Canada and the Far East, 1940-1953: 1940-1953 9781442656307

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
1. The Nature Of Canadian Nationalism
2. The War Years
3. Adjustment After The War
4. Canadian Policy In The Far East
5. The Record At The United Nations
6. The Peace Settlement And Security
7. Trade Policy And Access To Resources
8. Economic Assistance In General
9. Forms Of Economic Assistance
10. Cultural Intercourse, Human Rights, And Immigration
11. Canadian Opinion About The Far East
12. Postscript, 1953
Index

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Canada and the Far East 1940-1953 By

H. F. ANGUS

UNIVERSITY

OF T O R O N T O

PRESS:

1953

Issued under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Institute of Pacific Relations

Copyright, Canada, 1953 Printed in Canada London: Geoffrey Cumberlege Oxford University Press

ANNOUNCEMENT The Canadian Institute of International Affairs is an unofficial and non-political organization founded in 1928. The Institute has as its objects to promote and encourage in Canada research and discussion in international affairs and to give attention to Canada's position both as a member of the international community of nations and as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Institute, as such, is precluded by its Constitution from expressing an opinion on any aspect of public affairs. The views expressed, therefore, are those of the writer.

THE INSTITUTE OF P A C I F I C RELATIONS The Institute of Pacific Relations is an unofficial and non-partisan organization, founded in 1925 to facilitate the scientific study of * the peoples of the Pacific area. It is composed of autonomous National Councils in the principal countries having important interests in the Pacific area, together with an International Secretariat. It is privately financed by contributions from National Councils, corporations and foundations. It is governed by a Pacific Council composed of members appointed by each of the National Councils. In addition to the independent activities of its National Councils, the Institute organizes private international conferences every two or three years. The Institute conducts an extensive program of research on the political, economic and social problems of the Pacific area and the Far East. It also publishes the proceedings of its conferences, a quarterly journal, Pacific Affairs, and a large number of scholarly books embodying the results of its studies. Neither the International Secretariat nor the National Councils of the Institute advocate policies or express opinions on national or international affairs. Responsibility for statements of fact or opinion in Institute publications rests solely with the authors.

NATIONAL COUNCILS AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC. AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

COMITE D'ETUDES DES PROBLEMES DU PACIFIQUE INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS INDONESIAN INSTITUTE OF WORLD AFFAIRS JAPAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS NETHERLANDS NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PACIFIC AFFAIRS NEW ZEALAND INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PHILIPPINE COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

International Secretariat

1 East 54 St., New York

Preface THE purpose of this volume is to bring together and interpret information relating to Canada's contacts with the countries of the Far East since the commencement of the Second World War. An account of earlier contacts can be found in Canada and the Far East 1940, written by Professor A. R. M. Lower for the I.P.R. Inquiry Series (New York, 1940). While the present volume is not in the strict sense a sequel, repetition has been, as far as possible, avoided. The narrative has been carried to the end of 1952 and a postscript has been added dealing with the first four months of 1953. As Canada's policies in the Far East and in Southeast Asia are the resultant of Canadian policies in general, it has been necessary to discuss general policies as well as their particular application. Much the same is true of Canadian attitudes and opinion. In the early chapters extensive use has been made of Canada in World Affairs, September 1941 to May 1944, by C. C. Lingard and R. G. Trotter, and of Canada in World Affairs, 1944-1946, by F. H. Soward (both volumes are published by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto, 1950). In describing the treatment of persons of Japanese race in Canada, I have made use of The Canadian Japanese and World War II, by F. E. La Violette (Toronto, 1948). Reference to the excellent publications of the Canadian Department of External Affairs has been so frequent that abbreviations have been used for the more important of them: T.S. stands for Treaty Series; C.S. for Conference Series; E.A. for External Affairs. In explaining both Canadian policy and Canadian opinion the speeches, in and out of Parliament, of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Hon. Lester B. Pearson, have been frequently quoted and of necessity, for no one else has done so much to make Canadian foreign policies intelligible to Canadians.

H. F. A.

University of British Columbia vii

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Contents PREFACE I The Nature of Canadian Nationalism II The War Years III Adjustment after the War IV Canadian Policy in the Far East V The Record at the United Nations 1. Competing Chinese Governments 2. Chinese Claims against the U.S.S.R. 3. Formosa 4. Events in Korea 5. Kashmir 6. Indonesia and Indo-China VI VII

The Peace Settlement and Security Trade Policy and Access to Resources 1. Trade 2. Transportation 3. Access to Resources 4. Fisheries

VIII Economic Assistance in General IX Forms of Economic Assistance 1. The Food and Agriculture Organization 2. The Colombo Plan 3. The International Bank 4. The Economic and Social Council 5. Trusteeship ix

vii 3 11 21 32 43 44 45 46 52 54 56 67 72 72 73 77 82 84 88 89 91

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CONTENTS

X

Cultural Intercourse, Human Rights, and Immigration 1. Missionaries 94 2. Cultural Contacts 96 3. Human Rights 98 4. Immigration 99 XI Canadian Opinion about the Far East 101 XII Postscript, 1953 115 INDEX 123

Canada and the Far East, 1940-1953

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1 The Nature of Canadian Nationalism IN the following chapters an account will be given of those developments during and after the Second World War which have directly affected Canada's relations with the countries beyond the Pacific. In some degree these developments have changed the character of Canada as one of the dramatis personae of the Pacific area. An even greater change has occurred as the outcome of a process which began long before the Second World War but reached its culmination as a result of the part played by Canada in that war. Canada has become a highly self-conscious nation, aroused to the desirability of promoting distinctively national aims in many fields of activity. It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the differences which establish the unique quality of Canadian nationalism, and set it apart from the nationalism, equally or even more intense, manifested by so many newcomers on the world scene. While Canadian nationalism has it roots in the past, and is the outcome of a long and steady progression, accelerated in its final stages by the dramatic events of the last war, it does not look to the past, whether recent or remote, for a golden age. It has emerged from the tutelage of youth and not from a status that could conceivably be compared to servitude. There has never been an oppressor. The feeling of full freedom is rather like that following the celebration of a twenty-first birthday than like that which follows the ceremony of emancipation or manumission. Family ties have been preserved and remain capable of richer development on a basis of equality and mutual respect. They are quite as real and are more spontaneous than the obsequia of a freedman. In its very inception Canadian nationalism is unusual and its birthmarks are distinctively British. In describing Canadian nationalism it is safest to begin by saying what it is not. For one thing it is not racist. It might easily have been so. Even such organizations as Native Sons of Canada and 3

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Native Sons of British Columbia have been inclined to give a curiously selective sense to the word "native" in considering the eligibility of Indians, Eskimo, and Orientals. But the Canadian Citizenship Act1 makes no such distinctions and no races have ever been designated as incapable of naturalization. Keeping Canada "a white man's country" might, indeed, easily have become as emphatic a slogan as the more celebrated phrase "a white Australia"; and it might easily become so if immigration from Asia were intensified.2 But today there is little racial feeling, even in British Columbia, and the place of race has been taken by a vague belief that there is something in the Canadian environment, in Canadian ecology, which will make genuine Canadians, with all the admirable qualities imputed to them by national pride, out of any human material in the course of a single generation. In a more moderate form the belief is that Canadian society is now strongly enough established to be able to assimilate outside elements in any numbers at all likely to arrive within the foreseeable future. Canadian nationalism is not, in the extreme sense, economic. It might easily have been so, and might easily become so. Today, however, Canada is committed by self-interest, and therefore by conviction, to the policies of multilateralism and reduction of trade barriers. It is as apostles of these policies that Canadian delegates have appeared at international conferences. The economic facts demand them and their tone and temper harmonize admirably with Canada's political ambition to be treated as an individual nation and not as part of a larger political system inconsistent with full recognition of individuality.3 Religious nationalism—except in the sense that nationalism itself is apt to have a religious content—would be an anachronism in the 20th century. In Canada it is even more remote than racial nationalism. Indeed, both race and religion have appeared in Canada as disruptive forces to be overcome. "Race" is currently used in the peculiar sense in which French are of one race and English, Scotch, Irish, and Welsh of another race; "religion" in the sense in which Protestantism and Catholicism are different religions. This travesty of terminology might be continued by suggesting that there is a 11946, 10 Geo. VI, c. 15. Immigration from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon is limited by quotas; immigration from China and Japan is even more restricted. 8 For instance, Canada refused to share in the United Kingdom's representation on the Allied Council in Japan. 2

THE NATURE OF CANADIAN NATIONALISM

5

tendency for the French-speaking Canadians to be accepted by Canadians of English ancestry as honorary Anglo-Saxons; and for them to accept Protestants as honorary Christians. Vestiges of these disruptive forces remain even in the Canadian national anthem4 though they have been discreetly omitted from the English versions. Today the emphasis is on unity. The emphasis is strengthened by regarding communism as the enemy of Christianity in general, though not as an enemy against whom Canadians are eager to conduct a crusade.5 Canadian nationalism has a smaller military content than is usual. The reason is unique. Canada's military efforts have been a source of pride but they have always been international in character, a contribution to a joint effort in a common cause. Not only has there never6 been a war which was primarily Canadian, not only has Canada never7 cherished ambitions realizable only by war, but Canadian participation in wars has invariably, in their initial phases at least, taken the form of assistance to the mother country. Both in 1918-19 and in 1945-46, Canada experienced a sense of frustration in the minor importance assigned to her in peace-making. National consciousness involves a sense of a separate personality and, therefore, requires a rival or, what is better, an enemy. Canada is fortunate in having both in a relatively harmless form. The rival is the United States and the type of rivalry is peculiar.8 One is reminded of the romantic stories in which the poor boy, in spite of all his handicaps, comes out victorious or, more simply, of the fable of the hare and the tortoise. No one expects the tortoise to win but it may be permitted its day-dreams when the hare is asleep. The enemy is the Soviet Union. A deliberate choice of evils has led to Canadian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. University students are urged, by the Department of National Defence, to join the Officers' Training Corps, "to defend 4

"Ta main sait porter Pe'pee; elle sait porter la croix . . ." and "et ta valeur de foi trempee." Both official versions are hard for the recent immigrant to accept: "Terre de nos aieux"; "our home, our native land." 5 The very cordial speeches of welcome with which the representatives of English-speaking scholarship were received by the French-speaking hosts at the conferences of the various learned societies in Quebec in June 1952 stressed this essential unity of Christians as opposed to communists. 6 The purist might say "hardly ever." The French defended Canada against the British; the British against Americans in rebellion; the Canadians themselves against the Americans in 1812-14. 7 Or "hardly ever"! There was possibly an exception in the War of 1812-14. 8 It will be described in relation to cultural nationalism, later in this chapter.

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the rights you cherish." What rights are young men expected to cherish? The advertisement is not explicit. But an enumeration would involve a description of the Canadian way of life as it is believed that young men would like it to be. Although Canada is arming, and recruiting young men, there is no immediate danger of military nationalism. It is as a member of the United Nations that Canada is arming, defensively, against one of her fellow members. It is as a member of N.A.T.O. that Canada is sending troops to Europe. And, yet, Canada has taken a long step forward. Canada is associated with others and not, as in the past, giving them assistance in what is primarily their struggle. Canadian national unity is not in much danger so long as it is fortified by rivalry with the United States and by hostility to the U.S.S.R. If as a nation Canada needs an enemy, the appearance of the U.S.S.R. in this role is almost an answer to prayer. But the deus ex machine, entering as an enemy has assumed a strange form. There was no one else who could have done it. The United Kingdom (even at the height of movements for increasing Canadian autonomy) has never been more than a sparring partner. The United States has long ceased to be a potential enemy in the military sense. Thanks to the U.S.S.R., Canada is solidly united. If, however, the western Canadian provinces were to turn communist, Canadian nationalism would perish instantly. It might seem ridiculous to suggest that Canadian nationalism is cultural. Its objective claims to such a distinction are of the slightest. None of the world's great books, none of its great pictures, none of its great music, none of its great sculpture is Canadian. An ardent Canadian nationalist, challenged to name a national hero, would be as unlikely to name an artist as to choose a soldier, a religious leader or a scientist. He would probably mumble, with some embarrassment, the name of an explorer or a politician. A golden age, as has been pointed out earlier, need not lie in the past. Cultural ambitions may, if faith is strong, do for Canada what cultural achievement has done for others. The best evidence on this point is to be found in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Arts, Letters and Sciences, in the popular submissions on which its findings were based and in the general approval with which they were greeted.9 ^Ottawa, King's Printer, 1951. A list of submissions appears at p. 423 of the Report.

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The reasons for this emphasis on cultural nationalism are not far to seek. It is the only practical basis for promoting unity of the French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians. It provides a ground on which they can meet as equals and engage in the mutual admiration which conduces to cordiality. And yet it is reassuring to minority groups which can aspire much more easily to participation in the cultural life around them than they can to assimilation in a racial sense. Almost from the outset they can feel themselves part of a richer and a wider life to which they can make important contributions. It is no small part of the merit of cultural nationalism that it provides a bulwark against subserviency to the United States, while at the same time consolidating opposition to communism. The United States appears at times as a rival, at times as a kindly friend against whom Canadians must be warned if they are to preserve their individuality.10 The U.S.S.R. appears as a hostile force, strange, menacing but distant. It compels some degree of dependence on the United States. Care must be taken to ensure that this dependence does not become too great. The most effective form for this care to take, so the Commission suggests, is well-planned, and possibly lavish, expenditure by the Government of Canada, on the promotion of cultural aims in a distinctively Canadian way. "Biculturalism" may be a possibility: French and English influences need not blend; but they must go hand in hand recognizing some ultimate Canadian quality which transcends them. It is here that the mystique of Canadian nationalism lies. It is not xenophobic. Foreign influences are welcomed and are, indeed, even sought in moderation and especially when they can be requited in kind. On these conditions, even American influences are welcome. It is always easy to make a case for the moderate consumer, even of foreign culture, but he is in constant danger from the prohibitionist on the one hand and the immoderate consumer on the other. The adventure of fostering a national culture, to which Canadians have been summoned by the Royal Commission, is facilitated today by three fortuitous circumstances. The first is the existence of an economic boom; the second is the heavy expenditure on armament; the third the nature of the enemy. In a depression, an empty treasury and the demands for relief would preclude spending on culture and the market for artistic production would, like other 10 Cf. Aesop's fable of the stone jar and the earthenware jar floating down the river.

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markets, languish. The cost of armaments does not have the same effect. It induces a feeling of shame or guilt and can be used as an argument for matching sterile by creative effort. If, it can be asked, we find thousands of millions for armaments, how can we refuse a few millions for our cultural life, to give us, the Commission was bold enough to say, something worth defending.11 How, then, is a nationalism to be described which has no sense of mission, no golden age, no myth of race, no heroes, no strong religious bond, no glorious cultural performance? It undoubtedly exists. Its essence is to be found in an unbounded faith in the future based on a justifiable pride in collective rather than individual achievement. The political achievement has been the most conspicuous—so much so that, were it not for the faith in the future which is definitely non-political, we might speak of political nationalism. To understand Canadian nationalism we must analyse this faith. It is not the remote future that is in question. We need not invoke the time-machine. History, like a clever card-sharper, has allowed Canadians to win the first hand. Our political ambitions have been realized. French and English live in harmony; the Commonwealth has been preserved in the form most acceptable to Canadian sentiment. Commerce and industry have flourished. Wars have been fought and won without overstraining loyalties or resources. History has filled us with confidence. Hubris perhaps? Quos deus vult perdere? Such ill-conceived suspicions would be banished with contempt. Of course Canadian nationalism has a mission: to lead the middle powers in the construction and maintenance of a peaceful world. Our golden age lies before us. The myth of race has been replaced by a sociological myth that a matrix of civilization has been created into which peoples of all races can be poured (in moderation of course) with confidence that the result will be wholly admirable: Canadian heroes will be born; they will probably wear frock coats and die in their beds; outstanding cultural achievement will come at no distant day; there are already hopeful signs and in some directions promising performance. Judicious expenditure can do wonders. The profane cannot tell whether this faith is justified; but even they must recognize its sincerity and acknowledge that, if no better, it is certainly no worse than the faiths on which other nationalisms have been built. No one can prove it impossible of n

The Report uses this argument at p. 274.

THE NATURE OF CANADIAN NATIONALISM

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fulfilment, though anyone could imagine circumstances in which it would become manifestly absurd. But who can tell how the dice of history may be loaded? The qualities of Canadian nationalism have exercised an influence on the view which Canadians have taken of the Asian nationalisms which have been so much in evidence in recent years. These are apt to command sympathy in Canada if they are understood as political in character and as finding their satisfaction in independence and self-determination. The doctrine that good government is no substitute for self-government seems obvious to Canadians. Canadians have no sympathy with xenophobia, none with the identification of foreign investment with exploitation, and none with ambitions of aggrandizement based on historic traditions. Indeed, they have probably little understanding of the religious and cultural aspects of Asiatic nationalisms. A desire for industrialization as a means of avoiding the status of hewers of wood and drawers of water is in itself intelligible in the light of Canadian experience but Canadian sympathy is often tinged with contempt for efforts to create an industrial economy without an adequate base in natural resources. And the proper road to industrialization seems to Canadians to lie in attracting foreign capital by fair treatment and not in scaring it away or in demanding it as a gift. Prima facie, nationalism commands sympathy and respect but it quickly forfeits both if it appears as an obstacle to a realistic and enterprising attitude towards the future, a future in which the short-run economic aspect is likely to dominate. Its alliance with communism to overcome the powers of landlords and money-lenders is barely intelligible and is regarded as a sort of perversion. This view of Asian nationalism is thus in sharp contrast with the communist interpretation of the same phenomenon. It also differs from the view prevalent in the United States, for it seems to Canadians in no way incongruous that nationalism in India, Pakistan, or Ceylon should find itself at home in the Commonwealth. Perhaps, however, imperialism rather than nationalism is the word which leads to misunderstandings. In one sense, imperialism existed in Canada, was considered and deliberately rejected. But it was not imperialism in the social or economic sense to which not only communist theorists but economic historians generally are apt to confine the term. It was rather itself a form of nationalism, a

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Pan-British nationalism, that was part and parcel of historic tradition, but which was distasteful to French-speaking Canadians and repugnant to the steadily growing sense of Canadian individuality. Once again it was neither the communist nor the American outlook which the Canadian view resembled, for it was found possible to combine Canadian nationalism with a very genuine appreciation of the merits of the Commonwealth. Speaking in explanation of the Royal Style and Titles Act in the House of Commons on February 3, 1953, the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. Louis St. Laurent said: "I think that the real link between the various members of the Commonwealth is in their common ideals, their memories of association in the past, their intimate conviction that that association in the past has been for the benefit of their people, and their desire to conserve that association in the future for the benefit of their people. I do not think that we are being presumptuous or conceited when we believe, and even when we express the belief, that this commonwealth group not only works for the benefit of its own peoples but is an effective instrument for the good of free mankind throughout the whole world."12 The Canada which is cautiously re-entering the Pacific area after the war is very different from the Canada that played a minor part, almost that of a super, in that area before the war. Confident, buoyant, hopeful nationalism; a full stomach and a generous purse; these things must make a strange impression on the war-torn and impoverished nations of Asia, on the communists for whom nationalism has so often appeared as an ally, on the ancient civilizations which used to boast that they had witnessed all the vagaries of history. What, they may well ask themselves, are the real Canadian interests which lie behind this fagade of nationalism? What influence will Canada bring to bear on the destinies of the Orient? 12

Canada, House of Commons, Debates, vol. 95, no. 37, p. 1567.

2 The War Years THE WAR to resist German aggression, in which Canada joined by her declaration of September 10, 1939, was primarily a European war. Its immediate effect was to concentrate Canadian attention on western Europe and, by June 1940, on the defence of Britain. The dangers of an extension of the war to the Far East could not be disregarded, but it seemed the path of reason to divert as little of the national effort as possible to a region in which the United States, in spite of its deep-seated isolationism, could be expected to do whatever might be necessary. Such precautionary measures as were taken can be reviewed briefly. So far as Canada was concerned, the Japanese war had many of the aspects of a war of collective security in which Canada engaged in order to assist her associates in resisting a dangerous and "wanton"1 attack. The purely military precautions were the joint concern of Canada and the United States which had set up a Permanent Joint Board on Defence in accordance with the Ogdensburg Agreement of August 17, 1940.2 It held three meetings on the Pacific coast in November 1940 and recommended both the establishment of additional air bases and the acceleration of work on the Northwest Staging route designed to provide communication by air between Edmonton and Whitehorse. It advised the extension of this route to Fairbanks, Alaska, with the result that the route was usable "in daylight and during fine weather" by September 1941.3 The war in Europe had been in progress for more than a year before the Government appointed a Special Committee on Orientals in British Columbia.4 Its object, as appears from its terms of referlr The word "wanton" was used in the Canadian declaration of war to describe the attack on Pearl Harbor. 2 G. Cecil Lingard and Reginald G. Trotter, Canada in World Affairs, September 1941 to May 1944 (Toronto. 1950), p. 25. *Ibid.: pp. 29-34. ^Special Committee on Orientals in British Columbia, Report and Recommendations (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1940).

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ence, was mainly to reassure the general public. It was to consider what could be done to reduce any "special danger to the internal security of the province or to national defence in general" by "improving the state of feeling between the white and oriental communities, and by recommending precautionary measures designed to meet activities prejudicial to civil security or national defence, whether on the part of the white or oriental population." It was also to consider the application of conscription for home defence to oriental Canadians.5 The main recommendation of this Special Committee was that there should be a voluntary registration of persons of Japanese race and on January 7, 1941, a Standing Committee on Orientals was appointed to supervise it.6 The registration was entrusted to the R.C.M.P. and proceeded smoothly. Of the persons of Japanese race 76 per cent were classified as British subjects by birth, 15 per cent as British subjects by naturalization, and the remainder as Japanese nationals.7 A few claimed dual nationality. As the original committee was divided on the question of conscription for home defence no action was taken, and persons of oriental race remained exempt.8 When tension with Japan increased, Canada took action, in July 1941, pari passu with the United Kingdom and the United States, to freeze Japanese credits and to block bank balances owned by Japanese nationals.9 In a quiet way the shipment of war supplies had been discontinued and Canada went so far as to detain at Victoria, B.C., a Greek ship en route to Japan with a cargo of scrap iron loaded at New Orleans. This cargo was eventually sold in the autumn of 1941 by its Japanese owners and unloaded at Seattle. While opinion in Canada generally was concerned in these actions merely in so far as they seemed to afford some assistance to China, they were followed with intense interest on the Pacific coast. 5 For a full statement of the terms of reference and an account of the work of this committee, see Forrest E. La Violette, The Canadian Japanese and World War II (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1948), pp. 31 et seq. ep.G. 117, January 7, 1941. TLa Violette, op. cit., p. 64. 8 They might enlist for service anywhere and some endeavoured to do so. Very few were accepted. The case against conscription for home defence under the National Resources Mobilization Act was threefold: conscription would confer an almost unanswerable claim to the franchise; there might have been some disagreeable incidents between white and oriental conscripts before army discipline had taken hold; there was no shortage of troops for home defence. In the case of the Japanese alone there were possible doubts as to their reliability in the event of hostilities with Japan. 9 Lingard and Trotter, op. cit., p. 45.

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The only military movement of importance was the despatch, announced on November 15, 1941, of two battalions of infantry to Hong Kong in response to an appeal by the Government of the United Kingdom on September 19, when the actual outbreak of war was still thought to be improbable.10 There was no wish whatever for war with Japan. It is true that Japanese actions in China had been generally condemned in Canada as in the United States. But they had been condemned by opinion for ten years and condemnation might have remained at the level of opinion indefinitely. Yet, in spite of the hostages given to fortune at Hong Kong, the attack on Pearl Harbor brought a general sense of relief. It obviously committed the United States to full-scale participation in the whole war, and the difference between Lend-Lease and full-scale belligerency was expected to outweigh whatever assistance Japan might give to the Axis. There had been a vague expectation that, sooner or later, the United States, committed to the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition, and Japan, committed to the idea of the co-prosperity sphere, were bound to fight. There had, however, also been some apprehension that Japan might attack the British and the Dutch without rousing the United States to immediate and total war. Pearl Harbor removed this fear. A Canadian declaration of war followed at once. Indeed, as it did not require parliamentary approval, it came more quickly than the American or the British. Side by side with these dispassionate judgments were more violent emotions : hatred and fear, soon raised to a high pitch by the disaster at Hong Kong. It was naturally on the weakly defended Pacific coast that these interrelated emotions reached their greatest intensity. And it was on the Pacific coast that the greater part of Canada's Japanese population lived. Within the first few weeks decisions of major importance to the welfare of some 22,000 people had to be made. These were the men, women, and children of Japanese race resident in British Columbia. Thirty Japanese were interned.11 The registration which had been progressing successfully was made compulsory for Japanese nationals under the Defence of Canada Regulations and, on December 16, for all persons of Japanese origin, regardless of nationality.12 No similar step had been taken in respect of Canadians of German or Italian i*Ibid., p. 47. uibid., p. 61. P.C. 9760, December 16, 1941.

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origin. Japanese were treated differently for several reasons: because of doubt as to the sincerity of their allegiance; because some sections of opinion considered all persons of Asiatic race to be aliens, as was evidenced by their exclusion from voting in British Columbia; because of their concentration in a small area on the Pacific coast; because complete registration would help to detect any illegal entrants who might be enemy agents; above all because of the fear and resentment which proximity to war had produced on the Pacific coast. Another immediate step was the seizure of Japanese-owned fishing boats and the removal of the fishermen from dangerous locations. There was nothing unusual or criticizable in these strictly military precautions.13 The deportation of the entire population of Japanese race from the "defence zone" extending for a hundred miles from the Pacific coast was another matter.14 The plain fact was that a large and influential body of opinion in British Columbia had for a long time been anxious to get rid of "the Japanese."15 It made little distinction between nationals of Canada and nationals of Japan, except that it apprehended that the former would sooner or later be enfranchised, particularly if they were permitted or compelled to serve in the armed forces. Deportation is impossible in a civilized country in peace time. The war presented a last chance which it would have seemed folly to neglect. The Government had to find, at short notice, a policy which would satisfy this body of opinion with the least injury to the national war effort.16 The result, as announced in a press release on January 14, 1942,17 promised just treatment both to Canadians of Japanese racial origin and to Japanese nationals resident in Canada. No action would be taken, or permitted, which would give ^Subsequent disputes concerned damage done to boats, the theft of gear, and the conditions under which the boats were sold in order to maintain the productivity of the fishing industry. 14 It is described in detail by La Violette, op. cit. 15 How large and how influential is a matter of opinion. The writer's own experience was that many people could be logically driven to this position, for they would not consider the Japanese population in British Columbia as permanent. Some corroboration of this view is to be found in the protests of "white" and North American Indian fishermen against the return of fishermen of Japanese race, who were allowed to obtain licences as from April 1, 1949. In fact only 210 had obtained licences by April 21, 1950, or about 10 per cent of the16pre-war numbers. See Vancouver Sun, March 17, 1949, and April 21, 1950. The political pressures are discussed by La Violette, op. cit., pp. 36 et seq. 17 Cited by La Violette, op. cit., p. 47.

THE WAR YEARS

15

any excuse to the Government of Japan for mistreating Canadians under its control or would enable it to arouse hostility against the white race. The reference to Canadians taken prisoner at Hong Kong was obvious. Canada would continue to co-ordinate its policies with those of Great Britain and the United States. To give effect to this policy an Order-in-Council was passed empowering the Minister of National Defence, with the concurrence of the Minister of Justice, to make any area in Canada a "protected area" from which enemy aliens would be excluded.18 Two such areas were established, one on the Pacific coast, the other at Trail, B.C. where the smelter might have been a tempting target. All persons of Japanese racial origin were prohibited from serving on fishing vessels, and Japanese nationals were forbidden to use short-wave radio receiving sets, radio transmitters, and cameras. It was announced that a Civilian Corps of Canadian Japanese would be recruited. This moderate policy was greeted, at first, with approval.19 Difficulties soon arose. The policy did not allay public anxiety and it left the Japanese in fear for their property and their livelihood, particularly when some 6,000 Japanese nationals were required to leave the protected areas.20 Although the general policy was reaffirmed by the Prime Minister on February 9, the action of the United States Government, on February 19, in evacuating American Japanese, made it impossible to resist demands for complete evacuation. On February 24, the Minister of Justice was empowered to control individuals of Japanese origin in the protected areas.21 Two days later complete evacuation was announced and, on March 4, the British Columbia Security Commission was established to carry it out.22 While deportation was rationalized by military considerations, humane treatment of the deportees was rationalized by explaining that Japan must be given no excuse for mistreating Canadians under Japanese control.23 If this latter rationalization was unnecessary, it is a pity that it was employed, as it made it appear to the deportees, Canadian and Japanese alike, that they were protected from ill treatment by the strong arm of the Mikado. There is no need to follow in detail the fortunes of either the enemy aliens or the Canadians of Japanese origin. Evacuation was 18RC. 365, January 16, 1942. *9La Violette, op. cit., p. 48. ZOIbid., p. 49 et seq. 2ip.c. I486, February 24, 1942. 22RC. 1665, March 4, 1942. 23 Press release of January 14, 1942, cited by La Violette, op. cit., p. 47.

16

CANADA AND THE FAR EAST, 1940-1953

completed by September 30, 1942. The Security Commission did its work effectively and humanely. Many, who moved voluntarily, established new homes, often east of the Rockies. About half were housed in "ghost towns" in mining areas or in a camp at Tashme,24 where the chief difficulties concerned the provision of adequate shelter, medical services, education, and social services. Some family groups were induced, by persuasion which they later considered misleading, to settle in sugar beet areas in Alberta and Manitoba. They remained a charge of the Government of Canada and were to be removed when the emergency was over. Able-bodied men were employed on road work or in the beet fields of Ontario. In short, the wartime policies achieved nothing permanent, and in the next chapter we shall have to consider how the post-war problem was tackled. We may anticipate by saying that ultimately good came out of evil, and that, at the price of a good deal of individual suffering and injustice, a healthier situation was provided for the people of Japanese origin in Canada. It is a serious thing for a government to inflict hardships on citizens who have not been convicted and, indeed, not individually accused25 of any serious misconduct. Direct military expediency, as determined by the military authorities, would be a valid excuse, and so too would the indirect military necessity of maintaining the civilian will to victory. Whether the facts established either or both of these excuses remains a matter of opinion. Apart from considerations of justice, the policy had the merit of avoiding civil disorder and bloodshed (though police protection might have sufficed for this purpose) and of "appeasing" certain sections of opinion. It had the demerit of preventing the best use being made for the purposes of the war of a substantial pool of manpower. Its social consequences will be discussed in the next chapter. We must now turn to Canada's share in the military operations of the Japanese war. They began, inevitably, with the loss of Hong Kong, where more than 1,000 Canadians were captured. Bitter controversy arose as to the conditions under which the garrison had been reinforced and as to the equipment of the troops. For our present purposes the importance of the matter is that Canadians had a direct interest in the treatment which prisoners received and 24 Named 25

after the members of the Commission: TAylor, SHirras, and MEad. On August 4, 1944, the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons "no person of the Japanese race born in Canada has been charged with sabotage or disloyalty." See Lingard and Trotter, op. cit., p. 65.

THE WAR YEARS

17

became very sensitive to stories of cruelty and neglect. Personal anxiety, which can be harder to bear than grief, was brought to many Canadian homes.26 Canadian participation in the Japanese war was not extensive. The defence of North America was naturally a joint enterprise in which the policies of the United States were dominant. It began with the entry of Canadian airmen into Alaska as "distinguished visitors."27 Canadian air forces co-operated in checking the Japanese operations at Kiska and Attu, islands in the outer Aleutians, in June 1942.28 In July and August 1943 a brigade group participated in the expedition to recover Kiska, only to find that the island had been evacuated.29 Early in the war negotiations with the United States30 provided for the construction, by that country, of a military road following the line of the airway staging route from Edmonton to Alaska.31 This and its subsidiary enterprises32 led to the presence of a substantial number of civil and military personnel in Canada, who came to be known derisively as "the army of occupation." Canadian auxiliary cruisers and corvettes were placed under American command in Alaska. A squadron of the R.C.A.F. was stationed in Ceylon. Many Canadian airmen served in the R.A.F. in Ceylon and Burma.33 Some interest attaches to the contribution which Canada was prepared to make to the war against Japan, if it had been prolonged, as might conceivably have been the case if the atomic bombs had not been used. It was, for obvious reasons, a matter of policy to maintain Canada's claim to participation in high level international 26 C. P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-45 (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1948), pp. 280-88: "of the 1973 Canadian soldiers who sailed from Vancouver in October 1941, there were 555 who never returned to Canada." Quoted by Lingard and Trotter, op. cit., p. 52. 27 The phrase used to secure the exemption of their equipment from customs duties. See Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), vol. II, p. 1182. 28 See Lingard and Trotter, op. cit.., p. 108. 29 See Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-45, pp. 289-90; 4,800 men were sent, including a large^ number of N.R.M.A. troops who were not, at that time, liable for service outside the western hemisphere. 30Notes were exchanged on March 17 and 18, 1942. See Lingard and Trotter, op. cit., p. 67. siEdmonton, Grande Prairie, Dawson Creek, Fort Nelson, Watson Lake, Whitehorse, Fairbanks. There was a spur to the coast at Haines. See map, ibid., p. 31. 32 For example, Canol (Canadian Oil), a project for providing supplies from Canadian oil wells for use in Alaska. See ibid., p. 69. 33See ibid., p. 108.

18

CANADA AND THE FAR EAST, 1940-1953

discussions by shouldering a fair share of the burdens in the form most acceptable to Canada's associates and easiest to make acceptable to Canadian opinion. The result is a significant indication of the pattern of Canadian participation in collective security operations such as those subsequently undertaken by the United Nations in Korea. As early as November 1944, the war committee of the Cabinet decided that Canada's military contribution should consist of one division with ancillary troops.34 Officers and men were recruited on a voluntary basis. They were to assemble in Canada under the command of Major-General B. M. Hoffmeister and to move to the United States to complete their training. Eventually they would have served with the United States Army.35 This force was disbanded on September 1, 1945. Minor military participation took the form of despatching officers to serve as observers with Australian, New Zealand, and American units, and recruiting of specialists, some of them of Japanese and Chinese origin, with special language qualifications.36 The Navy made plans for making sixty ships available for service in the Pacific, including two cruisers, two aircraft carriers, twelve or more destroyers, and some forty frigates. The naval contribution was to be associated with the United Kingdom's command.37 Uganda had joined the Royal Navy as early as April and Ontario before the surrender of Japan. Air Force units would have formed part of a composite group including British, Australian, and New Zealand squadrons to be attached to the United States Army Air Force. Bomber and transport squadrons were training for service in the Far East when the war ended.38 Mutual Aid, which was so important in the European war, appeared on a minor scale in the Pacific. As early as 1943 mutual aid agreements extended to China and Australia. Later New Zealand and India were included. The Chinese supplies were delivered by air "over the hump."39 34F. H. Soward, Canada in World Affairs, 1944-1946 (Toronto, 1950), p. 3624 n. Mlbid., p. 24. See La Violette, op. cit., p. 297; Chinese were not conscripted till August 1944 and Japanese volunteers, exceptional cases apart, were not accepted until February 1945. 37Soward, op. cit., pp. 24, 25. **Ibid., p. 25. ZQIbid., pp. 74 et seq. See also Canadian Mutual Aid Board, Final Report (Ottawa, 1946).

THE WAR YEARS

19

It remained true that the war against Japan was an unwanted war, willingly accepted partly because of the aggressive policies pursued by Japan, partly as the obvious price of the assistance of the United States in the all important struggle in Europe. Canada never was, and probably never would have been, a major participant. The interests for which Canadians would resort to war in the Pacific area are almost non-existent. They are practically confined to the defence of Canadian territorial sovereignty including the right to exclude excessive immigration. These peculiar interests were, as we shall see, far more seriously imperilled by victory than they would have been if the war had been avoided altogether; for Japanese aggression at Pearl Harbor, Hong Kong, and Singapore, while it was bound to provoke successful resistance and retaliation, led, much as unsuccessful rebellions are apt to lead, to measures designed to remove legitimate grievances. Albeit at a terrible price, the Japanese secured the recognition of racial equality and will, in all probability, secure the commercial opportunities which are essential to the viability of their precarious economy. When Japan surrendered, Canada had been at war for nearly six years. Writing in 1940 of the period immediately before the war, Professor Lower was able to say, "Canada finds itself in the strange position of being a power of the first rank economically but of the second rank politically or diplomatically."40 The same words might well have been used at the end of the war, but with a very different meaning, for both first and second ranks had been sadly depleted. In a general way Canada began to call herself a middle power. Weakness in manpower was counterbalanced by an enormous economic potential. Production, both primary and secondary, had been greatly increased and Canada was one of the very few countries to emerge from the war richer and stronger, both comparatively and absolutely, than when she entered it. Given immunity from invasion (which was probable) this development was inevitable. It carried with it an increase in prestige and influence which was greatly enhanced by Canada's comparative disinterestedness—the disinterestedness of a nation well satisfied with its possessions, seeking only their protection, and ready to play an active part in promoting human welfare. It was the German and not the Japanese war which transformed 40A. R. M. Lower, Canada and the Far East 1940 (New York, I.P.R., 1940), p. 98.

20

CANADA AND THE FAR EAST, 1940-1953

Canada. Three main developments had their origin in the war, and must be noted here, although their full significance appeared later. Canada emerged from the economic stagnation of the 1930's into a period of expansion comparable with the early years of the century. The increase in relative and absolute strength brought with it an increase in status and prestige. It was, however, the change in outlook which was most significant. It resulted in part from the increase in wealth and prestige, but its spiritual causes were far more important. For the first time Canada had engaged in a great enterprise capable of commanding the support of all sections of the people. The will to win had been a deep-seated popular will. As far as is possible when fighting is kept at a distance the war had been a people's war. For nearly a year Canada had been second only to the United Kingdom in importance as a combatant in what had come to be almost universally recognized as a life and death struggle for human liberty. As more powerful allies had appeared on the scene Canada had preserved her importance by a disciplined and dignified effort in the course of which her strength had not been grudged. The result was to give form and content to Canadian nationalism. The roots of Canadian nationalism lay deep in the past. But, without the accident of the Second World War, it might never have reached full flower. A sense of unity comes from external dangers faced in comradeship; a sense of individuality from being forced to rely on one's own strength. French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians had co-operated as never before, with mutual respect and esteem. The crises which might have divided them had been skilfully avoided. Together they had participated in all phases of the struggle, the economic, the scientific, and even the diplomatic as well as the strictly military. They had feelings of confidence and pride. They had not been compelled (as less fortunate nations have at times been compelled) to make adjustments that were humiliating or degrading. Friend and foe alike treated them with respect. As has been explained in chapter I, the part which Canada was to play as one of the dramatis personae in the Pacific area would inevitably be influenced by all these changes but particularly by the deep psychological change which had occurred in Canada and which was, as we shall see, to continue in the post-war era.

3 Adjustment after the War WAR in the Pacific ended on V-J Day, August 14, 1945. For a short time Japan had enjoyed the unfruitful honour of standing up alone to an aggregation of power such as no other nation has ever faced1—enemies possessed of novel methods of ruthless destruction and provoked by Japanese behaviour to a point at which they had no strong inhibitions against using them. There could have been only one end. To have prolonged resistance would only have postponed the day on which the victorious powers would quarrel with one another. Indeed, that day might not have come, for the victorious powers spoke of each other politely as "peace-loving" and had reached, at San Francisco, agreement on a loosely constructed form of international association which, under favourable circumstances, might have ushered in an era of peace. Its failure to do so will be considered in the next chapter. At this stage we have the pleasanter task of considering briefly the very real achievements of some of the international agencies which were created.2 It is not an easy matter for victorious allies to garner the fruits of victory, even when a division of the spoils is all that is involved. It takes an unusual degree of sophistication to understand that there may well be no spoils to divide, or that the spoils may be greatly outweighed by the burdens which the victors must accept and apportion among themselves if a lasting settlement is to be reached.3 The plan for world peace, made at Dumbarton Oaks and at San Francisco, produced the United Nations Charter. It was world-wide Wot even Germany in 1917, 2or the United Kingdom in 1940, was in such an 3 untenable position. See chapters IX and X for a fuller account. There is an interesting review of the relative durability of "Peace Settlements during the last three centuries" in a data paper, entitled Canada and the Pacific after the War, by A. R. M. Lower, presented to the Ninth Conference of the I.P.R. in 1945. Professor Lower awards the record to the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 which "remained the basic law of Russo-Japanese relations until 1945." The "average" peace lasts about 12 years and 8 months! 21

22

CANADA AND THE FAR EAST, 1940-1953

in scope; but while it did not exclude the Far East it was not primarily concerned with that area. The promotion of this plan constitutes Canada's major external interest. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (U.N.R.R.A.), as its name indicated, was organized by the United Nations to alleviate hardships in devastated countries and help them to become self-supporting. Its activities did not extend to reconstruction. In theory the contributing countries, which did not themselves stand in need of relief, subscribed a uniform percentage of their national incomes while all the United Nations participated in the control. In practice nearly three-quarters of the money came from the United States and the international character of the administration would not have been politically possible if the United Kingdom, in spite of its impoverishment, had not remained a proportionately equal contributor. Canada's economic position made it possible for her to be a model member, both in meeting her financial responsibilities and in furnishing physical supplies.4 The funds were at no time adequate for the gigantic task which had been undertaken and serious problems arose in connection with their apportionment. The U.S.S.R. was dissatisfied with its share, and China insisted on the principle that human needs are the same in all countries. Canada played no great part in these disputes beyond helping others to reconcile conflicting views.5 The immediate problem of relief was soon merged in the general question of international economic assistance. In February 1946 Canada agreed to lend the Chinese Government $60,000,000 for the purchase of supplies originally requested under Mutual Aid and for the purchase of goods and services for civilian purposes. When the agreement expired on December 31, 1948, orders amounted to slightly over $51,000,000.6 Under the Export Credit Insurance Act the Canadian Government guaranteed a loan of $12,750,000 by three Canadian banks to the Ming Sing Industrial Company of Chungking for the construction of nine river vessels in Canada.7 *The Story of U.N.R.R.A. (Washington, 1948); summary in F. H. Soward, Canada in World Affairs, 1944-1946 (Toronto, 1950), pp. 82 et seq. The Canadian War Relief Fund had spent $6,500,000 on relief in China, a figure surpassed (pro rata) by no other country. 5 Canada's share of U.N.R.R.A. relief to China has been estimated at $20,000,000; D. H. Gardner, Canadian Paper no. 1, Eleventh Conference of the I.P.R., October, 1950 (mimeo.). ^ *Ibid., p. 7. flbid. Canadian loans and gifts to China, during and after the war, thus amounted to more than $100,000,000.

ADJUSTMENT AFTER THE WAR

23

Canada has participated, as will be described later, in the international efforts to promote investment in under-developed countries, in technical assistance programmes, and in the Colombo Plan. Canada has also contributed to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Programme in Korea for which $7,250,000 was voted in 1951.8 This amount, roughly proportionate to Canada's share (3.2 per cent) of the United Nations budget, was what Canada considered an appropriate contribution to a total of $250,000,000. It was, of course, for immediate needs in South Korea only and was additional to military and Red Cross relief. Canada's interest in the abortive negotiations for the constitution of the International Trade Organization (I.T.O.), the drafting of a Trade Charter, and Canada's membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.), can more conveniently be considered in connection with Canadian interest in trade with the Far East. Some aspects of Canada's internal reconstruction after the war have a very direct bearing on her relations with Asiatic countries. Even before the war ended it became urgent that something should be done about persons of Japanese origin who had been removed from their homes. Some had successfully established themselves in new surroundings. But "between February, 1942 and March, 1945 no action was taken [by the Government of Canada in relation to persons of Japanese origin] with a final, specific goal in mind."9 It is true that on August 4, 1944, the Prime Minister made a cautiously worded announcement of policy. It was a compromise between opposed views and committed the Government to nothing precise.10 Provision was made11 for a quasi-judicial commission to determine the loyalities of persons of Japanese race in Canada and to decide who might remain after the war, but no appointments to it were made. The Commissioner of Japanese Placement did, how8E.A., vol. Ill, no. 4 (April 1951), p. 130. Forrest E. La Violette, The Canadian Japanese and World War II (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1948), p. 227. 10 His speech made the following points: people of Japanese race, who have not "remained loyal" should not have the privilege of remaining in Canada after the struggle; they (i.e., those Canadian-born or alien permitted to remain) should not be allowed to concentrate in British Columbia; there should be substantial consistency of treatment with the United States but there is no need for identity of policy. (See La Violette, op. cit., p. 230.) It would be a good intellectual exercise for a law student to try his hand at drafting an amendment to the Criminal Code defining and forbidding "concentration in British Columbia." As long as controls lasted a licence was required for movement. HP.C. 7357, December 1945, withdrawn in 1947. 9

24

CANADA AND THE FAR EAST, 1940-1953

ever, post notices regarding "applications for voluntary repatriation to Japan." A free passage was offered for "repatriates" and their dependents. Those wishing to remain were urged to re-establish themselves east of the Rockies, and warned that refusal to accept employment east of the Rockies might be regarded at a later date as lack of co-operation with the Canadian Government in its programme of dispersal. There has been much controversy as to whether the applications for "repatriation," which were received in large numbers, were based on decisions freely made with full knowledge of the facts by people able to take a calm and rational view of their prospects. Later nearly half expressed a wish to revoke their decision.12 Persons of Japanese race were not alone in feeling confused. Public opinion, which had been dominantly hostile to them till the end of the war, changed very suddenly and became particularly sensitive to the type of legislative enactment necessary to implement a "tough" policy. The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act introduced into the House of Commons as Bill 15, on October 5, 1945, provided for the continuation, during a transitional period, of the wartime powers of the Government, notably the power to control "entry into Canada, exclusion and deportation, and revocation of nationality." This proposal aroused violent opposition from many quarters and the clause was dropped. On December 17, however, the Prime Minister tabled three Orders-in-Council covering the definition of classes of people deportable and conditions of deportation; the removal of Canadian nationality after deportation; and the appointment of a loyalty commission.13 The question of the validity of these orders was referred to the Supreme Court where there was a conflict of opinion.14 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on December 2, 1946, held that all three orders were valid.15 In the meantime, however, there had been a change of policy. The litigation had gained time and had directed public opinion, and perhaps governmental opinion as well, to the enormity of i2La Violette, op. cit., pp. 238, 253. 13P.G. 7355, P.G. 7356, and P.C. 7357 of December 15, 1945. See La Violette, op. cit., p. 258. 14 Rinfret C.J., Kerwin and Taschereau JJ. concurring, held the orders valid. Four other judges held them valid, except for certain clauses. ^Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians and another v. AttorneyGeneral for Canada and another, [1947] A.C. 87. The Privy Council decided that none of the Orders-in-Gouncil was in any respect ultra vires.

ADJUSTMENT AFTER THE WAR

25

forcibly deporting natural-born British subjects under the age of sixteen against whom no charge whatever had been made. Canadian-born Japanese were allowed to revoke their request for "repatriation." As early as April 15, 1946, an article in Maclean's Magazine stated confidently: "It's now an accepted thing around here [Ottawa] that no one will be sent to Japan unless (a) he still wants to go; or (b) he is found guilty of an overt and active [overt act of?] disloyalty to Canada. At the moment the Government seems to have no information that there will be any at all in the second category. About 400 were interned during the war, but mainly for 'excess zeal for free enterprise,' as one civil servant put it—they kicked too vigorously at being dispossessed from homes and businesses in British Columbia."16 On January 24, 1947, the Prime Minister announced that the three Orders-in-Council had been withdrawn. There was no enforced deportation and, in all, only 3,964 Japanese actually left for Japan.17 Grants for repatriation were stopped on September 10, 1947. Two problems remained outstanding. Could Canadian nationals return to Canada, if they had accepted a passage to Japan? And could Canadian-Japanese, who had been in Japan during the war, come back? These are matters of immigration policy. The resettlement of persons of Japanese origin who remained in Canada proceeded, on the whole, smoothly. The fact that there was very little unemployment made the process easier. So, too, did the growth of Canadian national feeling disposed to champion the rights of Canadians regardless of race, creed, or colour. Most important of all was the behaviour of the Japanese themselves. "For those who have had direct contact with the resettled Japanese, the stereotypes formed in and disseminated from British Columbia have been found to be false. The amazingly good conduct of the 16

"Backstage in Ottawa, by the Man with the Notebook," Maclean's Magazine, April 15, 1946, quoted by La Violette, op. cit., p. 271. 17 For details see La Violette, op. cit., p. 273; 9,891 had registered their intention of leaving, though at one time the number, including wives and children, had been put by the Department of Labour as high as 10,632. Of these 6,903 were over sixteen years of age; this figure comprises 2,946 Japanese nationals, 1,466 naturalized Canadians, and 2,491 Canadian-born. The average age of members of the first two groups was so high that their departure would have made very little difference to the number of persons of Japanese race ultimately living in Canada. Of the 3,964 who actually left, 1,264 were Japanese nationals; 626 were naturalized Canadians; 1,985 were Canadianborn.

26

CANADA AND THE FAR EAST, 1940-1953

Japanese resettlers in the east, the apparently slight animus which they verbalized as a result of evacuation, the brief publicity given to the few who were taken into the army in February, 1945, and the first-hand experience which has belied the stereotypes—all of these have worked to make easterners feel that citizens of Japanese ancestry should have legal equality."18 As a matter of fact, legal equality came very quickly and, what is even more important, with every symptom of permanence. The restrictions imposed by Orders-in-Council under the War Measures Act, and legislation prolonging certain extensions of the restrictions, came quietly to an end. No permanent disabilities were imposed, either by defining the "disloyalty" of which Japanese had been vaguely accused, or by defining and forbidding "concentration" in British Columbia. The movement in favour of a Canadian Bill of Rights, and Canada's signature of the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights, would both make any such legislation politically, though not constitutionally, difficult to enact. The legal disabilities in force in British Columbia applied to all persons of Asiatic race and were closely related to the right to vote. This right was very quickly conceded to persons of Chinese and "Hindu," that is, East Indian, race;19 and a few years later to persons of Japanese race as well.20 Professional disabilities imposed on persons not eligible, if of proper age, to be on the voters' list lapsed. The clause in provincial government contracts providing for heavy penalties if Orientals were employed, was dropped in 1949. The de facto prejudice against the employment of Japanese disappeared rapidly. They could compete on their merits with others as long as they did not invade any one occupation in overwhelming numbers or threaten to do so. And their merits were high. Deportation itself, if only by reducing the numbers in the higher age groups and the proportion of foreign-born, improved their average competence. Japanese came to be met in the professions and in the government service, both provincial and federal. They were no more "foreign" in outlook than many of their contemporaries of other racial origins. Popular apprehensions came to be concentrated i8La Violette, op. cit., p. 289. 19 Of course all voters must be British subjects or Commonwealth citizens. By Statutes of British Columbia, 1947, c. 28. 20/foW., 1949, c. 19; amending R.S.B.C., 1948, c. 106, ss. 2 and 4.

ADJUSTMENT AFTER THE WAR

27

against "communists/' an ideological rather than a racial category, and Japanese communists were practically unknown. In 1953, a Canadian Japanese won a Navy League of Canada scholarship enabling him to study for a naval commission in the Naval Training Division at the University of British Columbia.21 Reparation was made, if not on a wholly satisfactory scale, for property losses inflicted on innocent men by measures taken in the course of the war. For the almost total loss of earning power which had occurred in many cases during and immediately after the war no compensation was given. To all these changes the Japanese themselves responded in an exemplary manner, displaying an attachment to their status as Canadians which it was impossible for anyone to associate with disloyalty. They had suffered but, as displaced persons go in the present century, not in an extreme degree, and moderate suffering, bravely borne, commands respect and strengthens people of character. On the whole, good had come out of evil. There is no Japanese problem in Canada today. By vastly different processes two other minorities of Asiatic race have been rapidly Canadianized. China had won Canadian sympathy and had achieved the status, first of an ally, and then of a member of the Security Council. Chinese in Canada had benefited correspondingly. They had not been the object of suspicion. In the second and third generations, they are not numerous. There was somewhat less concentration than in the case of the Japanese. They had been both "acculturized" and accepted, before the emergence of Communist China. Indeed, this unexpected political development has, in a sense, cut them off from their cultural roots and made their acceptance of Canada as their primary loyalty inevitable. East Indians in Canada have always been British subjects. They became, if they so chose, Canadian citizens under the terms of the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946. It seemed, at one time, as if their status might be disturbed. But the decision of India to remain in the Commonwealth and the creation in 1950 of the status of Commonwealth citizen has preserved it. Their somewhat incongruous position of being Canadian citizens disaffected because of the political subjection of India has completely disappeared, and, as they no longer have any reason to press on the Canadian Govern21

Vancouver Province, January 3, 1953.

28

CANADA AND THE FAR EAST, 1940-1953

ment demands connected with the status of India, they emphasize in every possible way their own status as Canadians.22 The status of minorities of Asiatic race was powerfully, if indirectly, affected by the enactment of the Canadian Citizenship Act.23 In a general way very few disabilities had been imposed on aliens because Canadian provinces, unlike states of the United States, were constitutionally incompetent to legislate on such a subject.24 While the new enactment in no way decreased the number of people who could be prejudiced by provincial legislation discriminatory on racial grounds, the tendency was to suggest that Canadian citizens, as defined by the Act, were somewhat more genuinely Canadian than other British subjects resident in Canada and that they were entitled to equal treatment irrespective of racial origins. No category corresponding to aliens ineligible for citizenship was created. And no Canadian citizens could possibly be considered as having been forced on Canada as part of the British Empire. Because of the peculiar position of Canada in relation to the British Empire and the Commonwealth, the provisions of the Act, as amended in 1950,25 are somewhat complicated. In addition to the categories of natural-born Canadian citizens and aliens, there are British subjects or Commonwealth Citizens (for the purposes of the Act the two terms mean the same thing) who have become Canadians, Citizens of the Republic of Ireland (other than Commonwealth) who have become Canadians, aliens who have become Canadians, and those British subjects, or Commonwealth Citizens, and those Citizens of the Republic of Ireland who are not Canadians but are also not aliens. All Canadians are British subjects. The acid test of a change of heart in racial questions is to be 22 The writer was a guest at a dinner of the Khalsa Diwan to celebrate the anniversary of the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Among the guests of honour were members of the provincial and federal governments including members who had, a few years before, been conspicuous as anti-Asiatic. The tone of the speeches demonstrated a number of things: the Canadianization of the Indians; the value of the franchise which they had acquired, both in making them feel that they were really Canadian and in making politicians remember that they had votes; the general dislike, in Canada, of disabilities based on race, which itself is largely the outcome of dislikes based on ideologies, and the wish for allies. 2310 Geo. VI, c. 15. 24 For the extent of discrimination against aliens in certain states of the United States see M. R. Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law (New York, 1946), chap. 6. 2514 Geo. VI, c. 29.

ADJUSTMENT AFTER THE WAR

29

found in the immigration law. Each of the three Asiatic races must be considered in turn. The long-standing "gentlemen's agreement" with Japan ended with the war and has not been replaced. Although, in principle, immigration from Japan is not permitted it does occur in certain cases: the wives of soldiers; Canadian nationals resident in Japan and who did not fight against the United Nations; close relatives of Canadians of Japanese origin. Canada also receives Japanese students who do not intend to remain and who are, therefore, not immigrants. The Chinese Immigration Act,26 which was a standing insult to a friendly people, has been repealed.27 Nominated immigration has been permitted in the case of wife and children. But no quota agreement was reached with the National Government of China and none has been attempted with the Central People's Government, which Canada does not recognize. In the case of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon the virtual prohibition of all but the wives and children of residents of Canada28 has been superseded by quotas mutually agreed on by an exchange of notes with the government concerned. Canadian quotas differ from those in use in the United States. They do not apply to all countries. They are not based on a formula but are established by negotiation with the country to which they apply. It remains to be seen whether they can be made the basis for a comprehensive and permanent policy. As yet the quotas are employed only within the Commonwealth. The year 1953 has furnished further evidence of the improvement of race relations in Canada. The welcome extended to the Japanese Crown Prince, Akihito, was warm and friendly. The participation of Canadians of Japanese race on this occasion was particularly significant and met with general approval by other Canadians. 2613 and 14 Geo. V, c. 38. 2711 Geo. VI, c. 19. 28See E.A., vol. Ill, no. 11 (November 1951), p. 376, for text of exchange of notes in Karachi, on October 23, 1951, according Pakistan a quota of 100 per annum in addition to husband, wife, or unmarried children under 21 of a citizen of Canada if the settlement arrangements in Canada are shown to be satisfactory. The annual quota of 100 citizens of Pakistan, including both sexes and all ages, is authorized, provided the immigrants comply with the provisions of the Canadian Immigration Act. In addition a citizen of Pakistan, who can comply with the provisions of the Act, may be admitted for permanent residence if he or she is the husband, wife, or unmarried child under 21 years of age of any citizen legally admitted to and resident of Canada, and if the settlement arrangements in Canada are shown to the Canadian authorities to be satisfactory.

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They did not appear to forget for a moment that Canada was their country of primary allegiance. They naturally desire, as Canadians of other races desire, the most friendly relations with their country of ancestral origin. Many of them go so far as to say that, great as was the moral shock and great as were the hardships of the deportation, good has come out of evil and that they have benefited in the long run. They have made homes and friends throughout the country and have begun to establish themselves in occupations barely open to them before the war. Twenty-four are in the army, of whom eleven are in Korea and twelve in Japan. They are accepted in both the Navy and the Air Force. Their chief concern today is with the immigration question. What they ask is not a general quota, such as has been established by agreement for India, Pakistan, and Ceylon, but the admission, perhaps by a system of decreasing quotas, of relatives of Canadian residents. The restrictive measures of which they complain are those excluding Canadians who accompanied their parents to Japan under a wartime exchange agreement, men who served (perhaps by compulsion) in the Japanese armed forces, persons who left Canada as children under sixteen because their parents had elected for "repatriation," former residents of Canada who went back to Japan but who regret their decision, and Japanese nationals barred by immigration laws. Representations to the Government of Canada have met with a sympathetic reception.29 Canadians of Chinese race, too, are fast coming to feel more Canadian and less Chinese. Their interest in the political vicissitudes of China is difficult to appraise because support for the Central People's Government is less likely to be overt than support for earlier revolutionary movements. The obvious cleavage is between those prepared to give active assistance to the National Government and those who consider that, as Canadians, they should be neutral. Canadians of East Indian race, as has been noted, are emphatically Canadian. Greater ease of communication with India and relaxation of barriers to immigration on a small scale have made them more contented and, at the same time, more aware that they are much better off in Canada than they would be in India. In all three cases, Canadians in general and British Columbians in particular are receiving the reward for their enfranchisement of 29 See, for instance, The New Canadian (Toronto), vol. XVI, nos. 31, 35 (April 22 and May 6, 1953).

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Asiatics and their condemnation of racial discrimination as between Canadian citizens. A bill which is (as at May, 1953) before the Parliament of Canada, where it is meeting little opposition, would forbid discrimination in employment, not by amending the criminal law, but by applying the rule to enterprises controlled by the federal government. This increasingly generous attitude to racial differences has not yet been put to the test of mass unemployment which provides the real criterion of sincerity in such matters.

4 Canadian Policy in the Far East CANADA'S interest in the war in Korea involves three aspects of her international policy which are not easy to harmonize with one another. The first concerns the fulfilment of Canada's obligations as a member of the United Nations; the second Canada's interest in the establishment of collective security; the third Canada's interest in checking the spread of communist power. It would be easy to construct hypothetical cases in which one or other of these policies would have to be sacrificed; it is the task of statesmanship to avoid being forced to face such issues. A conscientious writer is confronted with a dilemma; he must appear as an enfant terrible, or as a blind man. If a statesman had to undergo the sort of gruelling cross-examination to which someone claiming to be a conscientious objector is exposed, he might be asked to say what he would conceive it to be his duty to do if his country had subscribed to a collective security agreement only to find that its most friendly and trusted neighbour was about to make an unprovoked and unannounced attack on the country it most distrusted—if, for instance, the United States were to "Copenhagen" the Russian Air Force. Neither Canada nor her statesmen could respond to this sort of hypothetical questioning and emerge untarnished. In Korea, however, Canada was lucky in the sense in which Britain was lucky when Kruger sent his ultimatum, or when Germany invaded Belgium. It was possible to comply with United Nations procedures because the U.S.S.R. was not represented at the Council meeting; it was possible to oppose communism because its champions did not include a member with an effective veto. It was possible to do as a matter of obligation what might well have been done as a matter of policy and to present the bill to the electorate as the cost of a necessity. All this can be put a little differently. For Canada the United 32

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Nations, in so far as it approximates to a system of collective security, is a rationalization of almost precisely what Canada would choose to do as a matter of policy. In the Far East this is especially true. Canada has no interests which she would fight there to maintain, other than the protection of her territorial sovereignty. Canada is, indeed, waging war today, but is doing so in performance of her United Nations obligations to the extent necessary to uphold a system which, in the main, promises more good than evil. Like many political innovations, the United Nations came into being when people were so emotionally exalted that they were blind to its shortcomings, ready to overlook them, or willing to accept them as necessary evils. This is the condition under which commitments can be undertaken even though they are not precisely defined and under which, therefore, agreement can be reached in spite of wide divergence of interest. It was in order to secure general and speedy acceptance that no provision was made in the Charter for contingencies that were not only theoretically possible but almost certain to arise in practice sooner or later. If the spirit of the Charter had prevailed no doubt these contingencies would have presented no great practical difficulties; but to assume that the spirit would prevail is precisely the act of irrational faith that excited emotions are most likely to demand. Among many possible contingencies three deserve consideration here. No provision was made for the event of a country, admitted to permanent membership in the Council as a great power, ceasing to be a foremost power, either because of disintegration through revolution, or because of the rise in relative importance of some other power. No explicit provision was made for action by the Council to stop aggression by the protege or satellite of a great power. The danger of the rearmament of defeated enemies (peacehating powers?) was exaggerated and that of conflict among the victors belittled; that is to say, of two lessons from the experience of the past, one was stressed, the other ignored. It is easy to excuse the generous emotions of the people. But, unless statesmen were themselves carried away by emotion, it is harder to excuse their cynicism. In Canada, emotional enthusiasm for the U.S.S.R. reached a very high pitch at the end of the war. The sufferings of the Russians commanded universal sympathy, their military efforts universal respect. But emotional enthusiasms cannot be kept in bounds. Much that was harsh and cruel was over-

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looked or brushed aside as incidental to the dangers of war time. The adjective "peace-loving" was applied, not merely as a conventional term of address, like "friendly" or "honourable" in domestic political life, but probably in all seriousness with the expectation that collaboration in pursuit of peace would take the form of willingness to live and let live, to practise give and take, to bear minor irritations with patience and understanding, to accept majority decisions as having a high persuasive value which should be disregarded only when major vital issues are at stake. This view was highly uncritical and cannot, of course, be attributed to a rational man. But statesmen might, and did, take advantage of its existence to begin a work of political construction which might, with luck, have developed the very qualities which were so ardently desired. Canadian opinion received a rude shock in what came to be known as the "spy trials."1 The U.S.S.R., and other states as well, have done far worse things than those of which Russian agents were accused. But the disclosures came at a moment when Canadians were experiencing emotional enthusiasm for the U.S.S.R. There seemed no reasonable motive for Russian espionage unless there was either profound hostility towards, or profound distrust of, Canadians. Both these sentiments were resented as unjustified. But resentment went further. An ordinary act of vulgar treachery for pecuniary motives is relatively easy to detect, whether by observing the offender's way of life, or by examining his bank balance and his portfolio; but conscientious motives have no such objective manifestations: they are associated in "Anglo-Saxon" minds with religion in a way which precludes any imputation of mendacity or even of concealment. A secret conscience is as terrifying as smokeless powder or silent firearms. The police methods necessary for its control are repulsive. It seemed as if these methods might have to become a permanent part of our own public life. Matters that could be overlooked at a distance were brought home forcibly and brutally to people who would only too gladly have ignored them if they could have done so. This brief commentary on opinion has been necessary, though it may have been inadequate, to prepare the way for a study of the change by which an alliance, designed to restrict the U.S.S.R. and ipor details of the "spying," see report of the commission appointed under P.C. 411 in 1946.

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recognize the division of the world into two hostile camps, came to command the same sort of emotional enthusiasm as the attempt to form one world by the Charter of the United Nations had commanded a few years before. Indeed, opinion has insisted on identifying the two things—subtly interwoven incongruities like Buddhism and Shinto in Japan—so that today war is raging in Korea in the name of peace, and a conflict with communist powers has been undertaken in the name of world unity. The conflict is natural enough but the choice of flag is strange. With this brief survey of opinion as a background, we can deal separately with several issues on which Canadian policy had to be formulated. Of these the first was intervention by force of arms in Korea.2 Intervention appeared as a United Nations policy and, indeed, as a crucial test of the willingness of the United Nations to act vigorously against aggression. The decision was supported by Canada. Canadian participation followed as a matter of course. The sole issue was its extent and its form. There is a curious gradation in the type of assistance which nations are willing to accord to one another. The lowest is what used to be called benevolent neutrality. Then comes organized assistance in providing supplies against payment and in facilitating loans. Next in order are operations of the character of Lend-Lease or Mutual Aid. Active military help may take the form of facilitating recruitment of trained or untrained personnel; that of providing non-combatant assistance, such as medical services; that of providing specialists; that of forces manned by specialists, for example, an air detachment; that of naval assistance which is not likely to suffer heavy casualties; penultimately that of the provision of the ground forces which have to face the greatest hardships, have to be recruited in large numbers at a popular level, and have to face the heaviest casualties; finally that of the provision of conscript soldiers. In Korea, Canada has gone through every stage except the final one which, for historic reasons, presents peculiar difficulties. For this almost exemplary record the reason was that, while direct Canadian interests were not at stake, there was nearly universal recognition of the need for a substantial contribution by Canada in order to preserve the collective character of the international action and in order to maintain Canadian prestige—perhaps one may go so far as to say self-respect. The extent of the 2

The record at the United Nations is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

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contribution had to bear some rough and ready proportion to what was being done by other comparable countries, with due regard to commitments elsewhere. A decision of some importance concerned the question of whether the Canadian contribution should be primarily associated with that of the United States or with that of the Commonwealth. A number of imponderables were involved. In the case of the ground forces, the outcome was the presence of a Canadian brigade in a Commonwealth division. The same considerations did not apply in the case of air and naval forces. Air transport planes were provided immediately because they were readily available and, for obvious reasons, it was in close association with the United States that this assistance was furnished. Three destroyers were sent and, again for obvious reasons, were made part of an integrated naval effort. All in all, the Canadian contribution has been substantial and stands up well in comparison with what other countries have done, unless it is measured as a fraction, corresponding to the ratio of population or even of national income, which Canada bears to the United States. This crude test, which consists in multiplying the Canadian ground forces, numbering about 5,500, by either 12 or 16, as a rough and ready index of relative population or national income, and comparing the product with the numbers of the United States ground forces, is considered irritating when applied by Americans.3 The second major issue which Canadian policy had to face concerned the recognition of the Communist regime as the government of China. This recognition had been accorded by the Republic of India, and by the United Kingdom, but not by the United States. On the simple test of realism, the recognition of a de facto government in order to be able to transact business, Canada might have been expected to follow the example of India and the United Kingdom. But this was not an urgent reason for there was not much business to transact and the friendly services of other Commonwealth countries were available. Besides, there were complications. The first complication concerned the curious character of the United Nations Charter which would (presumably) have given a government generally recognized as the government of China a seat 3 See Mr. Pearson's speech of April 10, 1951, to the Empire and Canadian Clubs of Toronto, E.A., vol. VIII, no. 5 (May 1951), p. 159.

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not only in the General Assembly but also on the Council as one of the permanent members and, with much more reason, would have denied such a seat to its predecessor. There is no procedure prescribed for ascertaining the sincerity with which a new regime accepts the purposes of the United Nations or the way in which it understands these purposes. The second complication concerned the ambiguous status of Formosa, which was to be ceded by Japan to "China" and was occupied by the forces of the National Government of China en parlance, with the support of the United States. Had a recognized government of China the right to unhindered action in suppressing a rival in occupation of Chinese territory? Would recognition by Canada challenge inevitably the validity of a policy formally announced by the United States and so help the cause of communism? Canadian hesitation, conditioned by these considerations, was obvious: recognition was not accorded to Communist China. Indeed, the case against recognition was immensely strengthened when Communist China by extending informal aid to North Korea acted contrary to the purposes of the United Nations, as these purposes had been interpreted by the Council (in the absence of the U.S.S.R.) and by the Assembly. Recognition would obviously have to depend on some reconciliation of the policy of Communist China and the purposes of the United Nations. This, in turn, would depend on the cessation of hostilities in Korea. Behind these complications, of which Canadians were aware, lay a more profound question of power policy. It is stated very clearly by C. P. Fitzgerald.4 Everyone knows that Asian absentee landlordism, usury and bureaucratic racketeering are the principal obstacles to any advance or any rise in the standard of living in Asia. Social reform came too late in the Far East to be the child of either Liberalism or Socialism; revolutionary thought had outstripped these movements and passed on to the Left. It was Communism which inherited all of the programme which in the West was first known as Liberal. Thus, to oppose New Democracy is not merely to resist the progress of Russian imperialism, but also to take sides with reaction. The weakness of western policy in Asia today is that it is negative. Communism must be stopped, but in favour of what? Not democracy, for few of these countries have it or any prospect of it. The only alternative proves to be those in power today, whoever they are, however they got there. 4 "Peace or War with China/' Pacific Affairs, vol. XXIV, no. 4 (December 1951).

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The application of these ideas to China follows later in the same article: The West has to make up its mind about the Chinese Revolution: either to oppose it at the constant risk of war, the eventual loss of all Asian support, and the probable failure of such a policy, or to decide what can be conceded and what should be asked in return. If a peace settlement in Korea is worked out, it will be on terms which will yield North Korea to China. This is a realistic decision, but none the less a lowering of the aims which the West at one time entertained. Recognition of the Peking government and the seating of its representatives in the United Nations is obviously an offer which the West could make without endangering the peace of the World or the security of the home countries. These opinions have been quoted at length because they indicate issues which it is very difficult for the United Nations, or its members, to state frankly. It is not as students either of the debates in the General Assembly or of Hansard that Canadians can become aware of them. Perhaps neither the United Nations itself nor those of its members who are engaged actively in military operations in Korea can formulate policies for "the West." The Commonwealth is perhaps a better organization for the discussion of problems affecting East and West, and it may have the ear of the United States. For realists, it is United States policy which must dominate. The conduct of the war in Korea was the third of the major issues confronting Canada. It comprised some very interesting points. One was the degree of control of its armed forces which a participating member of the United Nations should retain in the course of operations under a combined command.5 No one would have undertaken to prescribe a set of principles, but questions of detail were bound to arise, as such a question did arise when Canadian forces were detached for use in connection with the custody of prisoners. A second point concerned the military objectives of the campaign. The purpose of the United Nations, expressed in the phrase "a united Korea," required more than the expulsion of the North Korean invaders, but the military occupation of North Korea was not unlikely to lead, as it did in fact lead, to an extension of the conflict. The demarcation of the field of authority of the Commander of the 5See E.A., vol. IV, no. 6 (June 1952), pp. 223-24, for the text of the Canadian note to Washington concerning the assignment of a company of Canadian troops to Koje Island where prisoners of war were detained, and ibid., vol. IV, no. 7 (July 1952), p. 263, for Mr. Pearson's statement in the House of Commons.

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United Nations forces from that of the President of the United States and that of the United Nations itself was not clear. When the approach of United Nations forces to the borders of Manchuria and Siberia led to the intervention of Communist China and, eventually, to the establishment of a fairly static front near the 38th parallel, Canadian policy and Canadian opinion favoured the negotiation of a cease-fire to be followed by a discussion of the whole situation in the Far East, difficult as it obviously was to mix negotiations based on force with negotiations based on the somewhat controversial purposes of the United Nations. The charges of inhumanity and even of germ warfare freely made against the United States in communist circles commanded no general credence in Canada and were, except in the very limited groups attracted by them, treated more as indications of the unscrupulous character of communist propaganda and of the incredible credulity of communist well-wishers.6 The fourth issue concerned a threat to peace in an even more remote area. Canada had special reasons for taking an interest in the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir which was brought before the United Nations. The dispute was between two Commonwealth countries, with both of which Canada was on the most friendly terms. War between them would have destroyed the Commonwealth as a world-wide organization at a time when its acceptance by India gave a much-needed element of security. Furthermore both India and Pakistan were sincere in their United Nations membership and a violent clash between them would have been a disaster for that organization. It might well be that the United Nations could not expect to cope with the deep-seated conflict of communist and non-communist powers; but failure to settle a territorial dispute between two members both of which recognized its status and its honesty of purpose would have been an admission of impotence. Where no basic principle was at stake, and no vital act of self-preservation, the very term "peace-loving" would be a mockery if an amicable settlement could not be reached. Nor could India and Pakistan be safely allowed to feel that a matter on which they both felt deeply and passionately did not receive sympathetic study from their associates whether in the Commonwealth or in the United Nations. On all these matters there are basic dissimilarities between Cana