Campaigns and elections American style : the changing landscape of political campaigns [Fifth ed.] 9781138605152, 1138605158, 9781138605183, 1138605182

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgments
Contributors
1 Elections in a Polarized America: Understanding the Dynamics and the Transformation of American Political Campaigns
PART I: The Political Context of Campaigns: Campaign Planning and Management, Political Parties, and Redistricting
2 Campaign Planning and Management: The Key Elements of Campaigns
3 The Role of Political Parties
4 Elections and the Long Journey into the Redistricting Thicket
PART II: Identifying Voters: Who Votes, Why, and How
5 The Uses and Challenges of Survey Research in Election Campaigns
6 Political Data, Analytics, and Targeting
7 U.S. Elections on the Brink
8 The Ground Game: Field Organizing in Political Campaigns
PART III: Communicating with Voters
9 Creating a Winning Campaign Strategy
10 Paid Media Today: Four Screens but the Same Two Eyes
11 From Radio to Twitter: The Evolution of Earned Media
PART IV: Financing Elections
12 Candidate Campaign Fundraising Strategies
13 Outside Money and Inside Policy: Campaign Finance Before and After Citizens United
PART V: The Future of Campaigns and Elections
14 Why Campaigns Matter in a Polarized Environment
Index

Citation preview

Praise for the Fifth Edition As the 2016 election taught us, important changes have taken place in how elections are won. Nelson and Thurber have assembled an excellent team of authors to help us understand prior elections and also train our sights on future elections. A distinct element of the book is the cutting-edge, insightful chapters by those actually ­doing the work of running campaigns, while being grounded in expert academic work. Together, they provide strong coverage of phenomena old and new to place campaigns in the broader context of American government: the use of big data, social media, and substantial unpaid-for traditional media; campaign finance, major donors, Super PACs, and 501(c) organizations; and polling, campaign management, the ground game, parties, and redistricting. David Magleby, Brigham Young University Thurber and Nelson’s text is an important resource that brings together perspectives of both academics and experienced campaign professionals to evaluate central elements of the 2016 campaign, making the case “that campaigns matter.” While these insights consider the influence of recent changes in digital technology, data, and social media in an increasingly polarized society, they also connect their analysis of key variables – the political context, voters, messaging, and money – to the fundamentals of successful political campaigns. Amy E. Jasperson, Rhodes College Campaigns and Elections American Style is the perfect companion to my unit on campaigns. The chapters are clearly written and appropriately sized, representing an ideal mix of academic analysis and practicioner experience. The new edition provides vital perspective on the 2016 election without over-focusing on its ideosyncrasies. The chapters on strategy, tactics, messaging, and communications are particularly useful for my in-class simulation. Bruce F. Nesmith, Coe College By combining insights from academic research on campaigns with firsthand experiences of campaign practitioners, Campaigns and Elections American Style provides a comprehensive and enlightening account of contemporary political campaigns at every level. Rachel Bitecofer, Christopher Newport University

Campaigns and Elections American Style

Following one of the most contentious and surprising elections in US history, the new edition of this classic text demonstrates unequivocally: campaigns matter. With new and revised chapters throughout, Campaigns and Elections American Style provides a real education in contemporary campaign politics. In the fifth edition, academics and campaign professionals explain how Trump won the presidency, comparing his sometimes novel tactics with tried and true strategies including how campaign themes and strategies are developed and communicated, the changes in campaign tactics as a result of changing technology, new techniques to target and mobilize voters, the evolving landscape of campaign finance and election laws, and the increasing diversity of the role of media in elections. Offering a unique and careful mix of Democrat and Republican, academic and practitioner, and male and female campaign perspectives, this volume scrutinizes national- and local-level campaigns with a special focus on the 2016 presidential and congressional elections and what those elections might tell us about 2018 and 2020. Students, citizens, candidates, and campaign managers will learn not only how to win elections but also why it is imperative to do so in an ethical way. Perfect for a variety of courses in American government, this book is essential reading for political junkies of any stripe and serious students of campaigns and elections.

Highlights of the Fifth Edition • Covers the 2016 elections with an eye to 2018 and 2020. • Explains how Trump won the presidency, the changes in campaign tactics as a result of changing technology, new techniques to target and mobilize voters, the evolving landscape of campaign finance and election laws, and the increasing diversity of the role of media. • Includes a new part structure and the addition of part introductions to help students contextualize the major issues and trends in campaigns and elections.

Candice J. Nelson is professor of government, and academic director of the Campaign Management Institute, at American University. She is the author of Grant Park: The Democratization of Presidential Elections: 1968–2008; coauthor of The Myth of the Independent Voter, Vital Signs: Perspective on the Health of American Campaigning and The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform; and coeditor of Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in Elections, Crowded Airways: Campaign Advertising in Elections and Shades of Gray: Perspectives on Campaign Ethics. James A. Thurber is distinguished university professor of government, and founder and former director of the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies, at American University. Dr. Thurber is the author, coauthor, or editor of Obama In Office, Rivals for Power: Presidential–Congressional Relations, Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in Elections, Crowded ­Airways: Campaign Advertising in Elections, The Battle for Congress: Consultants, Candidates, and Voters, Congress and the Internet, and American Gridlock: The Sources, Character and Impact of Political Polarization.

Transforming American Politics Series Editor: Lawrence C. Dodd

Dramatic changes in political institutions and behavior over the past three decades have underscored the dynamic nature of American politics, confronting political scientists with a new and pressing intellectual agenda. The pioneering work of early postwar scholars, while laying a firm empirical foundation for contemporary scholarship, failed to consider how American politics might change or recognize the forces that would make fundamental change inevitable. In reassessing the static interpretations fostered by these classic studies, political scientists are now examining the underlying dynamics that generate transformational change. Transforming American Politics is a series that brings together texts addressing four closely related aspects of change, A first concern is documenting and explaining recent changes in American politics – in institutions, processes, behavior, and policymaking. A second is reinterpreting classic studies and theories to provide a more accurate perspective on postwar politics. The series looks at historical change to identify recurring patterns of political transformation within and across the distinctive eras of American politics. Last and perhaps most important, the series presents new theories and interpretations ­t hat explain the dynamic processes at work and thus clarify the direction of contemporary politics. All of the books focus on the central theme of ­transformation – transformation in both the conduct of American politics and in the way we study and understand its many aspects.

Campaigns and Elections American Style

The Changing Landscape of Political Campaigns Fifth Edition

Edited by Candice J. Nelson and James A. Thurber

American University

Published 2019 by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Taylor & Francis The right of editors Candice J. Nelson and James A. Thurber to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Fourth edition published by Westview Press 2013 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Thurber, James A., 1943– editor. | Nelson, Candice J., 1949– editor. Title: Campaigns and elections American style: the changing landscape of political campaigns / James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson, American University. Description: Fifth Edition. | New York: Routledge, 2019. | Series: Transforming American Politics | “Fourth edition published by Westview Press 2013”—T.p. verso. Identifiers: LCCN 2018015270 | ISBN 9781138605152 (hardback) | ISBN 9781138605183 (paperback) | ISBN 9780429468278 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Political campaigns—United States. | Campaign management—United States. Classification: LCC JK2281 .C353 2019 | DDC 324.70973—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018015270 ISBN: 978-1-138-60515-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-60518-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-46827-8 (ebk) Typeset in Minion Pro by codeMantra

To David, Kuniko, Peter, Michael, Elina, Roman, and Sadie CJN

To Claudia, Mark, Lissette, Kathryn, Greg, Tristan, Bryan, and Kelsey JAT

Contents

Acknowledgments xiii Contributors xv 1 Elections in a Polarized America: Understanding the Dynamics and the Transformation of American Political Campaigns 1 James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson Part I

The Political Context of Campaigns: Campaign Planning and Management, Political Parties, and Redistricting 11 2 Campaign Planning and Management: The Key Elements of Campaigns 14 Anne Caprara 3 The Role of Political Parties 36 David A. Dulio and John S. Klemanski 4 Elections and the Long Journey into the Redistricting Thicket 66 David Lublin Part II

Identifying Voters: Who Votes, Why, and How 91 5 The Uses and Challenges of Survey Research in Election Campaigns 94 Glen Bolger xi

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6 Political Data, Analytics, and Targeting 123 Tom Bonier 7 U.S. Elections on the Brink 136 Chris Sautter 8 The Ground Game: Field Organizing in Political Campaigns 160 Alicia Kolar Prevost Part III

Communicating with Voters 185 9 Creating a Winning Campaign Strategy 188 David Winston 10 Paid Media Today: Four Screens but the Same Two Eyes 218 Martin Hamburger 11 From Radio to Twitter: The Evolution of Earned Media 241 Ed O’Keefe Part IV

Financing Elections 265 12 Candidate Campaign Fundraising Strategies 267 Anthony Corrado 13 Outside Money and Inside Policy: Campaign Finance Before and After Citizens United 304 R. Sam Garrett Part V

The Future of Campaigns and Elections 329 14 Why Campaigns Matter in a Polarized Environment 331 Candice J. Nelson and James A. Thurber Index 343

Acknowledgments

The first edition of this book was published in 1995 (after the 1994 election). This edition is published after the historic 2016 election and just prior to the 2018 midterm elections. Much has changed in U.S. politics in the last 23 years. However, the genesis and continued inspiration and revision of all editions of this book stays the same. The book comes from American University’s Campaign Management Institute (CMI), which was started by campaign professionals and academics in 1985. From the first edition to the fifth edition, this intense two-week hands-on course that brings together the latest academic knowledge and practical wisdom about campaigning continues to have profound influence on the book. It is updated after each election cycle with the latest developments in campaign strategies and tactics. CMI students receive professional guidance from academics, campaign managers, pollsters, media specialists, mobilization experts, campaign strategists, and candidates. This is reflected in the chapters. We thank the thousands of the students who have attended CMI and the dozens of campaign professionals who have lectured and dozens of people who have mentored our CMI students. Many CMI graduates have gone on to professional careers in campaigning or to elective office and have given back to the institute. We are proud of their accomplishments and thank them for generously sharing their invaluable knowledge and insights about the strategies and tactics of campaigns and elections in America. We thank our friends at Routledge for their support and encouragement to produce a fifth edition. We give special thanks to Jennifer Knerr (our first editor for this book), senior editor for politics at Routledge/ Taylor & Francis Group, who continues to support our original idea of combining the knowledge of campaign professionals with academics in a single book about campaigns and elections in America. Also thank xiii

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you to Ze’ev Sudry, senior editorial assistant at Routledge. Thank you to Ada Fung, senior editor at Hachette Book Group, for her expert editorial direction and backing of this edition before Westview was acquired by Routledge. We also thank Rebecca Prosky, program coordinator, and Professor David Barker, director, at the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies at American University for their assistance in the production of this edition. We thank all the contributors for their chapters and for sharing their wisdom from academic study and practical experience. This is a collective effort, but we take full responsibility for any omissions or errors of fact or interpretation. Candice J. Nelson James A. Thurber

Contributors

Glen Bolger is one of the Republican Party’s leading political strategists and pollsters. He is a partner and cofounder of Public Opinion Strategies, a national political and public affairs survey research firm whose clients include leading political figures, Fortune 500 companies, and major associations. Public Opinion Strategies has 12 U.S. senators, seven governors, and 59 members of Congress as clients. Glen is one of only two pollsters to be a three-time winner of the “Republican Pollster of the Year” award from the American Association of Political Consultants, winning the prestigious award for his work in 2002, 2009, and 2012. Prior to cofounding Public Opinion Strategies, Glen was the director of Survey Research & Analysis for the National Republican Congressional Committee, the political arm of the House Republican Conference. He is a graduate from American University in Washington, D.C. Glen and his wife, Carol, have three young adult daughters. Tom Bonier is a veteran Democratic political strategist, cofounder of Clarity Campaign Labs, and the CEO of Target Smart. Prior to that he cofounded Clarity Campaign Labs in 2012 and helped build it into one of the nation’s leading Democratic analytics and research firms. He has spent more than 20 years working in Democratic and progressive politics. Prior to Clarity, Bonier served as chief operating officer at the National Committee for an Effective Congress (NCEC). Throughout his career, Tom has received numerous awards for his contributions to political campaigning, redistricting, and strategic planning. He has also appeared as a commentator for multiple publications, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and Politico, as well as on air on News Hour on PBS and All Things Considered on National Public Radio. Anne Caprara is a political professional with over 16 years of experience in Democratic campaigns. Anne has managed and consulted with candidates and elected officials at every level of state and federal government. Anne currently serves as campaign manager for Illinois governor candidate

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J.B. Pritzker (D) and is a senior advisor for Priorities USA Action, the main Super PAC that supported Hillary Clinton for president in 2016. Anne previously served as executive director of the group. In that capacity, she managed a multimillion-dollar budget and a professional political staff focused on the 2016 presidential election. Before coming to Priorities, Anne served as the vice president of campaigns at EMILY’s List. In 2014, Anne was political director for the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, helping to oversee Senate races in 33 states. In 2011 and 2012, Anne served as the DSCC’s deputy political director, covering all Senate races east of Wisconsin. In 2008, Anne was the campaign manager for Betsy Markey, a first-time candidate running against a three-term Republican congresswoman in Colorado’s Fourth Congressional District. Betsy won by the race by 12 points. Anne subsequently served as Betsy’s chief of staff from 2008 until 2010. Before that, Anne served as chief of staff for Ohio Congresswoman Betty Sutton and as the deputy research director at EMILY’s List. She obtained her master’s degree from George Washington University and her undergraduate degree from American University. Anne was born and raised in the Philadelphia area and is an avid surfer and a tried and true Eagles fan. Anthony Corrado is professor of government at Colby College. He serves as chair of the board of trustees of the Campaign Finance Institute, a nonpartisan research organization, and as a member of the board of the Campaign Legal Center. He formerly was a nonresident senior fellow of the Brookings Institution and an advisor to the American Bar Association’s Committee on Election Law. He is the author or coauthor of numerous books and articles on campaign finance law, political finance, and presidential elections, including contributions to Financing the 2012 Election (2015), Financing the 2008 Election (2011), and The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook (2005). David A. Dulio  is a professor in the Political Science Department and director of the Center for Civic Engagement at Oakland University. He teaches courses on campaigns and elections, Congress, political parties, interest groups, and other areas of American politics. Dulio has published ten books, with his most recent being Michigan Government, Politics and Policy and Campaigns from the Ground Up. He has written dozens of articles and book chapters on subjects ranging from the role of professional consultants in U.S. elections to campaign finance. Dulio is also a former American Political Science Congressional Fellow on Capitol Hill, where he worked in the U.S. House of Representatives Republican Conference for former US Rep. J.C. Watts, Jr. (R-OK). R. Sam Garrett holds a Ph.D. in political science, M.P.A. and B.A. (summa cum laude), all from American University’s School of Public Affairs. He serves as a specialist in American National Government at the Congressional

Contributors

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Research Service, Library of Congress. Sam was selected as a 2005 presidential management fellow. Sam continues to teach at AU as an adjunct faculty member in the Department of Government. He is also a research fellow at the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies. Prior to joining CRS, Sam served as a visiting instructor in AU’s Department of Government and as assistant director for research at CCPS. He is the author of Campaign Crises: Detours on the Road to Congress (Lynne Rienner, 2010). Sam and his wife, Karen, live in Washington, D.C. Martin Hamburger is a partner at Hamburger Gibson Creative, which creates innovative message campaigns for candidates, causes, and institutions seeking to create change. Hamburger has won awards for his 20 years of unique, creative advertisements, and plaudits for his innovative campaign strategies and insightful strategic judgment. He has worked as a public interest group lobbyist, on political campaigns across the country, as a staffer for the Democratic Party, and, since 1993, as a political media consultant. His political ads have won numerous Pollies, Addies, and other awards. He’s won awards for his short films, such as at the 2009 International Wildlife Film Festival, and his recent long-form documentary, Lurking in the Trees, was broadcast on Public Broadcasting Stations nationwide in spring 2010. He also completed Trees, Pests and People, making him the world record holder in the highly exclusive category of “Making Documentaries About Bugs.” Hamburger is sought-after as a trainer and educator, having developed campaign skills trainings, campaign simulations, and curricula for diverse organizations and institutions such as the Nature Conservancy, the US Forest Service, Planned Parenthood, and American University, where he was an adjunct professor in the School of Public Affairs. He is an author of Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in Elections, published by Brookings Institution Press in 2000. John S. Klemanski  is professor of political science at Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan. He is the coauthor/editor of a number of books and book chapters on campaigns and elections, including Campaigns from the Ground Up (2015). His most recent publications include “Parties and Populism in 2016,” in American Political Parties under Pressure (2017) and “Michigan: Hiding Behind a Thin Blue Wall,” in Presidential Swing States, 2nd ed. (2018). David Lublin  is the recipient of three National Science Foundation grants and a fellowship from the German Marshall Fund. His most recent book, Minority Rules: Electoral Systems, Decentralization, and Ethnoregional Parties, was published by Oxford and won the Best Book Award from the Race, Ethnicity and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association in 2015. Previously, he authored two books, The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress and

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The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change, on American politics published by Princeton. David has published articles on American and Comparative politics in a variety of journals, including American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, British Journal of Political Science, and Stanford Law Review. His work on redistricting was cited by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Ashcroft. David is a fellow of the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies. Candice J. Nelson is a professor in the Department of Government, and the academic director of the Campaign Management Institute at American University. She is the author of Grant Park: The Democratization of Presidential Elections: 1968–2008, coauthor of The Myth of the Independent Voter, Vital Signs: Perspective on the Health of American Campaigning, and The Money Chase: Congressional Campaign Finance Reform, and coeditor of Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in Elections, Crowded Airways: Campaign Advertising in Elections, and Shades of Gray: Perspectives on Campaign Ethics. Ed O’Keefe  is a political correspondent for CBS News who has covered ­presidential and congressional politics and the federal government since 2008. He has covered the presidential campaigns of Jeb Bush and Marco Rubio, traveled the country covering the 2008 and 2012 presidential campaigns, and briefly covered the war in Iraq. On Capitol Hill, he has tracked the “fiscal cliff” negotiations, two government shutdowns, and debates on gun control, immigration, and the repeal of the military’s “don’t, ask, don’t tell” policy. He is a political contributor to CBS News and also frequently appears on C-SPAN, NPR, PBS, Telemundo and Univision to provide political analysis. A native of Delmar, N.Y., he is a 2005 graduate of American University’s School of Public Affairs. Alicia Kolar Prevost  is the project manager of the Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. Previously, she was director of voter mobilization at the Environmental Defense Fund and founder of Defend Our Future, an initiative of EDF that mobilizes young people around climate change. Alicia’s experience in nonprofit and political campaign management also includes work at the Democratic National Committee, the Climate Action Campaign, and the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights. She has a Ph.D. from American University and an M.P.P. from the Harvard Kennedy School. Alicia teaches regularly at American University’s School of Public Affairs and Campaign Management Institute. Chris Sautter  is a nationally recognized political strategist, award-winning documentary filmmaker, and election attorney. Sautter has advised and produced media for dozens of candidates from coast to coast, including writing and producing Barack Obama’s first campaign ads. He is ­coauthor of The Recount Primer (1994), considered to be the definitive guide to

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election recounts, and has played a prominent role as lawyer and consultant in almost every major recount in the country over the past 35 years. His work on behalf of behalf of Al Gore in the 2000 Florida presidential recount was profiled in New Republic and praised by Jeffrey Toobin and Jake Tapper in their books on the Florida vote. Sautter served as a lead attorney in Al Franken’s U.S. Senate 2008–09 recount in Minnesota. Jay Weiner, author of This Is Not Florida: How Al Franken Won the Minnesota Recount, pegged him as “unquestionably the most experienced recount attorney in the country.” More recently, he served as voting rights attorney for the Bernie Sanders for President campaign and helped direct voter protection activities in Florida during the general election for the Hillary Clinton for President campaign. As a documentary filmmaker, Sautter directed and produced the award-winning The King of Steeltown: Hardball Politics in the Heartland (2001), about contemporary machine politics from which six public officials were sent to federal prison. In addition, Sautter has taught election law as an adjunct professor at American University. James A. Thurber  is distinguished university professor of government and founder (1979) and former director (1979–2016) of the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies at American University. He was principal investigator of a seven-year Pew Charitable Trusts grant to study campaign management. He was awarded the Senator Mark O. Hatfield Public Policy Scholar of the Year for 2013, the 2010 Walter Beach Pi Sigma Alpha American Political Science Association award for his work combining applied and academic research, and given the 2010 American University’s School of Public Affairs award for outstanding scholarship, research, and professional contributions. He is a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration and a member of the American Bar Association’s Task Force on Lobbying Law Reform. He is the author and editor of numerous books and more than 80 articles and chapters on Congress, congressional– presidential relations, interest groups and lobbying, and campaigns and elections. His most recent publications are Rivals for Power: Presidential– Congressional Relations (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017, with Jordan Tama) and American Gridlock: The Sources, Character and Impact of Political Polarization (Cambridge University Press, 2015, with Antoine Yoshinaka). David Winston is the president of the Winston Group, a Washington, D.C., strategic planning and survey research firm. Winston has served as a strategic advisor to Senate and House Republican leadership for the past ten years. He was formerly the director of planning for Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, and advises center-right political parties throughout ­Europe. Additionally, Winston was a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, where he did statistical policy analysis and econometric modeling. In the private sector, he has advised Fortune 100 companies on strategic

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planning and brand reputation. Winston has lectured at the Wharton of School of Business, MIT, Harvard, and the National War College. His writings have appeared in a variety of publications, and he authored the chapter on strategy for the college textbook Campaigns and Elections American Style. He is credited for originating the concept of “security mom” and played a key role in developing the narrative “where are the jobs” for the 2010 election cycle. Winston is an election analyst for CBS News and frequently appears on cable and network news.

1 Elections in a Polarized America

Understanding the Dynamics and the Transformation of American Political Campaigns James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson

In an election unlike any the U.S. has experienced, on November 8, 2016, ­Republican Donald J. Trump was elected the forty-fifth president of the United States in a victory that surprised nearly everyone. A reality ­television star and real estate tycoon with no knowledge of governing or of ­domestic and foreign policy defeated Hillary R. Clinton, former First Lady, U.S. senator from New York and secretary of state. Clinton was the opposite of Trump, deeply knowledgeable of government, politics, and policy, and an experienced campaigner, which may have worked against her. Trump bested 16 other Republican candidates in unusually crowed primary and caucus contests. Hillary overcame populist Senator Bernie Sanders’s ­challenge in a combative set of caucuses and primaries. In the general election, Trump won 30 states worth a total of 306 electors, or 57% of the 538 available Electoral College votes, ensuring his election, even though ­Clinton received about 2.9 million more votes nationwide, a margin of 2.1%.1 The major shock of the election was that Trump won the four perennial swing states of Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, and Iowa. Three of the four states, Florida, Ohio, and Iowa, had in 2012 been claimed by 1

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President Obama, while North Carolina had been taken by Mitt Romney. Trump also carried the three “blue wall” Democratic stronghold states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, which had not been won by a Republican presidential candidate in decades. Throughout the primaries and general election, a Trump victory was considered highly unlikely by almost all polls, expert analyses, and media forecasts.2 It was reported that even Trump thought he was going to lose.3 Some asserted it was the greatest upset in a presidential election in modern U.S. history.4 How this happened is the central theme of this book: campaigns matter. The 2016 voters were sorted, polarized, and angry, following the trends of the past 20 years.5 The Trump populist campaign for the presidency was unique, bizarre, nontraditional, negative, and definitely ­consequential, but in the end it relied on the basic elements of modern campaigning. His campaign strategy, theme, and message were clear. It was change: “Make America Great Again,” focusing on immigration, tax reform, trade, and the role of the U.S. in the world, and not inconsequently his view of his opponent, whom he dubbed “Crooked Hillary.” He attacked Clinton, President Obama’s policies, and government generally and in doing so captured widespread voter anger with alleging “insider politics as usual.” Trump employed highly unorthodox campaign strategies through Twitter and other social media. He is the first candidate in the modern era of campaign finance, which began with the adoption of the 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), to win the presidency despite being significantly outspent by his opponent (See  Corrado, Chapter 12, “Candidate Campaign F ­ undraising Strategies”). In both the primary and general elections, Trump took an unconventional approach to fundraising, not worrying about the amount of money coming into the campaign. He lagged well behind Clinton and his primary opponents in the race for campaign dollars, but earned at least $9.6 billion in free media, an historic high for presidential candidates. He helped keep the total spending for the presidential election at its lowest in the last three election cycles.6 His campaign tactics of multiple daily tweets, often at odd hours, of frequent new campaign managers, and a focus on earned media defied conventional campaign strategic thinking.7 In the end, Trump’s “hip” social media strategy worked against Clinton, a far more “traditional” candidate who was trapped by lessons from past campaigns, relying on voter “metrics” and micro-targeting that hit too many wrong voters in the wrong states. She was a “status quo, hold the course, pro-Obama” contender



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using weapons from past campaigns. The campaign was dominated by Trump’s message of angry populism against a ­Washington insider representing big government and big business. What does campaign management have to do with the outcome of the 2016 election? This book answers that question from several perspectives. The authors do not always agree with each other. The book consists of studies of campaign management and elections from the perspective of academic wisdom and the practical knowledge of professional political consultants. Some of the authors are academics who are also practitioners who teach campaign management. Academics use explicit hypotheses and scientific methods for making systematic observations about campaigns and elections, whereas campaign professionals draw generalizations based on direct experience. Academics use large data sets and systematically test hypotheses to make careful statements about ­voters and elections.8 They attempt to explain individual and collective political behavior and try to answer questions about who votes and why and with what impact. When political scientists write about campaigns and how candidates get elected, their approach is based on scholarly analysis rather than wisdom from experience.9 Campaign professionals focus on who votes and why, but for the purpose of developing a winning strategy to attract voters to their candidate. They know full well that factors such as the state of the economy and the popularity of the candidates make a difference; they try to change voter perceptions in order to win over those barriers, as clearly shown in 2016. When campaign consultants write about campaigns, it is to explain why their candidates have won and to give general advice in how-to-win “manuals,” or to offer anecdotal “insider” accounts of campaigns.10 They are hired activists who develop strategies and tactics to influence voters and election results.11 They ­focus solely on how to win. Campaign consultants “test hypotheses” by winning and losing elections, unlike academics, who are motivated to ­publish in a body of knowledge for students and scholars. Despite these differences, these two worlds often merge in modern campaigns. The common phenomenon facing both campaign professionals and academics is the constant change in the way campaigns are waged and elections won or lost in the past 30 years. This is ­especially true in Trump’s 2016 election campaign. In the following chapters, academics and political consultants analyze the impact of the changes in the 2016 presidential election cycle from a variety of perspectives. The authors of the following chapters address the evolution and

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innovation in campaign strategy and management, the importance of political parties, the use of survey research, the changes in fundraising strategies, the role of communications and media, the use of digital and social media, and the advancements in micro-targeting and fieldwork, as well as the ­stability and changes in election law and turnout over the last few ­decades. Most consider the future of campaigns after 2016. For candidates and professionals, campaigns are zero-sum games, or even minus-sum games: there are always winners and losers. For ­academics, on the other hand, campaigns are objects of analysis; they do not represent a personal gamble, a deeply felt ambition, or a commitment to the objective of winning. Campaigns are not political causes but rather a focus of intellectual interest. Academics are interested in why people vote (e.g., explanations of turnout); professionals are interested in how to get them to vote for a particular candidate (e.g., field and micro-­ targeting tactics). Academics study who contributes money to campaigns and why; professionals persuade people to give funds to their candidates. Both need to know the legal framework of campaign finance law. This book joins these two worlds and shows how both the academic and campaign professional perspectives are needed in order to more completely understand election campaigns. When the knowledge of academics and the practical wisdom of campaign professionals do converge, as they do in this book, much can be learned. Every campaign cycle reveals new strategies and tactics, as shown so clearly in the 2016 election. The rich dialogue between ­campaign consultants and political scientists in this book offers a new, more complete view of election campaigns that is essential to an understanding of ­twenty-first-century American politics. The 2016 campaign, like those before it, was a war between the ­Democrats and the Republicans. It was a battle for the hearts and minds— and the votes—of the American people. The word “campaign” comes from military usage: a connected series of military operations forming a distinct phase of a war or a connected series of operations ­designed to bring about a particular result. An election is like a war, complete with “war rooms” and “generals” (campaign managers). Candidates and campaign organizations are fighting to capture control of government to advance their policies. Campaigns are battles to define public problems and develop policy solutions and, of course, to persuade voters to support those ideas.



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Those who manage successful election campaigns, be they presidential, congressional, or down-ballot races (local and state candidates), evaluate the existing political environment, develop strategies and plans within that political environment, pursue a strategic theme and message for a candidate, establish an organization, solicit and use campaign money, buy advertising and attempt to use free (news) media, schedule candidates, organize and use a field organization, use opposition research, and conduct survey research and focus group analysis, among a variety of other activities. In the last three decades, the basic elements of campaigning have changed dramatically owing to the power of the media ­(especially ­television and social media), technological advancements (­ micro-­targeting), and the professionalization of campaigns (Johnson 2017). What has not changed is that successful campaigns need to develop an explicit strategy, theme, and message, linked to appropriate tactics. Campaigns do not happen in a vacuum and they are not predetermined by economic and political circumstances. Prevailing economic and political conditions influence a campaign, and candidates and ­campaigns in turn can have an impact on those conditions, as was the case with the 2016 election of Donald Trump and the 2008 and 2012 elections of President Barack Obama. There are three fundamental elements of campaigning: strategy and message, organization, and funding. On the strength of these three ­elements, Barack Obama ran nearly perfect campaigns in 2008 and 2012. His strategy and message were focused. This should be ­contrasted with Hillary Clinton’s lack of discipline in the 2016 battleground GOTV wars and unpopular message (stay the course) during the primaries and the general election. President Obama’s 2012 campaign cultivated a positive image of a president caring about the middle class and the unemployed, and it projected an unfavorable perception of Governor Romney as uncaring and out of touch with the American people. Donald Trump’s 2016 populist, antiestablishment negative campaign message was about capturing widespread anger with government and promising change. He attacked Hillary Clinton relentlessly. In many ways Trump’s campaign organization broke all the rules of campaigning.12 It was ­nontraditional and ­chaotic. It was supported with massive amounts of free media (over $6 billion) and millions of small contributions.13 Clinton’s campaign message about keeping the status quo, continuing the Obama policies, did not move

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voters in key battleground states. She had a large campaign organization and plenty of money to finance her strategy and tactics. However, in the end, the election was about change, turnout, and deep-seated concern about government, not about Hillary’s policy and governing.14 Until 2016, a winning campaign payed close attention to campaign fundamentals.15 Raising money (less important in 2016), setting the ­candidate’s schedule, doing opposition research, linking resources to campaign tactics, preparing for debates, advertising on television and radio, and mobilizing supporters to vote all follow from the campaign’s strategy, theme, and message. In a well-run campaign, the message is ­expressed in communications with voters: television and radio ads, s­ ocial media, and the direct mail campaign.16 Trump communicated ­directly to the voters, supervening the media, through his frequent tweets and was always available to the media for interviews and appearances on television. Trump did not follow the standard campaign strategy, which encompasses a commitment to the fundamentals of campaigning17—a clear strategy, theme, and message linked to appropriate tactics. Clinton stayed true to a clear strategy and message, but the candidate was not popular and her “status quo” message did not work in several key ­battleground states (especially Florida, North Carolina, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania). A campaign manager must know how many votes are needed to win and where these votes will come from. This is never as simple as it may sound. Many pundits thought Clinton would win in 2016. However, by methodically focusing on the battleground states through advertising, social media, micro-targeting, get-out-the-vote mobilization, campaign visits, and other tactics, the Trump campaign was able to overtake the Clinton campaign’s early advantage. Clinton, on the other hand, did not run an effective get-out-the-vote ground operation in key battleground states, as evidenced by her pulling staff and finances out of competitive states like Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania and putting those ­resources into marginal places like Arizona. In comparison, Trump ran a nearly perfect campaign in terms of message discipline and quick response to criticism or attack. Clinton did not. The Trump campaign never let a news cycle go by without initiating an attack on Clinton or responding to her statements, often within hours or even minutes at any time of the day or night. Trump’s campaign ­strategy and message were driven by defining Clinton as



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insensitive to the working class and out of touch with the needs of the American people. Trump had an obsessive focus on the message of contrasting himself, an outsider candidate of change and a successful businessman, to a negative image of Clinton as a criminal and as the ultimate insider who exemplified everything that was wrong with Washington. Clinton was never able to finesse the problem of being defined negatively by Trump.

Campaign Organization in 2016 President Trump’s organization dominated the media “air war” early with tweets and through earned media (more than $6.8 billion) and with overwhelming strategic investment in the 2016 battleground states. He also dominated in the “ground war” through large events (covered by the media) and “spontaneous” GOTV movements. Clinton had more staff and offices in more states than Trump, trying to repeat what Obama did in 2008 against McCain and 2012 against Romney. Obama’s staff (paid and volunteer) advantage allowed him to get his message out to more people and to organize more supporters than the Romney campaign did, but that did not work for Clinton in key battleground states. Obama’s field staff (which typically makes up the bulk of a campaign’s in-state operation) identified and contacted potential voters, persuaded them to become supporters, and then got them to vote, especially in the target states. In 2016 Clinton’s staff failed to do that as well in the critical battleground states.18 One reason might be that although the Clinton campaign organization at the national level was made up of experienced, ­d isciplined people who had gone through many campaign battles and the discipline of their internal organization and message was directly linked to the candidate, the group of well-tested professionals had major conflicts and differences over campaign strategy and tactics.19 The Trump campaign’s use of tweets and new conservative social media forums to communicate his populist message directly to voters and to recruit volunteers gave him a strategic advantage by allowing him to bypass the regular national media. Trump’s website served as a recruiting tool for volunteers and donors. The campaign was constantly reaching out to supporters through its email list and social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter. These techniques helped turn out volunteers and motivate big noisy crowds at his

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rallies. Campaign staff and volunteers positioned themselves at these events to get names of supporters and to recruit them to volunteer.

An Overview of This Book The authors analyze elections and discuss the major elements of successful campaigns. The book is organized around four general themes. Part I covers the political context of campaign and elections, with a focus on the key elements of campaign planning and management, and the role of political parties and redistricting. Part II ­d iscusses identifying voters (who votes, why, and how) with a ­d iscussion of survey research, targeting and modeling, election laws, and registering and turning out voters. Part III covers communicating with voters through a clear strategy, theme, and message, using paid and earned media. Part IV focuses on financing campaigns (­ democratization of contributions, party fundraising, PACs, Super PACs, and outside money). We conclude the book with a discussion of why campaigns matter and the future of campaign elections in a polarized environment.

Notes 1. Schaffner, Brian F., and John A. Clark. 2018. Making Sense of the 2016 Elections: A CQ Press Guide. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE/CQ Press. 2. Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. 2017. “How Trump Lost and Won.” Journal of Democracy, 28 (2) (April): 34–44. 3. Sabato, Larry, Kyle Kondik, and Geoffrey Skelley. 2017. Trumped: The  2016 Election that Broke All the Rules. Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield. 4. Mezey, Michael L. 2018. (S)electing the President: The Perils of D ­ emocracy. New York, NY: CNN; Melcher Media. 5. Jacobson, Gary C. 2017. “The Triumph of Polarized Partisanship in 2016: Donald Trump’s Improbable Victory.” Political Science Quarterly 132 (1): 9–41. Thurber, James A. and Antoine Yoshinaka (eds). 2015. American ­Gridlock: The Sources, Character, and Impact of Political Polarization. New York, NY: ­Cambridge University Press. 6. Note that despite the crowded field of 19 candidates the cost of the White House race was under $2.4 billion, including campaign committee and outside spending. It was lower than that of both 2008 (about $2.8 ­billion) and 2012 (over $2.6 billion), even when measured by actual dollars (not inflation-­adjusted).



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Congressional races totaled more than $4 billion, compared to $3.8 billion in 2014 and under $3.7 billion in 2012. Democrats and Republicans roughly split the costs of the election, with each picking up 47.7% of the tab; the remaining 4.6% came from independent groups (Chapter 12, Corrado, “Candidate ­Campaign Fundraising Strategies”). 7. Chadwick, Andrew. 2017. “Donald Trump, the 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign, and the Intensification of the Hybrid Media System.” Oxford Scholarship Online. 8. Campbell, James E. 2017. “A Recap of the 2016 Election Forecasts.” PS: Political Science & Politics 50 (2): 331–338. 9. Mezey. 2018. Polsby, Nelson W., Aaron Wildavsky, Steven E. Schier, and David A. Hopkins. 2012. Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. Nelson, Candice J. 2011.Grant Park: The Democratization of Presidential Elections. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Kenski, Kate, Bruce W. Hardy, and ­Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 2010. The Obama Victory: How Media, Money and Message Shaped the 2008 Election. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Dulio, ­David A. and Candice J. Nelson. 2005. Vital Signs: Perspectives on the Health of ­American Campaigning. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Thurber, James A., and Candice J. Nelson. 2000. Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in Elections. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Thurber, James A. 1998. “The Study of Campaign Consultants: A ­Subfield in Search of a Theory.” PS: Political Science and Politics 32 (2): 145–149. 10. Johnson, Dennis W. 2017. Democracy for Hire: A History of American Political Consulting. New York: Oxford University Press. John F. Kennedy School of Government Institute of Politics. 2017. Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2016. Lanham, MD: Roman and Littlefield. ­Jamieson, Kathleen Hall (ed.). 2009. Electing the President 2008: The Insider’s View Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Jamieson, Kathleen Hall (ed.). 2013. Electing the President 2012: The Insider’s View. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Shea, Daniel M. 1996. Campaign Craft: The Strategies, Tactics and Art of Political Campaign Management. Westport, CT: Praeger. Napolitan, Joseph. 1972. The Election Game and How to Win It. New York, NY: Doubleday. 11. Johnson, 2017; Dulio and Nelson, 2005; Thurber and Nelson, 2000. 12. Mezey, 2018. Nelson, Michael. 2017. The Elections of 2016. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press; Sabato, 2017; Schaffner and Clark, 2018. 13. Schaffner and Clark, 2018. 14. Ceasar, James W, John J. Pitney, and Andrew Busch. 2017. Defying the Odds: The 2016 Elections and American Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield; Nelson, 2017.

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15. Mezey, 2018; Schaffner and Clark, 2018; Dulio and Nelson, 2005; Thurber and Nelson, 2000; Medvic, Stephen K. 2006. “Understanding ­Campaign ­Strategy: ‘Deliberate Priming’ and the Role of Professional Political Consultants.” Journal of Political Marketing 5: 11–32. 16. Jamieson, 2009; Jamieson, 2013. 17. Thurber and Nelson, 2000. 18. Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2017. What Happened? New York, NY: Barnes and Noble. 19. Allen, Jonathan and Amie Parnes. 2017. Shattered: Inside Hillary ­Clinton’s Doomed Campaign. Danvers, MA: Crown/Archetype.

Part I The Political Context of Campaigns

Campaign Planning and Management, Political Parties, and Redistricting

All campaigns analyze the political environment, choose tactics or tools to implement the campaign strategy, and establish the campaign budget (the allocation of money, time, and personnel to each element of the campaign plan). Campaign tactics are the specific activities used to achieve the strategic objective: victory in the election. Campaign tactics, m ­ anaging the message to target groups of voters, are at the operational level of the campaign. The critical elements of campaign strategy and planning have evolved with each election cycle, amid dramatically changing methods and tactics for achieving strategic goals, as shown in the 2016 presidential campaign. In Chapter 2, “Campaign Planning and Management: The Key Elements of Campaigns,” Anne Caprara a­ rgues that a campaign without a plan is a journey without a map. She focuses on the key elements of a modern campaign—regardless of size, office sought, or location. She points out that all winning campaigns have ­certain things in common and all bad campaigns share certain elements as well. ­Understanding both is fundamental to success. She illustrates that the fundamentals of a good campaign transcend party, candidate and location. No matter what party or candidate, disciplined and professional campaigns mostly look the same. She describes the role of campaign manager, operations and organization, fundraising, research, communications, digital operations, field, and consultants in a well-run campaign organization. Smart campaigns learn from opposing campaigns and candidates. They adapt when they see successes by their opponents. Strategy requires good instincts,

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an understanding of politics, historical context, and careful quantifiable and qualitative research. A campaign must be organized into a plan ­(often written) to present a message to voters about a candidate, but that plan is always subject to change, a dynamic and endless series of ­dialogues within the campaign to sharpen the focus of the strategy and message. It is the compass that points toward victory. In Chapter 3, “The Role of Political Parties,” David Dulio and John S. Klemanski examine the evolving role of political parties in the 2016 ­campaign. They begin with a brief history of parties and populism in U.S. politics. They explain why the recent populist messages from ­Sanders and Trump emerged and why they were so persuasive to voters in 2016. They chart the popularity of Bernie Sanders’s populism and how he became a serious contender for the Democratic nomination. They show how his surprising success served as a predictive measure of H ­ illary Clinton’s vulnerability against Donald Trump’s populist messages in the general election. They analyze Trump’s primary election campaign and his anti–party establishment populist approach. In the general election, they show how Donald Trump’s Electoral College victory came in large part due to voter support in the traditionally blue states of P ­ ennsylvania, ­Michigan, and Wisconsin. These industrialized blue-collar states had long ­supported Democratic presidential candidates, but Trump’s p ­ opulist, antiestablishment, anti-Clinton message effectively shifted these states to the ­Republican column. They conclude by explaining how the s­ uccess of populism in the 2016 presidential election has caused both major political parties to examine their own messages. Scholars have debated about whether certain past elections have served as realigning ­elections, or if there has been a long-term dealignment among voters. They address the question as to whether voters now focus less on party attachment as a voting cue and more on specific policy positions of candidates, individual candidate qualities, or personality politics. The r­ esolution of that ongoing debate will influence the future direction and policy positions adopted by the two major parties in 2018 and beyond. The redrawing of boundaries for electoral constituencies, ­redistricting, due to population shifts determined by the U.S. Census every ten years, must occur to equalize populations among state legislative and ­congressional districts. States remain firmly in charge of redistricting federal congressional districts, though they must adhere to federal l­egal and constitutional requirements. The newly drawn district boundaries and the subsequent addition or the loss of districts is a key factor in



Part I: The Political Context of Campaigns

13

election campaigns. Federal law requires single-member congressional districts of equal population constructed of contiguous territory. State legislatures, commissions, or a combination of legislatures and governors draw the district lines, which have a direct impact on electoral competitive and campaigns. David Lublin, in Chapter 4, “Elections and the Long Journey into the Redistricting Thicket,” gives a history of the judicial actions on redistricting. He summarizes the evolution and impact of racial redistricting law and discusses the prevalence of partisan gerrymandering. Districts can be drawn by the majority party in each state or by state commissions based on a number of different criteria. All of these approaches have a direct effect on the electoral competitiveness of districts and ultimately campaign strategy. Lublin also discusses partisan gerrymandering and its future as well as the role of commissions in the redistricting process. Successful campaigns must concentrate their resources on identifying potential voters and ensure that their supporters in the electorate show up at the polls. Campaigns refer to these efforts as the field campaign, the “ground war,” or GOTV. Trump’s campaign had solid turnout in the state that counted. Clinton’s campaign failed to turn out traditional Democratic Party voters at high enough rates in critical battleground states, especially Florida, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. She overperformed in turnout in overwhelmingly Democratic states like California, New York, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington. This hurt her in the Electoral College.

2 Campaign Planning and Management The Key Elements of Campaigns Anne Caprara

A good campaign is like a good surfer—devoted to constant practice, an understanding of process, and an ability to hold onto the board through a tumultuous paddle-out all so that you can be in the right place at the right time for the right wave. Just like surfing it’s a combination of skill, equipment, hard work and plain old luck. Campaigns have undergone such massive structural changes over the last two decades that best practices can be almost impossible to keep track of in real time. But, even as the political calendar has accelerated and the money necessary to build and retain a top-notch campaign operation has exploded, certain fundamentals haven’t changed. As campaigns have developed more sophisticated social media and data operations, there has been a renewed emphasis on more traditional electoral tactics that prioritize person-to-person contact. We will focus here on the key elements of a modern campaign—­regardless of size, office sought, or location. All good campaigns have c­ ertain things in common. (All bad campaigns share certain elements as well.) The fundamentals of a good campaign transcend party, candidate, and location. “We do it differently here!” is a common refrain that ­every campaign professional has heard on the trail, but the truth is, while ­politics can shift from state to state and town to town, disciplined and professional campaigns mostly look the same. 14



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Additionally, smart political professionals are not partisan in their willingness to learn from opposing campaigns and candidates—and adapt the techniques and technology they see in other campaigns to their own races. Even President Obama’s vaunted 2012 data operation took cues from the 2004 reelection campaign of George W. Bush: The Obama leaders not only wanted all the lists to be able to talk to one another, they also wanted people to be able to organize their friends and family members. This was taking a concept ­introduced in 2004 by George W. Bush’s reelection team — the notion that voters are more likely to listen to people they know than to paid callers or strangers knocking on their door — and updating it to take advantage of new technology, namely the ­explosion of social media.1

This chapter will examine the key elements of winning campaigns, as well as outline the common deficiencies seen in losing operations. ­Understanding both is fundamental to success.

Campaign Management While most staff positions on a modern campaign have undergone massive change over the last few decades—one job remains immutable: the campaign manager. Campaign managers are a strange breed of nomadic political entrepreneurs who travel to all corners of the country every two years, refining their skills on ever bigger campaigns. The best ones are part CEO, therapist, political strategist, and comedian. The worst ones lack the ability to create order in chaos and they cater to a candidate’s baser instincts instead of managing them. The most important quality in a campaign manager is experience doing the job itself. That seems obvious but it’s surprising how often campaigns of all sizes end up with a person with very little experience in the top job. Candidates will choose everyone from their best friend to their business partner to their spouse to run a campaign—often to disastrous ends. In 2006, state Senator Charlie Wilson of Ohio hired his son to manage his campaign for Ohio’s Sixth Congressional District. Wilson was a strong Democratic recruit for a seat that was being vacated by retiring

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Part I: The Political Context of Campaigns

Congressman Ted Strickland and considered a favorite to win. But W ­ ilson failed to submit the 50 valid constituent signatures that were needed to get on the ballot in Ohio (they submitted 96 signatures but many were from people who did not live in the district and so were disqualified.) The Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) had to spend well over $1 million to help Wilson win a write-in campaign.2 A campaign manager should come to the job with experience commensurate with the office being sought. A local city council candidate can afford to hire someone with very little political experience—a ­campaign for the United States Senate should be led by a person with many years of electoral management behind them. The campaign manager should be one of the very first hires a candidate makes and should be tasked with interviewing and hiring other senior staff, in consultation with the candidate. The manager should set and negotiate staff salaries, write and manage the budget, approve ­expenses, and chart the overall strategic direction of the campaign. Many candidates think that if they hire a brilliant political strategist then they are, by definition, hiring a great campaign manager. But managing a campaign is 10% political strategy and 90% people management. Brilliant political strategy only happens when you have sound staff and budget management. Modern campaigns are like medium-sized startup businesses where all the capital is raised and spent in under 24 months. A competitive congressional campaign has a budget of anywhere from $1.5 to $3 million. A competitive statewide race can cost upwards of $40 million. Staff sizes range from ten people to over a hundred.3 A campaign manager who has brilliant slogan ideas but has never seen the right side of an Excel spreadsheet and doesn’t understand smart hiring and staff management strategy will be a disaster in the job. Additionally, successful managers need to be able to hire competent staff who they trust to do their job. Politics tends to attract Type As who want to do everything themselves. Not only is this physically impossible on a campaign; it means that one person is, at best, doing a lot of jobs in mediocre fashion, as opposed to many people excelling in their ­individual roles. It’s important that the manager be empowered to oversee all aspects of the campaign and is answerable only to the candidate. Managers should never report to outside consultants who handle media and ad placement, polling, or general campaign consulting.



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This can be harder in practice than it is on paper. Managers are often younger and less experienced than pollsters or ad makers. Campaign consultants’ relationships with a candidate can predate the manager. Managers should develop and foster environments where decisions are made in consultation with experts the campaign has hired to help. Experts often disagree, however, and that’s where the manager becomes invaluable. A good manager can get everyone to row together in the same direction, even when there is internal dissension about a decision. The candidate must set the precedent that the manager is the ultimate decision maker on the campaign and must trust the manager’s ability enough to not waver in that stance when the manager’s authority is challenged. Ultimately, good campaign managers are good strategic thinkers and patient people handlers. They can be firm without being rude. They ­understand the importance of winning the candidate’s trust but also standing up to them when they are wrong. They have good gut instincts but are not so obsessed with being right that they can’t listen to differing opinions and change their mind. Finally, good campaign managers know how to manage the morale of a team. Campaigns have lofty highs and debilitating lows. There are moments in every election when the stress is crushing. The manager sits at the fulcrum of everyone’s emotions—staff, consultants, and candidate. Great managers engender faith in the staff that the campaign will ride out any storm, and faith in the candidate that the staff knows what they are doing when the storm comes. There is a passage from one of C.S. Lewis’s great Chronicle of Narnia novels about what it means to be a king … his words are quite applicable to the role of campaign manager as well: For this is what it means to be a king: to be first in every desperate attack and last in every desperate retreat, and when there’s hunger in the land (as must be now and then in bad years) to wear finer clothes and laugh louder over a scantier meal than any man in your land.4

Operations The laws, rules, and local regulations that govern campaigns at the federal and state levels are complex and constantly changing. They require extensive reporting that differs depending on the race and the proximity to an election. Additionally, digital organizing and advertising as well as online fundraising

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Part I: The Political Context of Campaigns

have often outpaced the ability of the Federal ­Election ­Commission (FEC) and state jurisdictions to regulate—meaning that campaigns sometimes must make educated guesses about how to comply with the law. The rise of independent expenditures and Super PACs in the post–­ Citizens United world add an extra level of risk for candidates and campaign staff because of strict regulations regarding coordination between and among political entities. Campaigns also have mundane business concerns like the need to pay taxes, provide health coverage for ­employees, balance checkbooks, sign leases for office space, and purchase ­insurance that can get overlooked if not managed properly. A campaign should have an operations department commensurate with its size. At a minimum, the operations department should consist of a campaign scheduler, an office manager/operations director, a compliance director or firm, and legal counsel. The campaign scheduler should be one of the very first hires. A ­ ttention to detail, a discreet nature and an ability to say no politely and firmly are the fundamental requirements for the job. This is not a position that requires extensive political experience, although it’s always nice to have. Often the best schedulers come from customer service positions, where a mature personality is a must. When choosing a scheduler, consider that this person is often the first representative of the campaign that a potential volunteer or supporter encounters—and that a scheduler must have intimate knowledge and communication with a candidate and their family. Smaller campaigns will hire a basic office manager to cover a small set of duties. Larger organizations need an operations director who oversees the phones and the front desk, information technology, scheduling, and advance. Campaign offices need someone who makes sure the doors get locked at night, the copier works, the interns are kept busy, the internet is running and secure, trips and press events are properly set up and staffed, and an employee manual is developed and adhered to. These can seem like small things but they become enormously ­important when everything about the operation is open to press scrutiny. Particular attention should be paid to human resource issues—with an eye toward politics. For example, a candidate that advocates a $15 ­minimum wage or more extensive health care coverage should make sure all employees are making $15 an hour and have good health insurance. More than one campaign has found themselves in trouble for ignoring in practice what their candidate is preaching in principle.



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These operation roles have taken on added importance in the wake of the cybersecurity breaches of 2016. For years campaigns, even large ones, had little to no cybersecurity systems in place. Information ­technology was often overseen by a tech minded intern or a campaign volunteer. No serious effort was made to safeguard against hacking or technology breaches. Campaigns are frugal by nature and sophisticated IT ­operations were often seen as a luxury, but that changed with the 2016 presidential campaign and the threat of having secure communications hacked and leaked.5,6 It’s essential that campaigns hire experts to set up, maintain, and educate staff on information technology. Like most modern businesses, enormous amounts of information float around on the computers and phones of political staffers. Unlike most modern businesses, the Washington Post would love to get its hands on those emails and texts. C ­ ybersecurity experts can establish secure communication channels and institute best practices within campaigns. Their services don’t run cheap but they are essential in the modern age. Finally, all campaigns need compliance and legal operations. Compliance refers to the tedious work that goes into making sure donations that come into the campaign comply with the law and are properly logged and reported. Most campaigns hire a consulting firm to oversee this operation and work with a staffer in the finance shop to log checks and online donations. Legal counsel for campaigns is almost always an outside firm held either on retainer or billed hourly. Legal questions come up almost daily on campaigns and it’s essential that staff have an expert to consult. Lawyers sign off on disclosures for television, radio, and digital ads, and work with managers and TV stations when the campaign is looking to get an opponent’s ad pulled from the air. Campaigns will often hire local legal counsel to assist with the more mundane needs of the organization, but complicated FEC matters should be handled by a law firm with experience in election law. If you hire a firm that doesn’t know the law and bills hourly, you may very well end up paying for that attorney to learn election regulations before replying to your inquiry. Campaigns that make the mistake of treating operations like an afterthought pay for it dearly. Modern campaigns are multi-million-dollar businesses that require the human resources, legal and compliance capability to run efficiently and legally.

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Fundraising Nothing in American politics has changed as dramatically and as quickly as the fundraising and financing of electoral operations. Whether it was the cost of modern campaigning that rose first and pushed fundraising to accelerate with it or vice versa, campaigns are more expensive now than they have ever been and there seems to be no limit in sight. Consider that, in 2016, Americans running for elective office spent close to $7 billion on their campaigns.7 And while the $2.65 billion that Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump spent running for President in 2016 was slightly less than the $2.76 billion Barack Obama and Mitt Romney spent in 2012, spending in nonpresidential years is hitting new highs.8 The midterm elections in 2014 were the costliest on record with a 25% increase in spending on Senate campaigns compared to 2010.9 A 2017 special election for the for the Sixth Congressional District in Georgia became the most expensive House race in history, with spending topping $55 million.10 Jon Osoff, the Democrat in that race, who went on to lose, raised over $23 million alone.11 Whether it’s a statehouse race in California, a congressional race in Pennsylvania or a Senate race in Massachusetts, candidates can ­expect to have to raise into the millions or tens of millions of dollars to be competitive in modern campaigns. Contrary to popular belief, successful ­campaign fundraising does not rely on having a lot of wealthy friends. And only in the rarest of circumstances does online small-dollar ­fundraising for a candidate take off on its own. Successful fundraising requires extensive staff, an organized call time and events operation, and a commitment to building the infrastructure necessary to make online fundraising successful. It is the hardest and most grueling work on a campaign, and the most vital. A productive fundraising operation is often the difference between winning and losing. Which means that the finance director can be the most important hire on a campaign—even more important than the campaign manager at times. Often candidates will hire finance directors BEFORE they hire managers. Campaigns need money before staff can be hired. In the finance director role, there is no more important qualification than a track record of success. The win/loss record of a finance director is much less important than their ability to raise cold, hard dollars. A finance director who was successful raising money for a mediocre candidate is someone worth considering for a job.



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Talented finance directors tend to rise quickly in the ranks of political operatives and are snatched up for the best races. Competition for these resumes is fierce and they command top salaries. Candidates should never hesitate to pay and hire the best fundraising talent they can attract. It’s the best investment a campaign can make. A former Congresswoman and old boss of mine liked to jokingly tell the story about how she got a call from another candidate wanting to hire her former finance director. The candidate liked the job applicant but told the Congresswoman that she was put off by how much money the woman requested for her salary—to which my old boss replied, “She’s a fundraiser. You’re hiring her to ask for money—so isn’t that what you want her to do?” Good finance directors obsessively cultivate relationships with donors and work on building an extensive donor list. They oversee one of the larger staffs on any campaign and so they need to be able to hire good ­talent and manage them effectively. This should include a call time ­manager who oversees the labor-intensive task of keeping call sheets updated and who physically sits with the candidate while they are making fundraising calls, taking notes, and dialing the phone. It should also include an events manager and usually several finance assistants who assist with the day-to-day tasks of the fundraising ­operation—from logging checks to making follow-up calls to chasing down pledges. The fundraising operation is one area of the campaign where the staffing budget should equal expectations. Never hesitate to hire a qualified finance staffer if the internal need is there. More capacity equals more money. If a midlevel finance staffer costs anywhere from $4,000 to $6,000 a month but they have the potential to bring in an additional $10k plus a month then the investment is worth it. A finance director also needs to have a good handle on building and implementing a successful online fundraising operation—which should be a joint effort between the fundraising and digital teams on a campaign. Online fundraising has come a long way since this was written about Howard Dean’s campaign for president in 2003: Democratic presidential hopeful Howard Dean has raised $1 ­million without serving hors d’oeuvres, hitting the phones or mailing thousands of appeals. The money has come through the Internet, a possible sign of fund-raising trends to come.12

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Indeed, Dean’s success raising money online was definitely a sign of things to come. In 2016, Senator Bernie Sanders raised $218 million online almost exclusively from small-dollar donors, giving the famous $27 on average.13 Candidates often make the mistake of thinking that online fundraising communities grow completely organically or that the trick to ­building a successful small-dollar online list is to create a great digital video and then “make it go viral.” While there are certainly examples of unique creative content or unexpected opportunities in the news causing a candidate’s fundraising to take off, most campaigns need to build the infrastructure for online giving through strategic investment and patience. Most campaigns work with digital consultants who help develop and build email lists through list swaps with other candidates, paid ­acquisition, or the renting of existing lists. It is important, however, that the campaign have in-house capacity to write fundraising emails and ­develop creative digital content. These functions can be outsourced to consultants but they work better when a paid staffer owns the creation and management of these items. It’s also the finance director’s job to make sure that any content that is being written to raise money does not clash with a candidate’s message or create unnecessary political headaches. For example, language used in fundraising emails and letters is often red meat for the party base—designed to spur outrage over an opponent’s views or actions. A fundraising email is essentially a press release for the many reporters who always sign up to get campaign communications, and if the email content writes a check that the campaign can’t cash then it will be the candidate on the hook. The fundraising team works with every campaign department. The field team helps identify volunteers and supporters who can become ­donors. The communications team polices messaging attached to fundraising appeals. Research can find unlikely donors by exploring a ­candidate’s background. And the relationship between a campaign manager and a finance director needs to be completely symbiotic. The manager writes and manages the budget but it’s the finance director who tells her how much she can spend.

Research, Policy, and Communications The research, policy, and communications teams are the nerve center of a campaign. Each should have its own separate team but it’s vital they work together daily. Managers should facilitate coordination among



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these departments by physically seating these staffers near each other in the campaign office. There is infinite value in having a research director and a policy director able to hear when a communications director or a press secretary are on the phone with a reporter and need a question answered quickly. Each one of these departments informs the work of the others. Great campaigns make it all look seamless. There is an incredible amount of misinformation and misconception about campaign research operations. Campaign research—real campaign research—is the work of finding out everything that can be discovered through public channels about both your candidate and any opponents. Public channels mean online searches of news and video databases, social media channels, and ­G oogle. Researchers will also comb through public records available at courthouses and other public institutions. ­Sometimes ­c ampaigns will FOIA records—a term that is used as a verb in the campaign world but that refers to Freedom of Information Act requests. Legitimate campaign research relies on publicly accessible records and information. Researchers are not Nancy Drew. They don’t sneak into houses, hack into computers, or steal information. Political professionals often talk about “the book” on their candidate or opponent and by that they mean the self and opposition research books that are compiled containing all publicly available information on the individuals in question. These books can take months to write and are often done by outside consultants, who charge anywhere from $10,000 to $50,000 per book depending on the extent of the record being researched. Campaigns MUST have an in-house research team. Composed of a research director, one or two research associates, and a tracker, the ­research department’s most fundamental job is to understand and help refute attacks on their candidate as well as develop and help launch attacks on their opponents. The daily work of a campaign research shop does not just revolve around finding “silver bullets” in an opponent’s record, but much more on the time-consuming grind of building narratives for the press. For example, research will often focus on the donors who give to a campaign and the size of those donations. Do they line up with certain votes that a legislator took? Are any of those donors problematic? On the flip side,

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research will also vet campaign donors writing checks to their candidate and help prevent a check from being cashed that comes from someone with a criminal record, for example. A tracker is a staffer who films opponents at public forums and events. They are usually young and patient people who can take a fair amount of verbal abuse without reacting. In recent years, trackers have become campaign stars for catching an opponent speaking out of school. Perhaps the most famous example of this is from the 2006 Virginia Senate race, when Republican George Allen was caught on tape calling the 20-year-old tracker working for his opponent, Jim Webb, ­“macaca” due to the young man’s Indian descent. The story—complete with video—landed in the Washington Post the next day and many believe it cost Allen the race.14 Researchers immerse themselves in the information they are seeking and become experts on the candidates. They are invaluable for pointing out inaccuracies or lies in an opponent’s narrative and become indispensable during debate prep. Candidates are human and their memories are fallible (intentionally and unintentionally). Research directors need to have the discretion to keep what they know close to their vest, but the confidence to speak up when the candidate wants to say something false or inaccurate, particularly about their own record. Researchers fact check polls, ads, press releases, and public campaign material. They tell the media consultant how far they can take an attack ad and a press secretary what they can say to defend their own candidate to the press. They are the guardrails of every competent operation and no serious campaign is complete without them. Research should not be confused with policy on a campaign. Research focuses on background information on the candidate and opponent. ­Policy focuses on public issues—like health care, education, defense, and budgetary issues. The policy team develops the plans and proposals that the candidate offers to the public. They convene experts in various issues areas to serve as a sounding board for ideas. They also work with the research team to vet legislation and proposed policy that the candidate might like to support. Not every campaign has a dedicated policy staff. Smaller races often don’t have the same kind of need for a dedicated policy team and outsource the work to someone in the communications shop. Statewide races usually require a policy director and gubernatorial and presidential races require a dedicated policy team.



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The challenge on every campaign is that the intersection of politics and policy can be extremely fraught. Policy experts can sometimes clash with political staff, especially when it involves introducing complicated issue proposals to the public. The most skilled campaign operatives make good policy look like good politics—the worst ones ignore both. The final piece of this holy trinity is the communications shop. Most typically composed of a communications director, a press secretary, and a press assistant, this team is responsible for all conversation with the press. The exact formula that makes for a successful communications staffer is somewhat elusive but usually consists of part pit bull, part smooth talker, and part social animal. Managing an effective press strategy requires a team who knows the personalities, interests, and idiosyncrasies of the reporters they work with. They have an innate sense of the right reporters to pitch stories to, and they are not shy about going to war over a misreported article. They increasingly must have a good handle on the many bloggers and internet personalities who write about politics—as well as an able handle on how to use Twitter to influence media coverage. In many ways, a communications director is like the field goal kicker for a football team—they know the way the wind is blowing and they have a short memory that doesn’t obsess over a missed kick but focuses on the one right in front of them. In larger campaign operations, the communications director will handle the management of the press team, the planning and execution of overarching message strategy, and the day-to-day contact with the most important reporters. A press secretary will help write press releases, talk to the vast majority of the press, and staff the candidate on the road. Press assistants usually handle sending clips to the entire campaign team and assist with writing. It’s rare for a campaign not at the presidential level to have dedicated speechwriters. This function is typically handled by someone on the communications team. Of course, if the circumstances of a race require it, then a speechwriter should be hired, but it’s not typical. The communications team works closely with the digital operation to push stories and messages on social media. Social media is overseen by the digital director, though, for an important reason. Communication on channels like Facebook and Twitter differs from the standard press ­playbook. You are communicating with a wider and more diverse audience online than just the press. Social media is also used to drive things like fundraising and email sign ups which don’t fit easily into

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the standard press playbook. But, as was noted earlier, everything that goes out of a campaign on a public channel is subject to press scrutiny so it’s vital that the communications team is involved in the social media operation. The best operations treat research, communications and policy with equal respect and value the opinions and viewpoints of each department in big picture message conversations and campaign strategy. The campaign manager should make it a priority to ensure that these departments work effortlessly with one another and that the candidate and campaign consultants understand the importance each one of these departments plays in charting the direction of a campaign.

Digital For many years, campaign digital operations were called “new m ­ edia”— long after they stopped being new. Even today, there is a tendency among some candidates and operatives to treat the digital operation like a campaign luxury as opposed to an essential and indispensable tool for ­communicating with voters. Digital advertising on campaigns, which encompasses video ads, mobile, email, social media, and search, grew an unbelievable 789% from 2012 to 2016 ($159 million compared with $1.4 billion).15 Broadcast TV spending in campaigns dropped nearly 20% in the same period.16 Whereas TV was once the gold standard of campaign advertising, digital media is steadily increasing and the shift has taken a lot of ­campaigns off guard. Consider how increasingly rare watching live broadcast ­television is, versus time spent on computers and mobile devices. ­Americans get their news and their advertising differently than they did ten or even five years ago. Campaigns must adapt if they are to remain relevant to voters. Campaign digital teams must reflect this shift. Even in the 2012 election cycle it would have been odd for most campaigns to have more than one staffer dedicated to digital communication and advertising. ­Nowadays even the smallest operations must have a sophisticated grasp of political digital strategy and a staff that can handle its execution. A digital director is an essential early hire on a campaign. Ideally this person has some experience in politics. Most importantly, however, they need to have a good understanding of online advertising strategy, email acquisition, targeting, and using social media to drive messaging.



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Campaign managers often look outside the political world to find likely candidates to fill these roles. The skill set needed to understand the technology, keep up with shifting trends in the industry, and marry this into a cohesive political strategy that nontechnophiles can understand is not incredibly common. It’s often necessary to take someone with the basic skill sets needed for the job and groom them into the role. Most campaigns work with a digital consultant who assists with basic strategy and buying. For many years, these firms would also be tasked with a host of other outsourced responsibilities like writing email copy, producing digital advertising and videos, and graphic design. Increasingly, however, managers want to bring those functions in-house to the campaign and outsource bigger tasks like building the website and buying digital ad inventory. For a statewide campaign, the digital operation should include a social media manager who controls the candidate’s Twitter and Facebook accounts and runs copy by the senior team before posting online. The team should also include graphic designers, content strategists, and a videographer and video editor if the budget allows. The importance of social media as both a persuasion tool and a rapid response instrument has necessitated nimbler digital operations. Campaigns need digital staffers who can film and manipulate video quickly and who know how to capitalize on the intimate way channels like ­Facebook and Instagram can paint a candidate. Digital media has tremendous rapid response capability, particularly when combined with opposition research like tracker footage of an opponent lying or contradicting a previous statement. The ability to build organic followers on social media and then use those networks to enhance fundraising or increase exposure of advertising (or both) is somewhat limitless in the modern age of campaigns if there is staff and expertise to execute on it. Additionally, sophisticated social media monitoring can serve as the canary in the coalmine of pending political issues. Local Facebook groups and the comments section on the candidate’s own page can give a glimpse into how the public at large views messaging coming from the campaign or national events that affect the race. While they should never become substitutes for scientifically sampled polls and modeling, they should not be ignored either. Finally, candidates and campaign managers should hire digital teams that have a willingness to take on calculated risk. Digital communication is a dynamic and constantly changing field, which often clashes with the

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somewhat ossified world of campaign strategy. The limitations of a campaign budget should constrain untested expenditures, but sometimes the investment is worth it. There is long-term benefit for operatives and candidates in both parties if campaigns serve as laboratories for digital organizing and communication strategy. Before 2008 and Barack Obama’s campaign for president, no candidate had made social media and digital fundraising central to an election win. But Obama treated the possibilities of online organizing as opportunities to be explored, not sideshows to the main event. The campaign hired a digital director that was elevated to a senior staff level, invested heavily in online platforms that they could use to collect information and organize volunteers, encouraged local organizers to tap into their own online networks to gather support, and brought in experts from ­Silicon Valley and academia to innovate on the campaign. While nowadays those things are standard operating procedure, it’s important to remember that when Obama implemented them they were revolutionary.17

Field The irony of the digital sophistication of modern campaigns is that the more advanced they become, the more they rely on old-fashioned means of organizing and communication. Perhaps it is because voters are bombarded with more messaging and advertising than at any other point in history that they distrust that information in historic numbers as well.18 This dynamic has increased the value of endorsements that come from people in one’s own social circle or neighborhood and increased the importance of true person-to-person communication in campaigns. Consider this dynamic in your own life. What is more likely to make you try out a new hair salon—an online ad or an emphatic endorsement from a close friend with great hair? Candidates are always looking for the volunteer who will be the emphatic endorsement with great hair. More accurately, they want to build an army of people who can deploy in their own communities, knocking doors and making phone calls, to endorse the candidate to their friends and neighbors. This army does not naturally form on its own. It requires months of work and a battalion of paid organizers to build, as well as reliance on accurate voter files and data. The collective practice of direct voter communication to persuade and turnout voters is what practiced operatives refer to as “field.”



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There are some campaign operatives who were genetically designed to be field organizers. They are the extroverted, gregarious types who love meeting new people, talking to crowds, and immersing themselves in the hard work of persuading common citizens to volunteer their free time to knock on doors or make phone calls. They usually have endless reservoirs of patience, rarely lose their temper, and know how to be self-starters. Great field operations start with great field directors and, in this ­position, experience commensurate with the size and scope of a campaign is essential. Most field directors started as field organizers or regional organizing directors, working their way up in terms of management and responsibility. A good field director needs to understand the large data operations that drive modern campaigns and how to manipulate that data to serve a useful purpose. They need to be skilled managers of people as the field team is usually the largest department of the campaign. They also serve as a human resources director for the paid organizing staff, which is not typically based out of the campaign headquarters and spends a large amount of time walking their turf and taking meetings in local communities. Finally, a field director needs to have a deft political touch as they are usually the ones that have the most contact with the local community elected officials and undecided voters. Field directors will usually break up their “turf” (meaning the district or state the candidate is running in) into various regions and then hire regional organizing directors to run those regions. There are a million ways to divide a state or district but usually the segregation comes along geographic and demographic lines. There is value to keeping likeminded communities together for one regional organizing director to manage and in making sure those regions are not so geographically large that they become unmanageable. Field organizers are the worker bees that span out into communities around a state or district and work to directly recruit volunteers and supporters. Field organizers (or FOs, as they are known) are usually young, entry-level campaign employees who embed themselves in their region and then chase leads for volunteers. They take one-on-one meetings with potential supporters, organize and staff phone banks and canvasses, and make sure regional field offices are open for business in the community. All campaigns need a field organization. It is not something that can be outsourced to TV or digital ads or that can be taken for granted. The size and scope of a field operation depends on the size and scope of the

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campaign, but the investment in a single quality field organizer can pay dividends in terms of supporters turned out to vote on Election Day. Common (but unverified) campaign knowledge dictates that field efforts can increase vote share by at most 3–4%—but that 3–4% matters a great deal in a close contest.

Consultants The most critical management challenge for any candidate or manager is wrangling the large cast of characters in the political consulting class that surround every campaign. Most campaigns hire consultants to handle four major tasks: the production of TV ads and media buying, polling, direct mail persuasion, and digital advertising and ­fundraising. ­Depending on the size of the campaign, there may also be research, fundraising, and field consultants to add to that mix. Consultants are typically campaign veterans with many more years in the business than most staff and perhaps even the campaign manager. At times, their relationship with the candidate may predate that of the manager. Often consultants are responsible for recruiting and hiring the manager. This can make for an awkward relationship between the senior staff and the consultants if it is not properly managed. Media consultants are responsible for the writing of scripts, the production of ads, and the buying of TV advertising time. They are some of the highest-profile campaign operatives and typically one of the first hires a candidate makes. Unlike campaign managers, media consultants and their firms tend to stick with a candidate through many elections and the progression to higher offices. This means that they often have a very long-standing and personal relationship with the candidate. Media consultants can also be very involved in the day-to-day press operation, helping shape the communications strategy, the candidate talking points, and the deployment of opposition research. Pollsters also usually begin working for a candidate on their first ­campaign and stick with them through many election cycles. Polling is vital to understanding the electorate and crafting effective campaign messages and it’s often very helpful to have a pollster that has tracked opinions in a state or district over a long period of time. The intuitive ­insights they bring to campaign strategy, and often gut instinct on a candidate’s strengths and weaknesses, can be invaluable when tough decisions must be made in the heat of a campaign.



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Consultants don’t typically work on the campaign in a day-to-day staff capacity. The challenge for any manager is harnessing the enormous knowledge that they bring to the team in a way that is productive and beneficial to the campaign. At a minimum, a campaign manager should conduct weekly scheduled calls with the consulting team to review press and media strategy. Regular check-ins also provide the entire team with an opportunity to discuss problematic political issues, come to agreement on strategic challenges facing the campaign, map out long-term polling and advertising strategy, and exchange ideas in a free-flowing format. Additionally, campaigns should host in-person strategy retreats with the entire consulting team, senior campaign staff, and the candidate once a quarter. These gatherings should be tightly scheduled around key decision points and the manager should have specific takeaways they are looking to get out of such meetings. They should NOT be unstructured opportunities for people to pontificate about random points for hours on end. The key to making sure consultants are a productive part of the team is managing their input and relationship with the candidate. A manager should never try to shield a candidate from the advice and opinions of their team, but they should have an understanding that information flows through the manager first. Consultants who call the candidate directly to go around the manager’s back on a decision can create chaos. Likewise, managers who try and silo the candidate from other opinions and advice are doing a disservice to the campaign. Campaign staff and consultants tend to be individuals with healthy egos and strong opinions—they wouldn’t survive in the business otherwise. Harnessing those personalities takes a deft touch and a willingness to give differing viewpoints a fair airing. Managers should encourage frequent and healthy debate that shines a light on tough decisions. A campaign manager is first and foremost a sorting point for an avalanche of information and opinions. There is no shortage of people surrounding any campaign who think they could write better ads, hold better events, send better emails, get better press, or design better yard signs than the people tasked with that work. It can be maddening to deal with on a day-by-day basis, but the key to managing it is understanding what deserves more attention and time and what doesn’t ­really matter. Spoiler alert—a lot of it doesn’t matter.

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Conclusion: The Good Versus the Bad Bad campaigns are like a bad weekend in Las Vegas—bad decisions beget bad decisions until the entire thing is an enormous mess and no one can remember how it started. Most truly terrible campaign operations start with inexperienced staff who don’t know what they don’t know—and are unwilling to seek help or good advice. Bluster is used to mask ignorance and bold statements are used to hide poor planning. There tends to be an overuse of phrases like “we do things differently here” or “we’re not running a traditional campaign” and a surprising lack of details about how those things are going to be accomplished. Bad campaigns mistake strong opinions on politics with strong experience in politics. Good campaigns value planning and consist of team members that complement each other’s strengths and weaknesses. Good campaigns create an environment where dissenting opinions can be heard and ­listened to and no one voice has a monopoly on any conversation. Good campaigns value follow-through and follow-up and everyone from the campaign manager to the most entry-level team member understands the path to victory. On a good campaign—small things matter. Bad campaigns ignore the boring but important. They don’t care about human resources, lack internal accountability measures, don’t make compliance and campaign reporting a priority, and don’t have any processes to vet employees, donors and campaign supporters. They prioritize the exciting over the essential. They spend weeks debating the look of the campaign logo but no time on setting up internal processes for approvals and scheduling. Good campaigns have a long-term vision. They know that things that look spontaneous or organic are often the result of patient work and excruciating attention to detail. Bad campaigns live in the moment. They eschew long-term planning. They don’t give the budget the time and attention it deserves. They think money will flow into the campaign with little or no work—and they ask ­little of the candidate in terms of fundraising call time or hours pressing flesh. Good campaigns scrutinize every expense. They spend conservatively and direct resources to voter contact. They know the value of adding staff where appropriate and they pay a good living wage. On



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good campaigns, no one is too important to empty the trash, deliver a yard sign, or talk to a volunteer. Bad campaigns have bad campaign managers who always tell the candidate yes and care too much about being liked to set boundaries with electoral allies. Bad campaign managers never delegate. They make quantity of work a priority over quality—they keep staff working until late at night and every day of the week with no breaks or vacation ­because “that’s what you do”—which is the dumbest reason ever given for anything. Good campaigns never take their opponents for granted. They have contingency plans for when things go horribly wrong (as they always do). They don’t think that ignoring your candidate’s weaknesses means ­opponents will ignore them too. Good campaigns make self and opposition research a priority. They don’t let a candidate get away with saying “everyone already knows everything there is to know about me.” Good campaigns fact check everything. Good campaigns employ a lot of people who don’t look and think the same. They are diverse in gender, religion, ethnic background, and race. They reflect the electorate the candidate seeks to represent. It’s hard to really understand the difference between a good and bad campaign unless you’ve lived through both. No campaign experience is ever wasted—they are all learning opportunities. And it’s important to understand that not all losing campaigns are bad campaigns—good campaigns lose sometimes. The critical skill in living and working in the campaign space— whether as operative or candidate—is developing an instinct for what differentiates the good from the bad—and how to take the good to the great. Great campaigns have an intangible sense of positivity and joy. On great campaigns, every staffer from the entry-level field organizer to the highest-paid consultant feel like they are a part of something bigger than themselves. They are committed to a common mission and feel knowledgeable about the bigger issues of the election. Great campaigns reflect an authentic candidate running on a platform they believe in. Great campaigns have a sense of humor about their own shortcomings. Great campaigns don’t lie. Great campaigns bring out the best in a candidate and they find the best in the electorate they seek to persuade. They change the world—and they do it with moral and intellectual honesty that engenders pride in all the people who are a part of it.

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Remember—a good campaign is like a good surfer. Learn how to paddle out through choppy waters and line up for your board in just the right spot. Because, when you catch the perfect wave, it’s a ride unlike any other.

Notes 1. Balz, Dan. 2013. “How the Obama Campaign Won the Race for Voter Data.” Washington Post, July 28, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-theobama-campaign-won-the-race-for-voter-data/2013/07/28/ad32c7b4-ee4e11e2-a1f9-ea873b7e0424_story.html?utm_term=.52ecb7ea0e92 2. Rothenberg, Stuart. 2006. “A Dumb Mistake May Cost Democrats.” ­Inside Elections, February 26, www.insideelections.com/news/article/a-dumbmistake-may-cost-democrats 3. OpenSecrets.Org. n.d. “Most Expensive Races,” accessed September 8, 2017, www.opensecrets.org/overview/topraces.php?cycle=2016&display=allcands 4. Lewis, C.S. 1954. The Horse and His Boy. New York, NY: HarperCollins, 310. 5. Miller, Sean J. 2017. “Cyber Risk Analysts Are Exposing Consulting Firm’s Vulnerabilities.” Campaigns and Elections, June 30, www.campaigns andelections.com/campaign-insider/cyber-risk-analysts-are-exposingconsulting-firms-vulnerabilities 6. Bowman, Bridget. 2017. “Defending Against a Cyberattack on Democracy.” Roll Call, June 29, www.rollcall.com/politics/campaigns-cyberattack-election 7. Berr, Jonathan. 2016. “Election 2016’s Price Tag: $6.8 Billion.” CBS News Moneywatch, November 8, www.cbsnews.com/news/election-2016sprice-tag-6–8-billion 8. Berr, 2016. 9. Desilver, Drew, and Patrick Van Kessel. 2015. “As More Money Flow Into Campaigns, Americans Worry About Its Influence.” Pew Research C ­ enter Fact Tank, December 7, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/07/asmore-money-flows-into-campaigns-americans-worry-about-its-­i nfluence 10. Parlapiano, Alicia, and Rachel Shorey. 2017. “Who Financed the ­Georgia Sixth, the Most Expensive House Election Ever.” New York Times, June 20, www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/20/us/politics/georgia-6thmost-­expensive-house-election.html 11. Parlapiano and Shorey, 2017. 12. Vries, Lloyd. 2003. “Dean Raises $1M Via Internet.” CBS News, May 23, www.cbsnews.com/news/dean-raises-1m-via-internet 13. Revolution Messaging. n.d. “Case Study: Bernie 2016,” accessed ­September 14, 2017, https://revolutionmessaging.com/cases/bernie-2016



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14. Craig, Tim, and Michael D. Shear. 2006. “Allen Quip Provokes Outrage, Apology.” Washington Post, August 15, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2006/08/14/AR2006081400589.html 15. Kaye, Kate. 2017. “Data Driven Targeting Creates Huge 2016 P ­ olitical Ad Shift: Broadcast TV Down 20%, Cable and Digital Way Up.” ­Advertising Age, January 3, http://adage.com/article/media/2016-political-broadcast-tvspend-20-cable-52/307346 16. Kaye, 2017. 17. Carr, David. 2008. “How Obama Tapped into Social Media’s Power.” New York Times, November 9, www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/ 10carr.html 18. Kurtzleben, Danielle. 2015. “2016 Campaigns Will Spend $4.4 Billion On TV Ads, But Why?” NPR It’s All Politics, August 19, www.npr.org/sections/ itsallpolitics/2015/08/19/432759311/2016-campaign-tv-ad-spending

3 The Role of Political Parties David A. Dulio and John S. Klemanski

Political parties in the United States find themselves in an interesting position in politics near the beginning of the third decade of the 2000s. On one hand, they are viewed negatively by the American public; since the start of the 2010s, almost without exception, less than 50% of the ­American public has had a favorable view of both the Democratic and Republican parties.1 On the other, E.E. Schattschneider’s words remain true when, in his seminal work Party Government, he argued that ­“political parties created democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties.”2 Modern campaigns and elections in the American context reflect this dichotomy as well. Political parties are a fundamental and substantial component to our system but at the same time many of their activities, and even some of their candidates, are reviled and not looked upon favorably by the American public. In this chapter, we examine the multiple and sometimes complex ­areas of political parties’ key role in our system of campaigns and elections. We begin with a discussion of different conceptions of party to establish a context. We also consider some of the major activities parties engage in during campaigns, including the nomination of candidates for office and the different processes that are employed, the parties’ fundraising efforts, and the parties’ efforts to assist their candidates during a campaign. We then examine several important trends that impact parties and that have been driven by parties since the turn of the century. Each of the aforementioned topics can be applied to any election cycle in American politics. The last portion of the chapter is devoted to the role of parties in the 2016 presidential election. While the 2016 election was 36



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noteworthy for a number of reasons, one aspect is important for our purposes in this chapter. Political parties certainly played an important role in 2016, but at the same time the 2016 election will be remembered for several aspects that could be described as either anti-party or anti–party establishment. Indeed, the Republican Party’s nomination of Donald Trump to be its standard bearer reflects this fact, as Trump’s relationship with the GOP was loose given that he had been associated with another party in the past, had made statements counter to Republican orthodoxy several times over the years prior, and ran on issue positions that did not fit with traditional Republicans. In addition, while the D ­ emocratic Party nominated Hillary Clinton, someone who is clearly part of the ­establishment, there were other dynamics at play for the Democrats in 2016 that again point to an anti-party or anti–party establishment election. While he did not win the nomination, Bernie Sanders’s successes in the ­Democratic primary process are noteworthy for the simple fact that he is not a Democrat. While he caucuses with the Democrats in the U.S. Senate, he labels himself an independent.3 Some of this aversion to the party is over his positions on issues relative to the mainstream of the Democratic Party. Indeed, during the 2016 primary, many saw Sanders pulling Clinton farther to the left on the ideological spectrum and worried that it would be problematic during the general election.4 Moreover, Sanders repeatedly had run-ins with the Democratic Party’s leadership over issues he said showed favoritism to his opponent. So, while Sanders did not win the nomination, he did have some profound success, and some of this can be attributed to his anti-party or anti–party establishment approach. This, along with similar dynamics on the Republican side, made the 2016 election one of the most interesting in terms of the role of political parties.

Different Elements of Party Political parties play a number of important roles during a campaign season. Nearly all of these fall under the umbrella of V.O. Key’s tripartite model of parties, which includes the party affiliation of candidates for office (party in government), how voters identify (or do not) with a party (party in the electorate), and the activities that parties engage in to help their candidates win elections (party as organization).5 Each element of Key’s model has been studied by many; a full accounting of each of these areas of research is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, some

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key components of each—and how they have changed over time—are ­important to what follows in the sections below.

Party in the Electorate The most familiar aspect of Key’s model, it can be argued, is party in the electorate—each person’s identification or connection to the ­Democratic, Republican, some other party (e.g., Green, Libertarian, etc.), or no party at all. Because the United States does not have a party system that ­requires individuals to formally join a party (e.g., where individuals pay yearly dues), it can be difficult to measure party identification (party id). In some states, it is easier than others because certain states require i­ ndividuals to declare their party affiliation when they register to vote (see the section on nominating contests below). In other states, individuals register without any declaration of party id. Therefore, the only method of measuring party id across the nation is through scientific surveys of Americans. Trends in party identification over time provide a window into how Americans view not only their own attachment to a party but also a more general view of party in the electorate. Figure 3.1 shows party identification between 1992 and 2015.6 At least two important trends can be clearly seen: First, throughout this time frame, a higher percentage of ­Americans have viewed themselves as Democrats than Republicans. For a brief time in the mid-1990s, this was not the case, as slightly more Americans considered themselves Republicans than Democrats. This was right after the GOP won a majority of seats in the U.S. House of ­Representatives in the 1994 elections. In the early 2000s Republicans nearly reached parity with the Democrats—during the first few years of George W. Bush’s presidency. A more striking trend that has important ramifications for campaigns and elections is the steep increase in the percentage of Americans who consider themselves independents, which begins in the late 2000s and continues through 2015.7 Indeed, the number of Americans who considered themselves independents in the mid-2010s far outpaced those who consider themselves either Democrats or Republicans. The result is that both parties have seen an erosion of those who identify with them over this time. For candidates and parties who are working to win elections, the fact that fewer and fewer people identify with their “brand” means it is sometimes more difficult to attract the votes needed to win that election. For many Americans, the shift to considering themselves to be



Chapter 3. The Role of Political Parties

39

Figure 3.1  Party Identification in the United States, 1992–2015 45

40

Percent

35

30

25

19

9 19 2 93 19 9 19 4 9 19 5 9 19 6 9 19 7 9 19 8 9 20 9 0 20 0 01 20 0 20 2 03 20 0 20 4 05 20 0 20 6 0 20 7 0 20 8 0 20 9 1 20 0 1 20 1 1 20 2 1 20 3 1 20 4 15

20

Independent

Republican

Democrat

Source: Pew Research Center, “Party Identification” http://www.pewresearch.org/datatrend/political-attitudes/party-identification/# (accessed July 14, 2017).

independents stems from a dissatisfaction with both parties, their candidates, policy alternatives offered (or not offered) by the parties and their elected officials, and a general dissatisfaction with government. As we discuss below, this was a significant factor in Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election. His campaign as an outsider candidate who had not spent years as a “Washington insider” attracted votes from many Americans who thought of themselves as left behind by both parties and government in general. However, Trump’s first several months in office did little to change Americans’ minds on how government was working. According to ­Gallup, in early 2017 over 20% of all Americans said dissatisfaction with government was the country’s most pressing problem.8 Not all of this can be laid at Trump’s feet. Some Americans likely blame other branches of government—namely Congress—for their dissatisfaction. Wherever the blame is placed, both parties clearly have work to do in the 2018 and 2020 elections and beyond.

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Part I: The Political Context of Campaigns

Party in Government The simplest component of V.O. Key’s tripartite model is arguably party in government. This piece of the party puzzle focuses on the party affiliation of candidates for office and elected officials. In terms of candidates for office, the vast majority have either a “D” or an “R” after their name on the ballot, indicating that they are running as a Democrat or Republican. Some elections, however, include no candidates with party affiliations because these are conducted as nonpartisan contests. Names of ­candidates are simply placed on the ballot with no party labels. Many mayoral, city council, and other local elected positions are chosen through nonpartisan elections. Some candidates will run as independents, or members of another party including the Green Party, Libertarian Party, or others. While there are a wide range of other parties that exist in the U.S., only candidates running as Democrats or Republicans tend to win office. This is in large part because of the electoral rules that are employed in the overwhelming majority of general elections in the U.S. These electoral rules— winner-take-all, plurality rules in single-member districts—only reward the candidate who finishes first, shutting out candidates of ­parties that receive smaller percentages of the vote. When party affiliation is present it can act as a strong cue to voters about what that particular candidate will do in office should he or she be elected. In short, a party label can carry a lot of information with it and can be “useful to voters as predictors of legislative behavior.”9 ­However, fewer candidates than one might expect actually refer to their party affiliation during a campaign. One recent study, while finding important differences across candidates, found that “on average, candidates devoted very little airtime to talking about the parties” in their television ­advertising during congressional elections held between 1998 and 2008.10 This research shows that candidates are strategic in their use of party labels. It is certainly possible, if not likely, that, as the number of Americans who consider themselves independents has increased, the mentions of party affiliation by candidates has gone down. Once candidates who win elections transition into elected officials, nearly all report a party affiliation. This is because in most governmental structures in the U.S. party is the organizing mechanism of government. In short, the party that has the most members of a particular body is in charge of that body. Legislatures are the clearest example here. Take the U.S. Congress, for instance. In the 115th Congress, the U.S. House of



Chapter 3. The Role of Political Parties

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Representatives had 241 Republicans and 194 Democrats. Therefore, with Republicans in the majority, they were in power. Even those who run as independents or as members of another party will at least t­ angentially align with one of the two major parties once in office. For instance, in the U.S. Senate during the 115th Congress, there were 52 Republicans, 46 Democrats, and 2 independents. However, those two independents— the aforementioned Bernie Sanders and Angus King (ME)—both have chosen to caucus with the Democratic Party because the Democrats are closer to many of their policy positions. The act of caucusing with a party is a loose affiliation and is tied to meetings that all party members can attend as well as committee assignments within the institution.

Party as Organization The final leg of Key’s tripartite model—party as organization—is arguably both simple and complex. It is simple in that it refers to basic organizational structures and functions of a party, but complex when considering the specifics of those structures and functions. It is also most closely related to an ultimate goal of parties—to win and maintain (through elections) control of government so they can implement their preferred policy alternatives. Organizationally, both the Democratic and Republican parties have national committees (the Democratic National Committee [DNC] and the Republican National Committee [RNC]). These committees have members from across the nation and serve as ­decision-making groups for the party. According to the party itself, “the DNC is composed of the chairs and vice-chairs of each state Democratic Party Committee and over 200 members elected by Democrats in all 50 states and the territories.”11 The RNC consists of three elected members from each of the 50 states.12 In addition to members of the committee, both have chairpersons and other leaders who guide the organization. The national committees’ main focus is electing its presidential candidate every four years, holding the party’s national convention during presidential election years, crafting a party platform, and serving as an agenda setter for the party. In addition to the national committees, each party also has two “Hill committees” that focus their efforts on electing candidates to the U.S. House and U.S. Senate—the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC).

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Part I: The Political Context of Campaigns

The national committees and the Hill committees are generally similar in size and scope. Once one goes beyond the national level into the states, however, significant and important differences emerge. While all 50 states have state Democratic and Republican party organizations that focus on electing candidates to offices in their state, the size and scope of what these organizations do differs greatly across the country and sometimes within a particular state. For instance, during the 2016 election cycle, the California Democratic Party raised over $24 million but the Louisiana Democratic Party raised just $13,500; that same year, while the Wyoming Republican Party raised only $78,000, the GOP in Florida raised over $10 million.13 The differences in fundraising mean that the parties are able to do more or less to help their candidates win elections. The state parties in the U.S. are so varied that it is often said that there are not two parties in the U.S. but 100. Moreover, once one moves below the state level, there are even greater differences across and within states. Several different types of local party organizations exist—congressional district party organizations, county party organizations, city party organizations, and, at the lowest level, precinct party organizations. Not surprisingly, party organizations often exist at every level of elective office, since they help support their candidates for these offices. At times in some places, an organization might exist, but there are no individuals who agree to hold the positions. The activity of local party organizations is driven in large part by how many individuals volunteer and how much funding each can attract. In addition to state parties being quite different in terms of the size of their budgets and volunteer lists, what it means to be a Democrat or ­Republican in a particular state can also be quite different. G ­ enerally speaking, Democrats in California or Oregon are more liberal than ­Democrats in Georgia or Tennessee. At the same time, Republicans in Texas or Oklahoma are generally more conservative than those in ­Massachusetts or Rhode Island. This can be better understood when ­examining the party affiliation differences that exist within states. ­According to Gallup, states including Vermont (25.5%), Massachusetts (24.9%), Maryland (23.2%), and New York (21.1%) all have large party affiliation differences where Democrats outpace Republicans by more than 20%. Similarly, Wyoming (33.8%), Utah (27.6%), Idaho (26.2%), South Dakota (22.7%), and North Dakota (20.9%) are states where Republicans outnumber Democrats significantly.14 These figures help define these states as solidly Democratic or solidly Republican.



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The Party Network While Key’s tripartite model is very helpful in understanding the different elements of party, it is not the only way of conceptualizing a political party. More recent research has argued that, rather than ­limiting parties to three mutually exclusive categories, a party is better represented as a network of interconnected and cooperative organizations and individuals that extend beyond the formal party organization. In particular, “a party is broadly defined to include its candidates and officeholders; its formal apparatus; loyal donors, campaign workers and activists; allied interest groups; and friendly media outlets.”15 Rather than one structure that serves to help candidates win elections, the party network view ­a rgues that multiple groups and organizations work toward the same goal. The formal party leadership works alongside ­donors, activists, and outside groups (e.g., 527 organizations, Super PACs, etc.). Scholarly research has shown that there are strong connections between these ­various groups that help them to achieve their goals.16 There is a clear and tangible link between the party as organization component of Key’s tripartite model and the party network concept in the activities that take place during a campaign cycle. Another way to think of the party network is as a “team” where “[a]ctors ‘join’ the party when they begin communicating with other members of the network, developing common strategies and coordinating action to achieve shared goals” including to defeat the opposition party during an election.17 There are some activities that are reserved for the formal party apparatus and others that are shared between the party organization and the rest of the “team.”

Roles of Parties during a Campaign The activities of the party during campaigns and elections are numerous and run the gamut from the fundamental work of nominating ­candidates for office (done by the formal party organization) to more “inside baseball” political activities that include conducting research that will shape a candidate’s message in a House or Senate race or help create language that will become part of an independent expenditure advertising ­campaign. In the next section, we highlight some of the most prominent of these.

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Part I: The Political Context of Campaigns

Candidate Nominations One area of work that is reserved for the formal party structure is the nomination of candidates for office. While other activities during a campaign season may be shared (e.g., between the candidate, their party, and even outside organizations), only a political party (as opposed to, say, an interest group) can nominate a candidate. Today, parties use several different types of processes to choose candidates for the general election. We will focus on three types of nominating contests here—primaries, caucuses, and conventions. Today the most familiar way that candidates are selected for the general election is the primary. Primary elections work just like any other election—registered voters go to the polls and cast a ballot for their favored candidate. These elections are controlled by a combination of state and local government decisions that, through state and local laws, determine the specific details of the primary process. An interesting aspect of states controlling this process is that, at the end of the day, primaries are all about a decision that is internal to the party. No candidates are being chosen to be elected officials; rather, the state is performing a function that helps the parties. The state also is funding what amounts to an ­internal party decision. For example, depending on a number of factors, presidential primaries can cost anywhere from roughly $1 million (New Hampshire) to nearly $100 million of taxpayer money.18 The date of a state’s primary election is decided by state law and is varied across states. In the 2018 election cycle, primaries for seats in the U.S. Congress (and other offices in individual states) range from early March (Texas) to mid-September of that year (e.g., New York and Rhode Island). When a state holds a primary, typically all of the offices that will use a primary to select candidates for the general election are on the same ballot. However, in many instances states hold their primary for congressional (and other) candidates at a date that is different from the presidential primary. For instance, in Michigan the 2016 presidential primary was on March 8 while the other primaries were on August 2. The state also decides who can participate in primaries and this often fits into three categories—open, closed, and semi-closed primaries. Much of the decision about what kind of primary to hold turns on whether the state collects party affiliation when an individual registers to vote. When states collect this information, it has the option to hold a closed primary, where only registered Democrats can participate in the



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Democratic primary and only registered Republicans can participate in the GOP primary. There is sound reasoning for this option. Primaries are about choosing a candidate to represent the party in the general election; only members of that party should participate in that process. This option, however, obviously leaves out those who identify as an independent or with another party. States that collect party affiliation also have an option that can include the voters who are left out of purely closed primaries through a semi-closed primary, which allows independents to vote in either the Democratic or Republican primary (but not both). ­Finally, states that do no collect party registrations have open primaries, where any registered voter can participate in either the Democratic or ­Republican primary. Another type of nominating contest is a caucus. While primaries are state-run affairs, caucuses are controlled and run by the state party organization. With this control, the state party decides all of the details of the caucus process. The state party also pays for the caucus. Because the state party controls the caucus process, the specifics of each caucus can be quite different from state to state. In general, they occur at places that include school gymnasiums, churches, and any other location in a community that can accommodate a large number of people at one time. The caucuses that are most familiar to most Americans are those that occur during the presidential primary process. Some caucuses are very simple and can even resemble primaries in that participants arrive and simply mark a ballot to express their choice for president. But, because the state party controls the process, they are able to include their own rules and these often differ greatly from state to state. For instance, in the 2004 Michigan presidential primary process, Democrats had a caucus and included a number of interesting elements including offering an online option for participation. At the end of the day, over 46,000 people participated in the 2004 Michigan Democratic caucus via the internet. The Iowa caucuses are the most famous caucuses, in large part because they are the first nominating contest to take place each presidential election cycle (typically held in January of the presidential election year). The Democratic Party process, however, is one of, if not the most, interesting caucus procedures used today. The heart of the caucuses is the formation of “preference groups” by caucus-goers as they gather in one area of the caucus site (hence the need for a large space such as a gymnasium). In short, during the Democratic Party’s Iowa caucuses, there is no such thing as a secret ballot.

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Part I: The Political Context of Campaigns

This brings us to the third type of nominating contest—conventions. Very simply, conventions are gatherings of party elites and activists to set party rules, decide on planks of the party platform, and, sometimes, to choose candidates for the general election ballot. Conventions are the closest process in use today to those of the party machine era in that voters play little, if any, role in choosing candidates for the ballot. Rather, the activists who gather make the decision on which candidates will be on the ballot. The extent to which conventions are used across the nation depends on the state. Some states use it extensively, while others use conventions more selectively or not at all. For instance, in Washington State, Democratic “nominees for all statewide partisan elected ­offices (U.S.  Senate, Governor, Lt. Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer, ­Auditor, Attorney General, Insurance Commissioner, and Public Lands Commissioner)” are selected at the state party convention.19 In ­Michigan, some candidates are chosen by primary, while others are chosen at each party’s convention. In particular, candidates for offices including lieutenant governor, attorney general, secretary of state, and members of the Michigan Supreme Court and the state board of education are chosen via state convention. Conventions can also be used in special circumstances; for instance, Montana Democrats used a convention process to choose a candidate to be on the ballot in the state’s 2017 special congressional election.20 Another aspect of candidate nominations is how individuals are ­included in the list of candidates considered for nomination in the first place. In short, the U.S. has a candidate-centered system of campaigns and elections—as opposed to a party-centered system—which means that, for the most part, candidates self-select into the process of running for office.21 Anyone, as long as they meet the formal requirements for office (as set forth in the U.S. Constitution, state constitution, or state law) and file the correct paperwork with the controlling government, can be on the ballot in a primary election. This means that parties have much less control over who participates in the electoral process today compared to the golden age of parties, when the party machine tightly controlled the process of candidate recruitment. There is no better example of this lack of party control in who steps forward to be considered for nomination than the 2016 Republican ­presidential primary field. Not only was this group of candidates incredibly large—at one point there were 17 candidates seeking their party’s nomination for president—but it included some who were from outside



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of the mainstream of the party (e.g., Ted Cruz, John Kasich, and Rand Paul), some who might be considered unorthodox (e.g., Carly Fiorina and Ben Carson), and at least one who had not always been a Republican (i.e., Donald Trump) (more on the anti–party establishment nature of the 2016 election is below). The GOP leadership would have likely preferred a smaller and more traditional field of candidates; this would have produced a more typical and controllable nomination battle than the one that ensued. This is not to say that parties do not try to impact who does (and  does  not) run in a primary election. Parties still can and do engage in ­candidate recruitment. Party elites are always on the lookout for new c­ andidates for offices up and down the ballot (although mostly down-­ballot). The party is looking for candidates who may have some ­experience running for o ­ ffice—maybe a state representative to run for state senate or a city council person to run for mayor, for instance— someone who has a strong network in politics, someone who already has significant name identification with the public (e.g., celebrities), and certainly someone who has the capacity to raise the funds necessary to wage a competitive campaign. At the end of the day, however, modern parties cannot stop anyone who wants to run from doing so.

Parties as Fundraisers and Spenders As noted above, in their heyday parties were thought to have monopolized politics but now have lost some of that power with the advent of the direct primary. Parties also lost power in other ways. Owing to reforms and other dynamics at work through the middle and end of the twentieth century, parties became no more than “peripheral organizations” that were, “at best, on the margins of the electoral process.”22 Much of this transformation was because of reforms such as the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of the early 1970s. In short, FECA took one of the parties’ main electoral tools—money—and severely limited it. Before FECA, parties could contribute as much money as they liked to their candidates’ campaigns. After FECA, parties could only directly contribute $5,000 per candidate per election.23 This went a long way toward making the party organization weaker and was a major factor in pushing them to the periphery of campaigns and elections by the end of the 1970s. However, parties were certainly not dead and they did not sit idly by waiting to be shoved further out of the campaign process. Rather, the

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Part I: The Political Context of Campaigns

parties adapted. One of the major areas of adaptation was in fundraising. In short, parties refocused their fundraising efforts. According to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), in 1978—arguably the low point of the parties’ power—the DNC, DCCC, and DSCC raised a total of $14.4 million, while the RNC, NRCC, and NRSC combined to raise $59.2 million.24 In the presidential year of 1980, the three Democratic Party committees raised a total of $18.7 million and the GOP committees raised over $122 million.25 By 1992, the Democrats’ total had risen to over $140 million and the Republicans’ to over $240.26 Just four years later, the three Democratic organizations raised nearly $300 million and the GOP $470 million. In 2004 these figures rose to $576 million and $657 million, respectively. Not to be outdone, the Democratic committees raised nearly $800 million in 2016 while the GOP’s three groups raised over $680 million. Clearly the national party organizations have had great success raising money. This has put them in a place to be major factors in modern campaigns and they are no longer peripheral organizations. Indeed, parties are a central figure in campaigns across the county. Because of their fundraising prowess, the formal party organizations are able to spend a great deal of money each and every election cycle trying to impact the outcome of many different races. Parties have multiple avenues they can take to help their candidates win. First, they can spend money directly on a campaign through several different types of expenditures—direct contributions to candidates (limited to $5,000 per candidate per election), coordinated expenditures with a candidate’s campaign, and independent expenditures that try to impact the outcome of an election without any coordination with the candidate’s campaign (see Chapter 12 for a detailed description of party spending in these ­areas). Second, they can provide services to candidates that those candidates may need to wage a successful campaign in modern ­American-style campaigns and elections.

Providing Services to Candidates Today, political parties can help their candidates by offering services that are often in demand during a campaign. According to its website, the DCCC is “the only political committee in the country whose principal mission is to support Democratic House candidates every step of the way to victory.”27 The NRCC bills itself as “devoted to increasing the ­Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives.”28 While



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a great deal of party money is spent on coordinated and independent expenditures each election cycle, the national committees and Hill committees each spend millions on their internal organizations all with an eye toward helping their candidates win. Each of the six committees at the national level (DNC, RNC, DCCC, DSCC, NRCC, and NRSC) houses dozens of staffers in different divisions including finance, communications, political, field (i.e., grassroots), and digital. For instance, parties can help candidates with their fundraising efforts by working to arrange meetings with political action committees (PACs) and other faithful donors to the party. A seemingly small service includes the national committees and Hill committees providing incumbent members of Congress with office space from which to make fundraising phone calls while in Washington, D.C. This is important because it is illegal for members to make fundraising phone calls from their congressional offices. It helps that both parties’ headquarters are within walking distance of most congressional office buildings. In addition, a major service to candidates is in the area of research. One of the core components of any campaign is research. Research to help understand the voters in a candidate’s district or state that will help form the candidate’s campaign message is certainly critical. But also important here is research on the candidates (the opposition and the candidate him or herself) running. Opposition research has been a hallmark of party organizations for decades. In 2012, “[w]ith a staff of 25, the DCCC boast[ed] the largest in-house research department of the four Congressional campaign committees.” A Roll Call report described the efforts of this large team that election cycle: The DCCC’s team of mostly 20-somethings researches opposition targets for eight weeks at a time, scouring news clips and Y ­ ouTube videos and traveling across the country to comb through public records, all in hopes of finding a good hit. Discoveries go into hundred-page research books on their targets that are used as bait to recruit candidates, leaked to reporters or cited in campaign advertisements and mail pieces.29

The NRSC sums up the party committees’ approach here nicely as they note that it provides “invaluable support and assistance to current and prospective Republican U.S. Senate candidates in the areas of budget planning, election law compliance, fundraising, communications tools

50

Part I: The Political Context of Campaigns

and messaging, research and strategy.”30 In short, the national party organizations see themselves as a one-stop shop for what their candidates need during a campaign. They can go to the party should they need help with interpreting campaign finance law, obtaining quality polling data, making a television ad or campaign video, or even something as fundamental as creating a strong message for their campaign. An important debate in the political science literature is over how parties have come to be where they are today in terms of providing services to candidates and how they have adapted to the changing circumstances and dynamics of modern campaigns. As noted above, by the end of the 1970s parties were only “peripheral organizations” after nearly a century of reforms and changes that led to the decline of party power. In addition to governmental reforms such as the Pendleton Act in 1883 and the institution of the direct primary, beginning in the early 1900s, which both took a great deal of power away from the party bosses, and FECA, other factors contributed to this decline. One of those factors, it was argued in the early 1980s, was the presence of political consultants: “The services provided by consultants, their new campaign technologies, have undoubtedly supplanted party activists and influences.”31 However, also noted above is that parties were able to get back into the electoral game and become much more than peripheral organizations. Part of this revitalization would not have been possible without the help of political consultants. Parties, in fact, hired professional consultants to help with their fundraising efforts that led to their larger campaign coffers. They also hired consultants to help provide many of the services that were in demand early in their revitalization—pollsters, media consultants, direct mail specialists, etc. It has been asked whether parties and consultants have been and still are allies or adversaries.32 Evidence produced by scholars investigating this question tips heavily in favor of the conclusion that consultants and parties are allies.33 Indeed, “the campaign techniques [consultants] provide have not destroyed the parties but have strengthened them.”34 The presence of consultants helped parties become important players in modern campaigns. They may not monopolize campaigns as they did in the past, but they play an important role with their candidates and are “in service” to them.35 Taking the allied argument even further, consultants and parties have adapted to the point where there is an efficient division of labor between the two that exists in modern campaigns. In short, there are some campaign services that are better provided by parties and others that are better provided



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by consultants. Modern campaign services can generally be divided into two categories: those that are campaign-specific and centered on the creation and delivery of a candidate’s message and those that require a great deal of staff resources and time. Consultants are the main service provider of the former and parties the latter.36

Parties and the 2016 Election The above discussion provides a useful context for analyzing the role of parties in the 2016 elections. Particular attention is given to the presidential primary elections in both parties and then the general election for president, but congressional races are examined also. Of special interest is campaign spending and how parties serve their candidates as part of a broad network that includes Super PACs and independent expenditures, as well as the coordinated campaigns in which parties work with ­candidates and other groups for all party candidates running in 2016. This chapter began by noting how the 2016 presidential campaign featured a strong antiestablishment theme. This was true in both the ­Democratic and Republican primaries, as is discussed below.

Presidential Campaign in 2016 In the presidential primary season beginning in 2015, several c­ andidates from both major parties took a decidedly antiestablishment approach, including attacks on their own respective party establishments. For example, both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders railed against the mainstream media, the government establishment, and their own party elites. While Trump and Sanders often took widely different positions on many issues, their criticism of establishment institutions and individuals seemed to resonate with both Republican and Democratic primary voters. As noted at the outset of this chapter, Trump’s nomination by the GOP was awkward at best. While he won the support of enough delegates at the Republican National Convention, there is no denying that his nomination also reflected a strong antiestablishment sentiment among voters. In fact, routinely through the primary process he criticized ­Republican Party leadership. In one tweet, on February 11, 2016, Donald Trump wrote, “Remember, it was the Republican party, with the help of ­conservatives, that made so many promises to their base, BUT DIDN’T KEEP THEM!”37

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Part I: The Political Context of Campaigns

For his part, Bernie Sanders had an even less mainstream association with the Democratic Party. He was, after all, a self-proclaimed democratic socialist who was not even a member of the Democratic Party. While he caucused with the Democrats in the U.S. Senate, he has long run for office as an independent.38 Some of this aversion to the party has been over his more progressive positions on issues relative to the mainstream of the Democratic Party. In announcing his candidacy for the Democratic Party’s nomination, Sanders said, Today, with your support and the support of millions of people throughout this country, we begin a political revolution to ­transform our country economically, politically, socially and ­environmentally. … Brothers and sisters: Now is not the time for thinking small. Now is not the time for the same old – same old establishment politics and stale inside-the-beltway ideas.39

Indeed, during the 2016 primary, many saw Sanders as pulling ­Clinton farther to the left on the ideological spectrum and worried that this more extreme view would be a problem for many general election ­voters.40 Moreover, Sanders repeatedly had run-ins with the ­Democratic Party’s leadership, including over issues he said showed favoritism to his opponent. The strategic release of hacked DNC emails (just ­before the ­Democratic national convention in July) gave support to the ­Sanders camp’s claims of DNC favoritism.41 So, while Sanders did not win the nomination, he did have some success and much of this can be attributed to his anti–party establishment approach. This, along with similar dynamics on the Republican side, made the 2016 election one of the most interesting in terms of the role of political parties.

Supporting Presidential Candidates Even though the 2016 presidential election was unique in several ways, the two major political parties played an important role in the nomination and election process—as they have done for many years. As noted above, parties take on several roles in political campaigns. For example, they can recruit candidates. While there has been a fair amount of self-recruitment at all levels of public office in recent elections, parties often attempt to limit the number of candidates because their preferred



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candidate is seen as more electable or has views more in keeping with the mainstream party philosophy. The Republican primary in 2016 at one time had 17 candidates, so it was obvious that the party did not try to control recruitment (or was not very successful). The Democratic Party had a favorite candidate in Hillary Clinton, and none of the other candidates were seen as serious challengers to her front-runner status. Bernie ­Sanders surprised everyone with his early success, and the issue of ­favoritism did become a campaign issue in both the primary and general elections. National parties host nominating conventions every four years, in which their presidential and vice-presidential candidates are selected by pledged delegates. The party’s platforms are created and approved by delegates at this time as well. Parties also are active in mobilizing voters, through the get-out-the-vote efforts made around Election Day, but parties and their volunteer and paid staffs also are involved prior to that in voter registration drives. Parties also now play a fundraising and campaign spending role—in conjunction with a variety of other organizations and individuals—that still have an important place in modern campaigns. Changes in the law and various U.S. Supreme Court decisions have opened up campaign spending to many other groups now, but party and joint fundraising committees still play a role in providing support to party candidates. In 2016, the general election campaign pitted two very dissimilar candidates. Hillary Clinton was a veteran politician and a mainstream candidate of the Democratic Party establishment. She effectively raised money, as did the party and its associated committees. Super PACs operating on her behalf—and therefore part of the party network—were active and generous. The party and candidate had resources for both the air wars and the ground game. Yet she lost to her polar opposite, who broke most of the traditional rules about proper and effective campaigning. Donald Trump was an outsider whose comments during the primary were insulting to many people including those in his own party—and the party organization itself. The subsequent earned media attention he received meant that he did not need to spend very much money on paid media. His regular messages via Twitter to his followers served to rally his ­supporters and gain a great deal of earned media at no cost to the campaign. Below are the comparisons of campaign money raised and spent by the major-party fundraising committees (but not associated outside groups) on behalf of the two major-party candidates.

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Part I: The Political Context of Campaigns

Table 3.1  Party Committee Campaign Finance in 2016

Party Committee Democratic Party (all committees) Republican Party (all committees) Democratic National Committee Republican National Committee Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee National Republican Campaign Committee Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee National Republican Senatorial Committee

Total Raised $1.29 billion

Total Spent $1.28 billion

$968.8 million

$933.6 million

$372.2 million

$368.4 million

$343.4 million

$323.1 million

$220.9 million

$216.4 million

$170.6 million

$160.6 million

$179.8 million

$177.4 million

$138.4 million

$133.9 million

Source: Adapted from the Center for Responsive Politics, www.opensecrets.org/parties, accessed August 21, 2017.

In terms of the national party committees, the two major parties were relatively even in their spending totals in 2016. The Democratic National Committee (DNC) spent $368 million, while the Republican National Committee (RNC) spent $323 million. The two Democratic congressional campaign committees also spent more than their R ­ epublican counterparts. Overall, the Democratic Party (the Clinton campaign committee and all associated groups) spent about $1.3 billion to the ­Republican ­Party’s $934 million.42 (See Table 3.2.) Table 3.2  Money Raised in the 2016 Presidential Campaign by Source

Candidate Donald Trump Hillary Clinton

Candidate’s Campaign Committee $333, 127,164

Party Committees $ 968,825,737

Outside Groups $ 75,269,043

$563,756,928

$1,292,180,609

$231,118,680

Source: Adapted from the Center for Responsible Politics, https://www.opensecrets. org/pres16 (accessed August 21, 2017).



Chapter 3. The Role of Political Parties

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Supporting Congressional Candidates In addition to their focus on presidential elections, political parties also have hundreds of lower-level campaigns and elections to consider. There were 34 U.S. Senate seats and 435 U.S. House seats up for election in 2016. While this was a presidential election year, the 2016 Senate elections had produced a little extra interest from the parties, because a S­ upreme Court confirmation by the Senate and majority party status were both hanging in the balance. With Justice Antonin Scalia’s death in early 2016, ­Republicans felt it was imperative to keep their Senate majority—with the hope, but no guarantee, of also winning the presidency—so they could successfully confirm a GOP-nominated justice. In the end, Democrats picked up two Senate seats (in Illinois and New Hampshire), which resulted in a slim Republican majority of 52 to 48 seats. During the 2016 election cycle, a total of $467 million was spent by candidate committees on the 34 races for U.S. Senate. This is down from the $625 million spent in 2012, but it is estimated that an additional $400 million was spent by outside groups for the Senate in 2016. The major-party campaign committees in the Senate are the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC). In 2016, the DSCC spent $177 million and the NRSC spent $134 million.43 Including outside money, the U.S. Senate race in Pennsylvania ­between Republican Pat Toomey and Democrat Katie McGinty saw spending of over $168 million—the most expensive U.S. Senate race in history. In New Hampshire, the total amount of money (including outside groups) exceeded $126 million—in a race where Republican incumbent Kelly Ayotte lost to Democrat Maggie Hassan by about 1,000 votes out of over 700,000 cast. Nevada also had a high-spending race, with over $117 ­million spent by all groups, which saw Democrat Catherine Cortez Masto defeat Republican Joe Heck by about 2.5 percentage points to keep Harry Reid’s seat in the Democratic column. Senate races in Florida and Ohio spent almost $100 million each in 2016. Florida Senator Marco Rubio won reelection with 52% of the vote against U.S. Representative Patrick Murphy and a number of third-party and write-in candidates. Some of the financing by the DSCC and the Senate Majority PAC (a Democratic-associated PAC seeking to regain a Democratic majority in the U.S. Senate) in this race had been earmarked in anticipation of an open seat. However, after Senator Rubio dropped out of the presidential race, he chose to run for reelection. Several millions

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held in reserve by the congressional party campaign committees was released for other races, with the DSCC moving some of the Florida money to North Carolina and Missouri.44 Still, the total amount spent in this race reached over $90 million. In 2016, Democrats had a net gain of five U.S. House seats, picking up six seats from Republicans, but losing one seat to a Republican in ­Nebraska. In these House races, party committees also were active in raising and spending money on behalf of their candidates. The DCCC recruits and supports Democratic House candidates, and assists with various campaigns tasks by providing space for incumbents to make fundraising phone calls and providing facilities for their candidates to make TV ads. The National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) performs similar functions for its House candidates. In 2016, the DCCC spent $216,358,584 and the NRCC spent $160,642,785. A particular ­focus of the NRCC is to help support Republican incumbents thought to be ­v ulnerable. In 2016, the NRCC selected 12 incumbents, then added another eight, for a total of 20 House members that became part of the NRCC’s “Patriot program.” That program was fairly successful, as only two members identified as vulnerable lost to their Democratic opponent (Crescent Hardy lost to Ruben Kihuen in NV-4; Frank Guinta lost to Carol Shea-Porter in NH-1).

Voter Mobilization in 2016 Historically, political parties played a major role in campaigns in voter mobilization, or what is commonly referred to as get-out-the-vote (GOTV). In many respects, this is seen as just an important piece to a successful campaign as any other single factor. Even in presidential races that tend to rely on “air wars” (i.e., TV ads), parties have traditionally taken the “ground game” (direct voter contact and mobilization) more s­ eriously since the 1990s. Parties began to allocate more campaign resources to getting out the vote in presidential races and the coordinated campaigns than they had previously. Party or campaign volunteers may contact voters through door-to-door activities, in small groups, or through telephone calls, which could be from an individual or via a robocall.45 Increasingly, some campaigns (notably the Obama 2008 and 2012 campaigns) used a combination of big data analytics to identify potential supporters and making contact through social media platforms urging people to vote.46 As such, more campaigns have been able to engage in retail politics



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(targeting voters on an individual basis) in presidential elections—the Republican Party had taken on GOTV efforts using data analytic and social media in 2016 to successfully turn out voters in ­battleground states. In 2016, Donald Trump used his Twitter account to communicate ­directly to his supporters and potential voters. In fact, he made a ­campaign issue out of it—by directly tweeting to his followers, he argued he could circumvent the mainstream liberal media outlets whom he believed ­favored Hillary Clinton. As he saw it, when he used his own words and thoughts via Twitter, there could be no media filtering or negative ­interpretation. Moreover, the media couldn’t ignore his successes on the campaign trail (for example, the large crowds at his campaign rallies). As President Trump tweeted later in his defense of his Twitter use, “I won the 2016 election with interviews, speeches and social media. I had to beat #FakeNews, and did.”47 In a sense, Trump used Twitter as his major retail politics vehicle in 2016 and, it can be argued, largely bypassed the mainstream media to communicate with voters. His campaign abandoned the traditional ground game and instead used social media to contact voters. Instead, the Trump campaign left traditional door-to-door campaigning to the Republican National Committee. The RNC had spent over three years putting together an intense get-out-the-vote strategy in 11 battleground states for the 2016 election. Donald Trump won seven of those battlegrounds, including the traditionally blue states of Michigan, ­Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.48 Hillary Clinton and the Democrats put together a very large ground game plan in 2016—knowing that its party supporters tend to outnumber Republicans in national elections but also are less inclined to vote. By August 2016, the Democratic Party paid staff far outpaced those working for Republicans. The Clinton campaign had about 800 people on paid staff, while the DNC employed another 400 and state parties had 3,000 people in battleground states. Trump had only 130 people in the field, with 270 more hired by the RNC, and another 480 hired by state ­parties. Trump’s campaign had paid for half of the staff that the national party did. Clinton’s campaign paid for twice as many people in the field as the DNC did.49 To lead its GOTV effort, the DNC picked Donnie Fowler, a Silicon Valley CEO and a veteran of many presidential campaigns. The coordinated campaign organized by the Democrats (where party candidates running at all levels of political office) was put into place, with a focus on battleground states. The Clinton campaign benefitted from support

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of a number of celebrities and musicians, designed to boost enthusiasm and turnout. Jon Bon Jovi, Bruce Springsteen, Stevie Wonder, and Katy Perry all held free concerts for Clinton. The Democratic GOTV effort was quite large—for example, in Pennsylvania, the Clinton campaign had 56 official campaign field offices statewide, more than 300 GOTV offices, and about 300 staff members. By contrast, the Trump campaign in Pennsylvania had about 12 field offices and 12 staff members.50 Trump won Pennsylvania by less than one percentage point. Interestingly, there was some postelection speculation (by former Bernie Sanders senior advisors) that in some battleground states such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, and North Carolina, the Clinton GOTV effort had actually made contact with a fair number of Trump voters. This could have meant that the only GOTV contact that these voters had was with the Clinton camp, and the Democratic Party effort might have inadvertently helped increase ­turnout for Donald Trump.51 Despite her Electoral College loss, Hillary Clinton did win the ­popular voter by about 2.8 million votes. In that sense, the Democratic Party’s GOTV effort wasn’t a total failure. However, the Democrats did lose a majority of the 11 battleground states, including some states considered ­solidly blue. The success or failure of GOTV efforts by each party ­ultimately was determined by the result of those efforts in the ­battleground states.

Conclusion After the 2016 elections, both major political parties appear to be in transition. The Democratic Party lost a presidential election it had expected to win, and the party continued to lose seats in state-level races. While the Republican Party candidate won the presidential election and maintains majorities in both houses of Congress, its electoral success has not translated necessarily into governing success; in addition, the presidential candidate won, in part, by attacking the record of his own party and others associated with it. We began our discussion by identifying three elements of political parties—party in the electorate, party in government, and party as organization. Understanding parties through this analysis helps to understanding different trends and successes that have occurred in recent years. In many respects, all three elements of political parties have faced challenges in recent years. Each party is in flux regarding what policies they support and in determining their brand, as they market themselves



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to voters, as they create and fund their respective organizations, and as they attempt to govern once their candidates are elected. Yet other aspects show strength. Political parties as “party in the electorate” have seen a decline in those willing to identify themselves as partisans, as more voters prefer to think of themselves as independents. In an era of candidate-centered politics, TV advertising, and celebrity candidates, voters often look to cues other than the party label when considering which candidates to support. Moreover, there appear to be some voters whom political scientists would consider to be ticket splitters, who do not vote a straight party ticket when they vote. Despite possible decreases in self-identified partisans, U.S. politics has witnessed an increased partisan polarization, especially in Congress. As such, party in government also has undergone several changes since the mid-1990s. In general, there has been an overall trend toward party polarization (and party unity scores), in which Republicans have moved to the right and Democrats have moved to the left. However, there are also factions within each party. For instance, the tea party faction of the Republican Party has become stronger in Congress, and has pushed an aggressive fiscally conservative agenda that shut down the federal government in 2013, with a few near-misses since then. There also are a number of Republican social conservatives in Congress whose legislative focus has been on issues such as abortion, opposition to same-sex ­marriage, and restoration of religious freedom. The House Freedom ­Caucus and the Republican Study Committee represent the fiscal and ­social conservative elements of the parties in Congress, and their numbers have increased since 2010. The inability of Republicans in 2017 to pass a repeal and replace health care bill is testimony to the fractured state of their “party in government.” In addition, given their loss in 2016, some ­Democrats are pushing the party to embrace the less mainstream views of individuals such as Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren. Redistricting and lack of party control in primaries has brought more extreme individuals to both Congress and state legislatures, often unwilling to compromise on policy matters, even sometimes with members of their own party. However, party in government also demonstrates strength through some empirical measures. For instance, party unity remains very strong in Congress, as seen through the number of party unity votes taken in each chamber as well as the average party unity score for members of both parties, all of which remain high.52

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Parties as organizations have also faced their own challenges in recent years. Indeed, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, parties were nothing more than peripheral organizations during campaigns. However, after a redoubling of their efforts to raise money, some careful reading of the law, and a few favorable court decisions, parties have found some strength again. While they do not monopolize elections as they did in the late 1800s, parties do have a sizable role simply given the dollars they raise and spend during a campaign cycle. Some scholars now view parties as “networks,” in which they help facilitate the work of the groups active in supporting their party’s candidates. For example, rather than directly funding party candidates, party organizations connect ­candidates with political action committees (PACs), Super PACs, and the variety of campaign professionals (media consultants, pollsters) working on campaigns and elections. Despite an increased role for nonparty groups, the party organizations still have at least a seat at the campaign table. National party organizations such as the Republican National Committee (RNC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) can play a role every four years during a presidential election cycle. However, the RNC was faced with over 15 presidential primary candidates during the 2016 primary season. The RNC did make some primary election rule changes in the aftermath of Mitt Romney’s 2012 election. These rule changes were intended in part to shorten the primary schedule and reduce the chances of harming the reputation of its ultimate general election candidate. Donald Trump’s candidacy changed all of that, and the party organization ultimately had little control over the 2016 nomination process and results. The party organizations have done a decent job of adapting to the legal changes over the past 15 years. They often now act as service organizations that help to coordinate support for their candidates, and they still are able to raise significant amounts of money and mobilize their voters. They have a major role in the nomination process that provides access to the ballot for candidates. For these reasons, each party organization retains great potential an important part of the election process. On the Democratic Party side, fewer primary candidates gave the appearance of more party control. Then-Vice President Joe Biden decided not to run in 2016, thus eliminating Hillary Clinton’s most serious ­primary opponent. With arguably only weak candidates left in the race, the DNC had a little more impact in controlling the nomination outcome than the RNC had on the Republican side. However, the surprising



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success of Bernie Sanders in the primaries derailed a smooth nomination process for the Democrats. The public release of hacked DNC emails brought embarrassment to the national party organization, and ­confirmed for many people that the party organization had showed favoritism to Hillary Clinton throughout the process. Moving forward, both parties face several challenges. They must find a way to appeal to voters and form winning electoral coalitions. They must find a meaningful role in supporting their candidates within an environment that now includes many more organizations and actors. ­Finally, they must find a way to form and maintain a governing coalition in Congress.

Notes 1. Gallup. 2017. “Democratic Party Image Dips, GOP Ratings Stable.” www. gallup.com/poll/210725/democratic-party-image-dips-gop-ratings-stable.aspx?g_source=POLITICAL_PARTIES&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tiles, accessed July 17, 2017. 2. Schattschneider, E.E. 1942. Party Government. New York, NY: Holt Rinehart and Winston. 3. Kamisar, Ben. 2017. “Sanders: I Don’t Consider Myself a Democrat.” The Hill, April 18, www.thehill.com/homenews/campaign/329418-sanders-i-donot-consider-myself-a-democrat, accessed July 17, 2017. 4. See for example, Waldman, Paul. 2016. “Clinton Is Still Being Pulled to the Left by Sanders. But For How Long?” Washington Post, May 11, www. washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2016/05/11/clinton-is-still-beingpulled-to-the-left-by-sanders-but-for-how-long/?utm_term=.f1048948abf0, accessed July 17, 2017; Karni, Annie. 2016. “How Bernie Changed Hillary.” Politico, May 3, www.politico.com/story/2016/05/how-bernie-changed-­ hillary-222726, accessed July 17, 2017; Chapman, Steve. 2016. “Bernie Sanders Pulls the Democratic Party Dangerously Far Left.” Chicago Tribune, June 6, www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chapman/ct-bernie-sanders-­ democratic-far-left-20160606-story.html, accessed July 17, 2017. 5. Key, V.O., Jr. 1952. Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. Third edition. New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell. 6. “Party Identification.” The Pew Research Center, www.pewresearch.org/ data-trend/political-attitudes/party-identification, accessed July 26, 2017. 7. There is debate among some political scientists about whether data like that appears in Figure 3.1 is the best way to measure the number of ­independents. Some argue that it is, while others argue that many Americans who express that they are independents actually have some latent partisanship.

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Indeed, when many of those who report they are independents are asked a ­follow-up survey question about whether they “lean” to one party or the other a large percentage say that they do. See, for example, “Independent Political ID in US Lowest in Six Years.” Gallup, January 6, 2017, www.gallup.com/ poll/201638/independent-political-lowest-six-years.aspx?g_source=party+­ identification&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles, accessed July 26, 2017. 8. “Americans Name Dissatisfaction with Government as Top P ­ roblem.” ­Gallup, April 13, 2017, www.gallup.com/poll/208526/adults-name-­governmentdissatisfaction-important-problem.aspx, accessed July 26, 2017. 9. Grynaviski, Jeffrey D. 2010. Partisan Bonds: Political Reputations and Legislative Accountability. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 10. Neiheisel, Jacob R., and Sarah Niebler. 2013. “The Use of Party Brand Labels in Congressional Election Campaigns.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 38 (3): 377–403. 11. Democratic National Committee, www.democrats.org/organization/ the-democratic-national-committee, accessed July 26, 2017. 12. Republican National Committee, https://gop.com/leaders/states, ­accessed July 26, 2017. 13. Figures taken from the National Institute on Money in State Politics, www.followthemoney.org. 14. “GOP Maintains Edge in State Party Affiliation in 2016.” Gallup, ­January 30, 2017, www.gallup.com/poll/203117/gop-maintains-edge-stateparty-­affiliation-2016.aspx, accessed July 26, 2017. 15. Koger, Gregory Seth Masket, and Hans Noel. 2009. “Partisan Webs: Information Exchange and Party Networks.” British Journal of Political Science 39 (3): 636. 16. See Koger et al., 2009; Schwartz, Mildred A. 1990. The Party Network: The Robust Organization of Illinois Republicans. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press; Bernstein, Jonathan. The Expanded Party in American Politics (doctoral dissertation, University of California Berkeley, 1999); Doherty, Joseph W. Organized by Competition: Candidate-Consultant Networks in California Legislative Campaigns (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 2005); Dominguez, Casey Byrne Knudsen, Before the Primary: Party Participation in Congressional Nominating Processes (doctoral dissertation, University of California Berkeley, 2005). 17. Koger et al., 2009, p. 637; Skinner, Richard M., 2005. “Do 527’s Add Up to a Party? Thinking about the ‘Shadows’ of Politics.” The Forum 3 (30), Article 5. 18. “Taxpayer Costs of Closed Primaries.” OpenPrimaries.org, www.open primaries.org/taxpayer_costs_of_closed_primaries, accessed August 1, 2017. 19. Washington Democratic Party rules, p. 2, www.wa-democrats.org/sites/ wadems/files/documents/RulesForNominations.pdf, accessed August 3, 2017.



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20. Associated Press. 2017. “The Latest: Democrats Start Nominating House Candidates,” March 5, www.usnews.com/news/best-states/montana/­ articles/2017–03–05/the-latest-democrats-start-nominating-house-­candidates, accessed August 3, 2017. 21. The literature on candidate-centered vs. party-centered systems is too extensive to review here. See, for instance: Aldrich, John A. 1995. Why Parties: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; Herrnson, Paul S. 1988. Party Campaigning in the 1980s. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Salmore, Stephen A., and Barbara G. Salmore. 1985. Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns: Electoral ­Politics in America. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press; and Wattenberg, Martin P. 1990. The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952–1988. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 22. Herrnson, 1998, p. 18. 23. For these purposes, “per election” means that the $5,000 limit exists for both the primary and general election, which effectively means that the limit is $10,000. Special elections are also another election and have their own $5,000 limit. 24. Federal Election Commission. “FEC Releases Final Report on 1­ 977–1987 Financial Activity of Non-Party and Party Political Committees,” https:// transition.fec.gov/press/archive/1980/19800424_Partyactivity.pdf,  accessed ­August 3, 2017. 25. Federal Election Commission. “FEC Releases Final Figures on 1977–80 Major Political Party Activity,” https://transition.fec.gov/press/archive/1982/ 19820221_PartyActivityCorr.pdf, accessed August 3, 2017. 26. Figures in the remainder of this paragraph are taken from: Center for Responsive Politics. “Hard and Soft Money Raised by National Party Committees, 1992–2016 (in millions of dollars),” www.cfinst.org/pdf/vital/­VitalStats_ t13.pdf, accessed August 3, 2017. 27. Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, http://dccc.org/ about, accessed August 4, 2017. 28. National Republican Congressional Committee, www.nrcc.org/about, accessed August 4, 2017. 29. Rollcall Staff. 2012. “An Inside Look at the DCCC Research Department.” Roll Call, April 20, www.rollcall.com/issues/57_125/An-Inside-Look-at-the-­ DCCC-Research-Department-213982–1.html?pos=hln, accessed August 4, 2017. 30. National Republican Senatorial Committee, www.nrsc.org/about/, ­accessed August 4, 2017. 31. Sabato, Larry J. 1981. The Rise of Political Consultants: New Ways of Winning Elections. New York, NY: Basic Books, p. 286. 32. Kolodny, Robin, and Angela Logan. 1998. “Political Consultants and the Extension of Party Goals.” PS: Political Science and Politics 31 (2): 155–159.

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33. See, for example, Dulio, David A. 2004. For Better or Worse? How Professional Political Consultants Are Changing Elections in America. ­A lbany, NY: State University of New York Press; Dulio, David A. and James A. Thurber. 2003. “The Symbiotic Relationship between Political Parties and Political Consultants: Partners Past, Present and Future,” in John C. Green and Rick Farmer, eds., The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties, 4th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield; Dulio, David A., and Candice Nelson. 2005. Vital Signs: Perspectives on the Health of ­American Campaigning. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press; Kolodny and Logan, 1998. 34. Luntz, Frank I. 1988. Candidates, Consultants, and Campaigns: The Style and Substance of American Electioneering. New York, NY: Basil ­Blackwell, p. 244. 35. Aldrich, John A. 1995. Why Parties: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, p. 273. 36. Dulio and Nelson, 2005. 37. @realDonaldTrump, Donald J. Trump. 8:14 a.m., February 11, 2016. Twitter; https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/697815901190619136?lang=en, accessed August 21, 2017. 38. Kamisar, Ben. 2017. “Sanders: I Don’t Consider Myself a Democrat.” The Hill, April 18, www.thehill.com/homenews/campaign/329418-sanders-ido-not-consider-myself-a-democrat, accessed July 17, 2017. 39. Sanders, Bernie. May 26, 2015. Bernie Sanders Announcement, https:// berniesanders.com/bernies-announcement, accessed August 21, 2017. 40. See, for example, Waldman, Paul. 2016. “Clinton Is Still Being Pulled to the Left by Sanders. But For How Long?” Washington Post, May 11, www. washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2016/05/11/clinton-is-still-beingpulled-to-the-left-by-sanders-but-for-how-long/?utm_term=.f1048948abf0, accessed July 17, 2017; Karni, Annie. 2016. “How Bernie Changed Hillary.” Politico, May 3, www.politico.com/story/2016/05/how-bernie-changed-­ hillary-222726, accessed July 17, 2017; and Chapman, Steve. 2016. “Bernie Sanders Pulls the Democratic Party Dangerously Far Left.” Chicago Tribune, June 6, www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chapman/ct-bernie-sandersdemocratic-far-left-20160606-story.html, accessed July 17, 2017. 41. Hamburger, Tom, and Karen Tumulty. 2016. “WikiLeaks Releases Thousands of Documents about Clinton and Internal Deliberations.” Washington Post, July 22, www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/07/22/ on-eve-of-democratic-convention-wikileaks-releases-thousands-of-­ documents-about-clinton-the-campaign-and-internal-deliberations/?utm_ term=.adbabea1b4c3; accessed August 18, 2017.



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42. Narayanswamy, Anu. 2017. “‘How Much Money Is Behind Each Campaign?’ Election 2016, Money Raised as of Dec. 31.” Washington Post, ­February 1, www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/­campaign-finance, accessed August 19, 2017. 43. These and other campaign spending figures are from the Center for Responsible Politics, which can be found at www.opensecrets.org. For party spending figures in 2016, see www.opensecrets.org/parties, accessed August 19, 2017. 44. Everett, Burgess, and Kevin Robillard. 2016. “DSCC Yanks ­Spending from Florida Senate Race.” Politico, October 18, www.politico.com/story/2016/10/ dscc-no-florida-senate-race-funding-229938, accessed August 19, 2017. 45. Polsby, Nelson W., Aaron Wildavsky, Steven E. Schier, and David A. Hopkins. 2016. Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 80–81. 46. Semiatin, Richard J., ed. 2016. Campaigns on the Cutting Edge. 3rd ed. Los Angeles, CA: Sage/CQ Press, pp. 79–80. 47. Trump, Donald J. (@realDonaldTrump). 3:02 p.m., July 1, 2017. Twitter, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/881271809433374721?lang=en, accessed August 18, 2017. 48. Jackson, David. 2016. “Trump Outsources Voter Turnout Operation to Republican Party.” USA TODAY, September 23, www.usatoday.com/story/ news/politics/elections/2016/2016/09/21/trump-outsources-voter-­t urnoutoperation-republican-party/90772710, accessed August 18, 2917. 49. Pramuk, Jacob. 2016. “How Much Does Trump Really Need the Republican Party?” cnbc.com, October 11, www.cnbc.com/2016/10/11/how-muchdoes-trump-really-need-the-republican-party.html, accessed August 18, 2017. 50. Orso, Anna. 2016. “Clinton vs. Trump: Who’s Got the Ground Game to Get Out the PA Vote?” BillyPenn.com, November 7, https://billypenn. com/2016/11/07/clinton-vs-trump-whos-got-the-ground-game-to-get-outthe-pa-vote, accessed August 18, 2017. 51. Bond, Becky, and Zack Exley. 2016. “Hillary Clinton’s Vaunted GOTV Operation May Have Turned Out Trump Voters.” Huffington Post, November 11, www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hillary-clintons-vaunted-gotv-­operationmay-have-turned-out-trump-voters_us_582533b1e4b060adb56ddc27, accessed August 18, 2017. 52. “Vital Statistics on Congress.” The Brookings Institution, Tables 8–3 and 8–4, www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-­congress/?utm_ campaign=Governance+Studies&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium= email&utm_content=40297669#datatables, accessed August 22, 2017.

4 Elections and the Long Journey into the Redistricting Thicket David Lublin

Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution mandates the c­ onduct of a census every ten years so that congressional districts can be ­reapportioned among states. Redistricting, or the redrawing of ­boundaries for electoral constituencies, is often necessary due to population shifts and the subsequent addition or the loss of ­d istricts by states. ­Additionally, redistricting must occur in order to ­equalize ­populations among districts. Districts can be drawn based on a ­number of different criteria, such as voters, registered voters, or ­eligible voters; congressional districts are based on total p ­ opulation, ­i ncluding ­noncitizens and people too young to vote. States also draw  state legislative districts based on total population, though somemake ­adjustments to the official U.S. Census figures for this purpose. States remain firmly in charge of redistricting federal congressional districts, though they must adhere to federal legal and constitutional requirements. Federal law requires single-member congressional districts of equal population constructed of contiguous territory. Each state receives at least one representative no matter how small its population, and no districts span the boundary of a state. Congress has the power to expand the House, but has not exercised it since the Apportionment Act of 1911 increased its size to 435.1 66



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Gerrymandering, the manipulation of electoral district boundaries, is an old practice in the United States. In 1812, Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry inadvertently lent his name to the practice in the wake of fierce criticism over his signing into law a redistricting plan designed to keep his Republican Party in power. Race has been a factor in apportionment since the country’s inception owing to the Constitution’s infamous three-fifths compromise. However, race only became a major factor in redistricting when African-­Americans gained access to the franchise in large numbers for the first time after the Civil War. Blacks voted overwhelmingly Republican, the party of emancipation. Democrats worked to adopt redistricting that minimized their influence, often by concentrating black voters into just one congressional district. Republicans, naturally, wanted to spread black voters out more evenly in order to win more seats.2 In recent decades, partisan redistricting has exacerbated the decline in competitiveness in U.S. House elections caused by the increased ­geographical sorting of Democrats and Republicans into different a­ reas. The primary election serves as the real election in the most districts, which incentivizes appealing to more extreme primary electorates and heightens polarization within the U.S. House.

Gerrymandering Methods Cracking, packing, and stacking are the primary means of gerrymandering against any partisan or racial group of voters. Cracking entails ­dividing the group among multiple districts so that their votes are outweighed in all districts. In a well-known example, the Mississippi legislature split the long-standing Delta-based congressional district in the wake of in African-American Mississippians finally gaining access to the franchise owing to the success of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The ­manifest purpose of the radical change to district boundaries was to eliminate the black-majority Delta district, and divide up its concentration of black voters so that blacks did not constitute a voting majority in any district. Cracking the district and splitting up its black population diluted their votes by submerging them in districts with larger white populations and assured that no African-American could gain election to Congress from racially polarized Mississippi.3 Packing gerrymanders place as many members of a group as feasible into a single district in an effort to reduce its influence in other districts.

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This strategy is especially useful in minimizing the effectiveness of the votes of majority or very large groups, as it is impossible to craft a plan with no districts controlled by the majority group. Attempting to dilute the votes of very sizable minorities through cracking and spreading them out among many districts might backfire owing to miscalculation or a minor shift in electoral fortunes. Ceding a district to facilitate packing is often a safer strategy. North Carolina Republicans used packing to great effect in drafting their state’s current congressional districts. The plan packs Democrats into three of the state’s 13 districts, won by Democrats by an average margin of 68% in 2016, Republicans won the remaining ten districts by at least 13%, despite receiving just 53% of the statewide vote for U.S. House. The plan was so well constructed that, in 2012, ­Republicans gained nine districts, and fell just 654 votes of winning ten, even though their statewide vote share fell two points behind the Democrats. As opposed to cracking or packing, stacking relies on multimember districts to undercut the influence of the targeted group. The basic idea is that an area that could have alternatively been constituted as a ­single-member district likely to support a candidate from one group is submerged into a multimember district in which their votes are swamped by the votes of another group. To take a hypothetical example, imagine two equal-sized districts in which Democrats beat Republicans in one by 80 to 20% but Republicans defeat Democrats by 60 to 40% in the other. Combining the two single-member districts into a two-member at-large district, or stacking them, would allow Democrats to win both seats with approximately 60% of the vote and convert an even split into a two-tozero Democratic advantage. Mississippi utilized stacking to great effect in its 1967 state legislative plan to make it possible for whites to outvote blacks in virtually all state house districts. For example, merging Panola County, 44% white, with Lafayette County, 66% white, permitted the creation of a 53% white three-member district. As Panola was home to 57% of this stacked district’s population, Mississippi could have easily drawn at least one black-majority single-member district instead that would not have ­diluted African-American votes.4 Other partisan redistricting tools include combining incumbents from the other party into a single district to create more open-seat pickup opportunities. Similarly, mapmakers can carefully exclude the homes or political bases of potential strong candidates from districts. This last tool can also be used by individual lawmakers who want to



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game the redistricting process. During the 1990s redistricting round, for example, Texas carefully drew the new Thirtieth Congressional District to exclude the homes and political bases of potential primary opponents to Eddie Bernice Johnson—then chair of the Texas Senate Subcommittee on Congressional Redistricting—who won the seat in the next election.5

Population Equality in Redistricting Initially, courts were extremely reluctant to adjudicate cases over redistricting. In 1946, the court turned away a challenge to Illinois’s congressional districts, despite severe population disparities between districts and the state’s failure to redistrict for over 40 years. As Justice Felix Frankfurter summed up in his opinion, “Courts ought not enter this political thicket. The remedy for unfairness in districting is to secure state legislatures that will apportion properly or to invoke the ample powers of Congress.”6 Of course, the malapportionment elucidated by the plaintiffs made it difficult to secure either state legislatures or a Congress eager to address the gross overrepresentation of rural areas in either political arena. Ultimately, the court reversed the results of this precedent just 15 years later in Baker v. Carr (1961),7 a case that challenged the enormous population disparities between districts in the Tennessee General ­Assembly that resulted from that state’s failure to redistrict for 60 years. In contrast to the court’s previous unwillingness to involve itself in political q ­ uestions and deference to Congress, the court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rendered the case justiciable. Following on that decision, in Reynolds v. Sims (1964),8 the court invalidated maps for both houses of the Alabama state legislature that exhibited gross differences in district populations. The most populous Alabama Senate district had 41 times more people than the least populous district. In his opinion for the court, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote memorably that “Legislators represent people, not trees or acres.” ­Wading directly into the “political thicket,” Warren explained that “the Equal Protection Clause requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” Together, Baker and ­Reynolds enunciated the “one person, one vote” standard now embedded in redistricting law and public consciousness.

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Beyond attacking the existing wide gaps in the number of people represented by legislators, the court’s decision made clear that, unlike the U.S. Senate, states must redistrict states senates as well as state houses. While the states created the Union, and agreed to unequal representation in the federal Senate as part of the bargain when they ratified the U.S. Constitution, local governments are not “sovereign entities” and remain entirely subordinate to state authority. As a ­result, states may not mimic the federal model by allocating state senate seats to counties or other units based on population. The U.S. ­Supreme Court’s decision in favor of population equality was probably ­i nevitable owing to implacable resistance to eliminating enormous population disparities between districts that led to votes having much greater weight in some districts. While population equality seems like a simple principle, it led to a series of ­decisions that attempted to define the limits of “as nearly of equal population of as practicable.” Despite invalidating the Alabama state legislative plans at issue in Reynolds, the court’s opinion indicated that states possessed more latitude to accommodate political subdivisions in state legislative than congressional redistricting. Later judicial rulings ­suggested initially that deviations of less than 10% in state legislative plans were prima facie constitutionally valid.9 The standards for congressional districts narrowed gradually. In ­Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969),10 the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a Missouri congressional map in which the populations of the largest and smallest districts deviated from the average district by only 3%— far smaller than the vast disparities at issue in either Baker or Reynolds. ­Justice William Brennan explained for the court: [T]he “as nearly as practicable” standard requires that the State make a good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality. Unless population variances among congressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort, the State must justify each variance, no matter how small.

The margin for error narrowed further when the court invalidated a New Jersey congressional map that had only a 0.7% deviation between the largest and smallest districts in Karcher v. Daggett (1983).11 In that case, Justice Brennan opined that “there are no de minimis population variations, which could practicably be avoided, but which nonetheless meet the standard of Art. I, {section} 2 without justification.”



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This series of cases reached its apogee when the Middle District Court of Pennsylvania overturned the state’s new congressional district map, a Republican gerrymander, owing to an unjustified deviation of merely 19 people between the largest and smallest districts—a deviation much smaller than any differences due to either errors in the census enumeration or postcensus population changes.12 States desirous of ironclad insulation for their plans from legal challenges based on unjustified ­population deviations now adopt maps with a deviation of only one ­person between the most and the least populous congressional districts. Eventually, courts also ruled that state legislative plans with unjustified deviations under 10% were not safe from scrutiny on equal ­protection grounds. In Larios v. Cox (2004),13 the Northern District Court of Georgia invalidated that state’s state legislative redistricting plan, a Democratic gerrymander, despite maximum deviations under the 10% threshold, because of the lack of “legitimate, consistently applied state policies which justify these population deviations.” In short, the requirement that states justify population deviations has become a legal mechanism to attack egregious partisan gerrymanders. Regardless, the standards for population deviations have tightened considerably since Reynolds first invalidated a plan for massive population deviations. Population differences among districts within a state are far tighter than in countries like Canada and the United Kingdom, which tolerate greater deviations in order to make it easier to adhere to political subdivision boundaries, avoid especially odd divisions within communities, and overrepresent hard-to-reach extremely rural areas. At the same time, though the court’s increasingly strict enforcement has resulted in much greater population equality among districts within a state, large differences continue in the population of congressional districts between states. The need to apportion seats in whole units combined with award of a seat to even the smallest states creates surprisingly large differences in congressional district populations. After the 2010 ­redistricting round, Wyoming’s sole district was the smallest in the country, at just 563,626—a deviation of 21% below the national average of 710,767. In contrast, Montana’s only district had 989,415 residents—the most in the country and a deviation of 39%.

The Evolution of Racial Redistricting Law Anti-black redistricting efforts date back to Reconstruction, when Democrats packed African-American voters in congressional districts as

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described previously. Widespread disfranchisement throughout the South greatly reduced the importance of redistricting to the exclusion of blacks from politics. Southern legislators, however, were quick to return to antiblack redistricting plans once the Civil Rights Movement and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 assured African-Americans access to the franchise. The black share of the population had declined in the South due to the Great Migration, so state legislators relied much more on cracking than packing in drawing congressional districts, as there was no need to cede even a single district to African-Americans. Mapmakers utilized both cracking and stacking in drafting plans designed to exclude blacks from southern state legislatures. The Voting Rights Act (VRA) contained two methods to fight these discriminatory maps. First, the ban on voting practices or procedures that discriminate on the basis of race contained in Section 2 of the VRA provided an opportunity to seek judicial relief. Second, Section 5 provided a potentially much easier option than litigation. Specifically, ­Section 5 mandates that certain areas, defined as covered jurisdictions in Section 4, preclear new voting practices or procedures with either the U.S. attorney general or the U.S. District Court for the District of Colombia before they can go into effect. Put more simply, parts of the country had to seek permission from one of these two federal authorities before implementing any changes related to voting. Section 4 of the VRA contained a test that defined covered jurisdictions in a manner that captured Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia as well as 40 counties in North Carolina.14 A later version of the VRA expanded the areas covered to include additional areas of the country, ­including all of Alaska, Arizona, and Texas. Voting rights advocates hoped that the Department of Justice would use the attorney general’s power under Section 5 to prevent discriminatory redistricting plans from going into effect. The question arose as to whether the guarantees of the Voting Rights Act applied to laws that impact the effectiveness of a vote, including redistricting plans, as well as those related to the direct exercise of the right to vote. While the Supreme Court upheld the Voting Rights Act, including Section 5, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966),15 the breadth of the VRA’s application remained an open question. Covered jurisdictions argued strenuously that the VRA applied only to voting practices and procedures directly related to access to the franchise, and not to those like redistricting that shape its impact.



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Allen v. State Board of Elections (1969) put this question squarely ­before the U.S. Supreme Court. The decision was a major victory for voting rights advocates. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote: The Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle as well as the obvious regulations that have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race. … The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.

The court’s decision made clear that the Voting Rights Act applies to a broad rather than more cramped definition of voting practices and procedures, and that redistricting maps are subject to judicial scrutiny for violations of the VRA. Additionally, covered jurisdictions must submit redistricting plans for preclearance to comply with Section 5. The decision, however, did not clarify when vote dilution would constitute a Section 2 violation of the VRA. While only covered jurisdictions must seek Section 5 preclearance, Section 2 applies throughout the country. In Thornburg v. Gingles (1986),16 the court outlined a three-pronged test that made it far easier to determine when plaintiffs were likely to be successful in a legal challenge to districts under Section 2 of the VRA. The first prong requires that the minority group “is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-­member district.” Put another way, plaintiffs must show that there a way for courts to provide relief to minority vote dilution through the creation of a ­majority-minority district. The second Gingles prong is that the minority group must be “politically cohesive.” Finally, plaintiffs must demonstrate that “racial-bloc voting usually defeats the minority’s preferred candidate.” If the first prong demands that plaintiffs show a solution to the problem, the third prong requires that they prove that there is a problem in the first place. Plaintiffs cannot simply show that there is racial-bloc voting—that majority and minority group members tend to vote differently. They must prove that majority and minority are sufficiently polarized that minority’s preferred candidate usually loses. Put another way, courts will not interfere to force the creation of ­majority-minority districts if minority group members can win election without them. As Heather Gerken has explained,17 this provision effectively embeds a sunset provision into the VRA. When racial polarization

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declines sufficiently that minority groups can elect their preferred candidates without its aid, the protections of the VRA will no longer be enforceable under the Gingles guidelines. Moreover, as the share of minorities needed to elect minority-preferred candidates declines, courts should require that VRA districts contain lower shares of the minority population because majority-minority districts will no longer be needed to address the problem.18 Despite the clear standards outlined for Section 2 lawsuits in G ­ ingles, the court’s earlier decision in Beer v. United States (1976) had the ­potential to limit the Justice Department’s ability to compel the creation of new majority-minority districts under Section 5.19 In Beer, the court stated that the power of either the attorney general or the D.C. District Court to object to a plan submitted for preclearance under Section 5 is limited to preventing “retrogression” from the previous, or benchmark, plan. Section 5 objections can be utilized to impede declines in minority representation but not to require more than previously existed. However, jurisdictions still had to weigh heavily the possibility of lawsuits by either the Justice Department or outside parties under Section 2 if they challenged Section 5 objections by the Justice Department for requiring more than nonretrogression. Preclearance consequently proved a valuable tool in pressuring covered jurisdictions to create additional majority-­ minority districts despite the limits outlined by the court in Beer. Anxious to avoid lawsuits that they were likely to lose under the clear standards outlined in Gingles, many jurisdictions drew new ­majority-minority districts during the next major redistricting round after the 1990 census. Additionally, the Justice Department utilized the attorney general’s power to object to plans in covered jurisdictions that diluted minority votes. Finally, the threat and the filing of litigation, made much easier to win thanks to the clarity provided by the ­Gingles three-pronged test, along with court decisions also pressured or forced other jurisdictions to create new majority-minority districts. The results were readily apparent. Five southern states—Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia—sent their first black representatives to the U.S. House since southern black representation disappeared after the conclusion of Reconstruction. Increased minority representation arrived not only in Congress but also in state legislatures and local governments with districts where minorities had often long been excluded from representation. Besides African-Americans and Latinos, Gingles gave Native Americans the tools to fight for more



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congenial districts in state legislatures and local governments, though gains here often took longer.20 The U.S. Supreme Court took a more conservative turn and began to constrain both how and when jurisdictions could draw majority-­ minority districts, even voluntarily, in a series of highly controversial cases beginning with Shaw v. Reno (1993).21 In a 5–4 decision, the court ruled in Shaw that the use of race as factor in redistricting requires “strict scrutiny” by courts, in a manner parallel to its decisions in cases on the constitutionality of affirmative action, and that claims of an unconstitutional use of race in redistricting plans are justiciable. The court ­expanded upon its new approach in Miller v. Johnson (1995),22 another 5–4 decision that invalidated Georgia’s congressional districts. Courts must apply strict scrutiny when race is the “predominant factor” and that to survive strict scrutiny districts must be “narrowly tailored” to fulfill a “compelling governmental interest.” Cases continued to multiply due to contestation and confusion surrounding the meaning of these words. Both cases heightened attention to the compactness of districts as noncompact districts with tortured boundaries could provide evidence not just that race is the predominant factor but also that a district is not narrowly tailored. Civil rights advocates fiercely criticized the new decision, pointing out that a district that Justice O’Connor had likened to “political apartheid” in Shaw was highly integrated and that one could ­apparently draw bizarre districts for highly partisan reasons but not to benefit historically disadvantaged minority groups long shut out of the political process. Despite great concern by civil rights advocates, the impact on minority representation of Shaw and its progeny proved muted. The great majority of districts redrawn owing to these cases continued to elect minority representatives. For example, the African-American share of the population declined below 50% in two of the three black-­majority ­Georgia congressional districts but the incumbents won reelection handily.23 ­Increasingly, the flight of whites to the Republican Party combined with the overwhelming preference by African-Americans for the D ­ emocratic Party resulted in blacks comprising a majority of Democratic primary voters even in districts where they did not form a majority. Consequently, African-American candidates could win the Democratic nomination in these districts even if they did not receive much support from nonblack voters. These African-American candidates could then gain office, as long as enough sufficiently large minority of nonblack voters were willing to

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support the Democratic nominee in the general election.24 Other districts, such as Texas Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson’s Dallas-based congressional district, lost their African-American majority but were reconstituted as more compact districts with a combined African-­American and Latino majority that continued to elect minority-preferred candidates. In rarer cases, minority representation declined owing to the elimination of majority-minority districts. After federal courts deemed two different versions of Louisiana’s Fourth Congressional District an unconstitutional racial gerrymander,25 the sitting African-­American representative declined to seek reelection in 1996 under the much less favorable conditions provided by the new map. No other African-­American managed to gain election to a Louisiana U.S. House seat except the representative from the long-standing New Orleans–based black-­majority Second District. Accordingly, the decline in the number of African-American Members of Congress reflected the fall in the number of black-majority districts from two to one. Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003) raised the question of whether Georgia could choose to draw fewer black-majority state legislative districts, or reduce the share of blacks in existing districts, in an attempt to advance the substantive representation, or overall policy goals, of African-­Americans in the legislature.26 More bluntly, could Democrats reduce slightly the number of black districts and shave the proportions of blacks in others in order to maximize chances of Democrats retaining the majority, which also placed African-Americans at the chair of key committees and advanced black political power? In yet another controversial 5–4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states had the flexibility to adopt plans similar to Georgia’s that contain “influence and coalitional districts” in order to advance ­minority interests. They further cited the support of civil rights icon U.S. Rep. John Lewis in support of the plan, as well as the votes cast in favor by most African-­ American members of the Georgia legislature. Indeed, invalidating the plan would have placed the court in the position of overturning the judgment of these black officials, elected with strong support of African-Americans and whose representation the VRA protected in the name of providing blacks with officials who could speak to their interests and influence legislative outcomes. On the other hand, the plan ultimately failed to protect Democratic majorities even as the number of black legislators declined. Civil rights advocates feared that this decision would open the door to reductions in the number of districts likely to elect minority



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legislators. Changed political circumstances, however, limited its impact enormously. Only Democrats were likely to take advantage of the flexibility granted in Ashcroft to draw fewer VRA districts to advance ­Democratic control and minority interests, as long as minority representatives concurred. Excepting Arkansas, Democrats lost control of redistricting throughout the South by the 2010 redistricting round. Republican mapmakers instead were far more likely to favor the creation of VRA districts with minority shares in excess of that needed to elect a minority-­preferred candidate because such plans packed Democrats and made other districts more likely to elect Republicans. Legal challenges to the Voting Rights Act in wake of the 2006 renewal of its temporary portions, including Section 5 and certain protections for language minorities, have proved even more momentous than either Shaw or Ashcroft. In NAMUDNO v. Holder (2009),27 the U.S. Supreme Court initially turned back a challenge to Section 5 preclearance requirements. But a new challenge by Shelby County, Alabama, to the constitutionality of Section 5 resulted in a quite different outcome. In Shelby v. Holder (2013),28 a 5–4 majority of the court ruled the current formula for determining covered jurisdictions outlined in Section 4 is unconstitutional because it reflects decades ago problems rather than today’s voting rights challenges. The decision rendered Section 5 preclearance inoperative because of the invalidity of the coverage formula. Congress could restore Section 5 through the adoption of an updated coverage formula but has so far declined to act. Some members of the court would have gone further and declared Section 5 unconstitutional. When it originally upheld Section 5 in South Carolina v. Katzenbach (1966),29 the court called it an “uncommon ­exercise of congressional power” but said that “exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate” and justified ­Congress’s actions based on the extreme resistance to complying with the Constitution. In an echo of these statements, Justice Clarence Thomas argued in a concurring opinion that the “our Nation has changed” and the that pervasive discrimination in voting Congress addressed in 1965 “no longer exists” or “clearly distinguish” covered jurisdictions. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg wrote a stinging dissent arguing that the court ignored the will of Congress and the “voluminous record” of evidence it compiled in support of the continued need for Section 5 to combat ongoing discrimination despite progress. Her contention that “continuance would guard against backsliding” has been largely

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vindicated by the actions of some states in the aftermath of Shelby. Many states have adopted voter identification requirements that disproportionately burden minorities. North Carolina’s and Texas’s voter identification laws were overturned on the grounds of evidence that the laws were intended to discriminate against black voters. 30 Texas’s congressional and state house redistricting maps have been repeatedly invalidated for diluting Latino votes, though the U.S. Supreme Court has now stayed this decision. 31 Both North Carolina and Texas were subject to preclearance until Shelby suspended Section 5 indefinitely in the face of congressional ­i naction to construct a new constitutional definition of covered jurisdictions. Currently, Texas is fighting efforts for it to be “bailed in” to Section 5 preclearance coverage, a possibility provided for in Section 3 of the VRA, due to its repeated efforts to enact discriminatory laws. The overall record since Shelby indicates that voting rights advocates have been put on the defensive as states feel empowered to push the boundaries on discrimination in laws governing access to the franchise as well as redistricting plans that shape its effectiveness.

The Political Impact of Racial Redistricting Academic consensus is that congressional representatives elected from majority-minority districts are usually responsive to minority interests. Representatives elected from black-majority districts, overwhelmingly African-American Democrats, tend to be significantly more liberal than representatives elected from districts with lower minority populations.32 Similarly, evidence indicates that representatives elected from ­Latino-majority districts are more responsive to Latino interests than their colleagues.33 The creation of majority-minority districts had systematic effects on the racial composition of districts around the country. Owing to equal population requirements, the concentration of a minority group into one district inevitably leads to fewer group members in surrounding ­districts. Consequently, the addition of many new black-majority state legislative and congressional districts during the 1990 redistricting round “bleached” many other districts, which saw substantial reductions in their black populations. For example, increasing the African-­American population of Alabama’s Seventh Congressional District from 33 to 68% black caused the African-American population share to decline in four



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adjoining districts, most substantially from 34 to 9% in the Sixth District and from 31 to 24% in the Second District. Similarly, in North Carolina, raising the black population share from 35 to 57% in the First Congressional District caused declines from 40 to 22% in the neighboring Second District and 27 to 21% in the Third District.34 In the South, Republicans benefitted from the systematic creation of new African-American majority districts. Studies from the 1990s reveal that Republicans were much more likely to win elections in districts with lower black populations. The overwhelming support by African-­ Americans for the Democrats meant that Republicans had to win a higher share of the white vote as the share of black voters increased. Since the addition of many new black-majority districts denuded the region of 30 to 50% districts in favor of additional districts with stronger white majorities, racial redistricting made their task easier by systematically reducing the black population in state legislative and congressional district around the South. As African-Americans were among the most loyal Democratic voters, swings against the Democrats occurred primarily among white voters. Reductions in the share of their black constituents left many white Democrats without a crucial base of black support that would carry them through tough elections, such as 1994, caused by shifts in white support.35 Racial redistricting had broader effects beyond election outcomes in that it attacked the incentive structure for aspiring white politicians to run as Democrats. As heavily white districts were most likely to elect Republicans and black-majority districts increasingly elected black ­Democrats, white Democrats fared best in districts with substantial black populations but that still lacked a black majority. The systematic reduction in these districts encouraged strategic white politicians to seek election as Republicans because of the substantial reduction in opportunities to win election to local, state and federal legislatures. 36 Still, the story is more complex than one of simply Republican gains at Democratic expense. While that was largely the impact of ­racial redistricting in the South, Republican gains were more muted in other regions. Outside the South, blacks tend to live in urban regions ­surrounded by other Democratic voting populations. Scrambling district boundaries in many cities changed the race of the elected officials but not their party. Though Chicago and New York City, for example, contained several African-American- and Latino-majority

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congressional districts, all of the other districts—except the one centered on Staten Island in New York—continued to elect Democrats with ease. 37 Latino-majority districts may well have benefitted Democrats. High rates of noncitizenship, especially among the voting-age population, combined with low turnout rates among eligible voters resulted in very low turnout relative to the population in many Latino-majority districts. In an extreme example, just 50,779 voted in 1992 in the 84% Latino ­Thirty-Third Congressional District of California in Los Angeles, as compared to the turnout of 189,321 in the neighboring 26% Latino ­Thirty-Eighth District and 259,757 in the nearby 15% Latino Thirty-Sixth District. As a result, Latino-majority districts allowed Democrats to win seats cheaply in terms of votes. Unlike in the South, where spreading African-­American voters more widely would have tipped the balance to the Democrats in additional districts, the outcome is cloudier for Latinos. While placing more Latinos in a district would have boosted the ­Democratic vote by much less than adding African-Americans owing to lower turnout rates, replacing voting non-Latino Republicans with nonvoting Latinos could also still have reduced the Republican share of the vote. The partisan impact of racial redistricting has likely declined substantially since the early 1990s. In the South, so many whites have shifted to the Republicans that Democrats need higher shares of black population to have the same probability of victory as in the past. In highly racially polarized areas, like much of Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina, the requirement to draw black districts may aid Democrats. Moreover, while racial redistricting can aid Republican efforts to pack Democratic voters, the shift in control of redistricting from Democrats to R ­ epublicans prevents Republicans from diluting Democratic as well as minority votes when drawing majority-minority districts is unnecessary to secure ­Republican advantage. Courts have also become increasingly sensitized to Republican efforts to pack African-American voters into districts beyond the share needed to elect a black-preferred candidate in the aftermath of a 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision applying the racial gerrymandering precedents from Shaw to these cases.38 Prior to the 2016 elections, courts forced Virginia to unpack one black-majority congressional district, which resulted in the election of additional African-American Democrat.39 The increasingly Democratic voting behavior of urban centers around the country, the home of most majority-minority districts outside the South, may have further reduced the impact of racial redistricting in



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these locales. For example, while no congressional district wholly within Los Angeles County sent a Republican to Washington in 2016, four districts elected Republicans in 1992.

Partisan Gerrymandering The retention by American elected officials of so much power over the boundaries of their districts stands in sharp contrast to many other free democracies. Most U.S. states continue to allow politicians to draw state legislative and congressional districts with new redistricting plans usually adopted just like any other law. However, seven states appoint citizen or bipartisan commissions to redraw state legislative and congressional districts, with California the latest to adopt this approach.40 Commissions with varying degrees of independence from partisan control draft just state legislative maps in additional states. Single-party control of both houses of the legislature and the governor’s mansion facilitates partisan gerrymandering. Currently, the Republican Party has that “trifecta” in 26 states, including 20 with both a partisan redistricting process and multiple congressional districts. Republicans also control redistricting in North Carolina, as its governor lacks a veto over redistricting bills. These 21 states give Republicans the opportunity to draw lines for 203, or 47%, of all congressional districts. The D ­ emocratic Party has unified control of the governor’s office and state legislature in just three states with multiple congressional districts. They also have sufficiently strong legislative majorities to override vetoes of Democratic plans by Republican governors in two more states. ­Altogether, ­Democrats can draw boundaries of only 29, or 7%, of districts.41 Even states with divided control, the two parties may negotiate a division of the spoils. They may adopt a congressional plan that protects incumbents from both parties. When Democrats form a majority in one house in the legislature but Republicans control the other, agreeing to let the majority party control redistricting for the chamber in which it commands a majority is another possible bargain. The politicization of American redistricting contrasts sharply with practices in many other democracies. Australia, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have each adopted redistricting processes designed to minimize partisan influence over changes in constituency boundaries.42 Most grant primary authority to independent commissions, often staffed by bureaucrats or nonpartisan experts.

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Efforts to reform the redistricting process in the United States in the hope of providing both a more neutral process and fairer outcomes have moved forward only haltingly. Since 1980, Iowa has had nonpartisan bureaucrats, who may not consult political data, draft both state legislative and congressional redistricting plans in line with criteria related to population equality, compactness, contiguity, and the maintenance of political boundaries. The legislature must still enact the plans and may request new drafts. Other states have established independent redistricting commissions (IRCs). Washington created a commission to redraw state legislative and congressional districts prior to the 1990 redistricting round.43 Idaho and Montana did the same before the 2000 round.44 The initiative process has also played a major role. Voters forced Arizona to create an IRC to draft both state legislative and congressional districts prior to the 2000 redistricting round. California’s electorate did the same in advance of the post-2010 census redistricting. The composition of IRCs varies but they share the key feature that no one party controls them.45 The laws governing IRCs designate a series of criteria for them to follow in drawing districts. California rank orders its criteria as population equality, compliance with the VRA, geographic contiguity, maintenance of political boundaries and communities of interest, compactness, and nesting state assembly districts within state senate districts. It bans consideration of incumbency and other p ­ olitical criteria. Idaho’s requirements additionally emphasize transportation links between districts composed of multiple counties.46 Arizona has similar requirements to California but also mandates the creation of electorally competitive districts as long as the other criteria are met.47 The share of commission members unaffiliated with neither of the two ­ alifornia promajor parties varies from state to state. While Arizona and C vide for significant nonpartisan representation, Idaho and ­Washington split the voting members of the commission between the two parties. Similarly, while some states attempt to insulate commission members, regardless of party affiliation, from close links with party leaders, others grant party leaders the right to appoint commission members. At this point, independent commissions differ little with more politicized commissions that divide control between the two parties but ­allow party leaders to appoint virtually all commissioners. New Jersey, for ­example, has separate commissions to draw state legislative and congressional plans with an equal number of members appointed by



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various leaders within each major party. The state also has provision for the addition of a nonpartisan member to serve as a tie-breaker in case of deadlocks.48 In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015),49 the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly turned back a challenge to independent redistricting commissions based on the ­Constitution’s Elections Clause, which states: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof…”50 The Arizona state legislature contended that the establishment of the IRC violated the clause by taking away direct authority over redistricting from the legislature. The IRC argued, and the court’s majority agreed, that “for Elections Clause purposes, ‘the Legislature’ is not confined to the elected representatives; rather, the term encompasses all legislative authority conferred by the State Constitution, including initiatives adopted by the people themselves.” This 5–4 decision saved not only the Arizona IRC but also the IRCs of other states from extinction on constitutional grounds. It is critical to note that the guarantee of procedural fairness, however, does not necessarily result in unbiased electoral outcomes. Leaving aside the possibility of partisan or incumbent stich-ups by more politicized commissions, the geographic distribution of voters can greatly advantage one party over another. The concentration of Democrats in cities has reduced the efficiency of their votes and makes it harder for Democrats to win control of the U.S. House. This bias resulting from the geographic distribution of voters is not unique to the U.S. British Conservatives have suffered for the past few decades from the overconcentration of their voters in rural constituencies. Consequently, the Labour Party has won more seats for the same share of votes as their Conservative Party opponents.51 Leaving aside IRCs, other states have adopted criteria in their laws or constitutions that may limit partisan gerrymandering. In 2010, ­Florida voters passed the Fair Districts initiative, which amended the state ­constitution to enact redistricting standards similar to those of many IRCs but left drawing districts in the hands of the ­Republican-­controlled legislature. Legal challenges led by Democrats resulted in the Florida ­Supreme Court forcing changes to the Florida Senate map before the 2012 elections and the congressional map before the 2016 elections. While placing brakes on the limits of partisan redistricting, the process retains the adversarial, partisan legislative and judicial processes characteristic of many states.52

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Courts have been deeply reluctant to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims and, at the time of this writing, have yet to overturn any redistricting plan. The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. ­Bandemer (1986) overturned a lower-court decision invalidating an Indiana state legislative redistricting plan that awarded Democrats just 43% of the seats even though they had won 52% of the votes. The court’s majority ruled that political gerrymandering claims are properly justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but also criticized the lower court for relying on just one election as evidence to show that “the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter’s or group of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole.”53 The justices further cautioned that there is no right to proportional representation and that “the mere fact that an apportionment scheme makes it more difficult for a particular group in a particular district to elect representatives of its choice does not render that scheme unconstitutional.”54 The U.S. Supreme Court once again took up the question of partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), in which Democrats attempted unsuccessfully to challenge Pennsylvania’s congressional ­redistricting plan as an unconstitutional political gerrymander.55 The court polarized in its decision. Four justices argued that partisan ­gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and wanted to overturn the precedent set in Bandemer, while four other justices wanted to affirm Bandemer but disagreed on standards for adjudicating such claims. ­Justice Anthony Kennedy held the balance and concluded that no “limited and precise” standard for judging fairness in redistricting currently existed but held out hope that one might be developed in the future that would allow courts to offer relief. The U.S. Supreme Court heard LULAC v. Perry (2006),56 a case involving Texas’s decision to adopt a second congressional redistricting plan in a single decade after Republicans had gained control of both houses of the legislature and the governor’s office. Though Republicans unquestionably drew the plan to advantage their party, it was arguably fairer than the previous plan, which awarded a majority of seats to Democrats despite being the minority party in congressional and statewide elections. The court applied its ruling in Vieth that no discernable standard for adjudicating political gerrymandering cases yet exists and also determined that re-redistricting did not violate either the U.S. Constitution or federal law. In subsequent cases, however, some state courts have found



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that re-redistricting violates their state constitution, causing the original plan to remain in place.57 More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously decided to reject a challenge to the use of total population instead of eligible or registered voters for purposes of drawing districts that comply with the one person, one vote standard in Reynolds.58 Changing the basis for redistricting away from total population would have benefitted Republicans. In October 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in in Gill v. Whitford, an appeal from a lower court’s decision to overturn a Wisconsin state legislative plan as an impermissible partisan gerrymander. Once again, Justice Kennedy seems likely to hold the balance. The increased sophistication of redistricting technology that merges census and election data has only heightened pressure on the court to either develop a manageable standard for adjudicating claims or to overturn B ­ andemer. Political scientists have offered a variety of tests that could be used to adjudicate fairness, as well as critiques of these tests that may buttress claims that no fair standard exists. If the court does adopt a standard for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims, it might spur the creation of more IRCs not controlled by any one party. Commissions, or other processes that wrest redistricting away from one-party control, would likely offer safe harbor from partisan gerrymandering claims because it would not be possible to prove that the plan was adopted with goal of gaining an advantage for one party. Both parties have readily engaged in partisan gerrymandering given the opportunity. Currently, Democrats are much more eager to see courts rein in the practice because Republicans controlled the process in far more states during the 2010 redistricting round. While Democrats drew congressional districts in Illinois, Maryland, and Massachusetts, Republicans drafted plans in such large states as Florida, Georgia, M ­ ichigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia.

Conclusion Redistricting law has progressed since the Supreme Court gingerly first stepped into the political thicket. Unless the deviations from population equality based on the previous U.S. Census are justified to the satisfaction of the court, plans risk judicial invalidation. Racial redistricting has become more complex, with jurisdictions needing to thread the needle between avoiding minority vote dilution and racial gerrymandering.

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The suspension of Section 5 of the VRA has made it easier for previously covered jurisdictions to test the boundaries of redistricting law but not staunched the flow of lawsuits. Legal attacks on partisan gerrymanders have often occurred in the guise of cases focused on population or racial equality with both parties willing to use either as a legal cudgel against plans seen as favorable to their opponents. The U.S. Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in Gill v. Whitford, a case that provides it the opportunity to confront this issue directly or to avoid wading further into the redistricting thicket. Perhaps, if the court takes action, it will encourage the nascent trend toward the adoption of less partisan and more procedurally fair redistricting processes to minimize lawsuits. Fairer processes, however, are no guarantee of fairer results. Partisan control over redistricting shapes campaigns as well as elections. Geographic partisan sorting already separates Democrats and Republicans more and more into partisan enclaves but gerrymandering heightens the problem and limits the ability of citizens to use their votes to hold politicians accountable. These districts with strong leans to one party reduce general election competition by making strong challengers reluctant to enter the electoral arena and financial backers to invest in their campaigns. Consequently, the primary election is the sole ­contest that matters in the safe districts that elect the great majority of the U.S. House. Candidates in these districts have every incentive to cater to ­polar primary electorates. Primaries among Republicans are now usually a race to the radical right, with Democrats increasingly mirroring these demands with calls for more strident and uncompromising progressives. This increasing ideological distance only renders campaigns more bitter between nominees who see each other as extreme and even a danger.

Notes 1. The House grew temporarily in size after the admission of new states to the Union but returned to 435 members with the next census and reapportionment. 2. Lublin, David. 1997. The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress. Princeton, NJ: ­Princeton ­University Press, pp. 19–21. 3. Parker, Frank R. 1990. Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in ­Mississippi after 1965. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, pp. 41–51.



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4. Parker, 1990, pp. 63–66, 106–113. 5. Duncan, Phil, ed. 1993. Politics in America 1994. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, pp. 1535–1536. 6. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 7. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 8. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 9. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983). 10. 394 U.S. 526 (1969). 11. 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 12. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672 (MD Pa. 2002) (Vieth II). 13. 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (2004). 14. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–110. 15. 383 U.S. 201 (1966). 16. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 17. Gerken, Heather K. 2006. “A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: ­Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach.” Colombia Law Review 106 (3) (April): 745. 18. Grofman, Bernard, Lisa Handley, and David Lublin. 2001. ­“Drawing ­Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical ­Evidence.” North Carolina Law Review 79 (5) (June): 1383–1430. 19. 425 U.S. 130. 20. McDonald, Laughlin. 2010. American Indians and the Fight for Equal Voting Rights. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. 21. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 22. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 23. Voss, D. Stephen, and David Lublin. 2001. “Black Incumbents, White Districts: An Appraisal of the 1996 Elections.” American Politics Research 29 (2) (March): 141–182. 24. Grofman, Handley, and Lublin, 2001. 25. Hays v. Louisiana (Hays I), 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993); Hays v. Louisiana (Hays II), 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1994); U.S. v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995); Hays v. Louisiana (Hays III), 936 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. La. 1996). 26. 539 U.S. 461 (2003). 27. 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 28. 570 U.S. 2 (2013). 29. 383 U.S. 201 (1966). 30. North Carolina State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F. 3d 204 (2016). The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015); Veasey v. Abbott, Civil Action No. 2: 13-CV-193 (2017). Texas was given permission to use a revised version of its law for the November 2017 elections. 31. Perez v. Abbott, SA-11-CV-360 (2017).

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32. Lublin, 1997. 33. Casellas, Jason P. 2011. Latino Representation in State Houses and ­Congress. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 34. Lublin, 1997, pp. 104–108. 35. Lublin, David. 2004. The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Lublin, David, and D.  Stephen Voss. 2003. “The Missing Middle: Why Median-Voter Theory Can’t Save Democrats from Singing the Boll-Weevil Blues.” Journal of Politics 65 (1) (February): 227–237; Lublin, David, and D. Stephen Voss. 1998. “The Partisan Impact of Voting Rights Law: A Reply to Pamela S. Karlan.” Stanford Law Review 50 (3) (February): 765–777. 36. Lublin, 2004. 37. Lublin, 1997. 38. Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 576 U.S. __ (2015). 39. Page v. Virginia State Board of Elections (Page I), 58 F. Supp. 3d 533 (E.D. Va. 2014); Cantor v. Personhuballah, 135 S. Ct. 1699 (2015); Page v. ­Virginia State Board of Elections (Page II), No. 3:13cv678 (E.D. Va. 2015); ­Personhuballah v. Alcorn, No. 3:13cv678 (E.D. Va. 2016). 40. Montana is among the states that has its commission redraw congressional districts but it has not yet needed to perform that task because the state lost its Second District in 1992. 41. The total number of districts in states with redistricting under the control of one party will change slightly owing to reapportionment. The 2018 and 2020 elections that will be held prior to the post–2020 census redistricting round have the potential to cause much greater shifts. 42. Rossiter, D.J., R.J. Johnston, and C.J. Pattie. 1999. The Boundary Commissions: Redrawing the UK’s Map of Parliamentary Constituencies. New York, NY: Manchester University Press; Courtney, John C. 2001. Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts. Montreal: ­McGill-Queen’s University Press. 43. Washington State Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 43. 44. Idaho Constitution, Art. 3, Sec. 2; Montana Constitution, Art. 5, Sec. 14. 45. I ignore here commissions or boards that fall under the control of one party, as in Alaska. 46. Idaho Statutes, Title 72, Chapter 15, Section 72–1506. 47. Arizona Constitution, Art. 4, Pt. 2, Sec. 1; California Constitution, Art. 21. 48. New Jersey Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 2; Art. 4, Sec. 3. The commission that drafts congressional districts, known as the redistricting commission, has the 12 partisan members who select one more member as a tie-breaker. If they cannot agree, the New Jersey Supreme Court chooses the additional member. The state legislative redistricting commission, called the ­Apportionment Commission, only gains an independent member, who is appointed by the



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Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court, if the ten partisan members are deadlocked. 49. 576 U.S. __ (2015). 50. U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 4. 51. Johnston, Ron, Charles Pattie, Danny Dorling, and David Rossiter. 2001. From Votes to Seats: The Operation of the UK Electoral System Since 1945. New York, NY: Manchester University Press. 52. Lewis, Jordan. 2015. “Fair Districts Florida: A Meaningful Redistricting Reform?” University of Miami Race and Social Justice Law Review 5: 189–226. 53. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 54. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 55. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 56. 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 57. People Ex Rel. Salazar v. Davidson, Colorado Supreme Court 79 P.3d 1221 (2003). 58. Evenwel v. Abbott, 578 U.S. __ (2016).

Part II Identifying Voters Who Votes, Why, and How

Public opinion polling is central to shaping campaigns. Polling directs the development and refinement of strategy, message, and tactics in ­campaigns. Survey research remains a key component of campaigns, being used to track the status of the race and to shape key decisions about campaign messages that are targeted to a group of voters. Glen Bolger evaluates the challenges of campaign polling in “The Uses and Challenges of Survey Research in Election Campaigns,” Chapter 5. He offers a concise history of polling in campaigns, and he explains why and how polling is done, the methodology of polling, and how to understand polls. He argues that survey research is the most important campaign planning tool. He points out that campaigns use polling to make a whole host of decisions throughout the race, such as targeting voters, modifying the message, and reallocating resources of time and money, in addition to helping to provide message discipline and voter targeting. Campaigns use polls in a variety of ways: to measure the mood of the electorate, to confirm issues and measure intensity, to measure name identification and images, to test potential theses and messages, to determine the impact and intensity of vulnerabilities, to chart movement during the race overall and among subgroups, to determine the impact of a major hit on either (or both) candidates, and to establish credibility. Polling helps a campaign team put together a road map to victory. Bolger explains how the 2016 election presented pollsters with new challenges. Election night November 2016 was turned upside down for pollsters. The winners did not expect to win, and the losers did not expect to lose based on multiple polls. Everyone was surprised. However, despite 2016, Bolger concludes that polling is the central tool that drives the political strategy of candidates and campaigns.

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One theme that flows through many of the chapters in this volume in the way that data, or more precisely “big data,” has changed political campaigns. In Chapter 6, “Political Data, Analytics, and Targeting,” Tom Bonier delves into the history of the role that data has played in elections over the past four decades. A challenge for almost all campaigns is how to allocate finite resources, particularly time and money. While survey research has long provided campaigns with information about potential voters’ issue and candidate preferences, there are limits to how that information can be used. During the past 20 years campaigns have taken advantage of the ability to combine traditional campaign information— partisanship, voter preferences, demographics—with consumer data to better predict voter behavior. Bonier explains the evolution of modeling in campaigns and the advantages (and disadvantages) modeling provides to campaigns. In Chapter 7, “U.S. Elections on the Brink,” Chris Sautter discusses current election laws and controversies. He describes a crisis with U.S. elections in 2016 that is undermining confidence and threatens to destroy American democracy itself. The crisis is two-pronged. One, there is an intense partisan battle over rules governing elections: who may vote, when people may vote, and how votes are counted. He shows that some election outcomes are skewed by the number of citizens who are prevented from voting. Two, he also shows that the chronic breakdown of voting machines and human error routinely plague election administration. The election administration crisis is occurring against the backdrop of the 2016 presidential election, which was one of the “strangest, most polarizing and unpredictable in modern times.” From Republican ­Donald Trump’s unrelenting attacks on opponents of both parties and his wild rhetoric about a rigged election to the FBI’s investigation of Democrat Hillary Clinton’s emails to Russian meddling to a massive barrage of social media “fake news” and propaganda, the 2016 campaign was a weird sideshow that overtook the main event. These unprecedented developments created a chaotic and “unhealthy” election environment and may have altered the outcome of a U.S. presidential election. Chapter 8, “The Ground Game: Field Organizing in Political Campaigns,” by Alicia Prevost, combines academic knowledge with wisdom she gained from her practical experience as a campaign field organizer. She describes the goals of fieldwork: to identify, communicate with, and mobilize campaign supporters. Registering and turning out voters requires an organization focused on voter contact, which is the heart of a



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campaign’s field operation. The structure, duties, and size of a campaign field operation depend on the strategy and plan of the overall campaign. Few successful campaigns have no field operation. She reviews the primary functions of a field program: 1) finding voters, 2) communicating with voters, and 3) turning out voters through early voting or on Election Day. These the fundamental goals apply to all elections and have not change dramatically from party machines to today. The tactics used to achieve those goals have changed in important ways, but the goals have not. She shows that although the voter contact and GOTV techniques have changed dramatically over the last 50 years, especially in the 2008 and 2012 Obama campaigns and in 2016, the turnout goals have not. She concludes that one of the most important lessons from the 2016 presidential campaign is that “boots-on-the-ground,” traditional field organizing that allows campaigns to talk directly to voters, is still essential to winning elections. Prevost concludes that campaign fieldwork is good for democracy because it helps increase political participation, efficacy, and support for government by encouraging people to get involved in politics.

5 The Uses and Challenges of Survey Research in Election Campaigns Glen Bolger

The current challenges facing the science and art of polling led to an election night in November 2016 where the winners did not expect to win, the losers did not expect to lose, and the world turned upside down. This outcome has an impact on the upcoming elections of 2018 and 2020. The lower turnout election of 2014 had suggested that polling had stabilized as a predictive tool. And the national polls were, by and large, right. The final Real Clear Politics average of national surveys done in November before the election found that Hillary Clinton was leading by 3.2% in a race she ultimately won by 2.1%—a finding well within the margin of error.1 However, in the key states (especially Florida, North Carolina, ­Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania) that flipped from voting Democratic in recent presidential elections and gave Donald J. Trump his surprise victory, the state-by-state polls did not hint at the impending Electoral College humiliation of Clinton. There were also some surprising election results at the statewide office level, as the turnout surge for Trump in those states helped other Republicans, especially Senate races in ­Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, and to an extent in Florida and North Carolina.

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An analysis done by my business partner, Bill McInturff, from the NBC/Wall Street Journal data of the late deciders (those who decided in the last few days) in the key states (Wisconsin, Florida, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Michigan) that shocked the analysts and pundits found that those who made their final decision on whom to vote for in the waning days of the campaign broke by double digits to Trump (see Table 5.1). Meanwhile, late deciders nationally broke evenly between Trump and Clinton, thus allowing the national polls to be right while those state polls missed the mark. If Clinton had broken even with late deciders in the aforementioned five states, she would have won. Interestingly, the two close states that she did win, Virginia and ­Nevada, the late deciders went for Clinton by narrow margins. Those late deciders did not win her those two states, because her margin of victory was big enough among those who decided earlier. Having a rational explanation for why the results in those five states (Wisconsin, Florida, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Michigan) deviated from the preelection polling does not make the polling community happy. Instead, pollsters clearly prefer to be right, and need to be correct far more often than other prognosticators such as weathermen, sports touts, and stock market analysts. Trump drew the equivalent of an inside straight in poker by winning 71 electoral votes in states that were decided by less than 1.5%. As ­Figure 5.1 shows, that’s the most ever in a competitive American election. Table 5.1  Exit Poll: Among Voters Who Decided in the Last Few Days Late Deciders % of electorate

Clinton Vote Among Late Deciders

Trump Vote Among Late Deciders

Late Deciders in Exit Poll

Actual Election Results

National

8%

43%

43%

EVEN

+2.1

Wisconsin

10%

30%

57%

+27

+0.7

Florida

11%

38%

55%

+17

+1.2

Pennsylvania

10%

37%

53%

+16

+0.7

North Carolina

8%

37%

49%

+12

+3.6

Michigan

13%

39%

50%

+11

+0.3

Virginia

14%

45%

42%

+3

+5.4

Nevada

11%

45%

40%

+5

+2.4

Source: Data from CNN National Exit Polls, conducted November 8, 2016. Note: Data for Virginia and Nevada available only for voters who decided in the last week.

96 part ii: identifying voters Figure 5.1  Net Electoral Vote Margin in States Decided by 1.5  Points or Less 2016 1884 1960 2012 1888 1976 1876 1896 1968 1916 1948 1892

Electoral Votes Trump 306 Clinton 232

2004 1880 2000

Source: Data from the New York Times, December 19, 2016.

Challenges Facing Political Polling Survey research is a central element of election campaigns. This chapter analyzes how campaigns use survey research. A variety of organizations conduct election polls: candidates for office, political parties, the news media, Super PACs, and polling organizations themselves. Campaigns use polling differently from the media and the public. The media and public focus on the horse race aspect of polls: who is going to win, who is going to lose. Polls are often a central feature of news media coverage of election. Winning and losing is obviously important to campaigns too, as it is far easier to raise money if the candidate is either ahead or locked in a tight race. But the most important use of polling in a campaign is as a planning tool, not as a predictor. Campaign operatives use polling to help make key decisions throughout the race. They use polling to hone the message, broadly define the targeting, and make adjustments to resource allocation. This is not to slight the importance of the predictive capabilities of polling. These days, because there is so little ticket splitting by voters, it is absolutely crucial to determine the partisan, racial, and generational



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mix of the electorate.2 When the estimate of those populations are off, it is difficult to be right. Another challenge facing polling is a problematic mix of the perception that data analytics have outpaced polling in effectiveness, the increasing cost of polling, the increasing tendency of Americans to not answer their phones, and a very high refusal rate when they do. Data analytics is relatively new to campaigns, and is extremely important. Data analytics looks for meaningful patterns in campaigns by gathering data across multiple channels (marketing, lifestyle, campaign contact) and seeks to use that information to better target and reach voters. However, it does not replace polling. Data analytics is effective at identifying base and swing voters, but it does not substitute for the message testing that polling provides. The increasing cost of polling is being driven by the higher cost of interviewing cell phone respondents, along with the significant plunge in Americans being willing to answer their phones and take polls. Twenty years ago, a benchmark survey for a statewide campaign would cost $25,000–$35,000. These days, the same sample size and length survey often costs $40,000–$50,000. The challenges facing polling today are numerous, and it is important for pollsters to be accurate in order to keep the trust of candidates and political operatives who hire them. After all, pollsters who work for ­campaigns have a huge economic incentive to be right. Pollsters who work for candidates and yet are consistently inaccurate will soon run out of clients as word of their inaccuracy spreads. Pollsters who work for ­campaigns need to be consistently right, or they will soon be starving pollsters. Pundits like to warn viewers to take partisan polls with a grain of salt. That is amusing, because a partisan pollster who is wrong becomes a pariah in their own party. They have the most pressure of any type of pollster to be right. When a media or university pollster is consistently wrong, they just note that there were changes in the campaign. When a campaign pollster is wrong, the candidate, the media consultant, the direct mail consultant, and the campaign manager do not want to work with that pollster again. That is a strong incentive to be right.

A Brief History and a Look Ahead A brief history of political polling underscores that the industry is still scarred by a pair of seminal events early in its history. The first was the

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Literary Digest fiasco of 1936, which predicted the election of Alf Landon over Franklin Delano Roosevelt based on a postcard survey of its readers. The Literary Digest, having successfully conducted straw polls since the 1916 presidential election, sent out 10 million postcards and got an incredible 2.4 million responses.3 Landon won only two states, Maine and Vermont, and the failed ­survey killed the magazine in less than two years. The magazine had surveyed its subscribers, automobile owners, and people with telephones. During the Depression, all three groups were much wealthier than voters overall, so they totally missed the mark, because it was not based upon a representative random sample of voters. The good news for polling is that, around the same time, George Gallup was honing the techniques of random polling that used a demographically representative sample. Thus, at the same time that a huge “sampling” was wrong because it was not representative, a much smaller but statistically sound sampling was on the mark in the 1936 campaign. The second infamous event was the prediction that Thomas Dewey would defeat Harry Truman in the 1948 presidential contest. The prediction was based on a survey done by Gallup three weeks prior to voting day. It is still cited by critics as an example of the inaccuracy of polling, although it is primarily cited by candidates on the brink of defeat, nearly all of whom go on to lose. And, it is clearly true that polling can be inaccurate at times. However, the problem with the Gallup survey is a lot can happen in a campaign in the last three weeks. There is little doubt that Truman was behind for most of the 1948 election season, but he gained momentum by hitting on a compelling focus message around the time that swing voters were really focusing on the choices they faced. The Gallup poll may well have been right at the time it was taken, but the results were overtaken by events during those last three weeks of the campaign, causing opinions to shift. The famed “Dewey Defeats Truman” newspaper headline is one of the most famous touchstones in American political history. At the same time that Gallup was developing his methods and reputation, Elmo Roper was also improving polling techniques. Then, in 1960, Lou Harris became the first truly national political pollster by working for John F. Kennedy’s presidential campaign. This was the first time ever that a presidential campaign had hired a pollster. Up to that point, ­campaigns had simply followed the polls in the press.



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Harris eventually veered away from polling for campaigns and focused on polling nonpolitical clients and for the press. The next step in campaign polling took a few more years, when Republican pollsters like Dr. Richard Wirthlin and Bob Teeter, as well as Democratic pollsters like Peter Hart and Pat Caddell, became crucial members of campaign strategy teams. Polling became an integral part of presidential, Senate, gubernatorial, and even House races then, before eventually trickling down to state legislative and local races. These early partisan pollsters were major innovators. For example, Wirthlin, best known as Ronald Reagan’s pollster, created the modern nightly tracking poll. Teeter, best known as George H.W. Bush’s pollster, created dial testing of ads and debates. (Dial tests measure the reaction of focus group participants to ads, speeches, video clips in realtime testing.) Arthur Finklestein, who just passed away in 2017, was famous for his bare-knuckled efforts to help the Republicans capture the Senate in 1980. Many of the polling firms in the political business today can trace their roots back to those earlier firms, as entrepreneurial people earned experience at those firms before leaving to start their own companies. I started in polling by working for Dr. Wirthlin in 1985, and it was the best way that I could ever imagine to learn how polling works in an election campaign. It was great on-the-job training. Integration of survey research into campaigns blossomed during the 1970s and was standard operating procedure by the 1980s. Political pollsters face a myriad of challenges as the industry moves forward. The first four decades of widespread polling for campaigns was relatively easy. Everyone had landlines. The key was to ensure the right geography and turnout models. Those are both still important (although geography is much easier to master now because of the proliferation of computer software for mapping). These days, declining cooperation rates and declining use of landlines are driving up the costs of campaign polling, which worries ­budget-­conscious campaign managers. Internet surveys are still not yet representative, as the samples are too young, too white, and too well educated. Internet surveys are good for certain types of polling, particularly of specialized audiences, but are not yet there for congressional district surveys, for instance. Another challenge is the rise of public polling in specific campaigns. While public polls in Senate and gubernatorial races have been around a long time, the sheer number has skyrocketed. There used to be perhaps

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one or even two public polls during a campaign. Now it seems they are done on a weekly basis by a significant number of media outlets and with different methodologies. The problem for a campaign is that, while it may have a plan to come from behind, the added pressure from public polls creates a “get in the lead now” mentality that makes it more difficult for challengers to build the momentum and fundraising they need to win at the end. For example, in the 1996 Nebraska Senate GOP primary race, Chuck Hagel trailed Attorney General Don Stenberg in September 1995 by 46 points, down 8%–54%. The Stenberg campaign released a survey showing similar numbers in October. No polling was done until March, when my poll showed it a 40%–31% Hagel lead: a shocking 55-point swing. It was no secret why. Hagel crisscrossed the state and campaigned hard, a tactic that was buttressed by some great TV advertising highlighting the candidate. Hagel was great both in person and on TV. The media flipped out and the Stenberg campaign went nuclear. How could this be true? The race was over, they declared. No doubt the ­Stenberg campaign went back into the field, because shortly after the release of the March poll they started harshly attacking Hagel. It was to no avail, as Hagel won the primary 62%–37%. If there had been any public polling, the Hagel campaign might have had a more difficult time blowing past Stenberg. The same thing happened in the general election. This time Hagel faced popular Democratic Governor Ben Nelson for the right to replace Democratic Senator James Exon (be assured, dear reader, that Democrats used to regularly win statewide office in Nebraska, as they once did in South Dakota). Our first general election poll showed Hagel down 16 points in June, but by September the lead had been cut to nine points—a dramatic tightening. By mid-October, Hagel was ahead and pulling away in a race he would win by a stunning 56%–42%. In coming from behind to beat a popular attorney general and then a popular governor, Hagel knocked more than 30 points off the vote percentages the two had received just two years earlier. These days, sneaking up on a candidate is much, much harder. Political polling still faces many challenges, but it is adapting to the changing times. Campaigns still need significant message and demographic targeting data to make decisions. The Clinton campaign is widely faulted for not having done any state polling the last three weeks of the



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campaign, choosing to rely solely on analytics. For the inside game of campaigns, there is still no better method for fine-tuning message than polling.

The Four Elements of a Winning Campaign From my campaign experience, I have developed a theory about the four key elements of a winning campaign. There is no particular weighting of each element; it varies from campaign to campaign.

1.  Candidate Quality Lots of statewide elections and congressional district elections are no longer competitive. The number of competitive seats has nosedived as the ability to gerrymander has gotten slicker and slicker thanks to a combination of better technology, self-sorting of voters into areas where most other people share their political views, and more detailed psychographic information on each voter. Table 5.2 shows the decline in the number of competitive congressional elections. However, swing states and congressional districts still do exist. They are defined as campaigns where both political parties have a roughly Table 5.2  The Incredible Shrinking Swing Seat, 1997–2017 Swing Seats (D+5 to R+5)

1997

164

2001

134

2002

124

2004

122

2005

108

2009

103

2012

99

2013

90

2016

90

2017

72

Source: Data from The Cook Political Report.

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equal chance of winning. In those races, which are the marque campaigns of the year, the “better” candidate generally wins the election. The tricky part in a campaign is how voters decide who is the better candidate. In some years, such as 1994, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2014, the decision was heavily weighted toward candidates belonging to the party perceived to be not “totally screwing up.” In the five elections mentioned in the previous sentence, that was the party that does not control the White House. In other years, such as 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2012, the result was based primarily on voter judgment as to who is the better person and is more in tune with their values and issues. However, where there is a real gap in candidate quality, the better candidate can survive even in a down year. In 2006, a year in which Republicans lost six Senate seats, 30 House seats and control of both houses of Congress, Heather Wilson (now the first woman Secretary of the Air Force) won a stunning come-from-­behind victory against then New Mexico attorney general Patsy Madrid by just 875 votes. Wilson won on the strength of her superior debate performances against the Democrat. The seat had been extremely competitive throughout the years. Sometimes the contrast in candidate quality is easy to spot. In 2012, failed Republican Senate candidate Todd Akin was never taken seriously again by the electorate after his incredibly stupid (and wrong) comments on rape. The voters in the Show Me state were shown all they needed to know about him. Most of the time, candidate quality differences are not that easy to spot; Akin just decided to make it easy for the voters. Strong candidates also have the ability to overcome national tides and turn swing districts into safe districts. In 2006, Peter Roskam ran in an open-seat race in Illinois. Despite running in a Democratic wave year against a Democrat candidate who had a compelling story and was strongly backed by national Democrats like Rahm Emanuel, Roskam won a narrow victory by less than 400 votes. (As a footnote to the 2006 campaign, the woman he defeated was Tammy Duckworth, who ten years later was elected to the U.S. Senate, evidence there are many second and third acts in American political life.) Two years later, Roskam further demonstrated how a strong candidate can overcome national trends. In another very good year for Democrats, Roskam easily overcame home stater Barack Obama’s presence on the top of the ticket and cruised to a double-digit victory, outperforming John McCain in the district by 15 points. As a result of Roskam’s resounding



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win in a year in which it seemed like all the stars were aligned for a Democrat to beat him, Roskam has faced nominal Democratic opposition in the elections since then. A variety of factors go into the sizing up of candidates by the electorate. It is clearly not the same standard of measure from campaign to ­campaign, or from year to year. The clear factor that drove Donald Trump’s victory was change. The exit polls gave people four options and asked which candidate quality mattered most. Elections are about change. As Figure 5.2 shows, Hillary Clinton won three of the four qualities (much like Mitt Romney did in 2012), but Trump dominated on “change,” which also was the most important quality to voters. In 2012, Romney won on “is a strong leader,” “shares my values,” and “vision for the future,” but Obama won huge on “cares about people like me.” The single quality wins by both Obama and Trump were enough to get them four years in the White House. The same is true below the presidential level. Some members of Congress are handsome. Many are not. Some members are articulate. Many are not. Some are policy experts. Many are not. Some are charismatic. Many are not. Some members are smart. Some are less smart. Yet, somehow, whether through working harder, hitting the right issue notes, or having a focused message that resonates, they convinced enough voters that they were the better choice. Figure 5.2  Which Candidate Quality Mattered Most 82%

Can Bring Change (39%)

14% 34%

Cares About Me (15%)

25%

Good Judgment (20%)

Right Experience (22%)

57%

65% 7% 90% Donald Trump

Source: Data from CNN National Exit Polls.

Hillary Clinton

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2.  A Focused Message Few campaign components matter as much as having a focused/clear message linked to strategies and tactics. Pollsters help campaigns refine their message. Unfocused campaigns rarely win competitive races. In the aforementioned 1996 Nebraska Senate race, wildly popular governor Ben Nelson never had a message other than “You like me as governor, so send me to Washington.” Meanwhile, Hagel and his team had a disciplined message focused on fighting for lower taxes and Nebraska values. Once Hagel slingshot past Nelson, the Democrat’s campaign began to flail, putting up a new ad with a new message seemingly every other day. To be fair, sometimes a campaign flails around for a message because nothing is working. Democratic pollster Stan Greenberg wrote a piece in response to ­Hillary Clinton’s new book, What Happened. Stan, who is a consummate professional, had been Bill Clinton’s 1992 pollster, and provided advice to Secretary Clinton’s campaign as well. While he faulted a number of different aspects in the campaign for the loss, his number one target was the campaign’s message. From Stan’s article: Malpractice and arrogance contributed mightily to the election of Donald Trump and its profound threat to our democracy. So did the handling of the email server, paid Wall Street speeches, and the “deplorables” comment. And her unwillingness to challenge the excesses of big money and corporate influence left her exposed to attacks first by Bernie Sanders and then by Donald Trump and unable to offer credible promise of change. … For me, the most glaring examples include the Clinton campaign’s over-­ dependence on technical analytics; its failure to run campaigns to win the battleground states; the decision to focus on the rainbow base and identity politics at the expense of the working class; and the failure to address the candidate’s growing “trust problem,” to learn from events and reposition.4

Stan’s mention of “the rainbow base and identity politics at the expense of the white working class” is a searing indictment of the Clinton ­campaign’s decision to ignore the voters who decided the election: white working-class voters in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin.



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Yes, Clinton won the popular vote thanks to her strong performance in liberal coastal strongholds, but America did not change to an Electoral College for the presidency on November 7. She won overwhelmingly in the wrong places. To be fair, she did have a focused message, but it was one that failed to help her reach the voters that would have won her the election. Candidates get off message for different reasons. They may feel they need to talk about every issue to show how smart they are, or they take advice on their message from too many people and keep switching it up. It is fine early in the campaign to tinker with the message, but by Labor Day the campaign needs to exercise discipline for the home stretch. In one 2012 congressional campaign that I polled for, Republican Chris Collins challenged freshman Democrat Kathy Hochul. In the final weeks of the campaign, Hochul attacked Collins for owning companies that sent jobs overseas. The Collins campaign had similar opposition research on Hochul, specifically that she had profited from companies that sent jobs to China. It was tempting to launch a counter-attack on that issue. However, our message from the start of the campaign had been that Hochul was not a good fit for the district owing to her consistent Democratic voting record. Rather than getting dragged down into a fight over outsourcing, the Collins campaign decided to stay consistent with our messaging. This decision paid off, and Collins was one of the few Republican challengers to knock off an incumbent Democrat in the same year Barack Obama was reelected president. The need for a focused message is simple: campaigns never know when voters are going to pay attention to the race. Voters are not stupid. They simply do not pay as much attention to “this stuff” (politics) as those of us who do it for a living do. Voters are pretty smart at sorting through what they think is important. Thus, when swing voters tune in, it is best if they hear your strong, consistent message. There is an old saying at Coca-Cola headquarters in Atlanta that goes: “Just about the time you are going to throw up when you hear the company jingle one more time is about the time the average consumer can hum it.” Just because a candidate is tired of their message does not mean voters are aware of it yet. If it is a strong one, stick with it. Do not assume voters know why you should be elected. Tell them again and again. A focused message matters. Polling helps measure when the message is getting through to the voters.

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3.  Enough Money As stated in the book of Ecclesiastes, the race does not always go to the fastest nor the battle to the strongest. Famed writer Damon Runyon noted that “the race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong, but that’s the way to bet.” In politics, the campaign with the most money usually wins, but not always. It is the rare challenger who wins by outspending the incumbent. If that happens, it is often a sign of a lazy or corrupt incumbent. Lazy, because incumbents should never raise less money than their challengers, or corrupt and unable to raise funds from anyone worried about being associated with such a problem person. But challengers do win occasionally. The same is true of open seats: generally the campaign that spends more wins, but not always. Donors give money for a variety of reasons: 1. Winners. Only 72 seats out of 435 in the House of Representatives were won by a margin of 5% or less. That means that in more than 83% of the 2016 congressional seats the winner was pretty much known in advance. It is much, much harder for a challenger (or even open-seat) candidate to raise money if people do not believe they are going to win. Thus, by default, it is easy for the incumbent (or likely open-seat winner) to outraise their opponent. Donors like winners. 2. Ideological agreement. Some donors give because they believe in an issue or cause. Bernie Sanders raised over $134 million dollars in small-donor contributions (less than $200) in the 2016 presidential campaign (source: Opensecrets.org), not because his donors thought he would slay Clinton in the primary (though they certainly hoped he would) but because they believed in him and his issue causes.  It is not only small donors who give for ideological reasons. Sanders also raised over $97 million in large-donor contributions as well (source: Opensecrets.org). Controversial megadonors such as the Koch brothers (on the right) and George Soros (on the left) give money not to buy access but to advance causes and issues that fit their world view. 3. Buying access/rewarding support. Buying access means an organization gives a PAC contribution in hopes of having a positive welcome when going to lobby the member of Congress on an issue. Those PAC contributions also are a way of showing appreciation



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to a member for voting the way the organization wants them too. Many books could be, and have been, written, about whether it is okay for organizations to donate to campaigns, but that’s not what this chapter is about. 4. Friendship/personal support. The best place to start fundraising is from friends and family members. My wife and I once hosted a fundraiser (trust me, last one) that raised money for a candidate who is a longtime personal and professional friend. All of the donors were people who personally knew and liked the candidate. The biggest debate these days about money in campaigns centers on Super PACs. I have done a significant amount of work for a number of Super PACs in recent years. In a way, Super PACs are dream clients for campaign consultants, including pollsters. Instead of hours-long meetings and conference calls in which the candidate and their spouse needs to be persuaded about a course of action, Super PAC decision-making tends to be streamlined and fast. The drawback is that it is sort of a bloodless approach, in which consultants do not build a relationship with the candidate. Super PACs can help campaigns, but generally it is the campaign that is the reason for winning or losing. The role of money in campaigns is obviously significant. To those who complain about the role of big money, they do not recognize the expensive cost of campaigning—TV ads, digital, direct mail, radio, and other forms of communicating are not free. The cost of everything goes up—TV stations set the price of advertising. Facebook and Google do not sell ads for free, even if sometimes they sell ads to countries that they should not. Most candidates do not like raising money, but they have to in order to get their message out. Candidates generally spend the majority of their time raising money. Constantly cajoling donors is wearying, especially since the candidate envisioned themselves out interacting with voters, listening to concerns, debating with their opponent, walking in parades, and generally enjoying the process.

4.  A Strong Grassroots Operation The volunteer component has come back into vogue in recent elections. Once a staple of campaigns, grassroots organizing has come back with a vengeance, aided by technology and targeting tools. Old-fashioned voter

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contact is crucial in close races. Polling and micro-targeting play a key role in the “ground war,” aka grassroots operations. Both polling and micro-targeting are used in the ground war to more efficiently deploy the troops of volunteers who both carry the message directly to voters. They are both used to focus on subgroups of voters, or, in the case of micro-targeting, specific voters, as well as determine which issues are most important to communicate with these voters. The George W. Bush campaign won Ohio, and thus his reelection, by turning out an astounding number of voters. The John Kerry campaign hit their vote goal for the state, but Bush won by approximately 120,000 votes, stunning the Democrat. The Obama campaign had a huge advantage on grassroots in 2012, and it helped to significantly increase Obama’s margin of victory, pulling countless weaker Democratic campaigns over the finish line. The Obama campaign effectively utilized an approach that blended “high tech and high touch” in a savvy micro-targeting, neighbor-to-neighbor campaign that blunted the GOP’s advantage on voter enthusiasm by turning out voters who had been part of Obama’s 2008 history-making victory but had shown no interest in the 2010 election. Getting younger voters and minorities to turn out at levels equal to or higher than those of 2008 was an impressive feat of grassroots politics. It is still hard to judge the impact of grassroots programs on the 2016 presidential election. The Clinton campaign invested far more than the Trump campaign did, but, given that Trump netted 71 electoral votes in states where the election was determined by 1.5% or less, it’s hard to argue that the Trump Train was ineffective. It appears the Trump voter turnout was more organic (turning out without direction from the national campaign or party) than the Clinton voter turnout, and in 2016 that was enough.

Conclusions about Polling and the Four Elements of Campaigns Good polling helps shape the first two of the four elements of a winning campaign—candidate quality and having a focused message. Before conspiracy theorists shout, “Aha, I always knew polling is evil because it helps candidates be chameleons and hide their true nature,” let me clarify. Good polling helps focus candidate quality by better understanding what aspects of a candidate’s background and issue priorities resonate



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most with voters. It is very difficult to change a candidate’s basic personality and charisma. Voters tend to see through phonies. (A caveat: being in politics does change some officeholders, and their descent into corruption, affairs, and bold-faced lying is discouraging. Usually these people do not set out to become phonies, but along the journey they lose their way. And, yes, it happens in both political parties.) Given that nearly all campaigns have a limited ability to communicate with voters, it is always best to highlight aspects of a candidate’s background that matter most. My polling experience shows that a campaign should not spend money (a finite, very precious resource in most campaigns) highlighting something in a candidate’s background or issues that do not matter to voters. Polling helps a campaign improve the presentation of candidate quality to the electorate. Polling cannot give a candidate charisma, intelligence, or the innate ability to connect with people. But it can help keep the candidate and the message focused instead of veering off into a message no-man’s land.

Why Do Campaigns Poll? Good polling helps a campaign spend the rest of its resources more intelligently. A campaign faces many decisions, but it boils down to a simple formula: delivering the right message to the right target groups. Nearly every decision in a campaign revolves around or both of these questions: • WHAT is our message? Polling is done to develop the communications strategy. What does the campaign say to voters to attract the needed percentage for victory (often 50% plus one, unless there are multiple candidates) of the electorate. • WHO are our target groups? Along with messaging, polling is done to define the campaign’s target audience. Who does the campaign need to convince in order to get the needed percentage for victory? Rather than just guessing at target groups or hoping they have picked the right message, campaigns use polling to help refine those decisions. Just as the business adage says “You’ve got to spend money to make money,” a campaign must spend money on polling to better allocate the rest of its money. A campaign should not spend money pushing a message that

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does not work, nor should it target groups that it either cannot win over or already has locked down. Polling helps avoid those mistakes. There is a concern that politicians use polling excessively, leading them to make decisions they might not otherwise make. There is also a concern that politicians use polls to manipulate public opinion. Some of that may occur. However, it is far more limited than many fear. In the 32 years that I have been a pollster, there have only been a handful of times that a member of Congress has ever called me to talk through an issue before voting on it in the House or Senate. And even then, it was not to make the decision, but to gather more information to factor into a decision. Candidates use polling to help them make decisions about the ­campaign. Early polling is used to identify target groups, test themes and messages, and measure accomplishments.

How Campaigns Use Polls There are eight main uses of polling in a campaign. Not all of them apply all of the time to every poll or every campaign, but these are the most common ways in which campaigns can benefit from polling.

1.  Measure the Mood of the Electorate As 2006, 2008, 2010, 2014, and 2016 showed, the political environment can be a far more powerful factor than anything else in the campaign. From 1996 to 2004, however, House and Senate races were primarily determined by the four elements of a winning campaign, because the political environment was not as dominant a factor. The 2012 campaign outcome resulted from a strong grassroots and talented candidate skill more so than the political environment. In 2016, many in the electorate were tired of business as usual in Washington, and wanted to shake up the system. Trump voters have definitely gotten what they voted for: a shot across the bow of politics as usual from a president who does not bow to political correctness. The key questions are: what is the political environment, and how does it impact the campaign? Is there a mood for change? Is the electorate angry and, if so, is that frustration aimed at one party or both? What is the partisan split in the electorate? What impact are the other races on the ballot having on your campaign? All of those set the frame for the election.



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2.  Confirm Issues and Measure Intensity It is rare that a survey will discover a “magic issue” that has not been part of the public debate thus far. Instead, issue questions are important for measuring: • • • •

Overall attitudes toward top priorities; Intensity; Wording nuances; and, Key target groups for those issues.

Overall attitudes are important. If your candidate is on the right side of a 70% issue, and your opponent is on the wrong side, usually it is a good one to drive. If your candidate is focused on an issue that is far down the list of voter priorities, while your opponent is focused on the top priority, that is a problem. Highly polarized, fifty–fifty issues are not nearly as good, unless intensity and independent voters are on your side. Intensity is very important in public opinion. If more than 30% of the electorate either strongly favor or strongly oppose an issue, that is a pretty good sign of intensity. If intensity both pro and con hit the 30% mark, that result reinforces how polarizing the issue is to voters. On the flip side, an issue with little intensity is not very important to voters. Sometimes with issue questions, it is good to split-sample (ask half the respondents one wording, and the other half of respondents a slightly different version) to see which language about an issue resonates more. Key target groups are important, because analyzing the cross-tabs tells campaign which issues allow the race to be fought on their strength issues, and which issues benefit the opposition more.

3.  Measure Name Identification and Images Many decisions about campaign strategy and tactics revolve around the name identification and images of the two candidates, as well as the images of other key players in the race. The opening moves in a race usually depend on whether the candidate is unknown, well known, well liked, known but not well defined, or polarizing. If a candidate is unknown, usually the first step in the campaign is to introduce that candidate to the voters in order to build their name ID and favorable image.

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If a candidate is well known (usually the incumbent, or a candidate looking to move up a level from an office they currently hold) it is helpful to ask open-ended questions about the candidate. If voters have detailed opinions about a candidate, open-ended responses are a great way to gather in-depth focus group–like data that serve as the building blocks of a message. It is always easier to reinforce a perception voters already believe than to create a new perception.

4.  Test Potential Themes and Messages Given the importance of having a focused message in a campaign, surveys should test the themes that the campaign is considering. There are a variety of ways to do this, and surveys can test everything from broader messages to specific slogans to see what resonates best. Developing the themes and messages can be an ongoing process in the campaign. The poll tests ongoing options. The candidate takes those and road tests them in speeches and debates, constantly refining until the candidate and campaign hits its stride.

5.  Determine the Impact and Intensity of Vulnerabilities Campaigns need to test both self-research and opposition research. Self-research (looking at your own candidate’s vulnerabilities in an ­in-depth research package) is often overlooked in campaigns, while opposition research is an in-depth study of the opponent’s voting record, business record, statements, tax liens, issue positions, and other personal and political troubles. Opposition research forms the backbone of negative and contrast ads, and also provides a good look at likely strategies that will be used by the opponent. Generally there are a lot of opposition research points to test; the survey can help discover which issues move voters. The cross-tabs will show which hits sway undecided voters, and other key groups, as well as which contrasts shore up support among weaker groups. Many people do not like it when campaigns use opposition research, more commonly known as “going negative.” I hear it in focus groups all the time, and my friends who do not work in politics always tell me how much they hate the negative in politics. It is true, political campaigns do go negative far more often than product advertising does (although product advertising can be very negative, so commercial advertisers



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should get off their high horse!). But the reason is that negative advertising works. The best kind of negative is issue-based contrast—in which candidates contrast their stand on an issue with the opposite position of their opponent. Voters see issue-based contrast, which I call the most important three little words in politics, as fact-based information that helps them make vote decisions. They do not see issue-based contrast as negative, unless it is accompanied by the famed (and hated) dark music and fear-inducing ad copy that is so detested. Issue-based contrast is simple—Candidate X supports Obamacare, Candidate Y opposes it. Candidate X supports tax breaks for the rich, Candidate Y will end tax breaks for the rich. The possibilities are as ­endless as the political debates over policy are in this country. Issue-based contrast is not the only answer in campaigns; if an opponent rails against tax breaks for the rich but has consistently failed to pay their own property taxes on time, that is important for voters to factor in about someone’s character. Character-based attacks can often be seen as ugly, but if they are factual they are important information for voters to know and factor into their decision. Campaigns that knowingly make false charges deserve to lose. All attacks should be factual. Now, people will disagree at times whether an attack is factual or not, and that happens on both sides. No matter the mocking fun poked at Kellyanne Conway for using the phrase “alternative facts,” in a person’s life and record there can be alternative facts. Think back to debates where the charge was “You voted this way because you want to push Grandma off the cliff. No, I voted that way to save Medicare.” Both viewpoints may be right, and both are pushing alternative facts. (You could argue those are varying opinions, and there is some truth to that. Also, made-up facts are not facts, so do not take this point as an attempt at norming falsehoods.) Candidates are hesitant to test self-research; they do not want likely attacks getting out there. Many times, even if they are willing to test likely attacks on themselves, they will want to water the attacks down. It is important to remind them first that your opponent will find the attack and may well use it, and also that the opposing campaign will not water down the attack language; generally, they will make it tougher. The point of testing attacks both on your own candidate and your opponent is simple—to understand what works and what does not work. Sometimes an attack point everyone believes will work is just not

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important to the voters, so why spend money on it? Polling a series of opposition research points helps show which ones work best and which attacks do not work. It is also important to test issue-based contrast; a fifty–fifty issue that does not move voters is not worth spending c­ ampaign dollars on, while a 60%-40% win makes it worthwhile.

6.  Chart Movement during the Race, Overall and among Subgroups As the once-great boxer Mike Tyson is fond of saying, “Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the face.” When the battle is joined, it is imperative to track the race (whether it is monthly, weekly, or nightly depends on the race and the budget). It is important to know how much movement there is, which direction the movement is going, and among what target groups the campaign is gaining or losing ground, so that assessments can be made about how to allocate remaining message and dollar resources. In a recent U.S. Senate open-seat race in a conservative state where we had a comfortable lead, we polled almost weekly in September and watched as our opponent was making gains with his positive TV ads, positioning himself as a conservative populist who would be the change agent. By early October, the race had tightened to a dead heat, and his campaign had all the momentum. The gains by the Democrat’s campaign led us to switch gears and tell voters about the very liberal parts of his record that he was wisely choosing not to talk about. Once we switched from all positive to issue-based contrast, the way voters talked about the Democratic candidate in the verbatims changed dramatically and our ballot numbers rebounded, ensuring the expected easy win.

7.  Determine the Impact of a Major Hit on Candidates Is an attack by your opponent hurting your campaign, or can you ignore it and keep the pressure on? What subgroups is the campaign dropping with? When a heavy blow hits the campaign, whether it is an attack ad or a news story, it is vital to get into the field quickly with a poll to decide how to handle the situation. Whether to respond or ignore, to shift to defense, or to stay on offense are key questions that face campaigns when a major punch has been thrown. Aside from the introduction of the



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candidate to the voters, the decisions on how to handle negatives are the most important ones of the campaign. There is no single right or wrong approach, no automatic rule of thumb to follow. Each circumstance is dictated by factors. Get it right and win. Get it wrong and lose. In a 2002 congressional race in a truly toss-up open-seat district in Nevada, county commissioner Dario Herrera was “the anointed one” for the Democrats. A young, aggressive Hispanic candidate who was a good fundraiser, Herrera was saluted by the pundits as all but a shoo-in. The district was new, as Nevada was expanding from two seats to three (it gained another one in the 2011 reapportionment) and the toss-up seat was drawn as the product of a compromise between the Republicans who controlled the state Senate and the Democrats who controlled the General Assembly. In the spring, Herrera was hit hard by the press for corruption scandals. Las Vegas is a difficult market to burn a message through in earned media, so we polled to see the impact of his scandals. Herrera’s image had plummeted from 28% favorable/11% unfavorable in a January survey to 23% favorable/24% unfavorable in March. We released the survey and Herrera’s campaign tried to minimize it, saying that a bad newspaper story was not going to affect a November election. That may be true, but our October ads featuring those newspaper stories did affect the election, as Herrera only got 37% of the vote despite having been the favorite only nine months prior.

8.  Establish Credibility The campaign team often has to establish credibility with several key players in the race. First and foremost is the candidate. The team should use the survey as the template for the campaign plan, providing the candidate with confidence that there is a reason for the strategy, message and target groups on which the campaign is focusing. Second, polling is often used to establish credibility with donors. Some donors view their check as worth writing only if the candidate can win, so they need evidence of that viability first. A poll showing a competitive race will open checkbooks, both locally, with political action committees, and with the party. Third, polling can be used to establish credibility with the media. Campaigns should not always release their polls, and almost never ­release the whole survey. That would be like the coach of the New York Giants releasing his playbook in advance of the Super Bowl (although

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that might be the only way for the New England Patriots to beat the ­Giants). However, just as there are times that a coach says, “We are going to establish the run,” there are times that a campaign can release a poll to show strength or momentum.

Types of Polls Working in campaigns, you will hear descriptions of polls thrown around, such as “benchmarks,” “baselines,” “brushfires,” and “tracking polls.” You may also hear phrases like “focus groups” and “dial groups.” Here are some brief explanations of each: Benchmark: This is generally the first and most comprehensive survey of the campaign. The political environment, candidate images, ballot tests, issues, and both positive and negative messages that both campaigns are likely to use are extensively tested. Baseline: This is a shorter first survey, often checking the viability of a candidate’s run for office. There may be some issue and message testing, but the questionnaire is much shorter than a benchmark. It is often done to help a candidate make an informed decision about running. Brushfire: This survey is designed to test shifts in public opinion among demographic subgroups, message salience, changed perceptions of the two candidates, and effects of early media/voter contact. It can also be used to test new messages for the next steps of the campaign, as well as test reaction to campaign developments. Tracking: Tracking surveys are very short and conducted toward the end of the campaign. Often done nightly, they are designed to test shifts in candidate images, changes in the ballot, and effectiveness of voter contact efforts. Focus Groups: Surveys are quantitative research (numbers-focused), while focus groups are qualitative (attitude focused). Not every campaign does focus groups, but they help put the meat on the bones of the survey research by digging into the thinking of key swing groups. A trained moderator spends two hours with each group to better understand how key swing groups think and talk about the issues, the candidates, and the campaigns. Dial groups: These are focus groups, but concentrating on ad testing/video content. Participants use perception analyzers to react in split-­ second real time to advertising, speeches, debates, and other forms of



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video. This allows campaigns to drill down and better understand what causes positive reactions in voters, and what falls flat. It is also a good way to test tone and message in attack ads.

Facts and Myths About Push Polling Besides questions of dealing with a harder-to-reach electorate, the most controversial topic in polling is the topic of “push polling.” It’s controversial because there are a significant number of myths and misperceptions about it. The good news is, charges of push polling have died down in the last two election cycles, as the media now does have a better understanding of what actually constitutes push polling and what does not. Simply put, push polling is not polling. Instead, it is the use of negative advocacy phone calls done under the guise of polling. It takes its name from “push questions,” a polling term in vogue during the 1990s that refers to testing factual information about a candidate or candidates to see if that information has any impact on voters. There are dramatic differences between push polling and survey research: • Survey research seeks to collect or gather information, not to inform or change it during the process. Push polling is specifically intended to spread information (sometimes true, sometimes false). • Every survey research firm provides its name or the name of the telephone research center conducting the interviews. Most push polls do not name a sponsoring organization. • Survey research firms interview a limited sample of people that is designed to mirror the entire population being studied, as low as 300 interviews in a congressional district to a high of 800 or 1,000 interviews in a major statewide study. • Push polls contact thousands of people per hour with an objective of reaching tens of thousands (or more) of households to “push” their information. • Survey research firms conduct interviews of between five and over 20 minutes for a major benchmark study. • Push polls are generally designed to be 30 seconds to two minutes long.

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• Most importantly, push polls are usually done in the last few days of a campaign to thousands (or tens of thousands) of voters, with a three-question script. Push polling is part of the realm of phone banks that typically do GOTV (get-out-thevote) calls, persuasion, and ID phone calls. Push polling is a type of persuasion call that masquerades as a poll. Actual polling firms do not do push polling because the firms train their interviewers to follow certain interviewer methodologies that push polling does not follow, and because it is outside of the realm of polling. Survey research firms use different questionnaire design techniques to assess how voters will respond to new information about candidates and their opponents. The intent of this process is not to persuade or change the view of the electorate but to replicate information that could conceivably be available to the voter during the campaign. Push polls are designed solely as a persuasion vehicle. One reason for the controversy around the practice of push polls is that sometimes in the past the negative advocacy hit calls pushed messages that were simply not factual. While people will disagree about whether a particular interpretation of a vote is “factual,” knowingly using false information has no place in a campaign, and operatives who knowingly use made-up attacks deserve to have their candidates lose. Do negative advocacy calls under the guise of polling work? Evidence is coming down more and more that the answer is no. It seems to have fallen out of favor in campaigns, as I’ve heard fewer and fewer instances of it being done late in a race. Instead, phones are being used for GOTV or to drive a straight negative message (instead of disguising the negative information as poll questions). However, survey message testing is often mistaken for push polling in a campaign. Typically, a campaign tests opposition research messages in a benchmark survey, which tests the political environment, the state of the race, perceptions of the candidates and other key players, and important issues and themes, as well as opposition and self-research messages. Let’s say it is a state with an early June primary. After winning the primary, the campaign immediately prepares to go into the field with the general election benchmark survey. While candidates are often reluctant to test self-research messages, they are a crucial part of campaign polling. First, testing self-research makes it more difficult for your opponent to level the charge of push



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polling at your campaign. Second, your opponent is almost assuredly going to come after your candidate at some point, and it is better to know how harmful those attacks might be (and with which groups). By the way, campaigns that level charges of push polling at their opponents are like the kid in that old fable, “The Boy Who Cried Wolf but Is Actually a Wolf Too!” Most campaigns do polling to test opposition research, so to test it and then to whine when your opponent does the same thing is both disingenuous and tiresome. Fortunately, it appears that this is a diminishing trend, as fewer campaigns seem to be playing the “push poll” card with the media. Some have argued that there is no difference between advocacy calls and legitimate polls that test oppo messages. Even with all those counterpoint arguments listed above, another commonsense point is that using survey research to drive negative messages would be the least efficient use of campaign dollars possible. A statewide campaign may spend $40,000 on a 20-minute benchmark in June, testing the impact of messages among 600 likely voters. If spreading a negative message is the goal of the survey, that means the campaign spent $67 per respondent ($40,000 divided by N=600) to drive five to seven minutes’ worth of negative messages that 595 of those participants are going to forget by the next day (believe me, when I get on the phone with a campaign’s supporter who did our opponent’s survey, they can hardly remember the questions that were asked, and these are the voters who actually are interested in June!). That’s not much bang for your ­campaign buck. Instead, opposition research (and also self-­ research) should be tested by the campaign to help determine what works and what does not work. If an opposition research point is received with a collective yawn, why would the campaign ever spend money on it? To recap, push polling is done with thousands of voters just a few days or weeks before an election. Legitimate survey research is done with a limited random sample and tests both factual opposition and self-research. For more resources on push polling, see the website of the National Council on Public Polls at www.ncpp.org.

Public Opinion Trends In the 2006 congressional elections voters punished the Republican Party for the Iraq War and the poor handling of Hurricane Katrina, and handed control of the Senate, the House of Representatives, many governorships, and state legislatures to the Democratic Party.

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Two years after that election, they made history by being the first major political party in the United States to nominate an African-­American candidate for president, and they followed that up by having Barack Obama win easily in 2008. The Democrats also picked up eight Senate seats and 21 House seats, furthering their advantages in both chambers and giving the Democrats unified party government. The Democratic Party was ascendant, and the Republican Party was on the ropes. The 2010 congressional elections changed that. Now, of course, the Republican Party controls the presidency, the House, the Senate (albeit barely), a record number of governorships, and a vast majority of state legislative seats. What happened in those ten years to shift from Democratic dominance to Republican control? Some will blame gerrymandering and the Electoral College (as though it first went into effect on November 7, 2016, robbing the Clinton campaign of the time to decide to campaign in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania). In America, the political pendulum swings. Survey research shows that voters do not like it when one party has too much control, because, rather than compromise, the party is able to shove its agenda down the throats of the American people. Democrats should take heart from this; voters have little patience for one-party control. The country is deeply polarized, and knows it.5 The September 2017 NBC/ Wall Street Journal survey, conducted monthly by a bipartisan team of pollsters that includes my business partner, Bill McInturff, asked respondents: In thinking about the United States of America today, how united would you say that the country is—totally united, mainly united, mainly divided, or totally divided?

Only 20% say the country is united, while 80% say it is divided. Only 1% say it is totally united, but just 19% say it is totally divided. Gerrymandering reinforces that polarization. As noted earlier in the chapter, there are fewer competitive House races, so candidates worry more about protecting their political bases than about compromising to win swing voters. Most members of Congress in both political parties worry more about losing a primary than losing a general election, and that impacts how they talk, vote, and lead. Both parties’ bases do not like or trust the other party, and tend to consume news that reinforces that distrust. And yet independent voters (swing voters, as it were) remain important in elections. They tend to set the tone of the election, as Table 5.3 shows.



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That said, there are major shifts going on below the surface. In the last seven years, for instance, since the GOP took back the House and won many governorships and state legislative seats, the Republican Party has gotten older and more rural, while Democrats are doing better with younger and better-educated voters (see Table 5.4). Table 5.3  Congressional Ballot among Independents in Midterm Elections 2006

2010

2014

2018

GOP

39%

36%

54%

42%

Dem

57%

37%

42%

48%

Margin

-18

+19

+12

-6

GOP Seat Change

-30

+63

+13

Sources: Data from National exit polls, 2006, 2010, and 2014; and NBC–Wall Street Journal poll, June 2017. Table 5.4  Key Changes in Net Party ID, 2010–2017 More Republican Ages 50-64* Ages 65+* Men Ages 50+ Women Ages 50+ Whites Northeast* South Small Town/Rural Moderates Conservatives

Sub-Group Type

More Democratic

Age Gender/Age

Women Ages 18-49

Geography

West

Type of Community

Suburban Women

Ideology College Grads*

High School or Less* Men Less Than College*

Education

Post Grads Men College+* Women College+

Whites Non-College

White/Education

$50-$75K*

Income

Whites College+* $30-$50K More Than $75K*

Note: Subgroups with an asterisk indicate are those that shifted from net one-party to net other-party.

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Conclusion The country is deeply polarized, and partisans are moving further apart, geographically, demographically, and attitudinally. You can argue over when it started and why it is happening but you cannot argue that it IS happening. I am fond of saying that “trends are trends until they change.” The Electorate College Lock was a thing for Republicans until Bill ­Clinton picked it in 1992. The Big Blue Electoral College Wall was a thing for the Democrats, until it crumbled in 2016. The only thing unchanging in American politics is that support for one party ebbs and flows. When one party is up, it overreaches and American voters chop it down, which again may be the case in the elections of 2018 and 2020. While polling faces more challenges today than at any point since it has become ubiquitous in campaigns, it remains an important part of shaping the strategy and target groups in campaigns.

Notes 1.  https   ://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/us/general_­ election_trump_vs_clinton-5491.html. 2. www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/08/split-ticket-districts-oncecommon-are-now-rare. 3. Asher, Herbert. 2017. Polling and the Public: What Every Citizen Should Know, 9th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Congressional Quarterly Press. 4. w w w.greenbergresearch.com/his-thinking/2017/9/21/how-shelost?ct=t%28How+She+Lost+-+Prospect+Review%29. 5. Thurber, James A., and Antoine Yoshinaka, eds. 2015. American Gridlock: The Sources, Character, and Impact of Political Polarization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

6 Political Data, Analytics, and Targeting Tom Bonier

At the heart of every campaign’s strategy is a process by which they make decisions, including decisions both big and small. Increasingly, those ­decisions are being informed by, if not entirely driven by, data. Data-driven decision-making—whether in the context of political ­campaigns or in our everyday lives—is not a new concept. If we could peer into our subconscious, we would likely see a subtle process that ­assigns a weight to each possible course of action, considering the consequences and perceived likelihood of success. Of course, when facing more consequential, weighty decisions, most humans tend to enter into a more formal, deliberative process. That might include making a list of pro and cons, discussing the problem with others with experience making such decisions, and bringing any and all ­available data to the proverbial table before choosing one option over another. Political campaigns are, in effect, the sum total of countless decisions, mostly speaking to how the precious resources of the campaign are spent. With a finite amount of time until Election Day, a finite sum of campaign funds, and a finite number of people who will work to execute the campaign strategy, the difference between winning and losing is often determined by how effectively the campaign expends those resources. Of course, this isn’t an absolute. Many campaigns will do everything right and still lose, sometimes even to an opposing campaign that can’t get out of its own way. The environment, including the partisanship of the state or district where the campaign takes place, will dictate the outcome of most campaigns. 123

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The decisions campaigns face, in how they expend their limited resources, center on relatively simple questions but with increasingly complex solutions. Simply put, the tactics of a campaign are answers to the question of which voters are susceptible to outside intervention, ­persuading them to vote for the candidate and, implicitly, identifying those voters whose behavior is unlikely to be changed, regardless of campaign treatment, be they supporters of the candidate, supporters of the opponent, or nonvoters. Keep in mind, persuasion sometimes means convincing an undecided voter, or even a voter supporting one’s opponent, to support your candidate, and sometimes persuasion means persuading a likely supporter who may not vote to cast a ballot on Election Day. Campaigns have, from the beginning of our democracy, been about altering voter behavior to the campaign’s benefit. But contextual changes have fueled the evolution of campaign targeting of that persuasion—­ data-driven campaign decisions, the surge in campaign fundraising, the fragmented media landscape presenting challenges toward reaching target voters, while at the same time media platforms allowing for addressable communication to individual voters, and the rise of “big data.” Data-driven decision-making, or “targeting” in the parlance of the campaign world, is founded upon the idea of maximizing ­limited ­resources. Even so, as more money has flooded into campaigns, the ­importance of targeting has increased, not diminished. While this may seem counterintuitive, it’s a question of scale. To simplify—if you have a dollar to spend, you have fewer decisions and fewer options in front of you. With 100 dollars, suddenly things get more complex. As a reference point, almost $2.4 billion was spent in the 2016 presidential ­election, between the two major-party candidates, Super PACs, and party organizations. Consider the fact that these campaigns were launched in April (Clinton) and June (Trump) of 2015. These campaigns operated as ­billion-dollar startups, with very little ramp-up time and the highest possible stakes. Being able to target those resources effectively, even with a record setting amount of money at their disposal, would be critically important. More about this later.

Media Landscape Our media landscape has become increasingly fragmented over the last three decades, with a rapid acceleration over the last decade. In the 1980s, targeted campaign communication was less important, as a campaign



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could buy advertising on one of the network television stations and reach a large share of voters (targets and nontargets alike). The fragmentation began with the rise of cable television—moving from four networks to dozens of channels presented challenges and opportunities to target. A campaign could no longer place ads on a few network slots and feel confident they were reaching who they needed to win. At the same time, being able to place an ad on a specialized cable channel (say, “Home and Garden TV”) allowed campaigns to reach subgroups of voters, spending less money serving ads to voters who were not identified as productive targets. Of course, this new opportunity introduced new challenges—to target niche advertising efficiently, a campaign must have data identifying targets and their proclivities, a notion we’ll dig into in a moment. The acceleration of media consumption fragmentation was kicked into high gear by the internet. Campaigns could no longer rely on the fact that most voters got their information about campaigns from television and print newspapers. They were increasingly relying on sources online. ­Initially these sources largely mirrored offline sources, as newspapers and network TV sources would post their content on their websites as well. But it didn’t take long for the online platform to begin driving original content, becoming the go-to source for most Americans for ­consuming information. Next, social media platforms became ubiquitous, evolving from a place for people to share the minutiae of their daily lives to a mechanism to share news and, more importantly, advertising. The challenge of advertising comes down to getting eyes on content—­increasingly eyes were turned to social media, and advertisers (including political ­advertisers) followed. This rush to internet driven content finally circled back to consume traditional television broadcasting with the rise of online programming providers, led by platforms like Netflix. “Cord cutting” became a trend, as Americans increasingly shunned their cable providers, opting instead to purchase the content they desired from various on-demand and subscription providers. All of these changes shattered and then reshaped the political advertising and targeting landscape. Again, just as with the rise of cable ­programming, and just as with the explosion of money into campaigns, the political campaign industry was faced with a critical challenge. How do you reach the voters you need to win when they are only reachable across a complex network of dozens of media platforms? And, at the same time, a golden opportunity: the ability to micro-target your message to

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the key voters you need, without wasting your resources either preaching to the converted or to those who will never change. The answer to the challenge, and the means by which the opportunity could be realized was simple: data. And so, as the landscape evolved, so did the targeting tools the campaigns would utilize to take advantage of this new landscape.

From Little to Big Data Of course, none of this could have taken place if the data landscape itself hadn’t evolved and modernized at the same time. Decades ago, because most campaign communication was broadcast (television, newspaper ads, rallies, etc.), campaigns had little use for micro-level data. Which is good, because there was little micro-level data available to campaigns. The 1970s saw an explosion of political mail. This meant that campaigns needed more information about individual voters, where before they ­subsisted on much more broad datasets of county- and media market–level historical data. Unfortunately for them, the individual-level data available at the time was very limited and difficult to manage. As this all took place before the advent of personal computers, lists were not digitized. By the late 70s an effort began to collect “micro data” to better t­ arget campaign resources. Given the challenges collecting and analyzing ­individual-level voter data, precinct election returns presented the best opportunity. With historic election returns a campaign could make predictions regarding voter turnout and partisanship, and even get a sense of the historic volatility or “swing” of an area. This all relied on a notion that the past was prologue, and therefore the best predictor of the future. Of course, this meant grouping voters by geography, but it still represented an important step forward in campaigns’ ability to target resources. Campaigns could target precincts with a high concentration of likely supporters that underperformed in terms of historic turnout levels, and steer resources away from precincts that were strongholds for their opponent. With personal computers becoming more widely available and ­affordable, the 1980s saw the beginnings of campaigns relying on individual data, supplemented with precinct targeting. This individual-level voter data was sparse, generally collected from local- and state-level ­election offices, including very basic information such as name, address, and sometimes very basic demographic information (age and gender, most commonly). In states that allowed a voter to register with a



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political party, the data collected would include this information. After an ­election, the list of those voters casting a ballot would be collected as well (keeping in mind this exposes only that the individual voted in that specific election, not for whom they voted). Because the collection of this data was such a cumbersome process, these voter files weren’t updated very frequently, generally once or twice a year at most. What’s more, there was no national database of voters—the files were, for the most part, maintained by outside vendors who would compile states as their client list demanded. By the 1990s this process of individual voter data collection had ­improved somewhat, so that files were updated more frequently (but still only in states with competitive elections). Vendors would work with their clients to compile and maintain the voter IDs that usually ranked voters on a 1 to 5 scale based on their level of support for various candidates. This information allowed campaigns to make targeted decisions based on some sense of the individual’s partisanship, even in states with partisan voter registration. By the late 1990s consultants on both sides of the partisan aisle were beginning to perform higher level analytics on these voter files, but the efforts were still fairly simplistic and the results were mixed.

Growing Pains During the 1990s, campaigns vastly improved their ability and capacity to target individuals, as campaigns raised more money and became more sophisticated, but their ability to make more targeted decisions regarding how that money was spent lagged. Yes, the individual-level voter IDs provided some ability to identify targets, but the overwhelming majority of voters still had no identification history available on the file. What’s more, voter identification efforts were cumbersome and expensive, and therefore woefully inefficient. A campaign could dedicate significant resources toward calling voters and knocking on their doors, but still wouldn’t be able to reach most targets as such. What’s more, campaigns were beginning to stretch the limits of the tools at their disposal. Campaign polls, for decades, were used to get a sense of where the race stood (who’s winning), as well as the broad strokes of campaign strategy—which themes and messages would resonate with the electorate at large, etc. This process was more than adequate for campaigns that relied primarily on broadcast communication (television ads, newspaper ads, stump speeches) and had no real capacity for targeted

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communication. However, once campaigns began investing more in narrowcast communication (phones, mail, door knocks, and eventually emails and digital ads), the campaign polls were exposed as woefully inadequate tools to determine the right targets for those resources. Consider the typical survey sample for a congressional campaign— usually 400 or 500 respondents. Perfectly adequate to have a sense of who is winning, and by how much, and broadly how voters in the district feel about the candidates, and important issues. But imagine you are planning to send persuasion mail to key voters. You certainly don’t want to send mail to all voters in the district, as the average district has hundreds of thousands of voters—a campaign could spend a huge portion of their overall budget sending a single mail piece. In a typical race, no more than 10 to 15% of the voters are likely to be persuadable. The campaign’s survey will do a good job identifying that number—but at that proportion you are only talking to 40 or 50 swing voters. Not nearly an adequate sample size from which to accurately target your persuasion communication, given the massive margin of error. Given these constraints, but lacking a better option, most campaigns simply stretched the bounds of reason and used their polling in tandem with their voter IDs and precinct targeting data to target their communication. This method of targeting would remain the standard operating procedure for the better part of two decades, until finally eclipsed by more sound methods, emerging from more data and new survey techniques.

More Data The 2000 presidential election represented a turning point in political data and targeting. Al Gore, the Democratic nominee, famously won the national popular vote but lost the Electoral College to George W. Bush, with Florida’s decisive electoral votes finally allocated to Bush by the United States Supreme Court. Democrats recognized a need to modernize their data and targeting efforts, to better understand the electorate and how to find the key voters needed for victory. In the end, this was viewed as a marketing problem. Corporations stake their billion-dollar budgets on their ability to use data to better understand the marketplace—why were campaigns not adopting similar strategies? This line of thinking inspired Democrats to reach out to the giants of the consumer data industry, eventually working with Acxiom, one of the leaders in the field, a company based in Conway, Arkansas.



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The idea was to learn from the consumer marketing world in how to use data to persuade voters. This meant applying best practices, including data hygiene (ensuring the data was “clean”—with accurate addresses, names, and phone numbers), and consumer data appends. The consumer data appends produced a significantly increased depth of understanding of the voters, going from just knowing their name, age, ­address, phone, gender, and which elections they voted in to hundreds of data fields e­ xploring their occupation, race, ethnicity, income, education, and consumer habits. This, of course, presents a new problem: what to do with all of this data? When campaigns had only a handful of data fields at their disposal with which to create targeted voter contact universes, it was relatively easy to act decisively. Faced with several hundred data fields, it became clear that a more sophisticated approach was necessary. This gave rise to the early voter modeling efforts in political campaigns. Voter modeling is based on a fairly simple notion: there are data points that are predictors of political behavior. Some are well understood and obvious—African-American voters have, for decades, overwhelmingly supported Democratic candidates. Age, gender, and education also have clear (though less strong) correlations with partisanship. But what about someone’s consumer habits? Is the kind of car you drive predictive? The answer is: sometimes. With several hundred consumer variables to consider, most have very little predictive value for an individual candidate. The challenge is understanding which variable actually is predictive, and in which direction. And, in most cases, the variables are predictive only in concert with other variables. So, for example, the kind of car you drive may have only a weak correlation with partisanship, but if you include age, gender, and race with the type of car an individual owns, you may get a more accurate prediction of partisanship. So modeling created a systematic means of connecting political behavior with individual-level data points. Of course, to build a model, a “training data set” was needed. Training data refers to the information needed to shape the model. In consumer marketing the training data is often comprised of customer purchase history. That’s not transferrable to campaigns. So political models were built using survey data—matching survey responses regarding a voter’s opinion on various political matters to hundreds of fields of data detailing the individual’s demographic and consumer fingerprint allowed analysts to identify relationships b ­ etween the responses to key questions and select data points. For example, an

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analyst might determine that a consumer variable detailing whether or not an individual who owns a home is at least slightly predictive of whether they identify themselves as a Republican or a Democrat. Collecting survey data on voters’ political opinions was nothing new. However, a traditional campaign survey required somewhere between 400 and 1,000 respondents, generally. While this sample size is certainly adequate to draw broad conclusions about the state of play in any given campaign, it doesn’t expose the nuanced connections between voter ­behavior and the various data points available by matching consumer data to the voter files. Analysts would therefore create shorter questionnaires focusing exclusively on the key questions necessary to build ­predictive models. Which candidate is the voter supporting? How strongly are they supporting that candidate? If they are undecided, are they leaning in any direction? Which issues are most important to their candidate vote choice? While a traditional campaign survey may keep the respondents on the phone for 20 minutes or more, a modeling survey would typically last no longer than five minutes. These shorter surveys would be administered to a larger sample of voters—typically between 2,500 and 5,000 respondents. Speaking with this many respondents with a typical, longer survey would simply be cost-prohibitive. Analysts would match the survey responses back to voter file and then use advanced algorithms to identify relationships between each question’s responses and any data point from the voter file. They would eventually produce a single algorithm that predicted the probability that any individual voter (including the voters who were not surveyed, most importantly) would respond to the survey question upon which the model was built a certain way. So, for example, one of the most common types of predictive campaign models built early on in the era of political modeling (it still is ubiquitous today) is a partisan model. In this case, survey respondents would be asked if they tend to identify more as a Democrat or Republican. Independents would be asked, if they had to identify with one party or the other, whether there was one they leaned toward. The responses to this question would be appended back to the voter file, with the consumer data matched in as well. The analysts would determine which data points were correlated with someone answering this question saying they identify as a Democrat. The end result would be a score, between 0 and 1 (expressed as a percentage), where the higher number represented a higher probability of identifying as a Democrat.



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This process was honed over the 2000s by both parties. Most of the advances in this area had more to do with pushing more widespread adoption of the tools and tactics than in improving the process itself. The process of collecting and maintaining the core data files became more streamlined, with several firms on both sides of the aisle emerging, maintaining national voter files. This was facilitated by state and l­ocal elections officials making the raw voter data more readily accessible, ­a llowing for much more frequent updates of the base files. The ongoing professionalization of this process meant more historical campaign data was collected and maintained than ever before. This last part was critical to building more accurate models. As helpful as consumer data may be to honing models, nothing has a stronger correlation to vote choice than self-reported past vote choice. To simplify—if you have a history of voting Democratic in past races, you are overwhelmingly likely to vote Democratic in future races. These voter IDs played an essential role in producing more accurate models.

2012 President Obama’s reelect campaign in 2012 represented a leap forward in the use of data and analytics on a campaign. Prior to this cycle, both Republicans and Democrats relied largely on the party institutions and outside vendors to produce the voter models that campaigns relied on to make targeting decisions. The Obama campaign built an internal data and analytics team very early on in the election cycle, a team that would eventually exceed 50 people working out of the headquarters in Chicago. By bringing their data and analytics team inside the campaign ­structure, the Obama campaign could integrate data into almost every facet of their campaign’s decision-making. Analytics would be applied to campaign fundraising, building testing into their solicitations to identify the components of an effective pitch. Targeting data guided campaign resource allocation, right down to President Obama’s campaign travel schedule. Models were built to assign every voter in the country a score predicting their likelihood to cast a ballot, as well as their likelihood to support President Obama if they did come out to vote. The ­campaign also ran batteries of experiment informed programs, where they would serve targeted communication to a test group of voters followed by a survey to quantify the impact of the communication. The results of the survey would then be matched back to the voter file so as to model the

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likelihood that any voter receiving the same communication would move toward supporting Obama. These persuasion scores drove much of the ­campaign’s targeting. The campaign was so data-driven that the chief analytic officer, Dan Wagner, played a critical role in almost every decision. Conversely, Mitt Romney’s campaign invested much less heavily in building their own analytics team. While they were led by a talented ­individual (Alex Lundry), they simply didn’t have the resources the Obama campaign dedicated to create a fully integrated data and analytics operation. In the end, the Romney analytics team was only about 10% the size of the Obama team. In the end, President Obama prevailed. It’s impossible to say how much of this victory was due to the work of his data and analytics team, but the victory lit a fire under both parties to redouble investment and ­innovation in the field. Several new analytic firms were born out of the 2012 presidential campaigns, including some created by those who worked on the campaigns directly.

2016 Democrats entered the 2016 general election with the assumption that the “Obama model” was an essential component of victory in 2012. Thus, it came as no surprise that Hillary Clinton’s campaign mirrored this model, eventually building a team even larger than Obama’s. Again, the data and analytics team occupied a powerful position at the campaign’s strategic table. Very few decisions were made without input from the data and analytics team. Clinton’s data and analytics team operated in a very similar fashion to the Obama reelect team—if there was any difference it was generally such as the Clinton team had more influence over campaign strategy. One of the successes of the Obama campaign in ‘12 was the way in which the analytics survey operation was integrated with the traditional polling operation. As noted earlier in this chapter, in order to build the predictive models the campaign would rely on for driving their resource allocation, they would field large sample surveys. The Obama campaign would field these surveys in battleground states on a rolling basis, closer to Election Day, so that it was rare that they were not surveying voters. This information was not only used to build predictive individual-level models, but also to gauge where the horserace (the head-to-head Obama vs Romney) stood. These modeling surveys proved highly accurate in predicting the actual outcome in these targeted states in 2012.



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The Clinton analytics team followed a similar approach in 2016. In fact, the campaign had such confidence in this methodology that they ceased fielding traditional surveys in several battleground states over the last few weeks of the campaign. This included most of the so-called “Blue Wall” Midwestern states (MI, WI, OH, PA), which were considered likely wins for Clinton, and must-win states for Trump. The analytic team s­ urveys showed no cause for concern in these states, leading up to Election Day, so the campaign dedicated the bulk of its late resources and attention elsewhere, including states that were never considered necessary to amass the 270 electoral votes but which presented a tantalizing opportunity to expand the playing field and win with an overwhelming mandate. In the end, these modeling surveys failed to capture the tightening that was clearly taking place in these states. It’s impossible to say whether traditional surveys would have succeeded where these surveys failed, of course. In the end, every poll’s accuracy depends partly on creating an accurate depiction of voter turnout. If the poll sample includes too large of a proportion of Democrats, the results will skew proportionally, in relation to the actual election results. In 2016, most polls had a harder time reaching less-educated white, rural voters. And these voters turned out at a higher rate than most predictions suggested. Given the flaws of the Clinton data and analytics efforts, it’s tempting to assign a commensurate amount of credit to the Republicans and Donald Trump’s campaign for running a savvy data and analytics effort. However, there isn’t clear evidence that this was the case. Consider the following: the Republican National Committee held a briefing for reporters the Friday before Election Day, in which their analytics team presented, in great detail, how Donald Trump would lose the election. The briefing, of course, was embargoed until after Election Day. This was about as clear of an indication as you could get that the Republicans had not won by executing a stealthy effort that no one else saw coming. In the end they were as surprised as anyone. That’s not to say that the GOP efforts didn’t produce advances worth noting, though the accounts on this front are varying, often conflicting, and always murky. First, a British based firm called Cambridge Analytica figures prominently. Or very little at all, depending on who you listen to. The firm claims to have played a lead role in driving the campaign’s targeting, especially the targeting of their Facebook advertising—­something the Trump campaign invested in more heavily than any campaign in history. Cambridge Analytica talks about the “psychographic modeling”

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they claim to have deployed for the Trump campaign. Essentially, this modeling relied on a wealth of data on voters, collected primarily from Facebook surveys, that strayed from the traditional political survey questions on candidate support, vote likelihood, and position on various issues, and instead focused on a much wider range of opinions and motivations. The theory was that this depth of understanding of voters, when meshed with campaign communication, could produce a highly sophisticated and effective targeting tool, resulting in a higher rate of persuasion conversions than generally experienced. Of course, as much as Cambridge Analytica likes to promote the work they claim to have done for the Trump campaign, there are even more voices on the other side minimizing their role, including President Trump, who downplayed the role Cambridge Analytica played in his ­victory. And the architect of the Trump campaign’s vaunted digital effort claims that Cambridge Analytica did very little for the campaign, and instead gave the credit to the Republican National Committee’s data and analytics team (the same team that was so confident that Trump would lose that they briefed the media to explain how he would lose five days before Election Day).

Conclusion Campaign targeting must always evolve to stay relevant. The political landscape changes quickly, and so must campaign tactics. Existential challenges face the field of survey research, as voters are harder to reach and less willing to share their political views. While at the same time, political targeters are increasingly reliant on survey data to build their predictive models. So where do we go from here? Some solutions are more obvious, and also less impactful. Researchers have identified cell phones as an important part of the equation. That’s the only place you can reach most voters, these days. But having a cell phone number alone doesn’t solve the problem. How often do you answer your phone when you don’t recognize the caller? For most people the answer is: not often. Political data analysts are looking elsewhere for new solutions. One emerging area is in the social media sphere—collecting “observed data.” Instead of actively reaching out to voters on the phone to seek their opinion, why not take advantage of the insights they are openly providing on various social media platforms? The barrier to these insights,



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for years, has been the difficulty in connecting online profiles back to offline data (the campaign voter files). Yet, vendors are building these connections as we speak, which means connecting a wealth of insights back to our ­foundational datasets. For example, imagine collecting lists of ­Twitter users who “like” a tweet from President Trump. Or have used the #­ImWithHer hashtag that was popularized by Clinton supporters. These seemingly trivial online interactions tell us lots about these individuals. And, once we connect these datasets back to our voter files, they can be used to build models to tell us about other people who share demographic ­characteristics with these people. As the field continuously evolves to meet the challenges of the landscape, the fundamentals will remain the same—decisions made based on a depth of data will produce more effective and efficient campaigns.

7 U.S. Elections on the Brink Chris Sautter

Mark Twain once remarked that if voting made any difference they wouldn’t let us do it.1 That may explain why certain American citizens are being denied the ability to vote today. And it also may help explain why our election systems are becoming increasingly unreliable, unverified, and vulnerable to manipulation by outside forces. Democracy is only as stable as the quality of its elections. If classes of voters are systematically disenfranchised and results do not fully and accurately reflect the will of the people or the public cannot verify the results, confidence in democracy suffers and, if not addressed, eventually becomes a sham. Looking back at the 2016 presidential campaign, it is clear there is a growing crisis with U.S. elections that is undermining confidence and threatens to destroy American democracy itself. The crisis is two-pronged. First, the intensely partisan battles over rules governing e­ lections—e.g., who may vote, when people may vote, and how votes are counted—are reaching a point where some election outcomes are skewed by the ­number of citizens prevented from voting. Second, the chronic breakdown of voting machines and human e­ rror that seem to routinely plague election administration are now compounded by increased vulnerability to illegal manipulation at the hands of vote-tally machine vendors, programmers, other insiders, and even foreign actors. This crisis is occurring against the backdrop of a presidential election that was one of the strangest, most polarizing and unpredictable in modern times. From Republican Donald Trump’s unrelenting attacks 136



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on opponents of both parties and his wild rhetoric about a rigged election to the FBI’s investigation of Democrat Hillary Clinton’s emails to Russian meddling to a massive barrage of social media “fake news” and ­propaganda, the 2016 campaign was a weird sideshow that overtook the main event. Not only did these unprecedented developments create an extremely chaotic and unhealthy election environment. They also likely helped ­a lter the outcome of a U.S. presidential election. At least in part because of candidate Trump’s outrageous statements and behavior, the outcome of the election was a surprise—even a shock— to most observers. Unexpected upsets have happened before in U.S. ­presidential elections. But this is the first of this magnitude in the television era, or what might now be called the reality television era.

President Trump’s Voter Fraud Commission Though he triumphed in the Electoral College, Donald Trump asserted without evidence that illegal voting by millions of immigrants and others cost him the popular vote against Democrat Hillary Clinton. Clinton won the popular vote by over 2.8 million according to official results.2 Independent studies and state officials of both parties have found no evidence of widespread voter fraud. President Trump used his unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud as pretext to appoint a presidential panel to investigate what ­Republicans contend is a national epidemic. Named the Presidential Advisory ­Commission on Election Integrity, 3 it existed in theory to study ­policies and voting rules that either enhance or reduce public confidence in elections. Its critics, however, claimed the commission’s real purpose was to perpetuate baseless claims of voter fraud and legitimize voter suppression. Either way, it deepened the partisan divide on voting rights. Trump abruptly shut down the commission less than a year after it was formed owing to a wave of lawsuits, editorials denouncing the effort, and a general mishandling of public meetings and documents in violation of federal law. The president had stacked the 12-member commission with conservatives who had long track records of advocating controversial voter restriction laws. The lone Democratic member of the commission, Maine Secretary of State Matthew Dunlap, claimed he had been illegally excluded from deliberations.

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The administration’s effort to launch an all-out national assault on voting rights failed, at least by way of a presidential commission. Instead, the president asked the Department of Homeland Security to look into the matter, though they have little expertise in the types of election and voter issues facing the nation.

Who Votes in America The Trump commission represented, in a sense, a culmination of a ­decades-old political debate over who should vote in America and how— fights over voting lists, voter identification requirements, early voting, which ballots should be counted, and other related issues. The debate is part philosophical, part political calculation. The partisan philosophical divide is clear-cut. Republicans believe there should be strict rules on voting eligibility and procedures, rules that must be tightly enforced even if it means that some qualified voters might be disenfranchised. On the contrary, Democrats believe that every effort should be made to achieve universal access to voting even if it means that some individuals who are not qualified to vote might end up casting illegal votes. While disagreements over rules for conducting voting and recounts date back to the beginning of the Republic, the intense battles over ­voting rights and rules as we currently know them are rooted in the 1960s. With passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), the major political parties in effect traded positions on voting rights. Their respective positions have guided their approaches to elections and voting laws ever since. The Democratic Party—the party of the Confederate South and ­segregation that tolerated and thrived under repressive Jim Crow laws for almost a century—came to support expanded voting rights and universal access. Democrats not only began to take the lead on civil rights, but also pushed legislation designed to increase voter participation overall, beginning of course with the VRA but also with the Motor Voter law of 1993, which required states to allow registration when residents apply for a driver’s license and other public benefits like welfare. On the other hand, Republicans—the onetime party of Lincoln that had expanded democracy and voting rights at the end of the Civil War— began to oppose initiatives to increase voting rights and easier access to the polls. A great many Republicans, of course, supported the civil rights



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laws of the 1960s, while southern Democrats opposed them. But gradually Republicans came to oppose the VRA and fought to defeat the Motor Voter law when Democrats promoted it in the 1990s. Beginning with the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1870, which theoretically outlawed voting discrimination based on race, African-Americans had voted overwhelmingly Republican until 1932, when Franklin D. Roosevelt carried 71% of the black vote. Nonetheless, through the 1960 presidential election, ­Republican candidates actively sought and won an important share of the ­African-American vote. For example, Richard M. Nixon garnered 32% of the black vote in his narrow loss to John F. Kennedy in 1960, while Dwight D. Eisenhower received roughly 40% in his two races in 1952 and 1956. But after Lyndon Johnson pushed through the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 he captured 94% of the black vote, a record that stood until Barack Obama won 96% in 2008.4 Here’s the political calculation part of the voting debate. By embracing civil rights, the Democratic Party provided Republicans with an opening to win over disaffected white voters—mostly in the South—who had been loyal to the Democratic Party but opposed civil rights laws. Indeed, LBJ famously told his press secretary Bill Moyers after passage of the 1964 Act that Democrats “have lost the South for a generation.”5 As a result, in the 1968 presidential election the Republicans with Richard Nixon as their nominee in effect wrote off the black vote by adopting what has been referred to as “The Southern Strategy.” The Southern Strategy, designed by former Nixon strategist Kevin Phillips, called for Nixon to persuade southern white voters to vote Republican by using coded language and raising issues like states’ rights and forced busing to exploit racial fears without appearing to be overtly racist. Nixon adopted this strategy because he feared that George Wallace’s third-party candidacy would siphon off enough votes in the South to hand the race to Hubert Humphrey or throw the election into the Democrat-controlled U.S. House of Representatives.6 Meanwhile, Nixon, who had won just shy of a third of the black vote in 1960, made no real effort to win African-American votes in 1968. He wound up winning states bordering the South, like Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina, while Wallace running as a symbol of segregation carried all of the states in the Deep South except South Carolina, which Nixon won after the popular senator Strom Thurman endorsed him.

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In effect, Republicans were betting on white voters, particularly whites who were uncomfortable with aspects of racial progress, to carry them to victory for the indefinite future. The Southern Strategy, in its various incarnations, worked for 40 years as the only Democrats to win races to the White House between 1968 and 2008 were southerners Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. The strategy was so effective that it created what came to be known as an “electoral lock”—GOP control over the electoral map so dominant it appeared to virtually guarantee the party possession of the White House for years. Since 1960, Republicans have made little to no effort to compete for African-American votes, instead continuing the use of racially coded communications, symbols, and other activities in their campaigns to maximize white support. African-American voters quickly recognized the GOP strategy for what it was. Nixon won just 18% of the black vote in 1972 even as he was winning a landslide election. After Gerald Ford garnered 17% in 1976, black support for Republican presidential candidates sunk to around 10%. Ronald Reagan’s share of the African-American vote, which was 14% in 1980, dropped to just 9% in 1984. George H.W. Bush’s black support was 11% and 10% respectively in 1988 and 1992. Both Ronald ­Reagan and George H.W. Bush used racially tinged wedge issues in their campaigns for the presidency (Bush benefitted from the infamous “­ Willie Horton” ads). And Mitt Romney carried just 6% of the black vote in 2012 after airing TV ads falsely claiming that President Obama would end welfare work requirements.7 Following southerner Jimmy Carter’s election in 1976, Republicans extended their race-based vote strategy to voter intimidation activities at the polls. In the early 1980s, the Republican National Committee initiated a series of “ballot security” and “voter integrity” campaigns they claimed were aimed at reducing voter fraud but amounted to intimidation in minority communities. Some involved placing off-duty police ­officers outside minority-community polling places and posting signs and distributing leaflets suggesting voters could be subjected to prosecution. Unfair or baseless challenges of registered voters were also used. Several of these practices were successfully challenged in federal court, and Republican officials were forced to sign a consent decree agreeing to cease using them, though the practices have continued in alternate but somewhat more haphazard form. In 1993, for example, Republican consultant Ed Rollins conceded he was involved in a secret effort to



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suppress black turnout in the New Jersey gubernatorial race. The RNC has ­repeatedly tried to persuade the courts to lift the consent decree, claiming it interferes with its efforts to combat voter fraud and violates their First Amendment rights, though a court declined to hold the RNC in ­contempt for activities during the 2016 presidential campaign.8 Another approach to suppress minority votes occurs through voter purges. One of the best-known examples likely swung the 2000 presidential election. In Florida between May 1999 and Election Day 2000 then Secretary of State and Bush Campaign Co-Chair Katherine Harris and her predecessor, Sandra Mortham—also a Bush protégé—contracted with a firm to purge 58,000 alleged felons from the rolls. The project was botched because the company—DBT—failed to cross-check the voters, resulting in an estimated 20,000 eligible and disproportionately minority voters being disenfranchised.9 The attempts to limit the impact of minority voting through Election Day intimidation and preelection voter purges constituted the party’s primary approach to suppress the black vote for a couple of decades. Then the focus shifted to the legislatures and the courts. There are many observers who believe the change began with the 2000 Florida Recount. That view is that the very close 2000 election taught political operatives that the rules of the game can be manipulated and that even small changes in election laws can alter the outcome.10 The Republican race-based strategy is now running up against a new demographic reality as the nation’s minority population continues to grow. By 2008, the minority vote had increased to 25% of the total vote in the U.S. Barack Obama’s coalition of minorities, suburban women, white progressives, and younger voters seemingly shattered the ­Republican electoral lock. After the 2012 elections, the Republican National Committee commissioned an “autopsy” that recommended, among other things, fundamental changes in the way the party reaches out to minorities.11 Instead of heeding the warnings of the GOP “autopsy,” Donald Trump revived the GOP’s race-based strategy in 2016, using explicit language to exploit fears about Latino immigration and terrorists attacks on ­Americans by Muslims, to increase white turnout. At the same time, he sought to depress the black and youth vote for Democrat Clinton from what it had been for Obama to gain an Electoral College victory. But the demographic map suggests Trump’s approach may be difficult to successfully replicate, not to mention the impact such divisiveness has on the national psyche.12

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The Help America Vote Act If the 2000 Florida presidential recount provided the lesson that the elections can be manipulated by changing the rules, the national legislation that was designed to address the chaos and irregularities exposed during the 2000 Florida presidential recount—the Help America Vote Act of 2002, or HAVA—created the opportunity. The HAVA legislation was ­designed to raise standards and improve voting equipment, but it has also been the source of many of the serious unintended election administration and voting rights problems the country faces today. ­ emocrats HAVA amounted to a compromise between congressional D who want to increase voter access and Republicans who want to combat voter fraud. The legislation appropriated $4 billion to the states to upgrade voting equipment and established the Election Assistance ­Commission to help states modernize their voter registration systems, among other things. HAVA also required states to permit voters whose eligibility is in question to cast provisional ballots to be counted once eligibility is confirmed instead of simply being turned away. Finally, in a provision that would spawn future legal battles, Republicans insisted that HAVA require that voters who register by mail provide identification the first time they vote. This created the first national voter ID law and became the impetus for more restrictive state laws. Though touted as a bipartisan solution to the country’s electoral ­problems, as highlighted in Florida, HAVA created a whole new set of problems. The expensive new electronic voting machines that HAVA helped buy were built on still evolving and often faulty technology. Most touch screen machines, for example, came without a system to verify ­results and were susceptible to tampering. Election officials who rushed to purchase the new voting machines were not sufficiently trained or capable themselves to operate them. ­Malfunctioning equipment became a regular occurrence on Election Day, and irregularities in vote tallies began undermining confidence in the results. The companies that manufactured the new equipment were often owned or managed by individuals with strong partisan ties, further undermining public confidence. Corporate lobbyists and voting equipment company representatives began to exert undue influence on what had always been a public undertaking—election administration. HAVA’s provisional ballot mandate also produced unintended consequences. The provisional ballot requirement was prompted by complaints



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that large numbers of voters in Florida and throughout the country were improperly turned away from the polls because their names had been omitted from the voter rolls or were wrongly challenged by an election official. But requiring that voters be allowed to vote by provisional ballot and having states actually count those ballots has proven to be two entirely different matters. Because there are no clear and uniform standards for counting ­provisional ballots, the number of such ballots that are actually counted varies by state. For example, some states, such as California, count ­ballots cast in the wrong precinct, while several others do not. Predictably, ­California counts a very high percentage—over 80%—of provisional ballots, compared to a national average that is closer to 60%. The counting of provisional ballots is also subject to rules that are influenced by politics. Some election officials who exert influence over voting protocols are unabashed partisans who have made a concerted effort to limit the number of provisional ballots that should be counted.13 There is also evidence that people who should be voting by regular ballot are being steered by election officials to vote by provisional ballot. In addition, new voter identification laws are forcing people who would normally cast regular ballots to vote by provisional ballots. Another reason is that registration rolls are chronically inaccurate. The names of newly registered voters often do not appear on the precinct voter rolls though they are duly registered. Also, HAVA does not require state or local election officials to investigate possible administrative errors to determine whether provisional ballots should be counted. As a result, voters are dependent upon the sometimes flawed or biased judgments of local election officials working often without the benefit of sufficient relevant information.14 HAVA was supposed to help states modernize registration rolls, but many are still antiquated. One reason is that Congress failed to give the federal government the authority to require the states to maintain up-todate voter registration records. The Election Assistance Administration Commission that HAVA established to assist the states in updating voter rolls has become dysfunctional as the Republican-controlled C ­ ongress and now the Trump administration are trying to kill the agency ­a ltogether. Voter registration processes are also sorely in need of national standardization. Finally, HAVA failed to address the two most serious flaws in the way we run elections in America. The first problem is that politicians and political appointees are administering our elections. There are an

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insufficient number of trained professionals making key decisions. Partisanship increases the likelihood of conflicts of interest and manipulation of rules. Second, the extreme decentralization of elections ensures a lack of uniformity. Bush v. Gore held that like ballots should be treated in a similar manner.15 But America’s decentralized election system means that like ballots are frequently not treated the same. Voting equipment ballot design, quality of election officials, and interpretation of laws vary from state to state and often from county to county, ensuring a lack of uniformity in treatment of ballots. Meaningful change of serious problems that plague America’s voting is impossible unless these two issues are addressed head-on.

The Battle over Voter ID Laws Across America legal battles have escalated over a wave of state voting laws that impose new voter ID requirements, scale back early voting ­periods, and restrict voter registration efforts. The litigation is partisan because the changes impact voter turnout, i.e., who votes, which impacts outcome. All of these new laws have generated controversy, but the voter ID laws have been by far the most polarizing. Laws requiring some kind of identification to vote have been around for a while, though the early ones demanded little in the way of ID and were loosely enforced. However, the passage of HAVA prompted states to pass new stricter ID legislation tightening restrictions on voting in several states, beginning in Georgia, Arizona, and Indiana. Georgia’s strict voter ID law, the first of its kind, was approved by Bush’s Justice Department under the Voting Rights Act, despite clear evidence the law would disproportionately burden black voters. A federal court initially blocked the law’s enforcement but relented when the state passed an amended, toned-down version. In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court considered a challenge to the constitutionality of the Indiana ID law. In the case, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the court upheld the constitutionality of a law requiring voters to provide photo ID, finding that requirement sufficiently related to Indiana’s legitimate state interest in preventing voter fraud. Indiana provided no real-life examples of voter fraud that such ID would have prevented. Indeed, Indiana officials conceded that the rationale for ­passing the law was primarily political. But plaintiffs also failed to demonstrate that qualified voters would be turned away from the polls for lack of ID.



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So the court left the door open for future challenges depending upon circumstances. In short, while voter ID laws are not unconstitutional per se, they may be struck down if there is proof of clear voter suppression, racial discrimination, or denial of the franchise sufficient to overcome the presumption of constitutionality.16 Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the majority opinion in Crawford, a 6–3 decision. Stevens, who usually sided with the court’s liberal block, is a Chicago native and was perhaps influenced by his memories of the city’s well-organized political machine in the 1950s and 1960s, when voter improprieties were believed to be common. Stevens later admitted that “the impact of the statute is much more serious” on poor, minority, disabled, and elder voters than he’d initially recognized. Judge Richard Posner, author of the Seventh Circuit opinion upholding the Indiana law, has reversed his original position, saying the photo ID requirement is “now widely regarded as a means of voter suppression rather than of fraud prevention.”17 Combating voter fraud is a legitimate goal, of course. But many ­conservatives and Republican activists have taken to using voter fraud as a kind of boogey man and a pretext to push legislation that would ostensibly prevent fraud, yet have the effect of creating significant barriers to voting. In fact, there is virtually no current evidence of the kind of voter fraud that photo ID laws purport to prevent. A study by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law concluded that an individual is more likely to be hit by lightning than to commit voter fraud. That’s because fraud by individuals impersonating others is both difficult and irrational. Why would anyone commit a felony that accounts for a single vote? In fact, most of what is characterized to be voter fraud is something else—either bureaucratic error or inadvertent voter mistake. The reality is that the vast majority of fraud allegations are asserted to advance a political agenda rather than to clean up dirty elections.18 The trend of passing restrictive voting laws like voter ID accelerated greatly after the historic election of Barack Obama. The nature of Obama’s election sent shock waves through conservative and Republican circles. As mentioned, the rising percentage of minority voters, especially in states Obama carried, made clear that Republicans face a harsh demographic and political reality. But, rather than trying to legitimately ­compete for minority votes, Republicans decided to double down on their race-based politics.

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With apparent Supreme Court approval, Republicans stepped up their efforts to make voting more difficult and reduce turnout after they won governorships and legislatures in 2010. According to the ­Brennan Center, since 2013, 23 states have passed laws making it harder to ­register and vote. Three states have had their voting laws blocked in courts. All but two of the 23 states—Illinois and Rhode Island—had majority-­Republican legislatures when passing laws. Many states with Democratic majorities have passed laws making it easier to register and vote, e.g., same-day registration, automatic registration, expanded early voting. As a consequence, there have developed two separate and very different sets of voting laws—depending upon the partisan makeup of the state.19 Whether or not legislators believe their rhetoric about fraud prevention, it is pure political calculation that drives passage of these laws. Voter registration and ID barriers are more likely to fall disproportionately on voters likely to vote for Democrats, e.g., the poor, minorities, and students, since they are least likely to possess the kind of ID required. In close elections, these laws can make a difference. Recently, some courts have begun to strike down the worst of the restrictive voting laws. The argument Democrats and progressive groups are making against them is that they are far more discriminatory than the Indiana and Georgia laws that were upheld. Voter ID laws in Texas, Wisconsin, and North Carolina were blocked, at least in part, by the courts last year before the 2016 presidential election, although the Texas injunction against implementing the law has since been reversed by the Fifth Circuit of Appeals.20 The Wisconsin law that was blocked only in part is said to be responsible for disenfranchising tens of thousands of voters and may have cost Hillary Clinton the state, which she lost by 22,000 votes. Overall, 91,000 fewer voters cast ballots in 2016 than 2012. The drop-off in turnout was particularly stark in Milwaukee County, where Clinton got 103,000 fewer votes than Obama in 2012. A University of Wisconsin study ­released in September 2017 surveyed registered Wisconsin voters who did not vote in 2016 and found that 11.2% attributed their failure to vote to the state’s new voter ID law. The author projected that as many as 23,000 registered voters in reliably Democratic counties did not vote because of the law.21 The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to hear cases challenging the North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Texas ID laws.



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Gutting the Voting Rights Act The Voting Rights Act is widely considered the most successful and effective of its kind in history. Since its passage in 1965, courts have consistently upheld the VRA and Congress has reauthorized it four times based on evidence that discrimination in elections still exists. But conservative groups, encouraged by the Supreme Court’s turn to the right, brought a series of legal actions to scale back the law. That effort was ultimately successful in 2013, when the Supreme Court decided a case called Shelby County v. Holder. In Shelby County the court virtually eliminated a requirement in the VRA known as preclearance, mandating that states and counties obtain permission from either the Justice Department or a federal court before changing voting rules. ­Immediately after the Supreme Court invalidated this requirement, GOP lawmakers and officials across the country rushed out to install new voting restrictions. Before Shelby County, what was Section 5 of the VRA prevented restrictive voting rules in 15 states, most of them in the South. Chief ­Justice John Roberts wrote in his majority opinion that “our country has changed,” and that blanket federal protection was no longer needed to stop discrimination.22 As if to prove Roberts wrong, within two hours of the Shelby ­decision, the then Republican Texas attorney general, Greg Abbott—now ­governor—announced that the state’s voter ID law—which had been blocked by a federal court—would be amended immediately. ­Meanwhile, eight of the 15 states covered by the VRA passed voting restrictions within a year, compared to three of 35 not covered. At the same time several states not covered by the VRA expanded voting rights. Some Democratic members of Congress have tried to introduce without success legislation that would resurrect the key provisions knocked down by the Supreme Court.23

Partisan Gerrymandering The Supreme Court heard oral argument in October 2017 on a partisan gerrymandering case, Gill v. Whitford, that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg has called the most important one of the 2017–18 term. The plaintiffs, a dozen Wisconsin Democrats, allege that the redistricting plan enacted by the state legislature in 2011 after the last census is undemocratic and

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unconstitutional because it systematically reduces the voting strength of Democratic voters statewide way below their true numbers. In effect, the plan violates the “one person, one vote” principle.24 Lawmakers have been manipulating legislative maps for political advantage and to expand power since the late eighteenth century. The name refers to a partisan congressional map drawn by allies of Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry, a signer of the Declaration of Independence and delegate to the Constitutional Convention. One freakishly shaped district resembled a salamander. A political cartoonist drew the district with wings and claws and named it “gerry-mander.” The name is now synonymous with election districts drawn to favor one party. While the court regularly strikes down election maps that dilute the power of racial minorities, it has never done so simply because they lock in a purely political advantage for one party. Courts have been reluctant to wade into partisan redistricting, in part because no practical standard exists for determining unconstitutionally excessive partisan bias. The lower court in Gill found that the Wisconsin legislative districts were drawn to eliminate competitive districts altogether and that election outcomes were, in effect, preordained. The plaintiffs point out that in 2012 Republicans received 48.6% of the vote but won 60 of 99 seats in the legislature. In the 2014 election, Republicans received 52% of the vote but won 63 seats. Though it is difficult to discern the true positions of justices from ­Supreme Court oral arguments, Justice Anthony Kennedy, the swing vote on the issue, seemed to suggest that Wisconsin’s redistricting plan violates the First Amendment associational rights of Democrats by making their votes less valuable. He would join the four-member liberal block who appear eager to set limits on a political party’s ability to draw such districts. However, Kennedy stopped short of indicating that he believes the Wisconsin plan was so tainted by politics that it should be overturned, or that the challengers had come up with a satisfactory test to guide courts in ruling on future cases. He did manage to elicit a concession from the lawyer representing the Wisconsin GOP legislators that using purely partisan criteria in drawing districts would be unconstitutional. Some liberal members said extreme gerrymandering represents a serious threat to democracy, requiring that the court intercede. Justice Ginsburg argued that what is at stake in the case is “the precious right to vote.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor asked the simple question, “Could you



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tell me what the value is to democracy from political gerrymandering? How does that help our system of government?” Justice Stephen Breyer outlined a set of criteria to guide courts that would include one-party drawing districts that advantage the same party and last regardless of how the state swings politically.25 Chief Justice John Roberts, on the other hand, expressed concern about having courts police the likely avalanche of partisan gerrymandering cases because it would inject the courts too much into the political realm and undermine the courts’ legitimacy. The other three justices in the conservative block—Samuel Alioto, Clarence Thomas, and Neal ­Gorsuch—are expected to join Roberts in concluding that there is no practical test for determining excessive partisanship in redistricting. The Supreme Court’s decision in this potentially groundbreaking case could radically reshape the political landscape by requiring lawmakers to draw more competitive maps. In the short run, Republicans would likely lose seats. In the past two decades, the GOP has seized control of state legislatures and Congress, in part as a result of extreme partisan redistricting. According to an Associated Press analysis, Republicans hold as many as 22 additional House seats owing to the practice. Gerrymandering is believed to be a major cause of the extreme partisanship and gridlock that grips our politics today. Some activists, including former California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, advocate taking the politics out of redistricting altogether by establishing independent commissions to draw legislative districts.

Russian Meddling and Fake News While Donald Trump was at campaign rallies warning that the election could be “rigged,” Russian agents were engaged in unprecedented interference in the 2016 elections. As with his postelection claims of voter fraud that denied him victory in the popular vote, the claim of election rigging was made without evidence.26 But a Russian campaign of cyber intrusion and propaganda with the purpose of disrupting the 2016 presidential election directed by President Vladimir V. Putin is well documented by American intelligence agencies. Congressional investigators have confirmed that Russian hackers attacked election registration databases and voting systems in 39 states leading up to the 2016 elections and even tried to delete or alter voter data in one—Illinois. Both Senate and House committees looking into foreign

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interference in the presidential campaign as well as a special counsel probe have been attempting to determine whether Trump campaign associates obtained information from hacked voter databases or otherwise colluded with Russia.27 Some believe these activities were a test run by Russians in preparation for a more aggressive attack. The Department of Homeland Security warned election officials in swing states in 2016 to protect their voting systems from attack but they were brushed aside. The Obama administration reportedly used the “red phone”—a digital communications channel that allows the countries to send information back and forth— to provide Kremlin leaders with proof of the attacks. President Obama apparently decided not to reveal the extent of Russian activity, worrying it might undercut public confidence and sway the election. American spy agencies have concluded that Putin initially wanted to undermine Hillary Clinton’s ability to govern once elected. But as the campaign went on and Trump seemed viable, Putin tried to explicitly help the insurgent pull off the upset because Putin viewed Trump as a potential ally. While available evidence does not indicate Russia’s hacking efforts actually changed election totals, the fact that it was able to access voter ­information demonstrates the severity and potential of Russian meddling. The experience clearly exposed cyber vulnerabilities in the U.S. infrastructure and shows how very vulnerable U.S. elections systems are to both insider manipulation and outside foreign interference. In addition to its intrusion of voting systems, Russian hackers stole electronic files from the Democratic National Committee and passed them along to Wikileaks and other websites to embarrass the Clinton campaign and DNC officials and spread false propaganda as a means of trying to influence the outcome of the election. The effort involved not only publishing negative stories about Hillary Clinton but also false news about her such as claiming the Podesta emails included incriminating comments about the Benghazi affair, which Trump himself repeated at campaign rallies. One fake news story led to actual violence—the so-called “­ Pizzagate” matter alleging that Comet Ping Pong—a restaurant in northwest ­Washington, D.C.—was being used by Clinton associates to run a child sex ring. The reports prompted a 28-year-old North Carolina man to drive to Washington, go to the restaurant, and start shooting an R-15 rifle, though no one was hurt.28



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Finally, Russians used online tools and platforms to sow discord among voters and influence the election. Russians used Twitter fake accounts and automated bot networks to spread false news stories. A ­Russian propaganda organization purchased more than $100,000 in ­political ads on Facebook that were aimed at stirring up divisive p ­ olitical and social ­issues, some even including direct references to presidential candidates. Both Facebook and Google, the world’s biggest sellers of online ­advertisers, allowed the sale of ads tied to targeted to racist and bigoted users. These activities provide further evidence of a coordinated Russian attack against the U.S. election system.29 Trump campaign associates have repeatedly denied colluding with Russians or even contacting Russians during the course of the campaign, although they have had to walk back those claims several times. ­President Trump himself has said the Russia story is a “total fabrication, serving as an excuse for Democrats for the ‘greatest loss in the history of American politics.’”

Recounts, Voting Machines and Election Administration The election recounts of 2016 ended anticlimactically as courts prevented any review of ballots in two of the three states targeted by Green Party presidential candidate Jill Stein. Meanwhile, a move to recount ballots in North Carolina’s gubernatorial race ended abruptly when the math proved too daunting for the loser, incumbent Pat McCrory. One demonstrates the degree to which extreme partisanship has come to dominate election recounts. The other shows the degree to which deficient voting machine technology, inadequately trained election workers, and the lack of uniform recount procedures continue to plague U.S. elections two decades after the disastrous 2000 Florida presidential recount. The short-lived gubernatorial recount in North Carolina ended as so many do—with the candidate behind throwing in the towel after it became clear that the votes to turn it around weren’t there. Republican incumbent Pat McCrory sought a recount though he trailed Democrat Roy Cooper by more than 6,000 votes. McCrory’s campaign argued that fraud and computer glitches may have affected the totals. Republicans also tried to invalidate ballots cast by voters who registered on Election Day under North Carolina’s same-day election law. The battle over the results of the North Carolina election amounted to another chapter in a long war in the state over voting rights. The Supreme

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Court’s 2013 decision striking down key provisions of the Voting Rights Act triggered passage by North Carolina Republicans of the most restrictive and comprehensive voting rights law in the nation. It included photo ID, ended same-day registration, and cut back on early voting. The Obama Justice ­Department, along with a coalition of organizations, including the North Carolina NAACP, sued the state, and after losing at the district court level won a sweeping victory at the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. In striking down the law, the court found that it was passed with specific intention to suppress the votes of minority citizens who overwhelming vote Democratic.30 The 2016 presidential recounts were the first since the 2000 Florida recount. But, unlike 2000, almost nobody thought the 2016 recounts would or could change the outcome of the presidential election. They proceeded to various points in the three states—Wisconsin, Michigan, and ­Pennsylvania—and, unsurprisingly the results did not substantially change. But, like Florida, the 2016 recounts exposed serious flaws in our election technology, in security, transparency, and accuracy, and in the way we conduct election recounts in general. The elections in the three states were close but not by recount standards. The election between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton was, in effect, decided by 80,000 votes among the three states. The narrowest margin was in Michigan, which was decided by roughly 10,000 votes (47.6%–47.3%). Wisconsin’s margin was a little over 22,000 (47.9%– 46.9%). By comparison, in Florida 2000 on election night approximately 1,500 votes separated Bush and Gore and the official margin after the recount wound up being 537 votes. Nonetheless, many progressives became convinced that Trump’s unlikely Electoral College victory was due to a breakdown or tampering with the voting equipment or some other nefarious reason. Among other things, they cited exit polls that showed Clinton winning Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Almost from the day after the November election, grassroots activists began promoting the idea of recounting ballots to determine if the election had been hijacked. The idea really took off after a University of Michigan professor of computer science, J. Alex Halderman, claimed without specific evidence that Clinton’s poor performance in some counties could have been the result of tampered electronic voting machines.31 Green Party presidential candidate Jill Stein propounded that a cyber attack could have manipulated the results in the three states Trump surprisingly won. Though Stein cited no evidence of hacking, she referenced



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Halderman’s claim of anomalies, suggesting Clinton did worse in counties in Wisconsin that used electronic DRE-style voting machines as opposed to those that relied on paper ballots. There is no way to know for certain whether machines have been hacked or there have been widespread mistakes without a full hand recount or an audit, reviews that election officials were not doing and almost never do unless required by law. Many state recount laws provide for no more than a redetermination—a reexamination of the computer tapes rather than recounting ballots. Even after evidence of Russian hacking of voter files in 2016, there has been virtually no investigation into the impact of such hacking. Some election officials resent having their work checked for accuracy, even during court-ordered recounts. Most election officials continue to be in denial about outside interference. And many state laws provide insufficient authority for audits and transparency. In Wisconsin, the first state to begin recounting, a state court blocked an effort by Stein to require manual recounts in each of the counties. The court ruled that Wisconsin law gives county canvass boards discretion to conduct either a hand or machine recount. Twenty-four of the state’s 72 counties elected to conduct machine recounts, including three of the four most populous counties, among them Milwaukee and ­mistake-prone Waukesha County. As a result, nearly half of the ballots in the state were recounted by machine rather than by hand, even though most of the counties conducted hand recounts.32 Conducting a machine recount is a bit like obtaining a second ATM receipt—unless uncounted ballots are found and added to the total, the results will invariably be identical to the original certified numbers. ­Unfortunately, most election equipment currently in use in Wisconsin as well as throughout the country sacrifices accuracy for speed and fails to count some legal votes. Therefore, machine recounts are often simply reproducing inaccurate certified totals. In Racine County, just south of Milwaukee, for example, Stein observers used “clickers” to demonstrate that the tabulating machines were not producing an accurate count. Several months later, the Wisconsin ­Elections Commission, after reviewing the allegations decertified the voting equipment used in Racine and several other counties, although those county officials never acknowledged accuracy problems. There were other instances during the Wisconsin recount in which county boards of canvass certified obviously incorrect vote totals.33

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One piece of startling news to emerge from the Wisconsin presidential recount that raises new security issues was the revelation that—contrary to a range of assurances by public officials and commentators—some of America’s voting machines are connected to the internet. It turns out that the new Election Systems and Software (ES&S) DS220 model of ­optical scanner is fitted with internet cellular capacity. The Milwaukee County Clerk conceded the existence of modems in their DS200 optical scanners for the purpose of transmitting election results from the precinct to the central vote counting ­location ­election night. Despite assurances that the modems are secure, most computer experts agree there is potential for hacking into anything that is ­connected to the internet. Commentators who argue the ­country’s decentralized voting system makes hacking extremely ­d ifficult are correct. But the opportunity is clearly there for i­ nsiders and highly ­sophisticated hackers to tamper with results. A complete hand r­ ecount of all ballots in Wisconsin could have eliminated all doubt. There are currently more than 12,500 ES&S DS200 optical scan vote counting machines in use in 18 states. It is not known how many have cellular hookups similar to those in Milwaukee. If Russian hackers and other election opportunists did not already know that some optical scan voting machines are hooked up to the internet, they likely will by the next presidential election.34 Before the courts called off the Michigan recount as unauthorized by state law after only three days, problems arose that would have cast doubt on the results even if it had been completed. According to state law, precincts whose poll books don’t match with ballots cannot be recounted. In other words, the number of ballots has to exactly match the number voters who signed the poll book for a recount to proceed. It is an onerous provision (and somewhat unique) since discrepancies are almost always the result of an oversight by election officials. For example, it is not uncommon during busy periods for a very small number of voters to fail to sign in. In most instances, discrepancies are off by no more than one or two. Other times, ballots are discovered during the course of a recount somewhere else within the jurisdiction of election officials, e.g., in machines that broke down on election night. Most state laws provide that election officials pull by a blind draw ballots that exceed the total number of voters in the poll book rather than invalidating the recount for the offending precinct.



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In any event, in 59% of Detroit precincts, the number of ballots in precinct poll books did not match those of voting machine printout reports and under Michigan law they could not have been included in the recount. One precinct showed 306 voters but only 50 ballots in the sealed ballot box—suggesting that 256 ballots had been misplaced. But most other ballot discrepancies were very small in number.35 The Detroit elections director blamed the problems on the city’s ­voting machines, saying 87 optical scanners broke on Election Day. Many jammed when voters fed ballots into scanners, which can produce erroneous vote counts if ballots are inserted multiple times. Poll workers are supposed to adjust counters to reflect a single vote but in many cases failed to do so. There are a variety of possible explanations for what might have gone wrong in Detroit. An investigation by the secretary of state’s office put the onus on election workers not knowing how to record information in the electronic poll book as well as mishandling of provisional ballots. Other Michigan counties had also problems, though not as frequent as Wayne County, where Detroit is located. In a sense, the country dodged another bullet. Had the outcome of the 2016 presidential election come down to a Michigan recount with unexplained discrepancies in heavily African-American Detroit, all hell would have broken loose. Though Pennsylvania’s electoral votes were the most important in Trump’s victory over Clinton, it was the state least likely to flip. Not only was the margin the greatest; Pennsylvania has the worst voting system of all of them. The vast majority of voters (83%) use direct-­ recording electronic (DRE) machines with no paper trail to verify the vote. There is no way to conduct a meaningful recount with such DRE machines, and the path to obtaining a statewide recount is too difficult in any event. A federal judge ultimately struck down Stein’s bid for a Pennsylvania recount, citing the lack of evidence of hacking and no time to complete a recount given the Electoral College deadlines. There was never any real evidence of hacking or manipulation of the 2016 election results. But the recount exercise revealed growing legitimate concern over voting vulnerabilities sufficient to require upgrades in voting equipment, major improvements in elections administration, and fundamental changes in recount laws and election transparency.

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Conclusion The 2016 election produced another round of embarrassing revelations and problems in the way we elect our leaders. With widespread news of hacking, equipment failures, and voter suppression, the American people have a right to question the entire election process and to demand reform. Many believed the 2000 Florida presidential recount would serve as a wake-up call for a failing election system and the Help America Vote Act of 2002 would provide the fix. But the U.S. electoral system is worse than ever, tittering on the brink of disaster with each election. First, systematic race-based voter suppression has been going on at various levels for years and is sufficiently effective in disenfranchising certain voters that it can change election outcomes. Legalized barriers to voting such as extreme ID laws need to be eliminated immediately. ­Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court like Congress has become increasingly partisan in its approach to highly polarizing issues. There is little reason to believe the court will be able to tackle invidious racial discrimination in voting as the Warren court did in the early 1960s. The aftermath of the 2016 U.S. presidential election has also raised the public awareness of the vulnerability of our election systems to manipulation by outside forces. While hackers get the headlines, the truth is our elections are also vulnerable to illegal manipulation at the hands of insiders with approved access to election equipment. Unless we rapidly address these systematic vulnerabilities we can expect that future elections will be tainted. In addition, there is an impending crisis with voting technology as most voting machines are at or near the end of their lifespan. Most states are using machines purchased with HAVA funds over a decade old. Many run on vintage operating systems and are no longer updated with security patches. This machinery would prove disastrous in the event of another truly close presidential election along the lines of 2000. Recount laws also need updating. Jill Stein’s efforts to get proper recounts in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania were ridiculed as a waste of time and a pretext to raise money. But recounts are critical in verifying results in close elections. Recount laws in Michigan and ­Pennsylvania are disgracefully inadequate to verify election results. In the face of evidence of growing public mistrust about both the process and results, elections must be fully transparent and publicly verified.



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In fact, election recounts should be easier not more difficult to obtain. Many European countries conduct recounts or second counts automatically after all elections. At the very least, publicly financed hand recounts should be conducted in all races that are truly close, and mandatory audits with some hand counting should also occur following all elections. In addition, digital ballot images that are created by a growing number of modern voting machines as a part of the routine ballot processing could be used as a way to make our elections more transparent. Any one of these options can work as an easy election security solution to the increasing suspicion that some elections are not on the level. The presidential commission on voter fraud was a move in completely the wrong direction. Its partisan intent served to further divide the country rather than address the serious problems that beset America’s voting and the urgent need for reform. If we allow our elections to continue to deteriorate, the country is destined to experience an election meltdown worse than Florida in 2000. It is way past time to address these serious issues and make our elections worthy of American democracy.

Notes 1. This quote is attributed to Mark Twain but there is no actual documentation about where and when Twain uttered or wrote the words. 2. Official 2016 Presidential Election Results, Federal Election Commission, January 30, 2017. 3. Presidential Executive Order on the Establishment of Presidential ­Advisory Commission on Election Integrity, May 11, 2017, www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2017/05/1. 4. Nichols, John. 2014. “When the Republicans Really Were the Party of Lincoln.” The Nation, July 2, www.thenation.com/article/when-republicansreally-were-the-party-of-lincoln. 5. Ehrenfreund, Max. “How Racism Explains Republicans’ Rise in the South.” Washington Post, November 24, www.washingtonpost.com/news/ wonk/wp/2015/11/24/how-racism. 6. Green, Joshua. 2014. “Birth of the Southern Strategy.” Bloomberg Business Week, December 4. 7. How Groups Voted, Roper Center. 8. Berry, Rachel E. 1996. “Democratic National Committee v. Edward J. Rollins: Politics as Usual or Usual Politics?” Race and Ethnic Ancestry Law Digest 2 (1), http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crj/vol2/iss1/8.

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9. Pallast, Gregory. 2008. “Florida’s Flawed Cleansing Program.” Salon. com, December 4, www.salon.com/2000/12/04/voter_file/. 10. Hasen, Richard L. 2012. The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 11. Rubin, Jennifer. 2013. “GOP autopsy report goes bold.” Washington Post, March 18, www.washingtonpost.com/…/03/18/gop-autopsy-report-goes-bold. 12. Cheney, Kyle. 2016. “Trump Kills GOP Autopsy.” Politico, March 4, www.politico.com/story/2016/03/donald-trump-gop-party-reform-220222. 13. 866.ourvote.org. “Election Protection, Provisional Balloting,” www.866. 14. Hasen, 2012, p. 112: “Anyone who wants his or her vote to count should avoid casting a provisional ballot; you don’t know how election officials will handle them.” 15. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 16. Crawford v. Marion County Board of Elections, 553 U.S. 1 (2008). 17. Barnes, Robert. 2016. “Stevens Says Supreme Court Decision on Voter ID Was Correct but Maybe Not Right.” Washington Post, May 15, http://washington post.com/politics/courts/law/stevens-says. 18. Cleaver, Debra. 2017. “The Truth about Voter Fraud.” The Hill, January 27, thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/…/316458-the-truth-about-voter-fraud. 19. Hasen, Richard L. 2017. “The 2016 U.S. Voting Wars: From Bad To Worse.” Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2017–36, School of Law, ­University of California Irvine, July 12. 20. Veasey v. Abbot, 830 F.2nd 216 (5th Circuit 2017). 21. Marley, Patrick, and Jason Stein. 2017. “Study: Wisconsin Voter ID Law Deterred Nearly 17,000 from Voting.” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, September 26. 22. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013). 23. Cooper, Michael. 2013. “After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws.” New York Times, July 6, www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/us/politics/aftersupreme-court-ruling. 24. Stern, Mark Joseph. “Is Partisan Gerrymandering Dead?” Slate.com, www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/supreme-court-dispatches. 25. Liptak, Adam, and Michael D. Shear. 2017. “Kennedy’s Vote in Play on Voting Maps Warped by Politics.” New York Times, October 5, www.nytimes. com/2017/10/03/us/politics/gerrymandering… 26. Martin, Jonathan, and Alexander Burns. 2016. “Officials Fight Donald Trump’s Claims of a Rigged Vote.” New York Times, October 16. 27. Price, Greg. 2017. “Russia Could Hack 2020 Election—39 States hit in 2016.” Newsweek, June 13. 28. Fisher, Marc, John Woodrow Cox, and Peter Herman. 2016. “Pizzagate: From Rumor to Hashtag to Gunfire in DC.” Washington Post, December 6, www.washingtonpost.com/local/pizzagate-from-rumor-to…



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29. Shane, Scott, and Vindu Goel. 2017. “Fake Russian Facebook Accounts Bought $100,000 in Political Ads,” New York Times, 9/6/2017, www.nytimes. com/…/faceboo-russian-political-ads.html 30 “What’s Really Going On in North Carolina’s Gubernatorial Race.” ­ Atlantic, November 23, 2016. 31. Sherman, Gabriel. 2016. “Experts Urge Clinton Campaign to Challenge Election Results in 3 Swing States.” New York Magazine, November 2. 32. Stein, Jason. 2016. “Judge Rejects Steins Request for Hand Count.” ­Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, November 29. 33. Leary, Patrick. 2017. “Racine Voting Machines Decertified, Absentee Counting Process Changes.” Journal Times, September 26. 34. Dovere, Edward-Isaac. 2017. “Hacker Study: Russia Could Get into U.S. Voting Machines.” Politico, October 9. 35. Livengood, Chad, and Joel Kurth. 2016. “Half of Detroit Votes May Be Ineligible for Recount.” The Detroit News, December 5.

8 The Ground Game

Field Organizing in Political Campaigns Alicia Kolar Prevost

On November 9, 2016, newspaper headlines across the country—and around the world—heralded the outcome that almost no one expected: Trump won. “Stunning end to a wild campaign” was how USA ­Today ­described it.1 It was a “stunning repudiation of the establishment” ­according to the New York Times.2 “Stunning” seemed to be a favorite word of headline writers, with at least ten using the adjective to describe the upset victory.3 One reason for the widespread shock was that anyone paying attention to the “ground game”—the last phase of a campaign when organizers in battleground states get their supporters to the polls— thought that Clinton had an unbeatable operation. “Clinton’s Ground Game Will Sink Trump” said a headline in Politico;4 “Clinton Holds Huge Ground Game Advantage over Team Trump,” reported The Hill.5 Wired magazine predicted, “Trump’s Ground Game Gamble Could Be a Fatal Mistake.”6 But what these reports got wrong, and what few outside the campaigns knew until after Election Day, was that Clinton’s ground game was fatally flawed and the Republican National Committee (RNC) had built a solid get-out-the-vote operation to help Trump. There were many factors and countless decisions that led the campaigns to the “stunning” outcomes on election night, and decisions about how to design and deploy their field operation were just one factor. On a presidential campaign, the field department is typically responsible for the person-to-person conversations that happen in key states—the “battleground” states where the outcome of the election is decided. Field organizers are deployed to battleground states, where 160



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they recruit volunteers and allied organizations to talk to as many voters as possible and get them to the polls on Election Day or during early voting. It is generally accepted among political operatives that a good ground game can increase turnout in support of a candidate by a few percentage points at most. In a close election, the ground game is crucial. “It’s all about the ground game,” conclude countless reporters and pundits in the week leading up to Election Day, every election cycle. ­Inevitably, there is some point in every campaign when conventional wisdom coalesces around the conclusion that TV ads in battleground states have reached the point of diminishing returns. This is when “the ground war,” a campaign’s army of foot soldiers, becomes more important than the “air war,” a campaign’s arsenal of TV and radio ads. For the “ground game” to be effective, a campaign must start planning it many months before Election Day. As Jeremy Bird, Barack Obama’s 2012 field director, said, field is not a “turnkey operation. You can’t throw up some phone banks in late summer and call that organizing.”7 A successful field operation, be it for a presidential campaign, a congressional campaign, or a statewide ballot initiative, really any campaign needs a specific and detailed plan for finding voters, communicating with them over the course of the campaign, and getting them out to vote on Election Day or during the early voting period. In this chapter, I review the core functions of a field program: 1)  ­finding voters—by identifying supporters or potential supporters among already registered voters, or by registering new voters; 2) communicating with voters, by persuading those who could be supporters but aren’t yet, and by mobilizing your strongest supporters to volunteer; and 3) getting voters to the polls by creating a precise plan for making sure each precinct will deliver the votes needed to win on Election Day. These are the fundamental activities of any field operation—from a presidential campaign to a city council race. Many of these fundamentals haven’t changed in decades, or really since the beginning of American democracy: ­human-to-human conversations have proven to be the most effective form of communication. But there have been many innovations in political field work in the last 15 years, including the introduction of sophisticated statistical modeling to predict what voters a campaign should communicate with and the widespread adoption of “best practices” in voter turnout that have been developed from randomized controlled experiments, often led by academic researchers.

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The tradition of Campaigns and Elections American Style has been to offer the perspectives of academics who study campaigns along with the perspectives of campaign professionals (staffers and consultants who work on campaigns). I offer both perspectives: as a campaign staffer, manager, and consultant; as a political scientist; and as an instructor at American University’s Campaign Management Institute. As political campaigns have become more professionalized—with candidates and party committees relying more on professional consultants—another trend has emerged: the work of campaign professionals and the political scientists who study them has increasingly merged. The emergence of randomized field experiments to determine the most effective methods for contacting voters has systematized and professionalized voter contact methods. Pioneered by Yale political scientists Don Green and Alan ­Gerber starting in 1998, the revolution in scientific testing of campaign tactics has become a mainstay of political campaigns and political science conferences alike. Gerber and Green’s Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout is required reading for anyone working in campaigns.8 My experience working in field has spanned from walking door to door with a candidate for state representative in Michigan, where canvassing was our main campaign tactic—and where my primary job was to keep her from accepting too many offers of coming in for ­lemonade and a chat in the voter’s living room (“Ma’am, we have 23 more doors to knock on today; we can’t spend 15 minutes at each one”)—to ­hiring a professional canvassing firm to knock on half a million doors in three states for an environmental campaign in 2012, to hiring dozens of millennials to work as field organizers in battleground states in 2016. In between, I worked on a congressional campaign where a canvasser was stabbed, a gubernatorial campaign where I hired canvassers from a neighborhood homeless shelter, and a presidential campaign where we proudly recruited grassroots organizers in every one of Ohio’s 88 counties. ­Because field is the most labor-intensive department on any campaign, it provides many entry-level jobs for new campaign staffers. At the end of this chapter, I ­include resources for finding work as a field organizer and ideas for further reading about writing a detailed field and get-out-the-vote (GOTV) plan. Field continues to be where the most exciting innovation is happening in campaigns. The integration of new technologies for contacting voters, like mobile phone tools and social networking applications, combined with old-fashioned grassroots organizing, has revitalized an area



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of campaigns that has traditionally taken a backseat to TV ads, debates, rallies, and speeches. As Rasmus Kleis Nielsen explains in Ground Wars: Personalized Communication in Political Campaigns, “New technologies have not replaced older forms of communication as much as they have revived them.”9 For example, mobile apps to facilitate phone banks and door-to-door canvassing have made those old-fashioned campaign ­tactics more effective and easier to scale. Field was the campaign division that was most in need of innovation. For decades, the work done by field directors was passed down from campaign to campaign and had little grounding in what actually worked.10 Another reason for the continued innovation in field could be because a field team relies on people—staff and volunteers, typically recruited at the local level—so there is always new energy flowing through the field team of a campaign. Journalist ­Sasha Issenberg reviews the revolution that occurred in field and voter contact, with the infusion of research from behavioral psychology and the use of randomized experiments. Issenberg’s book, The Victory Lab: The Secret Science of Winning Campaigns, offers a comprehensive overview of the culture of testing and optimization in campaigns.11 Field operations are major logistical endeavors: they require precise planning and employ more people power than any other area of the ­campaign. Field is one of the many areas of political campaign work that seems aptly compared to war preparations: there are vehicles, routes, personnel, fuel, food, lines of communication, and even reconnaissance (in the form of observers at polling places on Election Day, who report back to headquarters on turnout levels at predetermined “bellweather” precincts). On some campaigns, field is pretty much everything that ­happens involving “real people”—as in, outside of the campaign headquarters. This can ­include setting up tables at county fairs, recruiting volunteers to walk with a candidate in a Labor Day parade, building attendance for a massive rally or speech, and organizing voter registration drives. Regardless of a campaign’s size, from a campaign for state representative to a presidential campaign spanning 56 states and territories, there are a few key functions that every field team should perform: identifying voters, contacting them, and turning them out to vote on Election Day.

What Does a Field Team Do? The main task of a campaign’s field team has not changed much since the election of 1840, when Abraham Lincoln instructed his precinct captains

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to “organize the whole state, so that every Whig can be brought to the polls.” Marty Stone, a lecturer at American University’s Campaign Management Institute and the founder of Stone’s Phones, a communications and strategy firm, shares the timeless Lincoln quote with students each semester, just as the first field director I worked for shared it with me. Here is the full passage from the still-instructive Whig Party campaign literature: Our intention is to organize the whole State, so that every Whig can be brought to the polls in the coming presidential contest. We cannot do this, however, without your co-operation; and as we do our duty, so we shall expect you to do yours.

After due deliberation, the following is the plan of organization, and the duties required of each county committee. 1st. To divide their county into small districts, and to appoint in each a sub-committee, whose duty it shall be to make a perfect list of all the voters in their respective districts, and to ascertain with certainty for whom they will vote. If they meet with men who are doubtful as to the man they will support, such voters should be designated in separate lines, with the name of the man they will probably support. 2nd. It will be the duty of said sub-committee to keep a constant watch on the doubtful, and from time to time have them talked to  by  those in whom they have the most confidence, and also to place in their hands such documents as will enlighten and influence them. 3rd. It will also be their duty to report to you, at least once a month, the progress they are making, and on election days see that every Whig is brought to the polls. 4th. The sub-committees should be appointed immediately; and by the last of April, at least, they should make their first report. 5th. On the first of each month hereafter, we shall expect to hear from you. After the first report of your sub-committees, unless there should be found a great many doubtful voters, you can tell pretty accurately the manner in which your county will vote. In each of your letters to us, you will state the number of certain votes, both for and against us, as well as the number of doubtful votes, with your opinion of the manner in which they will be cast.12



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And there you have it—the primary functions of a field team, laid out very clearly by our (then future) sixteenth president: 1. “Make a perfect list of all the voters” and “ascertain with certainty for whom they will vote.” This is your voter file and your ID program. 2. “If they meet with men who are doubtful as to the man they will support, such voters should be designated in separate lines, with the name of the man they will probably support.” This is targeting, which can happen at the individual-level or the precinct level. 3. “Keep a constant watch on the doubtful, and from time to time have them talked to by those in whom they have the most confidence, and also to place in their hands such documents as will enlighten and influence them.” This is voter contact and persuasion, which is carried out through mail, phones, text, social media, or face to face. Lincoln even has figured out who the best messenger is: someone the undecided voter already knows—such as a ­Facebook friend, fellow union member, or fellow church parishioner. 4. “Our intention is to organize the whole State, so that every Whig can be brought to the polls in the coming presidential contest.” This is your GOTV program, turning out your supporters on Election Day. Fieldwork can also include outreach to specific constituencies, such as youth, seniors, veterans, and ethnic groups. It can include coordinating campaign events and visibility at candidate appearances, depending on the size of the campaign—a presidential campaign would have an event staff, or an “advance team” that is separate from the field team. In 2004, I was working at the DNC and helped manage the field team in Ohio. We had a rule that no field staff were allowed to attend John Kerry rallies or other candidate visits to the state (and there were a lot of candidate visits to the state). Our rationale was that candidate rallies were too ­distracting and our field organizers should stay focused on “meeting their ­metrics,” which means reporting to headquarters every night how many doors their teams knocked on and how many phone calls were made. (We made one exception, for a late October rally at Ohio State University featuring Bruce Springsteen.) In retrospect, just “meeting metrics” was not enough—instead of our laser focus on racking up our nightly voter

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contact numbers, we should have sent our organizers to the rallies to sign up volunteers and new supporters, as the Obama campaigns did in 2008 and 2012. One criticism of the 2016 Clinton campaign has been that the team at headquarters in Brooklyn didn’t listen to feedback from the people on the ground in battleground states. Stan Greenberg, a longtime ­Democratic pollster, criticized the Clinton team for an overreliance on data and computer models, instead of listening to feedback from voters: The campaign relied far too heavily on something that campaign technicians call “data analytics”. This refers to the use of models built from a database of the country’s 200 million voters, including turnout history and demographic and consumer information, updated daily by an automated poll asking for vote preference to project the election result. But when campaign developments overtake the model’s assumptions, you get surprised by the voters – and this happened repeatedly13 [referring to the Michigan primary, Iowa caucus and other unexpectedly close primary battles where ­Sanders performed much better than the models anticipated.]

In their book Shattered: Inside Hillary Clinton’s Doomed Campaign, journalists Jonathan Allen and Jamie Parnes relay a story from a Clinton campaign volunteer: One volunteer who phone-banked from Brooklyn several times in October was assigned to make phone calls to registered Democrats in Florida. The main goal was to make sure these swingstate Democrats had received mail-in ballots. But the volunteer was also tasked with asking for whom the voter intended to cast his or her ballot – information that would be relayed to the analytics team. The majority of respondents either said outright that they weren’t going to vote for Clinton or declined to say whom they would support, which surprised the volunteer. After all, these were registered Democrats. More alarming, some of them reported they would vote for Trump.14

Despite reports like this, the Clinton campaign was surprised by the huge turnout of Trump supporters in Florida. According to Allen and Parnes, campaign leadership in Brooklyn watched the election night returns



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from Florida with a “frightening realization” that their “vaunted model was way off.”15 Even if the Clinton campaign had listened to feedback from field organizers and volunteers that Florida and other states were showing much stronger support for Trump than the statistical models predicted, there’s no guarantee that the outcome of the race would have changed. Still, that information could have helped the campaign make better decisions in the lead up to Election Day, instead of having a false confidence that they would turn out more voters. Field organizers knew that there were a “great many doubtful voters” (in Lincoln’s words), but that message didn’t seem to get through to headquarters.

Building the List and Identifying Voters The main goal of any electoral campaign, be it a candidate campaign or an issue campaign, is to win the election. In a two-candidate race or a yes–no ballot initiative, this means acquiring just over 50% of the vote. The first thing a campaign manager should do is figure out how many votes she needs to get that 50%-plus, and who the voters are who will cast those ballots to get her candidate or issue to victory. In 1840, at the time of Lincoln’s Whig Party circular, it was probably fairly easy to “make a perfect list of all the voters”—there weren’t that many of them. Today, most campaigns use professionally vended voter files to organize their lists. A voter file is a database of registered voters that is publicly available in each state and includes basic personal information like address and date of birth, plus other useful information such as a record of whether or not the person participated in past elections. Although voter files can be purchased from state election officials for use by campaigns or academic researchers (but not for commercial use), they are usually provided to a campaign through a professional vendor, often at a steep price. Once a campaign has access to a voter file (in the words of Lincoln, its “perfect list”), the next task is to identify its voters, or “ID” them, to see who they support. This will allow the campaign to allocate its scarce resources appropriately, so it’s not spending money to persuade voters who aren’t persuadable (because they are already staunch supporters of the opponent) or on voters who are already very likely to vote or very unlikely to vote. An ID program can supplement whatever polling data the campaign has collected to gauge base-level support for their candidate, and it can serve to train volunteers and give them something to do in the early stages of a campaign. IDs can be done over the phone, by volunteers

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or with robocalls, or through door-to-door canvasses. A robocall is an automated call that prompts a voter to press, for example, 1 if you support Bernie Sanders, 2 if you support Hillary Clinton, or 3 if you haven’t made up your mind yet. Once the ID is collected and the voter has been identified as supporting, opposing, leaning in either direction, or undecided, that information is recorded on the voter file. On many campaigns, the process of recording the ID is done instantaneously—during a door-to-door canvass, a volunteer often uses their own mobile phone with an app provided by the campaign that syncs with the campaign’s voter file. That information is then used to inform the voter contact and GOTV phases of the campaign. This information is only useful if the campaign actually utilizes it. Post-mortem reports from the Clinton campaign suggest that they didn’t always utilize the feedback they were getting from these routine calls and door knocks. This story from Michigan makes the field director in me shudder: Operatives watched packets of real-time voter information piled up in bins at the coordinated campaign headquarters. … Existing packets with notes from the volunteers, including highlighting how much Trump inclination there was among some of the white male union members the Clinton campaign was sure would be with her, were tossed in the garbage.16

The Trump campaign, on the other hand, bragged about its deployment of mobile apps for organizers, which allowed them to forgo bricks-andmortar campaign offices, while updating their campaign data lists in real time. Brad Parscale, Trump’s digital director, reported at the Harvard Campaign Manager’s Conference in December 2016: What the RNC did in partnership with us – by using the iPhone and the Android devices where you walk out your door and you could start going knocking doors – meant we didn’t need a centralized location. With our budget, it didn’t make sense for us to go make all those offices so that they could sit there with the door closed. That’s a big change. The press was saying we don’t have a ground game because we don’t have as many offices. That was a dumb argument and one thing the media got wrong about the ground game.17



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In most campaigns, it is impossible to individually ID every voter who will make up your 50%. The information that is collected from an ID program and added to the voter file can be used to infer information about voters who are similar to those you have identified. For example, a campaign might learn from its ID program that single moms in racially diverse neighborhoods are likely to be supporters. That information can be fed into one of the voter file models, a “support model,” that is used to help identify other single moms in racially diverse neighborhoods. ­Similar models, which generate scores for voters from 1 to 100, can be created to estimate the likelihood of a voter turning out to vote or the likelihood of a voter being persuaded on a certain issue. Another activity field teams can engage in is voter registration. This is part of “making the list” too, especially if the current list of registered voters doesn’t include enough supporters or potential supporters to get your candidate to 50%. In 2016, the Clinton campaign and allied organizations ran large voter registration campaigns, with a focus on young and Latino voters. According to TargetSmart, a data targeting and voter file firm, D ­ emocrats had a major advantage in new voter registration in 2016, with 42.6% of new voters leaning Democratic and only 29% leaning Republican.18

Targeting After a campaign has built its list and segmented voters according to IDs and support or turnout models, the next step is targeting voters. Targeting is the process of deciding what kind of communication each voter will get from the campaign. The first thing we teach at the Campaign Management Institute is that every campaign has a limited amount of resources—time, money, and people are all available to a campaign in a limited supply. Even if the amount of money available is in the tens or hundreds of millions, a campaign manager still must decide how best to spend it. Campaign managers know that they cannot talk to every voter, and, even if they did, some voters just aren’t going to vote for their candidate. Candidates sometimes think otherwise—such as Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, who in her campaign for Congress in 1986 tried to knock on every door in her district and still lost. Mitt Romney’s infamous comment that 47% of Americans will never vote for him was a terrible thing for a candidate to say, but every campaign manager needs to know who the 47% of voters are in her district who will never vote for her, and who her campaign should avoid wasting resources on.

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Some voters won’t need any communication—those who are your strongest supporters and who always turn out to vote (such as the candidate’s family), and those who are your opponent’s strongest supporters. Even if you are a proponent of higher turnout overall because it is good for democracy, when you’re working on a campaign the main goal is to win, so, although no one should ever spread misinformation about when an election is occurring, when you are trying to get 50% of the vote you shouldn’t waste your limited campaign resources by reminding your opponent’s family members to vote. The simplest targeting chart for any two-candidate race, to determine how to allocate limited campaign r­ esources, could be conceptualized as in Table 8.1. According to this system of allocation, a campaign would focus all of its voter contact program resources on boxes B1, B2, and C2, with resources going to box C3 only if there is a voter registration or early vote program in the state. With limited campaign resources, it doesn’t make sense to try to communicate with people who never vote—your campaign might not be able to find them anyway, since if they have no vote history on the voter file they might not be registered to vote. It also doesn’t make sense to send persuasion mail to a voter who already supports you—in fact, if your campaign sends a persuasion message to a strong supporter, this almost guarantees a call to the campaign office berating the volunteer who answers the phone. So it is important to keep your list as “perfect” as possible, and to know what voters are in what contact program. At American University’s Campaign Management Institute (CMI), we teach students the basics of two types of targeting: geographic t­ argeting, which typically occurs at the precinct level, and individual-level Table 8.1  Using Targeting to Determine Which Voters to Contact

(A) Oppose (1) Always Votes (2) Sometimes Votes (3) Never Votes

(B) Undecided

(C) Support

Don’t want to contact

Should contact for persuasion or GOTV

Don’t want to contact

Don’t want to contact

Should contact for persuasion or GOTV

Should contact for persuasion or GOTV

Don’t want to contact

Don’t want to contact

Don’t want to contact



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targeting, of which micro-targeting is a subset. The geographic targeting ­techniques that we teach were first developed for progressive campaigns by the National Committee for an Effective Congress, commonly known as NCEC.19 Geographic targeting, which is typically conducted at the precinct level and is based on publicly available past election results, is accessible to any campaign staffer regardless of the campaign’s financial resources. Individual-level targeting, which is informed by consumer data, survey results, and predictive modeling, can be prohibitively expensive for smaller campaigns. Dividing voters into “separate lines,” as Lincoln instructs, based on their candidate preference or uncertainty, can be done by inference based on where a voter lives and the past election outcomes in that neighborhood. Past election data at the precinct level can show campaigns where their most solid bases of support are located, and where their opponent’s support is strongest. Based on voter turnout levels in similar previous elections, campaign staffers can predict what future turnout will be and what party support is likely to be precinct by precinct. Precincts can then be ranked and prioritized into: “base precincts,” which typically have more than 65% support for your party based on past support; “GOTV precincts,” which have high past ­support and low expected turnout; and “persuasion precincts,” which have shown a tendency to elect candidates from either party. These calculations will help determine a campaign’s voter contact programs for persuasion and GOTV. Although the Trump campaign was criticized for not having a traditional ground game, they did have a traditional targeting operation. Pascale says simply: We knew the 14 million people we needed to win 270. We targeted those in over 1000 different universes with exactly the things that mattered to them. We never fought for the popular vote. There was no economical reason, and there was no reason based off of our Constitution to do so. We needed to win 270, and to do so we needed to win in certain states, and we needed to target registered voters that had a low propensity to vote and propensity to vote for Donald Trump if they come.20

The Clinton campaign, on the other hand, seemed to change targets late in the game. Instead of sticking to their plan of winning a certain

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combination of battleground states (which included Florida, North ­Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Michigan), in the final weeks of the campaign they toyed with the idea of expanding their effort to states like Georgia and Arizona. According to a story in the Boston Globe two weeks before E ­ lection Day, “Hillary Clinton has grown so confident, she is working to expand her goals beyond merely defeating D ­ onald Trump and is now trying to flip Arizona and other traditionally ­Republican states to generate a broader Democratic victory in ­November.”21 Could the outcome have been different if Clinton’s ground game had instead redoubled efforts in swing states that she ultimately lost, including Michigan, ­Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, rather than diverting resources to Arizona, a state that was never part of their path to 270?

Voter Contact The primary methods of voter contact are mail, phones, canvassing, text messages, campaign literature, email, and social media. Voter contact encompasses all personalized communication with voters ­(except fundraising appeals). This is different from the contact that occurs when a voter sees a candidate’s ad on TV—which is an indirect form of ­communication, since every TV viewer in the media market will see the same ad. Direct voter contact includes mail sent to an individual voter on specific policy issues, phone calls to gauge support during the p ­ ersuasion phase of the campaign or to urge participation during the get-out-the-vote phase, and canvassing by knocking on a voter’s door.22 In the purview of the field department, most forms of voter contact are targeted—that is, they are directed at an individual voter or a specific group of voters. With limited campaign resources, it usually doesn’t make sense to blanket an entire neighborhood with literature or randomly canvass people on a street corner. Instead, the field team will use its voter file and targeting information to craft specific messages for particular audiences. For example, predictive modeling based on IDs that were collected and recorded on the voter file might indicate that undecided women with children in North Carolina’s suburbs are particularly interested in health care reform, so a campaign could target those women with mail pieces and phone calls that explain the candidate’s position on health care. The cost of voter contact tactics can range from close to free (for email and social media) to up to several dollars per contact (for paid canvassing or paid phone calls).



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Assessing the cost effectiveness of voter contact tactics has been one of the major contributions of the behavioral science revolution in campaigns. Beginning with the early Green and Gerber randomized experiments, campaigns learned that many tactics they relied on were not very effective at moving voters.23 Several subsequent experiments, both partisan and nonpartisan, have confirmed that robocalls and paid phone banks are not as effective as volunteer phone banks.24 Although these voter contact e­ xperiments have been primarily aimed at increasing voter turnout, not at persuasion, in terms of effectiveness of the messenger they are in line with what Lincoln indicated—that the best messenger for a persuasion appeal is someone “in whom they [the undecided voters] have the most confidence.” Voter contact rates have increased dramatically in recent years (see  ­Figure 8.1). I love to share the numbers with my Campaign Management Institute students, because in addition to showing the increasing rate of campaign contact with voters they also represent employment opportunities for campaign staffers, since voters aren’t usually contacted for free. Even when there are armies of actual volunteers, those volunteers must be organized by commensurate armies of paid field staff. Figure 8.1  Voters Contacted by Either Major Party, 1956 – 2012 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 '56 '58 '60 '62 '64 '66 '68 '70 '72 '74 '76 '78 '80 '82 '84 '86 '88 '90 '92 '94 '96 '98 '00 '02 '04 '08 '12

Source: Data from The American National Election Studies, November 11, 2015, http:// www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab6c_1a.htm.

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GOTV Since long before Lincoln’s directive, every candidate for elected office has had the imperative to get his or her voters to the polls. Once a voter is identified as a supporter, a campaign should move them into a ­turnout program if they are identified as an infrequent or unreliable voter. A voter turnout program could include direct mail, a knock at the door, and phone calls before and on Election Day. This is the most labor-­intensive and logistically driven part of the field operation. A statewide GOTV operation could include thousands of volunteers, hundreds of staging areas, and round-the-clock activity in the days leading up to Election Day. Increasing voter turnout has also been a primary concern of political scientists, as stated by Arend Lijphart in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 1996, when he said, “Low voter turnout means unequal and socioeconomically biased turnout.”25 E.E.  Schattschneider argued that groups who do not turn out to vote will not have their interests represented in government.26 Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) have similar findings.27 For campaign staff, the memory of the 2000 election being decided by 537 votes is enough to motivate GOTV planning. Today’s voter turnout initiatives have the benefit of more than a d ­ ecade of peer-reviewed academic research and evidenced-based scientific experiments to determine which methods are the most effective at increasing voter turnout. In the 2016 election, campaign organizers were able to draw on 15 years of research to deploy the most effective turnout messages.28 Perhaps the most popular finding from behavioral science that was put to use in campaigns up and down the ticket and on both sides of the aisle was “plan making.” This involves asking a potential voter if they have a plan to vote on Election Day. A series of experiments, first conducted by Todd Rogers and David Nickerson in 2010,29 found that asking a potential voter to think through the steps of voting—what time would they go to the polls? How would they get there? Would they drive, take the bus? Would they go with anyone else?—was one of the most effective tactics for increasing the likelihood that the person would vote. This series of simple questions has been found to increase the likelihood of turning out to vote by 4.1 percentage points—earning itself a place in standard GOTV scripts, from now until the next best tactic is discovered. Another effective turnout tactic identified by researchers is the use of “social pressure” messages, first conceived by Michigan political consultant



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Mark Grebner. Grebner’s experiment, which he perfected after teaming up with political scientists Green and Gerber, involved using the publicly available voting record for each voter to publicize who voted and who didn’t in a particular neighborhood.30 Although the social pressure tactic was found to increase the likelihood of turnout by a whopping 8.1 percentage points, it has been controversial and many campaigns have struggled to figure out how to utilize it without seeming to violate voters’ privacy. ­Sasha Issenberg describes the negative backlash that came from the original mailing, with Grebner’s phone voicemail system being taken over by angry voters who didn’t want him publicizing what they apparently thought was private information.31 Campaign managers who want to take advantage of the social pressure tactic will need to figure out how to do so in a way that doesn’t anger their potential voters. One tactic that is similar to social pressure is the use of social media, including using Facebook to ask supporters to reach out to friends who aren’t registered to vote. The Obama campaign used Facebook to reach voters it otherwise had no way of contacting. A Rolling Stone reporter who attended the Harvard Kennedy School’s quadrennial campaign manager’s conference in late November 2012 observed, “Social networks also gave the campaign a lifeline to contact sporadic voters.” He continued: The campaign didn’t have phone numbers for as many as 50 percent of its get-out-the-vote targets under age 30. But they could reach 85 percent of those voters through a Facebook connection of another supporter. This “targeted sharing”—friends lobbying friends on behalf of the campaign through Facebook—was a true revolution in digital campaigning, one the Obama team credits for nearly repeating the wave-election turnout of 2008.32

In 2008, political scientist Seth Masket examined the location of field offices and the relationship to a candidate’s local vote share. Masket analyzed counties in battlegrounds states to determine if the presence of an Obama campaign office in a county led to a disproportionately higher vote share for Obama in that county. He found that the presence of a field office does lead to increased vote share, and in three states (Indiana, ­Florida, and North Carolina) it could have made the difference in winning the state.33 The 2016 Trump campaign shunned traditional field offices, but the ground operation run by the RNC was perhaps more

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traditional than anyone wanted to admit. According to David Bossie, Trump deputy campaign manager: Our phone program, our mail program and our door-knocking program were extensive. Our volunteer effort, both phone and door knocking, on top of the paid side of things, was incredibly robust. The lengths in which we were in every one of those states is was more so than anybody understands.34

The Partisan Divide in GOTV Historically, the Democratic Party had been associated with ­massive voter turnout operations. According to Nelson Polsby and Aaron ­Wildavsky’s classic political science text, Presidential Elections (10th edition, 2000): Most citizens who identify with [the Democrats] are found at the lower end of the socioeconomic scale and are less likely to turn out to vote than those with Republican leanings. So the Democrats put on mobilization drives and seek in every way to get as large a turnout as possible. If they are well organized, they scour the ­lower-income areas for voters, they provide babysitters, they arrange for cars to get the elderly and infirm to the polls, or make sure they have absentee ballots.35

But in 2004 the Republicans took the GOTV mantle from Democrats with the RNC’s famed “72-hour project.” I saw it firsthand in 2004, when I was stationed in Columbus, Ohio—our headquarters in the perennial battleground state. When I saw dozens of people carrying Bush signs arrive at my Holiday Inn Express approximately 72 hours before ­Election Day, I knew the Kerry campaign was in trouble. F ­ ollowing Kerry’s defeat in 2004, Democrats regrouped in time for the 2006 midterm elections. By 2008 Democrats had a formidable GOTV operation in place. The mythical GOP “72-hour project” became the Democrats’ impetus to invest heavily in creating a national voter database and sophisticated new targeting and modeling techniques, and the willingness to embrace the research-based culture of testing everything from voter contact methods to email click-through rates to fundraising appeals.



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By 2008, and again in 2012, Democrats had clearly reclaimed the mantle of GOTV dominance. Several media reports document the Romney campaign’s failure to successfully implement a complicated voter turnout system.36 Reporters from the Daily Beast interviewed field-workers and campaign operatives about the Romney turnout system and found that they seemed to have invested the bulk of their resources on an Election Day system that was never fully tested: As campaign officials monitored central computers in Boston, ­instead of taking in the metrics of a proficient ground game, they saw depressing evidence of a gang that couldn’t shoot straight— anxious messages from operatives who were at the wrong polling place, couldn’t work their smart phones, or were barred from a precinct because they lacked the proper credentials. “It was amateur hour,” lamented one Romney official.37

The Obama campaign, on the other hand, had the good fortune of b ­ uilding on a field operation that it had started before the 2008 ­primaries—which in some states had been operating nearly continuously for almost five years. By the weekend before Election Day 2012, the Obama campaign had racked up some impressive GOTV statistics, as reported on its campaign website on November 3: This morning, as our volunteer Neighborhood Team Leaders opened 5,117 get-out-the-vote (GOTV) staging locations in the battleground states that will decide this election, they began to execute the final phase of a ground game unlike any American politics has ever seen. These staging locations are even more localized versions of our field offices—set up in supporters’ homes, businesses, or any area that can serve as a central hub for a team’s GOTV activities in the final days. … Volunteers have signed up for 698,799 shifts to get out the vote over the final four days of this campaign. The Neighborhood Team Leaders who are running our get-out-the-vote operation have been working in these neighborhoods for months, if not years.38

In 2016, many thought that the Clinton campaign’s field operation was the culmination of the two groundbreaking Obama campaigns—­a fter all, many of her campaign staff and advisors had been part of the Obama

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organizing revolution. In retrospect, it seems that the 2016 Clinton campaign was obsessed with the data-driven side of the Obama field operation, but not with the people-powered organizing side of the field operation. Allen and Parnes explain that Hillary Clinton had become a “disciple of Obama’s data-driven campaign style” and that she “sided with a younger generation that heavily favored science over the art of politics.”39 But abandoning the personal, conversational, two-way communications side of organizing in favor of data-driven statistical models seems to have been a fatal mistake. Perhaps the lesson for future field organizers is to keep the fundamentals while layering in the new technologies and best practices—to enhance the old tactics with new technology, but don’t abandon the basic functions of a field campaign: identify your voters, talk to them—and hear what they have to say and turn them out.

The Growth of Early and Absentee Voting With more than one-third of voters nationwide casting ballots before Election Day, the reality for many campaigns is that Election Day can last more than a month. In 2016, more than 47 million votes were cast early, either by mail or in person. Political scientist Michael McDonald compiles early voting and turnout data from every state at the United States Elections Project—an invaluable resource for academics and political professionals.40 For the 2016 elections, 27 states offered no-­ excuse absentee voting, and 21 states offered early voting.41 Three states (Oregon, Washington, and Colorado) are “vote by mail” states, which means that all registered voters get a ballot in the mail. Depending on the state’s absentee and early voting rules, campaigns can develop field and GOTV programs to take advantage of the longer voting period. Typical programs include adding absentee ballot applications into a direct mail plan, and designing a phone “chasing” program to follow the mailed absentee ballot with a phone call appeal to turn the ballot in. It is also important for field staff to develop relationships with county clerks and other election administrators, to stay on top of any changes to procedure (such as if there is a hurricane or other superstorm the week before Election Day, and early voting locations are changed or closed altogether), and so voters can be crossed off the list once they’ve returned their ballot.



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Fieldwork: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same? Like Lincoln’s pamphlet from more than 150 years ago, this union ­organizing pamphlet from 1944 is still remarkably accurate: In any political campaign – whether it is a campaign of a few neighbors to demand an improvement in their school or some other local issue, or a campaign for Governor or Congressman – you may have mass meetings, radio speeches, leaflets, newspaper ads. All of these are good. But all of them together would be wasted without the quiet talk of neighbor to neighbor about the issues and the candidates.42

Conclusion The goals and objectives of a campaign’s field team have remained the same over many cycles of presidential campaigns: identify supporters and persuadable voters, communicate with those voters using targeted and specific messages, and then mobilize those voters to cast a ballot on Election Day or before. But the tactics used to achieve those goals have changed in important ways, based on findings from carefully crafted randomized field experiments, and have allowed campaign managers to more effectively focus resources on proven voter contact methods for connecting with voters and mobilizing them. Perhaps the most important lesson from the 2016 presidential campaign is that boots on the ground, traditional field organizing that allows campaigns to talk directly to voters, is still vitally important. In the November 2017 elections, Democrats claimed victories in the Virginia and New Jersey governors’ races and achieved a series of historic electoral wins: the first openly transgender person elected to a state legislature, Danica Roem; the second African-American lt. governor of Virginia, Justin Fairfax; the election of black transgender activist Andrea Jenkins to the Minneapolis City Council; and the election of Liberian refugee Wilmot Collins as mayor of Helena, Montana—the first black mayor elected there since 1873.43 According to a New York Times story on the historic 2017 wins, If the 2016 presidential election reflected a primal roar from disaffected white working class voters that delivered for President

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The field organizing work by progressive groups since the 2016 election (including by newly formed groups such as Indivisible, the Women’s March, Emerge America, and Run For Something) all use traditional, person-to-person field organizing at their core. For Democrats, returning to the basics—as the Trump campaign seemed to do in its 2016 ground game—might be the key to victory in 2018 and beyond.

Notes 1. Slack, Donovan. 2016. “How Election Night Unfolded: Stunning End to a wild campaign.” USA Today, November 8, www.usatoday.com/story/news/ politics/onpolitics/2016/11/08/latest-election-results-live-blog/93481162. 2. Flegenheimer, Matt, and Michael Barbaro. 2016. “Donald Trump Is Elected in Stunning Repudiation of the Establishment.” New York Times, November 9, www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-­donaldtrump-president.html. 3.  Abad-Santos, Alex. 2016. “What Front Pages of US Newspapers Look Like the Morning after Donald Trump’s Presidential Victory.” Vox, November 9, www.vox.com/presidential-election/2016/11/9/13572686/donaldtrump-front-page-us-newspapers. 4. Shepard, Steven. 2016. “Democratic Insiders: Clinton’s Ground Game Will Sink Trump.” Politico, November 11, www.politico.com/story/2016/11/ democratic-insiders-hillarys-ground-game-will-sink-trump-230718. 5. Wilson, Reid, and Joe Disipio. 2016. “Clinton Holds Huge Ground Game Advantage Over Team Trump.” The Hill, October 22, http://thehill.com/ campaign/302231-clinton-holds-huge-ground-game-advantage-over-teamtrump. 6. Wohlsen, Marcus. 2016. “Trump’s Ground Game Gamble Could be a Fatal Mistake.” Wired, October 9, www.wired.com/2016/10/trumps-groundgame-gamble-fatal-mistake. 7. Ball, Molly. 2012. “Obama’s Edge: The Ground Game That Could Put Him Over the Top.” The Atlantic, October 24, www.theatlantic.com/ politics/archive/2012​ /10​ /obamas-edge-the-ground-game-that-couldput-him-over-the-top/264031. 8. Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2015. Get Out the Vote: How to ­Increase Voter Turnout, 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.



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9. Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis. 2012. Ground Wars: Personalized Communication in Political Campaigns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 10. Issenberg, Sasha. 2012. The Victory Lab: The Secret Science of Winning Campaigns. New York, NY: Crown. 11. Issenberg, 2012. 12. Lincoln, Abraham. Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. 1, 1809–1865, http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/lincoln1/1:214.1?rgn=div2;view​=​fulltext. 13. Greenberg, Stan. 2017. “How She Lost.” American Prospect, September 21. 14. Allen, Jonathan, and Amie Parnes. 2017. Shattered: Inside Hillary Clinton’s Doomed Campaign. New York, NY: Crown, p. 349. 15. Allen and Parnes, 2017, p. 377. 16. Dovere, Edward-Isaac. 2016. “How Clinton Lost Michigan – and blew the election,” Politico, December 14. 17. Harvard Kennedy School Institute of Politics. 2018. Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2016. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 18. Goldmacher, Shane. 2016. “America Hits New Landmark: 200 million registered voters.” Politico, October 19, www.politico.com/story/2016/10/ how-many-registered-voters-are-in-america-2016–229993. 19. See Issenberg, 2012, pp. 45–48 for an overview of the National Committee for an Effective Congress (NCEC). 20. Harvard Kennedy School Institute of Politics, 2017. 21. Viser, Matt, and Abbie Linskey. 2016. “Clinton Leads Democratic Charge into Red States.” Boston Globe, October 21. ­ ommunication 22. Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis. 2012. Ground Wars: Personalized C in Political Campaigns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 23. Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. 2000. “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment.” American Political Science Review 94 (3): 653–663. 24. Nickerson, David W., Ryan D. Friedrichs, and David C. King. 2006. “Partisan Mobilization Campaigns in the Field: Results from a Statewide Turnout Experiment in Michigan.” Political Research Quarterly 59 (1): 85–97. 25. Lijphart, Arend. 1997. “Unequal Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma.” American Political Science Review 91: 1–14. 26. Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. 27. Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. Who Votes? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America. New York: Macmillan. 28. For an overview of the effectiveness of GOTV tactics based on field experiments, see Green and Gerber, 2015.

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29. Nickerson, David, and Todd Rogers. 2010. “Do You Have a Voting Plan?: Implementation Intentions, Voter Turnout, and Organic Plan Making.” Psychological Science 21 (2): 194–199. 30. Gerber, Alan S.,Mark Grebner, Donald P. Green, and Christopher ­Larimer. 2006. “Does Voter Turnout Increase When Neighbors’ Voter Turnout Records Are Publicized?” Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago (Palmer House Hotel), April 20–23. 31. Issenberg, 198. 32. Harvard University Institute of Politics. 2012. Campaign Decision Makers Conference, November 29. Audio available at www.iop.harvard​ .edu/2012-campaign-decision-makers-conference. 33. Seth E. Masket. 2009. “Did Obama’s Ground Game Matter? The ­Influence of Local Field Offices During the 2008 Presidential Election.” Public Opinion Quarterly 73 (5): 1023–1039. 34. Harvard Kennedy School Institute of Politics, 2017. 35. Polsby, Nelson W. and Aaron Wildavsky. 2000. Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American Politics, 10th edition. New York: ­Chatham House. 36. Haberman, Maggie, and Alexander Burns. 2012. “Romney’s Fail Whale: Orca the Vote-Tracker Team Left ‘Flying Blind.’” Politico, November 8, www. politico.com/blogs/burns-haberman/2012/11/romneys-fail-whale-orca-the-­ votetracker-149098.html. 37. Lake, Eli, Daniel Klaidman, and Ben Jacobs. 2012. “The Romney ­Campaign’s Ground Game Fiasco.” Daily Beast, November 9, www.the daily​beast.com/articles/2012/11/09/the-romney-campaign-s-ground-game-­ fiasco.html. 38. Stewart, Mitch, Jeremy Bird, and Marlon Marshall. 2012. “Brick by Brick: Building a Ground Game for 270.” Organizing for Action, November 3, www​.barackobama.com/news/entry/brick-by​-brick-building​-a-ground-game​for-270​?source​=read-more. 39. Allen and Parnes, 2017, p. 398. 40. McDonald, Michael P. United States Elections Project, www.electproject.org/home 41. Desilver, Drew, and Abigail Geiger. 2016. “For Many Americans, Election Day is Already Here.” Pew Research Center, October 21, www. pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/21/for-many-americans-electionday-is-already-here. 42. “What Every Canvasser Should Know,” CIO Political Action Committee pamphlet, 1944. In Gaer, Joseph. 1944. The First Round: The Story of the CIO Political Action Committee. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, p. 138.



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43. Lewis, Philip, and Willa Frej. 2017. “Here’s a List of Historic Victories Democrats Had on Election Day.” Huffington Post, November 8, https:// www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/democratic-victories-firsts-election-day_ us_5a026c51e4b092053058cf38. 44. Tackett, Michael, Trip Gabriel, and John Eligon. 2017. “A Year After Trump, Women and Minorities Give Groundbreaking Wins to Democrats.” New York Times, November 8.

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David Winston, a Republican Party campaign professional with more than 30 years of experience in the field, describes how to develop a successful message strategy in Chapter 9, “Creating a Winning Campaign Strategy.” According to Winston, good campaign message strategies should include five key steps: define a desired outcome; develop situational awareness; identify your opponent’s potential strategies; define a winning coalition; and create a strategic communication plan. C ­ ampaign strategy answers the questions of who will vote for the candidate and why. The principles of sound campaign strategy and messaging are the same whether the candidate is running for a seat on a school board or for the presidency of the United States. Without a strategy, a campaign becomes a series of unplanned reactions to unanticipated events. Winston expands upon this by describing the major dimensions of campaign strategy and messaging. This chapter focuses on the foundation of a winning campaign: strategy. Crafting a successful strategy takes good instincts, an understanding of politics, historical context, and detailed quantifiable and qualitative research. He concludes that “Without a viable strategy based on a winning coalition, a campaign can make a lot of noise but is unlikely to make the kind of progress needed to win.” Winston analyzes the 2016 campaign and concludes there was massive “innovation disruption.” The innovation that impacted the 2016 ­campaigns—social media, the role of handheld devices, video screens, email, messaging—has fundamentally changed campaign tactics. Changes in the business model of the media and the role of “big data” in campaigns have had major impact on society and thus campaigns. The speed of these “disruptions” has increased dramatically for campaigns.

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The challenge for campaigns in the face of innovation is understanding when change is merely allowing things to be done faster or more effectively, versus providing a completely different perspective on how things can be done. Martin Hamburger, in Chapter 10, “Paid Media Today,” argues that paid advertising simplifies complex issues and takes them out of context. Political ads are simply another product of our mass culture, no better or worse than the rest of the media. We must be cautious about ­condemning ads when they merely reflect our larger media culture. More importantly, we need to understand the role of ads in politics, whether negative, contrast, or positive, and give Americans the tools to decode them and avoid being manipulated by them. Both positive ads and attack ads prey on people’s emotions—attack ads on fear, positive ads on hope. Campaign ads must conform to the rules that govern the rest of the mass media culture and accommodate themselves to the conventions of television. In devising ads, candidates and their strategists understand that most undecided and swing voters make up their minds based on televised impressions, symbols, and cues. Political advertising in the television age is more about projecting a likable persona than communicating ideas about governance. Campaigns must find ways to differentiate their candidate from rivals, and they do this by highlighting the one quality that seems to matter most with voters—character. In Chapter 11, “Earned Media,” Ed O’Keefe, a political correspondent for CBS News, offers a history of the use of free media in campaigns leading to the historic Trump earned media revolution (Also see ­Allcott, Hunt, and Matthew Gentzkow, 2017). Earned media can be announcements made through tweets, statements at a news conference, or issued in a news release. It can be comments made in a television or radio interview or guest spots on talk shows or podcasts, or snaps on Snapchat and images posted to Instagram. Given the wide use of social media, it is far easier for politicos to “earn” media attention in the faster-paced, media-saturated environment in which we live and work. Trump’s tweets and the reams of headlines and thousands of hours of chatter he generated helped make him president of the United States. He earned the attention by outhustling the competition, which relied mostly on expensive, top-flight consultants to develop well-worn media strategies that had successfully elected presidents before but failed miserably in 2016 (­Cavari, Powell, and Mayer (eds.), 2017). Trump revolutionized the way we think about earned media. Trump proved that, in



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the 2016 campaign, the fastest, easiest way for a candidate to earn media was to send 140-­character messages to Twitter followers. He did this on a near-constant basis, ­especially at hours of the day when he knew they could capture maximum attention. “I have over 100 million followers between Facebook, Twitter [and] Instagram,” Trump told the Financial Times in an April 2017 interview. “Over 100 million. I don’t have to go to the fake media.” O’Keefe argues that what made Trump’s earned media strategy so effective is the sheer size of his audience and by going above the heads of the regular media. Trump’s media strategy may have been more brusque than his predecessors and Clinton, but Trump is not much different than what many previous successful candidates understood: if you can understand and make use of the most popular medium of the moment, you will reach the American public and easily catch the attention of the press.

9 Creating a Winning Campaign Strategy David Winston

Just like business, the media, health care, communications and other elements of society, political campaigns are experiencing the disruptive impact of transformative innovation. The 2016 presidential campaign is clear proof. While social media was a factor in previous campaigns, 2016 saw social media used to completely change political discourse, something that had been primarily the purview of television ads. As a result, the concept of audience reach was significantly altered, leaving many campaigns with outdated models that drained their resources and left them ineffective. When it comes to both strategic and tactical decision-making in campaigns, the level of disruption has been massive. We’ve seen an explosion of information sources that has created very “siloed” viewers and voters. Some have sizable audiences like Fox News, Huffington Post, NBC, and the Drudge Report. Others have very narrow audiences, such as individual blogs or very issue-specific sites. This has disrupted traditional political news reporting and media delivery models with physical newspapers and magazines increasingly obsolete. The hundreds if not thousands of information sources available to voters have also diminished the impact of individual news outlets. To compete, traditional political media has been forced to operate in a lightning-speed environment, changing how and when news is covered and delivered while also dramatically changing their business models. Journalists are struggling to define the state of reporting news in this 188



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complex environment. But, oddly, one of the outcomes of this social media revolution is a country that trusts the media less, viewing the media’s hardball competition for “eyeballs and clicks” as not conducive to solid news reporting. Much of this disruption, certainly in political terms, began with the founding of Facebook in 2004 and Twitter in 2006. Perhaps the “canary in the coal mine” for what was to come politically from social media was the number of friends then candidate Obama had recruited on Facebook by early 2007. Those numbers should have alerted politicos of the potential power of social media and Barack Obama. Clearly people, especially those disenchanted with the news media and young voters, were turning to more personal interactions for information and political involvement. This led to new ways of consuming news, as people relied on friends as much as organized media operations for their political information. The disruption was exponentially driven by the introduction of the iPhone. In 2007, Steve Jobs introduced it by saying, “Today Apple is going to reinvent the phone.” It went much further than that. Jobs created a new communications infrastructure where people could define their own news sources and be in constant contact with friends through social media, far beyond simply making phone calls. Finally, they had access literally to any piece of information they wanted or needed. Today, we see people on the streets, in restaurants and in the office paying as much attention to their handheld screens as to their environs. For the first time, and this is an important sociological outcome, people controlled the content they wanted to consume and when they wanted to consume it. But, while individuals became more informationally autonomous at one level, they became more transparent at another. The emergence of social media gave way to the development of “big data.” Smarter data suddenly gave us a much more in-depth understanding of the electorate by fusing conventional political behavior with deep-dive demographics and consumer behavior. With websites and social media able to deliver very specific content to very specific audiences, voter outreach and communications were changed forever. It was the end of mass communications strategy as we knew it. Disruption was also the last nail in the coffin of one of politics’ set-in-stone assumptions: money matters more than message or policy. In 2012, Obama and Romney spent roughly the same amount of money—$1.2 billion each. In 2008, McCain lost to Obama after spending roughly half—$383 million to $778 million. In 2016, Trump, like

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McCain, spent half of what Clinton did but with a decidedly different outcome. What changed? Obviously, the political environment was different and so were the candidates but the explosion of social media, the upheaval in the media culture, and the increased sophistication of big data allowed Trump to circumvent traditional voter contact routes— paid advertising, traditional media coverage, and GOTV efforts—and reach voters far more directly and effectively and far less expensively. Disruptive innovation doesn’t mean you can win without money but social media, a churning news environment, and smarter data have changed the role of money in campaign strategies. Money still matters but it matters less. So how does one construct a good political campaign strategy in the face of so many shifting dynamics that have been overwhelming status quo politics on a huge scale? The biggest challenge in the face of innovation is understanding when change is merely allowing things to be done faster or more effectively, versus providing a completely different perspective on how things can be done. But first it is important to define the concept of a strategy. A lot has been written and said about this sometimes confusing but central component of a winning campaign, whether it is designed for the beaches of Normandy or for a congressional district in Long Beach. A favorite maxim of mine about strategy was written by Sun Tzu, the fifth-century author of the Art of War. He said, “Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” Two thousand years later, when it comes to strategy, not much has changed. However a more comprehensive definition of it comes from John Boyd, one of the great modern military strategists. He defines it as: A mental tapestry of changing intentions for harmonizing and focusing our efforts as a basis for realizing some aim or purpose in an unfolding and often unforeseen world of many bewildering events and many contending interests.

While there are as many definitions of strategy as there are strategists, given the previous two here is my take: Strategy is achieving a desired outcome using a knowledgeable approach based on understanding existing and potential environmental elements and your opponent’s potential strategies.



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The key phrase is “knowledgeable approach,” defined by Boyd as the “mental tapestry.” This chapter focuses on the foundation of a winning campaign: strategy. Crafting a successful strategy takes good instincts, an understanding of politics, historical context, and detailed quantifiable and qualitative research. Driving the process are five key steps that the campaign manager must undertake with support from the candidate, the campaign’s consultants, and other key players: • • • • •

Define a desired outcome. Develop situational awareness. Identify your opponent’s potential strategies. Define a winning coalition. Create a strategic communications plan.

After taking these steps, this same group must agree on the final strategy and get behind it to achieve success. But, as defined earlier, given the disruptive innovations, the “knowledgeable approach” must be continuously updated, and that is not a simple task.

“Think New” Before leaping into the process of putting together a winning strategy, every campaign manager must avoid the natural tendency to think as they have always thought. Remember the early critics who underestimated the 2016 Trump campaign’s decision to change the dynamics of the presidential race by expanding the pool of participants in the Rust Belt among those making less than $50,000, union members, and those with less than a college degree by focusing on economic angst and the desire for change. That was a strategic decision that took some new thinking. History backs up this idea. In the 1930s, the French General Staff hoped to discourage a German invasion by building the Maginot Line. The French embraced a “static defense” that was based on what they had learned in World War I. The Germans, focusing on the future, outthought them by developing a strategic doctrine based on mobility, which completely overwhelmed the French strategy. Now, fast-forward to the 2016 election. While the Clinton campaign was running a strategy that included defining some accomplishments of

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the Obama administration, Trump understood that the political and economic environment had changed dramatically over the past four years and crafted a strategy that would leave the Democrats being seen as the party of the status quo, while Trump became the candidate of change in an environment that wanted change. In both examples, the losers clung to the past while the successful strategists beat their opponents by “thinking new.”

Break the Rules One of the ways to think new is to break the rules. Here’s what I mean. See if you can solve the following puzzle, but be warned. Solving it takes some new thinking. The task is to connect the nine dots with three lines, but do it without lifting your pen or pencil from the paper.

Here’s the answer.

This is tritely but accurately called the “outside the box” solution. Most people fail to find the answer because they instinctively view the nine dots as a box and internally create a rule that says, “stay in the box.” An important structural element is at work here. To solve the puzzle, you have to consciously decide to break rules and do things differently. Breaking rules is one of the critical elements of being creative. For example, when going back to when Steve Jobs conjured up the iPhone, the design process got off to a rocky start. Jobs tossed the first



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design because the case clashed with the display, the element of the iPhone that was paramount in Job’s eyes. It meant delay of the launch and redesign of much of the phone’s interior hardware, but Jobs insisted that the look meet his design standard, and in doing so he also set a new creative standard. He broke the rules. Competitors scoffed at the $500 price tag. Steve Ballmer, president of Microsoft, told CNBC that the phone “doesn’t appeal to business customers because it doesn’t have a keyboard.” Ballmer was fighting the last battle in the cell phone wars, thinking like the French General Staff. Some 1.2 billion iPhones later, Apple has become one of the world’s richest companies.

Change Perspective Another way to think new is by changing your perspective. Here’s another puzzle to try. Remove three sticks and leave four.

If you look at this puzzle as a group of objects, you won’t solve it, but if you can transition your thought process to view it as a graphic, you can find the answer. Here it is.

Thinking new is often the crucial component in winning strategies. While the 2010 congressional election may seem dated by now, it is a classic example of a successful strategy that required different thinking. While pundits declared the Republican Party dead after the 2008 election

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and some even predicted a 40-year Democratic majority, Speaker John Boehner and House Republicans worked through the lessons of the 2006 and 2008 elections, changed their perspective, and thought new. By 2006, the Republicans’ 12-year House majority coalition had fallen apart. The GOP lost a number of key constituencies—married women with children, middle-income voters, independents, and Catholics. The impact of these demographic losses in important states was obvious. For example, Republicans lost Catholics by 11 points nationally. The results in 2006 should have set off alarm bells for 2008. Instead, the McCain people decided to run a tactical, base campaign. The strategy was to get out the base in large numbers everywhere, appeal to certain targeted constituencies in key electoral states, like Catholics in Ohio and Pennsylvania, and cobble together an Electoral College victory much as Bush had done in 2004. The campaign failed to understand that voters in what I call the Big Middle had abandoned the GOP in 2006 and nothing had happened in the interim to bring them back. A nationalized campaign to reach and attract those voters was their only hope of victory. The McCain campaign should have changed perspective, looked beyond the base, and found a strategy to rebuild the Republican coalition. For the 2010 congressional election, President Obama, like McCain in 2008, devised a strategy based on the past. His strategy was to simply increase the Democratic base turnout of the 2006 congressional election. The result was that base Democratic voter groups had a higher level of participation in 2010 than in the 2006 election, when Democrats won by eight points, nationally according to exit polls, and took both the House and the Senate. Liberal Democrats, women, African-Americans, and urban voters increased their participation in 2010, while younger voters and Hispanics matched their 2006 level of turnout. But on election night, despite a better base turnout than in 2006, Democrats lost to Republicans by a seven-point margin. How could a slightly better turnout composition for Democrats end up generating such a dramatically different outcome? The president had assumed that the Democratic coalition of 2006 was still intact and supportive. But he failed to understand the level of dissatisfaction with his policy priorities and the lack of economic progress during his first two years. In contrast to President Obama’s base strategy, John Boehner’s strategy was to try to build a majority coalition based on the idea of “winning the issues.” His belief was that in a center-right country, which polling



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data and exit polls have consistently shown, the center-right party should win if they focused on issues, specifically jobs and the economy in the current environment. President Obama blamed Republicans, and specifically George Bush, for the country’s economic problems, claiming they had put the e­ conomic “car” in the ditch and he had spent two years trying to get it out. He argued that now wasn’t the time to give the keys back to “the folks who got us in the ditch in the first place.” This partisan message appealed to the Democratic base but alienated independent voters, who saw the president as focused on health care when millions were out of work. John Boehner’s Republican narrative, derived from the “winning the issues” strategy, rested on one basic question—”Where are the jobs?”—­ reflecting the central question on voters’ minds. Republicans were generally successful in defining a new issue direction with the help of the Republican “Pledge to America,” which voters were broadly aware of even if they were not familiar with the specifics. Boehner’s emphasis on voters’ top issue— jobs—was also in direct contrast to President Obama’s agenda of the previous two years, which focused on issues designed to satisfy his political base (e.g., health care, green energy, and even the stimulus package). As a result, the closing arguments of these two strategies resulted in a decisive outcome favoring Republicans as they made significant progress with a number of important swing voter groups. But the key was their extraordinary success with the political center-independents. In 1994 Republicans gained the majority, winning independents by a 14-point margin. In 2006 Democrats gained the majority, winning independents by 18 points. In the 2010 election, Republicans won independents by 19 points. Embracing the “winning the issues” strategy wasn’t an easy sell to the House GOP conference. It forced both the leadership and members to think differently and change perspective, but on election night 2010 Republicans were back in the majority and tasked with governing based on issues, after having been declared dead just two years earlier. When developing strategy, too many campaigns today fight the last election. Don’t be afraid to change perspective as you develop your plan.

Step 1: Define a Desired Outcome Now that you have your head in the right place and are ready to think new and act differently, the first step on the journey to a winning strategy is settling on a desired outcome: your goal. In the business world, it could

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be increasing sales by 10%. In college, it might be getting a 4.0 grade point average. In political races, it usually means winning the election with a 50%-plus-one margin. Political outcomes are a little easier to determine than most. Your goal could be a number higher than 50%, but in most political contests the desired outcome is no more complicated than setting a winning percentage. Seeking a mandate to govern rather than simply winning an election is one exception to the norm. David Cameron, former Conservative Party prime minster in the United Kingdom, said that the purpose of a political party is not to win elections but to prove it is ready to govern. To govern successfully often requires a mandate. But whatever the strategy—in politics, business, the nonprofit sector, or even war—the first step to defining a successful outcome is to ask the right questions in order to define your goal clearly and develop a strategic plan to achieve it. In politics, the goal may seem obvious but sometimes we ask the wrong questions, sometimes literally. Going back to 2010, Barack Obama asked the wrong question: What do I need to do to increase turnout in the same Democratic coalition that won in 2006? Passing health care and blaming Republicans wasn’t the answer voters wanted in 2010. Boehner and House Republicans asked the right question—Where are the jobs?—and supported their argument with the “Pledge” that outlined how they would govern. Obama focused on turnout while Republicans focused on winning the issues. Another example of asking the right question occurred in 1994, when Newt Gingrich decided to ask why the GOP should continue to run campaigns based on the notion that “all politics is local.” After all, it was Democratic Speaker Tip O’Neill who coined the phrase. Gingrich answered his question by deciding to nationalize the 1994 congressional elections. He violated all kinds of Republican doctrine based on the belief that candidates win locally, one race at a time. He picked up over 50 seats in one election. In 2006 DCCC Chair Rahm Emanuel looked at the playing field and said, in essence, “If there are only thirty competitive seats, we can’t win.” Democrats won that election because Emanuel asked the right question: “How can we turn forty more seats into competitive contests?” ­Emanuel tasked Mark Gersh, a Democratic redistricting and election data expert, with expanding the electoral playing field. Ultimately, expanding the number of potential seats, coupled with a favorable political environment,



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allowed Democrats to win back Congress. Other factors were important— fundraising and candidate recruitment—but Emanuel changed the dynamics of the election cycle when he asked the key question.

Step 2: Develop Situational Awareness For most nonpresidential races, the bottom line is pretty simple: get the strategy right by developing a winning coalition. This takes us back to the second part of my definition of strategy: using a knowledgeable approach based on an understanding of the existing and potential environmental elements. To do that, campaigns must engage in something called “situational awareness.” The US Navy defines this as “the degree of accuracy by which one’s perception of his current environment mirrors reality.” In politics, your ability to assess the environment will determine, in large part, whether your campaign succeeds or fails. To understand situational awareness, a campaign manager must begin with an analysis of the existing elements that impact the political environment. A word of warning before you begin: It’s important to understand that every manager embarks on a campaign with personal biases. That’s not necessarily good or bad. It’s just a fact. We all grow up in different places and in different families with different views and values, go to different schools, and have a variety of friends and influencers. The key is to recognize your biases and incorporate them in a way that expands your options but does not limit your decisions. For example, I was once a ­senior fellow for statistical analysis at the Heritage Foundation, so I view issues through the prism of conservative economics. That perspective would be in total sync with most Republican candidates I might work for. But if I were a campaign manager for a Republican running on the Upper West Side of Manhattan, I would have to factor that bias out of my ­decision-making because most people in that area probably wouldn’t agree with me. It’s important to remember that the campaign manager is not the candidate. The manager’s job is to help get the candidate elected. So, let’s take on situation awareness. Assessing the Existing Elements Party Registration and Identification. First and foremost, you must know the party registration and identification numbers for your race by heart.

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This is an absolute necessity. The numbers tell you the critical composition of your voter pool—how many Republicans, Democrats, and ­independents—and where to find them. Without understanding these basic numbers at the core of your strategy, you are flying blind. The wider the gap in party registration numbers, the less chance a party has to compete. There can be rare exceptions. Maryland and Massachusetts are good examples of states in which Democratic Party registration can overwhelm even good Republican candidates statewide. However, the 2014 gubernatorial wins in Maryland for Republican Larry Hogan and in Massachusetts for Republican Charlie Baker are good examples of exceptions. On the Democratic side, Heitkamp’s 2012 Senate win in North Dakota is also a good example. Every election sees a few unexpected wins and losses in races heavily favoring one party or the other, but in races with a narrow registration gap party registration or identification numbers become extraordinarily important. Previous Political Behavior. Both parties focus on reaching and turning out their base, as they should. But nationally, and in most states, neither party has a sufficient electoral majority to win without looking at the Big Middle. One way to do that is to analyze previous political behavior. Voters’ past political behavior provides a gold mine of information to help develop strategic targeting. This data can answer questions like: What was the historical turnout in past elections? How has that turnout differed in presidential and non–presidential election years, and how has one party benefitted from these patterns? What kinds of candidates have generally won in this area? Is this a ticket splitting area? Answering this last question is particularly important because certain areas in the country have a history of ticket splitting. Ticket splitters, who may be registered Republicans, Democrats, or independents, vote for candidates in both parties. They make up the Big Middle and should never be taken for granted. The 2016 election clearly made this point in the Rust Belt, as Trump won Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and ­Wisconsin, something a Republican candidate for president had not done since Reagan crushed Mondale in 1984, winning 49 out of 50 states. When looking at past political behavior, remember that any targeting strategy should reflect ticket splitters. Years of election data and exit poll



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results have shown that most Republicans get at least 10% of the Democratic vote and most Democrats get at least 10% of the Republican vote. When you include independents, ticket splitters at the national level are somewhere in the neighborhood of 25 to 30% of the electorate. Precinct data can show where these swing voters are found. But that’s only half the analysis. The next step is to discover who the voters in your election are and what they care about. Demographics. A demographic analysis of an election district provides “up close and personal” information on voters by such factors as race (e.g., African-­American, white, Asian, Hispanics), income level, sex, age, and religion. The importance of demographics varies according to the nature of the election district, the candidates, and current key issues. In some Florida districts, for example, age is a significant demographic. In urban districts and, more recently, in southwestern and western areas, race is also a key demographic. The demographic makeup is critical because these groups tend to share common experiences, values, and issue positions. For example, Hispanics are concerned about education, jobs, and immigration policy. Women may be concerned with security, the economy, education, and health care. Analyzing demographics helps you identify issues that concern target voter groups and connect your candidate with these key voters. There are two main sources for demographic information. The Census Bureau can give you information on everything from the number of women 55 and older in your area to the number of low-income voters. It can provide data on race, age, sex, income, and union participation, to name a few variables. It does not have information on religious affiliation. The other key source for demographic information is your state’s voter files, as well as files made available by the two parties at both the national and state level. The latter is particularly important as the parties enhance their voter files with critical demographic and behavioral data. I will get into “big data” later in the chapter. Issues Currently in Play. Recently, both on-year (presidential elections) and off-year (nonpresidential) contests have been overwhelmingly about one issue: the economy. While that maybe be obvious to most of the electorate, it has eluded some. For example, the 2008 McCain campaign argued that the contest was about experience rather than issues,

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when in fact voters wanted a president who understood their economic concerns and offered solutions to address them. The McCain campaign thought the election was about defining Obama. The Obama campaign thought it was about the economy. Is it any surprise, then, who won? The 2010 election was the mirror opposite. The economy still remained the top issue by far, but the president and congressional Democrats moved to the left and focused on Democratic base issues rather than focusing on the economy and jobs. By Election Day, when the president’s policies had failed to produce jobs, voters were disillusioned and unhappy, and Republicans won the House. That year, any political leader not discussing the economy and jobs was simply on the wrong topic and seemed out of touch with the concerns of the American voter. Among those who voted in 2010, according to the exit polls, 63% said the economy was the most important issue facing the country. This is not to say that other issues were not important, but rather that the concern for economy and jobs was overwhelming. The Republican narrative that asked “Where are the jobs?” addressed that concern. Meanwhile, President Obama and Democrats fixated on their base by attacking Republicans and passing one partisan bill after another that failed to change the economic landscape for the better. That left independents open to hearing economic arguments from Republicans. Economic issues won the day in 2010. The 2012 presidential election again produced a disconnect with the electorate, this time by the Mitt Romney campaign. According to the exit polls, 59% of the electorate thought the economy was the most important issue and 77% thought the economy was either “not so good” or “poor.” However, the Romney campaign believed that the 2012 election would be a referendum on President Obama and mainly focused on attacking him, rather than defining economic solutions for the country. The decisive result came among those who defined the economy as “not so good,” which comprised 45% of the electorate. They went decisively for President Obama by a 55–42 margin. Romney should have won this group and perhaps the biggest lack of understanding of the electorate occurred at the 2012 Republican convention, when the Romney campaign posed the question “Are you better off than you were four years ago?” While the country was not happy about the current state of the economy, it wasn’t as bad as the fall of 2008, when the country was losing hundreds



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of thousands of jobs a month. Romney misjudged the economic environment and asked the wrong question. Now we come to 2016 and the two presidential candidates’ very different views of the state of the nation’s economy—the economic “situational awareness.” In the exit polls, 52% of the electorate said this was the top issue and 62% thought the economy was either “not so good” or “poor.” To Hillary Clinton, the economy still needed work but was headed in the right direction; this was not the time to change course. To Donald Trump, the economy was a mess and needed a wholesale change of direction. Voters agreed with Trump. In her primary battle with Bernie Sanders and the general election against Trump, Hillary Clinton supported much of the Obama administration’s economic record which was hardly surprising. Her campaign was dependent on the president’s base. But the larger electorate, hardly enthusiastic about the Obama economic record, saw her as part of the status quo, not the change agent they wanted. In this election, the 41% of the electorate who thought the economy was “not so good” went for Donald Trump by a margin of 53–40, similar to Obama’s 2012 margin. In the key states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, the shift from 2012 to 2016 among these voters was even larger and proved decisive. For example, in Michigan in 2012, President Obama won these voters by an 18-point margin, while in 2016 President Trump won them by a 26-point margin. By misreading the situational awareness of the 2016 political environment, Clinton ceded the economic argument to Trump and with it the election. So this gets to what would seem to be an obvious conclusion, but one that eludes many campaigns—to develop a winning strategy, campaigns and candidates must address the issues people care about or risk irrelevancy. A party or campaign that is overly focused on its base, especially in races other than presidential elections, often only emphasizes issues that don’t reflect what the majority of voters worry about on a day-to-day basis. That doesn’t mean base issues aren’t important, but to put together a majority coalition requires a broader issue matrix that matters to both the base and the Big Middle. This is where survey research can provide crucial issue information by political areas, by demographic categories, and by geography to help you reach your winning coalition of targeted voters. Strengths and Weaknesses: Your Candidate and Your Opponent. Every candidate has strengths and weaknesses that must be identified and

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agreed upon before a campaign strategy is crafted. This takes both courage by campaign managers and, oftentimes, an uncomfortable conversation or two. In effect, a campaign manager must undertake opposition research on both their own candidate and the opponent. Family, friends, colleagues, and external players can all be helpful in putting together a realistic picture of a candidate’s strengths and weaknesses. The voting record or background of an opponent is fair game along with previous statements and an assessment of an opponent’s ability as a candidate. Look at the 2016 presidential race. An honest assessment of Hillary Clinton would have found her in-depth understanding of issues and ability to debate them a strength but her message delivery and lack of empathy were weaknesses. Her long resume was a strength but the potential controversies in her background from her emails to the Clinton Foundation fundraising should have been considered as the campaign crafted its strategy. A similar critique of candidate Trump would have shown his business experience as a strength but also a potential weakness when considering his lack of government experience or issues like taxes and conflict of interest. His blunt rhetoric was clearly a plus with a sizable part of the electorate but a realistic assessment would have also pointed to the risks of alienating other voters. Putting together a candid assessment of the candidate’s and the opponent’s strengths and weaknesses is the final but critical last step in understanding the existing political environment and its likely impact on the campaign. If you don’t know that, you don’t know how to win. Assessing the Potential Elements Once you have analyzed the existing elements impacting the political environment, it is time to assess the potential elements that may affect the political environment. This critical exercise in making ­k nowledge-based assumptions begins by asking the right questions. Start with these.

What Are Future Issues Likely to Be?. In assessing the current political environment, survey research provides the most reliable and current analysis of voter concerns. While more macro issues like the economy and health care are likely to remain top voter concerns, the specific issue mix can change over time. For example, while the economy is still seen as the top issue in 2017, voters are becoming increasingly worried about the subset concern of “cost of living.”



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But as you write your campaign strategy, you should limit yourself to two or three major issues. Focus matters, and if there are too many issues being defined then voters can easily come to the conclusion that the candidate cannot define priorities, and without them won’t address their concerns effectively. It’s also important to make assumptions about whether the specifics of the current issue mix are likely to stay the same or change and to explain why. As with current issues, survey research can give you some sense of where the electorate could move. All of us have gut feelings about major issues. We can also get a sense from news coverage and listening to the opposition about potential issues. Early in the campaign cycle, it’s wise to think about other potential issues, have a “plan B” in the desk drawer, and be ready to pivot if a new issue arises. What in the Environment Is Likely to Change or Is an Unknown, and What Will Remain the Same?. Crystal balls don’t work, but we can make some educated assumptions about the political environment. For example, in the spring of 2010, assuming that the unemployment rate would remain a significant factor in the fall election was a pretty good bet. In 2016, the high negatives of both presidential candidates were extraordinary. So, one of the big unknowns was how the 20% of the electorate who disliked both would vote, a question that added volatility to the campaign and to the polling ­covering it. In the same race, the African-American turnout and the youth vote were also unknowns. Both groups had been important to Obama’s victories. How they might behave given a Clinton candidacy was not as clear, nor was the long-term impact of the Sanders primary battle. On the Republican side, there were plenty of questions about whether the GOP’s similarly hard-fought primary contest would have a negative effect on Trump’s general election chances. Another question focused on whether Trump’s economic populist message would connect with enough m ­ iddle-class and working-class voters to put states in play that lean Democrat in presidential contests, especially Rust Belt states. And overall, for both parties, would their communications strategies include new technologies from big data to social media and how effective would they be in using these conduits to reach voters? What Weaknesses and Strengths in Both Candidates Are Likely to Be Important?. By this point, you have put together what is likely to be a long list of strengths and weaknesses for your candidate and your opponent. The manager must pare down the list to the strengths and weaknesses that are likely to matter in the election.

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The 1992 election, while long past, is still an excellent example. Bill Clinton’s admission that he smoked marijuana was a weakness. So was his inexperience, but only the inexperience became a serious issue. The strength of his opponent, President George H.W. Bush, was his foreign policy experience, but it gained him little in the election because voters were focused on the economy. Your campaign must hone in on the two or three strengths and weaknesses of each candidate that will be most important to voters, given the political context of the election. This is crucial to a winning strategy. What Is the Impact of the National Brands of Both Parties and Other Political Races?. A bad national party brand or a tsunami of a campaign like Barack Obama’s 2008 effort can have a major impact on other campaigns. In 1980, Jimmy Carter’s disastrous economic record gave Ronald Reagan a huge win, and that wave helped Republicans win the Senate and pick up 34 seats in the House. In 1994, Democratic congressional scandals and Bill Clinton’s policy mistakes in his first year as president combined to form the perfect political storm, and Republicans gained control of the House for the first time in 40 years. The negative national Democratic brand simply overwhelmed many of their candidates that year. In 2006, it was the Republicans’ turn. Hurricane Katrina, the faltering war in Iraq, cost of living issues, and Republicans’ inability to develop a legislative focus downgraded the GOP brand to a point where Democrats were able to regain both the House and the Senate. Winning in a difficult environment is possible, but a realistic assessment of the impact of these outside factors must be part of the situational awareness process. Today, both parties are suffering from negative images particularly with independent voters. In 2016, many down-ballot candidates had to struggle with the fact that their party and their presidential nominee were both viewed unfavorably by a majority of the country. Democratic and Republican candidates had to develop strategies that reflected this reality. This party brand deficit isn’t likely to disappear soon.

Step 3: Identify Your Opponent’s Potential Strategies Campaigns are often compared to the game of chess, and it’s not a bad analogy. Like campaigns, chess is a game of strategic options—yours and your opponent’s. You don’t make your moves in a vacuum; nor does your



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opponent. How well you understand your opponent and the potential strategies he or she can employ will determine the outcome of the match. Like chess, winning campaigns consider the various strategic options available to their opponent before settling on their own campaign strategy—before making their first move. The best way to begin is by making a list of those strategic options along with their pluses and minuses. Be realistic in assessing the likely effectiveness and impact of each strategy that might be employed. Learn everything you can about the opponent’s past campaign behavior to give you important clues as to his or her likely strategic choices. Campaigns have a habit of talking to the media about their plans, so put a researcher to work digging up process stories that can give you an idea of the direction the opposing campaign will likely head. Then put yourself in his or her shoes. Think like your opponent. Trying to determine what your opponent is likely to do is a critical element in developing your own campaign strategy. This exercise works at every level of campaigning, from city council to the presidency. In the 2012 presidential election, both the Republican and Democratic campaigns had a number of strategic options available to them. President Obama could have chosen a positive approach, running on his record and arguing that he needed a second term to finish the job of repairing the economy. He could have made this a referendum on past Republican policies, claiming that voting for Romney was a vote for the policies that got us here in the first place. He could have chosen a base strategy focused on class warfare and personal attacks, or he could have stayed the course with hope and change. Or he could choose a mix of strategies based on what he thought the Romney campaign might do. Governor Romney could have chosen a base-oriented strategy, making this election a referendum on Obama’s record, or he could have opted for a more positive, “choice” strategy focusing on his ideas for the future and reaching out to the Big Middle. Or he could have defined his version of a choice between the two candidates and emphasize economic policy differences. These and other strategic options were available. In the early stages of both campaigns, the two teams should have put themselves in the other’s shoes and made an educated assumption on which strategy the other side would likely use, and what their best response should be for the best payoff. Here’s what happened. At the beginning of the campaign, Governor Romney and his strategists opted to make this a referendum on President Obama’s record. In contrast, the Obama campaign made the election a choice between the two candidates and their plans for the future. President

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Obama had the more effective strategy, as shown by a New Models postelection survey done by the Winston Group, in which voters said they ultimately saw the election as a choice rather than a referendum, by 77% to 22%. President Obama defined Romney in terms that would create a favorable contrast for himself, particularly on economic policies. Given the poor state of the economy, it should have been an uphill climb, but in the end he effectively defined the choice as either moving forward with the economic policies of the present (Obama’s) or going back to the failed economic policies of the past (Romney’s and Bush’s). Because Governor Romney focused on Obama’s negative record at the expense of defining himself, the Romney campaign never successfully engaged in the kind of economic debate that would have given voters a clear understanding of his economic vision for the country, why it would work, and how it differed from those of both Obama and Bush. Because the Romney campaign’s strategy failed to make a persuasive economic argument, President Obama was able to neutralize the biggest threat to his reelection and voters’ top issue—the economy—and go on to win. Before writing your campaign strategy, you need to know what you’re up against, and that includes the opponent’s strategy. As Frederick the Great once wrote, “It is pardonable to be defeated, but never to be surprised.”

Step 4: Defining a Winning Coalition Once you have a comprehensive picture of the political environment, including your opponent’s likely strategy, it’s time to move to the next step: defining a winning coalition. Start by precisely defining your coalition. This means more than simply coming up with vote totals. A precise definition requires knowing how many voters it will take to win, but you must also know who those voters are and where they are found. How many married women with children? How many Hispanics? How many younger voters? You must put both percentages and hard numbers behind the target groups. Next, determine which groups are reliably in your column and how you will hold them. Past political behavior and survey research are critical here. For Republicans, conservatives fall into this category, which remains a larger group than self-identified liberals, according to the 2016 exit polls. Evangelical Christians also remain reliably Republican. For Democrats, liberals and African-Americans make up their most reliable voters.



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Next, determine which groups are key swing groups and how to attract them. If you don’t know who these groups are, find out. Survey research can tell you which groups offer your campaign the best opportunity and which will be the biggest challenge. It can also tell you what issues are of greatest concern to these voters and what messages will have the most resonance. Appealing to your base and attracting swing voters are not mutually exclusive. But that is one of the most difficult challenges campaigns face especially today in trying to reach a winning coalition. As you put together your coalition of voter groups, target numbers, and percentages, keep in mind that voter groups are not static elements. For example, in 2006 Republicans lost the women’s vote by 12 points. In 2008, Obama won them by 13 points. Two years later, President Obama’s majority coalition had fallen apart and Republicans won women outright by one point, something they had not done during their previous congressional majority. Democrats had counted on women as a key voter group in their winning coalition, and they never expected Republicans to make the kind of inroads with women voters that we saw in 2010. It was a miscalculation that cost them the House. In 2016, the Clinton campaign made a similar mistake by assuming the first woman presidential nominee would easily win the women’s vote. While she carried women overall 54–41% over Trump, she lost the white women’s vote 43–52%, a key factor in her loss. Finally, predict what your opponent’s coalition will look like, and identify the friction points between the two campaigns. The single most important factor that will impact your strategy is your opponents’ strategy. So, figuring out how they might win and how you think you can win will give you the overlay—the playing field where the contest will take place. You must put your plan to build a winning coalition on paper. Your chart or spreadsheet should list the target groups, numerical and percentage vote goals, and the issues and messages that will bring those voters into the fold. For a Republican congressional race, an abbreviated hypothetical coalition might look something like Table 9.1. For Democrats, those boxes might include registered Democrats, ­African-Americans, single women, union workers, or a host of other possible targets. Geography (i.e., selected counties or precincts) can be a target group if a particular area behaves in a unique fashion. But remember that other demographics may have more impact on voters’ political behavior than where they live. For example, 18-to-29-year-olds in Tampa probably

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Table 9.1  Hypothetical Republican Congressional Coalition

Target Group Registered Republicans Independents Women 55+ $50–75K Income

Goal 92% 52% 50% 55%

Issue/Message Economy/national security Economy Health care Economy

Vote Total 121,400 58,240 44,000 48,400

have more in common with 18-to-29-year-olds at Ohio State than with the 70-year-old couple across the street. Given the current communications environment, in which political discourse has become nationalized thanks to cable and social media, geography is becoming a lesser factor in targeting. When putting together a coalition, remember that there will be overlap. Many voters will be found in more than one group. Don’t overcount. The Weakness of a Base Strategy Thanks to redistricting, a significant number of congressional districts— both Republican and Democratic—are relatively safe seats. In those races in which the base is large enough to provide the numbers needed to win, a base strategy may work. But for many races—local, congressional, statewide, and presidential—neither party’s base today is large enough to win outright. The voters who will push a campaign into the win column will be found in the middle. Don’t make the mistake of assuming that the base alone can win the race. “Big Data” While defining a winning coalition may seem overwhelming, know that you have a great new innovative tool to help you find the right equation— big data. This new way to access, view, and use political information has dramatically changed how campaigns can strategically plan and how they can target voters and deliver content tactically. Both Republican and Democratic data firms have fused election, demographic, and voter file data with other predictive data such as consumer behavior to deliver smarter, more “consumable” political information. These big data firms have developed a variety of data models that will help give you a better strategic understanding of your electorate and nothing is more important than knowing who your voters are and what drives their vote. Both parties have had access to voter files for decades, but now big data gives



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us the ability to go beyond simple voter information and be far more precise and predictive about voter behavior. There are two basic models that apply to all campaigns and form the basic foundation of data modeling. The first is a “likelihood to vote model.” By using a person’s prior voting history from the voter file (just whether they voted or not) and combining it with other demographic variables like age or education, a rating is assigned as to how likely a person is to vote. Usually, this runs on a scale from 0 (not at all likely) to 1 (absolutely will vote). This allows you to develop a variety of scenarios based on differing turnout assumptions, and then identify the specific individuals who will likely turn out for each scenario. Assumptions can be based on a number of factors from whether it’s a presidential year or not to whether there is a competitive race at the top of the ticket. Identifying and incorporating those assumptions into your modeling is a crucial first step in developing likely scenarios. Once your various vote/voter scenarios are completed, the next step is to run each scenario of voters against a second model based on the “likelihood of generically voting for a party’s candidate.” Again, this scale usually runs from 0 (not at all likely to vote for a party’s candidate) to 1 (absolutely will vote for the party’s candidate) and reflects a broader group of defining characteristics that could range from a voter’s party registration (if available), age, gender, race, education, and income to census and election data based on a voter’s geographic location. So, from a Republican perspective, a 0 rating would mean a voter is not at all likely to vote for the Republican candidate, while a 1 rating would mean a person is absolutely voting for the Republican candidate—looking through the generic lens. This two-step modeling process lets campaigns test various scenarios, identify actual “getable” voters for each scenario, and choose the most effective strategy to put together a winning coalition that is supported by real, usable data. Once scenario assessments are completed, you can get very specific in what types of voters are needed. Are they very likely to vote for your candidate or are they going to require significant persuasion? Are significant persuasion voters younger or older? What is the likely income? What is the likely education? This gives you a very specific understanding of what needs to be achieved, which is a significant step forward in building a strategy. One last point about some of the models and modeling in general. In some cases, firms develop more complex modeling, for example ­issue-specific models. Generally, these are based on interview information that is extrapolated from a sample of a larger population. These

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i­ ssue-specific models are getting better but require a significant sample to ensure accuracy. The interaction between issue models can also provide another level of useful analysis. Another example of modeling might be real-time information on where the campaign stands given the data being collected from voters. Having said all this, it is also very important to understand that all of these are models—and all models can be improved (and some as they currently stand may need a lot of work). Be discerning in your choice of big data models.

Step 5: Create a Strategic Communications Plan Strategy versus Tactics Once the campaign has identified the groups that make up a winning coalition, the next step is to develop an effective message. But don’t mistake tactics for strategy. Strategy includes elements like defining the political environment, understanding the opponent’s strategy, and developing messages to reach your audience. Tactics are methods for delivering the message and reaching voters, like direct mail, phone banks, social networks, mobile ­messaging, scheduling, advertising, and the internet. Strategy is like an ­architectural plan that reflects the wants and needs of the buyer and the environment in which the house will be built. Tactics are the tools to build the house. Strategy creates context for tactical decisions. Don’t buy an ad because you think you should buy an ad. Do it for a reason. Survey Research: Reaching Voters with an Effective Message During your situational awareness phase, survey research can be a major source of crucial information about voter concerns. You may also be able to gather information from public polls and other resources. But, as you put together strategic messaging, internal survey research is critical because it helps you listen to voters, learn what they’re thinking, develop policy positions to address their concerns, and then develop a message for the candidate so he or she can lead. All candidates have a series of issue positions. Surveys should not be used to decide a candidate’s position on issues but to assess the strength of a particular issue with a particular group. If one of your target groups is married women with children, survey research can identify their number one issue and the components of that issue. For example, it could be jobs or the cost of health care. It could be worries about how to pay for college, care for an aging parent, or deal with the national



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debt. Survey research can tell you which issues to emphasize with each of your target groups and gives you the ability to test the effectiveness of your candidate’s issue messages and those of your opponent. Strategic Communications David Ogilvy, a giant of modern advertising, said, “The results of your campaign depend less on how we write your advertising than on how your product is positioned.” Ultimately, it is a candidate’s positions—not money, not consultants, and not campaign managers—that will make or break a campaign. Does anyone think that Barack Obama would have won the Democratic nomination in 2008 if he had supported the war in Iraq? Would Donald Trump have won in 2016 if he had not embraced a nationalist, populist economic message? Positioning matters. When developing a strategy, it’s important to do an analysis comparing the strategic messaging for your campaign and your opponent’s. It’s called a communications matrix, and it’s an exercise to help you predict what the campaign narrative will look like in the months ahead. The matrix looks like this: Us (About our candidate)

Them (About our opponent)

Us (What we say) Them (What they say)

The upper left quadrant is what you are going to say about your ­candidate—what you are going to emphasize about his or her issue ­positions—in communications with the key groups identified in your winning coalition. The upper right quadrant reflects what you are going to say about the opponent. The lower left quadrant is what the opponent will say about your candidate, and the lower right is what the opponent will say about himself or herself.

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This tool gives you a starting point for a campaign discussion based on the issues you want to talk about. Once the communications matrix is completed, you take the potential messages from each quadrant and test them using survey research to determine who wins the battle of strategic messaging. If candidate A says, for example, “The economy is on the verge of catastrophe. We need another stimulus bill to get the country moving,” and candidate B says, “The country is facing tough economic times, but tax cuts for small business to create jobs is the answer, not spending billions for pet projects,” how do voters react? Strategic communications is the single most important element of your strategy because winning campaigns are all about delivering a well-constructed argument as to why voters should choose their candidate. Social Media—Disrupting Conventional Wisdom After the tumult of the 2016 presidential election, one of the most frequently asked questions has centered on the role of social media in determining the outcome. In the context of this chapter, a good question to ask is whether going forward, the use of social media in campaigns is a strategy or a tactic? It’s probably some of both. There’s little debate that the Trump–Clinton contest will go down in history as a campaign for the ages but perhaps a note of caution is in order in making too many assumptions. It’s too soon to truly assess the impact of the many factors at play during this presidential contest—from the Clinton emails to the Trump dossier to the historic negative views of both candidates—but one thing is certain: social media played a huge role. While it’s probably smart to let the dust settle a bit before taking away too many lessons from this highly unusual campaign, it’s clear that social media is likely to significantly impact how we run campaigns in the future and must be part of every communications strategy. The inexpensive reach of social media has the ability to change how we talk to voters, contact them with our messages, involve them in volunteer activities, and get them to the polls. This new communications dynamic is changing how we advertise as we see the multiplier effect of an ad going viral on Facebook or Twitter or picked up by news and partisan websites. Social media also lets campaigns target messages much more efficiently, which is increasingly important as online sources for both news and entertainment continue to expand. The days of ad buying solely on the networks or local TV are over.



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The cost and effectiveness of fundraising are also impacted by campaigns’ ability to maximize donor contacts through social media, mobile messaging, and email. GOTV efforts are dramatically changing as social media and email access make targeting much easier, less expensive, and more effective. Perhaps most important, when it comes to communications, the rise of social media and its impact on news gathering and delivery is reshaping political discourse in America—for good and bad. Both ­Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders to a degree understood the difference between “paying to get attention” as the Clinton campaign did or using content and the power of social media to drive messaging. If getting the attention of both the media and the public by delivering content through social media becomes the new normal, that will significantly change campaign communications strategy and the cost of campaigns going forward. As you develop your communications strategy, remember content is king when it comes to social media. Voter’s Memory Process Political strategic communications are impacted by what is called the voter’s memory process. Average people respond to three triggers that determine whether something is remembered or not. First are issues that interest voters. Recently, the issue of the economy has swamped all other issues, and voters remember what candidates have to say or not say when it comes to their economic plans for the country. The second type of memory trigger is what I call a sudden dramatic change. 9/11 is a good example of a searing memory that results from a highly emotional, vivid experience. Politically, we saw soccer moms suddenly become “security moms” as they watched people die in real time on television. Polls at the time showed the national security and defense issue, which had been at 4 or 5%, jump to 25%. The terrorist attack on a school in Beslan, Russia, just a few weeks before the 2004 election is another example of a dramatic moment that voters, especially women with children, remembered as they cast their vote for president that fall. More recently, the huge job losses of 2008 and 2009 had a dramatic impact on voters and vote behavior that continues today. The third memory trigger is, in reality, no trigger at all. The fact is that the vast majority of voters simply aren’t interested in politics. Too many

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politicians run ads based on what interests them rather than what connects with voters—which explains the failure of so much political advertising and messaging on both sides. People don’t remember what doesn’t interest them. For example, I am not interested in quilting. You could create the most compelling ad about quilting ever made and I wouldn’t remember the message. A lot of political messages are the advertising equivalent of a quilting ad. When the ads don’t work, campaigns sometimes make the mistake of simply cranking up the buy or pumping up the volume with a harsher tone. Too much of what passes for strategic campaign communications today is based on this methodology. Moreover, too many campaigns don’t understand why they’re not getting through to voters and as a result spend even more money to fund ineffective messages. If the challenge of every campaign is to develop a communications strategy and message that engages voters, then it must reflect the most important element of strategic communications—getting the issue mix right. Here is an example of a Republican strategic communications effort that worked because it addressed high gas prices, a key concern of voters in the summer of 2008. With the ban on offshore drilling scheduled to be lifted at the end of the fiscal year, the question facing the House was whether to extend the ban or let it expire. The Democrats’ liberal leadership had a record of inflexibility when it came to drilling and maintained its antidrilling views even with gas prices going through the roof. Democrats had the votes to extend the ban, but they didn’t count on a concerted strategic communications effort by House Republicans, who had long opposed the ban as a roadblock to energy independence, lower prices, and national security. Republican leaders argued for an “all of the above” energy policy that included drilling along with more funding for other energy sources like wind, solar, and biofuels. They drove home the point with assistance from vocal advocates for the policy like former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, and within weeks polling data showed that a large majority of Americans favored offshore drilling. The Democrats got the message. Despite their antidrilling views and the fact that they had the votes in Congress to extend the ban, they decided to quietly let the ban expire. They didn’t even take a vote. While 2008 wasn’t a good year for Republicans because of the “Obama effect” at the top of the ticket, exit polls showed that Republicans did win voters for whom energy was the top issue. The Republican victory on the energy issue didn’t result



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from an attack campaign against the Democratic leadership but from a strategic campaign to offer voters a positive policy alternative on an issue that interested them. If you’ve got the right issue, the right position, and the right message, it is possible to win even as the minority. That lesson was learned by House Republicans and became the impetus for their “winning the issues” strategy after the election. Means-End Theory of Communications: Laddering Engaging the voter is the name of the game in strategic communication. But how do you make a personal connection with a voter who may be interested in the campaign but more likely is not? One method is called laddering. It is a process of seeing issues in a way that connects your campaign and candidate with voters and their values through language. On paper it looks like this: Value

Personal Consequences

Issue Benefits

Issue Attributes

• Issue attributes are various policy components of the issue. • Issue benefits are the results of the policy—the outcome. • Personal consequences are the ways in which the outcome ­affects voters personally. • Values are the ways in which the consequences mesh with voters’ life goals. In practice, here’s how laddering works with a real issue: a 5% tax cut. To reach a more conservative voter, the language laddering might go like this: Issue: Issue benefit: Personal consequences: Value:

Favor a 5% tax cut. “You will have more money in your pocket.” “You can afford your child’s education.” “You are a good parent.”

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For a more liberal voter on the same issue, the laddering might go like this:

Issue: Oppose a 5% tax cut. Issue benefit:  “The government gets to keep more resources it needs in order to help people.” Personal consequences:  “More low-income elderly can get better health care.” Value: “You are a good citizen.” Both of these examples show how to approach issues in a way that goes far beyond a policy discussion to create a personal connection between an issue and a voter’s values—something that is important to him or her. Allocating Resources Reaching voters is not inexpensive. Whether it’s through TV ads, online display/video ads, social media, search engines, or earned media, to identify some of the options, making that personal connection to voters through shared values is likely going to be the most costly part of any campaign budget. As you do your targeting and put together a potentially winning coalition, put a dollar figure on the cost of reaching each target group. You must know not only who you are going to reach and what you are going to say to them, but how you’re going to reach them, how much it will cost, and whether you can raise the necessary funds. If not, go back to the drawing board. Managing Strategy Once a strategy is defined, too many campaigns assume that is how it’s all going to play out. Winston Churchill said of strategy, “However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.” The military has a useful doctrine, developed by John Boyd, that can help you manage your strategy. It’s called an OODA loop:

• • • •

Observe Orient Decide Act



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After you’ve begun to implement your strategy, the next step is to observe how your strategy is performing. This often begins by doing survey research, which provides a statistically based analysis of the campaign’s impact and progress. From those observations, you move on to the next stage: orienting, which is determining what has worked and what needs changing. Orienting is the process of learning from your observations and then developing options that move your strategy forward. This is the knowledgeable approach defined earlier or, as John Boyd described it, the “mental tapestry.” From those options, you decide which actions to take and then you execute them. Then you return to observation to see the impact of your actions and repeat the process. The faster a campaign can employ an ­OODA-loop self-assessment, the greater chance the campaign has to stay a step ahead of its opponents

Conclusion Campaigns that lack an effective strategy based on the elements I have described in this chapter are unlikely to be successful. In 2006, Republican leaders operated on the assumption that it would not be a national election and so they believed success depended on turning out the base. Strategically, they couldn’t have been more wrong. It was obvious months before the election that it was going to be nationalized and that a base turnout would not be sufficient to win. It didn’t matter if the GOP turnout operation was better. It didn’t matter if the television ads were better. The strategic assumptions were wrong, and Republicans lost badly. In 2010, Democrats made an equally devastating strategic miscalculation. Strategy matters. Once again, “strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” Without a viable strategy based on a winning coalition, a campaign can make a lot of noise but is unlikely to make the kind of progress needed to win.

10 Paid Media Today

Four Screens but the Same Two Eyes Martin Hamburger 1

“She ran a great campaign.” “His ads were hysterical.” “I couldn’t believe that hair in his ads.” “So many ads … I can barely watch TV anymore.” “I can’t wait until this election is over.” It never fails: you hear comments like this all the time in the fall of an even-numbered year. It’s because, more and more, the perception of an entire political campaign, from volunteers stuffing envelopes and going door to door, to fundraising and press relations and all the other mechanics of getting someone elected, somehow boils down to what voters thought of the TV ads. What we in the business call “paid media.” Pandora’s box was originally opened when the first political TV ad  was broadcast in 1952. 2 A bunch of Madison Avenue advertising executives approached General Eisenhower’s team to make 30-­second ads for his campaign. Little did they know the industry they were about to spawn: It’s been estimated that the 2018 election will see spending on political ads north of $3.5 billion. 3 That’s ­billion with a B. For decades since the “I Like Ike” jingle first wormed its way into Americans’ ears, the mantra of paid campaign media has been simple: make a bunch of ads, put them on the big three networks, and leave the campaigning and speechwriting to the others. No longer. Changes in technology, law, and society have radically changed the role of paid media, from its effectiveness and primacy to even the way in which it’s scripted and produced. 218



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Take the impact of technology. Today, we still call it “filming” a commercial, even though the last commercial I actually used Kodak film for was in 1998. Film was expensive. You couldn’t just push the trigger and keep filming, because you had to change reels every ten minutes or so. Plus all of it had to be developed, and that took additional time and money. Almost 20 years later, the technology has advanced to where we’re just moving electrons around, from a camera to a drive, to an edit system, eventually to a TV station, and again, digitally, to your TV or laptop, tablet, or phone. No film. Every smartphone has a video camera. Every candidate and campaign operative has made a short film, whether it’s the cat drinking out of the toilet or toddler spilling food on his or her head. How hard could making a TV ad be? Anyone can see him or herself making TV ads, so everyone feels empowered to have an opinion on them. Technology also means we can deliver ads much, much faster. It can be a matter of hours from shoot to air, if the human processes of creation and approval don’t slow things down. If the timeline is faster, costs are also lower. Technology means the process of editing ads and getting them on air is short, so video can be a tool for rapid response to important campaign developments. Some significant legal changes impact how we make and use paid media, first among them the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Elections Commission. The decision’s legal changes (too complicated to detail here) spurred a huge growth in the amount of money spent on political advertising of all kinds, and led to the rise of Super PACs. Super PACs are third parties that seek to influence the outcomes of elections and in most major political campaigns, these PACs get involved, for and against, meaning that the campaigns themselves have to figure out how to coexist and strategize around the actions of these third-party groups. Finally, society has really changed the way individuals consume political persuasion, most especially over the last decade. We live in a “four screens” world. First, despite what you might think, people just simply watch a ton of television. The average American watches—wait for it— five hours and four minutes of television each day.4 If you’re over 50, make that over seven hours a day. It’s no wonder golf is down, bike sales are off, and we’re getting more obese. The amount of time goes up and down a little, but has been pretty durable during the rise of the internet. We just like TV.

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But, increasingly, we are on our other screens as well. Laptops, tablets, and particularly mobile devices are the places Americans are spending more and more time. And they’re spending TV time cuddled up with their phones. … Spending laptop time checking their Facebook page. Reading on their tablet and texting with friends. Mobile is the new king. How we consume programming has radically changed in the last decade, but how campaigns advertise in this context has been slow to catch up. If screen time is increasing across these devices, then each of them becomes a new platform for advertisers. One would have to live in a cave not to see how advertisers use big data to target ads to particular users. Each device we have has a unique identifying code attached to it, called an IP address. It means that, with a little time and money, Amazon can know that this is Martin Hamburger’s iPhone, and since we know he’s Googled information about snoring we can run ads on his phone for snoring remedies. And, based on previous viewing habits, we know that Martin is probably watching the Giants game on Fox, so when he sees a Republican congressional ad the smart Democratic campaign can deliver a rebuttal ad to Martin’s iPhone in hopes of neutralizing the effect of the GOP TV ad buy. That’s change. But here’s what hasn’t changed much. People still rely on advertising, on TV or on other platforms, to get their information on politics. Paid media of all kinds still absorb 70% or more of a functional campaign’s budget. And the basic process of making the ads, again regardless of platform, hasn’t changed much. You can read more about that process below. To set a little context, the focus of this chapter remains mostly on federal and statewide campaigns, with some focus on presidential campaign lessons, and exceptions to those lessons. The author of this chapter is a Democratic political consultant. I’ve never worked on a Republican paid media campaign in my life. My friends tell me it’s basically the same over on that side. I don’t know. It could all be a ruse to keep me from learning their secret dark arts.

How We Make TV Ads. The fun part of making a political TV ad is when the clapper slaps shut and someone yells “Action!” But that’s about step 17 out of 20. The fun



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really starts with a bunch of research. Most of this research is covered in other sections of this book, but it merits a little discussion here. What are we researching? Basically we are trying to figure out how to win. How is this race beginning? Who are the players? What message will resonate most in a given district or state. Remember everything we suggest or enact on a campaign begins with the basic supposition of how do we win half of the voters plus one vote more. There’s several other pieces of this research, too. We need to know some key elements of the lay of the land. How many people will vote, and from what parts of the state or district? We look at past voting history to gauge what performance in the next election will look like. What’s the issue landscape look like? What are likely to be the major issues the electorate is concerned about, and what are likely to be, if any, the differences between the candidates on these or other issues? We use polling for some of this research, anecdotal insights or common sense for some of it, and look to the media and what’s coming up in Congress or in a state capitol. Finally, we do research on our candidate, and on our opponent. This is called opposition research, “Oppo” for short. It’s a common misconception that this practice is really about “digging up dirt” on one’s opponent. For sure, there have been candidates for political office that have made mistakes or willful violations of law or ethics. But does this research necessitate an approach that includes negative advertising (more on that below)? No. We first look inward at things that our candidate has accomplished of which we aren’t immediately aware. And we’re looking not only to gather facts but also to correlate them. For example, our candidate may have passed a law that strengthens regulations regarding who can qualify for a mortgage loan. That’s one piece of information. But if home defaults have gone down in the succeeding years, then we have a piece of research that’s potentially useful in a message. Similarly, we are looking for contradictions in both our record and our opponent’s record. Are we taking a stand with mortgage bankers but taking money from local credit unions? Are we voting against the interests of our district in some way, but getting support from those contrary interests? This research helps us plan our campaign, knowing what potential land mines might be out there, before we step on any. Increasingly, party committees, including the DNC, DCCC, DSCC, DGA, DLCC, and others have given campaigns a head start on this research. The committees have large staffs of researchers,

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and the parties have outside organizations devoted to opposition research, and tracking (covered in another chapter). American Bridge on the Democratic side, and America Rising on the Republican side, post video content of controversial statements and of footage caught by trackers and make this research available to third parties as they prepare their plans.

Independent Campaigns Third parties who conduct independent expenditure campaigns depend on this research as well. When the National Rifle Association wants to get involved in a few dozen campaigns with campaign mailers or ads, they don’t reinvent the wheel themselves. Though campaigns and third parties can’t legally coordinate, inventive attorneys have come up with a solution. The party committees regularly post details about research and a campaign’s intended strategy on their own websites. In the Democratic Party, these have come to be nicknamed “red boxes,” because, well, they are printed in a red box. Typically, they say, “The voters of Whoville need to hear that their Congressman voted against a bill to limit spearfishing in the desert.” This isn’t coordinating: since it isn’t a dialogue, this has been deemed to be legal and permissible. And, while anyone with a web browser can access the information, most campaigns feel getting the help from third parties is worth the cost of allowing their opposition to have an idea of what’s coming. Survey research is a key component of divining one’s paid media strategy. But few campaigns have the budgets to do lots and lots of polling. Planning the timing of your survey research is a critical piece of the puzzle and resources allocation. On the one hand, getting a poll done right away, early in the campaign, say even 18 months from Election Day, makes some sense. You want to start from the beginning with a good message and know what that is going to be from the get go. On the other hand, if you only have funds to do a single poll, you want to make sure it’s relevant to where voters are on Election Day. With a 24-hour news cycle and coverage of them amplifying their effects so dramatically now, issues can pop up on the landscape out of nowhere, and in ways no candidate or campaign staff person could foresee. So doing a poll “early” (whatever early means) risks something changing later that affects your thinking and planning in a big way. All of us would rather have information



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sooner rather than later, but we want information that’s the most relevant and useful when we have to make the big decisions, including planning the major paid media buys.

Strategy and Concepts Once the research is complete, we develop a strategy. Again, strategy is a topic that’s covered elsewhere in this volume. But, for our purposes, we’re looking at the question of how do we assemble enough votes to win, from what audiences, and with what messages? Audience and message are the key focus for a paid media strategy. For each of these individual tasks, we develop several concepts. These aren’t full-blown scripts, though they can be, but more like fleshed-out ideas. What consultants are looking for in the conception stage is to get our strategic team on the same page creatively. In any campaign there’s never only one single way to accomplish a strategic goal. Sometimes there are many ways. This can often be a challenging part if the campaign. In a given political cycle, many paid media firms can produce anywhere from 200 to 1,000 ads in one cycle, depending on their size. For each ad that gets produced, there are probably one or two ideas, each, that were discarded. Coming up with original creative for all of these campaigns is a challenge. Sometimes, the ideas just flow. Sometimes it takes a little more work. For me, I try to start the process by asking myself this simple, but often overlooked, question: “What am I trying to say?” I try to boil the task down to its essence. Our candidate is hard-­ working or she is a clean politician. I try to focus on what a friend of mine calls “the WIFM.” What’s in It For Me?” What’s the thing that makes the difference here, which make the choice between A and B compelling? One of my favorite ads ever was one I did about a politician who had cast a lot of votes against regulating water pollution during his career. He was a conservative U.S. senator and was skeptical of government regulation on industry. He was nothing if not consistent. He’d cast many dozens of votes over his career to curb regulations on water pollution. One idea was to visually demonstrate with a list of all the votes, the dozens and dozens of times the senator had voted “against clean water.” Scrolling a list of the votes on the screen was an idea intended to create the overwhelming plethora of votes. My own feeling is that, generally

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speaking, people watch TV because they’re tired of reading, so I tend not to gravitate toward very word-heavy presentations. A second idea was to show a series of interactions between a protagonist and a variety of foils, each of whom is sipping from a glass of water or bottled water, as the protagonist casually mentions the pollution issue. Upon hearing about arsenic or other heavy metals, there’s the classic vaudeville trope of a spit take. What am I trying to say? The spot was really about literal pollution in your water, in your mouth. It was trying to make something kind of abstract into something real and easily understood. And, while the notion of poisonous water could seem heavy-handed, using slapstick comedy to lighten the message seemed to help get the idea across. On the other hand, as a concept the spot seemed, well, a little disgusting. Who wants to see a lot of spitting? How do we keep it light but not be overwhelmed by the vulgarity of what was happening? In the end, though we filmed many instances of the spit take, we ended up using only one. The spot starts off with two guys sitting on a park bench, silently, just sitting. For 11 seconds. Eleven seconds is an eternity in TV. Finally, one guy starts to take a sip of water from a glass. The other guy tells him about how the senator in question voted to allow arsenic in your drinking water. The first guy spits the water out. It was a little disgusting. But that was basically the spot. A simple concept, stripped to its essence: You don’t want arsenic in your drinking water.

Writing Scripts After a campaign settles on concepts, we start to work on the actual scripts. Again, this can be challenging. An average TV ad contains about 75 words in 30 seconds. It’s not a lot of time to tell a story. One has to be economical with one’s words. Likewise, most spots consist of maybe ten shots, plus or minus. The art of combining the words and the shots is what makes the spot work or fall apart. Some people write a script and shoot it, or something like it, improvising heavily as they go along. Many people get great results this way. Me? I’m a big believer in planning. I script out every word, plan every shot. We advance every location before we film there and make adjustments as we go. Why? Because we’re not Madison Avenue. We don’t have hundreds of thousands of dollars to spend making a single ad. Most of our campaigns will get one or two shoot days for the whole campaign.



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So we have to squeeze the most value out of each day, and shoot as much material as we can. Despite the planning, inspiration can always strike. I think it’s important to leave room for that to happen. Sometimes an idea will strike you as you’re shooting. Film shoots are not democracies—the director has to be the general. But once in a while an idea will burble to the surface, or someone will think of a different look. To me, that’s what separates a good spot from a great spot. The planning and execution, supplemented by an idea that comes out of the blue. Here’s an example: We wrote an ad for a congressional candidate, in which he and his mother appear. It’s an ad you’ve seen before. Every election cycle someone does an ad with their husband or wife, parent or child, endorsing them. They’re good for a smile, but they aren’t very original at this point. I wasn’t crazy for the idea, but we decided to try it. The candidate’s mother was 93, sharp, and very sweet. And the candidate himself could have used a little buffing of some harder edges. So off we went. Despite all the planning, we hadn’t planned for the possibility that Marge, the candidate’s mother, had glaucoma and couldn’t read our teleprompter. No problem. I sat out of camera range and read her lines out loud, so she could repeat them after me. “I’m proud of Tom,” I said. “I’m proud of Tom,” she dutifully repeated. “He’s always been a fighter,” I prompted. “He’s always been a fighter,” she repeated. “And I love him,” she added, on her own. Bingo. Lightning struck. It was just the tenderness we needed, and we couldn’t have scripted it and have it come out the same way.

Shooting and Editing Shoot day is a big day. In some ways, it’s the most fun day of our campaign, and the most stressful. It’s like tearing up a five-dollar bill every minute. Sometimes we have material for half a dozen to a dozen ads we need to shoot. We’ve shot at as many as five different locations in a single ten-hour shoot day. It can be hot as hell, cold as can be, raining, buggy, too windy, too sunny, and almost anything can happen. And has! As noted above, we plan everything as much as possible. We create a shot list, a schedule, have all the names and digits of all the crew, extras, staff, candidate and family, and key contacts at locations. When you’re filming at a school and you blow a fuse, everything stops until you

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find the custodian. So we find him or her the day before. Everybody has printed, turn-by-turn directions. If the grip truck gets lost, you’re tearing up five-dollar bills every minute. Every staffer on the shoot is assigned a department. Everyone has his or her own job to do. If everyone does only their own job, everything works perfectly. If people help each other, fine, but not if it means falling short in your own department. A friendly rivalry emerges. Whole comedy routines of bad jokes have emerged, which lighting makes about the sound department, or art makes about the grips. Everyone jokes about the director. In the end, it’s the director’s job to make sure the vision is consistent, and the campaign is getting everything we need to make the ads. It’s my nightmare to come back to my office, hand footage to my editor, and have him look at it and tell me I missed something. “Why didn’t you get the shot of our candidate putting his head in the lion’s mouth? How are we going to do the circus ad without that?” In addition to shooting material from scripts, we also like to shoot what’s called B-roll. This is footage of our candidates doing stuff, without talking to camera. Doing things like talking on the phone, working with people, talking with voters, and so on. We use imagery like this to cover narration that describes action happening off-screen. This gives us a lot of flexibility to create material after our shoot. Always, in a campaign, despite our best efforts, something comes up that our team has never considered. There are always surprises. Having footage allows us to create a spot that accommodates changing circumstances, without having to go to the expense of doing an additional film shoot. And while we’re at it, let’s examine those charming terms “B-roll” and “film shoot.” It’s been the better part of 20 years since I was anywhere near any kind of actual acetate film. Now we shoot everything on high-definition digital cameras. Philosopher-artists will forever debate the various merits of either technology, but the marketplace settled the argument. It may or may not be better, but digital is MUCH cheaper. At the end of a shoot, instead of gathering heavy, cumbersome cans of film and sending them off to be developed and color-corrected, a whole day’s worth of shooting goes home with me on a hard drive the size of a deck of cards. It’s backed up all day long while we’re shooting,



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and the cards in the camera don’t get erased until we’ve got the “footage” (hint, it’s not measured by feet any more) loaded into our edit system. And we’re shooting not just for TV ads anymore. Most campaigns we are working with decide to do a video announcing their candidacy. Right out of the gate, we are creating video product for our clients. Along with that announcement product, we’re creating digital preroll ads, both static banner ads and rich media (digital talk for motion pictures). These preroll ads can be six seconds, 15 seconds, or 30 seconds, or even longer. Writing and executing six-second ads is an entirely new field unto itself. After shooting the ads, we begin the process of editing them. We start by selecting the pieces we want to use and fitting them together. If we’ve done everything right, the pieces all fit together in 30 seconds. But sometimes someone speaks slower that you thought, and it all fits perfectly together in 31 seconds. Unfortunately, TV stations don’t sell 31-second ad slots. So we have to do some work. Shaving a third of a second here, a half a second there, finding a take where the candidate reads the script faster or slower, all of this is in the first step of laying down a bed. What follows is the artistry. Using timing, visual devices, graphics, tempo, sound, quiet, all to create energy in a spot. There’s a lot more finishing that goes into a final spot for air than one might think. We do a round of color correction, adjusting the nature and quality of the coloring of the spot to look right and to match across the shots in the ad. We do a round of audio improvements, to make sure the sound is consistent across the entire spot. We make slight adjustments to timing, to beginnings and ends of shots, to the way graphics come up on the screen, to the way they stand out against the background. We look at what’s seen in negative space. And, believe me, we spell check. Spelling errors happen. We try very hard to avoid that. Working with our clients, we make necessary changes and get ready to ship our ads. Shipping takes more than simply emailing it to a station. Stations have intermediary services, which, for a fee, make sure the spots TV stations receive meet legal requirements for broadcast. These include not only things like disclaimers and their size and clarity but also volume, characteristics of the video, where on the screen words and images appear, and so on.

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Media Buying After a spot is made, it gets put on TV. But where and when? How do you decide what time slots to run a particular ad? Here is where the science, with some art involved, of media placement comes into play. For most political campaigns, the paid media line item is the biggest line item in the budget. And yet it can be the least examined, and is often the most confusing part of the paid media enterprise. Understanding how advertising is placed means cutting through jargon and bureaucracy. To begin, the country is divided into 210 media markets, called “DMAs.” The acronym stands for designated market area. The ­Nielsen Company (see below) created these markets, which are collections of “counties that form an exclusive geographic area in which the home market television stations hold a dominance of total hours viewed.”5 The largest DMA is the New York DMA, with 7,074,750 TV households. The smallest is Glendive, MT, with just 4,030 households! DMAs roughly correspond to metropolitan areas. Roughly, because TV waves emanate from TV station towers in a circular pattern, and metropolitan areas do not cluster in the same way. So the Boston DMA covers all of the City of Boston, as well as two-thirds of the state of Massachusetts, and some of Rhode Island and New Hampshire. This presents a challenge to campaigns in all three states. If you’re running in Massachusetts, you know a good portion of your ad dollars are being wasted on voters in other states. Similarly, Rhode Island candidates don’t feel good spending so much money on Boston voters. So campaigns have to make smart choices about where to advertise. In Rhode Island, they’d advertise on stations in the Providence DMA, not the Boston DMA. Television stations sell advertising time to advertisers based on a best estimate of how many viewers are watching at a given time. It makes sense, that if 100 people are watching a show, you’d pay less to run an ad there than if 10,000 people were watching. Since different programs have different kinds of audiences, advertisers must have data on not only how many people are watching a show but also who is watching. Several companies provide this data, but the largest and most commonly used is the Nielsen Company, which, among many other things, surveys television viewers and issues reports on what they are watching. These are called “ratings.”



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Television viewers for decades filled out paper diaries describing their television viewing habits, and send them back to Nielsen. These paper diaries are now being phased out and electronic monitoring systems are being phased in. It will be interesting to see if ratings change in changing from a system of self-reporting to a system of automatic reporting. It’s been a criticism of self-reporting that people employ social acceptability bias, essentially underreporting “bad” behavior like binge watching TV or watching certain programming. Will ratings for PBS News Hour decline and Keeping Up with the Kardashians increase? Without getting overly technical, ratings data give the number of viewers and other details about a television show’s audience. The number of people and the gender and age breakdowns of the viewers are bits of information advertisers want. Ratings are measured in a unit known as gross ratings points, or GRPs. A GRP is a percentage of the television audience tuned into a program. So the 6 p.m. evening news might get a 20 rating, meaning 20% of the audience is watching the show. If you run an ad five times in a week on that show, you get 100 GRPs behind the ad that week. As a viewer, one tends to see ads over and over. How many times is the right number of views? Like many questions in political campaigning, the answer to this one is, “It depends.” A rule of thumb is that we want our audiences to see a spot a minimum of six to seven times so that the message starts to sink in. That translates to 600–700 GRPs. If the spot is really simple and bold, it can be shown fewer times and still get across to the audience. But if a spot is more complicated, with lots of detail, facts, numbers, headlines to read, it might need more viewings to sink in. Media buyers essentially take the ratings data, and the polling data, and strategic guidance from the campaign, and figure out how to show the ad to the target audience the most times for the least money. Efficiency is the name of the media buying game. If you want to get 1,000 GRPs behind a specific ad, and you want an audience that is more women than men, one has to look at what combination of programming will garner that total number of GRPs for that spot. There’s no single path to assembling a media plan. Here’s where some of the art comes in. A media buyer might use software to chart a plan that adds up to 1,000 GRPs, but when it comes time to actually placing the buy he or she finds that certain programming is not available or is more expensive than previously thought. So there’s an element of negotiation and creativity involved. If you can’t get a women’s audience with

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a slot in the Today Show, you try to get one with Good Morning America instead. Fundamentally, media planning and buying is about data. Knowing what the strategy is means knowing what our targets are, and then apportioning resources appropriately. And it’s not static. Circumstances change in politics constantly. If money is tighter or more plentiful, one has to make adjustments to the plan. If an opponent runs a negative ad one has to consider responding. Making changes to the media plan happens in real time, and the media buyer is standing by, ready to make those changes. The process is similar, with a few particular wrinkles, for buying cable TV, radio, and print advertising. Some of the metrics are different. The geography is different. The timing can be different. Cable systems can tend to have lower-end technology than TV stations, which means it’s sometimes harder to change traffic on a dime on cable. Radio DMAs are different than TV DMAs, in part because radio stations have much more widely varying signal strengths, and are distributed around the country more broadly. Buying digital advertising is a very different process, and is a great deal more complex, probably beyond the limits of a chapter in a compendium such as this. It’s a new field and digital engagement and buying is rapidly changing. With the fallout still happening regarding Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. election, new transparency laws and regulations may come into play regarding the need to report who is placing digital advertising. It’s an area that’s sure to evolve in the coming cycles.

Four Screens—Integrating Digital Advertising into Traditional Paid Media. Lots has changed and lots hasn’t. As noted above, we Americans are still really into our TVs. And a lot of us watch a lot of TV. Most of us watch shows when they’re broadcast, still. People wonder about “time shifting.” Does anyone really watch a show when it plays, or do we binge watch when we have time? Well, most of us watch morning news TV while we eat breakfast or get ready before work or school. We want the weather and traffic, and some topical news discussion to get our minds going for the day. Almost no one tapes the Today Show in a given morning to watch three days later.



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The same goes for evening news. You watch the news because you don’t have time or inclination to read the news, and, well, you want news. The word “new” is in the title! So you watch it when it airs. That’s why we put a lot of political ads in the news. And, for popular series, people tune in because a new episode is coming on. You want to see what happens. Sports: A big Monday night game doesn’t seem as interesting played back three weeks later. Not much has changed in way we watch television since the 1950s. It’s helpful to remember that, with drones carrying our smartphones to our autonomous vehicles while we’re texting our orders for food delivery, a majority of America still turns on their TVs, letting advertising wash over them as they watch. We know this from anecdotal information, and we know this in other ways. TV viewing is some of the most widely studied behavior in ­American society. Ratings data, which has not always been the most accurate, is constantly being refined, because the market for advertising demands it. Where we used to rely on 1,000 people nationwide filling out paper diaries and mailing them back (this author once was part of a “Nielsen Family”), now set-top boxes monitor TV viewing without bias, and the data is not just more robust but is analyzed in real time. But, having said that, we know people watch TV in lots of other ways too, and the industry is starting to figure out ways to measure those consumers as well. With different generations come different approaches to media consumption, bred by time, circumstance and experience. People in their 70s learned to count by watching a teacher point to a sequence of numbers written in cursive above a slate blackboard in class. People in their 40s watched cartoons or Sesame Street. People in their 20s learned on a tablet or smartphone. So each of these age groups approach media consumption differently, based on their different experiences. It opens up possibilities. Technology helps. Mobile phones and smartphones mean people can do everything they used to do in front of a TV or desktop computer, or laptop, now on the go. While many people do sit in front of their TV for three hours a day, more and more don’t. So-called “cord-cutters” are a challenge to reach, since they don’t watch a lot of broadcast TV. But, even more than television viewers, we know who these cord-cutters are (because we know the IP addresses of their devices), and we know infinitely more about them, because companies track all their movements and interests online. So cord-cutters aren’t

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a threat to advertising; they are a boon. We know how to reach them, what they like and don’t, and where they are, physically, when they’re watching. We Americans, and people around the world, really, readily give up huge amounts of information about ourselves, and the advertising world uses that information. Normal voting records usually give things like age, gender, and in many cases race, but now we give advertisers access to our likes and dislikes, our product preferences, where we are at any given time, what we subscribe to, and so on. When a couple registers online for their wedding registry, the world knows they’re engaged, and maybe even when and where they will be married. When an expectant mother subscribes to a website or podcast about how to prepare for the arrival of a new baby, we know a lot about that person. When Amazon Prime gets you to make all your purchases through them, we learn a lot. Facebook has literally thousands of data points about its members, and uses them. If a politician has 500 or 1,000 Facebook likes on his or her page, he can create an audience of people who haven’t liked his page who are statistically similar to the “likers,” and advertise to them, with some assurance they’ll behave like their known neighbors. We call this “looka-like modeling.” I snore. So I read once about snoring on WebMD. Now, I get lots of ads on Facebook about snoring remedies and devices to keep me from snoring. Commercial advertisers have jumped in with both feet in ways that political advertisers are just getting started at doing. Modeling and micro-targeting is an area that’s related to advertising and will be covered elsewhere in this volume, but it deserves a mention here, because it’s changed how we do paid media. Let’s imagine you have an issue campaign. You want to have voters support construction of a new airport. Whether you support a new airport or not really has nothing to do with partisanship or ideology. Probably, Democrats will be more inclined to support a big public infrastructure project, Republicans less so. But you’d be taking a big gamble to gear your advertising around partisan lines. It’s an assumption that may not prove valid. What you want to do is create a model. You want to find voters who are persuadable on the airport, and also those who are already persuaded and those who are unpersuadable. You want to develop different strategies for each group. Here’s one way to do that.



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In a typical poll, you call maybe 400–500 people. That gives you enough of a sample to make some valid assumptions about the population as a whole, but when you get down into smaller subgroups your margin of error increases. Here, we want to get into very small subgroups. But you can’t call 5,000 people and keep them all on the phone for 20 minutes. It’s too expensive. You can, however, call 5,000 people and ask them a very few questions, especially if you can cross-reference their names with other data. So let’s say you ask them if they’re for the airport or not, or if they could be. Let’s say you ask them a couple other questions, like how often they fly, or whether they’ve traveled for work recently. You take those 5,000 people and their answers, and you append to each record all kinds of data from Amazon and Facebook and other commercial data services, so we know that Joe Blow likes the airport, travels for work, owns a dog, drives a Ford, subscribes to People and the Wall Street Journal, bought  soccer cleats for his kid, likes U2, hates ­Donald Trump, and signed a petition against a beer tax. Among 200 other pieces of information. Next, you find other voters in this jurisdiction who also like the airport, travel for work, own a dog, drive a Ford, subscribe to People and the Wall Street Journal, bought soccer cleats for their kids, like U2, hate ­Donald Trump, and signed a petition against a beer tax. Among 200 other pieces of information. Let’s say there are 50 of them in town. Using statistical analysis, you can predict how many of them will be supportive of the new airport. Even though you’ve never spoken with them. Writ large, you can take an entire voting population and create a model of airport support, where you rate each voter on their likelihood to support an airport, on a 100 point scale. Eighty and above? They’re your base. ­Seventy-nine down to 40? They are your swing voters. Below 40? They’d rather take the bus and are not worth your time or paid communication efforts. Now you have a score next to each voter’s name. Joe Blow is a 90. Bob Smith is a 50. So you want to persuade Smith, and make sure Blow votes. So you take their names and run them up against lists of IP addresses (for your phone or laptop or tablet) or Facebook membership. How does anyone know your IP address? Well, you’ve told them what it is, repeatedly. When you sign up for frequent flyer membership, they get your IP address associated with your name and address (and flying frequency). When you subscribe to the Washington Post online, bingo: IP address.

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So now we know your likelihood to support an airport, and we know how to put an ad on your phone. All we need to do is send a bunch of ads to your phone (or ads for snoring products), and we’re done, right? Well, no. The problem is that people don’t stare at Facebook three hours a day the way they do with TV. So, even if we inundated your Facebook page with ads, we can’t get the frequency we get with broadcast TV. It’s a supplement, but not a replacement. It’s interesting to look at digital outlets, and what works and doesn’t. As I write these words in 2017, it’s pretty clear that this could all change in a couple of years. Right now, Facebook is king. It has the most viewers, and people spend the most time there overall. Google is a close second. YouTube, owned by Google, is also important. From there, there are a million little outlets that have audiences, but none so comprehensive or as frequently used as those listed above. Pandora, Spotify, Twitter, news services, Yahoo, and AOL, believe it or not, still all have their audiences. Campaigns develop their own channels for media as well, though usually these aren’t paid. Social media includes using a campaign Facebook page or Twitter account, Instagram, and email list development, even the campaign’s own website are all ways campaigns get their message out in ways that are now new and would have been previously generated through paid advertising in years gone by.

Viral Video Many campaigns create videos on topics designed to “go viral.” By t­ elling a story in an interesting way, or taking a controversial stand, or doing something remarkable, campaigns hope that viewers will like what they see, pass it around, and make so many impressions that they will get attention, and campaign funds, for low cost. It does happen, but less often than you think. So does winning the lottery. But reaching for an ­attention-grabber can go horribly wrong. P.T. Barnum is credited as having said, “There’s no such thing as bad publicity.” Oscar Wilde said, “The only thing worse than being talked about, is not being talked about.” But Barnum and Wilde did not live in the 24-hour cable news cycle. Many attempts at digital stardom fail utterly, and cause problems for the campaigns that create them.



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What seems funny late at night in the campaign office, perhaps after a beer or two, might not seem as funny to the viewer looking to find out where a candidate stands on an issue like gun safety or the environment. And bad headlines about an announcement video gone wrong never go away. Even P.T. Barnum had an obituary, and that’s probably publicity he was hoping to postpone.

Integration What’s even more interesting about the possibilities that new technology has opened up are the ways we can integrate advertising on these devices. Here are some examples: Let’s say we know our campaign’s opposition is advertising on the evening news. There’s an ad for No on the airport scheduled for 6:07 p.m. Maybe the Yes side can’t advertise on TV just yet. But we can put our Yes ads on mobile devices and tablets of people whom we suspect are watching the news. We can counterprogram them. It’s not the same as having our ad on the news, but it’s better than nothing. Here’s another example: Let’s say there’s a major construction company in town that’s going to be building the airport. We can assume that most of the employees of that company are likely to be supporters, because they have a vested interest in doing the job. So we want to make sure they vote yes. We geotarget the office building of Jones Construction. Literally, that means we create a perimeter, within which every mobile device that passes through receives an ad from us. Furthermore, we make note of the IP addresses of those phones. Then we use their location services to find where those phones end up at the end of the day. If they stay there for eight hours or so, we can assume that’s the home of the people in our geotarget area. We can then look for other devices in that area and target them. We’re assuming (again, a lot of assumptions here, but play along) that those are family members of the Jones Construction employee, who might also see their own vested interest in the airport, and they might support the airport as well. What we’re essentially doing is using the technology and our own thoughtfulness to make our advertising audience communicable, almost like the flu.

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Issues versus Candidate Campaigns In many ways there are similarities between candidate campaigns and issue campaigns, but it’s worth noting some important differences. How we think about running each campaign is influenced by an understanding of these differences. Campaign managers love issue campaigns because there’s no candidate. The old joke goes, “How many candidates does it take to screw in a light bulb?” The answer is that it only takes one, who holds onto the light bulb, and the universe then revolves around the candidate. For some campaign managers and paid media consultants, the candidate— the client—can be a real challenge. Add to that the difficulties posed by the candidate’s support network: spouse, family members, friends, their political kitchen cabinet. It makes some campaign operatives yearn for issue campaigns. But issue campaigns have committees that run their campaigns, and those challenges are no lesser than the challenges that candidates pose. Divergent points of view, differing agendas, long-lasting niches in the community, the burdens of past battles and the baggage they all carry around, these are some important challenges. In developing any creative product, the candidate’s authentic voice becomes really important. In a candidate campaign, the voice of the candidate, as in the identity, not the sound of the candidate’s voice per se, is critical. And with a single candidate that’s a challenge. But in an issue campaign, a campaign with many or several masters, maintaining that voice becomes even more of a trick. In paid media, one needs to pay care to keep the creative sounding pure, and authentic, not the product of a committee meeting. There are other major differences. The moment you see a candidate on TV, you start to form opinions about him or her. Picture an ad for an older white male. The moment it comes on—that split second it registers—you form some opinions. Maybe there are some signifiers in what he’s wearing—a fleece vest, or an American flag lapel pin. Maybe his hair is a gray, wild mess. Maybe it’s a Marine Corps “High and Tight.” Before this guy opens his mouth, you have an idea whether he’s a Republican or Democrat. With an issue campaign or ballot initiative, you don’t have that context. You hear what the ad says—”paid for by the committee for goodness and righteousness”—but you’re not sure. You’re looking for signifiers— people you know, newspapers or other validators—where does this issue



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fit into my world view? Can I trust what I am seeing? All kinds of questions race through your mind. Because of that lack of context, the lack of signifiers, ballot initiatives can be volatile in the way candidate campaigns aren’t. It’s possibly sad but true that in today’s politics voters mostly vote their party. There are true independents, but they are a minority compared to partisans. In ballot questions, everyone is an “independent.” Ballot initiatives, by virtue of the fact that there is no candidate and the issues tend to be a little less clear, tend to get less press coverage. And, in turn, that contributes to the lack of definition and volatility. It becomes a vicious cycle. What do we men by volatile? The numbers can swing, and even wildly. People aren’t attached to their position on most ballot initiatives the way they are their partisanship. So their opinions can change. And their voting decisions tend to happen later. They remain undecided longer. Because of this volatility and late decision, there are issues with how voters approach ballot measures. If they’re not strongly attached to a position, voters can prefer not to jump into the unknown by supporting something about which they are unsure. There is a presumption that the status quo is better. It means people are more likely to vote no, just out of caution, even if the measure is around an issue they support. Voters in our imaginary city may want an airport but may be unsure about this airport. So a pro-airport city’s voters might start off in favor of the airport ballot question and then move late to vote no, if there comes to light information about which they are unsure. What does this mean for the paid media strategists? Well, first, one has to think about being able to be on the air, and strongly enough, when people are making their decisions. In candidate campaigns, there’s imperative to get on the air early, to help define a candidacy. In a ballot initiative, it’s the opposite. You want to be on the air late, but strong. It’s a short, intense war, not a long drawn-out war of attrition. You want to be the winner on Election Day, not August 1. You can secure votes, and lose them quickly, again, because of volatility. Third parties are really important in an issue campaign, because of the way they help voters contextualize their choices. If the local newspaper editorial board urges a vote for the airport, that really helps voters understand where they sit and what their opinion might really be. Similarly,

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relevant groups like the League of Woman Voters or the Chamber of Commerce can play that role. One final important difference is that initiatives get charged a higher rate for advertising dollars than candidates do. This gets complicated. For federal candidates, that is, candidates for House, Senate, and president, Congress has legally bound media outlets to charge their lowest rates. But they are not bound to charge the lowest rates for candidates for state office, or for ballot initiatives. Stations are owned by people, and people have to live in places where governors and senators get elected, so for candidates for office rates are lower than for issues. Issues can’t complain to a station owner. So they can pay more for the same slot a congressional candidate gets.

Paid Media Dos and Don’ts What would a campaign management book be without a list of some suggested rules of the road? Just remember: for every one of these rules, there’s an exception. The key to winning a campaign is knowing when to be flexible and when to stick with a plan. DO dominate in one medium before moving to another—Paid media is like making a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. You don’t want to spread the peanut butter too thin. So putting your dollars into TV, cable, radio, and digital, but spreading your dollars across those media thinly, isn’t a good idea. You want to do a good job in one medium before you put resources into another, even when they supplement each other. DO use specific media to get specialty messages across—If you want to reach Hispanic voters generally, usually the major news/talk radio station will give you the best share of those voters. But if you want to reach them with a message specifically tailored to them, say about immigration reform, use Spanish-language radio or cable. DON’T respond to an attack in one medium, in a different medium. If you’re attacked on radio, it probably makes the most sense to respond on radio, where you can most easily match the reach of the original attack ad. If you’re attacked on TV, you want to respond in the same medium where people saw the attack. DON’T change your messaging too frequently. Voters aren’t paying as much attention to your campaign as you think they might be. You have to make sure a spot sinks in before you change traffic and put a new spot on.



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DO remember that voters are really cynical and skeptical about what they see on TV. For any advertiser, if the ad says “green” the viewer is thinking “blue.” So when you make a claim about a politician or issue, you better be bulletproof on it. DO start advertising when voters are paying attention. We can’t decide when voters are paying attention to a campaign. They get that privilege. Advertising too early, trying to persuade people to make a choice before they’re ready to, that can be a waste of money. DON’T wait too long to start advertising. Some voters are information seekers. We can use digital advertising to help them make choices. Starting to advertise early for them can be a great choice. DO take risks. This is a time in politics when things are changing rapidly. Trying new things, using social media to test ideas and try audiences: those calculated risks can pay off and they’re how evolution occurs.

Conclusion Paid media is an exciting part of political campaigning. The job changes frequently. The work is never boring. You get to use the latest technology. You meet incredibly bright people. You end up having lots of interaction with the candidate or principal. Downside is you don’t get to hear the roar of the crowd and get the smell of the grease paint, as they say in the theater. If you’re someone who enjoys the action of a political campaign, you’ll seldom see the inside of a political campaign office except for the time around when you’re shooting. With the advent of FreeConferenceCall.com and email, you can do your work from almost anywhere, and lots of people do. So the joys of staying up all night stapling signs to wooden posts has vanished. Many feel this shouldn’t be the way campaigns are run. People should work for campaigns out of love and passion, and not as mercenaries. But experience matters. I’ve had the honor of having worked in 41 states. There are meaningful differences between Hawaii and Alaska and New Jersey. And over 22 years of doing this work I’ve made most of the major mistakes by now, and want to avoid them. (The time I faxed a poll draft to a Republican congressional office. The time I shipped an ad with a typo, leaving the L out of “Public Instruction.” So experience matters.) Our job is to get people elected, not improve civic dialogue, not educate. We’re trying to find the shortest distance between A and B. There are externalities. There’s a legitimate concern about paid media driving

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money in politics. Advertising costs are the culprit. Media is changing. These things all mean campaigns cost more and candidates and politicians have less time to spend with voters. We deal with the system as it exists. Citizens United was bad for democracy but good for business. I’d still like to see it overturned. Media consultant is one of the jobs they don’t tell you about in high school guidance, like hand model, and if you’re inventive, hard-working, diplomatic, and thick skinned it could be the job for you.

Notes 1. The author wishes to give specific thanks to several people who helped write or review this chapter. Janet Katowitz of Sage Media gave extensive guidance on media purchasing. Kevin Walling and Kelly Gibson provided terrific assistance on the general topic of digital advertising. Brad Todd gave a helpful review from his perspective as a Republican media consultant. Sarah McCreary, one of the best writers in the paid media business, was enormously helpful in editing and reviewing this prose. Thank you so much to all of you! 2. Brownell, Kathryn Cramer. 2016. “This Is How Presidential Campaign Ads First Got on TV.” TIME Magazine, August 30. 3. Koblin, John. 2016. “How Much Do We Love TV? Let Us Count the Ways.” New York Times, June 16. 4. Koblin, John. 2016. “How Much Do We Love TV? Let Us Count the Ways.” New York Times, June 16. 5. www.nielsen.com/intl-campaigns/us/dma-maps.html.

11 From Radio to Twitter The Evolution of Earned Media Ed O’Keefe

“Without the tweets, I wouldn’t be here.”

President Trump admitted that to the Financial Times in April 2017, nearly 100 days into a presidency once widely considered improbable. Like him or loathe him, Trump’s tweets and the reams of headlines and thousands of hours of cable news chatter they generated helped elect him president of the United States. He earned the attention by outhustling the competition that relied mostly on expensive, top-flight consultants who had run successful presidential campaigns in years past—but who failed miserably in 2016. Trump revolutionized the way we think about “earned media,” or news coverage of any event, statement, or appearance by a political candidate or elected official that generates headlines. The fastest, easiest way for a political figure to earn media in the modern age is through social media—most especially the 280-character messages sent via Twitter that Trump sent during his campaign, especially at early and late hours of the day when he knew they could capture maximum attention. In the view of this author, earned media can be announcements made during a news conference or issued in a news release, comments made in an interview on television, radio, or a podcast. Or images posted on ­Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat. Given the wide use of social media,

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it is far easier for politicos to “earn” media attention in today’s fasterpaced, media-saturated society. “I have over 100 million followers between Facebook, Twitter [and] Instagram,” Trump told the Financial Times in that April 2017 interview. “Over 100 million. I don’t have to go to the fake media.”1 What makes Trump’s earned media strategy so much more effective is that he insists that any information he shares through his social media accounts or his press secretary in the White House briefing room—and only his version of events—is the truth. Anything else—especially what he deems to be critical coverage of him—is considered “fake news,” an unfortunate moniker that is working for him and eroding the nation’s trust in nonpartisan news media. “I think what he does on Twitter is extraordinary,” Trump’s former senior advisor Steve Bannon said of the president’s earned media strategy in a September 2017 interview on CBS’s 60 Minutes. “He disintermediates the media. He goes above their head and talks directly to the ­American people.”2 Much of the noise, controversy, or news coverage of the president’s tweets is driven, Bannon said, by the “pearl-clutching mainstream media” and “what they deem is not correct, what they deem is not right.” “He knows he’s speaking directly to the people who put him in office when he uses Twitter,” Bannon explained. “And it sometimes is not in the custom and tradition of what the opposition party deems is appropriate. You’re – you’re absolutely correct, it’s not. And he’s not gonna stop.” And why should he? Trump masterfully figured out how to win the presidency in 2016—by appearing not to really have a strategy at all, by causing chaos every single day and scrambling the news agenda. Those of us who cover Trump’s Washington are exhausted and still adjusting to the faster pace. That’s exactly how the president—and his supporters—want it. But what Trump is doing is no different than what’s been done by presidential candidates and presidents over the course of American history in the age of mass media age that stretches over the last 85 years or so. It’s just that he’s doing it at a time when media consumption is coarser, more bifurcated, and faster. In 2016, the media research firm MediaQuant estimated that Trump earned more than $6 billion in free, or earned, media over the course of the presidential campaign. By contrast, his Democratic opponent, ­Hillary Clinton, barely reached the equivalent $3 billion in earned media coverage.



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In her analysis, MediaQuant researcher Mary Harris wrote that she didn’t like using the term “free media” because: Donald Trump earned his media coverage. He earned it from his bombastic and insulting statements, he earned it from pulling in massive crowds to his rallies, and he earned it from winning primary after primary. Whether by design or accident, he bypassed paid advertising to bask in the attention and validation of a 24hour news cycle.3

Trump topped Clinton in every medium—online, broadcast, on blogs, Twitter—even in newspapers. According to Harris’s research, Trump earned more than three and a half times the media value of Barack Obama in 2012 and more than six times that of Mitt Romney. That’s a testament to the pace of Trump’s churn but also how the amount of news media coverage of the presidential election mushroomed in just four years. Whether what Trump did is the exception to earned media strategies of the past or the new way of doing business will be debated for years to come and may not be known for sure until at least after the 2024 elections. What makes the 2016 presidential campaign cycle so incredible in this regard is that the amount of paid political advertising barely increased despite the multiscreen universe we live in. Advertisers can now reach consumers on a conventional television, on their mobile device, while scrolling through Facebook—even on screens at gas stations. But Trump found a way to earn more media than anyone else—and paid very little comparatively on traditional advertising. The nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics determined that the total cost of the election was nearly $6.5 billion, a 3% increase from 2012’s figure of just under $6.3 billion. Adjusted for inflation, it led to a drop of about 1.4%—a similar decline from cycles dating back to 2010. CRP concluded that the presidential race was responsible, in large part, for keeping the tally down in 2016. Trump was able to use his earned media to his advantage by not spending nearly as much to reach voters. Overall, the 19 presidential candidates and various outside groups spent just under $2.4 billion, less in actual dollars than the 2008 and 2012 races. Congressional races, on the other hand—where it’s far harder for a candidate to break through—were pricier than ever, totaling more than

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$4 billion, compared to $3.8 billion in 2014 and under $3.7 billion in 2012, CRP said. Now that he’s president, Trump is also transforming how reporters cover government. No longer must we wait for the daily White House press briefing from the press secretary, or even bother to call sources to see what’s going on—the president is setting the agenda even before we get out of bed. No, really. Since the start of the administration, few days have gone by without Trump taking to Twitter before 7 a.m. to share his thoughts on the situation in Iraq, China, North Korea, or Venezuela. He’s commented on crime in Chicago, the national anthem, and certain Democrats and Republicans serving in Congress that he feels have crossed him. And that’s just before the sun comes up. Everything the president says is news, no matter how it’s conveyed. When I was with the Washington Post, the White House reporting team grew from four reporters to as many as eight, assigned to cover the ­minute-by-minute action and keep tabs on the ongoing investigations, the shifting mood of his supporters across the country, and the broader administration. Shortly after Trump took office, members of the team took turns each week, waking up by 6 a.m. to be poised to write about the president’s early-morning tweets. The on-duty reporter at times has to stay perched for news until midnight, since the president is known to share his thoughts late into the evening. And it means that most reporters in Washington now set phone alerts for the president’s tweets the moment he hits send. Picking up on the president’s habit, other senior government officials are adopting his tactics, a tacit acknowledgment that his strategy worked. Democratic senators like Christopher Murphy of Connecticut or Kamala Harris of California now regularly retweet the president’s comments but provide their own response—immediately serving up responses for reporters to quote. Others, like former Utah Republican Congressman Jason Chaffetz, used Facebook to announce their retirement, bypassing traditional press releases or exclusive interviews to break the news. Politicians instantly sharing their thoughts with thousands if not millions of followers does make a reporter’s life a little easier, because it’s far faster than waiting around for a spokesperson to confirm the news or for a press release to arrive in our inbox. But it’s also making our jobs far more daunting and grueling—we’re now glued to our social media streams, poised for comments that can make news and quickly rejigger the day’s top priorities.



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While Trump’s approach to generating earned media is far more scattershot than most elected leaders, most are folding social media use into far more robust, well-orchestrated media strategies that still steer a news cycle. Just because Murphy and Harris tweet or Chaffetz uses Facebook to break news doesn’t mean they aren’t also holding press conferences, sitting for television interviews, or making public appearances that generate headlines. An exchange with reporters by New Jersey Republican Governor Chris Christie explained his approach in a remarkably transparent way. In September 2017, he held an event to announce a new statewide ­program to combat the scourge of opioids. A reporter asked why the governor wasn’t providing more details about the program even as he criticizes opponents for not being specific with their own proposals. “I’m focusing this week on the programs,” he said in response. For eight years, I’ve done this. The fact is this is the way I do this. I put the programs out first, I have a theme for the week. I go to places that enforce the theme of the week and I force you guys as best I can to write about what I want you to write about.

Christie told Katie Jennings of Politico New Jersey that he didn’t plan to share more specifics because: I don’t want you to write about that part of it now. I want you to write about what I’m talking about. If I give you a choice to write about something else, guaranteed you’ll write about the other thing.

“This is complete honesty on manipulation of the media,” Christie added. This is what I’m attempting to do. I’m attempting to get you to write about what I want you to write about and if I only give you the information that I want to give you, I got a better chance. Not a good chance, but a better chance of actually getting to write what I want you to write about.4

Christie’s explanation was such a perceptive explanation of how mediasavvy pols interact with the media; why wouldn’t we mention it in a textbook explaining what earned media is all about?

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We could devote this entire chapter to how Trump masterfully earned news attention throughout his campaign by tweeting his thoughts on a whim. Let’s instead start by tracing our way to 2016 and review how we got to Trump by highlighting past examples of politicians using emerging platforms or formats to generate headlines and earn broader press coverage.

How Donald Trump Is Like Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy (Yes, Really) Two presidential pioneers in reaching over the heads media to speak directly to the American people were the two who, like Trump, understood the incredible reach of relatively young modes of communication. Just as Trump swept into the White House on the wings of Twitter, Franklin D. Roosevelt succeeded as president by dominating the radio airwaves. And John F. Kennedy may not have won the White House, or succeeded as president, if he hadn’t been so omnipresent on daytime and primetime television. Roosevelt governed during the Great Depression and, a year into his first term, millions of Americans were losing their jobs, banks were failing, and war across the world was just a few years away. Eager to stave off further economic panic, he sought to speak directly with the American people. He decided to speak out regularly on the radio, hoping to directly reach tens of millions of voters to explain his policies uninterrupted and unfiltered. It’s a format that continues today in the form of the President’s Weekly Radio Address—which now also doubles as a video message posted online. The message, no matter the subject, is aired uninterrupted by many radio and television stations or can be viewed by citizens on the White House website. The opposition party also produces a radio/video message that is also aired by many outlets. Roosevelt’s embrace of radio was an acknowledgment of quickly shifting media habits. By 1933, radio was the more popular mode of news consumption as Americans realized that a box with speakers was a faster, cheaper, easier way to be informed and entertained. “The president wants to come into your home and sit at your fireside for a little fireside chat,” CBS News Radio announcer Robert Trout explained to his listeners just before Roosevelt’s first radio address in March 1933.



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Trout’s use of the term “fireside chat” stuck—a CBS manager first coined the term to describe what the network was about to broadcast. In his first fireside chat, Roosevelt acknowledged that most of the banking regulations and legislation he was unveiling, signing, and building support for were larded with confusing jargon and that he wanted to explain things “for the benefit of the average citizen.” “I owe this in particular,” he said, “because of the fortitude and the good temper with which everybody has accepted the inconvenience and the hardships of the banking holiday.” “I know that when you understand what we in Washington have been about, I shall continue to have your cooperation as fully as I have had your sympathy and your help,” he added. Roosevelt then launched into a lesson in Banking 101—explaining in clear and concise language some of the complex realities about the nation’s financial system that many likely did not know. He explained: When you deposit money in a bank, the bank does not put the money in a safe deposit vault. It invests your money in many different forms of credit, in bonds, in commercial paper and mortgages and in many other kinds of loans. In other words, the bank puts your money to work to keep the wheels of agriculture and industry turning ‘round.

But a “general rush” on the nation’s banks had sapped the cash and gold supply, making it impossible to turn all of those bank investments into actual cash. So, Roosevelt declared a national bank holiday and launched “the government’s reconstruction of our financial and economic fabric.” Roosevelt thanked Congress for “promptly and patriotically” passing legislation that gave him more powers to control the nation’s banks and cash flow. Lawmakers “showed a devotion to public welfare” and the need to act quickly to shore up the nation’s banking system. Seeking to stave off widespread panic, Roosevelt’s calmly explained that banks would reopen in waves over the course of a week and that “we’re moving as fast as the mechanics of the situation would allow.” “I can assure you, my friends, that it is safer to keep your money in a reopened bank than it is to keep it under the mattress,” he added, saying that full cooperation in the banking system would help revive the economy.

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“I hope you can see my friends from this essential recital of what your government is doing, that there is nothing complex, nothing radical in the process,” he added in what might have been the 1930s version of a president dismissing “fake news” or “alternative facts” about the nation’s banking sector. Delivering some straight talk, Roosevelt warned listeners, “I do not promise you that every bank will be reopened or that individual losses will not be suffered.” But, he said, if he hadn’t acted, “there would have been more and greater losses had we continued to drift.” Roosevelt concluded by thanking the country for its collective, shared sacrifice: You people must have faith. You must not be stampeded by rumors or guesses. Let us unite in vanishing fear. We have provided the machinery to restore our financial system and it is up to you to support and make it work. It is your problem, my friends, your problem no less than it is mine. Together, we cannot fail.5

Roosevelt’s speech was remarkable for the times. Never before had a president so clearly and patiently explained his positions live over the air to the American public. The first speech and subsequent radio addresses were so successful—and widely quoted and analyzed in newspapers— that Roosevelt replicated the format dozens of times over the course of his presidency. At least twice a year, he discussed economic policy or aspects of World War II. The speeches—usually made from the White House Diplomatic Room, which had no actual fireplace—reached 50 million listeners—an enviable audience size by today’s standards. Roosevelt usually announced his plans to address the nation sometimes weeks in advance. Nowadays, the White House may alert television and radio networks about plans to address the nation with just a few minutes’ notice. Three decades later, another president showed how another young, increasingly popular medium could be used to reach the masses. It’s well known how John F. Kennedy effectively embraced television during his 1960 presidential campaign, skillfully using the young medium to his advantage over his Republican opponent, Richard Nixon. Once in office, Kennedy became the first president to hold regularly scheduled live televised news conferences. He held 64 by the time he



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was killed, in November 1963. They usually aired live and uninterrupted across the country, with highlights sometimes played later in the day. Kennedy’s news conferences were a stark departure from the past. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had allowed cameras at some of his press conferences in the 1950s, but their broadcast was delayed sometimes for several hours. But, by 1960, 90% of Americans households had a television, meaning Kennedy could reach millions of voters during the day or in the evening. For the first time, Americans could sit and watch the president live and unfiltered. They could see what made him tick and how he responded to the questions, and, given his telegenic appearance, could admire his youth and good humor. Just as with the radio addresses, voters had a chance to gauge their president live and unfiltered, instead of waiting for newspaper recaps. On January 25, 1961, five days after his inauguration, Kennedy summoned the press for the first time to the State Department Auditorium, a room large enough to accommodate the requisite television equipment. Incredibly, 418 people attended the news conference, according to a transcript of the exchange published by the John F. Kennedy Library.6 Kennedy called for a month-long delay in negotiations on a new atomic test ban treaty so that his young administration could study up on the issue. He announced that his government would be providing more relief for a famine in the Congo by sending 1,000 tons of food, supplies, seeds, and medical equipment to the country. Finally—in what this reporter would consider a buried lead—the president announced that two members of an Air Force spy mission had been released by the Soviet Union. Kennedy took 37 questions—on issues ranging from changes in Senate rules to potential diplomatic relations with Cuba, to whether the president would take sides in a simmering dispute among Democrats in New York—and about whether spy flights would resume over the Soviet Union. Kennedy “was articulate, thoughtful, handsome and hip, a man who could think on his feet,” Sid Davis, who covered Kennedy for NBC News and the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, told the Daily Beast in a recollection of Kennedy’s news conferences. The decision to hold live televised news conferences was welcomed, Davis told the Daily Beast, because Eisenhower had required reporters to wait for clarifications of his statements before directly quoting him.

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Eisenhower had “a syntax problem,” Davis said, prompting the White House to regularly invoke “the Hagerty Rule,” named for White House Press Secretary James Hagerty, who required reporters to wait to quote Eisenhower until the official transcript had been edited.6 At his first news conference, Kennedy was asked whether conducting live, unedited news conference was prudent, given that Eisenhower had the luxury of cleaning up his statements before their public release. “There has been some apprehension about the instantaneous broadcasts of presidential press conferences such as this one, and the contention being that an inadvertent statement is no longer correctible, as in the old days, could possibly cause some grave consequences,” a reporter said. “Do you feel that there is any risk or could you give us some thought on that?” Kennedy said he wasn’t concerned, that he believed he would still be able to correct or clarify statements and that “this system has the advantage of providing more direct communication.”7 Presidents rarely give televised news conferences anymore, unless they’re appearing alongside a world leader, concluding an overseas trip, leaving for an extended vacation, or responding to a national emergency. But Kennedy excelled in the format—and he clearly enjoyed it. He held 64 televised exchanges with the press—roughly two per month—before he was gunned down in Dallas in November 1963.

The Good, Bad, and Ugly of Earning Media on the Campaign Trail in the TV Age Television remained the dominant medium for presidents and political candidates through the end of the twentieth century. Like Roosevelt and Kennedy, every president since has used the presidential bully pulpit to its maximum potential. But the way candidates used television to reach voters began to change. In addition to buying advertising time or sitting for formal news interviews, candidates sought other ways to reach broader audiences. Let’s look at two candidates who botched what they initially thought were prime opportunities to earn maximum exposure and significant earned media—and one candidate who nailed it. Ahead of the 1980 election, with President Jimmy Carter sputtering and sagging in public opinion polls, some Democrats began clamoring



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for Massachusetts Senator Edward M. Kennedy to challenge the incumbent for his party’s nomination. The younger brother of the former president, Kennedy had long been considered a potential presidential contender by virtue of his family lineage. Realizing that Carter was in trouble and amid a groundswell of grassroots support, Kennedy began mulling a presidential bid and was handed an enviable opportunity: the chance to participate in a CBS primetime documentary about his career and potential campaign. The hour-long special would be seen by millions and could quickly vault him into serious consideration for the White House. But Kennedy found a way to blow a sure thing and what transpired is an example of a candidate failing lofty expectations and of an ill-­prepared staff failing the boss in a big moment. “Why do you want to be president?”—it’s a simple question that CBS News correspondent Roger Mudd asked Kennedy during the documentary. When asked, Kennedy sputtered. “Well, I’m, uh, were I to make the announcement to run the reasons that I would run is because I have a great belief in this country that it is – there’s more natural resources than any nation in the world,” Kennedy said. Mudd later recalled in an interview with the Boston Globe that Kennedy’s response “was almost a parody of a politician’s answer.” “I don’t want to be known and don’t think I should be known as the man who brought Teddy Kennedy down,” Mudd added in that Globe interview. “I was the man who did an interview with him that was not helpful.”8 It was unhelpful because it exposed Kennedy as unprepared, or perhaps even unwilling, to completely devote himself to a presidential campaign. Why do you want to be president is a fundamental questions for any candidate—and if they can’t answer it quickly and definitively, perhaps they should look for a new line of work. Kennedy also struggled with questions about a July 1969 car crash in Chappaquiddick Island, Massachusetts. that left a young woman dead. Kennedy crashed his vehicle off a one-lane bridge into the water. He broke free and left the scene, but left behind Mary Jo Kopechne, a 28-year-old companion, who died. The senator later pleaded guilty to a charge of leaving the scene of a crash—a setback that played a role in his decision to pass on running for president in 1972 and 1976.

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Kennedy had never answered questions about the case on television and sparred with Mudd during the documentary. It once again exposed him as unable to answer basic questions about his political intentions or his past behavior. Kennedy ran for president in 1980 but came up short. He never ran again. The documentary wasn’t his campaign’s death knell but it didn’t help. Nearly a decade later, another Massachusetts Democrat, Governor Michael Dukakis, earned his party’s presidential nomination and was mounting a tougher-than-anticipated challenge against then-Vice President George H. W. Bush. But Dukakis had a problem: He was perceived as weak on national security issues when matched against Bush, a sitting vice president, a former CIA director, envoy to China, and military veteran. So, Dukakis campaign aides came up with a plan: have the governor visit a Michigan tank manufacturer to ride around in a tank in full military gear before giving a major policy address on defense spending. “It was a manifestly ridiculous thing to do and we shouldn’t have done it,” campaign aide Matt Bennett recalled in a 2013 Politico interview about what many have dubbed the worst political photo-op in American history.9 Dukakis, just five-foot-eight, came zipping out of a hangar standing aloft in the tank shaft as it sped along a practice course. He was wearing an oversized helmet—later dubbed a “Snoopy hat” by Bush campaign aides—and a jumpsuit. Despite the military gear, Dukakis kept on his black dress shoes. More than 90 reporters witnessed the spectacle, including topnotch network correspondents and well-known national newspaper reporters. “They started laughing at him. I remember Sam Donaldson l­aughing – some of them were laughing so hard they were kind of doubled over. … I knew we were in trouble,” Bennett told Politico.9 Television footage of the scene is peppered with reporters roaring. “He’s got a helmet on. He’s tough s— now,” one reporter said. “Everyone around me in the press corps was doing the same thing. Either laughing, or pointing or looking at each other like, ‘What’s this? How can he do this to himself?’” then-ABC News correspondent ­Donaldson recalled in an interview with FiveThirtyEight.com.10 Donaldson and other television reporters ran the footage of ­Dukakis in the tank in news reports and made little mention of his



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studious defense policy speech. Newspapers also excoriated Dukakis the next day. “Forget John Wayne and Clint Eastwood. Forget Rambo. Meet Macho Mike Dukakis,” Bernard Weinraub wrote in the New York Times. “At least that’s what his image makers are struggling to convey.” During the event, “Mr. Dukakis spent an inordinate amount of time showing he wasn’t one of those pasty, buttoned-up Cambridge types, soft on defense. The kind of fellow George Bush rails against,” Weinraub wrote.11 Bush campaign aides saw the footage and immediately realized its potential. Sig Rogich, Bush’s lead advertising advisor, quickly obtained footage of the tank ride and spliced it into an ad raising doubts about Dukakis’s defense priorities. With footage of Dukakis in the tank playing on screen, an announcer ominously noted that he opposed several Reagan and Bush defense decisions. “America can’t afford that risk,” the announcer concluded. “Here was a guy who was wearing what looked like a Snoopy-dog hat and he wanted to be commander-in-chief of our country,” Rogich recalled in an interview with Politico. “I was shocked that they put him in that setting.”12 The tank incident wasn’t the singular event that upended Dukakis’s campaign, but it contributed to his downfall and remains one of the best examples of how earned media strategies can backfire. Bill Clinton, meanwhile, used earned media to his skilled advantage. Presidents and presidential candidates had appeared on nonnews television programs frequently through the years. John F. Kennedy guested on The Tonight Show with Jack Paar in 1960. Richard M. Nixon made a five-second cameo on Laugh In during the 1968 presidential campaign. Gary Hart appeared on Saturday Night Live during the 1984 campaign cycle. But none of those presidential candidates could rock a pair of sunglasses and play the saxophone. Bill Clinton did it in 1992, not only because he could but also because he wanted to draw stylistic and generational contrasts with Bush, who was old enough to be Clinton’s father. Eager to reach younger and urban voters—the base of the Democratic Party and the kind of voter less inclined to back Bush—Clinton appeared on The Arsenio Hall Show in June 1992. At the time, Hall was the younger alternative to NBC’s The Tonight Show with Johnny Carson and was not a typical stop for presidential candidates.

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As the show began, Clinton stood jamming with the house band, wearing dark sunglasses owned by his advisor Paul Begala, playing “Heartbreak Hotel” as Hall walked on stage. “The big man,” Hall said with wonderment as the song wrapped up. “You can’t beat that.”13 The appearance was widely panned in the press and by GOP critics. ABC News anchor Barbara Walters dismissed the appearance as “undignified.” “It was not the kind of television performance Presidential candidates typically give, but it is not likely to be the last,” the New York Times wrote. The Times noted that perhaps “the greatest benefit of appearing in unconventional settings is that it can help generate more conventional coverage.” In other words, it generated earned media. “The trick is to say something on Arsenio Hall that will be picked up by the news shows and newspapers,” the Times added.14 The idea for Clinton’s appearance was hatched by his media strategist, Mandy Grunwald, then a 34-year-old whiz kid, who told the Washington Post’s Howard Kurtz in an interview that “It’s a lot more important to get five pages in People magazine than five minutes on ‘MacNeil/Lehrer,’”— then the name of PBS’s nightly news program. “Grunwald’s challenge was to end-run the establishment press, to find ways of painting a more personal picture of Bill Clinton in the era of the 7.3-second sound bite,” Kurtz wrote: The result was the Arsenio strategy, hitting every talk show all the way to MTV. “The nature of what makes it to the evening news is an attack or a proposal,” she says. “The question is how you reach people who don’t care about the evening news and don’t read the New York Times.”15

Grunwald’s strategy worked so brilliantly that it’s now a signature move for particular ambitious politicos. It’s now just as common to find senators, governors, presidential candidates and presidents on a late-night talk show as it is to see them on Face the Nation. Clinton’s appearance on Hall’s show not only humanized him but also brought the presidency closer to earth. Roosevelt drew Americans closer in by intimately explaining complex economic policy and Kennedy did it by exploiting his telegenic good looks and charm live and unfiltered on television.



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Whether Clinton’s appearance was dignified or just a nod to reality will be debated for perpetuity. This author would argue that his appearance on Hall’s show and subsequent interviews on daytime talk shows like Phil Donahue and on MTV opened up a far more personal, candid, and coarser style of campaigning that has played out ever since. Regardless, Clinton playing “Heartbreak Hotel” on Hall’s show stands the test of time and is considered a signature achievement of presidential campaigns. (Fun fact: He also played “God Bless the Child” with the Hall’s house band—sans glasses.) Clinton won the presidency, a new way of reaching voters was born— and the moment proved so historic that Begala’s sunglasses ended up on display at Clinton’s presidential library in Arkansas.

The Good, Bad, and Ugly of Earning Media on the Campaign Trail in the Internet Age Up until 2008, modern presidential campaigns had relied on television to reach the masses. But 2008 was “the YouTube election”—the year when campaigns could quickly and directly reach voters without the filter of newscasts, talk shows or paid advertising directly over the internet. There were presidential debates built around questions submitted by YouTube users. For the first time, campaigns released “online video ads” never intended to air as a traditional TV advertisement but instead to serve as video press releases to be written about in newspapers and overanalyzed on cable television news channels, for free. It was a cheaper, faster way to earn free media and it worked. Reporters wrote about the videos, TV and radio shows aired the video and audio—and the attention helped spread a candidate’s message. The newness of the approach also spawned separate headlines and analysis but also meant even more exposure for the content candidates were publishing. When Hillary Clinton launched her 2008 presidential campaign, she didn’t hold a campaign rally, sit for a network television interview, or play an instrument on a late-night talk show. Instead, she made the announcement from her living room in a video that lasted less than two minutes. “I’m beginning a conversation with you, with America. Because we all need to be part of the discussion if we’re all going to be part of the solution,” she told viewers.

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“After six years of George Bush, it is time to renew the promise of America,” Clinton said later: Our basic bargain – that no matter who you are, or where you live, if you work hard and play by the rules, you can build a good life for yourself and your family. I grew up in a middle-class family in the middle of America and we believed in that promise. I still do.

Let’s talk, let’s chat, let’s start a dialogue about your ideas and mine,” she said. “Because the conversation in Washington has been just a little one-sided lately, don’t you think? And we can all see how well that works. While I can’t visit everyone’s living room, I can try. And with a little help from modern technology, I’ll be holding live online video chats this week. Let the conversation begin. I have a feeling it’s going to be very interesting.16 Live online video chats? Presidential campaigns were changing once again. Presidential candidates had announced their intentions before in video messages. Ronald Reagan produced a seven-minute video when he launched his 1980 presidential campaign. But Reagan couldn’t email his supporters a link to the production or expect his fans to share it with others. Cable news channels didn’t exist yet, so Reagan’s footage didn’t air on a continuous loop. By 2008, the growth and growing dependability of online video meant candidates could now go directly to people with a video message. In turn, TV and radio channels had no choice but to use the video in their reports, because the message, after all, was news. What political reporters might not easily concede, however, is that this cheaper, faster way to reach voters also made life a little easier for the overworked, deadline-driven media to tell the story of the day. By producing the video content, it also easily provided content for TV producers desperate to fill 24/7-news void. Using online video to announce a presidential campaign seemed like a smart thing to do—but campaigns stooped to another level by producing content merely for the sake of generating buzz, or going viral and earning even more free media. At a time when the internet—and internet video—was an increasingly popular form of news and entertainment, the attempts often worked.



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At the height of the 2008 Democratic presidential primary, HBO’s popular series The Sopranos ended its six-year run. Hoping to capture the nostalgia for the show—and generate buzz among HBO-watching voters—the Clinton campaign released a Sopranos spoof to coincide with a fundraising push. The entire scene mimicked the closing moments of the series finale. As the song “Don’t Stop Believin’” by the band Journey played on a ­loudspeaker—just as it did on the show—Clinton walks in, just as Carmela Soprano did on the show. Bill Clinton shows up in a short-sleeved untucked shirt, similar to Tony Soprano’s outfit. The couple sits reminiscing—as The Sopranos did—as Chelsea Clinton struggles to parallel park outside, similar to a scene on the show. Even Vincent Curatola, who played John “Johnny Sack” Sacramoni on the HBO program, made a cameo. Ultimately, Clinton announced that she had selected Celine Dion’s “You and I” as her campaign theme song. But that didn’t matter. The video was designed to address one of Clinton’s weaknesses. As the Washington Post stated, Clinton was “not exactly Mrs. Hip in the pop culture department”—she was the older alternative to then-Senator Barack Obama, who was beginning to jump ahead of her in the polls. “Clinton’s camp is pushing hard for video cred, and yesterday’s effort is proof,” Jose Antonio Vargas wrote in the Post. “Forget that the self-­ inflicted analogy – the Clintons as the Sopranos – might be too irresistible for her detractors.”17 Obama’s viral hits were far more organic—not even produced by the campaign but by supporters. Model-turned-actress Amber Lee Ettinger quickly became known as “Obama Girl” in a video that had her espousing her “crush” on the Democratic contender while heels, cutoff shorts, and tight T-shirts. You seemed to float onto the floor At the Democratic convention 2004. I never wanted anybody more than I want you. So, I put down my Kerry sign. Knew I had to make you mine. Smart, black and sexy, you’re so fine. ‘Cause I got a crush on Obama.

Was it cringe-worthy? Oh yes. Corny? Absolutely. But the footage of the music video played continuously for several days on television, generating

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more free press for Obama, spreading his message across the internet and boosting interest and support among young, tech-savvy voters. Even more notable was “Yes, We Can,” a video co-produced by r­ apper will.i.am and director Jesse Dylan and featuring celebrities including John Legend, Scarlett Johansson, and Kareem Abdul-Jabbar. The fourand-a-half-minute song blended clips from Obama’s speech the night he lost the 2008 New Hampshire primary with singers and actors reading or singing the same lines. The juxtaposition was a powerful visual—and signaled that Obama was organically building a multigenerational, multiethnic coalition of voters. His campaign had nothing to do with the production—but certainly welcomed the help. “The intention was to make a really simple thing. … It was like, ‘Super Tuesday’s coming, let’s try and get this up, maybe it can help a bit,’” Dylan explained to the Washington Post’s Teresa Wiltz. “We weren’t doing it for the campaign. We were doing it for what [Obama] said in the speech. … I believe the words he had to say.”18 Realizing how pervasive the trend was spreading, news organizations began devoting entire blogs to track online videos. One of my first assignments as a young political reporter was to anchor a blog called Channel ‘08 that chronicled the best—and not so great—attempts at viral video, “video press releases,” and other online trends. But by 2016 such online content was so embedded in our culture that such a blog was no longer necessary. In fact, basically anything posted online became the main headline of the day.

Will Earning Media the ‘Modern Day Presidential’ Way Stick? If 2008 was the YouTube election, then 2016 was the Twitter election. By early 2015—before most candidates officially declared plans to run for president—Twitter was already transforming the way we covered elections and generally transforming political dialogue. Suddenly, 140 characters typed out on a phone or computer could earn more attention than a thousand-word speech or 30-second television commercial. Early in 2015, editors assigned me to cover the campaign of former ­Florida Governor Jeb Bush. The son and brother of former presidents, he was the early front-runner and quickly amassed tens of millions of dollars for a Super PAC that he helped launch before his campaign. Bush’s decision to start a PAC, then divorce himself from it to avoid violating campaign



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finance laws was a test of campaign laws and designed to scare off potential opponents he expected would be unable to match his cash haul. But, as Bush began to learn in the spring of 2015, campaign cash didn’t matter as much anymore. Bush hadn’t campaigned for political office since 2002, when he won reelection as Florida governor. His last campaign had been well before YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram transformed not only political campaigns but also American society. He was rusty. He was too wonky at a time when GOP primary voters were stark raving mad and eager for fundamental change in Washington. In the eyes of primary voters, the son and brother of a former president didn’t really cut it. Bush’s inability to articulate his family’s legacy—and how it fit into his campaign—tripped him up early on and led to a multiday disaster that played out across cable television and talk radio and generated awkward moments with voters that went viral. Trump quickly seized on his rival’s stumble and never looked back. In May 2015, Bush agreed to an interview with Megyn Kelly, then a popular Fox News anchor whom many Republicans wanted to speak with in order to reach her roughly two million viewers and because they expected—wrongly—that she might go easy on GOP candidates, given her network’s conservative tilt. During the interview, Kelly asked Bush: Knowing what we know now, would you have authorized the invasion of Iraq? “I would have and so would have Hillary Clinton, just to remind everybody. And so would have almost everybody that was confronted with the intelligence that they got,” Bush said. “You don’t think it was a mistake?” Kelly asked. “In retrospect, the intelligence that everybody saw – that the world saw – was faulty. And in retrospect, once we, once we, um, invaded and took out Saddam Hussein, we didn’t focus on security first. And the Iraqis, in this incredibly insecure environment, turned on the United States military,” Bush replied. “By the way,” he added later, “guess who thinks that those mistakes took place as well? George W. Bush.” “Your brother,” Kelly said. “Yeah, I mean, so just a newsflash to the world, if they’re trying to find places where there are big spaces between me and my brother, this might not be one of them.”19 Not only did Bush fail to provide a clear answer, he came across as trapped and grew incredibly defensive and somewhat sarcastic over the

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course of just a few seconds. By roping in Hillary Clinton, Bush hoped to rope in the Democratic front-runner and deflect the question, but she had spent years apologizing for her vote as a U.S. senator to authorize the war in Iraq. Bush spent three arduous days explaining, reexplaining, defending, and ultimately clarifying his answer to Kelly. He did it during interviews on Sean Hannity’s radio program. He did it in public appearances closely scrutinized by reporters. And then the issue earned even more attention when, with cameras rolling, a college student confronted Bush and accused his brother the former president of being responsible for the creation of the Islamic State terror group. Watching from afar was Trump, who succinctly and brutally called out Bush in a tweet that took very little effort and involved no consultation with high-priced consultants. “Jeb Bush really blew his interview with @megynkelly - should cost him big time. Said he would do the disastrous Iraq war all over again,” Trump tweeted.20 Realizing his attack had succeeded, Trump pounced again a few days later, this time not only going after Bush’s authenticity but that of Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), another would-be opponent that Trump knew he’d have to surpass to win the nomination. “I laugh when I see Marco Rubio and Jeb Bush pretending to ‘love’ each other, with each talking of their great friendship. Typical phony pols,” Trump tweeted.21 Trump kept at it with tweets and later, nicknames. He said Bush had “low energy.” He called Rubio “Little.” He labeled Clinton “crooked.” The brutal descriptions were catnip for Twitter—and the political press documented it all. Trump was articulating the feelings of many of his would-be supporters, who appreciated that he conveyed his views in a caustic manner. No other candidate replicated the authentic, immediate way Trump shared his views. Within weeks, Trump’s explicit attacks and the fact that he was lobbing them via Twitter were topic number one. He realized he could easily drive the news agenda with his sharp attacks, so he did. Notably, while moving images had driven previous elections, Trump earned his free media with just a few written words. When he did use video, it usually involved just quick bites released in odd or unexpected ways.



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In November 2015, as primary rival Ben Carson jumped in the polls, Trump posted a video including footage of Carson describing a childhood incident when he lost his temper and tried to stab a friend. “Violent criminal? Or pathological liar? We don’t need either as president,” text on screen said after the quick Carson clip. “Happy Friday the 13th,” Trump tweeted with a link to the video.22 The odd nature of the attack, the odd way that Trump unveiled the attack, and the validity of Trump’s accusations dominated the news all weekend, giving Trump yet another boost. We know what happened next. Trump cleared the field and used the tactics he’d honed during the GOP primary against Clinton. Trump’s relentless attempts to earn media attention as a candidate paid off, but he has suffered as president. A Washington Post-ABC News poll from July 2017 found that 67% of Americans believed he should stop tweeting. Seventy percent believe he was generally acting in an unpresidential manner. Just a few days before the poll’s release, Trump defended his tactics about Twitter on Twitter, naturally. “My use of social media is not Presidential - it’s MODERN DAY ­PRESIDENTIAL,” he tweeted. “Make America Great Again!”23 In that Financial Times interview, Trump also conceded that his prolific social media use might not always work to his advantage: “You know if you issue hundreds of tweets, and every once in a while you have a clinker, that’s not so bad.”24

Conclusion Trump figured out the best way to interact and win over voters in this moment—and how to use that outreach as a way to earned news coverage. While the tone and focus of the president’s tweets may be caustic and petty, it has captured the world’s attention and continues to drive the news agenda. The tenor of the current president’s media strategy may be more brusque than his predecessors, but, as this chapter has demonstrated, what Trump is doing is not much different than what many previous presidents understood: If you can understand and make use of the most popular medium of the moment, you’ll reach the American public and easily catch the attention of the press.

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Notes 1. Barber, Lionel, Demetri Sevastopulo, and Gillian Tett. 2017. “Donald Trump: Without Twitter, I Would Not Be Here – FT Interview.” Financial Times, 2 April 2017, www.ft.com/content/943e322a-178a-11e7-9c35-0dd2cb31823a. 2. Rose, Charlie. 2017. “Breitbart’s Bannon Declares War on GOP.” 60 Minutes, www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-breitbart-steve-bannon-declareswar-on-the-gop. 3.  Harris, Mary. 2016. “A Media Post-Mortem on the 2016 Presidential Election.” MediaQuant, November 14, www.mediaquant.net/2016/11/a-media-postmortem-on-the-2016-presidential-election. 4. Jennings, Katie. 2017. “New Jersey Pro: What You Missed This Week.” Politico Pro New Jersey, September 22, www.politico.com/pro/blog/ new-jersey-breaking-news-september-22-2017. 5. “Moving Image Section—Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division.” The Library of Congress, https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/ awhhtml/awmi10/television.html 6. Clift, Eleanor. 2017. “How President John F. Kennedy Invented the Modern Press Conference.” Daily Beast, May 23, www.thedailybeast.com/ how-president-john-f-kennedy-invented-the-modern-press-conference. 7. “President Kennedy’s News Conferences: News Conference 1, January 25, 1961.” The John F. Kennedy Library, www.jfklibrary.org/Research/­ResearchAids/Ready-Reference/Press-Conferences/News-Conference-1.aspx. 8. Silvio, Ann, and Scott LaPierre. 2009. “Ted Kennedy, Part 5: ‘Why do you want to be president?’” BostonGlobe.com, www.youtube.com/watch?v= e5TkhNWPspM. 9. Sobocinski, Matt. 2013. “Dukakis and the Tank: The Making of a Political Disaster.” Politico, www.youtube.com/watch?v=uBlEOvIBTEs. 10. Reid, Jason. 2016. “Film: How to Destroy a Presidential Candidate.” ESPN Films/FiveThirtyEight.com, http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/filmhow-to-destroy-a-presidential-candidate. 11. Weinraub, Bernard. 1988. “Campaign Trail; Loaded for Bear and then Some.” New York Times, September 14, www.nytimes.com/1988/09/14/us/ campaign-trail-loaded-for-bear-and-then-some.html. 12. Sobocinski, 2013. 13. The Arsenio Hall Show, June 3, 1992, www.youtube.com/watch?v= YqB7UEdhKug. 14. Kolbert, Elizabeth. 1992. “The 1992 Campaign: Media; Whistle-Stops a la 1992: Arsenio, Larry and Phil.” New York Times, June 5, www.nytimes. com/1992/06/05/us/the-1992-campaign-media-whistle-stops-a-la-1992arsenio-larry-and-phil.html.



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15. Kurtz, Howard. 1992. “The Woman Who Put Clinton on ‘Arsenio.’” Washington Post, August 10, www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1992/ 08/10/the-woman-who-put-clinton-on-arsenio/6b29669b-4daf-4063-8c20810993d13193/?utm_term=.ee38724a128e. 16. “Hillary Clinton’s 2008 Announcement Video,” January 20, 2007, www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/hillary-clintons-2008-presidentialannouncement/2015/04/10/b972ae92-df9a-11e4-b6d7-b9bc8acf16f7_video. html?utm_term=.29ebab5bf37d. 17. Vargas, Jose Antonio. 2007. “Hillary Clinton Rides ‘Sopranos’ Coattails in Video Spoof of Finale.” Washington Post, June 20, www.pressreader.com/ usa/the-washington-post/20070620/282235186242172. 18. Wiltz, Teresa. 2008. “For a Generation, Obama Video Evokes Dream of the Past.” Washington Post, February 6, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2008/02/05/AR2008020503765.html. 19. Kelly, Megyn. 2015. “Exclusive: Jeb Bush Interview.” The Kelly File, www.youtube.com/watch?v=AXy9TnjoVqE. 20. @realDonaldTrump, Donald J. Trump, May 12, 2015. Twitter, https:// twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/598299315912716288. 21. @realDonaldTrump, Donald J. Trump, May 17, 2015. Twitter, https:// twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/600117133184466944. 22. Video posted on Donald Trump’s Instagram Account, November 13, 2015, www.instagram.com/p/-B_ci4mhdA/?hl=en. 23. @realDonaldTrump, Donald J. Trump, July 1, 2017. Twitter, https:// twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/881281755017355264. 24. Barber, Lionel, Demetri Sevastopulo, and Gillian Tett. 2017. “Donald Trump: Without Twitter, I Would Not Be Here – FT Interview.” Financial Times, 2 April, www.ft.com/content/943e322a-178a-11e7-9c35-0dd2cb31823a

Part IV Financing Elections

How a campaign spends money is just as important as how much money is raised. Much has been written about the fundraising prowess of the 2016 Clinton campaign and Obama’s campaigns in 2008 and 2012. In many ways, Obama changed the way that money is raised in presidential elections. Bernie Sanders and Trump adopted and benefitted from Obama’s fundraising expertise. Any serious campaign for federal office requires a sophisticated online fundraising component. Trump, Clinton, Obama, and Romney all raised record amounts of money—over a billion dollars (which includes money raised during both the primary and general election). Money has become important in twenty-first-century politics, as shown by the precedent-setting six-billion-dollar 2012 election cycle, but how important was money in the 2016 elections? Anthony Corrado, author of Chapter 12, and Sam Garrett, author of Chapter 13, are two political scientists who study campaign finance. They offer complementary perspectives on the importance of the money chase in campaigns. Both scholars describe how election campaigns organize their finance efforts, focusing on changes in campaign finance law and on where the campaign money came from, how it was collected, and how it was spent. Campaign money can raise legal and ethical questions that may become an issue in a campaign, something Obama avoided in 2008 and 2012. Skillful use of money is central to a campaign strategy.

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Professor Corrado analyzes the new cycle of strategies and tactics of campaign fundraising in the post–Citizens United world. The fundraising activity in 2016 was built upon practices that had been used in recent elections, but it evolved because of more permissive rules on ­campaign funding established well in advance of the election. He highlights the major change that has taken place in the ways candidates, parties, and nonparty organizations raise money. Corrado shows that the 2016 ­election offered a new strategy to presidential fundraising, one in which ­multimillion-dollar donors and Super PACs (political action committees) played a major role, the era of the megadoner. He also concludes that Trump did not need or use as much money in his primary and general election campaigns as other candidates because of his massive amount of earned media. Sam Garrett’s Chapter 13, “Outside Money and Inside Policy: C ­ ampaign Finance Before and After Citizens United,” describes the complex rules of campaign finance and shows how contribution limits and r­ eporting requirements apply to various people and groups. He details substantial changes in permissible campaign spending for the 2016 campaigns. His analysis of campaign finance history serves as an important reminder that the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision was the culmination of decades of debate about what should be permitted in campaign finance. Garrett’s history of campaign finance law shows that it has remained more or less constant for more than 40 years. He discusses three factors that have shaped federal campaign finance law: 1) congressional limits on contributions in an effort to reduce the potential for corruption motivated by political money; 2) occasional congressional attempts to limit spending— distinct from contributions—although the Supreme Court has generally declared spending restrictions unconstitutional; and 3) congressional requirements to disclose information about which people and groups contribute to campaigns or independently spend funds to influence elections.

12 Candidate Campaign Fundraising Strategies Anthony Corrado1

Donald Trump’s unlikely and unorthodox path to the presidency defied conventional political thinking in many ways, particularly with respect to the role of money in presidential campaigns. At a time when fundraising success is considered a sign of a candidate’s viability and an essential element of a winning campaign, Trump began his bid for office by dismissing the need to raise money. In announcing his candidacy, he declared: “I don’t need anybody’s money. I’m using my own money … I’m not using donors.”2 Trump did rely on his own money as his principal source of campaign funds during the primaries, but he changed his strategy in advance of the general election and began to solicit contributions, although he did not begin to do so until late June of the election year, a time well beyond the point when other recent nominees had begun their general election fundraising and long after his opponent, ­Hillary ­Clinton, had begun to raise general election funds.3 Consequently, in both the primary and general elections, Trump took an unconventional approach to fundraising and lagged well behind his opponents in the race for campaign dollars. He thus became the first candidate in the modern era of campaign finance, which began with the adoption of the 1974 ­Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), to win the presidency despite being significantly outspent by his opponents.

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Trump was not the only candidate to adopt an approach that challenged conventional fundraising strategies. In the Democratic presidential race, Bernie Sanders made the role of money in politics a centerpiece of his progressive campaign platform, decrying the influence of wealthy interests in the political system, warning of the dangers of unlimited contributions by millionaires and billionaires to Super PACs and “dark money” groups, and calling for a reversal of the Supreme Court’s 2010 Citizens United decision. His campaign message energized grassroots activists and allowed him to mount an unexpectedly strong bid for the nomination. In a campaign reminiscent of Obama’s in 2008, Sanders mobilized an army of small donors, who became the foundation of his fundraising efforts. But, unlike Obama, Sanders relied almost exclusively on small donations and saw no need to participate in traditional fundraising events or make appeals to large donors. He thus demonstrated the power of social media and online platforms, and the viability of a small donor–based approach to campaign fundraising. While the presidential race was characterized by diverse and innovative approaches to fundraising, the congressional races largely reflected the well-established patterns of recent elections. In almost all cases, the candidate who won a House or Senate seat was the candidate who spent the most money. According to an analysis conducted by the nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics, the biggest spender won in 94% of Senate races and 96% of House races in 2016, as compared to 92% and 94% respectively in 2014, and 70% and 92% in 2012.4 Most of the money received by the candidates was raised by incumbents, who were able to outspend their challengers, in most instances by significant amounts, as has been the case in every election since the FECA was adopted. The most financially competitive congressional races took place in marginal districts or states, and open-seat contests where the outcomes were uncertain and the results would determine majority control of ­Congress, again following the pattern of recent elections. Winning a majority in Congress has always been a political party’s goal in congressional elections, but this objective has become especially important given the highly polarized political environment that has come to characterize congressional politics. Given the deep partisan divide in Congress, majority control equates to control of the legislative agenda, so the relatively small number of seats that are truly up for grabs have become high-spending electoral battlegrounds. Party leaders and partisan donors focus on these races, and candidates in these swing seats



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are now commonly required to raise millions of dollars if they hope to win. In this regard, the 2016 elections were also not unique, although the financial demands imposed on candidates in toss-up races increased dramatically, leading to a number of Senate and House contests in which candidates raised record sums of money for the seats they were pursuing. The 2016 elections thus evidenced the diverse strategies used by candidates in the chase for campaign dollars, as well as the rising demand for campaign money in an electoral environment characterized by a polarized electorate. The elections also reflected well-established patterns of campaign fundraising and recent innovations prompted by the expansion of social media and digital technologies, as well as changes in campaign finance rules. This chapter highlights the various fundraising strategies used by candidates and the issues that emerged with respect to the role of money in political campaigns.

An Overview of Candidate Funding Federal candidates raised more than $3 billion during the 2016 election cycle, with presidential candidates raising a total of $1.57 billion and congressional candidates taking in $1.64 billion.5 The presidential candidates raised more than the $1.32 billion total in 2012, when President Obama was unopposed for the Democratic nomination, but less than the $1.68 billion total in 2008, which was the most recent election to feature open nominations in both parties. Congressional candidates took in less than the $1.8 billion raised in 2012, which was also the total in 2010, when the Senate seats up in 2016 were last contested. They did, however, exceed the $1.4 billion raised by congressional candidates in 2008. So, while the candidates raised sizable sums, they took in slightly less than in previous elections. All of this money was raised under the contribution limits and disclosure rules that govern donations to federal candidates. These rules, which were first established by the FECA and revised by the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), allow candidates to accept donations from individuals and political action committees (PACs) that are subject to contribution limits. The law specifically prohibits contributions to candidates from corporations, labor unions, and foreign citizens who do not have legal status as resident aliens. In the 2016 election, an individual was allowed to give $2,700 per election to a federal candidate, with the primary and general election considered separate elections for the

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purposes of the limit. So the total amount an individual could give was $5,400. A PAC is allowed to give $5,000 per election, for a total of $10,000. The individual limit, which was set at $2,000 per election in 2002, is adjusted for inflation and thus increases with each new election cycle. The PAC limit is not adjusted for inflation and has remained at $5,000 per election since 1974. A candidate, however, does not have to wait until a primary is over to begin soliciting general election contributions. Monies for both elections can be raised at the same time, so long as the general election donations are maintained separately and not used to pay primary expenses. A candidate may also use personal resources to finance a campaign, with no limit on the amount of personal money that may be spent. All of the monies raised and spent by a candidate’s campaign committee are subject to public disclosure, and any contribution or expenditure of $200 or more must be itemized in campaign reports that are filed with the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which is responsible for making this information available to the public. Presidential candidates also have the option of financing their campaigns with public funds. Under the terms of this voluntary program, which was established by the FECA and is financed through a tax ­checkoff on federal individual income tax forms, candidates may receive public funds during each stage of the selection process. For the primary campaign, a candidate may receive a dollar-for-dollar match on the first $250 contributed by an individual donor. For the general election, a major-party nominee may receive a grant equal to the full amount of the general election spending limit, which was originally set in 1974 at $20 million plus a cost of living adjustment. By 2016, the amount of this grant had grown to $96 million. To receive these subsidies, a candidate must agree to abide by spending limits that are established by the law and agree to limit any personal contributions to his or her campaign to no more than $50,000. From 1976 to 1996, public funding was a significant source of presidential campaign money. Every major-party nominee and almost every major-party challenger accepted public matching funds during the primaries. During this period, presidential aspirants raised on average about a third of their primary campaign funds in public money.6 Every ­major-party nominee accepted the general election grant to finance a general election campaign. This system began to break down in 2000, as candidates began to view the trade-off involved—public money in exchange for spending limits—as an option that was no longer strategically viable.



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The move away from public funding began when George W. Bush, the leading contender for the 2000 Republican nomination and eventual party nominee, chose to campaign in the primaries without using public funds. Bush decided that the spending limits attached to the acceptance of public funding posed a strategic disadvantage, since the limits had not kept pace with the growing financial demands of the presidential nomination process. Most notably, the increased front-loading of the primary calendar, which resulted from an increasing number of states scheduling their primaries early in the election year, made it difficult for candidates, especially frontrunners, to finance the extensive campaigns needed to win yet remain within the spending limits. For example, in 1996 ­Robert Dole won the Republican nomination in a highly contested primary race, but by April he was already approaching the spending limit. Consequently, President Bill Clinton, who faced no serious challenge in his bid for renomination, was able to outspend Dole by millions of dollars in the months leading up to the party conventions. Bush wanted to avoid Dole’s fate and take advantage of his broad fundraising base to spend more than the limits would allow, and did so, eventually raising $94 m ­ illion, or more than twice the amount permitted under the public funding spending ceiling.7 With President Bush seeking reelection in 2004 and expected to forgo public funding again, his prospective Democratic opponents began to follow suit. Both party nominees, Bush and Democrat John Kerry, refused matching funds, with Bush eventually raising $269 million in primary money and Kerry $235 million, as compared to the $50 million that would have been allowed under the public spending limit.8 The experience in 2004 thus raised the fundraising bar in presidential campaigns and demonstrated that winning candidates could raise far more than public funding would allow. Thereafter, few candidates—and no major-party nominee—have accepted primary matching funds. The demise of public funding as a source of funds in presidential campaigns came in 2008, when Barack Obama became the first nominee to refuse public funding in the general election. Obama’s unprecedented fundraising success, taking in more than $450 million in the primary period alone, made his decision to reject the general election grant, which was $84 million at the time, an easy one.9 His general election opponent, Republican Senator John McCain, did accept the public grant—the last candidate to do so—and was greatly outspent. By the end of the election, Obama had raised more than $745 million.

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Since then, public funding has become nothing more than a means of last resort, a refuge for candidates who failed to raise money in other ways. In 2016, only one major-party aspirant, Democrat Martin ­O’Malley, accepted public funding. O’Malley, who dropped out of the race after the Iowa caucuses, raised relatively little money and qualified for matching funds when his struggling campaign had failed to make payroll, and he used much of the $1.09 million he received in public subsidies to pay off campaign debts.10 In the absence of public funding constraints, presidential candidates are allowed to spend as much as they can raise. This has significantly increased the emphasis on fundraising and placed greater pressure on candidates to pursue all available means to raise campaign money. In this regard, the financing of presidential campaigns has evolved in a way that makes them similar to congressional campaigns. While presidential campaigns are larger in scale and attract more money due to the prominence and national character of the race for the White House, both presidential candidates and congressional candidates are now wholly dependent on private contributions and are in effect governed by the same rules. Beyond the demise of public funding, the other major changes in the regulatory environment that have emerged in recent elections are the developments resulting from the 2010 Supreme Court decision in ­Citizens United.11 This case dramatically altered the context of candidate fundraising by creating new paths for unlimited spending and unlimited contributions by organizations supporting or opposing candidates. The court struck down the long-standing ban on the use of corporate money to advocate for federal candidates by affirming the right of corporations— and by extension labor unions—to spend money from their general treasuries to finance independent expenditures in support of candidates. The court also struck down BCRA’s prohibition on the use of corporate and labor money to finance electioneering communications, which are broadcast advertisements aired close to an election that feature a candidate. Even more important, the ruling paved the way for a subsequent appellate court decision, SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, that gave rise to Super PACs, which are political committees that solely spend money independently of candidates and do not make contributions to candidates.12 The court held that such committees do not have to abide by federal PAC contribution limits because they only make independent expenditures and thus pose no risk of quid pro quo corruption of candidates. Super PACs may therefore spend unlimited sums from



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unlimited contributions, including contributions from corporations, labor unions, and interest groups. Super PACs have quickly become a significant source of campaign funding, joining the party committees as major sources of external support for candidates. According to the nonpartisan Center for Responsive Politics, Super PACs spent $609 million in support of federal candidates in 2012.13 In 2016, this amount rose to more than $1 billion.14 More than half of this 2016 total, $538 million, was spent by 274 Super PACs that were established to support or oppose a single candidate, as compared to $269 million spent by 104 single-candidate Super PACs in 2012.15 Super PACs formed by former staff members or political advisors were established to support almost every presidential candidate, with the notable exceptions of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, from the start of their campaigns. Many of the congressional candidates involved in competitive races also benefitted from candidate-specific committees, as well as Super PACs closely allied with party leaders, including the Congressional Leadership Fund and Senate Leadership Fund on the Republican side and House Majority PAC and Senate Majority PAC on the Democratic side. Thus, in practice, campaign fundraising has become a team sport in which campaigns are funded by diverse organizations, including a candidate’s campaign committee, party committees, Super PACs, and allied groups (For a discussion see Chapter 13).16 The monies raised by candidates thus only constitute a share of the total monies that are raised and spent to support or oppose them, complicating the financial strategies employed in campaigns. It is no longer the case in competitive races that the financial contest is determined by how much each of the candidates can raise; it is now determined by how much each team can raise. Nonetheless, the money raised by candidates remains the essential component of campaign finance. Even with the rise of outside sources of funding, candidates still need to raise the funds needed to finance their campaign organizations and pay for essential tasks and services, ranging from staff and field operations to polling and advertising. A candidate’s fundraising is still a main measure used to assess a candidate’s strength and shapes perceptions of a candidate’s viability. Moreover, the monies received by a candidate’s campaign are the only funds a candidate completely controls and can determine how they are spent. So, while other actors can now supplement a candidate’s resources and even act as surrogate campaign organizations, the money chase among the candidates continues to be the principal determinant of campaign activity in federal elections.

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Presidential Candidate Fundraising With President Obama completing his second term in office, the presidential race featured open contests in both parties for the first time since 2008. The election was expected to be a hotly contested and costly affair that would place substantial demand on the candidates to raise money. In 2008 and again in 2012, the major-party nominees alone had combined to spend more than $1 billion, with Obama winning the Oval Office after spending $730 million in 2008 and $683 million in 2012.17 Whether a candidate would be able to match—or exceed—Obama’s totals was a matter of speculation, but political observers certainly expected that the party nominees would once again exceed the $1 billion mark. The competitions for the major-party nominations produced very different fields of candidates. The Democratic contest attracted few challengers, since Hillary Clinton was widely perceived to be the prohibitive front-runner at the start of the race. Clinton had extensive political experience, a well-established base of support within the party, and proven fundraising success, and had served as secretary of state in the Obama administration, which positioned her to claim the mantle of the Obama legacy. Only a handful of relatively unknown aspirants decided to enter the ring against her, and no one of these contenders was expected to mount a serious challenge to her candidacy. However, Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, who serves in the Senate as an independent, surprisingly proved to be a formidable challenger. In a campaign reminiscent of Obama’s 2008 quest for the party nomination, Sanders’s progressive message resonated with grassroots activists and young voters in particular, resulting in unexpected early fundraising success that thrust him into the spotlight. Sanders raised tens of millions of dollars from small donors in the months leading up to the election year and eventually built an unprecedented small donor–based campaign that took in $228 ­million by the end of the primary campaign, as compared to $274 million by Clinton.18 He won 22 states and remained competitive throughout most of the primary period before ending his candidacy on July 12.19 In contrast to the Democrats, the Republican race attracted an unusually large field of candidates, including many well-established politicians. At the beginning of the race, prospects for Republican victory were bright, which encouraged many candidates to run. President Obama’s relatively low approval ratings midway through his second term, a growing but sluggish economy, high levels of dissatisfaction with the direction



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of the country, and the recognition that the incumbent party is typically vulnerable in an election year when it is seeking a third consecutive White House term presented an electoral environment favorable to Republican prospects. Many of those who did decide to run were current officeholders or aspirants with previous elective experience who were well known to Republican voters. The crowded Republican field yielded a competitive chase for campaign dollars and a number of well-funded candidates (see Table 12.1). But no Republican primary challenger came close to raising the sums achieved by Clinton or Sanders. In fact, no candidate reached the $100 million mark achieved by Mitt Romney, who led the Republican money race in the 2008 and 2012 primaries.20 A number of candidates, however, did raise substantial sums. The leading fundraiser was Senator Ted Cruz, who raised almost $92 million and was the last man standing against Donald Trump. Trump basically matched Cruz, raising $91 million Table 12.1  Presidential Campaign Receipts, 2016

Republicans Trump Cruz Carson Rubio Bush Kasich Paul Fiorina Christie Walker Graham Huckabee Jindal Perry Santorum Pataki Subtotal

$ (millions) 408.9 91.8 62.8 44.0 34.1 18.8 12.1 12.0 8.4 8.2 5.5 4.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 0.5 715.5

Democrats Clinton Sanders O'Malley Lessig Webb Chafee

$ (millions) 622.2 227.7 6.2 1.0 0.8 0.0

Subtotal

857.9

Source: Based on an analysis of Federal Election Commission filings by the Campaign Finance Institute.

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through the end of May 2016, but his total included $46 million of his own money.21 Senator Marco Rubio and former Florida Governor Jeb Bush also raised notable sums, taking in $44 million and $34 million, respectively. The most surprising candidate was Ben Carson, who had no previous elective experience but appealed to conservative grassroots donors and benefitted from unexpectedly strong small-donor support, somewhat akin to Sanders on the Democratic side. Carson enjoyed a brief surge in the polls in the months leading up to the election year as a result of his fundraising success and he eventually raised more than $62 million. But this was not enough to sustain his candidacy owing to his poor performance on the campaign trail and in early presidential debates, and he was not a viable contender once the primaries began. What distinguished candidate fundraising in 2016 were the pronounced differences among the leading candidates in the strategies they employed to garner funds. The presumed frontrunners and established politicians with fundraising experience largely followed the playbook that had been used in past elections, focusing on the solicitation of maximum contributions or large donations of $1,000 or more. In this way they hoped to capitalize on their status and existing donor bases to gain an advantage in the fundraising race and cement their positions as leading contenders. Political outsiders, particularly Sanders, employed more innovative approaches, which had been used previously to some extent, to tap into grassroots donors through social media and online tools to realize the potential offered by the support of large numbers of small donors. Trump, perhaps the ultimate outsider in the race, followed the most unusual approach, relying on his own money early in the race and then shifting to a fundraising strategy that relied heavily on party support, which was ironic given that he ran as an antiestablishment candidate and regularly criticized the party during his primary campaign.

Large Donors Candidates with established donor bases built in previous runs for office and those who are considered likely prospects to win the party nomination typically emphasize the solicitation of large contributions in hopes of raising as much money as possible as quickly as possible as a means of establishing the strength of their candidacies. For example, in 2012, Republican nominee Mitt Romney received $305 million from individual donors who gave at least $1,000 or more, which constituted 65% of



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the total amount he received from individual donors. This included $223 million, or 47% of his total, which came from donors who gave the 2012 maximum gift of $2,500 in either the primary or general election or both. President Obama, while noted for the strength of his small-donor fundraising, also concentrated on large donors and raised $303 million from donors who gave $1,000 or more, which represented 39% of his total individual receipts. This included $171 million (22% of his total) that came from donors who gave the $2,500 maximum.22 In this regard, the 2016 election largely followed the patterns of the past. Most of the candidates who successfully raised substantial amounts of money received a sizable share of their funding from donors who contributed $1,000 or more. According to an analysis of FEC records by the nonpartisan Campaign Finance Institute, Hillary Clinton raised about $619 million from individual donors, with $325 million or 53% of this total coming from donors who gave $1,000 or more (see Table 12.2).23 This included $216 million or 35% of her total from donors who gave the maximum donation of $2,700. Similarly, the three of the top fundraisers in the Republican contest, Cruz, Rubio, and Bush, raised a sizable share of their campaign funds from large donors. Cruz raised $30 ­million from those who gave $1,000 or more, which was 35% of the total he received from individual donors. This included $14 million, or 16% of his total, from donors who gave the $2,700 maximum. Rubio raised $21 million from donors of $1,000 or more, which was 54% of the total he received from individuals, including $12 million or 31% of his total from donors who gave the maximum. And Bush was the most dependent on large donors of all of the candidates, raising 89% of his $32 million in total contributions from individuals from those who gave at least $1,000, including $24 million from donors who gave the maximum, which constituted about three out of every four dollars he raised. Hillary Clinton’s large donor fundraising was impressive but not unprecedented. She raised more from large donors than all of the Republican candidates combined ($325 million versus $189 million). She raised more from large donors than President Obama did in 2012, and received significantly more from donors who gave the maximum than Obama. Including both the primary and general election, Clinton raised more than a third of her funds, $216 million, from donors who gave the maximum, as compared to Obama’s 2012 total of $170 million, which represented 22% of the amount he received in individual contributions. Clinton, however, failed to reach Obama’s 2008 total of $357 million from donors who gave at least $1,000.24

Table 12.2  Source of Individual Contributions to Presidential Candidates, 2016

Aggregate Amount Contributed by Donor $200 or less Candidate

$201-999

$1000 or more

Net Individual $ Amount $ Amount $ Amount Contributions (millions) Percent (millions) Percent (millions) Percent

Republicans Trump

344.1

238.6

69%

44.7

13%

60.8

18%

86.6

25.4

29%

31.3

36%

30.0

35%

Carson

61.3

30.8

50%

19.4

32%

11.0

18%

Rubio

39.9

9.9

25%

8.4

21%

21.4

54%

Bush

32.5

1.7

5%

2.0

6%

28.8

89%

Kasich

18.5

3.7

20%

3.0

16%

11.6

63%

Paul

10.7

4.6

43%

2.9

27%

3.3

31%

Fiorina

11.7

5.1

44%

2.8

24%

4.0

34%

Christie

8.3

0.4

5%

0.5

6%

7.4

89%

Walker

7.4

2.8

38%

1.1

15%

3.5

47%

Graham

3.1

0.2

8%

0.3

10%

2.5

83%

Huckabee

4.4

1.7

39%

0.7

16%

1.8

42%

Cruz

Jindal

1.4

0.1

11%

0.1

5%

1.2

85%

Perry

1.2

0.1

11%

0.1

9%

1.0

80%

Santorum

1.3

0.3

21%

0.2

12%

0.9

65%

0.5

0.0

5%

0.0

7%

0.4

85%

632.9

325.4

51%

117.5

19%

189.6

30%

Clinton

618.8

136.8

22%

159.0

26%

325.2

53%

Sanders

226.1

99.7

44%

86.2

38%

40.1

18%

4.5

0.5

11%

0.6

14%

3.3

74%

Pataki Rep Subtotal Democrats

O'Malley Lessig

0.9

0.4

44%

0.2

21%

0.3

30%

Webb

0.8

0.3

39%

0.2

19%

0.3

41%

Chafee

0.0

0.0

46%

0.0

12%

0.0

42%

Dem Subtotal 851.1

237.7

28%

246.2

29%

369.2

43%

Source: Based on an analysis of Federal Election Commission filings by the Campaign Finance Institute. Note: Figures may not add up due to rounding.



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Clinton was well positioned to pursue a front-runner fundraising strategy. She began the race with a broad base of donors who had supported her over the years. She was a proven fundraiser, having raised $224 ­million in her unsuccessful race against Obama in 2008. Moreover, she was widely perceived to be the candidate most likely to win the nomination, especially after no well-known candidates entered the race against her. These expectations were confirmed from the start of her candidacy. Upon announcing her decision to run in April 2015, she embarked on an aggressive fundraising effort, holding dozens of fundraising events aimed at large donors. By the end of June, which marked the end of her first quarter of fundraising for the purposes of campaign finance reports, she had taken in more than $45 million, which set a new high-water mark for fundraising in the first three months of a campaign, surpassing the $42 million achieved by President Obama in his first quarter of fundraising for his reelection campaign in 2011.25 Moreover, 67% of her total came from donors who gave the $2,700 maximum, even though the campaign sought to create the impression of broad grassroots appeal by noting that nine out of ten donors had given less than $100.26 Like the leading fundraisers in other recent elections, Clinton was assisted in her fundraising efforts by recruiting a large number of “bundlers.” These are supporters who serve as volunteer fundraisers and are responsible for soliciting large contributions from friends and associates on behalf of the campaign, either by personally soliciting donations or by hosting fundraising events. Clinton established a National Finance Committee, consisting of her top bundlers, who were called “­Hillblazers,” with each responsible for raising at least $100,000 for the campaign. ­Although federal law only requires public disclosure of bundling if done by registered lobbyists who raise more than $15,000 for a campaign, Clinton followed the practice of President Obama, who voluntarily disclosed the names of individuals who raised $100,000 or more. By the end of the primaries, Clinton had recruited more than 1,100 of these elite fundraisers, who had collectively raised at least $113 million for her campaign or Democratic Party committees supporting her, which was undoubtedly an underestimate since some of these individuals certainly raised much more than $100,000.27 Clinton also aggressively sought contributions from donors throughout the spectrum of giving levels, including small donors. For example, she established a “Hillstarter” program that asked supporters to host fundraising events aimed at raising $27,000 through smaller

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contributions.28 She sought small contributions primarily through the array of digital means that have now become commonplace in presidential campaigns, including email solicitations, a donation button on her campaign website, digital advertisements, and appeals for contributions linked to messages distributed through Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms. These methods were used from the start of the campaign in hopes of replicating the success President Obama experienced with small donors willing to give less than $200, often in small increments of $25 or less. Clinton succeeded in raising substantial sums across all donor ranges. By the end of June 2016, Clinton had raised about $64 million from donors who had given a total of $200 or less, as compared to $107 million from those who gave the $2,700 maximum.29 These totals basically doubled by the end of the general election, with small donors accounting for $137 million, or 22% of Clinton’s total receipts, and maximum donors providing $216 million, or 35% of her total. Donors who gave $1,000 or more were responsible for more than half of her total funding (see Table 12.2). Clinton thus exhibited the fundraising strength that most observers expected at the start of the campaign. Moreover, the composition of her campaign funding was remarkably similar to that of her 2008 primary campaign, when she raised $194 million from individuals, with 22% of these receipts coming from small donors and 56% from those who gave $1,000 or more.30 She was therefore more dependent on large donors than Obama in 2012 and less successful with small donors. Obama raised 39% ($302 million) of his receipts from donors who gave $1,000 or more, and 28% ($219 million) of his receipts from those who gave less than $200.31

Small Donors While Clinton’s small-donor fundraising was noteworthy, it failed to compare to the extraordinary success of Bernie Sanders, who mounted the most successful small-donor fundraising campaign in presidential history. Sanders’s candidacy struck a chord with grassroots progressive voters who rallied around his antiestablishment and progressive message attacking the influence of the wealthy in the political system. He harnessed this support through his website and social media platforms, with a particular emphasis on mobile applications and the mobile-first audience, to build a fundraising machine that allowed him to keep pace with Clinton in the money race.



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Over the course of his campaign, Sanders received contributions from more than 2.4 million individuals, who collectively made donations to his campaign more than 7.6 million times.32 Sanders raised $228 million in total receipts, with about $201 million coming from contributions in amounts of $200 or less. The vast majority of his total, $216 million, came from contributions made online.33 Many of those who gave small sums gave more than once or repeatedly during the campaign, leading thousands of these donors to eventually give an aggregate of more than $200. Even so, as noted in Table 12.2, donors who gave an aggregate of $200 or less were responsible for 44% of the money he raised from individuals. An additional 38% came from donors who eventually gave a total of more than $200 but less than $1,000. Even more notable, he received only 4% of his campaign money, $8.6 million, from donors who gave the $2,700 maximum.34 No previous contender who had raised so much money had raised so little from large donors and been so reliant on small donors as a source of campaign funding. Sanders displayed surprising financial support from the start of his campaign. He received $1 million online within a day of announcing his candidacy and his campaign invested $250,000 into digital advertising to attract additional online donations.35 He thus launched the online fundraising effort that would define his campaign and allow him to convert his populist message and viral moments into a flood of campaign dollars. The campaign continued to invest in digital advertising throughout the campaign, eventually raising more than $61 million and acquiring more than three million email addresses directly from digital ads.36 These email addresses and others gathered throughout the course of the campaign proved to be the cornerstone of his fundraising effort as the campaign raised at least $114 million through its email solicitations alone.37 What was most remarkable about Sanders’s strategy was his lack of reliance on traditional fundraising events and the solicitation of large donations. Unlike Clinton, Sanders eschewed fundraising appearances. He attended only nine in-person fundraising events, a feat thought impossible in the current era of presidential campaign finance, and did not have a staff person responsible for planning events featuring the candidate.38 For comparison, Clinton held more than 350 fundraising events from the time she entered the race through the middle of October 2016, spending time on 200 days attending at least one fundraising event.39 Sanders could forgo traditional fundraising events because the success of his online fundraising made these events unnecessary. By the end of

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September 2015, he had received 1.3 million contributions from 650,000 donors, thus reaching the million contributions mark faster than any previous candidate (Obama did not receive one million contributions until February 2008 in his first race and October 2011 in his reelection cam­ illion paign.).40 At the end of the preelection year, he had received 2.3 m contributions, surpassing the record 2.2 million contributions that Obama had received in 2011.41 Sanders was able to build on his early fundraising momentum due to his performance on the campaign trail, as well as the enthusiasm of his supporters. Republican Ben Carson, who surprised the Republican field with his preelection-year success raising substantial sums from conservative small donors, quickly dropped out of contention and saw his fundraising dry up due to his poor performance on the campaign trail and failure to garner support in the crucial early contests. Sanders, in contrast, performed well and turned key moments in the campaign into viral online fundraising events. For example, within a day of the first Democratic debate in October 2015, Sanders took in $2.5 million;42 the day after his narrow loss in the Iowa caucuses, $3 million;43 and the day after his victory in New Hampshire, more than $6 million.44 By January Sanders had incorporated his fundraising approach into his main message, highlighting his reliance on small donors and heralding his claim that his average campaign contribution was $27, which became a common refrain at his campaign rallies. With an expanding donor base and recurring gifts from supporters, spurred by additional primary victories, Sanders outraised Clinton in January, February, and March, which allowed him to outspend her in a number of crucial contests. It was not until April, when the race had clearly turned in Clinton’s favor, that his fundraising began to ebb and Clinton again assumed the lead in monthly fundraising totals en route to winning the party nomination.

Trump’s Mixed Approach At the start of his bid for the nomination, Donald Trump proclaimed that he would self-finance his campaign, and by late October 2016 he was still highlighting his reliance on his own money, declaring that he would put $100 million into his campaign before it was over.45 But by the end of the campaign he had only contributed $66 million, including $50 million spent in the primaries. Most of Trump’s funding eventually came from private donations, which dwarfed the amounts he personally gave to his



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campaign. In practice, Trump followed an unusual mixed approach to campaign fundraising, employing different strategies in the primary and general election. In the primary, he relied primarily on his own resources and won the nomination despite being heavily outspent in the crucial early primary contests. In the general election, he adopted a completely different approach that relied heavily on small donors and assistance from the Republican National Committee, resulting in a general election fundraising strategy that differed from those of other recent nominees. Taken as a whole, his approach to campaign funding was unique, and led to surprising results by Election Day. Self-funded candidates typically seek to turn their wealth into an asset by claiming that donors will not influence them, and in this regard Trump was not an exception. These candidates also typically hope that their personal wealth will help establish their viability because they have the resources to finance a meaningful campaign and by spending large sums they can establish themselves as a leader in the money race. In this regard, Trump was an exception. In the 1996 and 2000 Republican nomination contests, Malcolm “Steve” Forbes gave $38 million and $42 million respectively to his campaigns, which allowed him to outspend his opponents in Iowa and other early states.46 But he failed to attract the voter support needed to become a serious challenger for the nomination. Similarly, in 2008, Republican Mitt Romney gave $45 million to his campaign as part of the $105 million he raised during the primaries, which established him as the early leader in the money race and a major contender for the nomination, but he ultimately lost to John McCain.47 Trump did not adopt this approach; instead he spent smaller sums over time, which left him well behind in the money race. By the end of 2015, he had given $12.8 million to his campaign and spent $12.6 million, which was less than half of the amounts that Bush, Cruz, Rubio, and Carson each had spent at that point and far less than each of these opponents had raised.48 Trump did not dramatically increase his spending once the primaries got underway. Unlike past self-financed candidates, he did not try to outspend his opponents in Iowa, New Hampshire, and other early states. Instead, he provided his campaign with regular infusions of cash, averaging about $6 million per month, which was primarily used to pay the costs of staff, travel, rallies (which became the staple of his campaign), and advertising. As a result, he did not come close to matching the broadcast advertising in support of his opponents. According to an analysis

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conducted by the Wesleyan Media Project, which included the advertising sponsored by Super PACs supporting the candidates through the first week of May, 33,000 ads were broadcast in support of Trump, as compared to 59,000 for Rubio and 51,000 for Cruz. In addition, Super PACs and other organizations opposing Trump’s nomination paid for 18,000 ads against him.49 Trump, however, did not lack publicity. He entered the race as a wellknown public persona due in part to his role as a reality television celebrity and he maintained a high profile throughout the campaign as a result of his controversial campaign statements and provocative tweets, which were often retweeted and distributed through various social media. According to an analysis by MediaQuant, a company that monitors media coverage, Trump had received $2 billion of earned media coverage by the end of March as a result of the coverage he received through traditional and social media news channels.50 By the end of the campaign, the value of his total media coverage had reached an estimated $5.4 billion.51 Trump thus dominated the news coverage like no previous candidate. To compare, his top primary opponent, Ted Cruz, received $447 million in coverage by the end of the election, while Hillary Clinton received and estimated $3.5 billion.52 Trump did raise money from individual donors who visited his campaign website, which featured a “Donate” button, but he did not initiate a fundraising effort. Most of the money he received, which totaled $17 ­million by the time he had effectively wrapped up the nomination in May, came from “contributions” recorded from the purchase of hats and paraphernalia available from the campaign.53 In June, the campaign began to test data-targeting techniques as a way to increase the sale of this merchandise.54 In other words, the campaign’s fundraising was a reflection of its merchandising efforts and unsolicited donations from supporters; it was not the result of a proactive fundraising strategy. Trump thus entered the general election phase of the campaign in the worst relative financial position of any recent nominee. Hillary Clinton had developed a broad base of primary donors who could be solicited again for general election contributions. She also had a notable head start on general election fundraising through a joint fundraising committee (JFC) called the Hillary Victory Fund (HVF), established in August 2015 in association with the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and more than 30 state party committees. A JFC is a common feature of fundraising strategies. It allows donors to give to the candidate, national



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party committee, and state party committees by making a single large contribution, with the money divided among the participants based on the contribution limit applicable to each and the terms of the agreement establishing the committee. As a general rule, the first money—the first $2,700 received by a JFC—goes to the candidate. What distinguished the HVF from previous JFCs was its early start; no previous JFC connected to a presidential race had been established so early in the election cycle.55 Because party contribution limits are annual limits, not per election limits, this early start benefitted the party, since donors who gave the maximum in 2015 could give again in 2016. The committee held its first fundraisers in December 2015 and by the end of June had already transferred $34 million to Clinton’s campaign committee, while keeping another $21 million raised for the campaign, which represented the candidate’s share of the JFC’s fundraising costs. Facing the prospect of an overwhelming financial disadvantage, Trump reversed course and worked with the Republican National ­Committee (RNC) leadership to develop an innovative general election fundraising strategy. In combination with the RNC and state parties, Trump agreed to two JFCs, which were established in May 2016. The first, Trump Victory, which was a joint effort with the RNC and state parties, emphasized the solicitation of large contributions. The other, Trump Make America Great Again, was established with the RNC to solicit small donations, based in part on an email list of six million Republican supporters that the RNC had built through its investments in digital outreach.56 Trump also launched an aggressive online fundraising effort driven by digital advertising. He hired Brad Parscale, a San Antonio–based digital consultant who had built websites for other Trump enterprises, to design a digital targeting strategy that would identify potential Trump voters and donors. Beginning with data received from the campaign, the RNC, and Cambridge Analytica, a data analytics company owned by Trump supporters Robert and Rebekah Mercer, Parscale launched an online fundraising campaign, with Trump sending out his first email solicitation in late June.57 The program, however, focused on attracting donors through digital ads, particularly on Facebook. Over the course of the general election, the campaign sent more than $90 million to Parscale’s firm, most of which was spent on digital advertising, with more of the money going to Facebook than to any other platform.58 On any given day, the campaign was running 40,000 to 50,000 variants of its ads, testing how they performed in different formats and monitoring voter

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response.59 Ads that proved the most effective in raising dollars and sparking engagement were retained; those that were less effective were jettisoned or reworked. The campaign even brought in different vendors to develop content for their advertising and social media outreach, encouraging them to compete against each other, and maintaining the contracts of only those whose algorithms proved most productive.60 As with Sanders, Trump’s fundraising demonstrated the power of digital technology as a fundraising tool. Trump was able to cultivate a base of grassroots supporters and conservative donors that allowed him to construct a powerful small-donor fundraising operation. By Election Day, the campaign estimated that it would capture 12–14 million email addresses and contact information for 2.5 million donors, and raise more than $250 million online.61 The RNC and the Trump Make America Great Again JFC, which kept 80% of the money it raised and gave the remainder to the Trump campaign, made a substantial contribution to these efforts.62 Trump’s fundraising was thus a tale of two campaigns, as noted in Table 12.3. This table compares the sources of funding for Clinton and Trump before June 30 and from July 1 through to the end of the election year, noting both the monies raised directly by their respective campaign committees and the monies they received through their respective JFCs. The contributions raised through the JFCs are differentiated to distinguish the cash sent to the candidate’s committee and the portion contributed to the candidate that was retained by the JFCs to pay the share of the fundraising costs attributed to the candidate. As Table 12.3 makes clear, Trump was much more financially competitive in the general election than was expected. In all, he raised $309 million after July 1, including $111 million taken in directly by his campaign and $198 million received through the JFCs. During the same period, Clinton raised $336 million, including $172 million taken in by the campaign and $164 million received through HVF. Trump therefore was more dependent on the party efforts than Clinton, with 64% of his general election funds coming through the JFCs, as opposed to slightly less than 50% for Clinton. In fact, Trump was more dependent on joint efforts with party committees as a source of campaign money than any other presidential nominee since the adoption of FECA. Trump was able to raise such a substantial sum because of his success with small donors. In the end, his own money constituted only 16% of his total campaign receipts. In comparison, he raised more than $238

Table 12.3  Breakdown of Contributions to 2016 Presidential Candidates and Joint Committees

Contributions Directly to the Candidate Committee

Contributions from Individuals Through June 30 Clinton 228.1 Trump 36.8 July 1–Dec 30 Clinton 171.6 Trump 95.4 Full Two-Year Cycle Clinton 399.6 Trump 132.2

Contributions through Joint Fundraising Committee(s) Amount Transferred to Candidates’ Committees

Combined Totals

Amount Attributed to the Candidate Used to Cover Expenses

Net Individual Contributions

Contributions from PACs

Candidate SelfFinancing

1.3 0.0

1.0 50.0

0.1 0.0

34.0 2.2

21.5 10.9

283.6 49.9

285.9 99.9

0.5 0.2

0.5 16.1

0.0 0.0

126.8 132.4

36.9 66.4

335.3 294.2

336.3 309.0

1.8 0.2

1.5 66.1

0.1 0.0

160.8 134.6

58.4 77.3

618.8 344.1

622.2 408.9

Other

Source: Based on an analysis of Federal Election Commission filings by the Campaign Finance Institute. Note: Figures may not add up due to rounding.

Total Receipts

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million from donors who gave an aggregate of $200 or less, which represented 69% of his total contributions from individuals and 58% of his total campaign receipts (see Table 12.1). To put this in perspective, Trump raised more money from small donors and a larger share of his campaign funds from small donors than Sanders and Clinton combined. Moreover, he raised more from small donors than Obama in either 2012 ($218.8 million or 28% his total receipts) or 2008 ($181.3 million, 24%).63 Trump’s totals, however, represent money primarily raised in a five-month period, as opposed to a full election cycle, so his donors did not have the same opportunities as donors to these other candidates to give multiple times and thus exceed the $200 aggregate for total donations. Even so, his small-donor fundraising was unprecedented for a ­Republican candidate (Romney raised $57.5 million or 12% of his funds from small donors in 2012) and proved to be the foundation of his general election fundraising.

Congressional Campaign Finance Congressional elections have become more nationalized, party-centered contests in the past two decades owing to the increasing partisan polarization of the electorate, high levels of party-line voting and low levels of ticket splitting by voters, as well as the partisan gerrymandering of congressional districts.64 Consequently, relatively few seats are truly competitive and those that are tend to become high-spending electoral battlegrounds because their outcomes hold the key to majority control in Congress. The 2016 elections reflected this broad political context. The election offered the prospect of a possible shift in majority control, especially in the Senate. The Republicans held a four-seat margin in the upper chamber (54 Republicans, 44 Democrats, and two independents who caucus with Democrats), with 24 seats held by Republicans on the ballot as opposed to only ten held by Democrats.65 The Republicans had a larger majority in the House (247 Republicans, 188 Democrats) but this represented their highest total since the 1920s, which meant that they had a large number of seats to defend and had to avoid a loss of 29 seats if they were to maintain majority control. While such a loss did not seem likely, the higher turnout in a presidential year as compared to a midterm election, public dissatisfaction with the status quo in Washington, and the nomination of Trump gave Democrats hope that they could take the Senate and perhaps even the House. By Election Day, however, the two



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parties had fought to a relative standstill, and the election produced little change, with Democrats picking up only two seats in the Senate and six seats in the House. While the congressional races were hotly contested, candidate fundraising indicated little innovation or change from the established patterns that have characterized congressional races in recent decades. Overall, congressional candidates raised $1.6 billion, with Senate contenders totaling $594 million and House contenders slightly more than $1 billion, which was less than the amounts raised in 2012 or in 2010, the previous election in which the 2016 class of Senate seats was up for election (see Table 12.4). This decline can be attributed in part to the lower number of candidates who decided to run and the decline in the sum raised by Senate candidates, who took in about $160 million less than candidates running for the same seats had in 2010. Total fundraising by House candidates was largely in line with the amounts raised in recent elections, although the number of candidates declined for the fourth consecutive election. As has been the case in every election since the adoption of FECA, incumbents raised more than their challengers, especially in House races, where there are relatively few competitive seats. House incumbents raised more than three times the total of their challengers ($661 million versus $183 million), increasing their relative advantage in fundraising for the fourth consecutive election cycle. Senate incumbents, who typically face stronger opponents than their House counterparts, realized a smaller, albeit meaningful, financial advantage ($268 million versus $207 million). Incumbents were thus able to outspend their opponents by substantial margins. In House general election races, the average amount spent by incumbents was $1.68 million as opposed to average challenger expenditures of $434,500. Republican incumbents, on average, outspent their Democratic challengers by more than three to one ($1.74 million to $562,600), while Democratic incumbents outspent their Republican opponents on average by almost six to one ($1.2 million to $206,000).66 In Senate general election races, incumbents spent an average of $10.1 million as compared to $5.8 million by their challengers, with Republican incumbents spending an average of $10.5 million as compared to an average of $7.4 million for their Democratic challengers, while Democratic incumbents spent an average $8.9 million as compared to $822,000 for their Republican opponents.67 Incumbents raise more money than challengers because they tend to be better known, have established bases of donor support, and capitalize

Table 12.4  Congressional Campaign Receipts, 2008–2016

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

$ Amount # of $ Amount # of $ Amount # of $ Amount # of $ Amount # of (millions) candidates (millions) candidates (millions) candidates (millions) candidates (millions) candidates Senate

433.7

169

757.2

307

742.3

251

635.4

233

594.5

217

House

983.3

1375

1103.2

1891

1136.5

1698

1033.9

1445

1049.8

1400

Total

1417.0

1544

1860.4

2198

1878.8

1949

1669.4

1678

1644.3

1617

Incumbents

234.1

30

249.0

28

256.1

25

294.4

30

268.3

29

Challengers

142.0

110

188.2

159

223.2

131

191.9

139

207.3

128

Open Seats

57.6

29

320.0

120

263.0

95

149.2

64

118.9

60

Incumbents

579.2

407

626.4

404

687.6

399

641.8

397

661.0

397

Challengers

226.6

673

333.6

1158

314.0

1002

203.8

712

183.2

690

Open Seats

177.5

295

143.2

329

134.9

297

188.3

336

205.6

313

Senate

House

Source: Data from Federal Election Commission. Note: Figures may not add up due to rounding.



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on the advantages of holding office. They also tend to carry out fundraising activities throughout the election cycle, allowing them to build a campaign war chest even before a challenger has decided to enter the race. While most candidates raise significant sums from individual donors, the major difference in incumbent fundraising is the substantial share of their receipts that comes from PACs (see Table 12.5). Sitting members of Congress emphasize PAC contributions because most PACs pursue access-oriented or pragmatic strategies that are designed to gain access or at least a hearing from members of Congress. These access-­ oriented PACs, especially those sponsored by corporations and trade associations, seek to establish relations with lawmakers, particularly those who work on issues related to their interests. They therefore concentrate their giving to incumbents, although they also devote a small portion of their donations to challengers for open seats. They rarely make contributions to challengers.68 Some PACs, especially those organized to promote a particular ideology or issue, pursue electoral or ideological strategies that are designed to assist candidates who either reflect a PAC’s partisan preference or share a PAC’s view on specific policies. These PACs, such as those formed to support progressive or conservative candidates, give to vulnerable incumbents and challengers with a prospect of winning in marginal seats or open-seat races, where their giving might tend to have more influence in shaping the partisan outcome of the election or the direction of policy in the future.69 Accordingly, incumbents raise significant amounts from PACs. In 2016, House incumbents raised about half of their total campaign receipts from PACs, with Republicans taking in $188 million and ­Democrats taking in $121 million (see Table 12.5). This follows the pattern of other recent elections in which incumbents raise much more than other candidates from PACs, and members of the majority party receive more than members of the minority. In contrast, challengers raise a minor share of their funding from PACs, with most given to challengers with a viable prospect of winning. Indeed, most of the gap between incumbents and challengers can be attributable to PAC funding. In 2016, PACs gave a total of almost $309 million to incumbents, as compared to $20 million to challengers. They contributed $22 million to candidates in open-seat races. PACs are also an important source of funding in Senate races, although the relative role of PACs is smaller in Senate races, representing about 15% of the total receipts of Senate candidates as compared to about

Table 12.5  Sources of Congressional Campaign Funding, 2016

Total Receipts ($, millions)

Individual Contributions $ Amount (millions)

Senate Republicans Incumbents Challengers Open Seats Democrats Incumbents Challengers Open Seats House Republicans Incumbents Challengers Open Seats Democrats Incumbents Challengers Open Seats

594.5 278.8 201.3 29.1 48.5 313.4 67.0 176.2 70.1 1049.8 559.4 406.7 51.5 101.2 476.4 249.9 126.7 99.7

424.2 179.6 133.8 13.3 32.4 243.1 46.6 141.5 55.1 546.4 270.9 186.4 29.1 55.4 270.7 122.7 91.3 56.7

Percent of Receipts 71.4% 64.4% 66.5% 45.8% 66.8% 77.6% 69.5% 80.3% 78.5% 52.0% 48.4% 45.8% 56.5% 54.8% 56.8% 49.1% 72.1% 56.9%

PAC Contributions $ Amount (millions) 92.8 61.3 52.5 0.9 8.0 31.5 16.0 10.2 5.3 354.5 202.5 187.8 3.6 11.1 148.9 120.9 16.7 11.3

Percent of Receipts 15.6% 22.0% 26.1% 3.1% 16.4% 10.0% 23.9% 5.8% 7.5% 33.8% 36.2% 46.2% 7.0% 11.0% 31.3% 48.4% 13.2% 11.3%

Source: Data from Federal Election Commission (April 2017). Notes: Figures may not add up due to rounding. Only Democratic and Republican candidates are included.

Candidate Personal Money $ Amount (millions) 31.6 17.4 0.4 14.4 2.6 13.4 0.0 11.4 2.0 107.0 51.9 1.4 17.8 32.8 49.2 1.4 16.6 31.2

Percent of Receipts 5.3% 6.2% 0.2% 49.4% 5.4% 4.3% 0.0% 6.5% 2.8% 10.2% 9.3% 0.3% 34.5% 32.4% 10.3% 0.6% 13.1% 31.2%



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a third of the receipts of House candidates. As noted in Table 12.5, the bulk of PAC contributions in Senate races went to incumbents, who received about 25% of their total receipts from these committees. A disproportionate share of these donations went to Republicans, who received $52 million from PACs as compared to only $16 million for Democrats. Smaller amounts were raised by challengers and open-seat candidates, with most of the PAC money given to challengers going to Democrats ($10 million) and $13 million to open-seat candidates, the majority of which went to Republicans ($8 million). Given the obstacles facing nonincumbents in their efforts to raise funds, it is not surprising that some of these candidates decide to use their own money in financing a campaign. Self-funding provides a candidate with the seed money needed to launch a candidacy and can help a candidate compete financially against a more established opponent. In 2016, about a third of the money raised by House candidates in open-seat races, as well as a third of the money raised by Republican challengers, came from the candidates’ own pockets. In Senate contests, almost half of the money raised by Republican challengers was self-financing. While self-funding offers many advantages, it does not assure victory. While these funds can help a candidate become known, it does not mean a candidate will be able to attract voter support, and past research indicates that these candidates do not have a greater chance of winning than other challengers in similar positions.70 This certainly was the case in 2016. Of the nine Senate candidates who gave at least $500,000 to their own campaigns, none won. Of the 27 House candidates who gave at least $500,000 to their own campaigns, only six won.71 Candidates in races that would determine the Senate majority and contenders for marginal House seats raised a disproportionate share of the money in the 2016 elections. The challengers and open-seat candidates who were well funded were typically the candidates involved in these contests, which became a focal point of national attention. For example, the battle for control of the Senate came down to tight races in Indiana,  Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. These contests became high-spending affairs, featuring candidates who raised extraordinary amounts of money. According to an analysis by the Center for Responsive Politics, the top ten Senate general election campaigns featured candidates who spent a combined $25 million or more (see Table 12.6). The general election candidates alone in these ten states collectively spent more than $346 million, which

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Table 12.6  Most Expensive Congressional General Elections, 2016

Senate Jurisdiction Pennsylvania Wisconsin Florida New Hampshire Ohio Nevada Missouri Illinois New York Indiana

House $ Spent

Jurisdiction

$ Spent

47,163,884 44,946,682 41,112,578 38,049,238

Florida 18 Wisconsin 1 Illinois 10 Arizona 2

13,706,697 13,410,703 10,503,884 9,402,312

37,073,656 30,350,691 28,982,689 28,688,676 25,068,776 25,020,652

New Jersey 5 Montana 1 California 49 Virginia 10 California 23 New York 1

9,006,502 8,587,609 8,316,845 8,112,264 8,107,679 7,922,937

Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Note: Includes only spending by general election candidates.

represented more than half of the total amount spent ($625.3 million) by all Senate candidates in 2016. These top states included five of the crucial battlegrounds, as well as Wisconsin, Florida, and Ohio, which were considered opportunities for Democrats for much of the election cycle, since these contests pitted ­Wisconsin’s incumbent Senator Ron Johnson against former Senator Russ Feingold, Ohio’s Rob Portman against former Governor Ted S­ trickland, and Florida’s Marco Rubio, who lost his home state to Trump in the presidential primary, against Congressman Patrick Murphy. Candidates in these races benefitted from extensive and aggressive fundraising efforts that attracted contributions from throughout the country. Partisan supporters focused on these contests, making contributions online, spurred not simply by the candidates’ outreach, but by support provided by independent progressive and conservative online platforms that urged their users to give to their preferred candidate in these contests. The party leaders were also involved, helping to raise funds for these candidates and highlighting these races on target lists to direct partisan supporters to these candidates. As a result, both party candidates were well funded in these races. And their resources were only a component of the total funding poured into these contests. Party



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campaign committees and Super PACs spent tens of millions of dollars in these contests. For example, parties, Super PACs, and other groups spent more than $123 million independently in the Pennsylvania race, more than $90 million in the New Hampshire race, more than $90 ­million in Nevada, and more than $59 million in North Carolina.72 Some of the money spent by party committees in support of these candidates came from members of the Senate, who are allowed to transfer unlimited amounts of money from their own campaign committees to party committees, which can then use these funds to support candidates in the battleground contests. This is one reason why incumbents, particularly safe incumbents, continue to emphasize fundraising: they are in effect raising money to meet not only their own needs but also to help other candidates and their parties in the battle for majority control, since majority status affects leadership positions, committee chairs, and other positions in Congress. This, for example, is why New York appears in the list of the high-spending races. Senator Schumer was not at risk of losing his seat, but he had much at stake in the overall election outcome, since he was in line to be Senate majority leader if the Democrats captured the Senate. He thus gave $9 million in campaign funds to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. Many other incumbent senators also deployed campaign funds in this way. In all, Senate Democrats transferred more than $18 million to their party campaign committee, while Republicans transferred more than $3.5 million to the National ­Republican Senatorial Committee.73 Similarly, the most expensive House races featured vulnerable incumbents who faced well-financed challengers, but in these races spending was driven by the substantial sums spent by the Republican incumbents, who outspent their challengers by large margins in their efforts to hold their seats. In all, these ten races represented $97 million in expenditures, or 10% of the total spending in House races in 2016. Among the top ten highest spending races, four featured races with vulnerable incumbents. In Illinois-10, incumbent Robert Dold lost to Democrat Bradley Schneider by a margin of 53%–47%, with Dold spending $5.6 million and Schneider $5.0 million. In the other three, Republicans held their seats while greatly outspending their opponents. In Arizona-2, Martha McSally ($8 million) defeated Democrat Matthew Heinz ($1.6 million), 57%–43%. In ­California-49, Darrell Issa ($6.3 million) defeated D ­ emocrat Douglas Applegate ($1.7 million), by less than 1%. In Virginia-10, Barbara Comstock ($5.3 million) defeated Democrat Luann Bennett ($2.9 million), 53%–47%.

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The top spending race, Florida-18, was an open seat won by Republican Brian Mast, 55%–45%, against Randy Perkins, a self-financed candidate who spent more than $10 million. House Speaker Paul Ryan faced no risk of losing his seat (Wisconsin-1) but his race was also among the most expensive. Almost all of the spending ($13.3 ­million) was by Ryan, who gave $4.5 million to the National Republican Congressional Committee, which was part of the $33.2 million Republican members gave to this committee.74 Democratic members, led by House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi’s $1.4 million, gave a total of $29.7 million to the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.75 These transfers to party committees indicate one of the ways in which incumbents now raise money to participate in the broader team approach to winning legislative majorities.

Conclusion Candidate fundraising strategies continue to evolve as candidates adapt to a changing political and regulatory landscape, and realize the potential of new fundraising tools. Candidates now have more means available to solicit contributions than ever before, and those who are able to capitalize on new technologies and the polarized environment that shapes the behavior of political donors are capable of raising substantial amounts of money. Established approaches still dominate candidate behavior, as evident from the fundraising efforts of Hillary Clinton and other presidential contenders, as well as most members of Congress. New approaches have also emerged, offering options to candidates who lack a traditional donor base or access to large donors, as demonstrated by the extraordinary success of Bernie Sanders and the highly unorthodox approach of Donald Trump. The various means now available to candidates to seek the money needed to mount a campaign were on full display in 2016, particularly in the presidential race. The continued expansion of social media platforms and growing power of big data analysis has opened possibilities that both enhance traditional strategies and create new options, particularly for candidates who can mobilize strong grassroots support from party activists and ideological voters. Candidates who are outside of the party mainstream or fail to conform to widely held assumptions about the characteristics of a viable candidate can now translate voter support and enthusiasm into campaign dollars much more readily and efficiently than in the past.



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President Obama demonstrated the ways in which online fundraising can empower small donors. Sanders showed how powerful small donors can be, breaking new ground by demonstrating that a strategy based exclusively on a small-donor strategy can provide the funds needed to finance a competitive presidential campaign. Similarly, Donald Trump demonstrated that small-donor fundraising is not a strategy that only works for Democrats or progressive candidates. His campaign’s use of digital advertising and small-donor support marked a new standard for a Republican candidate, and raised questions as to whether Trump’s success was unique, a function of his contentious and controversial candidacy, and the particular dynamics of the presidential race, or an example of how Republican Party investments in digital outreach are beginning to pay off. More broadly, the success of Trump and Sanders raises the question of whether new technologies are opening fundraising opportunities for a diverse range of candidates or whether they are best suited to ideological or polarizing candidates who can tap into the anger and frustration of voters. What was clear, at least in 2016, is that online fundraising has become a major means of presidential campaign fundraising and a common part of candidate fundraising infrastructures, and will continue to expand in importance in the future. New methods or innovative approaches have not had as profound or disruptive an effect on congressional fundraising. The basic sources of funding and financial patterns of previous elections largely remained intact in 2016, with the vast majority of races featuring well-heeled incumbents against poorly funded challengers. Where social media and digital technologies have the most effect is in the battleground races for majority control, which receive national attention in the current partisan environment and become a focal point for party leaders and partisan donors and activists, who help to flood money into these contests. In addition, these contests become the targets of most of the Super PAC and independent spending that become a major component of campaign finance. These dynamics complicate the fundraising calculus of candidates, who are no longer the sole financiers in an election campaign. What effect this has on candidate fundraising is difficult to discern since on the one hand candidates can now rely on others to help their cause, but on the other they must be prepared to compete against these varied participants. For most candidates, the best solution is to raise as much money as possible, which is still the predominant impulse of candidate behavior, despite the contrarian example offered by Trump.

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Notes 1. The author thanks Tassin Braverman and Austin Frederick for their assistance with the research and data on which this chapter is based. 2. Levinthal, Dave. 2016. “Donald Trump Embraces Donors, Super PACs He Once Decried.” Time, June 17, http://time.com/4373124/donald-trumpdonors-super-pacs. 3. Goldmacher, Shane. 2016. “Trump Shatters GOP Records with Small Donors.” Politico, September 19, www.politico.com/story/2016/09/trump-shattersgop-records-with-small-donors-228338. 4. Balcerzak, Ashley. 2016. “Where the Money Came From, Not How Much, Mattered in the Presidential Race.” OpenSecrets blog, Center for Responsive Politics, November 9, www.opensecrets.org/news/2016/11/where-the-moneycame-from-not-how-much-mattered-in-the-presidential-race. 5. The dollar amounts in this paragraph are based on FEC summary data for each election cycle. See http://classic.fec.gov/press/campaign_finance_­ statistics.shtml. 6. Corrado, Anthony. 1993. Paying for Presidents. New York, NY: Twentieth Century Fund Press, pp. 40–41. 7. Corrado, Anthony. 2012. “Financing Presidential Nomination in the Post-Public Funding Era,” in William G. Mayer and Jonathan Bernstein (eds.), The Making of the Presidential Candidates 2012. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 25–27. 8. Ibid., p. 26. 9. Ibid., pp. 32–33. 10. Fritze, John. 2016. “O’Malley Campaign Secures Public Cash Before Dropping Out.” Baltimore Sun, February 6, www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/ investigations/bs-md-sn-investigates-omalley-money0207–20160206-story. html; FEC. 2016. Federal Election Commission Certifies F ­ ederal Matching Funds for O’Malley, press release, April 6, www.fec.gov/press/press2016/news_releases/ 20160406release.shtml. 11. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 12. SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 13. See Center for Responsive Politics, www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S. 14. See Center for Responsive Politics, www.opensecrets.org/outside­spending/ summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=S. 15. For 2016, see the Center for Responsive Politics summary at www. opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2016&chrt=V&disp=O& type=C. For 2012, see www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle= 2012&chrt=V&disp=O&type=C.



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16. Magleby, David B. 2014. “The 2012 Election as a Team Sport,” in David B. Magleby (ed.), Financing the 2012 Election. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 17–30. 17. Parnes, Amie, and Kevin Cirilli. 2015. “The $5 Billion Presidential Campaign?” The Hill, January 21, http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidentialraces/230318-the-5-billion-campaign. 18. FEC. 2016. “Presidential Pre-Nomination Campaign Receipts Through June 30, 2016,” table, July 22, www.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/ presidential/presreceipts_2016_m7.pdf. 19. Currinder, Marian. 2018. “Campaign Finance: Where Big Money Mattered and Where It Didn’t,” in Michael Nelson (ed.), The Elections of 2016. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, p. 141. 20. See the FEC summaries for each of these races at www.fec.gov/ disclosurep/pnational.do. 21. FEC. 2016. “Presidential Pre-Nomination Campaign Receipts Through May 31, 2016,” table, June 22, www.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/ presidential/presreceipts_2016_m6.pdf. 22. Corrado, Anthony. 2014. “Fundraising Strategies in the 2012 Presidential Campaign,” in James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson (eds.), Campaigns and Elections American Style, 4th ed. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p. 113. 23. Campaign Finance Institute. 2017. “President Trump, with RNC Help, Raised More Small Donor Money than President Obama; As Much As ­Clinton and Sanders Combined,” press release, February 21, Table 2, www.cfinst.org/Press/ PReleases/17–02–21/President_Trump_with_RNC_Help_Raised_More_ Small_Donor_Money_than_President_Obama_As_Much_As_­C linton_ and_Sanders_Combined.aspx. 24. Ibid., Table 4. 25. Gearan, Anne. 2015. “Hillary Clinton Raised $45 Million Since April.” Washington Post, July 1, www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/ 07/01/hillary-clinton-raised-45-million-since-april/?utm_term=.d07 d56396d1f. 26. Ibid.; Campaign Finance Institute. 2015. “Jeb Bush’s Big Donor Percentage Sets Record for June 30 Off-Year Reports,” press release, July 16, Table 2, www. cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/15–07–16/June_30_Presidential_Fundraising_ Reports_Jeb_Bush%E2%80%99s_Big_Donor_Percentage_Sets_Record_for_ June_30_off-year_reports.aspx. 27. Beckel, Michael. 2016. “Elite Bundlers Raise More Than $113 Million for ­Hillary Clinton.” The Center for Public Integrity, September 23, www.public­ integrity.org/2016/09/23/20254/elite-bundlers-raise-more-113-million-hillaryclinton. 28. Becker, Amanda, and Emily Flitter. 2015. “Democrat Clinton Raises $45 Million since April U.S. Campaign Launch,” Reuters, July 1, www.reuters.

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com/article/us-usa-clinton-fundraising/democrat-clinton-raises-45-millionsince-april-u-s-campaign-launch-idUSKCN0PB59T20150701. 29. Campaign Finance Institute. 2016. “Trump Fundraising Picked Up Steam, But Slow Start Still Leaves Him Well Back,” press release, August 18. 30. Campaign Finance Institute, 2017, Table 4. 31. Ibid., Table 3. 32. Bernie 2016. 2016. “Sanders Launches Microsite on Historic Fundraising, Outraised Clinton in April,” press release, May 20, https://berniesanders. com/press-release/sanders-launches-microsite-on-historic-fundraising-outraised-clinton-in-april. 33. Total for contributions based on FEC quarterly reports. Online fundraising total from Corasaniti, Nick. 2016. “Bernie Sanders Campaign Showed How to Turn Viral Moments into Money.” New York Times, June 24, www.­nytimes. com/2016/06/25/us/politics/bernie-sanders-digital-strategy.html?_r=0 34. Campaign Finance Institute, 2017, Table 2. 35. Corasaniti, 2016. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Haskell, Josh, and Liz Kreutz. 2016. “Hillary Clinton Has Headlined More Than 350 Fundraisers Since Launching Campaign.” ABC News, October 25, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/hillary-clinton-headlined-350-fundraiserslaunching-campaign/story?id=43055539. 40. Gold, Matea, and John Wagner. 2015. “Sanders Nearly Matches C ­ linton in Fundraising for Third Quarter.” Washington Post, September 30, www. washingtonpost.com/politics/heading-into-primaries-sanders-raises-24-­ million-in-3rd-quarter/2015/09/30/ef061a36–67ac-11e5–8325-a42b5a459b1e_ story.html?utm_term=.6bed6869f0e8. 41. Bernie 2016. 2015. “Bernie Sanders Scores Big Win: Breaks Major Fundraising Record,” press release, December 20, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/? pid=114251. 42. Corasaniti, 2016. 43. Wagner, John. 2016. “In 24 Hours After Iowa Caucuses, Sanders Donors Pony Up $3 Million, Aides Say.” Washington Post, February 10, www. washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/02/02/in-24-hours-­a fteriowa-caucuses-sanders-donors-pony-up-3-million-aides-say/?utm_­term=. 96cdbdc39e91. 44. Wagner, John, and Matea Gold. 2016. “Sanders Blows Past $6 Million Fundraising Goal for the 24 Hours Following N.H. Win.” Washington Post, February 10, www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/02/10/ sanders-blows-past-6-million-fundraising-goal-for-the-24-hours-followingn-h-win/?utm_term=.d451538a73b5.



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45. Gold, Matea. 2016. “No, Donald Trump Has Not Given His Campaign $100 Million,andOtherAnswerstoYourMoneyQuestions.”W ­ ashingtonPost,­October31, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/10/31/no-donaldtrump-has-not-given-his-campaign-100-million-and-other-answers-to-yourmoney-questions/?utm_term=.e5cfca45e158. 46. Joe, Wesley, and Clyde Wilcox. 1999. “Financing the 1996 Presidential Nominations,” in John C. Green (ed.), Financing the 1996 Election. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 42–43; and Green, John C., and Nathaniel S. Bigelow. 2002. “The 2000 Presidential Nominations: The Costs of Innovation,” in ­David B. Magleby (ed.), Financing the 2000 Election. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 62–63. 47. Corrado, Anthony, and Molly Corbett. 2009. “Rewriting the Playbook on Presidential Campaign Financing,” in Dennis W. Johnson (ed.), Campaigning for President 2008. New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 130–131. 48. FEC. n.d. “Presidential Pre-Nomination Disbursements through ­December 31, 2015,” www.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/presidential/ PresCan2_2015_12m.pdf. 49. Wesleyan Media Project. 2016. “Advertising Volume Up 122% Over 2012 Levels; Spending in Presidential Race Over $400 Million,” press release, May 12, http://mediaproject.wesleyan.edu/releases/ad-spending-over-400-million. 50. Lafrance, Adrienne. 2016. “Trump’s Media Saturation, Quantified.” The Atlantic, September 1, www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/09/ trumps-media-saturation-quantified/498389. 51. Yu, Roger. 2016. “How Do You Use the Media to Win? Just Ask Donald Trump.” USA Today, November 9, www.usatoday.com/story/money/2016/11/09/ trump-presidential-victory-lesson-how-use-media-win/93552638. 52. Ibid. 53. Goldmacher, Shane. 2016. “Hillary Clinton to Begin Collecting General Election Cash.” Politico, June 3, www.politico.com/story/2016/06/hillary-clintongeneral-election-funds-223853. 54. Perez, Evan, Pamela Brown, Shimon Prokupecz, and Gloria Borger. 2017. “FBI Russia Investigation Looking at Kushner Role.” CNN.com, May 26, www.cnn.com/2017/05/25/politics/fbi-russia-investigation-jared-kushner/ index.html. 55. Gold, Matea, and Tom Hamburger. 2016. “Democratic Party Fundraising Effort Helps Clinton Find New Donors, Too.” Washington Post, February20,www.washingtonpost.com/politics/democratic-party-fundraisingeffort-helps-clinton-find-new-donors-too/2016/02/19/b8535cea-d68f-11e5b195–2e29a4e13425_story.html?utm_term=.ca3d77b4f680. 56. Green, Joshua, and Sasha Issenberg. 2016. “Inside the Trump Bunker, With 12 Days to Go.” Bloomberg Businessweek, October 27, www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2016–10–27/inside-the-trump-bunker-with-12-days-to-go.

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57. Gass, Nick. 2016. “Trump Sends First Fundraising Email, Vowing to Match Donations.” Politico, June 21, www.politico.com/story/2016/06/trumpfirst-fundraising-email-224594. 58. Lapowsky, Issie. 2016. “Here’s How Facebook Actually Won Trump the Presidency,” Wired, November 15, www.wired.com/2016/11/facebook-wontrump-election-not-just-fake-news. 59. Ibid. 60. Green and Issenberg, 2016. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 63. Campaign Finance Institute, 2017. 64. Abramowitz, Alan I. 2014. “Partisan Nation: The Rise of Affective Partisanship in the American Electorate,” in John C. Green, Daniel J. ­Coffey, and David B. Cohen (eds.), The State of the Parties, 7th ed. Lanham, MD: ­Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 21–36; Jacobson, Gary C. 2015. “It’s Nothing P ­ ersonal: The Decline of Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections.” Journal of Politics 77 (July 2015): 861–873. 65. Jacobson, Gary C. 2017. “Congress: Nationalized, Polarized, and Partisan,” in Michael Nelson (ed.), The Elections of 2016. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, p. 166. 66. Campaign Finance Institute. n.d. Table 3–2: House Campaign Expenditures: Major Party General Election Candidates, 1974–2016 (full cycle), www. cfinst.org/pdf/vital/VitalStats_t2.pdf. This table, as well as other tables from the Campaign Finance Institute on congressional campaign funding noted hereafter, are updated versions of those that are found in the book series, Vital Statistics on Congress, coauthored by Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, Michael J. Malbin, Andrew Rugg, and Raffaela Wakeman, published by the Brookings Institution Press. 67. Ibid. 68. Herrnson, Paul S. 2016. Congressional Elections, 7th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, pp. 146–150. 69. Ibid., 147. 70. Steen, Jennifer A. 2006. Self-Financed Candidates in Congressional Elections. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 71. Currinder, 2018, p. 138. 72. Campaign Finance Institute, 2017. “Political Parties and Candidates Dominated the 2016 House Elections While Holding Their Own in the Senate,” press release, April 13, Table 3, www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/17–04–13/ POLITICAL_PARTIES_AND_CANDIDATES_DOMINATED_THE_2016_ HOUSE_ELECTIONS_WHILE_HOLDING_THEIR_OWN_IN_THE_ SENATE.aspx.



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73. FEC. Campaign Committee Contributions to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2016, https:// transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/party/Prty7_2016_24m.pdf; Campaign Committee Contributions to the National Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2016, https:// transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/party/Prty8_2016_24m.pdf. 74. FEC. Campaign Committee Contributions to the National Republican Congressional Committee, January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2016, https:// transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/party/Prty6_2016_24m.pdf. 75. FEC. Campaign Committee Contributions to the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2016, https://transition.fec.gov/press/summaries/2016/tables/party/Prty5_2016_ 24m.pdf.

13 Outside Money and Inside Policy

Campaign Finance Before and After Citizens United R. Sam Garrett

Until relatively recently, the campaign environment largely was limited to candidates and parties. When Congress last substantially amended campaign finance law, in 2002, even the parties were allegedly in doubt. In fact, critics of the new Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) warned that it would be the financial death of the two major political parties. Congress had banned unlimited “soft money” and some feared that nonparty groups, such as politically active “527s,” would overshadow Democrats and Republicans. More importantly, within a decade, new groups known as “super political action committees” (Super PACs) would emerge to challenge or help parties (depending on circumstances and one’s perspective), politically active tax-exempt groups regulated under Section 501(c) of the federal Internal Revenue Code would have new opportunities for influencing elections, and much of BCRA would be constitutionally invalidated. At least financially, parties have recovered, although their organizational strength remains open to debate. In fact, in the first six months of the 2018 election cycle (January 1, 2017–June 30, 2017), political party committees raised $328.2 million and spent $241.5 million.1 Yet, as Table 13.1 below shows, below the surface, Democrats and Republicans were financially mismatched. Through 304



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Table 13.1  Selected Party Financial Activity, First Six Months of 2018 Cycle

Committee DNC RNC DCCC NRCC DSCC NRSC

Receipts $38.2 million $75.4 million $59.9 million $60.0 million $28.7 million $28.0 million

Disbursements $41.2 million $56.0 million $45.4 million $37.8 million $14.8 million $18.9 million

Cash-on-Hand $7.5 million $44.7 million $21.3 million $33.7 million $17.2 million $16.2 million

Source: Data from Federal Election Commission (2017).

June 2017, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) had raised $38.2 million but had just $7.5 million in cash-on-hand. By contrast, the GOP2 counterpart, the Republican National Committee (RNC), had raised almost twice that of the Democrats: $75.4 million, more than half of which ($44.7 million) remained in cash. Nonetheless, as Table 13.1 also shows, the four “Hill committees,” the Democratic ­Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), were far more evenly matched. Parties also had reason for optimism as they raised newly permissible funds for three special accounts each—for their headquarters committees, conventions, and recounts/legal compliance—that Congress first allowed in an FY2015 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 113–235, the relevant portion of which amended the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)). The two major parties moved quickly to take advantage of their new fundraising opportunities. In total, Democratic and Republican party committees raised $135.6 million for the new accounts. As Table 13.2 below shows, here, too, Republicans enjoyed a substantial fundraising advantage over Democrats in these accounts, with the GOP outpacing Democrats almost two to one. Amid these and other developments, some accounts framed the Democratic situation as a financial “crisis.” According to an August 2017 Politico magazine essay: The predicament isn’t simply that there is a funding gap between the parties; it’s what kind of money they attract. Republicans have quietly taken a decisive edge over Democrats when it comes to

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Table 13.2  Receipts for Special National Party Accounts, 2016 Cycle

Party Committees DNC

Convention $16.8 million

RNC

$23.8 million

DSCC

N/A

NRSC

N/A

DCCC

N/A

NRCC

N/A

Democratic Totals Republican Totals Grand Total

$16.8 million $23.8 million $40.6 million

Headquarters $7.0 million $26.4 million $7.1 million $9.4 million $7.3 million $10.1 million $21.3 million $45.9 million $67.2 million

Recount $4.1 million $6.0 million $2.9 million $1.3 million $2.7 million $10.8 million $9.7 million $18.1 million $27.8 million

Total $27.8 million $56.1 million $10.0 million $10.8 million $10.0 million $20.8 million $47.8 million $87.7 million $135.5 million

Source: Data from Federal Election Commission, “Contributions to Accounts of National Party Committees” for the 2016 election cycle, Table 10, https://transition.fec. gov/press/summaries/2016/ElectionCycle/24m_NatlParty.shtml, accessed October 2017. Note: The table excludes approximately $30,000 raised by committees other than those affiliated with the Democratic and Republican Parties.

small-dollar fundraising. [During the first six months of 2017] the RNC raised $33 million in small contributions—money from people who donate $200 or less over an election cycle—while that same class of donors gave the DNC just $21 million. This isn’t just about money. Small-dollar donors are an important measure of how much grass-roots enthusiasm a campaign or organization has. They are the supporters who will show up to knock on doors, make phone calls and get out the vote.3

The author of that assessment, it should be noted, served as a digital fundraising manager for Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders’s (I) Democratic primary campaign. Nonetheless, reports throughout early 2017



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suggested infighting in Democratic circles as the party sought to recover from its unexpected losses in 2016.4 As with all things campaign finance, though, there is still more. Beyond this brief statistical summary, we also find evidence of controversy for Republicans, despite their financial advantages noted above. Factions within and around the Republican Party struggled to take control of the GOP. For Republicans, the role of nonparty groups, particularly Super PACs, has been especially important in recent election cycles. Indeed, at the same time that some observers were predicting a Democratic financial crisis in 2018, others were warning that Republican squabbling would doom the GOP’s chances of holding the Senate, or perhaps even the House. In one prominent example, former White House and Trump campaign strategist Steve Bannon’s efforts to recruit antiestablishment congressional candidates for 2018 reportedly exacerbated tensions between Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY), the White House, and various groups within the party. As the Wall Street Journal reported in October 2017, [a]sked about Mr. Bannon aiming to loosen Mr. McConnell’s grip on leadership, the senator said [that] similar efforts have only hurt the party in previous elections. Amid the wave of Tea Party conservatism early this decade, Senate Republicans failed to win the majority, he noted.

The same report also quoted Steven Law, head of the Senate Leadership Fund—a Super PAC aligned with McConnell and the Republican ­establishment—as saying that “[e]very dollar and minute we waste fighting among ourselves is a free gift to the Democrats.”5 Some of the sense of urgency surrounding these and other nonparty groups grew from other recent changes in campaign finance law—in this case, from judicial interpretation of statute rather than congressional action—that permitted new actors to raise and spend money in federal elections. In particular, beginning in the 2012 election cycle, Super PACs emerged and, in some cases, challenged parties’ traditional dominance. By 2016, some Super PACs devoted to single candidates were spending heavily to shape the presidential race (in addition to some congressional contests). According to the Center for Responsive Politics, 247 ­single-candidate Super PACs were active in the 2016 cycle.6 For example, Super PAC Priorities USA Action made more than $133.4 million in

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independent expenditures supporting Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton. Even the best-financed Super PACs do not, however, necessarily guarantee success. Just as Priority USA Action’s presidential efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, so was the $23.2 million that ­Granite State Solutions spent opposing New Hampshire Democrat Maggie Hassan in that that state’s U.S. Senate contest. The preceding admittedly selective sample of recent financial activity demonstrates that a cast of characters around the campaign landscape— but not officially part of the campaigns—affects who wins and loses and how campaigns are conducted. The tension between parties and other noncandidate entities, such as political action committees (PACs), also is a recurring theme in the debate over money in politics. Although developments since 2010 have been particularly prominent, parties, PACs, and other “outside” entities have competed or worked in concert for campaign influence for decades. Success and equality among these groups can be measured in different ways at different times. Even some basic terms are imprecise. In particular, often used casually in journalistic and scholarly accounts, the term “outside money” is too imprecise to be very useful if one really wants to understand where these funds originate and how they are spent and why. So what is all this “outside money,” and where did it come from? There are basically two ways to explore that and similar campaign finance questions in scholarly settings: statistical summaries of financial activity to track whether one party, group, or candidate has a financial advantage compared with peers; or more qualitative analyses of campaign decision-making and policy issues. This chapter does some of both but emphasizes policy history to explain opportunities for entities other than candidate campaigns to raise and spend money in campaigns.7 Many of the topics discussed herein have been the subject of entire books, court cases, or statutes. This chapter provides an overview of some of the most prominent aspects of a policy debate that has lasted more than 40 years, but it intentionally does not attempt to address all fundraising and spending options that various groups have to influence campaigns. To narrow our focus, rather than thinking strictly of “outside” money, for the purposes of this chapter, the discussion might be more precisely called “noncandidate” money. This includes fundraising and spending— and, as we shall see, especially independent spending, by entities such as traditional political action committees (PACs), the recent breed of Super PACs and politically active tax-exempt “501(c)” organizations. A 2010 Supreme Court decision, discussed below, is the latest major change



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in how noncandidate funds can affect the campaign environment. To understand why, we must first understand what came before. The brief timeline below highlights major policy developments, emphasizing key turning points for “outside money.”

Selected Policy Developments, 1970s-2016 • 1971: Congress enacts initial FECA establishing basics of current campaign finance system. • 1974; 1976; 1979: Congress substantially amends FECA, especially following the 1976 Buckley Supreme Court decision. Recognition of distinction between limited contributions and unlimited independent expenditures in Buckley especially important for “outside” groups. • 1975–1976: Federal Election Commission (FEC) recognizes PACs concept; agency is reconstituted after Buckley. • 1990: Supreme Court upholds constitutionality of FECA corporate treasury ban in Austin. • 2002: Congress amends FECA via the Bipartisan Campaign ­Reform Act (BCRA), banning “soft money” for political parties and establishing electioneering communications. • 2003: Supreme Court upholds constitutionality of most of BCRA. • 2007: Supreme Court limits BCRA electioneering communication provision in • Wisconsin Right to Life • (WRTL II), arguably setting the stage for Citizens United. • 2010: Supreme Court issues Citizens United, invalidating FECA ban on corporate and union treasury independent expenditures and electioneering communications, and reversing portions of Austin and McConnell; Super PACs arise following Citizens United and D.C. Circuit’s SpeechNow decision. • 2014 (FY2015): Following the Supreme Court’s McCutcheon v. FEC decision lifting aggregate individual contribution limits, Congress permits additional party fundraising using special accounts.

Major Provisions of Campaign Finance Law Before 2010 Long-standing (albeit mostly inflation-adjusted) contribution limits are perhaps the most fundamental aspect of campaign finance law. Table 13.3

Table 13.3  Selected Federal Contribution Limits, 2018 Election Cycle

To National Party To Candidate Committees Committees From $2,700 per $33,900 per year, Individuals candidate, per plus $101,700 for electiona each special party account Unlimited From National $5,000 per Party candidate, per transfers among national party Committees electionb committees $5,000 per $15,000 per year, From election plus $45,000 for Traditional each special party PACsc account From Super Prohibited Prohibited PACs (permitted to (permitted to (not make make considered independent independent contributions expenditures expenditures under FECA) only) only)

To Traditional PACs $5,000 per year

To Super PACs Unlimited

$5,000 per year

Unlimited

$5,000 per year

Unlimited

Prohibited (permitted to make independent expenditures only)

N/Ad

Source: Data from Federal Election Commission, “Contribution Limits for 2017–2018 Federal Election,” https://transition.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimitschart.htm, accessed October 2017. Notes: a. Individuals may give $2,700 to any one candidate committee during the primary and during the general (and, run-off, if applicable) election campaigns. b. This amount refers to direct contributions, not coordinated party expenditures. Coordinated party expenditures—which are not otherwise addressed in this ­chapter—are purchases parties may make on behalf of, and in concert with, candidate campaigns. The table also excludes a special $47,400 limit for contributions by party committees to Senate campaigns (shared between the national party and its Senate campaign committee). c. This chapter uses the term “traditional PAC” to refer to those PACs permitted to make contributions to federal candidates (i.e., non–Super PACs and non-PACs operating under the Carey v. FEC exception that permits unlimited independent expenditures from a segregated bank account). This entry in the table also refers to “multicandidate” PACs, which are the most common type of PAC. Multicandidate PAC status is triggered when these committees make certain aggregate contributions to multiple candidates. d. Discussion of transfers/contributions among super PACs is beyond the scope of this chapter.



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provides an overview of contribution limits for the 2018 election cycle. Importantly for the purposes of this chapter, note that contribution limits are different for candidate committees and for outside groups. In particular, there are no limits for contributions that support “independent expenditures,” such as those that Super PACs make, a distinction that will become clearer over the course of the chapter.

The 1970s: Setting the Boundaries of Modern Campaign Finance Policy Congress first passed a major campaign finance statute in 1907. At President Theodore Roosevelt’s urging, arguably in an effort to combat criticism surrounding large contributions to his 1904 reelection campaign, Congress enacted the Tillman Act.8 The Act prohibited contributions from nationally chartered banks and corporations. Other restrictions and reporting requirements followed in the 1910s and 1920s, but the measures were largely viewed as ineffective. Congress banned contributions from labor unions in the 1940s, most notably via the Taft–Hartley Act.9 Modern campaign finance law did not emerge until the 1970s, when Congress enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and related statutes.10 First enacted in 1971 and substantially amended in 1974, 1976, and 1979, FECA remains the nation’s primary campaign finance statute.11 Among other points, FECA and its major amendments required disclosure (public reporting of information) about campaign receipts and expenditures. The Act also limits contributions and initially limited spending—although the Supreme Court has generally invalidated spending limits on First Amendment grounds (discussed below). Three kinds of entities, known as “political committees,” are principally governed by FECA and related FEC regulations. Political committees include candidate campaign committees (e.g., Johnson for Senate), party committees (e.g., the Democratic or Republican national committees), and PACs. All political committees must regularly report their financial activities to the FEC (or, in the case of Senate political committees, to the secretary of the Senate, who transmits them to the FEC).12 Political advertising and other activities classified as “independent expenditures” and “electioneering communications” (discussed below) must also report those activities to the FEC. Finally, the 1974 FECA amendments established the FEC; the 1976 amendments reconstituted the agency after the Buckley decision.

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Buckley v. Valeo (1976) was perhaps the most consequential campaign finance decision the US Supreme Court has ever issued.13 In brief, the case considered several challenges to the 1974 FECA amendments. The court upheld most of the amendments’ major provisions but also found some aspects unconstitutional. In one of the most important holdings, the court distinguished between permissible limits on contributions versus expenditures. Even though contribution limits constrained the donor’s political speech, the court held, doing so was a reasonable effort to limit potential corruption. The decision struck down limits on independent expenditures (e.g., funds spent to advocate the election or defeat of a candidate without coordinating with that candidate).14 As election scholar Michael Ortiz explains, different potential for corruption influenced the court’s distinction between contributions and spending. According to Ortiz, Simply put, the Court believed that a candidate could become beholden to a contributor but not to someone who merely expended monies on his or her behalf. If expenditures could not indebt a candidate to a voter, they could never give rise to even the appearance of corruption.15

Buckley was significant largely because it established a long-standing set of boundaries for which contribution, spending, and disclosure mechanisms were constitutionally valid. From a policy perspective, Buckley continues to influence which options realistically can be p ­ ursued—namely that, although contributions can be limited and reasonable disclosure can be required, spending generally cannot be limited. The distinction between “express advocacy,” which explicitly calls for election or defeat of a candidate (especially in political advertising), and “issue advocacy,” which at least ostensibly concerns policy issues rather than electoral outcomes, also took root in Buckley. All these topics would become major issues of debate for the next 40 years, ultimately building to the 2010 Citizens United decision. The court’s interpretation of constitutionally permissible limits on contributions but to permit no such limits on independent spending, is perhaps the most fundamental factor shaping the campaign environment of the past half-century. Citizens United provided new opportunities for noncandidate groups to spend money affecting elections, but Buckley enabled independent spending in the first place.



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Outside Money and Outside Advertising as Emerging Policy Concerns After Buckley, Congress occasionally made narrow amendments to FECA, but the law remained largely untouched for almost 30 years. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that nothing happened in campaign finance law and policy between 1976 and 2002 (when BCRA was enacted) or 2010 (when Citizens United was decided). In fact, it could be argued that the major developments that took place in 2010 were not relatively sudden occurrences but instead had been building for years. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, two related issues—the role of outside groups (especially PACs) and issue ads sponsored by those groups— demonstrated the intersection of politics and policy. Starting in the 1980s, thanks in part to the rise of the political consulting industry and the growth of media consulting as a dedicated profession,16 television ads became a staple in enough House and Senate contests that the issue took on public policy significance even after Election Day. As political advertising became more ingrained in all kinds of campaigns, the public, editorial boards, and legislators lamented the negative tone of “attack” ads, which critics contended distracted from substantive campaigning.17 Although all campaigns rely on advertising, they are also typically wary of it, especially when opponents, parties, and groups running against those candidates take to the air themselves. Developments before and after Citizens United affected political advertising and, perhaps ironically, the opposition advertising with which political campaigns are often most concerned. PACs and other groups were central to emerging concerns about the role of outside advertising. PACs emerged primarily during the 1970s as a result of an FEC advisory opinion (AO) in which, essentially, the Sun Oil Corporation asked the newly created commission whether FECA permitted it to establish a separate fund to make expenditures and contributions despite the law’s ban on the corporation itself engaging in such activity.18 Generating much controversy, the FEC answered affirmatively, thereby blessing the PAC concept and opening the door to the use of a corporate and labor presence in federal elections notwithstanding the FECA ban on corporate and union treasury funds for expenditures or contributions. Congress endorsed the move when it amended FECA in 1976 and 1979. Importantly, although corporations and unions could (and still can) use treasury funds for limited administrative support of their PACs,

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they may not use the PAC to funnel treasury funds for use in otherwise prohibited campaign contributions or expenditures. Funds for those purposes must be raised from voluntary contributions, such as from corporate employees or union members, with restrictions on when and how solicitations can occur. Whether these safeguards sufficiently establish a barrier between corporate and labor activity in elections or whether they enable a thinly veiled avenue for corporate and labor influence occupied much of the debate over federal campaign finance policy in the 1980s.19 PACs nonetheless became accepted as a political and policy reality over time, and new policy dilemmas—such as the role of unlimited “soft money”—became more pressing.20 Eventually, PACs invested heavily in various activities affecting campaigns. Their role in political advertising—especially ads that were derided as attacks from arguably less accountable “outside” groups (e.g., in contrast to a clearly recognizable opposing candidate)—became a major issue by the late 1980s and early 1990s. Some corporations, unions, and outside groups also began spending directly on commercials known as “issue advertising.” Issue ads managed to avoid FECA’s ban on corporate and labor treasury funds because the commercials did not trigger Buckley’s “magic words” standard, which referred to a specific set of terms understood to be synonymous with calls for election or defeat.21 By encouraging voters merely to contact members of Congress rather than explicitly encouraging a vote for or against the candidate, issue ads were ostensibly about public policy issues instead of determining electoral outcomes. Issue ads were widely believed to influence elections, even though they were not formally regulated by campaign finance law or FEC rules. This combination of noncandidate money and advertising encouraged (among other factors) the next major amendment to campaign finance law—a legislative effort that began in the 1990s and culminated in enactment of BCRA in 2002.

Building BCRA BCRA represented the first major amendments to FECA since the 1970s.22 For the purposes of this chapter, two implications for ­noncandidate money were particularly important. Perhaps most consequentially, BCRA—also known as McCain–Feingold for its principal Senate sponsors, Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Russ Feingold (D-WI)—banned soft money in federal elections. In practice, this meant that the millions of dollars



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that political parties previously raised from otherwise prohibited sources (e.g., corporations) for generic “party-building” activities were now off limits. Congress also included in BCRA a provision designed to combat the combination of outside money and advertising that was at least nominally about policy issues (“issue ads”)—often coming from PACs but also sometimes from corporations or unions—that had been on the rise in the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, BCRA also contained several other provisions, including adjusting contribution limits (except for PACs) for inflation. The decision to leave the PAC limits fixed reflected the lingering controversy over these groups that had begun in the 1970s. Congress relied on an extensive legislative record (including some prominent political science research) to examine whether issue ads were really mostly about public policy rather than influencing elections. BCRA supporters in the House and Senate determined that most issue ads were, in fact, what came to be derided as “sham” issue ads—­meaning the communications were widely understood to be aimed at deciding elections even if they conspicuously avoided Buckley’s “magic words.” Buckley precluded Congress from banning the ads outright. Nonetheless, through BCRA, Congress created a new category of political ­advertising—­electioneering communications—that essentially are treated as campaign ads for some regulatory purposes even if they do not meet the traditional standards of campaign advertising (e.g., express advocacy). Electioneering communications include only broadcast, cable, or satellite ads, refer to a clearly identified federal candidate, and must be targeted to the relevant electorate. The ads also are aired within 60 days of a general election or within 30 days of a primary—the period when the legislative record suggested was most important for influencing elections. Effectively, enactment of the electioneering communication provision meant that, although corporations, unions, or other groups could have used their treasuries to fund ads supporting or disparaging candidates before BCRA, they could not do so during preelection periods after BCRA (assuming the ads met the electioneering communication standard). As a result, the ads either had to be avoided altogether or had to be funded in limited amounts from permissible sources and disclosed under FECA. BCRA was immediately controversial. Many observers expected at least parts of the Act—particularly the electioneering communication provision—to be invalidated on First Amendment grounds. Senator Mitch McConnell (discussed above, and who remains, as of this writing,

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a leading voice against campaign finance regulation), filed suit to prevent the FEC from enforcing the Act. In McConnell v. FEC (2003)23 the Supreme Court held, in a five-to-four decision, that virtually all of BCRA was constitutional—including the soft money ban and electioneering communication provision. The majority ruled that even though parts of the Act burdened political speech, Congress had established a reasonable risk of corruption to warrant the restrictions. Despite initial success in the courts, BCRA remained intact for only two election cycles (2004 and 2006). Critics continued to bring challenges, both in court and at the FEC, which was writing rules to implement the law and various court decisions. By 2007, the Supreme Court again considered the electioneering communication provision—in this instance, not as an inherent or “facial” challenge, as McConnell had been, but in an “as applied” challenge that evaluated how the provision affected a specific organization. In Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL II, 2007),24 the court determined that the electioneering communication provision did unconstitutionally burden political speech in some circumstances. In brief, the majority sided with a tax-exempt corporation’s (Wisconsin Right to Life) appeal to use its treasury funds—rather than having to form a PAC and adhere to other FECA requirements—to air electioneering communications that urged speedy Senate votes on judicial nominees. The details of WRTL II are not essential for this chapter, but it is important to note that, as a policy matter, the case was significant because it marked the beginning of the end for key aspects of the electioneering communication provision. Essentially, it again opened the door to corporate treasury funds in elections, albeit in limited circumstances—and set the stage for far greater changes in 2010.

Citizens United: A Major Change in Campaign Finance Law for the 2010 Election Cycle Citizens United is notable for a variety of legal, policy, and practical political reasons. Like Buckley before it, Citizens United also is important for reasons that extend far beyond the case itself. Indeed, especially as it was first presented, Citizens United addressed a relatively narrow question about applicability of the electioneering communication provision. The implications of the case, however, were far broader. By the time the Supreme Court issued its five-to-four decision on January 21, 2010, advocates had come before the justices not the standard single time, but



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twice, and the court had expanded the issues in play. Essentially, the attorneys were asked to address the questions they had initially presented and whether those questions also had implications for other Supreme Court precedents that, in turn, had major implications for the nation’s campaign finance law—and, thereby, policy questions for Congress and federal agencies. This section presents an overview of those developments and why they are important for understanding Citizens United and its aftermath. Before proceeding, it is important to note that discussion here is intended to be a general academic and policy-oriented overview. Some important constitutional and legal issues are mentioned in passing, but those interested in a detailed legal discussion should also consult other sources.25 In Citizens United, an incorporated, tax-exempt 501(c)(4) organization called Citizens United challenged the electioneering communication provision. The group presented itself not as an interest group, as the organization was generally perceived, but as a media company that made documentary films. Citizens United contended that its film about then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton (Hillary: The Movie) did not qualify as an electioneering communication and, therefore, that the group should not be required to form a PAC to air the film in theaters and through video-on-demand cable, as it planned to do ahead of the 2008 elections. The FEC disagreed and Citizens United sued. After a district court sided with the FEC, Citizens United appealed (through an expedited review process established in BCRA) to the Supreme Court, which heard initial oral arguments on the electioneering communication questions in March 2009. In an unusual move, instead of issuing a decision, the court ordered the parties to file additional briefs and appear again for a second round of oral arguments. Among other questions, the court asked whether, in order to rule on whether Citizens United’s film qualified as an electioneering communication and, as such, had to be paid for with hard money (i.e., by a PAC rather than Citizens United itself), the court should reconsider its 1990 opinion in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce.26 In Austin, the court determined that political speech could be restricted based on the speaker’s corporate status. Austin essentially confirmed that corporations could not spend funds to influence federal elections. Once the court broadened Citizens United to include not only the status of the electioneering communication provision but also the question of corporate-funded independent expenditures, the case transformed

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from addressing the relatively narrow question of whether the electioneering communication provision applied to limited-distribution films, to considering the much larger question of corporate independent expenditures in general. When the court issued its ruling, it spurred a policy and public debate over campaign finance issues perhaps never before seen in the United States. Citizens United and corporate political spending were suddenly the topic of sustained national news and cultural importance that continue to this day. In Citizens United, the court overruled its previous decisions in McConnell (finding for the constitutionality of the electioneering communication provision generally) and Austin (regarding the government’s ability to restrict independent political speech based on the advertiser’s corporate status), among other points. What does this mean for the more general discussion here of the case’s implications for campaign finance policy and campaign practice, especially for independent spending? At least three issues in Citizens United are relevant for the policy and political issues discussed in this chapter. First, was Hillary: The Movie an electioneering communication (and, therefore, subject to the hardmoney funding and reporting requirements in BCRA)? Second, what did the case mean for the FECA ban on corporate independent expenditures? Third, what were the implications for disclaimers and disclosure—both of which provide regulators and the public with information about funding surrounding expenditures?27 All three issues are related, particularly those of the spending provisions raised in the first two questions. On the first point, Citizens United contended that the film was a documentary and should be exempt from the electioneering communication provision. The court disagreed, finding that the movie clearly took a position on Senator Clinton’s fitness for office and qualified as an electioneering communication. At first glance, this finding was good news for those who supported BCRA and the electioneering communication provision because the court had rejected the contention that, even though the format was not specifically addressed in BCRA (in addition to other technical issues not discussed here), it would not carve out an exception for documentary-style films. Thus, the electioneering communication provision in and of itself did not offer safe harbor for messages that criticized candidates during preelection periods just because the messages were transmitted via on-demand video. If the decision ended there, the integrity of the electioneering communication provision would, indeed, have stood. In the end, however, although the electioneering communication



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provision survived for disclosure purposes, its restrictions requiring that communications be paid for only with hard money collapsed. For those supporting additional campaign finance regulation, the fate of the electioneering communication provision would become a relatively minor concern in the universe of Citizens United. In an opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy (a Republican appointee), the majority went on to say that, essentially, the case had to be decided on broader grounds than just the electioneering communication provision. The option to form a PAC, Justice Kennedy explained, also didn’t provide a reasonable resolution because PACs still restricted political speech of the corporation itself: Section 441b [of FECA, the corporate expenditure prohibition] is a ban on corporate speech notwithstanding the fact that a PAC created by a corporation can still speak. A PAC is a separate ­association from the corporation. So the PAC exemption from {section}441b’s expenditure ban, {section}441b(b)(2), does not allow corporations to speak. Even if a PAC could somehow allow a corporation to speak—and it does not—the option to form PACs does not alleviate the First Amendment problems with {section}441b. PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive regulations.28

Here we come to the second point noted at the beginning of this section— the question of what Citizens United meant for FECA’s ban on ­corporate independent expenditures. In short, Citizens United struck down the ban, and in so doing marked the most fundamental change in federal campaign finance law since at least Buckley.29 As a result, corporations were permitted to use their treasury funds—rather than having to form a PAC—to make independent expenditures calling for election or defeat of political candidates. Although the case did not address the ban on union treasury expenditures, it was widely understood also to permit unions to use their treasuries to encourage votes for or against candidates. The presumption of independence was essential because, although the government had long ago established a reasonable risk of quid pro quo corruption arising from contributions, the same logic did not apply to independent ads—just the kind of spending that is central to the outside groups discussed in this chapter. Although contributions entail the candidate receiving money and potentially being “bought,” independent

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expenditures, by definition, involve no financial exchange with the candidate (Citizens United, 2010, 45). The third key issue concerns disclosure. In Citizens United, although the court found that elements of the electioneering communication provision and ban on independent expenditures were unconstitutional, requiring disclaimers and disclosure was permissible. Although these requirements placed some burden on political speech, they provided important information about who was responsible for political spending and did not prevent speech itself. According to the majority opinion, “Disclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak” but they “impose no ceiling on campaign related activities” [quoting Buckley] and “do not prevent anyone from speaking” [quoting McConnell].30 The Citizens United opinion generated substantial controversy, including within the court. There were a variety of dueling arguments among the several concurring and dissenting opinions filed by the ­justices. ­Justice John Paul Stevens, a Republican appointee generally viewed as being sympathetic to campaign finance regulation, served as the lead dissenter. Justice Stevens’s objection to the majority opinion was clear from the outset. He rejected both the scope of the ruling and the implications for corporate campaign spending. In the opening paragraphs of his dissent, Stevens protested: All that the parties [in the case] dispute is whether Citizens United had a right to use the funds in its general treasury to pay for broadcasts during the [electioneering communication period]. The notion that the First Amendment dictates an affirmative answer to that question is, in my judgment, profoundly misguided. Even more misguided is the notion that the Court must rewrite the law relating to campaign expenditures by for profit corporations and unions to decide this case. The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its iteration, and constant reiteration, of the proposition that the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker’s identity, including its “identity” as a corporation. While that glittering generality has rhetorical appeal, it is not a correct statement of the law.31

Debate over the legal, policy, and political significance of the ruling continues even today. The basic facts, however, were clear. The ruling



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represented a major change in federal campaign finance law. To summarize, the court determined that the spending restrictions in the electioneering communication provision impermissibly violated First Amendment speech protections, as did the FECA ban on corporate independent expenditures. Disclosure and disclaimer provisions, on the other hand, were reasonable accommodations to ensure transparency about who was speaking and where their funds came from and how they were spent. Importantly, the court’s ruling did not affect the FECA ban on corporate or union treasury-fund contributions. That is, the decision did not grant corporations or unions permission to contribute to candidates or parties. The decision also did not affect an individual’s ability to spend unlimited amounts on independent expenditures—a practice that the Supreme Court permitted in Buckley.

SpeechNow and the Rise of Super PACs A second ruling, although not by the Supreme Court, reinforced the importance of Citizens United a few months later. Super PACs arose from this second case, issued by the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (the “DC Circuit”). SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission was already making its way through the federal courts when Citizens United was decided.32 In SpeechNow, relying on the Citizens United precedent, the D.C. Circuit held in March 2010 that unlimited contributions to PACs that make only independent expenditures were constitutionally protected. The connection between Citizens United and SpeechNow might be thought of informally as follows: where Citizens United permitted corporations (and labor unions) to use their treasuries to fund unlimited independent expenditures, SpeechNow permitted corporations and unions to use their treasuries to give funds to other entities to make unlimited independent expenditures. The FEC and some practitioners began informally referring to these new entities as “independent expenditure-only committees”. The media and other observers called them simply “Super PACs.” Like traditional PACs, Super PACs are political committees and, therefore, are regulated under FECA. Among other requirements, this means that Super PACs must report their receipts and expenditures to the FEC. However, they may not make contributions and their activities must be independent from campaigns. They can spend as much as they like advocating for or against candidates.

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Super PACs and Other Groups in the Policy and Political Environments Super PACs are significant in federal elections because they provide a relatively new mechanism for people and groups to aggregate unlimited funds calling for election or defeat of federal candidates. But where do they fit in the policy and campaign environments? What can they do that other groups cannot, or vice versa? The answer is important because how a group is regulated determines what it can do—and where policymakers are typically engaged in debate over whether the activities of people or groups should be condoned as protected political speech or regulated as a perceived loophole that could facilitate corruption. The name “Super PAC” suggests that these groups are both similar to and different from traditional PACs. Traditional PACs (e.g., those that have been on the scene since the 1970s) also allow their donors to pool resources to support or oppose candidates and, like Super PACs, are primarily regulated by the FEC. Super PACs are unique, however, because of their ability to amass unlimited contributions. Traditional PACs and Super PACs also differ in their ability to make contributions: traditional PACs can do so; Super PACs cannot. Perhaps most importantly, Super PACs and traditional PACs are both political committees. As noted earlier in this chapter, being a political committee means the entity is regulated primarily by FECA. Among other important points, political committees must regularly file financial reports with the FEC and can make only limited contributions. Super PACs, however, are essentially a different kind of political committee, because although they report to the FEC they can accept unlimited funds but cannot make contributions. Understanding Super PACs also raises the important distinction between political committees and other entities this chapter calls “politically active organizations.” While political committees are party committees, candidate committees, and PACs, and are regulated primarily by FECA and the FEC, politically active organizations are regulated primary by the Internal Revenue Code (IRC, i.e., federal tax law) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Politically active organizations include two major kinds of entities designated by their placement in the IRC— 527s and 501(c)s. Sometimes colloquially referred to as “nonprofits,” both kinds of groups are tax-exempt entities. Best known for the relatively brief period in the early 2000s—­ particularly the 2004 presidential election—two prominent 527 groups,



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Swift Boat Veterans for Truth on the Republican side and the Democratic group America Coming Together, battled over Democrat John Kerry’s presidential campaign. Although all political committees are 527s for tax purposes (e.g., reporting investment income to the IRS), not all 527s are political committees. The small subset of groups claiming to be 527s but not political committees generated controversy before and after the 2004 election cycle. The FEC eventually levied substantial fines on some 527s for failing to register as political committees. In some ways, Super PACs appear to have assumed the role that 527 organizations played in previous elections. Like Super PACs, 527s, too, can accept unlimited funds and may make unlimited expenditures, but the extent to which the groups should be regulated by FECA and the FEC has been hotly debated. Because Super PACs are widely understood to be political committees—in this case, with clear permission to accept unlimited contributions and make unlimited independent expenditures—they appear to offer more regulatory certainty than the case-by-case assessment employed with 527s. Three kinds of 501(c) organizations—501(c)(4) social welfare groups, 501(c)(5) unions, and 501(c)(6) trade associations—were particularly important post–Citizens United, both independently and when interacting with Super PACs.33 These entities engaged in political activities before Citizens United, but some observers viewed the decision as giving (c) (4), (5), and (6) organizations more freedom to engage in independent expenditures because typically the groups are incorporated (and, hence, can use corporate treasuries to make independent expenditures). The degree to which these 501(c)s can engage in independent expenditures versus other activities (e.g., conducting more general “social welfare”) while maintaining their tax-exempt status remains open to debate. Many 501(c)(4)s, (5)s, and (6)s make substantial independent expenditures on their own and funnel funds to Super PACs. 501(c)s also may engage in electioneering communications. Overall, these groups’ electioneering communications and independent expenditures have increased markedly after Citizens United, but somewhat inconsistently. Activity by (c)(4) s, for example, peaked at $257.2 million in 2012, but fell to $145.5 in 2016. Trade association activity was comparatively steady, peaking at $55.4 million in 2012 and falling to $32.9 million in 2016.34 Using these 501(c) entities to route funds to Super PACs has important implications for transparency. Unlike political committees, some politically active organizations—including 501(c)s—do not typically report their donors to the FEC. Although any entity making an independent

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expenditure or electioneering communication must report that activity to the FEC, donors are only identified if they contributed specially for the “purpose of furthering” independent expenditures or electioneering communications.35 Therefore, routing contributions through 501(c) organizations permits Super PACs to avoid disclosing the original source of funds used for independent expenditures as long as those funds were given to the 501(c) for general purposes and not specifically for independent expenditures.

Policy and Politics: The Aftermath of 2010 The monumental changes in campaign finance law in 2010 did not spur major public policy changes. In fact, as of this writing eight years after the ruling, Congress has not amended campaign finance law to respond directly to Citizens United—although the decision to permit parties to raise additional funds in the FY2015 appropriations law (noted at the beginning of the chapter) is arguably an indirect attempt to permit parties to compete with Super PACs and other independent groups. In the Congresses following Citizens United, dozens of bills—mostly sponsored by Democrats—proposed various options, ranging from disclosure to constitutional amendments—but none became law. During the 111th Congress (2009–2011), the House narrowly passed the DISCLOSE Act (H.R. 5175), a bill that would have required additional reporting about the original sources of contributions and additional documentation throughout political transactions. Amid criticisms about the bill’s applicability and proposed spending restrictions, however, the measure died in the Senate. The FEC was similarly unable to reach consensus on how far new rules implementing Citizens United should go. Much of the disagreement centered on whether rules should simply rescind portions of the existing regulations that the court had invalidated (the deregulatory approach) or whether they should recognize the decision but require additional disclosure of the independent spending that Citizens United facilitated (the pro-regulatory approach). After protracted debate and deadlock among commissioners, the agency essentially chose the former approach in October 2014 when, almost five years after the court issued its decision, the FEC amended campaign finance regulations to remove preexisting prohibitions on corporate and union treasury expenditures, and related provisions.



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In the interim, the agency did issue advisory opinions providing guidance to campaigns and other players in some circumstances. Although these opinions did not have the force of rules, they played an important role in shaping the campaign environment, especially for outside groups, in the immediate aftermath of the court’s decision. The first wave of AO activity occurred in the summer of 2010, when the FEC approved two related AOs in response to questions from the Club for Growth36 and Commonsense Ten.37 In these instances, the commission determined that the organizations could solicit unlimited contributions for use in independent expenditures.38 In both AOs, the FEC also advised that, while post–Citizens United rules were being drafted to amend agency reporting forms, would-be Super PACs could file letters with the commission indicating their status. Hence, the FEC had recognized—albeit not through regulation—the concept of Super PACs. AOs also permitted federal candidates and party officials to solicit contributions for Super PACs. The commission advised, however, that contributions solicited by federal candidates and national party officials must be within the PAC contribution limits established in FECA (for example, $5,000 annually for individual contributions).

Conclusion This chapter has introduced the rules of campaign finance and tried to demystify how various contribution limits and reporting requirements apply to various people and groups. For some, the presence of “outside” funds represents a fundamental set of “loopholes” in campaign finance law and errors in judicial interpretation, especially once the financial universe expands to include nonparty groups. For others, diverse financial activity represents a well-functioning democracy, in which money fuels speech and in which government should not (or constitutionally cannot) judge which groups can participate and how they may do so. Similarly, statistical summaries provide relatively simple measures of which groups are “up” or “down” compared with candidate campaigns, but those numbers alone do not reveal much about the complex policy history that produced them. In most cases, courts have been suspicious that government should play much role in ensuring that candidates and various other groups are evenly matched. Against that backdrop, Congress had made many attempts, but has had relatively few lasting options, to affect different players’ financial resources. These are but the

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latest developments in a debate over money in politics that has now raged for more than 40 years. Although the players and details have changed, the fundamental tensions among candidates, groups, financial resources, and the Constitution remain largely constant.

Notes 1. Federal Election Commission (FEC). 2017. “Statistical Summary of Six-Month Campaign Activity of the 2017–2018 Election Cycle,” press release, September 29, www.fec.gov/updates/statistical-summary-six-month-­ campaign-activity-2017–2018-election-cycle, accessed October 16, 2017. 2. GOP refers to “Grand Old Party,” a historical nickname for the Republican Party. 3. Whitney, Michael. 2017. “The Democratic Party’s Looming Fundraising Crisis.” Politico, August 10, www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/10/the-­ democratic-partys-looming-fundraising-crisis-215474, accessed October 19, 2017. 4. See, for example, Weigel, David, and Ed O’Keefe. 2017. “DNC Reshuffle Has Some Worrying About a ‘Purge.” Washington Post “PowerPost” blog, October 19, www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2017/10/19/dncreshuffle-has-some-worrying-about-a-purge/?hpid=hp_rhp-more-top-­stories_ dnc-950pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.54ea8333a857, accessed October 20. 5. Bender, Michael C., and Janet Hook. 2017. “Trump Backs Some GOP Senators as Bannon Escalates ‘War’ on Incumbents.” Wall Street Journal, October 22, www.wsj.com/articles/trump-backs-some-gop-senators-as-bannonescalates-war-on-incumbents-1508710130, accessed October 22, 2017. 6. Super PAC data in this section appears in Center for Responsive Politics. n.d. 2016 Outside Spending by Single-Candidate Super PACs, www. opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2016&chrt=V&disp=O&type=C, accessed October 24, 2017. 7. For those interested in a more comprehensive analysis of campaign finance data over time, see various editions of the Financing the Elections edited volumes (Brookings Institution Press). As of this writing, the latest is Magleby, David B. (ed.). 2014. Financing the 2012 Election. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 8. 34 Stat. 864. 9. See 57 Stat. 167 (1943) and 61 Stat. 136 (1947). 10. FECA was originally codified at 2 U.S.C. {section} 431 et seq; it is now codified at 52 U.S.C. 30101 {section} et seq. 11. Because the discussion here is intended to be general, it does not address the specific contents of one set of FECA amendments versus another. For additional detail, see the original public laws at P.L. 92–225 (1971), P.L.



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93–443 (1974), P.L. 94–283 (1976), and P.L. 96–187 (1979). For an overview, see Mutch, Robert E. 1988. Campaigns, Congress, and the Courts: The Making of Federal Campaign Finance Law. New York, NY: Praeger; Corrado, Anthony. 2005. “Money and Politics: A History of Federal Campaign Finance Law,” in Anthony Corrado, Thomas E. Mann, Daniel R. Ortiz, and Trevor Potter (eds.), The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook, pp. 7–47. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 12. The requirement that Senate committees report to the secretary of the Senate rather than directly to the FEC is statutory and has historically been viewed as an institutional prerogative. The House and Senate generally defer to each other’s preferences regarding institutional matters affecting only one chamber. In recent Congresses, some senators have proposed legislation that would change the place of filing to the FEC and require electronic filing of campaign finance reports now filed on paper. 13. Buckley is 424 U.S. 1. 14. The court upheld spending limits for publicly financed presidential campaigns on the grounds that participating candidates chose to voluntarily accept public funds and could be required to meet reasonable conditions on receiving those funds. 15. Ortiz, Daniel R. 2005. “The First Amendment and the Limits of Campaign Finance Reform,” in Anthony Corrado et al. (eds.), The New Campaign Finance Sourcebook, pp. 91–122. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 16. See, for example, Dulio, David A. 2004. For Better or Worse? How Political Consultants Are Changing Elections in the United States. Albany, NY: SUNY Press; Garrett, R. Sam. 2010. Campaign Crises: Detours on the Road to Congress. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; Medvic, Stephen K. 2001. Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press; Thurber, James A., and Candice J. Nelson (eds.). 2000. Campaign Warriors: Political Consultants in Elections. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 17. There is substantial debate over whether ads characterized as “negative” and “attacks” are illegitimate criticisms or whether they raise legitimate contrasts that inform voters. Of course, that determination depends on individual context. For additional discussion, see, for example, Pfau, Michael, and Henry Kenski. 1990. Attack Politics: Strategy and Defense. New York, NY: Praeger. 18. For additional discussion, see Mutch, 1988. 19. See, for example, Biersack, Robert, Paul S. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox, eds. 1994. Risky Business? PAC Decisionmaking in Congressional Elections. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 20. “Soft money” is a term of art referring to unlimited funds that were often given to parties pre-BCRA. It stands in contrast to “hard money,” referring to funds subject to FECA contribution limits.

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21. These include terms such as “vote for,” “vote against,” “elect,” and “defeat.” See note 52 in Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 22. BCRA amended FECA and is, therefore, codified with FECA at 52 U.S.C. {section} 30101 et seq. On BCRA itself, see P.L. 107–155. 23. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. 2003. 540 U.S. 93. 24. Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC (WRTL II). 2007. 551 U.S. 449. 25. In addition to the case itself, several amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) briefs were filed and are available on the FEC website at www.fec. gov/law​/litigation_related.shtml#cu_sc08. See also, for example, Lowenstein, Daniel Hays, Richard L. Hasen, and Daniel P. Tokaji. 2012. Election Law: Cases and Materials, 5th ed. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press; Youn, Monica (ed.). 2011. Money, Politics, and the Constitution: Beyond Citizens United. New York, NY: Century Foundation Press. 26. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. 1990. 494 U.S. 652. 27. In general in campaign finance policy, “disclosure” refers to financial reports filed with the FEC. “Disclaimers” refers to identifying information contained in an advertisement, usually a statement naming the individual or group responsible for the ad. 28. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. 2010. 130 S. Ct. (slip opinion), 21. 29. There is debate about whether Citizens United was a departure from precedent or a return to it. See the majority and dissenting opinions in Citizens United for additional discussion. 30. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. 2010. 130 S. Ct. (slip opinion), 51–53. 31. Citizens United 2010, Stevens dissent, 1–2. Emphasis in original. 32. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 33. Importantly, the 501(c)s discussed here do not include 501(c)(3)s. These public charity organizations (e.g., schools and houses of worship) only may engage in limited political activity. 34. The 501(c) data in this section appears in Center for Responsive Politics. “Outside Money,” www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending, accessed October 24, 2017. It appears to combine electioneering communication and independent expenditure activity. 35. This distinction takes root in litigation surrounding FEC disclosure regulations and FECA reporting requirements. 36. AO 2010–09. 37. AO 2010–11. 38. Ibid.

Part V The Future of Campaigns and Elections

We conclude the book with Chapter 14, “Why Campaigns Matter in a Polarized Environment,” by summarizing and analyzing the impact of the many changes in elections over the past decades. New election administration rules, changes in campaign finance, the evolution in the use of social media, innovations in micro-targeting, and new technological developments in a highly polarized political world all had a transforming influence on elections. The principles and processes of campaign management described in this book contributed mightily to the outcomes of American elections in the last three decades. The basic thesis of this book is that election campaigns influence voter behavior—that campaigns matter. Few changes have transformed American elections more in the past three decades than the professionalization of campaign management and the evolution of new strategies and tactics. What began in the 1960s as the waning of political parties evolved into the increased importance of campaign professionals, which has become a major industry, involving at least $6 billion raised and spent in the 2016 election cycle. In this book we have describe what political scientists know about campaigns and what professionals know. The rivalry and collaboration between political scientists with scientific knowledge and professionals with their campaign experience are themes of this book. Campaign professionals are a staple of contemporary elections. This book describes and evaluates this crucial development—the professionalization and continued transformation of American political campaigns in 2016.

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The changes in modern campaigns, coupled with a highly polarized electorate, raise many questions as we look at elections in 2018 and 2020. We look at some of these questions in Chapter 14.

14 Why Campaigns Matter in a Polarized Environment Candice J. Nelson and James A. Thurber

The polarization of American politics has characterized campaigns and elections for over a decade.1 We have seen this in party identification, campaign messaging, voting laws, and campaign finance. Yet polarization does not explain all of what has happened over the last decade. If it did, Democrats would control all three branches of government. In public opinion polls, the number of Americans who consider themselves Democrats or Democratic leaners has exceeded those who consider themselves Republicans or Republican leaners over the last two decades.2 The reason Republicans control the White House, and both the House and Senate going into the 2018 congressional elections, is because campaigns matter. The result of the 2016 presidential election surprised almost everyone, likely including the winner of the election. At the start of the election there were strong candidates for both the Democratic and Republican nominations. Former Senator and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was seen as the front-runner for the Democratic nomination, and the contenders for the Republican nomination included nine governors or former governors and five senators or former senators. Despite a strong field of current and former elected officials, a political neophyte was elected president of the United States. Going into the 2016 elections, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former Florida Governor Jeb Bush were considered favorites to win their respective 331

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party’s nomination. Both had name recognition and the capacity to raise the money necessary to contest arduous nomination and general election campaigns. Yet former Governor Bush, despite his seemingly financial advantage over the rest of the Republican primary field in June of 2015, was out of the race by February 20, 2016. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ultimately won the Democratic nomination, but only after a long, contested primary ballot with Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders. Clinton’s organization and fundraising far exceeded that of the Trump campaign during the general election, yet she lost the Electoral College in November. This chapter will address the future of campaigns and elections in a polarized environment from three perspectives: how to understand the electorate, how to inform the electorate, and how to engage the electorate.

Polarization in the Electorate Polarization in the United States is not limited to political elites and elected officials. A study by the Pew Research Center conducted during the summer of 2017 found that opinions of Democrats and Republicans in the electorate on major policy issues differed substantially, and that those differences had increased dramatically since the Center began measuring differences on these issues in 1994.3 For example, on one of the major issues of the day, immigration, 84% of Democrats said that immigrants strengthen the country, compared to 42% of Republicans. On the question of government aid to the needy, 71% of Democrats said the government should do more, compared to 24% of Republicans. When asked why black people have trouble getting ahead, 64% of Democrats said it was because of racial discrimination; just 14% of Republicans attributed it to racial discrimination. On environmental regulation, 58% of Republicans said stricter laws cost jobs and hurt the economy, compared to 20% of Republicans.4 The Pew study looked at ten policy measures,5 and found that the average partisan difference between Democrats and Republicans more than doubled between 1994 and 2017. In 1994 the partisan divide on these issues was 15%; in 2017 it was 36%. Moreover, the study found that negative views of the opposing party also increased over the time frame. In 1994, 16% of Democrats had a very unfavorable view of the Republican Party, and 17% of Republicans had a very unfavorable view of the Republican Party. By 2017, those percentages were 44% and 45%, respectively.6



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Not only are there policy differences between Democrats and Republicans, but there are also substantial demographic differences in the makeup of the two political parties. A study by the Pew Research Center concluded that “the two parties look less alike today than at any point over the last quarter-century.”7 Just over half (54%) of white registered voters identify as Republicans, while slightly over one-third (39%) identify as Democrats.8 Sixty-three percent of Hispanics identify with the Democratic Party, compared to 27% who identify with the Republican Party.9 The greatest gap between the two parties is with African-Americans; there is an 80-point difference between African-Americans who identify with the Democratic Party (87%) and those who identify with the Republican Party (7%).10 Finally, and maybe most telling for the outcome of the 2016 presidential election, the advantage Democrats once had with voters with no more than a high school education had disappeared. In 1992, 55% of noncollege voters identified with the Democratic Party; in 2016, less than half (46%) identified with the Democratic Party. During that same period identification with the Republican Party among this group of voters increased from 37% to 45%.11 According to the 2016 exit polls, a majority (51%) of those with a high school education or less voted for Donald Trump.12 These growing partisan divisions present real challenges for campaigns in 2018 and 2020.

Understanding the Electorate As Glenn Bolger points out in Chapter 5, understanding the electorate has become more complicated. Virtually all preelection polls in 2016 predicted a Clinton victory, yet Donald Trump was elected president. As the electorate becomes harder and harder to reach by telephone, the traditional method of survey research, how to interpret the mood of the electorate, and the policy positions they espouse, will be an ongoing problem for candidates and policy makers in the coming years. David Winton, in Chapter 9, points out the importance of “situational awareness” and the role that played, or didn’t, in the 2016 presidential election. One question that survey research faces is the role that modeling will play in future campaigns and elections. As Tom Bonier, David Winston, and Alicia Prevost all point out, data, and the modeling forecasting that come from the data, have become a way for campaigns and interest groups to predict who in the electorate will vote and which candidates they will vote for. “Big Data,” as this information is referred to, provides campaigns with a way to understand potential voters’ policy proclivities. The use of modeling by

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the Obama campaigns in both 2008 and 2012 is credited with contributing to Obama’s successful election in 2008 and reelection in 2012. One of the senior advisors said, about the predictive profiles built by the data: The new megafile didn’t just tell the campaign how to find voters and get their attention; it also allowed the number crunchers to run tests predicting which types of people would be persuaded by certain kinds of appeals. Call lists in field offices, for instance, didn’t just list names and numbers; they also ranked names in order of their persuadability, with the campaign’s most important priorities first. About 75% of the determining factors were basics like age, sex, race, neighborhood and voting record. Consumer data about voters helped round out the picture. We could [predict] people who were going to give online. We could model people who were going to give through mail. We could model volunteers. … In the end, modeling became something way bigger for us in ‘12 than in ‘08 because it made our time more efficient.13

However, questions have been raised about the importance campaigns put on modeling at the expense of survey research. For example, the Clinton campaign in 2016 has been criticized for relying on modeling more than survey research in a few key battleground states. A story in Politico following the election illustrates this criticism: Multiple operatives said the Clinton campaign dismissed what’s known as in-person “persuasion” – no one was knocking on doors trying to drum up support for the Democratic nominee, which also meant no one was hearing directly from voters aside from voters they’d already assumed were likely Clinton voters, no one was tracking how feelings about the race and the candidate were evolving. This left no information to check the polling models against – which might have, for example, showed the campaign that some of the white male union members they had expected to be likely Clinton voters actually veering toward Trump.14

The article goes on to say that: the anecdotes are different but the narrative is the same across battlegrounds, where Democratic operatives lament a one-size-fits-



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all approach drawn entirely from pre-selected data – operatives spit out “the model, the model,” as they complain about it – guiding [Clinton campaign manager] Mook’s decisions on field, television, everything else.15

Stanley Greenberg, a respected Democratic polling consultant who worked on former President Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign, also criticized the Clinton campaign’s use of modeling. In an article published in September, 2017, Greenberg asserted that: the [Clinton] campaign relied far too heavily on … data analytics.  … Astonishingly, the 2016 Clinton campaign conducted no state polls in the final three weeks of the general election and relied primarily on data analytics to project turnout and the state vote. They paid little attention to qualitative focus groups or feedback from the field, and their brief daily analytics poll didn’t measure which candidate was the defining the election or getting people engaged.16

Moving forward, survey research will continue to be an important resource to understand the electorate, and modeling will likely contribute to that understanding. Yet, reaching potential voters and interpreting their opinions and behaviors will present challenges to campaigns, for many of the reasons discussed in this volume.

Informing the Electorate How the electorate learns about campaigns and elections also present challenges for the future. Campaigns can no longer rely just on television, radio, and direct mail to get their messages to potential voters; digital communications and social media are now part of the campaign communications mix. As Tom Bonier points out in Chapter 6, the “media landscape” has changed. Sources of political information have also become more disparate, and the importance of different sources of political information varies by demographic groups. Information sources have been “siloed,” as David Winston points out. Some media outlets have large audiences, while others are much smaller, but in both cases the media outlets may be only reaching viewers who agree with the content being presented.

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The Pew Research Center looked at sources of information that Americans used to learn about the 2016 presidential election. The study found that there was no one predominant source for information. Forty-five percent of Americans reported learning about the presidential election from five or more sources of news, while just 9% of Americans reported learning about the election from just one source of information.17 Television is still the predominant source of news, with 78% of Americans reporting that they learned about the presidential election from some form of television (local, cable, national nightly networks, and late-night comedy shows), but digital sources of news (news websites or apps, social networking sites, issue-based group websites, apps, or emails, and candidate or campaign group websites, apps, or emails) were used by almost two-thirds (65%) of Americans.18 But, as Ed O’Keefe and David Winston both point out, the changing roles of broadcast media and social media have had a profound impact on campaigns in the last decade. As a candidate, and now as president, Donald Trump adapted Twitter, a new communications medium, to communicate with the American public, just as Franklin Roosevelt did with radio and John Kennedy did with television. When asked what sources of news were most helpful, cable news led the list, but just one-quarter (24%) of Americans cited cable news as the most helpful. Social media and local news were each cited by 14% of Americans, 10% cited the network nightly news, and just 3% and 2%, respectively, cited print versions of local and national papers.19 Moreover, there are wide discrepancies in what news sources are seen as helpful by different age groups. Forty three percent of Americans 65 or older found cable news most helpful, while just 12% of young people (18-to-29-year-olds) cited cable news as most helpful. For young people, not surprisingly, social media was seen as most helpful, and the most often cited (35%). Only 1% of those 65 or older cited social media as most helpful.20 The disparate sources Americans use to learn about elections mean that campaigns have to use multiple sources to reach potential voters. As Martin Hamburger points out in Chapter 10, television is still the predominant medium for paid advertising on campaigns, but digital advertising is becoming more and more a part of advertising with each election cycle. Anne Caprara makes this point in Chapter 2, pointing out that spending on digital adverting increased from $159 million in 2012 to $1.4 billion in 2016. With use of social media increasing every year (the use of Facebook alone increased 7% between 2015 and 2016),21 the role



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of digital advertising will continue to be an increasingly important part of campaigns. Campaigns will continue to need to diversify how they inform the electorate.

Engaging the Electorate Parties and Outside Groups Political parties and interest groups have long been a way to engage citizens in elections. However, both the Democratic and Republican parties face divisions within their parties. The divisions within the Republican Party are more noticeable, largely because of the very public comments President Trump routinely makes about members of his own party. In just the first nine months of his presidency, the president threatened to encourage primary challenges against Republican incumbents who didn’t support his policy agenda, and criticized the congressional leadership for not getting the Republican agenda passed by the Congress. However, while less public, factions also exist within the Democratic Party. The divisions between the more mainstream wing of the party, which supported Hillary Clinton during the 2016 primary, and the more progressive wing of the party that provided the basis for Bernie Sanders’ campaign, still exist. While the divisions were pronounced during the contest for the leadership of the Democratic National Committee early in 2017, those divisions continued to simmer during the summer and fall of 2017, and will likely influence the 2018 congressional elections. They will almost certainly play out as candidates jockey for support going into the 2020 presidential elections.

Small Donations While candidates have historically relied on contributors who could write large checks to fund their campaigns, small donations—those under $200—are becoming more and more a part of campaigns. In 2008 and 2012 President Obama raised approximately one-fourth of his contributions (24% in 2008 and 28% in 2012)22 in donations under $200. In 2016 59% of Senator Sanders’s donations came in amounts of $200 or less.23 Sanders largely eschewed traditional fundraising events, raising most of his money online, with an average donation of just $27.24 Donald Trump also benefitted from small donations in 2016; 26% of his total individual contributions came in amounts of $200 or less.25

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Small donations allow campaign supporters without personal wealth to become engaged in the election. While many Americans cannot contribute the maximum allowable donation in federal elections ($2,700 in the 2016 and 2018 election cycles), they may be able to contribute $10 or $20 dollars. In 2012, the Obama campaign found that asking donors to contribute just $3 for a chance to have dinner with George Clooney or Sarah Jessica Parker and the president “generated tens of thousands of responses.”26 Contributions in small amounts allow average citizens the opportunity to engage in a campaign, and to engage repeatedly. Because the contributions are small, donors, if they so choose, can make repeated donations over the course of the campaign. Often, these repeated donations are tied to campaign events. As Tony Corrado points out in Chapter 12, some of Sanders’s biggest fundraising successes came in the days after the first Democratic primary debate and his primary victory in New Hampshire. As small donors see the impact their donations can have on a campaign, and as campaigns realize the advantages of being able to repeatedly reach out to these donors, we may see more and more campaigns beyond presidential campaigns try to engage less-wealthy donors.

Election Laws Over the past decades we have seen changes in election laws to relax restrictions on voting. In 1993, shortly after he was inaugurated, ­President Clinton signed into law the National Voter Registration Act, to allow Americans to register to vote in Department of Motor Vehicle Offices and social service offices. All states except North Dakota require citizens to register to vote prior to actually voting; the purpose of the NVRA was to make it easier for citizens to register, by enabling them to register as they engaged in their day-to-day activities. In 2016, 33% of Americans registered to vote at DMV offices.27 Thirty-five states plus the District of Columbia allow citizens to register online; in 2016 17% of Americans registered online, a 10% increase over 2014.28 Fifteen states plus the District of Columbia allow Election Day registration.29 Voters in those states still must register and then vote, but both can be done on Election Day. Most elections in the United States occur on Tuesday, a day on which a vast majority of Americans work. During the past decades there have not only been efforts to ease voter registration, but there have also been efforts to allow voters to vote at a time and place more convenient than



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in-person voting on Election Day. These changes to the election laws have taken three main forms: no-excuse absentee voting, early voting, and voting by mail. Taking advantage of these forms of convenience voting, in 2016 41% of ballots cast were cast before Election Day.30 Twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia allow no-excuse absentee voting, meaning voters can vote using an absentee ballot to cast their vote without a state-approved excuse for voting absentee. Thirtyseven states and the District of Columbia allow some form of early vote, meaning voters can cast their ballots prior to Election Day. In three states—Washington, Oregon, and Colorado—voters cast their votes by mail, not at polling locations. While changes to election laws to expand registration and voting opportunities have been passed to make it less cumbersome for citizens to vote, there have also been laws passed to make voting more restrictive. Some of these laws have rolled back early vote in some states; others have required voter identification to cast a vote. As Chris Sautter discusses in Chapter 7, the justification for stricter laws is to prevent voter fraud. Over the past few decades the debate over the role of election laws to engage the electorate has been between making it easier to vote, to increase electoral participation, and making it harder to vote, to prevent voter fraud. The discussions of elections laws in Chapter 7 and redistricting in C ­ hapter 4 illustrate the role election laws play in engaging the electorate.

Conclusion The 2018 and 2020 election campaigns will once again reveal the integral role played by candidates, campaign operatives, political parties, and outside groups in understanding, informing, and engaging voters. Institutional factors such as approval ratings of the president and candidates, the political environment in the country, the state of the economy, and legislative and judicial actions will all play a role in shaping the outcomes of the elections, but campaigns matter and are central to our democracy. As the chapters in the volume have shown, we don’t know if polarization is the new norm, or if candidates and parties will find a way to work together across party lines. However, the campaigns that candidates, and those organizations who support and oppose them, run, will matter. Ultimately, it is the role of candidates, their position on issues, and their campaigns that decide the outcomes of elections. All of the above are important, but it is the idiosyncrasies of campaigns that matter.

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Notes 1. Thurber, James A., and Antoine Yoshinaka (eds.). 2015. American Gridlock: The Sources, Character, and Impact of Political Polarization. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 2. Pew Research Center. 2016. The Parties on the Eve of the 2016 Elections: Two Coalitions, Moving Further Apart, September 13. 3. Pew Research Center. 2017. The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider, October 5. 4. Ibid. 5. The questions fell into the following policy areas: Government, regulation and the social safety net, foreign policy, race, immigration and discrimination, homosexuality, gender and religion, economic fairness, corporate profits and tax policy, and global warming and environmental regulation. 6. Pew Research Center, 2017. 7. Pew Research Center, 2016. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. CNN Politics, Exit Polls, November 9, 2016. 13. Scherer, Michael. 2012. “How Obama’s Data Crunchers helped him win.” CNN, November 8, www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/tech/web/obama-campaigntech-team/index.html. 14. Dovere, Edward-Isaac. 2016. “How Clinton lost Michigan – and blew the election.” Politico, December 14. 15. Ibid. 16. Greenberg, Stanley. 2017. “How She Lost.” The American Prospect, Fall, http://prospect.org/article/how-she-lost. 17. Pew Research Center. 2016. The 2016 Presidential Campaign – a News Event That’s Hard to Miss, February 4. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Pew Research Center. 2016. Social Media Update 2016, November 11. 22. www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/president/2012/Pres12_30G_Table4.pdf. 23. www.opensecrets.org/pres16/candidate?id=N00000528. 24. Foran, Clare. 2016. “Bernie Sanders Big Money.” The Atlantic, March 1, www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/bernie-sanders-fundraising/ 471648. 25. www.opensecrets.org/pres16/candidate?id=N00023864. 26. Romano, Lois. 2012. “Obama’s Data Advantage.” Politico, June 9, www. politico.com/news/stories/0612/77213.html.



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27. Election Assistance Commission. n.d. “The Election Administration and Voting Survey,” A Report to the 115th Congress, www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/2016_ EAVS_Comprehensive_Report.pdf. 28. Ibid. 29. In Maryland and North Carolina, Election Day registration occurs only during early vote; in the other 13 states and D.C. Election Day registration occurs on Election Day. 30. Ibid.

Index

Page numbers in bold refer to figures, page numbers in italic refer to tables. 501(c) organizations 323–4 527 organizations 323 absentee voting 178, 339 advance teams 165 advertising 6, 125, 186, 243; audience 223–4; B-roll 226; budget 228; candidate campaigns 236–8; concepts 223–4; consumption 219–20; context. 236–7; digital 26, 230–5, 297, 336–7; DMAs 228; editing 227; electioneering communications 311, 315–6, 317–20; independent campaigns 222–3; inspiration 225; integration 235; internet 255; issue 314; issue campaigns 236–8; issue landscape 221; legal changes 219; media buying 228–30; message 223–4; modelling 232–4; negative 221, 327n17; outside 314; paid media 218–40; placing 228–30; plan 229–30; platforms 220, 238, 243; presidential election, 2016 243; research 221–2, 222–3; risk 239; rules 238–9; screen time 220; script writing 224–5; shooting 225–7;

specifically tailored 238; strategy 223; survey research 222–3; targeting 220, 232–4; technology 219; television 218; timing 239; TV 26, 40, 220, 220–7; views 229; viral 234–5; vision 226; What’s in It For Me? 223 affirmative action 75 African-Americans: Democrats 78–9, 80, 129; party identification 333; population share 75, 78–9; and redistricting 67, 68, 71–81; Republican Party vote 139–40; turnout 203; voting rights 139–41 Akin, Todd 102 Alabama 72, 74, 78–9, 80 Alaska 72 Allen, George 24, 178 Allen, Jonathan 166–7 American Political Science Association 174 Applegate, Douglas 295 Arizona 6, 72, 82, 83, 295 Arkansas 76 Arsenio Hall Show, The (TV show) 253–5 attacks, impact 114–5 audience reach 188

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Index

Australia 81 authentic voice 236 authority, campaign managers 16 Ayotte, Kelly 55 Bakerm Charlie 198 Ballmer, Steve 193 ballot initiatives 236–7 Bannon, Steve 242, 307 baseline polls 116 battleground states 6 benchmark polls 116 Bennett, Luann 295 Bennett, Matt 252 Big Blue Electoral College Wall 122 big data 56, 92, 126–7, 185, 189, 199, 208, 220, 333–4 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2002 269, 272, 304, 314–6, 318 Bird, Jeremy 161 blue-collar states 12 Boehner, John 194–5 Bolger, Glen 91, 333 Bonier, Tom 92, 333, 335 book, the 23 Bossie, David 177 Boyd, John 190–1, 216 Brennan Center for Justice 145 brushfire polls 116 Buckley v. Valeo 312, 315 budget, congressional campaigns 16 bundlers 279 Bush, George H.W. 99, 140, 204, 252–3 Bush, George W. 15, 38, 108, 128, 271 Bush, Jeb 258–60, 275, 276, 277, 332–3 Bush v. Gore 144 buying access 106–7 California 13, 80, 81, 82, 143, 295 Cambridge Analytica 133–4 Cameron, David 196

campaign consultants 16 Campaign Finance Institute 277 campaign finance law 265, 266, 269–70, 304–26; 527 organizations 323; Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2002 314–6, 318; Buckley v. Valeo 312, 315; Citizens United 312, 316–21, 323, 324–5; DISCLOSE Act, 2011 324; disclosure 320, 321; electioneering communications 311, 315–6, 317–20; federal contribution limits 309, 310, 311, 312; Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) 305, 311–2; FY2015 305; independent expenditures 311–2, 318, 319–20; noncandidate money 308–9; outside money 308–9, 313–4; policy boundaries 311–2; policy developments 309; provisions before 2010 309, 311–6; SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission 321–2; Super PACS 304, 307, 307–8, 310, 311, 321–4, 325; Taft–Hartley Act 311; Tillman Act 311; transparency 321 campaign management 3, 14–34; campaign managers 15–7, 26; campaign research operations 22–4; communications 25–6; communications director 23, 25–6; compliance 19; consultants 30–1; coordination 22–3; digital 26–8; digital consultants 22; digital director 26–7; field 28–30; field director 29; finance director 20–2; finance staffer 21; fundraising 20–2; legal counsel 19; morale 17; operations 17–9; policy director 23; policy staff 24–5; presidential election,

Index 2016 51–2; professionalization 329; research director 23; social media 25–6; staff 15, 20–2, 23 Campaign Management Institute 170–1, 173 campaign managers 15–7, 167, 236; authority 16; bad 33; communication 26; consultants 31; role 16–7, 31; skills 16, 17; staff 16 campaign message 5–6, 12; Clinton 5, 104–5; discipline 6; focused 104–5, 112; going off 105; specifically tailored 238; testing 118–9; Trump 5–6, 7 campaign organization 11–2; Clinton 7; Obama 7; Trump 7–8 campaign research 22–4, 33 campaigns 4; bad 32–3; costs 20; elements of 5, 101–9, 101, 103; fundamentals 6, 14; good 14, 32–4; great 33; professionalization 5; structural changes 14; surfer metaphor 14; war metaphor 4 campaign scheduler 18 campaign services 51 campaign strategy 185–6, 188–217; base strategy weakness 208; coalition definition 206–10, 208; communications plan 210–7; data modeling 208–10; definition 190–1; desired outcome 195–7; dimensions of 185; innovation disruption 185, 188–90; management 216–7; opponent’s potential strategies 204–6; orienting 217; perspective 193–5; presidential election, 2016 191–2, 198, 201; resource allocation 216; rule breaking 192–3; situational

345

awareness 197–204; social media 212–3; steps 185, 191, 195–217; strategic communications 211–2; survey research 210–1; swing groups 207; thinking new 191–5 Canada 71, 81 candidate campaign committees 311 candidate campaigns 236–8 candidate-centered system 46 candidate lists 46–7 candidate nominations 44–7, 60 candidates: credibility 115; issue-based contrasts 113, 114; party affiliation 40–1; quality 101–3, 103; schedule 6; strengths and weaknesses 201–2, 203–4; support network 236 candidate services, political parties 48–51 candidate support: congressional candidates 55–6; presidential election, 2016 52–6, 54 Caprara, A. 11, 336 Carson, Ben 261, 275, 276, 282 Carter, Jimmy 140, 204, 250–1 caucuses 45 cell phones 134, 231 Census Bureau 199 Center for Responsive Politics 243, 273, 307–8 Chaffetz, Jason 244, 245 Chicago 79 Christie, Chris 245 Churchill, Winston 216 Citizens United 240, 266, 268, 272–3, 312, 316–21, 323, 324–5 Citizens United (group) 317–9 Civil Rights Act, 1964 138, 139 Civil Rights Movement 72 Clinton, Bill 122, 140, 204, 253–5, 271, 335

346

Index

Clinton, Hillary R.: background 1; campaign message 5, 5–6, 104–5; campaign organization 7; campaign spending 20; campaign strategy 191–2, 201, 207; candidate qualities 103, 103; coalition definition 207; donor base 279, 284–5; earned media value 242–3, 284; Electoral College humiliation 94, 105, 152, 332–3; electoral defeat 1, 94; field organization 160, 166–7, 168, 169, 171–2, 177–8; funding sources 286, 287; fundraising 53, 265, 267, 274, 277, 278, 279–80, 282, 284–5, 296, 308; fundraising appearances 281; fundraising receipts 280; get-out-the-vote 177–8; grassroots organization 108; lack of discipline 5; large donor fundraising 277, 278, 279–80; late deciders 95; National Finance Committee 279; nomination candidacy 53, 60–1; party nomination 37; polls and polling 100–1, 334–5; popular vote 58, 105; presidential campaign, 2008 255–7; primary victories 1; Russian meddling 150; situational awareness 201, 202; small donor fundraising 279–80; social media strategy 213; spending 190; strategy 6; strengths and weaknesses 202; as traditional candidate 2–3; Trump attacks on 2, 5, 6–7, 12; voter mobilization 57–8; voter modeling 132–3; voter turnout 13, 108; votes 1; vulnerability 12; What Happened 104 closed primaries 44–5 Club for Growth 325

coalition definition 206–10, 208 Collins, Chris 105 communications 6, 25–6, 163 communications director 23, 25–6 communications plan: laddering 215–6; resource allocation 216; social media 212–3; strategic communications 211–2; strategy 109, 210; survey research 210–1; tactics 210; voter’s memory process 213–5 competitive seats, decline in numbers 101–2, 101 compliance 19 Comstock, Barbara 295 congressional campaigns: budget 16; fundraising 288–96, 290, 292, 294 congressional candidate support 55–6 congressional election, 2002 115 congressional election, 2006 119 Congress, party affiliations 40–1 consultants 30–1, 50–1 contribution limits and disclosure rules 269–70 conventions 46 Conway, Kellyanne 113 Corrado, Anthony 265, 266 Corrado, Tony 338 costs 8–9n6, 20, 265 cracking 67, 72 credibility 115–6 Cruz, Ted 275, 275, 277, 284 cybersecurity 19 data 123–35; presidential election, 2012 131–2; sample size 130; targeting 126–31; training data 129–30; voter modeling data analytics 97, 130–1 data modeling 92, 129–34, 208–10, 333–4

Index Davis, Sid 249–50 dealignment, voters 12 Dean, Howard 21–2 debates, preparation 6 decentralized election system 144 decision making 96, 109–10; data-driven 123–35; presidential election, 2012 131–2; presidential election, 2016 132–4 Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 16, 41, 48, 49 Democratic National Committee 41, 48, 49, 57–8, 60, 61, 150, 284, 304–5, 305, 337 Democratic National Convention 52 Democratic Party: candidate nominations 45, 46, 60; coalition definition 207–8; congressional candidate support 55–6; conventions 46; divisions 337; financial crisis 305–7; fundraising 42, 53; get-out-the-vote 176–8; and immigration 332; national party brand 204; negative view 36; nomination of Clinton 37; partisan gerrymandering 81; party affiliations 42; party identification 38, 39, 333; primary elections 53; registration 198; and Sanders 37; state organization 41; voter mobilization 57–8; voter turnout 13; voting rights position 138–9 Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee 41, 48, 49, 55, 305, 305 Democrats, and racial discrimination 332 demographic analysis 199 desired outcome 195–7 Detroit 155 Dewey, Thomas 98

347

dial groups 116–7 dial testing 99 digital advertising 26, 230–5, 297, 336–7 digital campaign management 26–8 digital consultants 22, 27 digital director 25–6, 26–7 dignity 255–6 DISCLOSE Act, 2011 324 district boundaries 12–3; see also gerrymandering districts 66, 88n41; see also redistricting diversity 33 DMAs 228, 230 Dold, Robert 295 Donaldson, Sam 252–3 donors 20–2, 23–4, 266, 296; and credibility 115; large 276–80, 278; small 277, 279–80, 280–2, 288, 297, 337–8 Duckworth, Tammy 102 Dukakis, Michael 252–3 Dulio, D. 12 Dunlap, Matthew 137 early voting 178, 339 earned media 186–7, 241–61, 336; definition 241–2; durability 258–61; financial value 242–3, 284; followers 244; generating 246–58; internet 255–8; Kennedy 246, 248–50; online video 255–8; presidential election, 2016 258–61, 266, 284; radio 246–8; Roosevelt 246–8; social media 241–2; spread of use 244; TV 248–50, 250–5; video chats 255–6 economic conditions 5 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 139, 249, 249–50

348

Index

election administration crisis 92, 136–57; HAVA 142–4; partisan gerrymandering 147–9; presidential election, 2016 136–7, 156–7; race discrimination 139–41, 156; recounts 151–5, 156–7; Russian meddling 137, 149–51; voter identification laws 144–6; voting rights 138–41; VRA 147 Election Assistance Administration Commission 143 Election Day 338–9 electioneering communications 311, 315–6, 317–20 election laws 338–9 electoral constituencies, boundaries 12–3 electoral rules 40 Electorate College Lock 122 electorate, the 332–9; engagement 337–9; information sources 335–7; informing 335–7; mood 110; and political parties 38–9, 39; understanding 333–4 emails, fundraising 22 Emanuel, Rahm 102, 196–7 Exon, James 100 expenditures 48 expenses 32–3 Facebook 7, 27, 151, 175, 189, 212, 232, 234, 244, 285–6 Fair Districts initiative 83 fake news 92, 137, 149, 242 false charges 113 federal contribution limits 309, 310, 311, 312 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) 2, 47, 50, 267, 269, 289, 305, 311–2, 321, 323, 325

Federal Election Commission 18, 19, 48, 311, 311–2, 313, 322, 323, 324–5 feedback 166–7 field department 160 field director 29 field offices, location 175–6 field organization 160–80; core functions 161; early voters 178; feedback 166–7; functions 163–7, 179–80; get-out-the-vote 162; innovation 163; logistics 163; meeting metrics 165–6; outreach 165–6; plan 164–5; presidential election, 2016 93, 160–1, 166–7, 168, 169, 171–2, 174, 175–6, 177–8, 180; targeting 169–72, 170; volunteers 161, 163; voter contact 172–3, 173; voter identification program 167–9 field organizers 29, 160–1 field program, functions 93 field staff 7, 28–30 field team: functions 163–7; voter contact 172–3 fieldwork 92–3, 165 finance director 20–2 finance staffer 21 Financial Times 261 Finklestein, Arthur 99 Florida 1–2, 13, 55–6, 74, 83, 296; demographics 199; presidential election, 2000 141, 142–4, 156, 157; presidential election, 2016 94–5, 95 focus groups 116 Forbes, Malcolm 283 Ford, Gerald 140 Fowler, Donnie 57–8 Freedom of Information Act 23 funding 106–7

Index fundraising 2, 6, 106–7, 213, 265–6; bundlers 279; congressional campaign 268–9, 269, 273, 288–96, 290, 292, 294; contribution limits and disclosure rules 269–70; and credibility 115; data-targeting 284; digital outreach 297; emails 22; federal contribution limits 309, 310, 311, 312; finance staffer 21; friends and family 107; and ideological agreement 106; large donors 276–80, 278; management 20–2; mixed approach 282–6, 288; online 21–2, 280–2, 285–6, 297; outside money 308–9, 313–4; party contribution limits 285; party financial activity 304–5, 305; political parties 42, 47–8, 49; presidential candidates 269, 270, 274–88, 275, 278, 287; presidential election, 2016 53, 53–4, 54, 266, 267–8, 269, 269–70, 274–88, 275, 278, 287, 296, 297, 308, 337, 338; public funding 270–2; self-funding 283; small donors 277, 279–80, 280–2, 288, 297, 337; social media 280, 296; staff 20–2; strategies 266, 267–97; Super PACS 107, 307–8; transparency 321; Trump campaign 2; winners 106 FY2015 305, 324 Gallup, George 98 Garrett, Sam 265, 266 geographic targeting 171 Georgia 20, 72, 75, 76; voter identification laws 144, 146 geotargeting 235 Gerber, Alan 162, 173, 175 Gerken, H. 73 Gerry, Elbridge 67, 148

349

gerrymandering 13, 85, 120; legal challenges 83–5, 86, 147–9; methods 67–9; origins 67; partisan 81–5, 86, 147–9; see also redistricting Gersh, Mark 196–7 get-out-the-vote 6, 56–8, 93, 118, 162, 174–6; partisan divide 176–8; presidential election, 2016 174; social pressure messages 174–5 Gingrich, Newt 196 going negative 112–3 Google 151, 234 Gore, Al 128 grassroots organization 107–8 Great Migration, the 72 Grebner, Mark 175 Greenberg, Stan 104, 166, 335 Green, Don 162, 173, 175 Green Party 151, 152 ground game: see field organization Grunwald, Mandy 255 Hagel, Chuck 100, 104 Hagerty, James 250 Hagerty Rule, the 250 Halderman, J. Alex 152–3 Hall, Arsenio 253–5 Hamburger, Martin 186, 336 hard money 327n20 Harris, Kamala 244, 245 Harris, Lou 98–9 Harris, Mary 243 Hassan, Maggie 55 Heck, Joe 55 Heinz, Matthew 295 Help America Vote Act, 2002 142–4 Herrera, Dario 115 Hillary: The Movie 317–8 Hispanics 333 Hochul, Kathy 105

350

Index

Hogan, Larry 198 Homeland Security, Department of 138, 150 House Freedom Caucus 59 human resources 18 Humphrey, Hubert 139 Illinois 295 image 111–2 immigration 332 independent expenditures 311–2, 318, 319–20 independent redistricting commissions 82–3 independents 38–9, 39, 61–2n7 independent voters 120–1, 121 Indiana, voter identification laws 144–5, 146 individual-level targeting 171 individual voter data collection 126–7 information sources: electorate 335–7; explosion of 188–9 innovation disruption 185–6, 188–90 instincts 11 Internal Revenue Code 322 Internal Revenue Service 322 internet 255–8, 336 interns 18 Iowa 1–2, 82 iPhone 189, 192–3, 220 Issa, Darrell 295 Issenberg, Sasha 163, 175 issue advertising 314 issue-based contrast 113, 114 issue campaigns 236–8 issue intensity 111 IT operations 19 Jennings, Kate 245 Jim Crow laws 138 Jobs, Steve 192–3 Johnson, Lyndon B 139 joint fundraising committees 284–5

Kelly, Megan 259 Kennedy, Edward M. 251–2 Kennedy, John F. 98, 139, 246, 248–50 Kennedy, Justice Anthony 319 Kerry, John 108, 165, 176, 271, 323 Key, V.O. 37–43, 43 King, Angus 41 Klemanski, J. 12 Kopechne, Mary Jo 251 Kurtz, Howard 255 laddering 215–6 Landon, Alf 98 Latinos 78, 79–80 Law, Steven 307 legal counsel 19 legislative behavior, predictors of 40 Lewis, C.S. 17 Lijphart, Arend 174 Lincoln, Abraham 163–5, 166–7, 167, 171, 173, 179 Literary Digest fiasco, 1936 98 long-term vision 32 Louisiana 72, 76 Lublin, D. 13 Lundry, Alex 132 McCain, John 189, 194, 199–200, 271, 283 McConnell, Mitch 307, 315–6 McCrory, Pat 151 McDonald, Michael 178 McGinty, Katie 55 McInturff, Bill 95, 120 McSally, Martha 295 Madrid, Patsy 102 marketing 128–9 Maryland 198 Masket, Seth 175 Massachusetts 13, 198 mass culture 186 Mast, Brian 296

Index Mastro, Catherine Cortez 55 media consultants 30 media consumption fragmentation 125, 230–5 media coverage 96 media landscape 124–6, 335 media manipulation 245 media planning 229–30 MediaQuant 242–3, 284 media, the: and credibility 115–6; power of 5 megadonors 106, 266 memory triggers 213–4 Mexico 81 Michigan 2, 6, 13, 44, 45, 46, 156; presidential election, 2016 95, 95, 152, 154–5, 201 micro-data, individual-level 126–7 micro-targeting 5, 6, 108, 125–6, 171, 232; data 126–31 minority votes 140–1 minus-sum games 4 Mississippi 68, 72, 80 mobile phones 231 mobilization, voters 6, 56–8, 93, 118, 162, 174–6; partisan divide 176–8; presidential election, 2016 174; social pressure messages 174–5; voters 6, 53, 56–8 Montana 71, 88n40 morale 17 Motor Voter law, 1993 138 Mudd, Roger 251–2 Murphy, Christopher 244, 245 name identification 111–2 National Committee for an Effective Congress 171 National Finance Committee 279 national party brand 204 National Republican Congressional Committee 41, 48, 48–9, 49, 56, 296, 305, 305

351

National Republican Senatorial Committee 41, 48, 49, 55, 305, 305 National Rifle Association 222 National Voter Registration Act 338 Native Americans 74–5 Nebraska 56, 100, 104 negative advertising 221, 327n17 negative advocacy 118 Nelson, Ben 100, 104 Netflix 125 Nevada 55, 115 New Hampshire 55 New Jersey 82–3, 88–9n48 New York City 79–80 New York State 13 New York Times 253, 255–6 New Zealand 81 Nickerson, David 174 Nielsen Company 228, 228–9 Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis 163 Nixon, Richard M. 139, 140, 248 noncandidate money 308–9 North Carolina 1–2, 68, 72, 74, 78, 79, 139, 172; presidential election, 2016 94–5, 95, 151–2; voter identification laws 146 North Dakota 198 Obama, Barack 2, 5, 93, 105, 120, 139, 145; campaign message 5; campaign organization 7; campaign spending 20; campaign strategy 194–5, 196, 200–1, 205–6, 207; campaign travel schedule 132; candidate qualities 103; data operation, 2012 15, 334; digital campaign 28; earned media 257–8; earned media value 243; field organization 161, 177; fundraising 265, 271, 274, 277, 279, 280, 288, 297; grassroots organization 108;

352

Index

links to Russia 150; presidential election, 2012 131–2, 132; small donor fundraising 288, 297, 337; social media campaign 175, 189; spending 189; strategy 5; “Yes, We Can” video 257–8 observed data 134–5 offices 18 Ogilvy, David 211 Ohio 1–2, 55, 108, 165; presidential election, 2016 201; Sixth Congressional District campaign, 2006 15–6 O’Keefe, Ed 186, 336 O’Malley, Martin 272 online fundraising 21–2, 280–2, 285–6, 297 online video 255–8 OODA loop 216, 217 operations department 18 operations management 17–9 opinion polls: see polls and polling opponents, campaign strategy 204–6 opposition, learning from 15 opposition research 6, 112–3, 119, 221 Oregon 13 orienting 217 Ortiz, Michael 312 Osoff, Jon 20 outreach 165–6 outside advertising 314 outside money 308–9, 313–4 packing 67–8 paid media advertising 218–40, 223–4, 243; B-roll 226; budget 228; candidate campaigns 236–8; concepts 223–4; consumption 219–20; context. 236–7; digital 230–5; DMAs 228; editing 227; independent campaigns 222–3; inspiration 225; integration 235;

issue campaigns 236–8; issue landscape 221; legal changes 219; media buying 228–30; message 223–4; modelling 232–4; negative 221; placing 228–30; plan 229–30; platforms 220, 238; research 221–2, 222–3; risk 239; rules 238–9; script writing 224–5; shooting 225–7; specifically tailored 238; strategy 223; survey research 222–3; targeting 220, 232–4; technology 219; timing 239; TV 218, 220, 220–7; views 229; viral 234–5; vision 226 paid media consultants 236 Parnes, Jamie 166–7, 178 Parscale, Bob 168 Parscale, Brad 285–6 partisan divide 176–8, 332–3 party affiliations 40–1, 42 party committees 311 party identification 38–9, 39, 59, 121, 121, 197–8, 333 party network 43, 60 party registration 197–8 party unity 59 Pelosi, Nancy 296 Pendleton Act, 1883 50 Pennsylvania 2, 6, 13, 55, 84, 156; presidential election, 2016 94–5, 95, 152, 155, 201; voter mobilization 58 Perkins, Randy 296 persuasion 124 Pew Research Center 332–3, 336 Phillips, Kevin 139 phone banks 173 photo-ops 252–3 Pizzagate 150 polarization 120, 122, 331–9; immigration 332; partisan divide 332–3; racial discrimination 332

Index policy director 23 policy staff 24–5 political action committees (PACs) 49, 60, 269–70, 291, 293, 308, 311, 313–4, 319, 321, 322 political calendar 14 political committees 311 political conditions 5 political environment, situational awareness 203 political parties 36–61, 337; in the 2016 presidential election 36–7, 51–8, 54; campaign roles 43–51; candidate lists 46–7; candidate nominations 44–7; candidate services 48–51; candidate support 52–6, 54; consultants 50–1; and the electorate 38–9, 39; elements 37–43, 58–9; fundraising 42, 47–8, 49; goals 41; in Government 40–1, 59; leadership 43; local organization 42; major activities 36; national committees 41–2; negative view 36; networks 43, 60; as organization 41–2, 60; party identification 38–9, 39, 59; polarization 59; power 50; range of 40; researchers 49–50; role of 12; spending 48, 51; state organization 41; tripartite model 37–41, 43; unity 59; voter mobilization 53 Politico New Jersey 245 polls and polling 91, 94–122, 127–8, 210–1, 222; attack impact assessment 114–5; baseline 116; benchmark 116; brushfire 116; challenges facing 96–7, 99–100, 122; cooperation rates 99; costs 97; and decision making 109–10; dial groups 116–7;

353

dial testing 99; effectiveness 97; electorate mood 110; focus groups 116; history 97–101; and issue intensity 111; Literary Digest fiasco, 1936 98; media coverage 96; message testing 118–9; modeling 333–4; movement tracking 114; name identification and image 111–2; opposition research 112–3, 119; organizations 96; predictive capabilities 96–7; presidential election, 2016 91, 94–5, 95, 96, 100–1, 133, 333, 334–5; public 99–100; public opinion trends 119–21, 121; push polling 117–9; sample size 130; sampling 98; self-research 112–4, 118–9; tracking 116; types 116–7; uses 91, 96; using 110–6 pollsters 30, 97, 98–9, 104 Polsby, Nelson 176 popular vote 1, 58 population equality, and redistricting 69–71 populism 12 Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity 137–8 presidential election, 1936 98 presidential election, 1948 98 presidential election, 2000 128, 141, 142–4, 156, 157, 174 presidential election, 2008 108, 120, 189, 194, 199–200, 207, 255–8, 271, 274, 283, 334 presidential election, 2012 131–2, 132, 177, 189, 200–1, 205–6, 274, 276–7, 277, 334 presidential election, 2016: advertising 243; antiestablishment theme 51; campaign 51–2; campaign

354

Index

finance 53–4, 54; campaign strategy 191–2, 198, 201, 207; candidate nominations 60–1; and candidate quality 103, 103; candidate support 52–6, 54; congressional candidate support 55–6; costs 243; early voting 178; earned media 258–61, 266, 284; earned media revolution 186–7; election administration crisis 136–7; electoral votes 95, 96; field organization 93, 160–1, 166–7, 168, 169, 171–2, 174, 175–6, 177–8, 180; funding sources 286, 287; fundraising 53, 53–4, 54, 266, 267–8, 269–70, 274–88, 275, 277, 278, 279–80, 287, 296, 308, 337, 338; large donor fundraising 277, 278, 279–80; late deciders 95, 95; lessons 93; political environment 203; political parties in 36–7, 51–8, 54; polls and polling 91, 94–5, 95, 96, 100–1, 133, 333, 334–5; popular vote 58; primary elections 1, 53; recounts 151–5, 156–7; Republican primary 53; Russian meddling 137, 149–51, 154; social media strategy 212, 213; spending 51, 189–90; strategy 185; surprise result 332–3; voter fraud accusations 137–8; voter mobilization 56–8, 174; voter modeling 132–4, 133–4; voter turnout 108 Prevost, Alicia 92–3, 333 primary elections 1, 44–5, 47, 53, 59 professionalization 5, 162, 329 provisional ballots 142–3 psychographic modeling 133–4 public funding 270–2 public opinion trends 119–21, 121

public polling 99–100 pundits 97 push polling 117–9 Putin, Vladimir V. 149, 150 race, and redistricting 67, 71–81 racial discrimination 139–41, 156, 332 racial polarization 73–4 radio 246–8 Reagan, Ronald 99, 204, 256 Real Clear Politics average 94 Reconstruction 71–2, 74 recounts 151–5, 156–7 redistricting 12–3, 66–86, 196–7; Baker v. Carr 69; cracking 67, 72; criteria 66; gerrymandering 67, 67–9, 81–5, 86; independent redistricting commissions 82–3; Karcher v. Daggett 70; Kirkpatrick v. Preisler 70; Larios v. Cox 70; legal challenges 69–71, 72–8, 83–5, 86; necessity of 66; packing 67–8; partisan 67, 80, 81–5, 86; politicization 81; and population equality 69–71; procedural fairness 83; racial 67, 71–81, 85; reform efforts 82; Reynolds v. Sims 69, 70, 71; stacking 68, 72; see also gerrymandering registration rolls 143 regulation 17–8 Republican National Committee 41, 48, 49, 57, 60, 133, 134, 139–41, 141, 283, 285, 305, 305 Republican National Convention 51 Republican Party: African-American vote 139–40; candidate nominations 46–7, 60; coalition definition 208; congressional candidate support 55–6;

Index divisions 337; dominance 120; electoral success 58; financial controversy 307; fundraising 42; get-out-the-vote 176; and immigration 332; national party brand 204; negative view 36; nomination of Trump 37; partisan gerrymandering 81; party affiliations 42; party identification 38, 39, 333; primary elections 53; race-based vote strategy 139–41, 145–6; Southern Strategy 139–40; state organization 41; voter mobilization 57, 58; voting rights position 138–41 Republicans, and racial discrimination 332 Republican Study Committee 59 research director 23 researchers 24, 49–50 resources, tactics and 6 risk, level of 18 robocalls 168 Rogers, Todd 174 Rogich, Sig 253 Roll Call 49 Rollins, Ed 140–1 Romney, Mitt 2, 5, 20, 140, 169, 177, 189, 200–1, 205–6, 265; fundraising 275, 275, 276–7, 283 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 98, 139, 246–8 Roper, Elmo 98 Roskam, Peter 102–3 Rubio, Marco 55–6, 260–1, 275, 276, 277, 284 rule breaking 192–3 Russia, meddling accusations 137, 149–51, 154 Ryan, Paul 296

355

sampling 98 Sanders, Bernie 1, 37, 41, 273, 332, 337; antiestablishment theme 51, 52; fundraising 22, 106, 265, 268, 274, 276, 296; fundraising receipts 281; nomination candidacy 52, 61; popularity 12; small donor fundraising 280–2, 337, 338; social media strategy 213 Sauter, Charles 92 Sautter, Chris 339 Schattschneider, E.E. 36, 174 schedule, candidates 6 Schneider, Bradley 295 Schwarzenegger, Arnold 149 segregation 138 self-research 112–4, 118–9 semi-closed primaries 45 Senate committees 327n12 situational awareness 197–204, 333; candidate strengths and weaknesses 201–2, 203–4; current issues 199–201; definition 197; demographics 199; existing elements 197–202; future issues 202–3; national party brand 204; party registration and identification 197–8; personal biases 197; political environment 203; potential elements 202–4; previous political behavior 198–9 smartphones 219, 231 social media 175, 188, 189, 336, 336– 7; communications plan 212–3; earned media 241–2; followers 244; fundraising 280, 296; importance 27; management 25–6, 27; observed data 134–5; power of 5; reach 212; Trump strategy 2, 7–8

356

Index

social media manager 27 soft money 314, 314–5, 327n20 South Carolina 72, 74, 80 Special National Party Accounts 306 SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission 321–2 spending 20, 189–90, 265, 266, 283; congressional candidate support 55; limits 270, 271, 327n14; presidential candidates 272; presidential election, 2016 51 stacking 68, 72 staff 15; campaign managers 15–7, 16; campaign scheduler 18; communications director 23, 25–6; digital director 25–6, 26–7; field 7, 28–30; field director 29; fundraising 20–2; interns 18; legal 19; policy 24–5; policy director 23; research director 23; researchers 24; size 16; social media manager 27; trackers 24; volunteer 28, 108, 161, 163 staffers 49 Stein, Jill 151, 152–3, 156 Stenberg, Don 100 Stone, Mary 164 strategic communications 211–2, 215–6 strategic messaging 211–2 strategy 5, 11, 11–2; Clinton 6; definition 190–1, 210; Trump 6, 6–7 strategy retreats 31 Strickland, Ted 16 Sun Tzu 190 Super PACS 107, 124, 219, 266, 268, 272–3, 284, 295, 297, 304, 307, 307–8, 310, 311, 321–4, 325 supporters, mobilization 6 support, rewarding 106–7 Supreme Court: and advertising 219; and campaign finance law 308–9,

312, 316, 316–21; Citizens United 240, 266, 268, 272–3, 316–21; and fundraising 272–3; and partisan gerrymandering 147–9; and redistricting 70, 83–5, 86; and voter identification laws 144–6; and the VRA 72–8, 147 survey research: see polls and polling swing groups 207 swing seat 101–2, 101 tactics 6, 11, 14, 210 Taft–Hartley Act 311 target audience 109 target groups 109, 111 target identification 127 targeting 124; advertising 220, 232; data 126–31; field organization 169–72, 170; geotargeting 235; levels 171; media landscape 124–6; micro-targeting 5, 6, 108, 125–6, 126–31, 171, 232; presidential election, 2016 171–2; prioritization 171 tea party faction 59 Teeter, Bob 99 television 336; earned media 248–50, 250–5; power of 5; ratings data 228–9; viewing habits 230–5 television advertising 26, 40, 220; B-roll 226; editing 227; making 220–7; placing 228–30; script writing 224–5; shooting 225–7; slots 227; time shifting 230; viewers 228–9; views 229 Tennessee 139 Texas 69, 72, 78, 84; voter identification laws 146, 147 themes 112 Tillman Act 311 Toomey, Pat 55 Townsend, Kathleen Kennedy 169 trackers 24

Index tracking surveys 116 training data 129–30 Trout, Robert 246–7 Truman, Harry 98 Trump, Donald J.: antiestablishment theme 51; attacks on Clinton 2, 5, 6–7, 12; background 1; campaign finance 2; campaign message 5–6, 7; campaign organization 7–8; campaign spending 20; campaign strategy 2, 191–2, 198, 201, 207; candidate qualities 103, 103; coalition definition 207; comments about own party 337; communication 6; earned media strategy 186–7, 241, 244, 245, 259, 260–1, 261, 266, 336; earned media value 242–3, 284; Electoral College victory 1, 12, 152; electoral victory 1–2, 39, 94; electoral votes 95, 108; expectation of losing 2; field organization 160, 168, 171, 175–6; funding sources 286, 287; fundraising 2, 53, 265, 267, 273, 275–6, 275, 282–6, 288, 296; fundraising receipts 288; late deciders 95; media strategy 187; message discipline 6; online fundraising 285–6; outrageous statements 137; party nomination 37; populist campaign 2–3, 203; presidential nomination 51; primary victories 1; race-based vote strategy 141; Russian meddling 149–51; self-funding 283–4; situational awareness 201, 202; small donor fundraising 288, 297, 337; social media followers 242; social media strategy 2, 7–8, 213; spending 189–90, 283; strategy 6, 6–7; strengths and weaknesses

357

202; tweets 57, 241, 242, 244, 261; voter fraud accusations 137–8; voter mobilization 57, 58; voter modeling 133–4; voter turnout 13, 108; votes 1 Twitter 7, 135, 151, 187, 189, 212, 242, 244, 336 United Kingdom 71, 81, 83, 196 U.S. Constitution 46, 70; Article I, Section 2 66; Elections Clause 83; Equal Protection Clause 84; Fifteenth Amendment 139; First Amendment 148, 311, 315; Fourteenth Amendment 84; three-fifths compromise 66 Vargas, Jose Antonio 257 video chats 256 viral video 234–5 Virginia 72, 74, 139, 295 vision, long-term 32 volunteers 28, 108, 161, 163 vote counting 92 voter access 142 voter behavior 124 voter contact 172–3, 173, 190 voter files 167, 199 voter fraud 140–1, 142, 145, 157 Voter Fraud Commission 137–8 voter identification laws 78, 142, 144–6, 147 voter identification program 167–9; support model 169 voter mobilization 6, 56–8, 93, 118, 162, 174–6; partisan divide 176–8; presidential election, 2016 174; social pressure messages 174–5 voter modeling 129–31; presidential election, 2012 131–2; presidential election, 2016 132–4 voter registration 143, 169, 338

358

Index

voters: and candidate quality 102, 103; cynicism 239; dealignment 12; feedback 166; geographic distribution 83; independent 120–1, 121; memory process 213–5; polarization 120; previous political behavior 198–9; targeting 169–72, 170 voter turnout 13; early voting 178; initiatives 174–6; presidential election, 2016 108; social pressure messages 174–5; Trump 108 vote share, benefits of field efforts 30 voting machines 92, 136, 142–4, 152–5, 156 voting rights 138–41, 142, 151–2 Voting Rights Act, 1965 67, 86, 138, 144, 152; legal challenges 72–8, 147

Washington Post 244, 257, 258 Webb, Jim 24 Weinraub, Bernard 253 Wesleyan Media Project 284 Wildavsky, Aaron 176 Wilson, Charlie 15–6 Wilson, Heather 102 Wiltz, Teresa 258 Winston, David 185, 333, 335, 336 Wirthlin, Richard 99 Wisconsin 2, 6, 13, 156; partisan gerrymandering 148; presidential election, 2016 94–5, 95, 152, 153–4; voter identification laws 146 women voters 207 World War I 191 write-in campaigns 16 Wyoming 71

Wagner, Dan 132 Wallace, George 139 Wall Street Journal 120, 307 Walters, Barbara 255

youth vote 203 YouTube 234, 255 zero-sum games 4