual districts. Bilingual districts were a positive symbol to some, especially the minority francophones who stood to benefit from the cornerstone, but a negative one to others, especially majority anglophones who stood to reside in an eventual bilingual district. The fact that most majority anglophones approved of a bilingual district in their backyard does not negate the fact that the greatest opposition to the cornerstone came from fellow anglophones. This opposition was not specifically a reaction to bilingual districts. Anglophones who opposed bilingual districts in general also opposed bilingualism in general. Bilingual districts were lightning rods. This was most evident in Welland. For most Welland opponents, anything bilingual was unacceptable. The tbs memo called them backlash groups for a reason. For other opponents, bilingualism was acceptable at the national level but not at the regional level. Many francophones in Quebec

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came to similar conclusions about bilingual districts and bilingualism in that province. Bilingual districts in Quebec would have meant “English spoken here.” Almost everyone in Quebec involved in the bilingual districts program knew this to be a historic fact, but some opposed the official proclamation of this fact. Bilingual districts were the symbolic tool par excellence to correct the erroneous perceptions of the country’s geolinguistic reality, but their very symbolic purpose became a lightning rod for the opponents of the federal policy and the field on which they would conduct their battle. The program ran counter to a century of assimilationist policies and erroneous perceptions. Some Canadians either refused to correct their perceptions or perceived bilingual districts as a threat to those perceptions. Consequently, they opposed bilingual districts. My case study indicates that some anglophones and some ethnic groups opposed bilingualism and bilingual districts because they viewed them as tools to promote the French language and culture and demote their language and culture. Bilingual districts were recommended to promote the French language and culture outside Quebec (and diminish the official use of English in Quebec) but not to diminish the status of any other language or culture. However, by elevating French to an equal footing with English, bilingual districts contested the hegemony of the English language and culture in Canada and moved the French language and culture ahead of the other non-majority languages and cultures in the country. It did not seem to matter that francophones were at least ninefold more numerous than the other sociolinguistic groups at the national level. That national sociolinguistic reality was neglected in favour of the local sociolinguistic reality, where francophones were in some cases less numerous than other language groups. This was especially the case in the western provinces. Bilingual districts embodied different perceptions and an attack on some groups’ status and identity. Intended to correct the erroneous perceptions that fuelled the national crisis, in particular the belief that the French fact was limited to Quebec, they would have (re)established an equal partnership between the two significant and official languages, cultures, and societies after a century of provincial assimilationist policies. Bilingual districts were perceived by some as the symbolic manifestation of the federal government’s preferential treatment of the francophone minority. “Bilingual” meant “French.” This was indeed the gist of the B and B Commission’s intention, because the “bilingualism” inherent in section 133 of the bna Act had meant “English” since 1867. But to the

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numerous anglophones who had become accustomed to the preferential treatment of the English language and culture, as well as to the belief held by some ethnic minority groups who had emigrated to Canada that this preference was not only the de facto but also the de jure reality, bilingual districts and bilingualism meant a demotion of their own language and culture and an unjust preferential treatment of francophones. This is in great part why bilingual districts created for symbolic purposes were opposed for symbolic reasons by numerous groups. However, the vast majority of Canadians approved of the cornerstone. Bilingual districts, others argued, would tear apart communities and the whole country. They would damage the social cohesion that people need to cross the barrier between the two cultures. Bilingual districts would also create animosity between the two societies. And they would create ghettos for the minority. For their part, minorities rarely, if ever, considered bilingual districts established in their interest as ghettos. The beauty of bilingual districts was in the eye of the beholder. In the end, minorities lost the battle of symbolic perceptions. Policy-makers may have to choose between positive and negative symbols and positive and negative interpretations of the same symbol. In the end, as my case study reveals, the negative value won the battle. As a consequence, the symbolic bilingual districts were replaced by the non-symbolic bilingual regions. The government thus abandoned the program’s symbolic purpose. Under what circumstances are symbolic policies needed to quell what symbolic sociolinguistic conflicts? The answer may depend on the types of conflicts, the critical mass and geographical concentration of the minority, the historical context, and the social, economic, demographic, and political importance of other sociolinguistic minorities. Further studies are thus required. Symbols will likely continue to link and divide sociolinguistic groups, and conflicts on their value will occur sporadically. Practical solutions alone will not resolve these issues. Symbolic policies indeed seem necessary: “Symbolism is not without importance, and symbolism is crucial to Canada’s national unity” (Magnet 1995, 122) Symbols matter. B) Political philosophies dictate public policies, although it is difficult to determine exactly how and why. My case study indicates that political philosophies frame public policies, but it also suggests that they do so directly or indirectly, more or

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less, and at different times. Elements of the philosophical differences between communitarians and individualists, for example, influenced the specification and termination of bilingual districts. My study also indicates that philosophical differences do not necessarily produce different results because they either seldom represent a single and coherent guide to daily administrative action or are of no consequence when philosophical rubbers hit administrative roads. The B and B Commission did not espouse one political philosophy over others, but I argue that the “blue pages” of its first volume side with the communitarian variation of liberalism. To be sure, the variation existed only in disparate fragments in the 1960s. The commission could even be credited with linking some of these fragments together, creating the communitarian alternative from scratch after its consultations, research, and analysis. The scratch product was easy prey for the readymade individualist variation of liberalism that dominated the Western world after the Second World War and was espoused by Pierre Trudeau. Trudeau was one of the rare political leaders who published and argued for a coherent set of political principles. With his Lockean individualist idealism, Montesquian arguments for checks and balances, and Actonian penchant for federal solutions to multinational problems, he proved a formidable foe of the communitarian and bicultural framework proposed by the B and B Commission. The debate was framed by clearly marked lines. Moreover, Trudeau’s political philosophy in power dictated the policy through its adoption, specification, and implementation stages. Laurendeau’s death prevented a debate between his communitarian strand and Trudeau’s individualist strand. Also, had Trudeau not succeeded Pearson, the commission might have succeeded in convincing Canadians to put aside their Lockean principles. Even if the theoretical debate never took place, Trudeau’s ideals took significant tangents when placed in the real-life arena of pragmatic politics. Trudeau held fast to his philosophy, even when faced with the secessionist Parti québécois, but my case study shows that his principles were not anathema to every communitarian principle espoused by the B and B Commission. Trudeau’s most important means to resolve the sociolinguistic crisis was a mere amendment to the bna Act to guarantee minority communities the right to their own schools. Section 23 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the end product of his quest, bridges the communitarian and individualist variations of liberalism. It simultaneously follows symbolic/collective/cultural/ territorial and administrative/individual/linguistic/aspatial principles

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through the expression “where numbers warrant.” Moreover, Trudeau accepted and promoted bilingual districts as similar bridges. Thus, the differences between the political thoughts advocated by Trudeau and Laurendeau are not as significant as some have concluded (Laforest 1995; McRoberts 1997). While their political thoughts differed in many aspects, they were similar in many others. More importantly, the differences were not as significant in practice as on paper. One must therefore be wary of categorical conclusions on political philosophies. Laurendeau and Trudeau were both social democrats and liberals, although Laurendeau’s communitarian strand of liberalism did not coincide with Trudeau’s individualist strand. Both men advocated Hegelian idealism and communitarian realism, although Trudeau favoured the former while Laurendeau preferred the latter. Both were federalists opposed to Quebec’s secession, although Laurendeau thought it was a viable alternative if all others failed. They both sought a balance between state-sponsored and community-based solutions to the sociolinguistic conflict, although Laurendeau favoured the latter and Trudeau the former. They both advocated symbolic and practical approaches, political and administrative means, personal and territorial principles, individual and collective rights, and linguistic and cultural foundations, although they were on the opposite side of the continuum on each topic. Trudeau favoured individual language rights, although he knew that such rights can only be obtained and exercised collectively. He also conceded the sociological link between language and culture, although he rejected the political connection between culture and state while promoting the political connection between language(s) and state. In short, they agreed more than not. Concluding that Laurendeau’s communitarian strand was anathema to Trudeau’s individualist strand is thus misleading. There were differences, but most of these were more of degree than of substance. My case study supports the conclusions that the dichotomy between communitarian and individualist strands of liberalism is theoretically misleading (Kymlicka 2001) and empirically difficult to validate (Harty 1999). The lines are clearly drawn arguments that are too often constructed to oppose rather than to describe and explain reality. The differences are not always clear, and they do not always produce different results in practice. Political philosophies thus have a direct or indirect impact on public policies. Also, any impact is more or less significant and can occur at different times of the policy process. Moreover, political philosophies do not necessarily translate into single and coherent frameworks for action. For heuristic purposes, I presented

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Trudeau as an individualist and Laurendeau as a communitarian. But despite individualist and communitarian “ideal types,” political actors may not ponder these philosophical considerations when adopting or implementing public policies. But even if they did, as our exegesis of the thoughts of Laurendeau and Trudeau indicates, these philosophical poles often fuse in practice. Finally, although Laurendeau and Trudeau held rather coherent political philosophies, one should not conclude that the B and B Commission adopted Laurendeau’s communitarian strand or that the federal Cabinet adopted Trudeau’s individualist strand. Although one commission insider flatly denied that it followed “any predetermined ideology or convictions” (Morrison 1989), another demonstrated that the commission adopted a “blend of individualistic and communitarian features” (Oliver 1993, 319). The communitarian strand nevertheless dominated. Although the commission tried to straddle the personality and the territorial principles of language planning and stated that “individual human rights are unquestionable” (rcbb 1967, xxxix), its conclusions and recommendations favoured the communitarian strand. First, it considered language as a collective and cultural symbol rather than a simple means of communication (xxxv). Second, it stated that biculturalism encompassed bilingualism and was the glue that held together linguistic, historical, and territorial identity (xxxiv). Third, it sought the equality of peoples, languages, and cultures through the “equality of communities” over the equality of individuals (xliii). Fourth, it favoured territorial bilingualism over individual bilingualism. Recognizing Quebec as a distinct society and making bilingual districts its cornerstone recommendation clearly confirm this conclusion. Fifth, it concluded that individual rights are not enough and must be complemented, even superseded in some cases, by collective rights (xl–xli). And finally, the commission’s recommendations were intended to allow francophones within and outside Quebec a minimal institutional self-determination (xlv). But elements of the individualist strand can also be found throughout its report. On the other side, John Turner’s accommodating gestures towards Quebec indicate that not all of Trudeau’s ministers shared his political philosophy.12 My case study therefore cautions against facile generalizations about political philosophies. For instance, if individualism is the dominant political philosophy among anglophones in Canada (“the damnosa hereditas of Anglo-American democracy and Lockean political theory and liberal society” – McRae 1975, 290), how can Trudeau misconceive

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Canada by espousing the Lockean political philosophy (McRoberts 1997)? McRoberts may be correct in concluding that Anglo-Canadians’ rejection of duality, asymmetry, and territoriality is a case of “reading history backwards” (1997, 250), but his conclusion contradicts the one reached by McRae. Also, while it can be argued that the “two nations” concept, which rivalled Trudeau’s concept of Canada, has become a “sociological fact” and “will persist as one of the most tenacious elements of the way in which French Canadians understand the history of their Canada” (Falardeau, 1960, 25), this does not mean it was the dominant concept before Trudeau came along. Indeed, Laurendeau requested a royal commission because the two nations concept was denied by English Canada. The underlying difficulty lies in the fact that McRoberts, like Kymlicka (2001) and Laforest (1995), deifies English Canada and constructs political philosophies as coherent wholes able to guide action. But if English Canada, however defined, espouses a variety of political philosophies (there are anarchists and Marxists in Canada) and if opposite political philosophies can be fused in practice, especially when faced with the requirements of political compromise, generalizations and categorizations should be made with caution. This begs the question: what political philosophy, if any, do anglophone Canadians espouse – Trudeau’s Lockean individualist liberalism, as McRae argues (1975), or Pearson’s pragmatic accommodation to the Canadian duality, as McRoberts suggests (1997)? The former would complement Quebec’s vision; the latter would counter it. If anglophones espouse at least two political philosophies, does one dominate? Are they irreconcilable? Can they fuse in practice? Political philosophies espoused by political masters can guide or influence policy implementation. Whether the guide is direct or indirect will depend on at least three conditions. Did the political master clearly outline his/her political philosophy? Did the political master suggest to the implementing agency how to put the policy in practice? Alternatively, did the implementing agency rely on its interpretation of the political master’s political philosophy to guide its action? My case study provides a positive answer to the first question, a negative answer to the second, and no answer to the third. In fact, I do not know whether the actions of tbs officials were guided by the officials’ interpretation of Trudeau’s political philosophy. And if they were, I do not know whether the officials interpreted the philosophy correctly. There is a congruency between Trudeau’s nation-based territorial bilingualism and bilingual districts, but tbs

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officials could have reached a different conclusion. If that was the case, their interpretation could have been correct or incorrect. If tbs officials sought guidance through an interpretation of Trudeau’s political philosophy, my data indicate that political philosophies, if at all, should be interpreted and used cautiously in attempts to guide practical political and administrative action. The communitarian-individualist debate has proven that both sides are equally convincing. Policy-makers and public administrators would thus have to choose between equally valid interpretations of reality. Alternatively, they would have to link apparently contradictory ideas and principles with daily practices. My data also indicate that the opposite logic may be at work: political action influences political philosophies. Even if one disagrees with my argument that Trudeau’s administrative/individualist/linguistic/ aspatial principles coincided in practice with Laurendeau’s symbolic/ collective/cultural/territorial principles, one would be hard-pressed to explain why minority-language educational rights (and bilingual districts, by extension) can merge opposite political philosophies in action. In spite of a priori opposition on unresolved issues, the practical results a posteriori may negate or fuse opposing political philosophies. In my case study, opposing political philosophies tended to converge when concrete actions were needed. This might have been because the national crisis required pragmatic compromises, especially after the pq victory, but it might also have been because bilingual districts fit nicely into both the communitarian and individualist strands of liberalism. Bilingual districts also fit into the federal and Quebec policies. Policymakers and public administrators can therefore be misguided into believing, as tbs officials did, that a bridge is impossible and that a choice must be made between principles. Public administration may thus be as much the art of the possible as the art of interpreting political masters. Related to the interpretation of political masters is the interpretation of public opinion. As the preceding paragraphs indicate, it is one thing to espouse a particular political philosophy and argue in its favour in public, but quite another to convince citizens to accept that philosophy as a framework for specific policies and programs. This would seem especially significant when numerous and contradictory political philosophies are at play. Policy-makers and public administrators, if and when they look to an interpretation of their master’s political philosophy for guidance, could thus be tempted to seek congruity between action and philosophical principles, as well as between principles, action, and public acceptance. The fact that bilingual districts had

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become “red rags” in the opinion of tbs officials indicates that the officials sought congruity between principles, action, and public acceptance rather than between action and philosophical principles. But they might have sought the former as well. Seeking congruity between philosophical principles, political and administrative actions, and public opinion seems just as difficult as interpreting abstract and disparate philosophical principles, especially when sociolinguistic conflicts and policies are concerned. For one thing, the minority will remain at the mercy of the majority, at least to a significant degree. Interpreting the “majoritarian” political philosophy in a minorityrelated context can be difficult. If tbs took into account this majoritarian perspective, it went against the sociolinguistic policy’s most explicit political argument. Conceding that “the most ingenious reforms are of no avail unless they are undertaken in friendship, the soul of all valuable association” (rcbb 1967, lii), the B and B Commission argued that Canada’s sociolinguistic conflicts could only be resolved if Canadians put aside the majoritarian view of liberal democracy that holds that “Canada is one state within which majority rule and individual liberty are central tenets” (99). Trudeau shared this political argument (1968, 47–8). In fact, both the commission and Trudeau believed that the majoritarian attitude would not necessarily hold the minority in contempt. The regional consultations, empirical research, and public opinion surveys indicated to the commission members that symbolic and administrative bilingual districts were acceptable. The majority of citizens consulted by both advisory boards supported this conclusion. Trudeau’s goal, in short, was to convince English Canada to check its own majority rule with minority rights and balance the centralization and decentralization forces between Ottawa and Quebec. The final decision on bilingual districts was thus dictated by a small element of the majority – for instance, some anglophones in Welland, some francophones in Montreal, and some federal civil servants. Although the majority may have shared Trudeau’s political philosophy and perceived minority cultures as temporary and individualist phenomena that would disappear over time – a view quite unlike the francophone communitarian perception that minority cultures were permanent and collective phenomena (McRae 1975) – anglophones accepted the allocation of bilingual services to the minority and to symbolic and administrative bilingual districts. But a few did not.

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My case study also indicates that Canada has not one majoritarian political philosophy but two.13 This is not to say that the communitarian and individualist strands are equal. One may hold more converts than the other. Individualist liberalism may have come to supersede the communitarian strand in English Canada, but communitarian liberalism is the dominant political philosophy in Quebec. There is thus one dominant anglophone political philosophy and one dominant francophone political philosophy, which suggests that any discussion of political philosophies in regard to sociolinguistic conflicts and policies must take the federal nature of the country into account. However, my case study also indicates a paradox: the most vocal opposition to the communitarian-inspired bilingual districts came from the communitarian-inspired government of Quebec. The majoritarian attitude in Quebec, if one can deduce it from the Bourassa government’s vague stance on the issue, was much more damaging in the minority francophone communities outside Quebec than any anglophone majoritarian attitude from their neighbours, except in Welland and Bonnyville. Federalism explains the significant difference between the province-based communitarian principles espoused by the Québécois and the nation-based communitarian principles espoused by the francophone minorities and the B and B Commission. The most obvious example of Quebec’s indecision is provided by my case study. The consideration of Montreal, in whole or in part, as a bilingual district would oppose symmetrical and asymmetrical policies. The majoritarian attitude in Quebec was in fact divided on the issue. The head of the Gendron Commission, Le Devoir, La Presse, and even René Lévesque believed, in 1971, that Montreal should be a bilingual district. Moreover, it should be the only one in the province. The Bourassa government disagreed. While it accepted the eight bilingual districts outside Montreal recommended by Pelletier according to the 20 per cent ratio, it argued that the issue of Montreal being a bilingual district should be reconsidered after the 1971 census. William Mackey and Yvonne Raymond categorically opposed the idea in 1973. Even though the anglophone minority expressed a need for a bilingual district in the metropolitan area, this opinion was discarded by Mackey and Raymond, who instead heeded François Cloutier’s threat that a bilingual district would mean “the end of Confederation!”14 Québécois with the majoritarian attitude may have known what they wanted – special status and additional powers – but they were less clear when faced with bilingual districts and the other secondary elements of the

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national sociolinguistic policy. The minority francophone communities outside Quebec (and eventually the minority anglophone communities in Quebec) suffered the consequences of the perennial sociolinguistic tensions and the respective self-centred majoritarian attitudes – providing one can gel the various attitudes into a single coherent position. In spite of political differences between the federal and Quebec bilingual district policies, there was administrative complementarity between the federal and provincial bilingual districts. It would thus be misleading to conclude that the policies were in conflict (McRae 1978; McRoberts 1997). My case study suggests that opposing political philosophies, at least in Canada, have come to coincide in practice. The administrative complementarity, however, has never been coordinated. Also, conflicting political goals have been pursued independently and legitimately within the same liberal state. Quebec, like any other province, can be officially unilingual, although it must respect the asymmetrical constitutional obligations of section 133 of the bna Act. It can also designate bilingual districts for provincial purposes. Ottawa can be officially bilingual and designate bilingual districts throughout the country for federal purposes. Therefore, although administrative bilingual districtification has stemmed from conflicting political versions of territorial bilingualism, such conflicts have prevented the official overlap of the national and provincial versions of territorial bilingualism. This observation is important for two reasons. First, it cautions against facile generalizations whereby Trudeau’s individualist liberalism is seen as incompatible with bilingual districts and the territorial principle (Cameron 1993, 343). Indeed, bilingual districts were compatible with Trudeau’s political philosophy within the national version of territorial bilingualism. It is irrelevant that the argument is valid in terms of asymmetrical federalism and special status for Quebec under the provincial version of territorial bilingualism. Second, the observation also cautions against the facile generalization that the incompatibility between federal and Quebec policies led to the bilingual districts’ demise (McRae 1978). True, Quebec was opposed to bilingual districts because they would have represented a symbolic challenge to its territorial sovereignty and French unilingualism. But Quebec had no grounds to oppose the federal policy on the compatibility principle. On the one hand, its own policy created provincial bilingual districts that were based on similar criteria as the federal policy and that overlapped most federal bilingual districts. The differences were thus minor. Ottawa could make the entire country bilingual for federal purposes, and

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Quebec could make the province unilingual for provincial purposes. On the other hand, Ottawa had the constitutional right to disavow Quebec’s policy. The federal government left it up to the courts, which upheld Quebec’s constitutional obligations and eradicated some of the provincial policy’s most stringent limits on the status and use of English in Quebec. The federal government also pursued its own sociolinguistic policy in spite of Quebec’s opposition, although the election of the Parti québécois in November 1976 somewhat altered the policy. Quebec officially opposed bilingual districts in public but conceded that the federal proclamation would not change much. More importantly, the Quebec government even accepted the proclamation of eight bilingual districts in the province in 1972. Quebec and Ottawa knew that their respective policies were complementary rather than conflictual, but Quebec decided to oppose federal intervention in public because of conflicting political versions of territorial bilingualism. Federal bilingual districts were thus caught in the middle, even if they coincided with their provincial counterparts and fit into both the individualist and communitarian strands of liberalism. Political philosophies may be good general guides to political and administrative actions, but policy-makers and public administrators would be wise to consider three significant observations drawn from my case study. First, for theoretical and empirical reasons, it is difficult to construct and interpret a single and coherent political philosophy out of abstract and disparate ideas, even when the political masters publicly and convincingly develop and promote such a philosophy as the framework for practical action. Second, basing action on an interpretation of the dominant majoritarian political philosophy may be a delicate proposition when dealing with sociolinguistic policies that involve a majority and a minority. Finally, using any interpretation of political philosophies to guide action is made more complicated by a federal system where one political philosophy may dominate the national sphere but an opposite political philosophy may dominate the provincial sphere. In short, my observations make relative any simple generalizations about single political philosophies as guides to action. The most significant contribution to the literature my case study makes, however, is that the fields of academic and practical public policy analysis and public administration, as well as sociolinguistics, would gain a lot of insights if the contributions of political philosophies were to be considered. Although my case study does not demonstrate these contributions, its data indicate that political philosophies

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guide political and administrative action. It is of little significance whether they are more or less coherent or whether they guide action directly or indirectly, implicitly or explicitly, more or less, and sporadically or throughout the policy process, contingent on contextual variables. By considering the contributions of political philosophies, policy-makers and public administrators would improve their understanding of the contexts and concepts underlying the adoption and implementation of sociolinguistic policies. Sociolinguists and political scientists would improve their understanding of the actual policymaking process and products. Both groups would be better informed if they considered both theoretical and practical considerations. In short, an academic and practical multidisciplinarian approach to sociolinguistic policies should bear significant fruit. C) Specification is a significant policy stage. My case study suggests that the analysis of the public policy-making process should pay more attention to specification. While I concede that policy stages have limited theoretical usefulness (Sabatier 1999), my case study indicates that the above conclusion is contingent on specific factors. The policy-making process sometimes follows such steps and the steps sometimes merit special consideration. Indeed, my chronological description was crucial to the explanation of the bilingual districts’ demise, as was the distinction between the various stages of policy-making, especially specification and implementation. In the end, I argue, the death of bilingual districts was the result of bureaucratic deviation, even though specification problems, bad timing, and (negative) political symbols were crucial secondary reasons explaining this deviation. No single policy analysis framework could have enabled such a conclusion. First, the bad timing conclusion owes a great deal to John Kingdon’s (1984) policy streams framework. I have noted on several occasions whether “the window of opportunity” was open or closed. It was open until the Secretary of State told his colleagues that “considerable changes” had occurred between the 1961 and 1971 censuses and again after the events of the summer of 1976. The window was open in May 1972 and in May 1976. However, the coincidental streams approach is not completely adequate in this case. The fact that the window opened and shut on many occasions and for different reasons throughout the bilingual districts’ lifetime indicates that policies do not follow the bell-shaped policy-cycle

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curve suggested by Downs (1972). Thus, Kingdon’s model does not explain or predict how and why windows open and shut, and it certainly does not explain or predict how they do so repeatedly. Kingdon’s model is thus no better, no worse than the classic stages model (Jones 1970). Second, the bureaucratic deviation conclusion stems from the economic theory of bureaucratic behaviour elaborated by Downs (1967) and William Niskanen (1971), notably, although its roots can be traced to Weber (1978) and Merton (1968). It is one of the most popular theories in public administration, even though the exact causes and consequences are not always known. Bluntly stated, bureaucrats use their implementation discretion to shape policy to satisfy their interests. The tensions between democracy and bureaucracy are problematic but normal features of our democratic systems, where elected officials seek advice from civil servants and entrust them with the responsibility of putting policies into practice after sorting out the devilish details of implementation (Etzioni-Halevy 1983). Bureaucratic “discretion” and “deviation” are two sides of the same coin, and one should not be surprised that tbs officials, as chief bureaucrats, would shape the round sociolinguistic policy to fit into the square bureaucratic box and, once impossible, terminate the bilingual districts in favour of bureaucratic and administrative bilingual regions. Indeed, when the Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers studied bilingual districts, it came to the same bureaucratic conclusions as tbs: “the creation of bilingual districts would create serious staffing problems,” “the creation of bilingual districts would increase public demand for departmental services in the minority language,” and “other policies and programmes … may have made bilingual districts an outdated tool.”15 The committee even concluded that “from the point of view of tbs, the real problems today were at the administrative level: language of work, units working in French, position descriptions, the ‘compensation package’ (which in addition is a collective bargaining problem) and the like,” rather than “trivial matters like bilingual districts.”16 These bureaucratic bodies had no appreciation for symbolic values. Bureaucratic discretion led to deviation, and the tbs deviation occurred for self-interest maximization. However, this theory is methodologically self-serving. Deviation is a conclusion more than a hypothesis. One cannot simply hypothesize that bureaucratic deviation is behind every bureaucratic action and should consequently be the key variable every time one studies bureaucratic organizations and their actions. In other words, the theory would motivate policy analysts to continuously

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embark on a research project with the institutional rational model in mind, specifically in order to seek cases of bureaucratic deviation. One would thus face the danger of proving what one sought or, conversely, of putting in doubt that theory. That bureaucratic deviation occurs is well known. That it should be the only hypothesis sought from the outset is quite another matter. Should that have been so, it would have been easy to explain the bilingual districts’ demise by using the deviation hypothesis, but this may have led us down the wrong path if no such deviation had occurred. Moreover, there remains a secondary problem: one must explain exactly why and how the deviation occurred. As with the streams model, the deviation hypothesis is no better, no worse than the classic stages model. Third, the symbolic danger conclusion could only have been reached by respecting Edelman’s (1971) typology. One would nevertheless be hard-pressed to argue that this approach is more theoretically valuable than the heuristic stages model. There is a lack of theoretical insight explaining the exact circumstances under which political symbols lead to conflicts and symbolic policies resolve conflicts. Edelman and others have proposed some causes and consequences, but few verifications have validated their conclusions. From the outset, my research did not seek to verify hypotheses related to political symbols and symbolic policies. I do not think such hypotheses would have enabled me to explain the bilingual districts’ demise, even though the neglect of their symbolic purpose played a significant role. Again, it is impossible to know what theory to use at the outset. Finally, the problematic specification conclusion stems from the classic policy stages model (Jones 1970), the most salient of the four theoretical approaches identified. The chronological and sequential stages helped me identify problems that could otherwise have been missed. In particular, the contradictions in the tbs memo could have gone unnoticed if not for the fact that the deviation occurred in May 1976 rather than later. The memo’s typographical error may never have been discovered without reference to the previous Miller report. Without it, I could not have guessed that a bureaucratic deviation occurred, nor that it occurred as early as November 1975. The classic stages model was thus crucial. This does not mean that other models could not have framed the research. On the contrary, the rational institutional model would have targeted bureaucratic deviation from the outset and, consequently, would have confirmed it, although confirming the hypothesis would

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have been a stroke of luck. Also, the symbolic and policy streams hypotheses were needed to explain why the deviation occurred. These two points are not intended to suggest that the stages model can make theoretical contributions. It was crucial to describe and explain the reasons and process underlying the deviation, but it served more as a methodological tool than a theoretical model. In the end, the four frameworks complemented each other. The procedural and chronological distinction also highlights a significant organizational distinction. The stages model establishes, as an explanatory variable, the distinction between tbs as the newly designated policy specificator and as the eventual policy implementer (Alexander 1985). tbs was simultaneously responsible for both the specification and the implementation of the policy. It thus found itself in the position of conflicting interests against which the B and B Commission formally warned. Indeed, if tbs had not taken over the Secretary of State’s responsibility for bilingual districts, on 4 March 1971, the Miller report would have been submitted to Hugh Faulkner instead of Jean Chrétien. Therefore, tbs could not have avoided establishing an interdepartmental committee after 13 November 1975; it could not have sabotaged the Miller report in May 1976 or submitted a memo to Robert Andras in October 1976 recommending the termination of bilingual districts. Indeed, until that transfer, tbs had simply stayed on the sidelines, preparing the general standard operating procedures for departments and agencies to follow once bilingual districts were proclaimed. After the March 1971 transfer, tbs undertook the specification of the three pillars of section 9 (2): linguistic qualifications, bilingual areas, and significant demand. Once tbs became the bridge between the advisory board and Cabinet, it had the opportunity to specify the program according to its own goals. Had another organization steered the file to Cabinet, the outcome would probably have been different. The stages model, especially if different organizations are responsible for specific stages, is significant in our case study. It should not be dismissed lightly in cases where sequential events and organizational distinctions are crucial. A related conclusion is that symbolic sociolinguistic policies must be specified as much as possible, since symbols and symbolic policies are not regular features of bureaucratic organizations. In short, the more symbolic the policy, the more it should be specified by the political masters before it falls into bureaucratic hands for implementation. Judging by my case study, I am convinced that the B and B Commission

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would take advantage of hindsight to make explicit the symbolic purpose of bilingual districts and to recommend a specific number, size, and location for the initial set of bilingual districts. The commission had tried to identify specific bilingual districts based on census divisions, counties, and urban areas. With its members unable to agree and pressed for time on other matters, it left the specification of the cornerstone recommendation to the federal and provincial governments through bilateral agreements, then to an advisory board after each census. Had the commission members known of the difficulties stemming from the specification of bilingual districts, they might have wisely proposed two additional recommendations in their final report. The first would have begun as follows: We recommend that the federal and provincial governments proclaim, jointly or separately, the following areas as bilingual districts. The commission would then have presented a list of the most obviously viable of the fifty-four census divisions for immediate proclamation. Let us assume that these would have been the twenty-eight bilingual districts recommended by Pelletier in May 1972 according to the 20 per cent criterion. Areas that met the 10 per cent criterion but were not as obviously viable would have had to wait for the 1971 census. Prince Albert comes to mind. The second additional recommendation might have been phrased this way: We recommend that the federal and provincial governments appoint, jointly or separately, a review council to examine, in the light of the 1971 census data, whether the following areas of the country, as well as any other areas that meet the 10 per cent criterion, should also be proclaimed bilingual districts. The commission could then have presented a list of the twenty-six census divisions excluded from the first recommendation. It could also have argued for the use of languageof-use data instead of mother tongue for the ensuing specification effort. Consequently, the federal government would have proclaimed an initial list of twenty-eight bilingual districts after adopting the Official Languages Act in 1969. The following year, federal departments would have allocated their bilingual services in bilingual districts. Cabinet would have appointed the Duhamel Board in 1972 to determine, according to the 1971 census, which areas of the country, if any, should also benefit from the symbolic recognition and guarantees provided by section 9 (1) and which areas, if any, should no longer be designated bilingual districts and instead should rely on either section 9 (2) or section 13 (4). Cabinet would then have studied the board’s recommendations in 1973 and, in 1974, proclaimed an additional list of bilingual

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districts, if additional areas were recommended, and/or modified the initial list to ensure that the minority still met the 10 per cent criterion. Let us assume that half of the twenty-six discarded areas in 1969 qualified after the 1971 census. That would raise the total to forty-one bilingual districts (28 + 13). The Fox Board would only have been appointed in 1982 and would only have analysed the few, if any, remaining areas that met the statutory criteria after the 1981 census. Let us assume, finally, that one additional bilingual district would have been proclaimed in 1983, raising the total to forty-two, although many of the forty-one previous bilingual districts would have been cut down in size because of dwindling minority populations. The third advisory board would probably have performed a perfunctory function, and no other census divisions would have respected the statutory criteria after 1991. A fourth board would have been named in 2002, but would probably have made no recommendations, save to reduce the size of some bilingual districts. Assimilation has reduced the number and size of minority homelands since 1961. No additional bilingual districts would have been proclaimed after 1983. The census divisions excluded from the commission’s initial list, as well as the various areas of the country where the minority did not represent 10 per cent of the population, would have been served according to the significant demand criterion under section 9 (2). To save time, the B and B Commission would not only have specified the initial bilingual districts, but would also have enabled the advisory boards to avoid political controversy and ultra vires recommendations later on. Royal commissions (or similar bodies), courts, and legislatures would do well to consider administrative and organizational requirements and theories when making their decisions. This does not mean that they should reverse their priorities, as Eleanor Duckworth did when she gave greater weight to bilingual regions than to bilingual districts, but it does mean that they should not neglect, as Alfred Monnin and Adélard Savoie did, administrative considerations when specifying public policies. They should be as specific as possible in their directives to public servants when explicating the goals to pursue in the name of public interest. If this is not feasible in legislative preambles, then it surely must be done in internal memos. This is not to say that governments should go into infinite detail and leave no discretion to civil servants. But it does mean that governments should not leave the important details to civil servants, especially if the latter have a stake in the outcome of the policy or if the policy deviates significantly from

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bureaucratic norms. Bilingual districts would have significantly altered the existing bilingual districtification by abandoning the bureaucratic approach in favour of the adaptive approach. The specification process revealed how tbs faced a serious dilemma, having to choose between its own bilingual regions and the symbolic bilingual districts that would jeopardize two years of elaborate work. Also, numerous civil servants perceived bilingual districts as a threat to their job security. The line between bureaucratic discretion and deviation thinned out. The B and B Commission knew it and gave warning. Privy Council officials also became suspicious of tbs efforts. Yet the tbs deviation occurred nonetheless. Policy specificity would thus seem more important than philosophical coherence when the administration of symbolic sociolinguistic policies is at issue. The devil may indeed be in the specification details. Policy specification should thus be considered a distinct policy stage, especially when it is executed by distinct organizations according to specific statutory requirements. This was the case with bilingual districts. Indeed, the B and B Commission clearly requested that federal and provincial governments specify the size and location of bilingual districts, and clearly indicated that tbs should not be involved in the specification process. The federal government agreed by outlining in the Official Languages Act the tasks and criteria that the advisory boards had to follow to execute their mandate. There were clear chronological and organizational distinctions between the advisory board, Cabinet, tbs, and federal departments and agencies. First, the board would specify the bilingual districts. Cabinet would proclaim them after discussions in Parliament. tbs would then order the departments and agencies to ensure that the minority would receive its federal services in its mother tongue from their principal offices located in a bilingual district or, alternatively, to modify their administrative structure to serve minority homelands. The departments and agencies would have followed tbs orders. The fact that in March 1971 Cabinet reassigned responsibility over the specification of section 9 (1) from the Secretary of State to tbs, contrary to the B and B Commission’s wish, does not necessarily refute my argument. Specification was performed by an advisory board, not the same organization responsible for policy implementation. However, the fact that Treasury Board, rather than the Secretary of State, was responsible for funnelling the advisory board’s report to Cabinet does caution against generalizations without further empirical verification.

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My review of the policy analysis literature indicates that the department mandated to specify a program is almost always also charged with its implementation. A distinction between policy specification and implementation organizations is thus the rare exception to the rule. This is why policy specification is usually subsumed under policy implementation (Williams 1975; Rein and Rabinovitz 1978; Berman 1978; Goggin 1986). However, I found three other cases in the literature where specification is a distinct stage executed by a different organization (Hall 1980; Galantay 1975; Aldridge 1979; ipd 1976). This chronological and organizational distinction motivated Alexander (1979, 1985) to distinguish policy specification from policy implementation in a sequential policy-program-implementation process model. Such a distinction between chronological stages and responsible organizations can also be found elsewhere. Although exceptional cases, distinct specification endeavours warrant consideration. Policy specification is important because this stage translates political intentions into a “language” that guides administrative actions. This translation is important because political and administrative languages are distinct (Landowski 1974). Specification bridges political intention and administrative action by putting administrative flesh on a policy’s bones: a statute is transformed into regulations; norms and criteria are chosen; standard operating procedures are established; tasks and resources are allocated; and strategic planning and time lines are drawn. Regulations, criteria, and standard operating procedures help civil servants in their daily actions. They standardize the administrative action from one civil servant to another, from one day to the next, from one area of the country to another (Edwards and Sharkansky 1978). They reduce the number of requests from subordinates to superiors for guidance in the face of distinct circumstances, and they limit bureaucratic discretion and deviation. These are crucial policy elements, but they are rarely considered by the elected officials when they adopt policy. Specification may be a crucial stage, but it could be considered a missing link within the rational-sequential model of public policy-making. In cases where different organizations are involved, one could predict that the implementation body will neglect, modify, or even abort the specification results. But other cases may reveal specification efforts that coincide with the approach and mechanisms of the department or agency charged with the implementation of the program. Indeed, faithful implementation seems the rule. Nevertheless, attention should be paid to specification in light of the fact that, more and more often,

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ngo s, private companies, and municipal councils are contracted to implement federal and provincial policies and programs (Kernaghan et al. 2000). To paraphrase George Orwell, if every policy stage makes a policy, some stages may make a policy more than others. In the case of bilingual districts, the specification stage was significant. In addition to specification occurring without implementation, my case study points to another interesting phenomenon: both of the specification endeavours validated the sociolinguistic theory developed by the B and B Commission. The regional consultations confirmed the symbolic value of bilingual districts. The specification process even stimulated the minority’s need for symbolic recognition and sparked political controversy. Policy specification thus affects the policy environment. The defence of certain interests was amplified by the specification’s regional consultations. Notably, the minorities pursued their request for bilingual districts. Conversely, some provincial governments pursued their opposition to the program, especially when the second board refuelled smouldering sociolinguistic tensions. The tempest in Bonnyville, Alberta, is a case in point, but it was also the case when the Duhamel Board produced its report. The publication of a document recommending thirty-six bilingual districts outside Quebec produced a minimal symbolic victory for many francophone minorities by quasi-officially recognizing their homelands. This heightened awareness and recognition influenced the feedback received by the second board. The board reported that many of the citizens it consulted believed their area had already been proclaimed a bilingual district. The Prince Edward Island government’s about-face on recommending Egmont as a bilingual district is the most striking example of the impact the Duhamel report had on the perceptions of the country’s geolinguistic reality. As the Fox report noted, the Duhamel effort “was an interesting example of a report having some effect possibly in improving conditions without its recommendations ever having been implemented formally” (bdab 1975, 17). Finally, some of the recommendations made by both boards influenced the second part of the specification stage, namely Cabinet’s official decision. The opposition in Welland stems from the Fox recommendation rather than from any governmental position. There was therefore a reciprocal relationship between the changes in the environment and the policy specification effort in the case of bilingual districts. Policy specification, especially when it is clearly demarcated, is therefore a problematic policy stage. Proving that the initial theory is valid or resuscitating political debates born during the policy adoption stage

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indicates that policies are iterative rather than sequential. However, the stages model is not necessarily sequential (Alexander 1985; deLeon 1999). My case study not only indicates that the specification process can spark further political controversy, but also that political controversy can affect the specification of a policy. This is not a new phenomenon. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) demonstrated that actors and stakeholders pursue their interests after the policy is adopted. Implementation is seen as the stage where policies take life. Blocking or steering implementation according to the actors’ preferences is a common occurence. The same conclusion seems valid for specification. It would therefore be naive to expect anything other than the “politization” of the policy after its adoption (McRae 1998). In fact, the Official Languages Act clearly stipulated that the process was only half-completed. The number, size, and location of bilingual districts would only be determined later. The Act also awarded the advisory boards ample discretion to specify bilingual districts. Otherwise, statisticians could have been hired to indicate to Cabinet what areas of the country met the statutory criteria. The boards were given discretion and they used it. The fact that both boards abused their discretion by recommending entire provinces as bilingual districts does not alter the fact that the Act explicitly gave them discretion. That stakeholders tried to influence the boards’ decisions was to be expected. Consultations with provincial governments were compulsory, and both boards paid some attention to a few political events, such as the 1970 October crisis and Bill-22. Moreover, my case study noted the government of Quebec’s official opposition to federal bilingual districts throughout the process, even when this opposition was negated in practice by Bertrand’s acceptance of the concept in February 1969 and Bourassa’s acceptance of eight bilingual districts in May 1972. Finally, the events of the summer of 1976 are significant in the explanation of the bilingual districts’ demise, albeit only indirectly. The specification efforts of both advisory boards and the federal Cabinet clearly tried to avoid these political hurdles. Both boards indicated that specification was the crucial stage where the policy would take life. Consequently, policy analysts should pay attention to important elements of the specification process, particularly to the objective and subjective specification criteria adopted and discarded by central agencies or non-government organizations. In the case of bilingual districts, I noted the difficulties faced by both boards in adopting criteria to justify the rejection of certain areas.

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Another interesting topic would be the evolution of such specification criteria over time. My data indicate an obvious similarity between the boards’ respective lists, but also many differences over two years. It seems possible that the criteria adopted by the second board would have differed even more had some of the board members not also sat on the first board. A third subject of interest would be the concordance between the specification effort and the preceding adoption and succeeding implementation efforts. For instance, I explained the incompatibility between sections 9 (2) and 13 (4), which made bilingual districts perennial. Had the legislators paid more attention to the incoherence of the additions that were made to satisfy Bertrand, the sections would not have hampered the proclamation of twenty-eight bilingual districts in May 1972. Also, had the Official Languages Act properly explained the symbolic purpose of bilingual districts, many controversies would have been avoided. In addition, had the federal Cabinet properly explained to the advisory boards that it expected a specific and limited number of bilingual districts in Quebec and a single bilingual district to cover the entire province of New Brunswick, as the B and B Commission had suggested, the first board would not have adopted its ultra vires and controversial recommendation making the entire province of Quebec a single bilingual district. Finally, had Pelletier or Cabinet paid more attention to the B and B Commission’s warnings against the bureaucratization of the policy in the hands of tbs, as well as to the pco officials’ warnings about tbs manipulation of the decision-making process, tbs would not have been put in charge, simultaneously, of the specification and implementation of both bilingual districts and bilingual regions and it would not have been able to deviate from the government’s official policy. Sabatier (1999) presents excellent arguments for rejecting the stages model on theoretical grounds, but deLeon (1999) presents equally persuasive arguments for keeping it, especially for methodological purposes. My case study concludes that both authors have a point. Indeed, many analytic frameworks were useful, indeed crucial, in the understanding and explanation of why bilingual districts were abandoned. Any analytic framework that produces results should thus be maintained. Multiple perspectives and frameworks can analyse policies from many dimensions. Some perspectives may be theoretical, others simply conducive to practical research problems. Multiple approaches should be tolerated, indeed encouraged.

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D) The bureaucratization of federal sociolinguistic policy led to the demise of bilingual districts and their symbolic value. The allocation of public services to sociolinguistic minorities almost always conforms to the territorial principle. Bilingual districts were the Canadian version of administrative bilingual districtification. Bilingual districtification, at least in its administrative form, usually involves a layered and complex implementation process. Indeed, a continuum of types of services (radio, education, trials, etc.) is allocated according to the types of minority communities (nationality, enclave, scattered diaspora – Vandycke 1992), as determined by their respective critical mass. Such a layered complexity was suggested by the B and B Commission (rcbb 1967, xliii), neglected by the advisory boards, resuscitated by the Miller report, accepted by Chrétien, prevented by tbs in 1976, but implemented by tbs since 1992. The neglect of the symbolic value of bilingual districts and the layered complexity of bilingual regions stem from the bureaucratization of the policy. The B and B Commission both feared and desired this bureaucratization. It understood that the allocation of public services to minorities was better guaranteed by constitutional rights than by “the present de facto bilingualism, more or less precarious, constantly debated, and unequally accepted from one region to another” (rcbb 1967, 74). It knew that this situation was the result of political indecision and disinterest in the matter, but also of the hegemony of dominant anglophone values within the federal civil service. An official and holistic sociolinguistic policy was needed to preserve Canadian unity by altering the status quo. Bureaucratic discretion had to be replaced by symbolic measures. This was why the commission stated that tbs should not specify the bilingual districts. tbs, the commission believed, was the best organization to supervise the daily implementation of the policy but was unable to understand and specify a symbolic program. Governments should do so, and their effort should be based on the geolinguistic reality and objective data rather than on existing administrative boundaries. The commission, however, was fully aware and supportive of the fact that the implementation of the policy would fall to tbs. In fact, it recommended that tbs manage the implementation of the policy because only tbs had the managerial power to make departments and agencies respect their obligations. One can easily discern the commission’s desire to see tbs take the initiative because of past organizational resistance, but also its fear that tbs would specify bilingual districts according to existing

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norms. The commission feared, it seems, that tbs would bureaucratize the policy before its time. A more public organization should specify the program before tbs ensured its implementation. To the commission, the chronological and organizational distinction was crucial. Bureaucratic deviation occurred, as in many other cases, because “the right hand of government [did not know] what the left hand was doing,”17 as one respondent noted. The federal Cabinet did not scrutinize the work performed by its civil servants in 1972 and 1976. It is easy to downplay the significance of this lack of supervision in the first case. Indeed, it would be difficult to argue that Pelletier, his officials, the pco officials responsible for proofreading memos to Cabinet, the members of the Cabinet committee and Cabinet itself should have noted, in May 1972, the erroneous inclusion of Prince Albert and Chambly within the final list of twenty-eight bilingual districts for Cabinet consideration. It would also be easy to downplay their failure to verify the erroneous claim that “considerable changes” had occurred between 1961 and 1971. They did not perform their tasks adequately, but one cannot expect ministers to oversee every detail. If they had to spend hours revisiting the work performed by their subordinates, there would be little need for civil servants at all and little time for parliamentary tasks. However, it is more difficult to downplay the significance of Chrétien’s forgetfulness and the pco officials’ neglect in the performance of their duty in 1976. It is difficult to explain why Chrétien agreed to present the Miller report to Cabinet in May 1976, then said nothing when, in December 1976, Cabinet received a completely different memo from tbs asking it to abandon bilingual districts. He may have come to the conclusion that bilingual districts were no longer useful, but that would not explain why he did not raise any concern about the different memos. It is also difficult to explain why the pco officials responsible for proofreading memos to Cabinet failed to notice the missing reference to the Cabinet decision of 13 November 1975 in the initial section of the tbs memo. Finally, it is difficult to explain how tbs could undermine the rational policy-making process established by Trudeau when he came to power in 1968. Indeed, the alteration of tasks assigned by Cabinet to the interdepartmental committee went unnoticed by pco, the Cabinet committee, and Cabinet. In spite of many memos warning of tbs manipulation of Cabinet on the issue, pco did not raise concerns when the tbs memo stated that no interdepartmental committee had ever been established. A rational process requires that the information provided to

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decision-makers is complete and truthful. If this process had been followed, the additional tasks and tbs’s failure to establish a neutral interdepartmental committee would have been detected. tbs was able not only to sabotage the bilingual districts but also to undermine the rational policy-making apparatus. However, that the political right hand did not know what the bureaucratic left hand was doing indicates not only that tbs manipulated Cabinet, but also that the program was bureaucratized before its time. Bureaucratic deviation occurred because of the bureaucratization of the policy. If the federal government had created a specific organization for the specification of the sociolinguistic policy, as the B and B Commission recommended, if the recommendations of the advisory boards had carried more weight, or if the Secretary of State or the pco, rather than tbs, had been responsible for the memo to Cabinet, bilingual districts would probably have been proclaimed in May 1976. Cabinet’s decision of March 1971 to transfer the responsibility over the specification of bilingual districts from the Secretary of State to tbs was conducive to the program’s demise. Cabinet did not heed the warnings of the commission to enshrine a chronological and organizational distinction. Therefore, although the tbs deviation does not seem to add anything significant to the existing literature on bureaucratic deviation, nor to the considerable literature on the rational policy-making process (Lindblom 1959; Cyert and March 1963; Simon 1997; Papadakis and Barwise 1998) and on the tensions between bureaucracy and democracy (Etzioni-Halevy 1983; Beetham 1987; Dunleavy 1991; Peters 1995; Savoie 2003), the meticulous strategy used by tbs to avoid the government’s rational policy-making process is nevertheless worthy of further consideration. My case study suggests that tbs, through its control of the bureaucratic levers of government, made the round symbolic bilingual districts fit into the square bureaucratic holes, doing so by shaving off the bilingual districts’ symbolic edges. It also suggests that giving the responsibility over both specification and implementation of symbolic sociolinguistic policies to the same (bureaucratic) organization is not conducive to its proper implementation. My case study, however, does not present sufficient data to make more specific conclusions in this regard. Further analysis is needed. For such an analysis, references to the literature on the inner workings of the Treasury Board (Johnson 1971; Hicks 1973; Veilleux and Savoie 1988; Savoie 1999, ch. 7) may be useful. One could also refer to

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the literature on royal commissions and similar consultative fact-finding bodies (Wilson 1971; Maxwell 1969; Courtney 1969; Doern 1967; Rhodes 1975; Oliver 1993; Cameron 1993; Kernaghan et al. 2000, ch. 8). In particular, it would be interesting to compare the translation of ngo recommendations into legislation and daily action. For instance, how can governments translate symbolic policies into legislation? How can they avoid bureaucratizing policies before proper specification? What variables are at play in both forms of translation? The commission’s fear of bureaucratization justified adaptive and symbolic bilingual districts, but its desire for bureaucratization complicated matters. The fact that tbs inherited the file after it took over the bureaucratization of the policy suggests that the organizational and chronological distinctions are crucial to proper implementation. The bureaucratization of symbolic sociolinguistic policies, however, is not necessarily detrimental to the allocation of public services to sociolinguistic minorities. Indeed, the B and B Commission wanted tbs to manage the policy because it wielded significant bureaucratic levers. Once bilingual districts were proclaimed, tbs would be the best organization to ensure their complex and layered implementation. It would also help if the existing administrative districtification, limited as it might be, could facilitate the implementation of the symbolic version. Departments and agencies would thus easily be led by tbs. Moreover, existing bilingual districtification efforts elsewhere (Finland, for instance) could be used by tbs as reference points. The important thing, the commission concluded, perhaps naively, was to specify bilingual districts. The matter of making them work in practice to buttress the other policy measures was something that the head bureaucratic organization of the federal government would be in the best position to accomplish. Implementation was secondary to specification, but it was not a trivial matter. It was nevertheless the chronological and organizational distinction that would ensure that such a symbolic sociolinguistic policy would be specified according to the adaptive approach and subsequently implemented with the full force of bureaucratic levers. The neglect of the distinction contributed significantly to the demise of bilingual districts. The bureaucratization of the policy before its time gave precedence to the existing administrative system that the symbolic bilingual districts were supposed to replace. This enabled tbs to conclude, erroneously, that bilingual regions could replace bilingual districts and that other statutory measures could replace their symbolic value. That such

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a contradictory statement could be made by tbs indicates their bureaucratic blindness to symbolic measures. The B and B Commission was clear: no bureaucratization before specification, whether performed by the federal Cabinet, an advisory board, or a new language authority. By refusing to create this authority and specify bilingual districts itself, Cabinet had only one opportunity to prevent the bureaucratization of the program: the advisory board. Once Cabinet transferred the responsibility of funnelling the board’s work back to Cabinet in the hands of tbs, however, that preventive opportunity disappeared. There was still Cabinet, but the policy decision-making process under Trudeau had been significantly rationalized. The most significant rationalization occurred when Trudeau formalized the decision-making committees of Cabinet (Clark 1985). But another significant modification – the expansion of tbs managerial control, as formalized by the Act modifying the Financial Administration Act of 196718 and the Government Organization Act of 1966,19 adopted before Trudeau became prime minister – would add “bureaucratization” to the “rationalisation” of policymaking. This was indeed recommended by Eugène Therrien (rcgo 1962, 76) and the B and B Commission (rcbb 1969a, 285). Nevertheless, the latter clearly argued that any bureaucratization of the policy before its time would be harmful. An alternative strategy could have involved clearly spelling out, in policy and management terms, the symbolic value of bilingual districts in order to ensure that the symbolic purpose overrode the administrative purpose.20 The commission simply hoped its recommended language authority would be created and would ensure the priority of the symbolic purpose. This never happened and tbs inherited the file. Instead of simply implementing the program, tbs officials applied their bureaucratic rationality to the specification of bilingual districts.

chapter seven

Policy Relevance

Are bilingual districts applicable today in Canada? Raising the question is not as anachronous as it may seem. Recent national events suggest that the concept may be worth a second look. First, at a national round table on federal language policy, organized on 20 April 2004 by the Commissioner of Official Languages, the following issues, among others, were discussed: (1) the inadequacy of the “rigid method for determining significant demand for services in either of the official languages and its inability to ensure equitable access to federal government services of equal quality” and the “strict geographical criteria” used to establish significant demand; (2) “the practice of establishing bilingual offices designated to dispense services in both official languages”; (3) “the needs of Francophones more geographically dispersed”; (4) “two parallel linguistic divisions” for the allocation of services; (5) the “need for greater collaboration with provinces and municipalities”; and (6) “the creation of single window networks where all levels of government services would be offered in both official languages within a linguistic community’s institutions.”1 But when the idea of bilingual districts was mentioned as a means to cover those six topics, it was snubbed with little discussion. The participants rejected limits to the personality principle, yet “linguistic community” and “municipalities” imply the opposite. Second, the campaign leading to the 28 June 2004 federal general election opened a debate on federal sociolinguistic policy in general and on bilingual districtification in particular. On 26 May, Scott Reid, the new

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Conservative Party’s critic on official languages policy, stated that his party would perform “a major overhaul” by replacing “the current nearly coast-to-coast coverage” with “a new formula that would remove Ottawa’s obligation to offer bilingual services in communities” where minorities represent 5 per cent of the population and number 5,000 members.2 Reid added that the “mother tongue” criterion would be replaced by “language at home” and that the numerical criterion would be abolished. He insisted that this overhaul would not create “linguistic ghettos.” A scholar who opposed Reid’s policy overhaul was quoted as saying that the B and B Commission’s idea of bilingual districts to which Reid was alluding “proved an unworkable Balkan mess.” Neither Reid nor the scholar felt the need to substantiate his statement with supporting data. Finally, recent jurisprudence suggests that bilingual districts may not be unconstitutional, as once believed. In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada established that the “protection of minorities” was one of the country’s fundamental constitutional principles.3 The following year, it stated that governments have an obligation to proactively ensure sociolinguistic equality.4 Both rulings suggest that, contrary to earlier held opinions, bilingual districts would not restrict constitutional rights. Indeed, the addition of bilingual districts to the existing bilingual regions, as would have occurred if section 9 (1) had been implemented alongside section 9 (2), would better protect minority rights and give an equally significant boost to a number of francophone communities outside Quebec and a few anglophone communities within that province. Thus, bilingual districts would represent an additional level to the six that already existed subsequent to the 1992 regulations. In fact, they would be the equivalent of the upper level in the “sliding scale” the Supreme Court established in regard to minority-language rights in education.5 Their distinction from the six other levels, obviously, would lie in their symbolic value. These national events demonstrate how bilingual districts are worth a second look and how their symbolic and administrative purposes are misunderstood by many. The events also suggest that any reconsideration of bilingual districts will not be an easy task because, even if none were ever implemented, they mean different things to different people. Any reconsideration of the B and B Commission’s cornerstone recommendation must clearly explain the concept. Ultimately, the answer to the basic question must be provided by the minority members. As the B and B Commission argued, “Majorities generally can and do effectively assert their interests and defend themselves, and governments have to listen to them. Minorities are always liable to

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be overlooked, even in a régime of equality” (rcbb 1967, 145). Reconsideration of bilingual districts should depend on whether the minorities for which they were recommended need them in the third millennium. If they no longer require bilingual districts, the symbolic cornerstone should be given a proper burial once and for all. However, judging by the resolute opinion on bilingual districts observed during the national round table, it would be wise to consult the minority “representatives” very carefully before coming to a definitive conclusion on whether the minority wants bilingual districts or not. Our case study showed that almost every single minority member consulted by the advisory boards strongly requested a bilingual district in his or her backyard, but also that a few representative bodies did not. In the end, the opinion of the representative bodies won the day. The incongruence between the opinion of the minority members and the opinion of their representative elites merits further analysis. If the minority members still require bilingual districts, the reconsideration should answer four questions. First, is the country’s existing sociolinguistic reality still conducive to bilingual districts? Second, can bilingual districts meet the objectives for which they were recommended? Third, can they contribute to the policy’s ultimate goal – national unity? Finally, are bilingual districts applicable under postmodern and information-age conditions? My analysis will not provide definitive answers, but it should help policy-makers either resuscitate bilingual districts or give them a proper burial. 1 Is Canada’s geolinguistic reality conducive to bilingual districts? Have geolinguistic data changed so much since 1961 that minority communities no longer qualify for bilingual districts? If the changes are not considerable, bilingual districts could still be applicable. Changes have occurred since 1961, but none are very considerable. The situation has remained relatively similar to the one analysed by the B and B Commission forty years ago. First, Canada is still a country overwhelmingly populated by two sociolinguistic groups. Anglophones represent 59 per cent and francophones 23 per cent of the Canadian population.6 As in 1861 and 1961, no other language group comes close to even 4 per cent today. According to the 2001 census, the total number of Canadians whose mother tongue is other than French and English is less than the number of francophones, and the third largest language group in Canada (Italians) numbers less than 470,000 (1.6 per cent) of the Canadian populations.7 Because of

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immigration, francophones have dropped from 28 to 23 percent of the population, but they are still ninefold the third sociolinguistic group. It would thus still be correct to conclude that, “despite the constant increase in numbers of Canadians of other ethnic origins, as a result of immigration, linguistic duality remains the basic characteristic and foundation of the Canadian community” (rcbb 1967, 39). Second, demographic changes have occurred in Quebec, but francophones are still the overwhelming majority in that province, just as they were in 1861 and 1961. Francophones now represent 82 per cent of Quebec’s population; they represented 81 per cent in 1961 and 79 per cent in 1861. Quebec has thus slowly but steadily become more French since Confederation. This is mostly because the numbers and proportion of anglophones have decreased in that province, especially since the pq victory of 1976, but also because many anglophones have assimilated over the years. Indeed, 15 percent of anglophones (mother tongue) now have French as their language of use. This represents an increase over the 9.4 percent rate in 1961. However, the anglicization rate within Quebec has increased from 1.8 percent in 1961 to 3 per cent in 2001, and the proportion of unilingual francophones has decreased from 62 per cent in 1961 to 56 per cent today.8 In spite of mixed census results, French is now more than ever the dominant language in Quebec. The Official Language Act and the Charte de la langue française have established a collective psychological and political reality that finally reflects the geolinguistic reality of that province. Nevertheless, the secessionist threat is still present and powerful in Quebec. Finally and more importantly for our purposes, some communities have seen considerable demographic changes while others have not. According to the 2001 census, thirty-eight census divisions contain a minority population of at least 10 per cent. Four of them are in Nova Scotia (Inverness, Richmond, Digby, and Yarmouth counties); seven in New Brunswick (Madawaska, Gloucester, Kent, Northumberland, Restigouche, Victoria, and Westmorland counties); eighteen in Quebec (Argenteuil, Avignon, Bonaventure, Brome-Missisquoi, Champlain, Montreal, Outaouais, Côte-de-Gaspé, Gatineau Valley, HautSaint-François, Haut-Saint-Laurent, Collines-de-l’Outaouais, Memphrémagog, Minganie-Basse-Côte-Nord, Pontiac, Rousillon, Témiscamingue, and Vaudreuil-Soulanges); eight in Ontario (Cochrane, Greater Sudbury, Sudbury District, Nipissing, Ottawa, Prescott-Russell,

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Stormont-Dundas-Glengarry, and Timiskaming); and one in Manitoba (Division 2). More bilingual districts could be carved out of six additional census divisions that contain a minority population of just below 10 per cent but where some subdivisions contain a francophone community that meets the criterion, notably: Prince County (P.E.I.), Sunbury County (N.B.), Algoma District (Ontario), Division 4 (Manitoba), Division 3 (Saskatchewan), and Division 12 (Alberta). This could bring the total to between forty-four and fifty bilingual districts. These fifty areas coincide almost perfectly with the fifty-four bilingual districts identified by the B and B Commission, the thirty-bilingual districts recommended by the Duhamel Advisory Board, the thirty bilingual districts recommended by the Fox Advisory Board, and the thirty-one bilingual districts identified by the Miller task force. Canada’s geolinguistic reality remains conducive to bilingual districts. Minority homelands still exist. Some of these regions, however, are just on the threshold of qualification. If present suburbanization trends continue, many will drop below 10 percent without a drop in the number of minority members because of the significant influx of non-minority members. A thorough demolinguistic trends analysis is therefore required. 2 Can bilingual districts meet the objectives for which they were recommended? Bilingual districts had a dual purpose, but their symbolic purpose was critical. Existing bilingual regions cannot provide a symbolic recognition. If they could, Canadian citizens would know where they could obtain which bilingual services from which federal office. Instead, they do not know where bilingual regions are located. Bilingual districts would be proclaimed to provide the symbolic recognition of the country’s bilingual areas. They would thus better guarantee that all services to the public provided by the principal offices of each department and agency would be provided in officially proclaimed and delineated areas. The cornerstone program would thus meet its first objective. The only question remaining in this regard is this: would the official proclamation of bilingual districts still fan the flames of the sociolinguistic conflicts they were supposed to eradicate? In other words, would their positive symbolism be cancelled by their negative symbolism? Are bilingual districts still a threat to national unity? Are they still a “red rag to a bull”? The answer depends on the bull. If the bull represents

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Quebec nationalists, bilingual districts could serve to “integrate the new Quebec into present-day Canada, without curbing Quebec’s forward drive and, at the same time, without risking the breaking up of the country” (rcbb 1967, xlvii), but they would not make significant headway in that regard. Then again, Quebec nationalists’ position on bilingual districts has never been clear, and they may never be satisfied with any national sociolinguistic policy or state of affairs that promotes bilingualism in Quebec. Acceptance of the program will thus depend on whether Quebec nationalists are willing to accept official national bilingualism from coast to coast, limited by an equally symbolic nationbased territorial principle. In short, can they swallow the symbolic pill of a minimal number of bilingual districts in Quebec as a goodwill gesture to their dispersed cousins? That answer will depend on whether they maintain “a vital solidarity” with the other French Canadians or abandon them in favour of “an exclusively Quebec society” (rcbb 1965, 119). That answer would depend, finally, on whether “the way these minorities were treated in their respective provinces [is still] … one of the tangible indications of refusal or acceptance, by Englishlanguage Canadians, of the duality of Canada” (rcbb 1965, 119). The bull may therefore be on the other side of Quebec’s fence. If the bull represents Anglo-Canadian political philosophy, the question changes: can anglophones discard the individualist tenet of Lockean idealism, assuming that McRae’s (1975) categorization holds? That would depend on whether they can accept that the French language and culture are collective phenomena and that the minority language and culture have not disappeared over time but will continue to be a feature of Canadian life for generations to come. It would also help if the minority language and culture were perceived as a benefit for the entire country and worthy of national and provincial protection, as the 2003 federal Action Plan on Official Languages implied. That would determine whether or not the majoritarian political philosophy can reconcile majoritarian democracy and minority rights. That would depend on whether anglophones can accept an asymmetrical implementation of bilingualism and biculturalism. And finally, that would depend on whether anglophones can follow Aristotle’s principle that justice involves treating equals equally and unequals favourably – in other words, treating Quebec as a distinct society, thereby awarding it special powers and status to protect and nurture the French language and culture in that province, and accepting relatively more and larger bilingual districts outside Quebec than would be proclaimed inside that province.

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Bilingual districts would also meet the second objective – they would provide more services than bilingual regions. There is a difference between “all services to the public” guaranteed by bilingual districts and the “maximum of seven services” (police, taxation, employment, postal, income security, heritage) presently provided by bilingual regions. However, bilingual districts would cover less territory and serve less people than bilingual regions. Indeed, more bilingual regions now cover more territory and serve more minority members than bilingual districts would cover and serve. This is especially the case in the Prairie provinces, where a handful of bilingual districts would significantly reduce the allocation of bilingual services presently provided within bilingual regions. Although the 1976 tbs memo misled Cabinet when it claimed that the bilingual regions then existing would serve more minority members than would bilingual districts, that claim would be valid today. This conclusion, however, would be reversed if bilingual regions were to remain in place. For example, if bilingual regions were maintained as complements to bilingual districts, francophone communities in western Canada would receive the same maximum seven services in French within bilingual regions, and some would obtain more services from bilingual districts than are presently provided in bilingual regions. If some bilingual regions were promoted to the status of bilingual district while other bilingual regions remained intact, francophones in the West (and other minority communities elsewhere) would receive significant gains. If sections 9 (1) and (2) were applied simultaneously, as originally planned, bilingual districts would better meet the second objective than bilingual regions ever would. 3 Can bilingual districts contribute to the ultimate goal? The third criterion involves assessing whether bilingual districts could contribute to Canadian unity. This is possible but improbable, since symbolic and administrative districtification may not play a significant role in convincing Québécois to vote no if there is a third referendum on sovereignty. The status and use of the French language and culture in Quebec, protected by a distinct society clause in the Constitution, seem more important in that province than bilingual districts. The status of French outside Quebec is not as important as its status within the province’s boundaries (McRoberts 1976, 468). Anything officially bilingual would stir secessionists. It would take courage to stare them down. It thus appears naive to conclude that “there is no longer any

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need to hide the fact that Canada has bilingual districts within Quebec, for fear of rocking the political boat” (Reid 1993, 153). However, Quebec’s own secretive “bilingual districts” could open an interesting back door to nation-wide, official bilingual districts. Quebec has ninety-two bilingual municipalities that are populated by an anglophone majority and are recognized as bilingual by the Office de la langue française.9 They are not symbolically proclaimed as such, but it is possible to obtain the same result through other means. Federal bilingual districts could be drawn to coincide with Quebec’s bilingual municipalities, allowing the federal government to reduce the symbolic impact of its own bilingual districts in Quebec by this overlap. The secessionists would oppose the move, as they would anything bilingual, but most Québécois could be convinced of its worth. The federal government could then create bilingual districts elsewhere, although it would not be bound by the stringent 50 per cent geolinguistic criterion used in Quebec. This might seem unjust, but the application of the 10 per cent criterion outside Quebec and the 50 per cent criterion in Quebec would cover approximately the same percentage of minority anglophones and francophones because the former are significantly more urbanized and concentrated than the latter. Obviously, bilingual districts both in and outside Quebec could regroup numerous contiguous municipalities, census divisions and subdivisions, and other administrative units to reduce the number and increase the size of bilingual districts. In short, the proclamation of six or seven bilingual districts in Quebec to enable the proclamation of some thirty to forty bilingual districts elsewhere would symbolically recognize minority homelands and increase the number of bilingual services in those communities. It would also symbolically limit the official use of English in Quebec, something the nationalists and secessionists never fully understood from the B and B Commission’s report. A minimal symmetrical process could also avoid an anglophone backlash outside Quebec. Since Ontario10 and Prince Edward Island11 have their own administrative bilingual “districts,” superimposed symbolic federal bilingual districts should not pose a problem in those provinces. Nova Scotia is heading in that direction as well.12 There are fifteen bilingual municipalities in Manitoba, twelve in Saskatchewan, two in Alberta, and one in Newfoundland and Labrador. The New Brunswick government would have to determine if having a single bilingual district covering the entire province would still be better than

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cutting the province up into specific areas. It would probably favour a single bilingual district,13 but it could also ask the federal government to limit its bilingual districts to the bilingual municipalities and the areas served by the regional land use planning commissions and the regional economic development commissions specified by the new Official Languages Act.14 That leaves only British Columbia without bilingual districts. In short, overlapping federal bilingual districts with bilingual municipalities should not raise significant opposition. In addition, this would enable the participation of the three levels of government, just as the B and B Commission strongly urged in its report (rcbb 1967, 105–6). This adaptation of federal bilingual districts to provincial bilingual districts is not a novelty. Remember that the B and B Commission had desired an immediate joint effort but had conceded that the implementation of such an innovative policy would take time and that the specification process could follow many routes (rcbb 1967, 112). It had added that if an immediate joint proclamation was impossible, each sphere should proceed separately. The size, location, and number of bilingual districts could differ, and their proclamation did not need to be a joint endeavour from the start. The commission explicitly hoped that, as soon as possible, federal, provincial, and municipal services would be allocated in both official languages in the viable minority communities of the country and that these communities would be officially recognized as bilingual. It may have been naive to expect that the provinces would have followed the federal lead (Lalande 1987, 23), but such a conclusion is premature because no symbolic bilingual districts were ever created to lead by example. Since then, provincial bilingual districtification and bilingual municipalities have appeared. It has taken almost forty years, but it is now possible to officially proclaim joint or overlapping federal, provincial, and municipal bilingual districts, at least in nine provinces: Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia. The major difference since the time of the B and B Commission is that now the federal government would follow the provincial and municipal leads. 4 Are bilingual districts applicable in the future? The answer to this question depends on the eventual salience of postmodern and information-age conditions. I offer five postmodern conditions for the sake of argument. First, the globalization of the English language

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and culture could justify the symbolic and administrative purpose of bilingual districts at the local level. This is because globalization, like state nationalism before it, fuels reactive local cultural nationalism. Moreover, the valorization of heterogeneity and difference – languages, races, religions, and values, most notably – is a fundamental tenet of the postmodern society. Second, if postmodernism favours the aspatial rather than the local community of interest, then virtual identities may undermine the symbolic value of bilingual districts. But if the local reclaims its importance as a paradoxical counterweight to globalization, bilingual districts would be of value. Third, if immigrants bring considerable changes to a country’s national and local sociolinguistic realities, bilingual districts may no longer represent homelands for the sociolinguistic minorities. But since the vast majority of immigrants wind up in the country’s metropolitan areas, they will not alter these homelands. Also, if economic and social interactions are still grounded in the local community rather than in virtual communities and markets, bilingual districts could find significant meaning. Otherwise, bilingual districts may become empty ghettos in a generation. Finally, the globalization of the political decision-making processes and institutions could either reduce the number and significance of the numerous national and provincial public services so vital for minority survival or bring about greater administrative decentralization, from governments to the local minority groups. Postmodern conditions thus support and reject the value of symbolic bilingual districtification. Each society will have to assess the salience of each postmodern condition to determine if this value is worth promoting. The information age also points to a paradoxical assessment of symbolic bilingual districtification in the future. In The Power of Identity, Castells (1997, 2) demonstrated that the network society – the result of globalization, information technology revolution, and restructured capitalism – has seen a “widespread surge of powerful expressions of collective identity that challenge globalization and cosmopolitanism on behalf of cultural singularity and people’s control over their lives and environment.” Globalization is and will be challenged by religious, national, ethnic, family, and local movements, and both extremes will challenge the sovereignty of existing nation-states (2). Globalization strengthens localization because “subjects, if and when constructed, are not built any longer on the basis of civil societies, that are in the process of disintegration, but as prolongation of communal resistance” (11). And that holds true because the network society “is based on the systemic disjunction between the local and the global for most individuals and social groups …

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[and] by the separation in different time-space frames between power and experience” (11). The search for meaning takes place “in the reconstruction of defensive identities around communal principles. Most of social action becomes organized in the opposition between unidentified flows and secluded identities” (11). “Communalism” – the construction of local communities through collective action and memory – especially when it synthezises “raw materials from history, geography, language, and environment,” are key “sources of identity” that “build havens” for minority groups, although they may also “transform communal heavens into heavenly hells” (64–7). Globalization will simultaneously create new, universal identities, such as feminism and environmentalism, and strengthen old, local identities based on language, religion, and territory. Language and territory play a significant part in this dilemma, especially in a minority situation (Castells 1997, 66), since the cultural minority has “access to power at lower levels of the state, in the territories where they live,” and “regional and national minority identities find their easiest expression at local and regional levels” (271–2). But administrative decentralization as a means to “keep the principle of universal equality, while organizing its application as segregated inequality,” can further de-legitimize the state and risk “the tribalization of society in communities built around primary identities” (274–5). The simultaneous application of universal rights and local decentralization to serve particular cultures may be the only way to balance the push towards globalization and the pull towards localization. The glocalization paradox may thus support or quash symbolic and administrative bilingual districtification. Finally, digital information technology (dit) could make bilingual districtification obsolete. Indeed, dit could make the personality principle feasible. In particular, the Internet could eliminate the constraints of space and time.15 All oral and written communication within a country can be channelled to civil servants working in the national capital or in isolated call centres. They can be allocated ontime and online via telephone, webcam, or e-mail, and in many languages. In short, once the vast majority of citizens can request and receive their services via digital information technology, the personality principle could replace the territorial principle. Replacing administrative bilingual districtification with dit will not, however, replace the symbolic recognition of minority homelands, especially since bilingual districts had a primarily symbolic purpose and not only an administrative purpose. If bilingual districts are deemed necessary by the minority and meet the evaluation criteria, the federal government would have to heed five

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key administrative considerations. First, it would have to explain the symbolic purpose of bilingual districts. The concept may still mean different things to different people, but the number of meanings should be successfully reduced to three: the official recognition of the existence of minority homelands, the reduction of the official presence of English within Quebec (something arguably no longer necessary) and a guarantee of federal, provincial, and municipal services in both official languages. Confusion should thus be reduced. Second, the federal government would have to alter its administrative structures to respect the minority’s geolinguistic reality. This would mean resolving the principal offices dilemma. All offices located within the borders of a proclaimed bilingual district would have to provide all of their services to the public in both French and English. Federal and provincial institutions could re-delineate their administrative borders so that one of their offices serves the bilingual district. They would have at least four options: (1) decide that the office serving the bilingual district will allocate all of its public services throughout its entire service area; (2) establish a bilingual unit or a bilingual contingency to serve the bilingual district located within its service area; (3) open a local sub-office within the bilingual district; or (4) hire a local third-party multi-service provider. This fourth option would conform to the modern trend of single-window venues (Kernaghan et al. 2000, 142) and the foregone but not forgotten Acadian notaires (Vanderlinden 1995). Third, the federal government would have to choose between the adaptive and the bureaucratic approaches. The former makes borders coincide with minority homelands, while the latter makes borders coincide with administrative units. Overlapping federal bilingual districts with bilingual municipalities would favour the latter, but using other administrative units allows for more flexibility. The B and B Commission opted for the adaptive approach, section 15 (3) of the 1969 Official Languages Act opened the door for such a manoeuvre, and the 1988 Act and the 1992 Regulations enables it. Fourth, the federal government would have to adopt criteria to specify the number, size, and location of bilingual districts. Should bilingual districts be specified according to numerical or proportional criteria? The Finnish model and the B and B Commission used both, but the 1969 Act only used the 10 per cent criterion. Will mother tongue or home language data be used? The commission wanted to use the latter, but the data were not available until 1971. The data are now available, but they raise questions: does one use the language “most often” or “regularly” used at

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home? To minority families, which are increasingly exogamous (Landry 2003), the difference can be significant. A generous approach would favour data on mother tongue and a proportional criterion. Ten per cent still appears appropriate, but there appears to be no magic number. Fifth, the federal government would have to decide whether a bureaucratic organization or an advisory board should specify the bilingual districts. The former would be better equipped to specify administrative bilingual districts according to the bureaucratic approach, while an advisory board would be better able to specify symbolic bilingual districts according to the adaptive approach. The choice would determine the specification and implementation processes and results. My case study suggests that an advisory board should be in charge of specification and a bureaucratic organization in charge of implementation. One can only assume that bureaucratic deviation would be better checked by pco this time around. These and other considerations should nevertheless be secondary. The important thing to remember, as the B and B Commission explained, is that the process be “more concerned with the idea of bilingual districts and their language régimes than with the necessary arbitrary methods for their establishment” (rcbb 1967, 116). In other words, it is more important “to designate areas where the right of the official-language minorities to appropriate services will be recognized and an obligation for them assumed by the various public administrations” (117). It is particularly important that the minorities “feel that they are accepted as such” and “have at their disposal a certain number of actual services in their own language” (117). The former is crucial: “the essential decision is to recognize the official-language minorities wherever their relative importance justifies it” (116). Officially proclaimed bilingual districts, if still applicable, would provide a symbolic recognition of minority homelands and guarantee the allocation of all services to the public in both official languages. And if they could be complemented by bilingual regions beyond their borders, over 90 per cent of minority members would receive a minimal number and type of bilingual public services. Finally, if they could coincide with existing provincial “bilingual districts,” they would finally be established, albeit indirectly, “for federal, provincial, and local jurisdictions” (rcbb 1967, 106). In short, bilingual districts could finally achieve their initial purposes. Administrative and symbolic bilingual districtification, at least to some extent, still presents an appropriate solution to Canada’s sociolinguistic

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conflicts. Bilingual districts may indeed be even more appropriate today than two generations ago. However, the story of Canada’s bilingual districts warns us that specifying (and implementing) such a simple concept involves a complex set of administrative and political considerations. Sociolinguistic policies involve overlapping issues of identity, provided primarily by symbols, and concrete measures, provided primarily by bureaucratic services. Consequently, both symbolic and administrative mechanisms are complementary. Therefore, although one concept – bilingual districts – was supposed to accomplish both purposes simultaneously, the cornerstone of the federal policy lived a complex life and suffered an ironic death. Its reconsideration may thus prove equally futile. But the ghost of bilingual districts hovers over federal sociolinguistic policy. It is time for either proper reconsideration or burial.

Conclusion

Bilingual districts were one of many elements of Canada’s sociolinguistic policy, yet they were to be the cornerstone of that policy because of their symbolic purpose. Symbols matter. The main difference between bilingual districts and the tbs bilingual regions that eventually took their place was the former’s symbolic purpose. The tbs did not fully understand this distinction. The tbs deviation was the main reason why bilingual districts were terminated. Previous explanations were mere strings in the hanging rope. In spite of the bilingual districts’ importance, no one bothered to collect and analyse the empirical data to tie them together. I hope that this research will serve to promote the reconsideration of bilingual districts. But most of all, I hope this research contributes to the literature in public administration on administrative accommodations between majority and minority groups. Thus far, the subject has been dominated by law, sociology, and political geography. Yet bilingual districtification, increasingly prevalent in Europe,1 needs to be seen through the lenses of public administration. Also, few if any of the judicial, philosophical, and political debates and decisions on minority issues have taken into account the daily administrative considerations of policy ideas. Yet civil servants are left with little to guide them but their own intuition with regard to how to accommodate sociolinguistic minorities. Minority sociolinguistic communities in Canada have been struggling to boost their chances of survival by seeking the symbolic recognition of

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their homelands and the public services their members need – education and health are the key public services. The federal, provincial, and municipal governments, as well as the Commissioner of Official Languages, are also struggling with these issues. Bilingual districts would have simplified every one’s task. If they can still do so, let us hope they can be resuscitated. But it is possible that the significant inner migration of Canadians and the complexity of allocating public services to sociolinguistic minority groups have made bilingual districts obsolete. If that is the case, a requiem is in order. Whether bilingual districts are resuscitated or properly laid to rest is one outstanding issue. Another is Quebec’s distinct society and special constitutional status. A third significant issue still outstanding from the B and B Commission’s reports is “minority rule” or administrative selfdetermination. In other words, how can the sociolinguistic minorities that cannot obtain statehood instead obtain control over the administrative structures that affect their language and culture on a daily basis? How can they control the public institutions that specify and implement policies and services in education and health, in particular? How can they make use of municipalities, regional economic development agencies, and land use commissions to preserve their language and culture and enhance their vitality? In short, instead of relying on governments to make decisions on behalf of the minority, as would be the case with resuscitating or burying bilingual districts, how can a minority rely on its own institutions to allocate public services that would have been provided by federal departments and agencies within the bilingual districts? Can they obtain self-administration instead of self-government? Canada’s sociolinguistic minorities seem to prefer bureaucracy over self-determination (Cardinal and Hudon 2001). My case study suggests that they should be wary of governments and their bureaucracies. They should fear the bureaucratization of sociolinguistic policies. They should prefer minority rule.

Notes

Note: The government documents quoted in this book come from four basic sources. Some, like A National Understanding, are pamphlets or booklets that are available in libraries. Cabinet minutes and similar documents were obtained through access to information requests to the Privy Council. Departmental documents, like the olas manual, were found in Treasury Board Secretariat or Public Service Commission libraries. Finally, some documents were found in the National Archives under various collections.

introduction 1 Yves Laurendeau, “Between Hope and Disenchantment,” Language and Society 19 (April 1987): 15. 2 Although most briefs and testimonies before the commission were favourable to bilingualism and biculturalism, many categorically opposed anything “bilingual.” An extreme example is the solution advocated by John A.C. Bowen: “There would be one official country-wide language – North American English” (brief submitted to the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Toronto, 15 March 1964, 1). 3 The English Language Act (53 Victoria, ch. 14) of 1890 abolished provisions of the Manitoba Act (33 Victoria, ch. 3) of 1870. The abolition was judged unconstitutional, but only ninety-five years later (Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights [1985], 1 S.C.R., 721). 4 “Circular of Instruction,” Department of Education, Toronto, 17 August 1913. The regulation is reprinted in Mackell v. Ottawa Separate School Trustees [1914], 32 Ontario, R.S. 245, 252–4.

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5 The B and B Commission used the term “communities” instead of “homeland,” but the latter was used by Prime Minister Lester Pearson and Quebec Premier Daniel Johnson during the 1968 constitutional conference (Constitutional Conference – Proceedings, First Meeting of February 5–7, 1968 [Ottawa: Queen’s Printer], 9, 63). “Homeland” is also used by academics today (Herb 1999, 17) because it conveys the historical importance of the territorial aspects of identity that other concepts (e.g., “territorial and historical communities of identity”) do not. It has the advantage of being shorter, but it can have a negative meaning. 6 The term “districtification” is my translation of the term “districtisation” used by André Laurendeau (1990, 371). 7 Interview with tbs official, interview no. 31, p. 24, answer 211.

chapter one 1 Order-in-Council 1963–1106, Privy Council of Canada, Ottawa, 19 July 1963. The decision is reproduced in rccb 1967, 173–4. 2 Laurendeau specifically requested a royal commission in “Pour une enquête sur le bilinguisme” (Le Devoir [Montréal], 20 janvier 1962, 4). Subsequent editorials and columns would amplify his request, notably: “Nous – et eux” (30 janvier 1962, 4), “L’égalité des deux nations pionnières” (6 février 1962, 4), “Devant des refus” (8 février 1962, 4), and “L’ambiguïté continue” (13 février 1962, 4). 3 Debates, House of Commons, 15 November 1971, 9552. 4 For an abridged version of the B and B report, see Innes 1973. 5 Acadia is not one of Quebec’s “dispersed parts.” In fact, it was settled before Quebec, and Acadians have a distinct history and society, as the commission noted elsewhere (rcbb 1967, 33). Acadians formed a third of New Brunswick. Yet as the Fox report stated, Acadians were relatively ignored by Quebec’s elites before and since Confederation: “As late as the 1880’s Quebec newspapers were reporting with great amazement that travellers to the Maritimes had reported the existence of French-speaking communities there. Thus, although the French-Canadian fathers of Confederation were careful to ensure constitutional guarantees for their group in Quebec, they did little that would help the Acadians” (bdab 1975, 44). See Jean Daigle, (ed.), Acadians of the Maritimes (Moncton: Centre d’études canadiennes, 1982), for a general introduction to Acadia and Acadians. 6 For an introduction to Quebec’s secessionist movement, see Maurice Pinard, Robert Bernier, and Vincent Lemieux, Un combat inachevé (Sainte-Foy: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 1997).

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7 For a general overview of the terrorist movement in Quebec in the 1960s, see Marc Laurendeau 1990. André Laurendeau was the target of death threats from Quebec secessionists (Trudeau 1968, 207). 8 The commission defined societies as “the types of organization and the institutions that a rather large population, inspired by a common culture, has created for itself or has received, and which it freely manages over quite a vast territory, where it lives as a homogeneous group according to common standards and rules of conduct” (rcbb 1967, xxxiii; emphasis in original). 9 The commission defined official bilingualism as follows: “[T]he principal public and private institutions must provide services in two languages to citizens, the vast majority of whom may very well be unilingual” (rcbb 1967, 28); it defined official biculturalism as “the coexistence and collaboration of … two cultures” (rcbb 1967, 34). 10 An Act amending the Act respecting the Civil Service of Canada, 2 George VI (1938), ch. 7, sec. 1. 11 An Act respecting the Civil Service of Canada, 9–10 Elizabeth II (1961), ch. 57. 12 An Act respecting Employment in the Public Service of Canada, 15 Elizabeth II (1967), ch. 71. 13 Public Service Employment Regulations, S.O.R./67–129, Canada Gazette, part II, vol. 101, no. 7, 12 April 1967, p. 4. 14 The commission never explicitly stated that “the official use of English should be restricted in Quebec.” It probably feared a backlash for directly suggesting such a major alteration to existing practice. Nevertheless, it explicitly delineated twenty-four bilingual districts in Quebec (rcbb 1967, 108) and argued that “no part of Quebec should be regarded as solely Englishspeaking” (103) and that, outside bilingual districts, no official recognition should ensue (116). A member of the commission, Paul Lacoste, used similar arguments to reject the first Bilingual Districts Advisory Board’s recommendation that would make the entire province of Quebec a single bilingual district (“Appliquer le bilinguisme intégral au Québec serait une provocation,” La Presse (Montréal), 7 mai 1971, A-2). According to Lacoste, the commission clearly wanted to make French the dominant language in Quebec. 15 Minutes of 1–2 September 1966, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Ottawa, 15. 16 I found fourteen briefs proposing bilingual districtification. The requests came from a variety of organizations, ranging from those from the Quebec Association of Protestant Home and School Boards (Montreal, 1965) and the Catholic Women’s League of Canada (no location, June 1964) to those from the Montreal Board of Trade (Montreal, January 1965) and the

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18

19 20

Notes to pages 36–45

Canadian Labour Congress (Ottawa, December 1965). The briefs submitted by the United Church of Canada (Toronto, June 1964) and some Carleton University faculty members (Ottawa, 1965) nevertheless stand out. In particular, the former categorically requested the implementation of the Finnish model: “The natural basis for a similar arrangement suggests itself in the Canadian context within the framework of provincial autonomy” (1965, 1). The brief, written in part by Ken McRae, argued that bilingual districts would be the best mechanism to respect the geolinguistic reality of the country: “[M]ost of the communities of Quebec would rightly be unilingually French, whereas most of those of Ontario would rightly be unilingually English; perhaps some areas or municipalities in every province would eventually be unilingually French, and a good number would be bilingual”(2). Neil Morrison (1989) argued that Laurendeau gave more importance to volume 3 (The Work World) and how it would ensure the superiority of French in the daily lives of Québécois, but Michael Oliver (1993) argued that Laurendeau’s priority would not have rallied his colleagues. The Glassco Commission did not recommend that Treasury Board assume responsibility for the federal bilingualism policy within the civil service, as Eugène Therrien did, because his two colleagues were not too concerned about the problem. However, the significant managerial powers that Treasury Board would obtain in 1966 and 1967 were the result of the Glassco Commission’s recommendations favouring a greater coordination of federal departments by Treasury Board (rcgo 1962, 51–7). “La Commission B-B – Lettre des coprésidents à M. Trudeau,” Le Devoir (Montréal) 19 mars 1971, 5. Commissioner of Official Languages, Annual Report, 1985 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985) 1.

chapter two 1 An Act respecting the Civil Service of Canada, 8–9 George V (1918), ch. 12. 2 An Act amending the Act respecting the Civil Service of Canada, 2 George VI (1938), ch. 7, sec. 1: “[N]o appointment, whether permanent or temporary, shall be made to a local position within a province, and no employee shall be transferred from a position in a province to a local position in the same or in another province, whether permanent or temporary, until and unless the candidate or employee has qualified, by examination, in the knowledge and use of the language, being the French or English language, of the majority of persons with whom he is required to do business.”

Notes to pages 45–56

279

3 Civil Service Regulations (Ottawa: Civil Service Commission), Regulation 32A, 1942, p. 13. 4 An Act respecting the Civil Service of Canada, 9–10 Elizabeth II (1961), ch. 57, sec. 47: “The number of employees appointed to serve in any department or in any local office of a department who are qualified in the knowledge and use of the English or French language or both shall, in the opinion of the Commission, be sufficient to enable the department or local office to perform its functions adequately and to give effective service to the public.” 5 Debates, House of Commons, 20 December 1962, 2985. 6 Ibid., 12 June 1963, 1547. 7 Ibid., 25 June 1963, 1622. 8 The New Role of the Civil Service Commission (Ottawa: Civil Service Commission, 1 February 1966), 2. 9 Staffing Manual (Ottawa: Civil Service Commission, 1 February 1966). 10 Debates, House of Commons, 1 April 1966, 3915–17. 11 An Act respecting employment in the Public Service of Canada, 15 Elizabeth II (1967), ch. 71. 12 “Employees appointed to serve in any department or other portion of the Public Service, or part thereof, shall be qualified in the knowledge and use of the English or French language or both, to the extent that the Commission deems necessary in order that the functions of such department, portion or part can be performed adequately and effective service can be provided to the public.” 13 Public Service Employment Regulations, S.O.R./67–129, Canada Gazette, pt 2, vol. 101, no. 7, 12 April 1967, 4. 14 Cabinet minutes, Privy Council, Ottawa, Cabinet document 117–67, 5 December 1967, n. p. 15 “Report of the Cabinet Committee on Federal-Provincial Relations,” Privy Council, Ottawa, Cabinet document 30/68, 17 January 1968. 16 Cabinet minutes, Privy Council, Ottawa, Cabinet document 33–68, 26 March 1968, 9. 17 “Official Languages Act – Working Paper (Appendix to Preparation of Official Languages Act),” Privy Council, Ottawa, Document 138/68, 22 March 1968, 6–7. 18 Cabinet minutes, Privy Council, Ottawa, Cabinet document 33–68, 26 March 1968, 9. 19 Interview with Secretary of State official, interview no. 40, p. 5, answer 34; Interview with member of advisory board, interview no. 55, p. 1, answers 2, 22. 20 Debates, House of Commons, 17 October 1968, 1481. 21 Speech from the Throne, House of Commons, 12 September 1968, 7.

280

Notes to pages 56–62

22 Debates, House of Commons, 12 September 1968, 6–9. 23 In particular, see “Unity’s price tag” (Calgary Albertan, 22 October 1968, 6) and “Vers un Canada vraiment bilingue” (Le Devoir (Montréal), 21 octobre 1968, 6). 24 Debates, House of Commons, 21 November 1967, Appendix, 4554–5. 25 Ibid. 26 “Premiers to discuss six reforms in use of English, French,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), 22 November 1967, 4. 27 Ibid., 4. 28 Debates, House of Commons, 21 November 1967, Appendix, 4552–3. 29 “Premiers to discuss six reforms,” 4. 30 Constitutional Conference – Proceedings: First Meeting of February 5–7, 1968, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1968), 5. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., 9. 33 Ibid., 11. 34 Ibid., 13. 35 “The Constitution of Canada – A Statement of Policy by the Government of Canada,” Cabinet document no. 17/68, 1. 36 Constitutional Conference – Proceedings: First Meeting, 11. 37 Ibid., 11. 38 Ibid., 53. 39 Ibid., 167. 40 Ibid., 37. 41 Ibid., 67. 42 Ibid., 63. 43 Ibid., 67. 44 Ibid., 65. 45 Ibid., 205–6. 46 Constitutional Conference – Proceedings: Second Meeting of February 10–12, 1969. (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer), 9. 47 Ibid., 9–10. 48 Ibid., 9. 49 Ibid., 9. 50 Ibid., 218, 245, 253. 51 Ibid., 219. 52 Ibid., 243. 53 Ibid., 252. 54 Ibid., 248. 55 Ibid., 221.

Notes to pages 62–70 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

87 88 89

281

Ibid., 252. Ibid., 250–1. Ibid., 41. Ibid., 222. Ibid., 28–9. Ibid., 26. Ibid., 227. Ibid., 223. Ibid., 222. Ibid., 223. Ibid., 223. Ibid., 223. Ibid., 223. Ibid., 254. Ibid., 254. Debates, House of Commons, 20 May 1969, 8842. Minutes of proceedings and evidence – No. 2: Wednesday, 4 June 1969, Thursday, 5 June 1969, Special Committee on the Official Languages Bill, House of Commons, 195. Debates, House of Commons, 20 May 1969, 8842. Ibid., 8847. Constitutional Conference – Proceedings, Second Meeting, 223. Debates, House of Commons, 16 May 1969, 8785. Ibid., 8785–90. Ibid., 21 May 1969, 8916; 23 May 1969, 9018; 26 May 1969, 9067, 9089. Ibid., 27 May 1969, 9104–5. Ibid., 9111. Ibid., 20 May 1969, 8876. Ibid., 21 May 1969, 8923; 23 May 1969, 9005, 9016; 26 May 1969, 9067, 9081, 9085. Ibid., 21 May 1969, 8924. Ibid., 26 May 1969, 9082. Ibid., 27 May 1969, 9124. Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup), Poll 334, Toronto, March 1969; Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Gallup poll: “Only in Quebec is there keen support for a language bill,” Toronto, 24 May 1969. Minutes of proceedings and evidence – No. 1: Tuesday, 3 June 1969, Special Committee on the Official Languages Bill, House of Commons, 36. Ibid., 38. Ibid.

282 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112

Notes to pages 70–6 Ibid. Ibid., 42–3. Ibid., 43. Ibid. Ibid., 43–4. Ibid., 44–5. Minutes of proceedings and evidence – No. 2, 3–16. Ibid., 7. Ibid., 195. Ibid., 159. Ibid., 213. Ibid., 215. Ibid., 219. Ibid., 201. Ibid., 224. Ibid., 227. Debates, House of Commons, 3 July 1969, 10795. Ibid., 7 July 1969, 10919. Ibid., 4 July 1969, 10851. Ibid., 7 July 1969, 10925. Debates, Senate, 8 July 1969, 1766. Ibid., 9 July 1969, 1785. Section 41 of the Official Languages Act foresaw that the legislation would come into effect ninety days after assent by the Governor General of Canada. Since royal assent was given on 9 July 1969, the Act came into effect on 7 September 1969.

chapter three 1 Cabinet minutes – No. 6–70, Privy Council, Ottawa, 12 February 1970, 22–3. 2 Order-in-Council 1970–294, Privy Council, Ottawa, 12 February 1970. The order-in-council is reproduced in the Duhamel report (bdab 1971, Appendix A, 108). 3 Notes concerning first visit to the Maritime Provinces – New Brunswick and Cape Breton, Nova Scotia – 1–7 April 1970, Bilingual Districts Advisory Board (hereafter bdab), Ottawa, 4 May 1970, 5. 4 Ibid., 8, 11, 13. 5 Notes concerning visit to Southern Ontario – 24–27 May 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 4 June 1970, 12.

Notes to pages 76–8

283

6 Notes concerning second visit to Nova Scotia, bdab, Ottawa, 16 July 1970, 20–1. 7 Notes of visits to British Columbia and Alberta – 22–26 June 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 16 July 1970, 11. 8 Notes of visits to Manitoba and Saskatchewan – 23–31 July 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 28 September 1970, 9. 9 Notes concerning second visit to Nova Scotia, 14. 10 Notes concerning visit to Prince Edward Island – 10–15 August 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 2 September 1970, 9–10. 11 Notes on second visit to Saskatchewan and trips to North Battleford, VondaPrud’homme, and Perigord-St. Front – 17–21 February 1971, bdab, Ottawa, 5 March 1971, 3. See also Notes of visits to Manitoba and Saskatchewan – 23–31 July 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 28 September 1970, 39–41. 12 Notes on second visit to Saskatchewan, 3. 13 Ibid., 3–4. See also Notes concerning first visit to the Maritime provinces, 18–19. Representatives from the government of Ontario also expressed concern about the compatibility between the adaptive bilingual districts and principal offices (Notes of discussion at meeting with Ontario government representatives, bdab, Ottawa, 3 September 1970, 7, 10). 14 Notes of visits to British Columbia and Alberta, 4. 15 Notes concerning first visit to the Maritime provinces, 10, 12, 15, 23; Notes concerning visit to Prince Edward Island, 9. 16 Notes of visits to Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 33. 17 Notes concerning first visit to the Maritime provinces, 16. 18 An Act Respecting the Official Languages of New Brunswick, 17 Elizabeth II (1969), ch. 14. 19 The B and B Commission noted that “there is not only the distinct society in Quebec; elements of an autonomous society are taking shape elsewhere … especially in New Brunswick” (rcbb 1967, 33). Laurendeau also struggled to defend a distinct society in Quebec without proposing a similar concept for l’Acadie: is there, he pondered while in Moncton, “un Canada français ou deux?” (1990, 132). 20 Notes concerning first visit to the Maritime provinces, 16. 21 Ibid., 5, 16–17. 22 Notes concerning second visit to Nova Scotia, 13. See also “Rapport soumis aux membres du Conseil par M. H.D. Smith pour la réunion du Conseil le 17 juillet 1970,” bdab, Ottawa, n. d. [1970], 2. 23 Notes of visits to Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 39. 24 Notes of visits to British Columbia and Alberta, 4. 25 Minutes of sixth meeting – 30 January 1971, bdab, Ottawa, n. d., 4.

284

Notes to pages 78–82

26 Notes concerning second visit to Nova Scotia, 8–9. 27 Consultation with New Brunswick members of Parliament, bdab, Ottawa, 22 May and 5 June 1970; Meeting with the Honourable Allan MacEachen, M.P. concerning bilingual districts in Nova Scotia, bdab, Ottawa, 23 December 1970. 28 Notes concerning visit to Prince Edward Island, 14–15. 29 Consultation with New Brunswick members of Parliament, 2–6. 30 Report of meeting with Ontario government officials – Toronto, Monday, 4 May 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 4 May 1970, 3. 31 Notes concerning visit to Prince Edward Island, 7. In fact, the provincial officials misled the board: the 1971 census indicated that there were 1,505 Acadians in the Tignish area, many of whom were school-aged children. If only a few senior citizens lived in the area, how could there possibly be any request for a French-language school? 32 Notes on meetings with Premier Smith and members of the Nova Scotia government – 15 June 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 17 July 1970, 4. 33 Notes of visits to British Columbia and Alberta, 4; Notes of visits to Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 20–1. 34 Notes of visits to Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 20. 35 Notes on second visit to Saskatchewan, 3. 36 Notes of visits to Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 23. 37 Meeting with the Attorney-General of British Columbia – Monday, 1 March 1971, Victoria, B.C., bdab, Ottawa, 5 March 1971, 3. 38 Ibid. 39 Notes of meetings with senior officials of the government of Quebec – Quebec City, 11 September 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 30 September 1970, 4. 40 Ibid., 4, 8. 41 The Gendron Commission was created on 9 December 1968 to “inquire into and report on the use of the French language in Québec.” Its report was published four years later. 42 Notes of meetings with senior officials of the government of Quebec, 5, 7. 43 “Le Mandat du Conseil consultatif des Districts bilingues,” bdab, Ottawa, n. d, 3. 44 Ibid., 4 (my translation of “réactions défavorables”). 45 Ibid., 4 (my translation of “jouer les Ponce-Pilate”). 46 Lettre de François Cloutier à Roger Duhamel, Ministère des affaires culturelles, Québec, 19 mars 1971. 47 Ibid., 2. 48 “Bilingual area talks begin soon,” Ottawa Citizen, 4 May 1970, 3. 49 Minutes of sixth meeting – 30 January 1971, bdab, Ottawa, n. d., 5.

Notes to pages 83–7

285

50 Memorandum re bilingual districts in Ontario, bdab, Ottawa, Paul Fox, 10 July 1970, 9. 51 Minutes of second meeting – 15–16 May 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 11. 52 Notes concerning visit to Prince Edward Island, 16–17. 53 Notes of second visit to Manitoba and trips to potential bilingual districts in the areas of Alexander L.I.D., St Laurent R.M. and St Ambroise – 26–29 October 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 29 December 1970, 5. 54 Minutes of third meeting – 17 July 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 3–5. 55 Comments from Paul Fox about chairman’s draft of Part 1 of the report and about bilingual districts in Quebec, bdab, Ottawa, 2 November 1970, 2. 56 Minutes of fifth meeting – 5 December 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 9. 57 My translation of “pas comme les autres.” Minutes of second meeting, 12. 58 Minutes of third meeting, 11. 59 Interview with bdab member, interview no. 48, p. 8, answers 38 and 39; Interview with bdab member, interview no. 41, p. 25, answers 25 and 26. 60 Minutes of fourth meeting – 3 October 1970, bdab, Ottawa, 3. 61 Ibid., 6. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid., 7. 64 Ibid., 7–8. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid., 9. 68 Minutes of third meeting, 8. 69 Minutes of fourth meeting, 9. 70 Ibid., 9–10. 71 Minutes of fifth meeting, 6. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Minutes of second meeting, 5. 76 Minutes of third meeting, 8. 77 Ibid. 78 Consultation with New Brunswick members of Parliament, 4. 79 Minutes of third meeting, 8. 80 Ibid., 9. 81 Aide-mémoire for discussion at second meeting of Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, bdab, Ottawa, 13 May 1970, 1. 82 Letter to Mr W.T. McRae, Mayor of the City of Campbellton, from Roger Duhamel, bdab, Ottawa, 1 May 1970.

286 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

91 92 93 94

95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108

Notes to pages 87–93 Notes concerning visit to Prince Edward Island, 16–17. Minutes of fourth meeting, 4, 7, 13. Minutes of sixth meeting, 3. Minutes of third meeting, 9. Minutes of fourth meeting, 12. Ibid., 13. Notes concerning visit to Southern Ontario, 3; Notes of visits to Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 36. Minutes of second meeting, 12; Comments from Paul Fox about chairman’s draft, 2; Notes on first draft by Neil Morrison, bdab, Ottawa, 25 November 1970, 3; Minutes of fifth meeting, 5. Minutes of fourth meeting, 11; Notes concerning visit to Southern Ontario, 12; Notes concerning second visit to Nova Scotia, 21. Minutes of fourth meeting, 14; Comments from Paul Fox about chairman’s draft, 3; Notes concerning visit to Prince Edward Island, 16–17. Notes concerning first visit to the Maritime provinces, 15, 23; Minutes of second meeting, 8; Notes concerning visit to Southern Ontario, 2. Notes concerning visit to Southern Ontario, 2; Notes of discussion at meeting with Ontario government representatives, 7, 9; Notes of visits to Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 6–7; Minutes of fourth meeting, 11. Minutes of fourth meeting, 19; Minutes of fifth meeting, 6; Minutes of seventh meeting – 12 March 1971, bdab, Ottawa, 4. Minutes of seventh meeting, 4. “La crise d’octobre pourrait retarder la création de districts bilingues,” Le Droit (Ottawa), 25 février 1971, 4. Minutes of fifth meeting, 6. Joseph Thorarinn Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada [1975], 1 S.C.R., 138. Interview with Duhamel bdab member, interview no. 26, p. 6, answer 44. Ibid. Debates, House of Commons, 3 May 1971, 5431. Ibid. Neil Morrison, “Memorandum to Members of the Board – Progress of Report,” bdab, Ottawa, 15 April 1971, 1. “Report carries the mark of a man between the lines,” Ottawa Citizen, 5 May 1971, 17. “On recommande la création de 37 districts bilingues,” Le Droit (Ottawa), 5 mai 1971, 1 (my translation of “une valeur symbolique indubitable”). Debates, Ontario Legislature, 3 May 1971, 1104–9. Cabinet minutes (no number), Privy Council, Ottawa, 4 March 1971, 7.

Notes to pages 93–8

287

109 Interview with Secretary of State official, interview no. 56, p. 1, answer 5; Interview with Treasury Board official, interview no. 20, p. 1, answer 3. 110 An Act modifying the Financial Administration Act, 15 Elizabeth II (1967), ch. 74. 111 The Government Organization Act, 14 Elizabeth II (1966), ch. 25. 112 The Official Languages (Ottawa: Treasury Board, 1976), 6. 113 Report of the Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, Privy Council, Ottawa, Cabinet document 414–71, 14 April 1971. 114 Memorandum to the Cabinet – Report of the Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, Privy Council, Ottawa, Cabinet Document 414/71, 20 April 1971. 115 Cabinet minutes – No. 17–71, Privy Council, Ottawa, 29 April 1971, 10. 116 Letter from Pierre Elliott Trudeau to the premiers, Prime Minister’s Office, Ottawa, 30 April 1972, 2. 117 Letter from Joseph R. Smallwood to Pierre Elliott Trudeau, St John’s, Premier’s Office, 18 May 1971. 118 Letter from Harry E. Strom to Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Edmonton, Premier’s Office, 13 May 1971. 119 Letter from Alexander B. Campbell to Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Charlottetown, Premier’s Office, 7 June 1971. 120 Memorandum to Cabinet – “Recommendations of the Bilingual Districts Advisory Board,” Cabinet Document 832–71, Privy Council, Ottawa, 14 July 1971, Appendix 3. 121 Debates, House of Commons, 4 May 1971, 5470. 122 “Most leaders favor bilingual districts,” Montreal Star, 5 May 1971, 23. 123 “Ottawa holds back on bilingual areas,” Montreal Star, 6 May 1971, 32; “Le fédéral devrait créer bientôt une douzaine de districts bilingues,” L’Évangéline (Moncton), 6 mai 1971, 1; “Bilingual regions impractical – Davis,” Ottawa Citizen, 7 May 1971, 5. 124 In particular, see “Les districts bilingues en Ontario et ailleurs,” Le Droit (Ottawa), 6 mai 1971, 6. 125 Debates, House of Commons, 18 May 1971, 5921. 126 “À propos des districts bilingues,” La Presse (Montréal), 6 mai 1971, A-6. 127 “Ottawa holds back on bilingual areas,” Montreal Star, 6 May 1971, 32. 128 “Le français sera noyé dans ‘le marais du bilinguisme,’”, Le Droit (Ottawa), 10 mai 1971, 3. My translation of “véritable baril de poudre” and “absurdité.” 129 Ibid. My translation of “serait la pire injure faite aux Québécois depuis la conquête et ce, par un gouvernement dirigé par un premier ministre au nom français.”

288

Notes to pages 98–101

130 “Bilingual districts idea branded ‘absurd’ by Lévesque,” Ottawa Citizen, 20 May 1971, 13. My translation of “absurde,” “dégradant,” “injustifié,” and “réserves.” 131 Ibid. 132 “Des ‘réserves’ pour les Canadiens-français – Le pq,” La Presse (Montréal), 8 mai 1971, A-12. 133 “La ssjb de Québec s’oppose à la politique des districts bilingues,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 21 mai 1971, 8. 134 “Réserve de Québec sur les districts bilingues,” La Presse (Montréal), 6 mai 1971, C-1. 135 “Quebec opposes bilingual districts,” Montreal Star, 5 May 1971, 1–2. 136 “Un projet peu pratique pour l’Ontario et le Québec,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 8 mai 1971, 4. 137 “Les retombées de la BB,” La Presse (Montréal), 7 mai 1971, A-4. 138 Ibid. My translation of “un milieu unilingue francophone.” 139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 “Bilingual cop-out,” Ottawa Citizen, 7 May 1971, 7. 142 “‘Appliquer le bilinguisme intégral au Québec serait une provocation’ – Paul Lacoste,” La Presse (Montréal), 7 mai 1971, A2. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 “Il est trop tôt pour se prononcer,” Le Droit (Ottawa), 6 mai 1971, 1. 146 “Bilingual districts decision in fall,” Montreal Star, 24 July 1971, 1. 147 Ibid. 148 “Les districts bilingues: tout dépend du recensement,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 1 avril 1972, 2. My translation of “les mouvements de population survenus depuis le recensement de 1961 constituent un facteur dont il faut tenir compte avant de prendre une décision.” 149 “Bilingual districts decision in fall,” 1. 150 Ibid. 151 The Constitution and the People of Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975), 58. 152 Ibid. 153 Ibid. 154 Ibid. 155 Ibid., 56–8. 156 Ibid., 58. 157 Ibid.

Notes to pages 101–14

289

158 The Canadian Constitutional Charter, 1971 (Victoria Charter) 1971, reproduced in www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/Proposals/ Victoria_Charter.html. 159 “Le non du Québec n’est qu’un élément dans les négociations,” Le Devoir (Montréal) 25 juin 1971, 1. 160 “L’accord des dix,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 6 novembre 1981, 9. 161 The Constitution Act, 31 Elizabeth II (1982), ch. 11. 162 Cabinet minutes – No. 17–71, Privy Council, Ottawa, 29 April 1971, 10. 163 Memorandum to Cabinet – Recommendations of the Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, Cabinet Document 832–71, Secretary of State, 14 July 1971. 164 Memorandum to Cabinet – Recommendations of the Bilingual Districts Advisory Board; Cabinet Committee on Science, Culture and Information, Cabinet Document 888/71, Privy Council, Ottawa, 27 July 1971. 165 Ibid. 166 Cabinet minutes – No. 44–71, Privy Council, Ottawa, 29 July 1971, 50–1. 167 Memorandum to Cabinet – Recommendations for Proclamation of Federal Bilingual Districts, Cabinet Document 60/72, Secretary of State, Ottawa, 24 January 1972, 1. 168 Ibid. 169 Memorandum to Cabinet – Recommendations for Proclamation of Federal Bilingual Districts, Cabinet Document 177/72, Committee on Science, Culture and Information, Ottawa, 9 February 1972. 170 Ibid. 171 Cabinet minutes – No. 9–72, Privy Council, Ottawa, 9 March 1972, 7–10. 172 Cabinet minutes – No. 18–72, Privy Council, Ottawa, 5 May 1972, 2. 173 Cabinet minutes – No. 19–72, Privy Council, Ottawa, 11 May 1972, 5–6. 174 “Conseil consultatif des districts bilingues,” Secretary of State, Ottawa, Press release 5–1572E, 15 May 1972. 175 Interview with Cabinet minister, interview no. 46, p. 2, answer 137; Interview with Cabinet minister, interview no. 47, p. 16, answer 106; Interview with Secretary of State official, interview no. 57, p. 1, answer 2.

chapter four 1 Order-in-Council 1972–1125, Privy Council, Ottawa, 25 May 1972. The order-in-council is reproduced in the Fox report (bdab 1975, app. 2). 2 Minutes of first meeting – 28 and 29 June 1972, bdab, Ottawa, 2–3. 3 Ibid., 3. 4 Ibid., 7–13.

290

Notes to pages 114–17

5 Ibid., 11. 6 Ibid., 15. 7 W.H. Hickman, “A Brief Report to the Chairman and Members of the Bilingual Districts Advisory Board – re: Visit to Coquitlam Municipality,” bdab, Ottawa, December 1972; Annex “A” to Minutes of the fifth meeting – 12 and 13 January 1973, bdab, Ottawa, n.d. 8 Roland Morency, “Notes on meetings and consultations held with francophone groups and provincial governments of Manitoba and Saskatchewan – 8– 12 April 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, 3 May 1973, 3. 9 Eleanor Duckworth, “Notes on a visit to Antigonish and Cape Breton – 16 and 17 May 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, n. d., 2. 10 Lettre de Robert Bourgault au Conseil consultatif des districts bilingues, Longlac, Ontario, 12 juillet 1973. 11 Jane Carrothers, “Comments on the trip to St Paul and Bonnyville on 16, 17 January 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, n. d., 6. 12 Lettre de l’Association Canadienne-française de l’Alberta (régionale St Paul) au Conseil consultatif des districts bilingues, Saint-Paul, Alberta, 2 juillet 1973. 13 Léopold Lamontagne, “Visite de Vancouver, Victoria, Edmonton, St-Albert, Morinville, Légal (31 mars – 3 avril 1973),” bdab, Ottawa, n. d., 1. 14 Mémoire de l’Association canadienne-française de l’Ontario au Conseil consultatif des districts bilingues, Association canadienne-française de l’Ontario, Ottawa, juillet 1973. 15 Minutes of the ninth meeting – 25 and 26 May 1973, bdab, Ottawa, 3. 16 Léopold Lamontagne, “Visite à Montréal les 11 et 12 juin 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, n. d., 1–4; William Mackey, “The Gaspesian Anglophones,” bdab, Ottawa, 10 July 1973, 2; William Mackey, “The English Population of the North Shore of the St Lawrence,” bdab, Ottawa, 10 July 1973, 2. 17 Lamontagne, “Visite à Montréal les 11 et 12 juin 1973,” 1–2. 18 W.F. Mackey, “My Impressions of Our Meeting in Sherbrooke and Montreal in May 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, 25 May 1973, 1. 19 Léopold Lamontagne, “Visite à Fredericton, N.-B. Les 25–26 février 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, n. d., 1. 20 Roland Morency, “Notes of a visit to the census divisions of Yarmouth and Digby, N.S. – 10–13 December 1972,” bdab, Ottawa, 3 January 1973, 13. 21 Letter from the municipal corporation of County of Pontiac to Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, County of Pontiac, Campbell’s Bay, 10 September 1973. 22 Minutes of the ninth meeting, 6. 23 Roland Morency, “Notes on a visit to the Peace River district, Alberta – 5 and 6 February 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, 21 March 1973, 4; Don Cartwright,

Notes to pages 117–21

24 25 26

27 28 29

30 31 32 33

34 35 36 37

38 39 40

41 42

291

Comments on trip to Peace River-Donnelly-Falher and Girouxville in Alberta, bdab, Ottawa, 22 February 1973, 2. Mackey, “My Impressions of Our Meeting in Sherbrooke and Montreal,” 1; Lamontagne, “Visite à Montréal les 11 et 12 juin 1973,” 1. Mackey, “My Impressions of Our Meeting in Sherbrooke and Montreal,” 1. In particular, see Roland Morency, “notes au sujet de consultations tenues à Frédéricton, N.-B., les 25 et 26 février, 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, 15 March 1973, 2. Morency, Notes of a visit to the census divisions of Yarmouth, 3. Ibid., 6. Roland Morency, “Notes on meetings and consultations held with Francophone groups and provincial governments of Manitoba and Saskatchewan – April 8 to 12, 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, 3 May 1973, 4–5. Minutes of the eleventh general meeting – 20 and 21 July 1973, bdab, Ottawa, 3. Morency, “Notes of a visit to the census divisions of Yarmouth,” 9. Morency, “Notes au sujet de consultations tenues à Frédéricton,” 2. Roland Morency, “Notes of a meeting with the P.E.I. government representatives in Charlottetown and with a group of representatives of the Evangeline district in Summerside, P.E.I. – 19 and 20 February 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, n. d., 1–2. Lamontagne, “Visite de Vancouver, Victoria,” 2. Morency, “Notes of a meeting with the P.E.I. government representatives,” 1. Adélard Savoie, “Visite des représentants du Conseil consultatif des districts bilingues à Frédéricton,” N.-B., bdab, Ottawa, 13 March 1973, 2. “Rencontre avec M. Keith Spicer, Commissaire des langues officielles et ses adjoints – 11 janvier 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, 17 January 1973, 2–3. My translation of “d’élargir l’interprétation” of section 9 (2) and “réduire le nombre des petits dristricts [sic] plus ou moins viables.” A chapter in Second Annual Report, 1971–1972 – Commissioner of Official Languages (Ottawa: Information Canada, January 1973), 26–34. Ibid., 29. “Les districts bilingues, des ‘ghettos’?” L’Eau Vive (Saint-Victor) 22 février 1973, 3. My translation of “tout le contraire d’un ghetto!” and “les Francophones s’y sentiraient mieux à leur aise.” In particular, see “Ottawa devrait renoncer aux ‘districts bilingues,’” Le Devoir (Montréal), 1 février 1973, 1–2. Roland Morency, “Note de service aux membres – objet: Rapport annuel (1972) du Commissaire aux langues officielles,” bdab, Ottawa, 2 February 1973.

292

Notes to pages 121–3

43 “Board smarts after criticism,” Ottawa Citizen, 13 March 1973, 3. 44 Letter from Donald R. Getty to Gérard Pelletier, Department of Education, Edmonton, 17 August 1972, 1; Jane Carrothers, “Meeting in Edmonton – October 9, 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, n. d., 1; Letter from Don R. Getty to Paul Fox, Department of Federal and Intergovernmental Affairs, Edmonton, 21 May 1974. 45 Paul Fox, “Report on the Meeting with the Ontario Government – September 17, 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, n. d., 2. 46 Debates, Ontario Legislature, 3 May 1971, 1104–9. 47 Morency, “Notes on meetings and consultations held with francophone groups and provincial governments of Manitoba and Saskatchewan,” 6. 48 Léopold Lamontagne, “Rencontre avec M. François Cloutier – Visite à Montréal le lundi 21 janvier 1974,” bdab, Ottawa, 25 January 1974, 2; Yvonne R. Raymond and William F. Mackey, “Rapport de l’entrevue avec l’Honorable François Cloutier, ministre de l’Éducation et des Affaires culturelles,” bdab, Montreal, 27 February 1973, 1; W.F. Mackey, “Impression of Meeting with the Minister of Education – January 21, 1974,” bdab, Ottawa, 4 February 1974, 2; Interview with bdab member, interview no. 27, p. 2, answer 8. My translation of “tollé général” and “mettre fin à la Confédération!” 49 Lamontagne, “Rencontre avec M. François Cloutier,” 2; Mackey, “Impression of Meeting with the Minister of Education,” 4. 50 Lamontagne, “Rencontre avec M. François Cloutier,” 2. My translation of “il n’est pas nécessaire de le dire.” 51 “Un P.C. veut un district bilingue,” L’Évangéline (Moncton), 9 octobre 1975, 5. 52 Paul Fox, “Report on Meetings with mp s, December 12 and 13, 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, 3–4. 53 Paul Fox, “Report on Meetings with Members of Parliament in Ottawa – November 22 and 23, 1973,” bdab, Ottawa, n. d., 1–5; Letter from G.A. Percy Smith to Neil Morrison, Ottawa, 4 December 1973, 1. 54 Fox, “Report on Meetings with mp s,” 1. 55 Procès-verbal de la quinzième réunion – les 16 et 17 décembre 1973, bdab, Ottawa, 10. 56 Jane Carrothers, “Report of a Brief Meeting with Hon. C.M. Drury, President of the Treasury Board, in Cargary [sic] on Sunday, December 2, 1973,” bdab, Calgary, 5 December 1973, 1. 57 Ibid., 2. 58 Ibid., 1. 59 Letter from Paul Fox to A.W. Johnson, bdab, Ottawa, 18 September 1972.

Notes to pages 123–9 60 61 62 63 64 65

66 67 68

69 70

71

72 73 74 75 76

77 78

293

Interview with tbs official, interview no. 39, p. 11, answers 67–72. Letter from Paul Fox to A.W. Johnson, 1. Minutes of fourth meeting – 3 and 4 November 1972, bdab, Ottawa, 9. Procès-verbal de la 13e réunion – les 12, 13 et 14 octobre 1973, bdab, Ottawa, 3–5. Ibid., 4. My translation of “anxieux” and “trop tard.” Ibid., 4; Interview with tbs official, interview no. 22, p. 4, answer 40. My translation of “toute une mécanique épouvantable.” See also Interview with tbs official, interview no. 9, p. 4, answer 15. Interview with tbs official, interview no. 22, p. 4, answer 37. My translation of “une question de timing.” Manual of the Official Languages Administrative System (Ottawa: Treasury Board and Public Service Commission of Canada, June 1973). “Objectifs de direction concernant le bilinguisme dans la fonction publique,” texte de la déclaration faite par l’honorable C.M. Drury, Président du Conseil du Trésor, devant le Comité des prévisions budgétaires en général de la Chambre des communes, le mardi, 9 mars 1971. Conseil du trésor, Ottawa, n.d. “Progress Report and Framework for the Continued Implementation of Bilingualism,” Treasury Board, Ottawa, September 1971. Interview with tbs official, interview no. 39, p. 5, answers 27–32. See also “Participation équilibrée – Rapport de synthèse,” Groupe d’étude sur le bilinguisme, Ottawa, février 1973, 93. C.M. Drury, “Bilingualism in the Public Service of Canada” Treasury Board, Ottawa, December 1972. The term “région bilingue” is used in the French version, but the English version used “bilingual areas.” However, the term “bilingual region” would subsequently be used by tbs officials. Ibid., 1. Journals, House of Commons, 6 June 1973, 384–5. Debates, House of Commons, 6 June 1973, 4517. “Language Requirements of Positions” Treasury Board, Ottawa, Circular 1973–88, 29 June 1973. Roland Morency, “Memorandum to all members – subject: ‘Principal Offices in a Federal Bilingual District’ – ‘Significant demand’ – ‘Interpretation,’” bdab, Ottawa, 5 February 1973. Interview with tbs official, interview no. 22, p. 4, answer 36. See also Procès-Verbal de la 13e Réunion, 4. Procès-verbal de la 13e réunion, 1–2; Minutes of the fourteenth meeting – 9 and 10 November 1973, bdab, Ottawa, 16; Procès-verbal de la douzième réunion, les 14 et 15 septembre 1973, bdab, Ottawa, 17–18.

294

Notes to pages 130–2

79 Eleanor Duckworth, “Memo to all commissioners, N. Morrison, R. Morency, D. Cartwright – re: ‘Principal Offices’ and ‘significant demand,’” bdab, Ottawa, 10 March 1973, 1. 80 Minutes of the tenth general meeting – 22 and 23 June 1973, bdab, Ottawa, 17. 81 Ibid., 18. 82 Roland Morency, “Principal Offices and Significant Demand,” bdab, Ottawa, 30 August 1973. 83 Minutes of the eleventh general meeting, 7. 84 Ibid. 85 Verbatim report of a meeting with Mr B. Smith of the Department of Justice on various aspects of the Act relating to interpretation and possible recommendations, bdab, Ottawa, 3 October 1973, 27. My translation of “vous n’avez rien à faire consciemment avec l’article 9.” 86 Ibid., 13. 87 Ibid., 16. 88 Ibid., 29. My translation of “il comporte des faiblesses inérantes [sic] qui sont telles qu’on ne peut pas lui faire ou lui donner l’absolution sans confession.” 89 Ibid., 30. 90 Ibid., 37. 91 Ibid., 40. 92 Ibid., 41. 93 Ibid., 47–8. 94 Ibid., 54. 95 Ibid., 23. 96 Ibid., 3. 97 Procès-verbal de la 13e Réunion, 1. 98 Ibid., 7. 99 Ibid., 8. 100 Minutes of the fourteenth meeting, 8–9. 101 Ibid., 16. 102 Roland Morency, “Memorandum to Paul Fox, Chairman, Bilingual Districts Advisory Board – subject: Enquiry’s Objectives,” bdab, Ottawa, 12 September 1973, 1. 103 Ibid., 3. 104 Lettre de Adélard Savoie au Conseil de la Vie Française en Amérique, Moncton, 8 août 1972, 2. See also Minutes of the second meeting – 14 and 15 August 1972, bdab, Ottawa, 3; and Letter from Neil Morrison to Dr W.F. Mackey, bdab, Ottawa, 9 August 1972.

Notes to pages 133–6

295

105 Rapport de la Commission d’enquête sur la situation de la langue française et sur les droits linguistiques au Québec (Gendron) (Québec, décembre 1972), 263. 106 Ibid., 282–3. My translation of the federal government’s obligation to see to it that “tous ses fonctionnaires qui travaillent en sol québécois et dont les fonctions peuvent les appeler à communiquer avec le public aient une connaissance d’usage de la langue française.” 107 Ibid., 265. My translation of the provincial government’s obligation to recognize “aux municipalités et aux commissions scolaires le droit de publier leurs documents officiels dans la langue française seulement, à moins que les populations desservies comptent plus de 10% de citoyens anglophones.” 108 Ibid., 262. My translation of “faire en sorte que les communications individuelles soient faites dans la langue du citoyen et que les communications générales soient faites prioritairement en français […] ou encore, dans les deux langues si la chose est justifiée par la présence d’une minorité anglophone [où elle est] suffisamment importante.” 109 Official Language Act, 22 Elizabeth II (1974), ch. 6. 110 “Bilingual districts may be affected,” Ottawa Citizen 21 August 1974, 38. 111 Memorandum to members, Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, from N.M. Morrison – re: Federal Bilingual Districts and Bill 22, bdab, Ottawa, 3 September 1974. 112 Minutes of the eighteenth general meeting – 8 and 9 November 1974, bdab, Ottawa, 6–7. 113 “Keith Spicer n’y croit pas beaucoup,” La Presse (Montréal), 13 février 1975, A-5. 114 Minutes of the eighteenth general meeting, 7; Memorandum to members. 115 “Les districts bilingues: cinq ans de retard,” La Presse (Montréal), 12 février 1975, A-5. My translation of “la Loi 22 a quelque peu dérangé nos plans.” 116 Procès-verbal de la quinzième réunion, 34–40. 117 Yvonne R. Raymond and William F. Mackey, “Propositions pour régler le statut du Québec,” bdab, Montreal and Quebec, 4 August 1972, 1. 118 Report of the Bilingual Districts Advisory Board (Ottawa, October 1975), 22. 119 Jane Carrothers, Comments on the trip to St Paul and Bonnyville on 16 and 17 January 1973, bdab, Ottawa, January 1973, 6. 120 L. Lamontagne, “Désignation de districts bilingues fédéraux,” bdab, Ottawa, 6 décembre 1973; Procès-verbal de la quinzième réunion, 26–8.

296

Notes to pages 136–8

121 Paul Fox, “Memorandum to members, Bilingual Districts Advisory Board, from the Chairman – re: ‘Draft of General Introduction to Final Report,’” bdab, Ottawa, 7 September 1973. 122 None of the minutes of the eighteen meetings indicate that the board adopted specification criteria. 123 Raymond and Mackey, “Propositions pour régler le statut du Québec,” 2. My translation of “principe de parité.” 124 Ibid., 2. 125 Minutes of the second meeting, 9–10. 126 Jane Carrothers, “Possible Attitudes or Assumptions,” bdab, Ottawa, 16 May 1973. This is the only document that admits that the board accepted the principle of parity. The minutes of the meetings do not indicate any such decision. 127 William F. Mackey, “The Concept of Bilingual District and What It Entails in Practice,” bdab, Ottawa, n. d. [1972]. 128 Minutes of the second meeting, 15. 129 William F. Mackey, “Non-numerical Language Criteria,” bdab, Ottawa, 18 June 1973, 5. My translation of “la probabilité de dissension communautaire” and “le désir de la minorité.” 130 Minutes of the tenth general meeting, 16. The expression “rougeole” was used by Adélard Savoie to reject Mackey’s position during an earlier meeting (Procès-verbal de la huitième réunion – 27 et 28 avril, 1973, bdab, Ottawa, 27). 131 Procès-verbal de la douzième réunion, 15. 132 Ibid., 14. 133 Ibid. 134 Procès-verbal de la huitième réunion, 24. My translation of “les anglophones … [à Montréal] n’ont pas besoin d’être protégés par de s districts bilingues” and “ils n’en font pas état.” 135 Ibid., 25. 136 William F. Mackey, “Vers une politique de base pour le Québec,” bdab, Ottawa, 3 July 1973. See also Minutes of the tenth general meeting, 4. In fact, the board asked Mackey and Raymond to suggest the appropriate borders for a bilingual district in the Montreal area (Procès-verbal de la huitième réunion, 25). Mackey and Raymond would meet without Lamontagne, Fox, Morrison, and Morency, ignore the mandate the board assigned to them concerning Montreal, and submit a two-member report to the entire board.

Notes to pages 138–40

297

137 Mackey and Raymond’s use of the Duhamel Board’s opposition to the minimalist approach was most evident during the ninth, thirteenth, and fifteenth meetings (Minutes of the ninth meeting, 6; Procès-verbal de la treizième réunion (2e partie) – les 13 et 14 octobre 1973, bdab, Ottawa, 7–8; Procès-verbal de la quinzième réunion, 34–40). 138 Minutes of the ninth meeting, 5. My translation of “faire du Canada un pays bilingue.” 139 Ibid. My translation of “de reconnaître les droits des minorités francophones et de renforcer la seule province française.” 140 Ibid., 6. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid., 10. My translation of “il devrait y avoir le moins possible de districts bilingues au Québec.” 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Minutes of the tenth general meeting, 4–6. 147 Ibid., 5. 148 Ibid., 6. 149 Ibid. 150 Ibid., 7. 151 Ibid. 152 Mackey, “Vers une politique de base pour le Québec,” 1. 153 Procès-verbal de la douzième réunion, 4–5. 154 Ibid., 4. My translation of “si le Conseil veut être logique et maintenir sa crédibilité il faudrait tout de même donner à la population minoritaire anglophone les districts bilingues dont elle a besoin afin de pouvoir agir ainsi envers les minorités francophones des autres provinces.” 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid. 157 Ibid. 158 Ibid., 7–8. 159 Ibid., 8. 160 Ibid., 8–9. 161 Ibid., 8. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 Mackey, “Vers une politique de base pour le Québec,” 10; Procès-verbal de la douzième réunion, 14.

298

Notes to pages 140–3

165 Procès-verbal de la douzième réunion, 14. My translation of “assurer la survivance du français au Québec.” 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid., 15. 168 Ibid. My translation of “démontrer par là que le Québec est partie intégrale du pays.” 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 171 Ibid. 172 Ibid., 16. 173 Ibid., Addendum: “Des districts bilingues au Canada,” 2. The 1971 census indicates that francophones represented 6.8 per cent of Ontario’s population, whereas anglophones represented 13.3 per cent of Québécois. 174 Yvonne R. Raymond and William F. Mackey, “Recommandations de districts bilingues pour le Québec,” bdab, Ottawa, 10 October 1973, 1. 175 Ibid. My translation of “de façon systématique” and “les comtés fédéraux où il y a moins de 10% de la minorité.” 176 Procès-verbal de la treizième réunion (2e partie), 12. 177 Raymond and Mackey, “Recommandations de districts bilingues pour le Québec,” 1–2. 178 Procès-verbal de la treizième réunion (2e partie), 4. 179 Ibid. 180 Ibid., 3. 181 Ibid., 4. 182 Ibid. 183 Ibid., 6–7. 184 Ibid., 7. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid., 7–8. 187 Ibid., 7. 188 Ibid., 7–8. 189 Ibid., 8. 190 Ibid. 191 Ibid., 8–11. 192 Ibid., 11. 193 Ibid., 12–16. 194 Procès-verbal de la quinzième réunion, 34–40. 195 Ibid. 196 Ibid., 40. My translation of “soulèvement.”

Notes to pages 143–60 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205

206 207 208 209

210 211 212

213

299

Minutes of the eighteenth general meeting, 6. Procès-verbal de la treizième réunion, 7. Minutes of the fourteenth meeting, 8–10. Interview with Fox Board member; interview no. 10, p. 3, answer 12. My translation of “l’idée de symbole.” Minutes of the fourteenth meeting, 9. “Outside Quebec, Opposition to Bilingualism is High,” Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, press release, Toronto, 19 July 1972. “Almost Half Unaware of Bilingual Policy,” Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, press release, Toronto, 20 June 1973. “Loin d’augmenter, la prédominance de l’anglais n’a cessé de régresser dans le Québec urbain,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 16 décembre 1974, 5. “Quelques commentaires de la presse anglophone au pays,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 6 novembre 1972, 4; “Un ex-député libéral défait estime que la politique linguistique lui a coûté 4 000 votes,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 15 novembre 1972, 13. Jones v. Attorney General of New Brunswick [1975], 2 R.C.S., 182, p. 199. Morency, “Memorandum to Paul Fox,” 1. Ibid., 2. First example: “Pinpointing [the Chéticamp area] as a bilingual district might also make it a symbol of the existence of the local minority and strengthen its morale” (bdab 1975, 54; my emphasis). Second example: “We decided that we should recommend bilingual districts in Quebec where a district would afford the minority some additional advantage, such as strengthening the minority by giving it tangible recognition and a sense of cohesion” (76; my emphasis). Third example: “The creation of a bilingual district might assist such isolated minority groups by providing them with a sense of cohesion and a symbol of their existence” (77; my emphasis). A final example: bilingual districts “would recognize the existence of the local minority and encourage it to develop” (45). Interview with tbs official, interview no. 31, p. 24, answer 211. Minutes of Cabinet, Cabinet document 49–75, 13 November 1975, 11. Interview with Miller task force member, interview no. 2, p. 1, answer 1; Interview with Miller task force member, interview no. 3, p. 3, answers 27– 30; Interview with Miller task force member, interview no. 5, p. 2, answer 9, p. 3, answer 15, p. 4, answers 28–9; Interview with tbs official, interview no. 29, p. 1, answers 4–6; Interview with Miller task force member, interview no. 36, p. 7, answer 116, p. 14, answer 180. Debates, House of Commons, 21 November 1975, 9327–9.

300

Notes to pages 161–2

214 “Bilinguisme et districts bilingues,” Information Canada, Ottawa, 21 November 1975, 4. My translation of “toutes les minorités du pays doivent jouir d’une protection inscrite dans la loi en termes précis.” 215 Ibid., 6. My translation of “le même esprit et les mêmes principes qui présideront au découpage final des districts bilingues dans les autres provinces.” 216 Memorandum to Cabinet – “Bilingual Districts and Related Measures,” Cabinet document 549–76, 18 November 1976, 19. 217 Ibid. 218 Lettre de Richard Hatfield à Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Bureau du Premier ministre, Fredericton, 21 janvier 1976. 219 Letter from Frank D. Moores to Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Premier’s Office, St John’s, 28 January 1976. 220 “Québec ne céderait aucun territoire à un district fédéral,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 28 janvier 1975, 3. 221 “Cloutier en désaccord avec le projet de districts bilingues,” Le Soleil (Québec), 29 novembre 1975, A3. My translation of “Il s’agit d’une loi fédérale qui touche uniquement les institutions fédérales” and “ne changera rien pour le Québec.” 222 “Cloutier en désaccord,” A3. My translation of “On va prendre des services dans les deux langues, mais exclusivement au niveau des institutions fédérales.” 223 “Étude sur les incidences de la Loi sur la langue officielle du Québec,” Direction des Relations fédérales-provinciales, Bureau du Conseil privé, Ottawa, 16 décembre 1974, 2. 224 Debates, House of Commons, 21 November 1975, 9329. 225 Ibid., 9330–1. 226 “Lost in bilingual districts,” Ottawa Journal, 26 November 1975, 4. 227 “Districts bilingues et constats rejetés,” Le Droit (Ottawa), 27 novembre 1975, 6. My translation of “l’équité à l’endroit des minorités de langue officielle.” 228 “L’interprétation des chiffres officiels,” Le Droit (Ottawa), 8 avril 1976, 6. 229 “Des recommandations contradictoires concernant le Québec,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 5 février 1976, 5; “Des besoins grossis par une vision fausse de la réalité,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 6 février, 5. My translation of “sacrifier la réalité.” 230 “Grandeur et limites de la démographie,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 6 mai 1976, 5. 231 “Government rules that Montreal must be made bilingual district to protect minority,” Ottawa Journal, 27 November 1975, 4. 232 “Language Showdown,” Ottawa Citizen, 22 November 1975, 7.

Notes to pages 162–3

301

233 “La loi 22 jette son ombre sur les districts bilingues,” Le Dimanche (Montréal), 30 novembre 1975, 24. My translation of “une stricte observation de la situation démographique.” 234 “Affrontement Ottawa-Québec?” Le Jour (Montréal), 24 novembre 1975, 6. My translation of “concept qui répugne à l’esprit de la loi 22.” 235 “Lost in bilingual districts,” 4. 236 “Nouvelles intrigues dans les langues officielles,” L’Évangéline (Moncton), 24 novembre 1975, 6. 237 Interview with member of Parliament, interview no. 25, p. 15, answers 101–3; Interview with federal civil servant, interview no. 24, p. 2, answer 43; Interview with journalist, interview no. 19, p. 1, answers 8–10. 238 Interview with member of Parliament, interview no. 25, p. 15, answers 101–3; Interview with federal civil servant, interview no. 24, p. 2, answer 43; Interview with journalist, interview no. 19, p. 1, answers 8–10. 239 Marc Leman, “Propositions relatives à la création de districts bilingues au Québec,” Service de recherche, Bibliothèque du Parlement, Ottawa, 28 janvier 1976, 3, 17. My translation of “ne donne pas aux minorités linguistiques en matière de services bilingues les mêmes garanties ni la même sécurité que les stipulations du paragraphe 9 (1),” “est laissée dans une large mesure, à la discrétion des fonctionnaires,” and “favoriser l’épanouissement de l’unité canadienne.” 240 Ibid., 4. My translation of “fortifiera sans doute le sentiment de sécurité et de cohésion,” “encourager la vie communautaire d’une minorité linguistique officielle,” “une reconnaissance du statut égal des deux langues officielles à l’échelle du Canada, quelle que soit leur inégalité de fait aux niveaux provincial et municipal,” “encourager les autres ordres de gouvernement à offrir à ces groupes minoritaires leurs services dans les deux langues,” and “sensibiliser les groupes linguistiques majoritaires aux droits de la minorité.” 241 “Un comité des libéraux cherche à réconcilier les points de vue,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 7 février 1976, 2; “Cinq districts bilingues au Québec dont un à l’ouest de Montréal,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 9 février 1976, 5. 242 In the words of one mp who sat on the Loiselle Committee, there was no “levée de bouclier” (Interview with member of Parliament, interview no. 25, p. 14, answer 96, p. 18, answers 128–9). Le Devoir also noted that the Fox report had provoked little opposition in Quebec (“Des recommandations contradictoires concernant le Québec”), Le Devoir (Montréal), 5 février 1976, 5. 243 Memorandum to Cabinet (Cabinet Document 549–76), 20. 244 “Bilingualism the price of national unity and cost is cheap, Chretien says in Welland,” St Catharines Standard, 25 March 1976, 13.

302

Notes to pages 164–71

245 Canadian Press news wire – “Bilingualism,” Ottawa, 25 March 1976. 246 Interview with tbs official, interview no. 32, p. 2, answer 3. 247 Notes for a speech by the Honorable Jean Chrétien, President of Treasury Board – Chamber of Commerce, Welland (Ontario), Treasury Board, Ottawa, 24 March 1976, 3. 248 Ibid., 2. 249 Ibid., 4. 250 “Bilingualism the price of national unity,” 13. 251 “Keith Spicer n’en croit pas beaucoup,” La Presse (Montréal), 13 février 1975, A-5. 252 Interview with tbs official, interview no. 35, p. 2, answer 10. 253 Ibid. 254 “Implementation of the Official Languages Act with respect to the establishment of Bilingual Districts and related measures,” Treasury Board, Ottawa, 25 May 1976. 255 Pierre Joncas, “Memorandum for Morris Miller – Bilingual Districts: Evolution of a Concept,” Treasury Board, Ottawa, 25 February 1976, 9. 256 Ibid., 10. 257 Ibid., 10–11. 258 “Implementation of the Official Languages Act,” 28. 259 Ibid., 5. 260 Ibid., 16. 261 Ibid. 262 Interview with tbs official, interview no. 35, p. 2, answer 8. 263 Ibid., p. 4, answer 23. 264 Ibid. 265 Ibid. 266 Ibid., answers 23, 25; Interview with tbs official, interview no. 36, p. 3, answers 77–9, p. 8, answer 54, p. 9, answer 132. 267 Interview with tbs official, interview no. 31, p. 18, answer 151. 268 “Those near misses: pilots blame the two-languages control system,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), 22 June 1976, 1. See also “Les pilotes refusent de reprendre l’air,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 22 juin 1976, 1. Borins (1983) presents an excellent case study of the air traffic controllers strike. 269 “Reports by pilots of near-collisions over Quebec part of publicity campaign devised last year,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), 24 June 1976, 1. 270 “Une entente met fin au conflit de l’air,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 29 juin 1976, 1. 271 Report of the Independent Study on the Language Training Programmes of the Public Service of Canada, vol. 1: General Report, Gilles Bibeau, Chair (Ottawa, 1975), 225.

Notes to pages 171–6

303

272 Ibid., 226. 273 “Constat d’échec du bilinguisme à Ottawa?” Le Devoir (Montréal), 18 août 1976, 1. 274 “French-English views differ on emphasis on bilingualism,” Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Toronto, 19 May 1976. 275 “Bilingual Services for Canada? 37 Pct Support Them Nationally,” Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, Toronto, 11 September 1976. 276 Ibid., 1. 277 “Si on reconnaissait certaines priorités provinciales légitimes le Canada français se sentirait par le fait même plus libre,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 27 octobre 1976, 5. My translation of “à l’heure actuelle, au lieu d’unir le pays, le bilinguisme est devenu le symbole d’une série de frustrations.” See also “John Turner criticizes federal Government for its handling of the bilingualism program,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), 26 October 1976, 15. 278 “Bilingual Services for Canada?” 279 Letter from Morris Miller to Daniel Bourgeois, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, 7 February 1998. 280 (Revised) record of Cabinet decision – meeting of 13 November 1975, Privy Council, Ottawa, Cabinet Document 630–75RD, 1 December 1975, 2–3. 281 Memorandum to Cabinet (Cabinet Document 549–76), 8–9. 282 Ibid., 1. 283 Ibid. 284 Ibid. 285 Ibid., 2. 286 Ibid. 287 Ibid., 3. 288 Ibid., 2. 289 Ibid., 3. 290 J.S. Hodgson, Memorandum for the Steering Committee on Federal Official Languages Policy Review – “Bilingual Districts,” Privy Council, Ottawa, 9 September 1976, 22. 291 Memorandum to Cabinet (Cabinet Document 549–76), 23–4. 292 “Official Languages Policy Review – Meeting of the Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers, Tuesday, 21 September 1976,” Privy Council, Ottawa, 3. 293 Ibid., 3–4. 294 Ibid., 3. 295 Ibid., 6. 296 Ibid., 7. 297 Ibid., 1. 298 Memorandum to Cabinet (Cabinet Document 549–76), 31.

304

Notes to pages 176–80

299 Clovis Demers, Note à de Montigny Marchand – “Le bilinguisme dans la fonction publique – Rapports au Cabinet,” Bureau du Conseil privé, Ottawa, 4 mai 1976, 1. My translation of “il me paraîtrait moins que souhaitable de soumettre au Conseil du Trésor pour évaluation un ensemble aussi important de programmes qui relèvent du Président du Conseil du Trésor.” 300 Ibid. 301 Clovis Demers, Note à Monsieur Ross – “Districts bilingues,” Bureau du Conseil privé, Ottawa, 29 juin 1976. 302 Pierre Joncas, Memorandum for Mr Hodgson – “Bilingual Districts” – Treasury Board Secretariat draft memorandum, Privy Council, Ottawa, 31 August 1976, 4. 303 Ibid., 1. 304 Ibid., 2–3. 305 Ibid., 2. 306 Ibid., 5. 307 J.S. Hodgson, Memorandum for Mr Joncas, Privy Council Office, Ottawa, 1 September 1976, 1. 308 “Le remaniement touche la moitié du Cabinet,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 15 septembre 1976, 1. 309 Interview with tbs official, interview no. 32, p. 48, answer 394, p. 62, answer 476. 310 Memorandum to Cabinet (Cabinet Document 549–76), 36. 311 Ibid., 24–5. 312 Memorandum for Morris Miller, 9: “[I]f bilingual districts are to be joint federal-provincial-local endeavours, as was envisaged by the B and B Commission, and as the Government and Parliament seemed to have contemplated when the Official Languages Act was drafted and enacted, such bilingual districts could only be established in New Brunswick and possibly Manitoba, Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia.” 313 Memorandum for the Steering Committee, 22. Compare with Memorandum for Morris Miller, 9. 314 Memorandum for the Steering Committee, 22. 315 Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee on Official Languages Policy, Privy Council, Ottawa, Cabinet Document 549–76CR, 8 December 1976, 3. 316 Clovis Demers, Note à de Montigny Marchand, Bureau du Conseil privé, Ottawa, 21 septembre 1976. My translation of “1. leur rôle comme instrument de pression auprès des provinces et des municipalités les invitant, elles, à offrir des services bilingues et leur démontrant officiellement la ‘faisabilité’ d’un tel geste; 2. leur rôle de symbole auprès des minorités (surtout francophones) qui, de ce fait, voient qu’elles ne sont pas oubliées à Ottawa;

Notes to pages 180–93

317 318

319

320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327

328 329 330 331 332 333

305

3. le levier qu’ils représentent pour les minorités qui y résident lorsque celles-ci demandent à une assistance fédérale pour leur développement linguistique et culturel.” “Official Languages Policy Review,” 4. “Summary of Proposed Policies Regarding Language of Work, Employees’ Entitlements and the Language Requirements of Positions in the Public Service,” Steering Committee on Official Languages, Ottawa, 13 October 1976, 21. In addition to the thousands of complaints of lack of bilingual services in bilingual regions in the annual reports of the Commissioner of Official Languages, one can consult Special Study – Service to the Public: A Study of Federal Offices Designated to Respond to the Public in both English and French, Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages (Ottawa, February 1995). In short, the study concluded that, twenty years after the creation of bilingual regions and ten years after the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, “designated offices are hard to find,” “service in the minority language is not actively offered to the client,” and “communication in the minority language is not in fact available” (1). Arguably, little has changed in the ten years since the publication of the study. “Les districts bilingues, des ‘ghettos’?” L’Eau Vive (Saint-Victor), 3. Minutes – the Ad Hoc Committee on Official Languages, 4. “Bilingualism the price of national unity,” 13. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee on Official Languages Policy, 6. Note à Monsieur Ross – “Districts bilingues.” Memorandum to Cabinet (Cabinet Document 549–76), 9. Ibid., 31. In fact, the tbs memo recommended ninety census subdivisions as bilingual districts, but the vast majority of the units are contiguous to others and could easily be combined to form fewer and larger districts. The memo combined many of these units in its Appendix C-1. The final result was a list of thirty-one bilingual districts very similar to the Fox and Miller lists. Debates, House of Commons, 12 October 1976, 2. Ibid, 1. “Le véto du Québec entraîne la démission de Richardson,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 4 octobre 1976, 1. “25 years after pq breakthrough, sovereigntists no closer to goal,” Telegraph-Journal (Saint John), 16 November 2001, B7. Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee on Official Languages Policy, 3–7. Ibid., 5.

306

Notes to pages 196–200

334 Cabinet minutes – 23 December 1976, Cabinet Document C60–76, Privy Council, Ottawa, 18–20. 335 Ibid., 18; Minutes of the Ad Hoc Committee on Official Languages Policy, 4; Interview with tbs official, interview no. 32, p. 51, answer 421; Interview with tbs official, interview no. 29, p. 30, answer 270. 336 Cabinet minutes – 23 December 1976, Cabinet Document C60–76, 20. 337 Interview with tbs official, interview no. 32, p. 46, answer 385. 338 “Le gouvernement fédéral révise sa politique du bilinguisme,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 22 avril 1977, 7. 339 “Statement by the Honourable Robert Andras, President of the Treasury Board, on the Revisions to the Official Languages Policies in the Public Service,” Treasury Board, Ottawa, 30 September 1977, 1. See also Minutes of the Special Meeting of the National Joint Council held on Thursday, 16 September 1977, National Joint Council of the Public Service of Canada, Ottawa. 340 “Revised Official Languages Policies in the Public Service of Canada,” Treasury Board, Ottawa, September 1977, 12. 341 “Official Languages in the Public Service of Canada: A Statement of Policies,” Treasury Board, Ottawa, 6. See also Appendix B, 178. 342 Ibid., 6. See also Appendix B, 178–83. 343 “Plan to Set Up Bilingual Districts Scrapped,” Montreal Star, 1 October 1977, A2.

chapter five 1 Charte de la langue française, 26 Elizabeth II (1977), ch. 5. 2 Ibid., section 113 (f), Section 113 (f) has been replaced by section 29.1 in the revised statute. 3 La politique québécoise de la langue française (Québec: Gouvernement du Québec, mars 1977), 17. My translation of “écran de fumée.” 4 A National Understanding – The Official Languages of Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, June 1977). 5 Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, January 1979). 6 Ibid., 121. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Debates, House of Commons, 19 October 1977, 38. 10 Debates, House of Commons, 20 June 1978, 6573.

Notes to pages 200–4

307

11 Pierre DeBané proposed Bill C-202 (Debates, House of Commons, 31 October 1977, 427); Serge Joyal proposed Bill C-377 (Debates, House of Commons, 31 October 1977, 431); and Jean-Robert Gauthier proposed Bill C-210 (Debates, House of Commons, 31 October 1977, 428). 12 Debates, House of Commons, 18 October 1977, 4. 13 Annual Report, 1977 – Commissioner of Official Languages (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, March 1978), 7. 14 Annual Report, 1980 – Commissioner of Official Languages (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, March 1981), 8. 15 Ibid. 16 Annual Report, 1982 – Commissioner of Official Languages (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, March 1983), 8. 17 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Official Languages, issue no. 2 (21 October 1980): 22–3. 18 Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Official Languages, Report to Parliament, issue no. 22 (9 July 1981): 7–8. 19 Ibid., 8. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., 5. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., 5, 10. 25 Ibid., 9. 26 Ibid., 5. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., 10–11. 29 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Official Languages, issue no. 48 (8 February 1983): 20. See also The Fifth Report to Parliament – Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Official Languages, issue no. 53 (15 March 1983): 24. 30 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Official Languages, issue no. 14 (19 May 1981): 26. 31 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence (issue no. 48), 12. 32 Ibid., 11. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., 12.

308

Notes to pages 204–12

35 The Fifth Report to Parliament, 24. 36 Ibid. 37 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-72, issue no. 7 (20 April 1988): 24. 38 Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, The Response to Quebec: The Other Provinces and the Constitutional Debate (Kingston, 1980), 52. See also “Levesque’s plan refused,” Moncton Transcript, 20 August 1977, 1. 39 “C’est NON à 58,2%,” Le Devoir (Montréal), 21 mai 1980, 1. 40 “Neuf provinces se rallient: Lévesque se retrouve seul,” Le Devoir, (Montréal), 6 novembre 1981, 1. 41 The Constitution Act, 31 Elizabeth II (1982), ch. 11. 42 The Constitution Amendment Proclamation, 1993 (New Brunswick), 42 Elizabeth II (1993), SI/93–54, 7 April 1993. 43 “Toutes les grandes villes devront traduire leurs arrêtés municipaux,” L’Acadie Nouvelle (Caraquet), 22 janvier 2002, 3. 44 Debates, House of Commons, 25 June 1987, 7585. 45 Ibid., 7 July 1988, 17222. 46 An Act respecting the status and use of the official languages of Canada, 37 Elizabeth II (1988), ch. 38. 47 Official Languages (Communications with and Services to the Public) Regulations, Canada Gazette, pt II, vol. 126, no. 1, SOR/92–48, 16 December 1991, 241–58. 48 Official Languages Regulations: Service to the Public (Ottawa: Treasury Board, March 1992). 49 Over the years, tbs has reduced the importance of bilingual regions and replaced them with the designation of offices with service areas that overlap census subdivisions where the minority population meets the regulatory criteria. Based on the 2001 census data (Population Estimates by First Official Language Spoken, 2001 [Ottawa: Statistics Canada. Reference no. 94-F0042XCB, March 2003]), 3,156 of the 5,200 federal offices offer their services in both official languages (http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ burolis/burolis-man_e.asp). However, pursuant to the Treasury Board’s authority under paragraph 46(2)(a) of the Official Languages Act, tbs established the following policy: “Wherever the application of data from the 2001 census for the purposes of the Official Languages (Communications with and Service to the Public) Regulations would lead to a reduced obligation on the part of certain offices or facilities that are currently required to communicate with and provide services to the public in either of the official languages, the status quo pertaining to these services to the public in either of the official languages should be maintained by the institutions in order to

Notes to pages 214–40

309

enable the specified federal institutions to carry out appropriate consultations and consider the necessary adjustments” (http://www.hrma-agrh. gc.ca/ollo/reimplementation-réapplication/annexeareg_e.asp). I am not aware of any adjustments made to the list of 3,156 bilingual offices/regions. 50 Commissioner of Official Languages, Service to the Public: A Study of Federal Offices Designated to Respond to the Public in both English and French (Ottawa, February 1995). See also the commissioner’s annual reports to Parliament. 51 Ibid., 39.

chapter six 1 Interview with tbs official, interview no. 2, p. 1, answer 4. 2 Pierre Joncas, Memorandum for Morris Miller – “Bilingual Districts: Evolution of a Concept,” Treasury Board, Ottawa, 25 February 1976, 9. 3 Compare section I (Other Reactions) of Memorandum to Cabinet – “Implementation of the Official Languages Act with Respect to the Establishment of Bilingual Districts and Related Measures,” Treasury Board, Ottawa, 25 May 1976, 29–31, and section F (Other Reactions) of “Memorandum to Cabinet – Bilingual Districts and Related Measures,” Cabinet Document 549–76, Privy Council, Ottawa, 18 November 1976, 19–20. 4 Memorandum to Cabinet (Cabinet Document 549–76), 1. 5 Memorandum to Cabinet – “Implementation of the Official Languages Act,” 1. 6 Clovis Demers, Note à Pierre Juneau, Bureau du Conseil privé, Ottawa, 27 avril 1976. My abridged translation of “Maurice Miller lui a remis un premier projet de mémoire sur cette question.” 7 Interview with pco official, interview no. 58, p. 1, answer 2. 8 pco officials admitted that tbs could have easily manipulated Cabinet’s decision-making process in 1976. Interview with pco official, interview no. 58, p. 3, answer 15. 9 Interview with Cabinet minister, interview no. 1, p. 14, answers 107–9. 10 Memorandum to Cabinet (Cabinet Document 549–76), 1. 11 Interview with pco official, interview no. 58, p. 2, answer 7. 12 In particular, see “John Turner criticizes federal government for its handling of the bilingualism program,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), 26 October 1976, 11. 13 I use the term “political philosophy” because our ideal-type construction and opposition of communitarian and individualist strands of liberalism justify and warrant it. However, it may be wiser to talk of dominant

310

14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Notes to pages 240–62

political cultures if the various political values do not necessarily coalesce into what is defined as a political philosophy. W.F. Mackey, “Impression of Meeting with the Minister of Education – January 21, 1974,” bdab, Ottawa, 4 February 1974, 2. Minutes of a meeting of the Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers, Official Languages Policy Review, Privy Council, Ottawa, 21 September 1976, 3–6. Ibid., 7–8. Interview with Treasury Board official, interview no. 36, p. 14, answer 181. An Act modifying the Financial Administration Act, 15 Elizabeth II (1967), ch. 74. The Government Organization Act, 14 Elizabeth II (1966), ch. 25. J.E. Magnet (1995, 74) argued that the federal sociolinguistic policy could have succeeded “if more carefully managed by governmental actors,” which would have required “a clear vision of the overarching purposes of the policy, including its symbolic overtones.” Magnet nevertheless conceded that such “better management” would have been difficult: “This presupposes the existence of an intelligible network of principles and doctrine. Yet there is no clear body of principles or doctrine relating to official languages policy.” I agree.

chapter seven 1 Report on Proceedings of the Round Table on the Federal Language Rights Regime (Ottawa: Commissioner of Official Languages, 2004). 2 “Harper gov’t would overhaul bilingualism,” Times & Transcript (Moncton), 27 May 2004, 1. 3 Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998], 2 S.C.R., 217. 4 R. v. Beaulac, [1999], 1 S.C.R., 768. 5 Mahé v. Alberta [1990], 1 S.C.R., 342, 377. 6 http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/highlight/Language Composition/Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo=PR&View=1a&Table=1a& StartRec=1&Sort=2&B1=Counts&B2=Both. 7 http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/standard/themes/ RetrieveProductTable.cfm?Temporal=2001&PID=55774&APATH =3&GID=431515&METH=1&PTYPE=55430&THEME=41& FOCUS=0&AID=0&PLACENAME=0&PROVINCE=0&SEARCH =0&GC=0&GK=0&VID=0&FL=0&RL=0&FREE=0 8 http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/standard/themes/ RetrieveProductTable.cfm?Temporal=2001&PID=55536&METH= 1&APATH=3&PTYPE=55440&THEME=41&FREE=0&AID=0&FOCUS =0&VID=0&GC=0&GK=0&SC=1&CPP=99&SR=1&RL=0&RPP=9999& D1=0&D2=0&D3=0&D4=0&D5=0&D6=0&GID=431549.

Notes to pages 266–73

311

9 http://www.olf.gouv.qc.ca/francisation/admin_publ/rec291.html. 10 An Act to provide for French Language Service in the Government of Ontario, 34 Elizabeth II (1986), ch. 45. Section 5 stipulates that francophones have a right to receive provincial public services in French from offices “located in or [that] serves an area designated in the Schedule.” 11 French Language Services Act, 48 Elizabeth II (1999), ch. 13. Section 6 outlines bilingual districtification according to the “demand” and “the office [that] serves an Acadian and Francophone population.” Section 7 states that every government institution shall provide services in French “where the Acadian and Francophone community could reasonably be expected to use a particular service on a regular basis.” 12 French-language Services Act, 53 Elizabeth II (2004), ch. 26. The government of Nova Scotia has yet to adopt regulations on the matter, so it is not clear if “any part of the Province” respects the territorial principle (section 10.1 (c)). Since Acadians are concentrated in the southwest, Cape Breton, and Halifax areas, I predict the territorial principle will prevail. 13 The government of New Brunswick’s preference is a relatively moot point since the Federal Court of Appeal ruled, in October 2005, that it must provide all of its services in both official languages, including those of the rcmp under contract, throughout the province. Société des Acadiens et Acadiennes du Nouveau-Brunswick v. Canada [2005] FC 1172. 14 Official Languages Act, 51 Elizabeth II (2002), ch. O-0.5. 15 Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, Official Language Requirements and Government On-Line, (Ottawa, June 2002).

conclusion 1 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Strasbourg, 5.XI.1992, Article 1.b.

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Index

Ad Hoc Committee on Official Languages Policy, 193–4 air traffic controllers crisis, 170–2, 187, 191, 194, 216 Alberta, 76, 79 Allmand, Warren, 193, 196, 204, 226 Andras, Robert, 177, 181, 187, 192–3, 196–7, 198, 204, 246 Balantyne, Murray, 74 B and B Commission. See Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism BDAB. See Bilingual District Advisory Board Bennett, Gordon, 118 Bertrand, Jean-Jacques, 62–6 passim, 71, 80, 187, 217, 252, 253 Bibeau, Gilles, 171 Bibeau report, 170–2, 187, 191, 194, 216 biculturalism. See bilingual districts: symbolic value bilingual districts: adaptive, 228; administrative, 6–7, 22, 24, 28, 34, 39, 44–50, 53, 56, 62, 63, 76–7, 123–4, 174, 180, 213, 225, 228; advantages over significant demand, 163, 166–7; as alternative to Quebec secession, 8; bureaucratic,

228; and Canada’s geolinguistic reality, 261–3; cornerstone program, 3, 5–6, 7, 26, 28–35, 94, 105, 110, 118, 145, 159, 273; demise of, 13–14, 158, 170, 172– 92, 196–7, 198–214, 215–27, 241–2; establishment of, 105, 109, 304n312; federal, 101–2, 188, 266–7; final analysis of, 192–7; Finnish model of, 28–30, 278n16; future applicability of, 267–72; limitations, 146; and minority schools, 9, 22–3, 36–7; opposition to, 67–9, 79–81, 116–17, 232, 240–1; principal offices, 34–5, 53–4, 55, 64, 101, 114, 115, 120, 127–32, 145, 154, 157, 181, 187, 209, 210, 270; provincial, 78–80, 133–5, 174, 176, 188–90, 192, 266–7; public support, 172; specification, 30–4, 41–2, 133, 139, 164–5, 167, 266–7, 270–1; symbolic value, 6, 7, 8–9, 11, 13, 25–7, 50, 55–6, 62–2, 72, 75, 76, 119, 121, 122, 136, 143, 146–7, 151, 182–3, 188, 194–5, 203, 217, 224–5, 228, 229–33, 253, 254–8 passim, 260–1, 263–5, 267–8, 273–4, 299n209. See also bilingual regions Bilingual Districts Advisory Board (1970– 71). See Duhamel Board

322

Index

Bilingual Districts Advisory Board (1972– 75). See Fox Board bilingual regions, 56, 213–14, 225; creation of, 225; fusion with bilingual districts, 94; specification of, 210–12; tbs in favour of, 174, 177, 181, 184, 185–6, 197–7 passim bilingualism: and biculturalism, 17–21, 25–7, 277n9; institutional, in the private sector, 39–41; opposition to, 275n2; public opinion on, 171–2; territorial, 6–7, 40–1 Bill-22 (Quebec), 114, 134, 252 Bill C-120 (1968). See Official Languages Act (1969) Bill C-72. See Official Languages Act (1988) BNA Act. See British North America Act Bourassa, Robert, 79, 81, 84, 85, 98, 102, 252 British Columbia, 68–9, 80, 150, 267; Coquitlam, 76, 218–19 British North America (BNA) Act, 16, 26, 36, 57, 102, 150, 234; section 133, 44, 58 Cabinet, federal: analysis of the Duhamel report, 103–5; consultation with provincial governments, 96–7; language policy in the public service, 6, 9, 11, 18, 38–9, 45–9 passim, 53, 62, 64–5, 67, 105–6, 124–6, 133, 143–4, 156–7, 205– 8, 225, 259–60, 265, 272, 305n319; public approval of the federal language policy, 143–4; reactions to the Duhamel Report, 93–6, 97–9 Cabinet Committee on Science, Culture and Information, 105–6, 108, 109 Campbell, Alex, 62, 97 Canadian Air Line Pilots Association, 171 Carrothers, Jane, 113, 123, 142–3 Cartwright, Donald, 113, 164 Castonguay, Charles, 144, 162 Charbonneau, Hubert, 162 Charte de la langue française (Bill-101), 198

Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), 14, 205–7, 234; linguistic rights, 57–9, 99–101 Chrétien, Jean, 94, 159, 163–5, 169, 177, 190–1, 221, 223, 226, 246, 255; public meeting in Welland, 163–5, 187, 231, 251; symmetrical specification, 164–5 Civil Service Act (1918): Lacroix amendment, 44–5, 50 Civil Service Act (1961), 25, 45–6, 49, 50 Civil Service Commission, 45, 47–8, 49, 50, 53; adaptive approach of, 53–4, 55 classic policy stages model, 245–53 passim Cloutier, François, 81–2, 84, 95, 98, 161, 240 Coderre, Lionel, 80 Commissioner of Official Languages, 39, 43, 56, 69, 88, 102, 118, 131. See also Spicer, Keith Committee on Federal-Provincial Relations, 50–3 Confederation of Tomorrow Conference: sociolinguistic reforms, 57–8 Constitutional Act (1982), 102, 205–7; Constitutional Amendment Bill (Bill C-60), 200. See also Charter of Rights and Freedoms Coulombe, Pierre, 124, 129 Davis, Bill, 92, 122, 188 Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 110 Devoir, Le, 15, 98, 162–3, 240 digital information technology (DIT), 269 Dimanche, Le, 162 Droit, Le, 162 Drury, Bud, 123, 124–6, 160, 225 Duckworth, Eleanor, 113, 130, 132, 143, 157–8, 248; minority report, 132, 157–8 Duhamel, Roger, 73–4, 81, 84–6, 92 Duhamel Board, (1970–1971), 73–92, 124, 247; analysis and decisions of, 82– 9; bilingual districts, 82–9, 103; Cabinet’s ultimate decision and report rejection, 106–12; final report to Cabinet, 89–96 passim; Fox report similarities, 147–8; interdepartmental committee to

Index review recommended districts, 103–5, 106; maximalist approach, 76–9; opposition to minimalist approach, 138–40, 297n137; Quebec recommendations, 84–6, 103; regional consultations, 75– 82; report recommendations, 181, 277n14; specification process, 74–5, 247 Eau Vive, L’ (Fransaskois), 121 education, 36–7; of minorities, 56. See also bilingual districts; minority schools English Language Act of 1890, 275n3 equality. See Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism: equality thesis equal partnership, 4, 20–2, 26–7, 37, 40 Évangéline, L’, 162 Faulkner, Hugh, 94, 121,144, 246 Fédération des francophones HorsQuébec, 193, 205 Fédération des travailleurs du Québec (FTQ), 98 Finland: Languages Act (1922), 29–30. See also sociolinguistic policy: in Finland FLUs. See French-language units Fox, Paul, 83, 113, 123, 124, 129, 135, 138, 140, 141, 142 Fox Board, 111–97; appointment of, 247; establishment of, 111–12; deliberations and problems, 132–45; district specification, 147–50; final report, 145–58, 168; limitations, 154–6, 158, 161–2; initial analysis and consultations, 114– 32; initial analysis of Fox report, 159– 61; Interdepartmental Committee on Bilingual Districts, 172–3, 191; maximalist approach, 153, 160; media reaction to report of, 162–3; minimalist approach, 158, 160; Quebec subcommittee, 141–3; reactions to report of, 161– 6; recommendations, 111, 159, 160–1, 167, 177, 222, 251; tabled in the House of Commons (1975), 160 French-language units (FLUs), 38–9 Front de libération du Québec, 81

323

Gendron Commission, 80–1, 132–4, 137, 240, 284n41; final report, 133; provincial bilingual district recommendation, 134 Gendron, Jean-Guy, 137 Glassco Commission. See Royal Commission on Government Organization globalization, 268–9 Globe and Mail, 170–1 Hatfield, Richard, 79, 118, 122 Hickman, Harry, 74, 113, 137, 138, 139, 142, 157 individual principle, 26 Johnson, Al, 123 Johnson, Daniel, 59, 60, 276n5; opposition to “mathematical bilingualism,” 60 Jones, Leonard, 144 Joubert, Madeleine, 74 Jour, Le, 162 King, W.L. Mackenzie, 45 Lacoste, Paul, 99, 277n14 Lacroix, Wilfred, 44–5 Lacroix amendment. See Civil Service Act (1918) Lalonde, Marc, 193–4, 196 Lambert, Marcel, 161 Lamontagne, Maurice, 47, 116, 136, 137, 138, 140–3 passim language: and culture, 18–20 Lapointe, Ernest, 45 Laurendeau, André, 15, 42–3, 46, 61, 234–6, 283n19; as communitarian liberal, 234–6, 237, 238; death of, 234 Laurendeau–Dunton Commission, 105, 174 Lefebvre, Pierre, 124, 129 Léger, Jules, 114 Lévesque, Gérard D., 84 Lévesque, René, 98, 240 Lewis, David, 70 Loiselle, Bernard, 163 Lynch, Charles, 98–9, 162

324

Index

MacDonald, David, 78–9, 122 McEwen, Leonore, 74 McIsaac, Clifford, 80, 168 Mackey, William, 113, 115, 117, 133, 136–8, 141–3, 240; exclusion of Montreal, 141–3; minimalist approach for Quebec, 139–43; report to Fox Board, 117, 296n136 McQuaid, Melvin, 70 McRae, Ken, 28–9, 35, 237 McRoberts, Kenneth, 237 McWhinney, Bill, 166, 169, 177, 195–6 Maîtres chez nous, 5 “majoritarian” political philosophy, 239– 40, 241 Manitoba, 76, 304n312; abolition of official bilingualism, 4 Manitoba Act of 1870, 275n3 Manning, Ernest, 58, 59 Manual of the Official Languages Administrative System (OLAS), 124 Matte, René, 161, 163 Maxwell, D. S., 69 Mazankowski, Don, 72 Miljan, Toivo, 28–30, 133 Miller, Morris, 160, 169–70, 220, 221–2 Miller report, 166–70, 172, 174, 181, 184, 188, 192, 219–20, 221–3, 227, 255; reasonable person approach, 169 Miller task force, 220–1, 227 minorities: sociolinguistic, 16–17, 27, 58– 9, 75–7, 273–4 Monnin, Alfred, 74, 85, 113, 115, 129, 136, 137, 139–40, 157, 186, 248 Montréal, 42, 139–43, 151–2, 157–8, 161, 190, 240–1; exclusion of bilingual districtification, 107–10 passim Moores, Frank, 118 Morency, Roland, 74, 113, 121–2, 127–8, 132, 137, 138, 141, 144–5, 160, 168, 209; recommendations, 128–32, 154 Morley, David, 123, 124, 125 Morrison, Neil, 74, 84, 85, 86–7, 103, 113, 123, 124, 135, 138, 140, 141, 144–5 Mulroney, Brian, 207 municipal governments: provision of bilingual services, 6

National Understanding, A, 198–9 New Brunswick, 26, 33, 41–2, 75, 76, 86– 7, 110, 114–15, 123, 150, 153, 206, 304n312, 311n13; Acadians, 77, 79, 117, 123, 276n5, 311n12; Official Languages Act in, 77–8 Newfoundland, 30; Port-au-Port, 68–9 Nova Scotia, 76, 304n312, 311n12 October Crisis (1970), 81, 84, 88, 252 Office of Government Organization, creation of, 47 Official Languages Act (1969), 30, 35, 36, 42, 44, 56–7, 61–2, 66, 80, 88, 94, 96, 101, 110–11; adoption of, 66–72, 99, 173; problems with, 87–8; purpose of, 67; recommendations of RCBB, 50–7, 64; as symbolic gesture, 25 Official Languages Act (1988), 125, 126, 133, 145, 151, 156–7, 207–8, 211, 252, 282n112, 308n49, 144; proposed amendments, 200, 202, 204 Official Languages Regulations (1991), 209 Official Languages Regulations (1992), 210 Ontario, 25–6, 28, 41, 75, 76, 79; adoption of Regulation 17, 4–5; linguistic policy, 92 Osbaldeston, Gordon, 127, 166, 169–70, 176, 194–5, 224 Ottawa Citizen, 121, 162 Ottawa Journal, 162 Parent, Gilbert, 163 Parent, Oswald, 161 Parizeau, Jacques, 193 Parti québécois; 193, 198, 205, 216, 226, 234; 1976 victory, 172 PCO. See Privy Council Office Pearson, Lester B., 47–9, 50, 51, 53, 56, 57–9, 60, 237, 276n5; April 1966 declaration, 125, 126 Pelletier, Gérard, 67, 71–2, 93, 94, 96, 99, 103, 105, 106, 123, 124, 144, 176, 200, 240, 247, 253; recommendation to

Index Cabinet, 106–12; 20 per cent ratio, 106–11 passim personality principle, 10, 34, 63, 185, 206, 228 Peterson, Leslie, 80 political philosophy, 242–3, 309–10n13 Pontiac County Council, 117 Presse, La, 98, 240 Prince Albert, 218 Prince Edward Island, 30, 304n312 Privy Council Office (PCO), 106; concern over tbs actions, 227 provincial governments: anti-French policies, 4–5; negotiation of language rights, 57–66 public policy: political philosophers dictation of, 233–43 Public Service Commission: 1966 regulations, 49–50 Public Service Employment Act (1967), 25, 49, 125, 126, 225 Public Service Employment Regulations (1967), 25 Quebec, 41–2, 62–3, 71, 80, 84–5, 110; “distinct society,” 16, 26, 27, 28, 77, 264, 265–6, 274; opposition to bilingual districts, 80–1, 241–2; as single bilingual district, 114–15, 133, 134, 135, 139, 140–1, 253, 277n14; sociolinguistic policy in, 132–3, 143–4; “special” status of, 140, 150–2, 274; support for bilingual districts, 116, 137–8, 140–1, 152 “Quebec problem,” 114, 132, 136 Raymond, Yvonne, 113, 117, 133, 136–8, 240; exclusion of Montreal, 141–3; four-point assessment of bilingualism in Quebec, 138; minimalist approach for Quebec, 139–40; purpose of bilingual districts, 138; report to Duhamel Board, 296n136, 297n137; RCBB. See Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism Régimbald, Father Albert, 113 Reid, Scott, 259–60

325

Richardson, James, 192; resignation of, 194 Robarts, John, 59, 60 Roberge, Pierre, 144 Robertson, Gordon, 51 Robichaud, Louis, 59, 62, 79 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (RCBB); community rights, 21–2; dissolution of (1971), 42–3; equality thesis, 18–28 passim; liberalism, 234–5; mandate, 15, 25; the personality principle, 10; philosophical framework, 17–18; principles of symmetrical institutional bilingualism, 59– 60, 153; recommendations, 3, 16, 26, 27–8, 30, 35–42, 56, 89, 92, 100; sociolinguistic theory, 19, 251; territorial principle, 9–10 Royal Commission on Government Organization (RCGO; Glassco), 39, 45–6, 93– 4, 278n18 Saint Andrews Declaration (1977), 205 Saint-Boniface, 7 Saint-Denis, Roger, 74, 84 Saskatchewan, 76, 79 Savoie, Adélard, 74, 86, 113, 115, 129, 130–1, 136, 137, 139, 141–2, 157, 186, 248 Schreyer, Edward, 79, 118 Scott, F.R., 40–2, 87; appeal for symmetrical specification, 156 secession, 3, 4, 5, 7, 16–17, 41, 77, 137, 217, 235; territorial segregation leading to, 7 “significant demand,” 107, 112, 146–7, 208–10 Simpson, Robert, 68–9 Smallwood, Joey, 97 Smith, G.I., 62, 79 Smith, Harry, 74 Smith, T. Brad, 51, 114–15, 131–2, 144, 168 Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste, 98 sociolinguistic policy (federal), 5–6, 12, 22, 38–9, 43, 57–9, 93, 98, 102, 104,164, 176, 186, 190, 192–3 , 207,

326

Index

228, 259–60, 271–2, 310n20; Belgium, 28, 47; bureaucratization of, 254–8, 274; in Finland, 28–30; national round table (2004), 259, 261; proposed charter on, 23; in Quebec, 135; in South Africa, 28, 47; in Soviet Union, 28; in Switzerland, 28, 47; symbolic, 246–7 Special Committee on the Official Languages Bill, 69, 82 Special Joint Committee on Official Languages, 201–2; significant demand, 203 specification: as policy stage, 243–53 Spicer, Keith, 109, 118–22, 128, 146–7, 165–6, 200, 216; criticism of bilingual districts, 119–21, 187; second annual report, 143. See also Commissioner of Official Languages Steering Committee of Deputy Ministers, 170, 173, 174–5, 179, 193, 196, 220, 244 Strom, Harry, 97 symbolic policies: as tool to resolve sociolinguistic conflicts, 229–33

273, 309n8; districtification efforts, 143; establishment of, 93–4; establishment of interdepartmental committee, 225–6, 227, 246; internal task force, 160, 225–7; language policy, 127; memo recommending bilingual districts, 172–3, 225, 226, 245, 305n327; preference for bilingual regions, 12–13, 170, 178–92, 226, 273, 308–9n49; provincial option, 180, 223–4; responsibility for federal bilingualism policy, 47, 93– 4, 112, 278n18; sabotage of the cornerstone program, 12–13, 158, 170. See also Miller report Trudeau, Pierre E., 42, 56–7, 60–2, 63–4, 68–9, 93, 96–7, 100, 199–200, 205, 226, 234–6, 239; individualist liberalism, 234–6, 237, 238, 241; rational policy-making process, 173, 227, 255–6; support for bilingual districts, 227 Turner, John, 63–6, 71, 72, 172, 190–1, 236 unity crisis, 36

Task Force on Canadian Unity, 199–200 TBS. See Treasury Board Secretariat territorial principle, 185, 206, 241, 254, 311n12; nation-based, 26, 40, 228, 241; province-based, 9–10, 26, 40–1, 228, 241 Therrien, Eugène, 46–7, 50, 258, 278n18 Thorson, Donald, 51, 69, 70 Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), 73, 123, 124; administrative mechanism, 124–5; denial of events, 219–23; deviation of, 172–92, 216–19, 220–1, 223–7, 244–6,

Victoria Charter. See Victoria Constitutional Conference Victoria Constitutional Conference, 57, 81, 88, 95, 99–102 War Measures Act, 81 Welland (Ont.): demonstrations at, 163–5, 187, 231, 251. See also Chrétien, Jean Western, Maurice, 162 Yalden, Max, 51, 95, 103, 114, 200–3