Canada and Immigration 9780773561519

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
PREFACE
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Part One: International Migration since 1945
1. The International Scene
2. The Canadian Experience
Part Two: The Evolution of Canadian Immigration Policy
3. Prologue
4. Policy and Program, 1946–1957
5. Policy and Program, 1957–1963
6. Policy and Program, 1963–1971
Part Three: The Provinces and Immigration
7. The Shared Jurisdiction
8. Ontario and Quebec
Part Four: Overseas Operations
9. Overseas Immigration Service
10. Overseas Immigration Offices: Some Personal Impressions
Part Five: The Voluntary Sector
11. The Voluntary Sector and Government
12. The Voluntary Sector in Retrospect
Part Six: Immigration Management
13. Immigration Management
14. New Needs and New Policies
Part Seven: Sequel, 1972–1986
15. Sequel, 1972–1986
APPENDIXES
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
Y
Z

Citation preview

CANADA AND IMMIGRATION Public Policy and Public Concern

CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERIES COLLECTION ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE CANADIENNE J. E. Hodgetts, General Editor/Redacteur en chef The Institute of Public Administration of Canada L'Institut d'Administration publique du Canada This series is sponsored by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada as part of its constitutional commitment to encourage research on contemporary issues in Canadian public administration and public policy, and to foster wider knowledge and understanding amongst practitioners and the concerned citizen. There is no fixed number of volumes planned for the series, but under the supervision of the Research Committee of the Institute and the General Editor, efforts will be made to ensure that significant areas will receive appropriate attention. L'Institut d'Administration publique du Canada commandite cette collection dans le cadre de ses engagements statutaires. II se doit de promouvoir la recherche sur des problemes d'actualite portant sur 1'administration publique et la determination des politiques publiques ainsi que d'encourager les praticiens et les citoyens interesses a les mieux connaitre et a les mieux comprendre. II n'a pas etc prevu de nombre de volumes donne pour la collection mais, sous la direction du Redacteur en chef et du Comite de recherche de 1'Institut, Ton s'efforce d'accorder 1'attention voulue aux questions importantes.

The Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1908-1967 J. E. Hodgetts, William McCloskey, Reginald Whitaker, V. Seymour Wilson An edition in French has been published under the title Histoire d'une institutin: La Commission de la Fonction publique du Canada, 1908-1967, by les Presses de 1'Universite Laval Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada Kenneth Bryden Provincial Governments as Employers: A Survey of Public Personnel Administration in Canada's Provinces J. E. Hodgetts and O. P. Dwivedi Transport in Transition: The Reorganization of the Federal Transport Portfolio John W. Langford Initiative and Response: The Adaptation of Canadian Federalism to Regional Economic Development Anthony G. S. Careless Canada's Salesman to the World: The Department of Trade and Commerce, 1892-1929 O. Mary Hill Conflict over the Columbia: The Canadian Background to an Historic Treaty Neil A. Swainson L'Economiste et la chose publique Jean-Luc Migue (Published by le Presses de FUniversite du Quebec) Federalism, Bureaucracy, and Public Policy: The Politics of Highway Transport Regulation Richard J. Schultz Federal-Provincial Collaboration: The Canada-New Brunswick General Development Agreement Donald J. Savoie

Judicial Administration in Canada Perry S. Millar and Carl Baar The Language of the Skies: The Bilingual Air Traffic Control Conflict in Canada Sandford F. Borins An edition in French is distributed under the title Le frangais dans les airs: le conflit du bilinguisme dans le controle de la circulation aerienne au Canada by les Presses de 1'Universite du Quebec L'Analyse des politiques gouvernementales: trois monographies Michel Bellavance, Roland Parenteau et Maurice Patry (Published by les Presses de 1'Universite Laval) Canadian Social Welfare Policy: Federal and Provincial Dimensions Edited by Jacqueline S. Ismael Maturing in Hard Times: Canada's Department of Finance through the Great Depression Robert B. Bryce Pour comprendre 1'appareil judiciare quebecois Monique Giard et Marcel Proulx (Published by les Presses de 1'Universite du Quebec) Histoire de 1'adminstration publique quebecoise 1867-1970 James Iain Gow (Published by les Presses de 1'Universite de Montreal) Health Insurance and Canadian Public Policy: The Seven Decisions That Created the Canadian Health Insurance System and Their Outcomes Malcolm G. Taylor Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern Second Edition Freda Hawkins

Second Edition

C A N A D A A N D IMMIGRATION Public Policy and Public Concern

FREDA HAWKINS

The Institute of Public Administration of Canada L'Institut d'Administration publique du Canada McGill-Queen's University Press Kingston and Montreal

McGill-Queen's University Press 1988 ISBN 0-7735-0632-2 (cloth) ISBN 0-7735-0633-0 (paper) Legal deposit 3rd quarter 1988 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec First published in cloth and paper 1972 Second edition published in cloth and paper 1988 Printed in Canada on acid-free paper Publication has been assisted by financial support from the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Hawkins. Freda. 1918Canada and immigration (Canadian public administration series) 2nd. ed. Includes index. Bibliography: p. ISBN 0-7735 0632-2 (bound) ISBN 0-77 \V06V-0 ' p b k . ) 1. Canada Emigration and immigration Governmen; policy I . Title. II. Series. JV7225 H3 I9XX

12571

C88-090092-X

Contents PREFACE

XI

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Part One:

3. 4. 5. 6.

71 89 119 139

The Provinces and Immigration

1. The Shared Jurisdiction 8. Ontario and Quebec Part Four:

3 33

The Evolution of Canadian Immigration Policy

Prologue Policy and Program, 1946-1957 Policy and Program, 1957-1963 Policy and Program, 1963-1971

Part Three:

XIX

International Migration since 1945

1. The International Scene 2. The Canadian Experience Part Two:

XV

177 201

Overseas Operations

9. Overseas Immigration Service 237 10. Overseas Immigration Offices: Some Personal Impressions 267

CONTENTS

Part Five:

The Voluntary Sector

11. The Voluntary Sector and Government 12. The Voluntary Sector in Retrospect Part Six:

Immigration Management

13. Immigration Management 14. New Needs and New Policies Part Seven:

Vlll

291 303

325 355

Sequel, 1972-1986

15. Sequel, 1972-1986

373

APPENDIXES

401

NOTES

427

BIBLIOGRAPHY

453

INDEX

465

Tables 1 Canadian Immigration, 1962-1967, Professional and Technical Workers 2 U.S. Immigration, 1962-1967, Professional, Technical, and Kindred Workers 3 Immigration to Canada, 1945-1970 4 Immigration from the United States, 1950-1970 5 Intended Occupational Groups of Immigrants, 1946-1970 6 Major Source Countries, 1946-1967 7 Immigration from North and South America, 1946-1967 8 Immigration from Asia, 1946-1967 9 Immigration from the Middle East, 1955-1967 10 Major Source Countries, 1967-1970 11 Continental Sources of Immigration, 1946-1970 12 Country of Former Residence of Immigrants, 1946-1970 13 Intended Destination of Immigrants, 1967-1970 14 Intended Destination of Immigrants, 1946-1970 15 Immigration to Canada, 1931-1946 16 Immigration Service Employees, 1931-1946 17 Immigration Service Expenditures, 1931-1946 18 Immigration Backlog, All Countries, 1955-1959 19 Selective Immigration Service, Volume of Business 20 Immigration Offices Abroad, 1970 21 Canadian Voluntary Agencies

22 23 38 42 45 54 55 55 56 56 57 58 65 66 81 81 81 123 208 249 293

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Preface THIS BOOK ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE an analysis and record of twenty-five years of Canadian immigration. It tries to show how Canada has managed immigration since the Second World War and what the realities of political and bureaucratic control have been in this important sector of public policy. Beyond a small group of politicians and officials and a small number of voluntary organizations, very little is known about immigration in Canada. Few Canadians are aware of the exact nature of our immigration policy or how immigration is managed. Nor do they often know where our immigrants are coming from nor, in any detail, where they settle. That Canada is a major receiving country in international migration with a liberal immigration policy and a long record of assistance to refugees are facts better known abroad than at home. And since Canadian politicians of all parties maintain a decorous silence on this subject and the press examines it only intermittently, public discussion of immigration in Canada is minimal. This study, the first full-length work on Canadian immigration policy for fifteen years, is an attempt by one political scientist to fill this current and serious information gap in Canadian politics. It is written in the belief that immigration will continue to play a vital part in Canadian life, but that serious thought should now be given to the development of a population policy for Canada related to our future political, social, and environmental needs and to the role which immigration should play within it. Immigration must be considered now in relation to our own population growth and the rapid expansion of our labour force, but we also need an immigration policy for Canada which takes into account our ownership of more unoccupied living space than an overcrowded world an af ord to ignore. The narrow concept of immigration as a manpower policy which

PREFACE

has prevailed for the last six years, valuable though it has been in some respects, is not adequate for these purposes. There are two principal foundations on which this study is based. The first is a very liberal agreement which was worked out in March 1966 between senior officials of the new Department of Manpower and Immigration, my academic advisers at the University of Toronto, and myself. It gave me access to departmental files, except those which were highly classified or related to personnel, and permission to interview all members of the Department of Manpower and Immigration and of the former Department of Citizenship and Immigration, in Canada and overseas. The cooperation and help which I have had from this Department and its officers has been most impressive. I have interviewed some three hundred and fifty present and former staff members and have talked to some immigration officers many times. They have not only provided essential information, but have always been ready to discuss their own views, experience, and philosophy of immigration which has been invaluable. There has been a remarkable absence of administrative secrecy. The agreement itself contained no departmental veto of any kind. On the contrary, it stipulated that any differences of opinion which might arise in relation to interpretation of official material or interviews would be "negotiated" between department officials and the author. As it turned out, and despite the fact that this is a critical study, these differences have been minor. The other foundation on which this study rests is my own experience as an immigrant arriving from Britain with my husband and daughter in 1955, and the knowledge I then acquired of the Canadian community and voluntary sector during many years' association in Toronto with voluntary agencies concerned with immigration. This has helped to provide an awareness of the basic needs of immigrants and the extent to which these needs are being met in Canada, without which any study of Canadian immigration policy and programs would be meaningless. Two other receiving countries, the United States and Australia, have been used throughout this study as sources of reference about similar or alternative approaches to immigration management and the many problems it presents. Space permitting, I would have liked to include more information about their immigration policies and experience. But the reader will find that I have used these countries for comparative purposes in discussing some of the principal issues in Canadian immigration. Since writing the major part of this book, I have had an opportunity of spending a year in Britain to study British immigration and race relations, followed by a short visit to Israel to learn more about the work of the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. The more I have seen of the immigration process in different political environments, the more convinced I am that xii

PREFACE

immigration, in nearly all its aspects, is a common experience for individuals and for governments. Immigrants in Toronto, Sydney, Tel Aviv, Birmingham, and Chicago go through a very similar experience, I believe, in settling into a new society and they need very much the same kinds of help. For this and other obvious reasons, it is urged in this study that Canada should contribute now, in a much more positive way than in the past, towards the development of increasing international communication and consultation in relation to migration, whether that migration be intercountry or intracontinental, permanent or temporary. It would help to Improve the lot of immigrants and migrants and to lessen some of the political tensions involved in migration today, if information on this subject were shared to a much greater extent between the countries involved; and if common efforts were made towards the development of standards of good practice in employment and adjustment policies, immigration control, and in the protection of the individual and group rights of immigrants and migrants.

Xlll

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Preface to the Second Edition REMARKABLE CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE in Canadian immigration policy, law, and management since this book was first published in the final months of 1972. A long-awaited new Immigration Act was passed in 1976 and became law in 1978. This marked the beginning of a new, more liberal, and more co-operative era in Canadian immigration with better laws, closer federal-provincial collaboration, more confident and effective management, and a better and more open relationship with the public and the media. The new Act established clear and liberal national objectives in immigration and refugee policy. It introduced a completely new immigration planning process involving extensive consultation with the provinces and with the public, leading to an annual statement by the Minister in Parliament on the numbers of immigrants and refugees likely to be admitted to Canada within a specified period of time—at present the next three years. The whole system of immigration control and enforcement was also modernized and improved in the Act and, among other innovations, new and imaginative ways of involving the public in refugee sponsorship were introduced. Since 1972 we have also seen the gradual development of better funding and support for voluntary agencies involved in the settlement and adjustment of immigrants and refugees. Multiculturalism within a bilingual framework was established as a national policy in 1971, has had a varied and sometimes turbulent history since then, but has gradually become an important part of Canadian life. There has also been a slowly growing concern with Canada's present demographic dilemmas and the final emergence, at last, of real efforts to lay the foundations for population policies to which immigration can be related. Some of the problems discussed in this book have, therefore, been solved or dealt with in various ways.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Others have not, notably our continuing failure to overcome—despite greater efficiency—the fragmentation and loss of overall authority of immigration management since it became part of the new Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966. As predicted in part in this book, there have been major developments also in international migration. Refugees and refugee movements multiplied in the 1970s, culminating in the very large and dramatic Indochinese refugee movement which attracted world-wide attention and is not over yet. Refugees on the continent of Africa, fleeing drought, hunger, and war, have become more numerous than in any other region. During the past two decades at least, there has been a striking shift from north to south in the national origins of immigrants. Control of illegality in immigration, in all its forms, is becoming more difficult. We have also seen a large, world-wide increase in the number of undocumented migrants, mainly from Third World countries, who are attempting, by all available means including claims to refugee status, to move to countries with more stable political systems and higher standards of living. In the absence of any serious efforts by the international community to deal with the vast north-south socio-economic divide, these are without doubt the beginnings of a major out-migration from the Third World. This book is a portrait of Canadian immigration from the end of the Second World War to the early seventies. It is a record and analysis of immigration policies, laws, and methods of management during this period, as well as an account of the attitudes and beliefs of the politicians and officials who developed and managed this area of public policy. It was a pioneering study in that it looked, for the first time, at all aspects of Canadian immigration and paid as much attention to management and to the problems facing immigration managers as it did to immigration policy and policy makers. It also recorded some important moments in the post-war history of Canadian immigration which might otherwise have been forgotten. The text of the first edition has not been altered except to correct typographical errors; the facts and statistics have been left as they were in 1972. A final chapter, "Sequel, 1972-1986," has been added in which I discuss what has happened in the ensuing years in most of the different aspects of Canadian immigration discussed in this book. The Appendixes have been revised and updated. For a more detailed study of the period from 1972 to 1986 and the remarkable changes that have taken place in Canadian immigration, readers should turn to my new comparative study of Canadian and Australian immigration entitled Critical Years in Immigration, Canada and Australia Compared, also published by McGillQueen's University Press (1988). xvi

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Although Canada's immigration policies and management during the period from the Second World War to the early seventies had some serious weaknesses and left many things undone, it is important to remember that the whole operation was remarkably successful. Some millions of immigrants and refugees settled successfully in Canada during a period in which this country was doubling her population, through a combination of natural increase and immigration, without undue stress or strain. There is no doubt that this very large post-war movement of immigrants and refugees to Canada has been of immeasurable benefit to a small nation in a vast, under-populated territory—strengthening, invigorating, and diversifying her economic, social, and cultural life in innumerable ways. University of Warwick, April 1987.

F. H.

xvn

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Acknowledgements THERE ARE A GREAT MANY PEOPLE whom I would like to thank for the help they have given me in a long quest for facts and opinions on Canadian immigration. I cannot mention them all by name, but they include former Ministers and Deputy Ministers, Members of Parliament, the staffs of national organizations and voluntary agencies, a great many immigrants, and a great many officials in Canada and overseas. They also include the Chairman and fellow members of the Department of Manpower and Immigration's Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants. I have had a great deal of help from the provinces as well as from the federal government, and I would like to mention particularly and to thank officials of the Citizenship Branch of the Ministry of Community and Social Services, as well as the staff of the Selective Placement Service of the Ministry of Industry and Tourism in Ontario, and officials of the Department of Immigration in Quebec. My very special thanks, however, go to two groups of people: first, the members of the Immigration Division of the Department of Manpower and Immigration (in Canada and overseas, in the regions as well as in Ottawa) and to the former members of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. I have already mentioned the major contribution which they have made to this study. Secondly, special thanks to my friends in the voluntary agencies in Toronto—the board and staff in recent years of the International Institute and other agencies, the former members of the Immigration Section of the Social Planning Council, and others—the small group of people who have worked indefatigably for the welfare of immigrants in that city. I would like to mention specifically also two friends at the University of Toronto to whom I am greatly indebted: Professor J. Stefan Dupre,

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Chairman of the Department of Political Economy, and Professor J. E. Hodgetts, Professor of Public Administration and Editor of the Canadian Public Administration Series, who have watched over this study since it started officially in 1966. I am most grateful for their continuous support and encouragement. My warmest thanks also to two other friends, Arthur and Mavis Stinson, for their friendly hospitality and unflagging interest and moral support on my many visits to Ottawa. Research for this study which has involved a good deal of travelling overseas and in Canada has been very generously financed by the Canada Council and the Institute of Public Administration of Canada and I would like to express my grateful thanks to them. I have had the great benefit of the research facilities of a government department, but until very recently, I have had no research assistants or faithful secretaries. But I have had superb domestic assistance for fifteen years which has enabled me to lead a full-time professional life, from a fellow immigrant and a very good friend, Mrs. Paula Hitze from West Germany, and I would like to say how grateful I am to her for this essential support. Finally, I would like to thank Miss Phyllis Cowtan and Miss Gail Love for their very valuable help in preparing this manuscript for publication.

xx

Part One International Migration since 1945

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Chapter One The International Scene

THE MOST STRIKING FEATURE of the post-war period in international migration has been its political character. Since 1945 governments have promoted and regulated migration in an increasingly determined fashion. They have interfered at both ends of migration movements. The major receiving countries have developed very selective immigration policies requiring a complicated apparatus for selection and control. Intracontinental migration, particularly within the European Economic Community, has offered many migrants an alternative to permanent settlement overseas, has increased competition among receiving countries, and has intensified government action. And the refugee problem, whether arising from war, violent change, or natural disaster, has driven governments to take new initiatives. Voluntary activity for refugees arid migrants has also increased substantially, and out of this has developed an international fraternity of organizations which now has quite close relationships with government. In addition, national economic development and individual professional opportunity have become key factors in international migration. The pursuit of skills and talents by governments is world wide, as is the keen response of professional and skilled migrants to opportunities in affluent countries. It is becoming more and more difficult now for the unskilled to migrate, except in the categories of dependents and close relatives. Clearly, in our modern technological society, the effective use of vital human resources cannot be left to the operation of the free market. Government planning and government action are essential. The outcome of government intervention, however, is a pattern of post-war migration which bears no resemblance to the great waves of emigration, the free

PART ONE

movement of peoples which took place in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some fifty million people emigrated to North and South America between 1845 and 1924. Most of them were unskilled. At the same time, there were large-scale movements of capital in the same direction, with Great Britain as the world's largest lender. There were no government controls to regulate this huge inflow of people. This era of free migration has vanished altogether. In its place, we are experiencing a period of controlled migration which developed rapidly after the Second World War—migration controlled and regulated by individual governments in the light of their own national interests, with very little intergovernmental consultation but more awareness now of the experience and policies of other governments. At the same time the management of immigration by receiving countries has become more efficient and, for various reasons, more liberal, and the individual immigrant has derived great benefit from this improved management. For most receiving countries, immigration is now specifically related to manpower policy. So far, although there are some recent signs of change, national manpower development and programs of aid to developing countries have been essentially separate areas of public policy. It is possible, though not yet imminent, that this era in migration may also be on its way out, to be succeeded by another in which the control and management of migration does not rest so exclusively with individual governments and may be shared, at least to some extent, between governments and between governments and international agencies. For the unskilled immigrant, however, free migration, free but very rugged, seems most unlikely to return and migration as an escape from dire poverty will probably be possible only through organized effort. Mass migration as one solution to the problems of overpopulation does not, at present, look feasible. Although this has been an era of almost unrestricted private enterprise for the countries of immigration, it is noticeable that communication and negotiation between sending and receiving countries have been increasing throughout this period. Among receiving countries, Australia has always favoured direct, bilateral agreements with the countries of emigration. The Australian immigration pattern today was described by a recent Minister of State for Immigration as "a complex of formal and informal arrangements." Australian immigration programs are carried out "with the full concurrence of governments and, in some cases, with a high degree of actual cooperation in the physical migration arrangements."1 Canada has avoided this degree of commitment, and the philosophy and legalistic nature of U.S. immigration policy preclude it.2 Both these countries, however, have been involved in numerous negotiations and minor agreements 4

The International Scene with foreign governments concerning their own policies and programs and relating to special movements of refugees and migrants. Throughout the post-war period some sending countries have been very active in promoting emigration and in assisting their own emigrants after arrival. Both the Netherlands and Italian governments, for example, have been particularly energetic and persistent in this field. Their concern includes the well-being of their countrymen long after emigration. The Italian government has negotiated regularly with the Canadian government on a wide range of matters concerning immigrants in Canada, including, at one point, the high accident rate among Italian construction workers in Toronto. More recently, it has shown concern for the language problems of Italian immigrants in Quebec. The two major Italian community agencies for immigrants in Toronto, COSTI (Italian Community Education Centre) and the Italian Immigrant Aid Society, have both received much-needed grants and assistance from the Italian government. In the past, these and other initiatives by politicians and officials from Italy and the Netherlands have not always been well received by the Canadian government, sensitive to a threat of interference in her own internal management of immigration. But today relations are more cordial—so much so that consultation with the Italian government has now been placed on a regular basis. In September 1971 the Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, accompanied by senior officials, visited Ottawa in order to discuss a number of current immigration matters, including the recent marked decline in the levels of Italian immigration to Canada. The Italian delegation also visited Quebec City, Toronto, and Vancouver. As an outcome of this visit, an agreement was signed in Ottawa on September 20, providing for periodic meetings in both countries of senior Canadian and Italian officials to examine a wide range of matters concerning immigrants and their settlement in Canada. The first of these meetings will probably be held in Rome in 1972. This agreement establishes a very interesting precedent in Canada's relations with sending countries. POLITICAL PRESSURES This interchange between sending and receiving countries, limited though it may be, is part of a whole network of communication and pressures on governments which has had a powerful influence on the nature, volume, and directions of international migration in the post-war period. In this political environment, despite a substantial degree of control, immigration policy and operations have been difficult to clarify and execute, and rationality often struggles with unmanageable pressures. It is very 5

PART ONE

difficult to legislate in immigration with predictable results. National policies can be subtly changed and eventually altered by a much wider range of political influences than have been evident before. Moreover, just as governments have become much more active in the whole field of international migration, so have immigrants, acting collectively and as individual agents of change. In the receiving countries, they are becoming a political factor in their own right of a sharper and more organized kind. They are themselves more mobile and less committed, better educated and more able to exercise political influence. They can maintain useful political contacts in their own countries of origin where governments may also be working on their behalf. They can exert more effective pressure on behalf of other would-be immigrants. Their demands upon the receiving countries are becoming more articulate and more insistent. An interesting example of the rapid impact of political pressures on national policies and programs during the post-war period can be found in the swift action taken by the Canadian Cabinet in April 1959, after a heated debate in the House of Commons, to rescind an order-in-council restricting the automatic admission of non-dependent relatives.3 The purpose of the order-in-council was to stem what was then felt to be a mounting tide of relatives pouring into Canada from southern Europe. This was not the first or last time that official efforts of this kind would be made. No advance publicity was given to the order-in-council, and when its purpose dawned on the House of Commons and the interested public outside, there was a storm of protest from the Liberal Opposition, the press, and some ethnic organizations. As the outcome of a complicated piece of political interaction, whose participants included the Conservative government in Ontario (concerned with its standing among a large immigrant population), Liberal members defending the interests of their immigrant constituents, politically conscious immigrants and their organizations speaking up loudly, and a none-too-secure Conservative government in Ottawa, the order-in-council was immediately rescinded. At that moment and put forward in that way, an attempt to restrict the automatic admission of non-dependent relatives, for which there was then a strong case, was not politically feasible. Another illustration can be seen in the fate of the well-known Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act of 1952 in the United States. This Act, whose main purpose was to preserve the national origins quota system in effect since 1929 with its heavy bias in favour of immigration from northern and western Europe, was passed over President Truman's veto and met with immediate and determined opposition within Congress and outside. As it turned out, the principal intent of the Act was never ful6

The International Scene filled. Pressures were immediately applied for the admission of relatives, refugees, and inadmissible or restricted classes of immigrants. Between 1952 and the enactment of the new Immigration Act of 1965, which abolished the national origins quota system, there were successive amendments which facilitated the admission of special categories and groups. Four special acts provided for the admission of large numbers of relatives. More than half these relatives were Italians; others came in substantial numbers from Greece, Portugal, Yugoslavia, China, and Formosa. In the period between the two Acts, it has been established that two out of every three immigrants became non-quota entrants, and the major part of the total immigration movement to the United States did not come from the favoured countries of northern and western Europe.4 THE QUALITY OF MIGRATION Not only has the whole field of international migration changed becoming far more politically sensitive and the scene of large-scale government and voluntary activity, but migration itself has dramatically changed in quality, particularly in relation to education and occupations. Many observers—-demographers, economists, sociologists—have drawn attention to these changes, particularly during the last ten years when they have become very evident. In the United States, contributors to a special issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science entitled The New Immigration, published in 1966, noted the striking changes since 1945 hi the national origins of U.S. immigrants; the changes in labour force characteristics—the conspicuous numbers of persons with specialized skills and professional qualifications; the changed age distribution and sex ratio, with a significantly higher proportion of women; the changes in the class origin of immigrants with a much larger professional and middle-class component; and the considerable numbers of refugees, then comprising one-fifth of all immigrants to the United States since 1945.5 In an interesting study of post-war migration published two years earlier, R. T. Appleyard drew particular attention to the influence of government on the flow of migration in the post-war period and the changing character of migration between Britain and Australia.6 This study was based on a survey of assisted emigration from Britain to Australia between April and October 1959. A 20 percent sample of assisted emigrant families and single persons were interviewed before their departure for Australia, the first stage in a three-part investigation organized in 1958 by the Department of Demography at the Australian National University and directed by Dr. Appleyard. The second stage took place in 1961 when the 7

PART ONE

migrants were interviewed again after they had been in Australia for eighteen months, with a view to obtaining information about their early problems of adjustment. A third and final interview was conducted with the same families (including some who had returned to Britain) in 1966-67. One major finding in the first part of this study concerned the absence of compelling economic reasons for emigration among those who were interviewed. Although economic motives predominated among these emigrants, these motives were not in themselves an adequate explanation of the complicated migration process today. "It is significant," Dr. Appleyard wrote, "that nearly all the sampled emigrants had been at the emigration threshold for a number of years, and that accumulated frustrations rather than specific incidents finally decided them to step across that threshold. The most common frustrations described by emigrants related to their work situation and the absence of prospects for advancement. But one gets the impression that these were by no means compelling inadequacies, like insufferable poverty, for which emigration was the only solution."7 We should also note the views of a Canadian sociologist, Anthony H. Richmond, in his study Post-War Immigrants in Canada published in 1967, which was based on two surveys, the first in Canada in 1961 and the second in Britain in 1962-63. Dr. Richmond drew attention to the significant change in the class composition of Canadian immigration. The overall composition, he found, was now very similar to that of the Canadian population as a whole. "Whether considered in terms of their former status or their position in Canada, it is evident therefore that postwar immigrants formed a representative cross-section of the social structure. Unlike some previous waves of migration to North America they were not concentrated in the lowest levels of the social structure."8 Dr. Richmond was also very impressed with the mobility and lack of specific national commitment among modern immigrants. "A high proportion of the British entering Canada as landed immigrants," he said, "were short term migrants and many had no intention of settling anywhere permanently. They were part of an internationally mobile labour force and the return to their former country did not imply any failure on their part to adjust either economically or socially. Neither did it suggest that economic opportunities hi the receiving country were inadequate. The term 'transilient' (meaning 'to leap across, to pass from one place to another') may be appropriate to describe such migrants."9 In later articles, Dr. Richmond developed this concept as an important feature of emerging post-industrial societies in which he foresees a new relationship between immigrants and the host society. In these societies, Dr. Richmond believes, immigrants will have high educational qualifications, a cosmopolitan outlook, and a 8

The International Scene lack of permanency in any one country or locality. They will combine high rates of geographical movement with career mobility and a network of social relationships with similarly qualified people throughout the world. Although this transilient type of migration is now largely confined to the professional, managerial, and technical categories, it is evident that this movement will increase in size with the growing demand for professional and skilled personnel. Canada, in Dr. Richmond's view, will attract immigrants of this type in increasing numbers.10 Clearly migration in the mid-twentieth century has undergone a qualitative change. As these observers have noted, migration is characterized now by a substantial professional and managerial component, better-educated immigrants, wider class representation, and a more equal sex ratio. The modern immigrant is also better informed, more mobile, and has more resources to call upon, not necessarily of an economic nature. There is less commitment and more caution. Emigration is no longer a desperate measure and, much less, a plunge into the unknown. Like revolution and protest, emigration often occurs at moments when there has been some slight improvement in circumstances, which encourages the hope that things can be better yet. It is often experimental. "For ever and ever migration" is now only one among several alternatives.11 THE UNSKILLED IMMIGRANT At the same time, the vision of armies of technicians and immigrants with briefcases moving to selected countries should not obscure the fact that, in the post-war period, there have been, and still are, a large number of immigrants who are unskilled or semi-skilled, poorly educated, and often of rural origin, although their numbers are now decreasing. Many were admitted by the receiving countries in the early part of this period. Many more were sponsored by family and friends. After the professional man and the skilled and enterprising immigrant come their relatives who may have much less in the way of education and qualifications. Refugees are not all middle class and professionally trained. The great flow of relatives to North American and Australian shores in the post-war period has come largely from southern Europe. Canada has admitted over three million immigrants since the end of the Second World War, and more than a million of these were sponsored, mainly by relatives and family connections in Canada. As stated in the Canadian White Paper on Immigration Policy in 1966, "The majority of the sponsored have been drawn from Southern Europe, primarily as a result of the influx of immigrants from the under-developed, rural parts of this region in the early post-war years, the strong family relationships in those areas, and the 9

PART ONE

economic pressures to emigrate from them."12 Until very recently, statistical information about sponsored immigration to Canada has been very sparse, and there is little reliable information about the educational qualifications of relatives and other sponsored, unselected immigrants who have come to Canada in the post-war period. Nevertheless, the practical experience of immigration officials and those concerned with the employment and welfare of immigrants indicates that, quantitatively, these are the immigrants who now have most difficulty in finding employment and are most subject to the problems of ethnic isolation and slow adjustment. A two-year study of rural immigrants in Toronto, completed in 1964, drew attention for the first time to the urgent needs of this large group of Canadian immigrants for special educational and information services and for much more assistance in the use of community resources.13 The size and character of the post-war sponsored movement of immigrants to Canada were a major concern in the White Paper and specific proposals were put forward to deal with it. They were designed, in the Minister's words, "to control the element of rapid growth inherent in the present sponsorship arrangements," which, it was believed, was leading to the continuous expansion of an already large pool of unskilled labour.14 These proposals were rejected in view of an unfavourable parliamentary and public reaction to them. Nevertheless a considerable degree of control over the sponsored movement was introduced in new immigration regulations which became effective a year later. A similar element of control, relating to unskilled immigrants, was established in the U.S. non-discriminatory Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 which eliminated the national origins quota system. Apart from the annual ceilings on immigration, this control consisted mainly in an amendment to the Act requiring aliens, seeking permanent admission to the United States for employment, to obtain prior certification from the Department of Labour that sufficient United States workers were not available for the work the alien was to perform, and that admitting the alien would not adversely affect U.S. workers. This procedure did not apply, however, to family reunion immigrants. Abba P. Schwartz, who was Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs of the Department of State at the time, commented on this broad certification responsibility: "It is particularly the Western Hemisphere special immigrant and the non-preference immigrant who are hurt by the new labour restriction because they fall predominantly in the unskilled class. Very few will have sponsors in this country to locate employment for them. Except for the third preference professional class, it is not possible now for an alien to obtain a labour certification in the absence of a specific offer of employment."15 10

The International Scene For the United States, the Western Hemisphere has been in the past the source of large numbers of unskilled immigrants. But with the increasing demand for skilled manpower, unskilled immigrants are now very vulnerable in employment and in the increasingly complicated urban communities into which they have moved. The real threat which they present to the host country, however, is one of public expenditure. They require, today more than ever, expensive social and educational programs in basic education, training and upgrading, special language programs for themselves and their children, assistance with housing, information services, social integration, and community programs. Ironically, although they may be economically vulnerable and expensive in terms of community services, it may be these immigrants, rather than those with briefcases, who develop a determined and lasting attachment to their country of choice. As educational standards in southern and central Europe rise, rapidly in some countries and more slowly in others, the nearly illiterate or very rural immigrant from Europe may well disappear from the scene. But as the developed countries eliminate discrimination of a racial kind and range the world for skills and talents, they may also face a movement of undereducated relatives from non-European sources of equivalent or larger proportions. SKILL AND RACE Educational preference has now replaced racial discrimination as the major criterion in the selection and control of immigration in Canada and the United States. In Australia, it will probably play an increasingly important role. In announcing Canada's new immigration regulations which became effective on October 1,1967, the Honourable Jean Marchand, then Minister of Manpower and Immigration, said that these regulations "give increased recognition to family relationships and are more closely attuned to Canada's economic needs." With these regulations he believed that "we can abolish discrimination, pay more regard to the claims of family relationship; act with both greater efficiency and greater compassion than in the past and, through an expansionist immigration policy, serve the needs of our growing Canadian economy."16 Among the nine criteria which are the basis of the present Canadian immigrant selection system, "education and training" is the most important, followed by "personal qualities" and "occupational demand." Major racial discrimination was eliminated in the 1962 immigration regulations in Canada, but some geographical restrictions were maintained in the admission of certain categories of relatives. The 1967 regulations are applied universally.17 11

PART ONE

In 1965, at hearings on the new U.S. Immigration Bill, Dean Rusk, then Secretary of State, said that the United States was in "the international market of brains." The significance of immigration for the United States now, he said, depended less on the number than on the quality of immigrants. Under present circumstances, the United States had a rare opportunity to draw migrants of high intelligence and ability from abroad; and immigration if well administered, could be one of America's greatest national resources.18 There was no secret about the intention of the bill. When President Johnson signed the bill into law at the Statue of Liberty, he described it in this way: "This bill says simply that from this day forth those wishing to emigrate to America shall be admitted on the basis of their skills and their relationship to those already here."19 These administrative and legislative changes have already had a significant effect on the composition and national origins of immigration in both countries. At the 1970 annual meeting of the American Immigration and Citizenship Conference, the Honourable Barbara M. Watson, Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (which includes the Visa Office), discussed the changing pattern in American immigration two years after the national origins quota system was phased out.20 Among a number of significant developments which included an unmistakable and seemingly permanent increase in the total volume of immigration to the United States, the foremost, she said, were "the sharp upsurge in immigration from Asia" and the shift from northern to southern Europe as a primary source of immigration. Total immigration from the former Asia-Pacific Triangle rose from slightly over 15,000 in fiscal year 1965 to almost 81,000 in fiscal year 1969.21 Recent Canadian admission figures also show some significant changes. Although most immigrants still come from Europe, th percentage of European immigrants, including the British, fell from 87 percent in 1966 to 51 percent in 1970. The ten major source countries in 1970 were Great Britain (18.70%), United States (16.53%), West Indies (8.3%), Italy (5.78%), Portugal (5.35%), Greece (4.28%), Yugoslavia (3.84%), India (3.84%), China including mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan (3.64%), and France (2.99%). The most significant recent increases have been from the United States, the Caribbean, and Asia. Australia and also New Zealand still restrict the entry of i igrants on the basis of racial origin, although in both countries skill is becoming an important factor in relation to admission. Today New Zealand admits immigrants from Britain and northern and western Europe without restriction, but places some limitations on immigration from southern and eastern Europe and stricter limitations on immigration from Africa and Asia. New Zealand does, however, admit a small but steady flow of immigrant from 12

The International Scene Polynesia and considers that she has a special obligation in this matter to the peoples of the South Pacific. In Australia there have been some administrative changes which make the permanent settlement of non-Europeans a little easier. The most significant of these changes makes skill a means of entry for non-Europeans. By a decision taken in March 1966, it was established that "applications for entry by people wishing to settle in Australia with their wives and children will be considered on the basis of their suitability as settlers, their ability to integrate readily and their possession of qualifications which are in fact positively useful to Australia. Those approved will initially be admitted on five-year permits and will then be able to apply for resident status and citizenship."22 In announcing this decision, the Honourable Hubert Opperman, then Minister of State for Immigration, said that "no annual quota was contemplated, but the number of people entering would be controlled by careful assessment of the individual's qualifications and the basic aim of preserving a homogeneous population will be maintained." He stressed that the changes "were not intended to depart from the basic principles of our policy which they qualify and modify in a special way rather than revoke." He also pointed out that Australia did not intend to deprive underdeveloped countries of the skills and talents which they needed. "In cases of doubt there will be consultation with the governments of the countries concerned to satisfy ourselves on this point."-3 The new regulations of 1966 have resulted in the admission of only a fairly small number of nonEuropeans so far, and it will be interesting to see if these numbers increase and whether the present basic policy will be modified any further. Throughout the post-war period, Australia's firm insistence on white immigration has aroused considerable international criticism but has commanded very strong support among Australians. Recently, this criticism has been voiced very strongly in relation to the growing population crisis on many South Pacific islands.24 Criticism has increased in Australia itself. Skill is not a new criterion in immigration policy. Throughout the postwar period, the receiving countries have looked for "good well-qualified immigrants"25 and for immigrants who would adapt easily to a new environment. Under the 1952 Immigration Act in the United States, a special preference of 50 percent of each quota was earmarked for skilled workers whose services and education would be useful to the nation. Between 1956 and 1965 over 150,000 immigrants were admitted with skills in what the U.S. Department of Labour describes as "critical occupations," i.e., critical shortage areas. What is significant now, however, is the much closer correspondence over the whole field between the skills sought and national manpower requirements. Immigration has become an indispensable tool 13

PART ONE

of manpower policy. In this process there is obviously room for much greater refinement. Manpower planning is one vital aspect of national economic planning. It is difficult to organize and develop in a context of weak or partial economic planning, as the early difficulties of Canada's Department of Manpower and Immigration, which began operations in 1966, demonstrate.26 Recent operational developments in the Foreign Branch of the Canadian Department of Manpower and Immigration have emphasized and facilitated a great increase in direct transactions between the prospective employer and the immigrant employee. The Provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba have taken similar initiatives. A former director of Canada's United Kingdom Immigration Service in London said hi a recent interview that this was "always the best kind of immigration," the most satisfactory from Canada's point of view, and the one which offered maximum protection to the immigrant who was nearly always assured, in this way, not only of a job but of a great deal of help in general settlement. One of the recommendations in a recent report to the Minister of State for Immigration by the Australian Immigration Planning Council suggested that, in view of the counter attractions offered by the present level of European prosperity, Australia might have to develop a different approach to the present practice of open recruitment of workers in Europe for vacancies in Australia. The recommendation reads: "Methods of attracting skilled workers in Continental Europe should be supplemented by arrangements for recruitment against specific vacancies in Australia on the lines of group nomination schemes currently undertaken by Australian employers under the British assisted passage programme."27 In the United States there is considerable support among the numerous voluntary agencies working with immigrants and refugees for the concept of "planned migration" for the individual immigrant. This process would involve the use of a wide range of services for the immigrant and much closer collaboration between government and the voluntary sector. In effect, guidance and assistance would be given to the immigrant from the point of departure to the moment of satisfactory resettlement.28 At present in the United States and Canada, only refugees and certain special groups of immigrants have had this kind of help. But this is undoubtedly a very useful model for the future. All in all, as the Honourable B. M. Snedden, a recent Australian Minister of State for Immigration, pointed out, "Immigration is no longer the rather haphazard, catch-as-catch-can affair of the past." In Canada, the Department of Manpower and Immigration is now planning on a five-year projection basis. In Australia, the Immigration Planning Council is engaged in a continuing study of the long-term aspects of immigration plan14

The International Scene ning and submits an annual report to the minister on requirements and prospects five years ahead. In Australia also, according to Mr. Snedden, "Each year the volume and content of the programme is carefully planned, after a close and detailed study of all the factors involved, to ensure that it best serves national policies." The immigration program, he claimed, was only part of an integrated policy of national development. "Regard must be had to the sociological and demographic considerations involved which means in practice that recruitment of migrants must be selective. Flexibility is necessary so that the programmes may be adjusted to accord with short-term economic considerations in the country without undue fluctuations in the level of the total programme."29 There is no question, therefore, that government immigration policies are now more efficiently selective and much better planned. There is an increasingly well-organized international dimension in the employment and recruitment of highly skilled and skilled labour. The voluntary agencies assisting the migrant and the refugee are becoming more professional and better organized, nationally and internationally. The neutral pressures exerted by officials and their advisers, who simply attempt to improve the system and refine the equipment, help to move the whole management of immigration out of the "haphazard, catch-as-catch-can" era. All this is very helpful to the individual immigrant. Oddly enough the millions of immigrants who are part of the total flow of migration, included, with their relatives, among the selected and the acceptable, are often neglected in public discussion in favour of the excluded. Since they are thought to be successfully pursuing a better life for themselves, their rights and needs do not command much attention. In the last few years, however, the included have gained considerably from improved management and better services on the part of the receiving countries. Although there is still much to be done, this process is now accelerating and the immigrants' lot will undoubtedly improve much more, as "planned migration" of various kinds becomes a practical possibility for much larger numbers, and the influence and independence of immigrants themselves increase. THE WORLD REFUGEE PROBLEM Within this political environment, two special phenomena in international migration have attracted world-wide attention and concern. They have drawn, or may draw, some sectors of the international community somewhat closer together. They have encouraged, or may do so, the growth of international institutions of a functional kind which may perhaps, in the future, be collectively capable of exercising some degree of control over the whole field of international migration. They are, first, the continuing 15

PART ONE

world problem of refugees and, secondly, the unique (on its present scale) and recent phenomenon of the brain drain. Immigration policy and programs must be seen in the context of these two developments. No permanent solution to the world refugee problem is at present possible or conceivable since the supply of, refugees is constantly replenished from new sources. In the 1970 program of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), well over half the total budget of $5.76 million was earmarked for Africa. The largest single allocation was for Uganda to consolidate and improve six settlements for Rwandese refugees. The second largest allocation was for Ethiopia to improve the conditions of Sudanese refugees in the Gambele area. There were other substantial allocations to Tanzania for the increasing number of refugees from Mozambique, to the Sudan for the rural settlement of refugees from Ethiopia, to Zambia for the settlement of refugees from Angola and Mozambique, and to West African States for assistance to Nigerian refugees. In that year it was estimated that within the mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, there were some two and a half million refugees requiring varying kinds of settlement assistance and direct material aid. The principal groups included over 900,000 refugees in Africa, over 60,000 Tibetans in India and Nepal, 80,000 refugees from China in Macao, and many thousands of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong to whom UNHCR gives some assistance through the Hong Kong government and voluntary agencies. There were also small groups of refugees in the Mediterranean and Caribbean areas. In Europe there is a continuing stream of refugees who ask for asylum. But in 1971 the situation changed again and all these figures were dwarfed by the size of the refugee movement out of East Pakistan into India. The ten million refugees involved in this movement presented a problem whose solution was beyond the present resources and capacities of UNHCR despite considerable efforts, and could only be found in political and military action. Even without major crises, the UNHCR figures represent only a proportion of the very large number of refugees needing assistance in any one year in different parts of the world. A great many do not come within the official definition of a refugee contained in the Status of Refugees Convention, adopted in Geneva in 1951 and now ratified by fifty-eight states, and the 1967 Protocol to which thirty-seven states have now acceded, which greatly extended the scope of the Convention. UNHCR

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was established under a statute adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1950, and opened its headquarters in Geneva in January 1951 16

The International Scene at a time when almost all refugee activity was centred in Europe. The High Commissioner, now Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, is elected and reports directly to the General Assembly and to the Economic and Social Council. UNHCR has forty branch offices throughout the world and the High Commissioner is assisted by an executive committee of thirty-one members. Canada has been a member of this committee since its creation. The Canadian office of UNHCR was established in Toronto in 1961 and was transferred to Ottawa in January 1971. The basic purpose of UNHCR is to provide international protection and assistance to any refugee who comes within its mandate. This is a refugee defined by the 1951 Convention and amended by the 1967 Protocol as any person who "owing to well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." Refugees can apply for help to the High Commissioner at his Geneva headquarters or to any of his forty representatives and correspondents. UNHCR, however, is mainly a non-operational body. Its principal functions are to identify the immediate and long-term needs of refugees, to enlist the help of governments, organizations, and individuals in meeting these needs, to coordinate aid programs, and to assist in financing these programs. But if requested to do so by a government, it may provide immediate material assistance to meet emergencies and to promote the rapid re-establishment of refugees in new communities. The administrative expenses of UNHCR are included in the United Nations' budget. Program expenses are financed by voluntary contributions from government and private sources. In 1970 the UNHCR program was financed by contributions from more than eighty-two countries, the largest number ever to contribute to the program. As major receiving countries, Canada, the United States, and Australia have admitted approximately 75 percent of the refugees who have been resettled since the Second World War in countries other than those of first asylum. Each country has its own estimate of the number of refugees admitted during the post-war period from all areas. The official Canadian figure is more than 300,000. The United States claims to have admitted over a million refugees since 1945 and to have spent, on their behalf, over three billion dollars from government and private sources.30 According to Australian statistics, Australia has admitted some 354,000 refugees since 1945. Australia ratified the 1951 Status of Refugees Convention in 1954 with certain declared reservations, all of which (except one relating 17

PART ONE

to travel documents for refugees) have now been withdrawn. The question of her accession to the 1967 Protocol is still under consideration. Both the United States and Canada ratified the Convention and acceded to the Protocol in 1969. Both Canada and the United States have been re-examining their refugee policies and programs. One of the first questions referred by the Canadian Minister of Manpower and Immigration to the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council formed in 1969 concerned refugee policy.31 The Minister asked for a review of the criteria which should be used to judge whether refugees of various backgrounds and circumstances should be admitted to Canada in the light of our recent accession to the Convention and Protocol, and of the many new refugee situations and pressures which are likely to arise in the future. This matter is now being studied by the Department itself. In the United States politicians and officials report a declining public interest in international refugee problems. The United States does, however, still contribute substantially to the budgets of UNHCR and ICEM. ICEM

The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) was founded in December 1951 at a meeting in Brussels. The representatives of sixteen countries came together to find some solution for the ongoing European refugee problem, in view of the fact that the International Refugee Organization, established in 1946 under the auspices of the United Nations, was closing down. They created ICEM, a voluntary intergovernmental committee, whose first and most urgent task was to provide international assistance to people who wanted to emigrate from Europe, irrespective of nationality or refugee status, and for whom overseas settlement seemed the best prospect for the future. In the period from February 1, 1952, when ICEM started operations, to 1970 almost 1,700,000 national migrants and refugees moved to other countries under its auspices.32 The founding members of ICEM, however, did not limit the objectives of the organization to the movement of European migrants and refugees only. They also recognized the principle that "the international financing of European migration should contribute not only to solving the problem of population in Europe, but also stimulate the creation of new economic opportunities in countries lacking manpower." The founding countries and member governments of ICEM were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. Today ICEM has thirty-one members. They are: 18

The International Scene Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Bolivia Brazil Chile Columbia Costa Rica Denmark Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Federal Republic of Germany Greece Honduras

Israel Italy Luxembourg Malta The Netherlands Nicaragua Norway Panama Paraguay Peru South Africa Spain Switzerland U.S.A. Uraguay

The following countries participate as observers: Guatemala, the Holy See, Japan, Portugal, San Marino, the Sovereign Order of Malta, and Turkey. Canada withdrew from ICEM in 1962. Britain, France, and Sweden, onetime members of ICEM, have also withdrawn from active membership. Today ICEM has three major programs: national migration, transport and resettlement of refugees, and a selective migration program to Latin America. Membership is open to "any government with a demonstrated interest in the principle of free movement of people which undertakes to make a financial contribution at least to the administrative requirements of the Committee." The selective migration program which was started in 1964 serves fifteen Latin American countries and has recently moved approximately two thousand professional and skilled workers from Europe to jobs in Latin America which cannot be filled locally. ICEM works closely with UNHCR and is, in a sense, complementary to it since it can assist refugees who do not come within the definition of a refugee in the Geneva Convention and Protocol. It also works in close cooperation with other international organizations and voluntary agencies. The governing body of ICEM is the council on which all member governments are represented and which meets twice a year in Geneva. Council meetings are also attended by observers from other governments interested in migration, by representatives of international organizations with which ICEM has close working relations, and by representatives from the many voluntary organizations which participate in ICEM's programs. There is an executive committee of nine members elected annually. The cost of

19

PART ONE

financing ICEM's operations is met from two separate budgets, the administrative and operational budgets. Contributions to the administrative budget are mandatory, and each member government agrees to pay a certain percentage of the total annual costs of administration. The operational budget is supported by voluntary governmental contributions, by payments from emigrants and their sponsors in receiving countries, and by payments for special movements carried out at the request of international and national agencies and the voluntary agencies. ICEM's recent annual budgets have been in the region of $20 to $25 million (U.S.). Canada still has a fairly close and friendly relationship with ICEM, and some immigrants and refugees are still moved to Canada under ICEM auspices and are paid for on a numerical basis. Canada's annual contribution to ICEM as a member government during the period from 1951 to 1962 was approximately $215,000 (U.S.) annually. Upon withdrawing, Canada continued to make a financial contribution to ICEM on a reduced scale until 1965, when it was decided that this contribution should be channelled to UNHCR instead. The reasons given by the Diefenbaker government for Canada's withdrawal in 1962 were that ICEM's role was intended to be temporary and related to the refugee problem which was now under control; and that ICEM was taking an increasing interest in technical assistance which Canada felt was more properly the concern of the United Nations and other agencies. Mr. Howard Green, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, also suggested in Parliament that the cost of participation in ICEM was high, and while financial considerations were not the primary reason for Canada's withdrawal, it had become increasingly difficult to justify paying such a price for an organization of marginal use to Canada. Whatever the validity of these reasons at the time, it seems evident that the major reason, then and now, for Canada's decision to remain outside ICEM is a preference for managing immigration entirely unaided and also a reluctance, deriving to some extent perhaps from Canada's overseas experience with voluntary agencies and particularly with the churches after 1945, to rely on external organizations in this field.33 Today there is also the feeling that our present relationship with ICEM is cordial and reasonably satisfactory, and that it does represent the full extent of what ICEM can do for Canada. It does not, of course, represent the full extent of what Canada could do for ICEM. THE BRAIN DRAIN During the last few years, the increasing migration of professional and skilled personnel, generally referred to as the brain drain, has generated widespread discussion and concern. It is not a universal phenomenon and 20

The International Scene does not affect those countries involved in it to an equal degree. It is, however, very significant for a fairly small number of developed and developing countries. Despite considerable recent interest and investigation, information about the extent and consequences of the international migration of professional and skilled manpower is still very inadequate. Few countries keep satisfactory statistics on migration. We know very little about the return flows to the developing countries, and not enough about the return flows between developed countries. It is difficult to plot the stage-by-stage flows of professional and skilled manpower from lowincome to high-income countries. Above all, we are unable to do more than guess at the consequences for the developing countries, in technical and political terms, of the progressive loss of professional skills and talents which they have suffered, particularly over the last decade. One fact beyond question is that at present the brain drain is increasing at a rapid rate, although its precise composition and directions may be subject to change and fluctuation. Nevertheless, without any more evidence than we now have, it is clear that this great flow of highly trained and middle-level personnel to a few major developed countries cannot but enrich the latter at the expense of the less-developed and developing countries; and that thereby, the already dangerous gap between them is made wider. The most serious loss sustained by the developing countries may be the one which is most difficult to measure: that is, the loss of political and managerial talent and of men and women of vigour and enterprise whatever their professions and skills may be. The widespread interest in the brain drain in recent years, and the already considerable literature on it, is an indication of the very serious nature of this problem. With other countries, Canada is deeply involved in the brain drain. She has suffered a heavy loss in professional and skilled manpower to the United States, although the level of emigration is now decreasing for various reasons and the return flow is believed to have been substantial in recent years.34 In addition she has been a vital staging post in the eventual movement to the United States of large numbers of immigrants from Europe and Asia. But she is also the recipient of the second largest flow of professional and skilled immigrants in the post-war period. Indeed her immigration has been even more skill intensive than that of the United States. Between 1946 and 1970, 278,053 immigrants in the professional category emigrated to Canada. Taken together with the managerial and clerical categories, this group outnumbers every other immigrant group entering the labour force. The size, characteristics, and distribution of the total flow of immigrants to Canada since 1946 will be examined in the next chapter. Here we will 21

TABLE 1 CANADIAN IMMIGRATION, 1962-1967, PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL WORKERS Category

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

Total immigrants Immigrants with occupation Professional and technical workers Engineers Natural scientists Physicians and surgeons Professional nurses

74,586 36,748 74,586 967 473 530 1,621

93,151 45,866 9,640 1,198 444 687 1,379

112,606 56,190 11,965 1,416 640 668 1,967

146,758 74,195 16,654 2,254 945 792 2,829

194,743 99,210 23,637 3,210 1,251 995 3,732

222,876

119,539 30,833 3,704 1,721 1,213 4,262

SOURCE: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing Countries (A/7294), (New York, Nov. 5, 1968). NOTE : The Canadian figures are related to the calendar year and do not include professors and instructors in the relevant fields.

TABLE 2 U.S. IMMIGRATION, 1962-1967, PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL, AND KINDRED WORKERS Category Total immigrants Immigrants with occupation Professional, technical, and kindred workers Engineers Natural scientists Physicians and surgeons Professional nurses

1962

283,763 134,824 23,710 2,940 1,104 1,797 3,429

1963

306,260 140,669 27,930 4,014 1,612 2,093 4,135

1964

1965

1966

292,248 131,098 28,756 3,725 1,676 2,249 4,037

296,697 130,811 28,796 3,455 1,549 2,012 4,071

323,040 128,333 30,039 4,921 1,852 2,552 3,430

1967

361,972 152,925 41,652 8,822 2,893 3,326 4,874

SOURCE: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing Countries (A/7294), (New York, Nov. 5, 1968). NOTE: The United States figures are for the fiscal year which starts on July 1 of the previous year and ends on June 30 of the year under which the figure is listed. The occupational figures include professors and instructors in the relevant fields.

PART ONE

simply note the very rapid rate of increase in the number of professional immigrants admitted to the United States and Canada in recent years. This can be seen in Tables 1 and 2 based on a recent study by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) which recorded the admission to the United States and Canada during a selected period, 1962-67, of professional workers as a whole and of four special groups: engineers, natural scientists, physicians and surgeons, and professional nurses. The Commission on International Development, established by the World Bank in 1968 and chaired by Canada's former Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, pointed out in its report issued a year later that the brain drain out of poor countries was a problem of disturbing dimensions. The Commission noted that the present flow of skilled and qualified personnel from poor to rich countries actually outnumbered the flow of advisory personnel from rich to poor countries. In their analysis of the problems of developing countries, the members stressed that the needs of these countries today go beyond "a mere call for more aid." "International development," they said, "means a willingness to look to the total economic relationship between developing and industrialized countries."35 At the present time the problems of the brain drain might be said to be under continuous investigation. Among existing authorities no obvious agreement has been reached on the extent to which the brain drain does represent a serious threat to developing countries or, given that the threat exists, on the measures which should be taken to deal with it. Indeed there are eminent advocates of the status quo and many who see considerable advantages in the present system. Where action is recommended, the onus now tends to be placed rather more on the developing than on the developed countries, and it may be that this is related to the present degree of disenchantment with foreign aid and flagging support for international development reported by the Pearson Commission. Nevertheless, concern and study continue and UNITAR is now engaged on a multinational research project which involves extensive questionnaire surveys among foreign students and professionals in selected developed and developing countries. In its initial study Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing Countries, prepared for the Secretary General in 1968 and submitted by him to the General Assembly, certain "preliminary guidelines" were offered to developed and developing countries and to international agencies. The following guidelines were suggested for developed countries: (1) developed countries, which at the present time rely on developing nations for numbers of their trained personnel, should expand their training facilities and improve their internal career ladders 24

The International Scene so as to avoid heavy reliance on the human resources of developing nations; (2) developed countries, which have profited from the immigration of professionals from developing countries, should feel a special obligation to help these countries to improve conditions of education especially in the fields of science and technology; (3) developed countries should offer substantial assistance to establish additional international institutions for development that would provide education with competent international staff; and (4) research and development programs in the major developed countries should be extended where possible to appropriate centres in the developing countries, especially in such fields as tropical medicine, agriculture, and other fields in science and technology.36 It is interesting to note Canada's views on these and similar proposals. They were clearly expressed at the United Nations by Mr. B. Rankin, Canada's representative in the Second Committee, on December 2, 1968. 1. [Recent UN reports] indicate clearly the great need for coordinated and much improved statistical and research efforts about the brain drain . . . meaningful recommendations as to ways of solving the problems produced by the brain drain call for considerably more information than is presently available and we would support efforts to obtain and collate this additional and essential information. 2. Canada does not actively recruit any personnel in developing countries; it bases its immigration policies on the principles of universality and non-discrimination. In addition, a foreign national studying in Canada with the financial assistance of the Canadian Government must sign a pledge at the outset undertaking to return to his own country after completion of his training. In other words, Canada is not deliberately "enticing" trained manpower from those developing countries where it is in scarce supply. 3. Canada has its own brain drain to cope with—a natural and perhaps inevitable result of living next door to a close friend which also happens to be the richest country in the world with, among other things, tremendous research and employment opportunities for scientists and other professionals. 4. Legal restrictive action by developed countries to prevent immigration of trained personnel from developing countries is difficult to implement, contrary to the spirit of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, and in our case also contrary to the non-discriminatory provisions of Canada's own immigration policies. In brief then, we feel that the restriction of immigration is only really feasible when initiated by the home country. 5. Canada recognizes the seriousness of the brain drain problem and 25

PART ONE

is willing to assist in drawing up coordinated multilateral programmes aimed at solving that problem. In doing so, being itself subject to a brain drain of highly trained personnel, as well as a country built upon immigration, Canada realizes the very complex and two-sided nature of the problem.37 The brain drain has focussed attention on international migration in a sudden and dramatic way and this may have valuable consequences for the international community. It seems evident that, as an immediate target and as the dimensions of this problem grow larger, the manpower policies of the developed countries, in relation to both recruitment and training, must now be more closely related to national and international strategies for aid to developing countries and to the overall problems of development. But the brain drain also tends to distort our view of the whole migration scene, to make us forget the large and continuing movements of dependents and relatives to all the major receiving countries, and to obscure the non-economic needs and responses of all immigrants. Of the 147,713 immigrants entering Canada in 1970, only 52 percent were destined for the labour force, and more than half the immigrants entering the United States in fiscal year 1970 were wives, children, and other "non-workers." THE ANONYMOUS IMMIGRANT One additional and universal feature of this period in international migration has been the lack, hitherto, of accurate and detailed information on which to base policy decisions. Our information about the whole content of international migration and about the integration of immigrants in the countries in which they settle is still very limited, although the latter area is now the subject of increasing academic interest and more official concern. As already noted, it is generally recognized now that very few countries keep satisfactory migration statistics. Members of Canada's Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, appointed in October 1966 to examine the government's White Paper on Canadian Immigration Policy, were astonished to discover that the proposed policy changes, particularly in the area of sponsored immigration, were based on very limited statistical information. At committee hearings, they were very critical of the senior officials of the Department of Manpower and Immigration who were defending the government's proposals: Member for Essex West: I just want to say, through you, Mr. Chairman, to the witnesses that I am really surprised that you have come before us to make such wide-ranging proposals for changes in our existing 26

The International Scene system without a more detailed factual and statistical foundation. I would have expected more of you gentlemen. Member for Vancouver Quadra: I find it pretty astonishing that with all that is said and with all the discussion that takes place . .. the Government of Canada has at no time seen fit to trace through the manner in which the immigrant integrates himself into the community. I think everyone at this table must be astonished at this revelation. In reply, the Deputy Minister pointed out that all the available statistical information had been taken into account. The fact that this was incomplete arose from "the nature of the statistics which have been kept over the whole of the post-war period." The philosophy of successive Canadian governments had been that "once anyone had been admitted to the country as an immigrant, then he was an entirely free agent in every way 'and there would be no attempt to follow him up at all." A statistical search and follow-up of immigrants, according to the Deputy Minister, would have meant that a distinction was made between the native-born and the immigrant, and would also have involved the fairly difficult question of asking for a great deal of information from municipalities and provinces. No Canadian government had attempted it.38 The members of the Joint Committee were in fact concerned about a situation which has been common to most of the receiving countries, although perhaps less so to Australia where the government has played a much more active role in promoting integration. It has certainly been true of the United States despite a regular check on the whereabouts of aliens. The immigrant who avoids major difficulties has been left to his own devices, and remarkably little has been known about his progress or about many of the organizations which he has created. In the United States and Canada, it is increasingly clear that at present community agencies are only reaching a small proportion of the total intake of immigrants.39 This situation is a legacy of the "free-flow" era. It has serious disadvantages but also some undoubted virtues. The immigrant is free to go his own way unharassed. But today, our elaborate manpower requirements, higher standards of social security and welfare, swift communications, and increasing capacity to collect and process information mean that the day of the anonymous immigrant is almost over. Already public and private research is beginning to catch up with him. As a direct outcome of the dissatisfaction of the Joint Committee, the Canadian Department of Manpower and Immigration began to make preparations in 1967 for a major investigation into the economic and social adjustment of immigrants during their first three years in Canada. This study, now called the "Longitudinal Study of the Economic and Social 27

PART ONE

Adaptation of Immigrants," was started in 1969 and will take seven years to complete. It is based on the selection, for each of the years between 1969 and 1971, of a large sample (a cohort) of newly arrived immigrants who are destined for the labour force. Questionnaires will be sent to these immigrants on four occasions over a period of three years. The first questionnaire will be sent out six months after arrival. The other three questionnaires will be distributed after these immigrants have spent one year, two years, and three years in Canada. A preliminary report on the experience of the immigrants who landed in the first months of 1969 was prepared in the spring of 1970. It is hoped that a complete report on the experiences of the whole of the first cohort will be ready by the end of 1971, followed by regular reports during the remaining years of the study; and that all three cohorts will be covered in a final volume by 1976. The Canadian Longitudinal Study is intended to test many of the hypotheses and assumptions on which past and present immigration policy and programs have been based. One of its principal objectives is to test the validity of the new selection criteria adopted in 1967, and to learn more about the geographical and occupational mobility of immigrants and their experience in the Canadian labour market. Another is to examine the attitudes of immigrants towards life in Canada, and through the use of a control group of 5,000 Canadians who will also receive questionnaires, the extent to which they are accepted in the Canadian community. A PRIVATE INTEREST A quarter of a century of international migration and immigration operations of a very different kind has so far produced very little in the way of overall appraisal or comparative study. Nor is there evidence that the new immigration has excited the interest or the imagination of the public or of more than a few politicians in the receiving countries, except where it touches on some other very sensitive issue like race relations or serious unemployment, or where it is felt to contribute in a very direct and immediate way to national development and security. So far, the brain drain has only been of real concern to a very special international public. While some of the receiving countries have communicated with each other at the overseas field level, through refugee operations, at moments of crisis in migration, and to a limited extent within the framework of existing international organizations, there has been little evidence to show, throughout most of the post-war period, that they have shared their knowledge and experience in any very significant way or made any substantial study of the immigration operations of other countries. But this is changing and communication is increasing. In 1956 the Canadian Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Australian Department of Immi28

The International Scene gration arranged a year's exchange for one member respectively of their headquarters staffs. In Canada at the time, the Department made no use whatsoever of its officer's final report in which he recommended that Canada would benefit greatly from the introduction of consultative machinery in immigration on the Australian model, and from the development of the kind of public interest and involvement in the immigration process which he had observed during his stay there. Ten years later, however, the same Department made a rapid on-the-spot study of the Australian immigration planning, advisory, and publicity councils and other aspects of public participation in immigration in Australia. There is no doubt that use was made of Australian experience in creating the new consultative machinery established under the 1967 Canada Manpower and Immigration Council Act. More recently, in the summer of 1970, the Honourable Philip Lynch, then Australian Minister of State for Immigration, and the Secretary of the Australian Department of Immigration visited the United States and Canada and had meetings with the Canadian Director of Manpower and Immigration and his officials. In a recent speech in Australia in which he discussed the major areas and new developments in Australia's immigration program, Mr. Lynch said that there would now be closer liaison and mutual exchanges with Canadian migration authorities. Both Australia and Canada were countries of large-scale immigration and each would gain from closer cooperation. He also mentioned that his Department intended to organize "tune-span surveys of migrants" during their early years in Australia along the lines of the Canadian Longitudinal Study.40 There are some obvious reasons for the absence, thus far, of collective interest, sustained intergovernmental communication (among receiving countries) on the major issues of immigration policy, and extensive academic concern. The first decade of this new epoch in immigration was in many ways a large-scale emergency operation, the aftermath of war. In 1956 and 1957 there were two unexpected crises—the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez incident—which propelled thousands of refugees and immigrants to North America and the Pacific. In the late fifties and early sixties, there was a marked downswing in the economies of the United States and Canada which reduced intake and tended to inhibit constructive developments in immigration. The whole period of the fifties was deeply affected by Cold War psychology which caused great uncertainty about future trends in international migration and an expectation of further upheavals in eastern Europe and elsewhere. As already noted, national economic planning in its various forms, and with it, large-scale research and evaluation of public policy and programs, is a feature of the 1960s rather than the 1950s. 29

PART ONE

Collective interest, intergovernmental communication, and even academic concern have also been inhibited by the fact that immigration has long been regarded as a private matter for individuals and for governments. For this reason, it is hard to get at the facts. Migration is the outcome of a multitude of individual decisions on the part of immigrants themselves and those who select them. All the major receiving countries have practised a great deal of private administrative discretion. Security problems, exaggerated in the first place by Cold War difficulties and Cold War psychology, have involved considerable secrecy. Political pressures from all quarters have added to a sensitivity and desire for privacy on the part of governments. For the public, there are many deterring factors. Immigration regulations tend to be complicated and difficult to grasp, and unless one is accustomed to them, immigration statistics seem daunting. In this area also there are difficult public relations problems for government, both nationally and internationally. Since immigration involves the direct action of one government upon the citizens of another, there is always something slightly surreptitious about it and departments of external affairs have avoided close association with it or have kept it well apart from considerations of foreign policy. It is clear that immigration does not sit too well with foreign relations. It is embarrassing, for example, to have to admit openly to the practice of racial discrimination, however discreet, or now to the removal of skill and talent, particularly from the developing countries. In a free market situation, for those countries with an active immigration program, immigration operations also inevitably involve an element of promotion and aggressiveness which is distasteful in diplomatic relations. Equally important in explaining the lack of interest except among a small group of specialists, and the absence of deliberate review and reflection on a broad front, has been, at least until recently, the class image of immigration. This image has involved both immigrants and those who manage immigration, because this has not been felt to be a superior calling. Hie image has been a lower class one inherited from the great migrations of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The army of migrating engineers, doctors, scientists, graduate nurses, and secretaries has not yet quite obliterated the mental picture of the poor, huddled immigrant family with its meagre possessions and hungry look. However, the close association now of immigration with manpower—a marriage as in Canada or a joint responsibility and close planning or operational relationship as in Australia and the United States—plus the cumulative effects of the brain drain will no doubt involve a distinct improvement in status and public interest for all concerned. 30

The International Scene As the immigrant becomes less anonymous, he is likely to acquire greater respectability. Other factors which will probably contribute to this improvement include the development within immigration operations of higher standards of management and training and larger budgets for government and academic research. In the near future, the small band of specialists in international migration and integration, official and voluntary, may see some of their labour bear fruit in a greatly improved technology of immigration which is still national in character, but perhaps more open in operation and much better understood. And as in many other areas of international collaboration, we may now be within sight of an age of much closer world-wide communication and much more collective responsibility. POSTSCRIPT As mentioned in the Preface to this edition, some major developments have taken place in international migration since this book was written, although many of the conclusions drawn in this chapter hold true to-day. In 1973, Australia joined Canada and the United States in adopting a universal, non-discriminatory immigration policy. In the 1970s and 1980s, UNHCR has had to deal with a number of new refugee movements and with a great increase in the number of refugees in nearly all world regions. ICEM—the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration—has continued to play an important role in international migration and to work closely with UNHCR. It has removed the word "European" from its title and is now known as the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM). Both Canada and Australia withdrew from ICM—Canada in 1962, as we have seen, and Australia for a short time in the early seventies— but both have returned. Australia is now a full member once again and Canada is an official observer. One of the most important developments in international migration since this book was written has been the striking increase in undocumented migration and in most forms of illegality in immigration. This began to be seen as a major problem facing the international community only in the early seventies, when Canada experienced a very large illegal immigration movement. (See Chapter 15.)

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Chapter Two The Canadian Experience

CANADA has had no settled view of immigration. No common convictions about it exist among Canadians. In the United States, on the other hand, immigration, though now a secondary issue, has been part of a nationbuilding myth. In Australia, immigration has been seen as a vital instrument in national development. In his book A Nation of Immigrants first published in 1958, President Kennedy quoted Oscar Handlin as saying, "Once I thought to write a history of the immigrants in America. Then I discovered that the immigrants were American history." Kennedy noted that, of the fifty-six men who signed the Declaration of Independence, eighteen were of non-English stock and eight were first-generation immigrants. "Every ethnic minority," he wrote, "in seeking its own freedom, helped to strengthen the fabric of liberty in American life." The continuous immigration of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was "central to the whole American faith." "The abundant resources of this land provided the foundation for a great nation. . . . Immigration provided the human reserves. More than that, it infused the nation with a commitment to far horizons and new frontiers, and thereby kept the pioneer spirit of American life, the spirit of equality and of hope, always alive and strong. 'We are the heirs of all time,' wrote Herman Melville, 'and with all nations we divide our inheritance.' "* The same tones of conviction ring out from Australia on the subject of immigration (although public opinion has become more critical recently): that is, for white European immigration to create, as a former minister put it,2 a "generally integrated and predominantly homogeneous population," with some recent easing of restrictions for non-Europeans. The Australian parliamentary debates of March 1966 in which the government proposed

PART ONE

to open the door a little more to non-European immigrants, and to permit those already there to apply for citizenship after five years instead of fifteen, strike a note of exceptional satisfaction and unanimity on national immigration policy.8 And the Australian Immigration Planning Council in a study of immigration planning and programs for the period 1968 to 1973 stated simply that, in the context of some twenty years of planned immigration which began in 1947, the evidence showed clearly that immigration had received the unqualified backing of successive Australian governments. The Council also "reaffirmed its view" that large-scale immigration must continue to play a major role in the maintenance of Australia's prosperity and growth.4 In Canada, immigration is neither a national myth nor is it widely accepted as an essential element in national development. As an area of public policy, it has evoked conventional support but little real enthusiasm. It is true that, following American practice, politicians and others often refer to Canada as "a nation of immigrants." But this is not the central fact of Canadian history. The central fact i the existence of two founding races and the relationship between the The 1870-71 c sus, the first census after Confederation, revealed that the two largest g ups in Canada at that time were the French with a total of 1,082,940 and the British—the English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish—with a combined total of 2,110,502. If taken separately, none of the latter outnumbered the French. There were 706,349 Englishmen, 549,946 Scots, 7,773 Welshmen, and 846,414 Irishmen. Other groups were much smaller, the only sizeable one being the Germans with 202,991. There were 29,662 Dutch, 21,496 Negroes, then listed as "Africans," and small groups of Swiss, Italians, Spanish, Portuguese, and other nationalities. The Ukrainians were not mentioned. The Chinese community, probably already numbering several thousand and concentrated in British Columbia, was not present in this census, as the province did not enter Confederation until 1871.6 The central problem of French-English relations, the two solitudes, the existence of two founding races each with its own language, culture, and long historical tradition, has pre-empted the place of immigration in national mythology. Even recently, in his 1968 election campaign, Prime Minister Trudeau found it necessary to remind some French Canadians that there were plenty of Canadians whose mother tongue was neither French nor English. In book IV of the report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, there is an unequivocal statement on the nature of Canadian society which all immigrants, in the Commission's view, should be aware of. 34

The Canadian Experience Immigration continues to-day with far-reaching effects on the two main linguistic communities, and the population of Canada is still undergoing changes whose future extent it is impossible to foresee with any certainty. It is highly desirable that newcomers to Canada receive full and clear information about their new country. It is not enough to assure an immigrant work and material comfort; he must also be made aware of certain fundamental principles that will bear upon his citizenship in his adopted country. In particular he should know that Canada recognizes two official languages and that it possesses two predominant cultures that have produced two societies—Francophone and Anglophone—which form two distinct communities within an overall Canadian context. On the other hand, according to the Commission, being Francophone or Anglophone does not necessarily mean that one is of French or British origin. "Immigrants," it said, "whatever their ethnic or national origin or their mother tongue, have the right and are at liberty to integrate with either of the two societies." It urged that "the members of all groups be welcomed into the Anglophone and Francophone communities and that they participate fully in the political sphere from within one of these communities,"6 While there is no question that immigrants are becoming a much stronger element in Canadian politics, individually and collectively, and while one may question the Commission's statement relating to integration as a very simplistic view, immigration must be seen in the context of this fundamental characteristic of Canadian nationality. However large the intake of immigrants, it would seem that only when immigration is seen as a positive nation-building force, as it has been in the United States, as it is in Australia, and is now, to some extent, in Quebec, does it acquire a real urgency and high priority among the major sectors of public policy. The absence of firm conviction about immigration in Canada has led to great uncertainty in its management and considerable difficulty in its operation. The problems, and also the achievements of management in these circumstances, will be explored in later chapters. INTAKE OF POST-WAR IMMIGRANTS The total intake of immigrants during the post-war period in Canada is well over three million. Australian intake is now over the two and a half million mark. Post-war admissions to the United States total over seven million. The effect of these immigration movements on population

35

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growth has been most striking in Australia. Between 1947 and 1966 Australian population increased by just under four million—from seven and a half million in 1947 to eleven and a half million in 1966.7 Post-war settlers and their children accounted for some 55 percent of this increase. By the middle of 1966 almost one out of every five Australians was a post-war immigrant or the child of a post-war immigrant.8 Post-war immigration in Canada, however, has been much less significant in terms of population growth because of a larger initial population in 1945 and an unusually rapid rate of natural increase. Canada's population has, in fact, increased faster than that of any other industrialized country in the twentieth century. Her post-war population growth has been exceptional. In the fourth annual review of the Economic Council of Canada, it was reported that "in the 1950s alone some 4.2 million persons were added to the population, including about 1.1 by net immigration. In the middle of the 1950s the rate of natural population growth reached the highest level in a century." The Council noted that "net immigration and natural population growth in Canada have generally moved together in the historical waves of population growth. High rates of net immigration have tended to occur along with high rates of natural growth; and slower rates of natural growth have generally occurred in periods of relatively low net immigration or even net emigration."9 In the next few years, however, the Council anticipated that net immigration would continue to be a less significant element in Canada's total population growth than natural increase, but emphasized its volatile and therefore unpredictable character. In the United States, while annual intake is large by recent standards, the percentage of foreign-born in the total population declined from 14.1 percent in 1870 (with slightly higher rates in 1890 and 1910) to an estimated figure of 4.9 percent in 1965.10 Today, although immigration still arouses strong feelings and the Irish, for example, have at times protested vigorously about their very reduced share of the annual flow,11 this issue is no longer felt to be of major current concern. It is deeply overshadowed by the problems of division and violence in American life. The shape of the total movement of immigrants to Canada in the postwar period and the wide fluctuations in annual intake can be clearly seen in Chart 1 and Table 3.12 The fluctuations in the rate of intake are very striking; they hardly suggest that stable programming or forward planning has been a feature of this immigration operation. One can also see reflected here some of the major crises and developments in national policy and fortune which have occurred during this period. It is clear, for example, that the high rates from 1951 to 1953 are a reflection of a new point of departure: the 36

The Canadian Experience

CHART 1 Canadian Immigration, 1945-1970 more open immigration regulations of 1950, the admission of former enemy aliens, the final gathering-in of displaced persons, and the sheer availability at that point of large numbers of European immigrants. The economic climate in Canada was confident. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration, a completely new department, had started operations in 1950, and its Overseas Service was beginning to find its feet. The high rate in 1956 and the record-breaking rate of two hundred and eighty-two thousand in 1957 reflect, of course, the Hungarian Revolution and Suez crisis when thousands of Hungarians and British immigrants sought a political, or political and economic, haven in Canada. The sharp drop in intake from 1958 onwards to seventy-one thousand in 1961 coincided with a downward trend in the business cycle, slower rates of growth in Canada and the United States, and a long period of intermittent austerity in the operations of the Canadian government. The increasing intake from 1962 onwards, including the very high rates hi 1966 and 1967, reflect what the Economic Council has described as "The Great Expansion" and "the tremendous expansionary forces at work in Canada since 1961."13 The last two figures undoubtedly also reflect the considerable improvements in planning and organization, particularly of the Overseas Service, which began to take place shortly before and continued after the creation of the new Department of Manpower and Immigration early in 1966.14 In 1968 and 1969, despite the admission of some twelve thousand Czechoslovakian refugees, there was 37

PART ONE

TABLE 3 IMMIGRATION TO CANADA, 1945-1970

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957

22,722 71,719 64,127 125,414 95,217 73,912 194,391 164,498 168,868 154,227 109,946 164,857 282,164

1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970

124,851 106,928 104,111 71,689 74,586 93,151 112,606 146,758 194,743 222,876 183,974 161,531 147,713

SOURCE: 1970 Immigration Statistics, Department of Manpower and Immigration. NOTE: Years of high intake appear in bold face.

a marked downswing and this has continued in 1970 and 1971. These declining figures reflect in part the new 1967 immigration regulations with their carefully planned selection criteria, and the closer correspondence now between immigration admissions and occupational demand. They also reflect a deliberate policy of restraint in immigration promotion and selection in the light of the recent high unemployment figures in Canada. CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES: EMIGRATION-IMMIGRATION

Precise information and exact annual figures for emigration from Canada are lacking. It is generally believed that, of the three million and more immigrants admitted to Canada since the Second World War, approximately one million have returned whence they came or moved on, mainly to the United States. But as noted by the Economic Council, "No comprehensive data are available on (a) the gross outflow of persons from Canada to countries other than the United States, (b) the number of Canadian residents returning to Canada after a stay abroad, or (c) the number of immigrants from the United States who return to that country after a stay in Canada."15 In its 1967 annual review, population projections are made to 1980; in these projections, gross emigration is assumed to average eighty thousand annually.16 Emigration to the United States is obviously by far the largest element in the total emigration movement. During the period from 1946 to 1960, 38

The Canadian Experience it has been estimated that 70 to 80 percent of Canada's total emigration went to the United States and the United Kingdom, and that emigration to the United States constituted 60 percent of the total outward movement.17 In the last few years, however, ideas about the nature of this emigration movement have been changing. An article written in 1966 by K. V. Pankhurst of the Program Development Service of the Department of Manpower and Immigration is an interesting example.18 He suggested that the return flow of Canadians from the United States to Canada had been seriously underestimated and that consequently the rate of net emigration to the United States might be a good deal smaller than currently supposed. He also suggested that the explanation and evaluation of the movements between both countries have to be conceived now in much wider terms and particularly in terms of a common labour market. We must understand why the movement takes place in both directions and what its real motivations now are. The movement to and fro is obviously much larger than before. Similar views are expressed in the most recent study on this subject, by T. J. Samuel, also a staff member of the Program Development Service of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. Both his study and the earlier one by Dr. Pankhurst form part of a research program undertaken by the Research Branch of the Program Development Service which is intended to shed more light on migration between Canada and the United States. Dr. Samuel summarized his major findings as follows: It has been found that the emigration of Canadian-born to the U.S., has lost much of its significance as a drain on Canada's human resources. Not only is the level of emigration decreasing, but also a high percentage of these emigrants are returning to Canada. The return migration has been around 35 percent of the Canadian-born emigrants during the 1955-60 period and 40 percent in the 1960-68 period. Net migration of Canadian-born to the U.S., has been about 19,000 per annum in 1955-59 and, according to estimates, the rate rose slightly to 20,000 in the period 1960-65 and fell to 16,000 in 1966-68.19 Among the reasons given by Dr. Samuel for the higher rates of return migration of Canadian-born in the United States are the increasing percentage among these Canadian emigrants of professionals who tend to have a high degree of mobility; the fact that, although Canadian-born emigrants to the United States improve their earnings in relation to equivalent occupations in Canada, they do not, in many cases, raise their earnings to the levels obtained among the U.S. white population; and also the present social and political conditions in the United States including increasing 39

PART ONE

violence and the threat of military or moral involvement in the war in Vietnam. An interesting fact noted by Dr. Samuel is the declining proportion of Canadian-born immigrants in the United States who are taking out American citizenship. "Expressed in absolute numbers," Dr. Samuel wrote, "Canadian-born taking American citizenship decreased from an annual average of 12,000 during 1951-55 to 7,100 in 1964-68 despite an increasing trend in emigration during most of this time. This suggests that many of the Canadian-born who migrated to the United States were not planning permanent residence in the U.S."20 In addition to this return movement of Canadians, Canada has clearly exercised an increasing attraction in the last few years for highly skilled personnel from the United States. In the universities, for example, where employment opportunities have been increasing much more rapidly than south of the border, the inflow of university teachers from the U.S. to Canada has been roughly three times as great as the outflow, and this is now a sensitive issue hi Canada.21 Expanding American enterprise in Canada has also attracted both permanent and transient settlers. But there is another kind of attraction which may become increasingly important hi the next few years and which has probably had a considerable influence on recent admission figures. This is the appeal which Canada now makes to some citizens and residents of the United States as a convenient sanctuary from racial division and violence. Canadian immigration officials in the United States report an increasing volume of business and a very lively interest in Canada. By many of these applicants, Canada is seen as a land of vast spaces and small population, a peaceful new frontier associated with an ideal American past, a stable and well-managed country with no overwhelming problems of race or poverty—just a good place to raise a family. The image held in the business, investment, and development worlds from which, as noted, an increasing number of managerial immigrants come, must of course have some different dimensions. Canada has also offered sanctuary to many members of another group of U.S. citizens who have helped to swell the ranks of American immigrants. These are the draft evaders and deserters who have come to Canada in increasing numbers, as opposition to the war in Vietnam has grown hi the United States. Many have applied for landed immigrant status. After a period of hesitation and confusion relating particularly to deserters, Canadian policy towards both these groups was clarified by the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, former Minister of Manpower and Immigration, in May 1969. "Our policy towards draft evaders," he said, "is simple and straight-forward: if an applicant for landed immigrant status in Canada otherwise meets our immigration criteria, the fact that he is, or could be, a draft evader has no bearing on his eligibility."22 In a 40

The Canadian Experience statement in the House on May 22, 1969, the Minister made these comments relating to deserters: "Membership in the armed service of another country, or desertion if you like, potential or actual, will not be a factor in determining the eligibility of persons applying for landed immigrant status in Canada, whether such persons apply from within Canada at points of entry or at Canadian immigration offices abroad."23 It is not believed that the number of deserters applying for landed immigrant status has been very large at any time. During the fifteen months between January 1968 and May 1969, seventy-two persons identified as U.S. servicemen were granted landed immigrant status and another twenty-seven applications were being processed, seven applicants decided to return to the United States before their applications were dealt with, and nineteen were turned down because they failed to meet normal immigration criteria.24 On the other hand, the number of U.S. draft evaders in Canada is believed to be substantial, although their exact numbers are unknown. Recent estimates have been in the region of 100,000. Table 4 shows that, during the period from 1950 to 1970, American immigration, unlike total immigration, fluctuated very little and has simply increased steadily, particularly in the last few years. In 1959 Americans, that is immigrants who gave the United States as their country of last permanent residence, became the third largest group of immigrants admitted annually, outstripping the Germans who were in first place from 1951 to 1954 and in third place from 1956 to 1958. Between 1946 and 1967 a total of 244,280 immigrants were admitted from the United States compared with 827,567 from Britain, 409,414 from Italy, and 289,258 from Germany (the four largest groups).25 In 1968 the United States became the second, and in 1971 the first, major source country in Canadian immigration. CONTRIBUTION TO THE LABOUR FORCE Although immigration has made a lesser contribution to post-war population growth in Canada than it has in Australia, it has made a very important contribution to the size and quality of the labour force. During the period from 1950 to 1955, immigration accounted for two-thirds of the total labour force increase and for almost half the total increase during the whole of that decade.26 In the sixties, this contribution to total labour force increase has declined to some extent owing to the striking increase from domestic sources. In 1967 the Economic Council of Canada reported that the Canadian labour force was undergoing a remarkable expansion with a rate of growth "near the highest level ever attained in Canada's history" and far exceeding the recent and current growth rates

41

PART ONE

TABLE 4 IMMIGRATION FROM THE UNITED STATES, 1950-1970

Year

U.S. Admissions

Total Admissions

1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970

7,799 7,732 9,306 9,379 10,110 10,392 9,777 11,008 10,846 11,338 11,247 11,516 11,643 11,736 12,565 15,143 17,514 19,038 20,422 22,785 24,424

73,912 194,391 164,498 168,868 154,227 109,946 164,857 282,164 124,851 106,928 104,111 71,689 74,586 93,151 112,606 146,758 194,743 222,876 183,974 161,531 147,713

SOURCE: Immigration Statistics, Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and Manpower and Immigration.

in the labour forces of other industrial countries. This high rate of growth is expected to continue. In the period from 1965 to 1980, Canada's total civilian labour force is expected to increase by about 50 percent or by three and a half million persons. It is anticipated that the bulk of this increase will come from domestic sources rather than from net immigration.27 According to the Economic Council, this growth is "mainly a consequence of the lagged effect of Canada's large post-war baby boom which has now begun to augment the young, adult population. To a significant though lesser extent, rising female participation in the labour market and net immigration are also expected to be factors contributing to the future labour force growth."28 The most important role, however, which immigration has played in Canada's economic development during the post-war period probably lies 42

The Canadian Experience in a substantial improvement in the quality of the labour force and in the stock of highly trained manpower. On this matter, the Economic Council reports that "since the Second World War, the high demand for professional, technical and other highly skilled manpower in Canada has been met to a significant degree by immigration from overseas. Between 1953 and 1963, for example, slightly more than 80,000 professional and highly skilled technical workers entered Canada from outside North America [out of a total of approximately 95,000]. The largest proportion of these workers, accounting for approximately three-fifths of the total, were British. Moreover, although total overseas immigration has fluctuated widely from year to year, professional workers have been accounting for a rising share of the annual inflow."29 During the whole of the post-war period up to 1963, two-thirds of all the professional workers admitted to Canada were from Britain and the United States. British immigrants accounted for over half the total movement of professional workers during this period.30 Chart 2 shows the ethnic origins of professional and skilled immigrants from 1946 to 1963. It is also interesting to note that during the period from 1963 to 1968, nearly 122,000 professional and technical workers were admitted to Canada, and of these, some 17,500 were nurses, 14,500 were engineers, 6,700 were scientists (including agricultural specialists), and 5,600 were physicians and surgeons. The total occupational and numerical contribution of immigration to the Canadian labour force in the post-war period is indicated in Table 5 which records the intended occupations of all immigrants who were admitted between 1946 and 1970. A comparison between the two periods, 1946-55 and 1956-67, is very revealing. In the latter period there were striking increases in the managerial, professional, and clerical categories. Service and recreation workers was a rapidly expanding category, and the small category of communications trades showed a dramatic increase. As might be expected, the admission of farmers and farm workers, miners, fishermen, trappers, and loggers declined sharply. The manufacturing and mechanical trades, mainly skilled and semi-skilled workers (the largest group), the labourer category, and the construction trades all showed substantial increases in the second period. By 1970, however, there were further changes in the occupational composition of the total immigration movement. Of all the workers who came to Canada in that year, 32.82 percent were classed in the managerial or professional categories; 28.31 percent in the manufacturing, mechanical, or construction trades; 19.52 percent in the clerical, commercial, or financial occupations; 10.10 percent in the service occupations; 2.74 percent in agriculture; and 2.08 percent in the labouring category.31 43

PART ONE

CHART 2 Ethnic Origin of Immigrants to Canada by Levels of Skill, 1946-1963 From Louis Parai, Immigration and Emigration of Professional and Skilled Manpower during the Post-War Period, Special Study no. 1, Economic Council of Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965), p. 26. Reproduced by permission of Information Canada.

The most recent projection of Canada's manpower requirements by the Research Branch of the Program Development Service of the Department of Manpower and Immigration gives a clear indication of future trends in occupational demand hi Canada which will inevitably have a powerful effect on the composition and destination of Canada's immigration movement in the next few years.32 In all the manpower regions established by the Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966 (Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, Frames, British Columbia), the projected requirements in 1975 for craftsmen, production process and related workers represent between one-fifth and one-third of total manpower requirements, outnumbering requirements in any other occupations. Requirements in professional and technical occupations are the second highest, followed closely by requirements in clerical and sales occupations and, in the Prairie region, for farmers and farm workers. In all regions, except the Prairie region, requirements in the primary occupations are projected to 44

TABLE 5 INTENDED OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS OF POST-WAR IMMIGRANTS, 1946-1970 Occupational Groups Destined to labour force: Managerial2 Professional Clerical Transportation trades Communication trades2 Commercial sales workers Financial sales workers2 Service and recreation workers1 Farmers Construction trades Fishers, trappers, loggers Miners Manufacturing and mechanical trades Labourers Others Total Non-workers: Wives Children Others Total Grand Total

1946-1970

1946-1955

1956-1967

1968

1969

1970

4,213 44,526 46,788 14,331 1,001 25,257

2,385 29, 250 12,651

2,566 26,883 12,222

3,095 22,412 12,143

69,447 138,195 52,516 12,928 10,029 148,095 58,743 9,255

16,221 154,982 107,395 13,768 4,581 29,781 2,363 113,291 51,309 79,679 2,865 5,459 194,407 97,683 5,525

632 211 2,599 431 7,852 2,129 6,001 111 272 16,005 1,614 2,216

28,480 278,053 191,199 30,367 6,346 63,012 4,375 208,885 197,080 151,897 16,150 16,645 399,175 162,739 18,222

635,798

879,309

95,446

84,349

77,723

1,772,625

252,347 289,298 44,876

319,555 429,461 70,995

32,091 44,925 11,512

27,389 38,754 11,039

25,361 34,493 10,136

656,743 836,931 148,558

586,521

820,011

88,528

77,182

69,990

1,642,232

1,222,319

1,699,320

183,974

161,531

147,713

3,414,857

474

926 331 2,631 564 9,235 3,164 7,737 114 496 23,189 2,681 92

710 222 2,744 543 9,060 2,283 5,964 132 389 17,479 2,018 1,134

3,408 3,807 2,985 128,826 Includes domestic servants. 57,447 61,179 Available as a separate occupational group since 1953 only. From 7970 Immigration Statistics, Department of Manpower and Immigration, p. 75. Reproduced by permission of Information Canada. 2

PART ONE

form only a small proportion of total requirements. In all regions the projected growth in manpower requirements for the period 1971-75 is greatest for professional and technical occupations, and requirements in these occupations are projected to more than double by 1975. The projection also indicates that manpower requirements in 1975 for all occupations, except some of the primary occupations, will be greatest in Ontario, and that Ontario and Quebec will together account for roughly 60 to 70 percent of the national requirements in almost every occupation. The great influx of professional and skilled immigrants to Canada in the post-war period has not only met essential manpower needs, but has also constituted an immense saving in national outlay on education and professional and vocational training. The cost of training the highly skilled is substantial and the full implications of this in relation to domestic policy must be remembered. At the same time, Canada's continuing financial gain through the migration of professional and skilled workers from developed and developing countries must be considered in the light of her present and future international obligations. This is a very important point in considering the desirable emphasis and direction of Canada's future immigration policy. The domestic problem was very clearly stated by Dr. J. J. Deutsch, then Chairman of the Economic Council of Canada, in the evidence he gave before the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Immigration in December 1966. A committee member asked him, "Should we be scrambling for bright people from abroad?" Dr. Deutsch: It is a matter of social and political policy whether you want to bring people here and then educate and train them here or whether you want to bring them in educated or trained. I am saying the trend of requirements is in the direction of higher levels of education and higher levels of skills. Now how do you want to get at this? You can bring in immigrants who are already educated and trained as much as possible or, if you want to, you can bring them in and train and educate them here. But that means you must be prepared from a social and political point of view to do this. In other words it costs money; it takes time and it requires capital and at the same time we have a very heavy job to do in relation to our own population. We never have had so many young people in this country as we have now. We happen to have relatively more than almost any other industrial country in the world. We have far more than the United States proportionately and most of the European countries. We are going to try to give them an adequate education. That is very important and it costs a lot of money. It means a tremendous expansion of our school system which we are 46

The Canadian Experience in the process of doing and have been doing. Now it means a tremendous expansion of our higher levels of education, which is tremendously expensive. It all costs a great deal of money. It requires many skilled people, teachers and so on. In the face of that situation what do you want to do? Do you want to bring in more to be educated and trained? If you want them it can be done provided you are willing to put up the money for training facilities to do it. If you want to do that it can be done.33 THE SPONSORED MOVEMENT We should now look at the unskilled and uneducated, and the underskilled and under-educated, who have come to Canada since 1945. These are the immigrants who have come in mainly through the sponsored movement and who have helped to fill the demand for male and female unskilled labour or very minimally skilled labour. They have always been vulnerable to unemployment, and now with automation and the increasing need for skilled manpower, they are even more so. Many of them, present and to come, could be trained here to acquire certain skills and a number could become very highly skilled if we are willing, as Dr. Deutsch pointed out, to finance their education and training. The Department of Manpower and Immigration is now making a valiant effort through the Canada Manpower Training Program to tackle the enormous task of upgrading the skills of the present Canadian labour force.34 The sponsored movement, that is, the movement of relatives and quasirelatives, has played a very important role in Canadian post-war immigration and has been a source of great anxiety—perhaps over-anxiety— among those responsible for immigration policy and management. As already noted, a reasonable degree of control over it was established under the 1967 immigration regulations. But in view of the importance of this movement in the first twenty years of the post-war period in Canada, it is worth looking carefully at its principal features. Until the new regulations were introduced in 1967, Canadian immigration consisted of two broad categories of immigrants: unsponsored, or "open placement," and sponsored. Open placement immigrants were selected. Sponsored immigrants were unselected and were eligible to come because, theoretically, they had close relatives in Canada who were willing to sponsor and help them. Between 1946 and 1966 Canada admitted more than 2,500,000 immigrants, of whom some 900,000 were sponsored. Statistical information about the sponsored movement has been very sparse. An internal study on sponsored immigration by the former Department of Citizenship and Immigration, written in 1963, noted: 47

PART ONE

"There is a distressing scarcity of statistics which distinguish between sponsored and unsponsored immigrants after their arrival in Canada and similar statistics compiled at their time of arrival are incomplete. Full figures on some aspects are available only for the years from 1955 on; a few rough estimates are possible for the years 1951 to 1954." Prior to 1963, according to the estimates made in this report, Italy, Portugal, and Greece provided the largest number of sponsored immigrants, more than half the total movement, except in 1957. Roughly half the number of unskilled labourers in the total immigration movement during this period came from these three countries. About 40 percent of the total sponsored movement was Italian. From 1951 to 1963, roughly one-seventh of all immigrants admitted to Canada were sponsored immigrants from Italy, and in 1959—a peak year for Italian immigration—the proportion almost reached one-quarter. More detailed statistics on sponsored immigrants were kept from 1962 onwards and show that only a little over half of all sponsored immigrants in that year were close relatives. More distant relatives made up 42.4 percent of the movement; of these it was estimated that only 7.3 percent could have been selected as unsponsored immigrants. Of all sponsored immigrants from Italy and Greece, approximately 54 percent were more distant relatives, of whom only 2.4 percent in the case of Italy, and 5.3 percent in the case of Greece, could have qualified as unsponsored immigrants. Only one-third of the Portuguese sponsored movement consisted of more distant relatives, but only 1 percent of these could have been selected as unsponsored immigrants. According to a report from the Economic and Social Research Division of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in which the 1962 statistics were examined, 74.5 percent of all workers in the unsponsored movement in that year could have been classed as skilled or better, but only 27 percent of all sponsored workers could have been classed as skilled. Of all sponsored workers, 25.2 percent were totally unskilled compared with 2.2 percent of the unsponsored workers. Of the totally unskilled sponsored workers, 94.2 percent came from southern Europe. The proportion of totally unskilled workers among the sponsored workers from these countries was: Italy, 43.2 percent, Portugal, 22.7 percent; Greece, 6.6 percent; all other countries, 5.3 percent.35 In the immediate post-war period, it was firmly believed that the sponsorship system was an excellent type of immigration which smoothed the problems of adjustment to North American society and produced good Canadian citizens.36 But as the years went on, this view became substantially modified, at least in official circles, not in relation to the immediate family, but to the sponsorship and automatic admission of a wide range 48

The Canadian Experience of relatives. As it developed in Canada prior to 1967, the sponsorship system proved to have the following qualities: 1. A major bias in favour of national groups already established in Canada and particularly those with strong kinship ties. 2. An element of explosive growth. During much of the post-war period it was possible to sponsor a wide range of relatives. And there was little to prevent these relatives from sponsoring other relatives in a rapid process of chain migration. 3. A proportion of sponsors never carry out their full sponsorship responsibilities. Sponsorship served in a great many cases simply as an easier means of gaining entry to Canada. 4. Sponsorship, while it may provide immediate help and shelter for the immigrant (thus relieving government of this responsibility), is probably not in itself a major factor in satisfactory and long-term adjustment, and reliance upon it for this purpose is illusory. 5. The sponsorship system breeds pressure. It has been immensely time-consuming for officials and politicians in Canada. It is difficult to control. Geographic patterns develop within it which are difficult to change. For example, the very large sponsored movement from southern Italy pre-empted such a large part of the total Italian movement that virtually no promotion or development took place in northern Italy until fairly recently.37 6. The sponsorship system has also contributed powerfully to the growth of large and, to a considerable extent, self-contained ethnic communities in Montreal and Toronto and, to a more limited degree, in certain other cities.38 It is important to remember, however, that the influx of immigrants into Canada from the underdeveloped rural parts of southern Europe in the early post-war years was by no means entirely spontaneous. It derived to a considerable extent from the deliberate recruitment of unskilled labourers, mainly in Italy and Portugal, by both the Canadian government and private enterprise after the war. This can be illustrated by the following extract from an official report on Portuguese immigration in the fifties: Immigration movements from Portugal for the next few years (from 1953 onwards) must be studied in the light of the then current shortage of heavy manual labour in Canada, and the persistent pressure from railway construction companies and agricultural groups for immigrant workers, coupled with the decline in immigration from our traditional source countries in 1955 and 1956. For the 1954 programme, at the request of the Portuguese Government, the Portuguese movement 49

PART ONE

comprised 200 railway track workers for the R. F. Welsh Company [1000 Italian track workers had been recruited in 1953], 700 agricultural workers for mixed farms, and up to 50 tradesmen with all selection to be conducted in the Azores. In 1955 the approved movement consisted of 900 farm labourers and 50 tradesmen to be selected from the Portuguese Mainland. In 1956 a similar programme was approved but with selection from the Azores. For the 1957 immigration programme, in line with a general expansion of activities, the programme included 2000 farm labourers (1000 from the Azores and 1000 from the Mainland) as well as 50 tradesmen. Subsequently a movement of 1000 track workers from the Azores for the R. F. Welsh Company was also authorized in 1957.... About this time (1957-58) serious doubts began to be felt in the Immigration Branch about the Portuguese movement. The Portuguese Government was obviously making efforts to concentrate our recruiting activities in the Azores. At the same time there were increasing signs that the declining need for unskilled labourers in Canada would not continue to support the type of movements we had been accepting in Portugal. The several large movements of unskilled workers from the Azores showed signs of producing a disproportionate volume of sponsored immigrants (duplicating our experience in Italy).39 The problems associated with this great influx of unskilled workers and their families—their vulnerability to unemployment and their tendency to settle in, or to be entirely involved with, their own ethnic communities and to take very little part in Canadian life outside their working environment—are not, of course, a total description of the role which they and their children play in Canadian economic and cultural development. They have settled in Canada in large numbers without conspicuous difficulty. Many of them are valuable workers, if unskilled. They are consumers. They frequently have high economic motivation. The benefits of emigration to a land far from warm Mediterranean shores may nevertheless seem considerable to them, and their permanent attachment to Canada may be very strong. We do not know very much yet about the inner life and development of ethnic communities in Canada. It is certain, however, that most immigrants who have been part of this great post-war influx, skilled or unskilled, together contribute an energetic and dynamic quality, a sense of growth and potential in Canadian life which is very stimulating and of direct economic and cultural advantage. One can reflect also on the considerable contribution thus made to the economic future of this large flow of southern Europeans from areas of poverty and underdevelopment. 50

The Canadian Experience THE PROBLEM OF CONTROL

In all, the political and social consequences of the Canadian post-war sponsored movement are of exceptional interest, and the whole movement deserves special study. There have been three main problems associated with it from the point of view of reasonable management and control. The first simply was that it escalated—and in an alarming way. By the mid-fifties it was calculated that one Italian immigrant meant fortynine Italian relatives, and the potential for family sponsorship was even higher. The second problem was that the essential base of the movement was the unskilled, often nearly illiterate, manual labourer from southern Europe, emigrating or recruited in the first few years after the war. No other European group, and Europe was then the major source of Canadian immigration, wanted their relatives so much, both to enlarge the family base in Canada and to share with them her economic opportunities. Thus the quality of the sponsored immigrants whose applications came flooding into Rome, Lisbon, and Athens visa offices in the fifties was very low in terms of skill and education. This caused increasing anxiety within the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, always concerned to develop high-quality immigration and aware of the changing needs of the Canadian economy. The third problem was that strong pressures soon developed within Canada to perpetuate the sponsorship system in its existing form, and no government, until 1966, felt either sufficiently strongly on the subject, or sufficiently courageous, to take a firm stand, face the political consequences, and impose reasonable controls. The Immigration Branch was left to handle this as best it could. The result was a large post-war movement of immigrants to Canada which was unselected, autonomous, exceedingly difficult to control or adjust to changing economic requirements, and not integrated with the total immigration program. The very limited public discussion which has taken place in Canada on immigration has centred on the issues of admission, and, before 1962, on racial discrimination in immigration policy. The sponsored movement—free-flowing, largely unchecked and unselected, with major biases, responding aU the time to pressure, and continuously time-consuming for management in many ways—has been totally ignored. The real responsibility for this lies with cabinet ministers and senior public servants who failed to place the issues involved in sponsorship squarely before Parliament and the public, and so develop an intelligent understanding both of its advantages and of its problems. Thus the problems of the sponsored movement involved private suffering for government. The history of attempts to control it by regulation, instruction, and limitation of visa office staffs goes back to the early 51

PART ONE

fifties. None of the attempts was very successful, although they did result in some slowing up and some reduction of unlimited sponsorship from time to time. Two major public efforts were made to restrict unlimited sponsorship. The first, which was described in Chapter 1, was the attempt made by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1959 to restrict the admissible classes of relatives to the immediate family. The order-in-council of March 19, 1959,40 which amended the existing regulations to this effect, was rescinded after strong objections had been raised in the House and elsewhere. The second effort began with the publication of the White Paper on Canadian Immigration Policy in October 1966 and concluded with the announcement of new immigration regulations in September 1967. Control of the sponsored movement was only one of the objectives involved in this second effort, but it was a major one. The White Paper proposed that Canadian citizenship should be the necessary requirement for sponsoring non-dependent relatives. This idea had circulated within the Immigration Branch for a long time. It had been suggested as a possibility by the Deputy Minister in 1961, but this was not its first appearance. Its merit would be a levelling-out of the sponsored movement. As the White Paper put it: "If citizenship is a condition for sponsoring non-dependent relatives, the sponsored movement will lose its potential for explosive growth. If each successive link in the chain requires five years to forge—while the immigrant becomes a citizen before he becomes a sponsor—we will not continue to face the dilemma that unskilled workers may be an increasing part of the immigration movement although the proportion of jobs which require little education or skill is declining."41 This aspect of the White Paper provoked a good deal of unfavourable comment. There were the same protests in favour of unlimited sponsorship. Also the idea that citizenship should be made in any way mandatory was unfavourably received. So the whole matter had to be thought out again. A special task force was appointed within the new Department of Manpower and Immigration with instructions to express, in terms of regulations and procedures, a new selection system based on specific criteria for which points would be awarded, and a new approach to admission based upon the separation of dependent from non-dependent relatives. The outcome was the announcement of new immigration regulations on September 12, 1967.42 For the first time, these were to be totally non-discriminatory. In the words of the Minister, they would be applied universally, they would give increased recognition to family relationships, and they would be more closely attuned to Canada's economic needs. They were presented to Parliament and the public with a good deal of firmness and conviction. As already mentioned, the regulations 52

The Canadian Experience created a carefully planned point system for selection and three categories for admission—independent applicants, sponsored dependents, and nominated relatives. The sponsored stream was therefore divided into two parts—dependent and non-dependent relatives—the objective of many efforts hi the past. Non-dependent relatives, that is, "nominated relatives," do not now come in automatically. They have to pass through a modified selection process and must satisfy the visa officer in the areas of education, personal assessment, occupational demand, occupational skill, and age—the first five factors in the nine-part system which applies to independent applicants. The idea of Canadian citizenship as a useful factor in sponsorship is retained in a minor form, in that slightly higher preference will be given to a relative who is nominated by a Canadian citizen than to one nominated by a permanent resident. The new regulations were approved without difficulty. Their new and desirable features, combined with the firm way in which they were presented, disarmed criticism. Was it noticed that control over the sponsored movement, long sought and often rejected for political reasons, was now an integral part of the new system? Even so, the modified selection process through which nominated relatives must now pass is not very arduous and there is some feeling now, in view of the currently high levels of unemployment in Canada, that it still permits the entry of too many semi-skilled or unskilled immigrants who are very vulnerable to unemployment. NATIONAL ORIGINS So far we have considered the physical size and some of the major characteristics of the total flow of immigrants to Canada since 1945. We should now look briefly at the national origins of this immigration movement and its distribution across the land. Tables 6 to 9 show the major source countries of Canadian immigration during the period 1946-67, before the introduction of the new, completely non-discriminatory immigration regulations in 1967; and also the extent of immigration from the Americas and Asia during the same period and from the Middle East from 1955 to 1967. Since 1967 there have been some very interesting changes in the traditional pattern of Canadian immigration, which can be seen in Tables 10, 11, and 12. These changes reflect, not only the new immigration regulations and selection system and what appears to be a changing pattern of demand, but also a serious departmental effort which began before 1967 to improve overseas immigration operations.43 This included the opening of new visa offices and the strengthening of existing offices hi Asia and the Caribbean; and determined efforts in France to increase the 53

PART ONE

TABLE 6 MAJOR SOURCE COUNTRIES OF CANADIAN IMMIGRATION, 1946-1967 Above 40,000: Britain Italy Germany (Fed. Rep.) United States The Netherlands Poland

827,567 409,414 289,258 244,280 165,268 102,376

Above 20,000: Belgium West Indies-Antilles Denmark Australia

38,757 35,800 34,702 31,227

France Greece Portugal Austria Hungary China

82,877 80,216 57,427 54,511 52,734 46,765

Yugoslavia Republic of Ireland Switzerland

27,815 27,482 26,972

SOURCE: Immigration Statistics, Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and Manpower and Immigration.

numbers of French immigrants (combined with a more encouraging attitude towards Canadian immigration activities on the part of the French government). In 1967 the admission figures from France, 10,122, were the highest reached in the post-war period, although they have declined again since then. In the same year immigration from Central America and the Caribbean more than doubled over the previous year. The tables also show the steady increase in immigration from the United States. We have already seen that immigration from Europe, including Britain, fell from 87 percent of the total movement in 1966 to 51 percent in 1970. In 1968 there was a significant overall decline of 20 percent in the total number of applications from Europe—24 percent less from Britain, 33 percent less from Italy, and 52.9 percent less from Germany. This decline was apparent in the lower admission figures for 1969 and 1970. At the same time the number of applications from Asia and the Caribbean has been increasing steadily. Immigrants from thdse areas represented 23 percent of the total movement in 1969. In that year there were large increases from India and the Philippines, and immigration from the Caribbean doubled again. In 1970 immigrants from Asia and the Caribbean represented 22.5 percent of the total movement. New patterns in Canadian immigration are clearly emerging now. It is plain, however, that the total immigration movement to Canada in the post-war period has been very largely a movement from Europe and the United States. The movement from Europe (including the United Kingdom) has been partly spontaneous and partly the result of deliberate 54

The Canadian Experience TABLE 7 IMMIGRATION FROM NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA, 1946-1967 United States Argentina1 Brazili Mexico Central America Other South American countries

244,280 5,336 4,835 2,252 702 22,004

SOURCE: Immigration Statistics, Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and Manpower and Immigration. Included with "South America not British" in immigration statistics before 1955.

TABLE 8 IMMIGRATION FROM ASIA, 1946-1967 China India Philippines Japan Pakistani Ceylon2 Other Asian countries

46,765 15,148 7,801 3,564 2,624 713 5,053

SOURCE: Immigration Statistics, Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and Manpower and Immigration. Included with "India" in immigration statistics before 1954. Included with "other countries British" before 1954.

efforts on Canada's part. The movement from the United States has been mainly spontaneous and is the outcome of proximity, increasingly close economic relationships, professional opportunities in Canada, and recently, the attraction of Canada as a more peaceful land and as a temporary or permanent haven for draft evaders and deserters. This is a special emigration-immigration relationship. The strong European bias in the total movement has been the result of four major factors: first, Canada's historical ties with Europe and her obvious Atlantic orientation in foreign policy and international relations 55

TABLE 9 IMMIGRATION FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, 1955-1967 Israel Egypt Lebanon Morocco (from 1957) Tunisia (from 1957) Algeria (from 1957) Iran Saudi Arabia

18,254 10,621 6,147 5,002 1,598 879 550 95

SOURCE: Immigration Statistics, Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and Manpower and Immigration.

TABLE 10 MAJOR SOURCE COUNTRIES OF CANADIAN IMMIGRATION, 1967-1970 1967: Britain Italy United States Germany (Fed. Rep.) Greece France Portugal West Indies-Antilles China i Australia Total Admissions

62,420 30,055 19,038 11,779 10,650 10,122 9,500 8,403 6,409 4,967 222,876

1968: Britain United States Italy Germany (Fed. Rep.) Chinai France Austria2 Greece Portugal West Indies-Antilles Total Admissions

37,889 20,422 19,774 8,966 8,382 8,184 8,125 7,739 7,738 7,563 183,974

1969: Britain United States West Indies-Antilles Italy Chinai Portugal Greece Germany (Fed. Rep.) France India Total Admissions

31,977 22,785 13,093 10,383 8,272 7,182 6,937 5,880 5,549 5,395 161,531

1970: Britain United States West Indies-Antilles Italy Portugal Greece Yugoslavia India Chinai France Total Admissions

26,497 24,424 12,456 8,533 7,902 6,327 5,672 5,670 5,377 4,410 147,713

SOURCE: Immigration Statistics, Department of Manpower and Immigration. Includes mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Includes a large number of Czechoslovakian refugees who were processed through the Vienna office.

TABLE 11 CONTINENTAL SOURCES OF CANADIAN IMMIGRATION, 1946-1970 19461962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1 ,841,492 85.59

68,896 73.96

82,393 73.16

107,816 73.46

147,918 75.95

159,979 71.78

120,702 65.61

88,363 54.70

75,609 51.19

12,200 0.57

2,431 2.60

3,874 3.44

3,196 2.17

1.88

4,608 2.06

5,204 2.82

3,297 2.04

2,863 1.94

no. %

56,353 2.62

3,912 4.19

6,526 5.79

11,684 7.96

14,327 7.35

20,740 9.30

21,686 11.78

23,319 14.44

21,170 14.33

no.

22,595 1.05

1,692 1.81

2,305 2.04

2,711 1.84

4,059 2.08

6,179 2.77

4,818 2.62

4,414 2.73

4,388 2.97

187,526 8.72

14,347 15.40

15,034 13.35

18,565 12.65

21,873 11.23

28,043 12.58

28,551 15.52

36,693 22.72

37,795 25.59

no. %

19,974 0.93

1,779 1.91

2,257 2.00

2,471 1.68

2,604 1.33

3,090 1.38

2,693 1.46

4,767 2.95

4,943 3.35

no. %

11,365 0.52

94

Source Area Europe: no.

%

Africa: no. % Asia:

Australasia: /o

North and Central America:

no. /o

Scwr/z America:

Oceania and other:

Total: no.

%

2,151,505

100

0.10

93,151

100

217

0.19

112,606

100

3,661

315

301

146,758

194,743

0.21

100

0.15

100

237

320

222,876

183,974

0.10

SOURCE: Immigration Statistics, Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and Manpower and Immigration.

100

1970

1969

1968

0.17

100

678

0.42

161,531

100

945

0.63

147,713

100

TABLE 12 COUNTRY OF FORMER RESIDENCE OF POST-WAR IMMIGRANTS, 1946-1970 Country of Former Residence Albania Algeria1 Argentina2 Australia Austria Belgium Bermuda Brazil Britain Bulgaria Ceylon3 China Czechoslovakia Denmark Egypt* Estonia Finland France Germany, Fed. Rep. Greece Hungary Iceland India Iran2 Ireland, Rep. Israel Italy Japan Latvia Lebanon2 Lithuania Luxembourg2 Malta Mexico

1946-1955

150 441

6,715 26,038 19,749

575 235

358,681

649 31

16,186 10,860 13,667

68

10,431 9,274 29,041 145,198 14,734 10,433

218

1,865

6

10,102 6,486 130,752

409

10,783

335

9,898

61

6,065

665

1956-1967 11

879 4,895 24,512 28,473 19,008 1,247 4,600 468,886 136 682 30,579 672 21,035 10,553 82 9,796 53,836 144,060 65,482 42,301 269 13,283 544 17,380 11,768 278,662 3,155 73 5,813 35 847 7,166 1,587

1968 _ 23 466 3,710 8,125 1,081 192 493 37,889 15 76 8,382 918 1,184 1,915 5 740 8,184 8,966 7,739 529 30 3,229 162 1,545 1,497 19,774 693 2 1,682 3 31 447 245

1969

1970

1946-1970

_ 18 541 3,526 2,083 1,004 222 639 31,977 18 179 8,272 1,754 693 1,429 5 700 5,549 5,880 6,937 516 70 5,395 84 1,235 863 10,383 766 2 1,196 4 31 341 377

1 24 315 3,461 745 660 204 533 26,497 18 167 5,377 763 564 913 2 604 4,410 4,193 6,327 461 54 5,670 123 1,123 818 8,533 797 6 1,206 2 46 263 448

162 944 6,658 41,924 65,464 41,502 2,440 6,500 923,930 836 1,135 68,796 14,967 37,143 14,878 10,525 21,114 101,020 308,297 101,219 54,240 641 29,442 919 31,385 21,432 448,104 5,820 10,866 10,232 9,942 1,016 14,282 3,322

Morocco1 Netherlands, The New Zealand Norway Pakistan3 Philippines5 Poland Portugal Romania St. Pierre & Miquelon Saudi Arabia South Africa, Rep.2 Spain Sweden Switzerland Syria Tunisia1 Turkey U.S.S.R. United States Yugoslavia Africa, n.e.s.4 Asia, n.e.s.4 Central America Europe, n.e.s.4 South America, n.e.s.4 West Indies-Antilles Other countries, n.e.s.4 Total

109,582 2,282 6,103 117 80,529 2,103 6,049 216 12 265 866 6,606 7,790 1,076 196 12,063 90,909 14,988 3,858 467 264 459 7,226 6,699 10,793

5,002 55,686 6,017 5,725 2,507 7,801 21,847 55,324 986 309 83 6,350 7,296 5,736 19,182 522 381 3,090 1,149 153,371 12,827 4,944 4,586 438 217 14,778 29,101 1,758

1,336 3,264 1,105 465 627 2,678 1,092 7,738 70 26 48 924 1,367 602 3,529 396 37 505 183 20,422 4,660 969 2,216 103 20 1,734 7,563 323

326 2,494 885 341 1,005 3,001 859 7,182 86 15 19 599 879 459 2,307 226 42 387 112 22,785 4,053 883 2,313 201 22 3,587 13,093 681

254 1,916 924 239 1,010 3,240 723 7,902 144 13 22 646 808 412 2,098 188 34 281 131 24,424 5,672 992 2,552 250 11 4,095 12,456 948

6,918 172,942 11,213 12,873 5,266 16,720 105,050 80,249 7,335 579 184 8,784 11,216 13,815 34,906 2,408 494 4,459 13,638 311,911 42,200 11,646 12,134 1,256 729 31,420 68,912 14,503

1,222,319

1,699,320

183,974

161,531

147,713

3,414,857

From 7970 Immigration Statistics, Department of Manpower and Immigration, p. 21. Reproduced by permission of Information Canada. 1 Before 1957, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia were included with "Africa not British." 2 Before 1955, Egypt was included with "Africa not British"; Iran with "Asia"; Republic of South Africa with "Africa British"; Argentina, Brazil with "South America not British"; Lebanon with "Syria"; Luxembourg with "Europe not British." 3 Before 1954, Ceylon was included with "other countries British"; Pakistan with "India," 4 n.e.s. means "not elsewhere specified." 5 Before 1961, Philippines were included in "other countries not British."

PART ONE

during almost the whole of the period under discussion; secondly, immigration policies which were exclusively based, until 1962, on these concepts and relationships and which only began to be effectively universal in 1967; thirdly, as an outcome of this orientation and these policies, and as a feature also of the negative controls and attitudes to development of the Canadian public service in the fifties, the concentration of visa office facilities in Europe and the absence of facilities and deliberate promotion and encouragement for immigrants in other parts of the world. The fourth factor is the availability of very large numbers of potential immigrants in post-war Europe, particularly in the first decade after the war, and the strong Canadian impulse in the early years to give assistance in this area, plus Canada's traditional first preference for immigration from the United Kingdom and the availability of large numbers of British immigrants throughout the post-war period. We should remember also, in relation to Canada's historical ties with Europe, her experience in the European campaigns of two world wars and the friendships and loyalties which developed from them. A great many Canadian immigration officers in the post-war period have been veterans of the Second World War. Some European countries were very familiar to them, and for some time the frontiers of western Europe were the frontiers of their own international experience. Only a very small number of Asian, African, West Indian, and other non-Europeans were admitted to Canada prior to 1962. From some of these areas, there was no spontaneous demand for immigration facilities at this period. From others, the West Indies for example, the demand was considerable. The Chinese, having a larger community base in Canada already, mainly in British Columbia, and possessing a remarkable talent for illegal immigration developed in the face of very restrictive policies over a long period of time, were able to bring in more people, although still subject to considerable restriction.44 The 1962 immigration regulations abolished discrimination in general, but retained some restriction on the admission of relatives from non-European countries, as no solution had yet been found to the problems inherent in the sponsorship system. This restriction did not, however, apply to the West Indies. But the expansion of facilities which must accompany a liberal admission policy did not begin, for reasons which are explored elsewhere, until several years later.45 Middle East immigration, which was not restricted in a total sense and proved to have a very high professional component, did not get under way until the mid-fifties. Within the total post-war movement to Canada of more than three million people, by far the largest groups, as the tables show, have been the British and the Italians, although the United States has proved to be a very 60

The Canadian Experience strong, long-distance runner. Both nationalities shared the attribute of being highly migration-minded and of wishing to emigrate to Canada in large numbers. The majority of British immigrants have been open placement immigrants or, now, independent applicants. The majority of Italians, over the whole of the post-war period, have been sponsored. For a time, these two movements were closely related in an interesting way, namely, in the anxiety of Canadian policy-makers in the fifties and early sixties to keep one ahead of the other. Immigration officials anxiously watched the Italian movement, whose large, unskilled, sponsored component caused them great concern, just as they kept a wary eye on the immigration operations of the Australians overseas. After study of the history of the sponsored movement, one might almost say that, beneath an outward appearance of civility, the Canadian government was engaged for some years hi a long and arduous struggle with the Italian masses, eager to join their Canadian relatives in large numbers and assisted by Church and State. Who won this battle? Without any question, at least until 1967, the Italians did. Chart 3 shows the levels of British and Italian immigration to Canada between 1950 and 1970, both of which are, at present, declining. The years from 1957 to 1963 are of particular interest as they illustrate the close relationship between these two movements and some of the dilemmas of policy-making during this period. The year 1957 is usually remembered as the year of the great influx of Hungarian refugees and rightly so, as this was a special and emergency operation. But in that same year, in fact, three times as many British immigrants arrived in Canada as Hungarian—108,989 compared with 31,643. This was the sudden exodus generated by the Suez crisis. In that year also 28,430 Germans arrived and 27,740 Italians. In 1958, however, the number of British arrivals dropped sharply, and for the first time the Italian intake was larger than the British. This continued until 1962. As we have noted, 1958 was the beginning of a downswing in the business cycle in Canada and the United States. During the next few years more than 6 percent of the Canadian labour force was unemployed. In late 1959 and 1960 there was serious criticism of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, voiced in the House of Commons and elsewhere, for conducting an over-vigorous promotion campaign in the United Kingdom at a time of serious unemployment in Canada. What was described at the time by the Deputy Minister as a "low key approach in the U.K." resulted and continued until 1963. At the same time, in April 1959, in a contradictory move, the House had reacted strongly against the new regulation to control the growing sponsored movement which consisted largely of unskilled immigrants. In 1960 the backlog of appli61

PART ONE

CHART 3 British and Italian Immigration, 1950-1970 SOURCE: Immigration Statistics, Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and Manpower and Immigration.

cations from sponsored immigrants in the Rome office reached a record level of 65,587. The Department was obliged to deal with this situation administratively, which they did.46 Priorities were established, putting dependent relatives first. Settlement arrangements were rigorously ex62

The Canadian Experience amined, and where they were less than satisfactory, non-dependents were required to qualify occupationally (essentially the same idea as in the 1967 regulations). The effect was immediate. The backlog began to melt away. Hundreds of applications from unskilled workers were refused or postponed, and another factor—the increasing opportunities for migrant labour within the European Common Market—also played a part. All these factors are reflected in the downward movement after 1960 of the Italian curve in Chart 3. But this solution to the problems of sponsorship was not permanent, and the sponsored movement began to pick up again as economic conditions started to improve in Canada in the early sixties. In the meantime, British immigration had dropped to eleven thousand, the lowest level since the war, causing alarm and despondency in some quarters and very low morale in the London office of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. But in February 1963, there occurred what was known in the Department at the time as "Bell's Resurrection." Richard Bell had become Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in the Diefenbaker government after the general election of 1962. Ellen Fairclough, the previous Minister, who had incurred some unpopularity over her reasonable attempt to check the escalating movement of relatives,47 had been defeated in her Hamilton riding by a young politician of Italian origin, Joe Macaluso.48 Richard Bell, who had firm views on the value of immigration for national development, was very disturbed by what he found on assuming office—low intake, low morale in the Department in Ottawa and London, and very limited resources. Officials felt that there was no political backing or public interest in immigration. He found that Italian immigration was way ahead and British immigration was lagging. George Drew, then High Commissioner, and other Canadian friends in London pointed out how well the Australians seemed to be doing in Britain. Largely on his own initiative, therefore, since the Cabinet was anti-immigration because of heavy unemployment, Bell decided "to put the Department back in business." He sent new staff and special instructions to London to get moving again. And a senior official was sent on a tour of all visa offices in Europe to give them the green light to go ahead. Once again the immigration figures began to rise. It was indeed a moment of resurrection.49 From this time onwards, both British and Italian immigration increased substantially, and for the next few years these groups remained in first and second place, with the United States as the third major source country. In 1967 the round admission figures were 62,000, 30,000, and 19,000. But in 1968 and 1969, as we have seen, the United States replaced Italy as the second major source country. In 1970 the round figures for Britain, the United States, and Italy were 26,000, 24,000, and 8,000, and 63

PART ONE

in 1971, for the United States, Britain, and Italy, 24,000, 15,000, and 5,000, the U.S. having replaced Britain as the major source country. DESTINATION IN CANADA Finally we should note the way in which the annual flow of immigrants to Canada is distributed, or settles itself across the land. This is a spontaneous pattern of settlement which has remained constant, within a few percentage points, throughout the post-war period. Although there have been some schemes designed to encourage immigrants to settle in provinces other than Ontario and Quebec, no serious attempt has ever been made to change it. Indeed Canadian immigration officials have always believed that immigrants must be free to settle where they choose. Table 13 shows the percentage of immigrants destined for Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, the Prairie Provinces as a whole, and the Atlantic Provinces for the period 1967-70. Table 14 shows the intended destination of post-war immigrants for the whole of the post-war period up to 1970. Over half the immigrants admitted to Canada each year proceed to Ontario and more than half that number settle in Toronto. In the last few years, Toronto has been receiving an annual inflow of at least 40,000 immigrants, more now, it is believed, than any other city in North America. A very large majority of the immigrants proceeding to Quebec, which has received the second largest (though much smaller) flow of post-war immigrants, settle in Montreal and have attached themselves, at least until very recently, to the English-speaking rather than the French-speaking community in that city. One of the principal objectives of Quebec's Department of Immigration which was established by law on November 5, 1968, is "to facilitate the adaptation of immigrants to the Quebec environment." The lopsided pattern which these tables reveal has aroused remarkably little interest in Canada so far, except for Quebec which has recently become acutely aware of the benefits of immigration and Manitoba which, from the mid-sixties onwards, developed an intermittent recruitment program on the Ontario model. Politicians and officials in British Columbia have claimed to be quite satisfied with their share of the annual flow, supplemented as it is by a very considerable and favourable internal migration. From time to time, but without any very obvious result so far, ministers assure the Atlantic Provinces that efforts will be made to increase their very small share of the annual intake. The new Canada Manpower Programs, including a nationwide service of employment counselling, placement, training, and mobility assistance; the increasing 64

TABLE 13 INTENDED DESTINATION OF IMMIGRANTS, 1967-1970

Province

no.

Ontario Quebec British Columbia Prairie Provinces Atlantic Provinces Yukon and N.W.T.

116,850 45,717 27,215 28,071 4,859

Total

164

222,876

% 52.4 20.5 12.2 12.5

2.2 .07

no. 96,155 35,481 22,496 25,483 4,164

195

183,974

SOURCE: Immigration Statistics, Department of Manpower and Immigration.

1970

1969

1968

1967

% 52.3 19.3 12.2 13.9

2.3 .10

no. 86,588 28,230 21,953 20,146 4,420

194

161,531

»/ /o

53.6 17.5 13.5 12.4

2.7 .12

no. 80,732 23,261 21,683 17,940 3,892

205

147,713

% 54.7 15.7 14.6 12.14

2.2 .13

TABLE 14 INTENDED DESTINATION OF POST-WAR IMMIGRANTS, 1946-1970 Province

Newfoundland Prince Edward Island Nova Scotia New Brunswick Quebec Ontario Manitoba Saskatchewan Alberta British Columbia Yukon and N.W.T. Not specified Total

19461955

19561967

2,565

2,490 23,495 12,827 240,432 636,033 62,343 36,881 95,343 109,347 563 1,222,319

19461970

1968

1969

1970

5,875 1,226 18,890 11,689 364,052 900,664 59,217 28,698 106,842 196,668 1,616 3,883

1,006 176 1,957 1,025 35,481 96,155 8,723 3,557 13,203 22,496 195 -

832 182 2,167 1,239 28,230 86,588 6,380 2,492 11,274 21,953 194 -

630 185 2,007 1,070 23,261 80,732 5,826 1,709 10,405 21,683 205 -

10,908 4,259 48,516 27,850 691,456 1,800,172 142,489 73,337 237,067 372,147 2,773 3,883

1,699,320

183,974

161,531

147,713

3,414,857

From 1970 Immigration Statistics, Department of Manpower and Immigration, p. 24. Reproduced by permission of Information Canada.

The Canadian Experience governmental attention now being given to the problems of regional disparity in Canada; and the expanding demand for professional and skilled manpower in all the provinces may work to change, to some extent, the present uneven distribution of the undoubted benefits of immigration. For immigrants, at present, the pull of cities, the pull of relatives, the pull of the prosperous image of Ontario, and the prospect there of more, and more varied, employment are as strong as ever.

67

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Part Two The Evolution of Canadian Immigration Policy

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Chapter Three Prologue

SINCE 1966 and the disappearance of the former Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Canadian immigration policy has had a firm manpower orientation. A recent annual report of the Department of Manpower and Immigration declared that "the prime objective of immigration policies and programs is to encourage and facilitate the movement to Canada of those who have skills and talents in strong, general or specific demand in this country." Immigration policy is frequently referred to by some officials in the Department as a "manpower policy." And this provides an answer, though not a very satisfactory one, to the dilemma which has plagued those involved in this sector of public policy since the Liberal government under Mackenzie King was obliged to work out an acceptable immigration policy and program shortly after the Second World War. Public discussion of immigration in Canada has centred, as we have noted, on the problems of admission. In the public mind, the major policy issue in immigration during much of the post-war period has undoubtedly been the question of an open or much more open door policy; yet many members of the public, including some of the best informed, failed to notice that in 1962 and 1967 the door opened wide to immigrants from all countries who had some education, professional qualifications, or skills. But among the politicians and senior officials who were responsible for immigration policy, the question of admission was only one difficult issue among several. For them the major issue was the purpose and use of immigration for Canada and the proportion of national resources which should be devoted to its management and development. Much of the conflict and irresolution in Canadian immigration policy in the first twenty years of the post-war period derived from a failure to

PART TWO

resolve this problem. What purposes did immigration now serve? Was it simply a necessary evil: an area of public policy which was very difficult to control, but more difficult to get out of for external and internal political reasons? Was it, in itself, a positive good? For national development and population growth? As a generally stimulating factor in Canadian economic expansion? To fill precise gaps in the labour force? In the absence of a strong ideological conviction about immigration, either inherited from the past or deliberately developed by government at the outset, these questions remained without a clear answer until recently. What made them more difficult to answer in the earlier part of this period was the absence of specific national goals, any significant kinds of planning, and adequate information about the Canadian economy on which to base decisions. THE TRUE BELIEVERS While no overall national conviction about immigration existed, there were a few individuals in strategic positions who felt strongly on this question. George Drew as Premier of Ontario and High Commissioner in London, Richard Bell as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration briefly hi 1962-63 and as a back-bencher, and J. Armstrong as Ontario's Agent General in London1 were examples of Canadians with a strong faith in immigration. Employers, of course, supported immigration as a valuable source of labour supply and as a factor favourable to national development. Some ethnic groups and many individual immigrants were, understandably, keen though uninfluential advocates. The churches were active supporters of immigration for broad humanitarian reasons and also for their own special interests. The voluntary agencies were active supporters. The IODE was for it and laboured nobly in the field. All political parties said they supported it, except, until recently, those in Quebec. The leadership of the labour movement could be counted as a judicious supporter, particularly in recent years, but with strong reservations about "unplanned immigration." But the only strong institutional source of conviction hi the post-war period that immigration was beneficial on all counts was the former Department of Citizenship and Immigration created in 1950 and, specifically, its Immigration Branch. This strength of conviction on the part of immigration officials, which is just as strong today in their more reduced role in the Immigration Division of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, was a strategic but rather isolated phenomenon. A strong conviction about the benefits of immigration grew among the younger post-war recruits to the service, and by the late fifties it was very strong. It derived first from the Department's simple possession of the field: from their management of this area of public policy, their sense of 72

Prologue responsibility for it, and their awareness of it as a national asset. Secondly, it derived from their contact with immigrants, and their observation of the valuable human resources in Canada's annual immigration movement and among potential immigrants in the source countries. This experience occurred particularly in the Overseas Service, but there was a frequent interchange of personnel then between what are presently known as the Home Service and Foreign Service Branches. But a firm belief in immigration could also arise from experience at headquarters, in the Settlement and Placement Service, at ports of entry, or in some other aspects of immigration work. Immigration officers in Canada, seeing more of the problem cases and adjustment difficulties than officers overseas, being more exposed to pressure, and having to handle the control and enforcement side of management, tended, however, to be less enchanted. But here too conviction was considerable. In this connection it is important to remember that immigration undoubtedly exerts a fascination over many of those who are closely involved in it because of the sheer human interest of migration and, very often, the sense of potential and optimism implicit in it. There is a moving quality also in the hope and confidence which most immigrants place in the country they want to move to. This degree of commitment among officials of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, and their knowledge that it was not widely shared, had certain consequences. It led, together with other factors, including the considerable degree of administrative discretion permitted under the 1952 Immigration Act, to the development on their part of a proprietary interest and concern in this area of public policy and an anxiety about outside interference and hostility. It led also to a firm belief in the value of selection to produce high-quality immigration and therefore to a continuing concern about the quality of the sponsored movement, which was discussed in the last chapter. And it engendered a strong belief in immigration planning geared to the long-term needs of the Canadian economy and population growth. More recently, therefore, before its demise in December 1965, the Department showed resistance to attempts to use immigration solely as a means of filling gaps in the labour force or to gear immigration planning too precisely to the movements of the business cycle. It was felt that immigration should, to some extent, be "carried" in times of economic downswing because of its overall and longterm value. This point of view, which took some time to develop, was reinforced by experience in the field through the fifties. By 1955, if not earlier, immigration had ceased to be a buyer's market. The absence of clear-cut policies, unpredictable annual programming, and working estimates of 73

PART TWO

occupational demand in Canada based on inadequate information created great difficulties for the Overseas Service. Promotion is meaningless and unethical if immigrants are to be encouraged one year and discouraged the next; and in competitive circumstances, with the Australians maintaining a much more consistent position, this was simply bad business. The directors of the overseas immigration offices and members of headquarters staff began to urge longer range planning, a clearer definition of policy, and a more consistent commitment to immigration on which they and immigrants could rely. One of the best expressions of this departmental attitude is found hi an important internal memorandum on policy and program prepared in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration early in 1960. This was written by senior officials, supported by a small research staff in the Economics and Research Division which had been created in 1959. The memorandum consisted of a critical analysis of immigration policy and program since 1947, together with some positive proposals for future action. In this memorandum, department officials stressed the need for a dynamic policy and program. It was pointed out that since 1955, apart from the Hungarian and Suez crises which had caused great increases in admissions from mid-1956 to the end of 1957, the supply of immigrants from Europe had been declining. This was due first to the brightening economic climate in the United Kingdom and Europe, and secondly to a lack of initiative on Canada's part, or, as the memorandum put it, "Canadian timidity and vacillation in immigration policy and programming." Since the war, according to this memorandum, immigration administration had consisted largely of "adjusting the flow." Canada's selective immigration policy formulated by the Liberal government in 1947 had consisted in practice of a cautious adjustment of "abundant supply to almost limitless demand." The consequences of this policy were that "since the policy was not forward-looking or geared to any type of planning, there evolved from it a form of annual immigration programming consisting of a guess based on the previous year's performance and the coming year's prospects. This was about all the policy would permit and the result has been spasmodic (the 'tap on and off' system). It is true that 1/2 million immigrants came to Canada hi this period, but it can b argued that they came here in spite of the efforts at immigration programming rather than because of them." In addition, because of this policy or lack of policy, there were considerable operational difficulties in annual immigration programming. It was urged in the memorandum that certain positive steps should be taken to remedy this situation. Immigration should be endorsed by gov74

Prologue

eminent "as a means to stated population goals." The need for immigration and its economic advantages should be clearly explained to the Canadian public. A stable immigration program with longer range planning should be adopted and "movements of undesirable or unqualified immigrants should not be allowed to develop from some countries while suitable persons from those countries find it impossible to have their applications considered" (a reference to sponsored immigration). It was recommended that the following be established as Canada's national immigration policy: 1. For economic, political, and moral reasons, Canada must accept a substantial flow of immigrants. 2. Immigration policy should aim at an average flow equal to one percent of the Canadian population with annual movements of .75 percent to 1.25 percent of the population. In terms of Canada's present population, this would amount to an average annual immigration flow of 175,000. 3. Within these limits, immigration will be subject to regular review by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, but negative adjustments will not be effective within one year of the time decisions are reached. 4. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration will be given the authority to proceed with a program designed to bring to Canada suitable, desirable and adaptable immigrants who will be of economic benefit to Canada, who will be able to establish themselves in Canadian social, cultural, political and economic life without undue hardship to themselves, or hardship and dislocation to the Canadian communities in which they will settle. These specific proposals were submitted to Prime Minister Diefenbaker's Cabinet, the Conservatives having defeated the Liberals in the 1957 and 1958 elections. But only points 1 and 4 were approved and no action was taken on the really substantive proposals. However, the fourth recommendation had some importance because it gave the Department greater freedom in program planning and relieved it of frequent referrals to Cabinet which had been the pattern in the past. Contrary to popular belief, therefore, the predominant attitude within the Department of Citizenship and Immigration towards immigration planning from the mid-fifties onwards at home and overseas was expansionist. But this was hard to implement for some years because the Department was: (1) arguing a case which did not command any substantial political interest or support either within the Cabinet or House 75

PART TWO

of Commons; (2) not strong enough within the public service to secure support from Treasury Board or the Civil Service Commission in vital planning decisions, and suffering generally from the policy of negative control characteristic of the pre-Glassco period;2 (3) only partially able to sustain its point of view against the quite different philosophy which then obtained in the Department of Labour;3 (4) not strong enough visa-vis the Departments of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce to secure sufficient status or (for some time) sufficient resources for the Overseas Service of the Immigration Branch. These four propositions, which describe some important aspects of the experience of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in managing Canada's immigration program for a good part of the post-war period, will be examined in more detail as this study proceeds. It is proposed now to examine the development of Canada's post-war immigration policy and program in four stages. First, we shall consider the opening phase of this period, the critical years just after the Second World War when immigration became a pressing issue for Canada and the new Department of Citizenship and Immigration was created to deal with it. This is a good moment in time, before any major policy efforts were made, to observe the basic constitutional position with regard to immigration, the political considerations involved in its management at the outset, and the climate of opinion in Canada relating to it—in other words, the preconditions of Canada's post-war immigration policy and program. The immigration operation itself will be divided into three periods: (1) 1946-57, the period of early Liberal management which began with Mackenzie King's famous statement on immigration policy in 1947, included the creation of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950, and ended with the defeat of the St. Laurent government in June 1957; (2) 1957-63, the period of Conservative administration which coincided with economic slowdown and heavy unemployment, but which was also a period which generated a great movement of self-evaluation in Canada in the public service and in major areas of public policy; (3) 1963 to the present, a period of rapid change, the beginning of a great economic expansion, and the emergence, brought about by a combination of factors, of an overall manpower strategy for Canada which has embraced immigration. It may be useful at this point to note how important it is in immigration to consider policy and program together. Policy is meaningless without a program to implement it and facilities to enable that program to be carried out. As one example, the 1962 immigration regulations which removed discrimination, except in the sponsoring of relatives, did not result in a striking increase in the admission to Canada of independent 76

Prologue

applicants from non-European countries. This was not a matter of design, although this possible outcome may well have occurred to those who planned the regulations. It was due to the fact that the facilities to service large numbers of non-European applications were simply not there: the necessary visa offices and staff did not exist. Canada was just emerging from a severe bout of governmental austerity which had caught the Immigration Branch when it was seriously understaffed. No money had been available for any kind of expansion.4 PRECONDITIONS CANADIAN FEDERALISM

The first precondition of Canada's post-war immigration policy and program was, of course, section 95 of the British North America Act, 1867, and the way in which powers have been distributed and used in the Canadian variant of federalism. Section 95 made immigration, with agriculture, a shared jurisdiction, a concurrent responsibility of the federal government and the provinces. This section of the Act reads as follows: Agriculture and Immigration 95. In each Province the Legislature may make Laws in relation to Agriculture in the Province, and to Immigration into the Province; and it is hereby declared that the Parliament of Canada may from time to time make Laws in relation to Agriculture in all or any of the Provinces, and to Immigration into all or any of the Provinces; and any Law of the Legislature of a Province relative to Agriculture or to Immigration shall have effect in and for the Province as long and as far only as it is not repugnant to any Act of the Parliament of Canada. An equally important point in relation to immigration is the distribution of all the powers of government in Canadian federalism and the way in which these powers have been used in this country. In this regard, there are five areas of governmental responsibility which particularly affect immigration management. 1. Finance. A federal and provincial responsibility. The nature of federal-provincial financial relationships in Canada and the special bargaining-negotiating relationship which has developed from them have had certain direct consequences for immigration. First, they have made it difficult to decide—a matter for negotiation—who should pay for immigrant education, training, citizenship programs, medical services, and welfare and who should create these services, if in fact they should be created, 77

PART TWO

where they do not exist. Secondly, the special character of this relationship—the bargaining-negotiating aspect—inhibited creative joint planning of an overall kind in an area where, in 1945, a great deal of new development was required. 2. Education. A provincial responsibility. Education is a vital aspect of immigration management and immigrant services, particularly in relation to language training, occupational training and upgrading, the special educational problems of immigrant children, citizenship training and development, and the whole area of adjustment to Canadian life. What happens to these vital services and concerns in situations such as the one immediately after the Second World War when one province was prepared to be very active in immigration, one was totally hostile, and the rest were indifferent?5 3. Social Security and Welfare. The responsibility of three levels of government: federal, provincial, municipal. In 1945 social security and welfare was an area of underdevelopment for all Canadians and newcomers. In the building process of an adequate system of social security and welfare—a piecemeal development divided among three governmental jurisdictions and private enterprise—how would the immigrant be protected and provided with at least some security? How would he know what services were available? How would he use these services if he did not speak English or French? 4. Cities. The responsibility of all levels of government. Immigrants congregate in cities, and particularly, in Canada, in the cities of Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver and, to a lesser extent, in Edmonton, Winnipeg, and some of the smaller but fast-growing cities of Ontario. They add to the already heavy burden of large municipalities, where the existing financial structure is now inadequate to deal with the present pace of urban development and the provision of a full range of services for growing populations. To assist immigrants and others in dealing with the complicated problems of urban living in a new environment, citizens' advice bureaus or information centres are now urgently needed in all these large cities.6 Municipal government is an overall provincial responsibility. But in view of the facts that immigration itself is a concurrent responsibility of the federal and provincial governments, that the federal government handles the broad field of immigration policy and management, and that Canadian municipalities are very short of money, who takes the initiative in setting up information centres and who pays for them? 5. Community and Cultural Development. The responsibility of all levels of government and of the total community. Communities and immigrants need help in adjusting to each other. This is particularly important today in view of the changing character of Canada's immigration 78

Prologue movement. What responsibility should the federal government assume in this area, given that it controls the movement of immigrants to Canada and has the monopoly of information about them at the outset? What degree of leadership and financial responsibility should the federal government and the provinces assume in this regard? THE FRENCH FACT IN CANADA

The second vital precondition of an active post-war immigration program was the fact and state of mind of French Canada. It is obvious that the Canadian fact of two founding races, two languages, two cultures, and two sets of historical traditions must have exercised an influence on this area of public policy when the moment came for active government development of immigration just after the war. And in the post-war period, the French fact in Canada did exercise an intangible but substantial influence on immigration policy of a negative kind for almost twenty years. Quebec's traditional hostility to immigration is well known. The province had emerged from the war in a sensitive and critical mood after the last-minute conscription crisis of 1944-45. It is known that the Mackenzie King government was very apprehensive that a vigorous immigration policy might upset Quebec anew. Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, the Deputy Minister of the Department of Mines and Resources, then in charge of the immigration program, has said that he was well aware of the Quebec problem and of the opposition of the province to immigration. He deliberately appointed a French Canadian,7 a senior official in the Immigration Branch, to the senior post in the new Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950 because he hoped that this would "make things easier with Quebec."8 Unfortunately this had no effect whatever, and Quebec remained a negative presence, a ghost at the banquet, if only seen by some. Federal-provincial relations in immigration as they developed during the post-war period and the special role of Quebec which has now so dramatically changed are discussed in Part 3. Here we may simply note that the known hostility of Quebec on this question would probably, in itself, have prevented the adoption by the Liberal government of an enthusiastic posture on immigration, similar to the one adopted by Australia immediately after the war, even if the Liberals had had stronger convictions on the subject. NATIONAL EMANCIPATION: UNFINISHED BUSINESS In the immediate post-war years of which we are speaking, Canada was still not totally emancipated from her former close and dependent relationship with Britain. She was in the ultimate phase of this emanci79

PART TWO

pation process with a good deal of unfinished business to be dealt with. She had to create her own foreign relations and a foreign service of substance and repute, and some of her best minds put their energies and talents to this task. Canadian citizenship itself had to be established in law and this was done in the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946. The need to make the Supreme Court of Canada the final court of appeal and to devise an acceptable formula for constitutional amendment in Canada were among the matters which needed to be resolved. There were, therefore, a number of basic things to be done before thoughts would turn easily to unpredictable kinds of development, which is what immigration then represented to many of those who thought about it. Certain consequences flowed from this situation also which were very significant for immigration. First, the sense of national identity in Canada was weak and ideas about citizenship were undeveloped. Secondly, Canada's overseas orientation was essentially British and European and lines of communication were still running strongly Ottawa-London-Ottawa. Canada had played almost no part in the war in Asia and her interests in Asia were not yet in any way engaged. Thirdly, public interest in international affairs was slight. In a major address as the first full-time Secretary of State for External Affairs in January 1947, Louis St. Laurent pointed out that Canadians were slow to develop an awareness of their importance.9 While there was considerable enthusiasm for international organization among the informed public, direct experience or real knowledge of other countries and other cultures was limited. CANADIAN ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRATION

Finally, we should consider as an essential precondition, the prevailing Canadian climate of opinion on immigration, remembering that the majority of Canadians had had no recent experience of it. The last movement of immigrants to Canada of any size occurred in 1930 (104,806) and the last very substantial movement in the peak year of 1913 (400,870). Table 15 shows intake from 1931 to 1946. Immigration as a government activity had been very limited. The number of employees in the Immigration Service of the Department of Mines and Resources was small and its expenditures minimal as Tables 16 and 17 show. The most revealing source of information about Canadian attitudes to immigration immediately after the war are the proceedings of the Standing Committee of the Senate on Immigration and Labour which was appointed in 1946 and continued its investigations until 1953.10 It is worth examining these proceedings in some detail. 80

TABLE 15 IMMIGRATION TO CANADA, 1931-1946

27,530 20,591 14,382 12,476 11,277 11,643 15,101 17,244

1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946

16,994 11,324 9,329 7,576 8,504 12,801 22,722 71,719

SOURCE: Immigration Statistics, Department of Manpower and Immigration. TABLE 16 IMMIGRATION SERVICE EMPLOYEES, 1931-1946 Year

Full-time

Part-time

Year

Full-time

Part-time

1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

883 766 739 664 646 612 603 589

147 151 153 164 175 203 226 209

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946

599 602 583 594 585 565 594 734

236 234 237 237 239 249 257 251

SOURCE: From information provided by the Department of Mines and Resources to the Senate Committee on Immigration and Labour, Proceedings, no. 6, April 1948. NOTE: Immigration Service Employees include administrative staff and field staff in Canada and overseas. TABLE 17 IMMIGRATION SERVICE EXPENDITURES, 1931-1946

1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

$2,199,142 1,681,153 1,361,344 1,263,259 1,316,389 1,311,086 1,163,004 1,334,724

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946

$1,356,577 1,497,610 1,494,511 1,427,351 1,611,899 2,036,403 2,085,246 2,214,074

SOURCE: From information provided by the Department of Mines and Resources to the Senate Committee on Immigration and Labour, Proceedings, no. 6, April 1948.

PART TWO

Proceedings of the Senate Committee. The Senate Committee on Immigration and Labour was a very able committee; several of its members were outstanding in their interest in the subject and desire for information.11 The proceedings of the Committee are very valuable, not only as a revelation of the attitudes of Canadians of that day towards the possibility of a large, new immigration movement, but also as an examination, for the first time, of some of the principal issues and problems which immigration presents as an important sector of Canadian public policy. The Standing Committee was authorized "to examine into the Immigration Act [R.S.C., c. 93 and amendments], its operations and administration and the circumstances and conditions relating thereto including: (a) The desirability of admitting immigrants to Canada. (b) The type of immigrant which should be preferred, including origin, training and other characteristics. (c) The availability of such immigrants for admission. (d) The facilities, resources and capacity of Canada to absorb, employ and maintain such immigrants, and (e) The appropriate terms and conditions of such admission." The Senate Committee did its most important work between 1946 and 1949. When it started to hold meetings in May 1946, there was a desperate shortage of trans-Atlantic shipping, and Canadian servicemen and their dependents had to have first priority above any immigrants who might have been admitted. No official action had been taken on Canada's role in helping refugees and displaced persons in Europe, although the United States had taken swift action in December 1945.12 No change had been made in the Immigration Act and regulations which were highly restrictive.13 No word had been heard from the Liberal government on Canada's immigration policy, although Australia had already announced her vigorous post-war immigration program and special measures to attract British migrants, including free passages for British ex-service personnel and their dependents and assisted passages for British civilians.14 In its hearings the Committee sampled a wide range of official and voluntary opinion. Among the evidence presented were two substantial briefs ranging into the past from the Colonization Departments of the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railways. A. L. Jolliffe, the well respected Director of Immigration of the Department of Mines and Resources, who was later appointed Special Adviser on Immigration in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration created in 1950, gave the members a very clear account of the existing skeleton organization of the Immigration Branch in Canada and overseas. In later sessions they heard the Deputy Minister, Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, on current developments and policy and, early in 1951, the first Minister of Citizenship and Immi82

Prologue gration, Walter Harris. The work of the small, new Citizenship Branch established during the war was discussed with the Secretary of State and his officials. In the 1948 and 1951 hearings, the Department of Labour, represented by two Ministers, Humphrey Mitchell and Milton Gregg, and the Deputy Minister, A. MacNamara, presented its views very vigorously. Representatives of the labour movement, including A. R. Mosher and Eugene Forsey for the Canadian Congress of Labour and Percy Bengough and J. Arthur D'Aoust for the Trades and Labour Congress, presented briefs which were the first in a long and remarkable series of presentations by the Canadian labour movement to parliamentary committees and to the government on post-war immigration. The Senate Committee also heard a great deal of evidence from the Canadian National Committee on Refugees and others on the current situation in Europe and the plight of refugees and displaced persons. It was immediately exposed to serious divisions within the Ukrainian and Polish communities in Canada on the admissibility to Canada of displaced persons and members of the armed forces who did not wish to return to the Ukraine or to Soviet-dominated Poland. Saul Hayes, then Executive Director of the Canadian Jewish Congress, presented an impressive brief drawing attention to a definite discrimination against Jews in Canada's earlier immigration operations, urging the rescue of surviving Jews in Europe, and proposing some sound principles for future immigration policy. Some of the most interesting material in the earlier meetings of the Committee was provided by the Dominion Statistician, by the Director General and Deputy Director of Economic Research in the Department of Reconstruction and Supply, and by the Director of the Research and Statistics Branch of the Department of Labour. It was these briefs which raised basic questions about the uses of immigration for Canada and the extent to which immigration should be geared to the short- and long-term needs of the Canadian economy. Recommendations of the Senate Committee. From this and other evidence, the Committee came to some definite conclusions which are to be found in its 1946, 1947, and 1948 reports.15 It is clear that on all major matters, except one, there was a definite consensus among the committee members. It is worth examining the conclusions carefully, as this is the first comprehensive statement we have from a group of informed Canadians after the war about the kind of immigration policy and program they wanted. The Committee believed that immigration was of major importance to Canada. Immigrants should be admitted in substantial numbers, beginning as soon as possible. It noted that other countries were already taking 83

PART TWO

action in this field. Canada needed more people to maintain and improve her position at home and abroad and, in its view, her ability to support a substantial increase in population was beyond question. Canada should also do her share in helping refugees and displaced persons. Where possible, the Committee favoured immigration "sponsored by relatives and friends." Canada therefore needed "a well-considered and sustained policy of immigration," and in order to implement this, the Immigration Act and regulations should be revised.16 Selection of immigrants was essential: the Committee reported unanimous agreement on this among the witnesses it had heard. Continuity of policy was essential: immigration required careful and intelligent planning sustained over a number of years. However, immigration must also be geared to absorptive capacity: "Admissions should not exceed the number which can be absorbed from time to time without creating conditions of unemployment, reducing the standard of living or otherwise endangering the Canadian economy." It was here that some difference of opinion occurred. No one knew what absorptive capacity was, apart from immediate manpower requirements. Several official witnesses and the Canadian Congress of Labour had drawn attention to the fact that in the past Canada had evidently taken in more immigrants than she could absorb and that the surplus had gone on to the United States. The displacement theory had been discussed.17 The Committee was well aware of the emigration problem. Nevertheless one or two senators and some witnesses were ardent believers in a "take millions" theory. They believed that Canada should take as many immigrants as possible (still selected) to increase her population and to fill her virgin lands, and that she should not be deterred from this by short-term considerations of absorptive capacity and economic opportunity.18 This difference of opinion was not resolved and the problem of measuring absorptive capacity was not explored. The Committee stated firmly that "there should be no discrimination based on race or religion," but its understanding of discrimination related entirely to Canada's traditional pattern of immigration and her strong European orientation at that time. It never envisaged, for example, the admission of large numbers of Asian immigrants. "Any suggestion of discrimination based upon either race or religion," the Committee said, "should be scrupulously avoided both in the Act and in its administration, the limitation of Asiatic immigration being based, of course, on problems of absorption." The possible discrimination which the Committee had in mind quite clearly referred to citizens and residents of Canada (i.e., in the sponsoring of relatives), the Jewish community, and discrimination between different European nationalities. It had been very 84

Prologue sympathetic to a deputation from the Committee for the Repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act which appeared before it in 1948. The president of the Canadian Congress of Labour, A. R. Mosher, was a member of this deputation. They asked the Committee to recommend that Order-inCouncil P.C. 2115 be repealed, and that married men of Chinese descent resident in Canada be allowed to bring their wives and children into Canada to live with them. The Committee did so. But the deputation was anxious to point out that this was all they were asking the Committee to do—nothing more. "We are not asking you," they said, "to open wide the gates for Chinese immigration. We are only asking you to allow the wives and children of Chinese residents of Canada to come here, giving them the same privilege as we do Europeans and South Americans."19 The Committee also listened, without raising any objections, to these comments from Percy Bengough, speaking for the Trades and Labour Congress: "We recognize the need for selection and the exclusion of all races that cannot properly be assimilated into the national life of Canada. . . . It must be recognized that there are citizens of other countries who may be good brothers and sisters internationally, but yet would not be good brothers and sisters-in-law to Canadians. Experience has clearly demonstrated that because of this fact, certain nationals who have in the past been admitted to Canada remain as a distinct race and will remain a problem for future generations."20 The Canadian Congress of Labour firmly stated that "racial discrimination should have no place in our immigration policy," but pointed out that people from some countries would fit more easily into Canadian life than others and that this should be taken into account. Dr. Forsey made it plain that the Congress had never advocated "an open door for Asiatic immigration."21 The Committee made other recommendations. It was very interested in questions of assimilation and citizenship. It wanted to see a "strengthening of the work of the Citizenship Branch particularly in provision of educational material and liaison work." It also thought that there should be "closer co-ordination of the federal departments concerned in order to give clarification and leadership to the many agencies public and private whose co-operation would be very valuable." It recommended the establishment of an interdepartmental coordinating committee consisting of representatives of the Immigration Branch, the Departments of Labour, External Affairs, Health and Welfare, and the Citizenship Branch. And in order to develop "a well-considered and substantial immigration policy" and to deal with all the problems involved at home and abroad, the Committee wanted "an energetic immigration department, properly financed and intelligently directed."

85

PART TWO

An Anxiety Revealed. The Senate Committee was also very interested in the attitudes of the public towards immigration, and it felt that these were broadly favourable. The members were impressed by what they felt to be the positive attitude of the labour movement and made a special point of this in their 1946 report. "Organized labour," they said, "is not opposed to immigration as has been suggested." The Canadian Congress of Labour and the Trades and Labour Congress had both assured the Committee that they were in favour of immigration provided it did not reduce the Canadian standard of living which they had struggled so long to improve. Labour, the Committee said, was definitely opposed to the improper use of immigration to provide a pool of cheap and docile workers, but they would support a selective immigration designed to develop Canadian resources, and thus give additional work to the Canadian people. The Committee had also noted the resolution on immigration policy adopted by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce at its annual meeting in Winnipeg in October 1946. This resolution stated that Canada must have a vigorous immigration policy immediately. Canada could support a much larger population and "Canadians should think of immigration policies with confidence that the more there is produced, the more there is to share and not on the old basis that the fewer the people the more for each." The Senate Committee was clearly collectively optimistic and was impressed by the positive approach of most of its witnesses. In some of the evidence it heard, however, there were indications of another and less favourable aspect of public opinion on immigration. This was the background of anxiety about future employment prospects in Canada and the fear that the depression might return. Stewart Bates, Deputy Director General of Economic Research in the Department of Reconstruction and Supply, drew attention to this fear. "We have experienced during the 1930s," he said, "the crisis of more men than jobs which changed men's minds on the matter of immigration. That experience not merely crowded out the debt we owed to immigrants, but created among many a positive aversion to immigration." J. S. McGowan, Director of the Department of Colonization and Agriculture of the CNR, in an excellent brief made the same point. He felt that Canadians had lost the vision and enthusiasm for immigration which they had had in the early part of the century. They were "haunted by the fears of the economic insecurities of the past." It was difficult to eliminate the fear that new people would take away the jobs which Canadians should have. Last year [during the 1946 hearings] I made a passing reference also to the effect on public opinion of those people who refer to this country adding millions of new people to our population. I pointed out that it 86

Prologue left the impression that we were likely to be swamped by too many. We have been plagued by this fear that we might get more than we could absorb, and this thought alone has influenced to a marked extent our national thinking... . There is undoubtedly a growing public interest in immigration, but there are still many reservations and doubts. To develop a long-term and constructive policy, public opinion must stem from a deep conviction that increased population is vital and necessary to the future welfare of our country and our people.22 This was a very accurate account of public opinion on the issue of immigration at that time, and can be confirmed from many sources.23 The last sentence in this quotation is particularly significant in that no such conviction developed spontaneously in subsequent years and no effort was made to encourage its development. It is important to remember also that this anxiety in Canada was not confined to those most vulnerable to unemployment and to poverty. It was a national condition. Dr. J. J. Deutsch described the same climate of opinion as the national background to Canada's White Paper on Employment and Income in 1945: The White Paper was a product of the Keynesian Revolution and was addressed to the problems, to the fears and to the aspirations of a particular time. Against the background of the Great Depression, the stagnation theory had a strong hold. It was believed that the future would be dominated by a slower growth in population, by a declining influence from new technology and by a stubborn tendency for savings to run ahead of the demand for capital. As a consequence, it was feared that a substantial level of unemployment would become the normal state of an advanced capitalistic society.24 There was therefore a basic uncertainty and ambivalence in Canada about the real wisdom of an energetic immigration policy. It looked promising and was certainly something to be supported and tried. And it seemed, as ever, a possible answer to the daunting problems of ownership of such vast territory, and perhaps to the enigma of Canada's undramatic development, her nonpossession, hitherto, of the twentieth century. But to all cautious minds, immigration on any scale also held a definite threat in the struggle for survival in an uncertain future. Finally, in this brief survey of the endeavours of the Senate Committee, we should note the significant fact that at no time during its long deliberations did it consider the special problem of immigration to Quebec. If the committee members were aware of Quebec's continuing hostility to immigration, neither they nor their witnesses mentioned it. On the other hand, 87

PART TWO

it was quite plain that the Committee felt that it was working for all the provinces, for the whole of Canada. There is no confirmation anywhere in these proceedings for the persistent French-Canadian suspicion that all those who wanted a vigorous immigration policy were deliberately conspiring to fatten the land and increase the population of Englishspeaking Canada. Just as the Committee did not appear to be aware of any special problem in relation to Quebec, neither did it consider the specific provincial interest. No more than a few passing references were made to the provinces in general and these were mainly related to the question of the education and integration of immigrants, only one aspect of overall policy. We have now examined four major factors or preconditions which go some way to explain the kind of post-war immigration operations which Canada would have. These were, first, the design and functioning of Canadian federalism; secondly, the fact and state of mind of French Canada; thirdly, Canada's incomplete national emancipation; and fourthly, a climate of opinion on immigration in which there were strongly favourable elements, but also a background of anxiety and hesitation. There was one other important factor which had short- and long-term consequences in Canada's post-war immigration operations. This was the strong demand for labour in Canada in the first years after the war which enabled the economy to absorb the large movement of displaced persons, as well as returning servicemen and civilians in war-time employment. There was a strong demand for professional and skilled workers, but also, in certain sectors, for large numbers of unskilled workers, and it was this which led to the large-scale recruitment of these workers in southern Europe soon after the war. These were the major preconditions of Canada's post-war immigration operations. We shall now see how these operations were handled.

88

Chapter Four Policy and Program, 1946-1957

CANADA'S post-war immigration operations can be conveniently divided, as we have suggested, into three periods: 1946-57, 1957-63, and 1963 to the present; each of these periods will be examined in turn. The following discussion, however, is not intended as a detailed, chronological account of events in Canadian immigration throughout the post-war period. Rather, the intention is to examine only the major features of each period relating to the development and evolution of Canada's immigration policy and program. The first period from 1946 to 1957 coincides with the last half of the long era of continuous Liberal rule in Canada which began in 1935, but in fact had extended with only one break from 1922. There were two Prime Ministers during this latter period: Mackenzie King who retired in 1948 and Louis St. Laurent who was defeated by the Conservatives under John Diefenbaker in June 1957. There were three Ministers of Mines and Resources responsible for immigration from 1946 until 1950: J. A. Glen, C. D. Howe very briefly as Acting Minister, and Colonel Colin Gibson. When the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was created in 1950, the first Minister was Walter Harris, who was followed by J. W. Pickersgill in 1954. The Deputy Minister of the Department of Mines and Resources was Dr. Hugh Keenleyside. The Deputy Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration from 1950 to 1960 was Laval Fortier. The full list to date of ministers and deputy ministers of the Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and Manpower and Immigration will be found in Appendix 3. In 1946 the classes of immigrants who were admissible to Canada were restricted by an order-in-council of March 31, 1931 (P.C. 695), to: (1) British subjects as defined in a previous order-in-council (P.C. 183) as

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"British by reason of birth, or naturalization in Great Britain or Ireland, Newfoundland, New Zealand, Australia and the Union of South Africa," (2) U.S. citizens, (3) the wife and unmarried children under 18 and fiance(e)s of legal residents of Canada, and (4) "agriculturists having sufficient means to farm in Canada." Under an order-in-council of September 16, 1930 (P.C. 2115), Asiatic immigration was restricted to the wife and unmarried children under 18 of any Canadian citizen resident in Canada who was in a position to receive and care for his dependents. Under the revised Chinese Immigration Act of 1923, all persons of Chinese ethnic origin, except merchants, were prohibited from admission regardless of their nationality or religion. The term "merchant" was narrowly defined to mean "a person who devoted his undivided attention to mercantile pursuits, who had not less than $2,500 invested in an enterprise importing to Canada or exporting to China goods of Chinese or Canadian origin or manufacture and who had conducted such a business for at least three years." In examining this period, we shall look first at the initial steps taken in relation to immigration in the first four years after the war by the Liberal Cabinet and its officials and by the senior officials hi the relevant Departments of Mines and Resources, Labour, External Affairs, and Health and Welfare. The major moves made by this policy-making group in the matter of immigration from the beginning of 1946 onwards are as follows: 1. They looked into the matter. A cabinet subcommittee was formed early hi 1946 to consider the whole question of post-war immigration to Canada, and an interdepartmental committee was created to consider the domestic implications.1 2. They dealt with the wider problem of Canadian citizenship in the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1946. 3. They cautiously widened the categories for the admission of relatives in 1946, 1947, and 1949, since there was an urgent need for this on humanitarian grounds.2 4. They agreed on emergency measures to bring refugees and displaced persons to Canada. These were announced by Prime Minister Mackenzie King in the House on November 7, 1946. Arrangements were made with the International Refugee Organization to facilitate the movement of refugees and displaced persons to Canada. By March 1947, two immigration teams were in operation in Europe and the first displaced person sailed for Canada in April 1947. On June 6, 1947, provision was made for the admission of 5,000 displaced persons and this number was subsequently increased.3 An Immigration-Labour Committee was created, consisting of representatives of the Immigration Branch and Departments of 90

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 Labour, External Affairs, and Health and Welfare, to guide and watch over this movement. The Deputy Minister of the Department of Labour was chairman of this Committee. 5. They agreed on the admission of three special movements of immigrants, two in 1946 and one in 1947. These were Polish ex-servicemen then in the United Kingdom and Italy, Netherlands farm workers (following an approach by the Netherlands government), and immigrants from Malta (following representations from the United Kingdom government).4 6. They added farm workers, miners, and loggers (coming to assured employment) to the admissible classes in view of the urgent need for labour in Canada's primary industries.5 7. They decided to propose the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923 and to place the Chinese, with other Asians, under the still very restrictive provisions of P.C. 2115. A bill to repeal the Chinese Immigration Act was introduced in the House on May 2, 1947. 8. They formulated a post-war immigration policy for Canada. This was outlined by Prime Minister Mackenzie King in the House on May 1, 1947. 9. They decided to place citizens of France in the same category for admission to Canada as British subjects (as defined) and U.S. citizens.6 10. They created the Department of Citizenship and Immigration which came into existence on January 18, 1950. 1947 STATEMENT ON IMMIGRATION POLICY The Mackenzie King statement on immigration policy of May 1947 is famous and frequently quoted. It served as the official formulation of Canadian immigration policy until 1962. It is usually regarded as a special emanation of the King mind in its sober and cautious tone, its firm sense of propriety, and its "dislike of the world beyond the North Atlantic Triangle."7 The statement was in fact drafted by Gordon Robertson, Secretary to the Office of the Prime Minister, redrafted by J. W. Pickersgill, Mackenzie King's special assistant, and submitted to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. It was the product of several minds.8 The Prime Minister began with a short policy statement: "The policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration. The government will seek by legislation, regulation and vigorous administration, to ensure the careful selection and permanent settlement of such numbers of immigrants as can be advantageously absorbed in our national economy."9 After a short reference to the social, political, and economic circumstances resulting from the war, the problems of ocean transportation, the

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difficulties of establishing inspection facilities in some countries, the urgent problem of the resettlement of the displaced and the homeless, the statement is then divided into two parts: consideration of the government's short-term program ("measures designed for immediate application") and long-term program. In the first part, the Prime Minister outlined the steps which had already been taken and which have been described above. In the second part of the statement, he established six major premises as the basis for Canada's long-term immigration program. In view of the importance of these premises, they are summarized and set out below. The Prime Minister's Statement on Canada's Long-Term Immigration Program, May 1, 1947 1. The objective of Canada's immigration policy must be to enlarge the population of the country. It would be dangerous for a small population to attempt to hold "so great a heritage as ours."

Immigration for population growth.

2. If properly planned, immigration will improve the Canadian standard of living. A larger population will help to develop Canada's resources, enlarge her domestic market, and reduce her dependence on the export of primary products.

Immigration for economic development.

3. It is essential that immigrants be selected with care.

Immigration must be selective.

4. It is of the utmost importance to relate immigration to absorptive capacity. This will vary from year to year in response to economic conditions. The serious losses of population in the past through emigration—particularly of young people educated and trained in Canada—were a warning that absorptive capacity should not be exceeded.

Immigration must be related to absorptive capacity.

5. Immigration is a matter of domestic policy and is subject to the control of Parliament. Objectionable discrimination should be removed from existing legislation, but Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the immigrants she wants. An alien

Immigration is a matter of domestic policy. Its control is a national prerogative.

92

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 has no "fundamental human right" to enter Canada. This is a privilege. 6. The people of Canada do not wish to make a fundamental alteration in the character of their population through mass immigration. The government is therefore opposed to "large-scale immigration from the Orient," which would certainly give rise to social and economic problems, which might lead to serious international difficulties. The government has no intention of changing the regulations governing Asiatic immigration "unless and until alternative measures of effective control have been worked out." However, the government is ready to negotiate special agreements with other countries for the control of immigration based on complete equality and reciprocity.

Immigration must not distort the present character of the Canadian population. The restriction on Asiatic immigration must remain.

The statement ended with the brief comment that through the years of depression, war, and restricted immigration, the facilities of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources, at home and abroad, "were reduced to proportions wholly inadequate to cope with an active immigration policy." It was the government's intention to expand and strengthen this part of the public service and to develop immigration services further to meet expanding requirements. There was no mention in this statement of provincial responsibilities and interest in immigration. There was no mention of Quebec. The six major premises outlined by the Prime Minister undoubtedly reflected majority opinion among those English-speaking Canadians who thought about immigration immediately after the war. It will be observed how close they are to the recommendations of the Senate Committee on Immigration and Labour which had been exposed to a significant range of official and non-official opinion. There was one quality, however, which was present in the recommendations and views of the Senate Committee and in a good deal of the evidence presented to it, which is wholly absent from the Prime Minister's statement, and that is enthusiasm. The Senate Committee was enthusiastic about immigration, despite the anxieties which it clearly could create in the public mind. The government's statement on immigration policy was an unenthusiastic statement which did not appear to spring from, and was unlikely to generate, any excitement 93

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about a new and important area of Canadian development: the potential addition of several millions of people to the population of Canada. Another significant omission in this statement was immediately noted by the Member for Kamloops, E. Davie Fulton, who spoke first for the Opposition in the debate which followed. There is no indication, even in general outline, of just how the government proposes to go about applying these general principles.... (1) To what countries will we look for immigrants? (2) What is the general type and classification of the entrants who will be permitted to come? (3) Is the government prepared to enter into negotiations with, say, the governments of the U.K., France or the Netherlands or the Low Countries? (4) What measures of assistance will be provided for immigrants—if any?10 Although these were very important matters, the government did not divulge any thoughts on them. The categorical rejection of Asian immigration in the Prime Minister's statement is striking. But it must be remembered that his statement was likely to receive widespread approval in Canada at that time. At different times in the post-war period also, the Prime Minister's words have been echoed almost exactly by American congressmen and by Australian ministers and members of parliament. In other words, his statement was in no way a unique phenomenon. The background of Asian, and particularly Chinese, immigration to the United States, Canada, and Australia is very similar, and the attitude shown in the 1947 Canadian statement is part of a common syndrome which these three countries have shared. It is the timing of change in these attitudes, and in the response of these countries to particular world conditions and technological change, which is signficant. In this connection, it is important to remember where Asia was in 1947. In the public mind, western Asia has now receded to the shores of the Arabian Sea and the borders of Afghanistan. A new political and geographic entity, the Middle East, occupies the territory between Istanbul and Karachi. But in the minds of the Canadian Liberal government in 1947, Asia meant almost everything in the Eastern Hemisphere outside Europe. Its northwest frontier ran along the southern border of the Soviet Union and the Black Sea and round the eastern and southern coasts of the Mediterranean. All Turkey and lands to the south, including Egypt, were in Asia. Only the Armenians managed to slip out of the Asian net.11 94

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 Thus by excluding Asians and, by association and extension, Africans also (except white South Africans), Canada was prepared to accept only one kind of immigrant from the Eastern Hemisphere—the European immigrant. A DEPARTMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION The government's plan for the improved management of immigration was revealed in 1949. Mackenzie King had retired the year before and Louis St. Laurent had taken his place.12 On November 26, Prime Minister St. Laurent moved three resolutions in the House that bills be presented to constitute three new departments: a Department of Resources and Development, a Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, and a Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The former Departments of Reconstruction and Supply and Mines and Resources were to be dismantled. Dr. Hugh Keenleyside has described the way in which these new departments had been created. He and J. W. Pickersgill had drafted the plan to reorganize the functions of the Department of Mines and Resources which had become "a grab-bag for everything." They decided that it was a logical procedure to separate natural from human resources and to put human resources, i.e., immigrants and Indians, under one department, together with the Citizenship Registration Branch and the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State. They had a feeling also that a certain dignity and sense of equal status for all would be implied in this arrangement.13 In moving the three resolutions, the Prime Minister echoed these views. He said that there had been a growing feeling that the Immigration Branch had very little relation to the other activities of the Department of Mines and Resources, and that "the increasing importance and complexity of immigration required more attention from the Minister and Deputy Minister than it was humanly possible to give to the Immigration Branch, included as it was with the numerous other branches of the Department." It had also been apparent for some time that the relationship between the Citizenship Branch and the Immigration Branch should be as close as possible, so that uniformity of policy and treatment could be achieved and overlapping of services avoided. Once the decision had been reached to recommend the establishment of a Department of Citizenship and Immigration, it was decided to include the Indian Affairs Branch: It was felt that it would have some psychological effect to say that these three activities dealing with human beings, and which are designed to bring those human beings to the status of full citizenship as rapidly as 95

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possible, were under one head. Having citizenship, immigration and Indian affairs in the one department, would indicate that the purpose of the activities of that department was to make Canadian citizens of those who were born here, of the original inhabitants of the territory and of those who migrated to this country.14 As it proved, this was not a good idea and the administrative structure which emerged from it was unwieldy. While the new Department was, in the main, a great improvement on former arrangements, the inclusion of Indians and immigrants in separate branches but under one management proved to be a psychological and administrative mistake. Indians had no wish to be associated with immigrants, nor immigrants with Indians, but this may not have disturbed too many in either camp. More important was the fact that the knowledge and expertise required by government to deal with these two kinds of special clientele were totally different. Each required energetic and imaginative management, but of a different kind. In addition, immigration proved to be a very demanding portfolio, and this arrangement made a heavy load for one minister if he attempted to deal with both areas conscientiously. It is probable that immigration preempted most of his time and attention. CITIZENSHIP BRANCH: LOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES The Citizenship Branch, the other major element in this new Department, is now back in its original home in the Department of the Secretary of State after fifteen years of a not very satisfactory relationship with the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.15 The major reason for this unsatisfactory relationship was the failure of the federal government at the outset to think hard about, and accept responsibility for, the provision of proper services for immigrants once they had arrived in Canada, and the failure to distinguish clearly between these essential services and the wider concerns of citizenship which also affect immigrants. The basic requirement in both these areas was, and still is, close collaboration with the provinces. Since this problem was not faced, and collaboration with the provinces was only undertaken in very limited ways, the Citizenship Branch had to remain advisory and not managerial. It could not manage, without agreement, an area which came so largely within provincial jurisdiction and in which some really creative development was required. But because its functions were largely advisory, because it was not integrated with the basic operations of the Immigration Branch, and because it received minimal government support for all its activities, the Citizenship Branch remained an appendage to the Depart96

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 merit, a rather unimportant appendage with very limited resources. The Branch had no direct responsibility for immigrants and its overall objectives and priorities never came across clearly to the public. Early in 1964 the Deputy Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Acting Director of the Citizenship Branch initiated a thorough review of branch operations and development, and the following were the principal conclusions which emerged from it: The major revelation of this study occurred perhaps as the Branch realized that few of its programmes could be said to be of a national dimension. In each case there were large geographical areas which were not reached at all.... It appeared as if in its 24 years of existence since 1942 the Branch had been unable to receive enough attention from the government to grow into a full-scale federal agency. Reading the files, one received the distinct impression that successive administrations had considered the Branch too small to merit their attention and yet doing work that was too important to be discontinued.16 Initially, the small Citizenship Branch, within the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, concentrated its activities with a great deal of enthusiasm on immigrants and ethnic organizations in the Canadian community and related questions. But as the operations of the Immigration Branch expanded from 1950 onwards, its direct responsibility for immigrants, which the Citizenship Branch did not have, drew the Immigration Branch further into the settlement and integration areas. At the same time, the Citizenship Branch and its small Field Service, while they did not lose their interest in ethnic groups, became increasingly absorbed in the other activities for which they had become responsible: Indian integration, human rights, citizenship development and leadership training, and, later, bilingualism and biculturalism. There was very little meeting of minds between the two Branches.17 Immigration officials and the staff of the Citizenship Branch came generally from very different backgrounds. The Citizenship Branch, as one former staff member noted, "came out of Canadian adult education, community organization and the Y." Prior to the major changes in management and organization which began in 1970, the Branch consisted mainly of individuals who had been trained in the social sciences, with experience in, and a strong orientation towards, community development. Oddly enough, this type of training does not necessarily breed concern for the average individual immigrant or for the essential administration which must go with the management of large movements of people. It does breed a great interest in intergroup relations, in the sociology of integration, and,

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above all, in the development of the total Canadian community. Another interesting characteristic of this broad constituency was its lack of political orientation and reluctance to come to grips with political needs and realities; a liking, no doubt, for a different kind of decision-making environment. Thus it is reported that the Citizenship Branch always seemed reluctant to engage in the hard fighting for the resources and support which its responsibilities really required. The study and evaluation of the role of the Citizenship Branch, which started in 1964 and which was part of a larger effort involving the whole of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, led to the recognition and acceptance of a new and more appropriate set of priorities for the Citizenship Branch. With the creation of the Department of Manpower and Immigration early in 1966, the Branch became, once again, part of the Department of the Secretary of State. But the problem of deciding which government department should be responsible for the integration of immigrants—thinking of immigrants primarily as thousands of separate individuals and not as a complex of ethnic groups—was not satisfactorily resolved. This issue, together with the most recent developments in the long saga of the Canadian Citizenship Branch, will be discussed as part of the final period of policy-making from 1963 to the present.18 The unsuitable location of the Indian Affairs Branch and the failure, for a long time, to work out an appropriate role for the Citizenship Branch in relation to immigration were two consequences which flowed directly from the awkward structural blueprint of the new Department as it was designed in 1949. THE NEW DEPARTMENT: THE EARLY YEARS We will now turn to the major developments in policy and program which occurred during the first seven years in the life of this new Department. These first few years were most important. They established the legal basis and style of operation in immigration and the status of the new Department within the public service. They determined whether the Overseas Service would be visible or invisible, a showpiece or not, and what its relations would be with other departments overseas.19 And they established the pattern of relations with Parliament, with the voluntary sector, and with the general public. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration opened its doors on January 18, 1950.20 It was equipped with some broad policy guidelines, a skeleton organization in Canada, and a small emergency organization overseas. In Europe the period of acute post-war emergency was coming to an end and the movement of displaced persons to Canada was begin98

Polity and Program, 1946-1957 ning to taper off. Nevertheless the supply of would-be immigrants was still plentiful and there was no evident need to make special efforts to attract them. In Canada the economic climate was confident. There was still a strong demand for labour in the primary industries and an increasing need for manpower in the professional and skilled occupations. Overall unemployment in Canada was not particularly worrying. Charts 4 and 5 show the number of immigrants admitted to Canada during the period 1945-70 along with the unemployment rate in Canada for 1947-70. Although thousands of European immigrants were ready to come to Canada in 1950, eligibility for admission had to be created for them. In addition, a decision had to be taken on the admission of the Germans and Japanese.21 It was essential therefore to enlarge the narrow existing categories for admission and to revise and modernize the old restrictive Immigration Act. The new multiracial Commonwealth also presented a difficult problem in relation to the Liberal government's total rejection of Asian immigration and some gesture of friendship had to be made in this area. Some rapid moves were made in these directions. By an order-incouncil of June 9, 1950 (P.C. 2856), the admissible classes of European immigrants were enlarged to include any immigrant "who satisfies the Minister that he is a suitable immigrant having regard to the climatic, the social, educational, industrial, labour or other conditions or requirements of Canada; and that he is not undesirable owing to his probable inability to become readily adapted and integrated into the life of the Canadian community and to assume the duties of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after his entry."22 Thus a new broad category was added to the existing admissible classes which included British subjects as defined, citizens of France, citizens of the United States, and also non-immigrants who had served in the Canadian armed forces. By an order-in-council of September 14, 1950 (P.C. 4364), revoking an earlier order prohibiting the entry of enemy aliens, Germans were placed on the same basis as other Europeans. The Japanese remained as enemy aliens until July 1952. In January 1951 agreements were concluded with the goverments of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon whereby 150 Indians, 100 Pakistanis, and 50 Ceylonese might be admitted to Canada each year, in addition to the wives, husbands, and unmarried children under 21, fathers over 65, and mothers over 60 of Canadian citizens, resident in Canada, of these countries of origin. With some slight changes, these quotas remained in force until 1962. There was a revealing comment on them from J. W. Pickersgill, then Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, when he appeared before the House of Commons Special Committee on Estimates in March 1955. In that year the Committee made a 99

CHART 4 Canadian Immigration, 1945-1970 (repetition of Chart 1)

CHART 5 Unemployment Rate in Canada, 1947-1970 SOURCE: Based on data from the Economic Council of Canada and the Dominion Bureau of Statistics.

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 very thorough examination of the estimates of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the whole immigration operation. When asked by a member of the Committee why it was necessary to maintain a staff of twelve in New Delhi to process so few immigrants, Mr. Pickersgill replied that most of the staff were locally engaged and, he suspected, not paid very much. (There were 20,000 applications for these jobs when the New Delhi office was opened.) The local staff were probably engaged in answering correspondence and, ever frank, Mr. Pickersgill added: As a matter of fact, you know as well as I do, that we do not have an office in India for the purpose of getting immigrants, for the sake of increasing the population of Canada. We agreed upon this quota as a gesture for the improvement of commonwealth relations. And, having done so, we have to treat these applicants decently and have enough employees there to answer the letters and deal with the correspondence and the applications which are received.23 Finally, as a basic move in creating what was hoped to be an effective legal and operational base for the new Department, a new Immigration Act was passed in 1952 and became effective June 1, 1953. This Act is still in force though, as already pointed out, it has been considerably modified by subsequent regulations and some recent legislation, and will probably be replaced by a new Act in the near future. The Act was drawn up by senior officials of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in consultation with officials of the Department of Justice, the Privy Council Office, and the other departments with a major interest in immigration. Before it was enacted it was studied by committees of the House and the Senate. THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1952 The Immigration Act of 1952, innocuously described in the Department's 1954 annual report as an act which "clarified and simplified immigration procedures and removed certain anomalies which have been brought to light during the continued movement of newcomers to Canada,"24 had, from the moment of its enactment, an immense influence on the management of Canadian immigration and on the impact of Canadian immigration, managed in this way, on Parliament and the community in Canada. Its contents and implications must be studied most carefully. The Act did some necessary and useful things and others which were very questionable. In its major provisions, it established the right of admission for Canadian citizens and persons with Canadian domicile, and it defined Canadian domicile for immigration purposes. It exhaustively 101

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listed the prohibited classes and established the right of examination of immigrants. It defined the powers of the Minister and his officials. It laid down conditions for the arrest, detention, and deportation of immigrants and would-be immigrants and for examinations, inquiries, and appeals. It also provided for "reports in certain cases" on persons other than Canadian citizens who were associated with subversive organizations or were undesirable for other specified reasons. The Act dealt with offences and penalties in immigration law, and it attempted to provide some protection for immigrants against exploitation by establishing this as an offence with specific penalties attached to it. It also provided penalties for exploitation and corruption in the Immigration Service. It provided that loans could be granted to immigrants to cover the costs of transportation and expenses en route. Finally, the Governor-in-Council was given the all-embracing power to prohibit or limit the admission of persons by reason of: 1. Nationality, citizenship, ethnic group, occupation, class, or geographical area of origin; 2. Peculiar customs, habits, modes of life, or methods of holding property; 3. Unsuitability having regard to the climatic, economic, social, industrial, educational, labour, health, or other conditions or requirements existing temporarily or otherwise, in Canada or in the area or country from or through which such persons come to Canada; or 4. Probable inability to become readily assimilated or to assume the duties and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after admission. This new Immigration Act had two fundamental defects which have had far-reaching consequences in Canadian immigration. The first was the degree of uncontrolled discretionary power vested by the Act in the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and his officials. The second lay in the nature of the Act itself as an instrument of government policy and as the basis of an active immigration program. The Act gave the Minister powers of discretion such as to give him potentially the last word on every individual case. In addition to his powers as head of the Department, able to reverse the decisions of his officers, he could "confirm or quash . . . or substitute his decision" for the decision of any Immigration Appeal Board which might be created under the provisions of the Act. He could admit any individual by Minister's permit for a twelve-month period and extend that permit indefinitely, subject only to the obligation to report the fact to Parliament annually. He had, in fact, total authority over admissions, and total authority in relation to deportation over those immigrants who were not yet Canadian citizens and did not 102

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 yet have Canadian domicile. In the latter case, the Act decreed that there was to be no recourse in law for the new immigrant: Section 39. No court and no judge or officer thereof has jurisdiction to review, quash, reverse, restrain or otherwise interfere with any proceeding, decision or order of the Minister, Deputy Minister, Director, Immigration Appeal Board, Special Inquiry Officer or immigration officer had made or given under the authority and in accordance with the provisions of this Act relating to the detention or deportation of any person, upon any ground whatsoever, unless such person is a Canadian citizen or has Canadian domicile. These provisions of the Act did not make the Minister's job an attractive one. Indeed they substantially contributed to the fact that this portfolio was always regarded as burdensome, touchy, and unrewarding. Ministers were deluged with individual cases on which their personal decision was required. Two years after the Act was passed, J. W. Pickersgill, in an appearance before the Special Committee on Estimates, said that he was spending 90 percent of the time which he devoted to the Immigration Department on marginal cases. He did not think that this was the real purpose of the Immigration Department which was, he felt, as Mackenzie King had said, to increase the population of Canada by immigration.25 In an interview, he referred to the "mountains of cases," flowing in in those years because there was too much discretionary power for the Minister.26 Richard Bell, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in 1962-63, also referred in an interview to "the inexorable flow of individual files across the Minister's desk, preventing constructive administrative action." He said that both the Minister and the Deputy Minister were trapped in this way.27 It was only in 1968 that this flood of correspondence to the Minister on individual cases began to show a small but significant decline, probably owing to the much more explicit nature of the 1967 regulations and the new criteria for selection, and the creation in the same year of a new Immigration Appeal Board with proper authority.28 The Minister's discretionary powers under the 1952 Immigration Act had further consequences. The flood of correspondence on individual cases and the representations on behalf of individuals, which had to be dealt with, were as time-consuming for the Department as they were for the Minister. And this affected immigration operations at home and overseas. The director of an overseas immigration office had to devote a considerable amount of his time to individual cases. As time went on, however, the Department contrived to contain and manage this problem more efficiently. In 1964, as part of a general reorganization of the Immigration Branch into five directorates, a Directorate of Special Services was created 103

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with the major responsibility of handling individual cases and representations. In an interview, the Director said that the purpose of this move was to relieve the Deputy Minister, the Assistant Deputy Minister, and other senior officials of these responsibilities, so that they could get on with the essential tasks of planning and management. He felt, however, that the central problem, the key to the whole matter, was the extent of administrative decision-making under the Act.29 The substantial powers accorded to the Minister under the 1952 Act also devolved upon his officers. They too were given very considerable powers in their own right. Section 11 of the Act, for example, stated that "(1) immigration officers-in-charge are Special Inquiry Officers and the Minister may nominate such other immigration officers as he deems necessary to act as Special Inquiry Officers, (2) a Special Inquiry Officer has authority to inquire into and determine whether any person shall be allowed to come into Canada or to remain in Canada or shall be deported." In addition, a Special Inquiry Officer had full powers to hold an inquiry, to "issue a summons to any person requiring him to appear at the time and place mentioned therein and to testify to all matters within his knowledge relative to the subject matter of the inquiry," and also to "administer oaths and examine any person upon oath, affirmation or otherwise" and to "issue commissions or requests to take evidence in Canada." In this connection it must be noted how broad and often imprecise the grounds for deportation were. Two of these grounds which were particularly disturbing and caused much anxiety among immigrants were, first, that it was entirely possible for a landed immigrant to be deported if he had a mental illness, or a recurrence of a mental illness, and had become an inmate (if only temporarily) in a mental institution. Secondly, it was possible for him to be deported if he became a public charge. In 1956 the powers of Special Inquiry Officers were somewhat modified hi relation to admission but not to deportation.30 In that year the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that in delegating the authority to decide admissibility to Special Inquiry Officers, the Governor-in-Council had exceeded its legal authority.31 As a result of this decision, it was decided to spell out the precise classes of persons who were admissible to Canada. This was done by order-in-council on May 24,1956.32 These substantial discretionary powers worked to the disadvantage of the Department and its officers, just as they worked to the disadvantage of the Minister. It is not an exaggeration to say that they created an initial bias against immigration officials, as a result of a natural presupposition that such substantial powers could lead only to abuse. The Act left the Department unprotected, without the means to justify many of its decisions. In addition, this important piece of legislation, which, with the regu104

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 lations, was the only item of immigration law on a Canadian lawyer's bookshelves for many years, created a negative climate in immigration, a climate of suspicion. Law can be a positive instrument of government and the bare bones of a law can be clothed in encouraging language. The 1952 Immigration Act was a discouraging document. As a handy work of reference for immigration officials, with its negative tone and heavy emphasis on exclusion, it is small wonder that some of them made errors of judgement.33 Some of the inadequacies of the 1952 Act were quickly understood. Very soon after its appearance on the Statute Book, a move began within the Department to revise it. It is a sad illustration of the general failure of political will in this field that the effort to revise the Act has continued, without result, ever since. The prospect of a new Immigration Act being placed before Parliament in the fairly near future does now look more promising. This, however, will be the end of a very long road. In 1955 the Minister secured the approval in principle of Cabinet to make certain substantive changes in the Act, but no action was taken. In 1958 a comprehensive policy memorandum was submitted by the Department to Cabinet, seeking its approval and guidance in the revision of the Act. A cabinet committee on immigration was appointed to examine this memorandum and report on the issues involved. But the cabinet committee never completed its task and the memorandum was never dealt with. In 1959 and 1960 drafts of a new Act were prepared by legal officers in the Department, but these were rejected by the Minister, Mrs. Fairclough, and the Deputy Minister, Dr. Davidson, as being too legalistic and control oriented. It was then decided, in mid-1961, to proceed with a complete overhaul and revision of the immigration regulations as it was felt that they embodied the kind of discrimination which came most frequently under attack. The revised regulations came into effect on February 1, 1962. This effort, however, only postponed the attempt to revise the Act. In 1963 a newly appointed Assistant Deputy Minister came to the Department with the avowed hope of securing the revision of the Act. In the considerable process of departmental self-evaluation which preceded the preparation of the White Paper on Immigration in 1966, and which will be discussed later, revision of the Act was constantly to the fore. But in 1967, as in 1962, a substantial change in immigration policy was again effected by changing the regulations and not the Act. The principal stumbling block has always been the anticipation of acute political difficulties in relation to major changes in immigration law, and the problem of steering a complicated new Act through the House of Commons and of avoiding a serious political storm inside and outside the House.34

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We have discussed the influence of the Act, in its award of extensive discretionary powers, on the working lives of the Minister and his officials. A further serious consequence was the effect which the existence of these discretionary powers had on the relation between the Department and the legal profession in Canada and between the Department and the House of Commons. THE CRITICS The most severe critics of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and of the immigration operations of the Department of Manpower and Immigration have been lawyers and Members of Parliament. Very often they have been Members of Parliament who were also lawyers. As fas as the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was concerned, other critics, and there were plenty of them, barely counted. In the House of Commons, the focus of disturbing criticism and critical attack on the two Departments, over the long run, has not been the Opposition parties, but a small group of M.P.s who have large numbers of immigrants in their ridings, or who have, for some reason, perhaps their own ethnic origin, a special interest in immigration. Within the legal profession, one important feature of the scene has been the existence of a small number of legal firms specializing to a considerable extent in immigration and handling a large number of the immigration cases in Canada. Recently, one wellknown firm in Toronto was handling approximately five hundred immigration cases at any one time, mainly Canadian, but with a few from the United States. Canadian lawyers, as part of a general tendency to question the powers of the bureaucracy, have always disliked the imprecise nature and insufficiency of Canadian immigration law. They have distrusted the Department's use of its discretionary powers under the Act, and they have opposed the long-continued official policy of giving no reasons, or very limited reasons, for decisions taken.35 They have also disliked the quasijudicial character of some immigration proceedings and the absence, until recently, of an adequate opportunity of recourse to law for those threatened with deportation. The Department, on the other hand, particularly in earlier days, was under constant pressure from lawyers and legal firms and continuously involved in protracted, time-consuming legal cases. It became wary of lawyers, believing that many, though not all, tended to put the client's interest and their own interests before that of the public. The Department also tended to be suspicious of those who made their living out of immigration, either in Canada or overseas. Immigrants frequently apply to lawyers or to their Member of Parliament for help. An M.P. is an obvious channel and shortcut to the'Minis106

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 ter, and a powerful advocate with the Department in seeking the general protection of the rights of the individual immigrant, the review of any case where an unfavourable or possibly unjust decision had been made by the Department, special consideration for admission outside the normal categories on compassionate or other grounds, and a possible means of influencing immigration policy. Like the Minister, Members of Parliament with heavily immigrant ridings were inundated with cases and many other members usually had a few on their hands. Like the Minister also, they found this task very burdensome and time-consuming. From this, an unusually contentious relationship developed between Members of Parliament and the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, which continued after the reorganization of departments and the creation of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. By 1966, when a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons was appointed to examine and report on the White Paper on Immigration, it is fair to say that this relationship had become one of considerable mutual hostility. The hostility and suspicion of M.P.s towards official immigration management has been assuaged, to some extent now, by the 1967 immigration regulations and the creation of a new Immigration Appeal Board in the same year, by the more secure position and firmer tone of the new Department, and by a more open style of immigration operations. But it has not disappeared; nor is there evidence, so far, that a climate of greater trust and a more fruitful kind of interchange between politicians and officials in this difficult area of public policy is yet emerging. PARLIAMENT AND IMMIGRATION, 1946-1957 House of Commons debates from 1946 to the mid-fifties, and particularly from 1950 onwards, record a deterioration in the support and respect which the Liberal government could command in the House for its immigration policy and program. The innocent days of the Senate Committee on Immigration and Labour, the comfortable acceptance of the Mackenzie King policy statement, and the relatively harmonious experience in the House of the first Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Walter Harris, gave way to a climate of increasing questioning and distrust, with no obvious increase on the part of members in their understanding of the basis problems of immigration and the difficulties of immigration management. In part, this deterioration was due to a natural sequence of events, both human and parliamentary. In part, it was due to the poor handling of Parliament in those years by the Liberal government and its failure from the beginning to educate and involve Parliament in the immigration process. In part, it was due to the sheer complexity and 107

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difficulty of immigration as an area of public policy; and in part also, to the Immigration Act itself. By 1953 large numbers of immigrants had arrived in Canada, and both their needs and the problems which they might create were becoming more apparent. Overall unemployment figures in Canada were beginning to climb rather steeply. A few individual members drew attention to this in the House in the early fifties and also began to question the government on the issue of racial discrimination. The Opposition soon fastened on immigration as a fruitful area for periodic attack and E. Davie Fulton, as principal spokesman for the Conservative party on this question, proved a very effective critic—one of the very few speakers in the House, then or later, who could analyse the full implications of the government's immigration policy. The basic issue of individual rights in immigration was particularly well suited to the talents of Mr. Diefenbaker (leader of the Conservative party from December 1956 onwards) and Mr. Fulton, both lawyers. They displayed these talents to the full in the first major critical debate on immigration since the formulation of the government's immigration policy in 1947.36 The debate which began on February 15, 1955, on a motion of censure, was introduced by Mr. Fulton on behalf of the Conservative party, who stated that, "in the opinion of this House, the immigration policy of the Government is not clear, consistent or co-ordinated; it is not in conformity with the needs or responsibilities of Canada; and in its administration denies simple justice to Canadians and non-Canadians alike."37 The debate drew together, in a dramatic but confused way, the anxieties of some members of the House and some members of the legal profession about the administrative and legal consequences of the 1952 Immigration Act and the administrative practices of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. As heavy ammunition, the Opposition used the 1954 report of a subcommittee of the Committee on Civil Liberties of the Canadian Bar Association, together with a resolution proposed by the Law Society of Upper Canada and passed at a meeting of the Bar Association in Winnipeg. Both the subcommittee's report and the resolution were concerned to remedy what was felt to be administrative malpractice in immigration and a denial of legal rights to immigrants. There was some doubt as to the standing of the subcommittee's report within the Bar Association which had evidently felt some anxiety about its political consequences and reliability, and the Minister, Mr. Pickersgill, made full use of this fact in his reply to Opposition charges. Nevertheless, the ammunition was good enough and Mr. Fulton and Mr. Diefenbaker made the most of it. The subcommittee's report was based on the study of a number of re108

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 cent immigration cases in which hardship or injustice appeared to be involved. The subcommittee had in fact reported twice to the Bar Association—in 1953, when its report was referred back for further study, and in 1954. On both occasions it had urged the need for administrative reform and proper attention to the legal rights of immigrants. In its 1954 report, the subcommittee made a number of recommendations including a possible codification of immigration regulations; publication of intradepartmental directives and, particularly, instructions to field officers concerning the application or interpretation of the Act; the implementation of "proper and legal appeal procedures as contemplated in the Act"; the possibility of making departmental files available to applicants and their attorneys (excluding confidential material prepared by departmental officials); the recognition of the role of barristers and solicitors in immigration law; and "the establishment of a procedure setting forth reasons for rejection in each case, in such a way as to give the rejected party or the applicant concerned an opportunity of overcoming the Department's objections."38 Using this material, Mr. Fulton charged the government and the Department with administrative lawlessness and Mr. Diefenbaker charged them with absolutism. Mr. Fulton's was the major speech and he made a number of telling points over the whole range of immigration policy. Immigration, he claimed, next to high taxation and unemployment, was causing more dissatisfaction and concern in Canada than any other subject. He strongly criticized the government's handling of immigration in the House and the amount of time allotted to it. This had "effectively denied the House the opportunity of discussing, sensibly and coherently, the question of immigration and the government's policies and deficiencies in that regard." Further, the government was not speaking with one voice on the subject: ministers were making conflicting statements on immigration. There was no evidence that immigration policy was being properly coordinated with industrial expansion and the development of Canada's resources. He added, "Nor is there sufficient co-ordination, on the evidence that we have, between the activities of the Immigration officials and the activities of the Department of Labour." The present policies of the government and the declining immigration intake since 1952 did not accord with Canada's undisputed need for more people.39 Mr. Fulton said that the government was neglecting British immigration and it was not using the assisted passage scheme to the best advantage, particularly in relation to immigration from the United Kingdom.40 But the most pertinent part of his criticism of the government was that, in its immigration policy, it denied simple justice to Canadians and nonCanadians alike. The government's view, repeatedly stated in the House 109

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and in correspondence, was that there were no rights attached to immigration. It was a matter of discretion only and could not be made a matter of law. "When reasons for decisions do not have to be given," Mr. Fulton said, "as the Government maintains that they do not, and when ministerial discretion, which means in the nature of things, departmental discretion, is the sole arbiter, then error, corruption, favouritism, and injustice are invited and rights and liberties are denied in principle as well as in fact."41 These views had received an "almost startling but most gratifying" confirmation in the report of the subcommittee of the Committee on Civil Liberties of the Canadian Bar Association presented in Winnipeg in September 1954. The Conservatives' motion of censure was defeated after a three-day debate, but the government's performance in the debate was not impressive. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ESTIMATES: IMMIGRATION REVIEW Mr. Pickersgill was much more convincing in his appearance before the Special Committee on Estimates which examined the estimates of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in February and March 1955. The Committee opened its proceedings on the second day of the debate in the House, February 17, 1955. Mr. Fulton was a member and he tried, unsuccessfully, to induce the Committee to call two members of the subcommittee of the CBA's Committee on Civil Liberties as witnesses. The Committee Chairman, Walter Tucker, was obviously very opposed to this thought, and there was a long and acrimonious discussion before the Fulton proposal was rejected. The Committee's proceedings, a review of the major operations of the new Department, are a valuable record of the stage of development which we are now considering in Canadian immigration. The fundamental issues in policy and administration raised by Mr. Fulton in the House are all re-echoed here. There are numerous small items of information about immigration operations, as they were then, and much that is revealing about the attitude of the Liberal government towards immigration management. Mr. Pickersgill was very informative and, in the main, very frank. What emerges from these proceedings, on the part of the government, is a firm adherence still to the major premises in the Mackenzie King statement; reasonable satisfaction with the procedures set up under the 1952 Immigration Act (Mr. Pickersgill was unshaken by Opposition attacks); very limited intentions in the provision of assistance and services for immigrants after arrival (lest these should give immigrants a preferred 110

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 status over Canadians); and a style of operation which had a totally dayto-day tone about it. There is no evidence in these proceedings of a forward-looking, developmental approach on the part of the government, no suggestion of experiment, inquiry, or objective assessment of results. There is no reference to any kind of consultation on policy-making, apart from some collaboration with other government departments. ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY: CONFLICT WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR We have already noted that the predominant attitude within the Department of Citizenship and Immigration itself towards immigration planning from the mid-fifties onwards was expansionist, but that this position was hard to implement for a number of reasons, including the fact that the Department was only partly able to sustain its point of view against the quite different philosophy of the Department of Labour. A conflict over the control of immigration operations and the purpose and use of immigration for Canada began immediately after the war when the Immigration Branch was still in charge. Dr. Keenleyside's difficulties in this regard, as Deputy Minister of the Department of Mines and Resources, are recorded later.42 The old Immigration Branch and the new Department of Citizenship and Immigration succeeded in establishing their right to manage immigration at home and overseas. They did not, however, establish exclusive control over immigration programming because of the need, at least in the early years, for frequent, almost daily, consultation with the Department of Labour on employment opportunities and manpower needs in Canada. It was equally important for the Department of Labour to know what was going on in immigration and to have a voice in the overall selection of immigrants. The Department of Labour's point of view on immigration was unambiguous. It had been enunciated quite plainly by two Ministers of Labour in the evidence they gave before the Standing Committee of the Senate on Immigration and Labour.43 The Department of Labour firmly believed that immigration programming should be geared to the business cycle, and that, in times of heavy, or threateningly heavy, unemployment, immigration should be severely restricted. It also believed that the annual immigration program should be planned, as far as possible, with a view to filling precise gaps in the labour force. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration, believing in the long-term value of immigration and becoming increasingly aware of the real operational difficulties of the "tap on and off" policy, instinctively rejected this view and gave in to it only when obliged to do so. The available evidence suggests that at this period

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the Department of Labour was much more sensitive to the downswing of the business cycle than to the upswing, and was not sensitive at all to operational problems. In the eyes of the Department of Labour, however, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was dangerously insensitive to national unemployment levels running, from 1957 onwards, at well over 6 percent. The real difficulty lay in the fact that Mackenzie King's three major premises relating to the purpose of immigration for Canada, i.e., immigration for population growth, immigration for economic development, and the overall requirement that immigration must be related to absorptive capacity, had never been adequately discussed or explored at the political or official level. Parliamentary discussions of immigration at this period and later reflect considerable confusion about the implementation of all these objectives. In reality, as already noted, it was impossible to establish the role of immigration in relation to population growth and economic development, or to arrive at any working concept of absorptive capacity, without first a much clearer definition of national goals than either of the two major political parties was prepared to provide; and secondly, without more information about the Canadian economy than was then available. Intelligent immigration planning required a much more sophisticated and coordinated use by government of all the instruments of national policy-making. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the difficult area of immigration programming, officials were floundering in an open sea. During this first period of immigration management, the conflict between the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Department of Labour became a fact of life. The files are full of references to it, and throughout the entire post-war period until the creation of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, it is evident that every deputy minister in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration found the situation rather trying. Increasingly, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration endeavoured to become more independent of the Department of Labour and to develop its own sources of employment information. During the second period of operations, however, from 1957 to 1963, it is evident that the Department of Labour pressed its views harder and more successfully because of the high rate of unemployment and its strong voice in the Cabinet. One very interesting aspect of the different approach to immigration on the part of these two Departments, which is difficult to document and cannot be stated with any certainty, is that the Department of Labour does not appear to have been very concerned with the composition of the total immigration flow to Canada, and appears to have given no strong support to the Department of Citizenship and Immigra112

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 tion in its efforts to control the movement of relatives. The concern of the Department of Labour appears to have focussed on the open placement movement. The Immigration Branch, before its translation into a full-scale department in 1950, did make one effort to define absorptive capacity and to produce some clearer thinking on this question. In 1949, Dr. Hugh Keenleyside commissioned a special research study by Mabel F. Timlin, professor of economics at the University of Saskatchewan, which was subsequently published under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in 1951, under the title Does Canada Need More People? In her study, Professor Timlin concluded that "a larger population for Canada should mean a higher physical product per capita and hence higher real incomes for Canadian citizens." The degree of benefit, however, would rest upon the character and stability of world political and economic reconstruction and Canada's special relations to it. She felt that she could not be more precise than this, because information was so inadequate and a great deal of new research was required. Without extensive information, projection respecting absorptive capacity for immigrants was impossible. She concluded, however, that, although unlimited immigration was neither politically possible nor necessarily desirable for Canada, "freer migration than we have known for most of the past twenty years and trade policies favouring continuation of large-scale movements of goods in international trade, may both be elements as favourable to Canada's future as they are favourable to the future of the world." Professor Timlin conceded that her view was optimistic and that it implied the desirability of positive policies in these fields. She felt that "for Canada in particular, in the present stage in world affairs, the errors of optimism appear likely to be less destructive of the future and less frustrating than the errors of a self-seeking and over-cautious pessimism."44 It is difficult to estimate what influence this study had, if any. It may have contributed to the development of an optimistic and long-term approach to immigration within the Department. On the other hand, one or two older officials have argued that, because the study emphasized the difficulties of long-term projection and said so little about planning or about any of the ways in which positive policies of a long-term character could be developed, it left the way open in the first few years to immigration programming of a very short-term "tap on and off" kind. The next event in the development of national thinking on this question was the publication in November 1957 of the report of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects. This Commission, the Gordon Commission, came out strongly in favour of a well-planned and stable immigration policy geared both to the requirements of the Canadian

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labour force and to population growth and suggested that immigration should be "carried" in times of mild recession. It is our conviction that the economic advantages of continued immigration are substantial enough to justify an attempt to maintain a stable immigration policy, even through periods of mild recession in Canada. Inevitably—and rightly in our opinion—if there were a deep and widespread drop in employment in Canada, immigration would either be drastically reduced or suspended altogether. But, as we have suggested, there may be difficulty over the next two or three decades in obtaining as many suitable immigrants as it would be to Canada's advantage to have. The task would be made harder if our immigration policy, as expressed through regulations and administrative instructions, were to fluctuate with every minor fluctuation of business activity in Canada.45 This was strong support for the gathering departmental conviction of the need for long-term planning and stable programming in immigration. It may have given strength and impetus to this conviction. But on the evidence of what followed in immigration in the next few years, it is doubtful whether the report had any immediate influence on policy-making. Five or six years later, however, it undoubtedly did contribute to the great changes which occurred, particularly in the senior levels of the public service in attitudes towards immigration and immigration management. HUNGARY AND SUEZ This first period of Liberal immigration management ended in a brief moment of splendour. The Hungarian crisis of November 1956, which by the end of December 1958 brought 37,566 immigrants to Canada, awoke the nobler instincts of the Liberal government. It was a perfect liberal cause and they responded swiftly to it. The issue of Hungarian freedom seems to have been particularly appealing to Mr. Pickersgill who flew to Vienna himself as a demonstration of the government's interest and goodwill and to get things moving. Shortly after the Hungarian Revolution, the Suez crisis erupted, and in the wake of the Hungarians came 108,989 British immigrants, in a mood to migrate after this sad demonstration of ineptness by the Eden government. Total Canadian immigration figures soared as Chart 4 indicates, and a tidal wave of immigrants hit Ontario and particularly Toronto, the major receiving centre. The government moved with unusual speed to handle this crisis situation. A special section of the Immigration Branch was set up immediately to deal with the Hungarian movement on an emergency basis. Additional staff were assigned to Austria. Canadian eligibility to sponsor refugees 114

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 was enlarged. Refugees in Vienna were simply given a quick visual medical screening and all immigration procedures were simplified. Free transportation to Canada was provided for every refugee and ships and planes were chartered in cooperation with the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration.46 Except in Quebec, special arrangements were made with the provinces, either to extend the existing hospital-welfare agreements for immigrants to include Hungarians, or to conclude new agreements on their behalf.47 The Citizenship Branch rose to the occasion also, and its own version of this special effort is as follows: The arrival in Canada of large numbers of Hungarian refugees, commencing in November 1956, made sudden demands on the Branch and upon the services of liaison officers. Co-operation was quickly established with the Hungarian Section of the Immigration Branch and regional liaison officers worked closely with provincial officials, welfare agencies and voluntary organizations in arranging for the reception and care of the refugees, planning programs and organizing local co-ordinating committees. Special committees were set up at ports of entry.48 Large numbers of Hungarian refugees had been assembled in camps in the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands prior to their movement to Canada in the spring of 1957. A senior official of the Citizenship Branch went to the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to assist in the provision of language and orientation programs in these camps. A special team of seventeen teachers, a coordinator, a Hungarian-speaking lecturer, and social worker were sent from Canada to the Netherlands. Among other materials, a "Handbook for Newcomers" in Hungarian was hurriedly prepared in Ottawa and 20,000 copies were distributed in Canada and overseas.49 A remarkable feature of the whole Hungarian movement was the extent to which it prompted vigorous and successful planning and management on the part of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, quite close collaboration with the provinces, and considerable community involvement. For a brief period of time, the House of Commons was united on this dramatic immigration issue. The essential planning and management element in the whole operation is illustrated by the following extract from the section on Hungarian refugees in the 1958 annual report of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration: As the majority of refugees were without funds, arrangements were made for their accommodation and maintenance until they could earn 115

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their subsistence. Through the generosity of public spirited individuals and voluntary welfare groups a number of refugees were taken into private homes while others were placed in reception centres across the country. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration had sole responsibility for the placement of Hungarian refugees and pending establishment ensured that they had food and shelter. Persons requiring hospitalization or treatment were given care at Government expense. Refugees were distributed as evenly as possible throughout Canada, approximately one-third settling west of the Great Lakes, onethird in Ontario and the remainder in Quebec and the Maritime Provinces.50 By midsummer 1957 the Hungarian refugee movement was coming to an end and consisted mainly of sponsored cases. As a final and rather sad note, the Department, alarmed by the very high immigration figures for 1956-57, recommended that the flow of Hungarian refugees be reduced by cutting off the extra sponsorship privileges for Hungarians which had been introduced in the previous year. Cabinet gave approval to this on July 11, 1957, and instructions were issued to this effect on July 23. However, at the end of the year, following representations from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, it was decided to admit one more group consisting of 700 Hungarian refugees from Yugoslavia. An advance party came by chartered aircraft in December 1957, the balance following by sea early in 1958.51 In the general election of June 10, 1957, the Liberal government was defeated by the Conservatives under John Diefenbaker. It was a Conservative Cabinet which cut back the sponsored immigration from Hungary. At this moment, overall unemployment in Canada had reached its highest point since the end of the war. In interdepartmental discussions on immigration, the Department of Labour was pressing hard for a reduced and very selective intake.52 As we shall see, the new government was faced with some unexpected problems in immigration which had been gathering force during the previous period. One of these was the uncontrolled expansion of the sponsored movement and the backlogs in some European offices. Another was the recent awareness of the existence of a large, well-organized, illegal movement of Chinese immigrants to Canada. More important than all this was the fact that, despite its strong stand in the 1955 debate, immigration proved to be one of the minor concerns of the Conservative Cabinet. The burst of effective crisis decision-making in 1956 and 1957, the generous response to the plight of Hungarian refugees, the closer collaboration with the provinces, and the high degree of community involve116

Policy and Program, 1946-1957 ment in the Hungarian movement might have created a breakthrough in Canadian immigration management from 1957 onwards, but the opportunity was allowed to slip away. In Toronto, within eighteen months of the admission of the first Hungarian refugees, the vigorous, successful citizens' committee organized by the Citizenship Branch to help hi the initial reception and integration of the Hungarians was losing momentum and its funds were petering out. The churches, which had taken an active part in joint reception procedures and other programs for this great influx of immigrants, were beginning once again to go their own way. And immigration officials were withdrawing from the vital leadership and partnership role which they had played during the crisis period. There was no creative leadership either at the political or the official level to sustain this brief but significant experiment in cooperative action in immigration.53 SUMMARY, 1946-1957 A brief summary may be useful at this point as the first period, 194657, is longer than the two that follow. It is also the period when the essential foundations were laid in Canadian post-war immigration policy and management. After the war, as we have seen, the Liberal government made some decisive moves hi this field. Impelled by the plight of displaced persons, the general post-war dislocation in Europe, and the requirements of Canada's external relations, immigration was accepted as an area of higher priority in Canadian national policy than hitherto. A broad statement on immigration policy was presented to the House in 1947. It envisaged selective immigration as an instrument of population growth and economic development, at a rate consistent with absorptive capacity. No "fundamental alteration" was to be made, through immigration, in the character of the Canadian population. Large-scale immigration from Asia was specifically rejected. To implement this policy, a Department of Citizenship and Immigration was created in 1950 with responsibility also for Indian affairs. The authority of this Department to manage Canada's overseas immigration operations was established. A broader operational base for the new immigration program was created through the enlargement of the existing categories for admission, permitting the entry of large numbers of European immigrants. Small quotas were introduced for India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. The legal framework within which immigration would be managed was laid down in the Immigration Act of 1952. During the next few years, immigrants were still easy to get. In Canada there was a general atmosphere of prosperity and optimism, and unem117

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ployment was not too severe. And after the firm initial moves which have just been described, the initiative of the Liberal government in this area of public policy died away. No further serious thought seems to have been given to planning and development in immigration, to the on-going requirements of immigration management at home and overseas, or to the development of adequate services for immigrants in Canada beyond meeting their basic welfare and medical needs for one year after arrival. As we shall see in later chapters, there was almost no consultation with the provinces in this area of common jurisdiction and concern. There was no involvement of the community in immigration. Overseas, the Immigration Branch had to manage with small resources, weak support from Ottawa, and almost no help from other overseas departments. Despite the propitious economic climate in Canada in the early 1950s, it soon became apparent that immigration would be a difficult area of public policy to manage. There was a continuing conflict between the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Department of Labour over the basic issues of immigration policy and planning; difficulties soon appeared in relations with Parliament and the public. In this, immigration was very much a casualty of the general failure of the St. Laurent government to handle Parliament well and to establish effective communication with the public. Parliament and the public were informed about the immigration program. They were not educated in the difficulties and problems of immigration, nor involved in their solution. Government was defensive, not frank, about the real problems which immigration presented.54 In addition, the Immigration Act of 1952 proved a great handicap to effective immigration management. It was a poor and illiberal piece of legislation which was difficult to administer. The latter half of this period, therefore, was, in a number of ways, one of rather disagreeable discovery. It was clear that no very harmonious pattern of operations was developing, although many more immigrants were coming to Canada. Briefly, during the Hungarian crisis and refugee movement, there was a glimpse of what better leadership and a much more cooperative approach to immigration in Canada might achieve.

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Chapter Five Policy and Program, 1957-1963

ON JUNE 21, 1957, E. Davie Fulton became Acting Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. On May 12, 1958, he was succeeded by Ellen Fairclough who held this portfolio for four years and three months, longer than any other minister so far, with the exception of Walter Harris. Halfway through this period, on April 26, 1960, George Davidson became Deputy Minister, replacing Laval Fortier who was appointed chairman of the Unemployment Insurance Commission. Mrs. Fairclough was defeated in the federal election of 1963. But prior to this, in 1962, she became Postmaster General, and her place as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration was taken by Richard Bell who held this office for only eight months from August 9, 1962, to April 22, 1963. After the Conservative defeat in the federal election of 1963, the first in a series of Liberal ministers responsible for immigration, who followed one after another in the next five years, was Guy Favreau. By 1957, as we have seen, some serious and specific problems in immigration which had been gathering force during the previous period now required urgent attention. The first was the sponsorship question and the very large backlogs of applications piling up in the European offices. The second was the evident inadequacy of the Immigration Act and the need to revise admission policy in the light of Canada's increasing need for skilled manpower, and of the widespread criticism of her present discrimination against non-European immigration. The third was the need for more stable immigration programming and for the improvement and development of the Overseas Service. A fourth problem which landed most uncomfortably in the lap of the Conservative government was the confirmation that a large-scale, illegal, Chinese immigration movement had been operating for a considerable time out of Hong Kong. These were

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the issues with which Mrs. Fairclough, the Deputy Minister, and officials of the Department battled for the next few years. It was possible, at this time, to change some aspects of immigration policy which did not involve great expense. It was not possible to do much about development in any direction. Money was too tight and unemployment too high; and also, according to the Minister, Cabinet was, in the main, uninterested in these questions.1 In its first annual review in 1964, the Economic Council of Canada noted that during the whole post-war period, the Canadian economy appeared to have passed through two distinct phases of economic performance and had probably entered a third. The first of these phases which continued through the immediate post-war years to the early fifties was, according to the review, a period characterized by almost consistently high employment and well-sustained increases in productivity and growth in total output. At the same time this period was marked by special and recurrent price and cost pressures and strains in the balance of payments. Subsequently, during the 1950s, there was a transition to a totally different situation in which the economy, for a variety of causes and in a variety of different ways, lost momentum and suffered a significant deterioration in its competitive position. This was a period marked by relatively high unemployment, slow gains in productivity and total output, a relatively high degree of price and cost stability, and a loss of strength in the balance of payments, which was a reflection of many different factors, including inappropriately high levels of the exchange rates and interest rates.2 The third phase, in the view of the Economic Council, had occurred since 1961 and had led to what has been described in its second annual review as "The Great Expansion." The period now under discussion in Canadian immigration management falls into phase two. It was characterized by serious financial and economic difficulties which the Diefenbaker government proved incapable of handling. A very uneasy relationship between Cabinet and senior officials in the public service also existed during this period. During his eleven months as Acting Minister of Citizenship and Immigration from June 1957 to May 1958, Mr. Fulton made few changes in existing policy or procedures, despite his vigorous criticism earlier of many aspects of Liberal immigration management. This was perhaps understandable since he was also serving as Minister of Justice, where his real interest probably lay, and, on occasion, as Acting Secretary of State 120

Policy and Program, 1957-1963 for External Affairs.3 While he was Acting Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, changes were made in the regulations permitting East Indian and Chinese immigrants to apply for the admission of relatives before acquiring Canadian citizenship. The government also announced its intention to amend the Citizenship Act to remove the distinction between natural-born and naturalized Canadians in the matter of loss of citizenship. Among other lesser moves, steps were taken to establish impressive citizenship ceremonies in centres other than Toronto and Montreal. From this point on, regrettably, Mr. Fulton disappeared from the immigration scene. Although he was principal spokesman for the Conservative party on immigration for ten years, he said no more on the subject and took no further part in immigration debates. Ellen Fairclough was a popular minister with immigration officials in Ottawa. They remember her as willing to listen, efficient, and considerate. They saw more of her than of other ministers. She spent more time in the Department, probably because she was herself much more of an administrator than a natural parliamentarian. She was not particularly diplomatic nor very creative. She had no support in the Cabinet. But she was willing to tackle difficult problems and did not try to evade them. The first of these problems, when she became Minister in May 1958, was the increasing size of the sponsored movement and the growing backlogs in the European offices. THE SPONSORSHIP QUESTION The principal events of March and April 1959 have already been described briefly.4 The two major speeches in the House relating to these events were, first, Mr. PickersgilPs attack on the government on April 15, 1959, for "an unnecessary and cruel act" in enacting the order-in-council of March 19 restricting the admission of relatives to the immediate family. There had been no prior discussion of the current problems of sponsorship in the House and the whole manner in which this matter was handled by the government was described by Mr. Pickersgill as "a grave affront to Parliament."5 The second major speech was Mrs. Fairclough's defence on April 22, 1959.6 Mr. Pickersgill's views on immigration, at least during this period, did not appear to change in any way. He remained firm in his belief in the value of immigration for Canadian growth and development, in his real preference for the more traditional sources of immigration, and in his attachment to the principle of the desirability of sponsored immigration.7 The following are some extracts from his speech: We are told by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, or by some so-called spokesman for that department, that the reason they

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made this unnecessary, cruel and inhuman order was to give preference for skilled workers. Of course that is the most unadulterated camouflage; there is not the slightest intention on the part of the government of doing anything about that at all. This order was just a restriction. It was an unnecessary and inhuman restriction, and it was aimed at one community in this country. . . . The reason it was done, sir, was that when the government realized that more people of Italian origin than people from the United Kingdom came in last year, they got in a panic. They were afraid of many of their political supporters, and they felt they had to do something about it. Then they did this stupid, cruel, silly and inhuman thing.8 Mr. Pickersgill went on to point out that the order-in-council also worked great hardship on other communities, particularly on the Polish community who were able to get some of their relatives out of Poland for the first time. The government had, in his view, concealed its intentions. No word about the order-in-council had been breathed by the Minister, even though the Department's estimates were being discussed up to March 18. Mrs. Fairclough made a vigorous counterattack in her speech in the House on April 22. She pointed out that nothing was more cruel than to promise something which could not be fulfilled and this was the effect of the policies of the previous administration. The mounting backlogs in the European offices were testimony to the fact that large numbers of applications had been accepted which could not be handled for two years or more. She gave figures for the total backlog in all countries from 1955 to 1959 which are set out in Table 18. Mrs. Fairclough went on to say that because the largest backlog was in Italy> this country had been seized upon by Mr. Pickersgill for special mention. There was no truth whatever in the charge that this amendment was designed to curtail immigration from Italy. It would, in fact, eventually permit applications to be accepted from a much broader range of persons in Italy and would thus achieve a more diversified and representative movement from that country. There had been discrimination in the past against well-qualified Italians who wished to migrate to this country, but had little or no chance of being considered unless they were in the sponsored categories. She pointed out that the practice of the former Liberal government had always been to control the admission of relatives administratively: In 1952, despite the fact that the administrative regulations provided for the entry of a fairly broad range of close relatives from most countries in Europe, the government of that day curtailed the entry of close 122

Policy and Program, 1957-1963 TABLE 18

IMMIGRATION BACKLOG, ALL COUNTRIES, 1955-1959 Year

Sponsored

Unsponsored

Total

Dec. 31, 1955 Dec. 31, 1956 Dec. 31, 1957 Dec. 31, 1958 Feb. 28, 1959

26,332 47,178 63,659 73,540 75,847

50,826 69,957 88,962 47,774 55,938

77,158 117,135 152,621 121,314 131,785

SOURCE: Can., H. ofC. Debates, vol. 3, 1959, p. 2933.

relatives from Italy to such relatives as husband, wife, unmarried children under 21 years of age, father and mother. Because this change was accomplished administratively, without a formal order-in-council, there was relatively little publicity.9 One could properly conclude, Mrs. Fairclough continued, that if it had not been for the judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Brent case in 1956,10 "the regulations which had been in force from July 15th, 1950 would not have been changed and admission of close relatives would not have been provided for by the order-in-council of May 1956 and the then government would have continued its secret policy of discrimination." She read into the record the order-in-council of June 9, 1950 (P.C. 2856), in which there was no mention of the admission of relatives; and section 20 of the order-in-council of May 24, 1956 (P.C. 785), which had just been amended. She pointed out that section 20 implied that all classes of persons mentioned therein would be admitted so long as they were of good character and good health, but as members of the House knew, this was not the case. In many countries listed in section 20 the facilities to process applications did not exist. Mrs. Fairclough listed these countries as Spain, Cyprus, Andorra, Iceland, Monaco, San Marino, Liechtenstein, Vatican City, Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Mexico, and the countries of Central and South America. Mr. Pickersgill then pointed out that in a narrow, restricted sense it was correct to say that these countries did not have proper facilities. In these cases, however, immigration to Canada was looked after by representatives of the Department of External Affairs or, where there were no Canadian missions, by the British consulates. Mrs. Fairclough suggested that this procedure was inadequate.11 Despite this defensive posture, the Conservative government backed down. Mrs. Fairclough expressed it in this way at the conclusion of her

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speech. She said that, when she accepted this portfolio, she had hoped that her tenure of office would be classified as humane and sympathetic. She had no aversion to changing her mind if circumstances made such action advisable, and she went on: Therefore, taking into consideration the fact that I hope to suggest revisions to the Act in a few months' time in any event, I am asking my colleagues to rescind order-in-council 1959-310 until such time as the discriminatory Section 20 placed into the regulations by those now in opposition can be replaced. I trust that the revisions which I will then propose will be understood and will have the approval of all those interested in immigration.12 This incident is now regarded in the Department as a failure in diplomacy. No attempt had been made to educate Parliament or the public in the real problems of the sponsored movement, particularly in relation to the very high rate of unemployment at that time. There was considerable secrecy surrounding the controversial order-in-council which does confirm the impression that it was hoped that no one would notice it. The order-incouncil came into force on March 19, 1959. No publicity was given to it until April 1. As Mr. Pickersgill pointed out, it was not mentioned in the debate on departmental estimates. Any suggestion, however, that there were grounds for genuine dispute about policy is quite unrealistic. Whichever party was in power was obliged to do something about the escalation of the sponsored movement. Two years earlier, on June 10, 1957, in view of the heavy backlogs particularly in the Rome office, the Deputy Minister recommended to the Minister, Mr. Pickersgill, that sponsored immigrants be divided into five categories and that workers in the last two categories, categories D and E (married children with their families and brothers and sisters with their families) be required to comply occupationally. In view of the federal election then taking place, Mr. Pickersgill deferred his decision. But the new Minister, Mr. Fulton, gave his approval on June 25. By August 7, 1957, the Athens office reported a very serious backlog. On October 17, the chief of operations in the Department recommended that applications for relatives in categories D and E should no longer be accepted. On November 6, in his submission to Cabinet on the 1958 program, the Minister commented at length on the poor quality of sponsored workers and recommended that the new priority system established in July be continued. But Cabinet reserved decision. On January 7, 1958, the Rome office recommended that applications for relatives in category E should no longer be accepted and, throughout that year, the sponsored move124

Policy and Program, 1957-1963 ment continued to cause concern. The Lisbon office joined the Rome and Athens offices in reporting a large increase in its sponsored backlog in which dependents formed only a small percentage. In the early months of 1959, therefore, senior officers in the Department began working on the draft amendment to regulation 20.13 It is interesting to note that a few months after he assumed office, Mr. Fulton authorized the Deputy Minister to make this statement at a conference of branch officers: "Mr. Fulton has asked me to assure the staff that there is no change of attitude by the present government regarding immigration."14 THE NEW IMMIGRATION REGULATIONS The main effort and achievement of Mrs. Fairclough's ministry were the 1962 immigration regulations which removed racial discrimination as the major feature of Canada's immigration policy, retaining only one privilege for European over most non-European immigrants—the sponsoring of a wider range of relatives.15 These regulations explicitly established skill as the main criterion in the selection of unsponsored immigrants. They also enlarged the jurisdiction of the Immigration Appeal Board, established under the 1952 Act and formerly known as the General Board of Immigration Appeals, and improved the appeals procedure against deportation. Under the new regulations, the vital section relating to independent applicants reads as follows: 31. Landing in Canada is limited to persons who comply with all the requirements respecting landing in Canada set out in the Act and these Regulations and who come within one of the following classes: (a) a person who by reason of his education, training, skills or other special qualifications, is likely to be able to establish himself successfully in Canada and who (i) has sufficient means of support to maintain himself in Canada until he has so established himself, (ii) has come to Canada, under arrangements made or approved by the Director, for placement in employment, (iii) has come to Canada, under arrangements made or approved by the Director, for establishment in a business, trade or profession, or in agriculture. All immigrants could sponsor close relatives, although the classes of close relatives were somewhat reduced. Brothers and sisters, for example, were 125

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excluded. But in the category of other or more distant relatives, only the following were admissible, and this was the discriminating clause: 31. (d) a person who is a citizen of any country of Europe, including Turkey; or of any country of North, Central or South America or islands adjacent thereto; or of Egypt, Israel or Lebanon, if such person is: (i) the son, daughter, brother or sister, as well as the husband or wife and the unmarried son or daughter under twenty-one years of age of any such son, daughter, brother or sister as the case may be; or (ii) the unmarried orphan nephew or niece under twentyone years of age, or fiance of a Canadian citizen or of a person legally admitted to Canada for permanent residence, who is residing in Canada and who has applied for such person, and who is willing and able to provide care and maintenance for such person until he has established himself in Canada. For the purpose of sponsoring more distant relatives, this clause ruled out Asia and all of Africa except Egypt, but it included the West Indies. The changes relating to the Immigration Board and the appeals procedure against deportation as described by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration are as follows: Under the former legislation jurisdiction of the General Board of Immigration Appeals was limited to certain classes of appeals; the rest were dealt with by the Minister or by local, regional or headquarters appeal boards consisting of Immigration officials. This had been subject to criticism on the grounds that no opportunity was given for the appeal to be presented to a tribunal, free to conduct its proceedings independently of departmental officials. Under the new regulations the responsibility for the hearing of all appeals rests with the Immigration Appeal Board, which is completely independent of the Immigration Branch. At the same time the procedures, rights and privileges of persons subject to deportation were codified and classified.16 Although this was an improvement for all concerned, the Board was still not entirely independent of the Department. Nor could it hear appeals by sponsors whose applications to bring relatives to Canada had been refused, a much larger area of concern than deportation. Thus it did not substantially change the large numbers of individual cases on which the 126

Policy and Program, 1957-1963 Minister's decision was required. It was not until the Immigration Appeal Board Act became law on March 23, 1967, that a really effective Immigration Appeal Board was created. It is interesting to note that, in the debate on the estimates on February 9, 1961, Mr. Pickersgill had urged that provision should be made for appeals in sponsorship cases. I have come to the conclusion that on balance there ought to be a provision in the act for the establishment of an appeal board to consider any appeals in sponsorship cases. This is a very difficult task for a minister. A minister is under all kinds of pressure from all kinds of people, some of them benevolent and some of them quite mercenary. It does seem to me that if we could lay down rules for sponsorship and then create an independent tribunal to consider any cases that were appealed by the legal sponsor in Canada, it would make this portfolio supportable. I must say I have a good deal of sympathy for whoever has this task at the present time because there are too many decisions that nobody but the minister has the right under the law to make for one human being to be expected to make them, to be able to make them conscientiously and live a normal life.17 The new immigration regulations were tabled in the House by Mrs. Fairclough on January 19, 1962, and came into force on February 1. On February 27, Mr. Pickersgill, speaking for the Opposition, said that the greatest change in immigration policy since Mackenzie King announced the resumption of immigration in 1947 had gone into effect without approval or even debate in Parliament. "The essence of it," he said, "is to give immigration officials greater responsibility and more individual discretion than they have ever had before." And he added, "The reason why such a fundamental change of policy could be made without parliament's approval is that the real control over immigration has always been at the Cabinet's discretion. The Immigration Act in practice leaves the government free to do almost anything it wants."18 It is interesting to consider the circumstances in which this major change in immigration policy was made. After the federal election of June 1957, the Conservative government probably intended to do something about immigration. In his election campaign, Mr. Diefenbaker had promised that a Conservative government would "apply a vigorous immigration policy in co-operation with the provinces. The Immigration Act would be overhauled—Canada must populate or perish."19 But there is no reference in the files to a directive from the Cabinet on this matter although this might have been verbal. It is evident, however, that, after the Hungarian crisis, a new and more critical approach towards existing 127

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policies and procedures began to crystallize within the Department and a desire for change in several important areas. First, as already mentioned, there was the need to remove the stigma of racial discrimination from Canada's immigration policy, a central feature of it however much this might be denied by members of the current administration. Secondly, it was felt to be essential to stress quality migration in view of Canada's increasing need for skilled manpower and the high prevailing rates of unemployment, particularly among the unskilled, not to mention the Department of Labour's pressure on these issues. Thirdly, there was the evident need for more stable immigration programming. Finally, there was strong feeling within the Department that something must be done about the sponsored movement. As a background to all this, there was the already accepted view that the Immigration Act itself should be revised. The 1958 annual report of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration stated that a thorough review of immigration policies and procedures was started during the year. In her speech to the House on the sponsorship issue in April 1959, Mrs. Fairclough said that there were many things in the Act which she did not like and that the Conservative government had initiated "a thorough review of the Immigration Act, the regulations, the procedure and the policy." When proposals had been drafted, she intended to consult with representatives of ethnic groups and the ethnic press and to seek the advice of immigrant aid agencies, labour, business, and the church and welfare groups. From the review and consultations she hoped that they could produce "a new deal in immigration matters: positive approaches, democratic programming, raising of standards, flexible practices for selective immigration to replace rigid restrictions in the present act and regulations."20 It is reasonable to conclude that at least some of these views reflected current thinking among senior officials within the Department with whom Mrs. Fairclough was in constant communication. Early in 1960 the Department submitted the proposals to Cabinet to provide for a stable immigration program with longer range planning which were discussed earlier.21 As we have seen, the items in this submission relating directly to a stable program and forward planning were rejected. On February 9, 1961, in the debate on the estimates, Mrs. Fairclough mentioned the Immigration Act again. The Speech from the Throne had referred to the expectation that a revised Immigration Act would be laid before Parliament, but Mrs. Fairclough said that she could not add anything at the present time to her previous statements on this matter. Representations and inquiries had been received from a number of important 128

Policy and Program, 1957-1963 national organizations, some of them urging that more time be taken to complete the revision of the legislation. However, the presentation of any draft bill, she said, "depends on a great number of factors which I am not in a position to predict at the moment. Chief among these is the general timetable for the business of the House and the progress of the government's legislative program as a whole."22 Mrs. Fairclough also said that, while she did not like the Act, she had no intention of bringing before the House some half-baked instrument to take its place. Later in the debate, Mr. Pickersgill commented that he gathered from what the Minister had said that the revision of the Immigration Act was very far indeed from being in a final form for submission to the House.23 After Mrs. Fairclough had become Postmaster General, the new Minister, Richard Bell, asked the Deputy Minister for a report on "where we stand with the work of revising the Immigration Act." The following is the timetable of events recorded in this report:24 7957 and 1958 Statements made by the Conservative party interElection preted as meaning that the government intended a Campaigns complete revamping of the Immigration Act. 7959

The Department submitted a comprehensive policy memorandum to Cabinet, seeking guidance and approval concerning a basis for legislative revision. A cabinet committee on immigration was established to consider and report on the issues involved. The committee never completed its task and the memorandum was never dealt with.

1959-60

Detailed draft immigration bill prepared by a former legal officer working with other officers in the Department.

Fall, 1960

The Speech from the Throne promised a new Immigration Act, but nothing happened.

Winter, 1960-1961

The Minister, Deputy Minister, and a former senior official in the Department reviewed the first part of the draft bill. It was decided that it was too control oriented and not in tune with the times. The Department of External Affairs and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were asked for their comments. The RCMP proposed a long series of additional controls. External's comments were less rigid but not very helpful.

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Summer, 1961

A number of voluntary organizations were submitting comments and suggestions. There was little real demand for an early revision of the Act. The Canadian Welfare Council recommended that at least another two years be taken before a complete revision of the Act be attempted to give time for the preparation of detailed proposals. The Council offered some interim suggestions.

Midsummer, 1961

It was finally agreed that the Department would tackle the job in two stages: first the regulations and then the Act itself.25 Work was then discontinued on the Act. The revised regulations were produced between August 1961 and January 1962.

Mrs. Fairclough explained in the House that it would be necessary to allow some time for the new regulations to be tested before any further steps could be taken. But the Opposition continued to criticize the government for its failure to produce the promised new Immigration Act and for its bureaucratic decision-making. After the federal election of June 1962, the government made no further mention of a new Act. If these events are taken together with the comments on the Diefenbaker Cabinet made by Mrs. Fairclough and Mr. Bell in interviews whic are discussed later in this chapter, it seems legitimate to conclude that the Cabinet as a whole had very little to do with the major initiatives in policymaking which have just been described. If it acted at all, it was in a negative sense. The changes embodied in the new regulations had their real origin in the Department itself. The major intentions of the Department are made quite clear in the following extract from an internal memorandum from the Deputy Minister, Dr. Davidson, written on January 3, two weeks before the new regulations were tabled in the House: Our prime objective in the proposed revision is to eliminate all discrimination based on colour, race or creed. This means that, if we continue to allow Greeks, Poles, Italians, Portuguese and other Europeans to bring in the wide range of relatives presently admissible, we will have to do the same for Japanese, Chinese, Indians, Pakistanis, Africans, persons from the Arab world, the West Indies and so forth. The only possible result of this would be a substantially larger number of unskilled close relatives from these parts of the world to add to the influx of unskilled close relatives from Europe. 130

Policy and Program, 1957-1963 We can in short achieve our prime objective of eliminating all discrimination only in two ways: (1) By opening the doors to close relatives from the "coloured" parts of the world to the present level accorded to Europeans. This will greatly increase (probably double within a very few years) the influx of unskilled persons as close relatives: or (2) By a compromise, as proposed in the Draft Regulations, reducing to some extent the categories of European close relatives who can be admitted, regardless of skills, and then raising the "coloured" countries to a level of equality with the European. There is no mention here of section 31 (d), the one remaining discriminatory clause which appeared in the final version of the regulations. It seems evident that this was inserted at a very late stage as an extra precaution against a non-European influx of relatives. CHINESE IMMIGRATION: THE ILLEGAL MOVEMENT The large illegal movement of Chinese immigrants to Canada in the post-war period (and earlier) which arose to plague the Conservative and subsequent governments is a most fascinating problem with endless ramifications and, even today, no very clear solution has been found to it. During the period we are discussing, it is said that the Deputy Minister became totally absorbed in Chinese immigration. Every evening he would arrive home with an armful of Chinese case files. Late into the night he would unravel the mysteries of Chinese family relationships. In discussing this issue, it is important to bear the following considerations in mind: 1. The long record of exclusion and discrimination against the Chinese in North America; 2. The inevitable reaction of a highly inventive and ingenious people, some of whom were determined, or persuaded, to emigrate to this continent anyway;26 3. The early creation of an illegal immigration industry based in Hong Kong, specializing in the creation in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere of fictitious Chinese families, or fictitious "slots" in existing Chinese families, into which fictitious relatives could be fitted; 4. The striking success of this effort. The extensive commercial interests and financial rewards involved in it. The great difficulty of any return to legality at either end of the movement. In the mid-fifties, perhaps earlier, the American authorities in Hong Kong became aware of the existence of a major conspiracy to evade the 131

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immigration laws of the United States. It was discovered that an organized operation existed for the sale and purchase of false identities, enabling almost any Chinese to enter the United States, even if ineligible under the existing immigration laws. At that time, American citizenship could be purchased in Hong Kong for approximately $3,000 with $500 down and the balance after arrival in the United States. There was also a wellorganized system for the collection of American pensions by large numbers of people who were not entitled to them. Canada's Hong Kong visa office and Immigration Branch headquarters in Ottawa were also aware that misrepresentation on a very large scale existed in Chinese immigration. In the spring of 1959, the Director, Inspection Services, of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration visited Hong Kong at the request of Mrs. Fairclough and became convinced that large numbers of Chinese immigrants had been gaining admission to Canada illegally. On his return, he submitted reports to the Minister and to the RCMP, who initiated a major investigation into illegal Chinese immigration in Canada, resulting in the arrest of certain immigration agents involved hi this movement, the dismissal of several immigration officers against whom charges were laid, and the eventual development of the programs relating to Chinese immigrants which are described below. But in Hong Kong actual proof of illegal immigration activity was hard to get. A breakthrough occurred in August 1959, however, when the Superintendent of Canadian Immigration in Hong Kong cabled to say that the Hong Kong police, following a lead in one of the Canadian cases which had been referred to them for investigation, had raided establishments in the Colony and had arrested about thirty-five people and seized hundreds of letters and documents. The British authorities believed that they had uncovered information on a large, organized ring of immigratio agents in Hong Kong, New Zealand, Australia, the United States, Canada, and South America. Further investigation by the Hong Kong police and the RCMP confirmed the existence of a very large and well-established illegal immigration movement from Hong Kong to Canada. On June 9, 1960, Mrs. Fairclough outlined in the House of Commons the measures which the government proposed to take to deal with this problem. She first announced an "amnesty" to all Chinese who had entered Canada illegally before July 1, 1960, and said that it was not the intention of the government "to prosecute or deport from the country any Chinese presently in Canada who have not themselves engaged in assisting other Chinese, apart from their own relatives, to enter Canada illegally." This amnesty was later extended by the Liberal Minister, Rene Tremblay, by a "period of tolerance" which continued up to September 1, 1964. Mrs. Fairclough also announced the introduction of the Chinese 132

Policy and Program, 1957-1963 Adjustment Statement Program which was modelled on the American Truthful Statement Program for Chinese which had been introduced in 1956. The purpose of the Adjustment Statement Program and the additional measures which were taken were described in an official departmental report as follows: [The program] called upon Chinese who entered Canada illegally to come forward and make complete and honest statements pertaining to the circumstances under which they had entered Canada, together with truthful information concerning their family backgrounds. In return, these illegal immigrants would have their cases reviewed by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and might be permitted to remain in Canada if they were of good moral character and had not been systematically engaged in illegal immigration. Simultaneously a fullscale field investigation was to be mounted to demonstrate to the Chinese that the government was serious in its intentions and that the truth was the only alternative to prosecution and deportation. The Chinese Adjustment Statement Program is still in force. From June 1960 to July 1970, 11,569 Chinese had their status adjusted. Several attempts have been made to terminate the program because its continued usefulness seemed very doubtful, but strong representations from Members of Parliament, members of the Chinese community, and others secured a postponement. It is widely felt now, however, that the whole program has had limited value. The problems of investigation and enforcement were too difficult. Although many Chinese came forward in the spirit of the program and it was helpful to those who did so, the program itself did not get at the heart of the problem which was organized crime on a large scale, high profits, and very flexible operations. The firms and agents soon became familiar with the Adjustment Statement Program and coached their clients in it. Truthful statements in Canada frequently implicated relatives and others in Hong Kong, or led to the revelation of vast areas of earlier misrepresentation. The "paper families" had a tenacious strength of their own. In 1964, four years after the program started, the Minister, Mr. Tremblay, and senior officials from the Department visited Hong Kong and held discussions with the British and other officials. The following is an extract from their report: In Hong Kong we had conversations with the British, Americans, Australians and United Nations officials as well as with our own staff [and RCMP and Health advisers]. All immigration services in Hong Kong, 133

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including the British, described exactly the same problems as ours: extensive fraud, complete disregard for the truth or legal oaths, ready use of forgery, bribery or any other devices to gain the ends desired. All agreed that almost every migrant is lying about something, either because he or she is an imposter, is covering for someone else or is trying to create new "slots" for future use.27 On his return, Mr. Tremblay announced in the House of Commons on August 14 that the Chinese Adjustment Statement Program would be terminated. But following strong pressures and the large numbers of Chinese who came forward to make adjustment statements immediately after this announcement, it was decided to extend the program until further notice. Following the introduction of the new immigration regulations on August 16, 1967, the Deputy Minister recommended that the amnesty and period of tolerance and the Chinese Adjustment Statement Program be terminated. He gave these reasons: The Adjustment Statement Programme has now lasted over seven years and the Chinese who entered illegally before September 1st, 1964, have had ample opportunity to make adjustment statements.... If [the program] is continued beyond the introduction of the new Regulations, those who have already made adjustment statements will attempt to create new "slots" for relatives and those who have not made adjustment statements will have the opportunity of creating a larger "paper family" based on the broader admissible classes. In addition, this Programme and the special privileges it gives to the Chinese does not conform to the new policy of universality and non-discrimination. The end result of cancellation of the Adjustment Statement Programme as well as the "Amnesty" and "Period of Tolerance" will be that Chinese who entered Canada illegally will be treated as any other illegal entrants unless they have regularized their status under the programme.28 At the time of writing, however, no further action has been taken, and the Chinese Adjustment Statement Program continues to trickle on. But in the last two years only some 260 cases have been dealt with, and it may well be that the program will now peter out of its own accord. A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW As a background to policy-making during this period, one must remember the economic problems facing the Diefenbaker government, the 134

Policy and Program, 1957-1963 high rates of unemployment, and the low-key approach to immigration felt to be essential in the light of these circumstances. The dramatic slump in immigration intake during these years can be seen in Chart 4 on page 100 with its low point in 1961 when only 71,689 immigrants were admitted. From early 1960 onwards the Department's financial operations involved a series of damaging cutbacks, and promotional activity for the Overseas Service was ruled out. The following comments on the condition of this Service from a report prepared for the new Minister, Richard Bell, in January 1963 are revealing: With a restrictive policy in effect, immigration has of course been assigned a relatively low priority in governmental financial considerations. The full force of the austerity programme has been applied and is still in effect. In the overseas establishment we are particularly vulnerable. For some time past we have been in the process of converting the overseas organization into a career service staffed largely by Foreign Service Officers. When the freeze hit we were caught with only 104 out of 136 Canadian positions abroad occupied and the ceiling of 104 has applied since. The establishment of 136 was considered adequate to cover a total case load (including visa refusals, non-immigrant visas, etc.) of up to roughly 125,000 and would allow, at least in some measure, for necessary rotation and replacement. While the staff of 104 can properly process a case load of up to 110,000 (including refusals, etc.) which may produce a movement of 75-80,000 migrants, the whole staff of 104 should be on strength abroad at once and no provision can be made for necessary rotation or replacement. The freeze does not permit us to recruit from outside and while we are trying to fill some of the gaps from the Canadian service, it is unlikely we will get many successful applicants from this source and in any case this just transfers the 1 for 10 problem to the Canadian Service which is already hard hit. . . . To sum up, in most countries abroad, our overseas staff are now working to the limit to produce the current migrant flow. This was the point at which Mr. Bell decided, mainly on his own initiative, to get things moving again in immigration and to develop a deliberately expansionist policy. In interviews he described his first impressions when he became Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in August 1962.29 As already noted, he found the state of morale in the Department at this point very low indeed. There was a policy of "drift" and "lid on." Morale was low at home and overseas. The resources of the Department were very limited and officials felt that they had no political backing whatso-

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ever. He was particularly shocked" by the state of morale in the London office. Italian immigration was way ahead. British immigration was lagging and the Australians were doing very well. He decided that, even at that difficult point, immigration was good for Canada, and he went ahead on his own initiative to "take the lid off" and to begin an active recruitment program overseas. But he did not have time to do more than get it going before the Conservatives were defeated in 1963. Mr. Bell said that the Cabinet was definitely anti-immigration at this time because of heavy unemployment. He had frequent discussions with Michael Starr, Minister of Labour, on this point. There had been considerable pressure from the unions for a go-slow policy. It was in this climate of opinion that Ellen Fairclough had had to operate. She had asked for very little from the Cabinet and got even less. But he felt that she had got on very well with the Department and immigration officials had always liked her. During his short tenure of office, Mr. Bell said that he had been very impressed with the need for organizational change in this area: for creative development in planning and administration. Neither ministers nor officials in this Department had been sufficiently organization minded, in his view, and this was what the Department really needed, together with strong support from Cabinet. He felt that it was a very difficult ministry and former ministers shared his view. So often, as minister, one got bogged down in difficult cases and cases which were potentially politically dangerous, and it was very difficult to get clear of all this to consider the larger issues of policy and development. And then one had to be nice to the ethnic groups for obvious political reasons and they always met at the weekend. Very little help could be expected from the House of Commons. The House was indifferent to immigration, apart from a small group of M.P.s with immigrant ridings, most of whom had very narrow concerns, but exercised a disproportionate influence. Nor were the attitudes of the Departments of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce helpful or constructive at that time. Both Departments wanted to keep immigration very firmly in third place in relation to status, pay, and allowances and in general overseas operations. Mr. Bell said that he was appalled by the classification of immigration officers when he first saw it. In an interview in Toronto on September 7, 1967, Mrs. Fairclough, reflecting on her four years as Minister, said that during her tenure of office, Cabinet and senior officials in the public service regarded immigration as a necessary evil. They showed no enthusiasm for it. It was felt to be an exceedingly touchy, difficult area in which there were a great many awkward political pressures. It was never seen as a prestigious activity. Treasury Board was unwilling to spend money on it—very tight with 136

Policy and Program, 1957-1963 money in her day. The Department of External Affairs was not very helpful in relation to the development of the Overseas Service. It did not wish any other department overseas to challenge its position in any way, and therefore opposed development and improvements in status for the overseas operations and staff of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The Department of Labour wanted to control immigration: to decide who should be admitted and who should not and to relate admissions to the employment situation in Canada. The Department was aggressive and exercised a good deal of interference, and it made its views known very clearly. The Minister, Michael Starr, was very influential in this matter. He was not friendly to the Department at this period nor to Mrs. Fairclough herself, but was on very good terms with Mr. Diefenbaker. Mr. Diefenbaker himself was not interested in immigration, although he paid lip service to it with the ethnic groups. Immigration simply did not excite his imagination at all. He was not concerned with it and did not support her efforts. Mrs. Fairclough also said that the administrative structure of the Department was a great problem. Indian Affairs and Immigration should never have been lumped together. She always said that they should have been separated, but this would have cost money which no one was prepared to spend on the Department at that time. When she was Minister, she had Immigration, Citizenship, Indian Affairs, and four agencies; it was impossible to deal adequately with all of them. She had been very concerned about the Overseas Service and had felt that some of the visa offices were a disgrace. But this was the fault of Treasury Board who would not sanction money for improvements. She had visited the U.K. and Paris offices and would have liked to go further and inspect some of the other European offices, but could not get cabinet interest or approval for this. Mrs. Fairclough also had some interesting comments to make on the activities of voluntary agencies in immigration at this period. She said that the Department, as a result of its post-war experiences with these agencies, was suspicious and wary of them. She herself felt that voluntary agencies had a very useful contribution to make in the matter of briefs and making recommendations, but were less effective when it came to performance, the practical end of it. They also tended, she felt, to be swayed by sentiment. She had nothing but praise, however, for one agency, the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services ("very professional, very reliable"), with whom she had been involved as Minister in an unpublicized rescue operation of approximately 800 Romanian Jews. This short Conservative interregnum from 1957 to 1963 was undoubtedly a depressing period for ministers, officials, and all those involved hi 137

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immigration, since financial stringency left so little room for manoeuvre. The notable features which it did have, however, were, first, the introduction of the new, mainly non-discriminatory immigration regulations of 1962 which were a major step forward; and secondly, in the last eight months, "Bell's Resurrection." This did, without question, inject into the staff the will to get moving again on an active immigration program and to begin thinking about the major administrative changes which were a feature of the next period in immigration management. Turning to this period, from 1963 to the present, the climate changed in a very remarkable way. Economic conditions were improving, unemployment declining. The Liberals returned to power invigorated. Richard Bell's initiative in getting things moving again in immigration and raising the morale of the Department could be sustained and developed. And the Department itself began to take a more critical look at its own administrative structure and resources.

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Chapter Six Policy and Program, 1963—1971

As AN OUTCOME of the very high levels of unemployment in Canada from 1957 onwards, a Special Committee of the Senate on Manpower and Employment had been appointed in November 1960 "to study and report upon the trends in manpower requirements and utilization in Canada, with the object of exploring the possibilities of maintaining and extending a high level of employment." In its final report, presented in June 1961, the Committee noted that the Canadian economy had entered a different phase in its development, and that the many and far-reaching changes taking place in Canadian economic life were having a profound impact on her manpower resources. The Senate Committee was very concerned about the heavy incidence of unemployment among young people, the unskilled, and the inadequately educated. It noted that the opportunities for unskilled and semi-skilled workers were becoming more and more limited as time passed. In the light of this, it urged that a much larger proportion of Canada's resources be devoted to education and training of all kinds. And it also recommended that a thorough study of the adequacy of the National Employment Service, and of its organization and practices in the light of present-day conditions, be carried out at the earliest possible time.1 There is no doubt that this report reinforced the ideas of those who were preparing the new immigration regulations in the summer of 1961, in which the major emphasis in admission was on skill. The report, however, is significant for immigration in another sense. It marked a very important early stage in the development of thinking in Canada which eventually led to the creation of the Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966, the major event in this period in immigration management. Three years later, in its first annual review, the Economic Council of

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Canada reported that effective labour market policies must be developed to promote more efficient use of Canada's manpower resources. The main agency, according to the Council, for implementing and coordinating labour market policy should be the National Employment Service (NES). If it was accepted that labour market policy should be an integral part of general fiscal, monetary, and other policies for the purpose of promoting national economic objectives, then it followed that the Employment Service must have a key economic role. It could no longer be regarded as simply an agency for registering unemployed applicants and taking orders from employers with unfilled vacancies, important as these services were. "A new concept of the role of an employment service," the Council said, "has developed in many of the advanced industrial nations. This concept suggests that the employment service must have the means to promote the occupational, industrial, and geographical mobility of the labour force to meet the requirements of a changing industrial economy."2 Like the Senate Committee on Manpower and Employment, the Economic Council also noted that the Canadian economy seemed to have entered a new phase: "More recently, since 1961, the economy appears to have entered a third phase in which a degree of reduction in unemployment has been achieved, productivity gains have been improved, balance of payments strains have been eased, and reasonable price and cost stability has been largely maintained."3 Later, in its fourth annual review, the Council reported that although a more moderate rate of expansion had emerged, "As of June 1967, the Canadian economy had been expanding without a significant reversal since the business cycle trough in March 1961. The expansion had thus lasted 75 months. This represents probably the longest uninterrupted expansion —and certainly the longest peacetime expansion—in Canadian business cycle history."4 While observing this great change in the Canadian economic climate after 1961, we should also note the remarkable burst of self-study and analysis in public policy and administration which occurred at much the same time, generating five major investigations by royal commissions. The most important of these for immigration was the Royal Commission on Government Organization, the Glassco Commission. The recommendations of this Commission, which have led to very significant developments in the management of the public service since 1963, removed some major obstacles from the efficient management of immigration in Canada. The period we are considering now, therefore, is one of continuous change, development, and expansion. Immigration figures reflect this, rising steeply from 1963 to 1967. We will now examine the major developments which occurred in the eight years from 1963 to 1971. 140

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 REORGANIZATION: THE TREMBLAY REVIEW Rene Tremblay was the second in the procession of Liberal Ministers of Citizenship and Immigration, and Manpower and Immigration, who followed Richard Bell after the Conservative defeat in April 1963. They included Guy Favreau for ten months from April 1963 to February 1964; Rene Tremblay for one year; John Nicholson for ten months from February to December 1965; Jean Marchand for two and half years; Allan MacEachen for just over two years; and Otto Lang for fourteen months. The present Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Bryce Mackasey, took office on January 28,1972. There have been six Deputy Ministers during this period. At the beginning of February 1963, George Davidson resigned as Deputy Minister to become Director and Deputy Head of the Bureau of Government Organization, a new body appointed "to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Government Organization."5 Dr. Davidson was replaced first by H. M. Jones as Acting Deputy Minister from February to November 1963, and then by Claude Isbister who was Deputy Minister for just over two years until the end of December 1965, shortly before the demise of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. On January 1, 1966, Tom Kent became Deputy Minister, first of the old Department during the transition period of the next few months and then of the new Department of Manpower and Immigration. He was succeeded by Louis Couillard on July 16, 1968. The present Deputy Minister, Jacques DesRoches, joined the Department on April 7, 1972. On August 14, 1964, after six months in office, Rene Tremblay made his first major speech in the House as Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.6 It was a remarkable speech. The Minister, in effect, announced the beginning of a badly needed new deal in immigration with a major emphasis on administrative improvements and with sanction from Treasury Board to go ahead. It is worth examining these plans in detail. Some were new. Some had been on the drawing board for some time, but no money was available to implement them, and no support or interest could be mustered on their behalf. Some were not implemented until after the creation of the Department of Manpower and Immigration two years later. There had in fact been a small but continuous stream of "development thinking" in this Department since the early fifties, but much of it made no impact because of the lack of political interest and concern, and the obstacles to development within the public service itself. But some of these useful ideas were picked up and used much later when the political and administrative climate changed. 141

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The major features of the Department's new plans for reorganization as announced by the Minister were as follows: 1. An interdepartmental committee of senior officials had been established to assess Canada's needs and absorptive capacity in immigration. This committee, which would serve in an advisory capacity, "should help the government in its objective of developing fairly long term programs not subject to the turning on and off of the immigration tap which has had such objectionable results in the past." 2. Major changes would be made at immigration headquarters in Ottawa and overseas. Proposals for the Canadian offices would follow in due course. The purpose of these changes was to implement a more positive and productive immigration program. Steps would be taken to decentralize some of the important work now done in Ottawa in order to improve the speed of service. It was hoped that these changes in organization would make a marked improvement in the morale of immigration staff. 3. The new organization at headquarters would reflect the whole flow of immigration from the planning process to the successful establishment of immigrants in Canada. There would be five principal divisions: Policy and Planning, Overseas Service, Canadian Service, Special Services, and Support Services. 4. There were major changes in plans for the Overseas Service. These included (a) a new regional office in continental Europe "to supervise immigration programs in the sixteen countries where we maintain offices"; (b) a new immigration staff unit to look after immigration from the Western Hemisphere, Asia, and the Pacific. Increased support and attention would be given to immigration from these sources; (c) a greatly increased promotional campaign abroad. Additional funds for this purpose were contained in the estimates; (d) a new establishment structure for immigration personnel abroad as a first step in plans to ensure better classifications. A career foreign service must be developed with "opportunities as fully rewarding as any comparable posts in the public service"; (e) improved immigration offices and facilities to create a better image for Canada overseas, better working conditions, and to enable Canada to compete more effectively in immigration with other countries. In all, some thirty proposals were made in this speech for changes or new initiatives of some kind. Mr. Tremblay also reported on his visit to Hong Kong and said that this was the first of a number of inspection visits which he hoped to make to learn the facts, at first hand, on which new immigration policies and programs could be based. Early in September he intended to leave for a visit to the European offices. He had chosen Hong Kong for his first visit because he was deeply concerned about the 142

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 complex problems involved in Chinese immigration and had received many complaints that the Hong Kong office was inefficient and discriminatory. His principal comments on this issue were as follows: There is evidence that many Chinese immigrants to Canada are in this country illegally. During my stay in Hong Kong I personally discussed the problem of illegal immigration with the immigration officials of other countries. All these countries experience the same problems that Canada does. They agree that there exists a well organized and highly efficient illegal Chinese immigration system involving forged documents and photographs, schools that coach immigrants in false identities, persistent use of false declarations and other abuses. Some Canadians are relatively unconcerned about illegal Chinese immigration. They feel that past discrimination has forced the Chinese to use illegal means to get their dependents into Canada. Our investigations have satisfied us that frequently relatives and friends, no doubt largely influenced by ties of blood and sympathy, have been parties to such illegal entries . . . I am also satisfied that, contrary to popular belief, a large number of these illegal Chinese immigrants are not close relatives of Canadian residents. They were brought here solely for the profit of illegal immigration agents. This is a serious and disturbing situation.7 Mr. Tremblay said that he was satisfied that the staffs of the Canadian visa and medical offices in Hong Kong and the local Chinese staff were honest and extremely hard-working public servants, who had been doing a good job in the face of very difficult circumstances. He was satisfied that, on the whole, the present admissible classes were adequate to permit a healthy Chinese immigration movement and the reunion of families, but he added one further minor group—male fiances as well as female fiancees. He announced that, although there was a severe shortage of office space in Hong Kong, the government was trying to reserve space in a new building which was being erected and these larger and better quarters should improve the speed of operations. He then announced that, hi view of the fact that the Chinese Adjustment Statement Program had had only limited success even though it had been in operation for four years, far longer than had been expected, and since everyone had had ample time to put his affairs in order, this program would be terminated as of September 1, 1964. On the question of the Immigration Act, Mr. Tremblay said that isolated amendments, which had been proposed by some members of the House, were not, in his view, appropriate. He proposed to initiate detailed studies over the whole field, after which he would introduce a revised Act 143

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for the consideration of Parliament as soon as possible. He also made an important statement relating to the government's overseas operations which passed unnoticed. It is very interesting in the light of Quebec's later initiatives in immigration and in light of the increasing climate of negotiation in international migration: "Let me say that in our efforts to promote immigration abroad, this government will welcome the participation of the provincial governments wherever they feel they can be of help. In addition, it is the intention of the government to discuss immigration matters with certain foreign governments in the hope we can achieve a better understanding of our operations and ambitions in the immigration field."8 The administrative reorganization and developments announced in this speech were warmly welcomed in the debate which followed. Speaking for the New Democratic party, Andrew Brewin (Greenwood, Toronto) welcomed this new positive approach and wished the Minister luck in carrying it out, because it was certainly a move in the right direction. Similar comments were made by other speakers. But Mr. Brewin also expressed disappointment in that no action had been taken to remove the discriminatory section 31(d) from the regulations, and pointed out that there was no need for detailed studies of the Immigration Act since the needs were clear and revision of the Act should be an "Al" priority for the Department. Speaking for the Progressive Conservative party, Gordon Fairweather (Fundy-Royal, New Brunswick) said, "Why wait for the Act? If we did our job properly in this place, we would have two or three amendments to the Act a year, provided they were sensible ones." Both he and Mr. Brewin urged the setting up of a parliamentary committee on immigration. Mr. Brewin said, "Why do we not have a committee of this house charged with the responsibility of reviewing these matters? I think this parliament should be used. I think there are plenty of people in parliament with experience in these matters who could contribute, not only by making complaints about some of the things which are wrong but, and this is far more important, by helping toward the development of the positive approach of which the Minister speaks."9 There was no evident support for Mr. Tremblay's decision to terminate the Chinese Adjustment Statement Program. Gordon Fairweather, Ian Wahn, Liberal Member for St. Paul's, Toronto, and K. H. More, Conservative Member for Regina, who had all shown great concern for their Chinese constituents, drew attention to a real problem in doing this. They felt that it had taken a long time to build up confidence in this program among the many Chinese who genuinely wished to take advantage of it and to re-establish their families on a legal basis. But this confidence did exist now. The Chinese communities in Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa, and Hamilton had presented a brief to Mr. Favreau urging that the adjustment 144

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 and amnesty programs be continued. In view of this confidence and of the value of the program, these members felt that it would be quite wrong to cut it off now. The cut-off date should be postponed. Apart from these issues, however, the real significance of Mr. Tremblay's speech lay, first, in its new emphasis on the essential administrative requirements, in Canada and overseas, of an effective immigration program; and, secondly, in the fact that it marked a very important moment of change—the beginning of a post-Glassco transformation in immigration management. A new economic climate, major changes in the public service, Treasury Board support for development, a new Deputy Minister with a major concern for administration—all these factors contributed to the development from this point on of a more positive immigration program. The transformation did not occur overnight. Indeed, before it could really come to fruition, it was overtaken by other events. THE SEDGWICK REPORT PART I

On June 19,1964, Guy Favreau, then Minister of Justice, asked an eminent Toronto lawyer, Joseph Sedgwick, to inquire into allegations that had been made in the House of Commons and elsewhere "that certain aliens have been unlawfully detained and deprived of access to counsel." In addition, the Minister asked Mr. Sedgwick to inquire into "the general procedure now being followed in relation to the arrest, deportation and prosecution of persons who enter Canada or remain there illegally" and to assess the reasonableness and correctness of these procedures and to recommend any changes he might think necessary. Mr. Sedgwick investigated the twenty-three cases in which allegations had been made. All but three involved Greek seamen who had deserted ship and attempted to remain in Canada (one of these was flown to Canada to join his ship, but never reported for duty). One case involved a Spanish seaman. The other two were the celebrated cases of Harry Hooper and Harold Nurse.10 Eleven of the Greek seamen had married Greek girls in Toronto. In his findings Mr. Sedgwick upheld the actions of the Immigration Branch in almost all respects. He found that these individuals were subject to deportation; that the proceedings leading to the making of the orders of deportation were above reproach; that the persons concerned were informed of their rights to counsel (except in one case where he felt that the information was inadequate); and that they were given full opportunity to put their side of the case. According to Mr. Sedgwick's first report, during the twenty-four month period from January 1,1963, to December 31,1964,1,264 aliens deserted 145

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their ships in Canadian ports. Of these, 804 were Greek citizens.11 In view of the large numbers involved, a decision was taken in Ottawa in February 1964 to step up the enforcement and prosecution of violations of section 50 of the Immigration Act by deserting seamen. Prior to this, enforcement had been lax. Mr. Sedgwick upheld this decision to enforce the law. "It will be seen from these figures," he said, "that the problem of deserting seamen is not an occasional one, but has developed into a wholesale and, I believe, deliberately planned method of circumventing Canada's immigration laws. That under these circumstances those responsible for the administration of those laws should be seeking out and deporting such persons and should not properly be the subject of criticism. Indeed if they turned a blind eye to this traffic they would be derelict in their duty."12 Without elaborating on the matter, Mr. Sedgwick was very critical of the way in which some segments of the press had presented the "facts" in these cases to the public. He found that "many of the attacks which have been made in this affair have been ill-founded or exaggerated."13 He was also critical of those who professed admiration for the deserting seamen. One of the anomalies that struck me, having regard to the facts, is that in some quarters at least, these deserting seamen are praised for their violation of the law. I cite the following example. On June 22nd a Member of Parliament said in the House of Commons: "I like the type of man who will try to get into this country illegally. I think he has a great future here. It shows a great amount of zeal and daring, qualities which the Liberal Government professed to have a year ago but which seem to have been forgotten." I, for one, do not share this admiration and I find it incongruous that a Member of the House of Commons should encourage the flouting of laws enacted by Parliament. The law breaker is idolized while, on the other hand, those charged with enforcing the law are often subject to unfair and generally groundless criticism.14 While Mr. Sedgwick was conducting his first inquiry, a paper was being prepared in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration which dealt primarily with the deportation process including arrest, detention, inquiries, decisions, and jurisdiction of the courts. It was one of a series of studies for internal use, which was intended to provide the groundwork for the preparation of a white paper on immigration policy which would be issued shortly. It is very interesting to compare the conclusions of this paper with Mr. Sedgwick's comments. The following is an extract from the paper on the question of detention: Much of the criticism of the Department in this area is unfair. The critics 146

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 often fail to distinguish between persons who are detained under the authority of the Immigration Act and persons who have been convicted by the courts of immigration offences and are serving terms of imprisonment. Furthermore the individuals themselves often prolong their detention by appeals to the courts which necessarily delay immigration proceedings. For example, in the celebrated case of Harold Nurse, a very lengthy detention arose mainly because of efforts by this man and his counsel to have the courts quash the deportation order against him. While much of this criticism is unfair, it is felt that so long as the Immigration Act provides such broad and uncontrolled power to detain individuals, the legal profession, the public and the press will tend to be very critical of anything which appears to be an excessive and improper use of this power. Although current immigration policy and procedures have established safeguards against abuses, the public will not be satisfied that these safeguards are genuine unless they are reflected in the legislation itself. The paper went on to recommend specific changes which should be made in the Act with respect to detention. But this was the heart of the matter: to a considerable extent, public attitudes in this area had been created by the Immigration Act itself. It is worth noting that, despite tougher law enforcement, Greek and other seamen have continued to jump ship, to remain in Canada by stealth, and to marry compliant landed immigrants at Toronto City Hall. During the fiscal year 1966, a total of 1,100 desertions were recorded from ships in Canadian waters and 715 seamen were ordered deported. Nevertheless from then onwards the control program appears to have had more effect. In any case, the number of deportations of seamen has declined significantly. In 1967, 442 seamen were ordered deported and 424 were actually deported. In 1968, the numbers were 344 and 309; in 1969, 276 and 267; and in 1970, 299 and 341. Since 1967, a new Immigration Appeal Board, established under the Immigration Appeal Board Act of that year, has had authority to hear appeals against any deportation order. The lower deportation figures for seamen since that date may be due to a more lenient attitude on its part towards the problem of ship-jumping. PART II

While engaged on this investigation, Mr. Sedgwick received a letter from Prime Minister Pearson enlarging the terms of reference "to include consideration of and the making of recommendations respecting the exercise of ministerial discretion under the Immigration Act."15 The second part of his report contains his recommendations on this question, on deportation,

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and on certain other matters. His recommendations actually amount to a prescription for the revision of the Immigration Act. Mr. Sedgwick did consider presenting a draft Act with his report but decided against it. The method of research employed was consultation. "During my research for the purposes of this report," Mr. Sedgwick said, "I consulted a great many persons who have a special knowledge in the field of immigration. These included the present Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Members of Parliament, Members of the Bar, senior officials of various Government Departments. Out of these consultations came many recommendations and suggestions." It is not proposed here to examine the second part of Mr. Sedgwick's report in detail, but the following are his most important recommendations: 1. The provisions of the Act relating to the deportation of landed immigrants who become public charges or are likely to become public charges should be reviewed. 2. The provisions of the Act relating to the deportation of persons on grounds of mental health should be reviewed. 3. There should be a new class of deportable persons, namely, "persons in Canada who counsel, aid and abet others to remain in the country illegally." 4. The Immigration Appeal Board should be vested with final authority subject to a right of appeal to the courts and should be truly independent. 5. The Board should have unfettered authority in relation to the deportation of permanent residents. 6. In relation to persons seeking admission to Canada or who entered Canada as non-residents or who gained entry surreptitiously, the Board should have the authority to quash a deportation order and authorize the granting of the status of permanent resident in exceptional cases only. Security screening should be required in these cases. 7. Section 39 of the Immigration Act should be struck out16 and express provision made for an appeal from the Immigration Appeal Board to the Exchequer Court of Canada on questions of law with a further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, with leave of that Court. 8. The practice of issuing special orders-in-council to exempt certain persons from compliance with the immigration regulations should be discontinued. The practice of issuing Minister's permits allowing any person to enter and remain in Canada for specified periods not exceeding twelve months should remain (except for persons under order of deportation). 9. A system of alien registration should be introduced for persons coming to Canada for permanent residence or for periods of extended duration. Fingerprints should be taken to facilitate the detection of criminals 148

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 and imposters. Fingerprint records would be destroyed on the acquisition of citizenship. Mr. Sedgwick went rather far on the sponsorship question, still a very sensitive issue. He was clearly impressed with what he had heard about its problems and disadvantages. He was also concerned with the fact that sponsors had no recourse to the courts. He therefore recommended that provision be made for such appeals, but only if sponsorship was limited in all cases to the basic family unit: spouses and the dependent minor children of Canadian citizens or persons admitted to Canada for permanent residence. Other alien relatives should be left to gain admission on then: own merits. Recognition of the right of appeal meant recognition of a right in the sponsor. There could be no recognition of a right in the sponsor to bring any relatives to Canada beyond the immediate family. The report ended with a firm opinion on the fundamentals of immigration policy, emphasizing a basic tenet of the 1947 Mackenzie King statement, namely, that admission to Canada is a privilege, not a right: I think the Act should state clearly that admission to Canada, either as an immigrant or non-immigrant, is a privilege and is not to be construed as a right. Flowing from that, it should be made clear that the mere physical presence of a person in Canada gives him no special privilege; he is, or should be, in the same position as if he had applied in his country of residence for a landing in Canada as an immigrant. . . . The test should not be merely the desire of a person to enter Canada as an immigrant, but rather the usefulness of such a person to the Canadian economy, his ability and willingness to work, earn and learn, and the probability (or at least the hope) that the immigrant and his descendants will become in time full Canadians.17 The Sedgwick report of 1965-66 did not produce many new thoughts, but it did produce some authoritative opinions which helped to establish certain clear priorities. It was most valuable in its firm prescriptions on ministerial discretion and the Immigration Appeal Board. Some of its main recommendations are now on the Statute Book or in the regulations, or have become accepted practice. The major problem of ministerial discretion has been handled in the way that Mr. Sedgwick and others have prescribed, through the Immigration Appeal Board Act of 1967, which has already been referred to and which will be discussed later in this chapter. For some time now, no immigrant has been deported because he has become, or is likely to become, a public charge, and mental illness is rarely used as a ground for deportation. But there is no system of alien registration, no procedure for the fingerprinting of aliens, no limitation of the sponsored movement on the lines prescribed in this report.18 149

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Provision has been made in the immigration regulations for visitors to apply in Canada for permanent residence, as recommended by Mr. Sedgwick. But unexpected and serious difficulties have arisen here related to the appeal rights given to these applicants under the Immigration Appeal Board Act and the way in which these rights are being used. In July 1970 Mr. Sedgwick was called in again to give his views on this particular issue. The issue itself and his recommendations will be discussed later in this chapter. BIRTH OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION In his speech in the House on August 14, 1964, the Minister, Rene Tremblay, had said, in relation to a new Immigration Act, that he proposed to initiate "detailed studies over the whole field," after which a revised Act would be presented for the consideration of Parliament. These studies were in fact initiated and they were carried out by the new Policy and Planning Division of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. They consisted of the series of papers, already referred to, on various aspects of immigration policy and management which was to provide the foundation, so it was decided, first for a white paper on immigration policy and then for the new Act itself.19 On December 31, 1964, the Prime Minister rashly announced in the House that a white paper on immigration policies, practices, and administration would be prepared for presentation to Parliament in 1965. According to the 1965 annual report (for the fiscal year ended March 31), the white paper would provide "a statement on the government's views on immigration policies and procedures of a broad and major character in relation to national problems and national interests."20 The report added optimistically that discussion of the forthcoming white paper and of Mr. Sedgwick's report, both in Parliament and by the public, was expected to give rise to a consensus on the nature of the changes required in immigration policy, procedures, and legislation. In fact, the white paper did not appear until October 1966, by which time Parliament, at least, had become quite restive on the issue. Within the Department in 1965, there was a general atmosphere of expansion and development. The new reorganization into five directorates including a separate directorate for the Overseas Service was completed. In addition to the arrival of Mr. Claude Isbister as Deputy Minister in November 1963, two other senior officials had been recruited to strengthen the small senior management team. It was this team which had prepared the thirty-odd proposals contained hi Mr. Tremblay's speech. Money for development was now available. Much more effort was put into promotion activities in the main service countries and in expanding selection and 150

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 examination facilities in the countries where there were no visa offices. Public relations staff were hired for Ottawa and the major overseas offices. Plans were made and staff recruited for a new regional office in Geneva. For the first time, a special film, Splendid Domain, was commissioned and produced for the purpose of promoting immigration overseas, together with a second film to attract private business to Canada. Direct newspaper advertising was greatly accelerated in Britain and introduced for the first time in the Netherlands. In 1964 a second attempt had been made to develop a career foreign service in immigration with the creation of a Canadian Immigration Affairs Officer series with distinctly higher classifications.21 The process of recruitment, training, and posting in this new series was now under way. The effect of all these measures can be seen in the rising admission figures: 93,151 in 1963; 112,606 in 1964; and 146,758 in 1965. In the midst of all this, without, it is said, any warning whatsoever to department officials below the rank of deputy minister, came the Prime Minister's announcement on December 17, 1965, that a new Department of Manpower would be created whose responsibilities would include immigration. At the same time, he announced that the new Minister of Citizenship and Immigration who would ultimately take charge of the new Department would be Jean Marchand, replacing John Nicholson who had held this portfolio for one year only, following a one-year tenure of office by Rene Tremblay. The plans announced by the Prime Minister were part of a larger reorganization involving a number of new departments. On December 18, the Toronto Globe and Mail reported: The new Manpower Department will be responsible for immigration— an important source of skilled labour—and will take over placement and employment services, technical and vocational training and civilian rehabilitation from the existing Department of Labour. This will make the new Department one of the key economic ministries. Legislation will be needed to establish the Department, but the practical reorganization will not wait for that. Sections of the Labour Department will be transferred by Administrative Order to the existing Department of Citizenship and Immigration effective January 1st. In turn, all the responsibilities of Citizenship and Immigration, except Immigration, will be transferred to other departments. This will create a new Manpower Department.22 The Deputy Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was aware of and involved in this impending administrative reorganization. But the rest of the staff were not. Although some of the final adminis-

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trative details were to be worked out during the following months, it appears that there was no prior consultation with senior officials in the Department as to the consequences of this move for immigration; nor as to the best way to accommodate immigration within the proposed new Department; nor on the effect on immigration of separating at least some of the responsibility for immigrant integration from the general responsibilities of immigration management (by transferring the remaining responsibilities of the Department elsewhere, in fact, to the Department of the Secretary of State). It seems evident that this decision was taken privately by the Prime Minister and his most senior and close advisers including Gordon Robertson, now Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet, Tom Kent, then Policy Secretary to the Prime Minister, and members of the Privy Council Office staff. The views of Dr. J. J. Deutsch, Chairman of the Economic Council of Canada, who had strongly urged the development of an effective national employment service which would have a key role in implementing labour market policies, were an important factor. Parliament was not in session. A federal election had taken place on November 8. The news of December 17 was, by all accounts, a severe shock to the Immigration Branch. It was initially interpreted by many immigration officers as a successful take-over by the Department of Labour.23 And it was indeed a take-over, but not by the Department of Labour which was itself cut in half by the proposed reorganization, although some former members of the Department of Labour (particularly the economists) were to have a strong voice in the new Department. It was a take-over, essentially, by the new technology of Canadian government; by forces which had been gathering strength since the reports of the Senate Committee on Manpower and Employment, the Glassco Commission, and the annual reviews of the Economic Council of Canada had appeared one after another; and by the specialist advisers who were urgently aware of new priorities. It was a product of Canada's new economic environment and her new tentative approaches to planning. In the high-level enthusiasm for this, however, immigration, as an important area of public policy, received rather short shrift. It fell victim, in fact, to a grander design. On January 1, 1966, Tom Kent took over as Deputy Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration which would shortly be dismantled and replaced by the new Department. The Indian Affairs Branch was moved to the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources. Vital sections of the Department of Labour, relating mainly to manpower, were transferred to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration.24 For temporary purposes, the Department was divided into three directorates: Immigration, Citizenship and Citizenship Registration, and Manpower, 152

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 and during the early months of 1966, shape was given to a new Department of Manpower which would include three divisions: Manpower, Immigration, and Program Development. A major recruitment and training program was started. On October 1, 1966, Citizenship and Citizenship Registration became part of the responsibilities of the Department of the Secretary of State. On October 3, the new Department, named Manpower and Immigration, opened its doors to the public, and the old National Employment Service offices became Canada Manpower Centres. It is important to see exactly what this reorganization did to immigration management. Its various consequences will be discussed fully in the final chapters, but here we will note what actually happened at the time. The Overseas Service of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, which was to become the Foreign Branch of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, was left undisturbed, and the developments which were already under way went ahead as planned. On April 1, for example, a new regional office was opened in Geneva and the development of the new Canadian Immigration Affairs Officer (CIAO) series proceeded as before. But the responsibilities of the Canadian Service, or the Home Branch as it was to be called, were drastically curtailed. All responsibility for the settlement and placement of immigrants (apart from some immediate assistance on or just after arrival) was removed and given to the Manpower Division. An official manpower theory was established as a working tool to the effect that all Canadian citizens and residents would be provided with employment services of a greatly improved but equal nature. Thus it would make no difference (this was the situation initially) whether a man arrived at a Toronto Canada Manpower Centre from Rome, Halifax, or Sudbury—he would have the same treatment. This theory ignores entirely the long experience of immigration officials and voluntary agencies which indicates quite clearly that, for a while at least, the immigrant is always a special case requiring, not better service, but a rather different kind of service. In fact, this theory has now had to be modified somewhat in the light of this undeniable fact. In effect, the responsibilities of the Immigration Division are now confined to admission, in Canada and overseas, initial reception, and enforcement. These responsibilities are officially described as follows: The Canada Immigration Division is responsible for the administration of the Immigration Act, the Immigration Regulations and the Assisted Passage Loan Regulations, and the implementation of government policy respecting immigration movements. It is also directly affected by the Immigration Appeal Board Act and orders and rules made thereunder. The Division encourages and assists the movement to Canada

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of immigrants who will be able to establish themselves economically and socially with little difficulty for themselves or the Canadian community. It also prevents the admission or arranges the departure of people, whether immigrants or visitors, whose presence in Canada is or would be contrary to national interests.25 As the reorganization proceeded, immigration officials in settlement and placement were given the opportunity of moving into the new manpower positions which carried rather higher classifications. Some moved; some did not. Throughout the summer and fall of 1966, five major regional manpower offices were created for the following regions: the Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairie Provinces and the Northwest Territories, and the Pacific (British Columbia and the Yukon). Initially, each region had a Director of Manpower and a Director of Immigration, the latter with a lower classification. In April 1968, however, as a result of an integration policy which may be extended throughout the Department's operations, each Regional Director of Manpower became Regional Director of Manpower and Immigration (the title is now Director General) with two operational directors under him, a Director of Manpower Operations and a Director of Immigation Operations. The division of responsibilities between the Manpower and Immigration Divisions and the Citizenship Branch took some time to work out, and may still prove to be a temporary arrangement since the whole area of citizenship in program, administration, and law has been under review. Discussions on this subject took place in the Department in the early summer of 1966. At this point, it was tentatively agreed that the Citizenship Branch would withdraw from involvement in immigrant integration. This subject had definitely become one of the lesser interests of the Branch, and senior branch officials readily admitted at this time that they would be glad to be rid of it. It was tentatively agreed that Manpower and Immigration would "provide all specialized direct services to immigrants, assuming responsibility for language training and for the liaison and co-ordination functions with voluntary agencies providing direct services to immigrants. The Citizenship Branch would continue and intensify its role in social and community development, assisting the Department in dealing with problems relating to community acceptance of immigrants but having no specialized immigration interest."26 At some point during the late summer and fall of 1966, this sensible solution was abandoned. In an exchange of correspondence between the Deputy Minister of the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the Under-Secretary of State in December 1966 and January 1967, the Deputy Minister of Manpower and Immigration proposed that his De154

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 partment should have a primary concern for the individual immigrant worker—providing him with reception, family and employment counselling to assist in his early establishment in the community; paying for the costs of language training for adult immigrants in the labour force, where it was established that the immigrant must have a knowledge of English or French to get a job; and working with voluntary agencies to the extent that they supplemented these primary services. The Department of the Secretary of State, on the other hand, would be more concerned with the social, political, and cultural integration of immigrants. The Citizenship Branch would continue to work with the provinces and voluntary organizations in the provision of classes for immigrants in language training and citizenship. There would in fact be two language-training programs, one oriented to employability and the other to the integration process generally. The Under-Secretary of State accepted this division of responsibility as outlined by the Deputy Minister, but he made it clear that his Department might not be able to provide adequate services in its field of responsibility for perhaps a year thereafter. He also pointed out that, prior to the announcement in December 1965 of the reorganization of government departments, the transfer to the Immigration Branch of the responsibilities of the Citizenship Branch for the social integration of immigrants was being actively considered and might have been completed if the reorganization had not taken place. A senior officer of the Citizenship Branch was in fact seconded to the Canadian Service of the Immigration Branch early in 1966 "to advise the Canadian Service on the requirements for a programme of immigrant integration and help plan the transfer of services, region by region, during the course of 1966." The senior liaison officer for the Toronto area was given this assignment and began to work on it in Ottawa. But those plans were first suspended and then cancelled as the Department of Manpower and Immigration took shape, and the decision was finally taken to leave immigrant integration with the Citizenship Branch.27 And that is where the matter rested. From 1966 until 1971, the major responsibility for the social, political, and cultural integration of immigrants, over the long term, ostensibly lay with the small Ethnic Participation Division of the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State and was one of several important responsibilities of the Department's field officers. The work of the Ethnic Participation Division represented one of five major program areas of the still small Citizenship Branch. Another program area—Citizenship Development—was also relevant for immigrants, but the budgets and number of staff available for both these programs were quite inadequate for the purpose. And for the next 155

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five years little was done, outside the field of language training, a small grants program for voluntary agencies, and the personal efforts of field officers (with very limited resources), to promote the social, political, and cultural integration of immigrants.28 The 1966 agreement marked out a rough frontier between the activities of the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the Department of the Secretary of State in relation to immigrants in Canada, and it permitted the former to concentrate its efforts on immigrants who were members of the labour force. But it never had and never acquired the status of a formal agreement or one which provided the basis for continuing interdepartmental communication and cooperation. Since that date, there has been no joint development or collaboration in immigration between these two departments, no consultation on the vital questions of provincial involvement, language training, research, the funding of voluntary agencies, or cooperation with the voluntary sector. This division of responsibility for immigrants has, in fact, led to a federal twilight zone in the planning and development of services for immigrants to facilitate their adjustment to Canadian life, since neither department felt totally responsible for immigrants in Canada, and neither initiated a process of coordination and joint development in immigrant programs. THE DEBATE ON THE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION BILL On May 9, 1966, in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister introduced a Government Organization Bill, providing for the establishment of a number of new government departments including a Department of Manpower, a Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and three other departments, and establishing the office of President of the Treasury Board, a recommendation of the Glassco Commission. He described this as the most extensive change in the administrative organization of government which had ever been made in peacetime. Among these new departments, he referred first to the proposed Department of Manpower and quoted the opinion of the Economic Council that a proper administrative structure was essential to coordinate labour market programs, and that whether an active manpower policy was successful hinged critically on effective administration. The Prime Minister added: The Government has also decided that it would be a wise course to place immigration under the same minister as the minister dealing with manpower generally. Immigration policy obviously must be administered in the interests of the country and of the immigrants themselves in a context that takes into account the entire position of employment, 156

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 training and placement in Canada. The association of the various aspects of manpower policies under the same minister should make it easier to implement programs and to implement them more effectively.29 Speaking for the Progressive Conservative party, Mr. Diefenbaker denigrated this whole effort in government reorganization and suggested that the new ministries had been created to provide impressive portfolios for the new cabinet ministers from Quebec. Speaking for the New Democrats, Mr. Douglas was much more friendly and warmly welcomed the combination of manpower and immigration, this being at least one move towards the overall economic planning which the NDP had long advocated. He thought it was an excellent combination and was very glad that the government had carried out the recommendation of the Economic Council in this matter. He also congratulated the Prime Minister for his choice of Minister and Deputy Minister for the new Department. Robert Thompson for the Social Credit party also welcomed the combination of manpower and immigration, while mildly regretting the emasculation of the Department of Labour. The major critic in this debate was Richard Bell. Using his experience as a former minister, he made a vigorous attack on the government for its proposals in the field of manpower, immigration, and citizenship. He made the following points: 1. Citizenship and Citizenship Registration should not be divorced from immigration. The Citizenship Branch must have more attention, more money, more staff, more parliamentary support. In the Department of the Secretary of State it would be "just another orphan, unwanted, unattended and unheard." 2. Submerging immigration in what was basically a labour portfolio was a grave error of national policy. The branches of the Department of Labour which were to be integrated with immigration had persistently sought to reduce immigration and cut it back. 3. Countries which had a separate immigration portfolio were much further ahead, in relation to immigration policy, than those which combined immigration with labour. Immigration was subdued wherever there was a marriage of immigration and labour. Mr. Bell then moved to strike out the clause in the Government Organization Bill setting up a Department of Manpower and to establish instead a Department of Citizenship and Immigration, stripped of its responsibility for Indian Affairs.30 He was supported, it is interesting to note, by Michael Starr who protested first against the dismantling of the Department of Labour and then against the new Department of Manpower and the separation of citizenship from immigration. He asked, "Is immigration 157

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not important enough to warrant the full-time attention of a minister? Are immigration criteria to be established purely and solely on the basis of the demands of the labour market? . . . Are we going back to the days when immigrants were allowed in according to the demand for labour?"31 Joe Macaluso, who had replaced Ellen Fairclough as the Member for Hamilton West, stated his belief that there should be two separate departments: one for manpower, one for immigration. But if there was to be one department only, then he was dismayed to find that it did not have the word "immigration" as part of its name; he proposed that this be changed. "Before we reach consideration of Clause 11 of the bill during the committee stage," he said, "I seriously hope that the government will propose a change in the name of this department. Canada is a country made up of descendants of immigrants. This fact should be given due consideration."32 Replying to these and other critics, the Minister, Jean Marchand, vigorously defended the proposed Department of Manpower, but he said that he was very ready to change the title of this portfolio to Manpower and Immigration and so moved. The motion was carried by unanimous consent.33 Mr. Marchand denied that immigration would suffer as a result of the merger with manpower. He argued that the conduct of immigration affairs depended to a large extent on the attitude of the minister. He firmly stated that immigration must be related to the needs of the labour market, though not exclusively, and he assured the House that the humanitarian objectives of immigration policy would not be disregarded. Programs designed to achieve the optimum use of human resources would be most effective if integrated under one portfolio, and immigration would contribute best to economic growth if it was handled by the Manpower Department. Both immigration and manpower were concerned with human resources; both required justice and humane understanding.34 Later in the debate, Mr. Marchand announced that the long-awaited White Paper on Canadian Immigration Policy was almost completed. He emphasized again that changing economic and technological conditions necessitated a shift in immigration perspective. Immigration programs must be adjusted to the growing professionalization and specialization of the work force. Unskilled immigrants would continue to be admitted through the sponsorship program whose aims were humanitarian. Immigration policy must reconcile economic interests with conscience. The Minister also gave notice of the government's intention to amend the Citizenship Act to remove the inequality in it between native-born and naturalized Canadians. He promised changes in the Immigration Act to abolish discrimination and announced that the problem of dealing with non-immigrants (i.e., visitors and ship-jumpers who apply for landed im158

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 migrant status) must be solved before the tabling of the White Paper.35 The Government Organization Act of 1966, creating, among its other provisions, a Department of Manpower and Immigration, a Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and placing the responsibility for Citizenship with the Secretary of State, became law on June 16, 1966. During the eighteen months which followed the passing of this Act, there were some very significant developments in immigration policy and management. The White Paper on Canadian Immigration Policy was tabled on October 14, 1966, and was followed by the appointment of a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Immigration to examine and report on the White Paper and the Sedgwick report. The Special Joint Committee held hearings from November 10, 1966, to February 29, 1968, and received thirty-nine briefs. Prior to the federal election of June 1968, the Committee ceased to exist. It has never been reconvened and, so far, no report has been presented. Nevertheless the minutes of proceedings and evidence and the briefs are available for study. On March 23, 1967, the Immigration Appeal Board Act was passed, creating a Board which is entirely independent of the Department of Manpower and Immigration; whose decisions are final, subject only to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on questions of law; and which can hear appeals against all deportation orders and appeals from some classes of sponsors. On August 16 the new immigration regulations were introduced which were discussed briefly in Chapter 2. They are totally non-discriminatory and spell out for the first time the precise criteria used in the selection of immigrants. And on December 21, a Canada Manpower and Immigration Council Act was passed establishing a Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and four Advisory Boards, which should lay the foundation for more community involvement in manpower and immigration management. These were very important measures, each of which represented a quite new departure in Canadian immigration, and they will be discussed in turn. THE WHITE PAPER ON CANADIAN IMMIGRATION POLICY The White Paper, when it finally emerged, was a curious document. It must have suffered considerably from long delay and frequent redrafting. It was, of course, in preparation long before the government reorganization which has just been described, and a near-final draft was available for the new Deputy Minister Tom Kent when he took over on January 1, 1966. This draft was considered at a departmental meeting in April, and it was agreed that it was essentially a document suitable for internal consumption and should be rewritten for greater "saleability." A senior orfi-

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cer was relieved of his current responsibilities and asked to write a fresh first draft "written as a document for the purpose of public acceptance."36 Even when allowance has been made for the problems of time lag and change, the omissions in the White Paper are nevertheless extraordinary. It is a pleasantly written document produced for a clientele in which there were presumed to be no experts, no knowledgeable people with whom a meaningful discussion could take place about the full range of immigration policy and the expectations and problems of management. Although it appeared eleven days after the official opening of the new Department, and although the whole of the past year had been spent in creating this new combination of manpower and immigration, there is only a brief reference to the Department of Manpower and Immigration in the final section. There is no comment on the new location of the Citizenship Branch or Indian Affairs Branch. There is only a very brief mention of the encouraging expansion and development which had taken place in the Foreign Branch. There is no mention of the Sedgwick report. Essentially, it was an exercise in persuasion for a particular policy. All this made the White Paper a very difficult document to discuss and one from which very little could be learned. Voluntary agencies preparing briefs for the Joint Committee were at a loss to know what its real purposes were, and no one learned anything from it about the new structure of management. Essentially the same difficulty plagued the Special Joint Committee itself and helped to create in its members a sense of exasperation with the Department and its officials which developed early on. There was simply not enough meat in the White Paper. The materials it provided for an intelligent discussion of Canadian immigration policy were very limited. In fact, the major objective of the White Paper was the legitimate and long-standing one of achieving a reasonable control over the sponsored movement, in the light of the increasing need for skilled manpower in Canada and the very real difficulties experienced by the unskilled in the Canadian labour market. The Deputy Minister had suggested that, among the solutions available, the restrictive factor most acceptable to the public might be that Canadian citizens should have a preference in sponsorship, thus creating a delaying factor in the sponsored stream.37 Under this arrangement, all immigrants could bring their immediate family to Canada. Canadian citizens could sponsor a wider range of relatives, provided that these relatives were literate or (if male) had or could attain seven years' schooling by the age of sixteen or were qualified occupationally. Exactly half the White Paper—twenty-one pages out of forty-two—is occupied with the development of arguments leading to this proposal and with the proposal itself. 160

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 This solution to the problems of the sponsored movement had at least one basic flaw in it. This was one of the main reasons for its rejection in briefs and by the Special Joint Committee. It attached a utilitarian value to citizenship which many people found repugnant. It was also a very oblique way of achieving a particular objective—much better to approach this directly which was what was eventually done. The rest of the White Paper, apart from a very short section (section VI) on "Financial and Other Assistance to Immigrants," is occupied with a discussion of other issues, including the changes which might be made in the Act in relation to prohibited classes; problems of selection and control, with proposals for a more efficient control system; proposals on deportation; a brief discussion of the Immigration Appeal Board legislation then before Parliament and the problem of ministerial discretion; and a word on security screening indicating that the prohibition on sponsoring relatives from Communist countries, because of the lack of security screening facilities, would no longer be applied. There is also a short discussion of refugee policy with a proposal to introduce separate legislation to "set forth the financial and other arrangements for receiving refugees and the responsibilities of the various departments and agencies of government concerned" (not implemented so far), and mention of Canada's intention to accede to the 1951 International Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1957 Hague Agreement on Refugee Seamen. THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITTEE The work of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons appointed to examine the White Paper and Sedgwick report was undistinguished. The Committee had no research staff, nor did it attempt to get any. It commissioned no independent studies. Apart from a very few knowledgeable members, one or two of whom appeared most infrequently, the Committee's initial ignorance of immigration was profound. It did not compare, in concern or capacity, with earlier committees on this or related topics: for example, the Standing Committee of the Senate on Immigration and Labour of 1946 which was discussed in Chapter 3 or the Senate Committee on Manpower and Employment appointed in 1960. The chairmanship of the Joint Committee was weak, and it may have been this which prevented the Committee from developing a collective vision and purpose.38 The Joint Committee was, on the whole, unwilling to accept the image of a technological society in which unskilled labour was at an increasing disadvantage, a view presented to it by department officials and by Dr. Deutsch of the Economic Council. It warmed most to a vigorous brief pre161

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sented by the Minister of Industry and Commerce for the Province of Manitoba, in which he stated that the immigration policy proposed in the White Paper, which purported to be expansionist, would in fact exclude people with lower education and skills and would hamper "frontier" development. It discriminated against the unskilled and many regions of Canada needed unskilled immigrants. He also made some firm points about regional disparities, disproportionate distribution of immigrants across Canada, and the need for more federal-provincial consultation in immigration. It was a very effective brief, and some members of the Committee clearly had a distinct nostalgia for the frontier approach. The Joint Committee reacted very adversely to the government's sponsorship proposals and, as already noted, developed a distinct hostility to the Department, particularly in the early hearings. In fact, the real issue in sponsorship and its historical background was never put plainly to the members. The issue was not skilled versus unskilled immigrants, as originally presented. To put it this way was always confusing. The issue was control, reasonable control over the sponsored movement so that it did not escalate, did not bring a disproportionate number of unskilled immigrants to Canada. As a result of the unfavourable reaction of the Joint Committee, the Department of Manpower and Immigration had to think again, and in this lay the Committee's only, and perhaps not inconsiderable, achievement. A four-man internal task force was appointed immediately by the Department with instructions to devise admission categories in which the sponsored stream was divided into dependent and non-dependent relatives, and new selection criteria based on a points system (an idea which had already been proposed by one or two department officials) and on the principle of universality. After several months' intensive work, the task force produced a set of proposals and a new approach to the selection and admission of immigrants which was much more satisfactory than anything that had gone before. Its proposals were embodied in the new immigration regulations of 1967, which have already been discussed, and which established a points system for the selection of immigrants and three basic admission categories: independent applicants, sponsored dependents, and nominated relatives, with a degree of control established over the latter.39 At least the entry of non-dependent relatives was no longer automatic and, with this change, the anxieties of the Department on this subject were reduced. Impressed with the new, more objective, selection system, the Joint Committee raised no objections to these proposals, and a motion was passed on April 18, 1967, recommending that the new provisions be implemented immediately.40 Five and a half months later, on October 1, 1967, the new immigration regulations became effective. 162

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 A NEW IMMIGRATION APPEAL BOARD The second and third readings of the bill to establish a new Immigration Appeal Board took place in the House of Commons in February 1967, while the Joint Committee was holding meetings and hearing briefs and while the Department's task force was working on the new regulations.41 The debate on the proposed Immigration Appeal Board was one of the best and most constructive of the very small number of useful debates on immigration which have taken place in the House since 1946 and should be read in conjunction with the Immigration Appeal Board Act.42 The quality of this debate was high, partly because three former ministers were present, Richard Bell, Rene Tremblay, and J. W. Pickersgill (although Mr. Pickersgill only played a small part); partly because the debate involved legal issues and evoked once again the keen interest and talents of some of the lawyers in the House; and partly because the jurisdiction and functions of the Board related to two important issues in Canadian immigration policy which have always concerned some Members of Parliament —the sponsorship issue and the problems of security and security screening. If one wishes to observe the strength of feeling and degree of partisanship on the sponsorship issue among a small number of Canadian M.P.s, it is here for all to see in this debate, which was in part an extension of earlier debates on this question. At the same time, the debate contains some excellent exchanges between members of the Opposition and the Minister, Jean Marchand, on the problems of security screening and the rights, if any, of would-be immigrants who are rejected on security grounds to information as to the grounds of their rejection and to a judicial hearing of their case. Opposition members were successful in securing three very important amendments to the bill. The first provided that the Immigration Appeal Board should not sit in Ottawa only but "may sit at such places in Canada as it sees fit." The second provided that "the Board may, and at the request of the parties to the appeal, shall give reasons for its disposition of the appeal." The third provided that, in dealing with deportation cases, the Board may take into account "the existence of compassionate or humanitarian considerations that in the opinion of the Board warrant the granting of special relief." Members of the Opposition were unsuccessful in an attempt to remove from the section of the bill referring to "appeals by sponsors," a provision that "an appeal under this section may be taken only by such persons and in respect of such classes of relatives referred to in the regulations as may be defined by order of the Governor in Council." They were also unsuccessful in an attempt to provide for some kind of judicial hearing for the prospective immigrants rejected on security 163

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grounds, or on the grounds of an adverse criminal intelligence report, whose cases would not, under the Act, come before the Board if the Minister and the Solicitor General jointly decided that this would be against the national interest.43 The Immigration Appeal Board Act was proclaimed on November 13, 1967. It created a new and independent Immigration Appeal Board with broad powers, which replaced the former Immigration Appeal Board established on March 1, 1956. The powers of the first Appeal Board were very limited indeed. It had no authority to consider an appeal against an order of deportation on other than strictly legal grounds and, under the Immigration Act, as we have seen, all its decisions were subject to review by the Minister who could confirm or quash these decisions or substitute his own. In the words of John Munro, then Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, who made an opening statement on behalf of the Minister in the second reading of the Immigration Appeal Board Bill: In these circumstances, the effectiveness of the existing board is extremely limited. The public is aware of the board's limitations. Everyone knows that its decisions may be reversed by the Minister or by officials acting on the Minister's behalf. Thus the board has no independent status. It is regarded as merely an arm of the immigration division which appears, hi effect, to decide the outcome of appeals against the action of its own officers. This casts doubts on the application of other aspects of immigration law, policy and procedure. It invites the application of pressure to the Minister and the department. Indeed it is through such representations, rather than through the appeal board, that efforts to obtain the redress of alleged grievances are chiefly made. The new Immigration Appeal Board consists of "not less than seven nor more than nine members" who are appointed by the Governor-in-Council. The present chairman is a well-known woman lawyer and legal editor from Ontario, Janet V. Scott. There are three vice-chairmen. The Board began its operations hi the fall of 1967 and now meets in Ottawa, Montreal, and Toronto. The Board is a court of record. It has exclusive authority to hear two classes of appeals in immigration: appeals from orders of deportation and appeals by sponsors. The latter, however, are restricted by the clause, which has already been quoted, permitting the Governor-in-Council to determine the persons who may appeal and the classes of relatives for whom an appeal may be made. At present, only Canadian citizens may appeal in a sponsorship case. The jurisdiction of the Board is described in 164

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 the Act as follows: "Subject to this Act and except as provided in the Immigration Act, the Board has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of fact or law, including questions of jurisdiction, that may arise in relation to the making of an order of deportation or the making of an application for the admission to Canada of a relative pursuant to regulations made under the Immigration Act." The decisions of the Board are, therefore, final. These decisions can, however, be appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada on any question of law, including a question of jurisdiction. Reasons for judgement are always provided by the Board, on request, to both parties. Among the interesting questions which arise from this important piece of legislation is the present limitation on appeals by sponsors. Is this likely to be removed or will it be a permanent feature of the Act? During the debate in the House, the Minister, Jean Marchand, refused to consider any change in this provision of the bill. It was, as he said, an experiment. It was the intention of the Department to extend the right of appeal by sponsors to all Canadian citizens and landed immigrants, but it wanted to do this gradually in order to see what impact it would have. His final word on this was, "So I would state that it is our intention to extend this provision to all Canadians and landed immigrants, but I think we need to know exactly how this measure will proceed and what kind of obstacles we will meet. We ask for this gradual application of Clause 17."44 The question is open, therefore, and depends upon the experience of the Board in its first few years of operation. Another very interesting question concerns the way in which the Board uses its authority in granting special relief in deportation cases on compassionate or humanitarian grounds. Some Members of Parliament feared that the Board might prove to be strictly legalistic in its approach to these cases. But if the experience of the first few years is any guide, this is clearly not the case. The Chairman, Miss Scott, when she gave evidence before the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Immigration in February 1968, commented as follows: There is very little reported law on the Immigration Act.... We therefore are in the position of creating law, creating precedents in any case, and to date we have taken great pains with the appeals which were squarely on legal problems, and resolved them on the basis of existing analogous law, if there is any, on the study of the wording of the Immigration Act and of our own Act, and made a legal decision. And once we clear that out of the way, if we allow the appeal on law, that is the end of it. If we dismiss the appeal on law, we then swing into our discretionary powers under Section 15 and this involves a consideration of

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the facts presented to us. I would say that in exercising our discretionary powers, if there is a reasonable doubt which can be resolved in favour of the appellant, it is resolved in favour of the appellant.45 The advent of an independent Immigration Appeal Board with substantial powers can hardly fail to have a significant effect on immigration policy and procedure if only because it introduces a new element in decisionmaking in relation to the admission of certain classes of immigrants. Some further comments on this will be made in the final chapters. But it may be interesting to note here what the actual experience of the Board has been since it began to hear appeals late in 1967. The Board has been swamped with cases. By the fall of 1970 there was a backlog of approximately 4,000, with appeals coming in at a rate of about 400 a month. Among these cases, the number of appeals by sponsors has been very few indeed, and this is understandable since the real drive to bring relatives to Canada occurs in the main during the landed immigrant stage. As the law stands at present, therefore, the demand in the sponsorship category is slight. Nor would the Board have been swamped in this way, had it been dealing with a percentage of the normal annual number of deportation cases. It has, in fact, been swamped by appeals from the very large number of visitors to Canada who apply for landed immigrant status after arrival, and when refused and subsequently threatened with deportation, appeal their case to the Immigration Appeal Board. This is creating a very serious situation which will have to be dealt with in one way or another, since the backlog is likely to grow ever larger. In July 1970, as already mentioned, Mr. Joseph Sedgwick was called in again to examine the problems arising from the use of the right of appeal to the Immigration Appeal Board by visitors to Canada whose applications for landed immigrant status have been rejected. In a report tabled in the House of Commons four months later, Mr. Sedgwick said that an increasing number of persons who wished to remain in Canada permanently were entering as visitors to avoid normal examination at their place of origin. The number of applications from visitors in Canada increased from 28,000 in 1968 to 42,000 in 1969. Some 23 percent of these applicants did not qualify for admission, and many intended "to exhaust all their legal remedies before leaving." This was causing serious backlogs both in the processing of applications in Canada and in the hearing of cases by the Immigration Appeal Board. Mr. Sedgwick recommended in his report, first, that visitors who apply for landed immigrant status in Canada and are rejected should have the right to an inquiry by a departmental Special Inquiry Officer, but should have no right of appeal to the Immigration Appeal Board, except by leave 166

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 of the Board in very special circumstances. Secondly, applicants in Canada who claim political asylum should either have the right to apply for leave to appeal to the Board on that ground alone, or—an alternative which Mr. Sedgwick said he would prefer—the matter should be left to the discretion of the Minister of Manpower and Immigration. Thirdly, the jurisdiction of the Immigration Appeal Board should no longer extend to security cases, and a decision on these cases should be taken by a security review board as proposed by the Royal Commission on Security. Fourthly, as temporary measures to deal with the backlog of cases, the Immigration Appeal Board should review all pending appeals and allow those applicants who would probably succeed on compassionate or humanitarian grounds to remain in Canada; and, while this was being done, ad hoc members should be appointed temporarily to the Board to assist the permanent members. Mr. Sedgwick emphasized a point made in his earlier report that immigration is a privilege and not a right. He saw no reason why those who enter Canada allegedly as visitors and then apply for landed immigrant status should have any special rights, nor why public money should be spent (i.e., in greatly increasing the staff of the Immigration Division and Immigration Appeal Board to deal with the present number of appeals) "solely to get rid of persons who do not meet our immigration standards." He suggested that the Immigration Act and regulations might be amended to provide for an "exclusion order" which would compel unsuccessful applicants to leave Canada, without the need to issue a deportation order which, as he said, carries an inference that the person has a criminal record or is mentally or physically unfit.46 It will be very interesting to see whether these recommendations are accepted by the government wholly or in part, and whether they are regarded as sufficiently urgent to be embodied in new legislation to be submitted to Parliament in the near future. THE CANADA MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION COUNCIL ACT The Canada Manpower and Immigration Council Act was passed on December 21, 1967. It provided for the creation of a Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and four Advisory Boards on Adult Occupational Training, the Adjustment of Immigrants, the Coordination of Rehabilitation Services for Disabled Persons, and Manpower and Immigration Research, respectively. It also empowered the Minister to create regional and local manpower committees and additional advisory boards if required. The Act provided that the Council should consist of a chairman and not more than fifteen members, plus the chairmen of the Advisory Boards. Each Advisory Board was to consist of a chairman and not more than

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eleven members. The chairmen of the Council and Boards were to be appointed directly by the Minister, the members being appointed "after consultation with such representative organizations as the Governor-in-Council deems appropriate." Both chairmen and members hold office during pleasure for a term not exceeding three years. All are eligible for reappointment. The primary function of the Council is to advise the Minister of Manpower and Immigration on all matters to which his "duties, power and functions" extend. In particular, it is the duty of the Council "to advise the Minister on all matters pertaining to the effective utilization and development of manpower resources in Canada, including immigrants to Canada and their adjustment to Canadian life." In addition, it is the duty of the Council to refer those matters that the Minister requests, or that the Council deems appropriate, to the appropriate Board for a report; to advise the Minister with respect to any report received by the Council from a Board; to advise the Minister on the establishment of local and regional manpower committees; and to advise the Minister on such other matters as the Minister may refer to the Council. The duties of the Advisory Boards relate to their specific areas of responsibility, and the Act requires that they report to the Council and not directly to the Minister. Thus the Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants is required to "consider and report to the Council on any matter within the Minister's responsibilities in relation to the adjustment of immigrants to Canadian life." A further clause states that "the advisory boards shall consider and report to the Council on (a) all matters within the terms of reference of the board as established by the Minister; and (b) any further matter referred to the board by the Council." These provisions enable the Boards to initiate the consideration and study of any topic of their choice within their terms of reference, as well as dealing with matters referred to them by the Minister and the Council. It should be noted, however, that neither the Council nor the Boards were provided with independent research staffs, a matter which provoked considerable discussion in the Department during the drafting of the Act. Some officials held that it was essential for the proper functioning of this consultative machinery for the Council and Boards to have an independent research capability. But this would have been an expensive procedure. It was finally agreed that the Department should provide any "professional, technical, secretarial and other assistance which may be required." Additional assistance may be sought—for example, research studies could presumably be commissioned—but according to the Act, "the provision of such assistance otherwise than from the public service of Canada is subject to approval by the Treasury Board." 168

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 At this point, as far as immigration is concerned, one may well say, "At last!" The first proposals for an advisory committee on immigration can be found in the briefs submitted to the Standing Committee of the Senate on Immigration and Labour immediately after the Second World War, and the same proposal has been made regularly since then by national organizations and individuals and was mooted, quite early on, within the Department of Citizenship and Immigration itself. These proposals and efforts are described in Part 5, "The Voluntary Sector." This did not amount to pressure, as the Canadian immigration lobby has been singularly weak and unorganized. It was simply a reiterated and rather desperate appeal that government might eventually see the good sense in this suggestion. The inaugural meeting of the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and Advisory Boards took place in Ottawa on July 25, 1969. It evidently took a considerable time to consult national organizations and to select and appoint the membership from some three hundred and fifty nominations. As the first chairman of the Council, the Minister appointed Sidney Pierce, a former diplomat who joined the Department of External Affairs in 1944 and who was also chairman of the interdepartmental task force appointed in October 1969 to study the integration of the foreign operations of Canadian government, including those of the Department of Manpower and Immigration.47 The other chairmen were: Adult Occupational Training: William Ryan, Dean of Law at the University of New Brunswick; Adjustment of Immigrants: John Jaskula, a Hamilton lawyer of Polish origin who was formerly Chairman of the National Employment Committee; Rehabilitation Services: Lome Campbell, a Winnipeg lawyer and former Chairman of the National Advisory Council on the Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons; and Research: Yves Dube, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at Laval University. Welcome though this consultative machinery was—and after two years' operation it is clear that the Council and Boards have done some valuable work and that some important issues are being referred to them by the Minister—nevertheless the roles and structure of the Council, the Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants, the Advisory Board on Manpower and Immigration Research, and any other advisory boards which might be established on immigration matters raise some critical questions in relation to the immigration policy area. As illustrated, the Boards report to the Council and the Council reports to the Minister. The central question for immigration concerns the capacity of the Council and Boards to deal adequately with the national and international aspects of immigration policy. Can this particular consultative complex develop a satisfactory and creative overall consideration of immigration which, if it is to be useful, must include operations in Canada and overseas 169

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Minister of Manpower and Immigration

Canada Manpower and Immigration Council (20 members)

Advisory Board on Adult Occupational Training (12 members)

Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants (12 members)

Advise try Board on the Coordination of Rehabilitation Services for Disabled Persons (12 members)

Advisory Board on Manpower and Immigration Research (12 members)

Any other advisory boards which maybe established

and an examination of provincial and municipal, as well as federal, activities in immigration? To be useful it should also be in close touch with developments in the Canadian citizenship area, as well as in international migration, and should relate research to the specific needs of the immigration field. In theory, the Council itself, meeting for one or two days twice a year, is supposed to achieve this and to take an overall view on the basis of specialist advice provided by two Boards, only one of which is concerned with substantive matters of immigration. But hi addition to the time needed to consider immigration as well as manpower matters, the present membership of the Council, able though it is, contains only a tiny minority of persons with extensive knowledge of the immigration field. One cannot be a generalist in immigration. The problems of management and control are too difficult, the needs and experiences of immigrants too complicated; and also the serious issues of immigration and national development, and Canada's role as a major receiving country in international migration, require a real knowledge of immigration policy and practice in Canada and other countries. This territory should never be parcelled up into separate and autonomous areas like "adjustment" and "research" for deliberations and proposals on which a body of generalists, however able and well-intentioned, will then briefly pass judgement. Properly conceived, there should be a single advisory body on immigration, with active subcommittees, having full authority to examine the whole Canadian immigration process with its national and international implications, and reporting directly to the Minister. In these circumstances, to use one ex170

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 ample only, those who make recommendations in the very important field of immigration research can hear the live arguments of those who are concerned with immigration management and the adjustment of immigrants and vice versa. The present structure makes this impossible. The Chairman and members of the small and energetic Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants, which does have expertise in this area, take a broad view of their mandate, as indeed they must. In addition to the issues referred to them by the Minister, they have mapped out a program of investigation which covers the whole immigration field in Canada. But they have been unable to report directly and quickly to the Minister. Although there has been no indication that the Council would prove in any sense a roadblock, the Board must report to the Council and wait for the next Council meeting (perhaps for several months) before their proposals can be considered and approved or rejected. In an emergency—a sudden refugee crisis for example—this procedure could no doubt be bypassed. But in normal circumstances, under the terms of the Act, it must be observed. In addition, the Board has been totally dependent for information on the services of the small, understaffed Immigration Division of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. So far, they have had no information at all relating to citizenship and the important developments now occurring in this field, nor have they had any means of giving their views to those concerned. They have no lines of communication with provincial governments. Does their mandate relating to the adjustment of immigrants permit them to consider whether Canada should rejoin ICEM? Or to study the increasingly difficult problems of Western Hemisphere migration? Or to examine the internal structure (in Ottawa and in the regions) of the Department of Manpower and Immigration and its capacity to handle the immigration function effectively? But if they do not consider these matters, who else, in this large consultative body, will do so? Speaking in the debate on the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council Bill in September 1967, Richard Bell, while welcoming this opportunity for more community involvement in immigration, reiterated a point which he made very strongly in the debate on the Government Organization Bill in 1966 in relation to the Department itself. "I am concerned," he said, "lest, under this proposal for a Canada Manpower and Immigration Council, immigration policy may become subordinate or subservient to manpower policy."48 Those who were responsible for creating a Department of Manpower which would also be responsible for immigration—and it will be remembered that the name Department of Manpower and Immigration was not part of the original intention of the authors, but was the result of an intervention by Mr. Macaluso in the House—were also responsible for the present structure of the Canada 171

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Manpower and Immigration Council and Advisory Boards and the concepts which lie behind them. They serve the same manpower theory which inspired the Department itself and their structure quite evidently reflects this. Happily, it did not take very long—about a year in fact—for the basic structural defect in the Act to become very evident to members of the Council and Boards and particularly to their Chairmen. In December 1970 the Council reviewed its activities thus far and reached a general agreement that changes were required in the structure and procedures of the Council and Boards. The Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants discussed this matter very thoroughly at its meeting in April 1971, and proposed two alternative forms of reorganization of the structure of the Council and Boards for consideration by the Chairmen and by the Minister. The first proposal recommended that the present organization be adapted in order to establish two councils: a Manpower Council and an Immigration Council (meeting three times a year), each with its own subcommittees and each reporting directly to the Minister. The two Councils would be interlocking and would communicate directly with each other as well as with the Minister. The second proposal was similar. It provided for two advisory boards, one on Manpower and the other on Immigration, with the same functions as the Councils and reporting directly to the Minister, but it also provided for an overall Canada Manpower and Immigration Council, which would consist of the members of both Advisory Boards and which would meet once or twice a year for the discussion of specific policy matters relating to manpower and/or immigration. On this occasion, the Advisory Board also recorded its firm belief in the need to develop, out of the present structure, an Immigration Council or Board which was independent and could report directly to the Minister and his officials; and whose field of inquiry and competence to advise the Minister should cover the entire field of immigration in Canada and overseas and should not be confined to adjustment only. Verbatim reports of all these discussions were sent to the Minister, and further meetings took place between the Chairmen of the Council and the Advisory Boards. In July, the Minister proposed a specific form of reorganization which was very close to the second proposal of the Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants. Under this proposal, there would be a Canada Manpower and Immigration Council, consisting of the present members of the Council and Advisory Boards, which would meet at least once a year. The Council would appoint two major committees, a Manpower Committee and an Immigration Committee, which could submit then: views directly to the Minister. These Committees would be free to form subcommittees to deal with specific problems. It was the'n sug172

Policy and Program, 1963-1971 gested that a meeting be held with the Chairmen of the Council and Boards early in the fall to discuss this proposed plan, to be followed by a full meeting of the Council and Boards themselves. At the time of writing, these negotiations are still in progress.

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Part Three The Provinces and Immigration

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Chapter Seven The Shared Jurisdiction

THE DEPARTMENT of Citizenship and Immigration was given final shape in what Donald Smiley described as the "zenith year" in post-war Canadian federal initiative—1949.1 In that year, as Smiley pointed out, the federal authorities in Canada took three constitutional decisions of the utmost importance, and in none of them were the provinces consulted. These were the decisions to admit Newfoundland to Confederation, to make the Supreme Court of Canada the final court of appeal in all Canadian cases, and to provide a procedure for the amendment of the Constitution. Under the BNA Act, immigration is a shared jurisdiction. The manner in which the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was created suggests that, if there was any consultation at all with the provinces in this important move, it was nominal. There was, however, a definite urgency in the move to create a new Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The movement of displaced persons from Europe was already under way. A properly organized immigration service had to be created. But although there was a world-wide awareness in 1949 of the immense disruption caused by war and of the movement of armies of uprooted people, there is no record at this point of formal consultation with the provincial governments as to the best way to manage and share this great potential influx of immigrants. The Cabinet did, however, instruct the Department, after its creation, to develop consultative arrangements with the provinces and with national organizations, which it did, as we shall see, in a very half-hearted fashion. In the interesting wartime history of the Citizenship Branch, which was first established in November 1941 as the Nationalities Branch of the Department of National War Services, and which acted as the very small administrative division of the voluntary Advisory Committee on Cooper-

PART THREE

ation in Canadian Citizenship, there is no record of the involvement of provincial governments in this important work of national concern. But there were a number of individuals from different provinces, including one from Quebec, on the Advisory Committee. The voluntary committee was disbanded in 1945, and its administrative division, now called the Citizenship Branch, was transferred to the Department of the Secretary of State. In a memorandum from the Cabinet, dated September 11, 1948, it was recommended that a new Advisory Committee on Citizenship be established, composed of one representative each from the Departments of the Secretary of State, Labour, Health and Welfare, and Mines and Resources, together with a representative from the Canadian Citizenship Council and from the Canadian Welfare Council. The task of this Committee was "to advise the Government on matters pertaining to the establishment of new settlers, their assimilation and instruction in the responsibilities of citizenship and to co-ordinate the activities of the various Departments and organizations engaged in this work." There was no mention of provincial representation. There was consultation with the provinces in the matter of language instruction. Meetings of all the provincial Ministers of Education were held at which this matter was discussed. In the early years of the Citizenship Branch, there was a good deal of informal talk with provincial politicians and officials. The first liaison officers of the Branch, who operated from headquarters as part of a very small staff, made considerable efforts to arouse provincial interest in citizenship. But a regular form of consultation was never developed and contacts were all at the operational level. It must be noted here that in 1945 the federal government had sought a broad mandate for action from the provinces. At the 1945 Conference on Reconstruction, and in the specific Green Book proposals made to the provinces in August of that year, a formulation of national policy was presented, providing for federal initiatives over a wide area of employment, development, and welfare. No agreement was reached at the Reconstruction Conference, but many of the proposed policies were in fact implemented gradually by the federal government, as part of what it felt to be its major responsibility for post-war reconstruction and development. Immigration was undoubtedly a field in which the federal government felt obliged to take some action. The establishment of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration which opened its doors in January 1950, the concept which lay behind it, and the defined role and purposes of the Citizenship Branch, however, were totally federal in origin. Like the other major decisions of the zenith year, this move had not involved significant consultation with the prov178

The Shared Jurisdiction inces. As things began, so they remained. During most of the period under discussion, the management of immigration, in all its essential features, has been an exclusive federal concern. Until the late sixties, Ontario was the only province which had had an active immigration program. But, until very recently, the major focus of this program has been on recruitment, mainly of skilled immigrants. It has not involved any real share in policy-making or planning at the national level. The special case of Ontario is discussed in Chapter 8. The prevailing state of federal-provincial relations and the special relationship between the federal government and Quebec have been, as we have seen, major factors in determining the way in which immigration has been managed in the post-war period in Canada. In another important area of joint concern, Corry described the state of post-war federal-provincial relations as "a long retreat"—a long retreat on the part of the federal government from the pre-eminent position it held during the depression, the war, and the reconstruction period.2 Smiley referred to "the highly centralized variant of federalism which developed during the Second World War and the subsequent decade." This was followed, in his view, by "the rapid though piecemeal disintegration of this system without the establishment of a new equilibrium in the relations between the federal government and the provinces."3 During this period, no general agreement was reached on a satisfactory and lasting settlement of federal-provincial public finance. Although national development urgently required closer collaboration in many fields, the mechanics of regular and satisfactory federal-provincial consultation were never established. Although the federal government was capable particularly during the early years of striking initiatives and of evolving its own brand of indicative planning and development, it was rarely capable of the kind of sustained and creative leadership which would involve the provinces in cooperative action and in the development of a sense of collective responsibility. This was as much a matter of philosophy as of capability. It is clear now that to think in terms of cooperative action and collective responsibility was not, at this time, part of the philosophy or style of the Liberal management group with major governmental responsibilities in Ottawa. Their style of operation, and the one to which their whole experience and training had been directed, was that of an intelligent and sophisticated management of affairs from the centre. Until very recently, this philosophy has governed the management of Canadian immigration. The intelligent and responsible management of affairs from the centre was felt to be better and safer. Other factors such as the unwillingness to spend money on public relations and development, which are discussed elsewhere in this study, tended to reinforce this approach. 179

PART THREE PROVINCIAL DISINTEREST What must have made this philosophy seem all the more appropriate, both generally and in this particular case, was the fact that collaboration and joint action with the provinces were often so difficult. First, there was the matter of interest and initiative: in some areas of legitimate concern, most provinces showed no interest whatsoever and immigration was one of them. Thus in the immediate post-war period and for some time thereafter, some federal initiatives were taken at least partly because no one else was taking any. Quebec, whose special position in immigration will be examined in the next chapter, is the most striking case. There was a disinterest in Quebec which quite defied normal efforts to achieve even limited kinds of cooperation. Other provinces, with the exception of Ontario, were not antagonistic, but almost totally inert. There are many reasons for this lack of provincial interest in an area constitutionally defined in Canada as one of joint concern. One is the historical role of the federal government in nation-building, in creating the infra-structure which enables a national community to survive and function in a difficult environment. Immigrants have been as important to national development as railroads, hence the tendency to leave the management of this area of public policy to Ottawa. Secondly, immigration has a certain connection with external affairs and perhaps a stronger connection in the public mind, particularly in the post-war period, with national security. On this account, it would be felt to be a major responsibility of the federal government. A third reason is the substantial economic inequality between regions and provinces in Canada. Unless countervailing action were taken, immigration inevitably flowed into the prosperous regions, particularly into Ontario. In a vicious circle of poverty, the havenot or have-less regions were deprived of its advantages on any scale, unexposed to its visibly stimulating qualities, and, in the main, uninterested in it. Manitoba is an interesting case in point. Manitoba has recently "woken up" in immigration just as Quebec has done and at about the same time. During the Conservative administration, defeated by the NDP in 1969, the province urged its claim quite strongly for a larger share of the total immigration flow and proper consideration for its special manpower needs. In his brief to the Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Immigration presented in January 1967, the Minister of Industry and Commerce of the Province of Manitoba stressed two vital principles for Canadian economic development: the use of immigration as a tool for national development and the need for balanced regional growth. This was part of his argument: 180

The Shared Jurisdiction A further aspect of immigration policy relevant for balanced regional growth which has not been recognized in the p a s t . . . is the pattern of immigration distribution among the various regions. During the postwar period, there has been an uneven distribution of immigrants which has tended to accentuate and aggravate general population and development trends and labour force shortages rather than to alleviate them. This distribution is attributable to the disparity in general economic growth among the various regions of Canada, a diversion of immigrants en route, a lack of knowledge of Canada and its constituent regions, different regional climates and the multiplier effect of the sponsorship programme. Had Manitoba, for example, received a proportionate share of immigrants, it would have had an extra 10,000 immigrants over the past five years, more than half again than the number actually received. A demand has existed and still exists for certain labour requirements which could be filled by immigration, but failure to use immigration as a device to meet these needs is impeding our growth, causing further regional imbalance.4 A further reason for the lack of provincial interest in immigration derives in a circular way also from the absence of involvement. The people who bring immigrants in are felt to have a special responsibility for them. This is a very important point, particularly in relation to the provision of services for immigrants in Canada. This belief was most evident in the early discussions between Ontario provincial officials and the federal government on the Department of Manpower and Immigration's Occupational Training for Adults Program, now called the Canada Manpower Training Program, and also in the important issue of special classes for immigrant children in Toronto—who pays for them? As the agency responsible for bringing the immigrants who need training (and their children) to Canada, the federal government is felt to have a continuing responsibility towards them. In addition, the recruitment and selection of immigrants, both personally or in a team, on behalf of a government, institution, or commercial enterprise, undoubtedly engenders, in itself, a strong interest in this subject. Immigration is not really a concurrent responsibility until the provinces participate, if only in a limited way, in this activity. Otherwise they cannot have a sense of real involvement and real responsibility. Finally, we should mention a prevailing attitude in Canada towards immigration, widely held at the political and official level, before the economic advantages of immigration became compelling and immigration was seen as an indispensable to manpower policy. This is the belief that immigration, though probably beneficial in the long run, is likely to be troublesome and divisive and is best played in low key or left to others

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if possible. Thus, if the federal government will handle it, it is best to let it do so. Even Ontario, the first province to pursue an active recruitment program, has clearly preferred to let the federal government handle the difficult problems of policy and control. It was, however, not only the absence of interest and independent initiative at the provincial level which made federal-provincial consultation and collaboration difficult. It was also the disparity in resources and personnel between these two levels of government, until fairly recently, and the sheer lack of resources and personnel in the poorer provinces. Thus, one federal official, who was in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration throughout this period, said that it was very difficult in some provinces to find officials with whom a useful discussion on immigration could be held. In addition, if the federal government was unwilling, until recently, to finance immigration generously, the provinces were even less likely to do so. Nor would it have seemed sensible, without urgent reasons, for the provinces to push into a territory in which the federal government was clearly assuming the major financial responsibility. These arguments suggest that the exclusive federal management of immigration in the post-war period in Canada was inevitable. This would be a compelling view were it not for the fact that Australian experience suggests that other options might have been open. What is striking about the Australian experience is the success with which both the states and the community have been deliberately involved in immigration, in a planning operation which was not inhibited by initial underdevelopment, regional differences, lack of interest, or potential resistance. THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE The origins of both the Canadian and Australian immigration services are to be found in the wartime experiences of these two countries and in the Europe of the immediate post-war period. In Canada, this emergency period was not a time when much careful thought was felt to be required in the recruitment of staff for the Immigration Branch or in their rewards or conditions of service.5 Nor did it seem a time to discuss the principles of Canadian immigration policy, or the requirements of an efficient immigration operation at home or overseas. At home there were serious problems of reconstruction to be solved, jobs to be found for millions of veterans, and shortages everywhere. Immigration management was not regarded as a major issue. Nevertheless, in exactly these circumstances, Australia did give some very constructive thought to her whole immigration program, and did embark upon some forward planning which was to produce a service with 182

The Shared Jurisdiction fewer internal political difficulties and a much higher degree of national interest and support than the Canadian service has yet achieved. With Arthur Calwell as Minister of State for Immigration in the post-war Labour government, and Tasman Hayes as the first and very able Secretary of the Australian Department of Immigration, a deliberate decision was taken to create an immigration operation as an exercise in nation-building which would involve everyone, would have built-in elements of democratic participation at every level, and in which the role of the states and the federal government would be clearly defined. A small planning staff was set up within the Department in 1949. A blueprint was worked out for a Commonwealth Immigration Planning Council, a Commonwealth Immigration Advisory Council, a Commonwealth Immigration Publicity Council, the Good Neighbour Movement, Citizenship Conventions, States Committees, and other activities. This organizational complex was in place in the early fifties with the exception of the Publicity Council, which came later. It is often said that Australian immigration has wider acceptance and fewer political difficulties because of the national consensus on the desirability of population growth as a means of achieving national security—implying that this consensus occurred spontaneously. But support for an extensive immigration program among a public which, in 1945, had few international contacts clearly did not simply arise spontaneously. Rather, it was the result of a deliberate effort on the part of politicans and officials to develop an immigration operation which would have a high degree of national involvement, and which would be visible to, and understood by, the bulk of the population. The following are some interesting comments on this operation by the Australian Department of Immigration in a recent letter to the author: Over the entire period since 1945, immigration has received a considerable amount of publicity in Australia. This has been part of a planned educational programme by successive Governments. The ami at the outset was to counter opposition to the large numbers of European migrants. Since then Governments have been reminding Australians of the considerable social and cultural, as well as economic, benefits which migration has brought to Australia. It is fair to say that, on the whole, as a result of Government leadership, the activities of the Immigration Planning, Advisory and Publicity Councils, Citizenship Conventions and the Good Neighbour Movement (with which are affiliated a great number of community-service organizations), Australians are reasonably well-informed about immigration and do have some sense of involvement in it, as a very important area of public policy. One indication of this is that all political parties have consistently supported large-scale 183

PART THREE

migration to Australia throughout the entire post-war period. When there is criticism, it is directed to the need for an evaluation of Australia's total requirements for population building during the seventies and not at individual migrants or migrant groups.6 It is interesting to consider why it was that these two Commonwealth countries, both with enormous land space, small populations, a history of immigration, and both with limited experience of economic planning or of running a foreign service, should approach the post-war immigration problem so differently and with different degrees of conviction. One obvious difference is that Australia does not have, as Canada does, two major charter groups with different languages and countries of origin, one of which has, until recently, always viewed immigration with deep suspicion. Thus immigration from western Europe, with a heavy emphasis on British immigration, carried no divisive threat to Australia and could be pursued wholeheartedly. A second major factor was the much more powerful shock element in the Australian Second World War experience. This compelled more radical thinking and involved a hard look at the national situation and a readier acceptance at an early stage of determined government action in this field. Nevertheless, this would not have been enough without politicians and officials capable of taking a real administrative grip on the problem and able to create both the elements of an effective service and the political institutions and communications required to support it. Today, public support for immigration in Australia is not quite so firm as it was. There has been considerable criticism recently of the size of Australia's immigration movement, and the effect which this has on social problems and the quality of life generally. It seems unlikely, however, that this will bring about a very substantial reduction in the number of Australian immigrants. EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL MANAGEMENT Both the Australian experience and the wider range of initiatives now being taken under the auspices of the Department of Manpower and Immigration in Canada have underlined the need for firm and creative leadership in the development and management of immigration. In a federal state, however, this should be accompanied by a considerable degree of consultation and communication with the community and with other levels of government. Both these elements have been largely lacking in Canadian immigration so far, although the creation of the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and the four Advisory Boards, which held their first

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The Shared Jurisdiction meetings in the summer and fall of 1969, was evidence of a welcome change of policy as far as the community is concerned. Immigration management in Canada in the post-war period provides a remarkable illustration of the difficulties and weaknesses of the exclusive federal management of an important policy area. Perhaps the most important consequence of this has been that there is, as yet, no national concern or real national interest in immigration in Canada. As in the voluntary sector, which will be examined in Part 5 of this study, the knowledge and sense of responsibility which come from involvement and participation have been sadly lacking at the provincial level. On national immigration policy, there have been no joint channels of communication with the public. Central decision-making by a very small group of people in Ottawa has meant that there is little expertise anywhere else. All this led to weak public relations and little public interest in and support for the former Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The Department had no real allies or sources of support and enrichment at the provincial or community levels. A second important consequence of the exclusive federal management of immigration has been that immigration services in Canada have been weak or non-existent. The basic services that immigrants need in addition to employment and, in some cases, occupational training, that is, reception, information and counselling, welfare, community services, citizenship education, and language training, fall very largely within provincial jurisdictions. The question as to who should provide and pay for these services on the necessary scale has never been adequately explored; and in the past no government has provided them except in the area of language training, certain basic welfare arrangements, and, recently, better reception arrangements at ports of entry, financial and other kinds of assistance for recently arrived immigrants in temporary difficulties, and the use of the employment services, occupational and language training, and counselling provided by or through Canada Manpower Centres. Some additional services are now being provided by Ontario and Quebec; these will be discussed in the next chapter. In the main, however, the other important services which immigrants need have been provided, as best they could, by voluntary organizations, secular, religious, and ethnic. Since only a few receive government support (which is quite recent) and most cannot command large funds, these organizations have so far reached only a fairly small proportion of immigrants.7 The Settlement Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, now disbanded, was able to give very personal and often very effective help in the initial settlement of immigrants and their families, particularly outside the major urban centres or where the number of immigrants was not very large. But it was a fairly small operational division

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in staff terms and could not handle very large numbers of immigrants.8 This service has never been replaced, in relation to immigrants, by the much larger operations of the Canada Manpower Centres of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. Some three hundred and sixty of these centres are now functioning in all the populated areas of Canada. While the CMCs do provide some counselling and referral on matters other than employment and training, it is important to remember that they are dealing only with immigrants who are members of the labour force and only with a percentage of these immigrants. What is urgently required in immigration services is joint federal-provincial planning and action, with the close involvement of voluntary organizations. This point was recognized in the 1966 White Paper on Immigration Policy: Once an immigrant has been settled in a home and placed in employment, he and his family still face the problem of social adjustment. Responsibility largely shifts to the community at large, to the provincial and municipal authorities and to the Citizenship Branch of the Secretary of State Department. There are numerous public and private agencies interested and active to varying degrees in the problem of immigrants; but there has not been the co-ordinated activity to resolve these problems which present circumstances seem to demand. Nor possibly have sufficient resources been devoted to this purpose in the past. A major co-operative effort to deal with this aspect of immigration is needed.9 But so far, the federal government has made no attempt to get this major cooperative effort going. It is important to note in this context that the Citizenship Branch was never organized to plan or provide services for immigrants, nor did the staff of the Branch ever see their task in that light. As we have seen, the function of this very small Branch was primarily advisory—advising the Department, and, through its liaison service, advising the community. Recent developments in the organization and objectives of the Citizenship Branch are discussed in the final chapter. AN ATTEMPT AT CONSULTATION It is interesting to examine the very limited consultation which did take place between the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the provinces in the fifties by virtue of the cabinet directive referred to at the beginning of this chapter. In 1950 a Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (DACI) was established within the Department, consisting 186

The Shared Jurisdiction of the Deputy Minister and senior officials of the Immigration Branch, "to advise the Minister with respect to the administration of the immigration policy of the Government." This Committee was authorized by Cabinet "to seek the advice and assistance of specialists from departments of the federal and provincial governments, representatives of national and provincial organizations, professional associations, labour unions, manufacturers' associations, educational institutions and of such other persons and organized bodies from whom it may deem it expedient to seek advice."10 This was a wide mandate. In 1953 the Departmental Advisory Committee held three separate meetings with provincial officials from Ontario (June 8), the Maritimes (June 10), and the Prairie Provinces (June 11). A further meeting was held on November 23 with labour unions. In 1954 only two meetings were held, one joint meeting with officials from Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia (September 30) and one with representatives of private organizations and labour unions (October 18). There were no meetings in 1955. In 1956 and 1957 one meeting sufficed for all groups. On March 19, 1956, and March 19, 1957, a meeting was held with federal and provincial officials and representatives of private organizations, labour unions, and voluntary organizations. A list of those who were at the final meeting in 1957 follows. It is worth quoting this list in full as it shows the size of these meetings, the nature of provincial representation and the provincial departments involved, and the national organizations then felt to be concerned with immigration. It should be noted that in 1957 a representative from Quebec attended for the first time. There is no record of attendance from British Columbia at any of these meetings, although invitations were sent on each occasion to all the provinces. Travelling expenses were paid by the Department. Meeting with Provincial Officials and National Organizations, March 19, 1957 Present'. Federal Government Department of Citizenship and Immigration The Hon. J. W. Pickersgill, Minister Colonel Laval Fortier, Deputy Minister (Chairman) Ten officials, including: Director of Immigration Chiefs of Administrative and Settlement Divisions Acting Chief of Admissions and Operations Division 187

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Department of Labour Assistant Deputy Minister Director of Employment Service, UIC Director of Special Services Branch Department of Trade and Commerce Two officials including Director of Economics Branch Department of Finance Director of Economic Policy Division Provincial Governments Quebec: The Hon. Jacques Miquelon, M.P.P., Government of Quebec Ontario: Director of Trade and Industry, Department of Planning and Development Nova Scotia: Director of Immigration and Land Settlement, Department of Agriculture New Brunswick: Inspector, New Brunswick Farm Settlement Board Manitoba: Director of Farm Labour Services, Department of Agriculture and Immigration Saskatchewan: Director, Public Assistance Branch, Department of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation Alberta: Deputy Minister, Department of Public Welfare Organizations Canadian Manufacturers' Association (3 representatives) Canadian Construction Association (1) Canadian Labour Congress (2) Canadian Catholic Confederation of Labour (1) Chamber of Commerce (2) Quebec Chamber of Commerce (2)

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Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (1) Canadian Council of Churches (1) Rural Settlement Society of Canada (Catholic) (3) United Church of Canada (1) Anglican Church of Canada (2) Canadian Jewish Congress (2)

The Shared Jurisdiction Junior Chamber of Commerce of Canada (1) Canadian Federation of Agriculture (4)

Jewish Immigrant Aid Services of Canada (2) Canadian National Railways (1) Canadian Pacific Railways (1)

The final meeting, held on March 19, 1957, was described in the minutes as a "Meeting on Immigration Matters between representatives of Federal and Provincial Governments, Labour, Management and Voluntary Organizations."11 This huge confrontation took place on one day only and did not even occupy the whole of that day. The meeting was addressed first by the Minister, J. W. Pickersgill, who had replaced Walter Harris, the first Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, in 1954, then by the Deputy Minister, and by the Director of Immigration. Mr. Pickersgill concentrated on the larger issues: Canada's need for immigrants, the government's immigration policies, and the highlights of the year 1956-57 including the dramatic Hungarian refugee movement. The Deputy Minister discussed the actual intake of immigrants in 1956 and the immigration potential in 1957. The Director of Immigration commented on specific aspects of the 1956 immigration program: the extension of the assisted passage loan scheme to include dependents, the relation between sponsored and unsponsored immigration in the 1956 movement, and the continuing need for farm workers. A general discussion followed which consisted largely of position statements by the provincial representatives and some of the major national organizations and also a certain amount of question and answer. A number of interesting points were made in these statements but these were not followed up in the discussion. Several representatives present at this and earlier meetings have commented on the frustrating nature of these discussions for which there was no adequate preparation, and during which, tune was far too short for an adequate exchange of views.12 The Departmental Advisory Committee was disbanded in 1958, and the 1957 consultation was the last of the formal confrontations between the Department, the provinces, and national organizations. The comments of the Deputy Minister on these meetings are the most revealing. In a memorandum on this subject in 1960, he said: I have noted that in the brief submitted to the Government by the Canadian Labour Congress, the suggestion made over the years concerning immigration has been repeated, that there be an Advisory Council on matters of immigration. This suggestion has, so far, not been accepted by the Government, and instead meetings were arranged 189

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which were attended by representatives of employees, employers, Provincial Governments, voluntary agencies, Church groups, etc. At those meetings, it has been the practice of the officials to discuss with those attending, the immigration results of the previous year and giving information concerning the programme of the current year. The last meeting was held on the 19th of March, 1957. No meeting has been held since, in view of the fact that immigration was curtailed and also that the immigration policy was under review. It could be said that, if these meetings did not accomplish much work, they had on the other hand the excellent result of maintaining good public relations with the representatives of all these groups. The meetings generally lasted one day, were opened by the Minister, and we were attempting to close as early as possible in the afternoon, as a good number of those attending had to catch a train to return to their home city.13 A year later there was an exchange of letters between Dr. Eugene Forsey, Research Director of the Canadian Labour Congress, and Mrs. Ellen Fairclough, Conservative Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Dr. Forsey had written to inquire what had become of the "annual pow-wows." Mrs. Fairclough replied on March 22, 1961: Dear Dr. Forsey, In reply to yours of March 17th, there seems to be some misunderstanding with reference to the nature of what you describe as an annual pow-wow which used to be held with representatives of the Department and various organizations. There was, I understand, some doubt within the Department as to the value of this particular conference and I know that I myself was not fully informed as to its nature. It was my thought that I will have these various representatives called together when we were ready to proceed with a new Act, but for one reason or another that did not materialize. I think that the best thing I can do is to pass your letter along to my Deputy Minister because we have been discussing this very thing, and I believe that we will be able to come up with some sort of a suggestion before very long. You may expect to hear from us soon. Yours sincerely, ELLEN FAIRCLOUGH.14 But the annual pow-wows were dead and probably rightly so, as they 190

The Shared Jurisdiction appear to have achieved very little. This kind of diplomatic confrontation with provincial politicians or officials and national organizations was not, of course, uncommon in the public service at this time. It was a familiar administrative device.15 But singularly little imagination or ingenuity seems to have gone into the planning and organization of these particular conferences which were truly brief encounters, nor was any time devoted to discussion of ways of achieving closer collaboration. At the first meeting with officials from the Prairie Provinces on June 11, 1953, the departmental Superintendent of the Western District pointed out that very close cooperation on a federal-provincial level was required for the settlement of immigrants to any extent in the western provinces. The present liaison on a field level was not very good. But he felt that this could be improved with the cooperation of the provincial officials.16 Practical ways in which this might have been achieved never seem to have been explored. The principal impressions, which come from a careful reading of the minutes of all these meetings with provincial officials between 1953 and 1957, are the following: 1. In normal circumstances, federal-provincial collaboration in immigration, apart from certain basic joint arrangements, did not really exist or was very limited indeed.17 2. At this stage the provinces had very narrow concerns in immigration and were mainly interested in filling specific labour shortages, particularly in agriculture. Ontario representatives, however, tended to take a broader view. 3. The provinces had little or no machinery to deal with immigrants in Canada. 4. The provinces were traditionalist in their immigrant preferences and had a definite liking for immigrants from northern and western Europe. 5. Most of the provinces were not ready, without considerable encouragement and assistance, for an expansionist immigration program. NORMAL FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS It should not be inferred from this discussion that, in normal circumstances, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration operated in total isolation from the provinces. It is evident from the files that there was a good deal of interchange with officials in all the provinces on a limited range of administrative matters. There were early discussions on the provision of language training on a shared cost basis. Language classes, usually combined with some instruction in citizenship, were provided by provincial Departments of Education in the early fifties in most of the larger urban centres, with teaching costs shared equally by the federal

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government. Free textbooks were supplied by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Agreements were concluded with Ontario in 1952, and subsequently with British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and the Northwest Territories, to share the cost of hospitalization and related welfare assistance for immigrants who had become indigent through accident or illness during their first year in Canada. From 1959 onwards, all the provinces, with the exception of Manitoba and Quebec, agreed to accept responsibility for the welfare of immigrants following their initial placement in employment and to treat them on an equal basis with other residents of the province under the terms of their welfare legislation. These provinces shared the expenditures involved under the Unemployment Assistance Act with the federal government. The Immigration Branch provided welfare assistance to newcomers until they were placed in employment. These measures staved off total disaster for the immigrant who got into early difficulties, and local action of this kind also seems to have been taken in the provinces to which these agreements did not apply. It must be remembered that this was the era before the introduction of provincial hospital insurance or any kind of medicare (except in Saskatchewan from July 1962). Any comparison of the range of social services available to immigrants in Canada with the social services then provided on a universal or very extensive basis in Britain and many European countries reveals how very inadequate they were. It may be useful to look at provincial activity in immigration as it was in 1966-67 at the time when the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was closing down and the new Department of Manpower and Immigration was taking over with an ambitious development program. The Province of Quebec had entered the immigration field very decisively and had its own small Immigration Service. This Service was then engaged in studying Quebec's needs and capability in immigration before the creation of a full-scale Department of Immigration, which was announced by the Provincial Secretary on February 16, 1968.18 Ontario, the regular recipient of more than half the annual flow of immigrants to Canada, had recently reorganized its Immigration Branch, effectively repatriating the direction of this operation from Ontario House in London to Toronto, and was continuing a vigorous recruitment program for skilled immigrants in the United Kingdom and Europe. The Ontario Citizenship Branch had embarked upon a much more ambitious and effective language-training program for immigrants. British Columbia, as before, was showing no special interest in immigration and had no immigration service of its own. A short departmental report on provincial activity in overseas immigration in 1966-67 noted that "British Columbia has never been active in immi192

The Shared Jurisdiction gration overseas and there appears to be no sign of activity as yet. British Columbia gets a fair share of the immigration flow without trying. British Columbia gets internal migration from other parts of Canada as well. The Agent General in London is not active hi immigration. No money is spent by British Columbia in promotion. All immigration enquiries are simply referred to Federal Government. British Columbia employers make use of our overseas facilities."19 By 1966-67 the three Prairie Provinces were waking up in immigration, to some extent, as we have already noted in the case of Manitoba. All three provinces had created their own immigration bureaus which, as in Quebec, were in the formative stage. Their mam concerns were to meet special provincial manpower needs and to receive a fair share of the total immigration flow to Canada. Manitoba and Saskatchewan had set up their own assisted passage schemes, and it appeared that these three provinces fully intended to work closely with the federal government. The Agents General of Alberta and Saskatchewan in London were thus far not active in immigration (Manitoba does not have an Agent General). In 1966 immigration officials from Alberta and Manitoba made overseas tours and held discussions with the Director of the United Kingdom Immigration Service in London concerning their provincial immigration programs. The Atlantic Provinces, however, were still quite inactive in immigration. According to the departmental report, "The four Atlantic Provinces are represented by one Agent General in London, but he is not active in immigration. All enquiries are referred to the federal government. Newfoundland has sent representatives abroad to recruit in specific occupations. There is a need for the Atlantic Provinces to become more active since they get very few immigrants." At this period, there were also certain stirrings of dissatisfaction—and some outright dissatisfaction—among some provincial politicians and officials with their role, or lack of it, in immigration planning and management. In a report issued in 1965, Human Resource Development in the Province of Ontario, which will be discussed in the next chapter, the Ontario Economic Council, reflecting these views, recommended that studies be made respecting the manner in which a higher degree of administrative co-operation may be obtained between the various federal and provincial government departments whose activities are related to or directly concerned with immigration matters. These Departments might include the Provincial Departments of Economics and Development, Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, Education, Labour and the Federal Departments of Citizenship and Immigration, and Labour, including the National Employment Service.20 193

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One of the recommendations of the Manitoba brief to the Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Immigration in 1967 was that "federal-provincial liaison on manpower and immigration problems should be continued and strengthened."21 In an interview in June 1967, Marcel Masse, Minister of State for Education in Quebec, drew particular attention to the absence in the past of any kind of committee or arrangement for regular consultation between the federal government and the provinces on immigration, and he stressed the urgent need for something of this kind. In interviews with the author, during the same period, provincial officials in Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta expressed similar opinions.22 THE OUTCOME OF EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL MANAGEMENT In this examination of federal-provincial relations in immigration in the post-war period and of the management of this shared jurisdiction, we have attempted to show that, during the lifetime of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, communication and consultation between the two levels of government were very limited. No machinery for regular consultation existed. This was in no sense a joint enterprise, and in all its essential features, the management of immigration was an exclusive federal concern. In the next chapter this point will be discussed further in relation to Ontario and Quebec. Not only was there very little direct consultation with the provinces or participation on their part in policy-making and planning, but also there was no deliberate involvement of the provinces in the total immigration operation. They therefore had none of the influence which could have been derived from such involvement.23 Australia has been cited as an example of the planned involvement of the state (i.e., provincial) level of government and of the community in the total immigration operation. The Australian experience suggests that weak resources in some areas or underdevelopment at the outset is not an obstacle in this involvement process, and that the vital factor is creative leadership at the federal level. So far, we have noted three major consequences of the exclusive federal management of immigration: the absence of a real national interest in immigration, weak services for immigrants, and a lack of knowledge and expertise in immigration at the provincial level, except in Ontario in the field of recruitment and later language training (prior to 1966). It is not, of course, suggested that other factors did not play a part here, sometimes an important one. For example, weak services for immigrants must also be seen in the context of the cautious development of Canadian social services and system of social security during a good part of this period. It 194

The Shared Jurisdiction is important to remember also that the phrase "exclusive federal management of immigration" implies style as well as location of authority. There were and are other ways of managing immigration federally which are not exclusive and might have produced rather different results. Twenty years of this kind of management, however, had some additional consequences for the provinces which should be mentioned. First, it set a pattern of policy-making and administration which is difficult to change. Secondly, the provinces had no say in admission and no planned share of the flow of immigrants. Both these points are keenly felt by Quebec and now rouse some feeling in the Prairie Provinces. Through the years, federal immigration officials made what efforts they could to fan immigrants out across the land and away from the major urban centres in eastern Canada. But this was exceedingly difficult to do on any scale without more resources than the Department of Citizenship and Immigration could ever command, and without a vigorous cooperative effort with the provinces in attracting immigrants to the less affluent and less well-known parts of Canada. The present Canada Manpower Mobility and other programs of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, taken together with the increasing interest of some provinces, may show what can be done in this matter. The cumulative effect of the sponsored movement has also been an important factor in the distribution of immigrants among the provinces and, in terms of numbers, it has worked powerfully for those who were early in the field. Immigrants must always be seen in the context of the relatives who come with and after them. Well over a third of Ontario's very large post-war intake has consisted of sponsored immigrants. Another significant consequence of the exclusive management of immigration by the federal government was a degree of intellectual poverty in the immigration program. The federal Immigration Branch was less able to present the "Canadian Fact" to immigrants, just as it was less able to present the "French Fact" to immigrants, because there was so little inflow of independent ideas, suggestions, interest, or enthusiasm from the provinces. And also, as already noted, by playing it alone, the federal government has always borne the brunt of public criticism. As we have seen in earlier chapters, exclusive management did not mean aggressive management. And it may be significant in this connection that immigration does not fit easily, if at all, into the general pattern of post-war federal-provincial relations described by Smiley and referred to at the beginning of this chapter. This now commonly held view sees the Second World War and subsequent decade as a period of federal dominance which rested upon a conjunction of interrelated circumstances, namely, a confident and entrenched party hi power in Ottawa, dedicated to the advancement of a group of national objectives by politically and

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administratively sophisticated means; the success of national policies in ensuring conditions of economic stability and growth; the willingness of the provinces to accede to federal leadership or provincial ineffectiveness in resisting federal dominance. When these circumstances ceased to prevail, according to Smiley, federal dominance became increasingly and profoundly attenuated and so far no new equilibruim in the relations between the federal government and the provinces has been found. Immigration was undoubtedly an area in which the post-war Liberal government felt it should assume firm control. But control was the operative word here rather than the advancement of national objectives. And the need for control was related to the external situation. A major initiative was taken in the creation of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950 and, with it, improvements were made in the organization of the Overseas Service. Subsequently, changes were made in the immigration regulations to permit the admission of a wide range of immigrants from traditional sources. But at this early point, as we have already seen, forward planning and major initiatives at the policy-making level really ceased until the early sixties, since no real conviction or drive lay behind this initial move. Although the federal government managed immigration with small reference to the uninterested provinces, it did so until recently hi a subdued and almost reluctant way.24 There is no pendulum here marked "action" pointing first to the federal government and swinging back through the late fifties and early sixties to the provinces, waiting to settle at some point of equilibrium. What we have seen in the last few years is really a simultaneous awakening of federal and some provincial governments to some of the economic and administrative advantages of a well-planned and well-organized immigration program. And at both federal and provincial levels, essentially the same influences brought this about. THE MANPOWER ERA Has this situation changed in any way during the five years of administration by the Department of Manpower and Immigration since 1966? Are the provinces now more involved, in a constructive way, in the total immigration process? This is very difficult to judge since the period itself is short and some manpower programs and research projects are of very recent origin. Nevertheless, it is suggested here that so far the fundamental pattern of federal-provincial relations in immigration remains unchanged, because the Department of Manpower and Immigration, while it is very clear about many of its objectives and responsibilities in the manpower field, is still very unclear about its objectives and responsibilities in the 196

The Shared Jurisdiction management of immigration in Canada. For this reason and because of the weaknesses of its present administrative structure in relation to immigration, the Department has thus far been unable to give the leadership and drive in immigration in Canada which it has undoubtedly given in the manpower field. It may also be too much to expect that leadership and drive in two major and specialized fields of public policy, in all their different aspects, can be provided by one department. Clearly many things have changed since 1966, and the whole decade of the sixties has brought major developments in the outlook, management, and performance of the Canadian public service at the federal and provincial levels, which are now affecting many areas of public policy. It is obvious, for example, that governments in Canada, as elsewhere, are talking to each other much more. Government departments are becoming far more active, more policy and task oriented, far more concerned with promotion and development than they were a few years ago. It is likely, therefore, that there is now a good deal more communication between the federal government and the provinces on various aspects of immigration. The Department of Manpower and Immigration itself has developed national manpower programs which cannot operate without provincial collaboration. The largest of these is the Canada Manpower Training Program which involves the purchase of training services directly from the provinces. In the fiscal year 1970-71, for example, the Department purchased various kinds of occupational training from the provinces, to the order of $44 million in the Quebec region, $38 million in the Ontario region, $19 million in the Prairie region, $20 million in the Atlantic region, and $10 million in the Pacific region. In addition, the Department has a substantial physical presence in the provinces with its regional headquarters in provincial capitals and numerous Canada Manpower Centres. The creation of manpower and immigration regions and regional directorates has also introduced a new element into this situation—a middleman —which may bring these two levels of government closer together and is certainly increasing communication between them. Thus if immigration is simply one of a number of manpower programs, then it is obvious that provincial involvement, commitment, and collaboration in matters relating to immigrants as members of the labour force have increased. But the management of immigration in Canada should involve much more than this. It should surely involve, at the least, a wide range of programs in relation to settlement and adjustment. There are also the vital issues of control and enforcement in immigration which can become particularly difficult along the U.S.-Canada border. The provinces should have a voice in these matters. It might also be mentioned that immigration overseas is not only a matter of intelligent recruitment and 197

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selection, but it also involves important issues of Canadian foreign policy and external relations in which Canadians in all parts of Canada should have something to say. In presenting the estimates of the Department of Manpower and Immigration for 1969-70 to the Estimates Committee of the House of Commons on May 8, 1969, the then Minister Allan J. MacEachen gave a very clear and full account of departmental policies and programs, beginning with manpower. He paid particular attention to the Occupational Training for Adults Program (OTA), now called the Canada Manpower Training Program, and discussed provincial involvement in it. He told the Committee: The training courses that we purchase for adults are largely provided by the provinces or their municipalities. We have a joint committee with each province to review continuously the manpower needs of that province and to consider the training implications. The great increase in our knowledge of the market for manpower—jobs that are not filled because trained people are not available—and the future skill needs of employers—is now beginning to make a major contribution to this process. The provinces, too, are interested in the program and concerned with its impact within a province. The regular mechanism for federalprovincial collaboration—the Deputy Ministers Committee on OTA— has formed a Review and Assessment Sub-Committee which is now hard at work. This Committee, on the basis of a substantial fact-gathering and analysis program, is examining the many questions surrounding how the OTA program can be improved and looking into the needs and priorities for possible changes in the program itself. This intensive joint review will, I feel, bear considerable fruit in the future. When it came to immigration, however, there was nothing like this to report in relation to the provinces. Here the Minister simply said, Immigration is, of course, a field in which the provincial and federal governments have concurrent jurisdiction, although in cases of conflict, the federal government has primacy. A workable immigration system requires, however, a great deal of federal-provincial collaboration. Provinces have jurisdiction in fields that are vital to the establishment of immigrants in Canada such as education, welfare, hospital and medical services which emphasizes the close links which are necessary. He went on to describe the overseas activities of Ontario and certain other provinces, and welcomed the new Department of Immigration in Quebec.

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The Shared Jurisdiction If a great deal of federal-provincial collaboration in immigration is required, however, one may legitimately inquire why there is no deputy ministers' committee on immigration or no official joint committees with the provinces in this vital area of joint responsibility, as there are in manpower.25 The answer can be found in the point made earlier that the Department of Manpower and Immigration has a much clearer view at present of its objectives and responsibilities in the field of manpower than it has in the field of immigration.

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Chapter Eight Ontario and Quebec

ONTARIO and Quebec are the only two provinces whose activity in immigration has been really significant in the post-war period. Ontario, where a very few influential politicians and officials have had strong convictions about immigration, has been more active than any other province. Quebec, where convictions of a different order have been equally strong or stronger, has played a negative role in immigration until a sudden awakening occurred in the early sixties to the political and economic advantages of an active immigration program. ONTARIO Between 1946 and 1971, 3,536,757 immigrants arrived in Canada and 1,864,529 chose Ontario as their final destination. In 1971, as in previous years, Ontario absorbed by far the highest proportion of immigrants— 52.8 percent of the total movement, compared with 15.8 percent for Quebec, 15.5 percent for British Columbia, 12.67 percent for the Prairie Provinces, and 2.48 percent for the Atlantic Provinces. Ontario has a long history of sporadic, governmental immigration activity. The first official Ontario government office was opened in London in 1908 and, in the past, Ontario immigration agents have often made recruiting trips to Britain. Ontario has had her own Immigration Branch during most of the post-war period and a small, though now expanded, Citizenship Branch since 1959.l In May 1947 the province made a dramatic intervention in immigration when Premier George Drew announced a plan to fly 7,000 British immigrants to Toronto. Despite a hostile initial reaction from C. D. Howe, then Minister for Reconstruction, the plan was carried out effectively. In all, some 10,000 British immigrants were flown to Toronto during the summer and fall of that year.

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Despite George Drew's continuing enthusiasm for immigration, and particularly for immigration from Britain, both as leader of the Opposition and as High Commissioner in London from 1957 to 1964, this initiative was never repeated. The airlift came to an end. Rainbow Corner in Shaftesbury Avenue, London, the airlift recruiting centre, was closed down, and so was Ontario's Glasgow office. In Ottawa, this was the moment when plans were being made to create a new Department of Citizenship and Immigration and a well-organized Overseas Service. Various official statements were made in Ontario to the effect that the federal government was now expanding its immigration program, and there was therefore no point in duplicating its services. Henceforth, it was announced, the Ontario office in London would operate simply as an information service. But this was reckoning without the Agent General in London, a George Drew supporter, a keen enthusiast for immigration, and strongly proBritish. Whatever periodic discouragement might come from Queen's Park, he and his principal lieutenant, who later became Deputy Director of the Immigration Branch and was located in London, maintained a very positive attitude towards immigration and promoted it whenever they could. The Agent General, the late James Armstrong, retired hi 1967. Until his retirement, Ontario House in London was the real centre of policy and planning for Ontario's Immigration Branch.2 Apart from this determined activity in Britain, there was no really energetic action in immigration by the Ontario Conservative government in the fifties, apart from a special effort made during the Hungarian crisis.3 In 1951 an Ontario Industrial Placement Plan was introduced whereby skilled immigrants were to be recruited from the United Kingdom and Europe to fill specific labour shortages. This plan was pursued in a fairly unaggressive way for the next ten years without major developments. Together with some other provinces, Ontario also collaborated with the federal government during this period in the overseas recruitment of farm labour. From 1961 onwards, however, when John Robarts replaced Leslie Frost as Premier of Ontario, there appears to have been a resurgence of interest in immigration and a deliberate decision taken to step up Ontario's immigration program and to pursue the recruitment of immigrants more vigorously. Premier Robarts visited the United Kingdom and Europe, evidently with this at least partly in mind. The Agent General made a European tour and so did the Deputy Director of Immigration. All engaged in some vigorous immigration promotion of a direct or indirect kind. In the next few years, Ontario House in London was modernized, staff was increased, a suboffice was opened again in Glasgow, and the deliberate recruitment of professional and skilled immigrants was* inten202

Ontario and Quebec sified.4 In a statement to the Ontario Economic Council, in the summer of 1965, Stanley J. Randall, Minister of Economics and Development, described the Industrial Placement Plan and subsequent developments in the following terms: Fourteen years ago the Ontario Immigration Branch conceived the idea and launched what was then called the "Ontario Industrial Placement Plan." Many of the larger industries were approached and asked if they would welcome the Ontario Government's assistance in obtaining skilled help from abroad which was not available in Canada. This plan was not the normal approach to immigration whereby an individual applied to immigrate and then sought a job after he arrived in Canada. It was a plan to place a "round peg in a round hole" before he or she left their native country. This is good immigration. The employer can plan, the immigrant approaches his new country with greater confidence and settles quickly and happily. Ontario has enlarged on this original plan and today not only industry but commerce, government departments, universities, hospitals and other institutional services are taking advantage of the plan. Just over a year ago (1964), the Ontario Immigration Branch initiated a survey of the personnel needs of a section of Ontario employers. This survey gave conclusive proof of the shortage of skilled labour in Ontario. What was even more illuminating was the projection of the survey. It indicated that the situation would not improve without a long-term and aggressive immigration policy. The Ontario Government, therefore, decided to embark on such a policy. Within the last year the Ontario Immigration Branch has extended its activities. In addition to opening a new office in Scotland, it is seeking and finding in northern Europe, the skilled help so badly needed in Ontario. . . . To explore the potential of immigrants from northern Europe, the Director of the Branch visited Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland and Germany. A system was set up whereby all Canadian Federal Immigration offices in these countries would be kept fully advised of the needs of Ontario employers. . . . Each Canadian Ambassador was visited on this occasion and full co-operation is given and received between the Federal and Provincial offices in referring suitable applicants for these jobs.5 In a very interesting interview in London in October 1966, James Armstrong reflected on his two decades as Ontario's Agent General in the United Kingdom. He said that immigration, and particularly British immigration to Canada, had always been one of his major concerns. He had worked with George Drew on the airlift and greatly admired the Premier's 203

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initiative. He regretted that the airlift had never been repeated as it was courageous and imaginative and just the thing that immigration needed. He firmly believed that Ontario had led the way since the war in fostering British emigration to Canada, while the federal government had always lagged behind and for most of the time had had a "stop-and-go program" which was fatal in immigration. Mr. Armstrong considered that services for immigrants in Canada had always been weak, and in this his views exactly matched those of the overseas staff of the former Department of Citizenship and Immigration.6 He believed that cabinet ministers in Canada, federal and provincial, had never paid proper attention to immigration because it did not pay political dividends. The Ontario government would not spend money on it, particularly not on services for immigrants after their arrival in the province. The matter of who pushed the hardest—did Ontario in fact lead the way in encouraging the British to emigrate to Canada?—was also discussed in London in October 1966 with the Regional Director of the United Kingdom Immigration Service of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. The Regional Director agreed that Mr. Armstrong had been a dedicated and unswerving supporter of British emigration to Canada in the last twenty years. But he did not agree that Ontario had "carried the flag" in immigration. He believed that the federal and Ontario immigration programs had been mutually beneficial and mutually sustaining. He pointed out also that the pattern of Canadian immigration, its distribution across the land, has been constant in the post-war period. Ontario has been a magnet, no matter what anyone did. In fact, he believed that the federal government and Ontario had instinctively "gone along together" and had not differed significantly on policy or program. But although there had been a few strong supporters for immigration in the province and the Ontario government had been for it in a general way, in reality there had been no more political support for immigration in Ontario than there had been at the federal level in Canada. In Ottawa, however, there is evidence of considerable operational irritation with Ontario's immigration activities particularly, but not entirely, in earlier years. One official, who was in a position to observe these relations from 1949 until the early sixties, said that in the fifties Ontario was "always getting in the hair of the Department." According to this report, the Department never really approved of Ontario House where it was felt that officials were giving out exuberant and often inaccurate information. The Department could not control these activities. The Immigration Branch did not advertise, and Ontario did. Immigration officials were always cautioned not to oversell and, if anything, to give "rather downbeat advice." Ontario, on the other hand, was there to sell. In 1954 the 204

Ontario and Quebec Assistant Superintendent of the Department's London office reported to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in Ottawa on the confusion caused by the multiplicity of official agencies mixed up in immigration and duplicating our services in the United Kingdom, viz., the Department of Labour, the Province of Ontario Immigration Department, the Alberta Immigration Representative, and British Columbia. . . . Each agency operates under terms of reference received from its headquarters in Canada and can and does give conflicting information, e.g. Alberta House is discouraging immigrants from proceeding to Alberta, and the Province of Ontario is encouraging immigrants to proceed to Ontario.7 It is clear from the files that the Department continued to be fairly sceptical about Ontario's activities. There was always a fear of duplication and of the provision of over-optimistic information about Canada. Uncoordinated activities overseas were felt to be confusing for the immigrant. It was always feared that aggressive promotion campaigns and tours might upset the good relations which had been carefully established with foreign governments who were not particularly anxious to lose their skilled personnel. The tour made in 1964 in northern Europe by Ontario's Deputy Director of Immigration was criticized on this account both by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and by the Department of External Affairs. A formal protest was made afterwards by the Norwegian government. ONTARIO'S IMMIGRATION PROGRAM It is evident that, at least until very recently, the major emphasis in Ontario's immigration policy and program has been on recruitment. This point was made by the Ontario Economic Council in 1965: "It is agreed that the Ontario immigration service is essentially a specialized personnel service designed to meet the requirements of Ontario employers for skilled workers unavailable in the Canadian labour market."8 Interviews with provincial officials confirm that the province has rarely attempted to influence overall federal immigration policies, but has simply pursued her own recruitment activities. Ontario has in fact preferred to let the federal government handle the larger questions of policy. And it is clear that Ontario's Conservative government has not wished to come out in the open with any specific declaration of its own on immigration policy. If nothing was said, apart from a general approval of immigration as part of provincial economic development, Ontario could not be accused of excessive bias for or against any of her increasingly significant ethnic populations. That the government of Ontario has, nevertheless, been well aware of

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the political implications and dangers of immigration is borne out by the part played by Premier Frost in the 1959 cabinet decision to rescind the order-in-council which, in effect, restricted the automatic admission of non-dependent relatives. It is known that the Premier of Ontario protested in the strongest terms to Prime Minister Diefenbaker about the order-incouncil. He is said to have pointed out that this might have a very serious effect on support for the Conservative government in Ontario among her large immigrant population, particularly among the Italian community.9 It is very interesting to note that the concern here was with political support and not with the social and educational problems which the admission of very large numbers of relatives from southern Europe with few skills and little education has undoubtedly brought to Ontario. This province is now faced with very large expenditures in education, social and community services as a direct outcome of federal policies over which it exercised no control. As we have seen, from the middle fifties onwards, if not earlier, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in Ottawa had felt an increasing concern about the rapid and uncontrolled growth of the sponsored movement. This concern inspired the 1959 order-in-council and, to a considerable extent, the 1966 White Paper on Immigration Policy and the new immigration regulations of 1967. Consistent efforts were made by the Department to exercise some control over it by administrative methods. This concern does not appear to have been shared by the government of Ontario which had to bear the brunt of the consequences. Provincial officials claim, however, that the government of Ontario was well aware of this situation, particularly in the last few years. It did not particularly like it, but felt that it had to be lived with. It was felt also that the economic advantages derived from the immense post-war flow of immigrants into Ontario were so great that it was well worth taking some of the accompanying disadvantages. It is interesting to note that a similar situation may now arise as a result of the new universal and non-discriminatory policy of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, and the opening of new offices around the globe. In 1967 immigration from Asia, Central America, and the Caribbean doubled and, since then, admissions from these areas have been increasing fairly steadily, although the total number of immigrants admitted to Canada has been declining. Under the new regulations, it is likely that most of the immigrants who come as a result of these efforts will have both education and skills. But their relatives may have much less. Almost all immigrants need some help in settlement and adjustment. Recent experience everywhere shows that immigrants who are unfamiliar—because they are black or because their outlook and way of life are very different or seem to be so—need more help initially with employment, housing, 206

Ontario and Quebec and social adjustment. The community needs more help in absorbing them without strain. Help means services. Services are expensive and Ontario, which will again receive the largest share of this new immigration, will have to provide them. As we have seen in the last chapter, there is still no consultation over national policy, no joint immigration planning between the provinces and the Department of Manpower and Immigration in Ottawa. It is interesting to speculate whether a point will be reached soon when some joint planning will prove to be an inevitable and sensible arrangement. SELECTIVE PLACEMENT SERVICE

The Selective Placement Service is the new name for the now very reduced operations of the former Immigration Branch (latterly known as the Selective Immigration Service) of Ontario's Department of Trade and Development. This Department is now known as the Ministry of Industry and Tourism. From a staff of thirty, in Canada and overseas, the Service now has a staff of nine (five of whom are in London). Today it provides a service for employers only. Up to the end of 1971, however, the Selective Immigration Service provided a flexible and specialized personnel service for Ontario employers and for prospective immigrants overseas. According to its senior officials, these employers were provided with a comprehensive service and were "taken by the hand." All arrangements were made for them and every facility provided in their efforts to find and recruit skilled manpower. In recent years the Service has recruited overseas engineers, teachers, nurses, physicists, glass-blowers, system analysts, die cutters, social workers, and other skilled personnel. Its customers have included the University of Toronto, Canadian General Electric, Belleville General Hospital, Atomic Energy of Canada, Hamilton Board of Education, Metro Toronto Separate School Board, and Ontario Hydro. Its officials maintained that they were always careful to inform the federal government about all their activities, and they had excellent working relations with federal officials at the operational level. It is interesting to note that in 1969 the then Immigration Branch was frequently consulted by the new Department of Immigration in Quebec, which was in the process of organizing, staffing, and developing programs during the year. In 1970 there were temporary exchanges of senior personnel with the Quebec Department. Table 19 shows the volume of business undertaken by the Service during 1968, 1969, and 1970. It may be noted that the number of immigrants actually recruited by the Province of Ontario has been quite small compared with the huge flow which comes in under federal auspices. Until recently, a steady overseas promotion activity, to maintain and 207

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TABLE 19 SELECTIVE IMMIGRATION SERVICE, VOLUME OF BUSINESS Activity First inquiries at Ontario overseas offices Prospective immigrants counselled Landed immigrants counselled in Toronto Employment applications received by employers Applicants offered employment Employers making employment offers Employers interviewing overseas Employer expenditure on advertising Total immigration to Ontario

1968

1969

1970

10,747 7,434

11,219 7,898

7,877 4,116

17,464 1,641

11,058 1,832

9,435 1,086

$69,693 96,155

$116,031 86,538

$65,093 80,732

464

435 67

489

661 53

821

486 44

SOURCE : Selective Immigration Service, Ontario Department of Trade and Development.

increase its immigrant clientele, has formed the basis of Ontario's immigrant recruitment program. In 1969, for example, some 5,500 potential immigrants attended meetings organized by the Immigration Branch in London, Edinburgh, Newcastle, Glasgow, and Philadelphia to view films and obtain information about living and working conditions in Ontario.10 Advertisements, encouraging application for "pre-emigration employment arrangements" and emphasizing the continuing high demand for skilled personnel in Ontario, were placed in overseas professional and trade journals. It will be seen from Table 19, however, that in 1970 there was a significant decline in the volume of business handled by the Service and this, together with its change of name, reflects the current state of the labour market in Ontario, with the present high level of unemployment in the province and the need to be more selective about overseas recruitment. For the time being, all overseas promotion has been stopped. The Glasgow office has been closed once again and, as we have seen, the staff of the Service, in Canada and overseas, has been substantially reduced. It remains to be seen whether this is a temporary phase only or whether these changes indicate that Ontario's major efforts in the recruitment of skilled personnel are now over, at least for the next few years. This is unpredictable, but it is said that the demand for this kind of assistance by Ontario employers has not diminished very much so far. CITIZENSHIP BRANCH

From the moment of arrival in the province, the Ontario immigrant is served by the Citizenship Branch of the Ministry of Community and Social Services. The growth of the Citizenship Branch also reflects the 208

Ontario and Quebec fact that 1961 was a turning point in immigration management in Ontario. The Branch was formed in 1961 by the merging of the very small Citizenship Division of the Department of the Provincial Secretary and Registrar General, which had been responsible for the provision of information, translation, group and community services for newcomers, with a section of the Community Programs Branch of the Department of Education, responsible for an English language training and citizenship instruction program introduced by George Drew, as Premier and Minister of Education, immediately after the war. At the same time, the Department itself was renamed Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, and John Yaremko was appointed its first Minister. After the amalgamation, the Branch had a staff of five and a budget of $58,000. By 1970, the staff had increased to thirty-eight and the budget to over a million. These figures principally reflect a dramatic development in languagetraining programs in which Ontario and, more recently, Quebec have been well ahead of other provinces and which has constituted the major program effort of the Citizenship Branch so far. In the last two or three years, however, there has also been a considerable development and expansion in the other programs undertaken by the Branch. In April 1972, following a major governmental reorganization announced in December 1971, the Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship ceased to exist and the Citizenship Branch became part of the new Ministry of Community and Social Services. It is interesting to speculate when this degree of development became politically feasible in Ontario. Throughout much of the post-war period, it was exceedingly difficult to obtain money from the provincial government in support of services of different kinds for immigrants. Nor did the government appear to encourage or support major initiatives from its own officials, except in the matter of language training, at least until the midsixties. The consequent weakness and need for energetic action today in the range and quality of services for immigrants in the province, where, on account of numbers, they should be most effective, must lie, at least in part, at the door of the Ontario Cabinet—always ready to support the recruitment of skilled immigrants, yet uncertain and reluctant, until recently, about the help which these immigrants and their relatives should receive after arrival. It was evident to the voluntary agencies who had negotiated for some time with the Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, and had urged the Ontario government to provide better services for immigrants or to subsidize those who could provide them, that at some moment in the early sixties there was a certain breakthrough in attitudes within the Ontario Cabinet towards immigrants. It was well known that there

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were some members of the Cabinet who firmly believed that no money should be spent on immigrants once they arrived in the province. Immigrants were lucky to be here. They should now fend for themselves as their countless predecessors had done. In the fifties and early sixties, these views were clearly in the majority, and they have been very influential until quite recently. Even where opinions were more liberal, immigrants have always rated low in the real scale of priorities in Ontario, despite a large annual influx. It was known that proposals involving any substantial expenditure on their behalf would never get past the provincial Treasurer or Treasury Board, and experienced officials saw little point in presenting them. But this began to change, first in relation to language training. The great success of Ontario's language-training program gave the Citizenship Branch additional confidence and bargaining power in terms of financial resources. It became easier to get money for various experimental programs associated with language training and for conferences of teachers of English as a second language. But money was still tight for any other kinds of development relating to the settlement and adjustment of immigrants. One example of what appeared to outsiders in recent years to be an invisible but powerful roadblock in the development of essential services for immigrants in Ontario can be seen in the long delay in setting up community information centres or citizens' advice bureaus which could serve both immigrants and Canadians generally in this province. This recommendation has been made many times. It was very well argued, though not for the first time, in Newcomers in Transition in 1964, a report prepared after a two-year study of immigrants carried out by the International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto with federal and provincial support. Following this study, a brief was presented to the provincial government in January 1965, by a delegation, of which the author was a member, urging that this relatively inexpensive proposal to establish a small number of citizens' advice bureaus in Ontario (using existing buildings and small staffs) should be implemented, first of all in the form of a pilot project. This proposal was turned down almost immediately by a group of no less than five Ontario cabinet ministers. Whatever the reasons which inspired this decision, the discussion revealed that these ministers thought it a proposal of little importance, but that, if anything like this was needed, it should be financed by the federal government. Since then, the proposal to establish citizens' advice bureaus or information centres in the larger cities in Canada has gathered even wider support and has been recommended by various federal and provincial bodies, including the Task Force on Government Information. Yet another brief investigation on this subject was commissioned by Information Canada in 210

Ontario and Quebec 1970 (without reference to this earlier background apart from the task force report). In the same year, however, Ontario's Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship was at last provided with funds amounting to $50,000 for "experimental programmes in citizenship development and information centres" and, at the first Provincial-Municipal Conference in 1970, Robert Welch, then Provincial Secretary and Minister of Citizenship, announced that his Department had recently received approval to enter into a number of "demonstration projects aimed at exploring the possible role of the Ontario Government in the establishment and operation of community advice centres." In the coming year, he said that they hoped to establish, in partnership with other levels of government, private agencies, and citizen groups, "several such centres across the province and to evaluate their operation in terms of administrative and financial arrangements, use of professional and voluntary staff, client satisfaction, and other matters relating to the collection, organization and dissemination of information for advice and referral purposes."11 It did seem then that in Ontario the idea had at last caught on. One year later we find the provincial government in the process of evaluating, with the aid of outside observers, the work of a group of community information centres in Toronto, Hamilton, Sault Ste. Marie, Brockville, Orillia, and other areas which had received non-recurring grants on a trial basis. In a comprehensive review carried out at Atkinson College, York University, on behalf of the Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, it was recommended that the provincial government should increase its supporting grants to these particular centres, should continue and expand its consultative role in relation to all community information centres, and should give financial support to an additional number of centres including some which are in specifically ethnic and low income areas. It was also recommended that community information services should be essentially voluntary in character and not governmental, but should receive substantial support from the provincial government. At the time of writing, no decision has been taken on these recommendations. This is only one aspect of the evolution and development which have been taking place during the last three years in the field of citizenship and community services in Ontario. The structure, programs, and title of the Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship itself were re-examined, and it was thought, at one time, that it might emerge as a new Department of Citizenship and Community Affairs or with some similar title. A proposal was also made and considered for some time by Cabinet for a "Total Citizenship Program" which would have brought together in one department services for most of the disadvantaged groups 211

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in the province and all recreational and cultural activities. This program was referred to in public by the Premier, but did not receive final cabinet approval. A less radical kind of reorganization then took place within the Department involving the creation of a Community Services Division with three branches, the Indian Community Branch, Citizenship Branch, and Community Development Branch. In December 1971, however, Premier William Davis announced a major restructuring of his administration, involving the regrouping of departments, the appointment of four new "super-ministers," and the creation of three new policy ministries. As we have seen, the Citizenship Branch, with the other elements of the Community Services Division, is now part of the new Ministry of Community and Social Services. Language training is still a major concern of the Citizenship Branch, but it is now developing programs on a much wider front.12 The Branch is divided into two sections: an Immigrant Integration Section which handles reception services, orientation programs, language training, and citizenship; and an Inter-Group Development Service which works with ethnic communities and deals with the grants given by the Branch to community organizations. We cannot go into these or any of the other branch programs in detail, but it is interesting to note that, following a feasibility study carried out by the Selective Immigration Service, Ontario now has its own reception service for immigrants at the two major ports of entry, Toronto International Airport and Dorval Airport in Montreal. In the field of orientation, the Branch has been experimenting with the use of cable television and has recently developed thirty half-hour programs in Italian, Greek, and Portuguese which provide information for immigrants about life in Ontario and in Canada generally. Encouraging though these new program developments are, it is clear today that the Ontario Citizenship Branch, with its still fairly modest budget, cannot adequately meet alone the many and varied needs of new and former immigrants in the province (and particularly in Toronto, Canada's major immigrant receiving centre). Joint development of a substantial kind with the federal government of new and existing immigrant programs is urgently required. The needs and problems of immigrants of all ages and nationalities are on a larger scale in Ontario than anywhere else in Canada. ONTARIO ECONOMIC COUNCIL: REPORTS ON IMMIGRATION

At a very timely moment, and giving very substantial support to these developments which had been set in train a little earlier, the Ontario Economic Council produced in July 1970 its second report on immigration since the Council was founded in 1962. Its first report, Human Resource 212

Ontario and Quebec Development in the Province of Ontario, produced in 1965, which has already been referred to, was short and basically concerned with the important contribution which immigration could make to the development of the Canadian and Ontario labour force. It was part of the manpower literature of the day. Its principal recommendation was that Canada should adopt a positive immigration policy based on her capacity to absorb more people and to fill her requirements for particular skills. This policy should "encompass the movement of entire industries and related technical personnel where they can add significantly to the expansion of the economy." The Council also recommended that Canada should be prepared at all times "to permit an annual base flow of immigrants, irrespective of economic conditions in the country," and that the administrative apparatus of the Canadian immigration service should always be adequate to meet a rather higher level than this, so that sudden requirements for additional immigrants, particularly skilled immigrants, could be met. The Council endorsed the existence in Ontario of an immigration service which was essentially a specialized personnel service designed to meet the needs of Ontario employers.13 The Council's second report, Immigrant Integration, is of a different order.14 It states that it is concerned with Ontario's obligations—political, social, and economic—to the 1,700,000 immigrants who have come to Ontario since 1945; and the Chairman, William Cranston, says in his Foreword that the Council was looking at the immigrant's problems through his eyes and attempting to see "what must be done to assist him in his efforts to cope with a new and often totally different economic environment." The report is, in fact, a major indictment of the federal and Ontario governments for their failure, hitherto, to provide adequate services for immigrants in Canada and for their attitude, and those of the people of Ontario also, of indifference to the problems of social integration. Its recommendations were directed mainly at the Province of Ontario which was urged to move to develop a comprehensive citizenship program designed to promote integration among all Ontario residents. This program should be carried out, in the Council's view, by the Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship. Its recommendations relating to this Department and the services which it felt should be provided for immigrants by the province will be found in Appendix 4. These recommendations were, of course, made before the 1971-72 governmental reorganization in Ontario. QUEBEC Immigration serves most brands of constitutional thinking in Quebec. It is as comfortable a concern or occupation for separatists as it is for

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federalists. Part of, associated with or separated from Canada, this large territory of nearly 600,000 square miles can be developed and diversified with the aid of this particular tool of national, economic, and cultural development. Immigration therefore makes good sense now to many politicians and bureaucrats in Quebec. It was seen first by the Liberal party in the early sixties as something to be for, not against. It was developed and given an effective institutional structure by the Union Nationale government. Since the 1970 provincial election, it has been in the hands of Liberals again without any major changes, so far, in policy and program. At the same time, an immigration program is expensive and difficult to run, and, in Quebec, the problems associated with it are fraught with difficulties and even dangers. As we have seen in Ontario, it is difficult enough (too difficult and unappealing for many politicians) to promote the integration of immigrants where the majority is in a secure and comfortable position. In Quebec, immigrant minorities must be encouraged and looked after in a situation where the majority itself is uncertain of its future and feels, in certain important ways, deprived; and in this situation too, immigrants themselves are faced with some difficult decisions. In addition, Quebec's present economic problems and persistently high levels of unemployment mean that immigration must be managed with the greatest care. On February 10, 1965, the Liberal government in Quebec announced the creation of a Quebec Immigration Service. This move was warmly welcomed in the House of Commons by J. R. Nicholson, then Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, who offered the complete cooperation of the federal government.15 On February 16, 1968, at a reception in the Legislative Building in Quebec, the Provincial Secretary in the Union Nationale government, Yves Gabias, announced that legislation would be introduced in the forthcoming session "to create an Immigration Department to assist the integration of immigrants into Quebec's French-speaking community." He said that agreement had also been reached with the federal government "to place Quebec immigration officials in Canada's immigration offices abroad to help select the kind of immigrants we want." The federal Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Jean Marchand, was present at this reception and gave his firm approval to these moves. He pointed out that Quebec, like any other province, had every constitutional right to establish an immigration department of its own. In interviews with newspaper correspondents after the reception, Mr. Gabias said, "We are not infringing one bit on federal authority. We are in complete agreement. We have the right to integrate immigrants, to greet them, to educate them and to help them find jobs." The federal government, according to Mr. Gabias, would retain such rights as citizenship, control over the number of immi214

Ontario and Quebec grants admitted, and selection standards. Both he and Mr. Marchand stressed the fact that Ontario and other English-speaking provinces had been recruiting immigrants overseas for some time, but that Quebec had been quite inactive in this field.16 Quebec's relatively sudden and decisive entry into the immigration field is in dramatic contrast to her earlier post-war attitude of total inaction and latent hostility to the federal immigration program. The extent of Quebec's influence on Canada's post-war immigration operations in this first inactive and hostile phase is a most fascinating one. And so, equally, is the question of the possible existence, during this period, of deliberate or inadvertent discrimination by the federal government against Quebec in immigration matters. It is easier to arrive at a satisfactory answer to the second question than to the first. A recent work which sheds light on the second question is Jacques Brossard's L'Immigration: les droits et pouvoirs du Canada et du Quebec. This is a study undertaken on behalf of Quebec's parliamentary Constitutional Committee, carried out at the Institute for Research in Public Law at the University of Montreal, and published hi 1967. It is an excellent survey of federal and provincial powers in immigration and the use made of them, and it includes some valuable comparative material. Various suggestions or options are proposed for future action by Quebec, and the whole study is a valuable source of reference concerning the effect of federal policies on Quebec itself. It does not examine the equally important question of the effect of Quebec policies and attitudes on federal activities in immigration, but this was not part of the author's original terms of reference. Brossard underlined the vital importance of immigration to Frenchspeaking Canada: Pourtant, ce sujet est d'une importance evidemment cruciale pour le Canada francais, non seulement sur le plan economique et social comme dans le cas de 1'Ontario, mais notamment sur le plan national et culturel: qu'il suffise de rappeler que, sur 2,500,000 immigrants admis au Canada depuis 1945, environ 60% etaient de langue anglaise ou d'origine anglo-saxonne tandis que 3% etaient de langue francaise et quelque 15% d'origine latine, et que seule une partie de ces derniers immigrants, meme au Quebec, s'integre au Canada francais. Ceux qui le font sont d'ailleurs dans 1'ensemble moins qualifies sur le plan professionnel que les immigrants qui s'integrent a la communaute anglophone.17 He stated firmly that the effect of federal immigration policies has been a substantial degree of discrimination against Quebec. 215

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II va sans dire qu'une consequence majeure de la politique suivie par le gouvernement central et surtout de la fa^on dont elle a etc mise en ceuvre a etc d'encourager beaucoup moins 1'immigration francophone ou latine dans son ensemble que rimmigration anglo-saxonne, avec les resultats concrets que Ton salt.18 La politique federate en matiere d'immigration fut, jusqu'en 1962, manifestement discriminatoire, tant sur le plan ethnique que sur le plan racial. Encore aujourd'hui, bien que ses criteres officiels soient d'ordre professionnel et social plutot qu'ethnique, sa mise en oeuvre parait servir bien davantage rimmigration anglophone et anglo-saxonne qui rimmigration francophone ou latine.19 At the same time, Brossard emphasized the negative approach, until very recently, of governments and public opinion in Quebec, and the apathy of all the provinces with the exception of Ontario, or as he put it, "L'inaction ou . . . 1'incurie des Etats provinciaux."20 Jusqu'a tout recemment, les gouvernements du Quebec ne s'etaient pratiquement pas interesses a rimmigration, sauf de fac,on negative. D'une part, nous aliens le voir, la legislation quebecoise en la matiere est mince et sans grande portee; et lorsqu'elle touche incidemment a ce sujet, c'est rarement de facon tres utile.21 D'autre part, non seulement les activites de 1'fitat ont-elles ete nulles en ce qui a traite a 1'information et a la preselection mais extremement limitees quant a 1'accueil et a 1'int6gration des immigrants admis par le gouvernement central et desireux de s'etablir au Quebec: les unes furent abandonnees a 1'Etat federal et les autres laissees aux soins d'organismes prives, sou vent anglophones. L'opinion quebecoise n'etant guere favorable, dans son ensemble, a 1'immigration polyculturelle intensive qu'encourageait le gouvernement central, les gouvernements du Quebec ne firent apparemment que partager cette attitude negative.22 The opinions expressed here by Brossard are, first of all, an articulation of a view which is widely held in Quebec that, at least until very recently, the federal government has so directed and managed immigration policy and programs that it has always favoured and strengthened English-speaking Canada. The federal Immigration Service has been thought to be staffed almost entirely, in Ottawa and overseas, by English-speaking Canadians plus a few French-Canadian "vendus." It is believed that no adequate information about Quebec was ever given to immigrants and that the French fact was neither understood nor presented by immigration officials. While it may be conceded in Quebec now that this situation may 216

Ontario and Quebec not have been entirely deliberate, it is felt that the facts of the matter are that Quebec has only received a very small share of the immigration flow, so that, whether deliberate or not, the outcome was a considerable degree of discrimination and a great loss to Quebec itself. There is a more extreme view which takes the form of a conspiracy theory. This implies a deeper design and some long-range Machiavellian planning in Ottawa to use immigration as an instrument to starve Quebec and steadily to fatten the land in English-speaking Canada; in other words, a discrimination which had a much more sustained purpose behind it. This view has been expressed in various quarters, but one interesting example of it is a piece of determined pamphleteering written in 1966 by Rosaire Morin, Director General of the Conseil d'Expansion ficonomique of Montreal. Au Canada, le miracle de la survivance franchise presente quelques analogies avec la resistance des Troyens. Pendant longtemps, notre legendaire revanche des berceaux a constitue une muraille imprenable et notre volunte collective de vivre, une forteresse invincible. Mais depuis le debut du siecle, le Ministere de I'lmmigration a introduit le cheval de Troie au Canada francais. 7,089,823 immigrants se sont etablis en terre canadienne. 2,740,031 sont des Britanniques et 112,740 sont des Francais. Cette disproportion ethnique des nouveaux venus a rompu 1'equilibre entre les deux nations fondatrices. Les minorites franchises ont ete noyees dans huit provinces. Pour completer notre deroute et briser les resistances des derniers bastions francais, le Ministere de la Citoyennete et de I'lmmigration multiple les initiatives. II augmente le nombre de ses bureaux et il intensifie sa publicite dans les pays anglophones.23 This view may seem exaggerated, but it undoubtedly commands a certain following. Morin also uttered a clarion call for action, appealing to French Canadians to engage at once in the battle of immigration. Pouvons-nous laisser au gouvernement federal la legislation sur rimmigration? Pouvons-nous abandonner au federal 1'application de la loi? Pouvons-nous oublier les lecons du pass6, 1'assimilation premeditee, les contingents des faineants, les nombreux fugitifs et les millions gaspilles? Ce n'est pas Tom Kent24 qui se preoccupe de savoir si nos NeoQuebecois apprennent ici 1'anglais pour s'en aller ensuite aux EtatsUnis. II ne se soucie pas du fait que la langue anglaise apparait aux 217

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Neo-Quebecois une condition premiere de la reussite en affaires. Jamais il ne tient compte des droits de la population franchise face a la population totale du Canada. N'en deplaise a Pierre Elliott Trudeau qui a bien choisi le comte ou il s'est fait 61ire, il faut reconnaitre la situation particuliere du Quebec. La politique d'immigration ne peut etre unique, uniforme et centralisee. Elle doit etre aussi definie en fonction du Canada francais. Cette tache est de la plus haute urgence.25 Morin wanted, in 1966, a provincial Ministry of Immigration, an international presence for Quebec, an immigration office at Quebec House in Paris and in Milan, immigration officers and agents in all French-speaking centres, a massive publicity campaign in French-speaking countries, a repatriation program for French Canadians in the United States and in English-speaking Canada "dans les regions perdues a la vie francaise," a French Canadian Citizenship Council, special reception centres at all ports of entry, a Quebec placement service, and other measures. In all this, he was simply a little ahead of politicians in the Union Nationale government who would shortly be implementing some of these policies. Morin was also frank on attitudes in Quebec towards immigrants. Opposition towards federal immigration policies, he felt, was translated into a hostility towards immigrants themselves. Part of his proposed program involved a determined effort to change this state of affairs. Despite considerable exaggeration, inaccuracies, and prejudice, this pamphlet breathes a vigour of its own and reflects the strength of feeling which immigration has aroused in Quebec. QUEBEC OPINION

In the summer of 1967 a series of interviews were held by the author in Quebec and Montreal, which were very informative about Quebec's attitudes and plans in the matter of immigration immediately prior to the creation of a provincial Department of Immigration. Those interviewed included the Provincial Secretary, Yves Gabias, then responsible for immigration; the Minister of State for Education, Marcel Masse; a small group of senior civil servants in Quebec; the Director General and Deputy Director of Quebec's Immigration Service in Montreal; officials of the Federation of St. Jean Baptiste Societies in Quebec; senior officials in manpower, immigration, and citizenship in Montreal and Quebec; representatives of the major voluntary agencies; Abbe Gerard Dion, professor of industrial relations at Laval University; and Dr. Nicholas Zay, head of the Laval School of Social Work. The Provincial Secretary, Yves Gabias, discussed the creation of Que218

Ontario and Quebec bee's Immigration Service and the plans of the Quebec government in immigration. Although the Liberal government had taken the first initiative in immigration and had created the Immigration Service, he said that this was mainly on paper and it remained for the Union Nationale to get the Service going. For the present at least, the government of Quebec really wanted to move into the same territory occupied by Ontario. Ontario was a useful model. The government did not wish to duplicate federal immigration services—this was in any case too expensive—but wished to use federal services to the full. It was a question of priorities: "We have to do a lot for our own people first." Health and welfare services, old age security, public works were equally important. The Immigration Service, as presently constituted, had done an excellent job, but it was a temporary arrangement which must lead to something more substantial. The serious problems of integration, use of the French language, and professional resistance to immigrants had to be tackled quickly. Mr. Gabias was very dubious about the quality of information on Quebec given to immigrants by federal officials. Immigrants were "mal informes," and this had to be put right. Effective contact had to be established with Quebec employers, and Quebec teams would be sent overseas to select highly qualified immigrants mainly, but not only, from French-speaking countries. One of the best statements of Quebec's approach to immigration at this period, and her assessment of the outcome of federal immigration policies, is to be found in a speech given by Marcel Masse, then Minister of State for Education. Mr. Masse expressed similar views during an interview. His approach was essentially the same as that of Jacques Brossard, but he was much more explicit on Quebec's own failure to take appropriate action in this vital area. In his speech, Mr. Masse emphasized the gravity of the situation: "Dans le Quebec, rien ne sert de le cacher, la situation est triste dans le domaine de I'immigration, et j'irais meme jusqu'a dire grave." He recited the now familiar facts about the immigrants who settle in Quebec, mainly in Montreal. Quebec had received 20.7 percent of the total flow of Canadian immigrants since 1946. Until the recent moderate increase in French emigration, only 12 to 13 percent of these immigrants came from Frenchspeaking countries, and 90 percent of them integrated in the English community of Quebec. The French-Canadian community, particularly in the Montreal area, had shown almost no assimilative capacity. "La majorite que nous sommes ne reussit pas a absorber le nouvel arrive, qui a tot fait de s'orienter vers 1'element beaucoup plus allechant au point de vue economique."26 He then made a very plain and categorical statement about the negative attitudes towards immigrants taken by French Canadians. He referred to "our indifference, if not hostility": 219

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Or notre incurie et notre insouciance que nous avons toujours manifestees envers le nouvel arrive nous ont joue un vilain tour puisque nous nous retrouvons aujourd'hui avec 500,000 immigrants installes au Quebec et dont 90% s'est integre a 1'element anglophone. Quant au petit nombre d'entre eux qui ont opte pour le secteur francophone, ils ont souffert enormement et souffrent encore de notre indifference a leur egard. . . . Nous ne faisons aucun effort pour aider le nouveau-venu a s'integrer dans le milieu francophone; au contraire, nous aliens meme inconsciemment 1'orienter vers le secteur anglais en ne prenant pas en main la situation des son arrivee. Notre indifference, sinon notre hostilite, rebute alors rapidement 1'immigrant, surtout lorsque ce dernier prend conscience du role economique dominant de la langue anglaise dans son milieu.27 At no moment since Confederation, however, had federal immigration policy attempted to preserve an equilibrium between the two founding nations. Tout s'est passe comme s'il n'avait pas existe de communaute francophone dans ce pays. Pour des raisons multiples, d'ordre economique et demographique, une large immigration parait indispensable au Canada. Ce qui etonne, toutefois, c'est qu'elle a etc concue et appliquee comme s'il n'y avait pas eu une telle chose que la coexistence de communautes socioculturelles distinctes au Canada.28 And Quebec herself had done nothing to rectify the situation. No special effort had been made in language training for immigrants, the essential factor in integration. The budget for language classes in Toronto alone was seventeen times larger than that in Montreal. Ninety percent of the 55,000 school children then in the Montreal region who were neither of French nor of British origin were registered in schools where English was the language of instruction. During the latter part of his speech, Mr. Masse emphasized the urgent need for action before it was too late, and he announced that the Ministry of Education planned to provide a special and permanent service for immigrants which would include, among other things, free language classes for immigrants and their wives in convenient locations and at convenient times; training for the teachers of newcomers; citizenship courses based on "the realities of Quebec life"; and a program to facilitate the adjustment of immigrants to working conditions and working methods in Quebec. These measures, he felt, were an important first step in "the reconquest of territory long-held by the English-speaking community." Attitudes to220

Ontario and Quebec wards immigrants must change. The new integration policy was designed to achieve this and to join the interests of the immigrant to those of the French community. When interviewed, Mr. Masse emphasized again how urgent it was for Quebec to move effectively into the immigration field. Immigration was essential to Quebec's development. He remained suspicious of federal intentions and felt that Quebec must run her own immigration operation. He spoke of the substantial public relations program which was required to educate Quebec public opinion. Mr. Masse is not, of course, noted for his warmth of feeling towards Canadian federalism but one of his most interesting points was a strong complaint that in immigration, as in so many other fields, no effective machinery had been set up for regular federalprovincial consultation. When Quebec had organized its own Immigration Service, there would have to be some kind of joint committee. And there would have to be a protocol, an agreed statement which would clearly delineate the respective functions of federal and provincial governments in immigration. Officials of the Federation of St. Jean Baptiste Societies in Quebec, who were interviewed at this time, also held very strong views on the subject of Canadian immigration and the way in which it had been managed in the past which, they felt, was closely related to Quebec's minority status in Canada. They insisted that the French language must become the real working language for the whole of Quebec and that immigrants must learn French first. They deplored the present situation in Montreal where Italian and other immigrants sent their children to English-speaking schools, believing that it was an economic necessity in Canada to speak English rather than French. They were certain that Canadian government departments overseas—particularly External, but Manpower and Immigration also— were strongly Anglophone in character, and they quoted the case of a colleague who had visited the Canadian embassy in Athens in 1961 and found no one who could speak a word of French. It was felt that many major problems would have to be dealt with before immigration could be organized on a satisfactory basis in Quebec. But Quebec would have to have her own department of immigration and to decide what she wanted in immigration. The initiative must come from Quebec, not from the federal government. The senior officials in the Quebec government who were also interviewed in 1967 were, on the whole, more cordial than politicians and others in their attitudes towards the federal government, and they spoke of friendly relationships with federal officials in Ottawa. They mainly stressed two aspects of the immigration issue: first, the need for Quebec to go fairly slowly in immigration and not to embark upon a very costly pro221

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gram all at once because of urgent needs and higher priorities in other areas such as education, health, welfare, and public works; secondly, the need for a very selective immigration program because of the present state of the Quebec economy. Immigration, in their view, would have "to fill gaps" and to consist of qualified immigrants only. Officials in Quebec's small new Immigration Service (which appeared then to be waiting for some major transformation) made the same point. The most urgent need in Quebec, according to the Director, was for skilled manpower, and her immigration program must be tailored to meet this need. He had just paid a "very pleasant and productive" visit to Ontario where he had had a warm welcome from directors of the Immigration and Citizenship Branches and others. He felt that a definite rapport existed and that Quebec and Ontario now shared a common desire for development in this area and a common anxiety about some of the activities of the federal Department of Manpower and Immigration. It is evident that the question of priorities was most important and that the priority which immigration should have was not at all clear. At the Laval School of Social Work, Dr. Zay also stressed the competing claims of other departments and other projects. The profound changes which had taken place in Quebec itself during the last few years had accelerated a demand for improved services in every field. He cited the problem of the concentration of almost all welfare services, governmental and voluntary, in the cities of Montreal and Quebec. These welfare services would have to be decentralized and effectively distributed throughout the province. This was a very expensive business. Another problem was the serious shortage of qualified personnel. There was no lack of good ideas and good projects in all these areas of development in Quebec, he claimed, but there was a serious lack of administrative capacity to carry them out. Social work was a case in point, and this had a definite relation to Quebec's present ability to mount an effective integration program for immigrants. The two Quebec French-speaking Schools of Social Work (at Laval and at the University of Montreal) were then producing some eighty trained social workers a year which simply did not meet the need. Both he and the Director of the Immigration Service stressed the problems of finding qualified personnel and of the capacity to pay the competitive salaries which Quebec would face in hiring a larger staff of immigration officials. The relation between immigration and other aspects of provincial development was discussed in a final interview with Abbe Gerard Dion, professor of industrial relations at Laval, whose role in the revolutionary change which has taken place in Quebec in the last decade is well known. He emphasized that immigration in Quebec could not be considered alone since it was enmeshed with other urgent provincial problems and was cen222

Ontario and Quebec tral to the political and economic problems of Quebec. As a first step, he thought, Quebec had to organize itself in immigration and get its own Service going. There would also have to be collaboration with federal authorities because Quebec needed the federal government in this field. The economic problems were too large to handle alone. The industrial base in the province was not strong enough yet. A larger immigration movement might well have to be financed almost, at least at the beginning, if unemployment in Quebec continued to prove such an intractable problem. All of which really dictated, in the fact of the matter, a substantial degree of collaboration with the federal Department of Manpower and Immigration, at least for some time. It meant that Ontario with its "specialized personnel service" was indeed a useful model, although Quebec would need to go further than this in ensuring that the French fact was adequately presented and the Quebec argument was properly put to intending immigrants. Thus teams from Quebec could explore the continent of Europe and elsewhere for qualified immigrants, as Ontario and Manitoba now do, working with and through the federal Immigration Service, but the province would undoubtedly feel the need to have its own immigration offices in strategic locations and also to place its own officers in some of the other important immigration offices overseas. This process has now in fact begun. Quebec has already opened her own immigration office in Paris and has placed her own orientation officers in the three federal immigration offices from which the majority of Quebec's immigrants are now coming, namely, Rome, Athens, and Beirut. It was announced on May 18, 1971, that an agreement had been reached between the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the Department of Immigration in Quebec on the general conditions under which the Quebec government might place her own orientation officers in the overseas immigration offices. According to the agreement, "the role of the Quebec orientation officer will be to provide additional detailed information on living and working conditions in Quebec to those immigrants who have chosen Quebec as their destination. The orientation officer will be provided with a secretary-clerk-interpreter." In Quebec, at this time, there appeared to be two philosophies of immigration which were not necessarily incompatible, but of a different order in imagination and ambition. One saw immigration as primarily a nation-building device for Quebec, whether within Confederation or outside it. Immigrants, properly integrated into the French community, would make a great contribution, as Marcel Masse put it, to the "epanouissement" (flowering) of Quebec. Their numbers were important. They must contribute to both population growth and manpower resources. From this view might come pressure for a larger intake, a bigger share of Canada's 223

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annual flow of immigrants, a more ambitious internal integration program, and perhaps firmer measures to ensure the orientation of Quebec immigrants towards the French-speaking community. According to the other view, however, immigration should be seen specifically as a valuable tool of Quebec's own manpower policy to supply the additional professional and skilled manpower which the province so badly needs; a fairly limited operation for the moment. In this view, the number of immigrants must be carefully controlled in the light of the limitations imposed at present by Quebec's internal resources and industrial capacity. It seems likely that this second view will prevail for the time being and that a more ambitious program must depend upon the extent and the speed of economic development in the province. Federal officials in Quebec in the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State, most of them French Canadians, were observing this scene with the greatest interest. Some had already received offers of employment from the Quebec government. No hostility towards Quebec's new initiatives in immigration was displayed by anyone. It was felt that Quebec had a perfect right to occupy this field as Ontario had done. Their attitude was that of the experienced official: "They are groping"; "They don't know yet what they are up against"; "Immigration is very difficult. You can't control it totally. They'll find that out when they get into it." These were a few of the comments made. Although the complexity of the problem may not yet have been appreciated in their view, it was felt, nevertheless, that any moves by the government of Quebec to promote integration were very desirable. What was expected for the near future was a fairly limited operation on the part of Quebec because of budget problems, and a good deal of federal-provincial collaboration. Both from conviction and from present instructions within their own Departments, it was obvious that their own approach would be a cooperative one. OTTAWA AND QUEBEC

We might now examine the proposition of Marcel Masse that "everything has happened [in immigration] as if a French-speaking community had not existed in this country." In its post-war immigration policy and program, is it fair to say that the federal government has ignored Quebec, or worse, deliberately acted against the best interests of the province? It will be argued here that neither is the case, but that this has been a complicated process of interaction, the outcome of which has been, until very recently, a mutual impoverishment in this important policy area. The argument runs as follows. 1. We have seen that, throughout the post-war period, the federal gov224

Ontario and Quebec eminent has failed to consult the provinces either in the formulation of policy or in immigration management. This applied to all the provinces, whether their immigrant intake was high or low. In all its essential features, immigration during the period under discussion has been an exclusive federal concern, apart from the independent role played by Ontario in the field of recruitment. In addition, the federal government made no real and sustained effort to encourage provincial initiative and participation. The only occasion during which more cooperation and communication took place was the Hungarian crisis of 1956-57. This might have been a moment of breakthrough in federal-provincial relations in immigration, but the opportunity was lost. 2. There is evidence in the files, however, of slightly more effort being made by the federal government with Quebec than with any other province. First, an attempt was made to overcome the total lack of interest and remoteness of the Duplessis government in any matter relating to immigration (or federal affairs in general); and, secondly, an effort was undertaken to show awareness of the need to increase the number of Frenchspeaking immigrants, and to secure at least some cooperation from the Quebec government in attempting to do this, if only in a limited way. There is, for example, a significant though rather one-sided correspondence at the time of the Hungarian crisis when it proved impossible to secure a firm agreement with Quebec on the assistance which the province would provide for refugees. There was a series of overtures from the early fifties onwards, not sustained or rigorously pursued, but at least there on record, in which attempts were made to provoke interest in and support for an effort to do something about the small numbers of French-speaking immigrants. But in almost all cases, there was no reply at all or a very non-committal response. This also occurred with many more routine matters. This state of affairs only began to change with the advent of the Liberal government in Quebec in June 1960. 3. There is no question that there was a definite awareness, at the ministerial level and senior levels of management in Ottawa, of Quebec's traditional and continued hostility towards immigration. Dr. Hugh Keenleyside who, as we have seen, played a major part in the creation of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, has made this very clear. As he described it, both Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent (though less so) felt that immigration was troublesome and divisive and might at any time upset Quebec. They therefore approached it very cautiously and without evident enthusiasm. As we have seen, a French Canadian, Laval Fortier, was deliberately chosen for the post of Deputy Minister in the hope that this might make things easier with Quebec. All those involved in the creation of the new Department were, Dr. Keenleyside has said, very much 225

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aware of the Quebec problem and of the opposition of the Duplessis government to immigration. They included J. W. Pickersgill, then Executive Assistant to Mackenzie King, who became Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in 1954 and who tried very hard to secure the cooperation of the Quebec government during the Hungarian crisis. Again, under the Diefenbaker government, the first Minister, E. Davie Fulton, initiated a survey (on which no subsequent action was taken) to investigate the potential for immigration or repatriation to Quebec of former French Canadians living in the northern United States. His successor, Mrs. Ellen Fairclough, and her Deputy Minister, George Davidson, made a special offer and appeal to Maurice Duplessis for cooperation in attempting to find immigrants who were acceptable to the province. All those interviewed at the senior political and official level during the course of this research have emphasized their awareness of Quebec's attitude to immigration, and their belief that this has always had to be taken into account by Cabinet and senior management. 4. Interviews with officials of the former Department of Citizenship and Immigration in Ottawa and overseas also revealed a definite awareness within the Service of the internal situation in relation to immigrants in Quebec clearly described by Jacques Brossard and Marcel Masse: "Nous ne faisons aucun effort pour aider le nouveau-venu a s'integrer dans le milieu francophone...." Overseas, this undoubtedly affected the willingness of immigration officers to counsel immigrants to settle in Quebec. 5. The reaction to both aspects of this question on the part of the federal government, however, was essentially that of "living with it" rather than making a determined effort to overcome it. And this undoubtedly had an emasculating effect on Canada's whole immigration operation. It helped to determine the fact that, for a good part of the post-war period, this operation would not be very aggressive or keenly expansionist. Large sums would not be visibly spent on it, lest this arouse further suspicions of imperialism in the minds of French Canadians. It was safer to run it in fairly low gear. 6. When French Canadians point to the undoubted "facts of the matter," i.e., the huge post-war flow of immigrants into English-speaking Canada and principally into Ontario, the 90 percent of the 20 percent of Quebec's intake which integrated with the English-speaking community in the province, one looks for the leadership at the federal level which might have attempted to redress this imbalance, without any substantial assistance from Quebec itself. This leadership, political or official, simply was not there, either under Liberal or Conservative governments. Nor were the resources available in money or in talent or bilingual staff. And until certain basic changes had taken place in the Canadian public service, which 226

Ontario and Quebec began to take shape after the Glassco Commission had submitted its reports, no real expansion or development could take place in immigration at the federal level. 7. When the matter of a deliberate conspiracy against Quebec in immigration is raised by a few, one looks to the federal level for the conviction, the planning capacity, and the understanding of developing trends in immigration which would have been necessary to carry this out. And it must be stated that these were not there either. Canadian immigration in the post-war period has been characterized by a singular lack of conviction in any direction. Those involved would agree that, at least until 1964, roughly speaking, there was no planning except on a year-to-year basis. There was no real planning for development. As noted, this was, in any case, seriously hampered by the structure and nature of management hi the public service. In the matter of the necessary understanding of developing trends in immigration, officials were, of course, well aware of the unequal distribution of immigration across the land, though not perhaps, until recently, of the sense of deprivation which would develop in Quebec on this account. But political disinterest in this subject was such that it is very doubtful whether more than a handful of M.P.s, front or back bench, would have been sufficiently interested in or aware of the developing shape of the immigration movement to see its potential as a weapon against Quebec. We are dealing here surely with an area of laissez-faire, underdevelopment, and mutual ignorance, and not with a piece of deliberate political planning. 8. What emerged most clearly from this sampling of opinion in Quebec is the importance of immigration as a domestic issue and how inseparable it is from Quebec's political and economic development. It is surely a fallacy to suppose that the federal government, even if acting with more energy and imagination in this field than were ever displayed during this period, could have initiated the essential change hi attitudes which had to precede Quebec's own immigration development at home and overseas. Quebec must want immigration. The initiative had to come from her own politicians. CREATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION

Bill 75, Quebec's Immigration Department Act (Loi du ministere de rimmigration) became law on November 5, 1968, creating a Department of Immigration, an Interdepartmental Commission on Immigrant Affairs, and power to create an Immigration Advisory Committee. The Department is now in existence, the Interdepartmental Commission and Immigration Advisory Committee have been established, and, as we have seen, a Quebec immigration office has been opened in Paris (with the possibility

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of others perhaps in Belgium and southern Europe) and orientation officers have been placed in the Rome, Athens, and Beirut immigration offices. At the outset, Mario Beaulieu was Minister of Finance and Immigration in the Union Nationale government. Briefly, before the tragic events of October 1970 when he was kidnapped and murdered by FLQ terrorists, Pierre Laporte was Minister of Labour, Manpower, and Immigration in the Liberal administration. His place was taken by Jean Cournoyer as Minister of Labour and Manpower and Dr. Francois Cloutier as Minister of Immigration. The present Minister of Immigration is Jean Bienvenue, who is also responsible for manpower. Dr. Cloutier is now Minister of Education and is responsible for language policies. According to the Act, the Minister of Immigration is charged with the responsibility of carrying out immigration laws, promoting the settlement in the Province of Quebec of immigrants capable of contributing to its development and participating in its progress, and facilitating the adaptation of immigrants to the Quebec environment. His functions include analysis of labour demand and career openings in the province, research, provision of information for immigrants on the state of the labour market in Quebec,29 preservation of ethnic customs, and the setting up of an immigrants' aid service to welcome and assist immigrants on arrival in the province and to keep in touch with them and give them any assistance they may need. The relevant clauses of the Act relating to overseas operations and education read as follows: 5. The Minister, in cooperation with the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, may establish immigration offices outside the province of Quebec and assign functionaries and employees of his department thereto. 6. The Minister, in cooperation with the Minister of Education and the bodies responsible for education in the province of Quebec, shall see that courses in technical and vocational adaptation and special teaching programs are made available to the various groups of immigrants. He shall likewise promote the working out of standards for the recognition in the province of Quebec of diplomas, studies and training received or pursued abroad and for the evaluation of credits. 7. The Minister, with the authorization of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, may make any agreement with the Government of Canada or any body thereof and with any other government or body, in conformity with the interests and rights of the province of Quebec, to facilitate the carrying out of this act. The Interdepartmental Commission consists of government officials pre228

Ontario and Quebec sided over by the Minister or his representative. The purpose of the Commission is to "advise the Minister upon any matter respecting the application of this act and, upon his request, make to the various departments recommendations regarding the services which they might render to the Minister." The Advisory Committee consists of not more than fifteen members appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to advise the Minister upon any matter which he submits to it "respecting immigration, the adaptation of immigrants to their new environment and the preservation of ethnic customs." In November 1969, with the passage of the controversial Bill 63, which concerned language rights in Quebec, an important additional clause was added to this Act respecting the functions of the Minister of Immigration. The clause provided that he should make the necessary arrangements, in collaboration with the Minister of Education, to see that immigrants who settle in the Province of Quebec acquire, on or before arrival, a knowledge of the French language and place their children in educational institutions where the medium of instruction is French. The new Quebec Department of Immigration, whose principal operations are located in Montreal, is the first government department at any level in post-war Canada to be concerned solely with immigration, although this portfolio is generally combined with other responsibilities. It is very interesting, therefore, to look at its structure. Although this will, no doubt, undergo many changes, Chart 6 is an organization chart of the Department as it existed in the fall of 1969 when the author talked to a number of its new staff members. At this point it will be seen that the Department consisted of five major divisions, together with a group of officers who reported directly to the Minister and Deputy Minister (Coordonnateur avec Ottawa, Coordonnateur interministeriel, and others). Among these divisions, the Direction generate de 1'etablissement was responsible for basic services: overseas operations, reception, welfare, and placement; the Direction generate de 1'adaptation was responsible for matters relating to integration including, in collaboration with the Department of Education, the new Centres d'Orientation et de Formation des Immigrants (COFI) which have aroused great interest and which play an important part in Quebec's integration program. They provide, for the first time on a large scale, residential (and also non-residential) language training courses of varying length, in French and English, combined with a ten-day orientation program in Canadian and Quebec life. The COFI, as they are now widely known, were established by the Department of Education before the Department of Immigration came into being and were managed by the Education Department until April 1,1970, when they were taken over by the Department of Immigration. They 229

Secretaire general du Ministere

Comite consultatif

Commission interministerielle

Le Ministre Coordonnateur consulaire (Montreal)

Commissaire general (Montreal)

L sousministre

Coordonnateur interministeriel (Quebec)

Coordonnateur avec Ottawa (Montreal)

Services administratifs (Quebec et Montreal)

Direction generale de I'etablissement (Montreal)

Direction generale de 1' adaptation (Montreal)

Direction generale des groupes ethniques (Montreal)

CHART 6 Gouvernement du Quebec, le Ministere de I'lmmigration SOURCE: le Ministere de I'lmmigration

Direction de I' information (Montreal)

Ontario and Quebec provide three kinds of language courses whose precise length is determined by individual need: (1) courses in French, maximum duration 20 weeks; (2) courses in English for those who have a working knowledge of the French language, maximum duration 20 weeks; (3) courses in French and English for those who have no knowledge of either language, maximum duration 20 weeks of instruction in French followed by 20 weeks of instruction in English. There were at this point, four centres in the Montreal area of which one was residential, and there was one residential centre in Quebec. COFI La Prairie in the Montreal area, the largest of the centres, is a very effective and interesting residential operation and has attracted a constant stream of visitors since it opened, including senior officials from the Department of Manpower and Immigration, from Ontario and other provinces, and from overseas. There is a certain irony hi the fact that the COFI are very largely financed by the federal government through the Canada Manpower Training Program. In 1970-71 the Department of Manpower and Immigration purchased some 3,750 places in the Centres which are used on a continuous basis throughout the year. The regional office of the Department of Manpower and Immigration is in constant communication with the Departments of Immigration and Education and with the Centres themselves, and department officials have a regular two-hour seminar with immigrants during each orientation course. Recruitment is carried out by the Department of Manpower and Immigration, and all students must be registered with the Canada Manpower Centres. At this period, the Department of Immigration was working on a number of programs relating to the integration of immigrants, but they were still in the exploratory or very early stages of development. They included a province-wide information campaign about immigrants and immigration, negotiations with the professions to facilitate the admission of immigrants, plans for the building and administration of community centres for ethnic groups, encouragement of ethnic cultural activities and folk arts, and special programs for immigrant youth. A provincial reception service had already been created at Dorval Airport and has now been extended to other points of entry. The Department was in the process of establishing close working relations with the community agencies concerned with immigrants. It is obvious, as noted in the previous chapter, that now that Quebec is actually in the immigration business, she is very much closer to and involved with the federal government in this area of public policy. It is also clear that Quebec needs the federal government in order to carry out her own immigration program, not only for financial reasons. At the present time, for example, Quebec undoubtedly benefits from the size and effi231

PART THREE

ciency of the Foreign Branch of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. She has shown no wish to be involved in any way in the difficult problems of control in immigration. It is also clear that the federal government, on its part, is now making every possible effort, probably more than with any other province, in cooperation and support. In December 1969 and January 1971, Quebec at last signed the language training and textbook agreements with the federal government.30 On the first more ceremonial occasion, the Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier, and Quebec's Minister of Finance and Immigration, Mario Beaulieu, both stressed the excellent cooperation which existed between their two departments. Another very interesting feature of the period before and after the opening of Quebec's new Department of Immigration in the summer of 1969 has been the frequent communication of a mutual kind on immigration matters with Ontario. The future role of immigration in Quebec, as well as the response of immigrants to this new call for participation in a French-Canadian future in Canada and North America, is of the greatest interest and is closely bound up with future constitutional developments in Canada. The very important issues of language rights and the extent to which immigrants are encouraged or obliged to learn French and to have their children educated in the French language is clearly not finally clarified and settled despite Bill 63 which came down on the side of incentives rather than obligation. The Gendron Commission, a commission of inquiry into the position of the French language and language rights in Quebec, which has been studying the problem of language rights in the educational system as a priority item, has still not, at the time of writing, submitted its report which was expected late in 1970 or early in 1971.31 In the Montreal Le Devoir on November 22, 1969, following the final reading of Bill 63 in the National Assembly, Editor Claude Ryan suggested that this bill was simply a beginning, a first stage in the development of a linguistic policy for Quebec and that not one, but perhaps four or five, basic laws were required to deal adequately with all aspects of the language problem. On the specific issue of immigration, he wrote: Mais le bill, dans sa version definitive, continue de ne reposer que sur le principe de 1'incitation, surtout en ce qui a trait au choix de 1'ecole. Or, cela ne parait pas etre suflfisant pour regler le probleme que pose 1'integration des immigrants: on doit regretter que le gouvernement ait refuse de bouger sur ce point precis. II faudra suivre de tres pres le developpement de cette question. Et Ton retiendra 1'engagement qu'a pris le gouvernement de recourir a des dispositions plus fermes si les resultats de cette politique incitative devaient se reveler insuffisants. 232

Ontario and Quebec But immigrants in Quebec have shown—at St. Leonard and in other ways —that they have strong views on this issue too, and their cooperation will inevitably depend on the extent to which the Bourassa government and succeeding governments are successful in making French an effective working language in the province, and on the success or otherwise of the present federal policy of bilingualism and of the integration policies of the new Department of Immigration. But, above all, the whole enterprise of a well-planned and vigorous immigration program for Quebec depends for its success on the outcome of present and future federal and provincial policies aimed at achieving a major provincial economic upswing and steady economic development, so that Quebec can be economically, as well as politically and culturally, attractive to intending immigrants. It may be noted here that the St. Leonard incident developed as the result of a decision by the Roman Catholic School Board of St. Leonard, a suburb of Montreal, gradually to eliminate English classes and to make all schools in the area French unilingual schools as from September 1968. Immigrants in St. Leonard, mainly Italian, determined that their children should be educated in English, strongly protested this action to the Quebec government and subsequently withdrew their children from the St. Leonard schools. This provoked fierce resistance, some of it violent, from the Ligue Pour 1'Integration Scolaire which was advocating French-only instruction in elementary schools, and from other elements. The St. Leonard school crisis was eventually resolved following the passage of Bill 63. However, Pierre Laporte, then Minister responsible for immigration, announced afterwards that the dispute had proved to be "a real setback" in persuading immigrants to send their children to French-language schools and that over 80 percent of the new immigrants in the province were selecting English as the language of instruction for their children. As an outcome of these events, the Department of Immigration decided to launch a more intensive orientation program to persuade immigrants to become part of the French-speaking community in Quebec. The 1971-72 statistics for St. Leonard, however, show that the number of children in English classes is increasing. It is believed now that over 90 percent of the children of Italian origin are at present opting for the "English sector." With unemployment as high as 15 to 20 percent in some areas of Quebec, immigration cannot flourish, however much it may be felt to contribute to the long-term development. Even the 19,222 who chose to settle in Quebec in 1971 may have seemed to many people too large a number. In an interesting interview with the press in September 1971, the former Minister of Immigration, Dr. Francois Cloutier, announcing the introduction of some new measures in language training and integration generally, said that for the time being Quebec had decided "to hold back" 233

PART THREE

on immigrant recruiting, but that this would be temporary. He also discussed the effect of Bill 64, a further measure in the development of Quebec's language policy, which makes it compulsory for immigrants to acquire a working knowledge of French within a year after arrival, if they wish to practise in some twenty-five of the principal professions in Quebec. A few months later, his successor, Jean Bienvenue, said in a speech in Montreal that for the time being, large-scale immigration to Quebec was simply not feasible when jobs for immigrants could not be guaranteed.32 Immigrants with capital, however, were very welcome and would be encouraged. It is important to note that the present economic situation in Quebec does not only affect the recruitment and settlement of immigrants, it also inhibits the development of services for them. The Department of Immigration has a small budget and cannot engage in expensive projects or substantial funding. Voluntary agencies serving immigrants in Quebec, for example, have the same needs today as they have in other provinces. As in Ontario, therefore, there is a very good case, at the present time, for some joint development in this area with the federal government.

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Part Four Overseas Operations

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Chapter Nine Overseas Immigration Service

THE OVERSEAS SERVICE of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, now the Foreign Branch of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, has been one of the largest and most interesting external operations of the Canadian government in the post-war period.1 Nevertheless, Canadian politicians, the press, and the public have displayed an astonishing lack of interest in it. It has remained largely invisible and has been run until recently in the shadow of the more powerful departments overseas. Yet it has been most influential in Canadian post-war development. Interviews with present and former members of the Overseas Service reveal a remarkable unanimity about its satisfactions, difficulties, and defects, and provide patterns of experience at different levels and at different times which confirm and corroborate each other. Thus the director of an important visa office who joined the Service after the war as a Clerk, Grade II, and worked his way up, a recent recruit from a prairie university, and an ex-journalist now working as an information officer overseas all come to very similar conclusions. The verdict of the staff on the way this operation has been run is almost unanimous. One of the major themes which occurs over and over again in studying the overseas operations of these two Departments is their relationship with other Canadian government departments overseas, particularly with the Department of External Affairs. This relationship has not been satisfactory in the vital areas of communication, joint endeavour, shared services and resources, status, and staff mobility. The Glassco Commission drew attention to this situation in 1963. The recent decision of the Canadian government, plainly stated in the series of papers on foreign policy tabled in the House on June 25, 1970, to develop maximum integration in its foreign

PART FOUR

operations may at least correct what the Commission described as "a compartmentalization that is wasteful and weakens Canada's representation abroad."2 This compartmentalization was not only wasteful but was also often painful to those who were outside the prestige-giving overseas operations of the Canadian government. One other very serious outcome of this compartmental approach and the mutual ignorance that accompanied it was the fact that, thus far, immigration policy and programs have not been given sufficient weight and attention in the discussion and formulation of Canadian foreign policy.3 Material for this and the following chapter is drawn from several sources, but mainly from a series of interviews (seventy-eight in all) with present and former members of the overseas staff. Most of these interviews took place during three tours of immigration offices in Europe in 1964, 1966, and 1969. They were informal and often of some length. The directors of the overseas immigration offices and their senior officers were most generous with their time and conversations with them often continued over several days. As noted elsewhere, the interest, frankness, and keen desire to discuss Canadian immigration in all its aspects were very impressive. A further series of interviews was held in Ottawa with senior officials of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, including the present director and senior officers of the Foreign Branch. These interviews were supplemented by study of relevant files and official documents in the Department of Manpower and Immigration. Since so little is known about the Overseas Service and Foreign Branch in Canada, particular attention has been paid to this aspect of management. In examining the post-war development of this Service, the major policy changes which have been dealt with in earlier chapters will not be discussed in detail. We will concentrate rather on the internal administrative developments which have affected overseas operations and on the changing conditions and circumstances in which this Service has operated.

THE POST-WAR SITUATION IN EUROPE During the post-war period, the Overseas Service and Foreign Branch have operated primarily in a European context with a few significant outposts, now increased in number, elsewhere, and a small group of offices in the United States whose work has become increasingly important hi the last few years. The Middle East became a significant area of operations from the mid-fifties onwards, supplying a small number of, in the main, highly qualified immigrants. Although the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was not created until 1950, and there was no real attempt to institute and operate a selective immigration policy until that date, the 238

Overseas Immigration Service real origins of this Service are to be found in the immediate post-war situation in Europe. It was at that time, in a series of responses to emergency situations and in a period of great difficulty and confusion, that some of its basic characteristics were acquired. As we have seen, on June 6, 1947, the Canadian government, taking independent international action, provided by order-in-council for the admission of an initial number of 5,000 displaced persons. In that year there were five Canadian immigration teams working in Germany and Austria, with headquarters, from 1947 onwards, in Heidelberg. Later this number was increased to nine and the headquarters office was moved to Karlsruhe. Visa offices were reopened in Paris, Brussels, and The Hague. During this period, immigration was still the responsibility of the Department of Mines and Resources, with the Department of Labour also firmly in the field. In Germany the Canadian Immigration Mission was under the temporary sponsorship of the U.S. Occupation Authorities, and its members carried U.S. Occupation Authority identity cards and drivers' licences. These teams were continuously on the move in Germany and Austria. Their living and working conditions were exceedingly difficult, yet their work, by all accounts, was exciting and rewarding. Moving from one camp to another and living out of suitcases or the trunk of a car where possible, they interviewed displaced persons in very large numbers. At the beginning, they had no base, no headquarters. Each team was mobile and consisted of immigration, medical, labour, and security officers. The International Refugee Organization made arrangements to advertise Canadian opportunities in the camps and to notify the Canadian Mission when camps should be visited. In a speech at Dalhousie University in November 1948, Dr. Keenleyside paid a warm tribute to the work of these teams and, in particular, to the head of the Canadian Government Immigration Mission: The initial work of starting the movement towards Canada was done by a single immigration officer, whose office was in his suitcase and whose method of transportation was by thumbing rides from military or other vehicles on the German roads. Starting from this meagre beginning, the organization developed to the condition I have described. [This officer] has done a most admirable job, as have the representatives of the other Departments concerned. I think it is not an exaggeration to say that the achievement of bringing to Canada something over 50,000 D.P.'s between July 1947 and November 1948 under the conditions that existed in Germany during that time, and in spite of the transportation difficulties which had to be overcome, is as remarkable a performance as anything that is to be found in the history of immigration to Canada.4

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The movement of displaced persons became a major operation and, by 1952, was employing a staff of some 150 people. The senior officer-incharge at that time described how absorbing it was to have been involved in this particular operation and the considerable effort and hard work that went into it. Conditions were very difficult. Turnover was high among the early visa officers in Germany. Some were sent back to Canada after a very short stay. ("Very raw recruits. They didn't know how to behave in a foreign country.") But some were very good indeed and laboured very hard in the cause. Those who were closely involved in this special movement, and look back on it now, obviously feel great pride in this largescale and successful effort in post-war immigration. THE PROBLEM OF JURISDICTION It was in this period of emergency, therefore, that the elements of the Canadian post-war Overseas Immigration Service were rather hastily assembled, more for the purpose of dealing with an immediate crisis than for the establishment of a permanent overseas operation of the Canadian government. At the outset a serious problem of jurisdiction arose in Ottawa and in Europe which has already been discussed. Under whose auspices should this Service really operate? For several years the Department of Mines and Resources and the Department of Labour fought this out. As already noted, an Immigration-Labour Committee was set up in Ottawa in 1947 with representatives of the Departments of Mines and Resources, Labour, Health and Welfare, and External Affairs. It was given the task of determining labour needs in Canada, defining the categories and numbers of displaced persons who were to be admitted, and generally watching over this movement. But in Europe, officials of the Immigration Branch and the Department of Labour were operating in an independent fashion, reporting back to their own chiefs in Ottawa. The former enemy territories were the critical areas. It was there that the Department of Mines and Resources had considerable difficulty in establishing the authority of their senior immigration official in Germany vis-a-vis the Department of Labour. There is urgent correspondence on this subject in the administration files of this period between Ottawa and Heidelberg and between senior officials in Ottawa. A telegram sent on October 1, 1947, from the Deputy Minister, then on a visit to Europe, to the Director of Immigration in Ottawa conveys how serious this matter was felt to be: This telegram emphasizes again the absolute necessity of doing something soon to set up a central office and get our own man in charge of 240

Overseas Immigration Service it. Then we can insist that all correspondence be channelled through him. This business of using a Labour Department official as the chief representative of the Canadian Government in dealing with immigration matters on the Continent must stop.5 On his return to Ottawa, the Deputy Minister wrote at some length to his counterpart in the Ministry of Labour in an attempt to clarify this issue. We feel very strongly here that there is a clear line of demarcation between the duties of the Department of Labour and the Department of Mines and Resources in connection with the movement of Displaced Persons to Canada. It is our view, and this has been repeatedly accepted and endorsed by the Government, that prior to their arrival in Canada the chief responsibility and the direction of this immigration movement should be in the hands of the Immigration Branch. After the arrival of the Displaced Person in Canada, the handling and direction of this immigration movement should be in the hands of the Department of Labour. . .. You will recall that on the 8th of August, the Acting Minister of this Department submitted a recommendation to Cabinet, which included the following paragraph: (b) That a Senior Immigration Officer have direction and be responsible for the work in Germany as it is necessary to co-ordinate work of various units comprising teams. He is well-qualified to assume command of operations. . . . It is recommended that he be officially designated Head of all Canadian teams operating in Occupied Territory, and if possible be given Consular ranking in Germany and Austria. This recommendation was accepted by the Government on the 14th of August and this decision was communicated to everyone concerned by the Secretary of the Cabinet.6 The problem of authority in the European area of operations was eventually settled, and the Immigration Mission in Germany was given full responsibility in that area. But as we have seen, the conflict between these two Departments, based on different concepts of the role of immigration in national policy and of the expertise required to plan and control it, remained and was inherited by the newly created Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950. In addition to the difficult question—who should run immigration?— temporarily resolved in this early period, there were problems of accreditation and status for the new Overseas Service, some of which are not totally resolved today. 241

PART FOUR THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS It was obvious that the Department of External Affairs must have a major say in the location of the overseas immigration offices and in the accreditation and status of this Service and its staff. As time went on, and it became clear that there would be a substantial and continuing emigration movement from Europe necessitating a fairly elaborate organization to deal with it, it became urgent to decide on more permanent accommodation for the Immigration Mission in Germany and Austria and on the location of other immigration offices. This immediately involved problems relating to the military occupation of Germany and Austria by the four powers and relationships with European governments. American accreditation, travel facilities, and other privileges were temporary benefits— what would happen when military occupation came to an end? As a permanent arrangement, should a visa office be part of a Canadian embassy? Should it be part of a consulate? Could immigration officials also act as consular officials? Should immigration officials have diplomatic status? If location and status privileges were sought from foreign governments for immigration offices and staffs, would there be an embarrassing obligation to reciprocate in Canada? These were difficult questions and, in nearly all cases, the voice of the Department of External Affairs was decisive. From 1948 onwards, there was constant discussion about the permanent location of immigration offices in Germany and Austria. On September 29, 1948, a cabinet decision was taken to establish three consulates in Germany and Austria—at Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Salzburg—where there would be "Immigration Inspectional Facilities." The Acting Undersecretary of State for External Affairs pointed out, in a letter of December 14, 1948, that it would not be possible for the officers of the immigration teams in Germany and Austria to have diplomatic status. Consular status would be possible. But in January 1949, Laval Fortier, then Associate Commissioner for the Overseas Service, wrote to the head of the Immigration Mission in Karlsruhe telling him that the Department of External Affairs had turned down their request for diplomatic status and had "definitely decided that if three Consulates were opened, they would wish their officers to be in charge in Frankfurt and Hamburg."7 It proved, however, too difficult to establish a Canadian consulate in Salzburg. The United States did not approve of it, as they feared that the Soviet government might somehow use this as a useful precedent. Indeed, the whole plan as originally envisaged was abandoned. But in March 1949 the first Austrian visa office was opened in Salzburg, accredited first to the U.S. High Commissioner for Austria and then to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany. Three years later it was moved 242

Overseas Immigration Service to Linz in the U.S. Zone which was thought to be more accessible for refugees and others; in 1955 it was transferred to Vienna, as part of the Canadian legation, but in separate premises. The Department of External Affairs steadily favoured separate premises and has done so until very recently. It remains to be seen whether this attitude will change as a result of the government's present policy of maximum integration in its foreign operations. Much later, in 1960 when the possibility of establishing a consulate in Stuttgart was being discussed, there were two interesting comments in letters from Mr. Fortier, Deputy Minister, since 1950, of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, who was then in Germany: "I further pointed out to him that there was always some reticence or objection by External abroad in having in the same office the Immigration and External Affairs staffs, in view of our clientele in Immigration." And a few days later: "The Embassy does not like having so many callers at the office as they are concerned from a security standpoint."8 Military occupation came to an end in Germany in 1955. For a year immigration officials in Germany operated without proper accreditation, identity cards, or established status. As the end of the occupation approached, the question of status was taken up again with the Department of External Affairs. Its decision was conveyed in a memorandum to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration on May 24, 1955. The head of the Canadian Immigration Mission in Germany only was to have diplomatic status. This was a vital precedent and remained unchanged for the next ten years. Additional immigration offices in Germany were to be designated as branch visa offices. Neither the officers in charge of branch offices, nor the senior officers at headquarters, other than the officer-incharge, were to have diplomatic status. Questions of status apart, it was exceedingly difficult to decide where offices should be located in Germany during this period. The new political institutions and industrial structure of West Germany were still settling into place; large numbers of people were still on the move; the refugee problem was still serious. There were visa offices in Hanover from 1951 to 1956 and in Bremen from 1953 to 1955. Offices were opened in Hamburg and Munich in 1954, in West Berlin in 1955, and in Stuttgart in 1956. In May 1956 it was agreed, and approved by the Department of External Affairs, that immigration headquarters in Germany should move from Karlsruhe to Cologne, and on December 4, 1956, the Minister, Mr. Pickersgill, officially opened the new immigration office in Cologne-Mulheim. The Department of External Affairs, as we shall see, from this early point on, consistently regarded the Immigration Service as a lowly and separate part of the overseas establishment of the Canadian government.

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It was never seen at this early stage, and even much later, as an integral and potentially very valuable part of the whole Canadian image-building and information-giving apparatus overseas. It was accorded no prestige whatsoever. In 19 62 a senior officer of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration undertook an exploratory and goodwill tour of all the European embassies in cities where visa offices were located. The purpose of this tour was to explore the existing relations between the overseas staff of these two Canadian departments and to encourage closer collaboration. The tour was felt to have been useful and was thought to have paved the way, at least to some extent, for a somewhat changed attitude on the part of the Department of External Affairs later on. But at that time the officer found that, with few exceptions, External Affairs staff regarded immigration as an inevitable but rather unpleasant fact; did not want to admit immigration officers into their jealously guarded category of foreign service officer; and did not feel that immigration officers were of the calibre, education, or class to make them suitable for any kind of equal status. But low status in Europe, low rank in relation to other Canadian departments overseas, the consequences flowing from a complete operational separation of one department from another, later noted and regretted by the Glassco Commission, became real difficulties for the Overseas Service in the ensuing years. This was a lost opportunity. A much more cooperative relationship could have been created from the beginning between the Departments of External Affairs, Trade and Commerce, and Citizenship and Immigration, and its successor. As it was, the Departments of External Affairs and of Trade and Commerce established their own elite status, and the Overseas Service was left far behind. Over the whole post-war period, it is fair to say that the Department of External Affairs has exercised a certain liberalizing influence on immigration policy because of the requirements of external relations, but, until very recently, has played an inhibiting role in the proper growth and development of the Overseas Immigration Service. It is interesting to consider why this was so. Part of the answer lies in the primary importance attached by the Mackenzie King and St. Laurent governments to the creation of an effective foreign policy and foreign service for Canada. This had total priority and was, in many ways, an exclusive operation, not only in relation to immigration. As noted elsewhere, there was no strong conviction behind the government's immigration policies, and immigration itself represented a rather unpredictable kind of development, except to the few who saw its potential value. In addition, there appears to have been no deliberate effort for many years to coordinate the activities of government departments overseas, although this 244

Overseas Immigration Service could always be achieved to some extent through the efforts of the head of a Canadian mission. Equally there seems to have been no general feeling on the part of the Department of External Affairs that a much weaker sector of the public service operating overseas should have every encouragement and support. Again there were a few missions where that feeling was present. The general failure to embrace immigration as a lesser but nevertheless important part of Canada's overseas operations, and to consider immigration officers as respected members of the overseas establishment, was a reflection also of the class structure in Canada immediately after the war, and of the rather clannish nature of the small, mainly Liberal elite which had charge of Canada's external relations. The authority and competence of this elite remained largely unchallenged until the early sixties. It must be noted here, too, that in the immediate post-war period the Department of External Affairs was itself faced with considerable difficulties. The significant role which Canada had played during the Second World War involved her, with her allies, in a series of new and very demanding situations from 1945 onwards. Experienced Canadian diplomats and foreign service officers were scarce. In 1940 there were only seven Canadian missions abroad and forty-four officers serving overseas. The Department obviously had limited experience of operating, on any scale, with other Canadian departments overseas. In the past, immigration agents had made little or no impact on the upper bureaucracy. An organized and extensive Immigration Service, however elementary, was a new phenomenon, and it produced a new and disturbing kind of Canadian representative overseas, not tailored to the education or class image of an inexperienced but developing foreign service whose reputation still had to be made. It is probable also that there was a real fear of dilution (of personnel) within the Department, some of which had already taken place as a result of wartime activities and expansion. In addition, the Immigration Service itself, operating on an individual and non-governmental level, appealing directly to the citizens of states with whom the Department was endeavouring to establish cordial relations, may well have seemed an embarrassing activity. Nevertheless, it was in these very early days of the Overseas Immigration Service that an unfortunate but indelible impression was created among individual immigration officers of second-class status in relation to the Departments of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce. Clearly inferior to both in rank, pay, and privileges, outside the diplomatic circle, quite often excluded or forgotten on social occasions open to other Canadians overseas, immigration officials took this matter to heart and it has rankled ever since. 245

PART FOUR RECRUITMENT Before 1950, staff intake, administration, and the potential planning of an Immigration Service were almost totally governed by emergency conditions. Recruitment to the ranks of the Immigration Service in the immediate post-war period was handled by senior officers of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources, whose careers, in the main, had covered the period of very limited immigration and the deliberately restrictionist policies of the war and the depression. It was they who were largely responsible for creating the post-war Service. While responding in a vigorous way to post-war emergency conditions, they set a stamp on the new Service which has proved very hard to remove. This was the calculation that it could be run by fairly low-ranking personnel without special qualifications. As in other areas of the public service, Grade 12 was then the basic educational requirement for immigration officers, although experience, then mainly war experience, was a factor. In the view of management at that time, immigration mainly involved controlling the flow of what looked like an unlimited supply of immigrants. Thus, it was felt that officers who handled human traffic at the border could handle it in Europe. A tour overseas could be taken as part of their normal assignment. Their ranks could be enlarged by the recruitment of some Canadian exservice personnel and others who might wish to serve or to continue serving overseas. The initial point of entry into this part of the public service in 1949 for a young man with a Grade 12 education was a Clerk, Grade II, with a basic starting salary of $1,770. One or two young university graduates were recruited at this time and they were given a slightly higher clerical grade. In 1949, the senior officer overseas, the Superintendent of European Emigration, had a basic salary of $6,000. It is clear now that it was a cardinal error to take such a limited view of the requirements of this Service and to hamper its development through this low initial classification. This point is made over and over again by senior officers of the former Department of Citizenship and Immigration who reflect upon its history and development. Moves should have been made as soon as possible to try and establish a career foreign service similar to, and to some extent at least, integrated with those of the Departments of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce. It should have been properly staffed, classified, and properly paid, with an establishment which could expand and in which there were reasonable chances of promotion and career development. The continuing problems of status and lack of prestige, the chronic staff shortages in the fifties and sixties, the failure to recruit or to develop from within a sufficient number of senior officers, the painful readjustments and upgrading which had to be undertaken when a 246

Overseas Immigration Service proper career foreign service was finally introduced in 1965, all stem, in large part, from this early planning failure. It is to the credit of the initial planners, however, that among the early entrants to the Immigration Service, at home and abroad, was a small group of able men, young and mainly without qualifications, who would today be automatically regarded as university candidates. Most were exservice men who were married, who needed a job quickly, or who wished to stay overseas.9 There was a microscopic sprinkling of university graduates among them. Despite low pay, lack of prestige, and other disadvantages, many of them stayed with the Service, and it was fortunate and indeed remarkable that they did. Both overseas and in Canada it was this generation, this special cadre of immigration officers who, to a considerable extent, managed the immigration operation in the post-war period. They stayed on, it seems clear, mainly and sometimes only because of the interest and rewarding character of the job itself and the fascination it undoubtedly has for those involved in it. These officers are now in senior positions in the Home and Foreign Branches, although a new generation has begun to take over and integration within the Department of Manpower and Immigration and among Canada's overseas operations may well bring new managers, greater interchangeability of personnel, and new styles of management. Among the early entrants, however, it is reliably reported that there were also some with very moderate abilities, some with none, a few who were in it for what they could get, and one or two with criminal tendencies. These were the "rough nuggets," as they are referred to, who were even less External's image than others. Europe at that time obviously offered exceptional opportunities to the criminally minded and especially to those protected by military rank. Some refugees would offer anything for a visa —daughters, jewellery, money. There were innumerable opportunities for lucrative deals and rackets. Visas could be sold, medical records switched, a dubious political past overlooked. Nevertheless, there were remarkably few real breaches of the law among the immigration teams and officials working in Europe in these early years.10 Nonetheless, it is felt that, policies and attitudes apart, Immigration's image with other Canadian departments overseas, particularly with the Department of External Affairs, started off badly. "External people did not like the way we operated," said a French Canadian who was working in Germany in 1948. "It was too rough, but we had to go where the people were. And External did not like us too much either!" In a variety of ways, therefore, the views that immigration should be regarded as a strictly limited functional activity which has no representational aspect, a limited information-giving role, and no particular need for status; that it

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should occupy separate premises, partly for security reasons and partly because of its "mass" nature; and that immigration officers were a rather different and lesser breed than the officers of the more senior and established departments overseas, undoubtedly had its vital origins in this early period.

VISA OFFICES Late in 1947, a recent recruit to the Immigration Service was sent to Rome to find premises and a secretary in order to open a visa office on a temporary basis. He was allowed a budget of $500 for furniture and equipment. He found an office which he thought would be adequate for the time being. Doing the best he could with $500, he explored the secondhand furniture markets and pawnshops and found desks, chairs, and a typewriter. He opened the office in January 1948. This office at 9, Via Acherusio became the principal, and until 1966 the only, visa office in Italy. It was finally closed in 1967. An unprepossessing string of rooms above a huddle of small shops, the former Rome office has been described in many ways, but most frequently, simply as a slum. For years the staff urged a move to better quarters. It is reported that action was only finally taken in 1965 when J. R. Nicholson, then Minister, on a summer visit with the Director of the Overseas Service, found the offices unbearably hot and so noisy that he could not make himself heard. He was obliged to retire to his hotel, and ordered an immediate search for new premises. The office in the Via Acherusio, perhaps the worst of its kind, is an example of unsuitable, unattractive offices acquired in the immediate postwar period when accommodation in Europe was extremely difficult to find. The old Paris office, abandoned in 1968, is another example. Accommodation often depended upon the goodwill of military authorities or of new foreign governments. Sometimes this produced an unexpected windfall like the very pleasant office used until recently in The Hague.11 But more often, abandoned barracks and refugee camps or old-fashioned, run-down offices were all that could be found. It required energetic action to get out of them when rebuilding got under way and new modern office blocks began to appear in European cities in the early fifties. But neither energetic action, nor appreciation of the need to move, nor money for new offices could be obtained from Ottawa for some fourteen years. In the meantime, parts of the Overseas Service had to manage in some very poor accommodation and its efficiency and public impact suffered accordingly.12 Today, however, standards of accommodation and furnishing for the overseas immigration offices, as they are now called, are very much higher. Impressive modern offices have been acquired in Paris and Rome, the 248

Overseas Immigration Service TABLE 20 CANADIAN IMMIGRATION OFFICES ABROAD AS OF JULY 31, 1970 Australia : Austria : Belgium: Denmark : France: Germany : Greece : Hong Kong : Hungary: India: Ireland : Israel : Italy:

Sydney Vienna Brussels Copenhagen Paris Bordeaux Marseilles Cologne Hamburg Stuttgart Athens Hong Kong Budapest New Delhi Dublin Tel Aviv Rome AAil on IVlllcLll

Jamaica : Japan :

Kingston Tokyo

Lebanon : Netherlands : Pakistan: Portugal : The Philippines : Spain : Sweden : Switzerland: Trinidad: United Arab Republic : United Kingdom:

United States: Yugoslavia:

Beirut The Hague Islamabad Lisbon Ponta Delgada Manila Madrid Stockholm Berne Port of Spain Cairo London Belfast Birmingham Glasgow Manchester Chicago New York San Francisco Belgrade

Vienna, The Hague, Hong Kong, and Milan offices have been relocated, and internal improvements have been made elsewhere. In 1969 the immigration offices in Beirut, Islamabad, New Delhi, Hong Kong, Port of Spain, and Tel Aviv were all enlarged and improved in response to a growing number of applications. A list of the opening and closing dates of all Canadian immigration offices abroad from 1945 to 1970 will be found in Appendix 5. Table 20 shows the immigration offices in operation as of July 31, 1970. MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE One of the first moves of the new Department of Citizenship and Immigration was to improve the management structure of the former Immigration Branch which was quite inadequate for the post-war scale of

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operations. In 1951 this structure was reorganized on a functional basis. There were five major divisions, each with a senior officer reporting to the Director of Immigration who was responsible to the Deputy Minister. The five divisions were Settlement, Admissions, Operations, Inspection, and Administration. The Operations Division was largely responsible for the Overseas Service and the Chief of this Division became a key figure in the overseas operation. The post itself had considerable status within the Immigration Branch. This organizational pattern, though developed and improved as time went on, remained in operation until 1964. The Chief of the Operations Division, who later became known as the Director of Operations, a title which is still used in the Foreign Branch of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, was responsible to the Director of the Immigration Branch for all field operations. This involved responsibility for the management of all districts and ports in Canada and all offices overseas. For a brief period after the war, the European visa offices, following traditional practice, came under the jurisdiction of the Superintendent of Immigration in London. But this arrangement caused considerable delay and confusion, and in 1951 the United Kingdom and European operations were separated for all administrative purposes. The officer-in-charge of each European office became directly responsible to the Director of Immigration in Ottawa through the Chief of the Operations Division, a pattern which remained unchanged until 1964. The United Kingdom offices did not become separate and independent units in 1951 like the European offices. They remained under the jurisdiction of the Superintendent of the London office who, like other officers-in-charge but always with a rather special status, was directly responsible until 1964, through the Chief of the Operations Division, to the Director of Immigration in Ottawa. The policy of complete independence from each other for the major national visa offices in Europe had many disadvantages. It led to a proliferation of solitudes, only slowly and partially alleviated by the practice of holding annual conferences for officers-in-charge which was introduced for the first time in Karlsruhe, then the principal German visa office, in 1953. Lines of communication ran strictly back and forth across the Atlantic. Even though at one point visa officers were explicitly authorized to communicate with one another in addition to communicating with headquarters, there appears to have been very little positive interchange of ideas and methods between posts during the lifetime of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The constant circulation of staff, however, clearly helped to create a sense of fraternity among overseas officers and provided a useful grapevine for information. This system, in which a group of independent units spoke directly and individually to Ottawa, but said 250

Overseas Immigration Service very little to each other, also facilitated a highly centralized and, in many ways, an autocratic headquarters operation. As we have already seen, a special directorate for the Overseas Service was created in 1964 as part of the extensive reorganization of the Immigration Branch which took place at that time. There had been increasing recognition within the Branch that the Overseas Service had special needs in terms of planning, staff, and physical equipment. From 1963 onwards, management hi Ottawa had both the determination and the means to begin to meet these needs; the creation of a separate directorate for the Overseas Service was an initial move in this direction. It was accompanied by a renewed effort to create a career foreign service in immigration which is discussed later in this chapter. This was the first significant change hi management structure since 1951. A further change occurred in 1966 when the new Department of Manpower and Immigration adopted a policy of decentralized operational control to be achieved through the creation of five regional offices in Canada and the following regions for the Overseas Service, now called the Foreign Branch: Region A: Region B: Region C:

The Americas, Asia, and Africa Headquarters: Ottawa The United Kingdom Headquarters: London Europe Headquarters: Geneva

It appears that there was considerable discussion at the outset as to whether Europe should be considered as one region or as more than one. Eventually it was decided, particularly in view of the expense involved, to start with one and perhaps to create other regions later. When interviewed in the fall of 1966, the director of the new regional office in Geneva firmly stated his belief that a regional system was very desirable provided that the regional offices were given sufficient authority, and that more than one region would be required in Europe. Since 1951 the United Kingdom operation had, in effect, been run as one region with headquarters in London. The 1966 change simply meant that the headquarters organization was strengthened and divided into a London office and a regional office with separate quarters and overall authority. But the regional system did not last long in the Foreign Branch. By the summer of 1969, the new regional headquarters in Geneva was closing down and its director returning to Ottawa. There were a number of reasons for the decision to abandon the regions. In July 1968 a new Deputy Minister of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, Louis Couil251

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lard, who had had long experience in the Department of External Affairs, replaced Tom Kent, a keen advocate of decentralization, who had supported the regional idea inherited (in its overseas form) from the old Department. The new Deputy was said to believe very firmly in a strengthening of the headquarters team. Regional offices were expensive and involved scattering able people across the globe. Some senior officers at headquarters and in the field believed that, at this stage, regional offices created an unnecessary roadblock or detour in the decision-making process and that the rapid communication then possible between Ottawa and the overseas offices made them redundant. Region A (the Americas, Asia, and Africa), although only a first stage in the development of appropriate regions in this huge area, was an administrative impossibility. There had been great difficulty in deciding where its headquarters should be and this was temporarily based in Ottawa. Nevertheless, there was a good deal to be said for a regional office in Geneva, an important centre of international activity, the headquarters of UNHCR and ICEM and the voluntary organizations concerned with international migration and refugee work. The office proved very valuable during the Czechoslovakian crisis, and it may well be that there are other continental areas—Asia for example—where some kind of regional headquarters, able to develop some communication between far-flung immigration offices and also a wide range of useful contacts, on a continuing basis, may eventually prove desirable. With the regional idea abandoned, at least for the time being, the system of a separate directorate for the Overseas Service/Foreign Branch established in 1964 continued as before, managing and communicating directly with all immigration offices overseas and in the United States and responsible for the recruitment, training, allocation, and career development of its personnel. This system had, in fact, hardly altered during the regional interregnum. But one local consequence of these changes was that all United Kingdom offices (London, Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow, and Belfast) communicated, for the first time, directly with Ottawa, instead of being organized on a regional basis. This may not be a desirable outcome, since a good deal of consultation is needed among this group of offices. Two very important developments have now occurred which may have a profound effect on the management of the Foreign Branch. The first is the deliberate policy of integration of the Manpower and Immigration Divisions in Canada and overseas which is now being pursued by the Department, and the recent decision that the Foreign Branch should be a branch of the whole Department and not only of the Immigration Division. The second is the recent decision of the Canadian government to 252

Overseas Immigration Service establish "maximum integration in its foreign operations." Both these developments will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. It is not proposed here to examine in detail the financing of the Overseas Service and Foreign Branch, but in order to give some idea of the cost of overseas operations in immigration during the post-war period, the following items are included as Appendix 6: a statement of the annual budget of the Overseas Service in the areas of operations and information for the years 1950-69; and a statement of the total expenditure for the years 1950-69 of four major offices: London, Paris, Karlsruhe/Cologne, and Rome, prior to the present integration policy in Canadian overseas operations. SLOW PROGRESS The progress of the Overseas Service from 1950 onwards can only be understood in the light of political and economic developments in Canada and the attitudes of the federal and provincial governments towards immigration which have been discussed in earlier chapters. Because the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was, in many ways, a "deprived" department, with weak political support, its requests ranking low in the order of priorities, the awakening to real needs in terms of the men, money, and plant to run an efficient, competitive overseas immigration service was slow. Before 1963, those at the most senior level who were aware of some of these needs seemed unable to overcome existing opposition and negative attitudes in Ottawa or to push their claims hard enough to carry the day in vital ministerial, Treasury Board, Foreign Service Committee, and other discussions where the major decisions governing the Overseas Service were taken. Able members of the Immigration Branch in Ottawa and overseas became aware of essential requirements fairly early, and there is ample evidence in the files of a range of sensible recommendations being urged by some senior members of the Branch in Ottawa and by directors of the overseas offices and others. Their recommendations were mainly in the large areas of improved immigration planning, swifter and better administration, better personnel management, improved status, better offices and information materials, and more conferences and consultation. While some suggestions were accepted and acted upon, mainly those which were inexpensive, there existed, until at least 1963, a curious void into which the major recommendations were consigned and from which they never emerged. Officers-in-charge overseas have complained that serious and well-documented proposals were sometimes turned down in Ottawa by quite junior staff. Through the fifties and early sixties, recommendations were coming in and decisions were being made on the same 253

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subject in Ottawa, with very little correspondence between them. And the decisions were often made for political and financial reasons which were rarely explained to the staff who had to carry them out. The reasons for this basic communication failure and waste of ideas and effort, with its consequent impact on performance, probably lie in the low expectations of senior management in the light of cabinet irresolution on the question of immigration. One may guess that frequently recommendations did not reach or did not get past the desk of the Deputy Minister, or survive discussion with the Minister, because of the often-confirmed expectation that a higher decision would be negative, or that to push harder would simply invite trouble in this exceedingly difficult area. To this negative attitude towards the essential requirements of the Overseas Service can be added a plain lack of expertise in Ottawa in running a foreign service: in thinking hard enough about status, working, living, and travelling conditions for staff; about their relations with other departments and officials overseas; and about their own needs in terms of training, language skills, and knowledge of the people and communities in which they would have to work. In this last area, knowledge of foreign peoples and foreign communities, there are similar situations in other areas of Canadian life. The approach, in terms of staff qualifications and training, which was evident in the management of Canada's overseas immigration operations during this period, can also be seen in official attitudes, until very recently, towards Canada's own minorities and ethnic groups, and in public attitudes towards overseas students and towards very different human societies and cultures. This approach is based on the view that reasonable, conventional behaviour and goodwill are sufficient without further effort. Although this is not the same as indifference and is regarded as positive by its practitioners, it leads all too often to a very superficial understanding and treatment of a problem. Where and how this originated in Canada makes fascinating speculation. It is clearly changing now. Did it derive from a simplistic, Christian, church and adult education approach? Was it the outcome of a conventional liberalism with its avowed humanitarianism and frequent unwillingness to come to terms with the tougher implications of that philosophy? Or was it simply ignorance and lack of curiosity? Whatever its origin, the failure to undertake the long demanding work of mastering a foreign language, of trying to penetrate the infinite complexity of other cultures, other sets of values, of attempting truly to understand human beings who are very different was as apparent in immigration during a good part of the period under discussion, as it was in some other significant areas of Canadian life. A further deterrent to efficient performance in this field was the tradi254

Overseas Immigration Service tional concept of the public servant, inherited from Britain, as one who is efficient, humane, and free from corruption; carrying out a policy, but not visibly making it; never practising the vulgar arts of publicity; never watching his image since the virtues of his administration would shine crystal clear; and never requiring, in his dealings with the public at large, the comforting aids of broadloom, cushions, and pictures on the wall. This view was in many ways a roadblock to the imaginative development of the Overseas Service. The immigration officer is in certain respects a promoter, a public relations officer, an image-builder. It is unrealistic to ignore this aspect of his work and, for this, he needs the tools of the trade. In a harsh and competitive world too, immigrants need reassurance, comfort, and a measure of reasonable seduction. Austere, unattractive offices, drab waiting rooms, old films, bleak and poorly printed information materials, all work against the best efforts of a hard-working immigration officer. It took a number of years before these facts were properly appreciated. Despite these difficulties and roadblocks, it would be untrue to suggest that the Overseas Service remained deprived, inadequately staffed, and poorly equipped during the whole of this period, making no progress whatsoever. It did progress, if slowly. As time went on, staff were better treated and early attempts were made to establish a career foreign service, to introduce better administration and better planning within the difficult context of no national planning, and to improve equipment and materials within the limits of very restricted budgets. It should not be suggested either that the only factors holding development back were in the areas of national attitudes towards immigration, lack of expertise in running this kind of service, old-fashioned concepts of the role of the public servant, and general parsimony. Unemployment in Canada was a major factor. It would be difficult, for example, to exaggerate the blow dealt to the Overseas Service and to the Immigration Branch in general by two minor and one major bout of government austerity, which were the outcome of economic downswings and high levels of unemployment. The major one, which occurred under the Diefenbaker government in the early sixties, came at a most unfortunate time for the Overseas Service and caused serious delay in development projects and general improvements which had been planned and authorized. OVERSEAS CONFERENCES The growth and development of the Overseas Service and Foreign Branch are reflected in the progress of the Conferences of Officers-inCharge Abroad which were first organized on a very small scale in the

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early fifties. The attitude of the Immigration Branch towards overseas conferences was initially very cautious, and at first the initiative came from individual members of the overseas staff. In October 1953 the Immigration Attache in Helsinki, after an informal meeting of immigration officers stationed in Scandinavia, wrote to Ottawa, suggesting that it would be very useful to have annual meetings of all officers-in-charge. The reply from the Chief of the Operations Division was terse: "The suggestion you make was envisaged a year and a hah0 ago. Because of the high cost involved in relation to the results achieved, the idea was discarded. At large posts, i.e. where several offices are under one jurisdiction, an annual meeting is taking place as you suggest. This is as far as we can go at the moment."13 Two months later, however, a special seminar for immigration officers in Germany was held at Karlsruhe under the chairmanship of the director of the Karlsruhe visa office. It was very successful and all those who took part urged that it should take place annually. A similar seminar was held in Karlsruhe again in November 1954 and for three subsequent years. At the same time, annual meetings of officers-in-charge in the United Kingdom were being held in London under the chairmanship of the Superintendent of the United Kingdom Immigration Service. The first truly European conference was held in 1958 in the new German headquarters in Cologne. It included Canadian staff in Germany and officers-in-charge in Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Berne, Vienna, Lisbon, Athens, Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Helsinki. Enthusiastic reports flowed into Ottawa afterwards. In his official report, the conference chairman described it as a very stimulating and satisfying event. It was the first time that a large number of immigration officers in Europe had had the chance of meeting each other and discussing their professional activities and problems. By now management was convinced that an annual conference in Europe was very desirable. The United Kingdom meetings had also attained conference status. In 1959 the conference, now officially called Conference of Officers-in-Charge Abroad, was held in Paris, and a United Kingdom and Eire conference was held in London at the same time. In 1960 the conference was held in Brussels and in 1961 in Rome. The 1961 Rome conference appears to have represented a definite step forward in more sophisticated conference organization and better advance planning. In 1962, however, all immigration conferences (District, Headquarters, U.K., and Continent) were cancelled as part of the Department's austerity program. Although this ban was lifted hi October 1963, the overseas conference did not get under way again until two years later. The next significant event was the 1967 conference held, with all the comforts of a 256

Overseas Immigration Service business convention, in the new Intercontinental Hotel in Geneva, a stone's throw from the Department's first regional office in Europe. The main purpose of this conference was to explain the new immigration regulations of that year which embodied the new admission categories and nine-point assessment system. Similar conferences were held at the same time in Quebec City for immigration officers from Quebec, Ontario, and the Maritimes and in Victoria, B.C., for officers from the Prairies, British Columbia, the United States, and Asian countries. There was no European conference in 1968, but in October of that year, a Far Eastern conference was held in Hong Kong for officers from Hong Kong, Manila, Tokyo, Islamabad, and New Delhi. In November a similar conference was held in Port of Spain for officers from the Caribbean and the United States. In 1969 another major European conference was held at the Intercontinental Hotel in Geneva, attended by a number of senior officials. The major theme of this conference was the recent and important decision, which will be discussed later, to integrate the Foreign Branch with the work of the Department as a whole and to increase its responsibilities. The following brief comments on this long series of meetings and conferences are derived from study of the conference files and discussion with some of those who took part from 1953 onwards. Throughout, the pleasure of the participants in these annual meetings and their need for more opportunities of this kind are very evident. A number of officers, however, regretted that participation had been limited, in the main, to officers-in-charge, and believed that there should have been many more opportunities for meetings of less senior staff. Senior management in Ottawa appears to have been slow earlier on to see the potential of these conferences and to attend in person. The Director of Operations made his first appearance at the Brussels conference in 1960 with the Superintendent of the United Kingdom Immigration Service. The 1961 conferences in Rome and London were attended for the first time by two more senior officials, the Director of Immigration and his Deputy. The Assistant Deputy Minister, a post created in 1963, attended an overseas conference for the first time in 1966; the Deputy Minister of the Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1967. It is interesting to note that the focus of all these meetings and conferences has been internal, and they certainly reflect the rather isolated and self-contained character of the Overseas Immigration Service thus far. These were meetings of a special kind of club with no fraternal delegates and little reference to the place in which the meeting occurred. Their purpose was the exchange of ideas and suggestions for improvement between practitioners of the same craft in different localities. There was no em257

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phasis on the kinds of development which would require outside expertise. There were no keynote speakers, no outside resource personnel. The meetings occurred without reference to other Canadian departments overseas. Since 1966, however, there has been a new note in conference planning. The most recent conferences have centred on the presence of senior officials from the Department in Ottawa and have been used by them as a means whereby important policy developments could be explained and discussed with the overseas staff. This practice seems likely to continue. It remains to be seen what effect the present integration policies will have on the annual conference and on conference technique and management. A CAREER FOREIGN SERVICE: THE STRUGGLE FOR STATUS Before 1957, as already noted, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration had no career foreign service. It had recruited very few university graduates. Staff were used interchangeably between the Home and Overseas Services. Immigration officers for the visa offices overseas were frequently recruited from the Canadian border service. Many of these officers did not expect to spend a lifetime serving overseas, and a tour of duty abroad was regarded by some as a pleasant bonus. In these circumstances, status problems did not loom very large. Nevertheless, it is evident from the careers of a number of officers that by 1957 a "foreign service establishment" was in fact building up. A number of officers liked serving overseas and wished to stay there, and had become involved in and committed to the overseas operation. The fascination which international migration exerts on those closely involved in it, the human problems encountered every day, the interest of living in a foreign country, and the sense of being of direct service to Canada had already won adherents. Inevitably, experience, a good performance, language skills, and degrees of interest were being taken into account in the allocation of staff, and this reinforced the growth of a special overseas service. Officers who have worked for the Department, mainly in the overseas posts, since the early fifties or before, and who form part of the core of this service, report an early awareness of inferior status in relation to the other major departments overseas. The term "poor relations" and "second cousins" were used very early. At branch headquarters also there is evidence of an early concern with this question, and there has clearly been a sense of disadvantage and inferiority among headquarters staff as well as in the field. The difficult and continuing problem of obtaining diplomatic status, at least for the most senior officers serving overseas, has been one 258

Overseas Immigration Service factor which has kept the status question very much to the fore. By 1957 the Department had become aware of a real need to upgrade its overseas staff. The view of immigration as a spontaneous flow which only had to be controlled had long gone. The Hungarian Revolution and the post-Suez influx of British immigrants had been dramatic lessons in the unexpected and the overwhelming. A certain professionalism was growing within the service which called for recognition and itself exerted pressure for improvement. There were expansionist voices at headquarters. The whole pattern of immigration, particularly from western Europe, had significantly changed. Immigrants with education and skills were more in demand and harder to get. The migration field was becoming more competitive and better organized. The Immigration Branch therefore embarked upon a campaign to recruit university graduates as foreign service officers, having in mind the creation of a proper career foreign service, and having, presumably, hopeful status expectations. The term "foreign service officer" was used in the recruitment process, before it was certain that this would have real meaning. The new recruits from universities across Canada at first believed that they were foreign service officers in the "External" sense. However, they rapidly discovered that this was not so and that their status and career opportunities, their salaries, allowances, and privileges would be distinctly inferior to those enjoyed by fellow graduates in the Departments of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce. Considerable frustration among these new recruits resulted from this disillusioning experience. They also encountered other difficulties and it is clear that the whole program had been poorly planned. A surviving 1957 recruit made the following comments: No one was told anything. The F.S.O.'s thought they were Foreign Service Officers like External people. Most of these recruits were fresh from university and were very young with high expectations. They were soon disillusioned. The atmosphere they met with in the Department was difficult and frustrating also. There was considerable resentment on the part of older officers to whom the whole thing was not adequately explained. This first Foreign Service Officer Series appeared to put a ceiling on overseas appointments for the average officer and blocked his way overseas. Training also was very inadequate. It was mainly "blind training" and you picked up what you could. The recruitment continued on a fairly small scale for several years. Between 1957 and 1964, seventy-two university graduates joined the Department of Citizenship and Immigration as foreign service officers. Forty left, many after very brief service—a 55 percent wastage. 259

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This effort on the part of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to improve the quality of its staff and to create incentives to better performance through the development of a recognized, professional overseas service appears to have received no encouragement from the senior levels of the public service. Between 1957 and 1964, the Department made a series of attempts to convince Treasury Board and Civil Service Commission officials that the staff of the Overseas Service should have comparable status with other foreign service personnel. None of these attempts was successful. Nor was there any apparent encouragement from the Department of External Affairs in this effort to improve the quality of an important Canadian overseas operation.14 The Foreign Service Committee, in which the Department of External Affairs had the most powerful voice, had a major influence in these matters. Representatives of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration found that this Committee persistently rejected proposed improvements in the status of immigration officers overseas. They felt that there was no conception by the Committee that the recruitment of human resources for Canada was a most important function and that the way in which immigration was managed was vital to Canada's image abroad. In 1964, as we have seen, under the aegis of more vigorous and confident management, there was a fundamental reorganization of the Immigration Branch in order to implement an energetic and expanding immigration program. And a second major attempt was made to develop a career foreign service which would be comparable to the foreign services of the External Affairs and Trade and Commerce Departments. The rapid development and expansion of the Overseas Service was planned. Apart from exceptional cases, university graduation was to be the minimum requirement for all new recruits. A new series, the Canadian Immigration Affairs Officer series, was created with six levels ranging to the senior level, CIAO 6. A distinctly higher classification level was approved by Treasury Board, marking a significant advance on earlier attitudes. A comprehensive appraisal and examination of all present staff were then undertaken by means of a written test and interview before an Appraisal Board. The standards set for both the test and the interview were deliberately high, making it difficult for anyone without university training to pass successfully. Although all employees of the Immigration Branch were invited to apply, only thirtythree non-university-trained candidates were successful in qualifying as CIAO officers. This meant the rejection of a large number of officers, already serving overseas, some of whom had given very devoted service or had proved very successful on the job. When the Appraisal Board visited the Hong 260

Overseas Immigration Service Kong office, it felt obliged to reject two-thirds of the existing staff. A member of one of the Appraisal Boards has said how very difficult it was to reject good people who were either unable to handle this kind of written test or not articulate enough in this sort of situation. This was a very painful process and caused a good deal of ill-feeling and discouragement. Later an attempt was made to make some amends to those who failed this examination and to make a special place for them within the Service. Painful though it was, however, this appraisal and sorting-out process was felt to be essential in order to raise standards and to create a fully qualified foreign service which would at last rank with those of other departments. A second step was the announcement of an open competition across Canada for CIAO officers at the 2 to 6 levels. A university degree and at least two years' experience in a responsible position were minimum requirements. There was a remarkable response to this competition—over 1,000 applications. The Selection Board was able to recruit an initial group of forty-five very well qualified candidates with other groups to follow later. Again these candidates were offered a professional career in a foreign service which would be comparable to those of the other two Departments. These new recruits were intended to fill vacancies in the middle and senior levels of the reorganized Overseas Service. In addition, a number of young university graduates were recruited to provide a steady flow of junior officers. They too were offered the prospect of a career in a foreign service of equivalent standing to those of the Departments of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce. There were some substantial accomplishments in the struggle for status during the years 1965-66. Diplomatic status was obtained for a wider range of overseas officers and a higher diplomatic rank established for certain senior positions.16 Overseas staff (previously designated as "employees") obtained "officer status" under the foreign service regulations in the areas of direct and indirect allowances. Special privileges in the form of vacation leave, tropical clothing allowances, tuition fees for the wives of officers, club allowances, and other smaller benefits were also obtained. To those overseas, these changes implied, at long last, a recognition by the government of Canada that they were career foreign service officers and not rather lowly civil servants working temporarily hi foreign countries. But the goal of complete equality with the other overseas departments proved, even at this point, to be a mirage. Almost within grasp, it suddenly vanished from sight, and those who were ahead managed to stay there, although their lead had grown perceptibly smaller. By the decision, no doubt, of very few people and to the dismay of those negotiating on behalf of the Foreign Branch of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, it was decided in 1967 to place CIAO officers in a separate group from 261

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those of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce under the Classification Revision Program. The category remained the same but the group (Program Administrator) differed. Those who were familiar with the consequences of this kind of decision were certain that this could not but imply a difference in treatment sooner or later. It should perhaps be noted that this desire for status and for a career foreign service which would rank equally with those of the other two Departments never meant a denial of the pre-eminent role of the Department of External Affairs, or any attempt to inflate the role of the Overseas Service and Foreign Branch to something beyond that of a specialized Canadian overseas operation. It was perhaps the apparently close association of the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Trade and Commerce—their joint recruiting program and common professional association, for example—which made the exclusion of the third overseas department more painful.16 While recognizing the special and responsible role of many External Affairs officers, immigration officers have failed to see why the recruitment of human resources for Canada, the channelling of an immense flow of skill and talent to Canadian shores, should be regarded as a more lowly occupation than that of a trade official. It is surely a greater sense of equality among these three different services (and other Canadian representatives overseas) that is so much to be desired, a much closer association and freedom of movement, and a much more intelligent use of combined resources. Fortunately two recent events have at last brought this desirable state of affairs within reach, and it is clear that opinion within the public service on this issue has now radically changed. The first of these events were the new foreign service directives issued on October 1, 1969, after a two and a half year study. These directives did not change the classification of immigration officers, but they introduced greater uniformity and very considerable improvements in pay, allowances, and other matters relating to all foreign service personnel. The second event, which will be described in more detail in the next section of this chapter, was the decision announced by the Liberal government in the summer of 1970 to develop maximum integration in its foreign operations. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS There have been three recent developments of great importance affecting all aspects of the work of the Foreign Branch of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. First, in chronological order, came the introduction on October 1, 1967, of completely non-discriminatory immigration regulations and a new selection process based on a points system. 262

Overseas Immigration Service After four years of operation, the points system appears to have won widespread approval in the Foreign Branch, although it is evident, as already noted, that changes may have to be made, in the light of experience, in the weight given to certain factors. This system provides a reliable guide and a substantial degree of protection for the individual immigration officer. It is now much more difficult to accuse him of discrimination and poor judgement. At the same time, it does leave him with a fair amount of individual responsibility in the selection process and this is very important. The perception and judgement which an experienced immigration officer can exercise are very valuable, and he should never be replaced by a totally automated selection system. The principle of complete universality in the present immigration regulations has been widely approved, but it has also undoubtedly caused some anxiety in the Foreign Branch, in the light of what was felt to be the inadequate preparation of the Canadian public for this policy, and the absence hitherto of a comprehensive, well-organized program to encourage the adjustment of much larger numbers of immigrants from Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. The second development is the deliberate policy of integration of the Manpower and Immigration Divisions now being pursued by the Department of Manpower and Immigration, the decision to make the Foreign Branch a Manpower as well as an Immigration Branch, and the attempt made in the last two years to broaden the responsibilities and horizons of the overseas staff by giving them a specific reporting role in relation to relevant political, economic, and social developments in their areas of operation. It appears that the latter move has been welcomed by the overseas offices and has already produced some valuable reports. Where possible, overseas staff now do two tours (of two and a half to three years) overseas and one tour in Canada in either the Immigration or Manpower Divisions, thus enabling them to keep in closer touch with developments in Canada and with the general activities of the Department. Integration within the Department and also among departments working overseas is likely to have considerable advantages and also some possible disadvantages which will be discussed in the final chapters. Among the advantages are the much more varied opportunities for promotion and career development which should be available for the overseas staff. There can only be, after all, a limited number of senior positions in immigration overseas. The final development is the decision, already mentioned, of the Canadian government to develop maximum integration in its foreign operations. Because of the great importance of this decision for immigration, the relevant extract from the recent foreign policy review will be quoted in full.1* Side headings have been added to draw attention to some of the ways in 263

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which this decision is being implemented. Some of its implications for immigration will also be explored in Part 6. Organizing for the Seventies To meet the challenge of coming decades, to be equipped to take advantage of new opportunities, to keep abreast of the rapid evolution of events, the Government needs a strong and flexible organization for carrying out its reshaped foreign policy. The pace of change renders more complex and urgent the problems of planning and implementing a coherent policy aligned with national aims. New staffing structures and modern management techniques are called for. The Government has decided that there should be maximum integration in its foreign operations that will effectively contribute to the achievement of national objectives. An integrated management system cannot be established immediately or easily. Each theoretical step leading towards the goal of integration must be evaluated, tested and transformed into practical reality without impairing the quality of service available to the Government and the Canadian people from established foreign operations. The new system must be developed harmoniously and above all keep its capacity for adapting to an evolving international situation. Committee on External Relations As an important first step in the development of an integrated system, the Government has established a new Committee on External Relations at Deputy Minister level. This Committee will have the responsibility for guiding the process of integration during its initial phases and for advising the Government on such matters as the formulation of broad policy on foreign operations, the harmonization of departmental planning with the Government's external interests, the conduct of foreign operations, the allocation of resources for those operations. Personnel Management Committee At the same time the Government has established, as a sub-committee of the Committee on External Relations, a Personnel Management Committee. It will be charged with the responsibility for advising generally on the staffing of posts abroad and in particular for developing to the greatest degree possible, co-ordinated and common policies on the recruitment of foreign service personnel, career development, classification and evaluation standards. The Personnel Management Committee will also concern itself with the formulation of programmes of rotation and secondment between the foreign service, on the one hand, and government departments, the business world, the academic community, on 264

Overseas Immigration Service the other. Such a programme will ensure that foreign service officers will be familiar and sympathetic with the viewpoints, concerns and interests of all government departments and private organizations operating abroad. Task Force A task force will report as soon as possible to the Committee on External Relations on the means necessary to integrate all the support services of the Government's foreign operations. As plans are developed they will be tested and put into effect, thereby enabling the Government to provide administrative support for foreign operations in a modern and realistic way. Authority of Heads of Post Abroad Finally, the Government has decided that heads of post abroad must be given clear authority over all operations at the post in accordance with approved operational plans; and that the head of post must represent and be accountable for all departments' interests in his area of jurisdiction. This implies, as regards the selection of heads of post, increasing emphasis in future on managerial capabilities and knowledge of the full range of government activities abroad. The Government's view is that, if its foreign policy is to be carried out effectively, the organization for doing so must be closely-knit, fully qualified and responsive to the changing demands that inevitably will be made on it. The steps taken towards the goal of integration will be systematically reviewed to ensure that they do continue to fulfil the emerging needs of the future.

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Chapter Ten Overseas Immigration Offices: Some Personal Impressions

IN 1964, 1966, and again in 1969,1 made three tours of Canadian immigration offices, known as visa offices for most of this period, in Europe. The purpose of these tours was simply to find out more about the Overseas Service, later known as the Foreign Branch, by talking to those who ran it. The first tour took place before the present study was started. Indeed it was an important factor in the development of the idea that it might be very interesting, and possibly useful, to attempt a study of the whole field of Canadian immigration. The first tour in 1964 was provoked, in the first instance, by curiosity and frustration, since I had spent the previous year as chairman of a seminar on Canadian immigration policy, organized jointly by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, when it proved most difficult to discover anything very substantial about Canada's immigration operations overseas. Apart from a few officials in the Toronto office of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, one or two official speakers from Ottawa, none of whom were then very communicative, and one citizenship liaison officer, who had worked with UNRRA and had visited the Lisbon visa office during a holiday in Europe, hardly anyone in Toronto, at that time, appeared to know or care where the visa offices were or how they were run. Academics devoted to the study of Canada's foreign policy and external relations seemed profoundly uninterested in immigration. Among Toronto's community agencies and organizations concerned with immigrants, there were at most three people who had any information at all on immigration management overseas.

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Having become very interested in Canadian immigration policy as an immigrant and as a volunteer with community agencies in Toronto, and finding it impossible to study this without actually seeing where and how it was being implemented, I felt that the only thing to do was to go and visit some visa offices and find out. Surprised, but most cooperative, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration arranged this at once. The following is a short report on my three tours of visa offices between 1964 and the fall of 1969, together with some personal impressions of the overseas operations of the Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and Manpower and Immigration and of the views and experience of their overseas staff. It is hoped that this report may add some first-hand evidence to the account given in the previous chapter of the progress and development of these operations through the post-war period. The first tour was a short one in the summer of 1964 to the Canadian Immigration Service in London and to visa offices in The Hague, Copenhagen, Cologne, and Paris. The second was longer and took place in the fall of 1966 when visits were made to visa offices in Rome, Vienna, Berne, Munich, Stuttgart, Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Lisbon, and the regional headquarters in Geneva and London. It was quite evident during the first tour that it was not possible, in the time available, to study the performance of visa offices, and to do this on any scale now is too large and difficult an undertaking for individual research. It was possible, however, and indeed essential to learn more about the national and local context in which a visa office operates and in which visa officers live and work. On both these tours, therefore, an attempt was made at most, if not every, port of call to learn more about the national setting and attitudes to emigration which have a considerable effect on the nature of the Canadian operation; to consider the place of an important visa office within the local Canadian mission; and to examine its relations with the local voluntary emigration agencies, if any, and with its major competitor, the Australians. This was an opportunity also to learn something more about the Australian Migration Service and the views of Australian migration officers about the needs and requirements of their particular profession. During these two tours, some very interesting discussions were held with emigration officials in the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy, and Portugal. Visits were made to the Canadian embassies in Rome, Berne, Vienna, Paris, Brussels, Lisbon, and to the High Commission in London, where in all cases the heads of posts varied enormously in their knowledge of and interest in immigration, and in the extent to which they involved or did not involve the immigration staff in the vital activities of the embassy. There were also some very useful interviews with the staffs of the principal voluntary agencies in Rome, Vienna, Geneva, and Paris and with the Australian 268

Overseas Immigration Offices migration officers in all the major cities which were visited. The third tour took place in the summer of 1969 and involved a return visit to four of the major European immigration offices: London, Paris, and Rome and the regional headquarters in Geneva which was then on the point of closing down. The purpose of these final visits was essentially to see whether anything had changed in the past three years and whether the optimistic expectations of the overseas staff in 1966 in relation to the new Department of Manpower and Immigration had been fulfilled. While in Geneva, I also had some very interesting meetings with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and members of his staff and with officials of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). What follows then is a sampling of opinion in a very interesting overseas sector of the Canadian public service and an attempt to see how this sector has been run in the recent past. FIRST TOUR First, a brief comment on the impact made by the first tour in 1964, this being the first contact I had had with the Overseas Service, apart from a minor encounter as an intending immigrant in London in 1955. In the interval of two years between this and the second tour in 1966, there were, as we have seen, dramatic changes in planning and organization at the national level in Canada and, during this second visit, I found a marked change in atmosphere and morale. I was accustomed to thinking of immigration in terms of policy, but this first visit in 1964 made very clear the equal if not greater importance of program, personnel, and resources. I was accustomed to thinking of immigration mainly in terms of the immigrant, and the agencies and individuals who laboured on his behalf, but this visit sharply underlined the importance of the views and needs of the officers who counsel and select immigrants for Canada. It illuminated an area which had been invisible, one rarely mentioned in any public discussion of Canadian immigration in which I had taken part. In 19641 visited the United Kingdom office, on the corner of Grosvenor Square in London, in a large, impressive, old-fashioned building with an establishment of considerable size, and then travelled to the small and pleasant office in The Hague, in an old terrace house in the diplomatic quarter, close to the Canadian embassy. After this, a long train journey to Copenhagen where the visa office was temporarily housed in a comfortable family residence in a poor location, a hard-to-reach, remote, suburban part of the city, central office space being very expensive and hard to find. Then back to Germany to the large visa office in Cologne-Miilheim, an

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efficient, functional block of offices on two floors; not central, but in an easy-to-reach, busy, industrial sector of the city. Finally back to Paris and to London for further discussions. This was a revealing group of visa offices in variety, locations, and degrees of attractiveness. The following is a brief description from my notes of the Paris office as it was then: Paris Office 1964. Splendid location (6th floor, Place de 1'Opera). Terrible office. Furniture old and ugly. Elevator (even in France) a death trap—very off-putting. The whole place badly needs redecorating. Unattractive waiting room with rather tattered newspapers. No map of Canada anywhere. Bleak offices. Desperately needs some money spending on it now. Interesting Contrast. Quebec House in Paris—the home of the Delegation Generate du Quebec—most luxurious and attractive, rugs, pictures, drinks, beautiful girl in foyer. Two organizations apparently working together quite amiably at present, but with totally different equipment. One of my major impressions from this first visit was that the Overseas Service of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration had clearly remained, since its inception, almost totally invisible, not only to the general public in Canada but also to the informed and politically active sections of Canadian society. I was astonished to discover that I was the first Canadian non-official visitor to two of these offices and one of the very few such visitors to the other three; the discovery that visiting by interested Canadians (official and non-official) had been rare at the overseas visa offices was confirmed during later visits. The sad truth is that, with very few exceptions (more now, but still not very many), members of the federal and provincial parliaments, journalists, representatives of the academic community, political parties, trade unions, and national voluntary organizations have not shown the slightest interest in this important area of government activity overseas. And the vast majority of those who have given their views on Canadian immigration in Canada, including politicians and officials who have made important political and administrative decisions in this area, have simply never been to see how this operation was being run. Later, in 1967, when talking to members of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Immigration, I asked a number of members whether they had ever thought of calling in at one or two of the overseas visa offices when visiting Europe for other reasons. Only two members had done so on one occasion, Walter Dinsdale in Athens and John Munro (then Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Manpower and Immigration) in Helsinki. The others had apparently never thought of it. 270

Overseas Immigration Offices Their own invisibility and isolation and the basic lack of interest on the part of important sections of the Canadian community have been only too apparent to the overseas staff; and this relates to a second point which struck me very forcibly on this first visit. The overseas staff did not appear to have any sense then of strong support hi Canada, either from their own Department, from ministers and politicians, or from the general public. They felt that they were often an unprotected target of attack on grounds of discrimination and injustice towards a few immigrants, whereas the good job they felt that they were doing for the majority of immigrants was rarely appreciated. Nor had any attempt been made to understand the real difficulties they encountered (for example, being caught in the midst of conflicting pressures), nor, at that time, to supply them with the staff, money, and equipment to do the job as well as it could be done. Their attitude towards their own Department in 1964 could best be described as jaded, disillusioned, not expecting much. Better equipment, improved offices, better status and pay, the things they had felt keenly about for some time, had been very slow in coming. Staff management, they felt, had not greatly improved. Immigration planning was as short term and spasmodic as ever. The changes and improvements in planning and management which began to take shape in Ottawa from 1963 onwards had clearly not yet made much impact on the Overseas Service. A third impression, and a more cheering one, related to the quality of staff and the conventional image of the immigration officer. Some of the new recruits to the Department of Manpower and Immigration at the senior managerial level, who were interviewed more recently, have commented on the calibre of the immigration staff whom they met when they first went overseas. "Very good people," "a very dedicated lot," "motivation very high" were some of their comments. They were frankly surprised at this. The image they had of the immigration officer, at home and overseas, had not been like this. They had had in mind someone more rigid, narrow-minded, rather petty, a restrictionist—something of that nature. I was also impressed with the quality of the immigration officers I met and particularly with their keen interest in the job and dedication to it. The interest and feeling of personal satisfaction which the overseas immigration officer seemed to derive from his job obviously enabled him to endure (or ignore) a great deal of public disinterest and some of the other disadvantages of working in this sector of the public service. This degree of interest and satisfaction also lends a cheerful quality to the whole immigration process overseas which it often sadly lacked in Canada then. And it suggested that it is probably more accurate to think of the overseas immigration officer as one who is naturally inclined towards productivity rather than restriction. He may have to apply restrictions. He certainly sup271

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ports the principle of selection since this is the reason for his existence. But his inclination is to find and get good immigrants. This is why the stopand-go policies and uncertain planning, particularly of the fifties and early sixties, were so frustrating to overseas staff. Quite soon during the first tour, although I had then no means to substantiate it, I became aware of what seemed to be not only a certain individual isolation of immigration officers from the total social life of other Canadian departments overseas, but also a departmental isolation. There was certainly no appearance of togetherness, of a pooling of resources, no apparatus of really effective collaboration between departments that I could see. And I was impressed with the strength of the feeling of inferior status in relation to other departments which all the visa office staffs (and their wives) seemed to have. It was only afterwards that I discovered that this had a real basis in the facts of classification, pay, and privileges and had been a painful issue for some time. A final observation, to be seen alongside a very favourable impression of the calibre of the staff, concerned the poverty of the equipment they had to use at this period and the general plainness, if not bleakness, of visa offices even when the buildings were reasonably good. There was no seduction of immigrants here. The Australian offices were comfortable and even cosy by comparison. The staff at all the Canadian offices in 1964 expressed bitter feelings about the quality of the information materials and films which they were obliged to use and about the snail's pace of management in Ottawa in improving matters. All these visa offices in 1964 were using, for promotion purposes, a 1954 Trans-Canada Airline travelogue with a commentary by Christopher Plummer, extolling the natural grandeur of the Canadian scene, but saying almost nothing about jobs, housing, cities, education, or government in Canada, and with a good deal of very out-ofdate material in it, although some of this had been edited out recently. I still have a package of literature which was then being reluctantly given to immigrants in Cologne. The material in German was very limited, unexciting, and included a most dreary collection of green fact sheets entitled "Tatsachenmaterial iiber Kanada," clipped together and issued by the Information Division of the Department of External Affairs. All this contrasted most unfavourably with some very glossy publicity material then being made available to all citizens by the City of Cologne and also with the much more attractive literature for immigrants being used in Cologne by the Australians. SECOND TOUR The second tour which started in September 1966 took place after the dismantling of the former Department of Citizenship and Immigration and 272

Overseas Immigration Offices the official appearance of the new Department of Manpower and Immigration. At this point it was intended that the basic structure of the Overseas Service, now the Foreign Branch, should remain the same, but would be subject in due course to considerable expansion and development. Some of the improvements which had been planned two years earlier had already begun to have an effect. The new Canadian Immigration Affairs Officer series had been created and a career foreign service at last established. A minor revolution had taken place in the areas of public relations and information, and new professional staff had been hired for headquarters and the major overseas offices. Money was clearly much easier to get. As already mentioned, the available world had been divided into three large regions each with a regional director, and a regional office to cover the whole of Europe had been established in Geneva a few months earlier and was moving into action. The Rome and Paris offices, in their famous premises in the Via Acherusio and the Place de 1'Opera, were about to move into impressive new quarters and better accommodation was being sought for other offices. Small teams of new CIAO officers in training were touring the United Kingdom and European visa offices. The difference in atmosphere and morale as a result of this powerful blood transfusion was remarkable. The feeling of deprivation and pessimism was much less. Staff talked of "a shot in the arm" and appeared to feel that they were on the edge of something like a technological revolution. They were hopeful about improvements in immigration planning and swifter communications. There was no longer the same gloom about films and information materials and these had in fact already improved. With certain reservations and an inclination on the part of some to wait and see, the reaction of the existing overseas staff to the manpower take-over seemed very positive. Above all, it was felt that the new Department of Manpower and Immigration would be a more powerful department, able to speak with a stronger voice, and would be less exposed to powerful political pressures. It was fairly confidently expected also that the status of the Foreign Branch and its officers would now improve. There were some major reservations, however, about the role of the Immigration Branch in Canada—an anxiety as to whether the skills, knowledge, and experience which had been developed in this Branch would continue to be used for the benefit of the immigrant, and whether the immigrant's special needs would be adequately catered for within the proposed manpower organization in Canada. At that time, there was also considerable anxiety at different levels about the new CIAO series: both concern for those who had been excluded by the written and oral examinations already referred to and anxiety about the new entrants. These new entrants were intended to fill gaps in the management structure at all levels. 273

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Because of the general failure in recruitment and career development in the fifties, there was a dearth of officers in the middle ranges of management and also, to a lesser extent, of senior officers with special talents, experience, or language skills. Some of the new entrants were therefore coming in at higher levels than existing staff with some years' experience, and this was causing a good deal of concern. From a research point of view, the imminence of change and the fact that a new regime was just beginning proved to be a distinct advantage. It produced a mood of reflection about the past, a feeling that an era in immigration was over and that previous achievement and previous weaknesses in planning and management could be analysed more objectively. The views of the overseas staff on these and other questions, reflecting both the past and the present, as it was then, were as follows. As already noted, there was a remarkable unanimity on the major issues. In discussing the tour which took place three years later, we will see to what extent these views have changed and what new elements have been added to them. 1. ACHIEVEMENT

There was a general feeling of considerable achievement, despite criticism and despite the continuous absence in Canada, as the overseas staff saw it, of strong support for and a real interest in immigration. The movement, up to that point, of more than two and a half million people to Canada in the post-war period mainly from the United Kingdom and Europe, which they had been largely instrumental in organizing, was felt to have been immensely beneficial to Canada. There was a feeling that this had been achieved almost in spite of Parliament and the Canadian public, but that it would be appreciated in the long run. It might be noted here that this feeling of a lone hand, of special responsibility where no public responsibility existed, appeared to be a characteristic attitude in the whole Department of Citizenship and Immigration at home and overseas. The Canadian immigration movement was felt by the overseas staff to have been, in the main, superior to the Australian movement in quality, in that higher selection standards resulted in better qualified immigrants. But the Australians were thought to have had a distinct advantage in much stronger political support at home and consequently higher status and more money to spend on pleasant offices, publicity, and good information materials. While each kept a watchful eye on the other, relations between the two services were felt to have been continuously friendly. If there was a doubt in the area of achievement, it concerned what was felt to have been a disproportionately large number of sponsored immigrants within the total immigration movement. The overseas staff quite clearly shared the views of the Department in Ottawa on this question. Of 274

Overseas Immigration Offices those interviewed, only one senior officer expressed a different view. They disapproved of any automatic right to sponsor the "extended family": immediate family yes, distant cousins, extending to an entire village, no. These relatives and connections should apply, they believed, as ordinary immigrants. The overseas staff also believed that the various attempts which the Department had made over the previous ten years or more to control the sponsored movement had failed because it was unable to withstand powerful political pressures working in the opposite direction. This failure had resulted in the admission to Canada of very large numbers of poorly educated, unskilled immigrants. These views on the sponsored movement seemed to be the outcome of a strong belief in the value of the selection process (automatic sponsorship on a large scale makes a mockery of this); a belief that sponsorship of large numbers of relatives tends to create a bias within the immigration movement in favour of those countries which are strongly family- and clan-minded and against those which are not; and a belief that in those countries which are family- and clan-minded, sponsored immigrants tend to exclude the unsponsored by pre-empting too large a part of the total national movement. 2. MANAGEMENT IN OTTAWA

Distant operations directly managed from a metropolitan centre tend to have common problems. High-level decisions are felt to be taken for unexplained reasons. Central administration appears totally ignorant of local conditions. The man on the job is never consulted. No doubt a percentage of normal staff dissatisfaction can always be deducted for this common condition of overseas services, even in this day of rapid communications. In the case of the Immigration Branch of the former Department of Citizenship and Immigration, however, we must add the fact that this administrative centre, for most of the period under discussion, was chronically understaffed and lacked political support and adequate resources. It was subjected to constant criticism and was usually very hard pressed. An inordinate amount of time had to be spent on the consideration and follow-through of individual cases in all their ramifications, and decisions on policy matters were hard to get. Communication was therefore likely to be weaker and correspondence slower than in equivalent situations elsewhere. Personnel management, not then very brilliant anywhere in the Canadian public service, was likely to reflect the same absence of planning and development as the immigration operation itself. As a result of all these factors, a condition of considerable exasperation with management in Ottawa seems to have been endemic in the Overseas Service, at least until the recent period of change and development.

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In discussing the question of headquarters management, members of the overseas staff with longer service appeared to make a distinction between an earlier and later period in their experiences in this Department. It was impossible to define these periods exactly. But it is clear that the early period covered the fifties, roughly speaking, but with an awareness that things were beginning to change and improve somewhat towards the end of that time. The second period covered the depressing interlude of austerity when Ellen Fairclough was Minister, Bell's resurrection, and the ensuing events up to the fall of 1966 when the Department of Manpower and Immigration officially opened its doors in Canada. Early Period of Operation. Older overseas officers looking back on the early period of operation saw senior management then as a small group running a highly centralized operation which was frequently autocratic. Consultation was very limited. The tone of correspondence between Ottawa and the overseas posts—and confirmation of this can be found in the files—was very firm and even at times dictatorial. Small mistakes, they felt, were always noted and praise was scarce. Immigration overseas bore a distinct resemblance to a tightly controlled military operation, whose objective was the best use of scarce resources and the avoidance of awkward situations in a campaign of rather marginal value. The comment was made that during this early period, senior management operated much too far down in the organization, controlling and directing everything. But it was noted also that the senior and middle ranks of management in Ottawa at that time were very thin, compared with the large numbers of clerical staff. Overseas staff could see the difficulties in running this kind of operation. But they strongly suspected that a much stronger pitch could have been made in Ottawa for more support and more resources. They believed that there had been a striking failure to press legitimate demands and to communicate generally at the political level. Some also believed that the overseas staff themselves, particularly the directors of the overseas offices, should have spoken with a louder voice and should have been more insistent that their demands for better facilities and better staff policies be taken seriously. But, at the time, with very few exceptions, they did not have sufficient confidence or rank to do this or were unaware of the lengths to which it might have been possible to go. In any event, they felt that they had been much too amenable. These officers were unanimous in believing that senior officials of the Department in Ottawa in this early period, and later also, were never sufficiently prestige conscious, never go-getting, never determined enough to create an attractive public image in Canada or overseas. "Even now a visa 276

Overseas Immigration Offices office is hardly a prestige address," said one senior officer. "It was nothing then." It seemed to them that senior management itself, though perhaps reluctantly, had come to accept a view of immigration as a low-ranking operation and one which could not be overplayed because of its infinite political difficulties. Like the Department itself, the visa offices were always short of money for development, always making do, and never able to think about appearances. This situation, it was felt, had been tolerated too long by everyone. Opinions about personnel management, in the early period, seemed to hinge mainly upon the issues of the development of a career foreign service and the problem of status. As already noted, it was the officer who was making a career in immigration overseas who felt disparities in pay and privileges and a lowly status most keenly. Although it was recognized that the expertise and experience in running an overseas service were not there at the outset, it was nevertheless felt that, in the early days, staff policies were a good deal less imaginative and considerate than they could have been and that staff changes and career development were often clumsily handled. Later Period of Operation. Some of these feelings in relation to headquarters management were carried over into the later period. But the background changed with the gradual development of a larger immigration service and more sophisticated administration. It may be useful here to summarize the many views expressed in interviews, which reflect both this later period and some continuing attitudes to management during the whole period under discussion. 1. The Department was still seen as suffering mainly from a lack of strong political support and a real public interest in immigration in Canada, and its weaknesses in the past were felt to be largely explicable in these terms. 2. Because of this lack of political support and public interest, and because of a failure on the part of ministers and senior officials to go out and get it, senior management had tended to be overcautious and negative. Thus the Overseas Service was seen as wanting immigration, while management in Ottawa was often pulling back for a variety of reasons. Since 1963, however, management had definitely become more vigorous and confident, although real improvements overseas were slow in coming. 3. The three major defects in the immigration operation, as it had been managed so far, were thought to have been (a) A lack of long-range, stable immigration planning and programming; (b) An unwillingness, until very recently, to spend money on attractive

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and efficient offices and essential equipment for the Overseas Service and on proper services for immigrants in Canada; (c) A failure in public relations and publicity. These defects were felt to have been due mainly to weak political support, but also to the absence of firm and sustained initiatives on the part of the Department. 4. In staff management and development, the initial mistake was to recruit and classify the Immigration Branch at too low a level. This was followed by inadequate recruiting in the fifties, resulting in a chronic staff shortage which made intelligent policies for career development impossible, and a failure, early on, to develop a badly needed career foreign service. Recent developments in this area, such as the new CIAO series, were very welcome and overdue, although painful to those who did not qualify. 5. The low status of the Overseas Service has been keenly felt all along. It has been very inadequate for: (a) Working purposes overseas where rank is very important in dealing with government officials at all levels and with the community and local organizations; (b) A satisfactory working and social relationship with other Canadian departments overseas. It was felt that low status had reduced capability; had, in this area, diminished the Canadian image overseas; and had produced considerable inequality within the Canadian public service. That it had continued so long was felt to be due very largely to the attitude of the Department of External Affairs. 3. PRESSURE Pressure, "representations," the unending stream of problem cases has been, and still is to some extent, a major bugbear for the Overseas Service and Foreign Branch. In the past, the decisions of the Overseas Service on individual cases were very frequently revised as a result of pressures of different kinds, mainly brought to bear in Canada. Since 1967, however, the introduction of explicit criteria for admission in the new immigration regulations and the division of the immigration stream into three clear categories, so that non-dependent relatives must go through the selection process have undoubtedly made the representations problem easier to manage for all concerned. The Overseas Service and Foreign Branch, although exposed to direct pressures from governments and persons of influence in foreign countries, have been less exposed than the Department at home to the range of immediate and often fierce pressures, alarms, and difficulties which have 278

Overseas Immigration Offices arisen and can still arise in Canada from Parliament, from the law, the press, the influential, the liberal-minded, from ethnic communities and undaunted relatives. But they are also further away from the sources of final decision and, in the past, have had little opportunity of arguing their case except in lengthy correspondence. The absolute irrationality, therefore, of some of the decisions which had been taken over their heads, and in the face of what seemed to them to be incontrovertible evidence, has been very keenly felt. The general consensus was that, although there had been an improvement of late, the former Department of Citizenship and Immigration had never stood up to pressure with sufficient firmness. As an outcome of this, it was felt that a very definite, though unintended, bias had existed within the system in the past, in favour of those countries where the exercise of political pressure and the use of influence were common practice. Immigrants from these countries who had failed to secure admission to Canada through the normal channels had had a much better chance of ultimate admission than the more legal-minded immigrant, because they or their relatives in Canada had used all the weapons at their command, often very successfully. 4. THE IMMIGRANT IN CANADA

It was very interesting to discover that the Overseas Service and Foreign Branch, although unaware of any similarity of view, shared the opinion, widely held among Canadian voluntary organizations, about the lack of appropriate and well-organized services for immigrants in Canada. It was felt that what services there were, were piecemeal and inadequate and that, in general, the immigrant has had better service before arriving in Canada than after. Many officers expressed the view that there had been a continuing failure at both federal and provincial levels to provide proper services for immigrants in Canada. As part of this general attitude, many of the officers interviewed had definite opinions about the Citizenship Branch as it was then. They clearly shared a view that had been widespread within the former Immigration Branch and which is discussed elsewhere. Expecting very much more in the way of tangible results and direct services to immigrants, the Citizenship Branch, as previously constituted, was felt to have been a failure. It was too small, too high-minded, had no money, and worked on the periphery of the immigration operation. A number of officers felt that it should have been integrated with the Immigration Branch from the outset. 5. ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRANTS

If the overseas staff have generally been hard working, dedicated, and anxious to find and select good immigrants whenever possible, have they

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also been liberal and reasonably sympathetic to the less desirable immigrant and the difficult case? Have they had any major prejudices? Have they been or are they now, at least to some extent, anti-southern Europe, anti-Communist or ex-Communist, anti-non-European or non-white immigration? To get at the root of some of these attitudes and to be very certain about them, one would have to spend much longer in investigating performance and in discovering how a large number of cases were actually handled. The following, however, is an attempt to provide some tentative answers, in relation first to the period before the introduction of the 1967 immigration regulations, on the basis of interviews only. European Preference. During much of the post-war period prior to the major policy and administrative changes of the mid-sixties, it was always claimed that Canadian immigration officials showed a marked preference for European and United States immigrants and, within the European category, a further preference for immigrants from northern rather than southern Europe. With the qualification that the overseas staff have, I believe, always wanted to find "good immigrants": that is, responsible immigrants with some education, evident adaptability and initiative, and would tend to encourage such immigrants whenever they found them, this claim was, I think, justified. But it must be seen in context. First, it must be remembered that the Overseas Service, apart from one or two outposts, operated in Europe. Almost all visa offices were there. European immigrants were the immigrants with whom the overseas staff were most familiar, and also the immigrants with whom they themselves often had some ethnic affinity because of the basically European character of previous immigration movements to Canada. Immigration officers are, inevitably, very conscious of their own family immigration history which, I found, was often quite recent or quite vivid in their minds. War service in the European theatre was a very common prior experience among the now senior immigration officers, and this established an early familiarity with some European countries, mainly northern Europe, and particularly with Britain where so many Canadians were based during the war. Familiarity has meant that immigrants are felt to be comprehensible, are unlikely to act in unexpected ways, and can be confidently and accurately assessed in one way or another. Among European countries, Britain has undoubtedly been in a specially preferred category because of considerable familiarity, vital historical and political ties, and a long history of large-scale emigration to Canada. Within the European category, immigrants from southern Europe were less familiar. The Italian, Portuguese, Greek, and Maltese immigration movements have been very largely a post-war phenomenon. The familiar280

Overseas Immigration Offices ity and cultural affinity, though definitely present, were there to a lesser degree. There were, however, other reasons besides a stronger sense of familiarity, for what I think clearly has been a preference for northern Europeans within the larger European setting. These related to the higher overall level of education in northern Europe and the likelihood that many more immigrants from these countries would have verifiable skills or professional training, and the fact that there was less poverty and illiteracy and rather higher health and medical standards in northern Europe. There was a feeling also that immigrants from northern Europe tended to be somewhat more legal-minded, that is, they tended to respect existing procedures and did not resort to the use of pressure which created considerable resentment among immigration officers and resulted in time-consuming individual cases. It was felt that most of their governments would be friendly but not particularly concerned to push emigration. The fact is also that language barriers have been higher in southern Europe, and consequently the capacity to appreciate the nature and quality of the society from which these immigrants come has been less. But it was the large post-war sponsored movements from Italy, and to a lesser extent from Portugal and Greece, of mainly rural immigrants with little education—movements which were to a considerable extent outside the control of the Overseas Service and in which immigrants were simply processed through with minimal counselling—which were a major factor in creating the more dubious attitude earlier on of Canadian immigration officials towards southern Europe. The immigrant from any country in southern Europe with a reasonable degree of education, particularly those with specific professional and trade qualifications, had, I believe, a high degree of acceptability. But in the case of Italy, for example, there was very little room until quite recently in the large total Italian movement for a sizeable movement of selected immigrants from northern Italy, where it was felt that a great many potential and well-qualified immigrants were to be found. This was due to the very large movement of near and distant relatives of Italian immigrants who came in the earlier post-war period from southern Italy. The first advertisement to attract immigrants to Canada was placed in newspapers in northern Italy in 1966, and produced 5,000 applications, many of them from well-qualified prospective immigrants. The advertisement was entitled "La Vita Serena" ("The Untroubled Life"). The Milan immigration office was opened in August 1965. The strength of feeling within the Immigration Branch in Ottawa from the mid-fifties onwards on the dangers of the unlimited sponsorship of relatives was widely known to members of the Overseas Service. In 1959 the Director of Operations, after personal investigations in southern Eur-

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ope, had produced a dramatic report on the snowballing effect and threatening nature of unbridled sponsorship. His conclusions were felt by some to have been exaggerated, but he undoubtedly focussed attention on a problem which had been causing increasing concern. Although the report was not widely circulated, even at branch headquarters, it is very likely that its contents became known to many members of the staff, at home and overseas, and coloured their thinking on this question. Most members of the Overseas Service were also well aware that for several years the Department had applied a form of administrative control (by limiting the size of the visa office staff) of the Italian movement in an effort to hold back, at least temporarily, what seemed to be a threatening flood of relatives. These circumstances undoubtedly affected the attitudes of the overseas staff towards immigrants from southern Europe, and increased the feeling that they were in a rather less desirable category than those from northern Europe. I have been speaking of a definite period of time from the end of the Second World War to the mid-sixties. These attitudes have changed very considerably with the completely non-discriminatory immigration regulations of 1967, the changing nature of international migration, and the familiarity which now comes from the established communities of southern European origin in Canada. Political Attitudes. I found no evidence among the overseas staff of marked political bias in one direction or another. What I did find, as might be expected, was a group of individuals with a normal range of political beliefs and interests. No department or division of a department is likely to be monolithic in its views, but there was no "tone" or atmosphere which could be said, for example, to be unduly conservative or unduly anything. Comments on immigrants and their background, or on the local political scene, or on events in Canada simply revealed a familiar mixture of political opinions and degrees of political interest which varied from very keen to minimal. It was interesting to note, however, that immigration officers considered themselves to be a good deal more politically sophisticated than the RCMP (Stage B) officers who conducted the security screening at each post, and interviews with some of these officers, with rare exceptions, certainly confirmed this. Immigration officers were very critical at that point of the security screening process in relation to political unreliability. They felt that it was out of date and did not reflect a very intelligent approach to the problems of former membership in the Communist party in some countries. In this area also, there was a very open attitude towards eastern Europe which, it was thought, might well become a fruitful area for new 282

Overseas Immigration Offices visa offices in the near future. Since then, immigration offices have been opened in Belgrade and Budapest and negotiations, so far unsuccessful, have taken place with the Polish government with a view to opening an office in Warsaw. I looked for but did not find any evidence of bias against or lack of enthusiasm for French-speaking immigrants, French or Belgian. The general feeling was that these countries were not and might never be "highyield" areas and that the French particularly were not emigration minded, although the situation was thought to have improved recently. Among those directly concerned with immigration from France, there was a firm belief that with energetic efforts it could be increased substantially, although it was unlikely to become a very large movement. There was, however, a widespread feeling among the officers I interviewed—and this to my mind is most important in view of the widely held belief in Quebec that immigration officers have deliberately channelled immigrants towards English-speaking Canada for political reasons—that until recently, immigrants, and perhaps particularly French immigrants, were likely to encounter at best a lack of interest and at worst a measure of hostility among French Canadians. Since, as we have seen in Chapter 8, those who are knowledgeable on this subject in Quebec do substantiate this point of view as far as the past is concerned, immigration officers can hardly be blamed for believing it. And it did, I think, undoubtedly make them more cautious in advising immigrants to settle in Quebec and to integrate with the French-Canadian community. At the same time, it was felt that just as the emigration situation in France was changing to some extent, for a variety of reasons, so were attitudes in Quebec. For political and economic reasons, and because of a much greater awareness of the international scene, it was believed that the earlier indifference and lack of warmth towards immigrants on the part of French Canadians was decreasing even before the new Department of Immigration had been opened in Quebec. It might be noted here that there were a number of French Canadians among the officers I interviewed overseas, some of them in senior posts. The Non-European Immigrant. Tours of visa offices in the United Kingdom and Europe in 1964 and 1966 did not reveal very much on this question, except in relation to one important and fairly recent area of development, the Middle East. It may be noted that the overseas staff had clearly welcomed the new, mainly non-discriminatory immigration regulations in 1962, and held no brief for the former system which they felt was damaging to Canada's image abroad, among its other undesirable features. But the approach of the overseas staff to immigration 283

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from the Middle East, which was the first large new non-European source of Canadian immigrants, was very interesting and perhaps indicative for other areas. From the early fifties onwards, political developments in the Middle East created a sudden supply of would-be migrants to the major receiving countries from North Africa and, to a lesser extent, from other parts of the Arab world. From this time onwards, there was a steady to and fro of Canadian immigration teams, exploratory missions, and officers sent on special assignments from Ottawa and the Vienna visa office (headquarters for Middle East operations) to strategic bases in the Middle East: Beirut, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and elsewhere. There were many interesting and special features in this Middle East operation which cannot be examined in detail here, but they included a considerable emigration of French nationals and Jewish minorities from North Africa; negotiations with Middle East governments; keen competition from the Australians; the problem of security screening where sources of information were weak; the difficulties of continued reliance for processing immigrants on Canadian embassy officials and British consular authorities; and a perpetual uncertainty in Ottawa as to whether an office or offices should be established somewhere in the Middle East. Offices were opened in Tel Aviv in 1955 and, finally, in Cairo in 1963 and Beirut in 1967. From all this, despite many difficulties, including Canada's restrictive immigration regulations prior to 1962, there developed a considerable professional enthusiasm for Middle East immigrants among those involved in the Immigration Branch. At least from the mid-fifties onwards, it was felt that this was a very fruitful area for development. The reports of officers who were sent to select immigrants or simply to investigate the situation were very optimistic and contained phrases such as "applications continue to pour in," "tremendous potential in the Middle East for us," and "we must come here more often, otherwise the Australians will get the cream." One officer, loaned from the Cologne office, pointed out that "the class that we are able to attract from here is very much higher than the class we are attracting from Holland and Germany," and a headquarters' report on immigration from Egypt noted that "in the fall of 1962, the immigration officer in Cairo reported that the quality of immigrants coming from Egypt was among the highest of immigrants coming to Canada from any country."1 All these reports were, of course, a response to what was, very largely, a highly educated urban intelligentsia from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere, who had been displaced by revolutionary movements and unwelcome changes of government and were now eager to migrate to North 284

Overseas Immigration Offices America or Australia. Some reserve was expressed in interviews by one or two officers about the size and nature of the sponsored movement which would inevitably follow this initial migration. At the Vienna visa office in the fall of 1966, the figures for sponsored immigration from the Middle East had, for the first time, climbed above those for unsponsored immigration. There was no indication, however, either in interviews in Vienna and Ottawa, or in the reports in departmental files, some of which were confidential, of any adverse reaction or considerable doubts about what really are some major differences in customs and in cultural and often religious backgrounds between immigrants from the Middle East and immigrants from western Europe. The Middle East movement simply underlines the fact that, when admission policy is liberal and non-discriminatory, education is a vital factor, regardless of whether the major emphasis of the immigration program is on the pursuit of skill and talent or not. It is useless to suppose that keen immigration officers will not respond more warmly to an educated middle-class, particularly in a developing country, than they will to would-be immigrants who have had no opportunities for education and travel, who cannot communicate in some internationally known language, and who may have difficulty in communicating at all. To encourage them and to open doors to them, when not obliged to do so, requires something more than a passing acquaintance with a foreign country. It requires a second stage in understanding, longer experience in a different kind of society, and a greater knowledge of it. Immigration officers are not likely to be specialists in Arab, Asian, or Latin American cultures, although they may become so. Deliberately to admit numbers of uneducated immigrants also requires, first, a real effort in Canada in planning adequate reception, education, and welfare services for them; and secondly, a confidence on the part of immigration officers overseas that this effort is being made. Liberality in Canadian immigration policy, the willingness to admit immigrants from any country or community; immigrants from very different cultures, or immigrants who are not members of educated elites, is surely a growing process for all concerned. An essential underpinning of this process is confidence that the whole immigration operation is intelligently planned and well-managed overseas and at home. Liberality can vanish if it is felt that a reasonable control over the operation has been lost. THIRD TOUR By 1969, when I revisited the London, Paris, Geneva, and Rome offices, major changes had taken place in immigration policy and manage285

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ment. The Overseas Service, under its new title of Foreign Branch, was in fact now part, as the intervening years had shown, of a much stronger department with larger resources, a more scientific attitude to management, and a different ethos. A career foreign service was an established fact and pay, privileges, and working conditions had improved a great deal. In October 1967, a year after my previous visit, the new immigration regulations had provided for the first time, as we have seen, explicit criteria for the selection of immigrants and a totally non-discriminatory, universal approach to immigration. With this new approach went a commitment to provide, as soon as possible, proper facilities for immigration in countries where there was likely to be a firm demand and where there was now no service. From this point onwards, therefore, immigration officers would be dealing with a wider and more varied clientele, many more immigrants from Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America, and might themselves have a more varied far-ranging overseas career. Not all these new immigrants come to Canada directly. Many come via the United Kingdom and Europe. During this visit, senior officers welcomed the evident improvements which had taken place since 1966: better offices; better personnel management, although it was felt that no real change had taken place so far in the status of the Department and its staff in relation to the Departments of External Affairs and Industry, Trade, and Commerce; and very much better information relating to occupational demand in Canada which was made possible by the much larger research facilities and data-gathering services of the new Department in Ottawa. The new Paris and Rome offices were impressive and attractive. Information for intending immigrants and overseas staff had improved greatly, although the first ambitious plans of the new Department in the information field had been scaled down and there was very little money for advertising or any kind of promotion. These officers strongly approved of the new points system and the new categories of immigrants which provided better control over the sponsored movement which was no longer seen as a serious problem. There were three major reservations, however, about the experience of the last three years and, as before, there was a remarkable unanimity of view on these questions. The first related to the point made in the previous chapter: an anxiety about what was felt to be the inadequate preparation of the Canadian public for the consequences of the 1967 immigration regulations and the absence hitherto of well-planned programs in Canada to encourage the adjustment of much larger numbers of immigrants from Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. The second concerned the disappointing fact of the continued absence of stable immigration programming. It was felt that the "tap on and off system" was still in effect, as 286

Overseas Immigration Offices immigration statistics since 1966 demonstrated, and that this system was as undesirable as ever. It was bad for immigrants and it would be as difficult as it always was to get things moving again when the tap was turned on.2 The third reservation related to "immigration within manpower." Most officers felt that, while a Department of Manpower and Immigration had many advantages, the anxiety that they had had initially about the Immigration Division in Canada had been justified, and that the special needs of immigrants in their general adjustment to Canadian life had not, so far, been adequately considered or catered for by this or any other department. It was also felt that immigration was now only a fairly small part of the manpower operation and had a very small voice in departmental policy discussions. The economic orientation of this Department was very strong and the main purpose of immigration was to fill gaps in the labour force. Immigration, it was felt, was no longer an important policy area and development factor in itself; it was simply one of a number of manpower programs. These interviews took place in the summer and fall of 1969 and they conclude what was described earlier as a sampling of opinion in a very interesting overseas sector of the Canadian public service. Canada's overseas immigration service has come a very long way since the days, after the Second World War, when it was organized out of a suitcase on the road between one refugee camp and another. One of the purposes of the two previous chapters is to record something about that journey and to make more visible the efforts of a small group of public servants overseas who have made a major and, largely unrecognized, contribution to postwar Canadian development. The much to be desired integration process in the foreign operations of Canadian government which is now under way is likely to make major changes in the management of this service and will, it is to be hoped, get rid of the class structure in overseas operations. At the same time, it is to be hoped that the professionalism of the immigration service, slowly built up over the post-war period despite many difficulties, will be preserved in an effective form. Immigration offices cannot be run by amateurs, and experienced immigration officers should be valued members of the management team of many Canadian missions overseas.

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Part Five

The Voluntary Sector

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Chapter Eleven The Voluntary Sector and Government

THE voluntary sector in immigration consists of a large network of voluntary organizations, national and local, all of which play some useful part in the reception, welfare, settlement, and adjustment of immigrants in Canada and in public education in immigration. This network can be divided into the following broad categories: 1. A very small number of non-sectarian voluntary agencies with professional staff specifically established to serve all immigrants, e.g., International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto; Service d'Accueil aux Voyageurs et aux Immigrants, Montreal (SAVI); International House, London, Ontario; Winnipeg International Centre. 2. A small number of influential sectarian voluntary agencies with professional staff serving a special immigrant clientele. These agencies have international connections and almost all of them have been involved at some time in overseas activities in immigration, e.g., Jewish Immigrant Aid Services of Canada; Catholic Family Services (Immigrant Department) . 3. A number of established community organizations with professional staff serving immigrants in some way as part of a range of community services or activities, e.g., Canadian Council on Social Development; Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto; YMCA; YWCA; University Settlement and St. Christopher House, Toronto; United Community Services of Greater Vancouver. 4. A small number of voluntary organizations (mainly without professional staff) with a community or traditional interest in immigration, e.g., IODE; Canadian Citizenship Council (until 1968); provincial Citizenship Councils; Fraternite Canadienne du Quebec. 5. A number of sectarian voluntary organizations and groups serving

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a special immigrant clientele as part of a range of service activities, e.g., Catholic Women's League; Baptist Women's Missionary Society of Ontario and Quebec. 6. A large number of voluntary organizations with a minor or occasional interest in immigration, e.g., Canadian service clubs; Junior Leagues of Canada; National Council of Women. 7. Ethnic groups with (a) a separate and professionally run organization to assist immigrants of their own nationality or (b) a voluntary organization or committee to perform this service, and/or (c) a special interest in immigrants of their own nationality and in immigration generally, e.g., Italian Immigrant Aid Society and COSH (which also serves non-Italian immigrants); Japanese Immigrant Liaison Association; Canadian Polish Congress (Toronto District Welfare Committee); JamaicanCanadian Association. 8. Committees established from time to time to attempt a coordinating role among voluntary agencies or to study or serve a particular immigrant constituency, e.g., National Inter-Faith Immigration Committee; Immigrant Services Committee, Vancouver; Toronto Inter-Agency Council for Services to Immigrants and Migrants; National Black Coalition; Toronto Community Committee on Immigrant Children. 9. Community information centres serving a broad clientele including immigrants (some of the smaller centres are of very recent origin and have only temporary funding), e.g., Hamilton Central Information Service; Winnipeg Community Switchboard; Edmonton AID Service. 10. The ethnic press in Canada. 11. Interested organizations which may make some occasional contribution to the welfare or integration of immigrants or to public education in immigration, e.g., Mental Health Association of Canada; Canadian Institute of International Affairs. 12. Certain unique organizations which do not fit into any of these categories, e.g., Office of the Canadian Correspondent of UN High Commissioner for Refugees; Canadian Folk Arts Council. In 1966 the Immigration Division of the Department of Manpower and Immigration carried out a survey of all the voluntary organizations in Canada which were then active in some way in the immigration field. They identified 337 voluntary agencies which provided some kind of service or assistance to immigrants. This survey was regarded by its authors as a rough guide only because it did not involve a close examination of the purpose, capacities, and resources of each agency. With the information which was available, however, these agencies were sorted out, first into those which were of major, minor, or minimal value to the Department in relation to the assistance they gave to immigrants; and secondly, 292

The Voluntary Sector and Government TABLE 21 CANADIAN VOLUNTARY AGENCIES PROVIDING SOME SERVICE OR ASSISTANCE TO IMMIGRANTS

Organizations

Providing a) Diversified services of major value b) Limited or special services of major value Providing diversified services of minor value Providing only limited or special services of minimal value Total

Total

Serving All Immigrants

Serving Ethnic Groups Only

Serving Religious Groups Only

46

22

11

13

13

5

4

4

139

27

50

62

139

52

48

39

337

106

113

118

.

within each of these three groups, into a further subdivision of those agencies which provided services to all immigrants, those which served specific ethnic groups, and those which served specific religious denominations. Table 21 illustrates this breakdown. When we examine the total figures in this table and particularly those in the first category, diversified services of major value (22 agencies serving all immigrants, 11 agencies serving only ethnic groups, and 13 serving only religious groups), it is important to bear in mind that only a limited number in each group would have been agencies with a professional staff, a reasonable income, adequate accommodation, records, even secretarial assistance. In the whole of Canada at the present time, there are only six non-sectarian agencies and one important branch of the Travellers' Aid Society which really qualify as specialized, professional community organizations serving all immigrants.1 At a conference organized in Toronto in the fall of 1968 by the International Institute, the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State, and the Citizenship Branch of the government of Ontario, for the purpose of examining existing services for immigrants and the agencies which can or could provide them, it was only possible then to identify four agencies in the non-sectarian, non-exclusively ethnic area.2 The voluntary sector in immigration is, in fact, very difficult to classify and to describe because it is a scene of great diversity, very unequal performance, and constant change and fluctuation. The survey undertaken 293

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by the Department of Manpower and Immigration gave us, for the first time, a rough idea of its dimensions. A recent but limited study, undertaken by the Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto for the United Community Fund, identified twenty-eight Fund-supported agencies in Toronto which provided some type of service to immigrants, of which eleven gave a considerable amount of service, but only four were professional immigration agencies keeping reliable records and providing services by staff who were trained and experienced in this field. These were the International Institute, the Catholic Family Services (Immigrant Department), the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, and COSTI, the Italian Community Education Centre.3 Another useful source of information is the Directory of Welfare Services compiled by the Canadian Council on Social Development, but a great many voluntary efforts are too ephemeral to be recorded there. A number of voluntary groups which may have been active for some time in immigration do not have an office, never keep records, and simply respond to the needs of the moment. Their program, objectives, and performance may change totally from year to year. Only a very few officials and experienced community workers in a particular city who have been working with these agencies, committees, and groups for some time can really assess the quality and usefulness of the work they do. WITHOUT DIRECTION OR LEADERSHIP Unlike the United States where voluntary organizations concerned with immigration have formed large associations—the American Immigration and Citizenship Conference and American Council for Nationalities Service—which, through their annual conferences and meetings, act as a very valuable forum for the exchange of ideas and information, are keenly interested in the evaluation and reform of immigration law, and have good working relationships with government officials and with Congress; and unlike Australia where the Good Neighbour Movement, developed and supported by government, has, for many years, acted as a coordinating body for voluntary activity on behalf of Australian migrants to the point where it is now likely to develop in new directions, the voluntary sector in Canadian immigration has been collectively unorganized and without direction or leadership. There has been no governmental or voluntary focus for its activities at the national level and no guidance at all for its development in relation to the federal government's immigration program. Since funds have been scarce, initiatives in this sector have been few. In addition, good initiatives have often been lost because there was no capability for follow-up. 294

The Voluntary Sector and Government Communication also has been very weak, vertically (to Ottawa) and horizontally (among the agencies themselves). There have been two occasions during the post-war period when, for a short time, there was closer communication and collaboration with government and some sustained joint action among the agencies. The first, as mentioned earlier, was the Hungarian crisis and refugee movement of 1956-57 and the second was World Refugee Year in 1959-60, but in both these developments, there was, for a short period of time, an external motivation and source of support. Apart from these occasions, there has been no effective, regular communication either between government and the voluntary sector generally, or among the major agencies and organizations involved in immigration, in the whole period since the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was created in 1950 and in the lifetime of the federal Citizenship Branch so far. Very occasionally, national conferences have been organized or supported by the Citizenship Branch which have brought some of the agencies and other interested organizations and individuals together. The first major conference after 1950 was the National Seminar on Citizenship held at the Guild Inn in Toronto in 1953 with representatives from all the provinces. The last was the Cross Canada Conference "The Community and Immigration," mentioned earlier, which was held in Toronto in 1968 as the result of an initiative on the part of the International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto and supported by the federal and provincial Citizenship Branches.4 The resolutions and speeches at both these conferences, separated by fifteen years, were largely concerned with the same unsolved problem: how to achieve closer collaboration between government and the voluntary sector in dealing with the problem of immigrants and their adjustment to Canadian society, and how to develop overall planning, leadership, and initiative in this field. The most recent recommendations on these issues (in July 1970) come from the Ontario Economic Council, and we might note again its gloomy comment that "for over twenty years, there has been a long succession of conferences, seminars and studies on immigration. . . . The same recommendations appear again and again. Unfortunately very few of them are implemented."5 The Council wants to see the development now of a major citizenship development program in Ontario whose administrative costs are met by government and in which voluntary community organizations are totally involved. It also wants to see government grants to these organizations increased. At the local level, attempts at coordination and association have a long history. In Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver efforts have been made from time to time to establish voluntary coordinating committees and to

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bring agencies together for regular consultation, with government representatives often acting as observers. The Toronto experience is described in more detail in Chapter 12. A few Citizenship Councils across Canada have managed to bring some agencies together, generally for rather limited purposes relating to reception and citizenship ceremonies. By and large, however, real coordination, at least until very recently, has proved too difficult because the organizers had no authority, limited information relating to the overall immigration program, no money, and no staff. For a number of years also, the Canadian Welfare Council, now known as the Canadian Council on Social Development, had a National Committee on the Welfare of Immigrants, but it was never an energetic committee. It had no real relationship with government, no special funds and, on the whole, achieved very little. Early in 1969, it was revived in the form of a Committee on Migrants and Immigrants whose stated objective was to develop "a comprehensive community approach to the delivery of adaptive services to all people-on-the-move." The Committee has now dissolved itself after producing a useful report entitled "People on the Move" which embodied its recommendations to the Council. The problem with committees of this kind, however, is that they are committees with a selected membership relating to an organization with very broad concerns. They have no real democratic, representative base in the immigration constituency, nor do they adequately represent or have sufficient contact with the numerous agencies and organizations in this field across Canada. This particular Committee was more representative than the earlier one, but it only met twice for all-day sessions in Ottawa, the first in June 1969 and the second in October 1970. There are some recent developments, however, which encourage the hope that the many years of confusion and governmental neglect in this area will not go on very much longer. Some of these developments have been referred to already. Others will be discussed in the final chapters. They include the creation in 1967 of the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and the four Advisory Boards, including one on the Adjustment of Immigrants (whose overall structure, as we have seen, is now being reshaped); the creation in 1968 of a Department of Immigration in Quebec, which is taking new initiatives in the integration area; and the increased activity and new programs of the Citizenship and Community Development Branches in Ontario in the last few years. They also include the formation in 1968 of a National Inter-Faith Immigration Committee which brought together for the first time the immigration activities of sixteen Canadian religious denominations and the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services of Canada (JIAS); and the creation in Van296

The Voluntary Sector and Government couver in September 1969 of an Immigrant Services Committee of the Vancouver Citizenship Council and in Toronto in April 1970 of an InterAgency Council for Services to Immigrants and Migrants.6 Another development of great importance is the major review undertaken in 1969 by the federal government of its citizenship responsibilities and the subsequent decision to develop a "revitalized program on citizenship" within the Department of the Secretary of State which will be described in Chapter 14. The Department of Manpower and Immigration has now improved its initial reception services for immigrants and has created, in five major cities, Immigrant Reception Centres where immigrants destined for the labour force can obtain special counselling and advice. In several of its five regions, a referral system is being worked out for immigrants between the Canada Manpower Centres and local voluntary agencies. Despite these developments, however, services and programs for all the immigrants who need them, including wives, children, and elderly persons as well as members of the labour force, are still very inadequate and very unequally provided across Canada. The funding of voluntary agencies which attempt to provide some vital services to immigrants is still in a confused and undeveloped state. It is not yet clear, for example, how the new coordinating committees in Toronto and Vancouver can be provided with a sufficiently large and reliable income to enable them to employ a professional staff of a reasonable size, and to undertake a range of useful activities for immigrants and for their member organizations. The role of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, the extent of its mandate in the field of the adjustment of immigrants, and the degree of leadership which it is prepared to provide in this field are not at all clear at the present time. The same is true of the Department of the Secretary of State and its Citizenship Branch. The respective responsibilities of these two Departments and of the provinces in relation to services and programs for immigrants in Canada urgently need clarifying.7 Another important element in this situation which is still missing, although it could grow out of the activities which have just been described, is the development of an effective immigration interest group, with major public concerns, at the national level. If the federal and provincial governments have been very reluctant in the past to give leadership in this area, it must be conceded that the complex of Canadian immigration organizations, scattered, unorganized, and speaking with many voices (though not very loudly) is very difficult to deal with. The question is posed therefore whether there is not an urgent need in Canada now for something like the American Immigration and Citizenship Conference which, with an active board, a very small staff and premises, but considerable initiative, has succeeded for some time hi acting as an important

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national focal point for community activity in United States immigration, and as a very valuable continuing means of communication with government and with elected representatives, although it is far from being, with the other immigrant organizations, a powerful American lobby. What it also does is to bring together in one national association many of the non-sectarian, sectarian, and ethnic organizations in U.S. immigration and enables them to make common cause. The interests of the former Canadian Citizenship Council, which with commendable realism removed itself from the scene in 1968, were too broad to serve this particular constituency. The creation of such an association or standing conference in Canada, which would have a representative organizational structure, a political role and purpose which cannot be achieved by a single committee of the Canadian Council on Social Development, could be the theme of the next national conference on immigration, now long overdue. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE IMMIGRANT We might look briefly now at some of the consequences which this degree of disorganization and underdevelopment has had for the immigrant himself. The diversity within this sector of voluntary activity and the total absence of planning from within and without have meant very unequal treatment for immigrants. Some immigrants do much better than others in terms of counselling and assistance of various kinds simply by virtue of ethnic origin or religious affiliation. It is a very good thing, for example, to be a Jewish immigrant in Canada. And it is strategic also to be a Baptist of any national origin. Both these groups are concerned to give as much assistance as they can to immigrants of their own community. The Jewish Immigrant Aid Services of Canada is one of the best performers among the agencies which help immigrants. In fact it is a model of what a good immigration agency can be. JIAS, however, has some distinct advantages over other groups. First, it has a network of international contacts and long experience in migration. Secondly, it is handling a comparatively small and homogeneous group of immigrants, although there is more variety in educational and cultural background within this group than might be supposed. Thirdly, it is well financed—an unusual situation. Because it is well financed, it can afford a well-paid professional staff at its national and regional headquarters. Because it has a professional staff and professional standards of operation, it can pursue consistent policies and evaluate its own performance, negotiate with government on a reasonable basis, and play a continuously active and useful part in community efforts in immigration.8 There is no equivalent professional 298

The Voluntary Sector and Government agency for Baptist immigrants. But Baptist churches and Baptist volunteers work with great zeal for their own immigrants. The Baptist Women's Missionary Society of Ontario and Quebec is among the very small group of women's organizations which are really active in immigration. In the matter of religious affiliation, it is clearly better to belong to a smaller church or community than to a larger one. The Catholics and the Anglicans, for example, have a much tougher immigration problem, a much larger clientele, than the Jews, the Baptists, or the Lutherans. Some Anglican churches do a great deal for their own immigrants. Some do little or nothing. For some years in Toronto, the Anglicans ran a very useful information centre which was open to immigrants of every faith or nationality, but this was eventually transformed into another kind of service centre. An interesting recent development within the Anglican Church has been the formation in 1970 of a National Task Force on Ethnic Ministries which is looking at the church's responsibility towards the new immigrant groups many of whom, particularly those from the West Indies, are joining Anglican churches. The Anglicans have also shown a great deal of interest in the international humanitarian causes which are related to immigration: refugees, orphans from Hong Kong, and other issues. The Catholics have shared many of these concerns. But they have probably provided, in the long run, a better, more sustained service for the continuing flow of Catholic immigrants to Canada, organized on a national and international basis. They have two major centres of activity in Toronto and Montreal and smaller ones in Winnipeg, Edmonton, Calgary, and Vancouver, and they have been very active in community efforts for immigrants. Recently in Toronto they have been developing a series of small community-based services to specific ethnic groups. They have, of course, a philosophy of migration derived from long experience of it and from the nature of the Catholic faith, and they have a source of guidance in and direct representation on the Pontifical Commission concerned with international migration in Rome. Just as it is better for immigrants to belong to some faiths than to others, so it is better to belong to some ethnic groups than to others. Some of the ethnic groups do a particularly good job in caring for their own nationals without having a formal agency to do it. Others set up a small office often staffed by only one or two people and provide information and other kinds of assistance on demand. In the whole spectrum of possibilities, one of the worst things to be in terms of direct service is a British immigrant and particularly one of no religious persuasion. The British, still by far the largest group of post-war immigrants, have no effective ethnic organization of their own: their numbers are too large, their feeling of association with Canadians is too close for this. Nor are they in any

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sense now, keen churchgoers measured by North American standards. They do, however, turn easily to government agencies for whatever kinds of help are offered. Like all immigrants, however, they could do with very much more readily available information and counselling. There are disadvantages also in belonging to any very large group of immigrants. The Italians in Toronto, Montreal, Hamilton, Vancouver, and other cities have had one of the most difficult group problems in recent years in terms of large numbers of new immigrants, often without much education (hitherto), language problems, and resulting ethnic isolation. But just as the Italians are, by instinct, more politically minded than many other groups, so they have been active and inventive in self-help, and they have had considerable and much needed assistance from the Italian government. The Italian Immigrant Aid Societies of Montreal and Toronto and COST! in Toronto are hard-working, active agencies.9 The Italian Consulate General in Toronto also sponsors an Italian Office for Labour and Social Assistance (ULAS) which provides information, referral, interpreter, and translation services. Since 1956 Italians have been closely associated, in an individual capacity, with the International Institute in Toronto. It is characteristic of this confused territory, however, that the Italian Immigrant Aid Society, although assisted by Catholic Family Services, cannot get financial help from the federal or provincial governments and is obliged to seek it elsewhere since government has been afraid to favour one ethnic or religious group over another. Both levels of government, however, do assist COST! which now serves all immigrants. The Italian government has always provided COST! with considerable assistance in the form of a rent-free building and a substantial annual grant. Where there is no planning, the newer groups of immigrants, who are coming in now in much larger numbers under the new immigration regulations and with the expansion of overseas facilities, are at a considerable disadvantage since there are few experienced community groups for them and, in the case of some nationalities, very few, if any, community workers who speak their language. As we have seen, immigration from Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America doubled in 1967 and has been increasing since then. Voluntary agencies must respond to this as best they can. Until very recently, there has been no evident planning, research, or extra effort under way on the part of governments or anyone else to facilitate the mutual adjustment of these immigrants and the Canadian community.

A VITAL SERVICE The federal government has been responsible for the major part of the movement of over three and a half million immigrants to Canada since 300

The Voluntary Sector and Government the war. The voluntary agencies across Canada have attempted to meet the immediate and continuing needs of these immigrants where they were not being met by the government. And the services provided for all immigrants in Canada—the immigrant and his family, the independent and the sponsored immigrant—although they have improved lately, have been very limited and are still mainly related to employment and, in collaboration with the provinces, to language training. The assistance given to immigrants by voluntary agencies has undoubtedly been varied in quality and its incidence haphazard. There is no way of knowing how many immigrants have been helped by the many agencies, large and small, which make some efforts in this direction, including those, like the family service agencies, which are not primarily concerned with immigration. Nevertheless, it is plain that over the whole post-war period the voluntary agencies have given considerable (and largely unpaid) service to the government in the reception, welfare, settlement, and adjustment of immigrants and are still doing so. Voluntary organizations in immigration obviously share the present problems of voluntary organizations everywhere. Because of the increasing social responsibilities of government, rising costs, and other factors, their continued existence is often open to question.10 But in immigration, there is no doubt at all that almost all these agencies and groups—nonsectarian, sectarian, and ethnic, new and old—perform a most valuable service in helping many immigrants to become accustomed to Canadian life by giving direct assistance in various ways; by providing simple counselling and information, often in the immigrant's own language; and by their very presence as evidence of community goodwill and desire to help. These valuable services, past and present, should be recognized in practical ways which permit creative and flexible development, primarily by establishing better communication and an effective, closer working and consultative relationship between these organizations and government at all levels; and by a new approach to financing which will get rid of the humiliating and most inefficient annual pleas for financial support to government and to community funds. Since government is now planning and budgeting on a much longer term basis, it is surely reasonable to expect and enable voluntary organizations to do the same. In relation to government, a damaging feature of the present system of ad hoc grants, disbursed annually by the decision of very senior officials who may well have limited experience in immigration and none at all at the local level, is that it leaves so little room for development and experiment. Nor is the principle yet established that sectarian and ethnic agencies can be just as valuable as non-sectarian agencies and often need help just as much. In this regard, it should also be remembered that it has always been

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very difficult to raise money in the community for immigrant organizations. Immigrants are too new and probably too healthy and cannot compete with the more evidently worthwhile causes, particularly since voluntary giving is in any case declining. Perhaps only the Jewish community, which sees immigration very much in the light of a continuing rescue movement, will give very substantial support to this kind of organization. Government, therefore, surely has a special financial responsibility in this area if it is concerned, as it must be, with the responsible management of immigration in Canada. POSTSCRIPT This is an account of the voluntary sector in immigration as it was prior to 1972. There are few areas of the immigration field which have been so volatile. Some of the agencies and committees referred to here have survived, while others have disappeared from the scene. The International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto, for example, a valuable, experienced, non-sectarian agency helping immigrants and refugees of all nationalities, has perished. Deserted by the United Appeal for most inadequate reasons, and lacking strong support from any level of government, it could not raise enough funds to continue operations. In the United States too, the voluntary sector—although it includes some very strong and well-financed agencies and organizations—is also prone to frequent change. Since the first edition of this book, The American Immigration and Citizenship Conference (AICC), referred to in this chapter has also ceased to survive as an independent organization, after many years of valuable work and long service to the immigration world by its small staff. AICC eventually merged with the National Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Forum in Washington.

302

Chapter Twelve The Voluntary Sector in Retrospect

THE relationship between government and the voluntary sector in immigration has a long and complicated history in the post-war period. It is not that this relationship has never existed. It is simply that it has, on the whole, been very inadequate. It is proposed in this chapter to look back at some of the significant aspects of it: the role of the churches; government grants to voluntary agencies; the Field Service and immigration responsibilities of the Citizenship Branch; the Toronto experience in attempting to coordinate voluntary activity; and the long record of pressure on the part of Canadian voluntary organizations and individuals for a national and local advisory councils in immigration. THE CHURCHES AND IMMIGRATION Like the Overseas Service and Foreign Branch, the recent activities of the Canadian churches in immigration have their origins in Europe in the first years after the war and in the considerable international, governmental, and voluntary effort then made to help some of the nine million displaced persons, three hundred thousand of whom found their way to Canada. Soon after hostilities ceased, the major religious organizations became heavily involved in relief operations, in the camps, and in the screening of refugees. In Canada at this time there was a very strong impulse to help refugees and to help in European relief generally. In 1947 six Canadian religious and ethnic organizations banded together to form the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCRR). These agencies were the Catholic Immigrant Aid Society, the German Baptist Colonization and Immigration Society, the

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Canadian Lutheran Relief, the Latvian Relief Fund of Canada, the Canadian Mennonite Board of Colonization, and the Sudetan Committee. Its purpose was "to organize the assembly abroad, selection, presentation to Canadian immigration offices, and onward movement to Canada of refugees and displaced persons who did not come within the mandate of the I.R.O." At this time, the work of the CCCRR was felt to be very valuable by the federal government, and the Council was given a grant of up to $10,000 a month which was continued until the end of 1951. At the same time, the major protestant church groups came together to form the Canadian Council of Churches (CCC) which was also very active in European relief and in the movement of displaced persons. The CCC consisted of the Church of England in Canada, the United Church of Canada, the Baptist Federation of Canada, the Church of Christ (Disciples), the Evangelical United Brethren Church, the Presbyterian Church in Canada, the Reformed Episcopal Church, the Salvation Army, and the Quakers. Both the CCCRR and the CCC and one or two other independent agencies were given privileges and authority in the selection and settlement of immigrants. All went reasonably well in the first few years of emergency operations. Everyone, in a sense, was an amateur. The need to help millions of individuals and families required large numbers of volunteers, and dedication and enthusiasm were very valuable qualities. This first phase, however, which applied to both government and voluntary agencies gave way after several years to attempts to create a more professional management of the refugee problem and of immigration generally. After the creation of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950 and the gradual development of a more effective Overseas Service, the enthusiasm of the federal government for the activities of the Canadian voluntary agencies in Europe cooled. The many organizational weaknesses of these agencies became apparent and their foothold in the selection of immigrants became irksome. The agencies, however, continued to feel that they were performing a valuable, humanitarian service. Early in 1953 the Department of Citizenship and Immigration attempted to restrict the scope of agency activities and to confine this first to the reunion of families (always a major concern of these voluntary agencies and particularly of the Catholics), and secondly to the selection of workers then coming to Canada for placement by the Department of Labour (i.e., farm labourers and domestics). In other words, voluntary agencies would be removed from the general selection field and the Overseas Service could manage this unharrassed. This move caused total confusion and made the situation, if anything, worse than before. Later in the year, therefore, the Department established what it called the Approved 304

The Voluntary Sector in Retrospect Church Program whereby overseas activities would be confined to four major sectarian groups: the Canadian Council of Churches, the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees, the Rural Settlement Society of Canada, and the Canadian Jewish Congress and Immigrant Aid Services. These organizations were given privileges in the selection of unsponsored immigrants and in the approval and processing of applications for sponsored immigrants. This was a major concession and it is evident from the files that the Department was still uneasy about it. At a meeting of the Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration at which these four groups were present on October 14, 1954, the Deputy Minister again attempted, diplomatically, to disengage the agencies from the selection process and to induce them to concentrate their efforts on the reunion of families and on the settlement of immigrants in Canada. The Department, according to the Deputy Minister, was now in a position to handle selection on its own. Since 1950 the Immigration Branch had been training its own selection officers in cooperation with the Department of Labour. He went on to emphasize the interest which the voluntary agencies had always taken in the reunion of families and suggested that, in addition, the activities of the agencies in Canada might be expanded. "If some of the money spent abroad in the pre-selection field," he said, "could be spent in Canada, many immigrants could be assisted in their initial period of establishment." He felt that this was more within the sphere of voluntary agencies than of government.1 These proposals were coldly received by the agencies (with the exception of the Canadian Jewish Congress to whom this matter was less important). They clung tenaciously to the idea that they were still performing valuable services in the selection field and that they could not do useful work in integration without some knowledge of the immigrants who were coming to Canada and without some foothold in Europe. They pointed out that the money the agencies received from international organizations was to move immigrants and to assist in the integration of those who were moved. When the movement stopped, the money would stop. They suggested also that the voluntary agencies might be in a better position to judge the moral attributes of immigrants than government and might select immigrants who would make better Canadian citizens than those who were occupationally suitable. The Deputy Minister then pointed out that the activities of the voluntary agencies were concentrated in Germany and Austria only and that the movement from these countries constituted only one-fifth of the total movement of immigrants to Canada. The government was obviously able to manage without the voluntary agencies elsewhere. In Germany at this

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moment, he pointed out, there was a huge backlog of applications. One of the reasons why the Immigration Branch could not deal with this backlog was due to the continual presentation of prospective immigrants by the voluntary agencies which took precedence. In addition, the voluntary agencies were principally interested in the unemployed whereas this was not necessarily the aim of the government's immigration program. The Immigration Branch was looking for immigrants with trades or qualifications in demand in Canada which would enable them to get a job as soon as possible. It was not clear at the conclusion of this meeting whether any compromise had been reached. The Deputy Minister offered to provide the voluntary agencies with information about the numbers of immigrants of any particular denomination who were coming to Canada if they would bring their activities in the preselection of immigrants to an end. Representatives of the CCCRR and the Rural Settlement Society said that they were prepared to go along with the Department's suggestion for one year on the understanding that no long-term commitment was involved. The CCC, however, was less accommodating and insisted that they must consult a representative of the World Council of Churches who was about to arrive in Canada before making any decision. Finally the Chairman said that the agencies should outline their proposed plans for 1955, bearing in mind "that in the execution of the programme for next year, pre-selection could be done by the Immigration Branch and all other existing arrangements are to remain the same." He also said that the agencies should give some idea of the number of opportunities for immigrant placement in Canada which they might be able to develop.2 The Approved Church Program continued for the next five years but was never really satisfactory. A former senior official of the Department who was closely involved in these negotiations, and was present at the meeting which has just been described, said in an interview that the Department was deeply disappointed in the churches and that the Approved Church Program left it with a considerable suspicion of voluntary agencies. The following comment on the Approved Church Program in the recent departmental study of voluntary agencies clarifies this point: The agencies had different interests, unequal resources, and, above all, disparate capacities for organization and implementation. Efforts to bring the Canadian Council of Churches into line with the other religious and ethnic organizations were not successful. Uncertainties, misunderstanding and complications developed between the Department and the agencies, and between the agencies in Canada and their overseas affiliates. Most serious was the propensity of the agencies in 306

The Voluntary Sector in Retrospect Canada to disclaim responsibility for the accommodation and maintenance of persons granted visas under the auspices of their representative counterparts abroad. In 1958 the Department was obliged to issue instructions to overseas staffs which, in effect, rendered the agencies harmless, but left them ostensibly with their privileges intact. This experience with the churches undoubtedly created a climate of mistrust within the Department, a doubt as to whether voluntary agencies could be relied upon and a feeling that they were difficult and trying to deal with. But no attempt was made to examine their operations carefully and to see what staff and resources they had. No sustained attempt was made to inform and educate this particular public. As a result, the churches continued on their separate ways, individually meeting or attempting to find immigrants of their own particular faith at ports of entry and developing their own activities for immigrants in Canada. Many Canadian immigrants, including the author, will remember being approached—even accosted—by five or six different church representatives on arrival in Halifax, Montreal, or at the Champlain Harbour Station at Quebec. It was an undignified procedure. The principal requirement of the churches from the Department of Citizenship and Immigration at this time was to know who was coming: how many Anglican immigrants? how many Catholics? how many Lutherans? Despite the fact that the religious affiliation of all immigrants was recorded overseas then, no satisfactory communication system was arrived at. In Canada, at times of crisis and special effort, that is, during the Hungarian refugee movement and World Refugee Year, the churches and other immigration agencies drew closer together and pooled their resources. Crisis and effort over, they went their own way. It was not yet the day of real ecumenical spirit. It is a pleasure, therefore, to record first the existence and continued operation so far of the National Inter-Faith Immigration Committee formed in 1968, and secondly the fact that the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the Committee have now found an acceptable system of notification, based on the voluntary registration of religious affiliation by immigrants. This new system meets the needs of the churches for some advance information about arrivals, and it has enabled them to set up a national system of neighbourhood visiting for new immigrants by volunteers, which is organized through six regional committees across Canada.3 As far as possible, the churches are now represented at ports of entry by only one representative, acting in their collective interest. The national visiting program is still new and varies in effectiveness, apparently, according to the degree of local interest in immigration and experi307

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ence of it and local capacity for collaboration among the churches. While these new arrangements are very much better than the old ones, the new notification system does not produce very large numbers of known arrivals for the churches who have not, in turn, provided very substantial funds for this operation so far. The national and regional committees could probably operate much more effectively, however, in the context of a wellorganized network of services and programs for immigrants in Canada. GOVERNMENT GRANTS TO VOLUNTARY AGENCIES Since 1951 the Citizenship Branch has made provision in its annual estimates for grants to voluntary agencies, and for a long time this was the only source of financial support from government available to the voluntary agencies in immigration. The amount of money to be disbursed for the whole of Canada was always very small, and the conditions of award contained the fatal clause that grants must not be regarded as contributions to the general maintenance or administrative expenses of the agency. In December 1953 the Director of Citizenship made the following recommendations to the Minister which were approved and which, from then on, formed the official criteria for the grants. The clause relating to administrative expenses has been italicized: 1. Grants would be made to organizations and agencies which seem best suited to carry out the specific projects or programs associated with citizenship promotion. 2. Organizations or agencies would be expected to submit plans in sufficient detail so that their value could be appraised and duplication avoided. The submission should suggest a plan which would have a definite conclusion such as a publication, report of research, the holding of a conference, etc; or it might be used for a specific period to initiate work which would be continued afterwards with public support once its value was proven. 3. The plan would be submitted hi advance so that provision could be made so that the grant would include service costs such as special salaries connected with the project, but not any part of the general administrative expenses of the organization concerned. 4. A report would be expected within a reasonable time after the conclusion of the project or on the progress of an ongoing work, including a report on uses of the monies spent, since the Department must be prepared at all times to account for the monies so expended. There were three ways in which grants from the Citizenship Branch were authorized: in the estimates themselves, by order-in-council, or by Treasury Board minute enabling payments to be made from year to year. 308

The Voluntary Sector in Retrospect More recently, supporting grants for citizenship promotion, which included immigration, were governed by a Treasury Board minute of 1962. According to this minute, grants had a ceiling of $5,000 to any one organization in any one year and were governed by certain criteria as to the purposes of the project. A larger grant would require separate Treasury Board approval. In the main they were given for "projects, programmes or services, including citizenship seminars, training sessions or conferences, in respect of which there is good evidence of community interest, participation and support, and of competent management." What did this do to a voluntary agency which sought support from the Citizenship Branch? It meant that the agency might be able to secure a grant for a conference or for a research project. But it could not look to that source of support to pay the salary of an additional case-worker, or to redecorate part of the premises, or to raise the salaries of its existing underpaid staff. Some hope might be thought to be provided in item 2 of the recommendations of the Director of Citizenship, that is, grants for work which would be continued afterwards with public support. Calculations have quite frequently been made with that possibility in mind. But the hope was generally illusory, because there was no planning agency with strong political support (federal or provincial) which could pick up a good idea or pilot project and see that it was converted into an ongoing operation. A striking case in point is the pilot project undertaken by the International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto in 1964, with support from federal, provincial, and foundation funds, to explore the difficulties encountered by rural immigrants living in Toronto. These were sponsored immigrants, part of the great post-war flow of sponsored immigrants from southern Europe. The report of this two-year project, Newcomers in Transition, together with its successor, Newcomers and New Learning, the outcome of a second two-year project, was very well received and had a wide circulation. It was used by the Deputy Minister of the Department of Manpower and Immigration and his officials in their presentation to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Immigration when they were desperately seeking reliable information to support their conclusions and proposals on the sponsored movement. It was discussed in the House of Commons and in the Ontario Legislature. The report made a number of sensible recommendations. Not a single one was implemented. No government agency lifted a finger to see that the results of this research were converted into practical operations which could be continued afterwards with public support. Five years later, however, there is evidence that the thinking in this report is beginning to have some effect.4

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A very limited number of agencies have received direct grants in recent years from the Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and Manpower and Immigration which were intended in the first place to assist these agencies in the reception of immigrants. Approximately 80 percent of the money has gone to Montreal, 20 percent to Toronto, and until recently none at all to other Canadian cities including Vancouver. As a general annual average, 33 percent of all immigrants have been admitted through the Port of Montreal and Dorval Airport. A combined total of 40 percent of all immigrants have been admitted through the Port of Toronto and Toronto International Airport and the City of Quebec. Many of the immigrants admitted through Montreal continue their journey, sometimes a little later, to Toronto. It will be recalled that in 1967 Ontario received 52 percent of all the immigrants admitted to Canada and well over half chose to settle in Toronto. Quebec received 20.5 percent, British Columbia 12.2 percent, the Prairie Provinces 12.6 percent, and the Atlantic Provinces 2.1 percent. Nevertheless, four-fifths of the grant money awarded in this category went to two agencies in Montreal: Service d'Accueil aux Voyageurs et aux Immigrants and the Travellers' Aid Society of Montreal. The latter is now disbanded and some of its major functions are being taken over by SAVI. In 1967-68 both the Travellers' Aid Society of Montreal and SAVI received grants of $15,000. In the same year the Travellers' Aid Society of Toronto received a grant of $5,000. The grants now have a broader purpose and have increased in size. In 1971-72 SAVI, the largest of the agencies and serving both immigrants and migrants, received a grant of $50,000 from the Department of Manpower and Immigration; the International Institute and the Travellers' Aid Society (now the Mobility Counselling Service) in Toronto received grants of $19,000 and $5,000 respectively. An additional grant of $20,000 was awarded to the International Institute to finance the appointment of two additional counsellors (for the Asian and West Indian communities) for one year only. In addition, COST! in Toronto and the Vancouver Immigrant Services Committee both received grants of $15,000. As suggested earlier, this system of annual grants urgently needs re-examination and new and more flexible ways found of financing a larger number of organizations across Canada. THE CITIZENSHIP BRANCH AND FIELD SERVICE Another very interesting aspect of the relationship between the voluntary agencies and government in immigration in the post-war period lies in their contacts with the Field Service, formerly the Liaison Service, of the Citizenship Branch, now an integral part of the Department of the Secre310

The Voluntary Sector in Retrospect tary of State. The Branch, whose role prior to 1966 within the Department of Citizenship and Immigration has been discussed in an earlier chapter,5 is undergoing a major transformation following the government's review of its citizenship responsibilities which has now been completed. The plans and proposals which emerged from this review, relating to a new Citizenship Act and a revitalized program on citizenship within the Department of the Secretary of State, will be discussed in the final chapter. In order to carry out these plans, the Citizenship Branch and its Field Service are now being reorganized and expanded. In this chapter, however, we are not thinking so much of what the Branch may become as what it has been in relation to voluntary agencies. In 1969-70 the Citizenship Branch consisted of five major programs, an administration division, and a research and communications division, with a total budget of $3,540,000 and a staff of 110. The senior officers of the Branch included the Director, an Assistant Director, Programs, and an Assistant Director, Operations, who was responsible for the Field Service located in twenty field offices with four regional desks, Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, and Western. The field offices, except in Montreal and Toronto, were generally manned by one officer only, with some secretarial assistance. The work of the field officers related to all five branch programs, depending to some extent on local circumstances and needs, branch requirements, and their own special interests. The five programs, with their budgets, were as follows: Travel and Exchange ($1,240,000), Citizenship Development ($875,000), Ethnic Participation Division ($800,000), Indian, Eskimo Participation Division ($275,000), and Human Rights Division ($150,000). The budget of the Ethnic Participation Division, which gives a good idea of the size and extent of this operation across Canada, shows the following breakdown: Ethnic Participation Division Budget 1969-70 Salaries $ 90,000 Grants 50,000 Language training 620,000 Professional services 30,000 Travel 6,000 Publications 4,000 TOTAL

$800,000

Just before the major changes which are now taking place, the responsibilities of the small Field Service were extended and related, in an in-

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formal way, to all the major activities of the Department of the Secretary of State. The former Liaison Service of the Citizenship Branch, now the Field Service, is a comparatively old institution. It has been central to branch operations and concepts of community development since the Branch was moved to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950. The first few officers of the Branch, even though they were stationed in Ottawa, were essentially pioneers of the kind that the Liaison Service or Field Service staff were intended to be. With very few resources and a lot of imagination and effort, they endeavoured to infiltrate the community in a well-meaning way and encourage social development on a broad front. As we have already noted, in the early days immigrants were a much more important part of that front than they are today, except perhaps in Montreal and Toronto. The style of operation was always individual. Although intensive self-examination occurred at headquarters, there were no real criteria, and very little money, for operations and program development. There was no regular system of feedback from the community and no established means for regular consultation with anyone. We have seen that, as a result mainly of very small resources and of weak political support, but perhaps also because of this style of operation, the Branch was accounted in 1966 to have had no national impact. The efforts and style of the citizenship liaison or field officers related very closely (as we have noted in relation to the Branch itself) to the adult education movement in Canada, its clientele, and the many community development projects which have sprung from it. But their activities related to national, provincial, and local politics, and to the political needs and aspirations of immigrants, in a very marginal way. Except in the case of a very few liaison officers with valuable political and social contacts, they were unable to harness, at least on a continuing basis, the interest and support of powerful sections of the Canadian community and involve them in community programs. Apart from their close connection with most university extension departments, their academic contacts were slight. In immigration, neither they nor the Branch as a whole, except briefly during the Hungarian refugee movement, had any contacts whatsoever with overseas immigration operations. Above all, they suffered from the lack, not only of financial resources, but also of a strong institutional base and of a clear and recognized working relationship in the broad field of community development, with provincial governments and officials. For voluntary organizations in immigration, therefore, the Citizenship Branch was, on the whole, a very weak source of support. The following are some very interesting comments on the Citizenship Branch and its Liaison Service from a report prepared by Arthur Stinson, 312

The Voluntary Sector in Retrospect formerly Executive Director of the Canadian Citizenship Council, for the final meeting of this Council in the fall of 1968. The purpose of this report was to assist the Council in deciding whether it should continue its limited and financially very restricted activities or terminate its operation altogether, and whether some other type of national voluntary organization might take its place. The Canadian Citizenship Council and the Citizenship Branch had always been closely associated and Mr. Stinson himself was very familiar with branch operations. At the request of the Branch, therefore, he was also asked to investigate the question as to whether the Citizenship Branch needed some kind of citizens' advisory body and whether a new organization which might succeed the Canadian Citizenship Council, if it were created, could fill that role. In his report, Mr. Stinson noted that throughout the post-year period the Citizenship Branch had had multifarious contacts with the community and was in constant touch with certain national organizations. Liaison officers each worked within a network of voluntary organizations, and there was constant interplay between these officers, groups, and individuals. In these circumstances, the Branch had not felt any acute need in the past to devise some kind of citizens' advisory board. However, Mr. Stinson noted the weaknesses of this approach, relating this to what he felt were some of the major needs of the Branch now: It is undoubtedly true at this moment that, although many voluntary organizations and individuals work in association with the Branch, none have an overall picture of what the Branch is attempting to achieve. There is no non-governmental institution which is in a position of supporting or criticizing the overall organization, budget, policies or methods of the Branch. . . . [This] means that the Branch competes in the jungle warfare in this government for scarce resources all by itself. It gets no help from the public it serves. In fact, these publics who may depend on the Branch for support of critical, experimental and innovative programs, may not even know that an internal struggle is taking place which will hamper their efforts.6 Mr. Stinson went on to argue that if the Branch needed a sympathetic and understanding non-governmental organization to help fight its battles from time to time, it was equally true that it needed such a group as critic. In addition, the Branch badly needed interpretation to the public. It had no public relations officer. Perhaps its services would become more widely known as an inevitable result of its program activity, but this was not enough and a more professional approach was needed. Even organizations which were in contact with the Branch and were receiving project grants, 313

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Mr. Stinson noted, had little appreciation of its purposes, structure, or policies. How much more difficult it must be, therefore, for those who had never heard of the Branch to avail themselves of its services. At this meeting in the fall of 1968, in a realistic and sensible move in the light of its diminished influence, the Canadian Citizenship Council agreed on suicide. Not all the provincial Councils followed suit, as some felt that they still had a useful role to play at the provincial level. But, although various meetings and discussions were held subsequently, it proved impossible to devise a suitable institution to succeed the Council without very substantial funds to get it going. The matter of the creation of a citizens' advisory board for the Citizenship Branch, by this means, was then left in abeyance. Shortly afterwards, however, in December 1968, the remaining Citizenship Councils decided to create a national association of their own in which individual Councils would play a more important part than in the past. This organization is known as the Canadian Citizenship Federation and its members now include six Citizenship Councils (Calgary, Manitoba, Montreal, Ottawa, Vancouver, and Victoria) and twelve other national organizations with citizenship concerns. The dying of the Canadian Citizenship Council was historically significant for immigration, as the Council had been very active in stimulating voluntary efforts for immigrants in the first decade after the war and had worked closely with the Citizenship Branch. But after this time, its influence as a national organization steadily declined and the once-privileged position it had held in relation to senior levels of government was lost and never recovered. THE TORONTO EXPERIENCE As noted in the previous chapter, during the post-war period in Canada no effective and regular consultation has taken place between government and voluntary organizations in immigration at any level. And no satisfactory system has yet been worked out for providing the voluntary organizations which give useful service to immigrants with adequate funds. The unfortunate outcome of this situation, it was noted, has been that so far the voluntary sector in immigration has been rudderless, without direction, without leadership. However, the creation in 1967 of the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and its four Advisory Boards, including one on the Adjustment of Immigrants, has been a very welcome development, particularly with the reorganization now in progress. The principal purpose of the Council and Boards, whose members are drawn from a wide range of Canadian organizations, is to give advice to the Minister of Manpower and Immigration. They are not structured as a regular forum for consultation among the governmental and non-govern314

The Voluntary Sector in Retrospect mental agencies directly involved in the provision of services for immigrants. Nevertheless, they may be one of the means whereby closer consultation can be achieved in the near future. The rudderless condition of voluntary organizations in immigration has 'applied with particular force to Toronto which has been absorbing in the post-war period the largest number of immigrants of any city in Canada and recently of any city in North America. Between 1961 and 1967, for example, its population showed a net increase of 20.5 percent, mainly as a result of immigration. The following is a short description of the more recent efforts which have been made by the voluntary organizations concerned with immigration in Toronto—in the absence so far of any leadership or help from any level of government except during the Hungarian crisis—to establish some kind of coordinating committee and a closer, more effective relationship with the federal and provincial governments. In April 1957, at the height of the Hungarian refugee movement, when immigrants were arriving at Union Station in Toronto at the rate of two and three hundred a day, the Social Planning Council of Toronto, at the request of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, set up a special committee, the Metropolitan Immigration Committee, to coordinate community services and to deal with this emergency. The Committee achieved great things: welcome centres at Union Station and Malton Airport staffed by paid workers and volunteers drawn from all the agencies; emergency training for the volunteers who were meeting immigrants; a housing registry with volunteer teams which had found accommodation for over two thousand families within the first three months of operation; a special brochure in several languages with information for immigrants; a special campaign to find jobs for immigrants and other efforts. A total of 41,000 immigrants were helped by the housing registry and welcome centres in 1957-58. As already noted, this emergency period was characterized by a great deal of cooperation and collaboration between government and the voluntary agencies and among the agencies themselves. Twenty-seven major community organizations and churches participated in the work of the Metropolitan Immigration Committee. A year later, when the crisis was over and all this activity was dying down, a special study by a subcommittee of the larger Metropolitan Immigration Committee strongly recommended that some way be found to continue this valuable coordinating service, in relation to reception and other services for immigrants. In December 1958 an Immigration Section of the Social Planning Council was created with an executive committee of twenty-one including all the activists of the Metropolitan Immigration Committee. At that time the Social Planning Council was organized into semi-autonomous sections on Housing, Ageing, Youth, and other topic 315

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areas. The major purposes of the Immigration Section, which rapidly developed a large organizational and individual membership, were as follows: 1. to encourage and promote activities by individuals and organized groups aimed at effective settlement and integration of all immigrants arriving in Toronto; 2. to bring together voluntary and tax-supported agencies for joint thinking on common problems related to the settlement and integration of immigrants; to further harmonious cooperation between organizations and to prevent duplication; 3. to encourage experiments and new methods to meet the needs of immigrants and bring about the rapid integration of the newcomer into the community. At least two representatives of the Immigration Branch of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration attended the meetings of the executive committee as observers. The Director of the Citizenship Branch of Ontario and the Toronto liaison officer of the federal Citizenship Branch were active members. The federal officials brought a great deal of interest, goodwill, and local knowledge to these meetings, but they were in no sense a regular channel of communication with Ottawa. They were never empowered to discuss the Department's needs, plans, or priorities. And they provided no resources to assist the Immigration Section in its regular operations. The Section had the part-time services of one member of the staff of the Social Planning Council. The Immigration Section survived for six years. It was the most active section of the Social Planning Council and was only disbanded because the Council made radical changes in its organizational structure and, despite some protests, closed all the individual sections.7 During these six years, the executive committee found that there were certain things which could be done by a voluntary group of this kind, but some others which were out of the question. The Section could hold conferences, and some meetings and seminars, which would always arouse great interest (five annual conferences were held with excellent programs and a large attendance). It could produce an information bulletin for the agencies if the work could be done by the overworked staff of the Social Planning Council. And it could sponsor inexpensive research projects. Two examples of these were a report on English-language instruction in June 1961 and a study of the integration of immigrants in Toronto, a sample survey carried out by students of the School of Social Work in 1963. However, if research projects were undertaken, it was very unlikely that any action would result. Similarly, no action resulted from the many proposals which went forward to government from the annual conferences. 316

The Voluntary Sector in Retrospect What the Section could not do was to coordinate the activities of the multiplicity of agencies and groups working for immigrants in Toronto. It had no power and no staff of its own. Nor could it ever establish any real communication or effective relationship with the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. Nor could it educate its own members, since it had no access to the vital centres of information about Canadian immigration. These weaknesses were very evident to the executive committee. When the Immigration Section was disbanded in 1964, it was agreed that there was no point in creating a similar organization which was voluntary only. The next one must have close working relationships with the federal and provincial governments. A temporary committee, the Toronto Provisional Immigration Committee, was created in December 1964, consisting mainly of the former executive of the Immigration Section; and, from this, a small subcommittee was appointed to negotiate with government and to explore the possibility of creating a national immigration advisory council in Ottawa and an effective council or committee in Toronto, a working group representative of both the federal and provincial governments and the voluntary sector.8 The protracted efforts of this subcommittee, although they may have had some small influence, were mainly frustrated by the fact that an important moment of change in Ottawa was at hand. The subcommittee approached the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1965 and was told that the Department was seriously considering the question of advisory committees and it was urged to await the forthcoming publication of a white paper on immigration policy (eventually published by the Department of Manpower and Immigration a year later). At that time the new Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, J. R. Nicholson, paid a visit to Toronto and made a public pronouncement to the effect that the government must bring immigration matters into the realm of public interest and public participation perhaps by the creation of an immigration advisory council. This seemed to be a hopeful situation and the subcommittee decided to await developments. But no white paper appeared, and in December 1965 came the announcement by the Prime Minister of a major governmental reorganization, including the creation of a Department of Manpower and Immigration. Negotiations were resumed with the new Department, as soon as its internal organization permitted. A memorandum was submitted to the Deputy Minister, Tom Kent, as a basis for discussion, urging the creation, as soon as possible, of a small national advisory committee on immigration and similar regional or provincial immigration committees, appointed on an individual basis and financed by government, combined with an annual national conference and regional conferences on immigration which would 317

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involve, at least once a year, the whole voluntary immigration constituency. The subcommittee was invited to a meeting with the Deputy Minister and senior officials of the Department on June 30, 1966. It was a friendly meeting. The Deputy Minister assured the subcommittee that the new Department definitely intended to establish a national and regional or provincial advisory committees, but that these committees must serve both manpower and immigration interests. He gave a personal assurance that the regional or provincial committees would have a major immigration component and that the Department would hold discussions with the Toronto Provisional Immigration Committee prior to the creation of a regional or provincial committee in Ontario. This outcome seemed very satisfactory and the Toronto Provisional Immigration Committee began to explore the possibility of improving its own organization and making it more representative by creating an Ontario Immigration Council, mainly as an exploratory and planning group, which would have a larger, province-wide membership and could negotiate with the government more effectively. But although several preliminary meetings were held, this project ran into the familiar problems of financing and staff, and travel for a small group of people who were deeply involved in their own professional activities. And it seemed doubtful whether a province-wide immigration organization could or should be organized without the substantial involvement of the Ontario Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship which was not then prepared to play a major role. In view of the fact, therefore, that it was confidently expected that a regional or provincial manpower and immigration advisory committee would be created by the federal government, this effort was abandoned. Meanwhile, the long-awaited White Paper on Canadian Immigration Policy was tabled in the House in October 1966. It contained a brief statement saying that the Department proposed to establish consultative machinery "so that concerned individuals and organizations can play a fuller part in devising improved methods of assisting immigrants to feel at home in Canada," and so that greater coordination could be achieved among the public and private agencies interested in the problems of immigrants. A year later Bill C-150, proposing the creation of a Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and four Advisory Boards, was introduced in the House. But the Provisional Committee was shocked to discover that while the national structure of Advisory Council and Boards appeared to be satisfactory although the two-tier system might have serious disadvantages, which has proved to be the case,9 the regional and local committees described in part III of the Bill were not mandatory (they were to be established at the discretion of the Minister) and they were manpower committees only. The Toronto group had always under318

The Voluntary Sector in Retrospect stood that these committees would be created automatically and that they would be called manpower and immigration committees so that they would have a recognized concern, in the eyes of the public, of voluntary organizations, and of the Department itself, with the special field of immigration. This was a considerable disappointment and, it was felt, a serious letdown by the Department in view of its assurances on this question. An emergency meeting of the whole Toronto Provisional Immigration Committee was held, protests were made, telegrams sent. But to no avail. The Act to establish a Canada Manpower and Immigration Council became law on December 21, 1967, with part III unamended. After this disappointment, and following the sudden and tragic death of its convenor, the subcommittee (now the executive committee) and with it the larger Toronto Provisional Immigration Committee gave up, at least for the time being, in the knowledge that at least one of its major objectives, a national advisory council on immigration, had been achieved though not, of course, entirely by its own efforts. But if the voluntary sector in Toronto has always lacked coordination, government support and financing, it has never lacked vitality. And a new initiative developed recently to meet what is a very evident and real need among Toronto's voluntary organizations in immigration. This time it came from the International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto which was represented on the Provisional Committee and which has been instrumental in creating, in April 1970, the Inter-Agency Council for Services to Immigrants and Migrants mentioned in the last chapter. Like the Metropolitan Immigration Committee of 1957, it involves some twenty-eight community organizations and churches and is setting its sights, once again, mainly at the local level. Unlike the Provisional Committee, however, it does not aim to secure more than a friendly observer role for government. Its work is divided among four subcommittees: Information and Referral Services, Interpreter Services, Orientation Services, and Mental Health Services. After less than two years of operation, however, and some very useful work (with only one professional staff member and a small budget), the finances of the Council are in a critical condition. So far, it has been unable to secure sufficient, ongoing financial support from the three levels of government and the United Community Fund to keep this operation going—in a city which has the largest immigrant population in Canada. AN ADVISORY COUNCIL IN IMMIGRATION The Toronto Provisional Immigration Committee was a relative latecomer in the long line of those who have urged the federal government to create an advisory council in immigration. A number of witnesses includ-

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ing the first Director of the Citizenship Branch, who appeared before the Standing Committee of the Senate on Immigration and Labour after the war, stressed the urgent need for collaboration and cooperation among all the agencies providing services for immigrants. In a remarkable brief to this Committee, the Canadian Polish Congress urged, among other things, that the government should establish "clear-cut and non-ambiguous principles in the selection and admission of immigrants," an impartial Immigration Appeal Board, a separate Department of Immigration, and an advisory committee to this Department: It has been suggested that an advisory committee should be attached to the Department. This is an excellent idea. The Department needs the co-operation of experts in the field, of economists and sociologists, of the representatives of the various industries, all industries, and of the unions and organizations of employees, farmers, and professionals, etc., —in short of a representative body of all classes and groups in Canada.10 Throughout the post-war period, the Canadian Labour Congress and its predecessors have urged that an advisory committee on immigration be created. The same point has been made a number of times by the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, both in briefs and in direct representations. The churches were always struggling towards this objective. In 1962 the Canadian Welfare Council made direct representations to the Deputy Minister, George Davidson, urging that an effective advisory council on immigration be established. In 1964 I submitted, as an individual contribution, a memorandum to the Minister, Rene Tremblay, with a "Proposal for a More Effective Relationship between Government and the Voluntary Sector" in immigration involving the creation of effective machinery for joint consultation, and later had a very encouraging interview with the Minister on this subject. As we have seen, the Toronto subcommittee began its negotiations with the Department early in 1965 with this objective in mind. In 1957 the Department of Citizenship and Immigration already had a memorandum from one of its own officials, referred to in Chapter 1, urging that non-governmental participation in immigration should be encouraged and that the Australian example of advisory councils should be followed. And by 1964 the Department was at last becoming convinced for various reasons that an advisory council might be a useful institution. One of the preparatory studies for the White Paper on participation of the Canadian public in immigration made the following recommendations: On the assumption that some form of public participation would be worthwhile, based largely on Australia's success in this field, the. Policy 320

The Voluntary Sector in Retrospect and Planning Directorate has made a careful study of Australian methods and has reviewed the feeble efforts in this direction in Canada in the past, as well as submissions and suggestions touching on the subject. For the reasons set out below, we are forced to the conclusion that there is only one practical recommendation that we can put forward at the present time; this paper thus consists of a proposal for the establishment of a National Immigration Advisory Council.11 It was a very good paper and many of its comments and conclusions are of great interest. A short selection follows: 1. The Department's limited experience with participation by the public has not been too encouraging. Some attempts at participation have been half-hearted and consequently doomed to failure. Others have been based on the self-interest of the organizations involved and have shown little concern for national policies or the interests of other groups. Still others, begun in all sincerity and devotion, have pined away with the removal of the original stimulus. 2. The ineffectiveness of the public is largely due to its lack of interest in the positive aspects of immigration and its lack of knowledge about what the Department is trying to accomplish. These are attributable in turn to a lack of communication with the public. No serious effort has been made to explain the objectives and advantages of immigration or to describe the difficulties involved. It is small wonder that the public's ignorance should result in apathy tempered only by occasional bursts of hostility against the "close-mouthed bureaucrats." At the same time the Department, by assuming this aloof attitude, has undoubtedly deprived itself of many valuable ideas that an informed public might have been able to proffer. 3. Despite the general lack of public participation in the past, as well as the often unsatisfactory results of the few efforts made, public participation could be a valuable adjunct to official action in achieving the Department's aims. The limited success of individuals and non-governmental organizations in the integration of newcomers is an indication of what they could achieve if they had full information and support. An increased general interest in both the positive and negative aspects of the Department's aims would ease the performance of its duties: an informed public is more apt to assist voluntarily and less likely to criticize an institution in which it is personally involved. Nor should the position of migrants themselves be neglected. Migration is an intensely personal matter; successful settlement is more readily effected through the assistance of interested individuals or their organizations than through the actions of government officials who, no matter how well-intentioned, simply do not have the time or resources 321

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to devote to the resolution of migrants' personal problems. At the same time as this paper was being written, the 1957 Australian report and recommendations and my memorandum to Mr. Tremblay were circulated among senior officers in the Department and discussed. Shortly after, the Department sent the author of the 1957 report, then Director of the Cologne office, to Australia again to see how the Australian consultative machinery was working eight years later. He came back with a very favourable report. And the 1966 White Paper on Canadian Immigration Policy contained the positive statement, already quoted, to the effect that the Department proposed to establish consultative machinery in immigration. After January 1, 1966, this proposal was adapted to the needs and structure of the new Department of Manpower and Immigration, and the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council Act was passed on December 21,1967. The Council and its four Advisory Boards have been meeting since the summer and fall of 1969 although, while the present review is in progress, only the Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants is now active. The structure of this consultative machinery was devised internally by the new Department of Manpower and Immigration. To my knowledge, no external advice was sought. As we have seen, its members were appointed almost entirely from some three hundred and fifty names supplied by national organizations. What has emerged for immigration, therefore, as already noted, is an able but largely (in an immigration sense) non-specialist Council occupied with the whole range of manpower and immigration matters and meeting very infrequently; and a small and active twelve-man Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants whose members are, in the main, specialists, meeting more frequently than the Council, but obliged to channel all recommendations and communication with the Minister through it. Fortunately, the awkwardness of this two-tier structure and the obstacles which it placed in the way of effective consultation were recognized very quickly by all concerned. The latest developments in this long saga will be described in the next chapter. It is probable that, ultimately, the Act itself will have to be amended. It might be noted here that an additional reason for amending the Act would be to permit the creation of government-sponsored and -supported immigration advisory committees, at the regional or provincial, and perhaps at some local levels, where they are very badly needed.

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Chapter Thirteen Immigration Management

WE HAVE SEEN that immigration is an area of public policy which has evoked conventional support but little real enthusiasm in Canada so far. Keen advocates have been scarce. Hardly a poet has sung its praises. Few politicians can claim a good speech on the subject; and although all national political parties have supported it, none has promoted it with vigour and conviction. Nor has immigration management been a task which many Canadian public servants, at least in the senior ranks, have been deeply moved to undertake. But it has been a task which has fired the actual managers with considerable enthusiasm. A paradoxical situation has arisen in Canada therefore in which the public service in general, and the public, have been quite unaware that an area of public policy was being developed with much dedication and effort, which they were accustomed to regard with some distaste—public servants because they thought it was difficult to manage, and the public because they suspected that there were sinister aspects to it, either for Canadians generally (or provincially) or for individual rights. Immigration is, of course, exceedingly difficult to manage in any environment and in national, provincial, or local circumstances. As we have seen, it is very difficult to legislate in this area with predictable results and continuing relevance. Immigration lends itself also to all kinds of ingenious and determined illegality and is therefore most difficult to control. The exercise of necessary and legitimate controls often involves difficult decisions and an apparent lack of compassion. There is always, in fact, a compassionate case to be made for the individual immigrant. In the effort also to achieve a delicate balance between the needs of outsiders, who want or have been encouraged to come in, and the requirements of insiders, who need to preserve then* hard-won rights and privi-

PART SIX

leges, an educated and informed public is essential. But public discussion of immigration in Canada has continued to be very limited and has tended, where it has occurred, to focus on policy and ignore management and to dwell on the problems of admission and neglect those of settlement and adjustment. Those responsible for immigration have rarely engaged in a real and continuing dialogue with the public, or with their legislators, about their particular problems and objectives. An unfortunate outcome of this has been that both departments in charge of Canadian immigration in the post-war period have been afraid of what has appeared to them to be an ignorant House of Commons and an ignorant public, an ignorance relating to the really difficult problems of immigration management and control. It has been contended in this study that Canadian immigration has been managed by the federal government throughout the post-war period, for reasons which have been outlined, without significant reference to or consultation with the provinces (except recently in relation to manpower programs) or with the voluntary sector, and without public participation in any part of this process prior to the creation of the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and Advisory Boards in 1967. In these final chapters, we will attempt to analyse federal management of immigration in more detail and to bring together the major conclusions of this study relating to it. We will also review and make some final comments on the most recent issues and developments in the management of this sector of public policy in Canada and overseas. SOME COMMON PROBLEMS AMONG RECEIVING COUNTRIES Until the introduction of new immigration regulations in 1967 and the creation of a new Immigration Appeal Board in the same year, Canadian immigration was largely managed, as we have seen, by regulation, administrative procedures, and the extensive use of ministerial discretion. In the past, this system was felt to be capable of more flexibility and compassion than a legal system, as in the United States, and to be more suitable for a country anxious to develop immigration, rather than to restrict it, and to increase the size of its population. Unlike Australia, however, there was no form of public participation in the immigration process to support it. Seventeen years' experience of this kind of immigration management in Canada—without substantial legal foundations, without public participation, and without an open system of operations—while it may have been flexible, created considerable difficulties for management and very weak public relations. Since 1967, however, as we have seen, a reverse trend is under way towards more legality and more open and explicit methods of 326

Immigration Management operations. Consultative machinery, through which more public participation and involvement in the immigration process should be achieved, was created in 1967 through the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council Act. American immigration management, on the other hand, has its foundations in the law, and the whole environment in which immigration takes place in the United States is profoundly legalistic. There is a large body of immigration law, much of which is in a state of continuous adjustment or evolution. There is an association of immigration lawyers with an extensive membership. A considerable degree of public participation and influence in the immigration process and in policy-making is achieved through the special relationship between the American bureaucracy and the community and between Congress and the immigration lobby. Lawyers in both the United States and Canada tend to prefer the American system of immigration management, claiming that it is a very open system in which everyone knows where he stands and that individual rights have greater protection than in a non-legal system. It should be noted that the United States with its population of over two hundred million does not promote immigration, nor does it need to. Domestic problems notwithstanding, it is still a powerful magnet for immigrants of all nationalities and races. In contrast to the United States, Australian immigration management is non-legalistic. It is basically administrative in character and very substantial decision-making powers relating to all aspects of immigration are vested in the Minister. But, as we have seen, there is considerable public participation, through the Commonwealth Immigration Planning and Immigration Advisory Councils and the Good Neighbour Movement, both in policy-making and in the management of immigration in Australia. Like Canada, Australia engages in immigration promotion and advertising campaigns in selected countries, particularly in Britain. Some of the major problems which Canada encounters in immigration management are common in some form to most receiving countries. Perhaps the major problem is the fact that immigration very often involves a conflict between national objectives and individual and group objectives and rights. National objectives must be preserved, but with sufficient humanity and flexibility to accommodate reasonable individual and group objectives. It is a very difficult matter to establish clear and acceptable policies in this area because of the changing and often unpredictable character of the political and economic environment and changing human needs. In this matter, the decision-making process and the real location of decision-making power are most important, and the manner in which decisions are arrived at contributes very directly to their acceptability or otherwise. 327

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A second problem which is common to most receiving countries is the difficulty of reconciling immigration with foreign relations. It is very difficult to establish a credible position in this area of public policy which can be defended internally, internationally, and in the field of individual human rights. We have already discussed this issue in relation to the brain drain and to overseas operations. Thirdly, there is the problem of adjusting admissions to current labour market requirements, without prejudicing the long-term advantages of immigration, the humanitarian considerations involved in it, and without adversely affecting the sources of supply. The "tap on and off" system which was used by Canada between 1950 and 1963 was a crude and unproductive way of doing this. But some kind of adjustment must be made on a continuing basis. The present Canadian system, involving the use of the regulatory mechanisms in the new regulations, was described by the first Deputy Minister of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, Tom Kent, in the evidence he gave at the final meeting of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Immigration in February 1968, in this way: In 1968, of course, the full force of the new regulations will be felt. An increase in applications can be expected from many parts of the world and in any given economic circumstance the new selection methods can be expected to produce somewhat more immigrants, especially relatives, than the former system did. However, the needs of the Canadian economy and especially its ability to absorb workers will be reflected more automatically and precisely. The extent to which the 1968 movement is greater or less than the 1967 movement will therefore depend primarily on economic conditions. I emphasize that I am not referring to what is called a tap on, tap off policy. I mean that a basically expansionist policy involves modestly upward and downward waves according to economic circumstances.1 But so far, since the peak admission figure of 222,876 in 1967, there have been no "modestly upward and downward waves." There has been a steadily decreasing immigration intake: 183,974 in 1968, 161,531 in 1969, 147,713 in 1970, and 121,900 in 1971. These figures undoubtedly reflect present economic conditions in Canada, high unemployment, and the rapid growth of the domestic labour force. But they raise once more the question of the long-term advantages of immigration for Canada which cannot be calculated by this kind of regulatory machinery. The fourth problem area consists of the sheer complexity of administration in immigration, arising from its far-flung and scattered field of operations and the management of a home and foreign service. There are 328

Immigration Management Canadian immigration officers working now in immigration offices from Stockholm to Sydney and Tokyo to Port of Spain. They are working at all the major ports of entry in Canada, on the headquarters staff in Ottawa, and at all the regional and some local offices of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. This scale of operations involves very difficult problems in communications and data processing. There is an enormous amount of detailed information about immigrants which has to be handled quickly, used by a number of people, and stored for reference. And one of the most difficult problems in this kind of operation is to be able to provide swift and conclusive service to the customer and to give sufficient autonomy to the field to facilitate this. There must also be rapid communication between headquarters and field so that in problematical cases a decision can be made with reasonable speed. In addition, there are special areas of operation in immigration which require different levels and kinds of decision-making ability: border control, where a mistaken decision can suddenly blow up into a crisis; overseas, where a special service is required involving language skills and, now, a representative and reporting function; in Canada, where there is another major admissions operation and where there should be, on the part of the departments with responsibilities in this field, a major concern for immigrant services and adjustment and for relations with the provinces and the community. Finally, there is the immigration officer as a law enforcement officer concerned with the very difficult questions of inquiries, appeals, deportation, and relationships with the Immigration Appeal Board. This is not, therefore, a tidy or homogeneous area of government operations. The many large and small reorganizations which took place in Canada within the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the many recent changes at the operational level within the Department of Manpower and Immigration reflect a long struggle to master it. SECURITY SCREENING

All receiving countries are faced with very difficult problems of control of the huge flow of immigrants and visitors which arrives annually. Many millions of people arrive in Canada every year through seaports, airports, and across the international border, and these numbers are likely to increase. Every receiving country is faced with a difficult problem of security screening, that is, the sorting out and identification within this great inflow of people of subversive, criminal, and other undesirable elements. Since subversive elements have other easier means of entry, the criminal elements are probably the most dangerous, and an effective police screen against them is now very difficult to create and maintain. As the problems of security screening are likely to become more difficult with the rapid

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growth of international traffic and communications, it may be worth looking at Canada's present security screening system in some detail. Canadian security screening is carried out by the RCMP on behalf of the Immigration Division of the Department of Manpower and Immigration with a major emphasis, hitherto, upon the identification of subversive elements. This security screening program was first introduced in 1947. The Department of Manpower and Immigration in Ottawa makes the final decision on security cases, but refers particularly difficult cases to an interdepartmental committee of officials for advice. But it has had no control over the methods employed or criteria used by the RCMP in its screening operations, which take place at every Canadian immigration office where applications for landed immigrant status are processed, and are known as Stage B. The RCMP does not have its own overseas intelligence and investigation system, but relies heavily on the intelligence and police services of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, West Germany, the Berlin Documentation Centre, and other services which are felt to be reliable. At present there is some difference in relation to the security screening of the three categories of immigrants established under the 1967 immigration regulations. Independent applicants are normally subject to full screening. Nominated relatives together with their nominators are subject to some form of screening. But sponsored dependents are not screened directly. The sponsor himself is checked for security, and only when an adverse report is produced is a security check made on the sponsored dependent. For a considerable time now, some Members of Parliament, Canadian lawyers, and others have felt that the security screening of Canadian immigrants has been a very inflexible process, slow to adapt to changing political conditions. We have seen in Chapter 10 that this view has been shared by many members of the overseas immigration staff. While the number of rejections on security grounds has been very small, whole areas—eastern Europe for example—have been excluded in the past from the sponsorship of relatives, because, in western terms, there were no suitable security screening facilities. A particularly difficult problem arises in security cases in relation to the issue, which has already been discussed, of "no reasons given." What explanation, if any, should be given to a would-be immigrant who has been rejected on security grounds: a rejection which might relate to a single episode when the applicant was very young or to a brief period of membership in a Communist party somewhere or to a single report by foreign police officers whose political affiliations and sympathies are unknown? The RCMP has insisted, and still insists, that no reasons can be given to these immigrants because its own sources of information, without which this work could not be carried out, 330

Immigration Management must be protected. But this can cause considerable hardship in certain cases since the applicant has no means whatever of discovering the precise reasons for his rejection and no means of correcting what might be a misleading or inaccurate report. The same problem occurs when applications for Canadian citizenship are rejected on security grounds. In recent years, however, there have been a series of negotiations between the Department and the RCMP, which have led to certain improvements, for example, a relaxation of the ban on the sponsorship of relatives in eastern Europe. Immigration offices have also been opened in Budapest and Belgrade. We have already seen that, after the introduction of the new immigration regulations in 1967 with their more open style of operations, a much more liberal attitude was adopted towards the provision of reasons for rejection in non-security and non-criminal cases. Nevertheless, there have been no major changes in the general manner in which security screening is carried out. The Immigration Appeal Board Act of 1967, however, has introduced a new element in relation to security in that the new Board may stay or quash a deportation order made for security reasons on legal, compassionate, or humanitarian grounds. But the Board may not take such action if the Minister of Manpower and Immigration and the Solicitor General sign a certificate to be filed with the Board, stating that "in their opinion, based upon security or criminal intelligence reports received and considered by them, it would be contrary to the national interest for the Board to take such action."2 It should be noted also that the 1967 immigration regulations undoubtedly make the security problem more complicated because many more immigrants will be coming from areas into which the conventional and well-known intelligence and police services do not or cannot effectively reach. One of the principal reasons for the recent immobility in the security screening of immigrants is that the whole area of Canadian security methods and procedures has been under investigation by a Royal Commission appointed on November 16, 1966. An abridged version of the Commission's report was published in June 1969, and it had some important things to say about immigration. The Commission did not come out in favour of greater liberality. The combined effect of all its recommendations, if implemented, would result in a very definite tightening of security measures in relation to immigration. It would, however, probably also result in clearer and more consistent procedures in security screening which could be applied to all prospective immigrants in all categories, wherever and however they applied for admission. The Commission was very concerned about this. "We have several times referred," it said, "to the need for scrupulously formulated and consistently enforced security policies and procedures, and we feel that this requirement applies with special

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force in areas such as immigration where there is an immediate impact on the lives of individuals."3 We cannot see the whole report. But it is clear that the members of this three-man Commission were very much impressed by the nature and extent of the present security threat to Canada and her allies and by the need to create an entirely new organizational structure for Canadian security. They recommended the introduction of continuously effective security procedures which should never be relaxed in periods of detente between Communist powers and the West, which they felt tended to be accompanied by increased attempts at subversion and penetration. They were not sanguine about the immediate prospects for a peaceful, relaxed, and cooperative world. And with this considerable and unquestioned degree of security consciousness, the Commission recommended some major changes in the procedures for the security screening of immigrants.4 These included fingerprinting for all prospective immigrants to confirm identity and to facilitate checks on criminal record. All prospective immigrants should be subject to a check on their criminal and security record, irrespective of relationship, sponsorship, or country of origin, and "significantly adverse security reports on an adult immigrant should lead to rejection, as should significantly adverse reports on a sponsor or nominator in those cases where data on the immigrant himself is not available." Applicants for landed immigrant status who are already in Canada should be treated in the same way as if they had applied abroad, and should have no entitlement to an appeal against rejection on security grounds. Independent applicants for immigration should not normally be accepted from Communist-bloc countries unless they have first established sufficient residence in a country where "a meaningful security check can be made." Guidelines should be introduced to take the place of the present rejection criteria, and the Commission offered a draft set of four not very original guidelines to assist officials in making their decisions. The Commission was also very concerned about the security problems involved in immigration from Hong Kong and recommended that "procedures for admitting Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong should be extensively revised as a matter of urgency. Some years residence in Hong Kong itself or in an area where a meaningful security check is possible should be mandatory." It is interesting to note that the members of the Commission also wanted more autonomy in security cases for officials in the field, plus a strengthened procedure, as they saw it, for review in Ottawa. But they also felt that there must be "an upgrading of the quality, maturity and training of the concerned officials in the field. A working knowledge of the local language, for example, would seem to be imperative." 332

Immigration Management Without commenting on the report as a whole and its major recommendations of a security secretariat in the Privy Council Office, a civilian security service, and a security review board, and without wishing to minimize the general or particular immigration security threat, the wisdom of some of these recommendations may well be questioned. What is a "meaningful security check"? Can you get one, at present, in Portugal or Greece? We now have a universal immigration policy and are admitting immigrants from many countries where no satisfactory local check can be made even on criminal records. Again, the recommendation that prospective immigrants from Communist-bloc countries must have "sufficient residence" or "some years residence" in a country where a meaningful security check can be made before admission would be a backward step and was probably made without sufficient knowledge of the earlier immigration background. At least as late as 1966, Canada had a "two year residence rule" for such immigrants in Europe; this was very much disapproved of by refugee and welfare organizations in the countries of first asylum and was officially abandoned by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. It is a demoralizing procedure and helps no one. Neither the immigrant nor his family, if he has one, can settle, find a permanent home or job or school for the children. Nor does it encourage attachment to democratic institutions. All in all, the published report of the Royal Commission on Security did not seem to be particularly helpful to immigration, especially in relation to the 1967 immigration regulations. Fingerprinting for all Canadian immigrants, however, may perhaps be necessary now because of its value in checking criminal records and for general identification purposes. It could be very useful in relation to criminal activities across the U.S.Canada border. It is interesting to note that the Commission also considered, but rejected, a system of alien registration, as in the United States, feeling that it served no useful purpose and could never be effectively enforced. NATURE OF CANADIAN IMMIGRATION MANAGEMENT As we have said, the problems which have just been discussed are common in one form or another to most of the major receiving countries in immigration. We will now review, very briefly, those problems relating to immigration which are specifically Canadian and which have been discussed earlier in this study, and then examine, in more detail, the nature of federal immigration management during the post-war period. The first of these problems relates to Quebec and to the basic issues of French-English relations in Canada. Immigration is a vital aspect of this relationship. We have seen that Quebec's views on this question have been 333

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very influential in the post-war period, without obvious efforts on her part to influence the course of events. This was a deterring presence much more than an active source of opposition. This situation altered only when Quebec's own viewpoint and policies on immigration changed so dramatically in the early sixties. Secondly, the management of immigration in Canada has been very difficult because of the absence of strong conviction on this subject among Canadian politicians. This factor is related to the first problem, but only in part. It also reflects the very considerable sense of security which Canadians have enjoyed in the post-war period because of the presence of a friendly and very powerful ally south of the border. No desperate need has been felt for a vigorous immigration program to build up national strength and security. For whatever reason, however, very few politicians in Canada to this day have had a clear view of immigration. They have put no real stamp on the operation, although their generally unclear attitude has helped to determine the way in which it would be managed. Parliament has failed to take a sustained interest in this subject, to create a standing committee on immigration early on, and, through such a committee, to develop an intelligent relationship with those responsible for immigration management. Thirdly, there was a failure at the outset, on the part of the Liberal government, to begin to create a "shared jurisdiction" with the provinces in immigration, even with minimal cooperation from the Duplessis government in Quebec; and a failure to establish effective communication with the public and to develop some public involvement in the immigration process. The means were there to do it, just as they were in Australia. But the style of exclusive federal management of immigration was set by the St. Laurent government in the early fifties. We have seen that a cabinet directive in 1950 instructed the Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration to seek the advice and assistance of specialists from federal and provincial government departments and representatives of a wide range of national organizations. Out of this it would have been possible to develop some form of regular consultative machinery, but no firm leadership in this matter was given by anyone. Fourthly, prior to the publication of the Glassco Commission report in the early sixties and the more positive attitudes to management which began to emerge at that point, the public service of Canada was ill suited to manage the kind of operation which immigration is. The system of negative controls and the parsimonious attitude to development, the lack of cooperation between government departments with overseas operations, the low esteem in which immigration was held within the public service, and the low classifications accorded to it, were all factors which made immigration management in Canada very difficult in the earlier part of 334

Immigration Management the period we are discussing. Since all but a small number of Canadian politicians have only had a minor interest in immigration, the major burden in immigration management and development in Canada has been carried by a relatively small group of federal officials. IMMIGRATION BRANCH

In 1950-51 the total number of staff in the Immigration Branch of the new Department of Citizenship and Immigration was 1,654: 226 officers were employed at headquarters, 1,282 in the Canadian Field Service, and 146 in the Overseas Service. By 1960-61, despite the effects of recession, this number had risen to 2,138, including 248 officers at headquarters, 1,485 in the Canadian Field Service, and 405 in the Overseas Service. In 1966-67 we find the establishment of the Immigration Division, as it is now called, at its maximum level: 2,252 in all, with 368 officers at headquarters, 1,343 in the Home Branch, formerly called the Canadian Field Service, and 541 in the Foreign Branch, formerly the Overseas Service. It will be recalled that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration disappeared from the scene at the end of December 1965 and that the new Department of Manpower and Immigration came into existence during 1966. These high figures for 1966-67 probably reflect the development plans of the previous administration. After 1967 they fall back sharply reflecting the movement of some senior immigration personnel into the Manpower and Program Development Divisions of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, the loss of the former placement and settlement function (although this only involved a small headquarters staff), and the movement of stenographic and other services into a central unit. In 1968-69 the total figure for the Immigration Division establishment was 2,230. The projection for 1971-72 is 1,760. It might be noted here that the managerial element at headquarters has always been small. At the outset, there were only a handful of immigration officers with administrative experience and capacity. In many ways, it has been a small, circulating elite distributed among the senior posts at headquarters and overseas. Not everyone circulates, however, and some senior members of the Overseas Service and Foreign Branch have never served in Ottawa and vice versa. As we have seen, in February 1951, a year after the Department opened, the headquarters operation of the Immigration Branch was reorganized on a functional basis. Staff responsibilities were grouped into five major divisions: Settlement, Admissions, Operations, Inspection, and Administration, the heads of these divisions reporting to the Director of Immigration. With many minor shifts and changes, this was the basic pattern of headquarters organization until 1964.

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In giving evidence before the Special Committee on Estimates in 1955, the Minister, Mr. Pickersgill (co-founder of the Department), described the origins of his Department and suggested that in 1950 the administration of the Department had to be created from almost nothing: The Immigration department was really the nucleus of the new department. There was no departmental administration at all on the day the department was started. It was really zero. I should not say that; there was the Deputy Minister. But outside of that the rest of administrative staff was clutched out of various branches, mostly from the Immigration branch, and the Citizenship and Citizenship Registration branches came from the Secretary of State's department. They had no previous connection with the department at all.5 But in fact it was not really zero. The old Immigration Branch of the Department of Mines and Resources contributed a great deal to the new Department in administrative procedures, phraseology, and habits of mind. This will be quite evident if the report on its structure and administration which A. L. Jolliffe, former Director of the Branch, gave to the Senate Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour in 19466 is compared with the first few annual reports of the new Department.7 The similarities are striking. And this is understandable since Mr. Jolliffe himself was adviser to the new Department; the first Director of Immigration had had twenty-five years' experience in the Immigration Service and had been Commissioner of Immigration since 1944, and the Deputy Minister himself was appointed Associate Commissioner of Immigration in 1947 and had served briefly as Commissioner of Immigration overseas from December 1, 1948, to his appointment to the new Department in January 1950. It may be recalled that members of the Overseas Service, and Foreign Branch, looking back on their experience in this Department, felt that they had lived through two eras in immigration management, which did not coincide with changes of government, and were now embarking upon a third. They could not precisely identify when the second era began, beyond feeling that it started at some point in the early sixties. But there was no difficulty at all in identifying the beginning of the third. This was in October 1966 when the Department of Manpower and Immigration first opened its doors to the public. The first era was one of firm adherence to the Mackenzie King principles in immigration and, at the political and official level, a close-to-thechest attitude in policy-making and in relations with Parliament and the public. It was an era, in the main, of easy-to-get immigration and weak control. It was a very difficult period for senior management, hampered 336

Immigration Management in the beginning by their own cautious approach to immigration and low expectations in the public service, but hampered a great deal more by the difficulty of getting policy and firm support out of the government, money out of Treasury Board, cooperation and support out of other government departments, and enormously hampered by a poor Immigration Act for which they were partly responsible. It was a difficult period also for all immigration officers; some interesting comments on these officers by a senior public servant who was with the Department in the early fifties follow: The Department consisted largely of self-made men. At that time, it did not hire university graduates or those with professional training. These self-made men had qualities and limitations. Early on they were instructed to operate strictly according to rule and later it was difficult for men taught to be controllers to become service people. They felt they had no strong political backing and would get no credit for any of the intelligent things they might do, but would always get the rap for a serious mistake. Their resources in the Department were extremely limited. Among the self-made men, there were many who had a great deal of dedication. They felt they were doing a good job for Canada which was unappreciated. They did not necessarily need this appreciation among the public. They needed it in their own parish, that is the professional parish of immigration. But they did not get it.8 There is no question that personnel management during the first period of operations was very weak, but this was in no way unique to this Department. It is doubtful whether senior management was really aware at that point of what good personnel management in a large organization could be. There was also much less departmental freedom in this area than later on, and there is no evidence to suggest that the Department received any real help in this matter from the controlling agencies in the public service. In the first few years, the efforts that were made by the Department itself, in training for example, were simply not ambitious enough. It is possible to date the beginning of the second era in post-war immigration management from the introduction of the new mainly nondiscriminatory immigration regulations of 1962 and from "Bell's Resurrection" in 1963. But major changes in the administration and development of the service itself did not occur until after 1964. The real point of departure, however, was the indefinable moment, buried deep in the Diefenbaker era, when a seachange began to come over Canadian attitudes towards public policy, planning, and economic development. As already

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mentioned, the first public indication of change was the advent of the rash of royal commissions, including the Glassco Commission's major investigation into government organization. Closely related to this change and equally important for immigration management was the take-off in 1961 into a period of very striking economic development in Canada, including an exceptionally large overall growth in employment. The second era then which dates from some point in Ellen Fairclough's ministry to 1966 is characterized by quite different features from the first, namely, more liberal policies; more positive management and more independent action by the Department; a thrust for improvement backed by more resources and much more support within the public service; much keener appreciation (after 1963) of the administrative requirements of the service; and a beginning made in assuming responsibility for the whole constituency of immigration in Canada. We have noted the plans announced by the Minister, Mr. Tremblay, in his speech in the House on August 14, 1964. This was the blueprint for development. But, as it proved, time was short for major changes in the headquarters organization and Canadian Service. Nevertheless, a great deal was accomplished. As we have seen, the headquarters structure was reorganized into five special sections: Planning, Canadian Service, Overseas Service, Special Services, and Support Services. In addition, a wholesale job reclassification was carried out, involving more than a hundred positions. A firm of management consultants was hired to organize support services along the lines spelled out by the Glassco Commission, And major improvements in classifications, pay, and allowances were secured for the Overseas Service. But many of these changes as they affected headquarters and the Canadian Service were swept away in the major government reorganization of 1966. IMMIGRATION WITHIN MANPOWER

In the United States, immigration is managed by two government agencies, with the collaboration of the U.S. Public Health Service. These agencies are the Visa Office of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs of the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. The latter handles all matters relating to immigrants, other than the issuing of visas, from admission to naturalization and citizenship; it is also the control and enforcement agency. In Australia, immigration has always been handled by one department, the Department of Immigration, whose responsibilities include citizenship and integration. In Canada, a unique situation has been created in which immigration has become the recognized servant of manpower policy and manpower development and is now managed by a new department specifically created to bring all manpower services together. A third and quite different 338

Immigration Management era in immigration management began, therefore, when the new Department of Manpower and Immigration came into being in 1966. For Canada now this is, in many ways, a highly logical arrangement. Even if immigration could manage without manpower, it would be difficult for manpower to manage without immigration. Labour market policies must be applied universally and the labour force served and developed as a whole. Overseas recruitment is an important arm of manpower policy and the total inflow of manpower must be observed and, to some extent, controlled. For immigration management in Canada and for immigrants themselves, the present arrangement also has some considerable advantages. For the Foreign Branch of the Immigration Division, it is probably beneficial on all counts. The Branch now has much stronger support services in Canada, including a much more sophisticated and accurate (though far from perfect yet) employment analysis and information service. Personnel management, plant, and equipment are likely to improve further or at least not suffer from neglect. For the next few years also, the major issues for the Foreign Branch are likely to be related to the working out of the government's integration program in its foreign operations. For immigrants, reliable employment information overseas and good employment services in Canada are vital. As the Immigration Branch and voluntary agencies always believed, a job is the first essential for an immigrant. Perhaps even more important than the job-finding service, provided by the Canada Manpower Centres at the present time, is the Canada Manpower Training Program and the whole climate of individual development, assistance, and training which is a central feature of Canada's manpower policy. It is very important to note, however, that at the time of writing, the 360 Canada Manpower Centres are believed to be serving about half the newly arrived immigrants who are destined for the labour force. For Canadians as a whole, the penetration rate of the labour market by CMCs is in the region of 42 percent and 25 percent for new registrants. This means that a great many new and fairly recent immigrants never pass through the Canada Manpower Centres although the Centres are always there as a resource. These immigrants obtain employment through private agencies, relatives, friends, and the classified sections of the newspapers. While this may be just as good a way of finding a job, it means that they are never exposed to any of the counselling and other services which the CMCs offer. In addition to the 360 Canada Manpower Centres, there are also 80 Immigration Offices or Canada Immigration Centres. The CICs are not concerned with the whole range of departmental activities in immigration in Canada, but with admissions and enforcement only. Thus the main operational drive of the Department and the nature and structure of its

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field operations are very limited in relation to immigration. Except at the outset, they are not concerned with the very important aspects of an immigrant's life which do not relate to employment and training. An immigrant is not only a potentially valuable addition to the labour force. He is often part of a family unit and he is also a potentially valuable addition to the community. His wife and children too have special needs which are not being adequately met by this organizational structure and orientation. The Department of Manpower and Immigration consists of five major divisions: Manpower, Immigration, Program Development Service, Administration, and Operations, each with its own Assistant Deputy Minister. The Assistant Deputy Minister, Operations, is responsible for directing and coordinating the Department's field activities in Canada in both manpower and immigration programs through the five regional headquarters and the Canada Manpower and Immigration Centres. It should be noted, therefore, that the Immigration Division in Ottawa has no operational responsibility in Canada. Its only real operational responsibilities now are the Foreign Branch and assisted passage loan scheme. The Division gives what is called "functional guidance" on the enforcement side and there is an Appeals Office in the Home Branch, but the Assistant Deputy Minister, Operations, actually issues the orders. At the regional level, initially there were separate directorates of manpower and immigration sharing certain common services in the field. But this ended on April 1, 1968, and each region now has a Director General of Manpower and Immigration with two operational directors (known as the Directors of Manpower Operations and Immigration Operations) reporting to him or (in one case) to her. The operational responsibilities of the Director of Immigration Operations are, as we have seen, confined to admissions and enforcement only. He has nothing to do, for example, with the voluntary sector in immigration. The move to integrate regional headquarters operations is part of a general departmental integration program which has now been adopted, involving the integration of offices and services (CMCs and CICs) as accommodation becomes available. This will probably not take place, however, in Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver, the largest centres, because of administrative difficulties with this size of operation. The integration of staff, that is, the complete interchangeability of manpower and immigration personnel is now under study, but no decision has been taken on it and the outcome is uncertain. Within the Department as a whole, the Manpower Division is responsible for a wide range of manpower programs including occupational training for adults, labour mobility, rehabilitation of the handicapped, adjustment of workers to technological change, youth services, and programs 340

Immigration Management for special groups such as older workers, servicemen, Indians and Eskimos, and students. The Program Development Service is concerned with research, planning, and evaluation in relation to manpower and immigration policy and programs, and has four branches: Research, Planning and Evaluation, Manpower Information and Analysis, and Training Research and Analysis. The Immigration Division now consists of three branches: Home Service, Foreign Service, and Programs and Procedures. As we have noted, its responsibilities comprise selection and admission of immigrants overseas and in Canada; initial reception and counselling of immigrants; and control and enforcement. The most recent statement on the responsibilities of the Immigration Division will be found in Appendix 9. This list of divisional responsibilities contains the following item (no. 8): "to make arrangements in Canada for the reception, early placement in employment and adjustment of immigrants." Although practice varies somewhat in different areas, this responsibility is now largely confined to initial reception. Subsequent responsibility for the welfare of the immigrant until he is placed in "permanent continuing employment" lies with a four-man unit recently established within the Department's Operations Division in Ottawa and known as the Immigrant and Migrant Services Section. This Section provides, through the Canada Manpower Centres, "adjustment assistance" for immigrants which consists mainly of financial assistance for immigrants in temporary difficulties, counselling and referral if required, and special kinds of assistance, mainly related to employment, such as the recognition of qualifications. It is concerned almost entirely with the immigrant in his first year in Canada, although the Section may have other responsibilities from time to time such as its present responsibility for the coordination of the Tibetan refugee program.9 In addition to this headquarters operation, Immigrant Reception Sections have been set up in Canada Manpower Centres in Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary, and Vancouver, and additional sections will be established in other large cities as required. These Sections provide immigrants with detailed information essential to their initial entry into the Canadian labour force, including working and living conditions, wage rates, trade qualifications, union membership, local transportation and language training, as well as the general counselling and assistance referred to above. It must be noted, however, that this service is available only for immigrants who are members of the labour force (although some of the counselling and referral may apply to immigrant families); for the recently arrived immigrant or the immigrant who is not yet settled in permanent employment; and for the immigrants in those categories who make contact with the Canada Manpower Centres.

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It is perhaps legitimate now to evaluate the first five years of this third era in post-war immigration management and to ask how immigration has fared within manpower, because that is where it is. This is in no sense a reasonably equal partnership with manpower in terms of planning, resources, and staff. This has been an absorption process, and for all major purposes immigration has become, as it is so often officially described, one of a number of manpower policies. In a recent press release, one of many which might be chosen, it was emphasized that the operations of this Department were "geared to identifying and meeting the needs of individual members of the work force."10 There is no doubt that the first few years in the life of the Department of Manpower and Immigration has been a highly creative period in many ways. The Department has the distinction of establishing for Canada, in the 1967 immigration regulations, a completely universal, non-discriminatory immigration policy and a unique and sensible selection system. We have noted some of the advantages which have accrued to immigration and immigrants because of this new administrative environment. But there are also some serious disadvantages, so serious that it is worth considering once more whether immigration does not need a department or agency to itself because of its present and potential contribution to Canadian national and provincial development; because of the need for far more effort and creativity in the field of settlement and adjustment (for all immigrants) ; and because of the problems of control which are likely to become more difficult. A major test of the effectiveness of any organization is the morale of its staff. There are few Canadian immigration officers who are happy about the consequences for immigration in Canada of the government reorganization of December 1965. In the debate on the Immigration Appeal Board Bill in February 1967, Richard Bell said that he did not believe that the immigration portfolio could be a part-time occupation. The Department of Manpower and Immigration is a very large department in which a substantial investment has been made. Its budget is one of the largest of all existing departments. Not only is it large, but its responsibilities in relation to the development and proper employment of the Canadian labour force are very important and very difficult to carry out, involving a continuous creativity and flexibility. It is not surprising therefore that immigration cannot get, either at the national or regional level, the attention it deserves as an important area of public policy in its own right. Downgraded to a manpower policy, it is seen primarily in economic terms. At the time of the switch-over in the early months of 1966, it was believed that immigration within manpower would have access to much larger resources. This has been true overseas where the recruitment of professional and skilled manpower is an important 342

Immigration Management aspect of the development of the Canadian labour force. It is not really true in Canada, except to the extent that immigrants have benefitted from manpower programs and can obtain full-time language training under certain conditions. The approach to the creation of adequate services for immigrants in Canada since 1966, outside the field of employment and training, has been extraordinarily slow on the part of both the Departments of Manpower and Immigration and Secretary of State, and the funding of voluntary agencies, in terms of current needs and costs, has been very cautious indeed, although grants are now increasing in size. Moreover, because immigration is serving another sector of public policy, we are not creating some of the institutions required to deal with it nor are we seeing immigration as a whole in both its national and international implications. We do not yet have, after all this time, an effective parliamentary standing committee on immigration. We have a Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower, and Immigration. How can a parliamentary committee handle that vast territory effectively? We have had, for a short period of time, a Canada Manpower and Immigration Council with four Advisory Boards, including one on the Adjustment of Immigrants and one on Manpower and Immigration Research. But we have already noted what an awkward and inadequate structure this has been for immigration (and for manpower) resulting in a rather remarkable collective effort to change it. At present, what seems likely to emerge are a Manpower Council and an Immigration Council in close communication, but reporting directly to the Minister. We still need, however, and still do not have, an established structure of regional (or provincial) and some local immigration committees working closely with the provinces and the community. The international implications of immigration and decisions relating to them now lie very largely within the private purview of Cabinet and senior officials. Since no one describes this territory in all its aspects to the public, there is no public discussion of it. What are the real problems of Western Hemisphere migration? They go far beyond the recent question of draft evaders and deserters and their permanent settlement or return. How does immigration fit into Canada's relationships with the West Indies and Latin America? Should Canada rejoin ICEM? Should we not do all we can to strengthen international and Commonwealth organization and consultation in the difficult field of international migration? If we were seeing immigration as a whole, and politicians and officials were talking about it in a really informed and comprehensive way, then we might have a much greater public understanding of it. There is another substantial disadvantage which derives from the subsuming of immigration within manpower and the present organizational 343

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structure of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. This relates to the small and emasculated condition of the Immigration Division today (except in relation to overseas operations) and to the continuing need for trained and experienced personnel in this field in Canada. Paradoxically, the "poor relations" of the overseas service have become the poor relations in Ottawa. A budget that is a fraction of the manpower budget and a staff that is a fraction of the manpower size mean a very small voice in departmental deliberations. It means that those who have a real knowledge of immigration are always in a minority and can easily be overruled. And the lack of direct operational responsibility for immigration programs in Canada has familiar consequences in administration. It means that the Division has no feeling of direct responsibility and involvement in day-today immigration affairs outside the fields of admission and enforcement. Except in these areas, there is no infusion of liveliness and concern from the field. The immigration specialists are divorced from their proper constituency and other people with less knowledge make the actual decisions. And control and enforcement, minus settlement and adjustment or any other positive activities for immigrants after admission, is a very negative activity. We are therefore failing to strengthen and develop a cadre of immigration officers who are really knowledgeable about the needs of immigrants and the management of immigration in Canada. What are the possible solutions to the present unsatisfactory state of immigration management in Canada and the problems of an Immigration Division which can, as it is now organized, carry little weight in the large organizational complex of the Department of Manpower and Immigration? The possibility of a separate Department of Immigration or a very much strengthened Immigration Division has been suggested. There are other alternatives. The Department of the Secretary of State could play a much more important role. One interesting possibility might be the creation of a semi-independent, government-financed agency responsible for the immigrant in Canada in all matters except those relating to employment, vocational training, and other manpower programs: an agency whose management would reflect the shared federal-provincial jurisdiction in immigration and the important role of the voluntary sector in this area of public policy. Such an agency might have direct responsibility for the funding of voluntary organizations and groups; for language training; for information and orientation; for professional and volunteer training; for research and communication within the immigration field and other matters. Its role at present might be that of a development agency and creative centre concerned with improvements in the quality of existing programs and the development of new ones in a federal-provincial-voluntary context. It might also be responsible for migrants in Canada as well as immigrants. 344

Immigration Management As we are considering immigration within manpower, we might comment here on the first two possibilities. The essential feature of a strengthened Immigration Division within the Department of Manpower and Immigration would be that it should have operational responsibility for immigration in Canada as well as overseas, and that its present limited functions should be completely revised to cover the full range of immigration management activities in Canada. This would involve a re-examination of the present integration policies of the Department and of the idea of a single administrator—the Assistant Deputy Minister, Operations, to whom all other managers are advisory—a concept which serves administrative convenience in a large department, but not necessarily the needs of two very different areas of public policy. To the protagonists of administrative convenience and to those for whom manpower objectives are paramount, this might seem a backward step. But, however convenient the present arrangements are, they do not serve immigration adequately. Immigration, like Indian Affairs, has always appeared to have slightly less than the full requirements for a separate department. Yet, like Indian Affairs also, its supporters might well urge that it will never have adequate attention in all its important aspects until it does. It is difficult to refute the logic of the Australian arrangement of one department responsible for all aspects of immigration, able to develop a continuing relationship with Parliament and the community, able to see immigration as a whole and providing in itself a focal point for immigration activity and development in Australia and visible evidence of the Australian government's concern with this sector of public policy. Were we more concerned too with the wider aspects of Canadian immigration policy, and particularly its relationship to population growth and regional development, the argument for a separate department might be stronger. A further argument in favour of a separate department which could give immigration its full attention lies, as already suggested, in the difficult area of immigration control which requires continuous attention, flexible policies, and firm and intelligent management. Because of Canada's vast internal spaces, her high standard of living and potential for development, and her long, open southern border, and because of the likelihood of increasing pressure on available living space in an overcrowded world, it is not unnecessarily apprehensive to suggest that these problems of control will become more difficult quite soon. It is obvious that a separate Department of Immigration would have to maintain a very close relationship with the Department of Manpower. The great advantages which accrue to both sectors of public policy from close association would have to be preserved. But immigration also needs a very close association with the department responsible for citizenship. Is

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it possible to conceive of a cluster of departments in the related fields of manpower, citizenship, and immigration, all concerned with Canada's human resources, working closely together and perhaps sharing certain common services? We have considered some of the advantages for immigration of a separate department, a separate existence, though closely linked to that of two other departments. It should be noted also that there might be some considerable advantages for a Department of Manpower in this arrangement or something like it. The importance and difficulty of the manpower task has already been stressed. To be relieved, either wholly or partly, of the burden of managing immigration as well might be, in the long run, a very welcome development. Is there a way, however, of achieving a similar result without the strain and disruption of a major surgical operation? Given that the principal needs in Canadian immigration today are internal, that they lie in the areas of public discussion and concern, immigrant adjustment, and the planning and development of satisfactory and reasonably equal services for immigrants across Canada. Given that our immigration policy is universal and well accepted, that our immigrant selection system is functioning reasonably well, though minor adjustments may be required, that immigration is, in some respects, an indispensable overseas arm of manpower operations, and that the integration process in the overseas operations of the Canadian government is well under way. In the light of this, should we not think of some other kind of institution (other than a government department) which would involve both the federal government and the provinces in the effective management of immigration in Canada, which might be responsible for the development of immigrant services, for information, research, and other matters, and which might constitute the focal point, the creative centre, which is so badly needed in Canadian immigration today? THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS How is immigration policy formulated? What has the role of Parliament been in this area? What voice in policy-making, if any, have the major interest groups had? It is obviously impossible to be certain about policy-making in immigration in the post-war period without access to the records of cabinet deliberations. The following views are based on the examination of departmental materials and on the study and experience of the relationships in this field between government and national and voluntary organizations and ethnic groups. Apart from the group of major decisions taken by Cabinet between 346

Immigration Management 1946 and 1950 relating to the post-war development of immigration operations, the creation of the new Department of Citizenship and Immigration, the early changes in the immigration regulations, the first decision relating to the Hungarian emergency, and the major decisions on government reorganization taken in 1965, immigration policies have originated in the main within the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and later within the Department of Manpower and Immigration. Policy-making in immigration has been largely a bureaucratic prerogative. From 1950 onwards, there was a constant policy-making activity within the new Department, often frustrated, often only partially successful, particularly in the early years. But after 1963 and accompanying the remarkable changes which took place in the sixties in the political, economic, and administrative climate in Canada, the departmental output of new policies in immigration, large and small, has been considerable. This process of policy initiation and development has taken place within a very small group of senior officials working with the Deputy Minister. Sometimes the Minister has been part of this working group, sometimes not. After this process of departmental policy formulation, the Minister is presumably the advocate of these policies in Cabinet. In this area of public policy in which there have been almost no specialist advisers outside the public service and very few inside, the Deputy Minister has been immensely influential, a key figure, lending his own special tone and direction to departmental operations, determining very often the pace of development and degree of experiment, making the final decision over a very wide range of matters, and exercising substantial powers of veto. At least two of the Deputy Ministers since 1950 have worked very closely with their Minister. In other cases, the relationship has seemed to be more distant. If the Department has been the major centre of policy-making activity, it is understandable that immigration policy has tended hitherto to emerge in the form of regulations rather than legislation. The decision of Dr. Davidson, a former Deputy Minister, to embody a new and mainly nondiscriminatory immigration policy for Canada in the regulations which were introduced in 1962, rather than to attempt to grapple with a new Act, is a classic example of this. On rare occasions, Parliament has made a decisive intervention in immigration matters: in 1959, for example, at the time of the uproar in the House of Commons on the issue of sponsorship restriction, and in 1964 when it was decided not to close the Chinese Adjustment Statement Program after the Minister, Mr. Tremblay, had announced his intention of doing so. In 1967, the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Immigration was decisive in rejecting the Depart347

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ment's proposals for control of the sponsored movement and was unwittingly influential in the subsequent formulation of the new points system. But the real pressures and roadblocks in policy-making in immigration have been governmental in origin and have been related to the government's economic policy and priorities, to restrictive attitudes in earlier years on the part of the controlling agencies in the public service, and to the different approaches and objectives of other government departments. It is commonly believed that Canadian immigration policy is arrived at by a careful balancing of conflicting pressures originating in the Canadian community as a whole. In my view, nothing could be further from the truth. There are however a few special cases in the exercise of political pressure in Canadian immigration which should be considered separately. These involve the Canadian labour movement, the Jewish community, the Italians, and the Chinese. Apart from these special cases, only one of which relates to the whole field of immigration policy, the exercise of political pressure in immigration has been very weak except in two areas: first, in individual cases where it has been very strong, and secondly, in the question of the retention of full sponsorship privileges and the attempt to bring relatives (or more relatives) from areas where sponsorship was limited or not permitted. Effective pressure involves effort, determination, and a substantial involvement. Immigration simply does not engender this degree of interest in Canada. No one could possibly say, for example, that Canadian employers and their organizations have really applied themselves to immigration problems or have become deeply concerned about substantive issues in immigration. They have certainly submitted briefs on appropriate occasions. But there has been nothing like a campaign or a sustained effort to influence the direction of policy. In Part 5 we noted how ineffective the pressures have been from voluntary agencies in immigration. Few ethnic groups can act or wish to act as pressure groups in immigration. They are not sufficiently homogeneous or organized, nor do they often have very clear goals except, in some cases, in the two areas which have been mentioned. Neither do they necessarily wish to act aggressively, nor do they have the regular and established communication with government which might enable them to apply pressure informally. In addition, ethnic groups do not usually demonstrate great concern for other ethnic groups and an interest in the major issues of immigration policy inevitably requires this. Their organizational apparatus is often weak. Ethnic groups and individual immigrants observe the Canadian community and its political patterns. They endeavour to act in ways which are suited to them. In this matter, the most relevant factor is the relationship between the bureaucracy and the community in Canada. The ecology of public administration in Canada is quite different from that of the United States. 348

Immigration Management Here the community simply does not flow to the door of the bureaucrat as it does south of the border, nor does the bureaucrat enter into close and continuing working relationships with interest groups as his American counterpart does. And there are relatively few areas of public policy, although these are increasing, where formal means of communication and consultation have been established. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration was a particularly isolated department. Painful experience of continuous representations on individual cases from Members of Parliament, lawyers, immigrants, influential persons of all kinds in Canada and overseas, together with the marked absence of political support and backing on difficult issues, created a tendency within the Department to keep well away from the community if possible. In 1964, as we have seen, a Directorate of Special Services was created to handle representations and individual cases. In an interview in 1966, which has already been referred to, the Director said that the real pressures came from Members of Parliament who represented the ethnic ridings and from lawyers, and that they were nearly all on individual cases. Pressure from ethnic groups was negligible because they were not well organized. Pressure on the sponsorship issues relating to southern Europe, eastern Europe, and Asia (mainly Hong Kong), which now cause less concern because of the new selection system, has been diffuse and unorganized. It has been exercised through Members of Parliament speaking mainly on behalf of Italians, Chinese, Poles, and other east European groups and through briefs and some direct representations to the Department. These efforts had considerable success in relation to southern Europe, particularly Italy, because they worked, without any awareness of doing so, together with two other important factors: first, the great concern of officials in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration about the sponsored movement and their acute apprehension of pressure in this area after their experience in 1959; and secondly, the nostalgia for what has been described as the frontier approach in immigration (the admission of immigrants who may have little or no education but a lot of determination) so evident among the members of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Immigration. There is no doubt that reasonable control over the sponsored movement could have been established much earlier if the same firmness of purpose had been shown as was evident in the introduction of the new immigration regulations and points system in 1967. On the issue of sponsorship from Communist countries, the problem really lay with the RCMP and the security screening system. Here, in recent years, the forces for change have lined up in a different way and, in

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a sense, the Department has negotiated on behalf of all concerned with some success. The issue of sponsorship from Hong Kong has been inextricably bound up with the whole problem of illegal Chinese immigration which has already been discussed.11 The Canadian labour movement provides the best example of pressure in immigration consistently applied—at least at fairly regular intervals— towards consistent ends and of a general concern for the whole field of immigration policy. The ends, as presented by the leadership of the labour movement, have been that immigration should be an important element in national economic planning and that admissions should be intelligently geared to the business cycle. It has always been maintained that immigrant labour must not be allowed to undercut Canadian labour. It has also been maintained from the beginning that proper services should be provided for immigrants as part of the armoury of social services which should be provided for all Canadians, and that consultative machinery in immigration should be established. It is important to note, however, that in most of these areas, almost no impact on policy has been made, at least in the short and medium run. There is only one period when the views of the labour movement really made a direct impact on policy and that was during the period of economic recession and high unemployment from 1958 to 1962. At this point, its views coincided exactly with those of the Department of Labour. The Jewish community, in the shape of the Canadian Jewish Congress and Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, has exercised pressure in its own areas of concern in immigration in a very individual and successful way. As already noted, the numbers of immigrants involved are fairly small. In addition, the Jewish community has the reputation of looking after its own immigrants when they arrive, and they are therefore unlikely to become a burden on the community at large. The Canadian Jewish Congress and JIAS do not seek the aid of Members of Parliament. They make direct approaches to senior officials in the Department and, on important issues, to the Minister and, perhaps, to other members of the Cabinet. Recently when the position of Jews in Iraq became worrying, the President of the Canadian Jewish Congress approached the Secretary of State for External Affairs directly. This kind of approach, which is accompanied by good briefs and proposals which are carefully worked out, has had a high degree of success. Just as the community does not flow to the door of the Canadian bureaucrat, neither does he have, as we have noted, the close relationship with Parliament which his American counterpart has with Congress. The relationship between the department responsible for immigration and Parliament has so far been distant, and an element of mutual hostility has 350

Immigration Management been present also, mainly because of the perpetual battleground of individual cases particularly prior to 1967. Even for the most senior officials in immigration now, there appears to be no to-and-fro, no regular, easy communication with Members of Parliament in the ordinary course of events. There is still, of course, communication on individual cases and on the urgent issues of the moment. What has been chiefly missing in the past in this relationship is an active, interested parliamentary committee on immigration which could establish a close relationship with the Department and could create some real expertise in Parliament itself. This has been an area of weak communications which has impoverished the management of Canadian immigration. We have noted how few M.P.s have been interested enough to visit some of the overseas immigration offices and also that they have not been invited to go. As we have seen, there is now a Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower, and Immigration. It has been suggested that this triple responsibility is too large a policy area for one committee to handle effectively. One of the most striking facts which emerges from a study of Hansard from 1946 onwards is the infrequency of debates on immigration and the small number of M.P.s who participate in them (the major debates and parliamentary occasions in immigration are listed in the bibliography). Throughout the post-war period, only a small group of stalwarts has shown a sustained interest in this area of public policy. Not long after a major government reorganization and the creation of the new Department of Manpower and Immigration, only some twenty members appeared for the important debate on the new Immigration Appeal Board. Participation in immigration debates has increased, however, from 1963 onwards. Exministers are often the most lively participants, and they and a very few knowledgeable members and the members with ethnic ridings form the core of interest and participation in the House. J. W. Pickersgill featured prominently in the debates on immigration after 1957 and he improved their quality considerably. And Richard Bell did the same after 1963. Among political parties, only the New Democratic party has had a consistent and individual approach to immigration which closely resembles that of the labour movement. Liberals and Conservatives are indistinguishable in their views on this subject. With a few exceptions, what has been important in the House of Commons has been the extent of a member's individual interest in immigration derived from the fact that he has a great many immigrants in his riding; he is of fairly recent ethnic origin and is concerned for a particular ethnic group; he is a lawyer and has been involved in immigration cases; or he has acquired a reputation for sympathetic handling of the problems of immigrants and they turn frequently to him for help. 351

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It is interesting to note that the Minister responsible for immigration is usually left alone by his colleagues to fend off opposition criticism. Prime Ministers have announced some of the major new departures in immigration policy, Mackenzie King in 1947, Louis St. Laurent in 1949, and Lester B. Pearson in 1965, but neither they nor their other front-bench colleagues have made significant contributions to the debates themselves. Like public discussion of immigration, parliamentary discussion has focussed almost entirely on questions of policy and administrative procedure which relate to admission. Only a very few members raise other issues. Interest in the regular operations of the Home and Foreign Branches has been very limited and discussion of the role and activities of the Citizenship Branch, at least until very recently, perfunctory. Consequently, parliamentary debates rarely reflect the whole scene in Canadian immigration management. There are now two new and important elements in the policy-making process in immigration. These are, of course, the new Immigration Appeal Board and the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and Advisory Boards (in their present form or as separate Manpower and Immigration Councils). Both are likely to have a substantial effect on immigration policy and management. The Immigration Appeal Board, though at present swamped with cases, is in the process of creating a body of immigration law relating almost entirely to deportation but by extension to admission, which introduces, for the first time, apart from the Immigration Act and a very few recent pieces of legislation like the Immigration Appeal Board Act itself, an independent and legal element in the policymaking process which is totally separate from the Department and cannot be changed by administrative procedure. The activities of the Board itself and its attitudes—the degree of compassion shown, for example, and the Board's attitude in cases involving a serious criminal record—also constitute an influence on policy-making of a less tangible but substantial kind. The other new element in policy-making, the consultative machinery set up under the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council Act in December 1967, is without question a new source of policies and an important policy-making instrument, although its function is advisory. The first few years of operation have shown that the Minister and the Department have been referring substantive issues to the Council and, through the Council, to the Boards. The Council and Boards are empowered to give the Minister advice "on all matters pertaining to the effective utilization and development of manpower resources in Canada, including immigrants to Canada and their adjustment to Canadian life."12 In the process of giving advice on the issues referred to them during the past three years, the Council and Boards have also been offering independent opinions and ad352

Immigration Management vice on a wide range of matters. Not all this advice has been accepted, but much of it has, and it is clear that this whole advice-giving process is being taken seriously by the Department. Thus the views of the Council and Boards cannot fail to have an influence on the content and direction of manpower and immigration policy. The proposal to adapt the present structure to provide separate Manpower and Immigration Councils (and, in due course, to introduce legislation to give these Councils legal status), to provide them with a more effective research capability, and to establish the whole field of immigration in Canada and overseas as the proper concern of the Immigration Council is likely to confirm this process and, hopefully, to make it more effective. One might mention also, as a very important new factor in the policymaking process in immigration, the active provinces. The more they do at home and overseas, the more they prod the federal government into a partnership role in the provision of new services for immigrants, the greater the influence they will have in the initiation and development of immigration policies in Canada. Already Ontario and Quebec have taken initiatives which are drawing the federal government into new fields in immigration management. All in all, therefore, it seems evident that the period of an exclusive, federal, bureaucratic prerogative in immigration policy-making, exclusive, it must be said, very largely because of the lack of concern and effort elsewhere, is now coming to an end.

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Chapter Fourteen New Needs and New Policies

WHO CAN PREDICT the major immigration needs and problems of the future? The facts of Canadian geography, her immense undeveloped natural resources, and increasing industrial strength suggest that immigration will continue to play a vital role in national development. And in a world of exploding populations, Canada's vast empty spaces, inhospitable though many of them are, must surely be used at least partly as living space. It seems clear, however, that from now on immigration and particularly the pattern of immigrant settlement across Canada will need to be much more closely related to environmental and social, as well as to economic, considerations and to the needs of all provinces and regions. To relate immigration to environment in a positive way will require a far more wide-ranging and socially oriented kind of immigration planning than we have today. An essential feature of it will be the kind of provincial and community participation in immigration policy-making and management which has been envisaged in this study. For the very immediate future, immigration needs to be visible and comprehensible as an important sector of public policy in its own right. Few Canadians today are aware of the changing nature of international migration and its effect on our own immigration movement, or that the United States has become the major source country in Canadian immigration, or that we are likely to receive many more immigrants now from Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America. The national and international implications of our present universal immigration policy are never discussed. The size of our annual immigration movement is left very largely in the hands of manpower economists. The issue of immigration and population growth is never mentioned. Immigration figures are now, in

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fact, at their lowest point for a number of years and are the outcome of a deliberate policy of restraint, exercised in the light of the currently high levels of unemployment in Canada and the present rapid expansion of the domestic labour force owing to the "baby boom" of the early post-war period. Officials of the Department of Manpower and Immigration believe that this is likely to be a temporary phase, though not a short one, and that these figures may rise again in a few years when we have passed through this period of rapid growth in our own labour force. Our present admission policy may well be the right one, but it should at least be the subject of some public discussion. It might be mentioned here that Canada has no journal of migration studies, no research institute, large or small, concerned with immigration and migration, although a good deal of research in this area is now under way. Meetings and conferences on immigration are a very rare occurrence indeed. The last occasion when those who work with and for immigrants in Canada's largest cities had an opportunity of meeting each other and sharing ideas was in 1968 at the Cross Canada Conference organized by the International Institute of Toronto which was mentioned earlier. Even this had to be confined, for financial reasons, to the established agencies. Regular conferences and national and regional meetings on immigration are badly needed, as are the means to share ideas and distribute information among those who work in this field. Across Canada, small groups are experimenting with new approaches to language training and to immigrant information and orientation, working both with new immigrants and with those who have been here for some years. There is almost no communication between them and no creative centre in Ottawa concerned with immigration which can provide them with encouragement, support, and practical assistance and put them in touch with other groups. So the lessons learned are never shared with anyone and the same experience is repeated many times hi diiferent places. Furthermore, Canada's role as a major receiving country in international migration deserves recognition in Canada as well as abroad. The need to relate immigration to Canadian foreign policy and external relations is also long overdue. Not to do so is yet another disadvantage of regarding immigration only as a manpower policy. Canada is not only a major receiving country in international migration, but also has a long history and good record in world refugee assistance. The world refugee problem will be with us for the foreseeable future and it seems likely that many movements of refugees to Canada lie ahead. As we have seen, Canada is deeply involved in the complicated transfers of professional and skilled workers, known as the brain drain, which has a special significance for the developing countries. In this connection, it is essential that our immigration policy 356

New Needs and New Policies should not negate our own efforts to provide some of these countries with effective development aid. Immigration policy and development assistance must be considered together. It is to be hoped that one outcome of the present integration program in the overseas operations of the Canadian government will be a much better appreciation on the part of the departments involved of the role of immigration in Canada's external relations. We should surely be giving some thought now too to ways of strengthening the institutions which already exist in international migration (UNHCR and ICEM); and about possible new initiatives, in a United Nations, Commonwealth, or any other useful context, to create closer communication among the countries involved in this activity, and to increase the fund of common knowledge about the management of immigration and about the needs of immigrants themselves. One very important aspect of Canadian immigration management today lies in the area of Western Hemisphere migration. A CanadianAmerican Working Party has been meeting from time to time on this question. We have seen that American emigration to Canada has been increasing steadily throughout the post-war period and that the United States has just replaced Britain as the major source country in Canadian immigration. The major changes which have been taking place recently in the immigration patterns between these two countries are of very great interest. Although the United States has been most hospitable to Canadian immigrants in the past, Americans now enjoy far fewer restrictions in emigrating to Canada, provided they can meet our selection criteria, than Canadians do in emigrating to the United States. Should the border be easier to cross hi one direction than in the other? At present, Americans also enjoy a special privilege over the nationals of other countries in that their applications are processed in Canada, so that they merely have to send hi their applications and come. Another interesting aspect of our present migration relationship with the United States concerns the large movement of American draft evaders and deserters now hi Canada. A considerable number have landed immigrant status, but a good many wish to return home as soon as they can, and this is a matter which is likely to involve difficult negotiations. There is also the serious problem of border control in relation to criminal elements in the United States and to all the illegal traffic now using the whole continent as its working territory. In the past, Canadian public opinion has tended to believe that Canadian border control was too tight. It would be much more realistic now to think of border control as being only just in control, 'it that, of an increasingly difficult situation. The twentieth anniversary of our outdated, inadequate and, in many respects, bypassed Immigration Act of 1952 is now upon us. It cannot be 357

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emphasized too strongly how badly we need a new one. It is tantalizing to know that we do have a new Immigration Act in draft, awaiting its turn in the present government's legislative program, but low, it is said, on the list of priorities. The draft is believed to include provisions for the control of the "visitor problem" discussed earlier, and, with it, the everincreasing backlog of cases before the Immigration Appeal Board. The children of visitors whose applications for landed immigrant status have been rejected and whose cases await a hearing before the Board are now sufficiently numerous to cause some provincial anxiety about the financing of their education. A solution to or alleviation of this problem is urgently needed. As already mentioned, a new Immigration Act was first conceived, discussed, and roughly drafted in the fifties. THE IMMIGRANT IN CANADA* One of the areas hi which there is room, as we have seen, for major change and development in the next few years concerns the immigrant in Canada. Leadership from the federal government in the field of immigrant adjustment has been weak during the post-war period, and consultation and collaboration with the provinces and the voluntary sector in the provision of effective services for immigrants in Canada have been very limited so far. The major cooperative effort by all levels of government and the community to promote the social adjustment of immigrants, envisaged in the 1966 White Paper on Canadian Immigration Policy, has never happened. In recent years, however, we have greatly improved the quality of our overseas immigration operations and the service we provide for prospective immigrants. We have improved our reception services in Canada, particularly the initial assistance we give to immigrants in temporary difficulties. The quality and availability of language-training programs for immigrants have also improved considerably although much more needs to be done. New initiatives in these and other areas relating to immigrant adjustment have been undertaken recently by Ontario and Quebec. Since 1966, as part of the development of nationwide manpower programs, we have made great efforts for immigrants as members of the labour force. But language training and manpower programs and initial settlement assistance are not enough. We need to make concerted efforts for immigrants as members of the community to facilitate their adjustment on a longer term basis to our rapidly changing society. This involves more gov*Some of the material in this section is from a working paper prepared by the author for the Department of Manpower and Immigration's Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants. 358

New Needs and New Policies eminent leadership, much closer federal-provincial and interdepartmental collaboration, and much more support by the federal and provincial governments for community efforts for immigrants. Due attention to the adjustment of all the immigrants who are admitted to Canada—not only to those who are members of the labour force—is becoming even more important now because of the changing, multiracial nature of our immigration movement. As already noted, immigrants have enjoyed a remarkable freedom in Canada, in a society which has been most tolerant to the efforts of energetic and creative newcomers. It has, of course, been easier for immigrants to create something new than to penetrate, in any numbers, the higher levels of the Canadian political, bureaucratic, and social structure. Nevertheless, few immigrants with some experience in Canada would deny the special feeling which this country gives of a spaciousness and room to move and develop, which is not only physical. But this kind of environment in which, in the past, few services have been offered to immigrants, and a great many have not had any assistance at all, favours the self-reliant and the determined. Most immigration movements contain a good many immigrants like this. But other people get involved in migration—dependents, relatives, well-qualified but less adaptable individuals, and some with physical, emotional, or family problems. Immigrants too are as prone as anyone to misfortune or bad luck, but can be more vulnerable than many Canadians are when this occurs. There is no doubt also that there exists in Canada today a legacy of unattended immigration, and it is most important that this legacy should now be reduced. The legacy consists of a large number of post-war immigrants who do not yet speak English or French or speak these languages poorly. It consists of many immigrant children who have passed through or are still in the educational system, seriously handicapped by language and cultural problems, and who later form some of those elements in the labour force which need rather expensive training and upgrading, to enable them to meet the employment requirements of an advanced industrial society. It consists also of many post-war immigrants whose knowledge of Canadian history, society, and political system is minimal. The report of the Task Force on Government Information drew the special attention of Canadians to the widespread disaffection which now exists, in varying degrees, among large groups in all Western countries, including Canada. The report referred not only to minority problems, racial conflict in some countries, strikes, and student unrest, but also to the alienation of large numbers of people who are out of touch with government and neither believe what their governments say or care what they do. The report identifies immigrants as one of the special publics which

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form part of a "huge, amorphous, baffling minority" in Canada which is seriously uninformed about government affairs. A survey undertaken for the Task Force suggested that a prototype of Canada's politically handicapped might be a recently arrived immigrant housewife in a "lower-status household." She has not had much education. Her grasp of English is limited. She does not feel herself to be part of the mainstream of Canadian life. The report suggests that we cannot continue to ignore these special publics. The immigrant housewife is not hearing many of the things that she needs to know. She and her children must be reached by government. It is the contention of this Task Force that the information services of the Federal Government must define the special publics in the country, and seek them out and serve them in ways that they have not defined or sought or served before. It is another contention of the Task Force that the job will require not only unprecedented coordination of government information functions . . . but also, and most crucially important, a fresh philosophy of service and, for the first time, a declared policy on the government's obligations to provide information to the public and the public's right of access to official information.1 Immigrants need information badly, not only before arrival and at the point of arrival, but for some years after. But this is only one of their urgent needs. The immigrant "special public" cannot be drawn into the mainstream of Canadian life without a special effort on the part of government in all the areas which affect the adjustment of immigrants. Like the information field, this also requires a fresh philosophy of service and a declared policy on the government's intentions and obligations. And it requires firm leadership from government. No other sector in the Canadian community can provide it. Ontario and Quebec have now appreciated, although many of their plans are not yet fully implemented, the range and variety of community services which are needed to facilitate the adjustment of immigrants. We have mentioned the COF1 (Centres d'Orientation et de Formation des Immigrants) and particularly COF1 La Prairie in Montreal, with its combined language and orientation program, although this is only one of the services which the Department of Immigration in Quebec is now providing. Ontario, in addition to its special efforts in the field of language training, is now developing, as we have seen, a three-part program for immigrants including reception services, orientation, and intergroup development. It is surely tune that the governments of some other provinces paid attention to these moves and began to develop their own distinctive brand of programs to facilitate the settlement and adjustment of immi360

New Needs and New Policies grants. But this does not solve the problems of overall planning, development, coordination, communication, and financing; in these areas, federal leadership and federal-provincial collaboration are essential. The central problem of responsibility at the federal level for the adjustment of immigrants on a long-term basis urgently requires attention. Should it lie with the Department of Manpower and Immigration, or with a separate Department of Immigration, or with the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State (hitherto concerned with groups and not with individuals), or with a new government-financed agency? Is it feasible to divide the responsibility for immigrants between two departments? This has led, since 1966, to twilight zones in which no one has done anything and to a complete absence of overall coordination and development. Within this complex area of government and voluntary activity and shared jurisdictions, it is easy to lose sight of the immigrant's real needs and the services required to meet them. What do immigrants need now in the way of basic services? If we examine the available evidence from the post-war experience of voluntary agencies in Canada's largest cities, the present policies and objectives in the adjustment of immigrants of the Citizenship Branch in Ontario and the Department of Immigration in Quebec, the recent report on immigrant integration of the Ontario Economic Council, and the needs of immigrants as seen by the new coordinating committees in Toronto and Vancouver, together with the experience of other receiving countries, a clear consensus emerges on this question. Briefly, there are twelve major areas in which immigrants may need help. Some immigrants need very little help of any kind; others need help for a considerable period of time. An immigrant may also do well for a year or two and then he or his family may encounter unexpected difficulties. The twelve areas are reception; accommodation (particularly in the first few months); employment; emergency welfare and medical assistance; language training; translation and interpreter services; information and orientation; individual and family counselling; vocational training and adjustment; special educational programs and assistance for immigrant children and mothers at home; community access and participation; and substantial protection for individual human rights and the rights of immigrant organizations. For a while after arrival, the immigrant is a special case and needs specialized assistance in some of these areas, though not necessarily in all of them. His needs are often similar to those of many Canadian migrants, but differ in certain important respects, namely, in knowledge of the language, of the land, and of the Canadian community and its way of living. Immigrants who have relatives in Canada often need as much help as independent applicants, and help for immigrants should include the 361

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whole family—wives, children, and elderly parents—as well as the wage earner. It must be easily accessible in central locations and also, if possible, in the areas where immigrants live. It must be provided on a continuing basis for a possible period of five years in the life of an individual immigrant. Major emphasis should be placed now, as the Task Force on Government Information underlined, on the provision of information in a variety of ways and over a considerable period of time using all the new communications media, to enable immigrants, past and present, to become much better informed about Canadian society and the Canadian political system and to enable them to participate more effectively therein. The real challenge in all this lies in the planning and delivery of these services to a very varied, large, and often scattered clientele, and it is here where new initiatives and major cooperative efforts are required. Two final points should be mentioned in relation to the immigrant in Canada today. First, immigrant problems are becoming—more than ever—urban problems. The forecasts are all too familiar: by 1980, 33 percent of all Canadians will be living in three vast urban areas and some 60 percent in thirty major city complexes. This suggests, therefore, that while services should be available in some form for all immigrants, we should concentrate our major efforts in immigrant adjustment in a number of selected cities across Canada which have, or are likely to have, a considerable immigrant population and intake. And, in planning for the near future, we have to think of the immigrant in the huge, urban conglomeration with all the problems of communication and participation which that involves. Lastly, as we have seen in earlier chapters, the composition of Canada's immigration movement has changed substantially in recent years, particularly since the introduction of completely non-discriminatory immigration regulations in 1967. It is now in a much more significant way a multiracial and multinational movement. During the last few years, there have been large increases in the number of immigrants admitted from the Caribbean, China (including mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan), India, and, to a lesser extent, from the Philippines and Latin America. In 1969 immigration from the Caribbean and Asia constituted 23 percent of the total number of immigrants admitted to Canada and 18.49 percent in 1971. At the same time, the increasing prosperity and larger membership of the European Economic Community and the opportunities it offers for intercountry migration are likely to bring further reductions in the numbers of immigrants from that continent. It seems likely therefore that the countries of the Western Hemisphere, including the Caribbean, and Asia will become increasingly important in Canadian immigration. It is doubtful whether the Canadian public is as yet aware of these facts. 362

New Needs and New Policies The changing character of Canadian immigration raises a number of issues, but one of the most important concerns colour and race relations. Will the presence of many more black immigrants in Canada, for example, and the growth of sizeable West Indian, Indian, and Pakistani communities and groups in our major industrial cities bring forms of racial conflict and stress to this country? Will their individual and collective adjustment to Canadian society prove difficult? Will they suffer from discrimination and isolation? Black immigrants, many of them in the younger age brackets, are now continuously visible in the streets of Toronto and in its big stores and supermarkets, and this will soon extend to other Canadian cities. Montreal too has its own black immigrant population. Canadian streets today are, on the whole, peaceful and these new immigrants, who are mainly in the professional and skilled categories, look busy and prosperous. But we cannot assume, because of these peaceful scenes and because Canada is at present free from racial though not from other kinds of conflict, that this will necessarily remain so. We have no special immunities. We must remember also that the militant minorities within minority groups now have world-wide communication. This surely emphasizes even more the need for much greater effort and imagination now on the part of federal and provincial governments to assist all immigrants, to facilitate the mutual adjustment of immigrants and Canadian society, and to ensure that our present universal immigration policy, with its very special advantages, commands real and continuing public understanding and support. THE RENAISSANCE OF THE CITIZENSHIP BRANCH In the previous chapter, two possible solutions were proposed to the present unsatisfactory state of immigration management in Canada at the federal level. These were the creation of a separate Department of Immigration or a strengthened Immigration Division within the Department of Manpower and Immigration. Two other possibilities were suggested, namely, a much more important role in relation to immigrants for the Department of the Secretary of State or the establishment of a semiindependent, government-financed agency responsible for immigrants in Canada in all matters except those relating to employment, vocational training, and other manpower programs, and reflecting the shared federalprovincial jurisdiction in immigration and the contribution of voluntary agencies. In the final section of this study, we will discuss the remarkable transformation which has been taking place in the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State and also a recent and surprising 363

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development in relation to immigration, both of which have a bearing on this important issue. When the final decision was taken in 1966 not to "repatriate" the immigration function from the Citizenship Branch in its new location in the Department of Secretary of State to the Department of Manpower and Immigration, discussions took place between officials of the two Departments in order to arrive at a division of responsibility for immigrants after their arrival in Canada. It was finally agreed that the Department of Manpower and Immigration would be concerned with immigrants destined for the labour force and with those services which would assist them in their reception and early settlement in the community. The Department of the Secretary of State would be concerned with the social, political, and cultural integration of immigrants and with language training not related to employment. At that time, as we have seen, the Department of the Secretary of State viewed this additional responsibility without enthusiasm. The Department of Manpower and Immigration was warned that little could be expected hi the first year because of limited resources. In fact very little was done in the following four years. Whereas the Department of Manpower and Immigration did fulfil its part of the bargain (but no more), the Department of the Secretary of State did not, except in relation to language training in which it simply carried out, without innovation, the requirements of the language training and textbook agreements concluded with the provinces, and the continuation of a small grants program to voluntary agencies. In addition, the Field Service gave what encouragement and practical assistance it could (with minimal resources) to voluntary agencies and ethnic groups. Nothing of any consequence was done to develop the social, political, and cultural integration of immigrants. Admittedly this is a very difficult task. The two Departments took no steps whatsoever to coordinate their activities in relation to immigrants, or to coordinate their own efforts with those of the provinces (except in relation to manpower programs) or with the activities of voluntary agencies. No effort was made to coordinate the funding of these agencies. To outside observers, the transformation which is now taking place within the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State appeared on the horizon like a small and distant hurricane early in 1970, but in fact it started well before that. In April 1968 Gerard Pelletier became Secretary of State in the place of Judy LaMarsh, and in October of the following year, Robert Stanbury was appointed Minister without Portfolio, responsible for Citizenship and Information Canada and, shortly afterwards, began his review of the whole area of citizenship and citizenship legislation. Within a few months, proposals were being made to Cab364

New Needs and New Policies inet for a "revitalized program on citizenship" within the Department of Secretary of State based upon five policy objectives which were to reinforce Canadian identity and unity; to encourage cultural diversification within a bilingual framework; to preserve human rights and fundamental freedoms; to increase and improve citizenship participation; and to develop meaningful symbols of Canadian sovereignty. Work had already begun on the drafting of a proposed new citizenship bill. An extensive development program designed to implement these five objectives was then authorized by Cabinet, for which the major responsibility would lie with the Department of the Secretary of State, particularly with its Citizenship Branch. In the early months of 1970, dramatic changes began to occur within the Branch itself. At the beginning of the year, the former Director of the Branch had retired on account of illness. At the same time, a new Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for the Citizenship Branch had been appointed and sweeping changes were made in its senior management. Following the cabinet decision, its budget expanded out of all recognition. As the Branch moved to implement the five policy objectives, new programs, research studies, and cabinet documents multiplied. More than a hundred new staff members and consultants were hired on contract. Management consultants were called in to reorganize the administrative structure of the Branch. Major changes were planned in the Field Service. The Department itself was given special tasks like the Opportunities for Youth Program and the planning and development of a group of programs designed to implement the government's policy on multiculturalism, which was announced a year later. And in the midst of this new drive and developing concern for human rights, citizen participation, youth, native citizens, citizenship promotion, voluntary organizations, symbols of sovereignty, and other program areas reflecting the five objectives, the thoughts of the management turned towards immigrants and the neglected area of integration. Immigrants were also seen as one of the special publics to be served and assisted through implementation of the Department's new policy objectives. It was therefore decided to initiate a thorough review of the Department's responsibilities in this field and to hire a specialist from outside the Department to do it. The following section is a personal account of what has ensued. These developments are so recent —and their outcome so unpredictable—that this description of them is being added in the form of a postscript. TASK FORCE

Task forces assume many shapes and sizes. This one is a one-woman task force supported by a small research staff. It was difficult to find 365

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a name for it which did not imply very substantial powers and which adequately reflected the present objectives of the Citizenship Branch. Task Force on Immigrant Services was one possibility but seemed to suggest an interdepartmental authority which the project did not have, at least at the outset, and the word "services" did not seem quite to accord with the Department's new vocabulary of participation. And was I a task force or an individual consultant? Within the Program Development Division of the newly designed Citizenship Branch, a unit named Future Citizens had already been envisaged in anticipation of new programs relating to immigrants. But this did not seem an appropriate title or place to be either, since this central division was, by then, largely operational, and the term "Future Citizens" does not, in fact, accurately describe our present total immigration movement or some of its needs. Eventually the project was located under the umbrella of Strategic Planning and was given the convenient title of Immigrant Programs Development Group. But in its style, duration, methods, and, perhaps, in its prospects of success, it has become a task force and has joined the fraternity of task forces, large and small, which have been examining, in the last few years, some of the critical issues and needs in Canadian public policy. I was asked by the Department of the Secretary of State to undertake this assignment in April 1971 and began to work on it in the following September. When defined, the task itself was described in these terms: 1. To make a thorough review of the role and responsibilities of the Department of the Secretary of State in relation to immigrants, and of the way in which these responsibilities relate to those of the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the provinces; 2. To make recommendations, arising from this review, for policies and programs which could lead to substantial improvements and development in the field of immigrant adjustment and which, if approved, will be submitted to Cabinet; 3. To carry out this review in close collaboration with the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the provinces and to consult with the voluntary agencies providing services for immigrants and with the national organizations concerned with immigrants in Canada. Among other things, this meant a critical review of the 1966 agreement between the Department of the Secretary of State and the Department of Manpower and Immigration; a new look at the Department's responsibilities for immigrants in the light of its "revitalized program on citizenship"; and an attempt to develop working arrangements in relation to this study, initially between the two Departments themselves and then between these Departments and the provinces, in order to begin to create the climate of 366

New Needs and New Policies collaboration and creative development which is so badly needed in this field. The difficulty of doing all this will be evident, as will the remarkable opportunity which this assignment offers to make some useful recommendations to the federal government relating to services and opportunities for immigrants in Canada. Like many task force efforts, nothing may come of it. It is quite possible that no consensus can be reached yet on the difficult question of responsibility at the federal level, but it is also possible that the time may have come when it is obvious to all that some action and reorganization are needed. The Department of the Secretary of State is particularly concerned now about the areas of immigrant information, orientation, and participation, as well as the possible revision of the language instruction and textbook agreements with the provinces. Initiatives in these areas might form part of its new thrust in the general field of citizenship. The Department of Manpower and Immigration, particularly its immigration staff, is well aware of the needs which lie beyond its present areas of responsibility and is not satisfied with the present state of affairs in language training or in the funding of voluntary agencies. Early discussions with some of the provinces indicate great interest and willingness to collaborate in new developments in this field. Ontario and Quebec have, in fact, wanted more effective intergovernmental communication and consultation in this area for some time. It was encouraging to find that the present climate for intergovernmental discussions on the subject looked promising. The needs of the voluntary sector, in which there are now many small emerging groups, as well as the established ones, and a number of new initiatives on a small scale in information, language training, and other immigrant services, are still urgent. These needs lie more than ever now in the areas of coordination, communication, training, access to information and research materials, and rational and flexible financing on an ongoing basis. But the community environment in which services for immigrants are or should be provided is changing rapidly. The remarkable growth of neighbourhood information centres, the trend in the social services towards multiservice centres and area development, the new stress on community action and preventive social service are all factors which will need to be taken into account in the development and identification of services for immigrants. Another important factor of an unpredictable kind is the present availability of non-recurring federal grants under the Local Initiatives, Multiculturalism, Opportunities for Youth, and other programs. Valuable though these programs are, it is now much easier to obtain money for a temporary and experimental project, but almost as hard as 367

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ever to secure financial support for the regular operations and development of established agencies and institutions. In addition, since some of the initiatives now funded on a temporary basis are very valuable and should be continued—and this applies to a number of immigrant projects —the problems of permanent financing are likely to become even more serious unless new policies are developed soon. The federal government's multiculturalism policy is in itself another interesting new element in the immigrant world in Canada although the programs designed to implement it are not very extensive so far and may not reach very many recent immigrants. Announced by the Prime Minister on October 8, 1971, this policy constitutes the government's response to book IV of the report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. It consists of four elements: support and encouragement for all cultural groups which show the will to survive and develop and have a clear need for assistance; help in overcoming cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society (such as a sense of not belonging or inferiority); promotion of creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity; and some further assistance to immigrants in acquiring at least one of Canada's official languages. Six specific programs, including a supporting grants program, have been designed to implement this policy and are now being administered mainly by the Department of the Secretary of State.2 At present the total budget for the multiculturalism program stands at $3 million over the next three years which is a modest amount compared with some recent federal programs. While this program will clearly do some very useful things and is valuable in the recognition and support which it gives to Canada's many and varied cultural communities (as they are now to be known), it should not be construed as a program which will be of direct help to immigrants, except for the additional help it may give in the language field. While they may practise a private kind of multiculturalism, a great many immigrants never relate to an ethnic organization, or only do so intermittently. Certain groups, such as the Jewish and Ukrainian communities, are able to achieve a continuously high membership, but many others reach only a minority of their potential clientele. Many immigrants simply do not join an organization of any kind. Nevertheless, the cultural aspects of the multiculturalism program are widely appreciated and, in the absence of other kinds of funding, a number of agencies and groups providing services for immigrants have benefitted from its grants program. As this book goes to press, my one-year assignment with the Department of the Secretary of State is barely halfway through, and only a short progress report is possible at this stage. Meetings relating to this project 368

New Needs and New Policies between the Departments of the Secretary of State and Manpower and Immigration have already taken place and it is anticipated that a working party representing both Departments will be set up to consider the recommendations, proposals, and ideas which emerge from this review. Consultations with the provinces and with voluntary agencies, individual organizations, and groups across Canada are now under way. Study and research are still in progress relating to some of the areas in which major improvements are needed in immigrant services. Although this review is not yet complete, it is evident now that the critical questions in Canadian immigration today are still the problem of responsibility at the federal level and the need for much greater federal, provincial, and community collaboration in the provision of services for immigrants. But if these basic problems can be resolved, the means exist today through use of the new communications media, new developments in information and adult education, the growing expertise in language training, and the present emphasis on community self-help and the needs of smaller groups, to provide services and opportunities to Canadian immigrants of all ages and nationalities, which are far more helpful, flexible, and readily available than anything we have had in the past.

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Part Seven Sequel, 1972-1986

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Chapter Fifteen Sequel, 1972-1986

THE YEAR 1972 WAS CRUCIAL for all aspects of Canadian immigration. In that year, Canada found herself confronted with the largest illegal immigration movement in her experience. In the final months of 1971, as we have seen, the Prime Minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, announced a national policy of "Multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" with four basic principles, six special programs, and a small budget; Quebec immediately registered strong opposition to it. On August 4, 1972, President Idi Amin of Uganda announced his intention to expel all Asians holding British citizenship. Canada's Ugandan Asian refugee movement, which eventually involved the admission of some 7,000 Ugandan Asian "expellees," as they were called in Canada, began shortly afterwards. In November 1972, Robert Andras, the chief architect of the new Immigration Act 1976 which has transformed the management of immigration in Canada, became Minister of Manpower and Immigration with an added responsibility for population matters. All these events quickened the pace of development in Canadian immigration. We have seen that, since at least the late 1950s, all Canadian governments had been well aware of the need for a new and more liberal Immigration Act, but the political will to achieve what was felt to be a very difficult and contentious political task was lacking. Several of the Ministers responsible for immigration had made half-hearted efforts in this direction which had come to nothing. But in Bob Andras, the Liberal Party acquired in 1968 an able energetic businessman of considerable talent and firm liberal opinions, but no previous experience of national politics. When he took over this portfolio in 1972—without the inhibitions of some Liberal politicians—he was determined to get a new Immigration Act, and he got one. Under-estimating the strength of provincial opposition at the time,

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he tried equally hard to establish at least the foundations of a population policy for Canada but failed. He succeeded, however, through his new Immigration Act, in creating the means whereby much closer federalprovincial collaboration in the immigration and population field could be achieved in the future—and this has, in fact, already taken place. He was also instrumental in creating the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission in 1978, believing that a semi-independent and powerful agency of this kind was essential if Canada's critical problems of employment and training were to be tackled effectively. TOWARDS A NEW IMMIGRATION ACT Despite the strong Andras drive towards a new Immigration Act that began in 1973, it took five years before a new Act was actually on the statute book. When Mr. Andras arrived to take up his new assignment, he found the Department of Manpower and Immigration in a state of considerable disarray and morale in the Immigration Division very low. After its creation in 1966, the Department had undertaken major developments in the new manpower field and in immigration without proper review and consolidation. Ministers and Deputy Ministers had rarely stayed very long. Departmental reorganizations had taken place without the necessary testing and evaluation. Among other immigration problems, the Canadian points system, introduced in 1967, urgently needed review and, as it stood, provided no control over numbers. With the aid of a new Deputy Minister—Alan Gotlieb from the Department of External Affairs, afterwards Canadian Ambassador in Washington—and a reorganized senior management, these problems began to be tackled in the early months of 1973. At the same time, the very large illegal immigration movement referred to earlier was escalating rapidly and had to be dealt with. It was not until September 1973 that the Minister was able to announce in the House of Commons that his Department would undertake a major review of immigration and population policies leading to publication of a Green Paper on the subject. This would be followed by a nation-wide, public discussion of the Green Paper and a major immigration and population conference, with the aim of establishing a forward-looking immigration policy, backed by legislation to be presented to Parliament as soon as possible. Mr. Andras also said that a special task force—later called the Canadian Immigration and Population Study—was being created within the Department of Manpower and Immigration to study policy options and organize the review process. Although it took fifteen months instead of the six originally envisaged, a Green Paper on immigration policy was finally completed by the Task 374

Sequel, 1972-1986 Force and submitted to Cabinet in the fall of 1974. The task had proved to be a particularly difficult one because of the scarcity of basic research and published work on Canadian immigration and population which the Task Force could refer to, as well as the fact that there were still very few Canadian experts in these areas. The present study, for example, was the only major study of Canadian immigration published since the 1950s. The former Department of Citizenship and Immigration and the Immigration Division of the Department of Manpower and Immigration had also been unaccustomed to producing research studies and reports. Nevertheless the Task Force failed to make good use of the expertise which was available and, unfortunately, the Green Paper proved to be a disappointing, over-cautious, and inadequate document which no one really liked. After it was tabled in the House of Commons on February 3, 1975, the Liberal caucus and opposition parties reacted strongly against the idea of a national conference on immigration policy, believing that Parliament should be directly involved in critical decisions on immigration and that a Parliamentary Committee should be appointed to examine the Green Paper. This view prevailed and a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Immigration Policy was appointed in March 1975 under the joint chairmanship of Martin O'Connell, a former Liberal Cabinet Minister, and Senator Maurice Riel. The Special Joint Committee held fifty public hearings on immigration policy in twenty-one cities across Canada. Some 400 witnesses were heard and more than 1,400 briefs submitted. The Committee proved to be much more capable and hard-working than the Special Joint Committee appointed to examine the 1966 White Paper and Sedgwick Report (discussed in Chapter 6, pp. 161-2), which did not even bother to produce a final report. This Committee produced an excellent Report to Parliament in November 1975 whose recommendations became the basis of a new Immigration Act. The Report was warmly received in Parliament and elsewhere, and sixty out of sixty-five of its recommendations were accepted by the government. Bob Andras complemented the Committee on a "masterful performance." The Committee's principal recommendations are listed below. It is most important that this Committee's contribution to the immigration debate should not be forgotten, and that the content of the Immigration Act 1976 which followed should always be seen as the outcome, in large part, of their deliberations. Their principal recommendations were: 1. Canada should continue to be a country of immigration for demographic, economic, family, and humanitarian reasons. 2. A new Immigration Act should contain a clear statement of principles and objectives, including those pertaining to admission, non-discrimina375

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tion, sponsorship of relatives, refugees, and the prohibition of certain classes of immigrants. Operational details and procedures should be specified in regulations. 3. The principal of non-discrimination in immigration on the basis of race, creed, nationality, ethnic origin, and sex should be continued and should be formally set out in the new Immigration Act. 4. A clear statement of Canada's refugee policy should be made. 5. Immigration should be treated in future as a central variable in a national population policy. A country as large and thinly populated as Canada cannot afford the declining population which is indicated by current trends in fertility and must continue to welcome a minimum of 100,000 immigrants a year as long as present fertility rates prevail. Major efforts should also be made to forestall a further decline in Canada's Frenchspeaking population. 6. Annual admission figures should be calculated on the basis of this 100,000 minimum, plus an annual target figure to be adjusted frorn time to time to achieve an even rate of population growth and to take account of changing economic conditions. 7. The Minister of Manpower and Immigration should propose an annual target figure, after consultation with the provinces. This target should then be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. 8. Immigration is a long-term investment in human resources. Our present rapid rate of labour force expansion is likely to decline abruptly around 1980. From then on, future economic development might actually be held back by labour shortages unless immigration is continued. 9. The settlement of post-war immigrants alongside our founding cultures has been one of the most positive chapters in Canada's post-war history, and the Committee looked to immigration to continue to contribute to the economic, cultural and social well-being of the country. Nevertheless our present immigration system needs modifying and modernizing with the objective of regulating our immigration flow to achieve desired population growth. 10. A permanent joint federal-provincial committee should co-ordinate the development and implementation of immigration policy. 11. The points system should be retained, but modified in certain respects: the category of area demand in the points system should be used experimentally to encourage immigrants to settle in areas requiring development and population growth. 12. More thorough follow-up, control, and enforcement procedures relating to illegal immigration within Canada should be introduced, and more immigration staff and better support services provided at CanadianU.S. border-crossing points. 376

Sequel, 1972-1986 13. Because deportation carries a stigma with it, the introduction of a simple "required to depart" procedure is recommended to be used in cases of minor breaches of the Immigration Act or regulations. 14. Increased attention should now be given by the Department of Manpower and Immigration to the planning, development, and co-ordination of immigrant services in Canada, in consultation with other levels of government. An Interdepartmental Committee created in April 1975, consisting of representatives of the Departments of Justice, Manpower and Immigration, External Affairs, and Secretary of State, actually constructed an Immigration Bill incorporating the Committee's recommendations accepted by the government. The Bill had its first reading on November 22, 1976. It received royal assent on August 5, 1977 and became law on April 10, 1978. THE IMMIGRATION ACT 1976 The new Immigration Act, which appeared a quarter of a century after the Immigration Act of 1952 (discussed in Chapter 4, pp. 101-10), is an excellent piece of legislation—only one or two serious defects needed correction. Described to the author at the time by the Deputy Minister as "a beautiful piece of work, well-constructed, liberal, and workable," its provisions are constructive, politically sensitive, and forward-looking. It creates in itself the positive climate in immigration which, as noted earlier, the 1952 Act had signally failed to do. Since it became law in 1978, the Act has received very little criticism, and there is no question that it, and the efforts of the Special Joint Committee which preceded it, have made a significant difference to the public image of immigration management in Canada. I will not examine the provisions of the Act in detail here, but will note its major and most significant provisions. These include, first, a statement of the basic principles of Canadian immigration policy as recommended by the Special Joint Committee—the first time that anything of this kind had been attempted in Canadian immigration law. These principles are listed in full in Appendix 2. Second, the Act creates a completely new system for the planning and management of Canadian immigration. This involves a very ingenious way of involving the provinces in immigration planning and decision-making, as well as opening this process to Parliamentary and to public scrutiny and discussion. Section 109 of the Act makes consultation with the provinces mandatory for the Minister and enables him to enter into immigration agreements with a province or a group of provinces. With the exception of Ontario, British Columbia, and 377

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Manitoba all the provinces now have immigration agreements with the federal government. Section 7 of the Act requires the Minister, after consulting the provinces and "such other persons, organizations and institutions as he deems appropriate," to announce annually in Parliament the number of immigrants which the government proposes to admit during any specified period of time—at present the next three years—together with an account of "the manner in which demographic considerations have been taken into account in determining that number." The "Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration Levels," tabled by the Minister for each year since the Act became law in 1978, has been preceded by a carefully worked-out process of consultation, lasting several months, with the provinces, business, labour, professional and voluntary organizations, and academic specialists. Third, the Act, and the Immigration Regulations which complement it and which also came into force in 1978, establish three classes of immigrants who will be admitted to Canada. First, a family class which refers to the immediate family and dependent children but also includes parents and grandparents over sixty or under sixty if widowed or incapable of gainful employment. (Since April 1978 all parents under sixty and their dependents have been included in the Family Class provided they are sponsored by a Canadian citizen.) The second class consists of refugees, including Convention refugees or members of a specially designated class of refugees. The third consists of other applicants selected on the basis of the points system, including independent applicants and what are now called assisted relatives, i.e., more distant relatives who are sponsored by a family member in Canada. In addition, the Act requires all visitors and students who wish to work temporarily or study in Canada to obtain prior authorization abroad. Once admitted, normally neither visitors nor students may change their status. Temporary workers who change jobs and students who change their course of study without proper authorization, as well as all visitors who remain in Canada beyond the period for which they were admitted, are subject to removal. Fourth, the Act makes major changes in the areas of exclusion, control, and enforcement and substantially reduces the excessive degree of Ministerial discretion in the 1952 Act. What were known as the "Prohibited Classes" in that Act and the long and depressing list of those regarded as undesirable (idiots, imbeciles, morons, the insane, epileptics, the physically defective, those guilty of "moral turpitude," and many others) have been removed. By contrast, the 1976 Act identifies certain broad classes of persons whose entry to Canada might endanger public health, welfare, order, security, or the integrity of the immigration program. Grounds for exclusion now include a degree of health impairment, judged on an in378

Sequel, 1972-1986 dividual's total health profile, which would constitute a threat to public health or safety, or cause excessive demands on health or social services; the lack of means of support or evident capacity to acquire them; serious criminal offences without evidence of rehabilitation; and involvement in criminal activity such as organized crime, or in espionage, subversion, or acts of violence such as terrorism and hijacking. All offences committed outside Canada are directly related to comparable offences under Canadian law and are judged in relation to admissibility by the sentence which would have been imposed in this country. The Act also introduces major changes in the way inquiries relating to removal from Canada are conducted and provides new ways to protect the fundamental rights of persons subject to removal. Instead of deportation in all cases requiring removal as laid down in the 1952 Act, there are now three procedures, depending on the gravity of the case—a deportation order, a twelve-month exclusion order, and a departure notice. There are a number of other interesting provisions in the new Immigration Act and accompanying Regulations, the most important of which are those relating to refugees and to the Canadian points system. First, the Act establishes, in Part I, Canada's commitment to fulfil its international legal obligations towards refugees and "to uphold its humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and the persecuted." It provides for the establishment by regulation of special selection standards for refugees, as well as special classes of refugees. This was done to meet the needs of groups of displaced persons who are, in fact, refugees, but who do not qualify under the definition of a refugee laid down in the Geneva Convention and Protocol of UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). The Act also established what were thought to be improved procedures for determining refugee status, but these proved to be too cumbersome and slow to handle the unexpectedly large flow of undocumented migrants claiming refugee status which appeared in the 1980s. The Immigration Regulations expand the refugee provisions of the Act and also set out the details of a refugee sponsorship plan which proved to be invaluable for Canada's share of the very large Indochinese refugee movement which took place after the fall of Saigon in 1975. The plan is a deliberate effort to involve the voluntary sector and the public in the settlement and adjustment of refugees in Canada. It provides for the sponsorship of a refugee family by any group of not less than five individual Canadian citizens or permanent residents who are over the age of eighteen and live in "the expected community of settlement"; or by a corporation which is properly incorporated under the laws of Canada or of any province and has representatives in this community. The group or organization must

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give a written undertaking to the Minister "to make provision for lodging, care, maintenance and resettlement assistance for the Convention refugee and accompanying dependents for a period of one year.'' Partly because the commitment, although it guaranteed total support, did not last very long, this plan proved to be very attractive to individuals and organizations anxious to help refugees. There is no doubt that it permitted many more Indochinese refugees to be admitted than would have been feasible otherwise. It is also likely to be very useful in relation to future refugee movements. The present version of the points system, first introduced in 1967, can be found in Appendix 11. This system was revised in 1974, 1978, and 1985. The 1985 revisions came into effect on January 1, 1986. They are intended to support the federal government's intention to increase immigration levels and to achieve a better balance among the family reunion, humanitarian, and economic streams in the immigration movement. As the result of a restriction—which has now been removed—on selected workers (i.e., the principal applicants destined for the labour force in the Independent categories) imposed on May 1, 1982 because of the recession, there had been a dramatic decline in selected worker landings. Total immigrant landings had also fallen from 143,000 in 1980 to just over 88,000 in 1984. Among other changes, the revised selection criteria for independent immigrants, in effect from January 1, 1986, introduce a new factor, "Levers Control," to help ensure that actual immigrant landings are consistent with announced immigration levels. This factor permits a maximum of 10 units of assessment to be awarded to all applicants when necessary to increase or decrease total numbers. The age factor is broadened from 18 to 35 in the previous system to 21 to 44. The penalty imposed in the previous system for failing to have arranged employment has also been removed. Finally, it is interesting to note a minor item in the 1978 Immigration Regulations which authorizes immigration officers to take fingerprints for identification purposes or for crime detection in special cases. This had not been permitted before and was a contentious issue in the 1960s, arousing strong feelings in Parliament (see pp. 148-49, 333, 409 n. 18). In 1978, with increasing crime and increasing illegality in immigration, this new regulation aroused little comment. POPULATION POLICY After the achievement of this badly needed new Immigration Act, the most important single development since 1972 has been the gradual move380

Sequel, 1972-1986 ment towards a population policy for Canada and the growing recognition that, as the Special Joint Committee recommended, immigration must be a central variable in this policy. It was agreed by Cabinet that, after the Green Paper had been tabled in the House on February 3, 1975, an effort should be made to interest and involve the provinces in Canada's present and future demographic needs. In an explanatory statement which accompanied the Green Paper, the Minister, Bob Andras, said that he hoped that the Green Paper would stimulate a national debate on immigration policy and management which would also include the development of a population policy for Canada which future immigration could be fashioned to support. "We need a set of flexible guidelines," he said, "to which policies which affect our population future may be related." The Government attached great weight to this. It would require close collaboration between Ottawa, the provinces, and the municipalities. The Prime Minister had written to the provincial premiers to ask them to designate "lead ministers" to participate in this enterprise. In Ottawa, the Government had appointed a Demographic Policy Steering Group of Deputy Ministers, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Minister of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, "to develop the federal view in the demographic policy area and to coordinate the federal input into the consultative process." A National Demographic Policy Secretariat, headed by a senior officer in the Department of Manpower and Immigration, had been created to support the work of the Policy Steering Group and to undertake consultations with the provinces and the public. In addition, Mr. Andras said, he would be visiting the provinces himself for "initial exchanges with the provincial ministers designated to participate with us in the discussion of demographic goals." This provincial tour took place almost immediately after the tabling of the Green Paper. Unexpectedly, all but two of the provinces—Quebec and Alberta— failed to respond to these overtures, at least in the short term. The other provincial governments were polite but cool to Mr. Andras when he came to see them and showed no interest whatsoever in the idea of population guidelines. They had too many problems of their own, they said, and no time, staff, or inclination to think about Canada's demographic future. Mr. Andras returned to Ottawa very disappointed. Quebec, which was always interested in demographic problems, had been very friendly, he told the author at the time, and so had Alberta, which was then very prosperous and engaged on a planning project of her own involving population, resources, and land use. But the other provinces had simply refused to get involved; Ontario had been particularly uninterested. The uninterested provinces did not have the last word on this matter, 381

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however. Bob Andras was determined that at least some consultation with the provinces on immigration and population would take place and believed that in time all the provinces would see the necessity of thinking about Canada's demographic future and the role of immigration in it. With the specific agreement of the Prime Minister, therefore, consultation between the Minister of Manpower and Immigration and the provinces on annual levels for immigration, as recommended by the Special Joint Committee, became mandatory in the new Immigration Act. Apart from one or two minor proposals, however, the federal government did not pursue the matter of a population policy for Canada any further at this time and the potentially valuable Demographic Policy Steering Group and Demographic Policy Secretariat disappeared from the scene. Thus ended the first real effort by a federal government to lay the foundations for a population policy for Canada. Soon, however, population problems would again become a serious federal concern. For a number of reasons, including the publication of Paul Ehrlich's dramatic book The Population Bomb, as well as the First Report of The Club of Rome, the international community became more aware of the world's demographic dilemmas from the late 1960s onwards. In 1974, its attention was focussed on the U.N. World Population Conference at Bucharest to which Canada contributed a "country paper" as required and in which some Canadian voluntary agencies took part. But a much more momentous demographic event was taking place then which will probably provide the real impetus for Canada to make a second attempt to establish a population policy related to immigration. The well-known American demographer Leon Bouvier has described it in the following terms: Sometime around 1973, a momentous new demographic phenomenon began to unfold throughout most of the developed world—fertility fell below the level of 2.1 births per woman needed to replace the population in the long run and remained there. . . . Actual population size did not begin to fall immediately in the early seventies. . . . because all of these nations experienced a rise in their fertility rate after World War II; some for just a few years, others like Australia, Canada and the United States for ten to fifteen years. . . . Never before in modern history has fertility been so low in so many countries for such a long period as has been the case since 1973.1 By the mid-eighties, it has become evident that this trend is a longterm one and a number of industrialized countries have become seriously concerned about it. At the same time, major demographic changes have 382

Sequel, 1972-1986 been taking place in the developing world, creating a tremendous momentum for population growth. A recent study of Canadian fertility by Anatole Romaniuk of Statistics Canada, Fertility in Canada: From Babyboom to Baby-bust, presents a similar view of Canada's demographic future and of the important role which immigration is likely to play in it. He writes that "The current regime of low fertility, and the consequent ageing and slowdown of growth in the Canadian population, are creating an historically new situation which may affect immigration strategies. Indeed if the fertility rate does not increase substantially and if population growth is a national goal, then large-scale immigration is clearly the alternative." The background paper tabled with the Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration Levels in November 1984 raised the issue of future population decline for the first time. In a very clear analysis of the options available to Canada, the paper emphasized that "assuming current trends continue, the rest of this century will be last period of robust demographic growth in Canada. The following twenty-year period (2,000-2,020) will be greatly influenced by the demographic events of 1980-1990. Were fertility to stay at or below current levels and annual net immigration to be held at a minimum of 50,000, growth would diminish and decline would begin by about 2020. Lower net immigration would advance the timetable and move the onset of decline closer to the year 2001."2 The Liberals were defeated in the election of September 4, 1984 and the Progressive Conservatives under Brian Mulroney were returned with a very large majority. The Mulroney Government has shown itself to be well aware that, with our fertility rate at 1.7 (1.4 in Quebec—the lowest in Canada), Canada does face the prospect of future population decline, unless immigration is substantially increased. But the problem is being approached cautiously through further investigation and research, while at the same time embarking on moderate initial increases in immigration levels. A.public debate on this very important question has been avoided so far. A major two-stage review of current immigration policies and programs, involving a good deal of public consultation, was started in November 1984. In addition, the Minister of National Health and Welfare, Jake Epp was asked, in his capacity as Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Social Development, to undertake "a separate assessment of the linkage between immigration levels and future demographic needs and of the economic and social implications of the future size, rate of growth and structure of the Canadian population." In May 1986, Mr. Epp announced that Cabinet had authorized a ' 'Review of Demography and its Implications for Economic and Social Policy," to be prepared by his Department over three years. The Review, which is headed by Dr. E. M. Murphy, a 383

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demographer and Assistant Deputy Minister in the Department of Health and Welfare, will report to Cabinet through the Minister by March 31, 1989 on possible changes in the size, structure and distribution of the population of Canada up to the year 2025, and on how these changes might affect Canada's social and economic life. The Review will involve multi-disciplinary research and a close relationship with the academic community. Its findings, Mr. Epp said, "will serve as part of the foundation for federal policy development for the 1990s and beyond." An interim report identifying key research issues and outlining the research and consultation strategy to be followed was made in December 1986. REFUGEES AND UNDOCUMENTED MIGRANTS After the large post-war movement of displaced persons, Canada had only two major refugee movements prior to 1972. As we have seen, these were the Hungarian refugee movement of 1956-57, which brought some 37,000 refugees to Canada, and the much smaller Czech refugee movement of 1968-69 in which close to 12,000 Czech refugees were admitted. After 1972, however, one refugee movement has followed another and much larger numbers of individual refugees have been accepted. During the Indochinese refugee movement which began in 1975 and attracted world-wide attention and concern, Canada has so far admitted over 100,000 refugees. Together with the United States, China, France, and Australia, she has been one of the five leading countries of resettlement for these refugees. At a ceremony in Ottawa on November 13, 1986, the present United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Jean-Pierre Hocke, presented the 1986 Nansen Medal to the Governor General, Jeanne Sauve, for the people of Canada in recognition of their services to the cause of refugees. Refugees have been a very significant phenomenon of modern times and their numbers have multiplied since the early seventies. There are believed to be a total of at least ten million refugees needing a home of some kind, somewhere, today. In response to this situation, Canada has reorganized her refugee policies and management, while continuing to work closely with UNHCR and remaining an active member of its Executive Committee. As we have seen, the Immigration Act 1976 established these new policies as well as the principle that Canada had an ongoing commitment to fulfill her international legal obligations towards refugees. From this point on, refugees have been treated as a separate and regular element in Canada's annual immigration movement. The special or designated classes of refugees which became possible under the Act have enabled Canada to avoid the constraints imposed by the still limited 384

Sequel, 1972-1986 definition of a refugee laid down in the Geneva Convention and Protocol of UNHCR. The special provisions for refugee sponsorship previously described have proved to be a most useful innovation. The annual refugee plan, which is now part of the Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration Levels made by the Minister of Employment and Immigration each fall, provides for a measure of control and planning in the absence of any overwhelming refugee movement. The decade of the 1970s began for Canada with two dramatic refugee movements—first the Ugandan Asians and then the Chileans. On August 4, 1972, President Idi Amin of Uganda announced that all Asians holding British citizenship—approximately fifty thousand individuals—must leave Uganda within 90 days. After appealing in vain to President Amin to extend the deadline, the British government appealed to Commonwealth and other governments for assistance in admitting and resettling these refugees. Canada responded quickly and in a very efficient and successful operation organized by the Departments of Manpower and Immigration and Secretary of State (which established a useful pattern of governmentvoluntary cooperation across Canada) eventually admitted 7,069 Ugandan Asians who settled successfully in a number of provinces. A high proportion found employment of some kind with remarkable speed and, in responding to later surveys, professed very little difficulty in adjusting to all aspects of Canadian life (except the climate). In contrast to this successful, well-financed, and well-publicized refugee movement, the Chilean refugee movement which followed was characterized by excessive caution and an initial lack of generosity and warmth on the part of the Trudeau government. Eventually, however, 6,990 Chilean refugees were admitted, but with very little government planning and assistance in their resettlement. The Chilean refugee movement began after the murder of President Salvador Allende in September 1973 in a right-wing military coup. The new military government immediately took repressive measures against Allende's officials and supporters and a real refugee movement began. Uncertain about the true nature of the new government, the political affiliation of the refugees, and the attitude of the United States, the Trudeau government dragged its feet badly during the first year or more following the Allende murder. Under pressure, however, from UNHCR, Amnesty International, and Canadian churches and voluntary organizations, and responding to world-wide condemnation of the Chilean military government, the Trudeau government relented. The excessive emphasis on security and other precautionary measures which had delayed admission were dropped and Canada began to admit sizeable numbers of refugees. After this, in addition to a great many individual refugees, came 700 385

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Cypriot refugees, a small group of Kurds from Iraq, 2,100 "Angola/ Mozambique Returnees" (mainly Portuguese), and 11,010 Lebanese refugees who arrived in Canada between 1976 and 1979. But the major refugee movement of the seventies and eighties has been the huge exodus of Indochinese refugees by land and sea following the fall of Saigon in April 1975. As already noted, Canada has played a major role in this refugee movement—which is not over yet—and has admitted over 100,000 refugees so far. As a member of UNHCR's Executive Committee, Canada has been involved in helping to establish and finance transit camps for these Indochinese refugees, in promoting schemes for' 'orderly departure'' from Vietnam, and in helping to combat the piracy on the high seas which has resulted in the death or disappearance of so many Indochinese boat people. Since there are a great many Indochinese refugees still lingering in the camps in South East Asia, it is likely that a good many more will eventually find a home in Canada. This refugee movement has been remarkable in many ways—not least because it was the first to be seen in some aspect almost nightly on television by a large world audience. This raised "refugee conciousness" and stimulated a desire to help in the developed world, but caused considerable alarm in the countries of first asylum in South East Asia. The publicity given to the Indochinese refugees in transit by land or sea attracted world attention and concern and also resources of all kinds. Yet there were even larger numbers of refugees in Africa, then and later, who also desperately needed help on a large scale. In Canada, the most remarkable feature of the Indochinese refugee movement—apart from its size—has been the high degree of group and community sponsorship of families and individuals, facilitated by the imaginative sponsorship provisions in the new Immigration Act and Regulations. So successful has this been that it has become an established part of Canada's annual refugee planning. All reports indicate also that government accepts that this kind of sponsorship is an excellent way of helping refugees to adjust to Canadian life. UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION It is well-known that legal immigration and refugee movements often inspire or set in motion illegal movements in the same direction. The ancient commerce of migration also flourishes today in the interstices and within the loopholes of immigration law. We are also witnessing the early stages of a remarkable out-migration by all available means from Third World countries as knowledge of the higher living standards and safer, more secure life in the developed world becomes more widespread. These 386

Sequel, 1972-1986 and other factors have contributed to a very large upsurge in the last few years in what is now called undocumented or irregular migration. Refugees and undocumented migrants are in fact competing today for admission to countries of first asylum and permanent settlement. Since the first edition of this book was published, Canada has had two dramatic experiences of undocumented migration on quite a large scale. The first took place between 1970 and 1973 and was the direct outcome of a section of the 1967 Immigration Regulations, together with the creation of a fully independent Immigration Appeal Board in the same year. Section 34 of the new Immigration Regulations permitted visitors to apply for landed immigrant status from within Canada. Within the space of at most two years, some travel agents and commercial operators around the world had appreciated the unique opportunity offered by this new regulation, particularly when combined with the right of appeal to an Immigration Appeal Board. Unusually large numbers of visitors began to arrive at Canadian ports of entry from almost all regions of the world. Word had spread that the best way to get into Canada was simply to come, apply for landed immigrant status, and, if refused, submit an appeal to the new Immigration Appeal Board. An appeal would take time, particularly if many visitors were applying, and this would give a would-be-immigrant time to settle in, find a job, and perhaps start a family, which would lessen the chances of deportation. Most of the flights to Canada were organized and the fees paid to the organizers by migrants with very limited resources were often substantial. This was the beginning of a large movement to Canada by undocumented or illegal migrants which escalated in an alarming way until brought under control by the Trudeau government. In 1970, approximately 45,000 visitors to Canada applied for landed immigrant status. By October 1972, these applications were increasing at a rate of 8,700 a month, and during that month 4,700 visitors arrived at Toronto International Airport during one weekend. By the end of May 1973, the backlog of cases before the Immigration Appeal Board had increased to 17,472, while the Board was only able to handle about 100 cases a month. On November 3, 1972, Section 34 of the 1967 Immigration Regulations was revoked by the Liberal government. After this, the opportunity to change status within Canada, except in special circumstances, will probably never return. On July 18, 1973, a Bill to amend the Immigration Appeal Board was introduced in the House of Commons. Among other amendments, it allowed for the enlargement of the Board whenever desirable and modified existing appeal rights. At the same time, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Bob Andras, announced the immediate introduction of a sixty-day "Adjustment of Status Program" to allow 387

PART SEVEN

those who had been in Canada continuously since November 30 to regularize their status. This sensible program was very successful and was carried out with great verve and imagination in an atmosphere of public enthusiasm and all-party support. It was in effect an amnesty, but was seen by the Liberal government as a decent gesture, an act of fairness towards the many migrants who had been deceived by unscrupulous agents or who, although they had originally come to Canada illegally, had now put down roots and established families. As the Minister said, the Adjustment of Status Program offered them a chance "to get their life in Canada off to a new legal start." When the program ended on October 15, 1973, some 39,000 people from more than 150 countries had obtained landed immigrant status. Many of those from the United States were former draft evaders and deserters from the Vietnam war period who had entered Canada mainly in the late sixties. A further 13,000 had been admitted through earlier administrative measures, plus the many cases heard by the enlarged Immigration Appeal Board, making a total of about 52,000. Canada's second major experience of undocumented migration has been the problem of refugee status determination which has involved nearly all industrialized countries in recent years as undocumented migrants and those who exploit them have become aware that refugee status is a possible mode of entry. These countries have been swamped by claims for this special status—many of them unfounded—and large backlogs have developed. In Canada, the number of persons seeking refugee status increased from 500 claims in 1977 to 6,100 in 1983 and has continued to increase steadily since then. The very cumbersome procedure for refugee status determination in the Immigration Act 1976 has resulted in an everincreasing backlog, amounting to over 18,000 in 1986 and an even higher figure in 1987. Following several government enquiries and reports, a new refugee status determination system to be introduced in the near future was announced by the present Minister, Benoit Bouchard, on May 21, 1986. The Minister also announced that a case by case administrative review and other special measures to clear the backlog would begin on July 15, 1986. On May 5, 1987, Bill C-55 on refugee status determination was tabled in the House. On August 11, 1987, the Minister tabled a Deterrence and Detention Bill designed to stop abuse of the refugee status determination system through firm deterrent measures. These measures include substantially increased penalties for smugglers of refugee status claimants and their accomplices; heavier fines and penalties for transportation companies bringing undocumented people to Canada; detention of those who arrive without proper documentation until their identities can be established; and removal of people who pose a criminal or security threat. 388

Sequel, 1972-1986 If Bill C-55 is passed, Canada's new refugee determination system will involve the creation of an independent Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), composed of the existing Immigration Appeal Board and a new Convention Refugee Determination Board (CRDB) which will deal exclusively with refugee claims. The Immigration Appeal Board will continue to deal with immigration appeals and will no longer be involved with refugee matters. With certain limitations on access (denied, for example, to those having the right of admission to other countries which are signatories to the Geneva Convention), the new system will provide refugee claimants with the right to a hearing before the new Board. Following an initial screening, they are required to present their case in person and must be heard by the Board within seven days of referral. The hearing will be conducted in a non-adversarial way by a two-member expert panel assisted by a Board counsel. Unsuccessful refugee claimants may appeal to the Federal Court on questions of law, jurisdiction, and perverse or capricious interpretations of fact. This new system should provide a much better and swifter refugee status determination process, although it is likely that very severe pressures by claimants from many countries will continue for some time to come. MULTICULTURALISM

Another remarkable development in Canada since the first edition of this book has been the adoption of "Multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" as a national policy by the Trudeau government. This new policy was announced by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons in 1971, together with a set of programs to implement it. It was a response to two principal factors, as well as to the government's increasing awareness that, as a result of post-war immigration and refugee policies, Canada's population had become much more ethnically diverse. The first of these factors was the existence and later the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. The Commission had been appointed in 1963 to recommend "what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of equal partnership between the two founding races, taking into account the contribution made by other ethnic groups." Several of the major ethnic groups, fearful that their contribution would in fact be ignored, made special representations to government on this point. But in Book 4 of its final report, the Commission did address this question and recommended that much higher priority, attention, and support should be given to ethnic groups, provided that this was done in the context of Canada's two charter groups and two official languages. The policy of multiculturalism was a direct response to this recommendation. 389

PART SEVEN

At the same time, the potential electoral strength of these new or relatively new elements in Canadian society was of great interest to the Liberal party. Quebec, the party's traditional and consistent source of support, was then in a remarkable period of change, development, and modernization, with a vigorous, independent-minded party, the Parti Quebecois, in the wings. Who knew what the outcome of all this would be or whether Quebec's steady support of the Liberal party would hold? It was safer, therefore, to have the ethnic communities in the Liberal camp if possible. This was the second factor which moved the Trudeau government towards multiculturalism. A vague, general feeling of goodwill towards Canadians of non-British and non-French origin also lay behind the new policy, together with the belief that their special concerns should have the higher priority recommended by the Commission. But multiculturalism was never intended by the Trudeau government as more than a modest contribution towards good community relations in Canada, as well as a means of establishing the government's relations with ethnic communities on a firm and manageable footing. It was known that Quebec would be opposed to anything more ambitious. Indeed, Quebec at that time was opposed to multiculturalism of any kind, as Premier Bourassa quickly indicated in 1971, although her views on this matter were later to change significantly. But Quebec apart, no political changes or significantly increased status for ethnic groups in the political system were even remotely envisaged. The budget for multiculturalism was very small—approximately five million dollars annually in the first instance, increased to ten million shortly afterwards—and it was considered unnecessary to create a new ministry to implement and manage the new policies and programs. A Minister of State responsible for Multiculturalism (and Liberal party concerns in this field) was appointed, but he had to make do with a small directorate within the Department of the Secretary of State. As announced by the Prime Minister in October 1971—the only real speech Mr. Trudeau ever made on the subject—the policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework would have four major objectives, four principles—relating mainly to ethnic group development, intergroup relations, and full participation in Canadian society—and six programs. Mr. Trudeau described the four major objectives as "preserving human rights, developing Canadian identity, strengthening citizenship participation, reinforcing Canadian unity, and encouraging cultural diversification within a bilingual framework." The six programs were mainly grant-giving programs for cultural development, Canadian ethnic studies, and the writing of ethnic histories, as well as the provision of funds for the federal cultural agencies—the National Museum of Man, the National 390

Sequel, 1972-1986 Film Board, the National Library, and Public Archives—to enable them to reflect Canada's many cultural traditions more effectively. Within the next two years, it was announced that a national advisory council on multiculturalism, the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (CCCM), would be created with a hundred and one members representing forty-seven ethno-cultural backgrounds. Since then, multiculturalism has had a rather turbulent history in Canada involving a procession of different Ministers and Chairmen of the CCCM. After a very indifferent performance, the CCCM finally collapsed in the early eighties, due to its impossibly unwieldy structure, the government's lack of confidence in it, and its use by the Liberal party as a convenient vehicle for patronage. It was replaced in 1983 by a new, improved council called the Canadian Multiculturalism Council (CMC) which has sixty members. The concept of multiculturalism was never thought through carefully by the Trudeau government and, at the outset, aroused expectations among some ethnic groups which could never be fulfilled, as well as some unease within the senior levels of government where its political role seemed dangerously ill-defined. Recently, the post of Minister of State responsible for Multiculturalism has been left unfilled by the Mulroney government and, at least for the time being, these responsibilities have become part of the portfolio of the Secretary of State. Nevertheless, despite this uncertain record, multiculturalism has undoubtedly had a beneficial—although unspectacular—influence on Canadian life and has proved useful to governments and ethnic communities. It affirms the recognition by government that Canada is a multicultural society. It provides a convenient way of handling the necessary relationship between government and ethnic communities, as well as a reasonably equitable and acceptable way of distributing grants to them for worthwhile projects. It has given ethnic communities, particularly the smaller ones, better access to government, and a status and a degree of security which they did not have before. It has also provided opportunities for these groups to collaborate with each other for various purposes, something they were not prone to do earlier. In addition, the whole multicultural effort has had a valuable spin-off effect among the provinces where a variety of active ethnic advisory committees and councils now exist. A Multiculturalism Bill will soon be tabled in the House of Commons which is intended to define and strengthen the role of multiculturalism in the Canadian political system to-day. One of the most important contributions which multiculturalism has made to Canadian life so far, however, is to provide it with a conveniently neutral and acceptable language with which to describe ethnic diversity. The language of multiculturalism is totally non-pejorative. It can be used 391

PART SEVEN

by politicians and officials, by the media, by academics, and by the public and is already widely used in Canada today. It is difficult to over-estimate the value and civilizing effect of this common language. It is doubtful, however, whether the present institutional structure of multiculturalism will last much longer. There is a strong case now for combining immigration, population, multiculturalism and possibly citizenship in one department. As Canada's immigration levels rise steadily to meet our serious demographic needs, and as our ethnic diversity increases, it is certain that there will be many changes and new developments in this area of public policy. ONTARIO Ontario is still admitting large numbers of immigrants—40,391 in 1985 or 48 percent of Canada's total immigration movement in that year. Reflecting a consistent pattern of post-war settlement in the province, 56 percent of these newcomers chose to live in the Greater Toronto area. Given Canada's declining fertility and the federal commitment to increase immigration levels from now on, pending the outcome of the Demographic Review now underway, Ontario expects a substantial increase in immigrant arrivals in the next few years. More than 60 percent of the immigrants now arriving in Ontario come from Asia, the West Indies, Latin America, and other Third World regions. There are now some 85 ethnocultural groups in Ontario and nearly a quarter of Ontario residents were born outside Canada. While prejudice and discrimination are still present, community and race relations in Ontario have been remarkably harmonious on the whole, given the province's rapid population expansion in recent years and great ethnic diversity. Considerable progress has been made, for example, in the appointment of Asian, black, and other fairly recent immigrants to important positions in the province. Credit is due to the determined efforts of successive Ontario governments and leading politicians in guiding the province along a roughly perceived multicultural course well before multiculturalism became fashionable. Above all, immigrants and their organizations in Ontario have felt that their contribution to provincial life was recognized and valued by the provincial government. In 1982, the Ministry responsible for citizenship and newcomer services, as well as for cultural affairs in Ontario, became the Ministry of Citizenship and Culture. Five years later, this Ministry was divided into a Ministry of Citizenship and a Ministry of Culture and Communications. In 198586, the Ministry's Multiculturalism and Citizenship Branch, which includes Newcomer Services, had a staff of 140. Its expenditures in 198586 amounted to $15,704,634. Since the first edition of this book, therefore, 392

Sequel, 1972-1986 there has been a considerable expansion—and a growing professionalism—in the services provided for immigrants, as well as in programs for community development by government in Ontario. None of the old inhibitions about the funding of voluntary agencies referred to earlier has survived. There is a strong partnership between government and the voluntary sector in Ontario today and funding is far more realistic and generous. The following is a short description of the principal services provided for immigrants by the Ontario government and the province's multicultural policies. It was contained in a letter to the author from the former Minister of Citizenship and Culture, Dr. Lily Munro, dated May 13, 1987. The Ministry plays several different roles in order to support the settlement and integration of immigrants: direct delivery of settlement services through the five Ontario Welcome Houses3; financial support to over 580 community agencies and voluntary groups which provide services to immigrants; and consultation, training and resource materials development—for example, the Ministry produces a variety of print and audio-visual material to support language training and newcomer orientation. Immigrants are also eligible for services provided by other ministries and institutions funded by the Ontario Government. These services include: translation and evaluation of educational documents; skills training and retraining; academic upgrading; health insurance and social services. . . . Multiculturalism The Ontario Government supports multiculturalism through programs that foster a climate of mutual understanding and respect among the diverse cultures of Ontario, and promote the full participation of all Ontarians in the province's life, recognizing a common bond of citizenship. The Government will be introducing a comprehensive strategy to encourage multicultural diversity in Ontario's political, social, cultural and economic institutions. The strategy will be accompanied by a set of initiatives to ensure that government programs reflect the province's multicultural reality. The Ministry of Citizenship and Culture will play the lead role in this strategy. Specific initiatives already undertaken in this Ministry include: funding of intercultural programs and projects at the community level; sponsorship of conferences and workshops which foster intercultural understanding; training for volunteer boards of ethnocultural organizations; intercultural training in the workplace and in public and voluntary agencies; an ethnocultural data base which provides statistical information on Ontario's population. 393

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Ontario has also had for some years an active advisory council in this area, the Ontario Advisory Council on Multiculturalism and Citizenship. Ontario is one of only three provinces in Canada which have not so far concluded a special agreement on immigration with the federal government, in the belief—strongly held in the past by Ontario politicians and officials—that policy-making should be left to Ottawa and was not a provincial concern. However Dr. Munro writes that "Ontario's position with respect to its participation in the selection and admission of immigrants to Canada remains unchanged at this time; we view this as an area of federal responsibility. However, we are examining options for the future, given the significant role immigration is likely to play in Ontario's development over the next two decades." QUEBEC There have been many interesting developments in the immigration field in Quebec also and a similar expansion and increased professionalism in the provision of services for immigrants, community development programs, and collaboration with the voluntary sector. Quebec's major innovation in language training for immigrants referred to earlier, the Centres d'orientation et de formation des immigrants (COFIs), first created in 1968, are still going strong and have proved to be a very valuable resource. The Bourassa government has also made important new decisions relating to immigration levels and multiculturalism. With the lowest fertility rate in Canada, Quebec now faces very serious population problems, documented recently by a parliamentary commission headed by the Minister of Communications, Richard French. The key issue in immigration, however, has been Quebec's desire to have substantial control over her own immigration program, relating particularly to the selection of immigrants overseas and their integration into Quebec society. A considerable degree of control was established in the Cullen-Couture Immigration Agreement of February 1978 and this has been enlarged by the provisions of the constitutional accord (the Meech Lake Accord) arrived at on June 4, 1987. Quebec was the first province to negotiate an official immigration agreement with the federal government. This was signed in May 1971 by Otto Lang, then Minister of Manpower and Immigration, and Francois Cloutier, Quebec's Minister of Immigration. The main purpose of the Lang-Cloutier agreement was to permit Quebec's immigration counsellors or orientation officers to work in federal overseas immigration offices and to provide better counselling and more encouragement to applicants intending to or considering the possibility of settling in Quebec. In 1975, the first Bqurassa 394

Sequel, 1972-1986 government informed the federal government that it wished to renegotiate the Lang-Cloutier agreement and, after four years experience of overseas operations, to take part in the actual selection process. As a result, a new agreement was signed in October 1975 by Robert Andras, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, and Jean Bienvenue, then Quebec's Minister of Immigration. The Andras-Bienvenue agreement gave Quebec's overseas immigration officers more, though not final, authority in the selection process and established a joint federal-provincial committee for exchange of information, consultation on immigrant settlement, and interpretation and implementation of the agreement itself. However, following the 1976 provincial election won by the Parti Quebecois, Quebec requested further negotiations and a new agreement which would give her more authority in this field. The Immigration Act 1976 had in fact authorized the Minister to enter into immigration agreements with the provinces and this seemed to justify another look at the Andras-Bienvenue agreement. Accordingly, a third agreement was signed in February 1978 by Bud Cullen, Minister of Employment and Immigration, and Marc Lalonde, Minister responsible for Federal-Provincial Relations, for the federal government and Jacques Couture, Minister of Immigration, and Claude Morin, Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, for Quebec. The Cullen-Couture agreement went much further than the two earlier agreements in providing for the joint selection of immigrants who wished to settle permanently or temporarily in Quebec, and for collaboration between the federal government and Quebec in all matters relating to immigration and population. It established a Joint Committee, chaired by the federal Executive Director, Immigration and the Assistant Deputy Minister of Quebec's Department of Immigration, to supervise the working of the agreement and ensure effective collaboration between the two levels of government. An Implementation Committee was also set up under the direction of the Joint Committee. These committees have appeared to work very satisfactorily since they were created in 1978. It is too early to say how the provisions of the constitutional accord will be implemented, how they will affect Quebec's immigration policies and management, and what will become of the joint committees. Under the accord, Quebec assumes full responsibility for the integration of immigrants into Quebec society, a responsibility she has long wished to have. She is guaranteed a share of Canadian immigration proportional to her share of the population plus an extra 5 percent, presumably in the light of her very low fertility. The allocation of responsibility for the selection of immigrants, however, is not yet clear and it may be that a fourth agreement with the federal government—federal-provincial im395

PART SEVEN

migration agreements with the force of law are provided for under the accord—is now in order. Quebec has long had a smaller share of Canadian immigration than Ontario, due partly to the fact that her sources of French-speaking immigrants have never been very productive and also to the strong attraction of neighbouring Ontario, particularly Toronto, for immigrants of all nationalities. Quebec's share of immigrants has averaged about 16.4 percent in the post-war period, still the highest among the other provinces if Ontario is excluded, and her annual immigration levels have varied according to Canada's annual intake—from 29,282 in 1976, for example, to 14,721 in 1985. In 1985, 38.7 percent of all the immigrants admitted to Quebec came from Asia, 26.5 percent from Europe, 27.8 percent from the Americas, and 6.6 percent from Africa. The largest numbers, representing one quarter of the total movement, came from Vietnam, Haiti, and France. The Montreal region continues to attract a very high percentage of Quebec's immigrants—87 percent in 1985. At present, Quebec has a fertility rate of 1.4. Canada's rate is 1.7. Both are well below the level required for population replacement (2.1). As already noted, low fertility, an ageing population, and the not too distant prospect of population decline faces most industrialized countries today. But these are particularly critical problems for Quebec as the major centre and guardian of the French language and culture in North America. It is most important also for Canada, and for Quebec's political, economic, and social well-being, that her population should at least not decline below its present level of 26 percent of the Canadian population as a whole. Quebec's demographers have been drawing attention to this problem for some time, but the Parliamentary Commission chaired by Richard French has addressed it very recently. The Commission's principal recommendation to the Bourassa government was to increase immigration to Quebec substantially while trying to reduce emigration which has continued at a fairly high level from Quebec as it has from Canada as a whole. In response, the Bourassa government has taken a series of initiatives relating to immigration levels and to multiculturalism. Quebec's increased immigration responsibilities arising from the constitutional accord will also play an important part. Her very serious demographic dilemma, part of Canada's whole population problem, is likely to involve her in at least as much federal-provincial collaboration in the immigration field as in the past, if not more. Quebec now has a consultative process on her own immigration levels similar to and running parallel with that of the federal government. As of October 1985, the Council of Ministers in Quebec has made the final decision on the level of immigration for Quebec for the coming year; this 396

Sequel, 1972-1986 is then transmitted to Ottawa. The recommended level for 1986 was 18,000. For demographic reasons, it is hoped and expected that these numbers will increase substantially in the next few years. Business immigration is also being given high priority and Quebec is attracting an increasing number of immigrant investors, particularly from Hong Kong, South Korea, Lebanon, and the countries of the Persian Gulf. In May 1985, at a federal-provincial conference on multiculturalism in Winnipeg, the former Minister of Immigration, Gerald Godin, made a very significant speech in which he defined Quebec's present approach to multiculturalism. He also paved the way for important new initiatives in this area which were announced in the following year. Quebec, M. Godin said, was still strongly opposed to a concept of multiculturalism in which the people of Quebec were seen as one element in the Canadian cultural mosaic rather than as a distinct society. Quebec's policy towards cultural minorities envisaged the development of a cultural pluralism in which there would be a rapprochement between these minorities and the francophone majority in a French setting. This policy of cultural pluralism was based on four principles: first, that Quebec is a distinct society within Canada; second, that while there is a francophone majority in Quebec, it is at risk because it is a minority within Canada and North America; third, that Quebec is a pluralistic society which recognizes and is enriched by the presence of cultural minorities; and fourth, that Quebec attaches great importance to the principle of equality in human affairs. M. Godin also said that Quebec's policy towards cultural minorities would have four main objectives: preservation of the French character of Quebec; respect for the principle of equality; development of these communities and their rapprochement on an equal basis with the francophone community; and full participation by these communities in Quebec's national life. In January 1986, M. Godin's successor, Madame Louise Robic, developed these ideas further and outlined some of the steps which the Quebec government intended to take to create a sense of belonging and of being a vital part of Quebec society among her other cultural communities. 5 It was no longer possible, she said, to speak of Quebec as a homogeneous society. Quebec today, and even more in the future, would be a pluralistic society composed of many cultural communities. Attitudes would have to change. Government must consult and listen to these communities in order to understand their needs. Discrimination in social and economic affairs must be eliminated. The true picture of Quebec must be reflected in all government information materials and these communities must be made to feel that they had a stake in all aspects of Quebec society. Quebec now has a fifteen-member advisory council on immigration and 397

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multiculturalism, Le Conseil des communautes culturelles et de 1'immigration, whose creation was announced by Premier Bourassa in October 1984. Bill 10, which established the Council, became law in April 1985 and the Council held its first meeting in the following June. A Consultative Committee on Intercultural Relations, which also has fifteen members, was created in Montreal in February 1986 with the major objective of fighting racism and discrimination. The National Assembly unanimously approved a special "Declaration on Intercultural and Interacial Relations" on December 10, 1986. These are very important developments in Quebec, and, as in Ontario, where multiculturalism has a longer history but is now being developed further, they are a prelude to an anticipated increase of significant proportions in the number of immigrants who are likely to arrive in the next few years from every part of the globe. IMMIGRATION MANAGEMENT Immigration management inevitably reflects Canadian development and the administrative ability and sophistication of its public service. With the backing of good immigration law in the Immigration Act 1976 plus extensive post-war experience of immigration, Canadian immigration management is now more efficient, knowledgeable, and liberal than it was in the years prior to 1972. The Canadian public is also better informed about immigration, as are Members of Parliament and the media. The voluntary sector too is more sophisticated and talented—and better financed—than it was in those years, and Canada is at last developing a small "informed public" in this field which is very important in any area of public policy. Immigration nearly always arouses anxieties in the public mind relating simply to the arrival of large numbers of foreigners who may, it is feared, disturb established society in unknown ways. Observing that immigration is under control and well-managed and knowing that is management is open to public scrutiny assuages these fears. More important still, the public needs regular reassurance—affirmative statements from time to time—from leading politicians and other important persons in the community that immigration is desirable, beneficial, and indeed essential for Canada's national survival. The far more open and cooperative procedures in Canadian immigration in the 1970s and 1980s have served these purposes. They have also made the work of immigration officers, high and low, a good deal easier and have protected them, to a much greater extent, from public criticism. Affirmative statements on immigration and multiculturalism by politicians and others have been made quite frequently at the federal level in recent 398

Sequel, 1972-1986 years. In the two provinces admitting the largest numbers of immigrants, Ontario, as we have seen, has made them an important feature of the government's approach to immigration for some time, and Quebec has clearly announced its support for higher levels of immigration and for a comprehensive policy of multiculturalism. What is needed now and must have attention soon is the creation of a sensible management structure for immigration with the necessary status and authority. If we are to meet the challenge of a potentially declining population and the need to increase immigration levels substantially from now on, we need a department which can handle this—not a small, invisible directorate embedded within the vast Canada Employment and Immigration Commission—and an overall immigration management which is not, as at present, seriously fragmented. In a recent speech by Gerry Weiner, the present Minister of State for Immigration, the Minister drew attention not only to Canada's serious demographic dilemmas, but to the problems which lie ahead because of exponential population growth in the developing world and the effect this is certain to have on international migration. "The challenges which these global population changes will bring to us over the next fifteen years will be enormous," the Minister said. "They will require new approaches and new forms of institutions if we are to continue to have planned and controlled movements of people." As the Special Joint Committee emphasized in 1975, immigration and population policy are—and must be—closely related. They should be managed, in an administrative sense, by one responsible authority. As we have seen in this study, Canadian immigration was the responsibility of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration from 1950 to 1965. From 1966 to 1976, it was part of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. From 1977 onwards, it has been part of an even larger organization, the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission (CEIC). Within CEIC, immigration is one of seven separate directorates and has no direct voice in the top management of the Commission, which consists of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and two Commissioners, one representing employers and the other workers. The Immigration Group has no authority outside Ottawa—and very little in it—no direct lines of communication with immigration officers in the regions, and no control, in a management sense, over Canada's overseas immigration service, now the responsibility of the Department of External Affairs. While the Immigration Group now has an effective Settlement Branch, responsibility for immigrant services is divided between the Commission and the Department of the Secretary of State which is theoretically responsible for long-term settlement and adjustment—the result of an unwise decision taken shortly after the creation of the Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966.

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The Immigration Group does not even have any direct connection with the Canadian Employment and Immigration Advisory Council (CEAIC) created at the same time as the Commission.4 Fragmented management is therefore the order of the day and is only partially overcome by informal networks and personal contacts. When the Demographic Review is completed and firm decisions have to be made about future immigration levels, this situation must be corrected. As noted earlier, the arguments in favour of a separate Department of Immigration, Population, and Multiculturalism (with or without Citizenship) are very strong.

400

Appendixes Appendix 1 IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION STATISTICS TABLE A SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF CANADA'S POPULATION, 1861-1981 Intercensal Years Data Period 1861-71 1871-81 1881-91 1891-1901 1901-11 1911-21 1921-31 1931-41 1941-51 1951-61 1961-71 1971-81

Births

Deaths

'000 1,369 1,477

'000 718 754 824 828 811

1,538 1,546 1,931

2,338

2,415

2,294 3,186

4,468 4,063 3,589

9881 1,055 1,072 1,214 1,320 1,360 1,647

Immigration

'000 183 353 903 326

1,759 1,612 1,203 150 548 1,543 1,429 1,447

Population at End of Decade Total

Canadian Born

'000 3,689 4,325 4,833 5,371

7,207 8,788 10,377 11,507 14,0092 18,238 21,568 24,083

'000

3,064 3,722 4,189

4,672 5,620 6,832 8,069 9,488 11,949 15,394 18,273 20,216

Foreign Born '000 625 603 644 699 1,587 1,956

2,308

2,019

2,060 2,844 3,295 3,867

SOURCE: Canada Employment and Immigration Commission 'Excludes extra mortality associated with World War I, estimated at 120,000 Includes Newfoundland which had a population of 361,416 in 1951.

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APPENDIX 1

TABLE B IMMIGRATION TO CANADA, 1852-1986 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885

29,307 29,464 37,263 25,296 22,544 33,854 12,339 6,300 6,276 13,589 18,294 21,000 24,779 18,958 11,427 10,666 12,765 18,630 24,706 27,773 36,578 50,050 39,373 27,382 25,633 27,082 29,807 40,492 38,505 47,991 112,458 133,624 103,824 79,169

1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919

69,152 84,526 88,766 91,600 75,067 82,165 30,996 29,633 20,829 18,790 16,835 21,716 31,900 44,543 41,681 55,747 89,102 138,660 131,252 141,465 211,653 272,409 143,326 173,694 286,839 331,288 375,756 400,870 150,484 36,665 55,914 72,910 41,845 107,698

1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953

138,824 91,728 64,224 133,729 124,164 84,907 135,982 158,886 166,783 164,993 104,806 27,530 20,591 14,382 12,476 11,277 11,643 15,101 17,244 16,994 11,324 9,329 7,576 8,504 12,801 22,722 71,719 64,127 125,414 95,217 73,912 194,391 164,498 168,868

SOURCE: Canada Employment and Immigration Commission

402

1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1876 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986

154,227 109,946 164,857 282,164 124,851 106,928 104,111 71,689 74,586 93,151 112,606 146,758 194,743 222,876 183,974 161,531 147,713 121,900 122,006 184,200 218,465 187,881 149,429 114,914 86,313 112,096 143,117 128,618 121,147 89,157 88,239 77,510 92,590

CHART A Canadian Immigration, 1900-1970 SOURCE: Immigration Statistics, Departments of Citizenship and Immigration and Manpower and Immigration.

Appendix 2 CANADIAN POINTS SYSTEM 1967 This system was first introduced in new Immigration Regulations on October 1, 1967. It was revised in 1974, 1978, and 1985. Appendix 10 contains the 1985 version. A SUMMARY These regulations are applied universally and, for the first time, spell out in detail the principles governing the selection of Canadian immigrants. They provide an assessment system which permits immigration officers to apply the same standards in selecting immigrants in all areas of the world. The regulations also formally confirmed the fact that Canadian citizens and permanent residents of Canada are entitled to bring their dependents to this country; extended the privilege of citizens and permanent residents to apply for the admission of more distant relatives to all countries; and enlarged the classes of non-dependent relatives for whom application for admission may be made. The regulations created three categories of immigrants: (1) sponsored dependents, (2) nominated (i.e., non-dependent) relatives, and (3) independent applicants who are neither sponsored nor nominated. Dependents are defined for immigration purposes as husband or wife; fiance or fiancee; unmarried sons or daughters under twenty-one; parents or grandparents over sixty, or younger if they are widowed or unable to work; and orphaned brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, or grandchildren under eighteen. Provision is also made for adopted children, and in cases where the only dependent is a husband or wife, for the nearest living relative. Sponsored dependents are admitted to Canada, provided they are in good health and of good character. Independent applicants and nominated relatives have to meet certain standards under an assessment system based on the following factors. ASSESSMENT SYSTEM

To qualify for admission, the independent applicant must normally obtain fifty out of the hundred assessment units available. Standards for nominated relatives are less exacting. Failure to achieve a high assessment on any single factor, such as education, does not in itself disqualify an applicant from admission to Canada if there are other compensating factors. Immigration officers may approve the admission of an applicant (independent or nominated) who does not achieve sufficient units of assessment, or refuse the admission of an applicant who does achieve sufficient units, if there are good reasons why the assessment does not reflect the particular individual's chances of successful establishment in Canada. In such a case, however, the immigration officer must submit a report in writ404

CANADIAN POINTS SYSTEM 1967

ing and obtain the approval of a superior officer. Assessment units are allocated in the following way: 1. Education and Training: Up to twenty assessment units to be awarded on the basis of one unit for each successful year of formal education or occupational training. 2. Personal Assessment: Up to fifteen units on the basis of the immigration officer's assessment of the applicant's adaptability, motivation, initiative, and other similar qualities. 3. Occupational Demand: Up to fifteen units if demand for the applicant's occupation is strong within Canada whether the occupation is skilled or unskilled. 4. Occupational Skill: Up to ten units for the professional, ranging down to one unit for the unskilled. 5. Age: Ten units for applicants under thirty-five with one unit deducted for each year over thirty-five. 6. Arranged Employment: Ten units if the applicant has a definite job arranged in Canada. 7. Knowledge of French and English: Up to ten units dependent upon the degree of fluency in French and English. 8. Relative: Up to five units if the applicant has a relative in Canada able to help him become established but unprepared or unable to sponsor or nominate him. 9. Employment Opportunities in Area of Destination: Up to five units if the applicant intends to go to an area of Canada where there is a generally strong demand for labour. NOMINATED RELATIVES

The nominated relative category includes sons and daughters over twenty-one, married sons and daughters under twenty-one, brothers and sisters, parents and grandparents under sixty, nephews, nieces, uncles, aunts, and grandchildren. The first five factors in the assessment system— education, personal assessment, occupational demand, occupational skill, and age—apply to applicants in the nominated relative category. The remaining four, however, which are short-term factors affecting the applicant's initial establishment in Canada, apply to independent applicants only. It is recognized that the nominee would be receiving positive assistance from his nominator in adjusting to Canadian life and that this would compensate for the last four factors. On the general presumption that a Canadian citizen will usually be better established in Canada than a more recent arrival, and hence in a better position to give his relative more assistance, a slightly higher preference is given to a relative who is being nominated by a Canadian citizen than to one nominated by a permanent resident. 405

APPENDIX 2 VISITORS

Visitors, and other persons who are in Canada temporarily, may apply for landed immigrant status without leaving the country, but they must also meet the selection criteria. The regulations provide that either a nominated relative or an independent applicant who comes to Canada as a visitor and then applies to remain permanently will have to meet slightly higher selection standards than if he or she had applied overseas.

406

Appendix 3 MINISTERS AND DEPUTY MINISTERS Citizenship and Immigration (1949-1966) MINISTERS

DATE APPOINTED

Walter E. Harris John W. Pickersgill E. Davie Fulton (Acting) Ellen L. Fairclough Richard A. Bell Guy Favreau Rene Tremblay John R. Nicholson Jean Marchand

January 18, 1950 July 1, 1954 June 21, 1957 May 12, 1958 August 9, 1962 April 22, 1963 February 3, 1964 February 15, 1965 December 18, 1965 December 31, 1965

DEPUTY MINISTERS

Laval Fortier George F. Davidson H.M. Jones (Acting) C.M. Isbister

January 18, 1950 April 26, 1960 February 11, 1963 November 4, 1963 December 23, 1965

Manpower and Immigration (1966—1977) MINISTERS

Jean Marchand Allan J. MacEachen Otto E. Lang Bryce S. Mackasey Robert K. Andras J.S. (Bud) Cullen

October 1, 1966 July 6, 1968 September 24, 1970 January 28, 1972 November 27, 1972 September 14, 1976 August 14, 1977

DEPUTY MINISTERS

Tom Kent L.E. Couillard Jacques Desroches Alan Gotlieb

January 1, 1966 July 22, 1968 April 10, 1972 May 15, 1973 407

APPENDIX 3

Canada Employment and Immigration Commission (1977— ) MINISTERS

J.S. (Bud) Cullen Ronald G. Atkey Lloyd Axworthy Flora MacDonald Benoit Bouchard

August 15, 1977 June 4, 1979 March 3, 1980 September 17, 1984 July 15, 1986

MINISTERS OF STATE (IMMIGRATION)*

Walter McLean Gerry Weiner

August 20, 1985 July 15, 1986

DEPUTY MINISTERS

J.L. Manion J.D. Love Gaetan Lussier

June 2, 1977 October 1, 1979 April 1982

*The decision to create a post of Minister of State (Immigration) was announced by the Prime Minister on August 20, 1985. The Minister of Employment and Immigration is still responsible for overall immigration policy and for reporting to Parliament on the activities of the Commission and the Department.

408

Appendix 4 ONTARIO ECONOMIC COUNCIL: REPORT ON IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION (Toronto, 1970) Recommendations relating to the Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship The Council made the following recommendations as "essential first steps" in the development of a comprehensive citizenship program in Ontario: That the Ontario Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship 1. establish reception services at major points of entry for immigrants entering Ontario; 2. provide orientation programs to assist immigrants with their adjustment to the community and also develop programs to interpret immigrant culture to Canadians; 3. establish, in conjunction with other departments of government, a provincial information service; in partnership with other governments and voluntary organizations give financial support to regional or central information offices, such support to include assistance in the organization of community information services at the neighbourhood level; provide staff to aid in the development of community information centres; 4. continue pilot projects related to language training; 5. continue to foster the expansion of language training for immigrants not reached by existing programs; 6. analyse needs and consult with the Department of Education regarding ways and means of expanding or improving the language-training program; 7. continue to encourage voluntary organizations to sponsor programs taught by volunteers, assist these organizations with teacher training, and provide financial support for the supervision of classes; 8. identify those agencies which are assisting immigrants with their integration into the community and provide them with added financial support; 9. add to its staff qualified community workers to assist in the development of citizenship programs at the community level.

409

Appendix 5 DEPARTMENTS OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION AND MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION IMMIGRATION OFFICES ABROAD, 1945-1970 Post

Date Opened

Date Clos

EUROPE UNITED KINGDOM

London Birmingham Manchester Liverpool Leeds Bristol Glasgow Belfast

Remained open during W. W. II 12.9.66 6.1.69 10.1.49 15.7.57 14.1.57 26.4.48 9.4.49

Open Open Open 30.12.68 30.11.68 31.3.68 Open Open

19.4.49

Open

2.1.46 1.1.66 31.12.64

Open Open Open

1.12.56 1.2.54 1.12.56 4.1.54 1.6.55 20.3.48 14.2.51 1953 1.3.54 13.11.47

Open Open Open 30.4.68 31.3.70 5.11.56 5.11.56 30.9.55 30.9.55 20.3.48

REPUBLIC OF IRELAND

Dublin FRANCE

Paris Bordeaux Marseilles GERMANY

Cologne Hamburg Stuttgart Munich Berlin Karlsruhe Hanover Bremen Hanau Heidelberg 410

IMMIGRATION OFFICES ABROAD

Post

Date Opened

Date Closed

18.7.55 15.2.52 1.4.49

Open 15.7.55 12.2.52

20.1.48 17.8.65

Open Open

25.6.49

Open

22.1.57 1.7.67

Open Open

3.9.63

Open

2.1.47

Open

1.1.48

Open

15.7.49

Open

15.5.51

Closed in 19 66. Operations transferred to Stockholm.

16.11.48

Open

28.4.50

Open

15.9.52 Reopened 1.10.56

1.1.56 Closed hi 1966. Operations transferred to Stockholm.

AUSTRIA

Vienna Linz Salzburg ITALY

Rome Milan GREECE

Athens PORTUGAL

Lisbon Ponta Delgada SPAIN

Madrid THE NETHERLANDS

The Hague BELGIUM

Brussels SWITZERLAND

Berne NORWAY

Oslo

SWEDEN

Stockholm DENMARK

Copenhagen FINLAND

Helsinki

411

APPENDIX 5

Post

Date Opened

Date Closed

16.8.69

Open

1.11.68

Open

HUNGARY

Budapest YUGOSLAVIA

Belgrade

UNITED STATES (Counselling Information Offices) New York City Chicago San Francisco Denver Los Angeles

1.4.57 1.4.57 5.7.60 18.7.60 13.11.66

Open Open Open 30.5.70 30.4.70

THE MIDDLE EAST UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Cairo

1.2.63

Open

7.2.55

Open

Beirut

1.12.67

Open

HONG KONG

5.4.48

Open

13.10.52

Open

1.10.67

Open

15.6.66

Open

11.12.64

Open

ISRAEL

Tel Aviv LEBANON

ASIA INDIA

New Delhi PAKISTAN

Islamabad JAPAN

Tokyo PHILIPPINES

Manila 412

IMMIGRATION OFFICES ABROAD

Post

Date Opened

Date Closed

CARIBBEAN JAMAICA

Kingston

1.6.67

Open

28.4.67

Open

TRINIDAD

Port of Spain

PACIFIC AUSTRALIA

Sydney

1.3.68

Open

413

Appendix 6 OVERSEAS IMMIGRATION OFFICES, 1986 Abidjan Amman Athens Atlanta Bangkok Beijing Beirut Belgrade Berne Bogota Bonn Boston Bridgetown Brussels Budapest Buenos Aires Buffalo Cairo Chicago Colombo Copenhagen Dallas Detroit

414

Dhaka Dublin Georgetown Glasgow Guatemala Helsinki Hong Kong Islamabad Kingston Kuwait Lagos Lima Lisbon London Los Angeles Madrid Manila Marseilles Mexico Milan Minneapolis Moscow Nairobi

New Delhi New York Paris Port-au-Prince Port of Spain Pretoria Rabat Rome San Francisco San Jose Santiago Seattle Seoul Singapore Stockholm Sydney Tel Aviv The Hague Tokyo Vienna Warsaw Washington

Appendix 7 NOTES ON FOUR OF CANADA'S LEADING VOLUNTARY AGENCIES IN IMMIGRATION IN 1972 1.

The International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto 321 Davenport Road Toronto 5, Ontario Founded in 1956. A voluntary non-sectarian agency, supported by the United Community Fund and by the federal and provincial governments, providing a range of services for immigrants including information, counselling, and referral services in fifteen languages, interpreter and translation services, education services, and a recreation program. The Institute also provides classrooms and counselling services for a continuing language-training program organized by the Citizenship Branch of the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services and a hall and meeting rooms which can be rented by immigrant organizations. The Institute organized two major research projects in Toronto which resulted in the publication of two reports, Newcomers in Transition (1964) and Newcomers and New Learning (1966); was co-sponsor of the Cross Canada Conference on voluntary agencies hi immigration held in Toronto in 1968; has recently run a government-supported pilot project in the teaching of trade English to immigrants; and hi the summer of 1970 was instrumental in creating the Inter-Agency Council for Services to Immigrants and Migrants in Toronto. 1971 budget No. of professional staff No. of volunteers

$183,066

1971 grants: United Appeal Federal government Provincial government Municipal government

$ 102,000 31,500 15,000 8,000

Average no. of immigrant interviews per month, 1971 Average no. of immigrants in language classes per month

10 75

346 4,222

415

APPENDIX 7 2.

Service d'Accueil aux Voyageurs et aux Immigrants (SA VI) 445 St. Francois Xavier Montreal, Quebec Founded in 1955. A private, non-profit-making social agency, supported by the federal and provincial governments, which has played a very important part in the provision of services for immigrants in Montreal. SAVI is the largest of the agencies described here and serves all migrants who pass through, stay temporarily, or settle permanently in Montreal. The services provided by SAVI for immigrants include assistance in housing, employment, information and counselling, interpreter and translation services, recreation, social security, and legal aid. A reception service for immigrants is maintained at Dorval Airport and at the Central and Windsor Stations in Montreal. 1971-72 budget No. of full-time professional staff, 1971 No. of part-time staff No. of volunteers No. of interviews Cases Sources of Grants: Federal and provincial governments

$353,066 (approx. 33% to immigrant services) 23 24 (including interpreters) none 67,624 per annum 5,416 per annum including 1,673 immigrants from 80 countries

3. Jewish Immigrant Aid Services of Canada (JIAS) 5780 Decelles Avenue Montreal, Quebec

Founded in 1922. JIAS facilitates the lawful entry of Jewish immigrants to Canada, cooperates with United Hias Service and other agencies throughout the world concerned with immigration problems, and, together with the Canadian Jewish Congress, represents the Jewish community in overall Jewish immigration matters. JIAS is supported by the Jewish Community of Canada, deriving its funds from subventions from the United Jewish Relief Agencies, Allied Jewish Community Services of Montreal, the United Jewish Welfare Fund of Toronto, the Winnipeg Jewish Welfare Fund, and from membership and contributions. If assists 416

FOUR VOLUNTARY AGENCIES

independent applicants and those applying for the admission of relatives and provides extensive services for immigrants before and after arrival. These include a reception service at all points of entry and social services whose aims, according to its annual reports, are "to help the immigrant after arrival in Canada to find suitable accommodation and employment, to facilitate his general adjustment and provide financial assistance until he becomes self-supporting, to provide counselling through trained social workers to help him with the emotional, social and other problems of integration and to offer a comprehensive directional service to cornmunity resources." JIAS also conducts an adult education program which includes English- and French-language classes, citizenship instruction, and trade retraining, and provides bursaries to Jewish immigrants to help them pursue vocational training and retraining courses. JIAS also assists and encourages Jewish immigrants to apply for Canadian citizenship. Approximate no. of Jewish immigrants admitted to Canada, 1971 Average monthly caseload, 1971

3,800 442

Emergency financial assistance to immigrants, 1971 Total expenditures, 1971

$618,184 953,258

4. Italian Community Education Centre (COSTI) 136 Beverley Street Toronto, Ontario Founded in 1962. COSTI is a community service organization dedicated to the principle of "integration through education," believing that education and vocational training are the most effective ways of facilitating the integration of newcomers in Canadian society. It is supported by the United Community Fund, the federal and provincial governments, and the Italian government. The COSTI building in Beverley Street, Toronto, is the property of the Italian government which has been providing the agency with an annual grant of between $17,000 and $25,000. COSTI provides the following services for immigrants: general counselling and orientation services, English classes, skill training, rehabilitation services, youth counselling, citizenship courses, community information and cooperation. Most of these services are also provided at COSTTs branch office in Hamilton, Ontario. COSTI works closely with the provincial Department of Labour and with the Canada Manpower Centres. Eighty percent of its clients have been Italians, but it now serves all newcomers. Recently COSTI has undertaken an experimental orientation project for

417

APPENDIX 7

immigrants consisting of a series of short orientation courses held at different times and in different languages according to the group involved. 1971 budget

$197,262

1971 grants: Federal government Provincial government (Dept. of Education) Municipal government United Community Fund Italian government

$ 15,000 10,000

Average no. of interviews per annum Average no. of immigrants per day in language classes in trade courses

418

2,000 14,000 25,000 8,000 150-175 828

Appendix 8 THE IMMIGRATION BRANCH, DEPARTMENT OF MINES AND RESOURCES, 1946 Witness: Mr. A. L. Jolliffe, Director of Immigration, Department of Mines and Resources, Ottawa. The Chairman: Gentlemen, Mr. Jolliffe, Dkector of Immigration,' is here this morning and will speak to us. I presume the committee will indicate from time to time what particular line of information they desire. Hon. Mr. Roebuck: Mr. Jolliffe, you are the Director of Immigration of the federal Immigration Branch in the Department of Mines and Resources, are you not? Mr. Jolliffe: Yes, sir. Hon. Mr. Roebuck: Perhaps we could commence in an orderly way by asking you to give us an outline of the organization of your department as it is engaged in the work of immigration to Canada. Mr. Jolliffe: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I shall be very glad to furnish any information I possibly can to assist you in your studies of immigration. The Immigration Branch is one of four or five branches of the Department of Mines and Resources, and it operates under a Director, who is responsible to the Deputy Minister and the Minister. The branch for administration purposes is divided into three divisions: Headquarters Division; Field Service, Canada, and Field Service, Overseas. The Headquarters Division deals with all administrative matters. It is composed of various subdivisions, such as central registry for correspondence, manifest division for recording immigration, a statistical division, a juvenile division for dealing with juvenile immigrants, a staff division, and a general division, which deals particularly with the administration of the law in Canada, under a Commissioner. The second division is the field and inspectional division in Canada, and for purposes of administration it is divided into four districts: the Atlantic District, which takes in the Province of Quebec and the Maritime Provinces; the Eastern District, which takes in that part of Ontario from the Quebec border up to but not including Port Arthur; the Western District, from Port Arthur west to and including Kingsgate, British Columbia; and the Pacific District, all territory west of Kingsgate, including the Yukon Territory. Each of these districts is under the direction of a district superintendent and staff at district headquarters. The district headquarters of the Atlantic and Eastern Districts are at Ottawa; of the NOTE: From the proceedings of the Senate of Canada Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour, May 21, 1946. 419

APPENDIX 8

Western District, at Winnipeg; of the Pacific District, at Vancouver. In the districts are ports of entry, both boundary ports and ocean ports and some inland agencies. The ports are under the direction of an Inspector in Charge. Some of them have as many as fifty inspectors; and one or two, such as Windsor and Niagara Falls, have more than that. The inland agencies are for the purpose of dealing with investigation work in the interior of Canada. The overseas organization is in Europe, the headquarters in London, under the direction of a Commissioner. Under normal conditions there are agencies in the United Kingdom and inspectional points on the continent. At the present time there are no inspectional points or agencies overseas, apart from the London Office, and I shall comment on that in a few moments. Under normal conditions there is also one inspectional point in Hong Kong, which deals with a particular phase of our work, relating particularly to Chinese immigration, under a special immigration officer. That office is not open at the present time. There are 40 inspectional points at seaports in Canada, and there are 203 international boundary ports. The year before last, on the international boundary, officers of the department examined over 21 million persons coming into Canada. That does not mean that 21 million different people were examined; it means that 21 million persons passed inspection. To illustrate what I mean: at Windsor, for instance, there are a lot of people who commute, and they will come over from Detroit and go back once or twice a week, some of them daily. But the actual number of persons that passed inspection on the international boundary in the year ending March 1945 was over 21 million. I mention that to show the amount of inspectional work that is performed by the service. Thus the ports of entry are primarily engaged in the inspection of immigrants coming to Canada. Each person is required to be examined to ascertain whether admissible under the law. If he is not admissible he is rejected and has the right of appeal to the minister. The rejection with the appeal procedure frequently involves investigation in the interior of Canada. That is one of the reasons why we have offices in the interior, with officers who can conduct a quick investigation and also prevent the unnecessary or lengthy delay of persons at the border who have been refused admission. Our overseas inspection service operates similarly to the inspection service at the international boundary ports. There is an inspector in charge, and the immigrant coming from Europe is required to obtain an immigration visa at the port to establish his admissibility to Canada. In normal times we have inspectional points at Paris, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg—which includes Bremen—Danzig, Gdynia, and Riga. At these points we also have medical officers who are required to examine all persons coming from the continent to Canada. Hon. Mr. Roebuck: Do you have them in Italy and southern countries? Mr. Jolliffe: No, the flow of immigration all comes through those ports. Hon. Mr. Roebuck: The ports which you have mentioned? Mr. Jolliffe: The ports I have mentioned. Under normal conditions we 420

IMMIGRATION BRANCH IN

1946

also have a medical staff in the United Kingdom. These officers were stationed at Liverpool, Glasgow and Belfast, so that all British immigrants coming to Canada passed their medical inspection overseas. That system was put into effect about 1921 or 1922, the purpose of it being to prevent the arrival at Canadian ports of immigrants who on crossing the Atlantic were found to be inadmissible to Canada for health or similar reasons, and were required to return with resultant hardship owing to their having purchased transportation, sold their homes and so forth. In the United Kingdom these points of medical inspection were found not to be sufficient and there were appointed medical men on what we called a Canadian roster. There were about five hundred selected by the Department of Health and given instructions as to the particular requirements of the immigration service in regard to the establishing of good mental and physical health. At the present time we have them operating only in London.

421

Appendix 9 RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE IMMIGRATION DIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION The Canada Immigration Division is responsible for the administration of the Immigration Act, the immigration regulations and the assisted passage loan regulations, and the implementation of government policy respecting immigration movements. It is also directly affected by the Immigration Appeal Board Act and orders and rules made thereunder. The Division encourages and assists the movement to Canada of immigrants who will be able to establish themselves economically and socially with little difficulty for themselves or the Canadian community. It also prevents the admission or arranges the departure of people, whether immigrants or visitors, whose presence in Canada is or would be contrary to national interests. Within the broad objectives of the Department, the Immigration Division has the following as its more specific objectives: 1. to find workers with occupations in strong general or specific demand, by: (a) bringing particular opportunities to the attention of suitably qualified applicants overseas; (b) seeking additional applicants having the desired qualifications; and (c) assisting Canadian employers to recruit workers by advertising and other means; 2. to facilitate the admission of other workers able to meet the selection criteria for independent applicants; 3. to expedite as efficiently as possible the admission of sponsored dependents of Canadian citizens and residents; 4. to assist Canadian citizens and residents who can demonstrate thencapacity to aid in the establishment of other categories of relatives, who qualify under the criteria in the regulations, to bring them to Canada as nominated relatives; 5. to alleviate international refugee problems to the extent that resettlement is the solution, by: (a) participating in special international programs for the selection and establishment of handicapped refugees, in consultation with the provinces; (b) facilitating the admission of refugees who are able to qualify as independent applicants or nominated relatives; (c) admitting for compassionate or humanitarian reasons refugees who are likely to be able to establish themselves successfully in Canada

422

RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMMIGRATION DIVISION

notwithstanding that they may not be fully qualified as immigrants under the regulations; 6. to develop the capability overseas to provide universal, non-discriminatory service to those seeking admission to Canada as immigrants, subject to the wishes of each country concerned; 7. to provide counselling to independent applicants and nominated relatives about working and living conditions in Canada; 8. to make arrangements in Canada for the reception, early placement hi employment, and adjustment of immigrants; 9. to encourage Canadian citizens living abroad, particularly students and professionals, to return to Canada; 10. to devise unproved systems and procedures for identifying and dealing with people who should be denied admission to Canada, or who ought to be removed from the country, the systems and procedures to be compatible with the principles enunciated in the White Paper on Immigration and to take into account the national interest in the promotion of tourism and trade. Department of Manpower and Immigration 1967

423

Appendix 10 SELECTION CRITERIA FOR INDEPENDENT IMMIGRANTS The Points System (Revised in 1985) Units of Assessment Factor

Previous

Revised

Education

12 maximum

12 maximum: no change

Specific Vocational Preparation

15 maximum

15 maximum: no change

Experience

8 maximum

8 maximum: no change

Occupation

15 maximum: "0" an automatic processing bar

10 maximum: "0" an automatic processing bar

Arranged Employment

10: 10 unit penalty if not obtained

10: no penalty if not obtained

Location

5 maximum 5 unit penalty if designated as not in need

eliminated

Age

10 maximum: 10 units if 18 to 35 years. If over 35, one unit subtracted for each year up to 45

10 maximum: 10 units if 21 to 44 years. Two units subtracted per year if under 21 or over 44

Knowledge of French and English

10 maximum: Five units to a person who reads, writes, and speaks English or French fluently; 10 units if fluent in both languages

15 maximum: up to 15 units for fluency in official language(s)

Personal Suitability

10 maximum

10 maximum: no change

Levels Control

N/A

10 units maximum: set at 5 to start

Relative

5

eliminated

TOTAL

100

100

50

70

PASS MARK Bonus for Assisted Relative Applicants

15-30

10 if accompanied by an undertaking of assistance

SOURCE: Canada Employment and Immigration Commission. 424

SELECTION CRITERIA FOR INDEPENDENT IMMIGRANTS TOTAL AND PASS MARK

Under both the previous and revised systems, the maximum number of units of assessment which may be awarded is 100. The pass mark under the previous system was 50; the pass mark under the present system is 70. The higher pass mark is intended to ensure the selection of highly qualified applicants. The 10-unit bonus for applicants with relatives in Canada means that they will need a minimum of 60 units of assessment to be successful, provided that they—like applicants without relatives— are awarded at least one unit of assessment under the Occupational Demand factor.

425

Appendix 11 OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF IMMIGRATION POLICY Immigration Act 1976, Part I Canadian Immigration Policy. OBJECTIVES 3. It is hereby declared that Canadian immigration policy and the rules and regulations made under this Act shall be designed and administered in such a manner as to promote the domestic and international interests of Canada recognizing the need (a) to support the attainment of such demographic goals as may be established by the Government of Canada from time to time in respect of the size, rate of growth, structure, and geographic distribution of the Canadian population; (b) to enrich and strengthen the cultural and social fabric of Canada, taking into account the federal and bilingual character of Canada; (c) to facilitate the reunion in Canada of Canadian citizens and permanent residents with their close relatives from abroad; (d) to encourage and facilitate the adaptation of persons who have been granted admission as permanent residents to Canadian society by promoting cooperation between the Government of Canada and other levels of government and non-governmental agencies in Canada with respect thereto; (e) to facilitate the entry of visitors into Canada for the purpose of fostering trade and commerce, tourism, cultural and scientific activities, and international understanding; (f) to ensure that any person who seeks admission to Canada on either a permanent or temporary basis is subject to standards of admission that do not discriminate on grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion or sex; (g) to fulfil Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees and to uphold its humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and the persecuted; (h) to foster the development of a strong and viable economy and the prosperity of all regions in Canada; (i) to maintain and protect the health, safety, and good order of Canadian society; and (j) to promote international order and justice by denying the use of Canadian territory to persons who are likely to engage in criminal activity.

426

Notes Notes to Chapter One 1. The Hon. B. M. Snedden, "An Australian View of ICEM," International Migration 5, no. 1 (1967): 5. 2. See a relevant comment in the 1966 White Paper, Canadian Immigration Policy, in which it was stated that "there is little scope for bilateral or multilateral government agreements designed to regulate what is essentially a natural movement stemming from a multitude of individual choices. It is the Government's policy to refrain from such agreements which would introduce an element of rigidity and formality into an otherwise largely spontaneous movement." (p. 17) 3. This incident is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 4. See Marion T. Bennett, "The Immigration and Nationality (McCarranWalter) Act of 1952, as Amended to 1965," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 367, The New Immigration (Sept. 1966): 127. 5. See Edward P. Hutchison, "The New Immigration: An Introductory Comment," ibid., p. 1; Ernest Rubin, "The Demography of Immigration to the United States," ibid., p. 15. 6. R. T. Appleyard, British Emigration to Australia (Canberra: Australian National University; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 211. 7. Ibid., p. 212. 8. Anthony H. Richmond, Post-War Immigrants in Canada, p. 100. 9. Ibid., p. 252. 10. See Anthony H. Richmond, "Immigration and Pluralism in Canada"; idem, "Sociology of Migration in Industrial and Post-Industrial Societies." 11. At the 1966 European Population Conference of the Council of Europe, Dr. D. H. Hofmeijer, Director of the Netherlands Emigration Service, suggested that it may be advisable to take from migration its "for ever and ever" character. "Modern man," he said, "is less prepared to take many risks than the emigrants from pre-war years. The jump into the dark, which emigration still is to a certain extent, loses more and more of its attractiveness." (International Migration 4, nos. 3 and 4 [1966]: 162) 12. Can., White Paper, Canadian Immigration Policy, p. 11.

NOTES TO PAGES

10-14

13. Edith Ferguson, Newcomers in Transition, p. 82. 14. Can., Spec. Jnt. Com. of Sen. and H. of C., Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1, 1966, p. 10. 15. Abba P. Schwartz, "The Role of the State Department in the Administration and Enforcement of the New Immigration Law," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 367, The New Immigration (Sept. 1966): 100. 16. Statement issued by the Dept. of Manpower and Immigration, Sept. 12, 1967. 17. See Appendix 2 for a summary of Canada's 1967 immigration regulations. 18. U.S., House of Representatives, Hearings of the Sub-Committee on the Judiciary, pt. II, no. 13, July-August 1964, pp. 389-90. (Quoted in the UNITAR report, Brain Drain: The Migration of Professionals from Developing to Developed Countries [New York, Sept. 1968]). 19. U.S., Congressional Quarterly 23, no. 41, 1965, pp. 2063-64. 20. New York, Apr. 17, 1970. 21. The Asia-Pacific Triangle, a concept created under the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, consisted of an area embracing some twenty countries with about half the world's population. Under the 1952 Act, these countries were given, for the first time, minimum quotas of 100 each, with 185 for Japan and an extra quota of 105 for Chinese persons outside China. These quotas, together with the Triangle concept itself, were abolished in 1965. 22. From a speech made by the Hon. Hubert Opperman, M.P., Minister of State for Immigration, at the Youth and Student Seminar, Canberra, May 28, 1966, cited in Migration News, no. 1 (1967): 61. 23. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 24. The Australian Department of Immigration supplied these facts about non-European migration to Australia. As of June 30, 1968, there were some 40,900 non-Europeans in Australia, including 19,800 who had Australian citizenship; 5,000 who had resident status; 3,300 who had temporary resident status; 12,000 overseas students (mainly from Asia and the Pacific); and 800 visitors. Between January 1, 1966, and March 1, 1970, 2,068 non-European migrants, including dependents, were admitted on the basis of qualifications; 4,003 were admitted on the basis of family relationship; and (up to December 31, 1969) 4,928, including dependents, were granted resident status following entry for temporary residence. 25. A phrase frequently used by Canadian officials. See the evidence given before the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Estimates in 1955 by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Hon. J. W. Pickersgill, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1, Feb. 24, 1955, p. 23. He said that the Department was looking for skilled immigrants. 26. In his study of modern capitalism, Shonfield pointed out that in most countries, planning is "an activity of very recent origin, belonging to the 1960s rather than to the 1950s." (Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism [London: Oxford University Press, 1965], p. 221) The United States and Canada are not in the forefront of this movement.

428

NOTES TO PAGES

14-29

27. Commonwealth Immigration Planning Council, Australia's Immigration Programme for the Period 1968 to 1973 (Tabled in the House of Representatives, Sept. 10, 1968, Dept. of Immigration, Canberra), pp. 83 and 38-39. 28. See Ruth Z. Murphy and Sonia Grodka Blumenthal, "The American Community and the Immigrant," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 367, The New Immigration (Sept. 1966): 126. 29. Snedden, "An Australian View of ICEM," p. 5. 30. Domestic problems notwithstanding, the United States is still the mecca of a very large number of refugees. In a recent interview in Geneva, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, said that if you could give every refugee a ticket for Kennedy Airport and the assurance of being admitted to the United States he would be really happy. 31. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and Advisory Boards. 32. This figure includes 96,512 immigrants and 99,891 refugees who moved to Canada under the auspices of ICEM. 33. See Part 5. 34. See L. Parai, Immigration and Emigration of Professional and Skilled Manpower During the Post-War Period; K. V. Pankhurst, "Migration between Canada and the United States"; T. J. Samuel, The Migration of Canadian-Born between Canada and United States of America 1955-1968. 35. Commission on International Development, Partners in Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 79. 36. United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing Countries (A/7294), New York, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 57. On February 20, 1970, an Act to establish an International Development Research Centre was passed by the Canadian Parliament. The objects of the Centre are, in the words of the Act, "to initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into the problems of the regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting scientific, technical and other knowledge to the economic and social advancement of those regions and, in carrying out those objects (a) To enlist talents of natural and social scientists and technologists of Canada and other countries; (b) To assist the developing regions to build up the research capabilities, the innovative skills and the institutions required to solve their problems; (c) To encourage generally the coordination of international development research; and (d) To foster cooperation in research on development problems between the developed and developing regions for their mutual benefit." 37. Canadian Mission to the United Nations, Brain Drain, Statement no. 87, Dec. 2, 1968. 38. Can., Spec. Jnt. Com. of Sen. and H. of C. on Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 2, Nov. 29, 1966, pp. 42-43. 39. See Murphy and Blumenthal, "The American Community and the Immigrant," p. 125; Ontario Economic Council, Immigrant Integration. 40. The Hon. Philip Lynch, "Immigration in the Seventies" (Address to the Metal Trades Industry Association, Melbourne, July 30, 1970). 429

NOTES TO PAGES 33-38

Notes to Chapter Two 1. John F. Kennedy, A Nation of Immigrants, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 64, 65, and 68. 2. The Hon. Hubert Opperman, M.P., Minister of State for Immigration, 1963-66. 3. Australia, Parliamentary Debates, March 9, 24, and 29, 1966. 4. Commonwealth Immigration Planning Council, Australia's Immigration Programme for the Period 1968 to 1973 (Tabled in the House of Representatives, Sept. 10, 1968, Dept. of Immigration, Canberra). 5. Census of Canada, 1870-71, vol. 1, table 3, p. 332. 6. Can., Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Report, book IV, The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups, pp. 4, 5, and 86. As a measure of relief from these political facts of life and as a response to other recommendations in book IV of the report of the Royal Commission, the federal government announced on October 8, 1971, its support for "a policy of multi-culturalism within a bilingual framework" together with a varied program of assistance to ethnic groups. See Chapter 14. 7. Exact figures: 7,579,358 and 11,544,691. 8. C. A. Price, "Migrants in Australian Society," H.R.H. The Duke of Edinburgh's Third Commonwealth Study Conference, Background Paper no. 6 (Australia, 1968). 9. Economic Council of Canada, Fourth Annual Review: The Canadian Economy from the 1960s to the 1970s, pp. 46-47. 10. Ernest Rubin, "The Demography of Immigration to the United States," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 367, The New Immigration (Sept. 1966): 15. 11. See "Immigration Shows an Ethnic Change," New York Times, March 18, 1968. "In the St. Patrick's Day parade, the American Irish Immigration Committee which had been doing some vigorous lobbying, distributed buttons saying 'Immigration or Die, 1968.' " 12. The fluctuations in the annual intake of immigrants can be seen in the tables showing (1) a summary of the principal components of Canada's population, 1861-1981, and (2) immigration to Canada by calendar year, 1852-1986, found in Appendix 1. 13. Economic Council of Canada, Fourth Annual Review, p. 12. 14. In a major departmental reorganization, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was closed down, and the Immigration Branch was incorporated in a new Department of Manpower and Immigration which began operations in January 1966. See Chapter 6, "Birth of the Department of Manpower and Immigration." 15. Economic Council of Canada, First Annual Review: Economic Goals for Canada to 1970, p. 167, note to Table 51. For a useful discussion of the emigration of professional and skilled manpower in the post-war period up to 1963, see Louis Parai, Immigration and Emigration of Professional and Skilled Manpower During the Post-War Period. 16. Economic Council of Canada, Fourth Annual Review, p. 56. 430

NOTES TO PAGES 39-44

17. Dept. of Labour, Economics and Research Branch, The Migration of Professional Workers into and out of Canada, 1946-1960, p. 3. 18. K. V. Pankhurst, "Migration between Canada and the United States." 19. T. J. Samuel, The Migration of Canadian-Born between Canada and the United States of America 1955—1968, p. 42. According to this study, in 1960 the number of all Canadian-born counted in the U.S. census was 952,600, 0.5 percent of the total U.S. population, the lowest percentage on record. This figure is equivalent to 6.2 percent of the native-born Canadians living in Canada in 1961 or 5.3 percent of the total population of Canada. (Ibid., p. 4) 20. Ibid., p. 38. 21. See Robin Mathews and James Steele, eds., The Struggle for Canadian Universities (Toronto: New Press, 1969); and Ian Lumsden, ed,, Close the 49th Parallel etc.: The Americanization of Canada, University League for Social Reform (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970). In a speech introducing the estimates for the Department of University Affairs of the Province of Ontario for 1970-71, the Honourable William G. Davis, Minister of University Affairs and now Premier of Ontario, referred to a survey of the citizenship of full-time faculty members in Ontario universities undertaken by the Committee of Presidents. He noted that, according to this survey, faculty members holding U.S. citizenship ranged from 6.3 to 28 percent in Ontario universities and that those holding British citizenship ranged from 5.3 to 18.8 percent. He pointed out that there is considerable variation within the major disciplines. In the faculties of business administration and commerce, for example, 81.3 percent of faculty are Canadians, but in the social sciences, the percentage is only 53.6. 22. Statement to the Standing Committee of the House of Commons on Labour, Manpower, and Immigration, May 8,1969. 23. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 113, no. 154, May 22, 1969, p. 8930. 24. Ibid., p. 8931. 25. 7970 Immigration Statistics, Dept. of Manpower and Immigration. 26. Economic Council of Canada, First Annual Review, p. 34. 27. Economic Council of Canada, Fourth Annual Review, pp. 71 and 72. 28. Ibid., p. 72. 29. Ibid., p. 166. 30. From 1962 onwards, the "professional" category in Canadian immigration statistics became "professional and technical." 31. 7970 Immigration Statistics, Dept. of Manpower and Immigration. 32. B. Ahamad, A Projection of Manpower Requirements by Occupation in 1975: Canada and its Regions, Research Branch, Program Development Service, Department of Manpower and Immigration, Ottawa, 1969. This study is one of a series of projections studies of Canada's future manpower requirements and supplies which are being made in the research program of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. According to the Department, this program is designed "to develop projections which will contribute towards consistent and related planning and policy-making for investment in education and training, employment, career counselling, immigration and other manpower policies: and also for the development of these 431

NOTES TO PAGES 47-63

manpower and education policies in relation to other social and economic policies." 33. Can., Spec. Jnt. Com. of Sen. and H. of C. on Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 3, Dec. 6, 1966, p. 93. 34. In the fiscal year 1970-71, occupational training and upgrading courses were provided for some 345,000 persons. Under the Adult Occupational Training Act, 1966-67, the Department of Manpower and Immigration purchases training services directly from the provinces. There are three types of training: the acquisition of new skills, together with language and educational upgrading courses; apprenticeship; and training in industry. The following is a typical comment on the Canada Manpower Training Program by the former Minister of Manpower and Immigration, the Hon. Allan J. MacEachen: "I would point out that the manpower training program is not in any sense a make-work program; or a welfare program; nor is it intended to substitute for provincial education programs. It is a large scale national program designed to fill a specific need: the upgrading and training of Canadian workers to meet the demands of modern technology." (Speech to the Atikokan Board of Trade, May 30, 1970) 35. Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration, Economic and Social Research Division, The Skill Content of the 1962 Immigration. 36. See Can., Sen., Stand. Com. on Immigration and Labour, Proceedings, no. 1, Mar. 20, 1947, p. 5, and no. 9, June,4, 1947, pp. 238 and 241. For example, J. S. McGowan, Director, Department of Colonization and Agriculture, Canadian National Railways, said in evidence before this Committee: "In the development of a long-term policy, I am strongly in favour also of 'relative' immigration—by 'relative' immigration I mean people coming to relations in Canada. . . . There is little or no problem of absorption and the question of after-care is to a very large extent eliminated." 37. The first advertisement to promote immigration to Canada was placed in an Italian newspaper in northern Italy in 1966. 38. See Anthony H. Richmond, Post-War Immigrants in Canada, chapters 7 and 11; idem, "Immigration and Pluralism in Canada." 39. Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration, Departmental Report, 1963. 40. P.C. 1959-310. 41. Can., White Paper, Canadian Immigration Policy, p. 20. 42. The new selection policy was described by the Minister to the parliamentary Committee on Immigration on April 18, 1967. See Appendix 2 for a summary of the 1967 immigration regulations. 43. See Chapter 6. 44. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the Chinese movement. 45. See Chapter 6. 46. Both Italian officials and voluntary agencies in Rome were well aware of what was happening at the tune. Protests were made to the Canadian government and to the Rome office but without result. 47. "Poor Ellen," said Jack Pickersgill, former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, "how she mismanaged the Italians!" He had felt obliged to vote against her in 1959. (Interview, March 10, 1967)

432

NOTES TO PAGES 63-78

48. In an interview at the House of Commons on February 9, 1967, Mr. Macaluso said that Mrs. Fairclough was tactless with the Italians and opposed to family reunion. He had fought a hard fight and defeated her. He was very opposed to any change in the regulations affecting sponsorship. He said that in his constituency he spent 80 percent of his time on immigrants, mainly Italians but also some others. 49. Interviews with Richard Bell, June 16, 1966, and March 10, 1967.

Notes to Chapter Three 1. See Chapter 8. 2. The Royal Commission on Government Organization (Glassco Commission) which submitted its reports in 1962-63 was instrumental in introducing radical changes in the Canadian public service from this period onwards. 3. At that time also, the Department of Labour evidently had a much stronger voice in the Cabinet than the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. The Minister of Labour was Michael Starr. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration was Mrs. Ellen Fairclough. (From interviews with Mrs. Ellen Fairclough and Richard Bell) See Chapter 4. 4. See the opening speech by the Hon. Jean Marchand, then Minister of Manpower and Immigration, to the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Immigration in November 1966: "It is only fair to observe that the relatively favourable provisions for Europeans and residents of the United States, for instance, have developed over many years and have acquired the patina of tradition. Real non-discrimination in practice as well as on paper will not be effective overnight. Extension of facilities in other countries will be possible to the extent that Parliament provides funds and more trained staff can therefore be made available." (Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1) 5. See a relevant comment from the Deputy Minister of the Department of Mines and Resources (then responsible for immigration) in evidence before the Standing Committee of the Senate on Immigration and Labour on March 15, 1949: The Chairman: Would Honourable Senators like to hear the steps being taken to integrate the people in the communities of Canada? Some of the Senators: Yes. Dr. Keenleyside: The Government fully recognizes the importance of this matter. They also recognize, however, that education is a provincial responsibility, and that the provinces share with the Dominion the benefits resulting from increased population. Anything that the federal government does, therefore, must and should be conditioned by these two facts. 6. Information centres have been urged for some time by Canadian voluntary agencies and individuals concerned with immigration. See Chapter 8 and Part 5. 433

NOTES TO PAGES 79-85

7. Laval Fortier, first Deputy Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. 8. Interview with Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, formerly Co-Chairman of British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, September 1967. 9. Can., Dept. of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, Louis St. Laurent, no. 47/2, Jan. 13, 1947. 10. Can., Sen., Stand. Com. on Immigration and Labour, Proceedings, 1946-1953. 11. Senator Roebuck, Senator T. A. Crerar, formerly Minister of Mines and Resources, Senator Mrs. Cairine Wilson, then Chairman of the Canadian National Committee on Refugees, were particularly active on this Committee. 12. President Truman made a "Statement on the Admission to the United States of Displaced Persons and Refugees in Europe" and issued a special directive to federal agencies on this matter on December 22, 1945. Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced the Canadian offer to help on November 7, 1946. 13. The Act and regulations provided for the admission of British subjects as specifically defined; United States citizens from the United States; the wife and unmarried children under 18 years of age of (non-Asiatic) residents of Canada (only Asiatic citizens could bring their wives and children to Canada) ; and agriculturalists with funds intending to farm in Canada. The first small change was made on May 28, 1946, and provided for the admission of a wider range of relatives of non-Asiatic Canadian residents. 14. Statement on British migration to Australia by the Hon. Arthur A. Calwell, Minister of State for Immigration, Canberra, Mar. 5, 1946. 15. Can., Sen., Stand. Com. on Immigration and Labour, Proceedings, no. 11, Aug. 13, 1946; no. 14, July 9, 1947; no. 10, June 24, 1948. 16. It is worth quoting the Committee's comments on the existing Immigration Act. "Canada's Immigration Act, as it has been for many years past, is a non-Immigration Act. Its main purpose seems to be exclusion. . . . The unenviable task of our Immigration Department during the past year has been almost entirely negative." (Ibid., no. 11, 1946, p. 310) 17. The theory that the admission of large numbers of immigrants to Canada leads to the displacement and eventual emigration of Canadians, nearly always to the United States. 18. Senator T. A. Crerar was a representative enthusiast for population growth. "We still have tremendous areas of undeveloped spaces," he said. "In my judgement no country in the world has greater potential wealth and greater possibilities for development than Canada has, and I think this question of immigration in its broader aspects is one that we shall have to wrestle with and settle. I am firmly convinced that we cannot keep half a continent for the relatively few people we have here now." (Can., Sen., Stand. Com. on Immigration and Labour, Proceedings, no. 2, 1949, p. 17) 19. Ibid., no. 4, 1948, pp. 97-98. 20. Ibid., no. 4, 1947, p. 185. The Chairman of the Committee did ask Mr. Bengough what races he had in mind. But other committee members said first it was unfair to ask him, and secondly, they knew what races he had in mind. 434

NOTES TO PAGES 85-91

21. Ibid., no. 8, 1947, p. 209. 22. Ibid., no. 9, 1947, p. 236. 23. As one example, see Is Our Immigration Policy Satisfactory?, a Citizen's Forum pamphlet published by the Canadian Association of Adult Education to accompany a CBC public affairs broadcast on November 19, 1947: "At present industry is booming and employment figures have reached record levels. There is a shortage of manpower in many trades and the worker can choose among jobs. But the future holds uncertainties. World trends which we are powerless to control might speedily alter our prospects. . . . While it is true that immigration will not necessarily increase unemployment, there is no proof that it will automatically put more people to work. The depression of the 1930s is far from forgotten. There is a widespread feeling among workers that we should be more certain of the future before we add too substantially to our present numbers." 24. Dr. J. J. Deutsch, "Canadian Economic Policy 1945-65: A Summing Up," in Canadian Economic Policy Since the War (A series of public lectures published by the Canadian Trade Committee in 1966 in commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of the White Paper on Employment and Income of 1945), p. 123.

Notes to Chapter Four 1. See the debate in the House of Commons on December 14, 1945. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 3, 1945, pp. 3525-27. The Liberal Member for Spadina, David Croll, afterwards a well-known member of the Senate, urged that the question of immigration be studied immediately with a view to the development of a short-term and long-term immigration policy. The Minister, J. A. Glen, said that there would be no announcement at that time of any longrange immigration policy, but that the government was studying the matter. They felt then that their first duty was the repatriation and re-establishment of service personnel with their dependents. 2. P.C. 2071, May 28, 1946; P.C. 371, Jan. 30, 1947; P.C. 1734, May 1, 1947; P.C. 2743, June 2, 1949. 3. P.C. 2180. The total number of displaced persons admitted to Canada between 1947 and 1952 was 165,697. The peak year was 1948-49 when 50,610 were admitted. 4. These movements resulted in the admission of 4,527 Polish ex-servicemen, 15,000 Netherlands farm workers, and 500 Maltese and their dependents. The Poles, all single men, agreed to accept agricultural employment for two years (after which permanent landing would be granted), and Canadian employers agreed to provide employment and accommodation for them. The Netherlands farm workers were described as "bona fide farm owners unable to export their capital because of exchange restrictions." Their ultimate intention was to buy farms in Canada. This three-year movement was, on the whole, highly successful. The Maltese movement was a gesture in response both to the unemployment and distress caused by the reduced operations of the Royal Dockyards in Malta after the war, and, in effect, to the gallant war record of the Island of Malta. There were, however, repeated representations 435

NOTES TO PAGES 91-99

from the U.K. government before this was agreed and the initial movement was undertaken on an experimental basis only, but it was continued. 5. P.C. 371, Jan. 30, 1947. 6. P.C. 2743, June 2, 1949. 7. See J. Holmes, "Nationalism in Foreign Policy," in P. Russell, ed., Nationalism in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 207: "Mr. King really disliked the world beyond the North Atlantic Triangle." 8. Interview with the Hon. J. W. Pickersgill, Mar. 10, 1967. 9. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 3, 1947, pp. 2644-47. 10. Ibid., pp. 2646 et seq. 11. By special concessions in 1949 and 1951 which were not publicized, it was agreed that Armenians should be treated as Europeans for the purpose of sponsoring relatives. When the immigration regulations were revised in 1956, Armenians were then processed according to their country of citizenship. The Canadian Armenian Congress had been officially organized in April 1948, and it was they who made the initial representations to government on behalf of Armenians. In 1956, the Congress again appealed successfully to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration on behalf of stateless Armenians, and special movements of these Armenians were approved. 12. Mackenzie King retired as Prime Minister in November 1948. He died on July 22, 1950. Louis St. Laurent was sworn in as Prime Minister of Canada on November 15, 1948. 13. Interview with Dr. Hugh Keenleyside, formerly Co-Chairman, British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority, Vancouver, Sept. 1967. 14. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 3, 1949, pp. 2284-97. 15. See also Chapter 12, "The Citizenship Branch and Field Service." 16. Departmental files. 17. There is a consensus on this among former members of both Branches of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. 18. Chapter 6. See also Chapter 12, "The Citizenship Branch and Field Service," and Chapter 14. 19. See Part 4 for a full discussion of the development of the Overseas Service, now the Foreign Branch of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. 20. In 1950 the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration was responsible for Citizenship, Citizenship Registration, Immigration, and Indian Affairs only. In 1951 he also became responsible for the National Gallery, and in 1953 for the National Film Board. 21. Italians had been removed from the class of enemy aliens in January 1947 by order-in-council (P.C. 2908). The Rome visa office in the Via Acherusio was opened a year later. Hungarians, Romanians, and Finns had also been removed from this category. 22. This order-in-council appeared to eliminate the system of sponsoring relatives. But this was, in fact, continued administratively under the authority of the Minister. 436

NOTES TO PAGES 101-6

23. Can., H. of C., Spec. Com. on Estimates, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 11, Mar. 14, 1955, p. 301. 24. Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report, fiscal year ended Mar. 31, 1954, p. 23. 25. Can., H. of C., Spec. Com. on Estimates, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 2, Feb. 25, 1955, pp. 48-49. 26. Interview, Ottawa, Mar. 10, 1967. 27. Interview, Ottawa, Mar. 10, 1967. 28. A comparison was made by the Department on the number of individual case files referred to the Admissions Section from the Minister's office, on which the Minister had been asked to intercede, during the same 14-week period in 1966 and 1968. The following results were obtained: Total no. of case files, 14-week period, April to June (inclusive) 1966 4191 1968 3585

Average no. per week (same period) 1966 299 1968 256

(From information supplied by the Dept. of Manpower and Immigration, June 1968) 29. Interview, July 15, 1966. 30. It should be noted here that, throughout the post-war period, the Special Inquiry Officer has also performed a useful reviewing function at ports of entry in giving an applicant, found by the original examining officer to be of doubtful admissibility, a second look. 31. Attorney General of Canada v. Brent, [1956] Can. Sup. Ct. 318. 32. P.C. 1958-785. The order-in-council provided for the admission of unsponsored immigrants from Britain, France, U.S.A., Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa on the same basis as before; unsponsored immigrants from specified western European countries; a broad range of sponsored relatives from Europe, America, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey; and the restriction of all other immigrants to the restricted class of sponsored close relatives, previously applicable to Asians, i.e., husband, wife, unmarried child under 21 years of age of a Canadian citizen willing and able to sponsor them. (Mothers over 60 and fathers over 65 were also added to this group.) This list does not include the annual quotas from India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. It is interesting to n©te the following comment on this order-in-council in a departmental survey of admission policy: "The new admissible classes introduced a rigidity which led to the admission of thousands of persons every year who did not fit within these classes." This may be compared with U.S. experience under the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 referred to in Chapter 1. 33. One of the weaknesses of the Act which could easily lead to errors of judgement was the failure, in its prohibited and deportable classes, to distinguish between the permanent and temporary categories in admission. 34. Departmental files and interviews. 35. This has always been a matter for dispute. For many years the Department maintained that to provide every rejected applicant with the reasons for

437

NOTES TO PAGES 108-16 his rejection was impractical and, in security and medical cases, unwise. This applied to deportation also. This policy undoubtedly caused hardship and anxiety in many individual cases. A substantial change in the official attitude, however, took place with the introduction of the 1967 immigration regulations and the more open style of operations which accompanied them. Today visitors applying for landed immigrant status in Canada can have an explanation if rejected, and overseas applicants are given an explanation on request. The Immigration Appeal Board will also provide reasons for its decisions on request. See also Chapter 13 for a discussion of security screening. 36. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 2, 1955, pp. 1158-68. 37. Ibid., p. 1158. 38. Ibid., pp. 1241-42. 39. Ibid., pp. 1158etseq. 40. The assisted passage loan scheme was introduced in 1950 when it became evident that immigration had seriously declined since 1948, particularly from Britain. The Australian assisted passage scheme was noted. The Canadian scheme provided interest-free loans to immigrants (with their dependents) coming to Canada from Europe. In September 1966 immigrants from the Caribbean became eligible for assisted passage loans, and in April 1970 these loans were made available on a universal basis. Since this scheme was started, more than fifty million dollars has been provided in loans with a repayment loss of only 2.2 percent. Loans have been granted to some 310,000 immigrants. 41. Can., H. ofC. Debates, vol. 2, 1955, p. 1165. 42. See Chapter 9, "The Problem of Jurisdiction." 43. See the evidence given to this Committee in March 1949 by Humphrey Mitchell, Minister of Labour. Can., Sen., Stand. Com. on Immigration and Labour, Proceedings, no. 2, Mar. 22, 1949. 44. Mabel F. Timlin, Does Canada Need More People?, pp. 122-24. 45. Can., Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, Final Report, p. 120. 46. See Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report, fiscal year ended Mar. 31, 1957, p. 27. 47. Additional agreements were concluded with the Provinces of British Columbia and Saskatchewan whereby the federal government assumed full responsibility for the maintenance and care of Hungarian refugees during their first year in Canada, regardless of status. 48. Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report, fiscal year ended Mar. 31, 1957, p. 11. 49. Ibid., pp. 12-13. 50. Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report, fiscal year ended Mar. 31, 1958, p. 25. This was one of the very few attempts, referred to in Chapter 2, by the Department to achieve an even distribution of immigrants across Canada. There was a further effort during this crisis period when the Air Bridge to Canada plan was introduced in 1957 to meet the very large movement of immigrants in that year, mainly from Britain. A total of 17,565 immigrants came to Canada via the Air Bridge. The fare for those using these

438

NOTES TO PAGES 116-27

special charter flights was $200 per adult and $100 per child, regardless of destination in Canada. Of the 207 flights chartered, all but 78 terminated in western Canada. 51. It is interesting to note that the Czechoslovakian refugee movement which occurred some ten years later was handled, very expeditiously, by the Department of Manpower and Immigration itself, and although help was received from private organizations and individuals, there was no substantial public involvement. The movement itself was much smaller than the Hungarian refugee movement: 11,153 Czechoslovakian refugees were admitted between September 1968 and March 1969. The Department established a special Czechoslovakian refugee program, normal admission requirements were relaxed for the first four months, and considerable assistance was given to refugees after arrival. The total cost of this program was in the region of nine million dollars. A three-year adjustment study, based on a sample survey of 2,000 of these refugees who are now established in Canada, was undertaken by the Department of Manpower and Immigration in the summer of 1969. The total number of Czechoslovakian refugees admitted by the end of 1969 was almost 12,000. 52. Departmental files. 53. See Chapter 11 and Chapter 12, "The Toronto Experience." 54. See John Meisel, The Canadian General Election of 1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), chapter 1, for other well-known examples of (in his phrase) the government's "want of candour in dealing with the twenty-second parliament."

Notes to Chapter Five \. See the interview with Mrs. Fairclough later in this chapter. 2. Economic Council of Canada, First Annual Review; Economic Goals for Canada to 1970, p. 29. 3. Before the appointment of Sidney Smith. 4. See Chapter 1. 5. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 3, 1959, pp. 2711-12. 6. Ibid., pp. 2933-38. 7. Ibid., vol. 2, 1961, p. 1944. 8. Ibid., vol. 3, 1959, p. 2711. 9. Ibid., p. 2936. 10. See Chapter 4, p. 104. 11. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 3, 1959, pp. 2938-39. 12. Ibid., p. 2938. 13. Departmental files. 14. Ibid., p. 25. 15. P.C. 1962-86. 16. Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report, 1963, p. 15. 17. Can., H. ofC. Debates, vol. 2, 1961, pp. 1915. 439

NOTES TO PAGES 127-45

18. Ibid., vol. 2, 1962, p. 1332. 19. Toronto Telegram, Apr. 26, 1957. Quoted in the House by Mr. Badenai. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 3, 1957, p. 1938. 20. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 3, 1959, pp. 2937-38. 21. See Chapter 3. 22. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 2, 1961, p. 1902. 23. Ibid., p. 1914. 24. Departmental files. 25. Mrs. Fairclough said in an interview that her Deputy Minister, Dr. Davidson, advised her that they did not really need a new Act. They could achieve what they wanted within the regulations. 26. It must not be imagined, however, that the Chinese are the only people who go in for illegal immigration on a large scale. In fiscal year 1969 the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the U.S. Department of Justice discovered no less than twenty Texan midwives who had falsely registered births in the U.S. of over a thousand children who were actually born in Mexico. Their parents were all applicants or prospective applicants for immigrant visas. In the same year the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service completed 11.419 investigations of possible immigration frauds, an increase of 49 percent over the previous year. See American Council for Nationalities Service, Interpreter Releases 46, no. 22, p. 136. 27. Departmental files. 28. Departmental files. 29. Interviews, House of Commons, June 16, 1966, and Mar. 10, 1967. Notes to Chapter Six 1. Can., Sen., Spec. Com. on Manpower and Employment, Final Report, pp. 8-9. 2. Economic Council of Canada, First Annual Review: Economic Goals for Canada to 1970, p. 173. 3. Ibid., p. 29. 4. Economic Council of Canada, Fourth Annual Review: The Canadian Economy from the 1960s to the 1970s, p. 11. 5. Order-in-Council, P.C. 1963-235. 6. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 7, 1964, pp. 6817-26. 7. Ibid., p. 6822. 8. Ibid., p. 6820. 9. Ibid., pp. 6821-26. 10. Harry Hooper was an American citizen convicted in Toronto for impaired driving and trafficking in narcotics (marijuana) and deported for these reasons. He returned illegally twice after deportation. Harold Nurse was a British citizen born in Trinidad. He was deported for illegal entry, but returned after deportation. Both Mr. Hooper and Mr. Nurse married Canadian citizens whom they have since deserted. 440

NOTES TO PAGES 146-52

11. But other nationalities were also prone to ship-jumping. Mr. Sedgwick reported that at the time of writing, "there have been so many desertions in Newfoundland ports by Portuguese sailors, that the management of the Portuguese fishing fleet is seriously considering moving its base from St. John's to St. Pierre and Miquelon, thus depriving St. John's of a long established industry which is said to contribute some $12 million annually to the economy of the Island Province." (Joseph Sedgwick, Report on Immigration, pt. I, p. 18) 12. Sedgwick, Report on Immigration, pt. I, p. 18. 13. Ibid., p. 38. 14. Ibid., p. 18. 15. Ibid., p. 38. 16. This was the section providing that "no court and no judge or officer thereof has jurisdiction to review, quash, reverse, restrain or otherwise interfere with any proceeding, decision or order of the Minister, Deputy Minister, Director, Immigration Appeal Board, Special Inquiry Officer or immigration officer had, made or given under the authority and in accordance with the provisions of this Act relating to the detention or deportation of any person, upon any ground whatsoever, unless such person is a Canadian citizen or has Canadian domicile." 17. Sedgwick, Report on Immigration, pt. II, p. 21. 18. The possible introduction of fingerprinting for immigrants for crime detection purposes is still under discussion. This question was discussed briefly in the 1966 White Paper on Canadian Immigration Policy. It stated: "There is a national repugnance to this type of identification. Yet the fact is that the failure always to detect criminals entering Canada stems in some degree from the present inability of examining officers to demand fingerprints. . . . For persons entering Canada, it may be unwise to rule out this means of identification which is particularly useful in the absence of reliable documentary identification." (sections 79 and 80) The Royal Commission on Security, whose abridged report was published in June 1969, recommended that "the requirement to provide fingerprints should be levied on all prospective immigrants, both to confirm identity as well as to facilitate criminal records checks." (recommendation 140, p. 112) See also Chapter 13, "Security Screening." 19. The series included papers on such subjects as: immigration programming, migrant supply, the sponsorship system, social and cultural factors in immigration, the participation of the Canadian public in immigration, immigration appeals, immigration subsidies, and other questions. 20. Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration, Annual Report, 1965, p. 18. 21. See Chapter 9, "A Career Foreign Service: The Struggle for Status." 22. The Indian Affairs Branch was also moved, for the time being, to the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources. 23. The uneasy relationship with the Department of Labour had continued. In a memorandum of March 1964, the Deputy Minister stated that, while it was customary and proper for that Department to express concern about immigration, "it is important to us to avoid becoming a satellite of the Labour Department." 441

NOTES TO PAGES 152-62

24. These sections included the National Employment Service, Civilian Rehabilitation, Technical and Professional Training, Manpower Consultative Service, Economic and Research Directorate, Information and Labour Gazette, Administrative and Financial Services, Personnel Services, and Special Services. 25. Dept. of Manpower and Immigration. 26. Departmental files. 27. Interviews with those concerned indicate that an important factor in this decision, in early 1967, to continue to share the responsibility for immigrant integration, or adjustment to the Canadian community, with the Citizenship Branch was the fact that the new Department of Manpower and Immigration had a great deal on its hands and there had been a considerable amount of administrative reorganization already. The Citizenship Branch had had to fit into a new department. There had been a good deal of disruption in individual professional lives. In this matter, therefore, it was decided, at least for the time being, to let sleeping dogs lie. 28. See also Chapter 14, "The Renaissance of the Citizenship Branch." 29. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 5, 1966, p. 4872. 30. Ibid., p. 4891. 31. Ibid., p. 5435. 32. Ibid., p. 5520. 33. Ibid., vol. 6, 1966, pp. 5730-31. 34. Ibid., pp. 5730-31, 5939-41. 35. Ibid., pp. 5968-76. New regulations of a temporary nature affecting non-immigrants were introduced on July 8. Permanent rules for non-immigrants were embodied in the 1967 immigration regulations. 36. Departmental files. 37. Departmental files. 38. The author attended most of the public hearings of the Special Joint Committee and assisted in the preparation of three briefs by voluntary agencies. The following committee members were interviewed: Ian Wahn, John Munro, Joe Macaluso, Herb Gray, Andrew Brewin, Walter Dinsdale, David Orlikow, Roger Regimbal, and S. J. Enns. Conversations were held with other members at the hearings. Mr. Enns, then Member for Portage, Manitoba, a former social worker and more of an observer in this field, said that this Committee struck him as surprisingly ignorant about immigration. There was not very much real expertise in it, such as one might find in parliamentary committees on health and welfare or defence. And it had no consultants or research staff. Richard Bell, also a member of the Committee, shared this view. 39. In the words of the Deputy Minister to the Joint Committee, "The admission of a non-dependent relative who will be entering the Canadian labour force is made partially sensitive to economic conditions in Canada." Can., Spec. Jnt. Com. of Sen. and H. of C. on Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1, Feb. 20, 1968, p. 2. 40. When Mr. Marchand presented the proposed new regulations and selection system to the Joint Committee on April 18, 1967, Mr. Brewin did 442

NOTES TO PAGES 163-86

raise again the question of the citizenship factor which was still present in a minor form in the new regulations in relation to sponsorship. Mr. Marchand said he would look into the matter but no change has been made. Ibid., no. 19, Apr. 18, 1967, p. 940. 41. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 12, 1967, Feb. 20, pp. 13267-70; Feb. 21, pp. 13280-328; vol. 13, Feb. 22, pp. 13346-67; Feb. 23, pp. 13375-90; Feb. 27, pp. 13502-10; Mar. 1, pp. 13626-41. 42. See the bibliography for a complete list of the major debates on immigration since 1946. 43. According to the Act, the Immigration Appeal Board cannot exercise its discretion if the Minister and the Solicitor General sign a certificate to the effect that, on the basis of security and criminal intelligence reports, it would be contrary to the public interest for the Board to take such action. 44. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 13, p. 13361. 45. Can., Spec. Jnt. Com. of Sen. and H. of C. on Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 1, 1968, p. 23. 46. Sedgwick, Report on Applicants in Canada. 47. See Chapter 9. 48. Can., H. of C. Debates, vol. 3, 1967, p. 2441.

Notes to Chapter Seven 1. Donald V. Smiley, "Federalism, Nationalism, and the Scope of Public Activity in Canada," in Peter Russell, ed., Nationalism in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 101. 2. J. A. Corry, "Higher Education in Federal-Provincial Relations" (An Address delivered at the AUCC annual meeting, Oct. 26, 1966). 3. Donald V. Smiley, The Canadian Political Nationality (Toronto: Methuen, 1967), p. 32. 4. Can., Spec. Jnt. Com. of Sen. and H. of C. on Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 6, Jan. 31, 1967, p. 203. 5. See Part 4. 6. June 1970. 7. A very small number of agencies serving immigrants, mainly in Ontario and Quebec, are now receiving annual grants of varying size from federal and provincial governments. Although these grants have increased in size lately, they are still not large enough nor secure enough to permit these agencies to deal with large numbers of immigrants, to meet their many needs, to pay adequate salaries to their own staff, or to engage in any kind of development. This question is discussed further in Part 5. 8. In 1963 there were ninety-nine immigration officers across Canada wholly engaged in placement and settlement work, thirty officers in one-man ports spending approximately 60 percent of their time on this, and forty-seven officers working on it for one or two days a week. (Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration, Report on Immigration Policy, 1963) 443

NOTES TO PAGES 186-94

9. Can., White Paper, Canadian Immigration Policy, p. 40. 10. DACI Minutes, July 7, 1950, Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration. 11. DACI Minutes, Mar. 19, 1957, Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration. 12. Interviews in 1967 with Rt. Rev. Msgr. Armand Malouin, Montreal; Rt. Rev. Msgr. Claude J. Mulvihill, Toronto; Dr. Joseph Kage, National Executive Director, Jewish Immigrant Aid Services of Canada. 13. DACI files, 1957, Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration. 14. Research Department, Canadian Labour Congress. 15. See J. E. Hodgetts, "A Retrospective View of the Public Service of Canada," Canadian Public Administration 7, no. 4 (Dec. 1964): 411. "It is no reflection on the Founding Fathers to claim that a division of labour between provinces and dominion made one hundred years ago is bound to become outmoded. . . . Flexibility has been provided by the development of what the Rowell-Sirois Commission called 'administrative expedients.' These have ranged from the sporadic assembling of a diplomatic conference between dominion and provincial leaders, ministerial or official conferences for more limited purposes—often in conjunction with national interest groups (as happened, for example, in the case of labour and agriculture), formal agreements rather like treaties, joint advisory committees, the use of federal officers to perform provincial tasks (and vice versa) and the employment of federal funds to finance provincial programmes." 16. DACI Minutes of Meeting with Provincial Officials from Prairie Provinces, June 11, 1953, Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration. 17. It was confined to the federal-provincial medical-welfare agreements. 18. See Chapter 8. 19. Dept. of Manpower and Immigration, "Activity of Provincial Governments in Overseas Immigration," 1966—67. 20. Ontario Economic Council, Human Resource Development in the Province of Ontario, p. 5. 21. Can. Spec. Jnt. Com. of Sen. and H. of C. on Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 6, Jan. 31, 1967, p. 30. 22. See also the resolutions submitted by provincial officials, urging more federal-provincial consultation in immigration, at the 1968 Cross Canada Conference on immigation held in Toronto. This conference, entitled "The Community and Immigration," took place on October 31 to November 2, 1968, and was sponsored by the International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto and the federal and provincial Citizenship Branches. 23. Efforts were made in the mid-sixties to encourage the provinces to produce more promotional material for use in overseas recruitment and to participate to some extent in the actual recruitment process. In 1964 and 1965, a series of labour requirement surveys was conducted in British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and New Brunswick, with a view to encouraging these provinces to send recruiting teams overseas to fill specific vacancies revealed by the surveys, or to allow federal immigration officers to recruit on their behalf. The surveys were a joint enterprise but the bulk of the work was done by the federal immigration staff. These efforts came to an end with the government reorganization of 1965-66, but they may have helped to 444

NOTES TO PAGES 196-211

stimulate a keener interest in immigration which began to emerge at this period, particularly among the Prairie Provinces. 24. Ontario, of course, was interested in immigration, but demonstrated no interest in the policy-making and planning process. 25. On the initiative of local officials, informal joint committees have met periodically to discuss immigration matters in the Ontario and Quebec regions.

Notes to Chapter Eight

1. In 1970, the name of the Immigration Branch which, in recent years, has been a branch of the Department of Trade and Development, was changed to Selective Immigration Service. This Service is now part of the new Ministry of Industry and Tourism and is known as the Selective Placement Service. The Citizenship Branch has been part of the Community Services Division of the Department of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship. Following a major governmental organization in Ontario announced in December 1971, the Division and Branch became part of a new Ministry of Community and Social Services. 2. See the Minister's speech on the Estimates, Immigration Branch, Dept. of Economics and Development, 1968-69. "1967 . . . saw the establishment of a new and enlarged staff in Toronto with a geographic capability substantially beyond the previous United Kingdom limits. . . . The centre of branch policy and planning was therefore effectively shifted from the London, England, office to the Toronto office. The former office, of course, continues, as it probably always will, to be the major service link in the Branch and the focus of direct overseas recruiting by Ontario employers." 3. An Ontario team, led by John Yaremko, went to Vienna at the height of the Hungarian crisis, in the words of one official, "to get Hungarian immigrants for Ontario." 4. The Glasgow office was closed on July 1, 1971. 5. Ontario Economic Council, Human Resource Development in the Province of Ontario, p. 13. In the first six months of 1965, eighty-one Ontario companies and organizations applied to the Immigration Branch for help in recruiting "personnel not available in Canada" and advertisements were placed overseas on their behalf. Thirty of these organizations sent their own representatives to the United Kingdom and Europe to interview prospective candidates. Interviews were held with 811 selected persons, most of whom were hired. 6. See Part 4, "The Immigrant in Canada." 7. Departmental files. 8. Ontario Economic Council, Human Resource Development, p. 5. 9. From an interview with Mrs. Ellen Fairclough, Toronto, Sept. 7, 1967. 10. Ontario has an up-to-date information kit for distribution to prospective and landed immigrants which is available in seven languages. A total of 47,518 kits was distributed in 1970. 11. The Hon. Robert Welch, Citizen Participation in Community Develop'

445

NOTES TO PAGES 212-32 ment, Dept. of the Provincial Secretary and Citizenship, Toronto, Apr. 24, 1970. 12. English classes are provided in Ontario through the Canada Manpower Training Program, by Boards of Education, voluntary agencies, and by the Citizenship Branch itself. The latter provides classes where there is a demonstrated need which cannot be met by local school boards or voluntary agencies. The Branch also runs an intensive summer evening course in Hamilton and teacher-training courses; and prepares textbooks and carries out research in the teaching of English as a second language. 13. Ontario Economic Council, Human Resource Development, pp. 4—5. 14. The report was written by Edith Ferguson, author of Newcomers in Transition and a companion study Newcomers and New Learning, sponsored by the International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto, and supported by the federal and provincial governments. Miss Ferguson has had long experience in community organization and research in Ontario, and was a member of a task force appointed in 1969 by the Department of Manpower and Immigration to examine the Department's responsibilities in the field of the settlement and adjustment of immigrants. 15. Can., H. of C. Debates, Feb. 19, 1965, p. 11,513. 16. Toronto Globe and Mail, Feb. 17, 1968. 17. Jacques Brossard, L'Immigration, p. 121. 18. Ibid., p. 100. 19. Ibid., p. 122. 20. Ibid., p. 58. 21. Written before the creation of the Department of Immigration in Quebec in November 1968. 22. Brossard, L'Immigration, p. 108. 23. Rosaire Morin, L'Immigration an Canada (Montreal: Editions de L'Action Nationale, 1966), introduction. 24. In 1966 Mr. Kent was Deputy Minister of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration and later of the Department of Manpower and Immigration. 25. Morin, L 'Immigration au Canada, p. 135. 26. Marcel Masse, "L'Immigration au Quebec—Un Facteur de Croissance que le Gouvernement ne Negligera Plus" (An address given at the Club Richelieu-Montreal, May 4, 1967), p. 6. 27. Ibid., p. 8. 28. Ibid., p. 9. 29. This clause reads "(c) give information about the Province of Quebec to persons who wish to immigrate thereto, inform them as to the state of the labour market and, in collaboration with the Minister of Labour, point out to them exactly what positions are available to persons with their qualifications, and put them in touch with employers." 30. The language training agreement, whereby the federal government pays for 50 percent of the teaching costs incurred by the provinces in the provision of language and citizenship training for immigrants, was originally signed by

446

NOTES TO PAGES 232-47

all the provinces except Quebec in 1953. The language textbook agreement, whereby the federal government is responsible for 100 percent of the cost of textbooks used by the provinces in language and citizenship training, was signed by all provinces except Quebec and British Columbia in 1963. These agreements are administered by the Department of the Secretary of State. 31. Premier Bourassa has now informed the members of the Gendron Commission that their inquiry must be concluded by December 31, 1972. 32. An address to the Loge L'Alliance of the B'nai B'rith International, Montreal, Apr. 1972. Notes to Chapter Nine 1. The Overseas Service seems the most convenient term to use in discussing the overseas operations of the Immigration Branch prior to the changeover to Manpower and Immigration in 1966, when the former Immigration Branch became the Immigration Division, comprising three branches—Planning, Foreign, and Home. Before this time, the terms Overseas Service and Overseas Branch of the Canadian Immigration Service were often used interchangeably in departmental files. But in recent years, the director of this area of operations has been called Director, Overseas Service. In discussing this Service from the end of 1966 onwards, the new term Foreign Branch will be used. 2. Can., Royal Commission on Government Organization, Report, vol. 4, Special Areas of Administration, p. 136. The Commission also said that the Department of Citizenship and Immigration had become "the most active dispenser of information on Canada throughout Western Europe." (Ibid., vol. 3, p. 74) 3. As an example of this, see the very inadequate treatment given to Canadian immigration policy and programs in the foreign policy review Foreign Policy for Canadians undertaken by the Department of External Affairs and tabled in the House of Commons in June 1970. 4. Departmental files. Official Speeches. 5. Departmental files. 6. Departmental files. 7. Departmental files. 8. Departmental files. 9. The Glassco Commission noted in its first report published in 1962, that the departments with the highest proportion of war veterans among their employees (about 50 percent) were the Departments of Veterans Affairs, National Revenue (Customs and Excise), and Citizenship and Immigration. Can., Royal Commission on Government Organization, Report, vol. 1, Management of the Public Service, p. 346. 10. The two best known cases involved the switching of x-ray photographs at the Amberg Camp in Germany and the sale of visas by a young visa officer in Germany at $250 each (the price dropped later) to an ad hoc Jewish organization centred in Munich. In the latter case, there was no prosecution and some restitution was made. 447

NOTES TO PAGES 248-93

11. The Hague office is now located on the fourth floor of a modern office building. 12. In a report on the Overseas Service which appeared in the Toronto Financial Post on March 14, 1964, it was emphasized that the immigration budget would have to be increased considerably if Canada was to have an active immigration program. The Department of Citizenship and Immigration had been managing on a shoestring budget and this was all too evident overseas. "Our immigration offices abroad," the article stated, "have been described as 'tatty,' 'filthy' and 'second rate' by depressed officials. Compared with the smart, attractive offices of the Australian Service, Canada cuts an unattractive figure." 13. Conferences of Officers-in-Charge Abroad. Departmental files. 14. See Chapter 5. 15. Until this point, the director of an overseas post, large or small, held the unimpressive diplomatic rank of Attache. In October 1965 the Regional Director of the Canadian Government Immigration Service in the United Kingdom responsible for all the British visa offices and a very large staff, was listed forty-first out of forty-nine on the Canadian diplomatic list in London. Above him were, among others, the First Secretary (Timber) and Third Secretaries (Commercial and Information). 16. By the Government Organization Act of 1969, the Department of Trade and Commerce was amalgamated with the Department of Industry and is now known as the Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce. 17. Can., Dept. of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians (Tabled in the House of Commons June 25, 1970), pp. 39-41.

Notes to Chapter Ten 1. Departmental files. 2. The admission figures for the last five years have been as follows: 1966: 194,743; 1967: 222,876; 1968: 183,974; 1969, 161,531; 1970: 147,713; 1971: 121,900. Allan J. MacEachen, former Minister of Manpower and Immigration, claimed that the present system was not a "tap on and off system" because the 1967 figures were unusually high for various reasons and recent figures had been very much higher than the previous ten-year average of 131,000. See the Minister's speech to the House of Commons Committee on Estimates, May 8, 1969.

Notes to Chapter Eleven 1. These agencies are the International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto, the Service d'Accueil aux Voyageurs et aux Immigrants of Montreal (SAVI), COSTI (the Italian Community Education Centre in Toronto which now serves all immigrants and has a branch in Hamilton), Winnipeg's International Centre, the Immigrant Services Committee of Vancouver, International House of London, Ontario, and the Toronto branch of the Travellers' Aid Society, 448

NOTES TO PAGES 293-306 the Mobility Counselling Service. See Appendix 7 for notes on four voluntary agencies. 2. International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto, Cross Canada Conference, "The Community and Immigration." 3. Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, A Study of Needs and Resources of Immigrants in Metropolitan Toronto. 4. Between 1961 and 1967, the Ontario Welfare Council organized a series of annual Conferences on Inter-Group Relations at Geneva Park or Port Elgin, Ontario, which were attended by representatives of voluntary organizations and ethnic groups. These conferences were supported by the federal and provincial Citizenship Branches and, on one occasion, by the Ontario Human Rights Commission. 5. Ontario Economic Council, Immigrant Integration, p. 1. 6. See Chapter 12 for a description of the Toronto Inter-Agency Council for Services to Immigrants and Migrants and its antecedents. The Immigrant Services Committee of the Vancouver Citizenship Council was founded in September 1969, consisting of a directorate (drawn from eighteen community organizations in the greater Vancouver area), an executive, and a number of functional subcommittees. Its aims are to assess the needs of immigrants; to coordinate the present activities of all agencies serving immigrants in the greater Vancouver area, in cooperation with the Department of Manpower and Immigration; to initiate new services for immigrants and enlist the active participation of citizens therein; and to encourage immigrants to participate in the life of the whole community. The Immigrant Services Committee has recently embarked upon a three-year pilot project to coordinate and expand immigrant services which will have a small professional staff and will also make extensive use of part-time workers and volunteers. It is now established as a separate organization and is no longer part of the Vancouver Citizenship Council. 7. See Chapter 13. 8. See Appendix 7. 9. See Appendix 7 for information on COSTI (Italian Community Education Centre). 10. It might be noted here that the International Institute which is one of the two major non-sectarian agencies in Toronto serving all immigrants, and providing premises and counselling in an attractive modern building for a provincial daytime language training program which accommodates some 700 immigrants a day, was in imminent danger recently of closing down because of the lack of sufficient financial support. It is still obliged to operate with a very small staff and cannot engage at the present time in any development or extension of service. See Appendix 7.

Notes to Chapter Twelve 1. Minutes of the 59th meeting of the Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration, Oct. 14, 1954, Dept. of Citizenship and Immigration. 2. Departmental files. 449

NOTES TO PAGES 307-36

3. In 1967 questions on religion and ethnic origin were eliminated from the application form for permanent residence in Canada. The Department now provides special cards in nine languages which are distributed to all immigrants after their visa has been granted. If they wish, immigrants can then give their destination address, religious affiliation, and date of arrival. These cards are then delivered to the national office of the Inter-Faith Committee. The Department now also provides the Committee with the names and addresses of all landed immigrants, so that they can be included in the visiting scheme if possible. 4. See Chapter 8 for a discussion of the most recent developments in Ontario. 5. See also Chapter 4, "Citizenship Branch: Location and Responsibilities." 6. Arthur Stinson, Canadian Participation in Social Development, p. 24. 7. The Social Planning Council then embarked upon a "project and research" approach to community development which produced very little for immigrants or immigrant organizations in the Toronto area in the ensuing years. 8. The members of this subcommittee were Muriel Jacobson (Canadian Correspondent, UN High Commissioner for Refugees) who acted as Convenor, Monsignor C. J. Mulvihill (Catholic Family Services), Louis Poch (JIAS), and the author. The subcommittee was later enlarged to include Dr. Jadwiga Bennich (Ontario Welfare Council), Douglas McConney (Social Planning Council), and Charles Caccia (COSTI and later Member of Parliament for Toronto, Davenport). 9. See Chapter 13. 10. Can., Sen., Stand. Com. on Immigration and Labour, Proceedings, no. 12, June 18, 1947, pp. 354-55. 11. Dept. of Manpower and Immigration, Immigration White Paper Study no. 15, Participation of the Canadian Public in Immigration, May 4, 1965.

Notes to Chapter Thirteen 1. Can., Spec. Jnt. Com. of Sen. and H. of C. on Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no 1, Feb. 1968, p. 4. 2. In his report to the Minister of Manpower and Immigration in November 1970 on the issue of the legal recourse to the Immigration Appeal Board by visitors whose applications for landed immigrant status have been rejected, Mr. Joseph Sedgwick recommended that the Board should no longer have jurisdiction in cases where applicants have been rejected on security grounds. A decision on these cases should be taken by a security review board as proposed by the Royal Commission on Security. 3. Can., Royal Com. on Security, Report (abridged), p. 49. 4. Ibid., p. 110. 5. Special Committee on Estimates, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, no. 3, Feb. 28, 1955, p. 66. 6. See Appendix 8. 450

NOTES TO PAGES 336-68

7. Can., Sen., Stand. Com. on Immigration and Labour, Proceedings, May 21, 1946. 8. Interview, Ottawa, June 16, 1966. 9. The Tibetan refugee program was started early in 1971. Initial approaches were made to the Canadian government on behalf of the Tibetan refugees in India several years ago. In 1967 an interdepartmental committee, representing five government departments, was formed to consider the questions of admission and settlement. In July 1970 the Dalai Lama was advised that Canada would consider the resettlement of up to 240 Tibetans. The resettlement program is said to be working out in a very satisfactory way. The cost of this project for the first year is estimated at $794,000. 10. Press release announcing the appointment of a new Assistant Deputy Minister, Operations, May 7, 1970. 11. See Chapter 5, "Chinese Immigration: The Illegal Movement." 12. Canada Manpower and Immigration Council Act, December 21, 1967, s. 11. Notes to Chapter Fourteen 1. Can., Task Force on Government Information, To Know and Be Known, p. 11. 2. Among these programs are a cultural development program which provides for research into the relationship between language and cultural development; the provision of textbooks for non-official language teaching and a study of the ethnic press; twenty ethnic histories to be commissioned by the Citizenship Branch; and additional programs to be developed by the federal cultural agencies: the National Museum, National Film Board, National Library, and Public Archives. Notes to Chapter Fifteen 1. Leon F. Bouvier, "Planet Earth 1984-2034, A Demographic Vision," Population Bulletin 39, no. 1 (Feb. 1984). A publication of the Population Reference Bureau Inc., Washington D.C. 2. Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, Background Paper on Future Immigration Levels, (November 1984). 3. Ontario Welcome House, first established in downtown Toronto in 1973 and now in four other locations, is a program of the Citizenship Development Branch of the Ministry of Citizenship. A community centre for immigrants, it provides multilingual settlement counselling, information, and referral for immigrants in thirty-eight languages, as well as language training, preschool and daycare programs, and many other immigrant services. 4. The hopes expressed in this study that the Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and its four (later two) Advisory Boards would play a useful role never really materialized. Although the Council and Boards had some very good, hard-working members, the government never made intelligent use of these ad-

451

visory bodies. The same applies—certainly on the immigration side—to the present Canada Employment and Immigration Advisory Council which was designed with no regard for immigration and consists mainly of employer and worker representatives. Unexpectedly, however, the consultative process which leads to the Minister's Annual Statement on Immigration Levels is providing the government with a great deal of advice from non-governmental organizations and individuals—a process with which it seems to be much more comfortable. 5. Bulletin de Liaison I, no. 6 (mars 1986). Ministere des Communautes Culturelles et de I'lmmigration, Montreal.

452

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Report of the National Seminar on Citizenship. Ottawa, 1953. Report of the National Seminar on Citizenship. Ottawa, 1958. Citizenship, Immigration and Ethnic Groups in Canada: A Bibliography of Research, 1920-1958. Ottawa, 1960. Citizenship, Immigration and Ethnic Groups in Canada: A Bibliography of Research, 1959-1961. Ottawa, 1962. Citizenship, Immigration and Ethnic Groups in Canada: A Bibliography of Research, 1962-1964. Ottawa, 1964. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH DIVISION

The 1959 Citizenship Applicants from Toronto and Montreal. Report no. C.R.-2. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961. Survey of Recent Immigrant Unemployed. Report no. I.R.-9. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961. Mental Health of Immigrants, 1958. Report no. G.S.-l. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963. Basic 1961 Data on Immigration and Citizenship. Report no. S.R.-2. Queen's Printer, 1963. Post-War Immigrant Family Earnings. Census 1961, Report no. G.I.-3/9. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963. The Skill Content of the 1962 Immigration. Report no. G.I.-8. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963. Immigrant Family Expenditure and Standard of Living, 1959. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964. DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION Annual Reports, 1966-71. Ottawa: Queen's Printer. Immigration Statistics, 1966-71. Ottawa: Queen's Printer. The Immigration Act and Regulations: Office Consolidation. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968. Canada's Manpower Requirements in 1970. Prepared by Noah M. Meltz and G. Peter Penz for the Program Development Service, Research Branch. A Projection of Manpower Requirements by Occupation in 1975: Canada and its Regions. Prepared by B. Ahamad for the Program Development Service, Research Branch. The Migration of Canadian-Born between Canada and the United States of America 1955-1968. Prepared by T. J. Samuel for the Program Development Service, Research Branch.

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The Canadian Family Tree. Centennial Commission. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967. Canadian Participation in Social Development. Prepared by A. Stinson for the Canadian Citizenship Council. Ottawa, 1968. DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR Annual Reports, 1946-66. Ottawa: King's (Queen's) Printer. Skilled and Professional Manpower in Canada, 1945-65. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957. Acquisition of Skills. Research Program on the Training of Skilled Manpower, Report no. 4. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960. The Migration of Professional Workers into and out of Canada, 1946-1960. Professional Manpower Bulletin no. 11. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1961. Trends in the Agricultural Labour Force of Canada. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962. The Changing Urban Structure and Post-War Immigrants, with Special Reference to the Toronto Italian Population. Prepared by Samuel Sidlofsky. Research Project, 1963-64. A Study in Short-Term Fluctuations in Canadian International Migration, 1964-1965. Prepared by Louis Parai. Research Project, 1966-67. Immigrants in Scientific and Technical Professions in Canada. Professional Manpower Bulletin no. 2. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967. DOMINION BUREAU OF STATISTICS, CENSUS DIVISION Census of Canada, 1961. Characteristics of Immigrants, Provinces, and Metropolitan Areas. Bulletin 1.3-11. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964. Birthplace and Citizenship by Age Groups. Bulletin 1.3-4. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964. Households and Families: Post-War Immigrant Families. Bulletin 2.1-8. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964. Housing, Dwelling Characteristics of Immigrant Households. Bulletin 2.2-10. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964. Labour Force, Occupations by Sex Showing Birthplace, Period of Immigra-

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MAJOR DEBATES AND OCCASIONS Resolution proposed by W. Ross Thatcher and David Croll urging the government to launch a coherent immigration program. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 1, Apr. 3, 1946, pp. 524-45. Prime Minister Mackenzie King's statement on government immigration policy. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 3, May 1, 1947, pp. 264447. Debate on the repeal of the Chinese Immigration Act. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 3, May 2, 1947, pp. 2696-718, 2726-41, 2749-95. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Hon. Walter Harris, outlines the responsibilities of his new Department. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 2, Apr. 21, 1950, pp. 1762-81. Debate over alleged bureaucratic injustice in the administration of the Immigration Act. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 2, Feb. 15, 1955, pp. 1158-75; Feb. 17, pp. 1238-61; Feb. 18, pp. 1282-98. Debate over the government's handling of the Hungarian refugee movement. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 1, Jan. 25, 1957, pp. 661-90. Debate over a government motion to amend the Canadian Citizenship Act in order to remove certain features discriminating against naturalized Canadians. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 4, Sept. 5, 1958, pp. 4690-700; Sept. 6, pp. 4756-60. Debate over the attempt of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to curtail sponsored immigration. House of Commons Debates. Vol . 3, Apr. 15, 1959, pp. 2711-12; Apr. 22, pp. 2933-39. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Hon. Ellen Fairclough, tables new immigration regulations emphasizing education, training, and skills as the prime criteria for admissibility. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 1, Jan. 19, 1962, pp. 9-11. Debate over new immigration regulations. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 2, Feb. 27, 1962, pp. 1326-36. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Hon. Rene Tremblay, outlines the new Liberal government's views on immigration as well as plans for the reorganization of the Department. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 7, Aug. 14, 1964, pp. 6817-26. Debate over the proposed creation of a Department of Manpower and Immigration. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 5, May 9, 1966, pp. 4877, 4884-88, 4891-97, 4899-904; vol. 6, May 30, pp. 5727-31; vol. 6, June 3, pp. 5939-41. 461

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The Minister of Manpower and Immigration, the Hon. Jean Marchand, tables the government's White Paper on Canadian Immigration Policy. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 8, Oct. 14, 1966, pp. 8651-54. Debate over the government's bill to establish an independent Immigration Appeal Board. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 12, Feb. 20, 1967, pp. 13267-70; Feb. 21, pp. 13280-328; vol. 13, Feb. 22, pp. 1334667, 13375-90. Debate over a government resolution to establish a Canada Manpower and Immigration Council. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 3, Sept. 25, 1967, pp. 2435-58; vol. 3, Sept. 26, pp. 2484-525; vol. 4, Nov. 13, pp. 4205-28. Debate over the new immigration regulations establishing complete universality and a points system for determining admissibility. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 4, Oct. 26, 1967, pp. 3505-7; 3531-34; vol. 7, Mar. 25, 1968, pp. 8013-19. Statement by the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Allan J. MacEachen, on Canada's immigration policies and practice as they apply to members of the armed forces of other countries who seek permanent entry to Canada. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 113, May 22, 1969, pp. 8029-32. Debate over references in the Speech from the Throne to the admission of Czechoslovakian refugees in 1968. The Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Allan J. MacEachen, comments and details the number of admissions to date and the employment status of Czechoslovakian refugees. House of Commons Debates. Vol. 114, Nov. 4, 1969, pp. 524-25.

ROYAL COMMISSIONS AND GOVERNMENT INQUIRIES Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects. Final Report. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957. Royal Commission on Government Organization. Report. Vols. 1-5. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962-63. Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Preliminary Report; Report. Books 1-5. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1965-70. Research Reports (a selected list) Adie, R. F. "The Ethnic Press." Donnelly, M. S. "Ethnic Participation in Municipal Government: Winnipeg, St. Boniface and the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg." Foon, Sien. "The Chinese in Canada." Hobart, C. W. "Italian Immigrants in Edmonton: Adjustment and Integration." 462

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Kattan, N. "Integration des immigrants francophones a la vie canadienne." Lajoie-Robichaud, A. "Politiques et attitudes a 1'egard de I'immigration depuis la Confederation au Quebec." Sherwood, D., and Wakefield, A. "Voluntary Associations: (German, Ukrainian and Dutch Ethnic Associations in Canada)." Walmsley, N. E. "Some Aspects of Canada's Immigration Policy." Royal Commission on Security. Report (abridged). Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969. Royal Commission on the Status of Women. Report. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1971. Task Force on Government Information. To Know and Be Known. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969.

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Index Absorptive capacity, 83-84, 92, 111-14, 142. See also Immigration, Canadian Adult Occupational Training Act, 198, 400 n.34. See also Department of Manpower and Immigration, Canada Manpower Training Program of Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants, 168-73, 319-22. See also An advisory council in immigration; Canada Manpower and Immigration Council Act; Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and Boards Advisory Committee on Cooperation in Canadian Citizenship (1941), 177-78 An advisory council in immigration, 314-22. See also Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants; Canada Manpower and Immigration Council Act; Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and Boards Aga Khan, Prince Sadruddin, 17 Alberta, 64-67, 192-94, 381. See also Federal-provincial relations; Provinces Alien registration, 145-50, 160, 331-33 America, South, 53-64, 355. See also International migration; Western Hemisphere migration

Andras, Robert K., 373-74, 381-82, 387-88 Appeal rights of applicants in Canada. See Immigration Appeal Board; Sedgwick report Appleyard, R. T., 7-8 Armenians, 94, 404 n. 11 Armstrong, James, 72, 202-4 Asian immigration: attitudes to, 84-85, 94-95; increased emphasis on (1964), 142; Mackenzie King rejection of, 93-94; post-war movement, 53-64; pre-war restrictions on, 90; and restriction on sponsorship (1962), 126. See also Immigration, Act of 1952; Immigration, policy, Canadian, racial discrimination in; Immigration regulations Assisted passage loan regulations, 153, 406n.40 Atlantic Provinces, 64-67, 192-94. See also Federal-provincial relations; Provinces Australia consultative machinery, 28-29, 183, 320, 322 immigration management: bilateral agreements in, 4; communication with Canada on, 28-29, 274; comparison of, with Canada and U.S., 182-84, 326-27, 338-39;

INDEX

Good Neighbour Movement of, 183, 294; and Middle East competition, 284; planning in, 14-15, 34, 182-84; and timespan surveys, 29 immigration policy: objectives of, 13, 33-36, 182-84; public support for, 33-34, 182-84; racial discrimination in, 12, 13, 396 n.24; on refugees, 17-18; non-discrimination in, 31 Bates, Stewart, 86 Beaulieu, Mario, 228, 232 Bell, Richard: "Bell's Resurrection," 63, 138; and Immigration Act revision, 129; in immigration debates, 163, 351; on immigration within manpower, 157-58, 171, 342; interviews with, 134-36; on ministerial discretion, 103; true believer, 72 Bengough, Percy, 83, 85, 402 n.20 Bienvenue, Jean, 228, 234 Brain drain, 20-26, 356-57 Brent case, the, 104, 123, 405 n.31 Brewin, Andrew, 144, 410 nn.38,40 Britain: Canadian emancipation from, 79-80; Canadian emigration to, 39; and Suez crisis, 114-17 immigrants from: Canadian preference for, 280; contribution to labour force of, 41-47; migration-minded, 60- 61; more assistance needed for, 299-300; no ethnic organization for, 299 immigration from: by airlift, 201-4; to Australia, 7-8; at Confederation, 34; declining, 12, 54; and Italian immigration, 60-64; neglected (1955), 109; to Ontario, 201-5, 207-8; post-war movement, 53-64; Richmond study of, 8-9; role of Ontario House in, 202-5 British Columbia, 64-67, 192-94,

466

414 n. 30. See also Federalprovincial relations; Provinces British North America Act, section 95, 77 Brossard, Jacques, 215-17 Cabinet: and policy-making process, 130, 346-47; post-war decisions of, 90-91; and sponsored movement, 51; views of, on immigration (1957-63), 63, 136-37. See also Conservative government; Immigration, policy, Canadian; Liberal government Campbell, Lome, 169 Canada Manpower and Immigration Council Act (1967), 29, 159, 167-73, 322. See also Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants; An advisory council in immigration; Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and Boards Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and Boards, 18, 167-73, 184-85, 296, 314-15, 352-53. See also Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants; An advisory council in immigration Canadian Bar Association: Committee on Civil Liberties, 108-10 Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCRR), 188, 303-8 Canadian Citizenship Council, 291, 296, 298, 312-14 Canadian Citizenship Federation, 314 Canadian Council of Churches (CCC), 188, 303-8 Canadian Council on Social Development (formerly Canadian Welfare Council), 130, 291, 294, 296, 298 Canadian Jewish Congress, 83, 188, 305, 350 Canadian Polish Congress, 292, 320 Caribbean, 12, 53-64, 126, 355, 362-63 Centres d'Orientation et de Forma-

INDEX

tion des Immigrants (COFI), 229-31, 360 Ceylon, 53-64, 99 Chinese immigration: admission of relatives, 121; Canadian attitudes to (1948), 84-85; Chinese Immigration Act (1923), 84-85, 90 -91; illegal movement, 116, 119, 131-34, 142-45, 408 n.26; migration to B.C., 34, 60; P.C. 1930-2115, 85, 91; political pressure, 348-50; post-war movement, 12, 53-64; security problem of, 332. See also Asian immigration Churches and immigration, 117, 188, 190,291-92,299,303-8. See also Immigrants, services for; Voluntary sector Citizens' advice bureaus, 210-11. See also Immigrants, services for; Voluntary sector Citizenship, 52-53, 90, 158, 161-62, 165, 364, 365, 410 n.44 Citizenship Branch and Field Service: within Department of Citizenship and Immigration, 96-98; grants to voluntary agencies by, 308-9; move of, to Secretary of State (1966 agreement), 152-56; no mention of, in White Paper, 159-60; parliamentary concern relating to, 352; and relationship with voluntary sector, 310-14; renaissance of, 363-65; role of, in Hungarian refugee movement, 115; task force within, 365-69. See also Multiculturalism; Voluntary sector Cloutier, Dr. Francois, 228, 233 Conservative government, 116, 120-21, 125, 127-28. See also Diefenbaker, John G.; Fairclough, Ellen; Fulton, E. Davie Corry, J. A., 179 COSTI (Italian Community Education Centre), 5, 294, 300, 310, 416 n.l

Couillard, Louis, 141, 252 Cournoyer, Jean, 228 Crerar, Senator T. A., 402 n.l8 Czechoslovakian refugee movement, 37, 407n.51 Davidson, Dr. George, 105, 119, 130-31, 141, 226, 347, 408 n.25 Department of Citizenship apd Immigration: and Australian exchange, 28-29; "Bell's Resurrection" in, 63, 138; conviction of, about immigration, 12-11 \ development plans of (1964-66), 141-45, 150-51; Directorate of Special Services within, 103-4, 349; formation and early years of, 37, 79,91,95-101, 178-79, 415 n.9; and Indian Affairs Branch, 95-96, 137, 152, 159, 160; management of immigration by, 335-38; preparations of, for White Paper, 146-47, 150; and provincial relations, 186-94, 412 n.23; Settlement and Placement Service within, 185-86, 411 n.8. See also Citizenship Branch and Field Service; Department of Labour; Federalprovincial relations; Immigration, management, Canadian; Immigration, policy, Canadian; Ontario; Overseas immigration offices; Overseas Immigration Service; Quebec; Voluntary sector Department of External Affairs: Canadian class structure reflected by, 245; Glassco Commission comment on, 237-38; post-war difficulties of, 245; priority of, for foreign service, 244; and relationship with Overseas Immigration Service, 76, 136-37, 237, 242-45, 246-48, 278; on revision of Immigration Act, 129 Department of Indian Affairs and ' Northern Development, 159. See also Department of Citizenship 467

INDEX

and Immigration, and Indian Affairs Branch Department of Labour: in conflict with Citizenship and Immigration, 90-91, 111-14, 116, 137, 240-41,401 n.3,409 n.23; effect of 1965 reorganization on, 152, 410n.24; immigration philosophy of, 76, 83, 111 Department of Manpower and Immigration: agreement of, with Secretary of State, 154-56, 297, 366-67; birth of, 150-56, 171-72; Canada Manpower Centres/Immigration Centres within, 153, 339; Canada Manpower Training Program of, 47, 64, 197-98, 400 n.34; creation of 1967 regulations by, 52-53, 162; critics of, 106-7; and debate on Government Organization Bill (1966), 156-59; evidence of, to Special Joint Committee, 26-27, 161-62; on future manpower requirements, 44-47, 399 n.32; immigration within manpower, 153-56, 199, 33 8-46; Immigrant and Migrant Services Section within, 341; Immigrant Reception Centres within, 297, 341; Longitudinal Study of, 27-28; and relations with provinces, 196-99; structure of, 340-41; White Paper of, 52, 159-61. See also Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants; Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and Boards; Immigration, management, Canadian; Immigration, policy, Canadian; Overseas immigration offices; Overseas Immigration Service; Voluntary sector Department of Mines and Resources (Immigration Branch): dismantled, 95; Immigration Service of (1931-46), 80-81; inadequate resources of, 93; jurisdiction of, 240-45; ministers and deputy minister of, 89; 468

recruitment policy of, 246-47; Timlin study commissioned by, 113. See also Department of Citizenship and Immigration, formation and early years of Department of National War Services, 177-78 Department of the Secretary of State: agreement of, with Manpower and Immigration, 154-56, 297,366-67; revitalized program of, on citizenship, 297, 364-65. See also Citizenship Branch and Field Service Department of Trade and Commerce (Department of Industry, Trade, and Commerce), 76, 136, 416 n. 16. See also Overseas immigration offices; Overseas Immigration Service Departmental Advisory Committee on Immigration (DACI), 186-91, 412n.l5 Deportation. See Immigration, Act of 1952; Immigration Appeal Board; Sedgwick report DesRoches, Jacques, 141 Deutsch, Dr. J. J., 46-47, 87, 152, 161-62 Developing countries, 4, 20-26, 46-47, 356-57, 397 n.36 Diefenbaker, John G., 108-9, 127, 137, 157 Dion, Abbe Gerard, 222-23 Douglas, T. C., 157 Drew, George, 63, 72, 201-4, 209 Dube, Yves, 169 Duplessis, Maurice, 225-26 Economic Council of Canada, 36, 37,41-43, 120, 139-40, 152 Ethnic groups: assistance of, to immigrants, 299-300; ethnic isolation of, 10, 358-63; inner life of, 50; as part of voluntary sector, 299-300; political pressure by, 6, 348-49. See also Multiculturalism; Voluntary sector Ethnic press, 292

INDEX

Europe: eastern, 282-83, 330-31; southern, 9-11, 47-53, 280-82 immigrants from: Canadian preference for, 54-55, 60, 280-82; contribution to labour force of, 41-47; decline in numbers of, 54; post-war availability of, 37; post-war movement of, 53-64. See also Czechoslovakian refugee movement; Hungarian refugee movement; individual European countries European Economic Community, 3, 63 Fairclough, Ellen: appeals to Duplessis, 226; attempts to control sponsored movement, 6, 52, 121-25, 400n.47, 401 n.48; attempts to revise Act, 105, 125-31, 408 n.25; comments on DACI meetings, 190; defeated in Hamilton West, 158; and immigration regulations (1962), 125-31; interview with, 136-37; no cabinet support for, 121 Fairweather, Gordon, 144 Favreau, Guy, 145 Federal-provincial relations: Keenleyside on provincial responsibilities, 401 n. 5; language training and textbook agreements, 191-92, 414 n.30; medicalwelfare agreements, 192; normal, 191-94; and policy-making pattern, 195; provincial dissatisfaction with, 193-94, 412 n.22; the shared jurisdiction, 177-99; simultaneous awakening of, 196; unchanged in manpower era, 196-97. See also Federalism, Canadian; Immigration, management, Canadian; Ontario; Provinces; Quebec Federalism, Canadian: Conference on Reconstruction (1945), 178; influence of, on immigration, 77-79; post-war performance, Smiley analysis, 177, 179,

195-96; the shared jurisdiction, 177-99. See also Federalprovincial relations; Immigration, management, Canadian; Ontario; Provinces; Quebec Ferguson, Edith, 414 n. 14 Fingerprinting, 148-49, 333, 380, 409 n. 18 Foreign policy and immigration, 238, 264-65, 356-57. See also Department of External Affairs; Overseas immigration offices; Overseas Immigration Service Foreign policy review, 264-65 Forsey, Dr. Eugene, 85, 190 Fortier, Laval, 89, 186-91, 225, 242-43, 276-77, 336-37 France, 12, 53-64, 91, 283. See also Europe; Immigration, policy, Canadian; Overseas immigration offices; Overseas Immigration Service; Quebec Frost, Leslie, 202, 206 Fulton, E. Davie: as Acting Minister, 119-21; attacks Liberal policies, 108-10; criticizes Mackenzie King statement, 94; disappears from immigration scene, 121; reassures Department, 125; role of, in special committee review, 110-11; survey of U.S. French Canadians initiated by, 226 Gabias, Yves, 214-15, 218-19 Gendron Commission, 232, 415n.31 General Board of Immigration Appeals, 125-27. See also Immigration Appeal Board Germany, 34, 41-47, 53-64, 239-43. See also Europe Glassco Commission. See Royal Commission on Government Organization Greece, 53-64, 333. See also Europe, southern; Sedgwick report; Sponsored movement Green, Howard, 20 469

INDEX

Hague Agreement on Refugee Seamen (1957), 161 Handlin, Oscar, 33 Harris, Walter, 83, 107, 119 Hayes, Tasman, 183 Hong Kong, 131-33, 143, 332. See also Chinese immigration; Security and security screening Hooper, Harry, 145, 408 n.10 Hungarian refugee movement, 29, 37,74,114-17,202,295, 406 n.47, 413 n.3 Immigrants: anonymity of, 26-28; as a political factor, 6; class image of, 30; mobility of, 8-9; professional and skilled, 11-15, 20-26; unskilled, 9-11 Canadian, 53-67, 185-86, 358-63; children of, 181, 35960; information and services needed by, 35, 359-62; manpower programs for, 339; task force relating to, 365-69. See also Sponsored movement services for: cooperative effort needed in, 186, 300-302; Manpower and Immigration survey on, 292-93; and 1966 agreement, 154-56; organizations providing, 291-92; present needs in, 358-63; weak and unequal, 297-300. See also Voluntary sector Immigration: difficulties in management of, 5-7, 35, 325-33; illegality in, 31, 131-32, 325; and skill and race, 11-13. See also Australia; International migration; United States Act of 1952, 101-6,108-10, 405 n.33,409 n.16; efforts to revise, 105, 127-31, 143-44, 158, 357-58; ministerial discretion, 102-5, 147-50. See also Immigration Appeal Board; Immigration regulations; Sedgwick report 470

Act of 1976, 374-80; Immigration regulations 1978, 378-79 Canadian: changing character of, 8-9, 12,30,53-55,355, 362-63; contribution of, to labour force, 41-47; displacement theory, 84; fascination of, 73, 247; and foreign policy, 237-38, 244-45, 263-65, 328, 355-58; illegality in, 31, 131-34, 145-50, 166-67, 386-89, national origins of, 53-64; and Parliament, 107-10, 136, 163, 351-52; pattern of settlement of, 64-67; and population growth, 33-36, 41, 84, 87, 92, 112, 113, 355; present needs in, 355-69; public discussion of, 51-71, 355-58; purpose of/belief in, 33-35, 71-77, 80-88, 91-95, 110-14, 325-26, 328, 355-58, 403 n.23; saving in education and training provided by, 46-47; unattended, 359-60 management, Canadian, 325-53; bilateral agreements relating to, 4-5, 395 n.2; distribution problem of, 64-67, 180-81, 195, 406 n.50; federal-bureaucratic management of, 184-86, 193-99, 325-53; manpower era of, 153-56, 158, 171-72, 196-99, 272-74, 285-87, 338-46; planning, tap on and off system, 74-75, 111, 328, 416 n.2; political pressures in, 5-7, 103-4, 278-79, 348-51, 405 n.28; public participation in, 167-73, 186-91,314-22, 348-49; specialism essential in, 170, 287; three eras of, 117-18, 134-38, 141-45, 275-78, 285-87, 336-46; future needs, 398-400. See also Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants; Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and Boards; Citizenship

INDEX

Branch and Field Service; Department of Citizenship and Immigration; Department of Manpower and Immigration; Federal-provincial relations; Sponsored movement; Voluntary sector policy, Canadian: European preference in, 55, 60, 91-95, 280 82; manpower orientation in, 71, 150-56, 196-99, 338-44; policy-making process, 346-53; preconditions of, 77-78; racial discrimination in, before 1962,51,54-55, 60, 84-85, 93-95, 121, 188; removed in 1962, 76-77, 125-28, 130-31, 138; and in 1967, 11-13; rejection, no reasons given, 106, 110, 163, 165, 330-31,405 n.35; religion and ethnic origin, 418 n.3; points system, 11, 159-62, 262-63, 285-87, 362-63, 380; White Paper on, 9-10, 26, 52, 146-47, 150, 159-61, 186, 319-22. Green Paper on, 374-75, 381. See also Canada Manpower and Immigration Council Act; Federal-provincial relations; Immigration Appeal Board, Act of 1967. Immigration Appeal Board, 125-27, 147-49, 163-67, 331, 352; Act of 1967, 126-27, 147-50, 153, 159, 163-65, 351 Immigration-Labour Committee, 90-91 Immigration regulations: 1962, 76-77, 105, 125-31, 347; 1967, 11,47,52-53, 159, 161-62, 262-63 Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire (IODE), 72,291 India, 53-64, 99, 101 Inter-Agency Council for Services to Immigrants and Migrants, 292, 295-97, 319

Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), 18-20, 31, 171, 357 International Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951) and Protocol (1967), 16-18, 161 International Development Commission, 24 International Development Research Centre, 397 n.36 < International Institute of Metropolitan Toronto, 210, 291, 293-95, 302, 309-10, 319, 356, 412 n.22 International migration, 3-31, 343, 356-57 Isbister, Claude, 141, 150-52 Italian Immigrant Aid Society, 5, 292, 300 Italian Office for Labour and Social Assistance (ULAS), 300 Italy, 5, 34,41-47,49-50, 53-64, 121-25, 206, 280-82, 300. See also COSTI; Europe, southern; Sponsored movement Jaskula, John, 169 Jewish community, 83-84, 302, 350 Jewish Immigrant Aid Services of Canada (JIAS), 137, 291, 294, 296, 298 Johnson, Lyndon B., 12 Jolliffe, A. L., 82, 336 Keenleyside, Dr. Hugh, 79, 82, 95, 113, 225-26 Kennedy, John F., 33 Kent, Tom: belief of, in decentralization, 352; as Deputy Minister, 141, 152; on effect of 1967 regulations, 328; mention in Morin pamphlet, 217-18; negotiations of, with voluntary sector, 318-19; as Policy Secretary to P.M., 152; White Paper draft for, 159 King, Mackenzie: apprehensive 471

INDEX

about Quebec, 79, 225; post-war policies of, 90-91; principles maintained by, 149, 336; on purposes of immigration, 112; retirement of, 95; statement of, on immigration policy, 91-95 Labour force: immigrant contribution to, 41-47; overseas recruitment of unskilled labour for, 49-50; post-war demand for labour, 88; rapid growth of, 41-42, 356. See also Department of Labour; Department of Manpower and Immigration; Ontario Labour movement, Canadian, 72, 83-86, 189-90, 320, 350 Lang, Otto, 141 Language training: a basic immigrant service, 358, 361; federal responsibility for, 154-56; postwar federal-provincial discussions on, 178; and textbook agreements, 191-92, 414 n.30. See also Ontario; Quebec; Voluntary sector Laporte, Pierre, 228, 233 Law Society of Upper Canada, 108-9 Lawyers and immigration, 106-11. See also Immigration Appeal Board; Sedgwick report Liberal government: continuous rule of, 89; philosophy and style of, 179; post-war immigration plans of, 89-96; on primary importance of foreign service, 244-45; statement of, on immigration policy (1947), 92-95 Liberal party, 351, 383. See also Liberal government "Longitudinal Study of the Economic and Social Adaptation of Immigrants," 27-28, 29 Lynch, Philip, 29 Macaluso, Joe, 63, 158, 401 n.48 MacEachen, Allan J., 40-41, 198, 416 n.2 McGowan, J. S., 86

472

Mackasey, Bryce, 141 Major source countries, 12, 53-64 Malta, 53-64,91 Manitoba, 14, 64-67, 160-61, 180, 192-94. See also Federal-provincial relations; Provinces Manpower. See Department of Manpower and Immigration Marchand, Jean, 11, 165, 214-15, 401 n.4 Masse, Marcel, 194, 219-21 Melville, Herman, 33 Middle East, 53-64, 94, 284-85. See also Immigration, policy, Canadian Migrants, Canadian, 296, 344 Migration. See International migration Minister's permits, 102, 148. See also Immigration, Act of 1952; Sedgwick report Montreal, 49, 64, 78, 218-22, 231-34. See also Quebec; Voluntary sector More, K. H., 144 Morin, Rosaire, 217-18 Mosher, A. R., 85 Multiculturalism, 368, 389-92, 393, 398 n.6, 419 n.2 Munro, John, 164, 270, 410 n.38

National Committee on Welfare of Immigrants (Canadian Welfare Council), 296 National Employment Service (NES), 139-40, 153 National Inter-Faith Immigration Committee, 292, 296, 307 Netherlands, 5, 34, 53-64, 91. See also Europe New Democratic party (NDP), 351. See also Labour movement, Canadian New Zealand, 12-13 Newcomers in Transition, 210, 309, 414n.l4 Nicholson, J. R., 214, 248, 317 Nurse, Harold, 145, 147, 408 n.10

INDEX

Occupational Training for Adults Program, 198. See also Department of Manpower and Immigration, Canada Manpower Training Program of Ontario, 64-67, 195, 201-13, 314-19, 381, 392-94, 413 n.10; Citizenship Branch, 208-12, 413 n . l ; Ontario Economic Council, 193, 203, 212-13; overseas operations of, 14, 201-8, 413 nn.2, 5; relations of, with federal government, 6, 184-91, 193-95, 212; Selective Placement Service, 207-8,413 n . l . See also Federal-provincial relations; Provinces; Voluntary sector Ontario Welfare Council, 417 n.4 Opperman, Hubert, 13 Orders-in-Council: P.C. 1930-2115 (Asiatic immigration), 90; P.C. 1946-695 (admissible classes), 89; P.C. 1950-2856 (admissible classes enlarged), 99, 123; P.C. 1950-4364 (admission of enemy aliens), 99; P.C. 1956-785 (admissible classes), 123; P.C. 1959310 (sponsorship restricted), 6, 52, 121-25; P.C. 1962-86 (immigration regulations), 125-31; P.C 1967-1616 (immigration regulations), 11, 162 Overseas immigration offices personal impressions of, 267-87; itinerary and interviews, 268-69; reasons for research, 267-68 first tour (1964): calibre of service of, 271; isolation of, 270-71; poverty of equipment of, 248, 270, 272 second tour (1966): during manpower era, 272-73; views of overseas staff: on Citizenship Branch, 279; on European preference, 280-82; on immigrant services, 279; on immigration within manpower, 273-74; on management in

Ottawa, 275-78; on Middle East operations, 283-85; on overseas achievement, 274; on politics, 282; on political pressure, 278-79; on Quebec, 283; on security screening, 282-83; on sponsored immigration, 274-75, 281-82; and liberality in immigration policy, 285 third tour (1969): major changes in, 285-86; need to preserve professional service of, 287; reservations of staff of, 286-87 Overseas Immigration Service (Overseas Service/Foreign Branch), 72-73, 237-65, 415 n.l, 416 n.12; as a career foreign service, 142, 151, 153, 246, 258-62; and departmental integration policy, 252-53, 263; early recruitment for, 246-48, 415 n.9; immigration offices of, 248-49, 273; influence and difficulties of, 237-38; jurisdiction problem of, 240-45; management structure of, 142. 153, 249-53; origin of, in post-war Europe, 238-40, 415 n. 10; and overseas conferences, 255-58; and overseas integration policy, 237-38, 252-53, 263-65; reasons for slow progress of, 253-55; recent developments in, 262, 265; status problem of, 76, 243-45, 258-62, 278, 416 n. 15. See also Department of External Affairs; Immigration, management, Canadian; Ontario, overseas operations of; Quebec, overseas presence of Pakistan, 53-64, 99 Pankhurst, K. V., 39 Parliament, 106-11, 346-53; Members of, 106-7, 146, 163, 349, 351 House of Commons: attitudes of, to immigration, 115, 136; need for separate standing committee in, 144,334,351; Special Committee on Esti473

INDEX

mates (1955), 110-11; and sponsorship issue (1959), 6, 52, 61, 121-25; Standing Committee on Labour, Manpower, and Immigration, 351 Senate: Special Committee on Manpower and Employment (1960), 139-40, 152, 161; Special Joint Committee of Senate and House of Commons on Immigration (1966), 26-27,46-47, 107, 159, 161-62, 328, 410n.38; Standing Committee on Immigration and Labour (1946), 80-88, 161, 169, 320,401 n.5, 402nn.ll, 18, 20 Pearson, Lester B., 147, 150-52, 156 Pelletier, Gerard, 232, 364 Pickersgill, J. W.: early policymaking role of, 91, 95, 336; on major issues, 99, 101, 103, 110, 127,400 n.47; other activities of, 189, 243; in parliamentary debates, 108, 121-25, 127, 129, 163, 351; role of, in Hungarian crisis, 114, 226 Pierce, Sidney, 169 Poland, 53-64, 91, 283. See also Canadian Polish Congress; Security and security screening Political parties, 351. See also Conservative government; Labour movement, Canadian; Liberal government Population Policy, Canadian 380-84, 396 Portugal, 12, 34, 53-64, 333, 409 n . l l . See also Europe, southern; Sponsored movement Progressive Conservative party, 108-10, 129, 157, 351, 383. See also Conservative government; Diefenbaker, John G. Provinces, 64, 67, 144, 161-62, 192-94, 353, 355. See also Federal-provincial relations; Ontario; Quebec Provincial Citizenship Councils, 474

314. See also Canadian Citizenship Council Public service, 51, 60, 197, 325, 334. See also Immigration, management, Canadian Quebec, 64-67, 213-34, 381, 390, 394-98; Department of Immigratioin, 227-34; and federal discrimination issue, 87-88, 195, 215-18, 220, 224-27; immigrant services in, 231, 360-61; influence of, on Canadian immigration program, 79, 224-27, 333-34; language rights and language training in, 229-33, 414 n.30; negative attitudes of, to immigration, 79, 180, 216, 218, 219, 283; opinion of, 218-24; overseas presence of, 214,219,223, 228, 231-32; purposes of immigration for, 35, 213-14, 218-24; Quebec Immigration Service, 214, 222. See also Federalprovincial relations; Federalism, Canadian; France; Provinces Randall, Stanley J., 203 Receiving countries, 3-6, 326-33. See also Australia; International migration; United States Refugees, 3, 15-20, 83-84, 356-57, 384-86. See also Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and Tibetan refugee movements; ICEM; UNHCR Refugee Status Determination, 379-80, 388-89 Richmond, Anthony H., 8-9 Robarts, John, 202 Robertson, Gordon, 91, 152 Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 129, 282, 330-31. See also Security and security screening; Sedgwick report Royal Commission: on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 34-35; on Canada's Economic Prospects (Gordon Commission), T13-14;

INDEX

on Government Organization (Glassco Commission), 140, 152, 237-38, 337-38, 415 n.2; on Security, 331-33 Ryan, William, 169 St. Jean Baptiste Societies, Federation of, 221 St. Laurent, Louis, 80, 95-96, 225 St. Leonard, 233 Samuel, T. J., 39 Saskatchewan, 64-67, 192-94. See also Federal-provincial relations; Provinces Schwartz, Abba P., 10 Scott, Janet V., 164-65 Security and security screening, 30, 282, 329-33. See also Immigration Appeal Board; Sedgwick, Joseph Sedgwick, Joseph, 145-50, 166-67, 418 n.2 Sedgwick report, 145-50, 160 Sending countries, 4-5, 12, 53-64. See also Brain drain; International migration Service d'Accueil aux Voyageurs et aux Immigrants (SAVI), 291, 310 Ship-jumping, 145-47, 409 n.ll Smiley, Donald V., 177, 179, 195-96 Snedden, B. M., 4, 14 Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, 291-94, 315-17 Spain, 34, 53-64. See also Europe Special Joint Committee on Immigration Policy, 375-77 Sponsored movement: administrative control of, protested, 400 n.46; discussion of, 9-10, 47-53; escalation of, 51, 61-62, 116, 119, 121-25. See also Europe, southern; Greece; Italy; Portugal; Unskilled immigrant Sponsorship issue: first control effort (1959), 6, 52, 61, 121-22, 130-31; political pressures in, 349-50; problem of control in,

51-53; second control effort (1966), 149-62, 410 n.40; Sedgwick recommendations on, 148-49; support from M.P.s on, 163; views of overseas staff on, 274-75. See also Immigration Appeal Board, Act of 1967; Immigration regulations, 1967 Stanbury, Robert, 364 Starr, Michael, 137, 157-58 Stinson, Arthur, 312-14 Suez crisis, 29, 37, 61, 74, 114-17 Supreme Court of Canada, 104, 123, 405n.31 Switzerland, 34, 53-64. See also Europe Task Force on Government Information, report of, 359-60 Thompson, Robert, 157 Tibetan refugee movement, 341, 419 n.9 Timlin, Mabel F., 113 Toronto: coordinating committees of, 117,292,295-97,314-19, 418 n.7; as major receiving centre, 49, 64, 78, 114, 315, 363; need of, for federal-provincial action, 212. See also Immigrants, services for; Ontario; Voluntary sector Tremblay, Rene, 133-34, 141-45, 150, 163 Trudeau, Pierre Elliott, 34, 389, 900 Undocumented Migration, 386-89 Unemployment and immigration, 53, 99-100, 120, 138, 139-40, 214, 233-34, 356 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Office of (UNHCR), 16-18, 19-20, 31, 379, 384-86; Canadian Correspondent of, 292, 418 n.8. See also Aga Khan, Prince Sadruddin; Refugees United Nations Institute for Train475

INDEX

ing and Research (UNITAR), 20-26, 397 n.36 United States: academic influx from, 40, 399 n.21; American Council for Nationalities Service, 294; American Immigration and Citizenship Conference, 12, 294, 297-98, 302; and brain drain, 20-26; and Canada, emigrationimmigration, 21, 38-41; draft evaders and deserters from 40-41, 357; as major source country, 12, 41-47, 53-64 immigration: changing character of, 7; and illegal immigration, 408 n.26; intake, 35-36; as national myth, 36; policy and management of, 4, 6-7, 10-11, 13, 31, 326-27, 338, 396 n.21; and refugee policy, 17-18, 397 n.30. See also Chinese immigration, illegal movement; Western Hemisphere migration Unskilled immigrant, the, 4, 9-11, 46-47. See also Sponsored movement; Sponsorship issue

Vancouver Immigrant Services Committee, 292, 295-97, 310, 417 n.6 Voluntary sector, 291-322, 358-69; attempts of, at coordination, 295-97, 314-19; and DACI, 188;

476

direction lacking in, 294, 358-59; funding problems of, 297, 301-2, 308-10, 367-68, 417 n. 10; organizations in, listed, 291-92; present needs of, 300-302, 367-68; professional agencies in, 293, 416 n.l; 1966 survey of, 292; and White Paper, 160. See also Advisory Board on the Adjustment of Immigrants; Canada Manpower and Immigration Council and Boards; Immigrants, services for; Ontario; Toronto Wahn, Ian, 144, 410 n.38 Watson, Barbara M., 12 Welsh, R. F., Company, 50 West Indies, 12, 53-64, 126, 355, 362-63 Western Hemisphere migration, 142, 343, 357. See also International migration; United States White Paper on Canadian Immigration Policy. See Immigration, policy, Canadian White Paper on Employment and Income (1945), 87 World Refugee Year, 295 Yaremko, John, 209, 413 n.3 Yugoslavia, 12, 53-64 Zay, Dr. Nicholas, 222