Cameron: The politics of modernisation and manipulation 9781526116307

Table of contents :
Front matter
Contents
List of tables
Acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
Introduction
The politics of detoxification: restyling and reconstructing Conservatism
The politics of delegitimisation: apportioning blame and establishing risk
The politics of depoliticisation: the Big Society narrative
Controlling the coalition agenda: limiting Liberal Democrat influence
Political binding: coalition unity and the exploitation of the Liberal Democrats
Managing political dimensions: the rise of multi-party politics
Conclusion
References
Index

Citation preview

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Series editor Richard Hayton

The study of conservative politics, broadly defined, is of enduring scholarly interest and importance, and is also of great significance beyond the academy. In spite of this, for a variety of reasons the study of conservatism and conservative politics was traditionally regarded as something of a poor relation in comparison to the intellectual interest in ‘the Left’. In the British context this changed with the emergence of Thatcherism, which prompted a greater critical focus on the Conservative Party and its ideology, and a revitalisation of Conservative historiography. New Perspectives on the Right aims to build on this legacy by establishing a series identity for work in this field. It will publish the best and most innovative titles drawn from the fields of sociology, history, cultural studies and political science and hopes to stimulate debate and interest across disciplinary boundaries. New Perspectives is not limited in its historical coverage or geographical scope, but is united by its concern to critically interrogate and better understand the history, development, intellectual basis and impact of the Right. Nor is the series restricted by its methodological approach: it will encourage original research from a plurality of perspectives. Consequently, the series will act as a voice and forum for work by scholars engaging with the politics of the right in new and imaginative ways. The right and the recession Edward Ashbee The territorial Conservative Party: Devolution and party change in Scotland and Wales Alan Convery David Cameron and Conservative renewal: The limits of modernisation? Edited by Gillian Peele and John Francis Rethinking right-​wing women: Gender and the Conservative Party, 1880s to the present Edited by Clarisse Berthezène and Julie Gottlieb English nationalism, Brexit and the Anglosphere: Wider still and wider Ben Wellings

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Cameron

The politics of modernisation and manipulation Timothy Heppell

Manchester University Press

Copyright © Timothy Heppell 2020 The right of Timothy Heppell to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Published by Manchester University Press Altrincham Street, Manchester M1 7JA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 07190 9645 7 hardback First published 2020 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-​party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. COVER IMAGE: David Cameron speaking at The London Conference on Afghanistan on 4 December 2014. © Patrick Tsui/FCO

Typeset by Newgen Publishing UK

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Contents

List of tables Acknowledgements List of abbreviations

page vi vii viii

1 Introduction

1

2 The politics of detoxification: restyling and reconstructing Conservatism

11

3 The politics of delegitimisation: apportioning blame and establishing risk

34

4 The politics of depoliticisation: the Big Society narrative

57

5 Controlling the coalition agenda: limiting Liberal Democrat influence

72

6 Political binding: coalition unity and the exploitation of the Liberal Democrats

87

7 Managing political dimensions: the rise of multi-​party politics

108

8 Conclusion

134

References Index

148 178

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Tables

1 Strands and strength of opinion within the PCP on social, sexual and moral issues, 1992–​2016 page 29 2 The Big Society: aims, indicators and impact 65 3 Alternative options in terms of government formation in the aftermath of the General Election of May 2010 74 4 Right–​left scores for individual sections in the Coalition Agreement 79 5 Government rebellion rates in the House of Commons, 1945 to 2015 91 6 Government defeats in the House of Commons, 1945 to 2016 98 7 EU referendum vote: strands and strength of opinion within the PCP, 2016 127 8 Strands and strength of opinion within the PCP vis-​à-​vis Europe, 1992 to 2016 128 9 EU referendum vote (2016) and party identification 130 10 Economic indicators, 2010–​15 138

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to Tony Mason and Robert Byron, as the commissioning editors for Politics at Manchester University Press, for their interest in this project and also for their patience. I should also acknowledge the support from the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds, as they granted a sabbatical that enabled me to complete the research for this book. However, the most important thanks are owed to those whose day to day lives have been affected by the time taken to complete this book, most notably my sons Matthew (aged 14) and Oliver (aged 11) and my wife, Gayle. This is my sixth book in the last 12 years and in each I have always paid tribute to my parents, Irene and Neil, who have always shown an interest in my work, and it is appropriate that I do so again.

newgenprepdf

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Abbreviations

AV CSJ FPTP GNI NHS PCP PLP SNP UKIP

Alternative Vote Centre for Social Justice first past the post Gross National Income National Health Service Parliamentary Conservative Party Parliamentary Labour Party Scottish National Party United Kingdom Independence Party

1

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

Enoch Powell once famously said that ‘all political lives end in failure, because that is the nature of politics’ (Powell, 1977: 151). Those words seem most apt when we consider the political career of David Cameron. For all his apparent success as a politician, he will be forever remembered as the Prime Minister who called a referendum on continued European Union (EU) membership, campaigned aggressively for Remain, and was rejected by the people, many of whom were Conservatives (see, for example, Ashcroft and Culwick, 2016; Bennett, 2016; Glencross, 2016; Oliver, 2016; Shipman, 2016; Clarke et al., 2017a; Worcester et al., 2017). This cataclysmic failure prompted his resignation as leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister, thus bringing to an end a political career that until that point had been characterised by repeated success. Consider the following. First, he won the leadership of the Conservative Party when only 39  years old, and after only four years in Parliament (for academic appraisals of how and why Cameron was elected as leader of the Conservative Party, see Denham and Dorey, 2007 and Heppell and Hill, 2009). Second, he took over a discredited and directionless party, which had suffered three General Election defeats in a row, and led them back into power in May 2010, albeit in coalition with the Liberal Democrats (for the best appraisal of this period see Bale, 2010: 283–​362). Third, he confounded expectations again by winning the General Election of May 2015 outright with a majority of 12, when every single opinion poll of the campaigning period suggested that it would be a hung Parliament, with the Conservatives and Labour running neck and neck (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 16, 162). The eventual gap between the Conservatives and Labour was nearly 100 seats (331 to 232), as the Conservatives increased their vote from May 2010 from 10,703,654 to 11,334,576 votes, with the gap between their vote and that of Labour being 1,987,272 votes (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 433). However, viewing Cameron through the lens of success or failure, according to the terms outlined above, is limiting. Cameron was also a risk taker or a political gambler –​for example, forming a coalition with the Liberal Democrats was a calculated risk, as was holding a referendum on electoral reform –​the Alternative Vote (AV) referendum of May 2011. The same argument has to apply to his willingness to acquiesce to the demands of the Scottish National Party (SNP) for a

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

2

referendum on Scottish independence (September 2014)  (Finkelstein, 2016). It was certainly not low risk for Cameron to choose to pursue legislation on same-​ sex marriage, or to legally enshrine that 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) should be spent on overseas development aid, given the hostility that was said to have existed towards both within his own parliamentary ranks (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015:  479–​80). Cameron engaged in these as calculated risks that he thought would be either directly to the advantage of the Conservatives, or would indirectly create complexities for his political opponents. Cameron was thus a political manipulator  –​always trying to define or redefine the rules of the political game to aid himself, his faction of modernisers, or the Conservatives more broadly (Heppell, 2013a). In many ways, as this book will try to demonstrate, he was an adept political manipulator, but on the most contentious issue of his time –​ continued membership of the EU and linked to this the issue of immigration  –​ Cameron miscalculated badly. As Finkelstein noted, it was on this issue that the gambler’s luck ran out (Finkelstein, 2016). However, notions of Cameron as a political manipulator have not been that apparent when academics have attempted to analyse his leadership. If there is one word that political scientists have used to define his approach then it is modernisation (see, for example, Kerr and Hayton, 2015; Dommett, 2015; Peele and Francis, 2016). What drives this book is the idea that the debates about modernisation  –​ what it is, and to what extent Cameron maintained his commitment to it –​are valid, but they are limiting in terms of understanding the politics of Cameronism.1 This is because modernisation, when used within the context of parties, is predominantly, but not exclusively, an opposition driven concept. It is mostly about analysing what parties do when they are in opposition, in order to address the obstacles to electoral recovery, more than it is about what they do once they regain power. Although parties that commit to modernisation may continue to emphasise it once in power, it has only limited value to us as students of British politics, when we are considering the Conservatives’ transition from opposition into coalition government. For all of the talk of governing in the national interest, the reality of coalition government between 2010 and 2015 was that the Conservatives wanted to exploit the Liberal Democrats and erode their support base. Thus modernisation is only part of the equation in terms of understanding Conservative Party politics post-​2005. Once the Conservatives were part of a coalition government Cameronism was about the politics of manipulation. By understanding Cameronism through the analysis of these two central themes –​the politics of modernisation and the politics of manipulation –​this book makes a significant contribution to the academic debates about the Cameron era in British politics. Studying Cameronism: the rationale for the book What is the rationale for the book? The answer to this question comes from the condition of the Conservative Party when Cameron became their new leader. Between

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

3

1997 and 2005 the Conservative Party, the supposed natural party of government in twentieth-​century British politics, had suffered three electoral reversals in a row. In doing so they had lost roughly one-​third of the support that they had when John Major led them to victory in April 1992. Their vote share had collapsed from 41.9 per cent in 1992 to 30.7 per cent in May 1997, and then improved slightly to 31.8 per cent in June 2001 and another small increase was evident in their 32.4 per cent vote share in May 2005. In terms of actual votes cast the 14,092,891 supporters in April 1992 had contracted to successive returns of 9,602,957, 8,357,622 and 8,772,473 (with their returns in 2001 and 2005 reflecting a decrease in the turnout from 71 per cent in 1997 and then down to 59 and 61 per cent in 2001 and 2005) (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 432–​3). This decline reflected the enduring impact of the governing failure; party divisions and sleaze associated with the Major administration (see Dorey, 1999), alongside the success of New Labour as a party of government (see Driver and Martell, 1998, 2006; Hay, 1999; Heffernan, 2001; Ludlam and Smith, 2003; Hindmoor, 2005; Seldon, 2007a; Beech and Lee, 2008; Diamond and Kenny, 2011). The scale of the Conservatives’ problem was identified by Michael Ashcroft in his report on the 2005 General Election defeat. Entitled Smell the Coffee, Ashcroft’s report identified a series of assumptions that the electorate had towards the Conservatives, all of which were immensely worrying to whoever was elected as their new party leader. In addition to showing that Labour had a lead of 40 per cent in terms of governing competence, the research also asked voters to identify the three parties in terms of a series of descriptions. On this the Conservatives came first in terms of being ‘negative’, ‘aggressive’, ‘confused’, ‘sloppy’ and ‘depressing’, and they came last in terms of being ‘positive’, ‘moderate’, ‘clear’, ‘professional’ and ‘uplifting’ (Ashcroft, 2005: 79–​97, 102; see also the following literature on the Conservatives in opposition 1997–​2005, Garnett and Lynch, 2003; Bale, 2010; Snowdon, 2010; Dorey et al., 2011; Hayton, 2012). Any doubts that the electorate did have about the governing capability of Labour was translating itself into increased support for the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrat vote share had increased from 16.8 per cent in 1997 to 22.0 per cent in 2005, and the number of votes cast for them had gone up from 5,242,947 in 1997 to 5,595,454 in 2005 (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 432–​3). The gap between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats was now only 2,372,168, as opposed to the 8,493,623 gap between them in 1992. The Ashcroft findings showed that the Conservative Party had a severe image problem, and that they had made virtually no progress in terms of addressing this problem since losing power in 1997. Constructing a strategy that effectively critiqued the record of Labour in government, and stalled the rise of the Liberal Democrats, was the objective for Cameron when he became leader of the Conservative Party in December 2005 (Bale, 2010: 283–​362). Before we proceed it is important to emphasise the mountain facing Cameron in terms of initiating an electoral recovery (Curtice, 2009: 182; for a wider historical assessment of the Conservatives in opposition, see Ball and Seldon, 2005). This is

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

4

Cameron

best achieved by considering the impact of Leaders of the Opposition since 1951 (Heppell, 2012a). By impact we mean the following –​the increase in seats secured at the next General Election under the new party leader, relative to the number of seats acquired at the last General Election, when the party in question is in opposition. Such an exercise demonstrates that to win power in 2010 Cameron needed a significant shift in public opinion. This was because he inherited a Parliamentary Conservative Party (PCP) made up of 198 members. This was 128 short of the number required to form a Conservative majority administration, and that would make a majority of just one. There is only one post-​war example of an opposition leader making gains on such a large scale. The impact of Conservative opposition leaders in terms of seats gained is as follows: Winston Churchill 1945 to 1950 (+86) and then 1950 to 1951 (+22); Edward Heath 1965 to 1966 (-​51), 1966 to 1970 (+77) and February to October 1974 (-​20); Margaret Thatcher 1975 to 1979 (+62); William Hague 1997 to 2001 (+1) and Michael Howard 2003 to 2005 (+32). The impact of Labour opposition leaders in terms of seats gained is as follows: Clement Attlee 1951 to 1955 (-​18); Hugh Gaitskell 1955 to 1959 (-​19); Harold Wilson 1963 to 1964 (+59) and 1970 to 1974 (+14); Michael Foot 1980 to 1983 (-​60); Neil Kinnock 1983 to 1987 (+20) and 1987 to 1992 (+42); Tony Blair 1994 to 1997 (+147); Ed Miliband (-​26) and Jeremy Corbyn (+30) (data updated from Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 432–​3; Denver, 2018: 16; see also Heppell et al., 2015). Of those who had failed to lead their party from opposition and back into power –​ i.e. Churchill in 1950; Attlee in 1955; Gaitskell in 1959; Heath in 1966 and October 1974; Foot in 1983; Kinnock in 1987 and 1992; Hague in 2001; Howard in 2005; Miliband in 2015 and Corbyn in 2017, only Hague and Howard started from a weaker parliamentary base than Cameron. The best comparison in terms of parliamentary arithmetic would be the situation that Kinnock inherited in 1983. He had a parliamentary base of 209 members and it took the Labour Party, first under Kinnock (1983–​92) and then John Smith (1992–​94) and Blair (1994–​97), 14  years and three parliamentary terms to return to power (Thorpe, 2008: 230–​56). Cameron, in comparison, achieved the same ends –​regaining power, albeit only in coalition –​in five years as opposed to 14, making gains of over 100 seats; increasing the number of votes cast by 1,954,082; and securing a 3.7 per cent increase in their vote share. Given the toxicity of the brand that he inherited in 2005 this was an achievement that Conservatives, and non-​Conservatives, need to acknowledge (Bale, 2012a: 236). When we factor in the 2015 General Election result as well then the scale of the Cameron effect is more evident. During his leadership tenure the Conservative vote increased significantly. They added 2,549,661 votes between the General Elections of 2005 and 2015, they increased their representation from 198 to 331 seats, and they added 4.5 per cent to their vote share. In comparison the Labour vote share declined by 5.1 per cent over the same ten-​year period and they lost the equivalent of 123 seats. The Cameron era also coincided with the collapse of the Liberal Democrats. Their vote share would shrink from 22.0 per cent to 7.9 per cent (down

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction

5

14.1 per cent); their parliamentary representation fell from 62 to eight; and their vote base went from 5,985,454 to 2,415,661 (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 432–​3). When examining the Cameron effect two other considerations need to be emphasised. The Cameron era may have run parallel to the erosion of support for Labour and the Liberal Democrats, but it also coincided with, first, the rise of the SNP and, second, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). The SNP secured a significant increase in terms of support with their 412,267 votes and six seats in 2005 transformed into 56 seats and 1,454,436 seats in 2015, with their gains being at the expense of Labour (Mitchell, 2015: 89). Meanwhile, although the rise of UKIP was not as evident in terms of parliamentary seats gained, it was in terms of votes –​as they went from 603,298 in 2005 to 3,881,129 in 2015 (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015: ­chapter 12). Their representative success was more evident in terms of the European elections. Their second-​place finish in the 2009 elections, on a 16.5 per cent vote share (2.5 million votes) and 13 MEPs, was transformed by 2014 into a 27.5 per cent vote share (4.3 million votes) and 24 MEPs. This placed them first ahead of Labour on 20 seats and 25.4 per cent with the Conservatives languishing third on 19 seats and 23.9 per cent (Curtice, 2014: 78–​80). That volatility, and the rise of multi-​party politics, would run parallel to wider political and economic turbulence. Whilst the Conservatives were in opposition the third term Labour administration, by now under the prime ministerial leadership of Gordon Brown, were rocked by the dual crises of the banking collapse and the subsequent recession, and then the parliamentary expenses scandal.2 If the degeneration of Labour and the fall of the Brown administration was dramatic, then events in the 2010 to 2015 Parliament produced a series of unexpected outcomes and potentially critical turning points, as the ‘rules of the game’ were openly questioned. The formation of a Conservative–​Liberal Democrat coalition government led to a series of constitutional debates opening up. In the early part of the coalition era the electorate rejected an opportunity to change from first past the post (FPTP) to AV (see Whiteley et  al., 2012; Curtice, 2013; Seawright, 2013a). In the latter part of the coalition era the Scottish electorate (narrowly) rejected independence (see Curtice et  al., 2015), although the consequence was the opening up of the English question (Hayton, 2015; Hazell and Sandford, 2015; see also Kenny, 2016). Alongside sticking to the status quo in terms of the voting system and Scottish independence, other elements relating to the ‘rules of the game’ that were high on the agenda included House of Lords reform and constituency equalisation (Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 179–​211). The threat to the Conservatives on their right from UKIP, led Cameron into committing a future Conservative administration to renegotiating the terms of EU membership, and then putting that new settlement to a referendum before the end of 2017. These debates on the ‘rules of the game’ –​some of which may seem remote to the concerns of everyday voters, but consumed the political class  –​would take place against a backdrop of deficit reduction. The Cameron–​ Clegg coalition government committed themselves to an austerity programme to

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

6

rebalance the economy. The route map out of recession was slow and painful, and did not result in rising living standards for all (see Whiteley et al., 2013). The above analysis demonstrates that Cameron was a politician of considerable historical significance. Under his guidance, and despite the turbulence within British politics during his leadership tenure, the Conservative Party was in a far a stronger position in 2016 electorally  –​irrespective of Brexit  –​than when he inherited the leadership. Had it been suggested to a Conservative parliamentarian, activist or member in 2005, that on the tenth anniversary of Cameron becoming party leader, they would be a majority administration facing a Labour Party on 232 seats, led by a hard left rebel like Corbyn, and that the Liberal Democrat threat had been neutralised to such an extent that they only had eight seats, they would have found that hard to believe. Studying Cameronism: justifying a thematic approach Beyond establishing the rationale for the book, the other question that needs a brief explanation is the approach of the book. Here the central driver is to provide something distinctive from the existing literature on the Cameron era. From the non-​academic literature there have been a couple of insightful biographies of Cameron  –​see, for example, Elliott and Hanning (2012) and Ashcroft and Oakeshott (2015). Journalistic accounts charting his impact as the new leader of the Conservative Party leader have been offered by Nadler (2007) (broadly sympathetic) and Hitchens (2010) (less so), and, of course, the publication of his conversations with Dylan Jones (2008) provided a clear insight into his motivations and convictions prior to becoming Prime Minister. Evaluations of his contribution to the evolution of the Conservative Party in opposition have been provided by the chronologically driven work of Bale (2010, 2016); Snowdon (2010); and Dorey et al. (2011); and similar territory is expertly covered from a thematic perspective by Hayton (2012). More policy orientated assessments of the Cameron era, both from an opposition and a coalition perspective, include Lee and Beech (2009, 2011), Beech and Lee (2015), Bochel (2011), Heppell and Seawright (2012), Seldon and Finn (2015) and Peele and Francis (2016). Hazell and Yong (2012), Dorey and Garnett (2016) and Atkins (2018) offer thematic assessments on the performance of the coalition. These academic offerings can be viewed alongside coalition appraisals emanating from broadly sympathetic allies in the shape of Matthew d’Ancona (former editor of the Spectator); and implacable critics such as Polly Toynbee and David Walker (Toynbee and Walker, 2012, 2015; d’Ancona, 2014). By far the most detailed and impressive assessment of Cameron as Prime Minister –​i.e. from a governmental rather than a party leadership perspective –​is the (broadly) chronologically structured work of Seldon and Snowdon (2015). This book avoids the chronological approaches identified above, and it also eschews the detailed policy based assessments. It does so not because such

Introduction

7

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

approaches are flawed but because they have already been provided. Instead this book adopts an approach that is built around the two themes identified in the opening paragraphs of the introduction –​first, the oft-​mentioned theme of modernisation; and, second, the hardly referred to theme of manipulation. The first part of the book considers the theme of modernisation and in doing so it concentrates on addressing the following: Detoxification is the focus of ­chapter 2 of the book. It focuses on the extent to which change within the Conservative Party occurred under Cameron. The use of the term detoxification reflects the perception that the Conservative brand was tainted, and that electoral recovery was dependent on distancing themselves from the negatives that had disfigured them in the post-​Thatcherite era. The chapter argues that change did occur, but that there were limits in terms of the scale of change that Cameron could impose upon his party. To illustrate this, the chapter will explore the following themes associated with modernised Conservatism  –​i.e. environmentalism, feminisation, international aid and same-​sex marriage  –​to showcase how their commitment to these themes, once in government, was patchy and inconsistent. The chapter will also consider the extent to which, numerically, the PCP was moving in a socially liberal direction in terms of attitudes towards social, sexual and moral issues. Delegitimisation is the focus of ­chapter 3 of the book. It will consider how Conservative strategy towards undermining Labour evolved during the Cameron era. It will identify how fluid the Conservative strategy was, and how dependent upon circumstances it became. The chapter will demonstrate how the Conservatives initially set about nullifying the ‘investment under Labour or cuts under the Conservatives’ narrative, which was so successful for New Labour in the age of prosperity pre-​2008. It will also identify how, in the aftermath of the financial crash, Cameron abandoned this strategy of converging on Labour to neutralise the economy. Thus, ­chapter 3 will explore how the Conservatives set about establishing their narrative of the financial crash –​i.e. it was the fault of a profligate Labour government. Apportioning blame was thus central to electoral strategy in 2010, and establishing risk about Labour regaining power was central to electoral strategy in 2015. The chapter will also identify how, alongside perceptions of economic competence, Conservative strategy also came to revolve around perceptions of leadership credibility, as Cameron was seen by voters as a more credible political leader than either Brown or Miliband. Depoliticisation is the focus of ­chapter 4 of the book. Chapter 3 focused in on the importance of economic policy, and perceptions of economic competence, to the Conservative approach. The financial crash was framed by the Conservatives as an indicator of a broken economy under Labour. Chapter 4 will focus on how this was aligned to a wider critique of Labour based around social decline. This was to feed into the Conservative narrative of ‘broken

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

8

Cameron Britain’  –​as evidenced by educational failure, family breakdown, welfare dependency, drug and alcohol addiction, and personal debt. Chapter 4 will consider how the broken economic and social policy agendas of Labour were used by the Conservatives to justify a shift away from Big Government, and towards their new governing strategy of the Big Society. The chapter will provide a critique of the Big Society, and the cynicism it provoked within Conservative ranks, before arguing that it should be seen within the context of depoliticisation. Chapter 4 will imply that the Big Society slogan was a rhetorical device for Cameron  –​i.e. it masked what was an ideologically motivated strategy to adjust the balance between the state and society. Therefore, ­chapter 4 will argue that the Big Society narrative should be seen within the context of, first, shifting public expectations of what the state should be responsible for, and, second, limiting the extent to which the state can be blamed.

Whereas the first part of the book (­chapters 2, 3 and 4) will consider Cameronism in relation to modernisation, the second section of the book (­chapters 5, 6 and 7) will consider Cameron in relation to manipulation, thus building on the ideas first advanced in Heppell (2013a). This second part of the book is clearly influenced by the work of Riker and the theory of heresthetics (see, for example, Riker, 1982, 1984, 1986; see also McLean, 2001, 2002 and Hay, 2009 for wider discussions about heresthetics). Heresthetics is the art of political manipulation. It identifies how individual political leaders alter or exploit their circumstances, so as to make it more likely that they can achieve their objectives. It is not just about how political leaders manoeuvre and manipulate in order to structure circumstances or choices so that ‘you can win’ (Riker, 1983: 55). It is also about structuring political situations so that your political opponents are constrained (Hargrove, 1998: 32; Kane, 2001: 38). This section of the book views the decision to enter into a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, rather than govern as a minority, as a heresthetic move. By that it can be argued that Cameron calculated that it was the move that was most advantageous to the Conservatives, or that it stalled alternatives that would have been disadvantageous to the Conservatives. It does so through three themes that relate to political manipulation: Agenda control is the focus of ­chapter 5 of the book. It will examine two particular aspects –​policy and personnel –​to showcase how Cameron managed to retain control of the agenda. In terms of policy the chapter will use the work of Quinn et al. (2011) to argue that the Conservatives’ ‘red lines’ were protected. The chapter will identify how the Conservatives secured their policy objectives in terms of the budget deficit, defence, immigration, Europe, crime, policing and justice, whilst acknowledging concessions in terms of the National Health Service (NHS), education, pensioners and social care. However, the chapter will argue that those Liberal Democrat concessions

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Introduction came with two significant caveats: first, tuition fees was a policy area with a real capacity to hurt them; and second, the Coalition Agreement came with the recognition that the trajectory of social policy would be subordinated to deficit reduction. On this latter issue, the chapter will note that ensuring that deficit reduction took precedence demonstrates that the coalition deal, in policy terms, clearly favoured the Conservatives. In terms of personnel, the chapter will argue that whilst the Liberal Democrats did well in terms of the number of ministers, the Conservatives retained control of the departments central to their agenda and identity. The chapter will also argue that Cameron marginalised the Liberal Democrats through portfolio allocation, which undermined them in terms of their capacity to influence policy trajectory. Strategic voting and binding is the focus of ­chapter  6 of the book. It will develop the arguments of ­chapter 5, and offer an additional way through which Cameron manipulated and exploited the Liberal Democrats. The chapter will start by noting how a pure heresthetician does not shape preferences, but structures situations so that other participants must act in a way that suits the interests of the heresthetician, even though the former’s preferences remain unchanged. The chapter will open up by noting that had Cameron attempted to govern as a minority, he would have been a long way short of a majority (326) with only 307 Conservative MPs. Not only would he, and the Conservative whips, have needed to have secured remarkably high levels of cohesion and discipline, they would have been reliant on the support of other parties, which given the difficult economic environment may not have been forthcoming. In a minority government scenario, it could be argued that based on their manifesto commitments and campaign rhetoric, the Liberal Democrats would have opposed the Conservatives across a wide range of policy issues. The chapter will outline how forming a coalition manufactured a majority of around 80 to protect Cameron when pushing through coalition legislation. What makes Cameron’s strategy here consistent with the actions of a heresthetician is the way in which he manipulated the Liberal Democrats, both frontbench and backbench, into behavioural loyalty to the coalition programme –​i.e. binding –​even though in attitudinal terms many of them will not have changed their preferences. The chapter will note the work of Elster (2000) on binding to support the above arguments, and will use tuition fees and deficit reduction to showcase Cameron’s manipulation and exploitation of the Liberal Democrats as a voting bloc. The chapter will conclude by examining the impact upon the Liberal Democrats in terms of their distinctiveness, their influence and, ultimately, their electoral appeal. Manipulation of dimensions, or the rules of the game, is the focus of ­chapter 7 of the book. This chapter broadens the analysis out to assess how Cameron dealt with the rise of multi-​party politics. This acts as an extension on from ­chapters 5 and 6 and the influence of the traditional third party –​the Liberal

9

Cameron

10

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Democrats –​and will provide scope to assess how Cameron shaped political dimensions to sustain Conservative electoral competitiveness in relation to the SNP and UKIP. The chapter will identify how the Liberal Democrats, the SNP and UKIP aimed to challenge those dimensions by their respective demands for electoral reform, Scottish independence and withdrawal from the EU. By examining these three case studies in relation to these challenges to the existing dimensions of British politics, we can better understand Cameronism, and how and why the arch political gambler was to be destroyed by the EU referendum. Having outlined the rationale for studying Cameronism, and the approach that will be used within this book, it is worth noting a few caveats before proceeding. The first caveat relates to the time frame under consideration. The book incorporates the Cameron era –​i.e. his period as Leader of the Opposition (2005–​10); as a coalition Prime Minister (2010–​15) and his brief period as Prime Minister of a Conservative majority government (2015–​16), although there is a strong focus on the 2010 to 2015 period. The second caveat relates to attitudes towards Cameron as a political leader. Here it is important to note that the author is not seeking to defend Cameron personally, and nor is the book meant to be an endorsement of Conservative politics. Rather it is an attempt to shape the way in which supporters, and critics, should analyse his approach to leading the Conservative Party. The third caveat is an extension of the second, in that the primary focus is a Conservative one, rather than an assessment of British government in the 2010–​16 period. What the book aims to examine is how, under Cameron, the Conservatives constructed their strategies vis-​à-​vis their main opposition party –​the Labour Party; their erstwhile coalition partners  –​the Liberal Democrats; but also how they tried to address the rise of multi-​party politics and engage with the threats created by the SNP and UKIP. Notes 1 Is Cameron a middle-​way, one-​nation Conservative in the mould of Harold Macmillan or a neo-​liberal Conservative in the style of Thatcher? That is the conundrum that has concerned political scientists studying the Conservative Party over the last decade or so. This book starts from the premise that this is not a question that can easily be answered, because in terms of his political rhetoric, policy choices and electoral strategy there is evidence of continuity and change from both traditions. The book argues that it is far more useful to analyse the Conservative Party leadership tenure of Cameron as distinctive from both of those past traditions. Given his longevity and achievement in re-​establishing the Conservatives as a party of government, alongside the sheer gravity of the challenges once in office, he is a politician of some substance. As such this book argues that the term Cameronism is a useful and justifiable term to seek to interpret. 2 For a detailed account on the impact of the financial crash on domestic politics, see Whiteley et al. (2013) and on the expenses scandal, see Allen and Birch (2014). For a wider assessment of the notion of crisis within British politics post-​2008 see Richards et al. (2014).

2

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of detoxification: restyling and reconstructing Conservatism

This chapter is concerned with how Cameronism evolved, from opposition and into coalition government, in terms of internal party change. The starting point for this analysis is to recognise that in marketing terms the Conservative Party were toxic when Cameron inherited the party leadership, and that their image problems constituted the central obstacle to electoral recovery. Cameron would devote a considerable amount of time to changing perceptions of Conservatism and the Conservative Party (Bale, 2010: 283–​362). Much of the existing literature sees this through the theme of modernisation –​or more simply change –​and this is a legitimate perspective to take. Chapters 2 to 4 present modernisation as part of a broader process which should be seen from intra-​party, inter-​party and governmental perspectives. This chapter considers the internal detoxification process; ­chapter 3 considers how the Conservative approach for delegitimising Labour evolved and changed; and ­chapter 4 considers modernisation from the perspective of governing post-​2010, and does so via the theme of depoliticisation. Modernisation is a word which is often used when discussing parties in opposition. As it is central to the first section of the book, it is necessary to engage in some background analysis of its meaning in order to understand its use within this book. The term modernisation is most commonly associated with the era of New Labour, and the changes that propelled Labour out of opposition and back into power in 1997 (Smith, 1994; Hay, 1999; Quinn, 2004). In the case of New Labour modernisation was a two-​stage process. In stage one, modernisation was used to justify the changes that would need to be made to make the party electable. This would involve a rhetorical emphasis on distancing the party from their recent failed past, in order to show that they were now fit for purpose and a worthy potential party of government. In stage two modernisation was broadened out, so that it was not simply about changing the party, rather it was about a modernised approach to governing. The language of modernisation was then used to legitimise governing philosophy, covering the economy, the constitution, education, the NHS, local government and transport infrastructure (Finlayson, 2003). This reaffirmed the difference between New Labour as the incoming administration –​dynamic and purposeful –​as opposed

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

12

Cameron

to the outgoing Major administration –​chaotic and directionless. Nothing captures that two-​stage process of modernisation better than the rebranding of Labour as ‘New Labour’ –​showcasing that internal change was occurring, which when in government would lead to the creation of ‘New Britain’ –​and thus voter frustrations with the failures of the Thatcher/​Major era could be overcome (Hay, 1998). Doubts about their governing competence were negated by reassuring the electorate that their ‘newness’ made them different from previous Labour administrations (see for example, Driver and Martell, 1998, 2006; Heffernan, 2001, and on the rhetorical presentation of New Labour, see Fairclough, 2000). However, New Labour were not the first party of opposition to use the term. It actually has a long lineage within post-​war British politics. It was a component part of the strategy of Gaitskell, as Labour Party leader between 1955 and 1963, as he battled to persuade his party of the electoral utility of multilateralism and the downgrading of their attachment to nationalisation (Haseler, 1969). It was also an influence upon Wilson, between inheriting the Labour Party leadership from Gaitskell and propelling Labour back into power in October 1964 (Favretto, 2000). Rhetorically Wilson relied heavily on the theme of modernisation to try and justify the type of change that he wanted to promote in terms of the British economy (Crines, 2014). The theme of modernisation was also used when the Conservatives were in opposition in the 1960s. It became a means for the new Conservative Party leader, Heath, the so-​called technocratic moderniser, to justify internal change and to project how his party would govern better than the Wilson governments of 1964 to 1970, but also the post-​war Conservative administrations of 1951 to 1964 (Garnett, 2012). There is a danger with the association of the term modernisation with New Labour. It creates an assumption between the term and success –​i.e. the unmodernised Labour Party kept losing General Elections, and then the modernised version under Blair won three General Elections in a row. This is over-​simplification. The term modernisation was actually being used by the Labour Party for years before Blair became their party leader (see Smith, 1994). It was part of the repositioning and repackaging of the Labour Party under Kinnock between 1983 and 1992, although obviously the speed of modernisation was slower under Kinnock than Blair. Modernisation did not work for Kinnock, and nor did it work for Hague or Iain Duncan Smith, when they flirted with modernising strategies during their terms as Leader of the Opposition between 1997 and 2001 and 2001 and 2003 respectively (see Garnett and Lynch, 2003). Therefore, using the language of modernisation is not a guarantee of success. It is worth at this juncture asking three key questions. First, what is the value of the term modernisation? Second, how has it been defined within the academic literature? Third, and finally, how is the term going to be exploited within this book? On the first question the work of Byrne et al. provides a clear justification for using the term modernisation. They argue that it provides clear benefits, as modernisation

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of detoxification

13

is usually used in a neutral and non-​ideological way. It is difficult for the moderate, floating, centrist voter to be offended by the term, as it usually implies reform and renewal towards the centre ground, rather than away to the ideological left or right. Not only does is sound neutral, but it also sounds credible without being constraining. Credibility comes from the idea that modernisation is the unifying theme around which policies will be linked. As modernisation seems neutral this can create an impression that it is a moderate agenda on offer, and one that could be realistically implemented once in power. However, it is not constraining as modernisation is essentially a vague term. That vagueness implies that an agenda will be implemented, but does not necessarily outline the specifics of that agenda. Specifics amount to promises, and if not kept that can erode the chances of re-​election once in power. Thus, because it is neutral and broadly inoffensive, but sounds credible without being constraining, it is a tempting strategy for opposition leaders to utilise (Byrne et al., 2012: 23). Although political elites might be attracted to using the term modernisation, we need to acknowledge that there is no academic agreement on what it means exactly. Indeed, Dommett describes it as ‘slippery’ and ‘ambiguous’, and laments the way in which academics and commentators use it in an ‘imprecise’ way, reducing it down to what parties do to get out of opposition (Dommett, 2015: 249–​51). To date the most compelling work on Conservative modernisation is that of Bale (2008), who suggests that modernisation should be viewed through the following elements. The first element relates to personnel and changes in the leadership and frontbench, which can be seen as part of a generational shift. These new faces and voices are unconnected with the associations of failure from the past (e.g. governing incompetence, electoral defeat or opposition impotence). The second element relates to the organisational infrastructure of the party. The focus here is on the need to ensure that resources (human and financial) are directed at the marginal constituencies, and alongside this that the research and media operations of the party are as effective and efficient as possible. The third element involves acknowledging where the party has been wrong in the past, and emphasising to the electorate that they are aware of these mistakes, and that they have learnt from them. This nullifying tactic of disassociating themselves from what may constitute obstacles to electoral recovery is tied to the fourth element of change –​i.e. changing the policies with which the party may be associated. Policies that may not be predominant in terms of voter concerns may be downgraded rhetorically, as might be policies on which the party may actually hold a lead in the opinion polls. To continue focus on owned policy issues is a strategy known as ‘shoring up’ your known support. To do so does not allow your party to ‘reach out’ and engage with the electorate on other issues, notably the issues on which your opponents might be said to own. Moving onto enemy territory, in terms of the policies that you rhetorically emphasise and downgrading your owned issues, may encourage voters who have not been listening to the party, to reconsider them. The final element of change is to ensure that the electorate understand that

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

14

Cameron

real change is occurring. This can be demonstrated by the party leadership quashing internal party opposition to the changes being initiated (Bale, 2008:  273). This constitutes the litmus test of modernisation –​the ultimate example of this being Blair challenging the old left by reforming Clause IV of the Labour Party constitution (Kenny and Smith, 1997). The first part of this book, which embraces ­chapters 2, 3 and 4, seeks to engage with some, but not all, of these debates on modernisation. When doing so the book operates on the assumption that the Bale definition has two limitations. These are as follows. First, the debates about modernisation are conducted too much in isolation, and are therefore too inward-​looking. Modernisation should be seen as an interactive process –​i.e. how these changes reconfigure the nature of party competition and how the opposition modernising party reconsiders how to undermine the current hegemony of the governing party. Second, the Bale definition seems too opposition-​focused; there is a need to extend the discussion and debate to identify the extent to which change is implemented once in government. These two observations contribute to the shaping of the first part of the book. The current chapter considers the modernising process from the intra-​party perspective. It uses as its dominant theme the need for change because the party brand was too tainted to be electorally successful without change occurring. Therefore, this chapter considers the politics of detoxification, and charts how modernisation attempted to, first, restyle the image of party by the promotion of a socially liberal brand of Conservatism; and, second, reconstruct modern Conservatism –​or the extent to which social liberalism was accepted by the PCP. Restyling Conservatism: justifying social liberalism as modernisation That Cameron was a moderniser was clearly understood when he acquired the leadership of the Conservative Party. The Conservative Party leadership of 2005 was a ‘tale of two primaries’ in which the parliamentary eliminative ballots involved a right-​wing primary, between two gold-​plated Thatcherites, David Davis and Liam Fox, and a left-​wing primary between Cameron and Kenneth Clarke (Denham and Dorey, 2007: 35–​41). The definitions attributed to Davis and Fox were justifiable given their views on taxation, the EU and social and moral matters. However, although Clarke was well known for his economic dampness, his social liberalism and of course his pro-​Europeanism, it was misplaced to describe Cameron as on the Conservative left. He was broadly Thatcherite in the economic sphere and a soft Eurosceptic. However, he deviated from the Thatcherite orthodoxy in terms of his social liberalism, thus explaining why he was perceived as of the modernising left within Conservatism. In the first parliamentary ballot it was Clarke who was eliminated. This aided Cameron, as he swept up Clarke supporters to win the second parliamentary ballot by 90 votes to 57 for Davis and 51 for Fox. This eliminated

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of detoxification

15

Fox and meant Cameron would face Davis in the membership-​wide ballot (Quinn, 2012: 111). As the campaigning period for the membership ballot unfolded it was clear that Cameron was going to win. The optimistic tone that his campaign was adopting, and the positive response in the opinion polls with regard to both his modernising arguments and his presentational skills, especially from those defined as floating voters, contributed to a comfortable victory over Davis by 134,446 votes (67.6 per cent) to 64,398 votes (32.4 per cent) (Denham and O’Hara, 2007: 166). For the first time since the fall of Thatcher in 1990 the Conservative Party had chosen a candidate for the leadership who had made it explicit that the party needed to modernise and change, and in doing it needed to transcend and move beyond the legacy of Thatcherism. There was no ambiguity in terms of the platform that he had stood and the mandate that he now had in terms of changing the party (Elliott and Hanning, 2012: 256–​90). Cameron appeared to be driven by pragmatism over ideology.1 He recognised the seriousness of the opinion polling and focus group evidence. He understood that preaching Thatcherism may appeal to the 30 per cent of the voting population that already was Conservative, but three electoral reversals in a row on a Thatcherite platform had shown it could not attract the extra 10 per cent that was needed to form a majority administration (Bale, 2010: 283–​362). The starting point for Cameron and the modernisers was acceptance of the perception that the Conservatives were the nasty party, i.e. they were seen to be obsessed with economics or the profit motive, and as a consequence were associated with greed and selfishness (see Quinn, 2008). In contrast New Labour were utilising power to focus in on tackling social injustice. That apparent lack of concern for the most vulnerable in society reinforced the impression that the Conservatives were an inherently elitist party. Compounding that perception were the increasingly outdated attitudes that they held on moral issues. The implicit demonising of various sections of the electorate by the Conservatives –​e.g. single mothers, homosexuals, immigrants –​reinforced an impression that they were reactive and defined by what they opposed, rather than what they stood for (Norton, 2009: 39). The downplaying of the traditional Thatcherite rhetoric on taxation, law and order, immigration and Euroscepticism2 was part of a ‘brand decontamination’ strategy on behalf of Cameron and the modernisers. This was necessary when we consider the following evidence from opinion polling. When faced with policy options to specific problems, but no knowledge of which party was advocating which solution, voters often did support the solutions being offered by the Conservatives. However, once voters were told that it was a Conservative solution, support for that solution would drop significantly. As d’Ancona observed, the Conservative Party that Cameron inherited was ‘so unpopular that it contaminated the very policies it espoused’, meaning that the ‘surest way to kill an idea was to say that the Conservatives supported it’ (d’Ancona, 2015: 400).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

16

Cameron

Replacing traditional Thatcherite themes was a deliberate attempt to rhetorically prioritise the issues that New Labour were seen to be dominant on (Heppell, 2013a:  261–​2). This replicated the New Labour strategy of triangulation from the mid-​1990s, where you attempt to nullify the supposed strengths that your opponents have on specific issues (McAnulla, 2010: 295). Competing with New Labour on their territory was a strategy designed to show that the Conservative Party had listened and was trying to change. This attempt to reach out would in time provide what Bale called ‘permission to be heard’ (Bale, 2010: 285). The key issue was that their motives needed to be trusted –​i.e. sections of the electorate did not listen to their arguments because they were the untrustworthy Conservatives. To get the electorate to listen to the arguments required major changes to their presentational approach. The first change was that Cameron was a new face, who represented a generational shift from the Thatcher and Major era. The second change was the rhetoric and tone used by Cameron, which was inclusive and moderate. The third change was the choice of issues that Cameron prioritized, i.e. he focused in on unexpected or non-​Conservative themes (d’Ancona, 2015: 403). This was tied to a desire to get across to the electorate a more positive argument for Conservatism. So instead of allowing their political opponents to define the Conservative Party by what they were thought to be against  –​e.g. immigrants, homosexuals, public sector workers, the EU –​all of which solidified an image of being extreme, Cameron wanted to show what they stood for3 (Norton, 2009: 39). Attempting to determine how effective modernisation was is a difficult question to address. If modernisation means change at both a stylistic, but also a substantive level (i.e. policy), then the question actually has three layers to it. First, is there evidence of a clear attempt to shift the overarching policy agenda of the Conservatives to the centre ground and towards the location of the median voter (Taylor, 2010)? Second, if the party has repositioned itself towards the centre ground, then is there evidence of continuity in policy terms from the rhetoric of opposition to the substance of policy implementation in government (Kerr and Hayton, 2015)? The final question is to identify the extent to which modernisation has been accepted by Conservative parliamentarians –​is it an elite dominated project or has it become embedded within the PCP? The final question on the extent to which modernisation has been accepted (or challenged) will be considered later on in this chapter (see pp. 28–​31), after the first two questions relating to modernisation have been addressed –​i.e. evidence of policy movement and evidence of that movement being sustained. On the first question of policy repositioning there is general agreement within the academic literature that an attempt (and a reasonably effective one at that, according to Kerr and Hayton, 2015: 114) was made in the 2005 to 2007 period both stylistically, and to a lesser extent substantively, to move to a more inclusive socially liberal mode of Conservatism (see Dorey, 2007, 2009; Bale, 2008, 2010; Quinn, 2008; McAnulla, 2010). Within the myriad of themes through which modernisation could be interpreted it can be argued that the following policy areas

The politics of detoxification

17

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

were predominant. First, there was the reaching out theme of environmentalism; second, there was the emphasis placed upon feminisation; third, there was the focus on international aid; and finally there was the emphasis on social liberalism, which was tested in government by Cameron’s commitment to same-​sex marriage (Heppell, 2013a: 260–​1). Did Cameron and the modernisers develop a consistent and sustained commitment with regard to these themes?

Environmentalism Let us consider environmentalism first. A  simplistic distinction could be drawn between opposition, and the ‘vote blue, go green’ slogan launched in 2006, which was apparently reaffirmed when entering office by Cameron’s pledge to deliver ‘the greenest government ever’, and the allegation that once in office a few years Cameron wanted to ‘get rid of all the green crap’ ( Jones and Clover, 2006; Randerson, 2010; Sparrow, 2013). The reality is slightly more nuanced and, even if Cameron’s environmental credentials in office are open to criticism, it is important to examine and understand the reasons why. Environmentalism was core to the modernisation strategy that was adopted in the initial stages of Cameron’s leadership tenure. The cynical interpretation would suggest that Cameron made these moves as they aided his objective of brand decontamination. Three obvious symbols of change emerged early on. First, he made a highly publicised visit to a Norwegian glacier to observe the impact of global warming, which resulted in the iconic photographic image of Cameron riding with a pack of huskies (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 256). Second, the Conservatives changed their logo from the old fashioned torch of freedom to a modernised logo of an oak tree, which was said to symbolise their new attitude towards the environment (Browne, 2006). Third, the Conservatives made their environmental focus central to the campaigning strategy for the 2006 local elections, which was when they came up with the memorable slogan of ‘vote blue, go green’ (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 256). The environment was a natural target to symbolise change as the Conservatives were seen to have a weak reputation on this. It was also of real importance in terms of distancing the party from their Thatcherite past. This was because Cameron was implying that a Conservative administration he would lead would not automatically prioritise economic arguments over environmental concerns (Carter, 2006, 2009). Furthermore, the environment represented an area in which the record of the Labour government was open to criticism, and it was an issue (prior to the financial crash) which was said to be high in terms of voter concerns (Carter, 2008; Carter and Clements, 2015). Moreover, it was an issue of importance to Liberal Democrat voters, and thus a strong Conservative emphasis here was part of a clear attempt to pitch the rebranded Conservatives to Liberal Democrat voters (Bale, 2010: 290).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

18

Cameron

The commitment to environmentalism was more than just symbolic. In opposition the Conservatives prioritised these issues in keynote speeches, mostly by Cameron, and policy statements. In doing so, Cameron committed the party to a number of initiatives, including green technology start-​ups; a Green Deal on energy efficiency; smart meters and feed-​in tariffs, all of which culminated in the Conservative Party manifesto for the 2010 General Election containing a far more significant, and far more progressive, section on environmental issues than earlier manifestos (Rootes and Carter, 2010:  993–​4). Other interventions appeared to solidify Cameron’s commitment. For example, he publicly stated his opposition to two high-​profile proposals: first, the application (made by E.ON) to construct a new coal-​fired power station in Kent; and, second, the controversial construction of a third runway at Heathrow (Carter and Jacobs, 2014). However, there was considerable cynicism within Conservative ranks, both within the parliamentary party and amongst members, and that cynicism was reaffirmed amongst the right-​wing press (Bale, 2008). Their reservations, notably about the proposal to increase green taxes (without supposedly needing to increase the overall tax burden), worried many Conservatives, and once the financial crisis tipped the economy into recession it solidified their scepticism. Ultimately, concerns about green tax increases undermining the competitiveness of British business led Cameron to quietly back down (Carter and Clements, 2015). Despite these reservations from within his own party, the Cameron–​Clegg coalition government, which claimed to promote an eco-​friendly economy, did set about implementing a range of significant environmental measures. There was, for example, the creation of a Green Investment Bank designed to fund projects on renewable energy and waste efficiency; the Green Deal designed to encourage greater household energy efficiency; commitments in terms of carbon emission targets; and investment into low carbon electricity generation (Carter and Clements, 2015). However, their environmental credentials came under significant strain over time. So, for example, the Green Investment Bank may have been established, but full borrowing powers were deferred until after 2015, thus subordinating its ambitions to the primary objective of addressing the national debt problem. Cameron also came under criticism for the limited impact of the Green Deal programme which was designed to support energy efficiency in UK households. The scheme provided householders with the opportunity to take out a privately financed loan fixed to the building and to be repaid through energy bills. However, the loans were offered at such an unappealing commercial rate that take-​up rates by households were considerably lower than had been anticipated, and the scheme was widely interpreted as a failure (Chandler, 2015: 191–​5). Further damage was done to Cameron’s environmental credentials by disbanding the Sustainable Development Commission and the Royal Commission for Environmental Pollution, as the newly installed coalition set about a cull of quangos (Chandler, 2015:  191–​5). This, alongside reductions in funding for the Environmental Agency and Natural England, and the abortive

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of detoxification

19

attempt to part-​privatise the National Forestry estate, alongside government support for the High Speed 2 rail network, badger culling and shale gas exploration, served to contradict the rhetoric of Cameron in opposition (Kerr and Hayton, 2015). The explanations for the limited success of this aspect of the modernisation project are two-​fold. First, it is a reflection of the constraining impact of the economic circumstances. Ashcroft and Oakeshott imply that the parlous condition of the economy meant that Chancellor George Osborne was loath to accept the green agenda if it frustrated business and undermined competitiveness (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 371). This first factor, and Osborne’s reticence, was tied to the second factor –​i.e. the ideological constraint emanating from the Conservative backbenchers. For many Conservative parliamentarians, especially those holding marginal constituencies, the key to their electoral future was the economy  –​i.e. securing growth and demonstrating economic and thereby governing competence –​and not the wider green agenda. Backed by the scepticism prevalent within parts of the right-​wing press, many Conservatives had a strong ideological objection, viewing green taxes as subsidies and thus as inappropriate state-​led intervention (Lockwood, 2013: 1344). This scepticism was said to reflect the views of many Conservative members and voters (see Clements, 2012, 2014a). Within the context of his own party, it was somewhat surprising that Cameron appointed John Hayes as a junior minister within the Department of Energy and Climate Change, given that Hayes was an opponent of wind farms; and it was also disconcerting that Cameron appointed Owen Paterson as Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, who later condemned the ‘all powerful environmental lobby’, before advocating standing up to this ‘green blob’ and repealing the Climate Change Act (Paterson, 2014a, 2014b). Feminisation If the modernisers’ commitment to environmentalism was open to criticism, then the same applies to the case of feminisation. Cameron made the feminisation of the Conservative Party a central plank of his modernisation agenda (see Childs and Webb, 2012), in order to address the accusation (made by Lovenduski) that they were ‘institutionally sexist’ (2005: 53). When his election as the new leader of the party was announced, he used his acceptance speech to condemn ‘the scandalous under-​representation of women in his party’ (Bryson and Heppell, 2010:  31). The early months of his leadership tenure saw him intervene on a range of issues –​ e.g. childcare, parental leave and the gender pay gap –​as a way of showing he was onside when it came to gender based concerns (Childs and Webb, 2012: 165–​81). This was carried through to the General Election campaign of 2010, when the Conservatives made a far more explicit attempt to target female voters with specific policy pledges (Ashe et al., 2010; Campbell and Childs, 2010). However, the rhetoric of feminisation has to be supported by the evidence of a positive impact. In

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

20

Cameron

terms of impact this can be defined in two ways. First, is there evidence that modernisation has contributed to the feminising of politics, as demonstrated in terms of the descriptive representation of women within the PCP and within its ministerial ranks after 2010? Second, is there evidence that modernisation has contributed to the substantive representation of women’s interests, via policy formulation and implementation, once in office after 2010 (Campbell and Childs, 2015: 148)? In terms of the descriptive representation of women within the PCP it is clear that some progress was made. When Cameron became party leader there were 17 female representatives out of a total of 198, or 8.5 per cent. The 2010 General Election saw that percentage increase to 16 per cent (49 from 306); and then increase again to 20.5 per cent at the 2015 General Election (68 from 331) (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 347). However, at both the General Elections of 2010 and 2015, when the Labour parliamentary share was shrinking and was lower than the Conservatives overall, their female representation was still considerably higher –​81 from 258 in 2010 (or 31.3 per cent) and 99 from 232 in 2015 (or 42.6 per cent) (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 347). The impact that the Conservatives made between 2005 and 2010 was partly due to the implementation of the priority list of candidates (known as the A-​list). Encouraged by Cameron, as an equality strategy, this was a list of approved candidates whom the leadership wanted to be considered for selection, by constituency chairs and activists, in potentially winnable seats (for an analysis of the implementation of the A-​list scheme see Mcllveen, 2009). However, the A-​list model, based around Conservative Campaign Headquarters intervening in selection processes and exercising pressure to select candidates approved by the centre, did meet with some resistance. As a consequence it was quietly abandoned in the lead up to the 2015 General Election. The justification for this was as follows: at the grassroots level the party had changed to such an extent that formal interventionist measures, such as the A-​list, were no longer needed4 (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 344). Progress was also made in terms of female representation within the ministerial ranks of the government. However, just as was the case with female representation within the parliamentary party, Cameron was criticised for not making more progress, from the opposition benches, left-​wing political commentators and academics, but also criticism from amongst his own right for preferential treatment (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016:  48). The ability of previous Conservative Prime Ministers to select female ministers was limited by the small number of female Conservative parliamentarians. Cameron made a clear commitment to address this, but a mismatch would emerge between his stated commitment and the number of females elected into Parliament at the General Election of 2010. When in opposition Cameron had committed himself to having one-​third of his ministers being female by the end of the Parliament (given that there are usually around 100 ministerial positions at any one time, then if we only included those elected to the House of Commons then Cameron needed to have 33 of those elected in 2010 holding ministerial office by 2015). Given that he had only 48 to choose from, perhaps lower

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of detoxification

21

than he had anticipated when making his pledge, this was going to be a difficult commitment to keep (Heppell, 2012b). Initially Cameron had as an excuse the fact that new parliamentarians are not normally selected as ministers, but this defence carried little weight by the end of the Parliament (although the constraints of coalition and the poor record of the Liberal Democrats on female representation provided an alternative cover). The impact of this commitment was thus most visible in terms of the 147 new Conservative parliamentarians elected in 2010. Of the 2010 cohort Cameron appointed to ministerial office 14 new female ministers from 35 new female parliamentarians; and 17 new male ministers from 112 new male parliamentarians (Heppell and Crines, 2016: 397, 399). That this imbalance would create resentment amongst male and socially conservative parliamentarians was inevitable. After all, as early as 2008 Conservative backbencher Philip Davies had condemned the one-​third objective, arguing that ‘it should be irrelevant what somebody’s gender should be. People who are good enough for the job will be accused of getting it on false premises and people who aren’t will be exposed as not being up to the job’ (Hinsliff, 2008). This view reflected the meritocratic mentality of many Conservatives, expressed on Conservative Home, who condemned Cameron for creating a ‘box-​ticking exercise when appointing ministers which is not the right way to go about forming a government’, which not only made ‘female ministers feel patronised’, but would ‘breed resentment among male colleagues who have not been promoted’ (Isaby, 2011). However, of perhaps even greater significance is the critique of the coalition in terms of the substantive representation of women’s interests. There is some evidence of pursuing feminisation in office, such as measures that have been advanced regarding stalking, violence against women in the domestic sphere, anti-​trafficking and on female genital mutilation (Campbell and Childs, 2015). However, progress in these areas has to be seen within the wider economic context and the impact of the austerity measures implemented by the coalition. It can be argued that austerity is a feminist issue because the fiscal retrenchment impacted disproportionately upon women, especially less well-​off women, lone mothers and single female pensioners (Annesley, 2012; Annesley and Gains, 2014; Campbell and Childs, 2015). The accusation was that once ensconced in power, Cameron moved away from the feminisation agenda. In a desire to implement cuts they sacrificed feminisation by choosing to, for example, abolish the health in pregnancy grant, and limit the Sure Start maternity grant to the first child. The impression was that Cameron and his modernising acolytes paid insufficient attention to gender equality when considering the impact of their policies (Bryson, 2012: 157).5 International aid6 If Conservative modernisation vis-​à-​vis environmentalism and feminisation is open to question, then a slightly more positive interpretation emerges with respect to

22

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

international aid. The fact that Cameron, both in opposition and then in government, placed such an emphasis on international aid represents a conundrum for the following reasons (Heppell et al., 2017a): • Historically the idea of increasing spending on international aid is not normally associated with centre-​right governments. Compare the legacies of Labour when leaving office in 1979 and 2010, to that of the Conservatives in 1997. In 1979 the percentage of GNI spent on international aid was 0.57, and in 2010 it was 0.51. Compare those with the 0.27 per cent left by the Conservatives in 1997 (see Heppell et al., 2017a: 898). That divergence can be explained by ideology –​ i.e. centre-​left governments believe in intervening to alleviate global poverty and to promote equality, whereas centre-​right governments are sceptical about such forms of intervention, both in terms of donor and recipient countries (Chaney, 2013; such arguments permeate the comparative literature on international aid spending, see Therien and Noel, 2000 and Therien, 2002). • The circumstances would normally be assumed to be obstacles to increased spending on international aid (Heppell et al., 2017a: 896–​9). Cameron and the Conservatives were entering power in an environment of economic constraint, and existing academic research showed that in such circumstances, governments tend to lower their interest (expenditure) on international aid (Tingley, 2010; Dang et al., 2013; Heinrich et al., 2016). • There were some doubts about the level of public support for increasing international aid spending given the economic circumstances (Heppell et  al., 2017a: 896–​9). Polling indicated that public support was conditional–​i.e. alleviating global poverty was desirable, but addressing domestic poverty should be the priority (vanHeerde and Hudson, 2010; Henson and Lindstrom, 2013; Hudson and vanHeerde-Hudson, 2012). Despite these factors Cameron was to sustain his commitment to international aid throughout opposition and government. Indeed, it was said that he wanted to establish the United Kingdom as a ‘development superpower’  –​as compared to the United States, which was a military superpower (Norton-​Taylor, 2011). When they entered coalition it was decided that international aid spending should be ring-​ fenced and made, alongside health, immune from the severe public expenditure cuts that other departments would be subjected to (Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012). Cameron ensured that the international aid budget would increase significantly during his prime ministerial tenure. Spending was at 0.51 per cent of GNI in 2010. It reached 0.56 per cent by the mid-​point of the coalition, but by the time of the 2015 General Election it was at 0.72 per cent (Lunn and Booth, 2016). Cameron took pride in hitting the 0.7 per cent target that had been reaffirmed at the 2005 G8 summit. The UK was the first G8 country to hit the target, and furthermore, only four nations had done so previously (Sweden in 1974, Norway in 1976, Denmark

The politics of detoxification

23

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

in 1978 and Luxembourg in 2000) (Lunn and Booth, 2016).7 That commitment was then cemented as the coalition introduced the International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act of 2015. This ensured that successor governments would be under a legal obligation to maintain that 0.7 per cent of GNI spending commitment. This made the UK the first Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development member to enshrine 0.7 per cent into law (Manji, 2016). Given the above constraints and obstacles the question has to be why? The following explanations can be advanced: • In opposition the commitment to international aid was part of their rebranding strategy. The modernisers argued that when it came to international aid the Conservatives were deemed to be ‘untrustworthy’ and as a consequence this was a policy that Labour ‘dominated’ or ‘owned’ (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 80). Therefore, modernisers calculated that making a clear commitment to international aid could be emblematic of the modernisation of the party (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015:  479). This led to the decision to commit an incoming Conservative government to meet the 0.7 per cent target, and it was a non-​ contentious part of the coalition negotiations with the Liberal Democrats (Sharp et al, 2010; Glennie, 2011; Mawdsley, 2011; Noxolo, 2011). • Cameron and leading modernisers did believe it in a moral sense. Seldon and Snowdon noted that Cameron showed a ‘dogged commitment’ to it, and that international aid was ‘one of the rare issues’ upon which Cameron would ‘lose his temper’ if challenged (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 479–​80). That commitment would be reinforced by the strongly moral tone that was to be adopted by Andrew Mitchell during his time as Secretary of State for International Development (2010–​12). Mitchell commented that ‘it is a stain on all our consciences that a girl born in South Sudan today is more likely to die having a baby than to complete primary school’, before noting that ‘when we know what life—​and death—​is like for over a billion people living on less than 80p a day, and we have the wherewithal to do something about it, then, yes, I do believe we have a moral imperative to do so’ (Elliott, 2011). When asked to explain the decision to ring-​fence international aid, whilst other domestic spending departments were implementing swingeing public expenditure cuts, Mitchell offered a clear response: ‘we will not balance the books on the backs of the poorest people in the world’ (Grice, 2011). • In addition to rebranding and genuine commitment, the modernisers shifted on international aid policy, because as Justine Greening (Secretary of State for International Development from 2012 to 2016)  argued that ‘tackling poverty overseas is about addressing the root causes of global challenges such as disease, migration, terrorism and climate change, all of which are the right things to do and firmly in Britain’s own national interest’ (Anderson, 2015; for a more detailed appraisal of the national interest perspective, see Mawdsley, 2017).

24

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Greening’s emphasis on markets, investment and structural rebalancing between the public and private sectors reflected her belief in the benefits to the UK from the provision of ‘smart aid’ (Mawdsley, 2015:  339–​40). She claimed that the financing of projects within developing countries would in the short term benefit the recipient country, and in the longer term would benefit the UK as the donor country, as ‘our money comes back when businesses are successful’ (Greening, 2013, 2014).8 However, despite a record of achievement Cameron was to face considerable opposition for his international aid commitment, from the print media (Cawley, 2015), from UKIP (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015), and from amongst his own backbenchers (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015:  279–​84). They spoke of alleged corruption and misuse of funds within the recipient nations. They questioned whether it was correct to approach policy making on the basis of how much was being spent. They also questioned why Cameron wanted to legally enshrine the 0.7 per cent spending commitment on international aid, but he had not advocated a specified percentage for spending in other policy areas. There was talk of a development/​defence ‘trade off ’ (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015:  479) as Cameron argued for cuts in defence spending, and throughout the coalition era seemed doubtful of the need to maintain UK defence spending at the NATO target of 2 per cent (he backed down on this in his final year as Prime Minister; see Dorman et al., 2016). Prioritising international aid over defence certainly seemed to annoy Gerard Howarth, the former Defence Minister, who asked: how can I look a soldier in the eye and say thank you for your service in Afghanistan, where you put your life on the line, were shot at, had your vehicle blown up, and you survived. I am sorry we’re having to make you redundant, but the good news is I’ve got a lot more money for overseas aid? (HC Deb, 4 November 2014, Col. 6)

Those critics of international aid prioritisation doubted that it was to the electoral advantage of the Conservatives. They noted how the approval rate for spending at 0.7 per cent was only 30 per cent, whereas 55 per cent of voters wanted to see the level of spending reduced. Amongst Conservative supporters the rate of opposition increased to 62 per cent, and amongst UKIP supporters the rate of opposition was even higher at 87 per cent. Those on the Conservative right, especially those holding marginal constituencies, argued that the appeal of UKIP could increase on the basis of their opposition to international aid, as well as their traditional pitch on immigration and the EU (Bailey, 2014). However, despite these reservations the actual scale of Conservative discontent on international aid was not that significant in behavioural terms (i.e. votes in the House of Commons). The passage of the International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act of 2015 was straightforward given the support

The politics of detoxification

25

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

of the Labour opposition, and therefore no whip was applied. Conservative parliamentarians split in three directions  –​24  ‘critics’ voted against, 94  ‘sceptics’ abstained (including Theresa May) and 190 were ‘advocates’ who voted for the legislation, or spoke in favour of it. It could be argued that with only 7.8 per cent of the PCP openly opposing what Cameron stood for vis-​à-​vis international aid, this represents a significant achievement in terms of modernisation, albeit one that has been largely overlooked in the existing academic literature (Heppell et al., 2017a). Same-​sex marriage Alongside environmentalism, feminisation and international aid, the fourth modernising theme identifiable with Cameronism was his attempt to present his party as less socially authoritarian and more socially liberal. A remodelled Conservatism advancing social liberalism, tied to their traditional pursuit of economic liberalism, would legitimise Cameron’s claim that he was a liberal Conservative (Hayton and McEnhill, 2015). The rationale for social liberal modernisation reflected the altered terrain after a decade of New Labour in power, who had made significant progress in terms of equality rights. As a consequence modernisers argued that as ‘the centre of gravity’ on social attitudes had been moved, it was necessary for the Conservatives to catch up with society, and avoid the danger of being behind the pace in terms of social change (Maude, 2013: 144). Between 1997 and 2005 the Conservatives had made themselves look socially authoritarian, with the associated dangers of looking hectoring and intolerant, as they either formally opposed or look badly divided on a range of moral issues –​e.g. under Hague on the repeal of Section 28 of the 1988 Local Government Act outlawing the implied promotion of homosexuality in schools; under Duncan Smith on providing equality for gay and unmarried couples to adopt children; and under Howard on the Civil Partnership Bill and the Gender Recognition Bill (for a wider discussion on these themes, see McManus, 2011 and Gilbert, 2014). The case for suggesting that Cameron fulfilled his commitment to being inclusive and socially liberal lies in the passage of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act of 2013. That he did so surprised many as it was not included within the Conservative Party manifesto of 2010, and he then announced his intentions at the Conservative Party annual conference of 2011 without having taken any significant soundings within the party (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015:  411). Cameron’s decision to ‘claim ownership’ of the issue (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 275) did make some long-​term sense. Public support for same-​sex marriage was on the increase and the greatest support for it was amongst the young, and the greatest opposition to it was amongst the elderly. Thus over the long term advocating a socially liberal reforming measure such as this could have act as a symbolic detoxifier of the Conservative brand (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 407; see also Clements, 2014b). With this logic underpinning his decision Cameron pushed ahead with same-​sex marriage

26

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

legislation. It would become one of the most significant ‘achievements’ during his prime ministerial tenure (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 282), as well as being a significant ‘milestone’ in terms of progress towards homosexual rights and equality (Clements and Field, 2014: 523). Although Cameron took pride in his decision, Liberal Democrat minister, David Laws, revealed that Cameron had admitted (to Nick Clegg) that it was a decision with consequences: ‘[G]ay marriage has been an absolute disaster. It has totally split my party. It has been as bad for me as tuition fees were for you, Nick’. The Prime Minister said that he now realised that it had been a big mistake to upset the ‘Tory base’ in the country. He pointed out that in his view this was a key reason why the Conservatives were losing ground to UKIP. (Laws, 2016: 105)

As a self-​proclaimed socially liberal Conservative, Cameron had always been distrusted by the socially conservative wing of the PCP. Throughout opposition Cameron had attempted to placate them by making frequent references to the fact that he was pro-​family, and that the traditional family unit was the ‘best institution’ in which to raise children (Hayton, 2010:  497). However, such rhetoric was twinned with a socially liberal and pro-​equality emphasis on homosexual rights. The consequence of this was that Cameron supported civil partnerships for same-​sex couples, as well as arguing for marriage to be recognised within the tax system, but with that recognition applying to same-​sex civil partnerships as well (Hayton, 2010: 497). Cameron therefore adopted a classic triangulating position of attempting to put together traditionally opposing assumptions, as he promoted himself as being ‘unequivocally and unapologetically pro-​marriage and pro-​family’, and at the same time arguing that the best way to shore it up as an institution was to extend it ‘to those who had previously been excluded’ (Ashcroft and Oakeskott, 2015: 409). Equality was a dominant theme for Conservatives who spoke out in support during the ensuing parliamentary debates. For such modernising social liberals, the legislation was about (a) the extension of rights for some; and (b) that such an extension did not limit the rights of others. For example, Mike Freer, who himself was in a civil partnership (and later was able to marry his partner), argued that ‘I am not asking for special treatment, I am simply asking for equal treatment’ (HC Deb, 5 February 2013, Col. 179). However, although Cameron was to secure a legislative success, same-​sex marriage would expose the depth of the social liberal–​social conservative cleavage within the PCP, as over 100 members voted against the proposed legislation (Watt, 2013). During the course of the parliamentary debate, Margot James commented that the tone of some of the speeches made by fellow Conservatives showed that ‘the modernisation of the Conservative Party is not yet complete’ (HC Deb, 5 February 2013, Col. 163).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of detoxification

27

Socially conservatives spoke out against the legislation of the following grounds. First, they noted that the coalition had no mandate for advancing the legislation. It was not in the Conservative or Liberal Democrats manifestos from the 2010 General Election, and nor was it part of the Coalition Agreement that both parties subsequently signed up to (Gilbert, 2014). Second, social conservatives argued against the legislation on the grounds that this should not be a priority at a time of economic constraint, and that it was doubtful that there was public support for the legislation. On this many Conservatives were influenced by how the measure was viewed by their own membership, rather than attitudes amongst the electorate as a whole. Support for the legislation was strongly influenced by age –​i.e. support amongst 18-​to 29-​year-​olds was 60.6 per cent and amongst 30-​to 44-​year-​olds it was 50.7 per cent, but support was very low amongst the over-​65s (only 16.5 per cent) (Clements, 2014b). Conservative Home reported that:  (a) 64 per cent of members opposed same-​sex marriage; and (b)  that 78 per cent of them felt that Cameron had badly misread the situation. Cameron was accused of failing to appreciate the depth of feeling on the issue, and that his dogmatism on this issue might drive more traditionalists into the hands of UKIP (Grice, 2012; Watt and Wintour, 2013). The scale of the backlash from the constituencies was not something that parliamentarians, especially those with small majorities, could easily ignore, and Graham Brady (Chair of the 1922 Backbench Committee) urged Cameron to think again (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 408–​11). Third, social conservatives argued that the legislation was not necessary as civil partnerships were sufficient. Indeed, during the second reading debates a number of senior Conservatives argued that they had been supportive of civil partnerships because that would be ‘the end of the story’ as Bernard Jenkin put it (HC Deb, 5 February 2013, Col. 160). Edward Leigh went as far as to argue that back in 2004 he had been given ‘solemn assurances on the Floor of the House, including by some sitting on the Opposition Benches now, that the Civil Partnership Act would not lead to full same-​sex marriage’ (HC Deb, 5 February 2013, Col. 160). However, the above three arguments were covers for the real reason why many Conservatives spoke out against the proposed legislation, i.e. they simply felt it was morally wrong. Roger Gale argued that ‘marriage is a union between a man and a woman’ and that to attempt to change it is in ‘Alice in Wonderland territory  –​ Orwellian almost –​for any Government of any political persuasion to try to rewrite the lexicon’ (HC Deb, 5 February 2013, Col. 152). Leigh was clear that marriage was ‘a heterosexual union’, and that by ‘its very definition requires two people of opposite sexes’, and ‘if we take that basic requirement away, what we are left with is not marriage’ (HC Deb, 5 February 2013, Col. 161). Leigh developed his argument further by emphasising how ‘every marriage has procreating potential’ as it ‘brings together biologically the two elements needed to generate a child’ (HC Deb, 5 February 2013, Col. 161). Leigh ended his opposition by situating the debate about same-​sex marriage within the context of equality, arguing that:

Cameron

28

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

we must get away from the idea that every single thing in life can be forced through the merciless prism of equality. I am a Conservative. I believe we should be concerned with equality, but not at the expense of every other consideration—​not at the expense of tradition. We should be in the business of protecting cherished institutions and our cultural heritage. Otherwise, what is a Conservative party for? Indeed, we are alienating people who have voted for us all their lives, and leaving them with no one to vote for. (HC Deb, 5 February 2013, Col. 161)

Reconstructing Conservatism: did the Conservative Party become more socially liberal? The above analysis provides an overview of how Cameron attempted to restyle Conservatism. However, a distinction does exist between restyling and reconstructing Conservatism –​the first implies changing the presentation of policy, whereas the second implies changing the underlying assumptions about what the policy should be. So did the Cameron era see a change in terms of underlying attitudes towards policy within the Conservative Party? One way of measuring this is to look at opinion within the PCP –​can we find evidence of a shift in opinion in the direction of social liberalism? Dorey et al. noted that some within the PCP were not fully paid up members of the Cameron modernisers’ faction (Dorey et al., 2011: 82). Those critics opposed the modernisers’ diagnosis of downplaying taxation, immigration and the EU. They advocated a more authoritarian approach to prevent disaffection on the right leading to voters defecting to UKIP. In opposition, social conservatives were said to be tolerant of Cameron and his modernising medicine, so long as it was likely that he was going to propel the Conservatives into power (as a majority administration). Writing in 2008 Evans argued that if Cameron did regain power the ‘latent power’ of the socially conservative wing of the PCP would constrain him (Evans, 2008: 291–​301). Furthermore, Norton argued that Cameron chose the option of coalition in May 2010 partly because he feared being beholden to the socially conservative right, and that the support of the Liberal Democrats, and a manufactured coalition majority, would provide him with breathing space from their demands (Norton, 2011: 254). The power of the socially conservative right was something that Evans implied would become a factor. However, given the time at which he was writing, he was not in a position to identify the numeric strength of the critics of Cameron. This can be achieved by reference to the academic work that exists examining the ideological composition of the PCP. A series of studies have been completed over recent decades, covering each of the parliamentary terms since 1987 (see, for example, Norton, 1990; Heppell, 2002, 2013a; Heppell and Hill, 2008, 2009, 2010; Heppell et al., 2017a, 2017b). In these studies the categorising of Conservative parliamentarians has been determined by methods initiated by Norton in his original study (e.g. via examining

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of detoxification

29

division lists, signatories to Early Day Motions, examining campaign literature, and researching the public comments of individual parliamentarians). These methods have also been utilised to determine the opinion of Conservative parliamentarians towards social, sexual and moral policy, i.e. between Thatcherite social conservatives or social liberals (see Norton, 1990; Garry, 1995). Running through this type of study the socially liberal–​conservative cleavage has been defined by the following assumptions:  social conservatives oppose homosexual rights, freedom of contraception and abortion, whilst supporting the family, capital and corporal punishment, censorship and restrictions on immigration; and whilst social conservatives adopt a relatively authoritarian role for the state, social liberals tend to adopt a more relaxed or laissez-​faire attitude on such matters (see Norton, 1990; Heppell, 2002). The research undertaken on attitudes across the five Parliaments since 1992 (see table 1) shows the changes in attitudes towards social, sexual and moral issues. Social conservatism was the dominant position during the opposition era within the PCP, peaking at 79.5 per cent in the 2001–​5 Parliament. The strength of social conservative sentiment could be said to have been an influence at the parliamentary ballots for the Conservative Party leadership in 1997 and 2001. Research identified how social conservatives were more inclined to Hague (a social conservative) than Clarke (a social liberal), and that social liberals were more likely to have voted for Clarke over Hague (Heppell and Hill, 2008: 79–​85). That contest was determined solely via the use of parliamentary ballots, and even though the final decision on who should be the new leader in 2001 was via a membership ballot, the candidates presented to the membership were determined via eliminative parliamentary ballots (Quinn, 2012: 97–​130). During these parliamentary ballots of 2001 Duncan Smith had the highest amount of support amongst socially conservative parliamentarians (indeed all but one of his 54 supporters were defined as socially conservative), whereas the depleted number of social liberals split between the more socially liberal inclined Clarke (59 votes) and Michael Portillo (53 votes) (Heppell and Hill, 2010: 47).

Table 1  Strands and strength of opinion within the PCP on social, sexual and moral issues, 1992–​2016 Parliament

Agnostic

Socially liberal

Socially conservative

1997 (n=164) 2001 (n=166) 2005 (n=198) 2010 (n=306) 2015 (n=330)

13 (7.9%) 9 (5.4%) 28 (14.1%) 62 (20.2%) 63 (19.1%)

29 (17.7%) 25 (15.1%) 25 (12.7%) 91 (29.8%) 148 (44.8%)

122 (74.4%) 132 (79.5%) 145 (73.2%) 153 (50%) 119 (36.1%)

Source: amended from Heppell and Hill (2008, 2009, 2010); Heppell (2013b); Heppell et al. (2017b).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

30

Cameron

The growth of socially liberal sentiment within the PCP would coincide with Cameron’s tenure as leader of the party. The parliamentary cohort of 2005 witnessed only minimal changes in terms of attitudes towards social, sexual and moral issues within the PCP, with the strength of socially liberal thinking at 12.7 per cent and socially conservative sentiment estimated at 73.2 per cent. However, some of the socially conservative sentiment identified was located amongst elderly Conservatives who would stand down at either the General Elections of 2010 or 2015. This created vacancies in winnable constituencies, which when added to the gains made in 2010 and again in 2015 would lead to significant changes in the attitudes of the PCP. The influx of new (and younger) Conservative parliamentarians would contribute to a reduction in socially conservative thinking  –​down to 50 per cent in the 2010 Parliament, and reduced further to 36.1 per cent in the 2015 Parliament. Running simultaneous to that, the level of socially liberal Conservatives would increase significantly –​from 12.7 per cent in the 2005 Parliament up to 29.8 per cent in the 2010 Parliament and then up to 44.8 per cent in the 2015 Parliament. At the end of his leadership tenure social liberal sentiment had increased from 12 members of the PCP (in 2005)  to 148 (in 2015). Furthermore, the number of socially liberal Conservatives (148) outnumbered the socially conservative ranks (at 119). However, perceptions that change was made was undermined by two factors: first, concrete evidence that changing the presentation and tone in opposition would translate into substantive change in power (citing the patchy record on environmentalism and feminisation); and second, the visceral and very public anger of the socially conservative wing of the PCP (albeit reducing in size) over same-​sex marriage. Analysing the extent to which there was acceptance of Cameron’s socially liberal modernising medicine also requires us to consider the party membership. Research by Bale and Webb on the social and political make-​up of the Conservative Party membership in the Cameron era revealed the following. The membership was unrepresentative of the electorate at large, as the average age of the membership (in 2013) was 59; 83 per cent of members were from the A, B and C1 social classes; 68 per cent of members were male; and 95 per cent were white (Bale and Webb, 2016: 126–​7). Significantly, compelling evidence emerged as to the limits to which Cameron had been able to persuade them to embrace his socially liberal positioning. When members were asked to locate themselves upon a left–​right spectrum, in which ranking themselves as 0 equating to holding a far leftish position and a 10 ranking was a far right position, the mean response of the membership was 8.37. This was significantly further to the right than their assessment on Cameron on the spectrum –​here they ranked Cameron closer to the centre on 7.02 (Bale and Webb, 2016: 128). On three of the central themes of modernising identified earlier in the chapter, considerable resistance was evident. On the Green Investment Bank, which supported sustainable energy projects, 67 per cent of the members opposed this, and only 18 per cent were supportive. On international aid spending, 18 per

The politics of detoxification

31

cent believed that it should be protected, whereas 67 per cent opposed this and wanted to reduce spending. Finally, on same-​sex marriage, only 24 per cent of the membership indicated that they were supportive, as opposed to 57 per cent who opposed this measure (Bale and Webb, 2016: 126–​8).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion Whenever academics write about Cameron you can be sure that the term modernisation will be used when they try to talk about his approach to leading the Conservative Party. The process of modernisation was designed to address the negative image of them as the nasty party. Thus for Cameron and the modernisers the problem was brand toxicity and the solution was brand decontamination. The process of decontamination operated on the level of restyling the image of the party, by adopting a softer tone and more inclusive rhetoric, and downplaying their traditional emphasis on the Thatcherite themes of taxation, law and order, immigration and Euroscepticism. Tied to restyling was a supposed commitment to repositioning their policy agenda, and shifting it towards the centre ground of British politics and the location of the median voter (Heppell, 2013a: 261). Elsewhere Kerr and Hayton have argued that the attempt by the modernisers to restyle and reconstruct post-​Thatcherite Conservatism had been ‘reasonably effective’ (Kerr and Hayton, 2015: 114). They qualified their claims –​i.e. reasonably not totally –​by noting the destabilising impact of the financial crash, which ‘acted as a catalyst for the exposure’ of ‘fault-​lines’ within the modernisation strategy that Cameron chose to advance (Kerr and Hayton, 2015: 114). They argued that these ‘fault-​lines’ would manifest themselves in ‘performance deficits’ in policy terms once in office, alongside a recurring ‘vulnerability to party management problems’ (Kerr and Hayton, 2015:  114). Those party management problems did embrace aspects of modernisation –​notably same-​sex marriage –​but Cameron was to find dealing with the resurgent questions over EU membership (see ­chapter  6) to be far more of a problem than gaining acceptance for socially liberal change within the PCP. Cameron bequeathed to his successor a PCP with a significantly stronger socially liberal wing than he inherited, and those first elected in 2010 and 2015 were significantly more socially liberal than earlier cohorts. This suggests that Cameron offered a cue for new and predominantly younger Conservative parliamentarians to promote social liberalism. It was significant that although those who opposed his position on international aid were very vocal, they were small number in number –​ i.e. only 7.8 per cent of the PCP were outright aid critics (Heppell et al., 2017a). Environmentalism, feminisation, international aid and same-​sex marriage were the policies that would define Cameron’s claims to socially liberal driven modernisation. However, his record was patchy in terms of the shift from the rhetoric of opposition to the challenge of implementation in government. On the one hand, progress was made in terms of international aid and same-​sex marriage, thus justifying the

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

32

claim that the Conservatives had moved in a socially liberal direction. On the other hand, claims vis-​à-​vis environmentalism and feminisation were less evident. What also matters is the following. Cameron entered his leadership tenure determined to downgrade the traditional Conservative emphasis on economic and European matters, only to have his time in office defined by austerity and ultimately Brexit. Cameron found narrating his brand of Conservatism to be challenging  –​as his modernising narrative of the Big Society failed to gain traction (see ­chapter 4) –​ and so making the Conservatives electorally competitive became as much about demonstrating the risks associated with Labour being office, as it was in showcasing that the Conservatives had been truly modernised. Notes 1 Cameron would personify modernisation. He was so central to the modernising project that Conservative strategists assumed that the party could cease to be seen as nasty simply because they thought Cameron was likeable (Elliott and Hanning, 2012: 291). 2 That decision to walk away from the issues upon which they were perceived to be superior to New Labour on ensured that Cameron had a block of enemies within his own party. They felt that he was deliberating trashing the past of his own party (Evans, 2008: 291–​314). 3 Cameron conceded that the Conservatives had been wrong in their attitudes on certain issues. Cameron accepted that it was insensitive of the Thatcher government to have implemented the poll tax in Scotland first, before rolling it out across England and Wales (Dorey et al., 2011: 63). He also admitted that section 28 of the 1988 Local Government Act, which made it illegal for local authorities to be seen to actively ‘promote’ homosexuality, was ‘wrong’ when he spoke at Gay Pride, whereupon he offered a formal apology (Bale and Webb, 2011: 46). 4 Given that 38 Conservatives stood down at the 2015 General Election, and only four were women, that means that there were potentially 30-​plus winnable constituencies that could have selected female candidates. When added to their 26 gains, this means that the increase from 49 to 68 could have been much higher (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 344–​7). 5 The negative policy impact came simultaneous to two parliamentary mistakes by Cameron in terms of presenting a modernised, and feminised, image of the party (Lovenduski, 2013: 88). First, in the masculinist bear pit that is Prime Minister’s Questions (Lovenduski, 2012) Cameron rebuked the Labour frontbencher, Angela Eagle, by telling her to ‘calm down, dear’, and had to refute suggestions that his tone was sexist and condescending (Lovenduski, 2014: 17). Second, Cameron was also open to criticism when answering a parliamentary question by Conservative backbencher, Nadine Dorries. He described Dorries as being ‘extremely frustrated’ within his reply to her question, which produced laughter amongst male Conservative parliamentarians (Mortimore et al., 2015). 6 This section, examining international aid under the Cameron government, utilises research undertaken for the following article –​Heppell, T., Crines, A. and Jeffery, D. (2017a) ‘The United Kingdom government and the international aid 0.7 percent target: What motivates opposition amongst Conservative parliamentarians?’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(4): 895–​909, at https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​1369148117726247. Therefore, this section is adapted and reproduced by permission of Sage publications.

The politics of detoxification

33

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

7 At the time that the United Kingdom hit the target only these four nations have superior aid to GNI ratios, and the United Kingdom compared favourably to the United States on 0.19 per cent (Booth, 2014; Lunn and Booth, 2014). 8 Cameron argued that increased aid spending could: (a) limit the need to intervene militarily in the future; and (b) limit the incentives to migrate to the UK as recipient nations became more economically and politically stable (Foreman, 2012: 36).

3

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of delegitimisation: apportioning blame and establishing risk

One of the most interesting aspects of the academic literature on Conservative modernisation is how inward-​looking it is –​i.e. it assesses what the Conservative Party did. Too often it under-​emphasises how change is driven by the need to respond to the strategic choices that have been made by their opponents. Much of the change that parties in opposition engage in is a reaction to the impact of defeat, either losing power or failing to regain it. In these circumstances their main political opponents are dominant in terms of voter perceptions, be that in relation to governing competence, party unity or strong leadership. Thus, understanding the evolution of Conservative modernisation requires a deeper appreciation of their interaction with Labour, to better understand the obstacles pre-​2005 that necessitated modernisation and how the strategy to neutralise Labour evolved in opposition from 2005 to 2010. It is this analysis that helps us to understand how the Conservatives attempted to deflect blame and responsibility to Labour for the economic circumstances that they would inherit in 2010, and how they would use this narrative to delegitimise Labour in opposition. The common thread running through opposition and into government would be that Britain was ‘broken’ –​both economically and socially. This was then used to argue for a change of governing philosophy, away from the ‘Big Government’ mentality of the centre left, and towards the ‘Big Society’ or the smaller state solutions offered by Cameron and the modernisers (Smith, 2010; Smith and Jones, 2015). The Conservatives faced a conundrum, with regard to Labour between 1997 and 2005, which they had not really faced before. This was a competent Labour administration, especially in relation to economic management. Low inflation rates, failing unemployment and continuous economic growth helped to establish their credentials with both the financial markets and middle-​class voters (Heppell, 2013c:  141–​2; see also Corry, 2011). The traditional Conservative opposition argument was that Labour was economically incompetent, which had some validity in the past –​e.g. the devaluations of the Attlee and Wilson eras, or the IMF crisis of the 1970s –​but this could not work between 1997 and 2005 (Gamble, 2010: 648). The consequence was that at the time of the General Elections of 2001 and 2005, it was the Labour Party who held a lead in terms of the party felt to be best equipped to manage the economy

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of delegitimisation

35

(Sanders et al., 2001; Whiteley et al., 2005). Nor could the Conservatives make political mileage out of Blair, who emerged as a strong and credible Prime Minister, especially between 1997 and 2003. Blair personified the New Labour brand (Heppell, 2013c: 142), and his charisma and communication skills ensured that Labour held a lead over the Conservatives on the question of which party leader would make the best Prime Minister (Finlayson, 2002; Heffernan, 2006; Bennister, 2015). The Conservatives also faced a strategic dilemma caused by the positioning of New Labour. Their third way triangulation strategy involved blending together themes associated with the centre left –​e.g. social justice, community and public services –​with themes associated with the centre right –​e.g. economic prosperity and individual achievement (Beech, 2008:  1–​3). This provided a wider electoral base for the Labour Party  –​the voting bloc of the traditional working class and trade unions remained in place, but was now supplemented by increased support from the middle classes (Heppell, 2013c: 141). The latter embraced New Labour as they welcomed increased investment in public services, which was financed via the proceeds of growth, rather than via increases in income tax (Fielding, 2010: 657–​8). According to Bale, the New Labour strategy worked because it tapped into the widespread belief amongst the British that there need not be  –​ indeed, should not be  –​a trade-​off between social justice and economic growth, between fairness and efficiency, between quality public provision and higher net disposable incomes. At the same time it [i.e. Labour] also managed to persuade people that a trade-​off does exist between lower taxes and investment in the NHS and state education, which, along with economic well-​being remained at the top of voters’ list of things that governments are supposed to deliver. (Bale, 2010: 5)

However, by the time Cameron acquired the leadership of the Conservative Party, Blair had been Prime Minister for over eight years and his popularity ratings were declining due to the military intervention in Iraq (King, 2006: 153–​4).1 When the Labour Party entered power at the General Election of 1997, it was on the back of a 43.2 per cent vote share, and 13,518,167 votes. Although they were returned to power for a third term, at the General Election of 2005, that vote share was down to 35.2 per cent, and their total number of votes was 9,552,436. A third term majority of 66 was healthy, but was significantly smaller than the majority of 179 back in 1997 (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016:  432–​3). If Iraq was one of the causes of Labour’s electoral decline, then it was the Liberal Democrats –​who had opposed the invasion –​who were the main beneficiaries. Their electoral return of 18.3 per cent in 2001 increased to 22.0 per cent at the General Election of 2005 (Curtice, 2007). However, Iraq was not the only factor. The consequence of being a long-​term government was that the number of internal party critics grew larger. Those critics can be subdivided into: (a) those backbenchers who hoped that one day Blair would notice their talents and offer them a ministerial role, and are increasingly resentful

Cameron

36

of being ignored; and (b) those who have been ministers, and were dismissed by Blair, and know that the prospect of being brought back into the ministerial fold is very low.2 Therefore, Labour entered their third consecutive term in office with their governing credentials questioned and with Blair’s political capital was diminishing (see Bennister et al., 2015; Bennister and Worthy, 2017).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Apportioning blame:3 a critique of New Labour Three questions dominated internal debate within the Labour Party during the late Blair era. First, when would Blair actually step aside  –​his intention was to serve through the third term, but doubts existed about the feasibility of this aim (Seldon, 2007b: 301). Second, who would succeed him –​here the automatic assumption was that it would be Brown, but the longer Brown was made to wait the greater the possibility of another candidate emerging (Heppell, 2010: 183–​5). Finally, would it be possible for Blair’s replacement to be a success as Prime Minister, given renewal in office is immensely difficult to achieve (Worthy, 2016). Electoral tolerance is reduced in long serving administrations as voters are less willing to give the incumbent party the benefit of the doubt (Heppell, 2008). This created opportunities for Cameron that had been largely been denied to his predecessors (see, for example, Hayton and Heppell, 2010). Ultimately, however, the strategy that the Conservatives would adopt in relation to Labour was to be become reactive and somewhat opportunistic. That was because the economic turbulence of 2007–​8 would knock Cameron off the original strategy that he had been mapping out in the first two years of opposition. The assumption of economic growth: neutralising investment versus cuts and convergence with New Labour Historically, how have the Conservative Party set about critiquing their Labour opponents? The answer to this question lies in the record of Labour administrations, and the difficulties that they have had in managing the economy, as McAnulla identifies: a large part of Labour’s failure was perceived to be a result of the economic crises that had engulfed it each time it had been in power previously. On a number of occasions Labour governments had significantly boosted public spending on entering office only to be forced to reverse policies and make cutbacks when economic problems emerged. Historically, financial markets had tended to lack faith in Labour governments and its perceived economic failure disillusioned voters, usually helping precipitate a quick exit from government. (McAnulla, 2006: 122)

Portraying Labour as economically incompetent had been central to the Conservative approach towards electioneering  –​it was their primary means by

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of delegitimisation

37

which to bind the middle classes to them (Heppell, 2013c: 143; see also Mitchell, 2000). Fear was central to this. Labour being in power was presented as a threat to the security and stability of the middle classes –​Labour would increase your taxes; Labour were beholden to militant trade union leaders; and Labour represented the interests of the poor (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009: 17). What validated these fear tactics was Clause IV of the Labour Party constitution, and the symbolism that this had within the Labour movement in terms of their commitment to public ownership (Bale, 1996). This enabled the Conservatives to argue that it was the instinct of Labour administrations to nationalise, and that re-​ nationalisations could only be financed by increasing taxation. That Blair challenged his own party by reforming Clause IV (Kenny and Smith, 1997), and made them accept the validity of the market and competition, carried with it huge consequences for the Conservatives. Downgrading nationalisation removed the tax threat that had been central to Conservative electoral strategy for generations (Kavanagh, 1997). Running parallel to this was the cumulative impact of the trade union and employment legislation of the Thatcher and Major era, which had significantly reduced the power base of the trade union movement relative to the 1970s (Rosamond, 1996). Taken together, and alongside the cross-​class appeal of New Labour under Blair, the Conservatives could no longer instil fear amongst the middle classes about socialism, nationalisation and trade union militancy. The Conservatives needed Labour to be ‘Old’ Labour –​that was what their electoral strategy for decades had been built on (McAnulla, 1999). Nonetheless, the assumption that Labour would be economically incompetent remained part of the Conservative psyche when they entered opposition. A trigger similar to that of 1949 or 1967 or 1976 would emerge proving the economic illiteracy of Labour in power. That this did not happen between 1997 and 2005 dumbfounded many Conservatives. It undermined their electoral strategy of narrating Labour as economically incompetent (Heppell, 2008:  590, 2013c:  143). On the contrary, Labour was clearly more economically competent than any previous Labour administration, as ten years of successive economic growth were recorded (Lee, 2008: 8). They also countered the traditional Conservative accusation used against them and narrated the Conservatives as the party of economic instability, using the famous and oft-used Brown soundbite of the party of ‘boom and bust’ (Fielding, 2010: 657). Continued economic growth, alongside low inflation and unemployment, appeared to prove the Labour could provide economic stability, and their governing competence provided the basis for their electoral strategy (Heppell, 2013c: 141–​3). Growth provided additional tax revenues and Labour were able to use this for investment in the public services. In doing so they framed electoral competition in the 2001 and 2005 General Elections around a clear choice –​you can have continued economic growth and investment in public services without tax increases under Labour, or cuts in public services under the Conservatives (Lee, 2008). Given the climate of opinion at that time, the Conservative offer in the 2001 and 2005 General

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

38

Cameron

Election campaigns, to reduce taxation but maintain the quality of public services (a more for less strategy based on efficiency savings) seemed disingenuous. It also played into the Blairite strategy of narrating the Conservatives as extreme –​i.e. that they had an ideological commitment to shrinking the state, and this allowed Labour to present the Conservatives as harsh and uncaring (Bale and Webb, 2011: 45). Investment under Labour or cuts under the Conservatives was a straightforward message. It was a choice that left the Conservatives lacking credibility on taxation and the funding of public services (Heppell, 2014a:  130). The Cameron strategy of dealing with Labour’s supremacy in terms of economic competence was to try and neutralise the issue (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 11). The objective was to limit Labour’s ability to use the investment versus cuts choice again. To do this the strategy was based on convergence with Labour (Lee, 2009a; Heppell, 2013c:  160–​1). Cameron would claim that an incoming Conservative administration would match the public expenditure commitments of the incumbent Labour administration (Heppell, 2014a:  139). In making that pledge Cameron went to extraordinary lengths to emphasise his commitment to health care and education (the primary strengths of Labour as well as high salience issues with voters) (Heppell, 2014a:  139–​40). He also emphasised how Conservatism was not solely about wealth creation, it was also interested in sharing the proceeds of wealth, and thus balancing tax reductions and public sector investment, so as to contribute to the reduction of poverty within society (Kerr, 2007: 50; Heppell, 2014a: 139–​40; see also Dorey, 2009). Strategic repositioning: the financial crash and divergence from New Labour The strategy of converging on Labour vis-​à-​vis economic management, so as to neutralise their investment versus cuts electoral strategy, rested on a clear assumption. That assumption was that economic growth would continue (Dorey, 2009:  261; Heppell, 2013c:  161–​2). The financial crash had a cataclysmic impact upon the Brown administration and British politics more generally (Gamble, 2009; Thain, 2009; for a wider discussion on the political impact of the financial crash, Whiteley et al., 2013). It was also a challenge for Cameron. It required a rethink in terms of their strategic positioning in relation to Labour (Heppell, 2013c: 162; Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 13). Cameronite thinking became reactive and opportunistic and was, of course, entirely dependent on seeing and interpreting the strategy of the Brown administration to the economic crisis (Heppell, 2013c: 162). As the crisis evolved, two scenarios emerged in terms of apportioning blame. Scenario one was that Labour could be blamed for the failure to regulate the finance sector of the economy, and that their minimalist approach towards oversight had showcased the limitations of capitalism, where the obsession with profit and bonuses incentivised risky lending

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of delegitimisation

39

practices (Beech, 2009:  528). However, it was the Thatcher administrations that had deregulated the financial services sector. There was thereby a danger that culpability for the crisis could be then attributed to the politics of Thatcherism, and thus the Conservatives (McAnulla, 2010: 291). Therefore, although it contradicted their initial approach, they would go for scenario two (Lee, 2011: 61). This was to frame and blame Labour for overspending both before and especially after the financial crash (Byrne et al., 2017: 207, 213; see also Hay, 2013). The Conservatives adopted this approach for short-​and long-​ term reasons. In the short term it was essential, electorally, for them to limit the accusation that the financial crash was due to deregulation and limited oversight, as that had no electoral value to them (Heppell, 2013c: 162; Heppell, 2014a: 143). Implying that Labour had been overspending throughout, and that they were the cause of the declining living standards to come in the age of austerity, helped the Conservatives to ‘establish a new definition of political reality and a new set of policies’ (Gamble, 2012a: 69). It helped them to establish their interpretation of the economic crisis. After 2008 leading Conservatives would repeatedly emphasise how the debt crisis was due to irresponsible overspending and a bloated state, not due to Labour having to spend to prop up the banking sector and the money markets in order to ensure that the free market could keep functioning (Kisby, 2010). At this juncture the credibility of New Labour as an electoral and governing strategy was unravelling (Fielding, 2010:  658). Moreover, it provided the Conservatives with the economic trigger to critique New Labour that had been missing since 1997. Significantly it allowed them to imply that the transition from Blair to Brown was running parallel to the end of New Labour and the reassertion of Old Labour (Heppell, 2013c: 145). For example, in January 2008 Cameron taunted Brown in Parliament as he suggested that the nationalisation of Northern Rock was as an Old Labour style nationalisation. Cameron claimed that Brown could not tell us how much taxpayers are in for or how long they will have to wait to get their money back. It is like a used car salesman who will not tell someone the price, will not tell them the mileage, and will not give them a warranty. He has gone from Prudence to Del Boy without even touching the ground. This deal depends on a massive effective subsidy from the British taxpayer to Northern Rock shareholders through either lower borrowing or a guarantee … [he] … will not tell us how much the taxpayer is in for, but the figure is £55 billion. Effectively, he has lumped every household in the country with a second mortgage. Taxpayers want to know how long it will be before they are off the hook. (HC Deb, 23 January 2008, Col. 1488)

Further evidence of a retreat back to Old Labour was offered on taxation. In November 2008, the Brown administration outlined how the top rate of income tax would need to be increased from 40p to 45p, and then six months later they announced that it would need to be increased to 50p (Fielding, 2010: 657;

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

40

Cameron

Heppell, 2013c: 146). Nationalisation and tax increases provoked condemnation from the former Tory press –​e.g. the Sun, which had switched to New Labour in 1997. They would largely return to the Conservative fold by the General Election of 2010 (see Wring and Deacon, 2010). Establishing the Brown administration as culpable would fuel the rhetoric that Cameron would utilise during his speech to the 2009 Conservative Party annual conference. Here Cameron talked of the legacy of New Labour as being ‘the highest budget deficit and the deepest recession since the war’ before identifying how the ‘enormous size of our debt’ was the ‘clearest sign of Big Government irresponsibility’ (Cameron, 2009a). He concluded by arguing that: the longer we wait for a credible plan, the bigger the bill for our children to pay. The longer we wait, the greater the risk to the recovery. The longer we wait, the higher the chance we return to recession. Here’s the most obvious reason we can’t wait. The more we wait, the more we waste on the interest we’re paying on this debt. Next year, Gordon Brown will spend more money on the interest on our debt than on schools. More than on law and order, more than on child poverty. So I say to the Labour Party and the trades unions just tell me what is compassionate, what is progressive about spending more on debt interest than on helping the poorest children in our country? The progressive thing to do, the responsible thing to do is to get a grip on the debt but in a way that brings the country together instead of driving it apart. (Cameron, 2009a)

Built into this speech was long-​term planning for the Conservatives. In the short term it was clear that the financial crash had obliterated the simplistic choice of investment under Labour and cuts under the Conservatives (Heppell and Hill, 2012:  218). However, in the longer term the state of the economy was going to constrain them once in power, as they would inherit a deep recession and unprecedented levels of public debt (Heffernan, 2011: 167). Whilst the Conservatives were comfortable in making the case that cuts in public expenditure would now be necessary, but not ideologically desirable, acknowledging the necessity of cuts was problematic for Brown (Heppell, 2013c: 145–​6). His reluctance placed him on a collision course with his Chancellor, Alistair Darling, and his Business Secretary, Lord Mandelson. The latter wanted Brown to present the electorate with a choice between the Conservatives as ‘ideological state retrenchers’ and Labour as ‘progressive state reformers’, which was a surprisingly non-​user-​friendly set of terms for a famed spin doctor to promote (Heppell, 2013c: 146). In effect what this meant was that the speed and scale of cuts was the dividing line that Brown needed to engage with –​i.e. present to the electorate the necessity of cuts and frame the choice of one of ‘nice cuts versus nasty cuts’ (Seldon and Lodge, 2010: 360–​2). Ultimately, Brown’s reticence on this played into the hands of the Conservatives. It fed into their narrative of Labour as an anti-​cuts party, thus giving the ‘impression’ that Labour ‘would simply keep on spending, borrowing and taking on debt’ (Mandelson, 2010: 477).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of delegitimisation

41

By the time of the 2010 General Election the Conservative strategy for opposing the Labour administration had gone through a number of changes. Cameron came to the Conservative Party leadership in an age of economic growth in which the choice of investment versus cuts worked electorally against the Conservatives. Assuming economic growth was ongoing, his strategy was to neutralise the issue by pledging to match the public expenditure commitments of the Labour government. The need to neutralise the investment versus cuts choice evaporated due to the impact of the financial crash, whereupon Cameron reverted to type, but he presented the language of cuts as out of necessity rather than as an ideological choice. However, this shift away from matching Labour’s spending commitments, and towards rebalancing the economy in an age of austerity, did leave them looking reactive (Lee, 2009b: 59; Heppell, 2013c: 160–​2). Altered circumstances: exploiting other Labour vulnerabilities As identified above, the central justification for New Labour was that it presided over a prolonged period of economic growth. This explained their re-​election in 2005, despite electoral misgivings about the ethical justification for the Iraq War (see King, 2006). Central to the success of this had been Brown as Chancellor. He built his reputation as being the architect of the age of prosperity, and the slayer of the cycle of economic boom and bust (on Brown’s leadership skills and political reputation see Foley, 2009 and Theakston, 2011). The consequences of the downturn placed the record of Labour in office in a new and different light, and they were subjected to greater scrutiny. They had claimed that their governing philosophy blended economic efficiency and prosperity with social justice. What was the attitude of the electorate to the approach that Labour had taken in office? Internal Labour Party polling came to the depressing conclusion that the ‘central drive of the electoral dynamic’ was that voter awareness of their ‘achievements’ in office was ‘negligible’ (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 64). Scepticism was evident within the traditional working class, and this was said to be due to concerns about, for example, poverty reduction, income differentials and immigration (Heppell, 2013c: 144). Although government spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product had increased from 40.1 to 44.1 per cent during their time in office, those defined as living in poverty was increasing during their final term in office from 12.1 to 12.7 million, and within this child poverty increased from 3.6 to 3.8 million (Coates, 2008:  3–​16; Fielding, 2010:  658). Aligned to this were concerns that the minimum wage had been set at too low a level, which was particularly galling given the reluctance of New Labour to use power to curb excessively high salaries. Thatcherite levels of inequality, and with the gap between the richest and poorest in society increasing in their third term, was not the legacy that some expected from a Labour administration (Coates, 2008: 13–​14; Heppell, 2013c: 144). Of the drivers of defections from Labour to other parties, the issue of immigration, and

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

42

Cameron

the idea that Labour was on the side of immigrants on benefits, was a perception that the leadership failed to grasp or respond to (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 340; see also Evans and Chzhen, 2013: 138–​57). Alongside this there were middle-​class progressives who had shifted to Labour under Blair but who had become alienated, not just by the limited impact in terms of poverty and inequality, but also by policies such as anti-​social behavior orders, ID cards, the extending of pre-​charge detention for terrorist suspects, and, of course, they were hostile to Blair for Iraq (Heffernan, 2011: 164; Heppell, 2013c: 144). With some doubts existing amongst their core and swing voters even when New Labour were re-​elected at the General Election of 2005, it was imperative that Brown entered the party leadership with a renewal strategy that could form the basis for a fourth term in office. Brown entered office with an apparent commitment to distancing himself from New Labour or more specifically Blair (Theakston, 2011: 90). Expectations within the Labour Party were high (Heppell, 2013c: 149). There was an assumption that a coherent governing agenda would be evident, especially as Brown had ‘plotted so meticulously and ruthlessly’ to remove Blair (Watt, 2010: 7). Tragically for Labour, but fortunately for Cameron, Brown had ‘no vision, no strategy, and no grand plan’, rather he was ‘simply making it up as he went along’ (Watt, 2010: 8). Admittedly, Brown faced very tough circumstances, and the dual crises of the financial crash and the expenses scandal undermined his ability to construct a viable policy programme and to impart a clear sense of direction and vision upon his administration (Seldon and Lodge, 2010: 420). Not only was there no clear strategy but what did exist in terms of vision was defined more by what he was against –​i.e. Blair –​than what he stood for (Seldon and Lodge, 2010: 426). And it was assumed, and was later confirmed, that Blair was contemptuous of Brown’s performance as Prime Minister. In his memoirs Blair lamented how Brown ‘wandered down into a cul-​de-​sac of mixed messages and indecision’ (Blair, 2010: 656), which reflected, in his view, how Brown ‘simply did not understand the appeal of New Labour, in anything other than a polling strategy, election-​ winning sort of way. He could see that it worked, but not why it worked’ (Blair, 2010: 616). That perception of governing failure, which would immobilise Labour in office, was clearly tied to weak perceptions of leadership credibility with regard to Brown (Heppell, 2013c: 150–​2). He was a liability to Labour and a drag upon their potential support, as he was personally less popular than the party he led, giving Cameron opportunities to exploit. Conservative strategists made Brown a target through which to undermine the appeal of Labour. Their advertising strategy –​personalised and negative –​made it clear that a vote for Labour was a vote for five more years of Brown as Prime Minister (Dorey, 2010: 411). Conversely, Cameron was clearly seen as an asset to the Conservatives and his personal ratings surpassed those of the party that he led (Dorey, 2010: 419, 429), which explains the personalisation of the campaign around him (see Seawright, 2013b).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of delegitimisation

43

Brown’s limitations went beyond a perceived lack of political vision and governmental direction. He became an asset for the Conservatives to exploit in strategic terms because he was a poor decision-​maker, which alongside the perception that he was a poor communicator and gaffe-​prone, contributed to his negative public image (Theakston, 2011). His image was further damaged by persistent rumours that he had temperamental issues that made him unsuitable to the highest office (Sparrow, 2009). The accusation that he was a poor decision-​maker was confirmed by the General Election that never was in the late summer of 2007 (Mandelson, 2010: 13). It was widely rumoured that he would call a General Election shortly after he had replaced Blair (Heppell, 2013c:  151–​2). The rationale for doing so was three-​fold. First, opinion polling evidence showed that Labour had a seven-​point percentage lead and this might be wiped out over the next three years. Was now the best chance to secure a fourth term for Labour? Second, should Labour achieve that fourth term it would provide Brown with his own mandate to be Prime Minister. With his legitimacy unquestioned, he could finally step out of the shadow of Blair (and given their toxic relationship this must have been attractive to him). Finally, should a snap General Election result in a fourth Labour term it would probably result in the removal of Cameron as Conservative Party leader. This might end the process of modernisation and the reaching out strategies that sought to locate Conservatism more to the centre of British politics. Provoking a knee-​jerk lurch to the right and crisis within Conservatism was also an attractive possibility for this most tribal and tactical of politicians (Richards, 2010: 290–​2). However, Brown dithered and when his opinion polling lead evaporated he confirmed that there would be no snap General Election (Cole, 2008: 34). What really damaged his credibility, however, was his claim that his decision had nothing to do with the opinion polls (Foley, 2009: 500). It was also a costly miscalculation for a cash-​strapped Labour Party.4 Anticipating that Brown would seek a dissolution of Parliament, the Labour Party spent £1 million on five million leaflets for marginal constituencies, billboard sites for advertising and additional staffing for Labour Party Headquarters (Watt, 2010: 171–​5; Heppell, 2013c: 157). Conservative strategists also benefited from the fact that Brown was a poor communicator (Mandelson, 2010: 10). He certainly came across as inferior to Blair in terms of delivering speeches in Parliament and at conference, but also he was weaker in relation to interviews and press conferences (Heppell, 2013c:  150; and for an analysis of both in these forums, see Bennister, 2015 and Atkins, 2015a). Brown resented this accusation, feeling that style was no substitute for substance (Price, 2010: 394), but attempts to make a virtue of this (i.e. the ‘not flash, just Gordon’ posters) failed to resonate with the voters (Fielding, 2010: 655). But he also came across as inferior to Cameron, against whom Brown struggled to compete with in their weekly parliamentary jousts ( Jones, 2010: 107). This weakness as a persuasive communicator was evident from opinion polling data taken in relation to the prime ministerial debates in the General Election campaign. He came a clear last in each of the three debates, scoring the following percentages in terms of the best

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

44

performer: 19 per cent in the first debate; 29 per cent in the second debate; and 25 per cent in the final debate (Fielding, 2010: 661; see also Wring et al., 2011; Drake and Higgins, 2012). Brown compounded these communicative limitations with a worrying tendency to make mistakes (Heppell, 2013c:  150). He was humiliated at Prime Minister’s Questions in late 2008 due to a slip of the tongue. Faced with Conservative barracking he meant to say that his interventions had contributed to saving the world’s banking system, but under pressure it came out as ‘we not only saved the world’ (Seldon and Lodge, 2010:  210). An even more humiliating experience occurred during the General Election campaign when he met an elderly Labour supporter called Gillian Duffy (Heppell, 2013c: 151). To capture Brown mingling with the voters he had a microphone attached to his tie, but this was left on when he climbed into his government limousine. Unhappy that Mrs Duffy had challenged him on immigration he was recorded describing her as a ‘bigoted woman’ (Smith and French, 2011). When the tape was played back to him (in the BBC Radio 2 studios where he was being interviewed by Jeremy Vine), and unaware that the radio programme was being televised as well, Brown put his head in his hands. It was the defining visual moment of the campaign that brought to an end thirteen years of Labour rule (Vine, 2013: 1). This was confirmation of what Conservative strategists had long assumed, i.e. that Brown was an electoral liability for Labour. That his tenure had been undermined by accusations of bullying, and persistent threats that he was about to be challenged for the party leadership, all worked to the advantage of Cameron and the Conservatives (Price, 2010:  240; Rawnsley, 2010:  510). Even though Brown survived to the General Election, and all of the attempted plots to unseat him failed, the speculation served to undermine his credibility (Quinn, 2012: 86–​94). Given the importance in modern electioneering attached to the perceptions of likeability and competence vis-​à-​vis party leaders, the Conservatives were immensely fortunate that Labour did not choose an alternative to Brown in 2007, or that they failed to persuade him to step aside before the General Election. The Labour Party itself appeared to lack confidence in its own party leader, with many Labour elites holding the view that their own loss of governing competence was inextricably linked to the reputation of Brown as Prime Minister (Kettell and Kerr, 2008:  492). Brown was considerably less likeable than Cameron –​securing a rating of 13 per cent as compared to Cameron’s likeability rating of 40 per cent; and even more worryingly for Labour, Cameron had a better rating in terms of being ‘in touch’ with voters’ concerns –​40 per cent to Brown on 21 per cent (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 250). Establishing risk: discrediting post-​New Labour With the New Labour electoral choice of investment versus cuts irrelevant in the age of austerity, whoever succeeded Brown as Labour Party leader would inherit a crisis about

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of delegitimisation

45

the meaning and identity of the Labour Party (Heffernan, 2011: 163). They would also have to face the challenge of reversing the perception of economic incompetence, which the Conservatives had used as their primary weapon of fear when demonising Labour (Heppell and Hill, 2012:  218). Cameron and the Conservatives needed to sustain their attack on Labour to try to establish a narrative that a return of Labour to power in 2015 would be a massive risk. In constructing this risk based narrative on Labour being too incompetent and untrustworthy, Conservative strategists were to be aided by three factors, some of which it can be said Labour contributed by their own choices. They were as follows: first, the circumstances through which Miliband won the party leadership and the perception that he lacked credibility as a potential alternative Prime Minister; second, the difficulty that Miliband found in re-​establishing their credibility vis-​à-​vis economic management; and third, the fact that Labour found it difficult to respond to the squeeze that they were being subjected to from UKIP on immigration, and by the SNP. These factors require some elaboration to see how helpful they were to the Conservative cause. The Conservatives’ not-​so-​secret weapon: Ed Miliband As the Labour Party entered their leadership contest they should have been influenced by the following question –​which outcome would be the most problematic for the Conservatives?5 On this the opinion data of YouGov provided two significant findings. First, when asked who would make the best Prime Minister David Miliband held a massive lead over all of the candidates, leading his younger brother by 47 to 19 per cent. Second, when narrowing down opinion to just those who had abandoned Labour in May 2010, the elder Miliband had a 25 percentage point lead as their favoured candidate (Heppell and Hill, 2012: 211). The peculiarities of the Electoral College allowed the more credible elder Miliband to lose, despite being the first choice of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) (140 to 122) and the first choice of constituency Labour Party members (66,814 to 55,992). The younger Miliband may have the first choice in only one tranche of the Electoral College, but his lead in the affiliated members tranche was sufficiently large enough (119,405 to 80,266) to mean that overall he won the Labour Party leadership by the narrowest of margins (50.65 to 49.35 per cent) (Dorey and Denham, 2011). The elder Miliband was clearly identifiable as the continuity New Labour candidate. The Blairite faction was said to fear that the younger Miliband, elected on a disputed mandate, would be a ‘doomsday scenario’ (Heppell and Hill, 2012: 212; Bale, 2015: 10–​17). The reaction at Conservative Campaign Headquarters, however, was one of sheer ‘joy’ because of the opportunities to discredit Labour as a viable opposition that it created (Hasan and Macintyre, 2011: 241). Obviously the disputed mandate element was helpful to the Conservatives, and they could claim that Miliband was ‘illegitimate’ because he was second in all the eliminative ballots until the last one, as well as emphasising that he was only first choice amongst the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

46

Cameron

trade union tranche of the Electoral College (Heppell and Hill, 2012: 211–​12; Bale, 2015: 10). As the Conservatives wanted to portray Labour as having lurched to the left, with all of the negative associations with Old Labour that this could provide, the selection of the more leftish candidate at the behest of the trade union tranche, neatly played into the ‘Red Ed’ image that they felt could have electoral value for them (Hasan and Macintyre, 2011: 262–​3; Heppell and Hill, 2012: 211–​12). Cameron was relentless in focusing in on Miliband’s disputed mandate to lead the Labour Party, and the fact that Labour parliamentarians would have preferred the elder Miliband as their party leader (Hasan and Macintyre, 2011:  275). The thinness of his mandate was something that Miliband was sensitive about and Conservative strategists calculated that it would unsettle him (Fielding, 2015: 58). That disputed mandate provided Cameron with a useful get out clause when in difficulty during parliamentary debates. For example, in December 2011 Miliband attempted to undermine Cameron by focusing in on divisions within the coalition over Europe, only for Cameron to respond with: no one in this House is going to be surprised that Conservatives and Liberal Democrats do not always agree about Europe, but let me reassure the right hon. Gentleman. He should not believe everything he reads in the papers. It’s not that bad—​it’s not like we’re brothers or anything! [Hon. Members: ‘More! More!’] He certainly walked into that one. (HC Deb, 14 December 2001, Col. 773)

Cameron and the Conservative also benefited from the fact that Miliband struggled to establish himself as a credible alternative Prime Minister (Bale, 2015). Within months of becoming Leader of the Opposition opinion polling data showed him to be inferior to Cameron (as had been the case in the hypothetical polling during the Labour Party leadership contest). For example, in terms of leadership capability Cameron scored 57 per cent to Miliband on 26 per cent and on who would make the best Prime Minister the gap remained with Cameron leading 38 to 23 per cent. In terms of crisis leadership the same impression emerged with Cameron on 41 per cent and Miliband on 15 per cent. On understanding the problems facing the country, the lead for Cameron remained although it was smaller, at 51 to 40 per cent. Even on honesty he trailed Cameron by 33 to 24 per cent (Worcester et al., 2011: 263–​72; Heppell and Hill, 2012: 215–​16). The idea that he could grow into the role, and that the electorate would warm to him once he became a more established figure, did not prove to be true. After four years as Leader of the Opposition no significant improvement could be detected in his opinion poll ratings. With less than a year to go before facing the electorate YouGov reported that their findings showed the following: first, 11 per cent viewed him as a strong leader as compared to 51 per cent who viewed him as a weak leader; second, a mere 16 per cent viewed him as an asset to the Labour Party, whereas 43 per cent felt that he was an electoral liability; and third, when asked whether he had looked and sounded like a potential

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of delegitimisation

47

Prime Minister only 14 per cent said yes, as opposed to 70 per cent who said no (Bale, 2015: 257). In historical terms his personal satisfaction ratings as Leader of the Opposition were worse than those who had failed to make it Downing Street, rather than on a par with those who succeeded in becoming Prime Minister (Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 539). Why was Miliband unable to compete on a personal level with Cameron? The ability of Labour to present Miliband as a potential Prime Minister was not helped by the constant and unpleasant anti-​Miliband propaganda emanating from the Conservative press. From the start they aided Cameron and the Conservatives by running stories designed to undermine Miliband (Gaber, 2014: 471–​9). Many of them must have seemed inconsequential –​for example, on whether his nasal surgery was really to help with his sleep or to address his so-​called annoying voice, or whether he was marrying his long-​term partner for love or political calculation, or the personalised attacks on the patriotism of his late father –​but their objective was to undermine him and question his credentials as a potential Prime Minister (Heppell and Hill, 2012: 215; Bale, 2015: 49; Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 542). However, although a persistently negative media portrayal of him was unhelpful, to blame it all on the Conservative press ignores the fact that Miliband had a number of significant limitations for a modern political leader (Gaffney and Lahel, 2013:  488). He simply lacked the ‘presence’ that elite politicians are expected to possess, and because of this he ‘continuously struggled to look Prime Ministerial, even to Labour supporters’ (Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 539). In public he had an awkward demeanour, pulled odd facial expressions and often used strange phrases in interviews which left him open to ridicule (Goes, 2016: 11). The label that he was a ‘geek’ seemed accurate and was difficult to shake off (Crines, 2015a: 190–​1). He did little to help his own cause when he admitted that he resembled the character Wallace from Wallace and Gromit (Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 541). The comparison struck a chord and again provided Cameron with ammunition in parliamentary exchanges. In one feisty debate over taxation, Cameron turned on Miliband and his then shadow Chancellor, Alan Johnson, with a brutal rejoinder of I know that the shadow Chancellor cannot really do the numbers, so there is no point Wallace asking Gromit about that one. (HC Deb, 12 January 2011, Col. 280)

However, those advising Miliband must take some of the blame. They knew from the moment that he became Leader of the Opposition that he had an image problem and presentational limitations, yet ‘inexcusably’ they ‘did almost nothing to try and address them’ (Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 542). Furthermore, they did not always protect him as much as they could have. For example, they should not have allowed him to be filmed eating a bacon sandwich –​because he was bound to look bad doing so, who wouldn’t, and it was bound to be exploited by his opponents to undermine him (Bale, 2015: 260; Goes, 2016: 11). Ever the opportunist, Cameron used this

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

48

in Parliament, as he cited how the government’s economic achievements had left Miliband ‘looking as awkward as when he ate that bacon sandwich’ (HC Deb, 3 December 2014, Col. 295). Ultimately, those within the Miliband team who felt that it should be about substance and not style showed their naivety. Voters understand and interpret the policy options through the party leaders, and thus their presentation skills and likeability are central to how voters make their choices (Fielding, 2015: 63). Yet, even by that substance not style yardstick, Miliband was not immune from criticism, and he undermined his own credibility during his speech to the Labour Party annual conference in 2014. He decided to deliver his conference address without the use of an autocue. He chose to memorise his speech but unfortunately he failed to remember the pre-​planned section where he would discuss the deficit. He was openly ridiculed by the Conservatives, who repeatedly emphasised how this demonstrated that he was unfit to be Prime Minister (Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 535). As the election drew nearer Cameron informed the Conservative Spring Conference of 2015 that Miliband was ‘too weak to stand up to the trade unions at home’, and that it was too risky to entrust the economy to the ‘guy who forgot to mention the deficit’ (Cameron, 2015a). Thereafter, to place this in a wider context, the repeated mantra from the Conservatives across the media was that ‘if you cannot fix the economy, you cannot fund the NHS’ (Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 535). ‘It’s the economy, stupid’: credibility, competence and legitimacy The poor opinion polling findings for Miliband ran alongside worrying opinion polling trends regarding Labour and economic management.6 However, it could be argued that by the time Miliband actually inherited the Labour Party leadership in September 2010, much of the damage on perceptions of economic management had already been done. Lodge and Thomas argue that: the situation was made all the more perilous in the first few months of the coalition, as the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats mounted a coordinated and devastating attack on Labour’s economic record. While the Labour Party was busy inwardly focusing on choosing its new leader, through an epic four-​month-​long campaign, the coalition partners were able to travel around the country tirelessly repeating the mantra that they were a government formed in the ‘national interest’ to fix ‘the economic mess the Labour Party left us in’. The failure of the Labour Party to respond adequately to these highly effective assaults left them exposed on an issue that would help define the next five years of British political life. (Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 524)

Despite the difficult governing circumstances that the coalition faced, and the unpopularity of the austerity programme that they implemented, the opinion polling data on trust vis-​à-​vis the economy never moved enough for Labour, even

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of delegitimisation

49

though the coalition failed to meet their target for eliminating the deficit (Lodge and Thomas, 2015:  535). In March 2011, shortly after Ed Balls was appointed Shadow Chancellor, Labour trailed by 9 per cent on the question ‘who do you trust to run the economy’ –​Miliband and Balls or Cameron and Osborne. Even a double dip recession, and the infamous ‘omnishambles’ budget, could not be effectively exploited by Miliband and Balls. The Cameron–​Osborne lead oscillated between 3 and 11 per cent throughout 2012, and grew throughout the remainder of the Parliament, and they held a 20  percentage point lead by the time of the General Election (Bale and Webb, 2015: 45; Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 535). Given the centrality of economic management to electoral politics, this was hugely problematic for Labour and symbolised the success of the Conservatives in establishing that Labour was to blame for the economic downturn, and that it would be a risk to return them to office. In this regard, the Conservatives were aided by the appointment of Balls as Shadow Chancellor. When Miliband acquired the party leadership in September 2010 he surprised many by appointing Johnson as Shadow Chancellor (Heppell and Hill, 2012: 213). The rationale for appointing Johnson was that his working-​ class credentials would play well against the elitist Cameron and Osborne, especially as they were imposing massive cuts upon the public sector (Hickson, 2011: 260). However, Johnson had limited experience in terms of economic management. At times this was evident in interviews and undermined his credibility, as the Conservatives argued that these ‘mistakes’ proved he was ‘not up to the job’ (Bale, 2015: 38). Johnson also disagreed with Miliband on key issues, such as tuition fees (Miliband proposed a graduate tax which Johnson was sceptical about), and while Miliband wanted the 50p tax rate made permanent, Johnson did not (Heppell and Hill, 2012:  213). When Johnson resigned (for personal reasons) in early 2011, Miliband made the fateful decision to appoint Balls, who would offer a ‘forthright, Keynesian critique of the government’s austerity programme’, as he would find it almost ‘impossible, both temperamentally and intellectually, to concede Labour made serious mistakes’ (Bale, 2015:  32, 39). Balls would constantly emphasise how the austerity measures being implemented were too severe, but the danger of this approach was two-​fold. First, appearing to oppose cuts per se fitted into the Conservative narrative that the economic predicament that the coalition inherited was caused by debt fuelled spending by Labour. Second, the Balls approach was based on arguing that the coalition was ruining the economy, but this approach would be less compelling if the economy came out of recession, and into growth, in the lead up to the General Election of 2015 (Bale, 2015: 39–​41). Moreover, the Conservatives ran a highly effective permanent campaign to delegitimise Labour in terms of economic management. Conservative frontbenchers would constantly repeat the mantra that Labour were irresponsible in government as they had ‘maxed out the nation’s credit card’ and they had ‘failed to fix the roof while the sun was shining’, all digestible and simplified messages in contrast with

Cameron

50

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Miliband’s academic musings about predistribution and the predator/​producer distinction (Bale and Webb, 2015: 45). Cameron, or more specifically Osborne, also tied debates on public expenditure (and economic competence) to welfare provision, to construct a narrative of Labour as not just spendthrift but also as a soft touch (Bale, 2013). Here they exploited the long-​established and popularly held distinctions between the ‘undeserving’ and the ‘deserving’ poor, to justify money-​saving policy changes by giving the impression that the only losers would be people currently getting ‘something for nothing’—​the shirkers and skivers rather than the workers and the strivers. Labour, because it was almost bound to stick up for those who stood to lose out, could then be portrayed as a budget-​busting friend of the feckless, with any outrage expressed on its part at the shocking unfairness of the stereotypes involved simply playing into Osborne’s hands by giving legs to all the stories that helped reinforce those stereotypes in the first place. (Bale and Webb, 2015: 46)

The success that the Conservatives had with the deserving and undeserving distinction was acknowledged by some Labour frontbenchers in the aftermath of their electoral defeat in May 2015. Yvette Cooper regretted the fact that the Conservatives had been so successful at portraying Labour as ‘anti-​business, anti-​growth and ultimately anti-​worker’, whilst Liz Kendall lamented the fact that Miliband seemed too focused in on the concerns of only the poorest in society. By doing so Kendall feared that the Conservatives had been allowed to portray Labour as being remote from the aspirations and ambitions of the middle classes (Fielding, 2015: 56). The squeeze on Labour: UKIP and the SNP Labour had assumed that voter unhappiness with austerity would lead to frustration with the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats, and that this would automatically translate into support for them. However, not only did this not materialise to a scale needed to regain power, but their electoral problems were compounded by their failure to anticipate, or respond to, the rise of UKIP and the SNP (Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 521). The assumption that the rise of UKIP was a threat to the Conservatives alone may have contributed to complacency amongst the Labour hierarchy. However, academic research by Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin had highlighted how UKIP could prove to be attractive to traditional Labour supporters who were elderly and white working class (Ford and Goodwin, 2014a). The assumption that UKIP was a party whose primary attraction was its hostility to the EU was too simplistic. The massive surge in the popularity of UKIP was a by-​product of making immigration the central weapon through which to demonise the EU, and given his high saliency amongst the electorate it was the focal point of UKIP’s election strategy (Goodwin

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of delegitimisation

51

and Milazzo, 2015). When UKIP aligned the ‘open door’ immigration approach of New Labour in office, to unemployment and pressures upon the public services (and exploitation of welfare provision), they developed the potential to tap into disaffection within traditional Labour Party heartlands. Indeed, those who defected away from Labour in the 2010 General Election cited immigration as being more important to their decision than the financial crisis (Evans and Chzhen, 2013: 138–​ 57). Dennison and Goodwin argued that this was because Labour had seen immigration through an ‘economic lens’ and largely neglected how it could be seen as a ‘threat’ to some voters in terms of ‘identity, values and ways of life’ (Dennison and Goodwin, 2015: 172). Miliband did come to acknowledge this, and accepted that mistakes were made when they were in government. This was part of a general shift towards neutralising the issue by adopting a tougher line on immigration towards the latter end of the 2010–​15 Parliament (Bale, 2014:  296–​303). However, despite shifts in rhetoric and policy tone it made so little impact that Labour candidates were advised when campaigning to try and avoid the topic when speaking to voters on the doorstep (Denison and Goodwin, 2015:  172). Evaluations on why Labour performed so badly at the General Election of 2015 included the fact that they lost working-​class support to UKIP. Defections were attributed to the perception that the Labour brand was toxic, and that its toxicity was, to these former Labour voters, due to immigration (Cruddas et al., 2015: 119–​25). However, whatever squeeze Labour were exposed to from UKIP has to be placed within the context of two factors. First, a similar squeeze, or threat, existed from UKIP to the Conservatives, and second, whatever squeeze existed to Labour from UKIP was nought in comparison to the impact of the SNP. Labour did not lose any seats to UKIP, even if the impact of UKIP candidates on marginal constituencies may have indirectly impacted upon the number of seats that they won. Conversely, a direct (and catastrophic) impact was evident in terms of the rise of the SNP at Westminster level. Although the SNP performed well in Scottish elections, and had been able to form an administration in Holyrood since 2007, Labour strategists assumed that the distinction that existed between voting in Holyrood elections and Westminster elections would continue. This distinction reflected the belief that Holyrood elections involved a choice between Labour and the SNP, but at Westminster elections the choice was essentially Labour or Conservative, which caused an erosion to the SNP vote vis-​à-​vis Holyrood elections. The Scottish referendum of September 2014 undermined this assumption, exposing the complacency of Scottish Labour and resulting in them losing all but one of the 41 Scottish constituencies that they were defending from May 2010 (Mitchell, 2015: 88–​100). The referendum campaign exposed the confused thinking within Labour circles. Miliband simply failed to grasp the nature of the threat, assuming that the issue was living standards, across the whole of the United Kingdom and not just Scotland, and failing to understand the importance of identity and nationalism in the minds

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

52

Cameron

of some Scottish voters (Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 543). Labour were unable to put forward a positive or coherent vision for Scotland continuing within the Union, and they were divided on how far to go in terms of further devolution. Pride made many within Scottish Labour resent offering further powers:  it looked weak and if concessions were being given to stem the nationalist tide, this could push the West Lothian question to the foreground, thereby opening up the English question and voting rights for Scottish Labour parliamentarians at Westminster. Tied with Cameron and the Conservatives, within the Better Together campaign group, was an uncomfortable position for many Labourites to find themselves, and the fallout was a significant downturn in Labour support in the opinion polls in the aftermath of the referendum (Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 528). Labour may have been complacent, but they were exposed on their Scottish flank by a highly effective, indeed manipulative, campaign by the Conservatives at the General Election of 2015. With opinion polls pointing to the possibility of a hung Parliament, the Conservatives mounted an aggressive campaign about the dangers of Labour forming a coalition government, or a looser arrangement, with the SNP. Nicola Sturgeon contributed to that by her talk of a progressive alliance that could lock the Conservatives out of power for a generation. The impression that this gave was that Miliband would be controlled by Sturgeon. Conservative strategy was to relentlessly drive home the dangers of this –​the so-​called coalition of chaos –​ in which the Conservatives presented to English voters how in that scenario the economy and the Union would be at risk (Mitchell, 2015: 88–​100). The coalition of chaos narrative was a powerful scare tactic that Labour could not fathom out a credible response to. It may have contributed to some tactical voting in English marginal constituencies –​i.e. Liberal Democrat or even UKIP inclined supporters switching to the Conservatives to prevent Miliband being Prime Minister and beholden to Sturgeon (Fielding, 2015: 54–​5, 67; for the Liberal Democrats, Laws revealed that it was a significant issue on the doorstops, with some citing it as their reason for voting Conservative, see Laws, 2016: 540). ‘The longest suicide vote in history?’ The Labour Party leadership election of 2015 The issues identified above formed the basis of the Conservatives’ election campaign in 2015 –​i.e. a relentless emphasis on the economic choice between competence versus chaos (where the Conservatives held a lead vis-​à-​vis economic competence); on the leadership credentials of Cameron counterposed against the leadership frailties of Miliband; and the threat of the SNP and their potential to blackmail Miliband in a hypothetical minority Labour administration (Bale and Webb, 2015: 47–​50). They also formed the basis for the post-​election evaluations on how and why Labour performed so poorly, thus validating the strategy adopted by the Conservatives (see, for example, Green and Prosser, 2015; Diamond, 2016a). Although the Labour defeat was explained via perceptions of weak image vis-​à-​vis

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of delegitimisation

53

competence and leadership, alongside the SNP/​UKIP squeeze, what did emerge from their own internal report was that it was not due to them adopting policies that were too left-​wing (Beckett, 2016). Another benefit to the Conservatives was the reaction of the Labour Party to their electoral defeat in May 2015. Having seen off Blair and Brown from the leadership of the Labour Party, Cameron had now outlasted Miliband as well, as the latter offered his resignation in the aftermath of their shattering defeat. Against all expectations the vacancy was filled by the veteran career backbencher and hard left candidate, Jeremy Corbyn (Richards, 2016; on how and why Corbyn won see Dorey and Denham, 2016 ; Quinn, 2016). Corbyn was assumed to be a gift to the Conservatives because they could portray him as extreme, incompetent and divisive (for a critique of Corbyn’s leadership limitations prior to the better than expected performance of the Labour Party in the 2017 General Election, see Diamond, 2016b; see also Dorey, 2017a). The extreme accusation seemed credible. Corbyn was a serial rebel and outsider within his own party. His views on issues such as Irish republicanism and his alleged sympathy with Hamas and Iran in the Middle East, alongside his preference for re-​ nationalisation and his multilateralism, gave the Conservatives (and the right-​wing press) plenty of targets to aim at (Diamond, 2016b). Portraying him as out of line with mainstream opinion was something that Cameron immediately honed in on, as he argued that: thousands of words have been written about the new Labour leader. But you only really need to know one thing: he thinks the death of Osama bin Laden was a ‘tragedy’. A tragedy is nearly 3,000 people murdered one morning in New York. A tragedy is the mums and dads who never came home from work that day. A tragedy is people jumping from the towers after the planes hit. My friends –​we cannot let that man inflict his security-​threatening, terrorist-​sympathising, Britain-​hating ideology on the country we love. (Cameron, 2015b)

It was also relatively easy for the Conservatives to question whether Corbyn was suitable as a potential Prime Minister. This was partly because he did not fit in to the traditional career background (i.e. he had no frontbench experience at all) or visual image of a Prime Minister in waiting, in part due to his reluctance to pander to the stylistics of politics and respond to the advice of image consultants (Heppell et al., 2015: 29). In establishing a narrative of unsuitability for the highest office, the Conservatives were aided by: (a) the incredibly unsympathetic press that Corbyn was to receive, just as had been the case for Miliband (see Cammaerts et al, 2016); and (b) the supposedly inept performance of Corbyn as leader of the Labour Party and Leader of the Opposition in the 2015–​16 period (Crines, 2015b; Diamond, 2016b). Furthermore, it was self-​evident that Corbyn was a divisive figure within the Labour movement. His mandate to lead came from the membership, where he

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

54

Cameron

secured 251,417 votes, or 59.5 per cent of the votes cast (Mason, 2015). It was a mandate that flowed from the new leadership selection rules which replaced the tripartite Electoral College. The Electoral College had been built around the equal weighting of Labour parliamentarians, constituency Labour Party members and those affiliated with trade unions (Quinn, 2012). The new procedures were based on one member one vote for the following three categories –​fully paid members; affiliated supporters (i.e. members of affiliated organisations but who needed to register in order to vote); and registered members (i.e. not paid up members of the party, but who have declared their support for the party and paid a nominal fee to enable them to vote) (see Collins, 2014). Under these new rules a newly paid up registered member had the same influence in the leadership succession ballot as a Labour parliamentarian. This created an environment in which a grassroots revolt against the party elites could succeed (Russell, 2016: 20–​2). Corbyn was victorious despite the fact that only 15 out of 232 Labour parliamentarians actually voted for him. His selection ‘plunged the PLP into turmoil’, as many of them shared the Conservative critique of Corbyn as extreme, incompetent and divisive (Dorey and Denham, 2016; on opinion with the PLP 2015–​17 see Crines et al., 2018). On that latter issue, the ability of Corbyn to demand loyalty was compromised by his own past. As a habitual rebel across a range of policy issues over many decades, any attempt by him to demand loyalty from his parliamentary colleagues looked hypocritical (Diamond, 2016b). In the period when Cameron was opposed by Corbyn –​i.e. September 2015 to July 2016  –​Corbyn was undermined by repeatedly weak polling evidence about him as a political leader. A historical comparison of the net approval ratings of new Leaders of the Opposition shows the following. Previous new Labour leaders in opposition since 1955 all had positive net approval ratings apart from Foot who had a zero rating –​Gaitskell in 1955, +18; Wilson in 1963, +31; Kinnock in 1983, +41, Smith in 1992, +26, Blair in 1994, +35 and even Miliband in 2010, +26. Corbyn entered his new role with a negative approval rating of -​8 (Kellner, 2015). Once established in his new role Corbyn continued to perform badly in terms of individual polling, and struggled to match Cameron in terms of the ‘key attributes voters tell us they want to see in a Prime Minister, such as being capable and good in a crisis’ (Skinner, 2016). For example, whilst half of those polled felt Cameron was a capable leader (53 per cent) only 27 per cent said the same for Corbyn, and Cameron also led Corbyn in terms of having a clear political vision (by 52 per cent to 39 per cent) (Skinner, 2016). Before Cameron annexed the leadership of the Conservative Party, four successive party leaders –​Major, Hague, Duncan Smith and Howard –​had struggled to overcome the perception that Blair was a more effective political leader, and that the Labour Party would be better equipped to manage the economy. Whatever criticisms that can be made against Cameron  –​and there have been many both from within and outside of his party, and over and beyond Europe –​what cannot

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of delegitimisation

55

be denied is that under his leadership the Conservatives reversed the trends in terms of leadership and economic competence. Given their centrality to electability this was a significant achievement for Cameron and those who were supportive of his modernising approach. The electoral position of the Conservatives after his departure is significantly stronger than what he inherited (198 to 331 Conservative parliamentarians), and the threat to them created by a Labour Party positioned on the centre ground of British politics has for the time being been minimised. Although the repudiation of New Labour within the Labour Party itself was created by multiple factors –​with the dual crises over Iraq and the economy doing much to discredit Blairite thinking –​the leadership strengths of Cameron vis-​à-​vis Brown, Miliband and Corbyn worked to the advantage of the Conservatives. Conclusion The above analysis demonstrates the fluidity of the approach that Cameron and the Conservatives adopted with regard to Labour. What the chapter demonstrates is that perceptions of economic and leadership competence were reversed during Cameron’s leadership tenure. The financial crash shattered Labour’s reputation for economic and thereby governing competence. Thereafter, and with the backing of the Liberal Democrats in coalition, the Conservatives relentless drove home their crisis narrative, based on the notion of British decline and emphasising how Labour were responsible (Crines, 2013, 2015c). This was politically useful for both the Conservatives, and the coalition as a whole, for the following reason. First, it meant that when entering office expectations were lowered. Second, it provided them with some cover, or a defence, should the economy continue to stutter longer than anticipated. Third, it served to undermine Labour’s attempt to claim, once in opposition, that they were economically competent and could be trusted to run the economy once again. The cumulative effect of the above enabled Cameron to present the coalition’s austerity strategy as a national economic recovery plan to overcome Labour’s profligacy and irresponsibility. It justified their perceived need to move away from the problems associated with ‘broken Britain’  –​i.e. Big Government –​and the shift towards fixing those difficulties via their new governing philosophy –​i.e. the Big Society (Kisby, 2010; Smith, 2010; Atkins, 2015b; Smith and Jones, 2015). Notes 1 Different perspectives exist on the Labour Party and prime ministerial leadership of Blair –​for a broadly praising perspective see Buller and James (2012) and for a negative perspective see McAnulla (2011). For an overarching critique of how Blair operated as Labour Party leader, see Minkin (2014). 2 The never possessed and dispossessed were now aligned to the critics on the hard left who questioned Blair on a wide range of issues, such as tuition fees, foundation hospitals and

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

56

Cameron

identity cards (Heppell and Hill, 2012: 210; Heppell, 2013c: 142). On the decline of New Labour, see Rawnsley (2010). 3 ‘t Hart and Tindall note that ‘apportioning blame is an integral part of contemporary politics in times of crisis’ as the framing of culpability during crisis matters in terms of electoral politics (‘t Hart and Tindall, 2009: 9). 4 The financial position of the Labour Party entering the 2010 General Election campaign was deeply worrying. Bankruptcy was a serious concern in 2007 when they had a deficit of £14.5 million, and donations were diminishing in the aftermath of the cash-​for-​honours scandal (Watt, 2010: 89–​103). 5 Cameron was apparently overheard at a party, held by Rupert Murdoch, saying that he ‘hoped’ it would be Ed Miliband and that he ‘feared’ David Miliband (Heppell and Hill, 2012: 212). 6 During his time as Leader of the Opposition Miliband utilised a number of themes to try to connect with the electorate. In the first year or so of opposition the renewal of Labour seemed to be driven by the shades of Labour debate –​most notably, Blue Labour with its small-​c social conservatism aligned to a stronger critique of neo-​liberalism, or Purple Labour which was widely seen as reheated New Labour (Beech and Hickson, 2014: 75–​ 87). Voter awareness of the shades of Labour debate never seemed that high, and the same applied in relation to the period when Labour frontbenchers seemed gripped by the need to say one nation Labour in relation to every conceivable issue that they were asked about (Fielding, 2015: 65–​6).

4

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of depoliticisation: the Big Society narrative

The previous two chapters have considered the evidence of continuity and change within the Conservative Party under Cameron. Chapter 2 focused in on the modernisation debates to examine the presentation of change and the level of acceptance within the PCP. Chapter 3 considered the extent to which the critique of Labour changed under Cameron. The findings within these two chapters were illuminating. Chapter 2 argued that there were limits to the extent to which the Conservatives did actually modernise under Cameron –​i.e. policy areas closely associated with modernisation were either pursued in a patchy and inconsistent way or downgraded once the demands of office crowded in on Cameron. The chapter argued that modernisation was more about restyling Conservatism to overcome negative associations –​the notion of toxicity –​but as ­chapter 3 identified the impact of the financial crash forced Cameron into an about-​turn in strategic terms. The need to neutralise the Labour investment versus Conservative cuts choice, which had been so potent during the era of prosperity, evaporated. From 2008 onwards ­chapter 3 showed how the Conservative Party did not really change their approach to opposing Labour. Their strategy of apportioning blame to Labour for the economic recession and for overspending pre-​2010, and establishing risk about allowing Labour back into office post-​2010, was remarkably similar to the strategy adopted to discredit Old Labour (Hay, 2013). The previous chapter focused on how Cameron sought to oppose Labour –​both when in opposition and in government  –​in the economic sphere. However, the Conservative attack of Labour’s record in office was actually far broader than simply being an economic critique. Indeed, the original strategic choice of Cameron upon becoming the new Conservative Party leader was to neutralise the economy and compete with Labour on non-​economic issues –​the logic being that if Labour was presiding over continuous economic growth there was limited utility in an economically driven critique of their governing competence (Lee, 2008; Fielding, 2010). As the long campaigning period towards the 2010 General Election evolved so the Conservative narrative that British society was broken developed (Dorey, 2009; Dorey and Garnett, 2012). Underpinning their critique was an emphasis on the

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

58

drivers of poverty  –​educational failure, family breakdown, welfare dependency, drug and alcohol addiction and personal debt –​and these were to be presented as the negative social legacy of Labour in power (Hayton, 2012: ­chapter 6). This chapter will evaluate the significance of what was meant to be the central narrative of Cameronism –​i.e. the notion of the Big Society, which Norman regarded as ‘a set of interlocking ideas, even a philosophy’ (Norman, 2010: 195) –​ and the solution to the Big Government of Labour. The argument will be split into three parts. The first part of the chapter will consider the problem that the Big Society was meant to remedy –​i.e. the Conservative argument about the negatives associated with Big Government. The second part of the chapter will consider the success, or otherwise, of the Big Society agenda once in power. The third part of the chapter will consider how, from an academic perspective, the Big Society agenda amounted to a depoliticisation agenda designed to limit the political (electoral) fallout of implementing austerity. The central pitch of the chapter is that as a governing strategy the Big Society agenda showed limited evidence of success, but that it is more appropriate to see the Big Society as a political strategy.1 Thus, the Big Society represented an attempt to redefine what constituted the responsibilities of the state, and to make the case for reforming the public services, promoting community empowerment and social action, as a way of limiting the political fallout for the Conservatives. Broken Britain: the problem of Big Government As the previous chapter emphasised, continuous economic growth during the first two terms (1997–​2005) blunted the Conservatives’ ability to critique the record of Labour in power. Operating on the assumption of continued economic growth, Cameron and his inner circle made a strategic decision to downgrade their emphasis on the economy and focus in on social decline under Labour (Dorey, 2009: 260). The impact of the financial crisis fundamentally changed the nature of the Conservatives’ strategy, meaning the social decline would not dominate, but would instead become attached to notions of economic decline (Lee, 2011). A clear rhetorical argument would evolve based on social decline equating to broken Britain. Within this the increasing reliance on the state –​fuelled by Big Government –​had eroded social responsibility. Broken Britain could only be fixed by addressing the problem of Big Government. So Big Government would be replaced by the Big Society (Kirby, 2009, although how something that is broken can be made both better and big is not explained –​Dorey and Garnett, 2012). Within wider culture the Conservatives were aided in their narration of broken Britain. Within the print media, their erstwhile allies at News International aided them, with the Sun newspaper running a constant stream of stories about teenage pregnancy, binge and underage drinking, knife and gun crime, and child neglect, all of which would chime with the arguments made by the Conservatives (Slater, 2012: 954).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of depoliticisation

59

Cameron would use his early speeches to acknowledge that ‘creating wealth cannot be the only objective’ and that ‘we must make the creation of wealth and the elimination of poverty the central objectives’ (Kerr, 2007: 50; see also Gibson, 2015). An incoming Conservative administration that he would lead would focus in on tackling social fragmentation and the inequalities that characterised ‘broken Britain’ (Dorey, 2009: 260). In doing so Cameron was acknowledging the mistakes of the Thatcher era in terms of poverty and social reform (see Hickson, 2009; Page, 2010; see also Williams, 2015). More specifically, that emphasis on seeking to identify the problems within society, and to attribute blame to Labour for them, was partly an attempt to offset one of the most negative legacies of the Thatcher era (Dorey and Garnett, 2012: 389–​90). After all, back in 1987 Thatcher had given an interview to Woman’s Own in which she famously was reported as saying: they’re casting their problem on society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. (Thatcher, 1987, interviewed 23 September and quoted in Woman’s Own, 31 October)

It was a claim that had ‘negative connotations but long term implications’ for the Conservative Party, with it becoming seen as a byword for the ‘selfishness and greed’ associated with Thatcherism (Crines et al., 2016: 132–​3). New Labour Blairites may have made an accommodation with aspects of the Thatcherite economic legacy (see, for example, Hay, 1999; Heffernan, 2001), but by blending together an emphasis on economic efficiency and social justice they continued the leftish critique of the Conservatives as ‘socially regressive and lacking in compassion, especially with regard to the excluded’ (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009:  24). As such, Thatcher’s rejection of society remained a tool through which the left aimed to stigmatise and delegitimise Conservatism. The Cameronite solution was triangulation in that it sought to differentiate the Conservative Party from two negatives. First, it sought to challenge the established negatives associated with Thatcherism and its neglect of social issues –​i.e. the aforementioned characterisation of the Conservatives as lacking in compassion. Second, it sought to emphasise the limitations of the Labour approach to social problems, identifying how their top-​down, target-​driven, state-​led initiatives had failed. As such, the critique of broken Britain and Big Government, and the emerging solution of the Big Society, represented a third or middle way solution, positioned between the unfettered markets of Thatcherism, and the interfering state mentality of Labour (Dorey and Garnett, 2012: 389–​90). In doing so, Cameron would seek to educate the electorate about the importance of addressing social ills via collective action, as opposed to thinking that it can be addressed solely through the apparatus of the state. The intellectual roots of the Big Society, as opposed to Big Government, were evident in a speech that he delivered to the Conservative Party annual conference in 2008. Here Cameron noted that:

60

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

for Labour there is only the state and the individual, nothing in between. No family to rely on, no friend to depend on, no community to call on. No neighbourhood to grow in, no faith to share in, no charities to work in. No one but the Minister, nowhere but Whitehall, no such thing as society –​just them, and their laws, and their rules, and their arrogance … You cannot run our country like this. (Cameron, 2008)

Cameron developed this further during his Hugo Young speech in late 2009. Here he drew a clearer link between the growth of the state and the damage to society as a whole. He noted that after three terms of Labour in power: the size, scope and role of government in Britain has reached a point where it is now inhibiting, not advancing the progressive aims of reducing poverty, fighting inequality, and increasing general well-​being. Indeed there is a worrying paradox that because of its effect on personal and social responsibility, the recent growth of the state has promoted not social solidarity, but selfishness and individualism. (Cameron, 2009b)

These comments captured Cameron’s belief in ‘responsibility’ and how it was ‘not enough for the government to pass another law’ ( Jones, 2008: 140). For example, he argued that in terms of education, progress meant that you ‘need parents to get their children to school on time’ and ‘teachers controlling the classroom’ as opposed to simply expecting government to drive up educational standards by constructing a new curriculum ( Jones, 2008: 141). The running core of the argument was challenging the assumption that statist solutions automatically work, and in doing so evidence of governing failures under Labour were used to validate the claims being made (Cameron, 2009b). However, it is worth noting that the process by which the Conservatives began to think about a social policy driven critique of Labour actually pre-​dated Cameron (see, for example, the work of Willetts on civic Conservatism, 1992, 1994, 2002; Green, 2003; Letwin, 2003, 2009). The common thread within these insights was that Conservatism must be seen as more than just the Thatcherite pursuit of the free market and individualism (Heppell, 2014a:  140). Post-​Thatcherite Conservatism needed to reconnect Conservatism with civil society  –​as argued by Willett’s emphasis on civic Conservatism, and Letwin focusing in on the neighbourly society and the language of communitarian Conservatism. An additional influence upon Cameronite thinking was the Red Toryism associated with the work of Philip Blond, initially for the think tank Demos and then ResPublica (Blond, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2010, 2012). Blond argued that the Thatcherite emphasis on nihilistic individualism and materialism had been damaging to civil society and had undermined communities. He implied that the privileging of markets and monopoly capitalism had contributed to social fragmentation and the disempowering of individuals (Blond, 2009b: 83–​97). For Blond the solutions involved the promotion of localism and communitarian civic Conservatism, based around private,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of depoliticisation

61

public and voluntary associations and institutions (and here Blond was keen to revive the classic Burke emphasis on ‘little platoons’, see Blond, 2009c: 33). Blond argued for a paradigm shift in which Cameron could use power to move away from the Thatcherite neo-​liberal market approach to a new approach –​the civic state. In this new model strategies to address social problems could be bottom up where possible, with the state there to offer a framework to steer or act as a facilitator (Blond, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). Also of influence to the evolution of Conservative thinking would be the work of Duncan Smith and the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ). In the period between its inauguration in 2004 until the Conservatives re-​entered government, the CSJ would publish approaching 50 different policy papers and reports, examining the extent and nature of social breakdown, as well as looking at the causes and proposing solutions (Dorey and Garnett, 2012). The central argument emerging from the CSJ was that the broken society that they referred to had its roots in broken families (Mooney and Neal, 2010: 145). The CSJ argued that if there was less family breakdown and fewer lone parent households, there would be less crime, less drug addiction, less need for remedial teaching in schools, and less demand placed on the NHS (Duncan Smith, 2007:  4–​5). Marriage and stable two-​parent families2 were thus presented as the route to better educational attainment and employment prospects, and thereby a means of reducing poverty. The cumulative effect, argued the CSJ, would challenge dependency on the state, and by doing so save the taxpayer money (Duncan Smith, 2006: 33). Duncan Smith emphasised how, irrespective of whether you are married, co-​habiting or single, the only way out of poverty for parents is through employment (Duncan Smith, 2007: 4–​5). Ultimately, the most strident critique that Cameron offered about social decline in Britain actually occurred in the aftermath of the London riots in the summer of 2011 (for a wider assessment of the riots, see Briggs, 2012; Rogers, 2013). Coming as they did shortly after Cameron had become Prime Minister they had the capacity to hurt the Conservatives (Heppell, 2014a: 156). From the left came a clear explanation. The economic circumstances, exacerbated by the cuts in public expenditure initiated by the coalition as part of their deficit reduction plan, were increasing deprivation and inequality (Birch and Allen, 2012: 32). Cameron sought to disassociate himself, and the coalition, from this, by arguing that such behaviour was the legacy of Labour. He made it clear that the riots were reflective of a breakdown in morality and it was emblematic of the broken society that he had been talking about in opposition (Heppell, 2014a: 156). The problems, Cameron argued, encompassed schools, welfare, families, parenting, addiction, communities; on the cultural, legal, bureaucratic problems in our society too; from the twisting and misrepresenting of human rights that has undermined personal responsibility, to the obsession with health and safety that has eroded people’s willingness to act according to common sense. (Cameron, 2011)

Cameron

62

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Cameron then expressed his condemnation for the individuals who rioted. He condemned their irresponsibility [and] selfishness. Behaving as if your choices have no consequences. Children without fathers. Schools without discipline. Reward without effort. Crime without punishment. Rights without responsibilities. Communities without control. Some of the worst aspects of human nature tolerated, indulged  –​sometimes even incentivised –​by a state and its agencies that in parts have become literally de-​ moralised. (Cameron, 2011)

Breaking these cycles of deprivation would be the objective for Cameron, and here the influence of the CSJ would be apparent. However, identifying problems is easier than constructing solutions. The central conundrum for the Conservatives was whether their claim that complex social problems could be solved by the state doing less, would be seen as credible. What was to drive their Big Society thinking was the concept of nudge economics, which was associated with the work of Thaler and Sunstein (2008). This was based on the assumption that individuals could be incentivised towards socially responsible choices. Cameron concluded that this should be the model that guides governments, rather than the top-​down methods associated with Labour. That this represented a libertarian paternalistic approach was of interest to Cameron, as it appeared to encourage good behaviour and choices, whilst at the same time preserving liberty (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008:  3–​5, 81). This suited Cameron, as having identified the dual problem of excessive statism and excessive individualism, they were looking at ways to incentivise what lies between the state and the individual –​i.e. the intermediate institutions that were the basis of society (McAnulla, 2012: 176). Fixing broken Britain: the Big Society as the solution The Conservatives started to use the slogan of the Big Society in late 2009 and it would develop into the central overarching narrative for the General Election campaign of 2010. In this period Cameron presented his new initiative in visionary terms. He committed his incoming administration to the removal of the ‘dead hand of excessive regulation and bureaucracy’, as part of a wider ‘restructuring of the relationship between state and society’ (Pattie and Johnston, 2011: 403). He argued that the shift from Big Government to the Big Society would break state monopolies, encourage decentralisation and localism, as well as reviving self-​reliance, personal freedom and community spirit. The Big Society would envisage a larger role for social enterprises, charities and voluntary organisations to provide public services. It would also transfer control to citizens and community groups at a local level, allowing them to take action rather than waiting for the state to intervene. Cameron presented the Big Society as being about empowerment and encouraging

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of depoliticisation

63

the best in individuals, who would be encouraged to be active and responsible members of their communities (see Kisby, 2010; Smith, 2010; Barker, 2011; Pattie and Johnston, 2011; Ware, 2011). Conservative candidates were expected to go out onto the doorsteps and sell the Big Society. They were encouraged to make the case for social responsibility, not state control, and to outline how the Big Society would encourage personal, professional, civic and corporate responsibility. They were expected to inspire floating voters that the Conservative strategy would reduce the role of the state, whilst fighting inequality, reducing poverty and increasing general well-​being. It was a big ask, and there was widespread scepticism amongst Conservative candidates about building the whole campaign strategy around a slogan that was so difficult to sell (Dorey and Garnett, 2012).3 Nonetheless, the Big Society mattered, and would continue to matter in coalition, at least to begin with, because it mattered to Cameron. It was said to be his ‘passion’ and his ‘mission’ to encourage people to look after themselves and each other, and to reduce their reliance upon the state (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 271–​6; Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 147–​64). Moreover, it mattered within the coalition as when Cameron spoke of the Big Society it chimed with the Liberal Democrat emphasis on localism, decentralisation and the promotion of community politics (see, for example, Davey, 2004; Huhne, 2007), although their initial enthusiasm dissipated over time (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 154). Within the Conservative Party, however, it struggled to gain traction due to the following three factors: • Like some Conservative candidates, many voters did not really understand what was meant by the term (Seawright, 2012: 38). Defty noted that opinion polling from just after the General Election of 2010 showed that only 42 per cent of voters had heard it mentioned during the campaigning period (even though it was the central theme of the Conservative campaign). Of those that recalled hearing the Big Society message, nearly 70 per cent of those polled said they either knew nothing about it or not very much about it (Defty, 2014: 13–​24). • If voters did understand what was meant by the term they did not necessarily like it. When they were informed of different elements of the Big Society agenda, rather than the concept overall, then more support was evident –​e.g. for specific initiatives, such as a Big Society Bank to finance community activities, or a National Citizen Service. However, even amongst those who acknowledged that the Big Society sounded like a good idea there was scepticism as to whether it could work (Defty, 2014: 13–​24). • Selling Cameron and the Conservatives around the Big Society narrative was problematic as it was easy for their opponents to criticise it (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 154). On a practical level the objectives of the Big Society were undermined by volunteer deficit. It was doubtful as to whether enough people

64

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

would have enough spare time to be able to devote to their community, and that committing time to unpaid activity would have to come at the expense of either family responsibilities or paid opportunities (Coote, 2011:  16–​17; Pattie and Johnston, 2011: 409). To the political left a clearer ideological motivation underpinned the rhetorical shift to the Big Society. This perspective assumed that the positive sounding rhetoric of the Big Society was a political, indeed an ideological, smokescreen. Thus, the purpose of the Big Society was to provide cover for the deep cuts in public services and welfare provision that would flow from austerity, and that the quality of public services would inevitably be impaired (Kisby, 2010). Had Cameron mapped out his Big Society vision in the early part of the Parliament, before the financial crash and when the Conservatives were pledging to match Labour’s spending commitments, then he would not have been so open to the leftish critique about dismantling public services and hidden privatisation (Dorey and Garnett, 2012; Smith and Jones, 2015; see also Toynbee and Walker, 2015). What impact did the Big Society have? A wide range of initiatives were advanced and the impacts may be more evident over the longer term, but in the short term the impacts were limited. Evaluating the value of the Big Society is best achieved by assessing its impact in relation to its aims. Three clear aims can be identified: first, community empowerment, based on the principle that local people should take control of decision-​making in their area and that local government should support this; second, opening up public services to innovative new ways of delivery involving charities, social enterprises and private companies; and finally, social action in which individuals should be incentivised to be more engaged with communities (Birchall, 2011; Lister, 2015). These aims were pursued through a range of initiatives too broad to cover here, but the most significant were as follows. First, the Localism Act of 2011, which amongst other measures granted new rights for charitable trusts and voluntary bodies enabling them to conduct services provided by local councils (see Westwood, 2011; Layard, 2012; Lowndes and Pratchett, 2012; Clarke and Cochrane, 2013; Williams et al., 2014; Rogers, 2015). Second, the Academies Act of 2010, which proved to be one of the most controversial aspects of the Cameron era, led to the creation of free schools, or charter schools, which made it feasible for parents, teachers, charities and businesses to set up and then run their own schools, free from local authority control (see Wright, 2012; Higham, 2014). Third, the National Citizen Service was established for 16-​to 17-​year-​olds as a voluntary, personal and social development programme (see Mycock and Tonge, 2011; Mills and Waite, 2017). Fourth, the Big Society Bank was launched under the name Big Society Capital, as an independent social investment institution, designed to achieve social as well as financial returns. It would provide finance to third sector organisations to support front-​line social sector entities that could help them to grow (see Daggers and Nicholls, 2016).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of depoliticisation

65

Fifth, and most controversially, the Big Society Network was formed and funded by a combination of public sector grants and the National Lottery. It was somewhat embarrassing to Cameron when the network was investigated for alleged misuse of funds by the Charity Commission, and then wound up (Wright, 2014). Ultimately, against each of these original three themes –​community empowerment, opening up public services and social action –​only limited progress can said to have been made, according to research conducted by Slocock et al. (2015). They took each of the aims of the Big Society and attached indicators to each, and then offered a qualitative assessment on whether there had been a positive or negative impact. This is presented in table 2. Their findings provide more evidence of negative impacts over positive impacts, especially with regard to opening up public services. As a consequence, they argued that if the Big Society had been designed to unify society, and reduce divisions, then there is no real evidence of progress. When assessed ‘against indicators of social capital, such as trust, community attachment, and neighbourliness, there has been a fall’, and they conclude that ‘crime has fallen but there has also been a significant increase in food poverty and homelessness’ (Slocock et al., 2015: 7; on food poverty and the rise in the use of food banks, see Caplan, 2016; Garthwaite, 2016;

Table 2  The Big Society: aims, indicators and impact Aims

Indicator Positive impact evident

Community empowerment

Influence over local decisions Increased local control Greater transparency

Opening up public services

Social action

Negative impact evident

Giving Community organisation

Source: Slocock et al. (2015: 10–​11).

Stronger communities Voluntary sector influence Diversification Voluntary sector funding More responsiveness Strong partnerships Voluntary sector accessibility Decentralisation Civil society input in service design Volunteering Adoption

66

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

and on housing and homelessness, see Hodkinson and Robbins, 2013; Jacobs and Manzi, 2013). As a consequence, they identify how the following stubborn divisions within society had deepened, despite the intentions of the Big Society: • The regional divide between the north and south. Those in the south are more ‘empowered’ and ‘tend to enjoy better services, and are more socially active’, and aligned to this the urban–​rural divide remained embedded, as ‘rural and southern areas have more voluntary activity’ (Slocock et al., 2015: 54). (Cameron placed a considerable emphasis on addressing regional disparities between north and south, which explained his commitment to the Northern Powerhouse, for an overview on this, see Lee, 2017.) • The generational divide between young and old, in which ‘political engagement, volunteering and giving increases with age’, although the young are becoming more socially engaged as their ‘volunteering rates have increased’ (Slocock et al., 2015:  58; see also Henn and Foard, 2012; Mycock and Tonge, 2012; Sloam, 2012; Briggs, 2017). • The ethnicity divide which identified how BAME people are ‘less likely to vote and are poorly represented in local authority leadership, and although volunteering rates are increasing, they remain low’ (Slocock et al., 2015: 55; for a strident critique of the impact of neo-​liberalism upon the racial and ethnic landscape of the United Kingdom, see Redclift, 2014). • The disability divide in which ‘disabled people have been particularly hit by cuts in public services and welfare payments, and will also have been hit by loss of income to voluntary sector groups in the field of social services and employment’ (Slocock et al., 2015: 55; see also Cross, 2013; Duffy, 2013). • The wealth divide between the richest and the poorest in society. The most affluent continue ‘to have the most power, get the best outcomes from public services and are more socially active’, and it is the ‘least affluent, upon whom cuts in public services have fallen disproportionately’, who ‘have suffered from cuts to the voluntary sector’ (Slocock et al., 2015: 54; for an overview of the changing nature of inequality in the United Kingdom since the economic crisis, see Hills et al., 2016; for a more generalised overview of social policy under the coalition see Bochel and Powell, 2016; see also O’Hara, 2014). The limited evidence of the Big Society making a positive impact is not surprising considering the difficulties in putting it into practice at the same time as implementing widespread cuts (Smith and Jones, 2015:  235). As the evidence mounted vis-​à-​vis growing inequality, homelessness and an increasing reliance on food banks, it seemed to legitimise the leftish critique of the Big Society as a cover for cuts (Toynbee and Walker, 2015). The reform agenda in terms of the public services was essentially market driven, and involved ‘concentrating power in the hands

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

The politics of depoliticisation

67

of new quasi-​monopoly private sector providers rather than in those of local people’, thus undermining claims of community empowerment (Slocock et al., 2015: 6). Ultimately, when it came to stimulating social action, Cameron, for all of the supposed engagement with nudge theory, failed to grasp that the Big Society asked voters ‘to increase what they were putting in without necessarily getting more out’, at a time when ‘people thought they were already putting in and not getting much out’ (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 275). It was optimistic or naive to assume that enough individuals would want to demonstrate their social responsibility by filling the void left by the retreating state. This represented the conundrum within Cameronism in terms of its understanding of behaviour. That was to say that their neo-​liberal economic strategy continued to emphasise individual responsibility built on the assumption of individuals as rational actors driven by utility maximisation (Smith, 2010:  830). And yet they linked their social reform strategy to encouraging social responsibility and collective action, within which individuals were driven by a sense of duty, and a social conscience, or an altruistic mindset. There was a clear contradiction between Cameron’s belief that individuals can be both profit-​seeking entrepreneurs and voluntary driven activists (Smith, 2010: 830). Kisby concluded that the altruism that Cameron favoured applied to ‘ordinary citizens’ and did not seem likely to lead to a great ‘contribution to the public good by the super-​wealthy’ (Kisby, 2010: 485). The Big Society as a depoliticisation strategy How should the Big Society be interpreted in a party political sense  –​i.e. what does it tell us about Cameronite Conservatism and what value did it have for the Conservative Party? From within the academic literature on the Big Society three perspectives have emerged  –​i.e., first, Bulley and Sokhi-​Bulley’s view of the Big Society not just as Big Government but as better government; second, Bonefeld’s argument that the Big Society is primarily a critique of existing social relations; and third, the Kerr et al. interpretation that sees the Big Society as part of a wider agenda to reformulate neo-​liberalism (Kerr et  al., 2011; Bulley and Sokhi-​Bulley, 2014; Bonefeld, 2015; see also Byrne et al., 2012, 2014). Let us consider Bulley and Sokhi-​Bulley first. They argue that defining the Big Society as simply a cover for an ideological drive for austerity is too limited. In practice they claim that ‘far from being removed or reduced’, the Big Society is actually about ‘more control and the increased management of the behaviour of communities and individuals—​i.e. bigger and better government’ (Bulley and Sokhi-​Bulley, 2014: 452–​3). In the second perspective, Bonefeld is highly critical of Bulley and Sokhi-​Bulley’s claim that the Big Society amounts to better government (Bonefeld, 2015). Bonefeld argues that the Big Society narrative is based on a critique of the irresponsibility of the existing character of society (Bonefeld, 2015:  413–​14). Specifically the logic underpinning the Big Society is that the welfare state is ‘inefficient, outmoded and counterproductive’ when it comes to addressing poverty and

68

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

social exclusion (Bonefeld, 2015: 414–​15). On the weaknesses of the existing order Bonefeld concludes that: instead of governing society, [the state] has become the prey of the social forces that dragged the state into society, each pursuing their particular rent-​seeking interests through the state as the public authority of their private aspirations. The state of pure quantity does not govern society. It is a state of ungovernability. In reality, the ungovernability of the state has to do with the politicisation of society. The flip-​side of the ungovernable state of pure quantity is the ungovernable society that is permeated by strife, political assertiveness, entrenched class relations and loss of social cohesion. The politicisation of society weakens the state as the independent power of society. For the sake of a big, self-​responsible society the state has therefore to find the strength to withdraw from society, reasserting its independence from the preying social forces. This effort entails both the politicisation of the state as the concentrated coercive force of society, successfully claiming the monopoly of political force and the depoliticisation of the socio-​economic relations. (Bonefeld, 2015: 414–​15)

From this it can be argued that the Big Society was a ‘political programme’ which involved ‘withdrawing the state’ and in the process creating for the state more ‘independence from welfare support’ (Bonefeld, 2015: 424). As such the Big Society is best seen as an attempt at re-​establishing society and the state as more distinct, but to do so requires a ‘strong state’ which can facilitate the establishment of a more ‘self-​responsible enterprise society’ (Bonefeld, 2015: 424). That desire to redefine the expectations of the state, coming alongside the austerity programme, is tied to the third main perspective on the Big Society, advanced by Kerr et al. (2011) and Byrne et al.,(2012). They argue that the modernising strategy deployed by Cameron represented a new form of neo-​liberal governmentality in which the Big Society narrative was crucial. To them, the Big Society amounts to an attempt to inaugurate a more cost effective, stable and decentralised form of neo-​liberalism in which control over the everyday activities of citizens is still maintained by the centre, but at a greater distance, and with less culpability when things go wrong. (Byrne et al., 2012: 25, emphasis added)

The successful implementation, or partially successful implementation, of the ideas underpinning the Big Society could reap political benefits for the Conservatives, as: in those areas in which the Big Society is due to take over the big state, the central state is still culpable if things go wrong. If budgets are exceeded the state runs the risk of being seen by the electorate as profligate –​carefree spenders of the taxpayers’ money. If the quality of service provided does not meet the expectations of the consumers of these services the state risks being viewed as incompetent –​incapable of properly managing its own affairs. However, if the state makes way for the Big Society then if

The politics of depoliticisation

69

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

things go wrong in these and other similar ways then the culpable party is none other than the people themselves, given that the Big Society is supposedly people power in action, and that the roll out of the Big Society amounts to nothing more than the simple empowerment of individuals and communities. (Byrne et al., 2012: 26)

Such observations seem to be aligned to those of Bonefeld, especially as they also link the Big Society to notions of depoliticisation. This is defined by Burnham as the ‘process of placing at one remove the political character of decision-​making’ (Burnham, 2001:  128). Depoliticisation has been traditionally associated with the Thatcherite response to state overload and the crisis and ungovernability in the 1970s (Kerr et  al., 2011:  200). For the emergent new right this necessitated the promotion of a limited state and measures such as curbing trade union power to rebalance the relationship between capital and labour. This involved readjusting the balance between the public and private sector via privatisation, and removing the state from wage disputes by rejecting incomes policies. These approaches served to move the responsibility at one remove from the state, thus distancing their accountability and responsibility, and possibly at the same time limiting the blame that can be held against them (Kerr et al., 2011: 200; for a wider discussion on depoliticisation, see Buller and Flinders, 2005; Flinders and Buller, 2006; Burnham, 2007). The value of the Big Society to the Conservatives was that it could limit, but not remove, the extent of governing accountability. Conceptually, accountability is politicised by opponents as a means to ascribe blame, and what the Big Society could potentially offer the Conservatives was a means to manage demands rather than increasing supply. According to Flinders and Moon (2012:  660), the Big Society represented an attempt to reduce upward political accountability and increase downward local accountability, based on an ‘under-​acknowledged change of emphasis from political responsibility (through politicians and bureaucrats) to social responsibility (through individuals and communities)’ (Flinders and Moon, 2012: 657). As a weapon of depoliticisation the Big Society can be seen as a strategy for ‘managing at a distance’ (Flinders and Moon, 2012: 660), although at this juncture it is important to remember that depoliticisation does not ‘imply an absence of governmental control or the absence of politics itself ’, rather depoliticisation ‘is about finding new means of control at a distance’ (Kerr et al., 2011: 200). Rather the consequences of implementing the Big Society agenda would be the creation of a ‘more complex, messy and asymmetrical patchwork of accountabilities between central government and a range of community groups, private companies and third-​ sector organizations’ (Flinders and Moon, 2012: 661). Conclusion It was in the latter stages of his time in opposition that Cameron began to use the label of the Big Society to reflect his political vision. Throughout the early stages of

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

70

Cameron

his prime ministerial tenure he remained a passionate advocate of it as an approach to governing, despite the scepticism that it provoked within his own party, and the outright condemnation that it received from the leftish commentators (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 271–​6; Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 147–​61). Part of the difficulty grappling with the Big Society as an idea stems from the fact that Cameron launched it, and relaunched it repeatedly, as a governing strategy, which would redefine the state–​society relationship. However, it is more appropriate to see it as a political strategy to limit the reputational damage to the Conservatives for the austerity programme (Taylor-​Gooby and Stoker, 2011). As a governing strategy the aims of the Big Society, as outlined on entering office, were difficult to define and communicate, but by the latter stages of the Cameron era, the evidence of the Big Society making a positive impact was increasingly questioned (Slocock et al., 2015; Fenwick and Gibbon, 2017). Ultimately the main lesson from the Cameronite Big Society approach related to ownership and power. The Big Society was ‘driven by central Government’ whereas a ‘genuine’ Big Society should have been ‘taken forward with civil society, a partnership in which the state facilitates but does not dictate and in which everyone, especially those with least power and influence now, is involved’ (Slocock et al., 2015: 6). However, although the Big Society was used less frequently after 2013, it was designed to be a political strategy for the Conservatives. That is because the coalition, at the behest of the Conservatives, was committed to an austerity programme of public expenditure cuts, in which their commitment to public services would be questioned. The Big Society was a ‘rhetorical device’ (Pattie and Johnston, 2011:  404) designed to legitimise their claim that they were committed to the public services in principle, not opposed, but they were engaging in a reform agenda that would create solutions to the socially ‘broken Britain’ that had been bequeathed to them by New Labour (Evans, 2011; Jacobs, 2015). Cameron and the modernising Conservatives could then link the so-​called social decline under New Labour, and the broken Britain narrative, to the calamitous economic environment that the Conservatives faced when entering office in May 2010. Cameron used the Big Society narrative, and the mantra of ‘we’re all in this together’, as part of his strategy to present his brand of Conservatism as being compassionate (Bochel and Powell, 2018). He implied that the austerity programme was being driven out of national necessity, rather than ideological desire, due to the legacy of Labour in office, and in the process he set about redefining the state–​society relationship. As a consequence, the rhetoric of the ‘financial crisis can be viewed, not as an inevitable precondition of public sector cuts, but rather as a preference shaping depoliticisation tactic which depicts certain issues as beyond the control of government’ (Kerr et al., 2011: 201). Cameronism, and thereby the principles underpinning the Big Society agenda, should be best interpreted as a ‘particular type of statecraft designed primarily to service the continuation of power and the maintenance of political office by reducing the risks of policy failure’ (Kerr et al.,

The politics of depoliticisation

71

2011: 200; see also Gamble, 2015). The Big Society was one means by which to limit the electoral damage to the Conservatives of the austerity agenda. The other tool was the presence of the Liberal Democrats in the coalition government, whom Cameron bound into the austerity agenda. This happened to be only one way in which Cameron exploited the Liberal Democrats in the 2010 to 2015 period.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Notes 1 According to critics of the Big Society, Cameron sugar-​coated his ‘agenda of public spending control with the compassionate rhetoric of “we’re all in this together” ’ (Hodkinson and Robbins, 2013: 64; on compassionate Conservatism, see Bochel and Powell, 2018). 2 Cameron did not fully embrace the CSJ rhetoric when in opposition, as he was nervous about accusations of backward-​thinking social conservatism, and a rehash of the flawed ‘Back to Basics’ campaign of the Major era (see Hayton, 2010). 3 Defeated party leadership candidate, Davis, dismissed the Big Society as ‘Blairite dressing’ (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 152).

5

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controlling the coalition agenda: limiting Liberal Democrat influence

The first part of the book concentrated on examining the concept of modernisation in relation to how the Conservative Party under Cameron changed. It did so in terms of detoxifying their own image; how they delegitimised Labour as an alternative; and how they sought to depoliticise their austerity agenda under the rhetorical slogan of the Big Society. The second part of the book moves beyond the concept of modernisation and the transition from opposition to government. Rather it concentrates on how Cameron set about maximising the position of the Conservative Party within the constraints of coalition government. The central driver of the second part of the book –​i.e. ­chapters 5 to 7 –​is the idea of manipulation. Chapter 7 will look at the wider debates that coincided with the era of coalition government, and that represented the key challenges for Cameron as Prime Minister –​i.e., first, the demands from the Liberal Democrats for electoral reform and the AV referendum in 2011; second, the demands from the SNP for independence leading to the Scottish independence referendum of 2014; and, third, the demands from UKIP, and from within the hard Eurosceptic faction within his own party, that resulted in a commitment to hold a referendum on EU membership by the end of 2017 (after renegotiating terms of membership). Grappling with these challenges –​challenges that relate to the ‘rules of the game’ and thus could seriously aid or hinder the Conservative cause –​tested Cameron’s strategic agility, and ultimately in the case of EU membership destroyed him. What was also a test was being in coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Chapters  5 and 6 concentrate on how Cameron coped with that challenge, and how his strategic choices exploited the Liberal Democrats. These two chapters do so from the assumption that this was the objective for the Conservatives all along. After all, upon completing the coalition negotiations, Hague, the chief Conservative negotiator, told his wife ‘we might have destroyed the Liberal Democrats’ (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 25). Although the main focus on this chapter is to examine how Cameron exploited the Liberal Democrats in terms of policy and personnel, the chapter opens by exploring how and why a coalition was the most attractive option for Cameron (Heppell, 2013a: 266–​74).

Controlling the coalition agenda

73

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Coalition formation What options did Cameron face in the aftermath of the General Election of 2010? Table 3 outlines the five possible ways in which the next government could have been formed, with the parliamentary arithmetic listed next to each option. Of these options the first three would result in Cameron becoming Prime Minister and the Conservatives returning back to power after a 13-​year absence. Options four and five would lead to Labour remaining in office. A range of opinions existed within the Conservative Party on the best course of action (Heppell, 2013a: 266–​7). Those on the Thatcherite right were less likely to have voted for Cameron in the 2005 Conservative Party leadership election (Heppell and Hill, 2009). They preferred the option of a Conservative minority administration, or a two-​party minority administration, in which the Conservatives relied on the votes of the eight Democratic Unionists (on the Conservatives as reluctant coalitionists, see Evans, 2012; and for a detailed examination of the views of Conservative members on the coalition, see Bale and Webb, 2016). Those of this opinion were simply angry with Cameron for his failure to deliver outright victory (Stuart, 2011: 247–​8). Thatcherites concluded that the campaign had failed to exploit two massive advantages for a party of opposition –​first, the fact that the Labour government no longer lacked economic credibility; and second, that Brown was a Labour Prime Minister who lacked leadership credibility (Dorey, 2010: 402–​ 3). According to Thatcherites, that failure was due to the misguided campaign that had been fought –​from the decision to enter the prime ministerial leadership debates that had energised the Liberal Democrat campaign, to the nebulous Big Society slogan. Thatcherites directed their anger not only at Cameron, but at his Director of Strategy, Steve Hilton, and Director of Communications, Andy Coulson (Wilson, 2010: 88; for a wider critique of the campaign, see Dorey, 2010; Seawright, 2013b). There was, however, some self-​interest in those who expressed their anger at Cameron for considering a coalition. If a coalition with the Liberal Democrats was formed then this would mean that there might be 20 or so less ministerial offices available for Conservatives. The Conservatives had entered the General Election campaign with a frontbench team of 95 members, all of whom expected ministerial office. Coalition would mean 20 more being on the backbenchers, against their own expectations, and others would be offered lower ranking ministerial offices than they wanted ( Jones, 2010: 620; Heppell, 2014b: 75). However, proceeding as a minority administration carried with it considerable risks (Heppell, 2013a:  267–​8). Gaining parliamentary approval would be a constant struggle and constraint, and there was the immediate concern as to whether they would be able to pass an emergency budget, and their vulnerability to a confidence motion would lead to unstable government (Bale, 2011: 247). A minority Conservative administration would have to advocate an austerity programme given the economic circumstances that they would inherit, which would carry

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

74

with it significant political risk (Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 8). If they lost a confidence motion, it might be very difficult for them to sustain their 36.1 per cent vote share, and match or better the 307 seats, that they had just won (Evans, 2012: 480; Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 333). For Cameron personally, minority administration meant short-​term instability, with his place in history possibly being that of a short-​term temporary Prime Minister (Quinn et al., 2011: 297–​300; Heppell, 2013a: 266–​8, 2014a: 147). Although Cameron had campaigned for a majority he had engaged in some, albeit limited, preparations for a hung Parliament (Boulton and Jones, 2012: 152; d’Ancona, 2014:  15–​21). Through these discussions Cameron concluded that forming a coalition with the Liberal Democrats might be a more desirable outcome than governing as a minority (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 334–​5). During the five days following the inconclusive outcome of the General Election, Cameron, despite suffering from ‘fatigue’ after a long campaign, and considerable ‘disappointment’ about falling agonisingly short, was to provide ‘impressive leadership’ (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 330–​1). He was proactive, and it was the clear that the decision was his, and his alone (Boulton and Jones, 2012: 129–​30; Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 330–​5). He was to set the agenda, and shape the parameters of the negotiation Table 3  Alternative options in terms of government formation in the aftermath of the General Election of May 2010 Possible government

Parties included within possible government (including the number of MPs for each party involved)

Number of seats in possible government and parliamentary majority (Majority 326)

Two-​party coalition with a parliamentary majority Single-​party minority government Two-​party minority government Two-​party coalition with no parliamentary majority Multi-​party coalition with a parliamentary majority

Conservative (306) Liberal Democrats (57) Conservative (306)

363 Majority approximately 80 306 No majority 314 No majority 315 No majority 327 Majority 1

Conservative (306) Democratic Unionists (8) Labour (258) Liberal Democrats (57) Labour (258) Liberal Democrats (57) Scottish National Party (6) Plaid Cymru (3) Social and Democratic Labour Party (3)

Note: The threshold for a majority was 326 (from 650 constituencies) but the five Sinn Féin Members of Parliament did not attend or vote. Source: Adapted from Dunleavy (2012).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controlling the coalition agenda

75

period, by his swift decision to offer the Liberal Democrats a ‘big, open and comprehensive offer’ of a full coalition,1 and by publicly inviting them to work alongside the Conservatives, to provide economic stability in the national interest (Fox, 2010: 611; Quinn et al., 2011: 301; Heppell, 2014a: 148; see also Norton, 2011; Stuart, 2011). The arithmetic helped Cameron, as it was clear that a Conservative–​Liberal Democrat coalition could command a clear majority within the newly formed Parliament, whereas Labour and Liberal Democrats alone would amount to a minority coalition. Nonetheless the tone that Cameron adopted  –​i.e. indicating that he was ‘open minded and flexible about the contours of a coalition’ (Stuart, 2011: 48) –​mattered in terms of reassuring the Liberal Democrats, who expected at best to be offered a confidence and supply agreement (Laws, 2010: 17–​21). His willingness to be so open and overt in his attempt to woo the Liberal Democrats was due of his desire to block any prospect of negotiations, and thus a coalition, between Labour and the Liberal Democrats. There was a real threat to the long-​term future of the Conservative Party should a progressive alliance be struck that enabled Labour to remain in office. The threat was the possible willingness of Labour to offer some form of electoral reform to secure the support of the Liberal Democrats (Boulton and Jones, 2012: 235; Elliott and Hanning, 2012: 399–​401). There was an assumption that many on the centre left –​encompassing parts of both Labour and the Liberal Democrats  –​had long wanted to engineer greater co-​operation between the two parties. They could mobilise the anti-​Conservative majority that existed within the electorate, and through electoral reform potentially lock the Conservatives out of power in perpetuity (Bale and Sanderson-​Nash, 2011: 249). Aligned to this fear was the underlying assumption that most Liberal Democrat parliamentarians, and certainly members, would instinctively prefer to form a coalition with Labour (Evans, 2011: 58–​9; Adonis, 2013: 119). Those fears –​of being locked out of power, and with the rules of the game potentially being changed in a way that would severely damage the long-​term prospects for the Conservatives –​were real and justified (Heppell, 2014a: 148–​9). Cameron was therefore deeply worried when, following negotiations between the Conservative team (Osborne and Hague plus Oliver Letwin and Ed Llewellyn), and the Liberal Democrats (Laws alongside Danny Alexander, Chris Huhne and Andrew Stunell), came the news that the Liberal Democrats were opening up parallel talks with Labour (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 213). The talks between the Conservative and Liberal Democrat negotiating teams had been productive across a wide range of policy issues, but the stumbling block remained electoral reform (Laws, 2010: 104; Wilson, 2010: 162). At this critical juncture Cameron believed, incorrectly it would seem, that Labour were offering the Liberal Democrats AV without a referendum. Cameron concluded that unless the Conservatives conceded some ground on electoral reform the prospect of a coalition being formed with the Liberal Democrats was remote. Although it was ‘distasteful’, Cameron accepted the need to offer the Liberal Democrats a referendum on the AV, and he secured the backing of his

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

76

shadow Cabinet and the PCP for this (Wilson, 2010: 179–​206). In reality it was a case of the shadow Cabinet and the PCP being informed of what Cameron and the negotiating team were going to do, rather than them being asked to endorse, or vote upon, the chosen strategy (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010: 221; Heppell, 2013a: 268–​ 9, 2014a: 149). Running parallel to the Conservative offer vis-​à-​vis AV, the negotiations between Labour and the Liberal Democrats stalled, thus enabling the Conservatives to regain power after 13 years in the wilderness. Although a clear majority would have been preferable, Cameron had coped with the post-​election result period in a way that warranted praise (Heppell, 2013a: 267–​70). It was a critical juncture within British party politics, and Cameron had stalled ‘the realignment of the centre left which had been the aspiration of so many progressives’ and transformed it ‘into a realignment on the centre right’ (Gamble, 2010: 644). Moreover, as the rest of this chapter will explain, Cameron had done so on terms that were reasonably favourable to the Conservatives. Controlling the agenda I: dominating the policy agenda To ascertain how favourable the Coalition Agreement was to the Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats, requires us to examine two issues:  how they negotiated the rewards of office in terms of (a) determining the policy agenda; and (b) deciding upon the ministers to implement that policy agenda (Heppell, 2013a: 266–​74; see also Laver and Schofield, 1990). The next two sections of this chapter consider these two issues in turn, starting with ‘who won’ in terms of policy (Quinn et al., 2011)? Addressing the question of ‘who won’ is based upon evaluating the contents of the full Coalition Agreement, Our Programme for Government, which was built around the unifying themes of freedom, fairness and responsibility (Cabinet Office, 2010a). Published at the same time as Our Programme for Government was a separate document entitled the Constitutional Agreement for Stability and Reform, which mapped out further details on how the coalition would work, explaining, for example, issues around the composition of government, how the principles of collective responsibility would operate, and voting in Parliament (Cabinet Office, 2010b). In forming the coalition the negotiators recognised that collective responsibility could be relaxed on divisive issues –​e.g. during the proposed referendum on electoral reform, tuition fees, the renewal of Trident, nuclear power and tax allowances for married couples. Matthews argues that in making ‘such concessions, a form of safety valve was introduced into the coalition machinery’, which was ‘intended to reduce the pressure at certain junctures in order to protect the integrity’ of the coalition (Matthews, 2011: 497). Our Programme for Government was a 16,000-​word policy document, which was made up of 400 policy pledges covering 31 different sections, which was published

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controlling the coalition agenda

77

on 20 May, and this built upon the initial agreement of 12 May, which covered 11 headings and included 90 policy pledges (Matthews, 2011: 495; Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 23–​4). Evaluating the contents of the Coalition Agreement is based on comparing the policy content for coalition implementation, to the intentions offered in their respective manifestos –​i.e. the Conservative document entitled Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 2010 (The Conservative Party, 2010), and the Liberal Democrat offering of the Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010: Change that Works for You (Liberal Democrats, 2010). It is also an interesting question to ask given that so many Conservative backbenchers were convinced that the coalition negotiations had been ‘won’ by the Liberal Democrats, and that it was they who had out-​negotiated the Conservatives (Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 26). Let us use the actual manifesto commitments as a starting point, and examine how many of them made it into the actual Coalition Agreement. Manifestos may not necessarily be read by many voters, but they have historically contributed to how campaigns are conducted, and how parties project themselves to the electorate. They provide a clear signal with regard to the priorities of each party, and they shape and influence the media coverage of each party during the election campaign. They also can contribute to a party gaining a stronger sense of ownership on a particular issue, and as such can contribute to shifts in public opinion, by building up claims to governing competence (on the importance of manifestos, see Bara, 2005, 2006 and on issue saliency, ownership and competence in the British context, see Green, 2007; Green and Hobolt, 2008; Green and Jennings, 2011, 2012). Whereas manifestos can be seen to constitute a pre-​election ‘contract’ between a party and those that vote for them, the terms of that contract have to be reconsidered when, post-​election, parties start to negotiate on their manifesto commitments when forming a coalition (for a discussion on coalition formation literature, see Müller and Strøm, 2008). A variety of different interpretations on ‘who won’ have emerged from within the academic literature. An evaluation by the Constitution Unit considered the coalition policy agenda from this perspective in the early Cameron–​Clegg era. They concluded that 75 per cent of the policy pledges from the Liberal Democrat manifesto had been included in Our Programme for Government, whereas only 60 per cent of the policy pledges included in the Conservative Party manifesto had (Yong, 2012a:  2). This interpretation seemed to justify Conservative backbench resentment that the Liberal Democrats had indeed ‘punched above their weight’ in the coalition negotiations (Dale, 2012: 50). However, if we examine the comparisons between manifesto commitments and eventual Coalition Agreement, by examining the contents of Our Programme for Government and tracing policy origins back to the manifestos a different picture emerges. Both Hazell and Yong and Matthews have completed appraisals from this perspective and similar patterns emerge. Hazell and Yong argue that when examining Our Programme for Government, 43.6 per cent of all policy pledges can

78

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

be traced back to the Conservative Party manifesto, and in comparison only 20.1 per cent emanate from the Liberal Democrat party manifesto (Hazell and Yong, 2012: 220–​1). Matthews draws similar conclusions, arguing that Our Programme for Government comprised 388 specific policy pledges, and that of these: 168 policies emanated solely from the Conservatives manifesto (or 43.3 percent); 88 policies derived solely from the Liberal Democrat manifesto (or 22.7 percent); 76 policies could be traced back to both party manifestos (19.7 percent); and 56 policies could not be traced back to either party manifesto (or 14.3  percent). (Matthews, 2011: 497)

In addition to the appraisals offered by Hazell and Yong, and by Matthews, it is also worth considering the insights of Quinn et al. (2011), who used the Comparative Manifesto Project coding framework, as a means of comparing and contrasting the coalition programme with the respective manifestos. Quinn et al. worked to locate the content of the manifestos on a left–​right scale. Political, social and economic equality and an enhanced role for the state and higher taxation clearly equated to leftish commitments, whereas commitments based on a smaller state, reduced spending, lower taxation and the promotion of the market, were aligned to the right within the coding framework –​for a wider discussion on this method and its value to understanding coalition government, see Laver and Budge (1992), Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2006). The extent of the difference between the original manifesto and the Coalition Agreement was as follows. On the left–​right scale, where 0 represents a centrist position between left and right and minus represents to the left, and plus constitutes the right, the Liberal Democrats were identified as being at -​3.0, whereas the Conservatives were positioned at +17.6. Table  4 includes a detailed overview of the Coalition Agreement covering all sections, and from this the overall score was +1.6, which is closer to the Liberal Democrat original position than that of the Conservatives, with the Liberal Democrats shifting by 4.6 and the Conservatives by 16.0 (Quinn et al., 2011: 302). It is clear that the Liberal Democrats did contribute to the ideological watering down of the plans that the Conservatives had within their manifesto. The main policy win for the Liberal Democrats can be said to be in the area of public services, as on jobs and welfare, the NHS, schools, pensions and the elderly, and social care, the measure was to the left (Quinn et al., 2011: 302–​5). Although this suggests the Conservatives had conceded more policy ground than perhaps was expected or necessary, and justifies the scepticism of right-​wing Conservative backbenchers, these findings need to be contextualised. Consider the following. First, in terms of economic policy, their findings produced a measure to the right, with regard to taxation and deficit reduction. Although the Liberal Democrats managed to get the Conservatives to concede ground by agreeing to a cut in taxation for the lowest

Controlling the coalition agenda

79

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Table 4  Right–​left scores for individual sections in the Coalition Agreement Section

Heading

3 29 21 6 14 17 9 20 8 27 1 13 10 16

Civil liberties Taxation National security Crime and policing Families Immigration Deficit reduction Justice Defence Social action Banking Europe Energy and climate Government transparency Environment and food Political reform Culture Equalities Transport Communities Public health Social care Universities Foreign affairs Pensions and elderly Business Schools NHS Jobs and welfare International development Consumer protection Foreword to agreement Back cover to agreement Total (of whole agreement)

11 24 7 12 30 4 25 28 31 15 23 2 26 22 19 18 5

% of all statements

Right %

Left %

Rile %

2.9 2.4 1.6 3.5 2.7 1.7 2.2 1.9 2.9 1.7 2.7 2.2 5.4 2.7

100.0 93.3 90.0 77.3 64.7 63.6 57.1 66.7 44.4 54.5 52.9 7.1 14.7 5.9

0 0 10.0 0 0 0 0 16.7 16.7 27.3 41.2 0 8.8 0

100.0 93.3 80.0 77.3 64.7 63.6 57.1 50.0 27.8 27.3 11.8 7.1 5.9 5.9

3.5 7.0 2.7 1.4 2.5 4.9 1.0 1.3 2.4 1.9 1.6 4.3 3.5 6.8 2.5 3.7

4.5 4.5 0 0 6.3 9.7 16.7 0 6.7 25.0 0 18.5 0 7.0 0 4.3

0 0 0 0 6.3 25.8 33.3 25.0 33.3 58.3 40.0 59.3 50.0 62.8 62.5 78.3

4.5 4.5 0 0 0 −​16.1 −​16.7 −​25.0 −​26.7 −​33.3 −​40.0 −​40.8 −​50.0 −​55.8 −​62.5 −​73.9

1.7 10.0 0.8 100.0

0 25.4 40.0 25.6

81.8 19.0 0 24.0

−​81.8 6.3 40.0 1.6

Note: RILE % = Right % –​Left %. Left + right % do not add up to 100% because some statements cannot be coded as either left or right. Source: Quinn et al. (2011: 304).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

80

Cameron

paid, Quinn et al. conclude that overall the Conservatives ‘won’ with regard to economic policy. Second, when considering security related matters  –​an umbrella term encapsulating crime and policing, justice and defence, immigration and national security –​the measure was also tending to the right, confirming that this was another area where the Conservatives can be said to have ‘won’. Third, the Conservatives were not required to concede policy ground on their most contentious area of policy –​i.e. European policy (Quinn et al., 2011: 306). As a consequence, both Norton and Bale, the pre-​eminent academics of Conservative Party politics in recent decades, have argued that Cameron protected the Conservatives ‘red lines’ on deficit reduction, defence, immigration and European policy (Norton, 2011: 257; Bale, 2012b: 328; see also Heppell, 2013a: 270–​1). Although Matthews would argue that both parties had ‘reasons to be satisfied’ as they both secured ‘victories’ in policy areas of real importance to them (2011: 497), such an argument has to come with a significant caveat  –​i.e. the pre-​eminence of deficit reduction over all else (Quinn et  al., 2011:  302–​5; Dorey and Garnett, 2016:  25). The subordination of the Liberal Democrat ambitions in the social sphere, to Conservative realism in the economic sphere, defined the trajectory of the coalition over the next five years, exemplified by tuition fees (which will be explored in greater detail in ­chapter 6, pp. 100–​2). Prioritising deficit reduction was a decision which ‘trumped all others’ within the Coalition Agreement, and as a consequence, on balance it can be argued that in policy terms it was a ‘victory’ for the Conservatives (Dorey et al., 2011: 191; Norton, 2011: 256; Heppell, 2013a: 271). Controlling the agenda II: marginalising Liberal Democrats ministers When analysing coalition formation it is clear that the negotiation process embraces two elements. The first element, and the one that should be of the greatest importance, relates to policy as discussed above, but of course for elite politicians the second element is of equal importance  –​i.e. the balances in terms of ministerial office.2 When analysing the ministerial rewards in terms of the Cameron–​Clegg coalition the focus should be on three themes (see Heppell, 2014b: 66): • Proportionality or numbers –​how many ministerial offices were granted to the junior coalition partner, relative to the parliamentary strength of the coalition parties? • Portfolio distribution –​to what extent do the Conservatives retain dominance or ownership of the portfolios that were key to their political identity and decision-​ making within government; and aligned to this, was breadth of portfolios across the full range of government departments a mistake by the Liberal Democrats? • Proportionality and portfolio distribution were part of the debates surrounding coalition formation, but every reshuffle constituted a potential renegotiation for both of the parties. How effectively did Cameron (and Clegg) use this?

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controlling the coalition agenda

81

Within the comparative politics academic literature on coalition formation the work of Gamson, and also Browne and Franklin, act as reference points (Gamson, 1961; Browne and Franklin, 1973). Their work comparing coalition formations demonstrated a correlation between the seats the junior partner held, as a percentage within the coalition, and the percentage of ministerial posts that they were granted –​ i.e. the theory of proportionality. Thereafter, academics have sought to test the theory, with further research suggesting that coalition formation actually results in slightly more ministerial positions being offered to the junior partner than proportionality would expect, and thus the larger party being rewarded with slightly less than proportionality would demand (Schofield and Laver, 1985; Ansolabehere et al., 2005; Carroll and Cox, 2007; see also Laver and Schofield, 1990; Budge and Keman, 1999). Numerically it is clear that the Liberal Democrats did well in terms of ministerial offices when the coalition was formed (Heppell, 2013a: 270–​1; 2014b: 69–​ 70). They secured 19.3 per cent of the ministerial positions, and 21.7 per cent of all Cabinet positions, which was slightly higher than the overall level of Liberal Democrat representation within the coalition as a whole –​15.7 per cent from the combined coalition representation (364) within the House of Commons (Quinn et al., 2011: 307; Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 31). For elite politicians, however, the prestige associated with the portfolios that the respective coalition partners secured matters almost as much as the numbers. This is not unusual, as portfolios have long been identified as a critical part of coalition formation vis-​à-​vis ministerial rewards (Laver and Budge, 1992; Warwick and Druckman, 2001; Bäck et al., 2009). The prestige attached to particular departments and portfolios is reflective of their assumed influence within government. Which Cabinet positions each party secures matters because controlling the policy agenda within a specific department lies with the Secretary of State (Laver and Shepsle, 1996:  295), and furthermore, existing academic research suggests that the capacity for junior ministers to influence policy within departments is limited (see, for example, Theakston et al., 2014). Assumptions about prestige and influence reflect the need for coalition parties, especially the junior party, to claim ownership and distinctiveness within the coalition, with this being key to their identity, but also their electoral strategy (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 183; see also Bäck et al., 2011). This leads to the obvious question about the prestige of the Cabinet appointments, both in terms of what Cameron claimed as Conservative-​owned, and what he was willing to offer to the Liberal Democrats. In asking this question it should be noted that issues to do with portfolio allocation, and thus prestige, were left to bilateral discussions between Cameron and Clegg, rather than being central to the formal coalition negotiations (Bennister and Heffernan, 2012: 781). On this Evans argues that Cameron simply outmanoeuvred Clegg (Evans, 2011: 55). This is evident on a number of levels. First, the so-​called ‘great offices of state’ –​ the Treasury; the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Home Office  –​ were held by Conservatives  –​Osborne, Hague and May, respectively (Heppell,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

82

Cameron

2013a: 271–​2, 2014b: 69; Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 31). Second, the key spending departments were also held by the Conservatives  –​e.g. Education (Michael Gove), Health (Andrew Lansley), and former leader, Duncan Smith ran Work and Pensions. The biggest departmental budget granted to the Liberal Democrats was the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, which was seventh largest in terms of departmental budget size (Paun, 2011: 256; see also Debus, 2011: 300; Lees, 2011: 284). Third, the crossover from opposition into power was relatively smooth for the Conservative frontbench, in that 14 of them, out of 18 in the newly formed Cabinet, held the same portfolio entering power as they had before the General Election (Russell, 2010: 519; Heppell, 2013a: 271, 2014b: 67). That the Liberal Democrats were marginalised is evident from the following. First, of the five Cabinet posts that they did secure none of them replicated the roles that the five in question had held in opposition (Russell, 2010: 519). Second, they were excluded from leading the key departments, and as such the central policy issues that would define the coalition –​i.e. economic policy, foreign policy or the key domestic policy issues of law and order, health, education, employment, welfare, were all in the hands of Conservatives (Debus, 2011: 300; Lees, 2011: 284; Heppell, 2014b: 69–​70; Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 31). Of these the inability of the Liberal Democrats to get the Education Department was significant. Education was a high priority issue for the Liberal Democrats during their election campaign and Cameron denied them the opportunity to develop this, and thus claim ownership of it, in office (Debus, 2011: 302). Third, the Conservatives also retained ownership of the Department for International Development. This mattered to the Conservatives because it was a ring-​fenced department in terms of the austerity programme that was to be implemented, and it was part of the brand decontamination strategy that Cameron had implemented in opposition. Retaining this gave the Conservatives some scope to continue to narrate their image as having a compassionate component, showcasing their concern for global poverty and social injustice (Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012: 130–​8; Heppell, 2014b: 69–​70). Fourth, of the departments that were granted to the Liberal Democrats only three of them were at the level of Secretary of State, and yet the balance and power dynamics within such departments was still different. McEnhill captured this, arguing that: the departments that were led by Liberal Democrats tended also to contain a preponderance of Conservative junior ministers. Business, Innovation and Skills, for example, had one Liberal Democrat junior in comparison to seven Conservatives, while all three Energy and Climate Change juniors were Conservatives. In contrast, departments led by Conservatives usually had only one Liberal Democrat ‘watchdog’ alongside one or more Conservative juniors. Thus, while the Conservative juniors in Liberal Democrat-​led departments possessed the necessary resources to effectively monitor and participate in the full range of departmental business, the same could not necessarily be said of Liberal Democrat juniors within Conservative-​led departments. (McEnhill, 2015: 101–​8)

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Controlling the coalition agenda

83

The above quote cites two of the three departments that the Liberal Democrats led on. Offering the Liberal Democrats the Department for Energy and Climate Change was an opportunistic act on behalf of Cameron (Heppell, 2014b: 69–​70). The Liberal Democrat manifesto had outlined their objection to the development of further nuclear power stations, and yet months later the compromises of coalition required that Huhne announce, and then justify, plans for the construction of eight nuclear power stations (Russell, 2010: 516). The most famous humiliation for the Liberal Democrats would relate to them being offered the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Here Cameron showed himself to be an astute and manipulative operator. Prime Ministers often enter power and make changes to the machinery of government. Cameron largely avoided this temptation, but he did rename the Department for Children, Families and Schools, the Department of Education. He ensured that this department remained in Conservative hands, but Cameron could have used the renaming of it the Department of Education as an opportunity to place responsibility for higher education within it. Higher education, however, remained under the auspices of the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, leaving the vexed issue of tuition fees under their control, and then handed the department to the Liberal Democrats (Evans, 2011: 57; Heppell, 2014b: 69–​70). Similar to the case of nuclear power, Cameron would require the Liberal Democrats to contradict their campaigning position on tuition fees, and as the next chapter will consider (pp. 87–​107) the consequences would be devastating. It left the Liberal Democrats lacking coherence and undermined their credibility (Finn, 2015: 497). The other three posts offered to the Liberal Democrats were either peripheral to Conservative concerns, or could be worked to the advantage of the Conservatives, or the disadvantage of the Liberal Democrats (Heppell, 2014b: 69–​70; Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 31–​2). So, for example, in the post-​devolutionary era the Scottish Office had become a relatively ‘unsubstantial office’ and, therefore, offering it to the Liberal Democrats (who had previously advocated its abolition), was of no real consequence to the Conservatives (Bennister and Heffernan, 2012: 781). Placing a Liberal Democrat in the Treasury, but subordinate to Osborne (first Laws and then Alexander), was simply to ensure that the Liberal Democrats were bound in to the tough economic choices that the coalition would implement (Laws, 2010: 200). Alexander became a form of ‘human shield’ for Osborne, absorbing a significant amount of the ‘political flak’ for austerity policies, according to Dorey and Garnett (2016: 32). Finally, the most significant marginalisation was that of Clegg as Deputy Prime Minister. Between them, Cameron and Clegg agreed that instead of leading the Home Office, Clegg should be based in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, charged with responsibility for political reform (Heppell, 2014b:  69; Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 32). Had Clegg been located in the Home Office he could have made an attempt to ‘carve out a distinctly liberal agenda’ that ‘would have given both a power base and a policy record of his own which he could have been able to stand on at the next General Election’ (Yong, 2012b: 43). Instead Clegg was left ‘overworked’

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

84

Cameron

and ‘understaffed’ (Bale, 2012b: 329), where he was focused on electoral and House of Lords reform, issues that, in an age of austerity, not only had low saliency but made Clegg look self-​interested (Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 32). What of reshuffles? Could they have presented the Liberal Democrats with an opportunity to reassess the relationship between the two coalition parties  –​by seeking to renegotiate on numbers and proportionality and portfolio distribution? If Cameron decided upon wholescale ministerial reshuffling, including changes to portfolio distribution, then such changes required the joint agreement of Clegg as the leader of the junior coalition partner (Fox, 2010: 615). As the above analysis suggests, the negotiations had produced an outcome that aided the Conservatives, then Cameron had no real incentive to want to engage in reshuffles (Heppell, 2014b:  70–​72).3 Cameron restricted himself to small ministerial changes out of necessity –​largely caused by resignations (e.g. Fox from Defence, Laws from the Treasury or Huhne from Energy). When later in the Parliament he did engage in two substantive reshuffles, September 2012 and July 2014, the number of Cabinet posts for the Liberal Democrats, and their portfolios, remained unchanged. Below Cabinet rank, only limited portfolio adjustments occurred in the 2012 reshuffle, as the Liberal Democrats switched two of their junior ministerial positions in Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office, for two junior roles within the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (gaining the role of Minister for Agriculture and Food), and in the Department for International Development, but with both prestige and proportionality unaffected (Heppell, 2014b: 70–​2). Across the five years of coalition, the Liberal Democrats had ministerial representation across a wide range of government. They spread themselves wide but thin with only four departments being left without ministerial representation –​ Northern Ireland and Culture, Media and Sport, and up until 2012, International Development and Environment. It was a strategy that they chose, but one which the Conservatives were supportive of and comfortable with (Yong, 2012b:  43). However, breadth of ministerial representation would dilute their impact and upon reflection they would have been better served going for depth –​i.e. obtaining a smaller number of departments in which they had ministers, but increasing the possibility that particular policy areas could become seen as owned by them (see Debus, 2011; McEnhill, 2015). Ownership in this way would have increased their capacity to present themselves as having policy successes to their name. However, they believed that breadth would make their junior ministers ‘watchdogs’, and as such they could act as a restraining influence within Conservative dominated departments (McEnhill, 2015). McEnhill argues that although breadth encouraged ministerial co-​operation, and thus an integrated rather than a segmented model of coalition, it afforded the Liberal Democrats less of an opportunity to express dissent with coalition policies, thereby limiting their ability to retain their distinctiveness (McEnhill, 2015: 101–​8).

Controlling the coalition agenda

85

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion Cameron had hoped to be able to secure a majority for the Conservatives in the General Election of May 2010. The failure of his party to secure that majority tested Cameron’s strategic agility, and this chapter has demonstrated that the Conservatives managed the coalition formation and negotiation stages reasonably effectively. Notwithstanding the risks that Cameron took with electoral reform, which was necessary to ensure the formation of the coalition, Bale argues that beyond that there was not much in policy terms ‘that the Liberal Democrats gained that even mainstream Tories could not live with’ (Bale, 2012b:  238). Any ground that the Conservatives may have conceded in terms of public services –​on jobs and welfare, health care, schools and pensions  –​was qualified by the fact that the commitment to deficit reduction shaped all other aspects of policy (Norton, 2011: 257). Bale notes that the Conservative negotiators were surprised by the ‘naivety’ of the Liberal Democrats (Bale, 2016:  359) and that the outcome in terms of policy and personnel shows ‘what happens when vegetarians negotiate with carnivores’ (Bale, 2012b: 328). When adding into the mix the issue of tuition fees, largely deferred in the coalition negotiations and to be addressed once the Browne Report on higher education finance was completed in late 2010, Bale concludes that it is difficult to conceive that a continental European party in the same position as the Liberal Democrats would have negotiated a deal which left all of the high offices of state in their partners’ hands, left that partner in full control of fiscal and economic policy, made it chiefly responsible for devising and implementing a policy (university tuition fees) that made a mockery of its prior commitments, and offered it so few tangible policy wins on which to fight the next election. (Bale 2011: 248)

That latter issue also mattered as the Liberal Democrats had been marginalised in terms of their ability to: (a) have a significant influence upon policy (as they were spread thinly across such a wide range of government activity, rather than densely populated in a small number of ministries); and (b) as a consequence it was difficult for them to claim control or ownership of specific policies, which matters in terms of party identity and appeal (as the next chapter will explore in greater detail). When placing the performance of the coalition into its wider longer term electoral context McEnhill concluded that: even if the coalition government itself is broadly popular, it is likely that the major partner will reap the bulk of the electoral spoils from such popularity through being more visibly associated with policy successes. Therefore, the smaller party has to work hard not only to separate itself from senior-​led policies that it may not agree with, but also to claim its share of the credit for those it does support. (McEnhill, 2015: 107)

Cameron

86

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Notes 1 There is a distinction between executive coalitions –​based on the parties that ministers are selected from –​and legislative coalitions –​based on the votes in Parliament that sustain the government, and here support parties can be part of a legislative coalition (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 67). 2 There is a long tradition of academic research on ministerial selection, covering a range of themes such as appointments and dismissals, longevity and turnover, ideological and social background characteristics of those selected (or not). Built into the literature on ministerial selection is a recognition of the constraints involved for Prime Ministers in terms of the pool of talent that they can select from. It is therefore a power which is characterised by bargaining and it is also tied to issues of party management (see, for example, Alderman, 1976, 1995; Alderman and Cross, 1979, 1981, 1985, 1986, 1987; Alderman and Carter, 1992; Berlinski et  al., 2007, 2012; Allen and Ward, 2009; Jones, 2010; Kam et al., 2010; King and Allen, 2010). 3 What emerges from the comparative academic work on ministerial reshuffles in coalition governments is how they occur less often than in single-​party governments (see Berlinski et al., 2007: 259; Allen and Ward, 2009: 336).

6

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Political binding: coalition unity and the exploitation of the Liberal Democrats

The idea of outmanoeuvring the Liberal Democrats in terms of policy and personnel is not the only way in which Cameron exploited his junior coalition partners. The other way was in legislative terms. The previous chapter considered the options that were available to Cameron in the aftermath of the General Election of 2010. It was emphasised how governing alone as a minority government, or striking an arrangement with the Democratic Unionists (which still left him without a majority) would have created a huge legislative complication for him. Forming a coalition with the Liberal Democrats created an artificial majority in the House of Commons of over 80. If Cameron could legislatively bind those 57 Liberal Democrat votes to him in parliamentary divisions, or the vast majority of them, it would also provide breathing space from his own backbench critics –​i.e. those on the hard Eurosceptic and socially Conservative right, or the non-​Cameronite modernisers (Fox, 2010:  688). In doing so he had manufactured a scenario in which the Liberal Democrat frontbench and backbench was expected to support in Parliament measures that they actually opposed (Yong, 2012c: 118). This can be seen within the context of ‘binding’, and the idea of limiting the freedom of action of rivals (Elster, 2000: 276–​7). It can also be seen as part of the Cameronite strategy of limiting the distinctiveness of the Liberal Democrats within the coalition –​i.e. their role as junior partner was to prop up Cameron in Parliament (i.e. to provide unity), and then for the Conservatives to claim ownership of successes in office. This chapter explores how in the short to medium term Cameron engaged in legislative binding to exploit his junior coalition partners, but that the longer term objective was to undermine their identity and distinctiveness and reap an electoral dividend at the next General Election (Heppell, 2013a). The chapter is broken down into two distinct sections as a means of showcasing Cameron’s manipulative skills in action. The first section considers the evidence of the coalition’s cohesion in legislative terms, and how Liberal Democrat votes buttressed him against dissent within his own parliamentary ranks. It will do so by identifying the issues which involved dissent and it will offer explanations as to causes of that dissent. This section of the chapter also explores how and why, despite high coalition

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

88

Cameron

dissension levels, the impact upon Cameron’s credibility as a Prime Minister was limited because of the circumstances of being in coalition between 2010 and 2015, as compared to being a single-​party government. The second section of the chapter looks at the consequences to the Liberal Democrats of being legislatively bound to the Conservatives. Here the section looks at the negative impact in terms of how they lost their distinctiveness (focusing here specifically on two examples of where the Liberal Democrats accepted the Conservatives’ viewpoint –​i.e. that austerity was necessary in the national interest, and how and why they made a volte-​face on tuition fees). It also considers how they struggled to demonstrate that they had influence, and how that loss of distinctiveness and influence had seismic electoral implications, culminating in their meltdown at the 2015 General Election, with the main benefactors being the Conservatives. However, before considering these issues it is worth considering how decision-​ making was made at elite level within the coalition. This involves considering two issues –​first, the significance of the personal relationship between Cameron and Clegg, and second, the significance of the decision-​making forum that was the Quad. These two issues matter as they provide us with an insight into the functioning of the coalition. Let us consider the Cameron–​Clegg relationship first. Here it was clear that personality mattered. At the time of the formation of the coalition, it was noted that both leaders came from similar backgrounds (Cameron went to Eton, and Clegg to Winchester) and both leaders were of a similar age (Cameron was 44 and Clegg was 43), and these were cited as factors which, somewhat simplistically, were said to explain their ‘good personal chemistry’ (Stuart, 2011: 49). Although that initial positivity would be challenged by the impact of events, notably over the AV referendum, constituency equalisation and House of Lords reform (see pp.  109–​13), they retained a ‘mutual respect for each other’ which went ‘beyond mutual survival’ (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015:  240). Towards the end of the parliamentary term Cameron had developed a ‘genuine affection’ for Clegg, and they both believed that there was ‘a strong likelihood that they will be in government together after the election’ (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 501). Even though Conservative electoral strategy was geared towards targeting Liberal Democrat seats, both leaders had assigned teams to begin informal work on a new coalition agreement, although this was kept relatively low profile, given the disapproval that it would create on the wings of their respective parties (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 501). Of their working relationship, Clegg offered the following assessment: over time we both became attuned to each other’s priorities, to sense what was serious and what wasn’t, whether arguments were confected or whether they were real, whether it was personal or political, all that kind of stuff. He used to be nonplussed about some of the things I  would get very stubborn or difficult about, and I’d be completely nonplussed about some of the things he would dig his heels in on. It was

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Political binding

89

helpful that we spoke on the phone quite often, invariably at the end of the weekends, and having these meetings on Monday, which act as a pretty effective filter. The things we discussed were almost always problems which couldn’t be resolved by others. In a very practical way, our job was to find agreement where others had not been able to. If you know you don’t agree with the person you’re talking to from the outset, it removes any of the emotional fractiousness because you’re not surprised that you don’t agree. So if you disagree and you’re open about your disagreement and try to find agreement, you might succeed or fail, but it’s actually quite a straightforward transaction. (Clegg, 2018)

And on the issue of how being in coalition played within their respective parties, Clegg was realistic as he recognised how in a rather symmetrical way, he was under huge pressure from the right of his party and I was under pressure from the left of mine. And neither of us had a huge incentive to push either too much into the hands of those wings of our parties. (Clegg, 2018)

There is certainly some validity to the assertion that the ‘obvious rapport’ between Cameron and Clegg was a source of annoyance amongst those Conservative parliamentarians who ‘resented’ being in coalition, and the way in which they felt Cameron had ‘bounced’ them into it (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 28, 502). These unreconciled Conservatives also disliked the importance of the Quad. This was the name given to the regularly scheduled meetings of the ‘inner Cabinet’ comprising of Cameron and Osborne for the Conservatives, and Clegg and Alexander for the Liberal Democrats (Matthews, 2019:  158). Understanding the Quad, which initially met on a monthly basis but over time the number of meetings grew, was one way of ‘deciphering’ how the coalition was functioning (and surviving) (Forsyth, 2012). When summarising the workings of the Quad on Conservative Home in 2012, Tim Montgomerie identified why it was so resented, not just by backbench Conservatives but by some ministers. The coalition was being run by the Quad, as it was the Quad that would ‘decide all major matters of policy’ (Montgomerie, 2012). More importantly, the Quad developed a reputation as being of greater importance than the actual Cabinet. Clegg described the Quad as the ‘engine room of decision-​making’ within the coalition, and that decisions made there were ‘rarely changed’ by Cabinet, which he said had little influence in terms of the overall ‘trajectory’ of policy (Clegg, 2018). This would antagonise many Conservatives, whether frontbench or backbench, for the following reasons. First, it created an imbalance of power in relation to decision-​making. The Liberal Democrats had only 57 parliamentarians out of the 363 coalition parliamentarians (or 15.7 per cent), and they had five out of a 23-​strong Cabinet (or 21.7 per cent), and yet within the Quad, where real power was located, they had two out of four, or 50 per cent (Montgomerie, 2012). Second, the two Conservatives within the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

90

Cameron

Quad were modernising liberal Conservatives, and the traditionalist Conservative right were excluded (although the same applied on the Liberal Democrat side with their two representatives being on the orange book wing of their party) (Montgomerie, 2012). Third, decisions made within the Treasury dominated Quad are then ‘handed down’ to ministers, thereby limiting their ‘freedom of manoeuvre’ (Montgomerie, 2012). However, those Conservatives hostile to being in coalition seemed be unwilling to acknowledge the value of the Quad in providing some degree of coherence to the coalition, and a forum for managing disagreements (Matthews, 2019). The Cameron–​Clegg relationship and the Quad fuelled a level of anger amongst Conservatives that was disproportionate. It was a partial and selective interpretation of coalition dynamics which failed to recognise the extent to which Cameron was exploiting and using the Liberal Democrats. Coalition cohesion: legislative binding and the Liberal Democrats as lobby fodder There is a long tradition of academics charting the evidence of parliamentary cohesion within British political parties, and from within this literature it is clear that rebellion rates give us an insight into the perceived competence of the governing party (see Norton, 1975, 1978, 1980; Cowley, 2002, 2005). It is from that body of academic literature that we are able to contrast different governments across time, and to compare rebelliousness between the Conservatives and Labour. Of course, it also enables us to see how the coalition rebellion rate compares. Although parliamentary cohesion remains the norm, there has been an increasing propensity of rebellion within governing parties. When commenting upon the evidence of backbench rebellion in the 1945 to 1959 period (i.e. when a parliamentarian enters the division lobbies to vote against the explicit instructions of their own Whips’ Office), Samuel Beer commented that ‘cohesion was so high that there was no point in political scientists measuring dissent levels’ (Beer, 1965: 350). Table 5 outlines the rebellion rates amongst governing party parliamentarians, as a percentage of all votes, and it showcases how in the period between 1945 and 1959 the rebellion rate was in single figures. With regard to the Conservatives, this does not mean that disputes did not exist within the PCP, as they did, but they did tend to be ‘temporary’ and over ‘solitary and specific issues’, according to Berrington (1961: 368). Evidence regarding the growth in Conservative backbench parliamentary dissent emerged in the 1959–​64 term, and was sustained during the Heath premiership of 1970–​74, when the rate for dissent increased to 12 and then 18 per cent (Norton, 1978: 208). That habit of Conservative backbench rebellion continued during the 1979–​97 period, with the dissension rate oscillating between 12 and 16 per cent (Cowley and Norton, 1999: 86). It is interesting to note that although the 1992–​97 PCP was assumed to be overwhelmed by internal feuding, the level of rebellion –​dominated as it was

Political binding

91

Table 5  Government rebellion rates in the House of Commons, 1945 to 2015 Government Labour 1945–​51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conservative 1951–​64 Labour 1964–​70 Conservative 1970–​74 Labour 1974–​79 Conservative 1979–​97

Labour 1997–​2010 Conservative–​Liberal Democrat coalition

1945–​50: 1950–​51 1951–​55 1955–​59 1959–​64 1964–​66 1966–​70 1970–​74 1974 1974–​79 1979–​83 1983–​87 1987–​92 1992–​97 1997–​2001 2001–​5 2005–​10 2010–​15 (Conservative only)

Majority

Rebellion rate (%)

146 5 17 59 100 4 99 31 no majority 3 44 144 101 21 179 167 66 coalition 81

6 2 1 1 12 0.2 8 19 7 20 12 16 12 13 8 21 28 35 (25)

Note: The rebellion rate for the 2015–​17 Parliament has not yet been subject to a systematic review and therefore is not available. Sources: Norton (1978: 208), Cowley and Norton (1999: 86), Cowley and Stuart (2012a: 44–​8) and Cowley et al. (2016: 108–​9).

by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty –​was only 13 per cent of all divisions (Cowley, 1999; Cowley and Norton, 1999). During the course of the 2010–​15 Parliament there were 1,239 parliamentary divisions. Covering both coalition parties a total of 438 divisions, around 35 per cent, involved at least one incident of coalition dissent. When we limit rebellion rates to Conservative parliamentarians alone the rebellion rate was 25 per cent, or 310 divisions (Cowley et al., 2016: 108–​9). It amounted to the highest percentage of governing dissent for a post-​war government –​with 35 per cent surpassing the 28 per cent dissension rate of the Blair–​Brown led government of the 2005 to 2010 Parliament (Cowley et al., 2016: 109). In terms of the Conservatives alone, in both government and opposition, it was their most rebellious Parliament of the post-​war era (Cowley et al., 2016: 109). This leads us to ask three key questions: first, what policy issues created the rebellions; second, what factors explain the high level of rebellions; and third, did the high rebellion rate matter as much as normal, given that the circumstances of coalition were so different to being a single-​party government?

Cameron

92

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Rebels with causes On the first question of what issues led to rebellion the answer is many and varied, and some of them involved only small numbers. On the dominant policy issue for the government –​i.e. the economy –​there was ‘relatively little dispute’ (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 49). The most contentious and consequential issues were Europe, House of Lords reform and military intervention in Syria (although contentious issues such as the same-​sex marriage legislation divided the PCP, the whip was not applied and therefore it does not count as a rebellion, Bale, 2016: 389–​91; Cowley et al., 2016: 113–​14). As expected, it was Europe that proved to be the primary cause of rebellion amongst Conservative parliamentarians. It would account for one-​fifth of all Conservative rebellions, and of these they were ‘double the average size of all Conservative rebellions’ (Cowley et al., 2016: 110). In October 2011, David Nuttall, a rebellious hard Eurosceptic backbencher, tabled a motion calling for a referendum in the next session on continued membership of the EU. Cameron had decided that a three line whip should be imposed on two grounds:  first, a referendum in this Parliament was not in the manifesto and was not official party policy; and, second, if left un-​whipped, around 150-plus might vote and the momentum that this would create had to be stalled (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 168–​9). In the end Cameron was still humiliated, as despite applying considerable pressure to ensure compliance, a total of 81 backbenchers rebelled, although thanks to opposition support, the coalition overcame what was the largest rebellion over European policy in the post-​war era, by 483 to 111 (Cowley and Stuart, 2012b: 402–​6). Then, in October 2012 the Conservative backbencher, Mark Reckless, tabled an amendment arguing for a real terms reduction in the EU budget in the 2014–​20 period. With over 50 Conservatives backing Reckless, and with Labour support, this resulted in a government defeat. Cameron was humiliated and complained about the ‘disloyalty’ of his Conservative parliamentarians (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015:  489). As a consequence, the leadership became keen to avoid further parliamentary divisions over European matters. Cameron had hoped that the January 2013 pledge to win the next election, and then renegotiate terms of continued membership, and then hold an in-​out referendum, would diffuse the European issue until beyond the next General Election (Copsey and Haughton, 2014). However, as many hard Eurosceptics were distrustful of Cameron, they tabled an amendment in May 2013 expressing ‘regret’ that the commitment to a referendum was not included in the Queen’s Speech. Facing what would have been an ‘enormous’ rebellion, Cameron decided to allow ‘a partial free vote on the issue’, as ‘ministers would abstain, while backbenchers could do what they liked’ (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 50). A total of 114 Conservative backbenchers choose to vote for the amendment (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 270). Even after having committed to the principle of the referendum, and then legislating for one, through the European Union Referendum Bill,

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Political binding

93

rebellions continued. In September 2015 nearly 40 Conservative backbenchers voted against the government, and with Labour and the SNP, to block ministers from amending the so-​called purdah rules limiting government activity during the campaign, and the government was defeated by 312 votes to 285 (HC Deb, 599, Col. 123, 7 September 2015). If Europe provoked the most significant (and persistent) form of rebellion, then the second most complex issue for the party whips related to the political reform aspects of the coalition agenda. The next chapter will consider the following in greater detail:  first, the AV referendum; second, the Fixed Term Parliament Act; third, House of Lords reform; and fourth, the equalisation of constituencies within the House of Commons (see pp. 109–​13). In terms of assessing legislative dissent the most significant event was in July 2012, on the Second Reading of the House of Lords Bill, which would have resulted in a significant reduction in the number of peers and phased moves towards the majority of future peers being elected on 15-​year terms. Brady, chair of the 1922 Committee of Backbench Conservatives, reflected the doubts amongst his backbenchers, many of whom felt that the proposed changes were ‘repellent’ and reflective of Cameron’s willingness to ‘make very profound constitutional changes for very short-​term political advantage’ (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015:  367). However, despite knowing that there might be disquiet about the proposals on the Conservative backbenches, there was ‘no concerted and consistent attempt by the leadership to prevent backbench opposition to it gaining momentum’ (Bale, 2016: 384). At the second reading of the Bill, in July 2012, a total of 91 Conservatives voted against. Those rebelling were not necessarily the usual suspects, and included a total of 47 from the 2010 intake (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 368). With this level of dissent, and without the support of the Labour opposition, it seemed inevitable that a similar size rebellion would result in a government defeat. Withdrawing the legislation, rather than suffering a defeat, was less politically damaging to Cameron. However, the impact was massive as far as the Liberal Democrats were concerned –​ i.e. a central plank of the Coalition Agreement, and one that mattered a lot to them after their humiliation over AV, had fallen by the wayside due to the threat of rebellion by Conservative backbenchers (Cowley, 2015:  150). In an environment of ‘mutual resentment’ the Liberal Democrats retaliated by removing their support for constituency equalisation (Norton, 2015:  480). The Conservatives were furious as they thought the deal between the coalition partners was as follows –​ the Conservatives would grant the Liberal Democrats a referendum on AV, and in return the Liberal Democrats would support the Conservatives plans for constituency equalisation. To Conservatives the issue of House of Lords reform was separate to these two developments, and now the Liberal Democrats were retrospectively linking House of Lords reform to constituency equalisation (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015:  369). Clegg would later admit to the significance of this, noting that:

Cameron

94

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

there were very few occasions when I can remember either of us really losing it with each other. I remember he really lost his temper and cool when I vetoed the re-​drawing of the constituency boundaries, because I was incensed that they’d pulled the plug on House of Lords reform. Unsurprisingly, because that was his ticket, at least he thought at the time, to a majority. (Clegg, 2018)

In August 2013 Cameron suffered a humiliating parliamentary defeat over military intervention in Syria (Kaarbo and Kenealy, 2016: 28). The coalition had concluded that it was morally justifiable for the international community to engage in a military response (as was the clear position of the Obama administration), after the Assad regime used chemical weapons against insurgents (Norton, 2015:  486). It was argued that advocating a military response would be consistent with the liberal interventionism that had come to define Cameron’s approach, as evident from his response to the Libyan Civil War in 2011 (see Beech, 2011; Beech and Oliver, 2014; Daddow, 2015; Honeyman, 2017). Cameron had incorrectly assumed that he would have the backing of the Labour opposition, which would offset any dissent on the government backbenches (Strong, 2015; Gaskarth, 2016). However, when the opposition engaged in a late volte-​face Cameron became immediately vulnerable to a parliamentary defeat, as the Whips’ Office had ‘failed to grasp the scale’ of dissent within his own parliamentary ranks (Norton, 2015: 486). Last-​minute attempts to placate potential rebels were undertaken but it was all ‘too little, too late’ as the coalition was defeated by 285 to 272 votes (Kaarbo and Kenaely, 2016). In the event, 30 Conservatives voted against (around 10 per cent) and nine Liberal Democrats voted against (around 16 per cent), and 18 of the 30 Conservative rebels were from the hard Eurosceptic and social conservative faction within the PCP –​ those defined as the ‘implacable critics’ of Cameron (Heppell, 2013b:  348; see Kaarbo and Kenealy, 2016). Causes of rebellions Having considered the main issues that triggered dissent, we can now turn to our second question with regard to coalition cohesion –​i.e. how do we explain what seem like high levels of dissent? Obviously maintaining legislative cohesion when in coalition is more complex than when in a single-​party government. Coalition means that the ideological range of opinion is broader and therefore finding compromise from a wider spectrum of opinion will be harder (Cowley et al., 2016: 107). It is therefore not surprising to note the following with regard to rebellions within the two parties of the coalition. Rebellions within the Liberal Democrats tended to come on social policy issues and emanated from the left of their parliamentary ranks, whereas Conservative rebellions tended to come on constitutional issues (e.g. electoral reform, House of Lords reform, on matters European) and tended to emanate from their traditional right (Cowley et al., 2016: 110). As a consequence

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Political binding

95

Cowley and Stuart argued, that in parliamentary terms, it was a coalition of ‘wobbly wings’ (Cowley and Stuart, 2012a).1 That it was a coalition government altered the traditional methods of party management. Some of the methods through which the Whips’ Office could cajole and persuade backbenchers to vote with the government did not apply. For example, a whip arguing that the measure was in the manifesto may not apply given the concessions made to form the coalition. Indeed, this argument could be turned on its head by potential rebels, who could claim that they were rebelling because of it being part of the manifesto. Additionally, a whip arguing to a potential rebel that loyalty was owed to the Prime Minister in return for having led the party to victory in the General Election was less credible when Cameron had not won the General Election outright. Moreover, the way in which Cameron had bypassed Conservative parliamentarians, and had sought and imposed a coalition upon them without consultation, made many Conservatives feel ignored and undermined the ties of loyalty (Cowley et al., 2016: 107–​8). Of course, the extent to which Cameron could use patronage as a weapon of party management had been blunted by entering coalition, and conceding 23 ministerial positions to the Liberal Democrats (Heppell, 2014b: 75–​7; Cowley, 2015: 148–​9). His attempt to ensure that one-​third of his ministers were female by the end of the Parliament contributed to increasing resentment amongst male Conservative parliamentarians, who realised that their chances of ministerial advancement were limited, and became more susceptible to the temptation of rebellion (Heppell, 2014b: 73–​4; Cowley et al., 2016: 108). All of the above created new and different challenges for Cameron as a coalition Prime Minister. However, whilst accepting these as constraints, a perception still existed that Cameron was not necessarily the most skilled at party management (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 47). Cameron was criticised for his ‘aloof ’ style, and his reliance on a ‘coterie of trusted and like-​minded advisors’ and his ‘tendency to determine policy’ without consultation with his own parliamentarians (Norton, 2015:  485). More specifically Cameron appeared to have two problems  –​first, finding an effective Chief Whip to rely on (Cowley et al., 2016: 107); and second, overcoming the problematic relationship that he had with Brady, a ‘right-​winger’ and chair of the 1922 Backbench Committee (Bale, 2016: 312, 361). During his prime ministerial tenure Cameron managed to get through five Chief Whips  –​alongside the more high-​profile Mitchell (2012) and Gove (2014–​15) were Patrick McLoughlin (2010–​12), George Young (2012–​14) and Mark Harper (2015–​16). (Between 1951 and 1964 the Conservatives had only three Chief Whips, and between 1979 and 1997 only six Chief Whips.) Cameron struggled to find a solution to his ‘ongoing problem’ (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015:  227), and Cowley and Kavanagh note that every ‘time a new Chief Whip took office, there was a discussion of how he (it was always a he) would shake up the Whips’ Office and solve the party management problems that the party was facing, and, each time, it made little difference’ (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 49). Maintaining harmony

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

96

within his parliamentary ranks was not helped by the fact that relations within the 1922 Backbench Committee could have been better. Upon entering office Cameron initiated a ‘cack-​handed attempt’ to gain greater influence for the leadership within the 1922 Backbench Committee, by suggesting that ministers should be allowed to vote in elections for the officers and executive members (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 47). Given that Cameron had a fraught relationship with Brady, the incumbent, it was seen as an attempt to secure a more leader-​friendly chair. Having seen the attempt to change the voting rights blocked, Brady was then re-​elected by 126 to 85 votes (Norton, 2012: 188). Did the rebellions matter? The central theme to emerge from the analysis above is that the 2010–​15 Parliament was the most rebellious experienced by the Conservatives when in office. Of the 307 Conservative parliamentarians a total of 163 engaged in rebellion, and 94 of the 147 from the 2010 defied the whip at least once (Cowley et al., 2016: 114). This creates an impression of Cameron being less effective than previous Prime Ministers, notably Conservative Prime Ministers, at party management in legislative terms. However, how rebelliousness is interpreted is dependent upon circumstances. Being a coalition Prime Minister redefined the circumstances vis-​à-​vis party management (Cowley et al., 2016: 118). What are the traditional assumptions with regard to prime ministerial credibility and parliamentary rebellion? Traditionally it is the combination of a small majority with persistent dissent that threatens the credibility of the governing party and makes the incumbent Prime Minister seem weaker and less effective. The size of majority shapes the likelihood that rebellions could result in parliamentary defeats, or retreats (i.e. the governing party contemplating policy compromises or abandoning policy in fear of defeat). If there is a realistic prospect of defeat it can have a destabilising effect upon the governing party and shape perceptions of their governing capability –​e.g. consider the Labour governments between 1974 and 1979 under Wilson and James Callaghan, undermined by either a small majority or no majority at all and sustained between 1977 and 1978 by the Lib-​Lab pact, or the Major administration after 1992 when they had a small and shrinking majority. When the governing party has a large majority, then even if the number of divisions involving dissent is roughly the same, the perceived political impact will be less. This is not just because the likelihood of parliamentary defeat is smaller, or the time-​consuming task of compromise to buy off potential rebels is less significant, but because the impact of rebellions shape perceptions of governing credibility. A government experiencing a limited rebellion that threatens their small majority makes the incumbent Prime Minister look weak, whereas a numerically larger rebellion, when the Prime Minister has a large majority, carries less political significance. Thatcher and Blair, so famed for their strong and decisive leadership styles, had the freedom to largely ignore and dismiss the rebels

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Political binding

97

within their own parliamentary ranks, as the risk of defeat was so small (on prime ministerial effectiveness, see Theakston, 2007 and on ranking prime ministerial performance, see Theakston and Gill, 2006, 2011). However, as a coalition Prime Minister the expectation was that rebellions would be higher, because, as Matthew d’Ancona noted, the ‘ties of loyalty were frayed by the fact of coalition’ (d’Ancona, 2015: 407). As a consequence, there was an expectation that differences of opinion would exist between the coalition partners, on both the front and back benches (Barber, 2014: 482–​3), and therefore whereas previous Prime Ministers were defined by their party management skills, Cameron would be assessed in relation to both his party management skills and his coalition management skills. Cameron was open to criticism in terms of his party management skills –​within the PCP there was a group of around ‘twenty diehards who despised him’ and an additional 30 with serious reservations about him personally, due to his ideological inconsistency and ‘high-​handed manner’ (see Bale, 2016:  378). However, as a coalition Prime Minister Cameron received recognition for his ability to ensure that the coalition functioned as effectively as it did, given the constraints that he operated under, and that it survived until the end of the parliamentary term (see, for example, Bennister and Heffernan, 2012, 2015). Although he might be stretching it somewhat, Barber was even more effusive in his praise of the overall unity of the coalition, as he argued the following: first, that the coalition was just as effective in managing their divisions as the Major government had been in managing the conflicts between wets and dries, and Eurosceptics and Europhiles; and, second, that the coalition was ‘more functional’ than the Blair era, riven as it was by the ‘tribal splits’ between the Blair and Brown factions between 1997 and 2007 (Barber, 2014: 475). The above analysis suggests that we should not over-​interpret the significance of the rebellion rates, as the circumstances of coalition made comparisons questionable. In addition to this it is also worth factoring in the number of government defeats in the House of Commons  –​whether caused by governing backbench dissent or not. Table 6 provides an overview of defeats in the post-​war era. It is clear that differences exist in relation to: (1) the parties –​i.e. Labour are more likely to suffer defeats than the Conservatives; and (2) the majorities –​i.e. the vulnerability to defeat is greater with small majorities, notably Labour 1974–​79. Meanwhile, large majorities can involve no defeats, such as the Conservatives between 1955 and 1964, and Labour between 1997 and 2005, or virtually no defeats, such as the Conservatives between 1979 and 1987. It is in this context that we can reflect on the observations of Norton about rebellions under the coalition  –​Norton described the level of dissent as being ‘notable for its persistence’, before arguing that it was ‘not necessarily effective’ (Norton, 2015: 477, 479). Table 6 confirms the point that Norton was making. As a coalition Prime Minister, with a majority of around 80, Cameron suffered only six parliamentary defeats over a five-​year period, but then as a majority government with a small majority of 12,

Cameron

98

Table 6  Government defeats in the House of Commons, 1945 to 2016 Government Labour 1945–​51

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conservative 1951–​64 Labour 1964–​70 Conservative 1970–​74 Labour 1974–​79 Conservative 1979–​97

Labour 1997–​2010 Conservative–​Liberal Democrat coalition Conservative 2015–​16

Majority

No. of defeats

1945–​50 1950–​51 1951–​55 1955–​59 1959–​64 1964–​66 1966–​70 1970–​74 1974 1974–​79 1979–​83 1983–​87 1987–​92 1992–​97 1997–​2001 2001–​5 2005–​10 2010–​15

146 5 17 59 100 4 99 31 no majority 3 44 144 101 21 179 167 66 coalition 76

1 3 1 0 0 5 1 6 18 41 1 2 1 6 0 0 9 6

2015–​16

12

3

Sources: updated from Butler and Butler (2010: 223–​4); see also Norton (2012, 2015), Cowley and Stuart (2012a) and Cowley et al. (2016).

he suffered three parliamentary defeats. Therefore, it can be argued that between 2010 and 2015 the Liberal Democrats were exploited as lobby fodder, to sustain the Conservatives in office and to aid them in achieving their legislative objectives. This relates to the extent to which coalition limited the freedom of manoeuvre from the Liberal Democrats by ‘binding’ them into agreeing with the Conservatives (Elster, 2000: 276–​7). The consequences would be three-​fold for the Liberal Democrats –​ first, their distinctiveness would become questioned; second, their influence within the coalition would be difficult to detect; and third, their appeal to the electorate would decline. The Liberal Democrats: distinctiveness, influence and electoral appeal According to the comparative politics academic literature it is clear that for the junior partner in a coalition the main challenge is maintaining their distinctiveness. Demonstrating their distinctiveness is central to their ability to retain their electoral support base. However, running parallel to their attempts to maintain their distinctiveness is the equally important task of demonstrating their influence

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Political binding

99

within government. Furthermore, within government a balance needs to be struck. An excessive focus on maintaining their distinctiveness can smack of intransigence and an unwillingness to compromise. Such an approach would impair the overall unity of purpose of the government, which would undermine the case for coalition, which the Liberal Democrats had been desperate to prove could work. However, an unwillingness to assert themselves can create an impression that as the junior partner in coalition they have no, or limited, influence upon government policy –​on that coalition conundrum of unity versus distinctiveness, see Boston and Bullock (2012). On this dilemma of maintaining the unity of the coalition and demonstrating loyalty, or asserting their independence, the Liberal Democrats came out of the coalition badly. The earlier analysis in the chapter shows how the Liberal Democrats acted as lobby fodder, to offset likely dissent from the hard Eurosceptic and socially conservative right within the PCP. However, in doing so, in accordance with the terms of the coalition negotiations and subsequent programme for government, the impression was that the Liberal Democrats had compromised too much (Dommett, 2013). The most significant compromises that the Liberal Democrats made, however, were in relation to accepting the necessity of austerity argument, and on the financing of higher education. It was on these two issues that the Liberal Democrats proved to be of huge political use to Cameron and the Conservatives. Undermining Liberal Democrat distinctiveness In the lead up to, and during, the General Election campaign of 2010 the Liberal Democrats had emphasised the risks associated with cutting too much, too soon, as this could choke the recovery and cost jobs. They argued for timing cuts to the economic circumstances, and not on political dogma. It was also clear from their manifesto that they had distinctive policy positions relating to an economic stimulus to aid job creation, and strategies designed to reform the banking sector and address loopholes in the tax system (Russell, 2010: 515). Emphasising the motivation for cuts as being driven by dogma was a clear criticism of the Conservative mindset, which had a far stronger emphasis on justifying cuts in public spending. The Conservative focus was on rebalancing the economy by encouraging private sector enterprise, the need to reform public services, and the case for reforming the benefits system to incentivise employment. Their manifesto made it clear that their focus would be on dealing with the debt crisis created by Labour and that this would be achieved by control of public spending. Dommett argues that these ‘differences’ in emphasis in their respective manifestos revealed their ‘alternative ideological principles and visions’ (Dommett, 2013: 218–​27). Despite this, and as the last chapter demonstrated, the negotiations that culminated in the formation of the coalition, and their subsequent Programme for Government, made it clear that that deficit reduction would take precedence over all

100

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

else (Quinn et al., 2011: 302–​5; Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 25). Conceding ground on the economy, and agreeing to deficit reduction far faster than Labour, carried with it significant political implications, all of which worked to the advantage of the Conservatives. Consider the following: • Had the Conservatives set about a similarly austere programme as a majority administration, if we pretend that they had won the General Election outright, it would come across as ideologically driven, and both Labour and the Liberal Democrats would have condemned them for it. This exploitation of the Liberal Democrats was understood by Laws, who noted that the Conservatives benefited from ‘joint responsibility for tough decision, not sole blame for painful cuts to come’ (Laws, 2010: 51). • Gaining Liberal Democrat support enabled the Conservatives to present their strategy as being driven around the politics of necessity, and in the national interest (Kerr et al., 2011: 203). • Binding the Liberal Democrats to the Conservatives approach placed the so-​ called progressive alliance on opposing sides of the central political debate of the times, and isolating Labour. Although the Liberal Democrats may have attempted to justify their volte-​face by citing the severity of the Eurozone crisis, the perception was that they had capitulated to the Conservatives (Lee, 2011; Dommett, 2013). Adopting the position, and associated rhetoric, of the Conservatives’ view on deficit reduction, was clearly of greater political value to the Conservatives, than it was to the Liberal Democrats. Of even more damage to the Liberal Democrats was the issue of the financing of higher education (Atkins, 2018: 45–​62). During the 2010 General Election campaign, they had made their opposition to university tuition fees abundantly clear, indeed their official policy position was for the eventual abolition of tuition fees. Despite privately having reservations about the viability of the policy in practice, Clegg signed a pledge not to raise tuition fees for the National Union of Students (and was photographed doing so) (see Clegg, 2016). The short-​term benefit of doing so was electoral, as aligning themselves with anti-​fees campaigners helped to win them a larger proportion of the student vote. Research by Fisher and Hillman estimated that the Liberal Democrats secured 44 per cent of the vote amongst full-​time university students (with Labour on 28 per cent and the Conservatives on 23 per cent), and the Liberal Democrat estimated share had increased by 6 per cent since 2005 (Fisher and Hillman, 2014: 24; it was estimated that the Liberal Democrats had the support of only 13 per cent of full-​time university students by the time of the General Election of 2015, see Hillman, 2015). The longer term consequence, once they had the opportunity to enter government as part of a coalition, was that they were committed to a policy position that they would, in all probability, be unable to deliver upon.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Political binding

101

The previous Labour government had deferred the contentious issue of higher education financing by establishing a commission –​led by Lord Browne –​which would deliver its recommendations after the 2010 General Election. Although the coalition was formed before the publication of the Browne Report, it was, nonetheless, widely expected that Browne would recommend that universities should be permitted to increase their fee rates substantially (Evans, 2011:  57). At this juncture, the Liberal Democrats distanced themselves from their pre-​election pledge, although it was agreed that if a parliamentary division was called arguing for an increase in tuition fees, then the Liberal Democrats could abstain (Cutts and Russell, 2015). By the time of the inevitable parliamentary division to endorse the recommendations of the Browne Report, Clegg was facing a dilemma in terms of how to preserve Liberal Democrat credibility. Expecting all 57 Liberal Democrats to abstain did not seem particularly credible, especially as the department that would pilot the legislation through Parliament was led by a Liberal Democrat in the shape of Vince Cable, who felt compelled to vote for it, as he was Secretary of State (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 105). It was also not realistic as a significant proportion felt it was necessary to keep their pre-​election promise and vote against. Given that the Labour opposition would be voting against, it was conceivable that if enough Liberal Democrat ministers abstained, then with a significant number of Liberal Democrat backbenchers voting against, the fees increase reform could have been defeated (Cowley, 2015). In the end, the Liberal Democrats fractured in three directions –​21 voted against the proposal to permit universities to increase fees up to £9,000, eight abstained and 28 (from amongst the ministerial ranks) voted with the coalition (Evans, 2011: 57). The chaos amongst the Liberal Democrats over the issue was best captured by the fact that their leader, Clegg, voted for; the Deputy Leader, Simon Hughes, abstained, and the Party President-​elect, Tim Farron, voted against (Hillman, 2016:  336). Here a clear benefit of coalition government became apparent to Cameron, as political commentators were fixating on the chaos within Liberal Democrat ranks, and their policy betrayal, rather than on the fact that six Conservatives voted against (including former leadership candidate, Davis) and a further two abstained (Isaby, 2010; Lee, 2011:  15). This was the case study that best encapsulated legislative binding, as 57 elected Liberal Democrats had collectively campaigned on a platform of phasing out tuition fees, and specifically not increasing fees, and yet through coalition they had been boxed into voting against their principles, and with the Conservatives, to their own detriment (Dommett, 2013: 220). Now consider a hypothetical. The findings of the Browne Report would have been the same had the Conservatives won the General Election outright, and had they done so they would have in all probability acted upon its recommendations in roughly the same way that the coalition chose to do so. Had they done so then the widespread condemnation, and the student demonstrations that followed, would have been directed solely at Cameron and the Conservatives.

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

102

However, it was effigies of Clegg that students were burning, as the leader of the Liberal Democrats experienced a remarkable transformation in his public reputation (Evans, 2011:  57). By entering a coalition with the Conservatives, and then betraying his party’s promise over tuition fees, so the Clegg-​mania of the 2010 General Election campaign, evaporated with remarkable speed (Cutts and Russell, 2015; for a wider discussion on impact of Clegg in the General Election of 2010, see Parry and Richardson, 2011). For the remainder of the coalition, Clegg could never shake off his casting as the ‘pantomime villain’, as he was the front man for a party of ‘broken promises’  –​even his later apology on tuition fees was ‘lampooned rather than accepted’ (Cutts and Russell, 2015: 72). Clegg needed to be resilient and thick-​skinned, as he was spat at by voters, had faeces shoved through his letterbox, and the graffiti on his constituency office read ‘kill Clegg’ (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 100). Clegg had become toxic as a political brand leader for his party (Cutts and Russell, 2015). Given that there was a clear correlation between positive attitudes towards Clegg and voting for the Liberal Democrats in the 2010 General Election (see Cutts, 2012; Middleton, 2015), the collapse in his personal popularity amongst the electorate, and the perception that he was the least competent and trustworthy of the three party leaders, was hugely damaging to the electoral prospects of the Liberal Democrats (Denver, 2015). According to Bale, of even greater benefit for the Conservatives was the fact that their junior partners felt they had no choice but to accept the situation with a degree of stoicism bordering on the masochistic: having pledged themselves to staying in the national interest, and fearing they might be wiped out in an early election were they suddenly to pull the plug on the coalition, the Liberal Democrats could only cling pathetically to the illusion that they would eventually be rewarded by the electorate for supposedly doing the right thing. (Bale, 2016: 375–​6)

Evidence of Liberal Democrat influence The Liberal Democrats entered the coalition with an optimistic view of how it would work out for them. They had anticipated that there would be a short-​term negative impact on their poll rating, but over the longer term they would gain credit for taking ‘tough decisions’ and what they had ‘delivered’ in government (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 99). Delivery implied that they needed to demonstrate to the electorate that they had a moderating influence upon the Conservatives, but throughout the coalition years ‘they appeared to get next to no credit for the policies which they blocked or the influence which they exerted’ (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 99–​100). Their view on the trade-​off between offering governing ‘stability’ and maintaining party ‘independence’ was that early on they had to provide stability to show that coalition could work, even if this implied sacrificing their own identity. Then, once it was established that coalition

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Political binding

103

could work, they would work to reassert their independence and distinctive identity, as this would be electorally necessary (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 102). This demands that we ask two key questions. First, what evidence is there of Liberal Democrat influence in the coalition era? Second, to what extent was that influence visible and understood by voters? On the first key question Dommett argues that a significant number of Liberal Democrat pledges that were built into the Coalition Agreement were implemented. The Liberal Democrats were also keen for this to be understood by voters, as they boasted of their positive influence upon the coalition –​e.g. the pupil premium (targeting extra funding in schools in England for pupils eligible for free school meals) and how the tax threshold was increased. However, despite this the party remained defined by their perceived capitulation to the Conservatives on the economy, and their U-​turn vis-​à-​vis tuition fees, or they were defined by their perceived failures –​e.g. electoral and House of Lords reform (Dommett, 2013). A study on the policies of the coalition era identified how, with regard to the tax threshold increase, only 19 per cent correctly identified it as a Liberal Democrat policy, whereas 21 per cent assumed it was a Labour Party policy, and 35 per cent mistakenly believed that it was a Conservative Party initiative (Cutts and Russell, 2015: 82–​3). Given their difficulties in demonstrating their positive influence within the coalition, the Liberal Democrats became increasingly interested in demonstrating their ability to impede their coalition partners. Their blocking ability became part of their attempts to differentiate themselves from the Conservatives, and showcase that they were a moderating influence within government. The Liberal Democrats tried to demonstrate that they had stalled Conservative plans to introduce inheritance tax cuts for millionaires, or proposals to scrap housing benefit for younger people (Cutts and Russell, 2015: 82–​3). The consequence of their attempts at differentiation towards the latter stage of the coalition caused confusion for voters. After all, it was the Liberal Democrats who had supported the austerity plans of the Conservatives in coalition government, who were now, as the Parliament drew to a close, criticising the Conservatives on taxation, the deficit and public expenditure (Cutts and Russell, 2015: 82–​3). It created an image of inconsistency, and confirmed in the minds of some voters that the Liberal Democrats were untrustworthy, and lacking clear principles and a coherent identity. The Liberal Democrats and electoral appeal: the decapitation strategy Despite how hard the Liberal Democrats worked to emphasise these self-​proclaimed achievements, they largely failed to gain traction with voters. Their failure to gain recognition could be attributed to the following. First, throughout the Liberal Democrats were undermined by unsympathetic press coverage. Political journalists found discussing their failures over tuition fees, electoral reform and House of Lords reform to be far more interesting. Cowley and Kavanagh noted that Liberal Democrat insiders viewed the media as a ‘headache’, and that it was ‘immensely

104

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

frustrating’ that ‘there were just two journalists in the entire lobby who he trusted not to f**k us’ (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: 101). Second, even had they benefited from better press coverage, the fact remained that the impact of their policy successes was not always easy to detect. This point was developed by Dommett (in a mid-​term assessment of their influence) when she argued that although key pledges have been advanced, they have often been qualified, diluting their impact by being implemented in phases, appearing as part of wider reforms or receiving limited attention. For example, the tax threshold change was phased in with an initial increase to £7,475 in 2010/​2011, then £8,105 in 2012/​13 and £9,205 in 2013/​14, rather than an immediate implementation of the £10,000 pledge. The pupil premium was also implemented as part of a wider set of reforms to education funding, with the extra £488 provided to every pupil in 2010/​11 not ring fenced—​meaning it would, according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies, result in limited real-​terms increases in funding for the most deprived schools. Elsewhere, policies such as the youth contract and abolishing child detention have received little prominence in the government’s reforms. (Dommett, 2013: 224)

However, before placing this in its wider electoral context, it is worth noting some of the constraints that would undermine the ability of the Liberal Democrats to remain electorally competitive after 2010. First, the very fact that they had entered coalition meant that they no longer could acquire votes as a protest party (Curtice, 2007), which had been part of their appeal prior to coalition (Cutts and Russell, 2015). Second, the fact that they entered coalition with the Conservatives was bound to have an impact amongst those centre, centre-​left leaning voters who voted Liberal Democrat, as an anti-​Conservative Party (Denver, 2015). Third, the overall effectiveness of the party was undermined by the fact that the relationship between Clegg and his fellow parliamentarians, and with the membership, was damaged by the demands of office (Finn, 2015: 498). Fourth, it was not just Clegg who became cut off from the wider party. A  similar observation appeared to apply to Liberal Democrat ministers, and the consequence of their focus on their ministerial responsibilities was that ‘backbenches and even party staff felt themselves to be shut out’ (Finn, 2015: 498). Fifth, the party organisation became hollowed out as many staff left their headquarters to become special advisors to Liberal Democrat ministers (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016:  101). Finally, entering office had serious financial implications for the party. When they were in opposition they were entitled to state funding, but by entering government they took ‘an effective £2 million hit’ to their budget, which resulted in redundancies and the closure of their policy unit (Finn, 2015: 498). Coalition had created that classic concern for the Liberal Democrats as the junior coalition partners –​i.e. would they get credit or blame from voters for entering the coalition and for its subsequent performance? The comparative politics academic literature implies that the larger coalition party will disproportionately gain credit

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Political binding

105

for their collective performance in power (see, for example, Fisher and Hobolt, 2010). When analysing the fallout for the Liberal Democrats post-​2010 it would appear that they got the worst of both worlds –​i.e. the Conservatives gained some electoral credit between 2010 and 2015, as their vote went up from 10,726,555, or 36.1 per cent, to 11,334,226, or 36.9 per cent, whereas the Liberal Democrats appeared to get blamed by voters as their vote collapsed from 6,836,188, or 23.0 per cent, to 2,415,916, or 7.9 per cent (a fall of 15.1 per cent), and their representation in Parliament fell from 57 to a mere eight ( Johnson and Middleton, 2016). That the Liberal Democrats would perform badly was not unexpected. Since the formation of the coalition support for them in the opinion polls had fallen sharply, and they experienced a series of devastating electoral reversals (Green and Prosser, 2016: 1130). Although not formally a defeat for the party, the AV referendum result of 2011 had a devastating impact upon party morale. Already badly damaged by the tuition fees volte-​face, Clegg was now condemned for his ‘complete failure to devise and lead an effective campaign’, and for ‘allowing it to be positioned so that the public perception was that this was all about furthering Liberal Democrat interests’ (Cutts and Russell, 2015: 85). The AV referendum coincided with the 2011 local council elections in England, and was the first of a series of electoral humiliations for the Liberal Democrats. The cumulative effect of successive local council reversals was that their local councillor base stood at around 2,200 in 2015, which was 1,300 lower than it had been when they entered coalition (Cutts and Russell, 2015: 72, 76). In addition to their poor performance in the devolved elections in Scotland and Wales in 2011, and the European parliamentary elections of 2014, their performances in by-​elections were also hugely disappointing –​indeed, they lost their deposits in 11 of the 19 by-​elections that occurred across the Parliament. Their return of 0.9 per cent, and fifth place, in the Rochester and Strood by-​election in November 2014 was the worst in their formation in 1988 (they had secured 16.3 per cent of the vote in 2010 General Election) (see Johnson and Middleton, 2016). Blame, or more specifically, criticism, was what the Liberal Democrats acquired through entering coalition with the Conservatives. Farron, later to briefly serve as Liberal Democrat party leader after the electoral massacre of May 2015, concluded that by entering coalition, the Liberal Democrats had lost their ‘identity’ (Watt, 2011). Dommett argues that the experience of the Liberal Democrats represents an example of ‘ideological snapping’ by (a) ‘failing to consistently project their own distinctive message pre-​and post-​election’ and by (b) ‘co-​opting significant tracks of Conservative thinking into their message’ (Dommett, 2013: 222). Attached to notions of blame and criticism would come accusations about their trustworthiness, caused by the apparent movement in their rhetoric and policy justifications. Dommett argues that the evidence of ‘ideological snapping’ is clear from polling on voter perceptions of the Liberal Democrats pre-​and post-​coalition. Prior to entering the coalition voters identified the Liberal Democrats as a left-​of-​centre party –​they were rated as between -​9 and -​17 on an ideological spectrum of British

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

106

politics, with centre being zero and left minus and right positive. After entering the coalition their position had changed in the minds of voters, and they were rated as +1, and notably Clegg was personally now viewed as a +10. The perception that they had repositioned themselves ideologically due to coalition would erode their ability to appeal to centre and centre-​left voters, which should have worked to the advantage of the Labour Party (Dommett, 2013). It was their ability to convert Liberal Democrat seats into Conservative gains that provided the basis for the Conservatives winning a majority in the General Election of 2015. The targeting of Liberal Democrat seats was a deliberate strategy on behalf of the Conservatives –​encouraged by Lynton Crosby and Jim Messina –​ and it was known as their ‘decapitation strategy’, in which they would zone in on Liberal Democrat seats, notably those in the south east (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016). They ‘micro-​targeted potential switchers from the Liberal Democrats to the Conservatives’ and they contacted them ‘ruthlessly’ through a ‘combination of centralised targeted messages’, and relying on ‘personal contact from their local team on the ground’ (Cutts and Russell, 2015: 85). Although it cost them a ‘considerable’ amount of financial resources it was ‘highly effective’ in key battleground constituencies (Cutts and Russell, 2015: 85). The Conservative strategy worked remarkably well, as the painstaking and incremental growth of Liberal Democrat parliamentary representation, which had taken a generation to build up, was obliterated. In Scotland, nine seats were lost to the Scottish Nationalists. In northern England, the foothold that they had established in urban areas as a credible alternative to Labour was challenged. With former Liberal Democrat voters defecting to Labour, they lost 12 of their seats to them, which was particularly dispiriting given the overall losses that the Labour Party suffered (Green and Prosser, 2016: 1302). Of greatest significance were the losses to the Conservatives, predominantly in the south west of England. Overall the Conservatives annexed 28 of the 57 Liberal Democrat constituencies ( Johnson and Middleton, 2016). Conclusion The last two chapters have examined the inter-​ relationships between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats during the coalition era. Chapter  5 analysed how and why Cameron decided that he wanted to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, and then demonstrated how he was reasonably effective at controlling the Liberal Democrats in terms of the policy agenda, and how he was also reasonably effective when allocating Liberal Democrat ministers within the coalition. This chapter has developed the analysis of the Conservative–​Liberal Democrat dynamic, by showcasing how Cameron successfully legislatively bound the Liberal Democrats into voting for many policy issues that were inconsistent with their previously held views. Specifically, the analysis in this chapter matters because had the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Political binding

107

Conservatives secured an overall majority we can assume the following vis-​à-​vis the Liberal Democrats:  first, they would have not supported the fiscal readjustment plans outlined in the Conservative manifesto; second, they would have voted against the likely legislation on tuition fees. Therefore, when we consider heresthetics, or the art of political manipulation, we can legitimately argue that Cameron performed well in terms of exploiting the Liberal Democrats. This is not unusual. The comparative politics academic literature on coalitions shows that exploitation of the junior coalition partners regularly happens (see Bolleyer, 2008; Dunphy and Bale, 2011). That literature tells us that the Liberal Democrats, as the junior coalition partners, were facing a number of competing challenges –​i.e. to appear competent and offer unity in government and to demonstrate influence (Müller and Strom, 1999), whilst still maintaining their distinctiveness, so as to sustain their electoral appeal (Boston and Bullock, 2012; Paun and Munro, 2013). The distinctiveness of the Liberal Democrats in relation to Labour and the Conservatives had been key to their ability to gain support (Green and Hobolt, 2008), and the coalition era demonstrated the consequences of aligning themselves so closely to the Conservatives ( Johnson and Middleton, 2016). As Cutts and Russell conclude: the party failed to learn the lessons from elsewhere that in coalition ‘the little party always gets smashed’. (Cutts and Russell, 2015: 80)

Note 1 The Coalition Agreement ensured that the government Whips’ Office would include both Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. The Conservative Chief Whip would act as the Government Chief Whip, and the Liberal Democrat Chief Whip would act as the Government’s Deputy Chief Whip. Each was to be responsible for the cohesion of their own parliamentary parties (Cowley et al., 2016: 107).

7

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Managing political dimensions: the rise of multi-​party politics

The aim of the second part of the book has been to explore Cameronism as political manipulation. Chapters 5 and 6 have done so by examining the dynamics between the coalition partners between 2010 and 2015. Chapter 5 considered how Cameron and the Conservatives outmanoeuvred Clegg, and his Liberal Democrat colleagues, in terms of the negotiations regarding policy and personnel. Chapter 6 considered manipulation within the context of legislative binding, and how Cameron was able to tie the Liberal Democrats to his agenda, notably in terms of the retrenchment of the state and tuition fees. The chapter identified the so-​called Black Widow effect in action  –​i.e. exploitation in government and erosion at the ballot box (Bale, 2012b). Chapter 7 takes the idea of manipulation one stage further and examines Cameronism in terms of the ‘rules of the game’. This will involve examining how Cameron coped with the challenges to the existing political order. It does so by considering three central constitutional dilemmas. First, it analyses the case of electoral reform, being pushed by the Liberal Democrats, and the compromise solution of the AV referendum of 2011. Second, it considers the rise of Scottish nationalism and the clamour that led to the Scottish referendum in 2014. Finally, it evaluates the threat posed to the existing order from UKIP (and from the Europhobic right of the Conservative Party) regarding membership of the EU, and the ongoing renegotiations and the referendum of June 2016. The chapter considers these as threats to the Conservatives in electoral and governing terms, and it examines how they tested Cameron’s strategic agility. In doing so the chapter notes that on the first two tests –​electoral reform and Scottish independence –​Cameron demonstrated that he was a political risk-​taker. On AV he forced the Liberal Democrats to campaign for a proposition that they did not really want, and then lost, whilst at the same time dividing the Labour Party, with no negative fallout for the Conservatives. On the Scottish referendum, although a massive risk, the outcome had no negative impact on the Conservatives, and may have aided them in the 2015 General Election, but it had a cataclysmic effect upon the Labour Party. The beneficial outcomes that Cameron accrued for himself and his party on AV and Scottish independence made him seem like a ‘gambler on a lucky streak’ according to Clarke, but when it came to

Managing political dimensions

109

the EU referendum, ‘he had stayed at the table for one too many hands and lost it all’ (Clarke, 2016: 492).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Cameron and the rules of the game, dilemma I: electoral reform and the AV referendum of 2011 As ­chapter 5 (pp. 72–​96) demonstrated, the question of electoral reform was a pivotal, and controversial, aspect of the coalition negotiating period. It certainly was a concern for many Conservatives. For example, Davis specifically told Cameron, during the coalition negotiating period, not to do any deals with the Liberal Democrats on electoral reform (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 334, 342). Anger remained within the PCP about the perception that Cameron bounced them into a coalition, with a referendum on AV, by implying that they had to because Labour were offering AV without a referendum (Wilson, 2010:  179–​206). Moreover, as Ashcroft and Oakeshott reveal in their less than flattering biography of Cameron, the Prime Minister regarded the ‘referendum as a bore’, which was ‘conceded in the frantic final stages of the negotiations’ (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 362). That lack of interest was evident as Cameron initially played only a limited role in the No campaign, given his assumption that the electorate would reject AV anyway (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 115). Only when the possibility of defeat emerged, and the level of discontent amongst his parliamentary colleagues was made clear to him, did Cameron snap out of his inertia (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 117). The referendum campaign turned into a ‘bitter partisan battle’ with the No campaign running a highly personalised attack campaign on Clegg, including leaflets picturing the Deputy Prime Minister next to the strapline ‘AV leads to broken promises’ (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015:  365). AV was a pivotal moment for the coalition, and within the working relationship between Cameron and Clegg (d’Ancona, 2014: 84). The stakes were high when it came to electoral reform, as the implications of defeat for the Conservatives would have been cataclysmic long term (Curtice, 2013:  218). Simulations based on voting behaviour in the General Election of 2010 identified the following differences between parliamentary representation under FPTP and AV. First, the Liberal Democrats had the most to gain from AV as their parliamentary representation would have increased by 32 seats (i.e. from 57 to 89 seats). Second, the impact of AV was calculated to be negative for the Labour Party –​they would have lost a further ten seats meaning that they would hold 248 seats. Finally, the Conservatives would have lost 22 seats meaning that they would have 284 seats not the 306 seats that they did have. The most crucial impact of this simulation was that AV would have made a progressive alliance between Labour (248) and the Liberal Democrats (89) possible, as with a combined representation of 337 seats it would have created a parliamentary majority of 11 (Sanders et al., 2011: 5–​23).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

110

Cameron

A number of factors worked to the advantage of the Conservatives in the AV referendum (see Atkins, 2018: 72–​7). Timing was a factor. At a time of financial constraint, during which debates on the deficit, debt and the recession dominated, offering a referendum on the voting system at the behest of the Liberal Democrats made the junior partners look self-​interested. While the average voter was concerned about their economic security, the Liberal Democrats were made to look as though they entered government to change the electoral system to their own advantage (Cutts and Russell, 2015) (the argument being the AV would increase the likelihood of hung Parliaments, and coalition governments, and thus Liberal Democrat access to power, Curtice, 2013: 218). However, coming shortly after tuition fees, it tapped into electoral distrust of their intentions, and furthermore, electoral reform was a low priority for much of the electorate (Pinto-​Duschinsky et al., 2011: 16–​17; Qvortrup, 2012: 112). The decision to hold the referendum on the same day as local council elections, and the Scottish Parliamentary and Welsh Assembly elections, also worked against the Yes campaign. It meant that the question of electoral reform became tied to other issues, most notably the collapse in support for the Liberal Democrats in the first year of the coalition (Stevens and Banducci, 2013). The No campaign also benefited from having greater financial muscle and the support of much of the print media (Baston and Ritchie, 2011; Renwick and Lamb, 2013). Cameron and the Conservatives also benefited from a Clegg factor. Before the General Election of May 2010 Clegg had said that AV was a ‘miserable little compromise’, and this phrase was regular used against him and the Yes campaign (Russell, 2010:  515). Although Clegg had actually added that it would nonetheless still be ‘a step in the right direction’ this was largely forgotten, meaning that he and his colleagues were left looking like they were campaigning for something that they did not believe in (Vowles, 2013: 255). Negative electoral perceptions of Clegg hurt the Yes campaign’s cause (Clarke et al., 2013: 226). When we consider the importance of elite cue theory and the influence of leaders on voter choices, the fact that Clegg had the lowest likeability rating of the three party leaders at the time of the referendum campaign mattered (Qvortrup, 2012: 114 –​e.g. liking Cameron reduced the probability of voters deciding to vote Yes, Whiteley et al., 2012: 312). Cameron and the Conservatives also benefited from a Miliband factor. Whereas Cameron was able to lead a broadly unified Conservative Party into the referendum campaign, Miliband was leading a disunited Labour opposition. Miliband campaigned for a Yes vote but it was estimated that over half of the PLP, including well-​known and widely respected names like David Blunkett and Margaret Beckett, opposed his position (Heppell and Hill, 2012: 221). That Miliband was unpopular, and had a low likeability rating, limited his ability to provide momentum for the Yes vote (Whiteley et al., 2012: 311–​12). It is also worth noting that his unwillingness to share a platform with Clegg looked petty and short-​sighted, as he might have needed to negotiate with Clegg in a future hung Parliament scenario (Heppell and Hill, 2012:  222). Miliband’s inability to unite his own party, and the subsequent

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Managing political dimensions

111

rejection of the reform that he was advancing, meant that he was subject to widespread criticism by political journalists (Hasan and MacIntyre, 2011: 289–​90). Cameron and the Conservatives emerged unscathed from the AV referendum. Although behind the scenes there were concerns, and Cameron was subject to criticism from Conservatives for having offered the concession in the first place, he did lead a unified party into the campaign and he did secure the outcome that he and his party required (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 342–​4, 362–​6). Academic research shows that his positive ‘effect’ in terms of influencing voters was more pronounced than that of Miliband and Clegg (see, for example, Whiteley et  al., 2012; Clarke et al., 2013; Vowles, 2013). Both of his rivals –​Clegg compromised by advocating a change which was not his preference, and Miliband leading a divided party –​were left diminished after the referendum and were subject to internal party criticism. Cameron had taken a calculated risk and emerged with two significant gains for his party. First, the scale of the rejection of AV (by 68 to 32 per cent) meant that electoral reform was likely to be off the political agenda for a generation, which was hugely depressing for the Liberal Democrats as it was ‘their raison d’etre for entering the coalition’ (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 122). Second, in doing so, it would not be a bargaining chip that the Liberal Democrats could use if future general elections resulted in hung Parliaments and coalition negotiations (Whiteley et al., 2012: 319). However, despite stalling the momentum for electoral reform Cameron received little appreciation from within the PCP. This was because the fallout over AV would be seen in conjunction with other aspects of political reform, some of which many Conservatives were sceptical about (Atkins, 2018: 77–​83). Part of that scepticism was driven by the perception that, even if the Conservatives had triumphed over the Liberal Democrats in terms of the economy during the coalition negotiations, they had conceded the political and constitutional reform agenda to their junior coalition partners (Fox, 2010: 34). The three other key reforming objectives to be pursued were as follows: fixed term Parliaments; House of Lords reform; and constituency equalisation. Of these three it was clear that a Conservative administration alone would have pursued constituency equalisation, but would not have proceeded with fixed term Parliaments or House of Lords reform (Norton, 2012: 183). The Fixed Term Parliament Act of 2011 was designed to restrict the dissolution of Parliament to situations of crisis or of government defeat, thereby constraining the previous ability afforded to Prime Ministers to dissolve Parliament at a time of their choosing. That discretionary option was felt to be open to abuse in that historically Prime Ministers have used this opportunistically. It may not have made dissolutions impossible, but in making in considerably harder, it was assumed to have established the principle of fixed parliamentary terms, and focused minds on the idea that the next General Election would be planned for May 2015 (for a wider discussion on the Fixed Term Parliament Act and its implications, see Youngs and Thomas-​Symonds, 2013; Schleiter and Issar, 2014; Blick, 2016; Norton, 2016). In agreeing to this Cameron appeared to have divested himself of a power that some

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

112

Cameron

Conservative backbenchers felt was hugely useful to him, but it could also be said that it reduced his ability to threaten his own backbenchers to support him against their will. The motivation from Cameron’s perspective was more short term. Given the fragile condition of the economy in May 2010, and the unchartered waters (in post-​war British politics) of coalition government, both partners saw a fixed term Parliament as a way of embedding their arrangement, and providing them with the necessary time to allow their agenda to help ease the economy out of recession –​ i.e. getting the economic and electoral cycles in sync (Bennister and Heffernan, 2015: 37). If the idea of mutual protection informed thinking with regard to the Fixed Term Parliament Act, it was absent when it came to the other two aspects of political reform: reform of the House of Lords and constituency equalisation. There was significant hostility on the Conservative backbenches to House of Lords reform, and they reacted badly to the proposed House of Lords Reform Bill in 2012. It was a huge disappointment to Cameron to see his plans for constituency equalisation stall, with the next periodic review of constituency boundaries deferred until 2018. Had it proceeded it would have produced a small, but significant, advantage to the Conservatives. This is evident by considering the General Election of May 2005 –​the last one that Labour won under Blair –​which showcased the Conservative view that the variations in the size of constituencies contributed to a bias in favour of Labour. Conservatives agonised about three interconnected issues. First, on only 36.1 per cent of the vote Labour secured 56.5 per cent of the seats in Parliament, whereas the Conservatives secured 32.4 per cent of the vote, which translated into 31.5 per cent of the seats in Parliament (the Liberal Democrats secured 22.6 per cent of the vote, but only 9.9 per cent of the seats in Parliament) (Borisyuk et  al., 2010:  4). Second, although the Conservatives actually secured a small majority over Labour within England alone  –​35.7 to 35.5 per cent –​this resulted in the Conservatives securing 194 out of the 529 English constituencies, and Labour secured 286 (Johnston et al., 2006). Third, the above biases reflected the fact that Labour required fewer actual votes to acquire seats –​i.e. they had a disproportionate amount of smaller seats. If the number of votes cast overall for each party was divided by the number of seats won, it showed that on average Labour needed around 27,000 votes per seat, the Conservatives 44,000 votes per seat, and the Liberal Democrats 97,000 votes per seat (Johnston et al., 2006). Cameron had hoped that by advancing constituency equalisation, and reducing the number of parliamentary constituencies from 650 to 600, this bias against the Conservatives could be addressed. What was proposed was the creation of constituencies within 5 per cent of the average size, which would be 76,641 (so the variations would be within 72,010 and 80,473, see Baston, 2011). Had voting in the 2010 General Election been across 600 constituencies instead of 650 it would have had the following impact, according to the work of Lewis Baston at Democratic Audit:  Labour would have lost 18 seats; the Conservatives would have lost 15 seats; and the Liberal Democrats would have lost 14 seats. With the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Managing political dimensions

113

target for securing a parliamentary majority now 301, the Conservatives would have been short by nine (on 292 seats). This would have left them closer than they actually were in May 2010 –​i.e. they were 19 short of 326 on 307. Moreover, the so-​called progressive alliance between Labour and the Liberal Democrats would still have been short of forming a majority coalition by 18, with Labour on 240 and the Liberal Democrats on 43. This was slightly more than reality in May 2010, when they were short by 11 with a combined parliamentary representation of 315. This simulation demonstrates why constituency equalisation mattered to the Conservatives  –​the impact may have been only small, but nonetheless it was hurtful to Labour and beneficial to the Conservatives (Baston, 2011). In the event, the issue which would end up creating an electoral advantage for the Conservatives –​by eroding support for Labour in the General Election in 2015 –​ was the issue of Scottish nationalism. Cameron and the rules of the game, dilemma II: Scottish nationalism and the independence referendum of 2014 Although the Conservatives have a track record of electoral success in post-​war British politics –​for example, winning eight of 12 elections between 1951 and 1992, with their victories often involving parliamentary landslides (e.g. 1959, 1983 and 1987), and their four defeats often being marginal (e.g. 1964 and both in 1974) –​ their electoral success has not been replicated when we consider Scotland and Wales. The last time the Conservatives secured a majority of seats in Scotland was in 1955, with 50.1 per cent of the vote, but their appeal diminished significantly thereafter, falling to 24.7 per cent in the February 1974 General Election, before collapsing to such an extent in 1997, at 17.5 per cent, that they failed to win a single constituency in Scotland (Seawright, 2010: 121–​2; see also Seawright, 1999; Mitchell and Convery, 2012). Meanwhile, the last time the Conservatives secured a majority of seats in Wales was in 1868, and in the post-​war era their vote oscillated between 23 and 33 per cent, before hitting its low in 1997 when their return of 19 per cent coincided with their failure to win a single seat (McLean, 2010: 172). The English domination of the Conservative Party has long been clear. Back in 1955 a total of 84 per cent of their parliamentarians represented English constituencies. Due to their failures in Scotland and Wales at the General Election in 1997 all of their seats were English in the 1997 to 2001 Parliament, and the situation had improved only marginally by 2010, when 97 per cent of their parliamentarians represented English constituencies. The consequence has been the increasing politicisation of the Union –​e.g. a Conservative-​dominated government imposing their centre-​right agenda upon Scotland, which is essentially a centre-​left country, has contributed to the rise of the SNP (on the rise of the SNP, see Hassan, 2009; Mitchell et al., 2012; Johns and Mitchell, 2016; and Scottish nationalism and national identity, see Keating, 2009; Mitchell, 2014).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

114

Cameron

Given that the rise of nationalist sentiment represented an electoral threat to Labour, the devolutionary process initiated by the Blair governments after 1997 which led to the creation of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly, was designed to address the perceived legitimacy deficit that was fuelling nationalist sentiment (on the devolutionary process see Bogdanor, 1999; Aughey, 2001; Curtice and Seyd, 2009; Mitchell, 2009; and specifically on the impact of the Scottish Parliament, see Jeffery and Mitchell, 2009; Cairney, 2011; and on the impact from a Conservative perspective, see Convery, 2016). The Conservatives campaigned against the creation of the devolved institutions for Scotland and Wales in the referendums of 1997, and the respective Yes votes left them as the party with the ‘most to do to establish’ themselves as ‘devolutionary bona fides’ (Aughey, 2011: 168). However, although they reconciled themselves to the new devolutionary settlement, the perception remained that they were an ‘anglicised party’, characterised by a coercive mindset in terms of peripheral interests (Seawright, 2002). Their electoral returns in the Scottish parliamentary elections of 1999 (15 per cent), 2003 (16 per cent), 2007 (16 per cent) and 2011 (14 per cent), were broadly in line with their Westminster election returns –​1997 (17 per cent), 2001 (15 per cent), 2005 (15 per cent) and 2010 (17 per cent)  –​thus demonstrating their difficulties in establishing their electoral credibility in the post-​devolutionary environment (on the SNP and the Scottish parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011, see Johns et al., 2010; Carman et al., 2014). Where did Cameron stand with regard to the Union? He was leading a party in which unionism was a core element of its historical tradition, yet contemporary Conservative politics was torn between the emotional pull of traditional unionism and English patriotism (Kenny, 2016; see also Gamble, 2016). Cameron was instinctively a traditional unionist and would persistently speak of the importance of protecting the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 409–​21). By doing so, Cameron was seen to be distancing himself from the narrower English nationalism that had become associated with the rhetoric of Thatcherism (Gamble, 1996: 35). As part of his desire to distance his modernised Conservatism from Thatcherism, he used the opposition era to move away from the rhetoric of English nationalism. In doing so he was downgrading their emphasis on addressing the West Lothian question, although he did not completely dispense with that commitment (see Aughey, 2010). The fact that Cameron entered a coalition with the Liberal Democrats in 2010 was then used as an opportunity to delay addressing the contentious issue of English votes for English laws (Hayton, 2015: 127; for more on the debates on the English question and Englishness, see Hazell, 2006; Kenny, 2015, 2016). However, the Scottish parliamentary elections of 2011 would force Cameron into the defensive as the SNP secured an overall majority, and it was assumed that the First Minister, Alex Salmond, would use his new mandate to make the case for a referendum on Scottish independence (Hayton, 2018). Since the inception of the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Managing political dimensions

115

Scottish Parliament in 1999 no party had been able to secure a majority. In 1999 the Labour Party were the largest party (winning 56 seats out of 129) but needed to form a coalition with the Liberal Democrats (17 seats), and Labour remained in office after the 2003 elections, winning 50 seats and continuing with a coalition with the Liberal Democrats (17 seats). The SNP entered power after the 2007 elections as a minority administration after securing 47 seats, before winning an overall majority in 2011 elections with 69 seats (see Carman et al., 2014). Rather than wait until Salmond demanded this, Cameron decided to ‘stage what was an in effect a pre-​emptive strike’ (Bale, 2016: 401) by offering Salmond and the SNP the opportunity to negotiate for an independence referendum. The rationale from Cameron’s perspective was as follows: first, the issue needed to be resolved; and second, the opinion polling evidence at that stage suggested that independence would be rejected (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 476; Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 409). Back in 2012, the decision to offer a referendum was not regarded as ‘high risk’ (Laws, 2016: 439). The central issues with regard to the conduct of the referendum were as follows: (a) how should the question be framed; (b) when should it take place; and (c) should 16-​and 17-​year-​olds be permitted to vote? These issues were resolved in the Edinburgh Agreement between Cameron and Salmond, and signed in October 2012. On the latter issue Cameron conceded, and it was agreed that 16-​and 17-​ year-​olds would be permitted to vote, even though they ‘were widely assumed to be keener on independence than older voters’ (Bale, 2016: 401). In terms of when the referendum should take place, Salmond managed to secure a two-​year timescale with the referendum agreed for October 2014. Given that the No campaign held a lead at that time, a shorter timescale would have been more advantageous. For Salmond and the Yes campaign, a longer timescale provided them with more space to make the case for independence. However, Cameron conceded ground on the timing, because from his perspective his red-​line related to the question being asked in the referendum. Cameron wanted the question to be a binary yes/​ no question, without the third option –​the so-​called devo-​max option. Cameron wanted this option excluded as the nationalists were confident that they could secure an endorsement for devo-​max, which they could then use as a staging post for separation at a later date (Bale, 2016: 401). The conclusion on this issue was that the question was asking voters to say yes or no to the following question  –​ ‘should Scotland be an independent country?’ It appeared that for Cameron two scenarios existed –​scenario one, the No campaign wins and Cameron is applauded for showing ‘decisive leadership’ and for being the Prime Minister who ‘resolved the Scottish question (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 410); or scenario two, the Yes campaign is victorious in which case Cameron would be forced to resign (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 473). Cameron remained deliberately distant from the official Better Together campaign. Rather it was presented as a cross-​party umbrella campaign, which pulled

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

116

Cameron

together the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats, all of which agreed that independence would be a ‘disaster’ (Laws, 2016: 439). It was felt that with his ‘posh English accent’ and with ‘Eton and Oxford on his CV’ Cameron would not play well as a campaigner (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 475). Given the ‘toxicity of the Tory brand’ in Scotland (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015:  410), Salmond would attempt to goad Cameron to become more involved in the campaign –​for example, by challenging him to participate in a televised debate. However, it made far more sense for the cross-​party Better Together campaign to have as its public face a Scot and a Labour figure. As such, the respected former Labour Chancellor, Alistair Darling, co-​ordinated the campaign, with significant coalition government input being offered by Liberal Democrat Scottish ministers in the shape of Alexander and Alistair Carmichael (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015: 410). Central to the Better Together strategy was emphasising the economic risks associated with independence, and the pivotal issue was to become the currency to be used in an independent Scotland. That was because the Better Together campaign put forward a joint position –​i.e. endorsed by Conservative Chancellor, Osborne, the Liberal Democrat Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Alexander, and the Shadow Chancellor, Balls –​that made it clear that should Scotland vote for independence then the currency union, and the use of sterling, would not be viable. This strategy did risk playing into the nationalist narrative of the established English dominated parties attempting to bully the Scots in compliance. However, it did highlight a significant fault-​line in the independence case –​i.e. the lack of clarity vis-​à-​vis the currency and thereby their inability to allay the economic risks associated with voting yes (the best accounts of the independence referendum are provided by Macwhirter, 2014; Torrance, 2014; Pike, 2015). However, with the opinion polls narrowing significantly a ‘growing sense of panic’ began to engulf the Better Together campaign (Laws, 2016: 441). Cameron would admit to Clegg that he was ‘incredibly nervous’ as ‘I really cannot be the Prime Minister who oversaw the break-​up of our United Kingdom’ (Laws, 2016:  444). Two late interventions became seen as pivotal in ensuring that the No campaign were victorious. First, Cameron, Clegg and Miliband made an explicit, and joint, commitment to offer a further devolution of powers to Scotland, in the event of them rejecting independence (Byrne et al., 2017: 215). Second, the former Prime Minister, Brown, who had hitherto been a ‘grumpy, aloof and divisive’ figure within the Better Together campaign, intervened (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 483). In the knowledge that Brown possessed ‘a unique ability to get out the Scottish Labour vote’ (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015:  417), they turned to him to make a keynote speech in the closing stages of the campaign. The No campaign were left grateful for his intervention, as he passionately made the case the continuation of the Union. Although in the end the No campaign was victorious by 55 to 45 per cent, and Cameron had managed to win the referendum vote, he had failed to resolve the issue. Nationalism in Scotland was given new impetus, and the future of the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Managing political dimensions

117

Union remains in the balance, as the case for another referendum remains on the political agenda.1 Part of the reason why is because of how Cameron behaved in the immediate aftermath of the outcome of the independence referendum. Cameron rationalised that now was the moment to address the English question. On the day of the Scottish referendum he informed Clegg that it needed to be confronted for two reasons; first, because ‘England is now the missing bit of the jigsaw’, and second, because of his need to deal with his ‘rather restive backbenchers’ (quoted from Laws, 2016: 447). Liberal Democrat ministers were dismayed by this. Clegg told Cameron that it ‘doesn’t make sense for us to turn the politics of grievance in Scotland into the politics of grievance in England’ (quoted from Laws, 2016: 448). Alexander correctly speculated that it would ‘give the nationalists a whole grievance agenda’ through which to further mobilise support for their cause (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015:  421). Despite these warnings Cameron announced that any further devolution of powers to Scotland would have to proceed in tandem with proposals that could address the issue of English votes for English laws. Cameron appeared to have been pressurised into this approach due to opinion within his own parliamentary party, many of whom were concerned about the ability of UKIP to exploit the growth of English identity (see Hayton, 2016). The consequence of Cameron’s intervention was that Scottish voters turned against unionist parties. Having established an image of Labour as ‘Tory stooges’2 (Ashcroft and Oakeshott, 2015: 487), it was Labour who had more to lose electorally than the Conservatives, as Bale alludes to: among the substantial minority of Scots who had voted for independence, however, there were many former Labour voters who were now angrier than ever with their party’s decision to share a Better Together platform with the Tories –​the very same Tories who now looked like they were trying to pull another fast one. As a result, they began to defect in droves. Cameron did not plan for that to happen when he stepped out of Number Ten to address the media on the morning after the night before. But it is difficult to imagine how things could have gone better if he had. (Bale, 2016: 403)

After winning an overall majority at the General Election of 2015, the Conservatives then acted upon their promise vis-​à-​vis English votes for English laws. It was introduced by changing the Standing Orders of the House of Commons, meaning that parliamentarians representing English constituencies would vote on the provisions of Bills concerning only England (Kelly, 2015). Hayton notes that once implemented it did not have a ‘radical impact upon the workings of Parliament’ and indeed, ‘it could be argued that the move represented a pragmatic response to address some of the most glaring asymmetries of devolution’ (Hayton, 2018:  229). However, as demonstrated in ­chapter  3 (see pp.  34–​56), the impact upon Parliament was not the most high-​profile consequence of Cameron manipulatively using the issue of Scottish nationalism to the advantage of the Conservatives. The campaigning strategy of the Conservatives was explicit in terms of its appeal

Cameron

118

to English voters –​i.e. ‘only the Conservatives could protect English interests from being sold out by Labour’, and Hayton argues that this ‘painted the Conservatives as a party that would put England first, downgrading the centrality of the union to Conservatism’ (Hayton, 2018: 230).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Cameron and the rules of the game, dilemma III: UKIP and membership of the European Union That the EU referendum of June 2016 occurred reflected the difficulties that Cameron had found in constructing a European policy strategy that was viable in governing terms, unifying in relation to his own party and popular with the electorate (Gamble, 2012b; Goes, 2014; Lynch, 2015). Cameron was not, however, the first Prime Minister to struggle to manage this so-​called poisoned chalice. Since entering the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 the relationship had been fraught with difficulties. Respective British governments, be they Conservative or Labour, had been accused of being ‘semi-​detached’, or of being ‘awkward partners’, ‘reluctant Europeans’, ‘on the side-​lines’ or the ‘stranger in Europe’ (see, for example, George, 1992, 1994; Baker and Seawright, 1998; Gowland and Turner, 1999; Daddow, 2004; Gifford, 2008; Wall, 2008; Gowland et al., 2010; Baker and Schnapper, 2015; Gifford and Tournier-Sol, 2015). In that time what constituted the ‘European question’ would evolve. In the 1960s and early 1970s the question was should we join the Common Market, with the case for remaining or leaving being determined by the referendum of 1975. In the 1980s the question was mainly about the case for joining, or not, the Exchange Rate Mechanism, with that then morphing into the question of the 1990s –​i.e. entering into (or not) Economic and Monetary Union. By the 2010s the debates had moved on significantly. Cameron would find his prime ministerial tenure defined by the debates around the repatriation of powers, and ultimately the case for exiting the EU (Heppell et al., 2017b: 764). As a consequence, Conservative thinking would evolve over time as the circumstances and questions changed. Smith concludes that the party would move from a position of ‘pragmatic pro-​Europeanism’ in the 1960s, to one of ‘pragmatic Euroscepticism’ by the 2000s (Smith, 2015: 371). This assertion should also been considered alongside the work of Stevens, who used Comparative Manifesto Group data to note the position of the Conservatives at the time of each General Election since 1964. From this Stevens noted that relative to the scepticism of Labour the Conservatives demonstrated broad enthusiasm between 1964 and 1983. However, having scored a positive manifesto ranking from their General Election manifestos between 1964 and 1983, their ranking has been negative in all but one since (Stevens, 2012). For the Conservatives the process of European integration have threatened to undermine the party in terms of their claims to (a) internal unity and (b) governing competence (Turner, 2000; Crowson, 2007). Whereas the rebellion rate for the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Managing political dimensions

119

Conservatives between 1951 and 1959 was around 1 per cent of all divisions, it was 18.4 per cent during the 1970 to 1974 Parliament, when the Heath administration sought parliamentary approval to enter the European Economic Community. During the passage of the European Communities Act of 1972, 40 different Conservative backbench parliamentarians rebelled at least one, which was around 12 per cent of the PCP overall (Norton, 1978: 208). The level of discontent had increased during the 1992 to 1997 Parliament, when Major sought parliamentary approval for the Treaty of European Union. Around 15 per cent of the PCP as a whole rebelled at least once, which amounted to 50 Conservative parliamentarians (Cowley and Norton, 1999; see also Baker et al., 1993, 1994). Major could ill-​afford these indicators of disunity. This was because the Conservative claims to governing competence had already been shattered by the humiliation of their ejection from the Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992 (Kettell, 2008: 630–​48). By May 1997 their European divisions were central to their electoral ejection. Over 200 candidates defied the leadership position of negotiate and decide, or wait and see, on the proposed single European currency (McAllister and Studlar, 2000: 361). Their inability to secure issue ownership on Europe was undermined by their divisions, meaning that they failed to exploit the fact that public opinion at the time was actually closer to their position than that of the more pro-​European New Labour (Evans, 1998; for a wider discussion on evolving public attitudes towards European integration, see Clements, 2010; Stevens, 2012). How to manage the European question, or questions, has been a challenge for all leaders of the Conservative Party since Macmillan (see Turner, 2000; Crowson, 2007; see also Dorey, 2017b). Lynch and Whittaker (2013a) have offered an overview of the different methods by which party leaders could seek to manage this divisive policy issue. A brief summary of these identifies Cameron’s problem: • Candidate selection:  seek to influence the composition of the PCP by intervening at candidate selection, and attempting to limit the recruitment of potentially disloyal parliamentarians, and increase the selection of candidates at one with the position of the current leadership. The ability of this method to make much difference is limited in two ways:  first, the reluctance of constituency associations to have the leadership intervening in the selection process; and second, even if the leadership could easily influence constituency selections, the number of constituencies changing candidates from one election to the next remains low. • Patronage: seek to promote potential rebels and bind them to the current leadership position. However, this strategy has limitations as promoting rebels in order to nullify them may (a)  be seen as a sign of weakness and indicative of the inability of the leadership to impose their will upon potentially rebellious backbenchers; (b) backfire as rebels publicly reject the offer of ministerial office and accuse the leader of trying to buy them off; and (c) antagonise previously

120

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

•

•

•

•

•

Cameron

loyal backbenchers who resent being overlooked for ministerial office, thus breaking the ties of loyalty and provoking more backbench rebellion. Permit low level or low cost dissent: offer free votes on the basis that if the main opposition party is supportive of the government position, then dissent can be permitted, as was the case for the Heath government in the early 1970s. However, this approach was not viable for Major in the early 1990s. This was because the Labour Party was broadly cohesive in voting against the passage of the Treaty of European Union, rationalising their opposition around the fact that the government had opted out of the social chapter. Adopt tough disciplinary positions:  use threats to impose discipline, either by threatening to remove the whip, or using confidence motions tied to European policy positions. However, the examples of this are not inspiring. Think of the Major era when he linked the passage of the Treaty of European Union to a vote of confidence in his government in July 1993, or when he withdrew the whip in the parliamentary division on increasing the UK’s budgetary contributions in late 1994. Policy compromise and/​or deferring decisions: seek to find policy positions which both factions could embrace on the basis that their wishes have not yet been fully ruled out –​e.g. Major’s ‘wait and see’ or ‘negotiate and decide’ position on the single currency in the mid-​1990s, or even Hague’s decision to rule out entering the single currency but only for a specified period of time. Neither were examples that can be described as successful. Reduce the saliency of Europe as an issue: seek to reduce the emphasis on Europe within the rhetoric that the party is using on the following bases. First, if the electorate are not defining debates on Europe as amongst their most important policy concerns –​i.e. it is not a highly salient issue as compared to other issues –​ then there is limited electoral value in prioritising this as an issue. Second, given that the party may be divided on the issue, obsessively talking about it showcases their divisions. Given that parties that are divided undermine their electoral appeal, then the party should seek to downgrade their emphasis on an issue in which they leave themselves looking obsessive, myopic and divided. Offer a referendum: if all of the above methods cannot resolve the issue, then the party can potentially buy themselves political space by offering a referendum. This can act as a sticking plaster that can potentially mask their divisions when electioneering. However, in the pre-​Cameron era, this method had been used by Major for the 1997 General Election campaign, in which (after winning re-​ election) he would negotiate with the EU the terms for a possible entry into the single currency, and would then offer the electorate a referendum on whether to join or not (Lynch and Whittaker, 2013a).

It is clear that in opposition Cameron aimed for option six as his primary method of managing the European policy dilemma. The rationale for doing so was the fact that

Managing political dimensions

121

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

the Conservatives had made Europe the central tenet to their 2001 General Election campaign –​based on the slogan ‘Save the Pound’ –​and they had been resoundingly defeated, winning only 166 constituencies on a 31 per cent vote share (see Dorey, 2001; Cowley and Quayle, 2002). That this was his preferred method was clear in his speech to the Conservative Party annual conference in autumn 2006. Here, he explained how self-​indulgent and counter-​productive their European feuding had been, arguing that: instead of talking about the things that most people care about, we talked about what we cared about most … While parents worried about childcare, getting the kids to school, balancing work and family life, we were banging on about Europe.3 (Cameron, 2006, emphasis added)

In saying this Cameron was really asking his party to ‘turn down the volume of intraparty debate and temper some of the rhetoric’, rather than this implying a ‘substantive policy shift’ (Hayton, 2018: 228). The policy positioned that Cameron was adapting was relatively hard line, and was reflective of the ‘deepening Eurosceptic consensus within his own party’ (Vail, 2015:  120). However, this strategy of lowering the saliency of Europe unravelled once in coalition government, as the ‘perceived threats associated with EU membership intensified’ between the period of opposition, prior to the financial crash, and their time in office (Heppell et al., 2017b: 767). Those threats embraced the following: • The ‘sovereignty’ threat. This was a long-​standing threat for those who had long been doubtful of the integrationist and expansionist attitudes of the EU. It would now have the opportunity to gain greater traction due to the increased saliency of the other threats listed below (Heppell et al., 2017b: 767).4 • The ‘economic’ threat. This reflected the perception that the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis appeared to vindicate those Eurosceptic Conservatives who had spent the last two decades arguing against further integration within the EU, and their case against the single currency (Heppell et al., 2017b: 767; see also Lynch, 2015). • The ‘identity’ threat. This was seen to be a response to the significant growth in terms of net migration into the UK (Heppell et al., 2017b: 767). An examination of long-​term migration in the UK since 1990 demonstrated how the balance between inflow and outflow had shifted considerably. In the early 1990s the balance was in the negatives –​for example, in 1992 approximately 268,000 entered the UK, and 281,000 left the UK, making the balance approximately -​13,000. When New Labour entered office in 1997 the balance between inflow (327,000) and outflow (279,000) was +48,000, but by 2010 the balance between inflow (591,000) and outflow (339,000) was +256,000. By the end of 2015 the balance was at +332,000 between inflow (631,000) and outflow

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

122

Cameron

(299,000), and the Conservatives had failed to meet their predetermined target of reducing net migration down to below 100,000 (see Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017: 455). Not all of that migration emanated from within the EU –​on New Labour and immigration, see Consterdine and Hampshire (2014). However, a clear link was drawn between that growth and the decision of the Blair government to grant the citizens of the eight countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 full freedom of movement rights. The vast influx of East European migrants was not anticipated by the Blair government, and negative stereotyping by the British tabloid press –​notably against Polish immigrants –​helped to stoke up electoral concern about immigration (Daddow, 2012; Hawkins, 2012; Okólski and Salt, 2014; Statin, 2015). They were blamed for the economic insecurity, unemployment and the low wages of British workers, and criticised for placing an additional burden upon public services, and the British government were powerless to prevent this due to EU rules vis-​à-​vis freedom of movement (Ford and Goodwin, 2014b: 92; for a critique of the assumptions identified above, see Lemos and Portes, 2013). • The ‘electoral’ threat. Exploiting all of the above factors were UKIP who had emerged as a populist party representing ‘the people’ against the EU (Gifford, 2014: 512–​52; Heppell et al., 2017b: 767). Their rise included a surge in their membership (Ford and Goodwin, 2014b:  3) and improved performance in opinion polls, local elections and the 2014 European elections (Ford and Goodwin, 2014b: 245–​8; see also Goodwin and Milazzo, 2015). This would culminate in the defections of two Conservative MPs –​Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless (on the dynamics between the Conservatives and UKIP see also Lynch and Whittaker, 2013b; Webb and Bale, 2014; Tournier-Sol, 2015). The consequence of these threats was that the fault-​line within the PCP over Europe would evolve and change (Heppell et al., 2017b: 767–​8). Whereas the Major era had been defined by a clear divide between the pro-​European and Eurosceptic factions, the level of pro-​Europeanism declined considerably during the era of opposition. By 2010 it was clear that identifying the European cleavage within British Conservatism by the terms pro-​Europeanism and Euroscepticism was no longer appropriate (Cowley and Stuart, 2010:  141). The Eurosceptic strand of thought within the PCP had morphed into two variants –​i.e. soft and hard variants (on this debates, see Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008; Flood, 2009). The hard variant held a rejectionist mindset. They rejected the excessively regulatory mentality of the EU, and would argue the case for a hyperglobalist economy (Baker et al., 2002) and the economic opportunities to exploit by prioritising the Anglosphere (Lynch, 2015; Wellings and Baxendale, 2015; Kenny, 2016). The soft variant was willing to continue to justify continued EU membership, but made it clear that they opposed any further integrationist objectives. This strand of soft Euroscepticism captured the revisionist mindset of Cameron (Heppell et al., 2017b: 768). It was based on

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Managing political dimensions

123

continuing to support membership of the EU, but making clear that they were opposed to further integration, such as the extension of EU competence in terms of social policy, justice and home affairs, and foreign and security policy (Lynch, 2011: 218, 2012: 86). As his leadership tenure continued, Cameron found himself increasingly pressurised by the hard Eurosceptic faction to consider the case for a referendum on continued membership, and within this debates on renegotiation and the repatriation of powers intensified (Lynch and Whittaker, 2013a). The ability of Cameron to effectively manage this divide was undermined by the lack of trust towards him amongst elements of the hard Eurosceptic faction (Heppell et  al., 2017b:  767). Their distrust of him stemmed from their concern that Cameron was too complacent vis-​à-​vis the hazards associated with continued membership of an unreformed EU. Specifically they cited how Cameron decided to renege on his earlier pledge to call for a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (Hayton, 2018). That distrust was reinforced by his decision to enter into a coalition with the pro-​European Liberal Democrats (Lynch and Whittaker, 2013a, 2013b). Hard Eurosceptics were also prone to arguing that a stronger emphasis on immigration, and tougher Eurosceptic rhetoric, would have limited the appeal of UKIP in the General Election of 2010. Their calculation was based on the impact of the UKIP vote in a raft of marginal constituencies, in which they argued that this cost the Conservatives an additional 21 of their target seats and thereby an overall majority. This assessment is based on identifying the gap between the incumbency vote and the Conservatives’ position in second place, and then combining the Conservative plus UKIP vote, which when added together would take them beyond the first placed party (Dorey, 2010:  342). However, the assumption that the appeal of UKIP was based on disaffected Conservatives can be justified, but is perhaps an over-​simplification. On the one hand, when examining the performance of UKIP in the 2009 European parliamentary elections, Ford et al. had identified how UKIP did draw their support primarily from the traditional Conservative vote base, especially from middle-​aged males (Ford et al., 2012: 206). However, on the other hand UKIP would later be said to be appealing to the disaffected working-​class and traditional Labour vote, as they successfully targeted working-​class voters, with lower educational qualifications –​those that Ford and Goodwin would refer to as the ‘left behind’ (Ford and Goodwin, 2014a). The cumulative effect of all of the above factors was that Cameron was dragged away from his preferred option of trying to make European policy a low salience issue. As was noted in ­chapter 6, his backbenchers became increasingly harder to control on European divisions. During the course of the 2010–​15 Parliament a total of 103 members of the PCP (out of 306) would defy the whip at least once on a division on European policy (covering 49 separate parliamentary divisions, see Lynch, 2015: 193; see also Cowley et al., 2016: 110). Moreover, Cameron was seen to be attempting to placate his own backbenchers in two contentious issues with the EU. First, in late 2011 he used the British veto to block a fiscal compact that

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

124

Cameron

was wanted by other European leaders to help address the Eurozone crisis (Gamble, 2012b: 469). Second, in early 2013 Cameron adopted a tough position in relation to the EU budgetary renegotiations. In an effort to demonstrate that he was trying to protect the interests of the British taxpayer, he managed to make the case for a real terms cut in the European budget for the first time in its history (Watt and Traynor, 2013). The confirmation of the failure of his preferred option of reducing the saliency of the EU as an issue was confirmed when in early 2013 he announced the following decision:  if re-​elected then his administration would seek (a)  to renegotiate the terms of the UK’s membership of the EU, and then (b) having done so they would put that to the electorate in an in-​out referendum (Copsey and Haughton, 2014; Heppell et al., 2017b: 768). It was a hugely risky strategy to adopt. Cameron had no way of knowing whether he would be able to secure enough concessions from the EU in the negotiations to satisfy his own party and the Eurosceptic elements within the electorate. Furthermore, by staking his future on his ability to do so, Cameron was making himself a ‘hostage’ to future events over which he had limited ability to control (Copsey and Haughton, 2014: 77). One of the few remaining pro-​European Conservatives, Clarke, condemned Cameron for making such a ‘casual’ promise, arguing that he had failed to ‘predict what the political landscape would look like by the time of the vote’, and that this was complacent of him, given the ‘mood of angry protest’ that was ‘sweeping across Western democracies’ (Clarke, 2016: 484). It was also an ironic position for Cameron to find himself in (Heppell et  al., 2017b: 768). After all he had begun his leadership tenure committed to reducing the saliency of Europe as a policy issue, and here he was making it a central determinant of the next General Election campaign, and by implication the dominant issue on his government’s in-​tray should they be elected. It was also a contradictory position to have put himself in. He was instinctively committed to the idea of remaining within the EU (Clarke, 2016:  473), and yet he had created the environment in which the roadmap to exiting the EU was now available (on this, see Matthijis, 2013; Glencross, 2015; Wellings and Vines, 2016). However, it could be argued that this decision could benefit Cameron in the following ways. First, it could be politically helpful to the Conservatives in terms of causing difficulties for the Labour opposition. Miliband did not want to offer a referendum commitment, and thereby Conservative strategists assumed that they could gain politically from describing Miliband as elitist and obstructive (Heppell, 2014a: 160). Second, it was designed to address the UKIP threat (Clarke, 2016: 473), as theoretically this should have nullified the need to embrace UKIP as a single-​issue party (Heppell, 2014a: 159–​ 60). These two calculations were clearly evident in the campaigning strategy of the Conservatives during the 2015 General Election campaign. Their pitch of ‘reform, renegotiation and referendum’ enabled them to argue ‘that Labour (and the Liberal Democrats) would deny voters this option, and that only they and not UKIP could deliver on this’ (Heppell et al., 2017b: 768; see Conservative Party, 2015: 72–​3).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Managing political dimensions

125

Third, it was also assumed that the offer of a future referendum was motivated by ‘reasons of party management’ as Cameron thought by doing so he would ‘placate’ the hard Eurosceptics and end the ‘constant bickering’ (Clarke, 2016: 473). Cameron hoped that by making it evident in 2013 that a referendum would follow after re-​election, this would allow the Conservatives to ‘concentrate solely on the serious business of government’ (Clarke, 2016: 473). Within these justifications for offering a referendum the need to unify the party and stall the rise of UKIP were the most pressing. However, given the delays implicit within this strategy, some hard Eurosceptics remained doubtful of Cameron’s motives. They feared that Cameron [was] playing a similar sticking plaster tactic that [Harold] Wilson utilised in the 1970s  –​i.e. commit to a referendum in the hope of creating the semblance of party unity needed for electioneering and present to the electorate an essentially cosmetic negotiation, and then ensure that membership is continued. (Heppell, 2014a: 160)

After winning the General Election in May 2015 the government used the Queen’s Speech of May 2015 to confirm that a referendum would take place, and that it would be held before the end of 2017 at the very latest (Smith, 2015). Achieving this involved two stages:  first, the parliamentary passage of the European Union Referendum Act, and second, negotiations between the British government and the EU (in spring 2016), the result of which would be the basis upon which voters would be asked to vote on in the in-​out referendum (to be held in June 2016). If voters decided to remain within the EU, then those terms would form the new settlement upon which continued membership would be based. However, Cameron entered the negotiations from an inherently weak position for the following reasons: • Clarity in terms of his objectives: Clarke argues that Cameron entered the renegotiation process facing a fundamental dilemma –​i.e. he ‘never really had a clear idea of what he wanted to get out of the EU reform negotiations’ (Clarke, 2016: 485). That he was ‘remarkably vague’ on this issue stemmed from the fact that he entered this process as a ‘tactical devise to kill the time and explain the delay between calling the referendum in 2013 and holding it years later’ (Clarke, 2016:  485). Moreover, the fact that Cameron’s own preference would be for the UK to remain inside the EU, weakened him in terms of his ability to gain concessions from the EU (Smith, 2018). • Competing expectations from the EU itself and UK voters about the renegotiation process: Smith argues the renegotiating themes that Cameron wanted to explore –​ economic governance, competiveness, sovereignty and immigration  –​were problematic for the EU. Given the centrality of immigration to the surge in hostility towards the EU –​and the emerging anti EU narrative of taking back control –​Cameron needed to offer some evidence of substantive change on freedom

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

126

Cameron

of movement, in order to placate Conservative parliamentarians, members and voters. However, freedom of movement was essentially a non-​negotiable issue for the EU. Smith accurately identifies Cameron’s problem –​his requests for reform were perceived to be ‘too far reaching’ for EU partners, and ‘too limited’ for those of a hard Eurosceptic mindset (Smith, 2018). Moreover, it was necessary for the EU to adopt a tough line in the renegotiation process, as offering too many concessions to the UK to placate them enough to remain could create a domino effect of other nations (with increasingly Eurosceptic electorates) making similar demands. Regardless, the EU were confident (or complacent) enough to assume the UK would vote remain anyway, and therefore there was limited need to make too many concessions during the renegotiations. • Timing and circumstances: Cameron wanted to complete the renegotiations, and hold and win the referendum, inside two years of winning the General Election of May 2015. He had already indicated that he would not be the leader of the Conservative Party at the General Election planned for May 2020. He therefore knew that his fellow Conservatives would be thinking about the succession, and if he was to have the time, space (and unity) to work on his prime ministerial legacy, he needed to resolve this issue as quickly as possible, as the likelihood was that he would be under pressure to step aside by 2018 or 2019. Another motivation for holding the referendum as quickly as was feasible, was the longer he waited the more time there would be for the polls to shift towards Leave. On this issue, Cameron was also compromised by the increasingly Europhobic tone of the right-​wing print media (Curtice, 2017a). These factors, that incentivised him to speed the process along, contributed to the lack of adequate planning ahead in terms of the renegotiations themselves. The consequence of the above were as follows. Cameron was unable to secure a new settlement that was going to be enough to encourage known anti-​Europeans, and likely Leave voters, to switch to vote Remain. He was now in a political bind of his own construction. The central driver of electoral hostility towards the EU was immigration, and the perception amongst a significant number of voters was that because the EU will not compromise on freedom of movement, this meant that leaving the EU was the only option. To such voters, Cameron’s renegotiated settlement was empty and of no real consequence (Ford and Goodwin, 2017; Smith, 2018). Renegotiation embraced the following elements, which would come into force when the vote for Remain was confirmed. First, an opt-​out from the commitment of member states, within the EU treaties, towards ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. Second, a change to in work benefits for EU nationals in the UK, meaning that there would be a four-​year delay before workers entering the UK could qualify for these payments. Finally, a switch to ensure that the child benefit paid for the children of an EU migrant would be linked to the standards of where the child was living (Curtice, 2017a; Ford and Goodwin, 2017). Not only was the

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Managing political dimensions

127

expert view that such alterations would have no significant impact on EU migration into the UK (see Portes, 2016), but more importantly for Cameron ‘voters were largely unimpressed’ by his claim ‘that he had negotiated a good deal for Britain’ (Curtice, 2017a: 25). In the aftermath of the negotiations, the opinion polls, which at that time were showing a small lead for Remain, ‘barely moved at all’ (Curtice, 2017a: 25). Once the renegotiation process was complete, and the date of the referendum set, Cameron made two issues clear: first, that the position of the government (and himself as Prime Minister) was to advocate remaining within the EU; and second, in a necessary act, that nonetheless made him look weak, Cameron announced that he would suspend collective ministerial responsibility –​thus allowing ministers to campaign for either Remain or Leave (Heppell et  al., 2017b:  768). Despite this, Cameron was confident of winning, according to Smith, who states that: it was a gamble that Cameron—​a man famously lucky in politics—​believed he could win and ‘win big’ (60:40 in favour of remain, sources claimed). (Smith, 2018: 3)

Within a year of the referendum a number of accounts have emerged covering the campaigning period –​see, for example, for the Remain camp the insider account by Craig Oliver (2016), which is complemented by an insider’s assessment by Leave donor Arron Banks (2017) (see also Ashcroft and Culwick, 2016; Bennett, 2016; Shipman, 2016). Alongside the journalistic appraisal of Shipman (2016) we have interpretations from psephologists –​see for example, Hobolt (2016), Curtice (2017a) and Clarke et  al. (2017a, 2017b) and see also Goodwin and Milazzo (2017) for the centrality of immigration to the decision-​making of Leave voters. Immigration proved to be the issue upon which Cameron miscalculated, as he assumed that a repetitious message about economic security and the politics of prosperity would trump the politics of identity and voter anxiety about immigration (Curtice, 2017a). Not only did Cameron miscalculate in terms of the voters at large, but he underestimated the scale of discontent within his own parliamentary ranks (see t­ables  7 and 8). The speed with which Leave sentiment developed within the PCP, between the 2010–​15 and the 2015–​17 Parliaments, was remarkable. Academic research had identified how the parliamentary ranks had been moving in a Eurosceptic direction in the period since 1992, and how the Eurosceptic ranks Table 7  EU referendum vote: strands and strength of opinion within the PCP, 2016 Leave

Remain

Undeclared

Total

145 (43.9%)

174 (52.7%)

11 (3.4%)

330 (100%)

Source: Heppell et al. (2017b: 770).

Cameron

128

Table 8  Strands and strength of opinion within the PCP vis-​à-​vis Europe, 1992 to 2016

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Parliament

Agnostic

1992 (n=331) 1997 (n=164) 2001 (n=166) 2005 (n=198) 2010 (n=306)

41 (12.4%) 11 (6.7%) 9 (5.4%) 10 (5.1%) 64 (20.9%)

2015 (n=330)

11 (3.4%)

Europhile 98 (29.6%) 14 (8.5%) 8 (4.8%) 7 (3.5%) 7 (2.3%)

Eurosceptic (Soft)

(Hard)

154 (50.3%) Remain/​ Euro-​realists 174 (52.7%)

192 (58.0%) 139 (84.8%) 149 (89.8%) 181 (91.4%) 235 (76.8%) 81 (26.5%) Brexit/​ Euro-r​ ejectionists 145 (43.9%)

Source: Heppell et al. (2017b: 771).

had morphed into two variants –​soft and hard (Heppell, 2013b). Once the referendum was called, virtually all Conservative parliamentarians publicly stated their voting preference, and from this Heppell et al. identified 145 (or 43.9 pe rcent) of the 330-​strong 2015–​17 PCP advocated withdrawal from the EU (Heppell et al., 2017b: 770). Cameron was also undermined by the high-​profile Conservatives who aligned themselves to the Leave campaign –​including former Conservative Party leader and Cabinet member, Duncan Smith, former London Mayor, Boris Johnson, and current Cabinet members, Theresa Villiers, Chris Grayling, John Whittingdale and, of course, Gove. That Cameron could not secure the loyalty and support for his renegotiated settlement from nearly half of his own parliamentary ranks, or from some current Cabinet members, was not a good portent of his ability to retain the support of all Conservatives within the electorate (estimated at around 36 per cent based on the previous General Election). This created the following irony for the Leave campaign: they needed to maximise the vote from those who were Labour and Remain voters in order to save a Conservative Prime Minister. However the Labour Party leader, Corbyn, was ‘widely criticised’ for ‘failing to deliver an unambiguous and passionate case for remain and for having a fractious, semi-​detached relationship’ with the ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’ official campaign (Ford and Goodwin, 2017: 24). The consequence of this was clear, and damaging, to the Remain cause. In one opinion poll of known Labour voters, conducted close to the day of the vote, it was found that almost half of them did not think that the Labour Party wanted to remain in the EU (Ford and Goodwin, 2017: 24). This was to matter as the referendum campaign was to become defined by three issues: first, the emphasis on economic risk –​i.e. calculation –​that drove the official Remain campaign; second, an emphasis on political control vis-​à-​vis immigration

Managing political dimensions

129

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

and freedom of movement  –​i.e. identify  –​that drove the Leave campaign; and third, the ability of leading players within Leave and Remain –​i.e. Cameron and Corbyn versus Johnson and Nigel Farage –​to provide a cue to help voters to form their opinion. On the conflict between risk and control, between economic security and political identity, the Remain campaign was unambiguous. As Clarke et al. have observed: the official campaign for Remain, Britain Stronger In Europe, joined Prime Minister David Cameron, Governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney, leaders of large trade unions and major business corporations, prominent media commentators and miscellaneous celebrities to warn voters that exiting the EU would have dire consequences—​households would be £4,300 worse off each year, workers would lose £38 a week in wages and house prices might fall by as much as 18 per cent. Only days before the vote pro-​Remain Chancellor George Osborne claimed that Brexit would produce a £30 billion ‘black hole’ in the budget that would necessitate harsh public spending cuts and tax increases. (Clarke et al., 2017b: 440)

The Leave campaign focused on delegitimising the claims of Remainers by accusing them of ‘scaremongering’ (Clarke et al., 2017b: 441). Even though Remain would lose the referendum, the primary motivation for voting Remain was found to be around the economic risks or economic instability that Brexit could provoke (Hobolt, 2016: 1263). Conversely, the primary motivations for voting Leave were identified as being about immigration control, but also involved an economic argument –​i.e. about the cost of membership (Hobolt, 2016: 1263). This suggested that Leave voters did respond to the central pitch of the Leave campaign –​based around Vote Leave, Leave EU and Grassroots Out  –​which according to Clarke et al. focused heavily on mobilizing public anxiety over immigration, the free movement of EU nationals and the further enlargement of the EU to encompass Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and possibly Turkey. The pro-​Leave campaign also had focused heavily on the issues of sovereignty and the economic costs of EU membership, variously claiming that voters could ‘take back control’ from unaccountable ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ by voting to leave the EU and that the country would save £350 million each week that could be redirected into the NHS. (Clarke et al., 2017b: 440)

Leadership cues can play an important role in persuading voters (see table 9). It is true that the unwillingness of Corbyn to enthusiastically contribute to the Remain cause ‘eroded the strength of cueing effects’ on behalf of the Labour Party (Clarke et al., 2017b: 447). However, one of the main motivations for Leave voters was lack of trust in Cameron –​alongside the aforementioned issues of immigration control and the costs of EU membership (Hobolt, 2016: 1263). Moreover, the ability of Cameron to persuade voters to the Remain cause was undermined by his inability

Cameron

130

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Table 9  EU referendum vote (2016) and party identification Party identification

Leave (%)

Remain (%)

Conservative Labour Liberal Democrats UKIP Green

54 33 27 100 21

46 67 73 0 79

Source: Curtice (2017b).

to carry his own parliamentarians, and fellow ministers, with him (Heppell et al., 2017b: 776). As a consequence, Clarke et al. conclude that: since the Conservative Party as a whole was deeply divided and had been sending contradictory messages about ‘Europe’ to the electorate for many years before the campaign began, this very likely muted the impact of a more general Conservative partisan heuristic. (Clarke et al., 2017b: 446)

However, the most damning criticism of his political leadership is not this misjudgement in itself. Rather his misplaced confidence in winning, meant that as Prime Minister he failed to engage in adequate contingency planning for a Leave result. This was to put his successor, May, at a serious disadvantage when she replaced him as Conservative Party leader and Prime Minister in July 2016 (Hayton, 2018; Smith, 2018). Conclusion The analysis provided in this chapter shows how Cameron sought to address the challenges to the existing rules of the game. By this we mean how he dealt with the traditional dynamics of British politics being attacked by three forces –​first, from the Liberal Democrats on the centre ground of British politics demanding electoral reform; second, from the rise of nationalism within Scotland demanding independence and a breakaway from the Union; and third, from the increasing saliency of immigration as an electoral issue linked to evolving hostility towards the EU, with these forces being stimulated primarily from UKIP, but also from within his own parliamentary ranks, as well as from an increasingly Europhobic right-​w ing  press. On the first challenge to the dimensionality of British politics, Cameron secured a significant victory. This provided two clear advantages for the Conservatives. First, any shift away from the existing FPTP system would be damaging to the electoral interests of the Conservatives, with the gainers being the Liberal Democrats.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Managing political dimensions

131

Moreover, under either an AV or Proportional Representation electoral system, the possibility of a Labour–​Liberal Democrat coalition would increase significantly. Second, and linked to the first point, the scale of victory  –​68 to 32 per cent  –​ removed the issue of electoral reform from forthcoming political debate, meaning that it would be of less importance in future hung Parliament scenarios. However, although Cameron secured a significant victory, his method of victory revealed a significant leadership trait –​i.e. his willingness to take risks. Had he lost it would have been hugely damaging to the interests of his own party. Cameron also revealed his willingness to turn to referendums, when it was becoming inevitable that contentious issues would have to be addressed, and not ignored. That is to say Cameron agreed to a referendum on electoral reform, not because he really wanted to, but because he accepted it as a necessity –​i.e. it was unavoidable if he was going to ensure that he could bind the Liberal Democrats into agreeing to a full coalition deal. In some ways the same applied in relation to the Scottish independence referendum of 2014. As an instinctive unionist Cameron did not want to create a roadmap that aided the journey towards Scottish independence, but he recognised the following. First, the SNP had secured a majority in the Scottish parliamentary elections of 2011, and that now provided them with a clear mandate to request a referendum. Second, as the ability to consent to an independence referendum lay with Westminster, Cameron calculated that refusing to offer one would increase support for Scottish independence. Third, as a consequence of the above factors, Cameron concluded that offering an independence referendum before Scottish nationalism gathered any more momentum (i.e. when the status quo position remained ahead in the opinion polls) was the best way of resolving the issue for a generation or more. In the end Cameron secured a numeric victory by 55 to 45 per cent, but it was not a psychological victory. The scale of victory in the AV referendum was so significant the issue was removed from ongoing political debate, but a 55 to 45 per cent victory served to intensify the debate, rather than end it. For Scottish nationalists, the referendum result was not the end of the debate, it was a staging post to their ultimate aim, and thus debates on the timing of another referendum continued post-​2014. Based on the above it can be argued that Cameron turned to the people in the case of electoral reform, and Scottish independence, not from a position of free choice. Rather he turned to the people out of perceived necessity, and when he turned to them it was not to address a quandary upon which he had no view. Instead he turned to the people to legitimise a position that he already had, and in doing so marginalise the alternative view. By the time of the outcome of the Scottish referendum in late 2014, Cameron was already committed to another referendum on the case for continued membership of the EU. Having announced his intention to hold an in-​out referendum in early 2013, winning the General Election of 2015 made it an inevitability. Could Cameron have avoided this? Having used the referendum promise as a means of garnering support at the 2015 General Election, and to placate hard Eurosceptics

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

132

Cameron

within his own ranks, he would have been pilloried had he tried to backtrack thereafter. As a consequence, his Director of Communications, Craig Oliver, suggests that those who think Cameron could have avoided a referendum were ‘denying what was political reality’ (Oliver, 2016: 1). It was necessary in order to detoxify the issue –​i.e. to win and shut down debate within the Conservative Party (the unity dividend), and to make UKIP irrelevant or less relevant (the electoral dividend). The first post-​Cameron General Election took place in June 2017, and it saw a significant increase in the combined Conservative and Labour vote, as compared to recent General Elections. Back in 1951, 96.1 per cent of voters voted either Conservative or Labour, but thereafter that figure gradually fell –​in 1970 it was 89.5 per cent, by 1992 it was 76.3 per cent, and by 2010 it reached a post-​war low of 65.1 per cent (see Quinn, 2013; McKibbin, 2016). During the Cameron era the UKIP performance in Westminster elections improved significantly, from 919,546 votes (or 3.1 per cent) in 2010 to 3,481,099 votes (or 12.6 per cent) in 2015. The impact of Brexit was cataclysmic for UKIP as they fell to 594,068 votes (or 1.8 per cent) in 2017. The collapse of the UKIP vote followed on the collapse in the Liberal Democrat vote in 2015 –​they fell from 6.8 million votes and a 23 per cent vote share in 2010 to 2.4 million votes in 2015 and a vote share of 7.9 per cent, and this did not significantly alter in 2017 –​2.3 million votes and a vote share of 7.4 per cent. The Conservatives and Labour were the electoral beneficiaries of the erosion of both the Liberal Democrat and UKIP vote. This was evident in voting patterns in 2017, when both made significant gains in terms of votes cast. However, the consequence of developments vis-​à-​vis Scottish nationalism and the case for independence, was the erosion of the Labour vote in Scotland, as the SNP vote increased from 491,386 in 2010 to 1,454,436 in 2015. Although the SNP vote diminished in 2017 (to 977,509) the rise in support for the Scottish Conservatives between 2010 and 2017 has been significant. They have moved from fourth place in 2010 with 412,855 votes (16.7 per cent) to second in 2017 (757,949 or 28.6 per cent), with their gains in 2017 appearing to be at the expense of Labour. Whereas Labour had a clear lead in Scotland in 2010 (1,035,528 votes and 42 per cent of the vote) they fell dramatically at 2015 (707,147 votes and a 24.3 per cent vote share), and they finished behind the Conservatives in 2017 (on 717,007 votes or 27.1 per cent of the vote) (see Hassan, 2017; Henderson and Mitchell, 2018). Overall, the dynamics of party competition have changed significantly as a consequence of the Cameron era. By intention, Cameron did erode the Liberal Democrat vote, after eliminating the threat of electoral reform. By accident, he secured a gain for the Conservatives, by inadvertently eroding the Scottish Labour vote, but in doing so the threat to the existing rules of the game from Scottish nationalism remain. By accident, he contributed to the erosion of the UKIP vote to the potential electoral advantage of the Conservatives. However, whatever partisan advantage that his party may have secured through this, it was secured in Cameron’s mind at the expense of the national interest.

Managing political dimensions

133

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Notes 1 The differences between Scotland and England were again demonstrated by the European referendum, when the Scots voted remain (see McHarg and Mitchell, 2017). 2 On Labour’s gradual decline in Scotland, which pre-​dates the independence referendum, see Hassan and Shaw (2012). 3 His disdain for obsessive Europhobia was also evident in his tone vis-​à-​vis the emerging threat that was UKIP, when (in April 2006) he labelled them as a ‘bunch of fruitcakes and loonies’ who were ‘closet racists mostly’ (Taylor, 2006). When UKIP demanded an apology for accusing them of being racists, Cameron reaffirmed his accusation by citing how their original founder, Dr Alan Sked, had left the party because he ‘thought they had been infiltrated by the far right’ (Taylor, 2006). 4 The terms used to define Conservatives vis-​à-​vis Europe would evolve over time. Those with doubts were labelled as anti-​Europeans in the 1960s, but became redefined as anti-​ Marketeers in the 1960s and 1970s, whereupon the term Euroscepticism gained traction in the 1990s. What united them over time was their doubts about the value of economic integration and political multilateralism, and saw this as surrendering sovereignty to a supra-​national body over which they had no control. Those of a pro-​European persuasion –​once defined as pro-​Marketeers in the 1970s –​held a con​federalist position, based on the assumption that pooling sovereignty within a more integrated Europe would bring with it economic benefits (Crowson, 2007: 105–​26; Heppell et al., 2017b: 764–​68).

8

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion

How should we interpret the tenure of Cameron as leader of the Conservative Party? That is the dilemma that this book has attempted to address. In doing so the book has made a clear attempt to move beyond existing interpretations, which have become dominated by analysing the Cameron era through the theme of modernisation. Although debates about modernisation are valid, this book rests on the assumption that Cameronism should also be viewed through the theme of manipulation –​i.e. to assess Cameron as a heresthetician. When pulling together both themes, the book examined modernisation in relation to the detoxification of the Conservative brand; how the Conservatives sought to delegitimise Labour as an alternative; and how once in power the Conservatives sought to depoliticise, or redefine, the responsibilities of the state, via the Big Society narrative. When considering manipulation, the book examined the Conservatives’ relationship with the Liberal Democrats in coalition, in terms of agenda setting and political binding, and it also evaluated three challenges to the existing dimensionality of British politics –​electoral reform, Scottish independence and EU membership. Based on the findings from these chapters, what conclusions can be drawn up in relation to Cameron? The success of Cameronism It may be tempting to interpret the politics of Cameronism as a complete failure as he was forced to resign in humiliation after the EU referendum in June 2016. However, given his longevity as leader of the Conservative Party,1 and the circumstances surrounding his premiership –​economic constraints running parallel to a wave of anti-​establishment sentiment, whilst governing in the first post-​war coalition  –​it is important to assess him in the round, and not just through the prism of Brexit. When we do so, as this book has attempted to, we can see that Cameronism does have some successes to its name. The evidence of success can be broken down into three broad themes.

Conclusion

135

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

1. Partial success in terms of detoxification We can argue that the Conservative Party did show some signs of success in terms of detoxifying their image in the Cameron era (Kerr and Hayton, 2015). It cannot be denied that Cameron had a legislative imprint in terms of international aid and same-​sex marriage. His pride in relation to the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act of 2013, and the International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act of 2015, was evident during his resignation speech on the steps of Downing Street in July 2016. He argued that although ‘politicians like to talk about policies, in the end it is about people’s lives’ (Cameron, 2016). He then identified two positive impacts from his prime ministerial tenure: first, for ‘the couples who have been able to get married [and] who weren’t allowed to in the past’; and, second, for the ‘people on the other side of the world who would not have clean drinking water, the chance to go to school, or even be alive, were it not for our decision to keep our aid promises to the poorest people and the poorest countries in our world’ (Cameron, 2016). Cameron did well in persuading his fellow parliamentarians to embrace the 0.7 per cent commitment on international aid, if even a vocal (if small) band of critics existed on this issue, who were supported by the right-​wing print media (Heppell et al., 2017a; see also Cawley, 2015). Although pursuing same-​sex marriage exposed a significant fault-​line within their parliamentary ranks –​which was split down the middle on the issue, and showcased the limits to his pursuit of social liberalism –​the fact remains that there was a significant growth in the number of socially liberal Conservative parliamentarians under Cameron’s leadership. In the 2001–​5 Parliament, it was estimated that around 15 per cent of the PCP could be defined as socially liberal, and this figure was to increase significantly by the 2015–​ 17 Parliament, with approaching 45 per cent identifiable as socially liberal. Running parallel to this there has been a significant reduction in socially conservative sentiment, which having previously accounted for around 80 per cent of Conservative parliamentarians, but social conservatives were in the minority within the 2015–​ 17 PCP (see Heppell and Hill, 2008, 2009, 2010; Heppell, 2013b; Heppell et al., 2017b). However, as there were limits to the extent of substantive change within the Conservative Party –​i.e. some socially conservative sentiment associated with the toxic or nasty imagery remained  –​the real weapon through which they tried to detoxify and decontaminate the brand was to be Cameron himself (see Seawright, 2013b; Pich and Dean, 2015; Pich et al., 2016; Pich and Armannsdottir, 2018). This emphasis on the party leader taps into the fact that voter choice in British General Elections has become increasingly shaped by valance based explanations (i.e. the perceived competence of parties or more specifically their leaders), as opposed to positional based explanations (i.e. the classic class based cleavage) (see Clarke et al., 2004, 2009). That increased emphasis on leaders relative to parties (Denver, 2005), and the personalisation of politics (Langer, 2007, 2011), has meant that

Cameron

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

136

political campaigning and party branding has become as much about ‘image’ and ‘symbolism’ as it is about ‘content’ and ‘policy’ (Smith, 2009:  214). Leaders are used by parties as ‘informational shortcuts to help’ voters decide, and ‘personality differences’ have come to obviate ‘the need to actively learn about party policies’ (Smith, 2009: 212). Parties increasingly rely on the performative abilities of their leaders (O’Shaughnessey, 2003), and their ‘looks, age, gender, dress sense, accent, and general demeanour’ have come to ‘carry wider meaning in the minds of voters’ (Smith and French, 2011: 719). What cannot be denied is that relative to either Brown or Miliband, Cameron was an electoral asset to his party, whereas they were electoral liabilities to theirs. In the General Election campaigns of 2010 and 2015, Cameron outscored Brown and Miliband as the preferred candidate to be Prime Minister. It was also significant that he had a support level that was either consistent with his party support base, or ahead of it (Dorey, 2010: 411; Worcester et al., 2011: 263–​72; Bale, 2015: 257). Moreover, Cameron entered the General Election campaign of 2010 ahead of Brown in the eyes of voters in relation to a range of prime ministerial leadership traits. Using a scale of 0–​1 voters rated Brown at 0.39 on responsiveness, relative to Cameron on 0.43; rated Brown at 0.42 in terms of trustworthiness, relative to Cameron on 0.51; and rated Brown at 0.50 in terms of knowledgeability, relative to Cameron on 0.54. On the overall assessment of competence, Cameron, at 0.50, was ahead of Brown on 0.39. Moreover, exposure to Cameron during the course of the campaigning period led to improvements in voter perceptions of his leadership capability (Stevens et al., 2011: 132). When Brown was replaced by Miliband, Cameron retained, throughout the 2010 to 2015 period, a consistent lead amongst voters as their preferred Prime Minister (Clarke et  al., 2016:  113). Critically, although Cameron’s competence rating on the 0–​1 sliding scale was not necessarily that high (at 0.42) it was ahead of Miliband’s (at 0.39), and the lead that he had over Brown on key leadership traits was sustained (Clarke et al., 2016: 113). There was clear evidence of a Cameron effect at the polls in General Election of 2015, as ‘71 percent of Tory voters cited the leader as one of the three most important reasons for voting for the party, compared with just 39 percent of Labour voters’ (Bale and Webb, 2015: 51). 2. Sufficient success at the politics of delegitimisation Given that his attempt to detoxify the Conservative brand had limitations, it is clear that their electoral success was as much about establishing doubts about Labour, as it was about the merits of the Conservatives. In this context Cameron was relatively effective at the politics of deflection. He used the financial crash as a means to drive a crisis narrative in which Labour, and specifically Brown, were to be blamed (Crines, 2015c). The crash was the trigger for a decline in support for Labour, and for a reversal in the decade-​long assumption that Labour was the best equipped

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion

137

party in relation to economic management (Fielding, 2010). Cameron used his speeches, in the late 2008 to early 2010 period, to apportion blame to Labour. In doing so he was planning beyond the actual winning of the General Election of 2010. Escalating the rhetoric of crisis, prior to entering office, created a defence case for the Conservatives in the early years of power, i.e. their economic inheritance was so calamitous that it would take time to initiate a full economic recovery (Heffernan, 2011). Apportioning blame was geared not just towards lowering expectations when the Conservatives entered power, but for establishing that Labour were so incompetent it would be risk to return them to office at the General Election of 2015 (Crines, 2015c). The Conservatives ability to apportion blame (pre-​2010), and establish risk (post-​2010), was helped by the fact that in opposition Miliband found it immensely difficult to carve out a distinctive and credible post-​New Labour identify for his party (Bale, 2015; Goes, 2016). His search for credibility saw him dabble with the debates that informed Blue and Purple Labour, as well as the rhetoric of predistribution and one nation Labour, none of which gained significant traction with voters (Fielding, 2015). Moreover, just as the Conservatives were facing a squeeze on the issue of immigration and the rise of UKIP, that squeeze was also evident for Labour, even if it was underestimated by their leadership. The same argument applies –​i.e. leadership complacency –​in relation to the squeeze on their vote base in Scotland, and the electoral threat from the SNP (Lodge and Thomas, 2015). Cameron’s skills at deflection, and delegitimising his primary political opponents, was needed, as his prime ministerial tenure was clearly open to criticism on policy grounds, and in terms of general competence. Key economic indicators did improve. For example, as table 10 demonstrates, the unemployment rate fell –​from 7.9 per cent in early 2010 to 5.5 per cent by early 2015 –​whilst economic growth improved in the same period –​from 0.1 per cent to 0.4 per cent. However, these claims have to be countered by the ‘omnishambles’ that was the Budget of 2012; the admission that the plan to eradicate the deficit by 2015 would not be feasible; and the loss of the AAA credit rating in 2013 (Byrne et al., 2017: 214). Furthermore, their approach to health care and welfare reform sparked significant debate. In terms of health care, there was widespread criticism of the Health and Social Care Act of 2012, which initiated a substantive restructuring of the NHS (Lister, 2012; Davies, 2013). Meanwhile, complexities existed in terms of the implementation of Universal Credit (see Dwyer and Wright, 2014; Millar and Bennett, 2017), and there was the hugely unpopular bedroom tax, in which tenants of council or social housing faced a reduction in Housing Benefit if they had a spare room (for a critique, see Moffatt et al., 2016). Notwithstanding these controversies, the critical issue was that the Conservatives managed to align the economic and electoral cycles sufficiently well to aid them in the General Election of 2015. Economic optimism  –​which dipped in the initial years of the coalition as unemployment increased and concerns remained vis-​à-​vis

Cameron

138

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Table 10  Economic indicators, 2010–​15

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. May

Rate of unemployment

Growth rate

Economic Optimism Index

7.9 8.4 7.8 7.2 5.7 5.5

0.1 0.2 −0.1 0.6 0.8 0.4

−12 −48 −27 +18 +5 +26

Sources: Cowley and Kavanagh (2016: 10–​11) and IPSOS Mori (2017).

economic growth –​returned by the end of the Parliament, as unemployment fell and economic growth returned. It was hardly a glorious economic success story, but it was politically sufficient to ensure that the Conservatives entered the General Election campaign of 2015 electorally competitive, and critically still holding a lead in terms of the party defined as the most economically competent (Bale and Webb, 2015: 45; Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 535; Clarke et al., 2016: 62). 3. Successful exploitation of the Liberal Democrats (a) The policy agenda and ministerial control Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated that Cameron was successful in terms of manipulating the circumstances of coalition politics to the advantage of the Conservatives, both in terms of policy and personnel. On policy, it is valid to argue that the Liberal Democrats secured some concessions from the Conservatives in terms of welfare policy, alongside electoral reform and the offer of a referendum on AV (Quinn et al., 2011: 303–​5). However, the notion of this as a Liberal Democrat negotiation ‘win’ has to be placed within the context of what was to happen later on tuition fees, where Cameron forced the Liberal Democrats to lead the implementation of a policy that directly contradicted their pre-​election position (Bale, 2011: 248). Moreover, the Conservatives came out of the negotiations protecting their interests on European and security matters. However, the whole negotiation process had to be placed in the context of the Conservatives ‘winning’ the argument vis-​à-​vis deficit reduction (Dorey et al., 2011: 191; Norton, 2011: 257; Quinn et al., 2011: 302–​6; Bale, 2012b: 328; Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 25). As Bale has argued, it was foolhardy of the Liberal Democrats to allow their senior coalition partners such clear control of economic policy (Bale, 2011: 248, 2016: 359). On personnel, it is valid to note that the Liberal Democrats did numerically well in terms of ministers. Indeed, they received slightly more ministerial posts than was required given the parliamentary representation of the two parties –​they had around 16 per cent of all parliamentarians within the coalition, and secured 19 per cent of

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion

139

all ministerial posts, and 21 per cent of the Cabinet posts (Matthews, 2011: 499). However, ­chapter 4 identified the importance of the portfolios in which they had ministerial representation and reached the following conclusions. First, Cameron and the Conservatives benefited from the Liberal Democrat preference for breadth, rather than depth, in terms of ministerial allocation (see Heppell, 2014b). By seeking ministerial representation across as many departments as possible, they spread themselves too thinly to have ownership of any particular policy areas. That lack of ownership would have consequences. It impinged upon their identity and limited their ability to demonstrate their influence within government (McEnhill, 2015). Second, in terms of the Cabinet posts offered Cameron outmanoeuvred Clegg (Evans, 2011:  55). They were allocated positions that aided the Conservatives  –​ Chief Secretary to the Treasury to share responsibility for austerity; Business to implement the toxic tuition fees policy; and the position of Deputy Prime Minister to co-​ordinate political reform (electoral reform, House of Lords reform and constituency equalisation), which made the Liberal Democrats look narrow-​ minded and self-​interested. The great offices of state remained in Conservative hands –​Foreign, Home and Treasury –​and the other key departments –​Health, Education, Work and Pensions –​also remained with Conservatives (see Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 31–​2). The remaining two Liberal Democrat positions –​Energy and Scotland –​were low prestige portfolios in the eyes of most Conservatives (Bennister and Heffernan, 2012: 781). (b) Binding the Liberal Democrats in legislative terms for governmental unity, and eroding their distinctiveness for electoral gain Cameron’s exploitation of the Liberal Democrats extended beyond policy and personnel. As a consequence of his policy ‘wins’ in the coalition negotiations, Cameron had manipulated the Liberal Democrats into legislatively binding themselves to the Conservatives. It was they who created an artificial parliamentary majority approaching 80, and then repeatedly voted for measures that they had hitherto opposed (Yong, 2012c: 118). Chapter 5 focused in on legislative binding in relation to two case studies. First, how Cameron used the Liberal Democrats to argue that austerity was a necessity and in the national interest, and was not driven by ideological dogmatism (Kerr et al., 2011: 203). Critically, on this the Liberal Democrats were used to isolate Labour on the central issue of the time, and aid the Conservatives in delegitimising Labour –​to apportion blame on the Brown administration (Fielding, 2010; Heffernan, 2011) and establish risk around making Miliband Prime Minister at the next General Election (Fielding, 2015) (as explored in ­chapter 3). Second, there was the issue of tuition fees. By making the Business Department a Liberal Democrat-led department, Cameron ensured that it was Cable leading the implementation of a policy position, which directly contradicted the position of the Liberal Democrats in the General Election of 2010. The Liberal

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

140

Cameron

Democrat polling position never really recovered from this volte-​face (see Cutts and Russell, 2015; Johnson and Middleton, 2016). Not only did Cameron exploit the Liberal Democrats in policy and parliamentary terms, but he also used coalition as a means to erode their electoral appeal. Given that much of the electoral foothold that the Liberal Democrats had had been accrued at the expense of the Conservatives, this was significant (on pre-​2010 Liberal Democrats parliamentary gains, see Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005; Cutts, 2006, 2012, 2014; Fieldhouse et al., 2006). The cost of compromise for the Liberal Democrats, and creating a semblance of governmental unity in coalition, was that their identity and distinctiveness were eroded. Struggling to demonstrate how they influenced policy within the coalition, they then suffered from the fact that the Conservatives appeared to gain a disproportionate amount of credit for any perceived policy successes (Dommett, 2013; McEnhill, 2015; Cutts and Russell, 2015). The assumptions that permeate the comparative politics literature were confirmed  –​i.e. disproportionate policy compromise to create unity in government and legislative binding, leading to a lack of influence in government, which aligned to policy compromises leads to loss of identify or distinctiveness and electoral punishment (see, for example, Bolleyer, 2008; Boston and Bullock, 2012).

(c) Protecting the existing ‘rules of the game’ in terms of electoral reform On the issue of the dimensionality of British politics it was clear that Cameron wanted to preserve the existing arrangements –​i.e. he was against electoral reform; he opposed the break-​up of the Union; and he believed in the case for continued EU membership. He resorted to the voters for validation of the existing status quo, and although this has led to an impression that he was a gambler, it can also be argued that he was pressurised in each case. On the first issue of electoral reform it was a precondition of securing a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, which Cameron deemed necessary given the parliamentary arithmetic that he faced in May 2010. On the second issue of Scottish independence, a referendum was not his preferred option, but he concluded that it was inevitable given that the SNP had secured a majority in the Scottish parliamentary elections of 2011, and earlier (by choice) rather than later increased the likelihood of success. Finally, as ­chapter 7 identified, concerns around party management and electoral competiveness dragged him into a scenario in which a successful EU referendum outcome –​i.e. a vote for Remain –​ would constitute a solution, and could be rationalised as in the national interest. On the case of electoral reform Cameron took what looked like a calculated risk, as a shift from FPTP to AV was potentially a ‘game changer’ (Lees, 2011: 180). The status quo was perceived to be beneficial to the Conservatives –​i.e. that British politics was unidimensional as opposed to multidimensional, and the dimension that defined party competition on the left/​right scale had historically been class. Add

Conclusion

141

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

this to Duverger’s law that simple majority single ballot voting systems work to the advantage of a two-​party system and thus it was clear that the status quo worked for the Conservatives (and Labour) and pushed the third party to the margins (Duverger, 1959: 217). Therefore, it is clear that Cameron wanted to maintain the existing dimensionality that had traditionally defined party competition in British politics –​i.e. maintain the stability that FPTP created, as opposed to the volatility and unpredictability of electoral reform (for a wider discussion on dimensionality and British party politics, see McLean, 2002; Taylor, 2005). The failure of Cameronism Although a case can be made to say that Cameronism had its successes in terms of (1)  the partial detoxification of the party image; (2)  the politics of deflection and the delegitimisation of Labour as an alternative; and (3) the exploitation of the Liberal Democrats, it cannot be denied that Cameronism had significant failings. Those failings can be broken down into three broad themes. 1.Ineffective depoliticisation: the limitations of the Big Society narrative As part of his strategy for delegitimising the Labour Party, Cameron had bound together economic and social decline as part of wider strategy about the appropriate role of the state. Cameron constructed an argument that started off by stating that the problem was Big Government, and the misplaced assumption that the state should do more. Having identified the problem of overly intrusive, interfering and ineffectual statist solutions, Cameron then rolled out his solution, i.e. the Big Society. Cameron envisioned a Big Society in which the role of the state moved towards creating incentives for socially responsible behaviour, rather than owning, funding and controlling as per the statist methods of the left. Through this process a rebalancing of the role of the state would be achieved, and social ills could be addressed by collective driven action, as community empowerment and civil society came to the fore (Pattie and Johnston, 2011:  403; see also Kisby, 2010; Smith, 2010; Barker, 2011; Ware, 2011). However, as a governing strategy the Big Society can be seen at worst as a failure, or at best as having had only limited positive impacts (Slocock et al., 2015; Fenwick and Gibbon, 2017). Most significantly, the rhetoric of ‘we’re all in this together’ that the Conservatives utilised to justify their commitment to the Big Society, was exposed as divisions within society intensified. Whether examined from the perspectives of regional and generational divisions, or in terms of ethnicity or disability, the trends were towards increasing inequality (Slocock et  al., 2015). The gap between the richest and poorest in society remained problematic, especially as the austerity programme involved significant cuts in public services, upon which the poorest in society were the most dependent. Critics of Cameron focused in on

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

142

Cameron

the evidence of growing poverty and inequality caused by austerity (Toynbee and Walker, 2012, 2015; see also Hills et al., 2016). Upon his resignation Cameron took pride in his achievements in terms of the economic recovery. He argued that there ‘can be no doubt that our economy is immeasurably stronger’ with the ‘deficit cut by two-​thirds’, and with ‘a half a million more people in work and one million more businesses’ (Cameron, 2016). He also noted how ‘hard-​working families’ were ‘paying lower taxes and getting higher wages because of the first ever National Living Wage’ (Cameron, 2016). However, critics found this analysis difficult to square with the growth in terms of the use of food banks. The number of people turning to three-​day emergency food supplies increased from 113,264 in the early stages of the coalition era, to 506,342 by the time of the General Election of 2015 (see Caplan, 2016; Garthwaite, 2016). Chapter  3 identified how the Big Society was as much a political strategy  –​ to aid the Conservatives –​as it was a governmental strategy –​to aid individuals and communities. Cameron and the Conservatives knew that an austerity programme that involved cutting public expenditure would not be popular with voters, so they needed a rhetorical means by which to limit the impact of what they were implementing. In addition to the Big Society narrative they used two other rhetorical methods. First, delegitimising the record of Labour in office, so Conservative rhetoric was built around implying that Labour were irresponsible and had been overspending (as explored in ­chapter  2), and, second, binding the Liberal Democrats to the pursuit of an austerity agenda that was frequently described as being in the national interest (as identified in ­chapter 4) (Pattie and Johnston, 2011; Bochel and Powell, 2018). All three approaches had a central purpose –​to limit the reputational damage to the Conservatives with voters (Taylor-​ Gooby and Stoker, 2011).

2. The law of unintended consequences: the Scottish independence referendum and a weakened Union but with electoral advantages If partisan advantage was the primary motivation with regard to electoral reform then the circumstances with regard to Scottish independence were different. Cameron wanted to preserve the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom. He held this view even though there was a clear electoral advantage to the Conservatives in Scottish independence. Scotland had traditionally been a Labour heartland. They won 41 out of 59 Scottish seats at the General Election of 2010 and the Conservatives held only one, whereas the Conservatives won 298 out of 533 English constituencies and Labour won only 191. Therefore, the prospect of Labour government would diminish significantly if Scotland voted for independence. Despite this virtually no Conservative parliamentarians wanted Scottish independence, which was expected to be rejected anyway. Instead, they felt that the issue of English laws for English

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion

143

votes needed to be prioritised alongside any further devolution to Scotland post-​ referendum (Gamble, 2016; Kenny, 2016). Cameron was a unionist by instinct. He believed that Scottish independence would be economically disadvantageous to both the Scottish economy and the UK economy overall (Seldon and Snowdon, 2015:  409–​21). He also concluded that breaking up the Union would diminish the influence of the United Kingdom in global terms, and that it would create a myriad of complexities that would disfigure politics for years. Over and beyond these noble considerations, Cameron hated the thought of going down in history as the Prime Minister who lost Scotland. However, these fears related to defeat, and given that the opinion polls pointed to the status quo, Cameron assumed that the level of risk was low (Laws, 2016: 439). Moreover, given that polling evidence, it was better to resolve the issue by defeating the case for independence sooner rather than later, especially as refusing or delaying a referendum, once the SNP had a majority in Holyrood, would serve to inflame nationalist sentiment further. In this context, Hayton has a valid point when he argued that Cameron had ‘little choice but to grant the independence referendum’ (Hayton, 2018: 228–​9). Although the Scottish electorate rejected the option of independence the margin of the victory, and the nature of the campaigning period, created seismic consequences in terms of the dynamics of party politics. The extent to which Cameron could have predicted these was open to question. The primary benefit to the Conservatives was that by aligning themselves to the Conservatives in the Better Together campaign toxified Labour in Scotland (Lodge and Thomas, 2015: 528). This resulted in a sharp swing to the SNP in the opinion polls, and the SNP winning 56 out of the 59 constituencies, and Labour losing 40 seats, leaving them with only one constituency, just like the Conservatives (Mitchell, 2015: 88–​100). The other consequence was that the Conservatives had an English undercurrent to their campaigning rhetoric, stoking fear of the consequences of a hypothetical Labour–​SNP coalition. Fear of the so-​called coalition of chaos helped to buttress the Conservatives in marginal constituencies, which was said to have stimulated some tactical voting (Fielding, 2015:  54–​5, 67; Tonge and Geddes, 2015: 257; Laws, 2016: 540). Cameron failed to resolve the issue of Scottish independence and in attempting to quell the rise of nationalism, had inadvertently contributed to it. As of 2019, the case for a second referendum remains on the agenda, and the future of the Union remains in doubt. Thinking within his own party on notions of Britishness and Englishness has evolved as a consequence. Hayton concludes that Cameron failed to either ‘shift the current thinking about national identity in a modernised direction’ or to successfully ‘revitalise its unionism’ (Hayton, 2018:  229–​30; see also Jeffery et al., 2016). Conservatives who tend towards addressing the English question have, via the pressure from UKIP, succeeding in pushing English votes for English laws onto the political agenda, whereas Conservatives seeking to preserve the Union have failed to make the case for a ‘new vision for Britishness based on a

144

Cameron

federal constitutional settlement’ (Hayton, 2018: 230). Cameron can thereby can be said to have scored a pyrrhic victory on this challenge to the rules of the game. His legacy to May was a Conservative Party that ‘struggled to speak meaningfully with one voice to all the nations of the United Kingdom’ (Hayton, 2018: 230).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

3.‘The worst political mistake made by a British Prime Minister in my lifetime’ (Clarke, 2016: 495): the EU referendum and the end of Cameronism Cameron won without any serious negative consequences on the first challenge of electoral reform. He also won on the second challenge of Scottish independence, but with a myriad of consequences  –​some in a partisan sense beneficial to the Conservatives –​but mostly negative to him as the Union remained under threat. However, he failed spectacularly in on his third and final challenge to the existing rules of the game, i.e. on EU membership. The consequences will dominate the immediate future of British politics. Even if the economy were to thrive over the longer term, and the vote to leave the EU can become justified and interpreted as the correct decision  –​a big if  –​then Cameron can gain no credit for this, given his passionate advocacy for Remain. That means that political historians will treat Cameron harshly. However, such condemnation has to be placed within the context of the circumstances that he faced. Cameron did not create the European problem. The growth of public scepticism about the EU, which explained the rise of UKIP on the coat-​tails of concern about immigration, had created a toxicity at the heart of British politics. That toxicity was eroding faith in the two main political parties, who were both losing support to UKIP. Furthermore, it had created divisions within both parties for decades, although since the 1990s its divisive capability had hurt the Conservatives more than Labour. Taking these factors into account, there was a logic to Cameron’s strategy, and it worked like this. Step one, promise a referendum on continued EU membership, after renegotiating terms, but do so after the next General Election. The merits of this were that it should create an incentive for his party to unify, as the decision had been deferred until after the next General Election. If they win, they can address the issue then. Moreover, it would create an incentive for UKIP supporters to vote Conservative, as it was the only way to achieve their ambitions. Step two, after winning the General Election of 2015, set about the process of renegotiating the terms of membership with the EU, gaining enough concessions to be able to sell those new terms to the British electorate (Cameron may well have been so consumed by the challenges that he was addressing in step one, that he failed to appreciate how difficult to achieve step two might be). Then, in step three, win the referendum, and by doing so, that toxic issue that had so disfigured British politics for generations would subside. If there was a 60:40 vote for Remain, what avenue would Conservative hard Eurosceptics have? What would be the ongoing rationale for UKIP? If they had fought as a single-​issue party for a referendum in order to

Conclusion

145

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

leave the EU and they had failed, then their purpose and identity would be open to question. Cameron could see a gain in terms of the ongoing unity of his party, and a gain in terms of the ongoing electoral appeal of his party (if UKIP was neutralised). In theory, those three steps sounded logical and would have eliminated the most significant threat to the existing institutional order. Instinctively, Cameron assumed that the economic insecurity arguments associated with Remain would trump the identity issues associated with Leave. His historical reputation will now be shaped by that miscalculation. Conclusion The rationale for this book was to offer an academic interpretation of the politics of Cameronism that went beyond the established debates about how Cameron modernised the Conservative Party. Although the debates about Conservative modernisation matter to our understanding of British politics in the 2005 to 2016 period, they should be viewed in the context of the changing political terrain, i.e. economic constraint, the politics of coalition and the threats to the existing rules of the game, flowing from the demands for electoral reform, Scottish independence and the case for leaving the EU. Modernisation was thus occurring in a challenging and volatile environment. As such, evaluations of Cameron, and his leadership skills, should be seen within the content of how he sought to manipulate that environment to the benefit of his party. Ultimately, for all of the skills that he did possess as a political manipulator, Cameron has to be seen as a failure –​in terms of heresthetics –​due to Brexit, as he was outmanoeuvred by UKIP and Farage, and the hard Eurosceptics on his own backbenches. There is a tragic irony in the fall of Cameron. The offer of a referendum on continued membership of the EU was designed to address his UKIP problem. When there was no option of a referendum on continued membership, as was the case in the General Election of 2010, the UKIP vote was only 919,546 (or 3.1 per cent in terms of vote share). When the option of granting a referendum was on the table by voting Conservative in the 2015 General Election, which could not be realistically achieved by voting UKIP, the UKIP vote increased to 3,881,099 (or 12.6 per cent in terms of vote share). However, by leaving the EU, the fuel that fanned the flames of UKIP was partly removed from the dynamics of party politics. This was evident from the General Election of 2017 when the UKIP vote collapsed to 594,068 (1.8 per cent). Although the combined number of votes gained by the Conservatives and Labour would outstrip the losses of UKIP2 –​in part due to increased participation by younger voters –​it cannot be denied that much of those gains will have been at the expense of UKIP (see Mellon et al., 2018). Cameron appears to have solved the UKIP conundrum, and removed it from the equation in terms of the rise of multi-​party politics, albeit not by the means intended. He did, however, significantly erode the Liberal Democrats as another

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

146

Cameron

aspect of the rise of multi-​party politics. Via coalition Cameron diffused the threat from the centre-​ground in the shape of the Liberal Democrats, and in doing so he removed electoral reform from mainstream political debate. Of the third and final contributor to the rise of multi-​party politics –​the SNP –​Cameron failed to nullify their threat. However, from a Conservative perspective that was not necessarily electorally problematic, as their gains have been at the expense of the Labour Party (Fieldhouse and Prosser, 2018). However, as British politics begins the process of adjusting to a post-​Cameron era, and the process of negotiating and then implementing Brexit, some of the ‘successes’ associated with Cameronism are beginning to be questioned. Those successes relate to the detoxification of the Conservatives, the delegitimisation of Labour as an alternative and the exploitation of the Liberal Democrats. The continued electoral flatlining of the Liberal Democrats, in the aftermath of their coalition experience, suggests that this remains as a legacy of Cameronism. However, in the other two respects concerns can be identified. First, consider the image of the Conservative Party. The importance of Cameron as the personification of modernisation now has to be placed within the context of his failings with regard to immigration and the EU. The rationale, in opposition, for downgrading their emphasis on these issues –​alongside taxation and socially conservative rhetoric –​was that they were the issues that reinforced the image of the Conservatives as being ideologically extreme, divisive and thereby nasty. For the critics of Cameron comes the argument that this downgrading created the space for UKIP to thrive post-​2005. Trying to diffuse that threat via the offer of a referendum resulted in a significant tranche of Cameron’s own parliamentarians aligning themselves with UKIP in making the case for exiting the EU. With their insular and tough line rhetoric on immigration, it could be argued that the hard Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative Party was actually re-​establishing some of that nasty imagery. Via modernisation Cameron had wanted to make a positive case for liberal Conservatism, based on a socially liberal platform based on what the Conservative Party stood for, and not what they stood against. Out of circumstance the May premiership has been defined by what it is against, i.e. the EU (Allen, 2018a). That negativity was evident in the flawed General Election campaign that the Conservative Party ran in 2017 (Allen, 2018b; see also Heath and Goodwin, 2017; Bale and Webb, 2018). Moreover, having lost their parliamentary majority the Conservatives chose to prop themselves up in Parliament via an arrangement with the Democratic Unionist Party. Known for their social conservatism on social, moral and sexual issues, they were not comfortable bedfellows for modernising socially liberal Conservatives (Tonge, 2017). That combination of factors has led to a perception that the party has been re-​toxified, leading to the reassertion and opposition narrative of them as the nasty party (Bale and Webb, 2018: 50). Second, consider the debates on the delegitimisation of the Labour Party. Cameron was sufficiently successful at establishing that Labour were to blame

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Conclusion

147

for the economic downturn when in office. He was also sufficiently successful at establishing that returning a Labour government at the General Election of 2015 was too great a risk in terms of economic stability. If a Miliband-​led Labour Party was seen as too big a risk in terms of economic stability, then a Corbyn-​led Labour Party was assumed to be an even larger risk, or so Conservative strategists assumed. However, the General Election of 2017 did not conform to Conservative expectations. Corbyn’s optimistic pitch to voters, about the case of an alternative to austerity, saw the Labour Party perform significantly better than they had under Miliband, and this could be seen as a manifestation of voter fatigue vis-​à-​vis austerity (Dorey, 2017a; Goes, 2018). The post-​Cameron period will be defined by the implementation of Brexit, and the danger is that this will distract the Conservatives from developing the positive case for Conservatism. That is Cameron’s legacy to the Conservative Party, and it is a legacy created from his desire to gain electoral consent to legitimise continued membership of the EU (Alexandre-​Collier, 2016). An instinctive political gambler, whose judgements had hitherto been validated by events –​winning the leadership of the Conservative Party in 2005; securing a coalition; pursuing same-​sex marriage; blocking electoral reform; preserving the Union; and winning the 2015 General Election outright –​he was finally undone and was left humiliated. He staked the future of the nation on the outcome of the EU referendum, in order to solve a problem within his party, and he lost. Rather than being defined by heresthetics and his skills as a political manipulator –​and a modern-​day Conservative version of Stanley Baldwin –​Cameron will be forever remembered for his hubris. Notes 1 Since 1955, when Churchill resigned, the Conservative Party has had 11 leaders. Only Thatcher, who was leader for just short of 16 years, was leader for longer than Cameron (ten and a half years). 2 The Conservatives gained over two million votes (from 11,334,226 to 13,636,684) and went from 36.9 per cent to 43.2 per cent of the vote, whilst Labour gained around 3.5 million, from 9,347,273 or 30.4 per cent, to 12,878,460 or 40 per cent (see Dorey, 2017a; Quinn, 2018).

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

Adonis, A. (2013) 5 days in May: The coalition and beyond, London: Biteback. Alderman, K. (1976) ‘The prime minister and the appointment of ministers: An exercise in political bargaining’, Parliamentary Affairs, 29(2): 101–​34. Alderman, K. (1995) ‘A defence of frequent ministerial turnover’, Public Administration, 73(4): 497–​512. Alderman, K. and Carter, N. (1992) ‘The logistics of ministerial reshuffles’, Public Administration, 70(4): 519–​34. Alderman, K. and Cross, J. A. (1979) ‘Ministerial reshuffles and the civil service’, British Journal of Political Science, 9(1): 41–​65. Alderman, K. and Cross, J. A. (1981) ‘Patterns of turnover in two Labour cabinets’, Political Studies, 29(3): 425–​30. Alderman, K. and Cross, J. A. (1985) ‘The reluctant knife: Reflections on the prime minister’s powers of dismissal’, Parliamentary Affairs, 38(4): 387–​407. Alderman, K. and Cross, J. A. (1986) ‘Rejuvenating the cabinet:  The record of post-​war British prime ministers compared’, Political Studies, 34(4): 639–​46. Alderman, K. and Cross. J. A. (1987) ‘The timing of cabinet reshuffles’, Parliamentary Affairs, 40(1): 1–​19. Alexandre-​Collier, A. (2016) ‘How populist was David Cameron?’, Juncture, 23(2): 116–​25. Allen, N. (2018a) ‘Brexit means Brexit: Theresa May and post referendum British politics’, British Politics, 13(1): 105–​20. Allen, N. (2018b) ‘Gambling with the electorate: The conservatives in government’, in Allen, N. and Bartle, J. (eds), None past the post: Britain at the polls, 2017, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Allen, N. and Birch, N. (2014) Ethics and integrity in British politics: How citizens judge their politicians’ conduct and why it matters, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Allen, N. and Ward, H. (2009) ‘ “Moves on a chess board”: A spatial model of British prime ministers’ powers over cabinet formation’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 11(2): 238–​58. Anderson, M. (2015) ‘UK passes bill to honour pledge of 0.7% foreign aid target’, Guardian, 9 March. Annesley, C. (2012) ‘Campaigning against the cuts: Gender equality movements in tough times’, Political Quarterly, 83(1): 19–​24. Annesley, C. and Gains, F. (2014) ‘Can Cameron capture women’s votes? The gendered impediments to a Conservative majority in 2015’, Parliamentary Affairs, 67(4): 767–​82.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

149

Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J. M., Strauss, A. B. and Ting, M. M. (2005) ‘The logic of Gamson’s law: Pre-​election coalitions and portfolio allocations’, American Journal of Political Science, 49(3): 550–​63. Ashcroft, M. (2005) Smell the coffee: A wake-​up call for the Conservative Party, London: Michael Ashcroft. Ashcroft, M. and Culwick, K. (2016) Well you did ask: Why the UK voted to leave the EU, London: Biteback. Ashcroft, M. and Oakeshott, I. (2015) Call me Dave: The unauthorised biography of David Cameron, London: Biteback. Ashe, J., Campbell, R., Childs, S. and Evans, E. (2010) ‘Stand by your man: Women’s political recruitment at the 2010 general election’, British Politics, 5(4): 455–​80. Atkins, J. (2015a) ‘The oratory of Gordon Brown’, in Crines, A. and Hayton, R. (eds), Labour orators from Bevan to Miliband, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Atkins, J. (2015b) ‘Together in the national interest: The rhetoric of unity and the formation of the Cameron-​Clegg government’, Political Quarterly, 86(1): 85–​92. Atkins, J. (2018) Conflict, co-​ operation and the rhetoric of coalition government, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Aughey, A. (2001) Nationalism, devolution and the challenge to the United Kingdom state, London: Pluto Press. Aughey, A. (2010) ‘Anxiety and injustice:  The anatomy of contemporary English nationalism’, Nations and Nationalism, 16(3): 506–​24. Aughey, A. (2011) ‘The Con-​Lab coalition agenda for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland’, in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds), The Cameron-​Clegg government: Coalition politics in an age of austerity, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Bäck, H., Debus, M. and Dumont, P. (2011) ‘Who gets what in coalition governments? Predictors of portfolio allocation in parliamentary democracies’, European Journal of Political Research, 50(4): 441–​78. Bäck, H., Persson, T. and Meier, H. E. (2009) ‘Party size and portfolio payoffs:  The proportional allocation of ministerial posts in coalition governments’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 15(1): 10–​34. Bailey, R. (2014) ‘The political paradox of UK aid spending’, 7 October, www.chathamhouse.org/​expert/​comment/​15957#. Baker, D. and Schnapper, P. (2015) Britain and the crisis of the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Baker, D. and Seawright, D. (eds) (1998) Britain for and against Europe: British politics and the question of European integration, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Baker, D., Gamble, A. and Ludlam, S. (1993) ‘Whips or scorpions? The Maastricht vote and the Conservative Party’, Parliamentary Affairs, 46(2): 151–​66. Baker, D., Gamble, A. and Ludlam, S. (1994) ‘The parliamentary siege of Maastricht’, Parliamentary Affairs, 47(1): 37–​60. Baker, D., Gamble, A. and Seawright, D. (2002) ‘Sovereign nations and global markets: Modern British Conservatism and hyperglobalism’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 4(3): 399–​428. Bale, T. (1996) ‘The death of the past:  Symbolic politics and the changing of Clause IV’, British Elections and Parties Yearbook, 6(1): 158–​77.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

150

References

Bale, T. (2008) ‘ “A bit less bunny-​hugging and a bit more bunny boiling”? Qualifying Conservative Party change under David Cameron’, British Politics, 3(3): 270–​99. Bale, T. (2010) The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron, Cambridge: Polity Press. Bale, T. (2011) ‘I don’t agree with Nick: Retrodicting the Conservative–​Liberal Democrat coalition’, Political Quarterly, 82(2): 244–​50. Bale, T. (2012a) ‘David Cameron’, in Heppell, T. (ed.), Leaders of the opposition:  From Churchill to Cameron, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Bale, T. (2012b) ‘The black widow effect:  Why Britain’s Conservative–​Liberal Democrat coalition might have an unhappy ending’, Parliamentary Affairs, 65(2): 323–​37. Bale, T. (2013) ‘Concede and move on? One nation Labour and the welfare state’, Political Quarterly, 84(3): 342–​52. Bale, T. (2014) ‘Putting it right? The Labour Party’s big shift on immigration since 2010’, Political Quarterly, 85(3): 296–​303. Bale, T. (2015) Five year mission:  The Labour Party under Ed Miliband, Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Bale, T. (2016) The Conservative Party from Thatcher to Cameron, Cambridge: Polity (Second Edition). Bale, T. and Sanderson-​Nash, E. (2011) ‘A leap of faith and a leap in the dark’, in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds), The Cameron-​Clegg coalition: Coalition politics in the age of austerity, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Bale, T. and Webb, P. (2011) ‘The Conservative Party’, in Allen, N. and Bartle, J. (eds), Britain at the polls 2010, London: Sage. Bale, T. and Webb, P. (2015) ‘The Conservatives:  Their sweetest victory?’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1): 41–​53. Bale, T. and Webb, P. (2016) ‘Not as bad as we feared or even worse than we imagined? Assessing and explaining Conservative Party members’ views on coalition’, Political Studies, 64(1): 123–​42. Bale, T. and Webb, P. (2018) ‘ “We didn’t see it coming”: The Conservatives’, Parliamentary Affairs, 71(S1): 46–​58. Ball, S. and Seldon, A. (eds) (2005) Recovering power: The Conservatives in opposition since 1867, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Banks, A. (2017) The bad boys of Brexit: Tales of mischief, mayhem and the guerrilla warfare in the EU referendum campaign, London: Biteback. Bara, J. (2005) ‘A question of trust: Implementing party manifestos’, Parliamentary Affairs, 58(3): 585–​99. Bara, J. (2006) ‘The 2005 manifestos: A sense of déjà vu?’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 16(3): 265–​81. Barber, S. (2014) ‘Stretched but not snapped: Constitutional lessons from the 2010 coalition government in Britain’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 52(4): 473–​92. Barker, R. (2011) ‘Big societies, little platoons and the problems with pluralism’, Political Quarterly, 82(1): 50–​5. Baston, L. (2011) Summary of Democratic Audit:  Boundary change simulation, London: Democratic Audit. Baston, L. and Ritchie, K. (2011) Don’t take no for an answer: The 2011 referendum and the future of electoral reform, London: Biteback. Beckett, M. (2016) Learning the lessons from defeat, London: The Labour Party.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

151

Beech, M. (2008) ‘New Labour and the politics of dominance’, in Beech, M. and Lee, S. (eds), Ten years of New Labour, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Beech, M. (2009) ‘No new vision: The gradual death of British social democracy?’, Political Quarterly, 80(4): 526–​32. Beech, M. (2011) ‘British Conservatism and foreign policy: Traditions and ideas shaping Cameron’s global view’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13(3): 348–​63. Beech, M. and Hickson, K. (2014) ‘Blue or purple? Reflections on the future of the Labour Party’, Political Studies Review, 12(1): 75–​87. Beech, M. and Lee, S. (eds) (2008) Ten years of New Labour, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Beech, M. and Lee, S. (eds) (2015) The Conservative-​Liberal coalition: Examining the Cameron-​ Clegg government, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Beech, M. and Oliver, T. (2014) ‘Humanitarian intervention and foreign policy of the Conservative led coalition’, Parliamentary Affairs, 67(1): 102–​18. Beer, S. (1965) Modern British politics: A study of parties and pressure groups, London: Faber & Faber. Bennett, O. (2016) The Brexit club:  The inside story of the leave campaign’s shock victory, London: Biteback. Bennister, M. (2015) ‘The oratory of Tony Blair’, in Crines, A. and Hayton, R. (eds), Labour orators from Bevan to Miliband, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Bennister, M. and Heffernan, R. (2012) ‘Cameron as prime minister: The intra-​executive politics of Britain’s coalition government’, Parliamentary Affairs, 65(4): 778–​801. Bennister, M. and Heffernan, R. (2015) ‘The limits to prime ministerial autonomy: Cameron and the constraints of coalition’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1): 25–​41. Bennister, M. and Worthy, B. (2017) ‘Limits to dominance? Comparing the leadership capital of Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair’, in Bennister, M., ‘t Hart, P. and Worthy, B. (eds), The leadership capital index: A new perspective on leadership, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bennister, M., ‘t Hart, P. and Worthy, B. (2015) ‘Assessing the authority of political office-​ holders: The leadership capital index’, West European Politics, 38(3): 417–​40. Berlinski, S., Dewan, T. and Dowding, K. (2007) ‘The length of ministerial tenure in the UK, 1945–​1997’, British Journal of Political Science, 37(2): 245–​62. Berlinski, S., Dewan, T. and Dowding, K. (2012) Accounting for ministers: Scandal and survival in British government 1945–​2007, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berrington, H. (1961), ‘The Conservative Party: Revolts and pressures’, Political Quarterly, 32(4): 363–​73. Birchall, J. (2011) ‘The Big Society and the mutualisation of public services: A critical commentary’, Political Quarterly, 82(S1): 145–​57. Birch, S. and Allen, N. (2012) ‘There will be burning and a-​looting tonight: The social and political correlates of law-​breaking’, Political Quarterly, 83(1): 33–​43. Blair, T. (2010) A journey, London: Hutchinson. Blick, A. (2016) ‘Constitutional implications of the Fixed-​Term Parliaments Act 2011’, Parliamentary Affairs, 69(1): 19–​35. Blond, P. (2009a) The civic state: Re-​moralise the market, re-​localise the economy and re-​capitalise the poor, London: ResPublica. Blond, P. (2009b) ‘Red Tory’, in Cruddas, J. and Rutherford, J. (eds), Is the future Conservative? London: Lawrence & Wishart. Blond, P. (2009c) ‘Rise of the red Tories’, Prospect, 28 February.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

152

References

Blond, P. (2010) Red Tory:  How left and right have broken Britain and how we can fix it, London: Faber. Blond, P. (2012) Radical republic: How left and right have broken the system and how we can fix it, New York: W. W. Norton and Company. Bochel, H. (2011) The Conservative Party and social policy, Bristol: Policy Press. Bochel, H. and Powell, M. (eds) (2016) The coalition and social policy: Restructuring the welfare state, Bristol: Policy Press. Bochel, H. and Powell, M. (2018) ‘Whatever happened to compassionate Conservatism under the coalition government’, British Politics, 13(2): 146–​70. Bogdanor, V. (1999) Devolution in the United Kingdom, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bolleyer, N. (2008) ‘The organizational costs of public office’, in Deschouwer, K. (ed.), New parties in government: In power for the first time, London: Routledge. Bonefeld, W. (2015) ‘Big Society and political state’, British Politics, 10(4): 413–​28. Booth, L. (2014) ‘The 0.7% aid target’, House of Commons Library. Borisyuk, G., Johnston, R., Rallings, C. and Thrasher, M. (2010) ‘Parliamentary constituency boundary reviews and electoral bias: How important are variations in constituency size’, Parliamentary Affairs, 63(1): 4–​21. Boston, J. and Bullock, D. (2012) ‘Multi-​ party governance:  Managing the unity–​ distinctiveness dilemma in executive coalitions’, Party Politics, 18(2): 349–​68. Boulton, A. and Jones, J. (2012) Hung together: The Cameron–​Clegg coalition, London: Simon & Schuster. Briggs, D. (ed.) (2012) The English riots of 2011:  A summer of discontent, London: Waterside Press. Briggs, J. (2017) Young people and political participation, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Browne, A. (2006) ‘Tories go for oak in an attempt to soften their image’, The Times, 15 September. Browne, E. C. and Franklin, M. (1973) ‘Aspects of coalition payoffs in European parliamentary democracies’, American Political Science Review, 24(2): 453–​69. Bryson, V. (2012) ‘Women and feminisation’, in Heppell, T. and Seawright, D. (eds), Cameron and the Conservatives: The transition to coalition government, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Bryson, V. and Heppell, T. (2010) ‘Conservatism and feminism:  The case of the British Conservative Party’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 15(1): 31–​50. Buckler, S. and Dolowitz, D. P. (2009) ‘Ideology, party identity and renewal’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 14(1): 11–​30. Budge, I. and Keman, H. (1999) Parties and democracy: Coalition formation and government functioning in 20 states, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Budge, I., Klingemann, H.-​D., Volkens, A., Bara, J. and Tanenbaum, E. (2001) Mapping policy preferences:  Estimates for parties, electors, and governments 1945–​1998, Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Buller, J. and Flinders, M. (2005) ‘The domestic origins of depoliticisation in the area of British economic policy’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7(4): 526–​43. Buller, J. and James, T. (2012) ‘Statecraft and the assessment of national political leaders: The case of New Labour and Tony Blair’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 14(4): 534–​55. Bulley, D. and Sokyi-​Bulley, B. (2014) ‘Big society as big government’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 16(3): 452–​70.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

153

Burnham, P. (2001) ‘New Labour and the politics of depoliticisation’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 3(2): 127–​49. Burnham, P. (2007) ‘The politicisation of monetary policy-​making in post-​war Britain’, British Politics, 2(3): 395–​419. Butler, D. and Butler, G. (2010) British political facts, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Byrne, C., Foster, E. and Kerr, P. (2012) ‘Understanding conservative modernisation’, in Heppell, T. and Seawright, D. (eds), Cameron and the Conservatives: The transition to coalition government, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Byrne, C., Kerr, P. and Foster, E. (2014) ‘What kind of “big government” is the Big Society?’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 16(3): 471–​78. Byrne, C., Randall, N. and Theakston, K. (2017) ‘Evaluating British prime ministerial performance: David Cameron’s premiership in political time’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(1): 202–​20. Cabinet Office (2010a) The coalition:  Our programme for government, www.gov.uk/​ government/​publications/​the-​coalition-​documentation. Cabinet Office (2010b) Coalition agreement for stability and reform, www.gov.uk/​government/​ publications/​the-​coalition-​documentation. Cairney, P. (2011) The Scottish political system since devolution, Exeter: Imprint Academic. Cameron, D. (2006) Speech to the Conservative Party annual conference, Bournemouth, 5 October, www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/​speech-​archive.htm?speech=314. Cameron, D. (2008) Speech to the Conservative Party annual conference, Birmingham, 1 October, www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/​speech-​archive.htm?speech=153. Cameron, D. (2009a) Speech to the Conservative Party annual conference, Manchester, 8 October, www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/​speech-​archive.htm?speech=154. Cameron, D. (2009b) ‘Big society speech’, 10 November, www.conservatives.com/​News/​ Speeches/​2009/​11/​David_​Cameron_​The_​Big _​Society.aspx. Cameron, D. (2011) ‘Prime ministerial speech after the London riots’, 15 August, www.gov.uk/​government/​speeches/​pms-​speech-​on-​the-​fightback-​after-​the-​riots. Cameron, D. (2015a) Speech to the Conservative Party spring conference, Manchester, 28 March, http://​press.conservatives.com/​post/​114835215960/​david-​cameron-​speech-​to-​ the-​conservative-​spring. Cameron, D. (2015b) Speech to the Conservative Party annual conference, Manchester, 7 October, http://​press.conservatives.com/​post/​130746609060/​prime-​minister-​conference​speech-​2015. Cameron, D. (2016) ‘David Cameron’s departing words as Prime Minister’, 13 July, www. gov.uk/​government/​speeches/​david-​camerons-​departing-​words-​as-​prime-​minister. Cammaerts, B., DeCillia, B., Magalhães, J. and Jimenez-​Martínez, C. (2016) ‘Journalistic representations of Jeremy Corbyn in the British press:  From watch dog to attack dog’, Media@LSE Report, 1 July, www.lse.ac.uk/​media@lse/​research/​pdf/​JeremyCorbyn/​ CobynReport-​FINAL.pdf. Campbell, R. and Childs, S. (2010) ‘Wags, wives and mothers:  But what about women politicians’, Parliamentary Affairs, 63(4): 760–​77. Campbell, R. and Childs, S. (2015) ‘Conservatism, feminisation and the representation of women in UK politics’, British Politics, 10(2): 148–​68. Caplan, P. (2016) ‘Big society or broken society? Food banks in the UK’, Anthropology Today, 32(1): 5–​9.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

154

References

Carman, C., Johns, R. and Mitchell, J. (2014) More Scottish than British: The Scottish parliament election of 2011, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Carroll, R. and Cox, G. W. (2007) ‘The logic of Gamson’s law: Pre-​election coalitions and portfolio allocations’, American Journal of Political Science, 51(2): 300–​13. Carter, N. (2006) ‘Party politicisation of the environment in Britain’, Party Politics, 12(6): 747–​67. Carter, N. (2008) ‘Combating climate change in the UK: Challenges and obstacles’, Political Quarterly, 79(2): 194–​205. Carter, N. (2009) ‘Vote blue, go green? Cameron’s Conservatives and the environment’, Political Quarterly, 80(2): 233–​42. Carter, N. and Clements, B. (2015) ‘From greenest government ever to get rid of all the green crap:  David Cameron, the Conservatives and the environment’, British Politics, 10(1): 204–​25. Carter, N. and Jacobs, M. (2014) ‘Explaining radical policy change:  The case of climate change and energy policy under the British Labour government 2006–​10’, Public Administration, 92(1): 125–​41. Cawley, A. (2015) ‘ “I’d be proud to spend the sacred foreign aid budget on our poor pensioners”:  Representations of macro aid resourcing in the Irish, UK and US print-​ media during the economic crisis, 2008–​2011’, International Communication Gazette, 77(6): 533–​56. Chandler, J. (2015) ‘Energy efficiency in the United Kingdom: The failure of the green deal’, Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review, 6(3): 191–​5. Chaney, P. (2013) ‘Unfulfilled mandate? Exploring the electoral discourse of international development aid in UK Westminster elections 1945–​2010’, European Journal of Development Research, 25(2): 252–​70. Childs, S. and Webb, P. (2012) Sex, gender and the Conservative Party: From iron lady to kitten heels, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Clarke, H., Goodwin, M. and Whiteley, P. (2017a) Brexit:  Why Britain voted to leave the European Union, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Clarke, H., Goodwin, M. and Whiteley, P. (2017b) ‘Why Britain voted for Brexit:  An individual-​level analysis of the 2016 referendum vote’, Parliamentary Affairs, 70(3): 439–​64. Clarke, H., Sanders, D., Stewart, M. and Whiteley, P. (2004) Political choice in Britain, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Clarke, H., Sanders, D., Stewart, M. and Whiteley, P. (2009) Performance politics and the British voter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Clarke, H., Sanders, D., Stewart, M. and Whiteley, P. (2013) ‘Leader heuristics, political knowledge and voting in Britain’s AV referendum’, Electoral Studies, 32(2): 224–​35. Clarke, H., Kellner, P., Stewart, M., Twyman, J. and Whiteley, P. (2016) Austerity and political choice in Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Clarke, K. (2016) Kind of blue: A political memoir, London: Macmillan. Clarke, N. and Cochrane, A. (2013) ‘Geographies and politics of localism: The localism of the United Kingdom’s coalition government’, Political Geography, 34(1): 10–​23. Clegg, N. (2016) Politics: Between the extremes, London: The Bodley Head. Clegg, N. (2018) ‘Nick Clegg reflects on how the coalition took decisions’, London: Institute for Government, 19 April, www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/​ministers-​reflect/​person/​ nick-​clegg/​.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

155

Clements, B. (2010) ‘What contributes to change and stability in individual-​level attitudes towards Britain’s membership of the EU? An analysis of the British Election Panel Studies, 1987–​1992 and 1992–​1997’, Journal of Contemporary European Research, 6(1): 43–​68. Clements, B. (2012) ‘Exploring public opinion on the issue of climate change in Britain’, British Politics, 7(2): 183–​202. Clements, B. (2014a) ‘Political parties supporters and attitudes towards and involvement with green issues in Britain’, Politics, 34(4): 362–​77. Clements, B. (2014b) ‘Partisan attachments and attitudes towards same-​sex marriage in Britain’, Parliamentary Affairs, 67(1): 232–​44. Clements, B. and Field, C. D. (2014) ‘The polls-​trends: Public opinion towards homosexuality and gay rights in Great Britain’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 78(2): 523–​47. Coates, D. (2008) ‘Darling, it is entirely my fault! Gordon Brown’s legacy to Alistair and himself ’, British Politics, 3(1): 3–​21. Cole, M. (2008) ‘The Brown factor in elections and public opinion: The return of the electoral cycle’, in Rush, M. and Giddings, P. (eds), When Gordon took the helm: The Palgrave review of British politics 2007–​2008, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Collins, R. (2014) The Collins review into Labour Party reform, London: The Labour Party. Conservative Party (2010) Invitation to join the government of Britain: The Conservative manifesto 2010, London: Conservative Party. Conservative Party (2015) Conservative Party manifesto 2015, London: Conservative Party. Consterdine, E. and Hampshire, J. (2014) ‘Immigration policy under New Labour: Exploring a critical juncture’, British Politics, 9(3): 275–​96. Convery, A. (2016) The territorial Conservative Party: Devolution and party change in Scotland and Wales, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Coote, A. (2011) Cutting it:  The Big Society and the new austerity, London:  The New Economics Foundation. Copsey, N. and Haughton, T. (2014) ‘Farewell Britannia? “Issue capture” and the politics of David Cameron’s 2013 EU referendum pledge’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(1): 74–​89. Corry, D. (2011) ‘Labour and the economy, 1997–​2010:  More than a Faustian pact’, in Diamond, P. and Kenny, M. (eds), Reassessing New Labour: Market, state and society under Blair and Brown, London: Wiley-​Blackwell. Cowley, P. (1999) ‘The parliamentary party’, in Dorey, P. (ed.), The Major premiership, London: Macmillan. Cowley, P. (2002) Revolts and rebellions: Parliamentary voting under Blair, London: Politicos. Cowley, P. (2005) The rebels: How Blair mislaid his majority, London: Politicos. Cowley, P. (2015) ‘The coalition and parliament’, in Seldon, A. and Finn, M. (eds), The coalition effect, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cowley, P. and Kavanagh, D. (2016) The British general election of 2015, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Cowley, P. and Norton, P. (1999) ‘Rebels and rebellions: Conservative MPs in the 1992 parliament’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 1(1): 84–​105. Cowley, P. and Quayle, S. (2002) ‘The Conservatives:  Running on the spot’, in Geddes, A. and Tonge, J. (eds), Labour’s second landslide:  The British general election 2001, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

156

References

Cowley, P. and Stuart, M. (2010) ‘Where has all the trouble gone? British intra-​party parliamentary divisions during the Lisbon ratification’, British Politics, 5(1): 133–​48. Cowley, P. and Stuart, M. (2012a) ‘The coalition’s wobbly wings: Backbench dissent in the Commons since May 2010’, in Kassim, H., Clarke, C. and Haddon, C. (eds), The coalition: Voters, parties and institutions, London, UEA/​Institute for Government. Cowley, P. and Stuart, M. (2012b) ‘The cambusters: The Conservative European referendum rebellion of October 2011’, Political Quarterly, 83(2): 402–​6. Cowley, P., Stuart, M. and Trenner-​Lyle, T. (2016) ‘The parliamentary party’, in Peele, G. and Francis, J. (eds), David Cameron and Conservative renewal, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Crines, A. (2013) ‘The rhetoric of the coalition:  Governing in the national interest?’, Representation, 49(2): 207–​18. Crines, A. (2014) ‘A discussion of rhetoric in Harold Wilson’s white heat speech’, Renewal: Journal of Social Democracy, 22(2–​3): 128–​34. Crines, A. (2015a) ‘The oratory of Ed Miliband’, in Crines, A. and Hayton, R. (eds), Labour orators from Bevan to Miliband, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Crines, A. (2015b) ‘Reforming Labour: The leadership of Jeremy Corbyn’, Political Insight, 6(3): 4–​7. Crines, A. (2015c) ‘The rhetoric of neoliberalism in the politics of crisis’, Global Discourse, 5(1): 116–​29. Crines, A., Heppell, T. and Dorey, P. (2016) The political rhetoric and oratory of Margaret Thatcher, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Crines, A., Jeffery, D. and Heppell, T. (2018) ‘The British Labour Party and leadership election mandate(s) of Jeremy Corbyn: Patterns of opinion and opposition within the parliamentary Labour Party’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 28(3): 361–​79. Cross, M. (2013) ‘Demonised, impoverished and now forced into isolation:  The fate of disabled people under austerity’, Disability and Society, 28(5): 719–​23. Crowson, N. (2007) The Conservative Party and European integration since 1945: At the heart of Europe, London: Routledge. Cruddas, J., Pecorelli, N. and Rutherford, J. (2015) ‘Exclusive! How Labour left its supporters behind, and lost’, Juncture, 22(2): 116–​25. Curtice, J. (2007) ‘New Labour, new protest? How the Liberal Democrats profited from Blair’s mistakes’, Political Quarterly, 78(1): 117–​27. Curtice, J. (2009) ‘Back in contention? The Conservatives’ electoral prospects’, Political Quarterly, 80(2): 172–​83. Curtice, J. (2013) ‘Politicians, voters and democracy: The 2011 UK referendum on the alternative vote’, Electoral Studies, 32(2): 215–​23. Curtice, J. (2014) ‘Message from the voters: The 2014 local and European elections’, Juncture, 21(1): 77–​81. Curtice, J. (2017a) ‘Why leave won the UK’s EU referendum’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(1): 19–​37. Curtice, J. (2017b) ‘The vote to leave the EU: Litmus test or lighting rod?’, British Social Attitudes www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/​media/​39149/​bsa34_​brexit_​final.pdf. Curtice, J. and Seyd, B. (eds) (2009), Has devolution worked? Manchester:  Manchester University Press. Curtice, J., Eichhorn, J., Paterson, L. and Ormston, R. (2015) The Scottish Referendum 2014: Is the Union now secure? London: Biteback.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

157

Cutts, D. (2006) ‘ “Where we work we win”:  A case study of local Liberal Democrat campaigning’, Journal of Elections and Public Opinion, 16(3): 221–​42. Cutts, D. (2012) ‘Yet another false dawn? An examination of the Liberal Democrats’ performance in the 2010 General Election’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 14(1): 96–​114. Cutts, D. (2014) ‘Local elections as a stepping stone:  Does winning Council seats boost the  Liberal Democrats’ performance at the General Election’, Political Studies, 62(2): 361–​80. Cutts, D. and Russell, A. (2015) ‘From coalition to catastrophe: The electoral meltdown of the Liberal Democrats’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1): 70–​87. Daddow, O. (2004) Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographical perspectives on integration, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Daddow, O. (2012) ‘The UK media and Europe: From permissive consensus to destructive dissent’, International Affairs, 88(6): 1219–​36. Daddow, O. (2015) ‘Constructing a great role for Britain in an age of austerity: Interpreting coalition foreign policy, 2010–​2015’, International Relations, 29(3), 303–​18. Daggers, J. and Nicholls, A. (2016) Big Society capital: The world’s first social investment wholescale bank, Oxford: Said Business School Case. Dale, I. (2012) ‘The Conservative Party and the coalition’, in Kassim, H., Clarke, C. and Haddon, C. (eds), The coalition:  Voters, parties and institutions, London:  Institute for Government. d’Ancona, M. (2014) In it together: The inside story of the coalition government, London: Penguin. d’Ancona, M. (2015) ‘David Cameron’, in Clarke, C., James, T., Bale, T. and Diamond, P. (eds), British Conservative leaders, London: Biteback. Dang, H.-​A ., Knack, S. and Rogers, H. (2013) ‘International aid and financial crises in donor countries’, European Journal of Political Economy, 32: 232–​50. Davey, E. (2004) ‘Liberalism and localism’, in Marshall, P. and Laws, D. (eds), The Orange Book: Reclaiming liberalism, London: Profile. Davies, A. (2013) ‘This time, it’s for real: The Health and Social Care Act 2012’, The Modern Law Review, 76(3): 564–​88. Debus, M. (2011) ‘Portfolio allocation and policy compromises: How and why the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives formed a coalition government’, Political Quarterly, 82(2): 293–​304. Defty, A. (2014) ‘Can you tell what it is yet? Public attitudes towards the Big Society’, Social Policy and Society, 13(1): 13–​24. Denham, A. and Dorey, P. (2007) ‘A tale of two speeches:  The Conservative leadership election’, Political Quarterly, 78(1): 35–​41. Denham, A. and O’Hara, K. (2007) ‘The three “mantras”:  “Modernization” and the Conservative Party’, British Politics, 2(2): 167–​90. Dennison, J. and Goodwin, M. (2015) ‘Immigration, issue ownership and the rise of UKIP’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1): 168–​87. Denver, D. (2005) ‘Valence politics: How Britain votes now’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7(2): 292–​9. Denver, D. (2015) ‘The results: How Britain voted’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1): 5–​24. Denver, D. (2018) ‘The results: How Britain voted’, Parliamentary Affairs, 71(1): 8–​28. Diamond, P. (2016a) ‘Learning the lessons from defeat: The Labour Party’s Beckett Report and the alternatives’, Political Quarterly, 87(3): 431–​6.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

158

References

Diamond, P. (2016b) ‘Assessing the performance of UK Opposition leaders: Jeremy Corbyn’s straight talking, honest politics’, Politics and Governance, 4(2): 15–​24. Diamond, P. and Kenny, M. (2011) Reassessing New Labour: Market, state and society under Blair and Brown, Oxford: Blackwell. Dommett, K (2013) ‘A miserable little compromise: Exploring Liberal Democrat fortunes in the UK coalition’, Political Quarterly, 84(2): 218–​27. Dommett, K. (2015) ‘The theory and practice of party modernisation: The Conservative Party under David Cameron, 2005–​2015’, British Politics, 10(2): 249–​66. Dorey, P. (ed.) (1999) The Major premiership, 1990–​97: Politics and policies under John Major, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Dorey, P. (2001) ‘The Conservatives’ performance in the 2001 General Election’, Representation, 38(3): 204–​12. Dorey, P. (2007) ‘A new direction or another false dawn? David Cameron and the crisis of British Conservatism’, British Politics, 2(2): 137–​66. Dorey, P. (2009) ‘Sharing the proceeds of growth:  Conservative economic policy under David Cameron’, Political Quarterly, 80(2): 259–​69. Dorey, P. (2010) ‘Faltering before the finishing line: The Conservative Party’s performance in the 2010 General Election’, British Politics, 5(4): 402–​35. Dorey, P. (2017a) ‘Jeremy Corbyn confounds his critics:  Explaining the Labour Party’s remarkable resurgence in the 2017 election’, British Politics, 12(3): 308–​34. Dorey, P. (2017b) ‘Towards exit from the EU:  The Conservative Party’s increasing Euroscepticism since the 1980s’, Politics and Governance, 5(2): 27–​40. Dorey, P. and Denham, A. (2011) ‘ “O, brother, where art thou?” The Labour Party leadership election of 2010’, British Politics, 6(3): 286–​316. Dorey, P. and Denham, A. (2016) ‘The longest suicide note in history: The Labour Party leadership election of 2015’, British Politics, 11(3): 259–​82. Dorey, P. and Garnett, M. (2012) ‘No such thing as the Big Society? The Conservative Party’s unnecessary search for narrative in the 2010 General Election’, British Politics, 7(4): 389–​417. Dorey, P. and Garnett, M. (2016) The British coalition government 2010–​2015: A marriage of inconvenience, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Dorey, P., Garnett, M. and Denham, A. (2011) From crisis to coalition: The Conservative Party 1997–​2010, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Dorman, A., Uttley, M. and Wilkinson, B. (2016) ‘The curious incident of Mr Cameron and the United Kingdom defence budget: A new legacy?’, Political Quarterly, 87(1): 46–​53. Drake, P. and Higgins, M. (2012) ‘Lights, camera, election: The 2010 television election and political leadership’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 14(3): 375–​91. Driver, S. and Martell, L. (1998) New Labour: Politics after Thatcherism, Cambridge: Polity  Press. Driver, S. and Martell, L. (2006) New Labour, Cambridge: Polity Press. Duffy, S. (2013) A fair society? How the cuts target disabled people, Sheffield: Centre for Welfare Reform. www.centreforwelfarereform.org/​uploads/​attachment/​354/​a-​fair-​society.pdf. Duncan Smith, I. (2006) Breakdown Britain:  Interim report on the state of the nation, London: Centre for Social Justice. Duncan Smith, I. (2007) Breakthrough Britain:  Ending the costs of social breakdown, London: Centre for Social Justice.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

159

Dunleavy, P. (2012) ‘The British general election of 2010 and the advent of coalition government’, in Baldini, G. and Hopkin, J. (eds), Coalition Britain: The UK election of 2010, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Dunphy, R. and Bale, T. (2011) ‘The radical left in coalition government: Towards a comparative measurement of success and failure’, Party Politics, 17(4): 488–​504. Duverger, M. (1959) Political parties:  Their organization and activity in the modern state, London: Methuen. Dwyer, P. and Wright, S. (2014) ‘Universal credit, ubiquitous conditionality and its implications for social citizenship’, Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, 22(1): 27–​35. Elliot, L. (2011) ‘Andrew Mitchell defends higher spending on aid as a moral duty’, Guardian, 8 June. Elliott, F. and Hanning, J. (2012) Cameron: Practically a Conservative, London: Fourth Estate. Elster, J. (2000) Ulysses unbound:  Studies in rationality, precommitment and constraints, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Evans, E. (2011) ‘Two heads are better than one? Assessing the implications of the Conservative-​Liberal Democrat coalition for UK politics’, Political Science, 63(1): 45–​60. Evans, E. and Sanderson-​Nash, E. (2011) ‘From sandals to suits: Professionalisation, coalition and the Liberal Democrats’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13(4): 459–​73. Evans, G. (1998) ‘Euroscepticism and Conservative electoral support: How an asset became a liability’, British Journal of Political Science, 28(4): 573–​90. Evans, G. and Chzhen, K. (2013) ‘Explaining voters’ defection from Labour over the 2005–​ 10 electoral cycle:  Leadership, economics and the rising importance of immigration’, Political Studies, 61(Special Issue): 138–​57. Evans, K. (2011) ‘ “Big society” in the UK:  A policy review’, Children and Society, 25(2): 164–​71. Evans, S. (2008) ‘Consigning its past to history? David Cameron and the Conservative Party’, Parliamentary Affairs, 61(2): 291–​314. Evans, S. (2012) ‘Reluctant coalitionists: The Conservative Party and the establishment of the coalition government in May 2010’, Political Quarterly, 83(3): 478–​86. Fairclough, N. (2000) New Labour, new language, London: Routledge. Favretto, I. (2000) ‘Wilsonism reconsidered:  Labour Party revisionism 1952–​ 1964’, Contemporary British History, 14(4): 54–​80. Fenwick, J. and Gibbon, J. (2017) ‘The rise and fall of the Big Society in the UK’, Public Money and Management, 37(2): 126–​30. Fieldhouse, E. and Prosser, C. (2018) ‘The limits of partisan loyalty: How the Scottish independence referendum cost Labour’, Electoral Studies, 52(1): 11–​25. Fieldhouse, E., Cutts, D. and Russell, A. (2006) ‘Neither north nor south:  The geography of Liberal Democrat voting in 2005’, Journal of Elections and Public Opinion, 16(1): 77–​92. Fielding, S. (2010) ‘Labour’s campaign: Things can only get … worse?’, Parliamentary Affairs, 63(4): 653–​66. Fielding, S. (2015) ‘Hell no! Labour’s 2015 campaign’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1): 54–​69. Finkelstein, D. (2016) ‘Gambler Cameron’s luck was doomed to run out’, The Times, 13 September.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

160

References

Finlayson, A. (2002) ‘Elements of the Blairite image of leadership’, Parliamentary Affairs, 55(3): 586–​99. Finlayson, A. (2003) Making sense of New Labour, London: Lawrence & Wishart. Finn, M. (2015) ‘The coalition and the Liberal Democrats’, in Seldon, A. and Finn, M. (eds), The coalition effect 2010–​2015, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fisher, S. and Hillman, N. (2014) Do students swing elections? Registration, turnout and voting behaviour among full-​time students, Oxford: Higher Education Policy Institute. Fisher, S. and Hobolt, S. (2010) ‘Coalition government and electoral accountability’, Electoral Studies, 29(3): 358–​69. Flinders, M. and Buller, J. (2006) ‘Depoliticisation:  Principles, tactics and tools’, British Politics, 1(1): 293–​318. Flinders, M. and Moon, D. (2012) ‘The problem of letting go: The Big Society, accountable governance and the curse of the decentralising minister’, Local Economy, 26(8): 652–​62. Flood, C. (2009) ‘Dimensions of Euroscepticism’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 47(4): 911–​17. Foley, M. (2009) ‘Gordon Brown and the role of compounded crisis in the pathology of leadership’, British Politics, 4(4): 498–​513. Ford, R. and Goodwin, M. (2014a) ‘Understanding UKIP: Identity, social change and the left behind’, Political Quarterly, 85(3): 277–​84. Ford, R. and Goodwin, M. (2014b) Revolt on the right: Explaining support for the radical right in Britain, London: Routledge. Ford, R. and Goodwin, M. (2017) ‘Britain after Brexit:  A nation divided’, Journal of Democracy, 28(1): 17–​30. Ford, R., Goodwin, M. and Cutts, D. (2012) ‘Strategic Eurosceptics and polite xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament elections’, European Journal of Political Research, 51(2): 204–​34. Foreman, J. (2012) Aiding and abetting:  Foreign aid failures and the 0.7  percent deception, London: Civitas. Forsyth, J. (2012) ‘Politics: Britain’s new gang of four’, Spectator, 18 February. Fox, R. (2010) ‘Five days in May:  A political order emerges’, Parliamentary Affairs, 63(4): 607–​22. Gaber, I (2014) ‘The othering of Red Ed or how the Daily Mail framed the British Labour leader’, Political Quarterly, 85(4): 471–​9. Gaffney, J. and Lahel, A. (2013) ‘Political performance and leadership persona:  The UK Labour Party conference of 2012’, Government and Opposition, 48(4): 481–​505. Gamble, A. (1996) ‘An ideological party’, in Ludlam, S. and Smith, M. (eds), Contemporary British Conservatism, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Gamble, A. (2009) ‘British politics and the financial crisis’, British Politics, 4(4): 450–​62. Gamble, A. (2010) ‘New Labour and political change’, Parliamentary Affairs, 63(4): 639–​52. Gamble, A. (2012a) ‘Economic policy’, in Heppell, T. and Seawright, D. (eds), Cameron and the Conservatives: The transition to coalition government, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Gamble, A. (2012b) ‘Better off out? Britain and Europe’, Political Quarterly, 83(3): 468–​77. Gamble, A. (2015) ‘Austerity as statecraft’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1): 42–​57. Gamble, A. (2016) ‘The Conservatives and the Union: The “New English Toryism” and the origins of Anglo-​Britishness’, Political Studies Review, 14(3): 359–​87.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

161

Gamson, W. A. (1961) ‘A theory of coalition formation’, American Sociological Review, 26(3): 373–​82. Garnett, M. (2012) ‘Edward Heath 1965–​1970’, in Heppell, T. (ed.), Leaders of the opposition from Churchill to Cameron, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Garnett, M. and Lynch, P. (eds) (2003) The Conservatives in crisis, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Garry, J. (1995) ‘The British Conservative Party:  Divisions over European policy’, West European Politics, 18(2): 170–​89. Garthwaite, K. (2016) Hunger pains: Life inside foodbank Britain, Bristol: Policy Press. Gaskarth, J. (2016) ‘The fiasco of the 2013 Syria votes: Decline and denial in British foreign policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 23(5): 718–​34. George, S. (1992) Britain and the European Community:  The politics of semi-​detachment, Oxford: Clarendon Press. George, S. (1994) An awkward partner: Britain and the European Community, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gibson, H. (2015) ‘Between the state and the individual: Big Society communitarianism and English Conservative rhetoric’, Citizenship, Social and Economics Education, 14(1): 40–​55. Gifford, C. (2008) The making of Eurosceptic Britain: Identity and economy in a post imperial state, Aldershot: Ashgate. Gifford, C. (2014) ‘The people against Europe:  The Eurosceptic challenge to the United Kingdom’s coalition government’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 52(3): 512–​52. Gifford, C. and Tournier-​Sol, K. (eds) (2015) The UK’s challenge to Europeanisation: Britain and Europe in the Eurosceptic debate, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Gilbert, A. (2014) ‘From pretended family relationship to ultimate affirmation:  British Conservatism and the legal recognition of same sex relationships’, Child and Family Law Quarterly, 26(4): 463–​88. Glencross, A. (2015) ‘Why a British referendum on EU membership will not solve the Europe question’, International Affairs, 91(2): 303–​17. Glencross, A. (2016) Why the UK voted for Brexit:  David Cameron’s great miscalculation, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Glennie, J. (2011) ‘From green paper to government: The coalition’s record on international development’, Area, 43(4): 508–​9. Goes, E. (2014) ‘The coalition and Europe: A tale of reckless drivers, steady navigators and imperfect roadmaps’, Parliamentary Affairs 67(1): 45–​63. Goes, E. (2016) The Labour Party under Ed Miliband: Trying but failing to renew social democracy, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Goes, E. (2018) ‘ “Jez, we can”: Labour’s campaign defeat with a taste of victory’, Parliamentary Affairs, 71(S1): 59–​71. Goodwin, M. and Milazzo, C. (2015) UKIP: Inside the campaign to redraw the map of British politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goodwin, M. and Milazzo, C. (2017) ‘Taking back control? Investigating the role of immigration in the 2016 vote for Brexit’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(3): 450–​64. Gowland, A. and Turner, A. (1999) Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European integration, London: Longman.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

162

References

Gowland, A., Turner, A. and Wright, A. (2010) Britain and European integration since 1945: On the sidelines, London: Routledge. Green, D. (2003) More than markets, London: Tory Reform Group. Green, J. (2007) ‘When voters and parties agree: Valence politics and party competition’, Political Studies, 55(3): 629–​55. Green, J. and Hobolt, S. B. (2008) ‘Owning the issue agenda:  Party strategies and vote choices in British elections’, Electoral Studies, 27(3): 460–​76. Green, J. and Jennings, W. (2011) ‘Issue competence and vote choice for parties in and out of power: An analysis of valance in Britain 1979–​1997’, European Journal of Political Research, 51(4): 469–​503. Green, J. and Jennings, W. (2012) ‘Valence as macro-​competence:  An analysis of mood in party competence evaluations in Great Britain’, British Journal of Political Science, 42(2): 311–​43. Green, J. and Prosser, C. (2015) ‘Learning the right lessons from Labour’s 2015 defeat’, Juncture, 22(2): 131–​41. Green, J. and Prosser, C. (2016) ‘Party system fragmentation and single-​party government: The British general election of 2015’, West European Politics, 39(6): 1299–​310. Greening, J. (2013) ‘Investing in growth: How Df ID works in new and emerging markets’, 11 March, www.gov.uk/​government/​speeches/​investing-​in-​growth-​how-​dfid-​works-​in​new-​and-​emerging-​markets. Greening, J. (2014) ‘Smart aid: Why it’s all about jobs’, 27 January, www.gov.uk/​government/​ speeches/​smart-​aid-​why-​its-​all-​about-​jobs. Grice, A. (2011) ‘It’s our moral duty to help world’s poor’, Independent, 1 October. Grice, A. (2012) ‘Tories warn PM that he’s splitting his party over gay marriage as leadership speculation mounts’, Independent, 27 December. Hargrove, E. (1998) The president as leader:  Appealing to the better angels of our nature, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Hasan, M. and MacIntyre, J. (2011) Ed: The Milibands and the making of a Labour leader, London: Biteback. Haseler, S. (1969) The Gaitskellites:  Revisionism in the British Labour Party 1951 to 1964, London: Macmillan. Hassan, G. (ed.) (2009) The modern SNP:  From protest to power, Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press. Hassan, G. (2017) ‘After the landslide: Scotland still marches to a different politics, even if slightly less so’, Political Quarterly, 88(3): 375–​81. Hassan, G and Shaw, E. (2012) The strange death of Labour in Scotland, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Hawkins, B. (2012) ‘Nation, separation and threat: An analysis of British media discourses on the European Union Treaty reform process’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(4): 561–​77. Hay, C. (1998) ‘That was then, this is now: The revision of policy in the modernisation of the British Labour Party, 1992–​1997’, New Political Science, 20(1): 7–​33. Hay, C. (1999) The political economy of New Labour, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Hay, C. (2009) ‘King Canute and the problem of structure and agency: On times, tides and heresthetics’, Political Studies, 57(2): 260–​279.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

163

Hay, C. (2013) ‘Treating the symptom not the condition: Crisis definition, deficit reduction and the search for a new British growth model’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15(1): 23–​37. Hayton, R. (2010) ‘Conservative Party modernisation and David Cameron’s politics of the family’, Political Quarterly, 81(4): 492–​500. Hayton, R. (2012) Reconstructing Conservatism: The Conservative Party in opposition 1997–​ 2010, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Hayton, R. (2015) ‘The coalition and the politics of the English question’, Political Quarterly, 86(1): 125–​32. Hayton, R. (2016) ‘The UK Independence Party and the politics of Englishness’, Political Studies Review, 14(3): 400–​10. Hayton, R. (2018) ‘British Conservatism and the vote for Brexit: The ideological legacy of David Cameron’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 20(1): 223–​38. Hayton, R. and Heppell, T. (2010) ‘The quiet man of British politics: The rise, fall and significance of Iain Duncan Smith’, Parliamentary Affairs, 63(3): 425–​55. Hayton, R. and McEnhill, E. (2015) ‘Cameron’s Conservative Party, social liberalism and social justice’, British Politics, 10(2): 131–​47. Hazell, R. (ed.) (2006) The English question, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Hazell, R. and Sandford, M. (2015) ‘English question or Union question? Neither has easy answers’, Political Quarterly, 86(1): 16–​23. Hazell, R. and Yong, B. (eds) (2012) The politics of coalition: How the Conservative-​Liberal Democrat coalition works, Oxford: Hart. Heath, O. and Goodwin, M. (2017) ‘The 2017 general election, Brexit and the return to two-​party politics:  An aggregate-​level analysis of the result’, Political Quarterly, 88(3): 345–​58. Heffernan, R. (2001) New Labour and Thatcherism: Political change in Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Heffernan, R. (2006) ‘The Prime Minister and the news media: Political communication as a leadership resource’, Parliamentary Affairs, 59(4): 582–​98. Heffernan, R. (2011) ‘Labour’s New Labour legacy: Politics after Blair and Brown’, Political Studies Review, 9(2): 163–​77. Heinrich, T., Kobayashi, Y. and Bryant, K. (2016) ‘Public opinion and foreign aid cuts in economic crisis’, World Development, 77(1): 66–​79. Henderson, A. and Mitchell, J. (2018) ‘Referendums as critical junctures? Scottish voting in British elections’, Parliamentary Affairs, 71(S1): 109–​24. Henn, M. and Foard, N. (2012) ‘Young people, political participation and trust in Britain’, Parliamentary Affairs, 65(1): 47–​67. Henson, S. and Lindstrom, J. (2013) ‘ “A mile wide and an inch deep”? Understanding public support for aid: The case of the United Kingdom’, World Development, 42: 67–​75. Heppell, T. (2002) ‘The ideological composition of the parliamentary Conservative Party 1992 to 1997’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 4(2): 299–​324. Heppell, T. (2008) ‘The degenerative tendencies of long serving governments … 1963 … 1996 … 2008?’, Parliamentary Affairs, 61(4): 578–​96. Heppell, T. (2010) Choosing the Labour leader: Labour Party leadership elections from Wilson to Brown, London: I. B. Tauris.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

164

References

Heppell, T. (ed.) (2012a) Leaders of the opposition from Churchill to Cameron, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Heppell, T. (2012b) ‘Ministerial selection and the Cameron government: Female ministerial representation and the one-​third objective’, Representation, 48(2): 209–​19. Heppell, T. (2013a) ‘The Conservative Party leadership of David Cameron:  Heresthetics and the realignment of British politics’, British Politics, 8(2): 260–​84. Heppell, T. (2013b) ‘Cameron and Liberal Conservatism: Attitudes within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and Conservative ministers’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15(3): 340–​61. Heppell, T. (2013c) ‘The fall of the Brown government 2010’, in Heppell, T. and Theakston, K. (eds), How Labour governments fall:  From Ramsay MacDonald to Gordon Brown, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Heppell, T. (2014a) The Tories from Winston Churchill to David Cameron, London: Bloomsbury. Heppell, T. (2014b) ‘Ministerial selection and portfolio allocation in the Cameron government’, Parliamentary Affairs, 67(1): 64–​79. Heppell, T. and Crines, A. (2016) ‘Conservative ministers in the coalition government of 2010–​15:  Evidence of bias in the ministerial selections of David Cameron?’, Journal of Legislative Studies, 22(3): 385–​403. Heppell, T. and Hill, M. (2008) ‘The Conservative Party leadership election of 1997: An analysis of the voting motivations of Conservative parliamentarians’, British Politics, 3(1): 63–​91. Heppell, T. and Hill, M. (2009) ‘Transcending Thatcherism? Ideology and the Conservative Party leadership mandate of David Cameron’, Political Quarterly, 80(3): 388–​99. Heppell, T. and Hill, M. (2010) ‘The voting motivations of Conservative parliamentarians in the Conservative Party leadership election of 2001’, Politics, 30(1): 36–​51. Heppell, T. and Hill, M. (2012) ‘Labour in opposition’, in Heppell, T. and Seawright, D. (eds), Cameron and the Conservatives: The transition to coalition government, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Heppell, T. and Lightfoot, S. (2012) ‘ “We will not balance the books on the backs of the poorest people in the world”: Understanding Conservative Party strategy on international aid’, Political Quarterly, 83(1): 130–​8. Heppell, T. and Seawright, D. (eds) (2012) Cameron and the Conservatives: The transition to coalition government, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Heppell, T., Crines, A. and Jeffery, D. (2017a) ‘The United Kingdom government and the international aid 0.7  percent target:  What motivates opposition amongst Conservative parliamentarians?’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(4): 895–​909. Heppell, T., Crines, A. and Jeffery, D. (2017b) ‘The United Kingdom referendum on European Union membership:  The voting of Conservative parliamentarians’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 55(4): 762–​78. Heppell, T., Seawright, D. and Theakston, K. (2015) What makes for an effective leader of the opposition? London: Centre for Opposition Studies. Hickson, K. (2009) ‘Conservatism and the poor: Conservative party attitudes to poverty and inequality since the 1970s’, British Politics, 4(3): 341–​62. Hickson, K. (2011) ‘The end of New Labour? The future of the Labour Party’, in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds), The Cameron-​Clegg government:  Coalition politics in an age of austerity, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

165

Higham, R. (2014) ‘Free schools in the Big Society: The motivations, aims and demography of the free school proposers’, Journal of Education Policy, 29(1): 122–​39. Hillman, N. (2015) Students and the 2015 general election:  Did they make a difference? Oxford: Higher Education Policy Institute. Hillman, N. (2016) ‘The Coalition’s higher education reforms in England’, Oxford Review of Education, 42(3): 330–​45. Hills, J., Cunliffe, J. and Obolenskaya, P. (2016) ‘The changing structure of UK inequality since the crisis’, in Lupton, R., Burchardt, T., Hills, J., Stewart, K. and Vizard, P. (eds), Social policy in a cold climate: Policies and their consequences since the crisis, Bristol: Policy Press. Hindmoor, A. (2005) Constructing political space: New Labour at the centre, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hinsliff, G. (2008) ‘Cameron’s vow on women ministers’, Observer, 2 March. Hitchens, P. (2010) The Cameron delusion, London: Continuum. Hobolt, S. (2016) ‘The Brexit vote: A divided nation, a divided continent’, Journal of European Public Policy, 23(9): 1259–​77. Hodkinson, S. and Robbins, G. (2013) ‘The rise of class war Conservatism? Housing under the UK coalition’, Critical Social Policy, 33(1): 57–​77. Honeyman, V. (2017) ‘From liberal interventionism to liberal Conservatism: The short road in foreign policy from Blair to Cameron’, British Politics, 12(1): 42–​62. Hudson, D. and vanHeerde-​Hudson, J. (2012) ‘ “A mile wide and an inch deep”: Surveys of public attitudes towards development aid’, International Journal of Development Education and Global Learning, 4(1): 6–​23. Huhne, C. (2007) ‘The case for localism:  The liberal narrative’, in Brack, D., Grayson, R. and Howarth, D. (eds), Reinventing the state:  Social liberalism for the 21st century, London: Politicos. IPSOS Mori (2017) ‘Economic optimism index:  State of economy 1997 to the present day’, www.ipsos.com/​ipsos-​mori/​en-​uk/​economic-​optimism-​index-​eoi-​state-​economy​1997-​present. Isaby, J. (2010) ‘A full breakdown of who which way and who rebelled in tonight’s votes’, Conservative Home, 9 December. Isaby, J. (2011) ‘Theresa May recommits David Cameron to appointing women to a third of government jobs by 2015’, Conservative Home, 28 January. Jacobs, K. (2015) ‘The allure of the Big Society: Conveying authenticity in an era of uncertainty’, Housing, Theory and Society, 32(1): 25–​38. Jacobs, K. and Manzi, T. (2013) ‘New localism, new retrenchment: The Big Society, housing policy and the problem of welfare reform’, Housing, Theory and Society, 30(1): 29–​45. Jeffery, C. and Mitchell, J. (eds) (2009) The Scottish Parliament 1999–​2009, Edinburgh: Luath Press/​Hansard Society. Jeffery, C., Henderson, A., Scully, R. and Wyn Jones, R. (2016) ‘England’s dissatisfactions and the Conservative dilemma’, Political Studies Review, 14(3): 335–​48. Johns, R. and Mitchell, J. (2016) Takeover:  Explaining the extraordinary rise of the SNP, London: Biteback. Johns, R., Mitchell, J., Denver, D. and Pattie, C. (2010) Voting for a Scottish government: The Scottish Parliament election of 2007, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

166

References

Johnson, C. and Middleton, A. (2016) ‘Junior coalition parties in the British context:  Explaining the Liberal Democrat collapse at the 2015 general election’, Electoral Studies, 43(1): 63–​71. Johnston, R., Rossiter, D. and Pattie, C. (2006) ‘Disproportionality and bias in the results of the 2005 general election in Great Britain:  Evaluating the electoral system’s impact’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 16(1): 37–​54. Jones, B. (2010) ‘Climbing the greasy pole: Promotion in British politics’, Political Quarterly, 81(4): 616–​26. Jones, D. (2008) Cameron on Cameron:  Conservations with Dylan Jones, London:  Fourth Estate. Jones, G. and Clover, C. (2006) ‘Cameron turns blue to prove green credentials’, Daily Telegraph, 21 April. Jones, N. (2010) Campaign 2010: The making of the prime minister, London: Biteback. Kaarbo, J. and Kenealy, D. (2016) ‘No, prime minister: Explaining the House of Commons’ vote on intervention in Syria’, European Security, 25(1): 28–​48. Kam, C., Bianco, W., Sened, I. and Smyth, R. (2010) ‘Ministerial selection and intraparty organization in the contemporary British Parliament’, American Political Science Review, 104(2): 289–​306. Kane, J. (2001) Politics of moral capital, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kavanagh, D. (1997) ‘The Labour campaign’, Parliamentary Affairs, 50(4): 533–​41. Kavanagh, D. and Cowley, P. (2010) The British general election of 2010, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Keating, M. (2009) The independence of Scotland: Self-​government and the shifting politics of union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kellner, P. (2015) ‘Analysis: Corbyn is Britain’s least popular new opposition leader’, https://​ yougov.co.uk/​news/​2015/​10/​05/​corbyn-​britain-​least-​popular-​new-​opposition-​leade/​5 October. Kelly, R. (2015) ‘English votes for English laws. House of Commons Library Briefing Paper no. 7339’, 2 December, www.parliament.uk/​about/​how/​laws/​bills/​public/​english-​votes-​ for-​english-​laws/​. Kenny, M. (2015) ‘The return of Englishness in British political culture:  The end of the union?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(1): 35–​51. Kenny, M. (2016) The politics of nationhood in England, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kenny, M. and Smith, M. J. (1997) ‘Discourse of modernisation:  Gaitskell, Blair and the reform of Clause IV’, British Elections and Parties Review, 7(1): 110–​26. Kerr, P. (2007) ‘Cameron chameleon and the current state of Britain’s consensus’, Parliamentary Affairs, 60(1): 46–​65. Kerr, P. and Hayton, R. (2015) ‘Whatever happened to Conservative Party modernisation?’, British Politics, 10(2): 114–​30. Kerr, P., Byrne, C. and Foster, E. (2011) ‘Theorising Cameronism’, Political Studies Review, 9(2): 193–​207. Kettell, S. (2008) ‘Does depoliticisation work? Evidence from Britain’s membership of the Exchange Rate Mechanism 1990–​1992’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 10(4): 630–​48. Kettell, S. and Kerr, P. (2008) ‘One year on: The decline and fall of Gordon Brown’, British Politics, 3(4): 490–​510.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

167

King, A. (2006) ‘Why Labour won –​yet again?’, in Bartle, J. and King, A. (eds), Britain at the Polls, London: CQ Press. King, A. and Allen, N. (2010) ‘ “Off with their heads”: British prime ministers and the power to dismiss’, British Journal of Political Science, 40(2): 249–​78. Kirby, J. (2009) ‘From broken families to the broken society’, Political Quarterly, 80(2): 243–​7. Kisby, B. (2010) ‘The Big Society: Power to the people’, Political Quarterly, 81(4): 484–​91. Klingemann, H.-​D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Budge, I. and McDonald, M. (2006) Mapping policy preferences II:  Estimates for parties, electors, and governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990–​2003, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Langer, A. (2007) ‘A historical exploration of the personalisation of politics in the print media: British prime ministers 1945–​1999’, Parliamentary Affairs, 60(3), 371–​87. Langer, A. (2011) The personalisation of politics in the UK: Mediated leadership from Attlee to Cameron, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Laws, D. (2010) 22 days in May, London: Biteback. Laws, D. (2016) Coalition: The inside story of the Conservative-​Liberal Democrat coalition government, London: Biteback. Laver, M. and Budge, I. (eds) (1992) Party policy and government coalitions, New York: St Martin’s Press. Laver, M. and Schofield, N. (1990) Multiparty government: The politics of coalition in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laver, M. and Shepsle, K. (1996) Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Layard, A. (2012) ‘The Localism Act 2011: What is local and how do we (legally) construct it?’, Environmental Law Review, 14(2): 134–​44. Lee, N. (2017) ‘Powerhouse of cards? Understanding the Northern Powerhouse’, Regional Studies, 51(3): 478–​87. Lee, S. (2008) ‘The British model of political economy’, in Beech, M. and Lee, S. (eds), Ten years of New Labour, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Lee, S. (2009a) ‘Convergence, critique and divergence:  The development of economic policy under David Cameron’, in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds), The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to last? Basingstoke: Palgrave. Lee, S. (2009b) ‘David Cameron and the renewal of policy’, in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds), The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to last? Basingstoke: Palgrave. Lee, S. (2011) ‘No plan B: The coalition agenda for cutting the deficit and rebalancing the economy’, in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds), The Cameron-​Clegg government: Coalition politics in an age of austerity, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds) (2009) The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to last? Basingstoke: Palgrave. Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds) (2011) The Cameron-​Clegg government: Coalition politics in an age of austerity, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Lees, C. (2011) ‘How unusual is the United Kingdom coalition (and what are the chances of it happening again)?’, Political Quarterly, 82(2): 279–​92. Lemos, S. and Portes, J. (2013) ‘New Labour? The effects of migration from Central and Eastern Europe on unemployment and wages in the UK’, The Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 14(1): 299–​328.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

168

References

Letwin, O. (2003) The neighbourly society: Collected speeches 2001–​2003, London: Centre for Policy Studies. Letwin, O. (2009) ‘From economic revolution to social revolution: Alan Finlayson interviews Oliver Letwin MP’, in Cruddas, J. and Rutherford, J. (eds), Is the future Conservative? London: Lawrence & Wishart. Liberal Democrats (2010) Liberal Democrat manifesto 2010:  Change that works for you, London: Liberal Democrats. Lister, J. (2012) ‘In defiance of the evidence: Conservatives threaten to reform away England’s National Health Service’, International Journal of Health Services: Planning, Administration, Evaluation, 42(1): 137–​55. Lister, M. (2015) ‘Citizens, doing it for themselves? The Big Society and government through community’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68(2): 352–​70. Lockwood, M. (2013) ‘The political sustainability of climate policy:  The case of the UK Climate Change Act’, Global Environmental Change, 23(5): 1339–​48. Lodge, G. and Thomas, I. (2015) ‘The coalition and the Labour Party’, in Seldon, A. and Finn, M. (eds), The coalition effect 2010–​2015, Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. Lovenduski, J. (2005) Feminizing politics, Cambridge: Polity Press. Lovenduski, J. (2012) ‘Prime Minister’s Questions as political ritual’, British Politics, 7(4): 314–​40. Lovenduski, J. (2013) ‘United Kingdom:  Male dominance unbroken?’, in Dahlerup, D. and Leyenaar, M. (eds), Breaking male dominance in old democracies, Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Lovenduski, J. (2014) ‘The institutionalisation of sexism in politics’, Political Insight, 5(2): 16–​19. Lowndes, V. and Pratchett, L. (2012) ‘Local governance under the coalition government: Austerity, localism and the Big Society’, Local Government Studies, 38(1): 21–​40. Ludlam, S. and Smith, M. J. (eds) (2003) Governing as New Labour: Policy and politics under Blair, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Lunn, J. and Booth, L. (2016) ‘The 0.7% aid target: June 2016 update’, House of Commons Library. Lynch, P. (2011) ‘The Con-​Lib agenda for Europe’, in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds), The Cameron-​Clegg government: Coalition politics in an age of austerity, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Lynch, P. (2012) ‘European policy’, in Heppell, T. and Seawright, D. (eds), Cameron and the Conservatives: The transition to coalition government, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Lynch, P. (2015) ‘Conservative modernisation and European integration: From silence to salience and schism’, British Politics, 10(2): 185–​203. Lynch, P. and Whittaker, R. (2013a) ‘Where this is discord can they bring harmony? Managing intra-​party dissent on European integration in the Conservative Party’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15(3): 317–​39. Lynch, P. and Whittaker, R. (2013b) ‘Rivalry on the right:  The Conservatives, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the EU issue’, British Politics, 8(3): 285–​312. Macwhirter, I. (2014) Disunited kingdom: How Westminster won a referendum but lost Scotland, Glasgow: Cargo. Mandelson, P. (2010) The third man: Life at the heart of New Labour, London: Harper Press.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

169

Manji, A. (2016) ‘The International Development (Official Development Assistance Target) Act 2015: Legislative spending targets, poverty alleviation and aid scrutiny’, Modern Law Review, 79(4): 655–​77. Mason, R. (2015) ‘Labour leadership:  Jeremy Corbyn elected with a huge mandate’, Guardian, 12 September. Matthews, F. (2011) ‘Constitutional stretching: Coalition governance and the Westminster model’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 49(4): 486–​509. Matthews, F. (2019) ‘Formal rules, informal norms and the everyday practice of coalition governance’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 21(1): 148–​68. Matthijs, M. (2013) ‘David Cameron’s dangerous game: The folly of flirting with an EU exit’, Foreign Affairs, 92(5): 10–​16. Maude, F. (2013) ‘No resting on our laurels’, Juncture, 20(2): 144–​5. Mawdsley, E. (2011) ‘The Conservatives, the coalition and international development’, Area, 43(4): 506–​7. Mawdsley, E. (2015) ‘DFID, the private sector and the re-​centering of an economic growth agenda in international development’, Global Society, 29(3): 339–​58. Mawdsley, E. (2017) ‘National interests and the paradox of foreign aid under austerity: Conservative governments and the domestic politics of international development since 2010’, The Geographical Journal, 183(3): 223–​32. McAllister, I. and Studlar, D. (2000) ‘Conservative Euroscepticism and the Referendum Party in the 1997 British general election’, Party Politics, 6(3): 359–​71. McAnulla, S. (1999) ‘The post-​Thatcher era’, in Marsh, D., Buller, J., Hay, C., Johnston, J., Kerr, P., McAnulla, S. and Watson, M. (eds), Post war British politics in perspective, Cambridge: Polity. McAnulla, S. (2006) British politics: A critical introduction, London: Continuum. McAnulla, S. (2010) ‘Heirs to Blair’s Third Way:  David Cameron’s triangulating Conservatism’, British Politics, 5(3): 286–​314. McAnulla, S. (2011) ‘Post-​political poisons? Evaluating the toxic dimensions of Tony Blair’s leadership’, Representation, 47(3): 251–​63. McAnulla, S. (2012) ‘Liberal Conservatism:  Ideological coherence?’ in Heppell, T. and Seawright, D. (eds), Cameron and the Conservatives: The transition to coalition government, Basingstoke: Palgrave. McEnhill, L. (2015) ‘Unity and distinctiveness in the UK coalition government: Lessons for junior partners’, Political Quarterly, 86(1): 101–​8. McHarg, A. and Mitchell, J. (2017) ‘Brexit and Scotland’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19(3): 512–​26. Mcllveen, R. (2009) ‘Ladies of the right: An interim analysis of the A‐list’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 19(2): 147–​57. McKibbin, R. (2016) ‘A brief supremacy:  The fragmentation of the two-​party system in British Politics, c. 1950–​2015’, Twentieth Century British History, 27(3): 450–​69. McLean, I. (2001) Rational choice in British politics: An analysis of rhetoric and manipulation from Peel to Blair, Oxford: Oxford University Press. McLean, I. (2002) ‘William H.  Riker and the invention of heresthetics’, British Journal of Political Science, 32(3): 535–​58. McLean, I. (2010) What’s wrong with the British constitution? Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

170

References

McManus, M. (2011) Tory pride and prejudice: The Conservative Party and homosexual law reform, London: Biteback. Mellon, J., Evans, G., Fieldhouse, E., Green, J. and Prosser, C. (2018) ‘Brexit or Corbyn? Campaign and inter-​ election voting switching in the 2017 UK general election’, Parliamentary Affairs, 71(4): 719–​37. Middleton, A. (2015) ‘The effectiveness of leader visits during the 2010 general election campaign’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 17(2): 244–​59. Millar, J. and Bennett, F. (2017) ‘Universal credit: Assumptions, contradictions and virtual reality’, Social Policy and Society, 16(2): 169–​82. Mills, S. and Waite, C. (2017) ‘Brands of youth citizenship and the politics of scale: National Citizen Service in the United Kingdom’, Political Geography, 56(1): 66–​76. Minkin, L. (2014) The Blair supremacy: A study in the politics of Labour’s party management, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Mitchell, A. (2000) ‘Reinterpreting Labour’s history of failure’, in Brivati, B. and Heffernan, R. (eds), The Labour Party: A centenary history, London: Macmillan. Mitchell, J. (2009) Devolution in the United Kingdom, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Mitchell, J. (2014) The Scottish question, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mitchell, J. (2015) ‘Sea change in Scotland’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1): 88–​100. Mitchell, J. and Convery, A. (2012) ‘Conservative unionism: Prisoned in marble’, in Torrance, D. (ed.), Whatever happened to Tory Scotland? Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Mitchell, J., Bennie, L. and Johns, R. (2012) The Scottish National Party: Transition to power, Oxford: Oxford University Press Moffatt, S., Lawson, S., Patterson, R., Holding, E., Dennison, A., Sowden, S. and Brown, J. (2016) ‘A qualitative study of the impact of the UK bedroom tax’, Journal of Public Health, 38(2): 197–​205. Montgomerie, T. (2012) ‘Ten things you need to know about the group of four that runs the Coalition’, Conservative Home, 16 February, www.conservativehome.com/​thetorydiary/​ 2012/ ​ 0 2/​ ten- ​ t hings-​ y ou- ​ n eed- ​ to- ​ k now- ​ a bout- ​ t he- ​ g roup- ​ o f- ​ f our- ​ t hat- ​ r uns- ​ t he-​ coalition.html. Mooney, G. and Neal, S. (2010) ‘Welfare worries: Mapping the directions of welfare futures in the contemporary UK’, Research, Policy and Planning, 27(3): 141–​50. Mortimore, R., Skinner, G. and Mludzinski, T. (2015) ‘Cameron’s problem with women: The reporting and reality of gender-​based trends in attitudes to the Conservatives 2010–​11’, Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1): 97–​115. Müller, W. and Strøm, K. (1999) Policy, office or voters? How political parties in Western Europe make hard decisions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Müller, W. and Strøm, K. (2008) ‘Coalition agreements and cabinet governance’, in Strøm, K., Müller, W. and Bergman, T. (eds), Cabinets and coalition bargaining: The democratic life cycle in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mycock, A. and Tonge, J. (2011) ‘A big idea for the Big Society: The advent of the National Citizen Service’, Political Quarterly, 82(1): 56–​66. Mycock, A. and Tonge, J. (2012) ‘The party politics of youth citizenship and democratic engagement’, Parliamentary Affairs, 65(1): 138–​61. Nadler, J. (2007) David Cameron: The regeneration game, London: Politicos.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

171

Norman, J. (2010) The Big Society: The anatomy of the new politics, London: University of Buckingham Press. Norton, P. (1975) Dissension in the House of Commons:  Intra-​party dissent in the House of Commons division lobbies, 1945–​74, London: Macmillan. Norton, P. (1978) Conservative dissidents: Dissent within the parliamentary Conservative Party 1970–​74, London: Temple Smith. Norton, P. (1980) Dissension in the House of Commons 1974–​1979, Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Norton, P. (1990) ‘The lady’s not for turning but what about the rest: Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party, 1979–​1989’, Parliamentary Affairs, 43(1): 41–​58. Norton, P. (2009) ‘David Cameron and Tory success: Bystander or architect?’, in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds), The Conservatives under David Cameron: Built to last? Basingstoke: Palgrave. Norton, P. (2011) ‘The politics of coalition’, in Allen, N. and Bartle, J. (eds), Britain at the polls 2010, London: Sage. Norton, P. (2012) ‘Coalition cohesion’, in Heppell, T. and Seawright, D. (eds), Cameron and the Conservatives: The transition to coalition government, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Norton, P. (2015) ‘The coalition and the Conservatives’, in Seldon, A. and Finn, M. (eds), The coalition effect 2010–​2015, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Norton, P. (2016) ‘The Fixed-​term Parliaments Act and votes of confidence’, Parliamentary Affairs, 69(1): 3–​18. Norton-​Taylor, R. (2011) ‘Mitchell v Fox:  Armed forces v development aid’, Guardian, 11 June. Noxolo, P. (2011) ‘One World, Big Society: A discursive analysis of the Conservative Green Paper for international development’, The Geographical Journal, 178(1): 31–​41. O’Hara, M. (2014) Austerity bites, Bristol: The Policy Press. Okólski, M. and Salt, J. (2014) ‘Polish immigration to the UK after 2004: Why did so many come?’ Central and East European Migration Review, 3(2): 11–​37. Oliver, C. (2016) Unleashing demons: The inside story of Brexit, London: Hodder & Stoughton. O’Shaughnessy, N. (2003) ‘The symbolic state: A British experience’, Journal of Public Affairs, 3(4): 297–​312. Page, R. (2010) ‘David Cameron’s modern Conservative approach to poverty and social justice: Towards one nation or two?’ Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, 18(2): 147–​60. Parry, K. and Richardson, K. (2011) ‘Political imagery in the British General Election of 2010: The curious case of Nick Clegg’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13(4): 474–​89. Paterson, O. (2014a) ‘I am proud of standing up to the green lobby’, Daily Telegraph, 20 July. Paterson, O. (2014b) ‘Why we have to scrap the Climate Change Act’, Daily Telegraph, 12 December. Pattie, C. and Johnston, R. (2011) ‘How big is the Big Society?’, Parliamentary Affairs, 64(3): 403–​24. Paun, A. (2011) ‘United we stand? Governance challenges for the United Kingdom coalition’, Political Quarterly, 82(2): 251–​60. Paun, A. and Munro, R. (2013) Endgames: Lessons for the Lib Dems in the final phase of coalition, London: Institute for Government.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

172

References

Peele, G. and Francis, J. (eds) (2016) David Cameron and Conservative renewal: The limits of modernisation? Manchester: Manchester University Press. Pich, C. and Armannsdottir, G. (2018) ‘Political brand image:  An investigation into the operationalisation of the external orientation of David Cameron’s Conservative brand’, Journal of Marketing Communications, 24(1): 35–​52. Pich, C. and Dean, D. (2015) ‘Political branding:  Sense of identity or identity crisis? An investigation of the transfer potential of the brand identity prism and the UK Conservative Party’, Journal of Marketing Management, 31(11/​12): 1353–​78. Pich, C., Dean, D. and Punjaisri, P. (2016) ‘Political brand identity: An examination of the complexities of Conservative brand and internal market engagement during the 2010 UK general election campaign’, Journal of Marketing Communications, 22(1): 100–​17. Pike, J. (2015) Project fear: How an unlikely alliance left a kingdom united but a country divided, London: Biteback. Pinto-​Duschinsky, M., McLean, I. and Lodge, G. (2011) ‘The alternative vote’, Political Insight, 2(1): 16–​17. Portes, J. (2016) ‘Immigration, free movement and the EU referendum’, National Institute Economic Review, 236(1): 14–​22. Powell, E. (1977) Joseph Chamberlain, London: Thames & Hudson. Price, L. (2010) Where power lies: Prime ministers and the media, London: Simon & Schuster. Quinn, T. (2004) Modernising the Labour Party:  Organisational change since 1983, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Quinn, T. (2008) ‘The Conservative Party and the centre ground of British politics’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 18(2): 179–​99. Quinn, T. (2012) Electing and ejecting party leaders in Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Quinn, T. (2013) ‘From two-​partism to alternating predominance: The changing UK party system, 1950–​2010’, Political Studies, 61(2): 378–​400. Quinn, T. (2016) ‘The British Labour leadership election of 2015’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 18(4): 759–​78. Quinn, T. (2018) ‘Revolt on the left: Labour in opposition’, in Allen, N. and Bartle, J. (eds), None past the post: Britain at the polls, 2017, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Quinn, T., Bara, J. and Bartle, J. (2011) ‘The UK coalition agreement of 2010: Who won?’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 21(2): 295–​312. Qvortrup, M. (2012) ‘Voting on electoral reform: A comparative perspective on the alternative vote referendum in the United Kingdom’, Political Quarterly, 83(1): 108–​16. Randerson, J. (2010) ‘Cameron:  I want coalition to be the greenest government ever’, Guardian, 14 May. Rawnsley, A. (2010) The end of the party: The rise and fall of New Labour, London: Penguin. Redclift, V. (2014) ‘New racisms, new racial subjects? The neo-​liberal moment and the racial landscape of contemporary Britain’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 37(4): 577–​88. Renwick, A. and Lamb, M. (2013) ‘The quality of referendum debate: The UK’s electoral system referendum in the print media’, Electoral Studies, 32(2): 294–​304. Richards, D., Smith, M. and Hay, C. (2014) Institutional crisis in 21st century Britain, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Richards, S. (2010) Whatever it takes, London: Fourth Estate. Richards, S. (2016) ‘Leadership, loyalty and the rise of Jeremy Corbyn’, Political Quarterly, 87(1): 12–​17.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

173

Riker, W. (1982) Liberalism against populism, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. Riker, W. (1983) ‘Political theory and the art of heresthetics’, in Finifter, A. W. (ed.), Political science: The state of the discipline, Washington, DC: American Political Science Association. Riker, W. (1984) ‘The heresthetics of constitution-​making:  The presidency in 1787, with comments on determinism and rational choice’, American Political Science Review, 78(1): 1–​16. Riker, W. (1986) The art of political manipulation, New Haven: Yale University Press. Rogers, C. (2015) ‘Localism and the (re)creation of capitalist space in the United Kingdom’, British Politics, 10(4): 391–​412. Rogers, P. (2013) ‘Rethinking resilience: Articulating community and the UK riots’, Politics, 33(4): 322–​33. Rootes, C. and Carter, N. (2010) ‘Take blue, add yellow, get green? The environment in the UK general election of 6 May 2010’, Environmental Politics, 19(6): 992–​9. Rosamond, B. (1996) ‘Whatever happened to the enemy within? Contemporary Conservatism and trade unionism’, in Smith, M. and Ludlam, S. (eds), Contemporary British Conservatism, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Russell, A. (2010) ‘Inclusion, exclusion or obscurity? The 2010 general election and the implications of the Con–​Lib coalition for third-​party politics in Britain’, British Politics, 5(4): 506–​24. Russell, A. and Fieldhouse, E. (2005) Neither left nor right? The Liberal Democrats and the electorate, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Russell, M. (2016) ‘Corbyn as an organisational phenomenon: A response to Steve Richards’, Political Quarterly, 87(1): 20–​2. Sanders, D., Clarke, H., Stewart, M. and Whiteley, P. (2001) ‘The economy and voting’, Parliamentary Affairs, 54(4): 789–​802. Sanders, D., Clarke, H., Stewart, M. and Whiteley, P. (2011) ‘Simulating the effects of the alternative vote on the 2010 UK general election’. Parliamentary Affairs, 64(1): 5–​23. Schleiter, P. and Issar, S. (2014) ‘Fixed-​term parliaments and the challenges for governments and the civil service: A comparative perspective’, Political Quarterly, 85(2): 178–​86. Schofield, N. J. and Laver, M. (1985) ‘Bargaining theory and portfolio payoffs in European coalition governments’, British Journal of Political Science, 15(2): 143–​64. Seawright, D. (1999) An important matter of principle: The decline of the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party, Aldershot: Ashgate. Seawright, D. (2002) ‘The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party:  The lesser spotted Tory’, in Hassan, G. and Warhurst, C. (eds), Tomorrow’s Scotland, London: Lawrence & Wishart. Seawright, D. (2010) The British Conservative Party and one nation politics, New  York: Continuum. Seawright, D. (2012) ‘The Conservative election campaign’, in Heppell, T. and Seawright, D. (eds), Cameron and the Conservatives: The transition to coalition government, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Seawright, D. (2013a) ‘ “Yes, the census”: The 2011 UK referendum campaign on the alternative vote’, British Politics, 8(4): 457–​75. Seawright, D. (2013b) ‘Cameron 2010: An exemplification of personality based campaigning’, Journal of Political Marketing, 12(2–​3): 166–​81.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

174

References

Seldon, A. (ed.) (2007a) Blair’s Britain 1997–​2007, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Seldon, A. (2007b) Blair unbound, London: Simon & Schuster. Seldon, A. and Finn, M. (eds) (2015) The coalition effect 2010–​2015, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Seldon, A. and Lodge, G. (2010) Brown at 10, London: Biteback. Seldon, A. and Snowdon, P. (2015) Cameron at 10: The inside story 2010–​2015, London: William Collins. Sharp, J., Campbell, P. and Laurie, E. (2010) ‘The violence of aid? Giving, power and active subjects in One World Conservatism’, Third World Quarterly, 31(7): 1125–​43. Shipman, T. (2016) All out war:  The full story of how Brexit sank Britain’s political class, London: William Collins. Skinner, G. (2016) ‘Cameron still viewed as most capable leader’, 25 April, www.ipsos-​ mori.com/​researchpublications/​researcharchive/​3725/​Cameron-​still-​v iewed-​as-​most-​ capable-​leader-​although-​Corbyn-​seen-​as-​being-​more-​honest-​than-​most-​politicians.aspx. Slater, T. (2012) ‘The myth of broken Britain: Welfare reform and the production of ignorance’, Antipode, 46(4): 948–​69. Sloam, J. (2012) ‘Rejuvenating democracy? Young people and the Big Society project’, Parliamentary Affairs, 65(1): 90–​114. Slocock, C., Hayes, R. and Barker, D. (2015) Whose society? The final Big Society audit, London: Civil Exchange. Smith, G. (2009) ‘Conceptualizing and testing brand personality in British politics’, Journal of Political Marketing, 8(3): 209–​32. Smith, G. and French, A. (2011) ‘Measuring the changes to leader brand associations during the 2010 election campaign’, Journal of Marketing Management, 27(7–​8): 721–​38. Smith, J. (2015) ‘Europe: The coalition’s poisoned chalice’, in Seldon, A. and Finn, M. (eds), The coalition effect 2010–​2015, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, J. (2018) ‘Gambling on Europe: David Cameron and the 2016 referendum’, British Politics, 13(1): 1–​16. Smith, M. (1994) ‘Understanding the politics of catch-​up: The modernization of the Labour Party’, Political Studies, 42(4): 708–​15. Smith, M. (2010) ‘From Big Government to Big Society: Changing the state-​society balance’, Parliamentary Affairs, 63(4): 818–​33. Smith, M. and Jones, R. (2015) ‘From Big Society to small state: Conservatism and the privatisation of government’, British Politics, 10(2): 226–​48. Snowdon, P. (2010) Back from the brink: The extraordinary fall and rise of the Conservative Party, London: Harper Press. Sparrow, A. (2009) ‘What happens when Gordon Brown gets angry?’, Guardian, 24 April. Sparrow, A. (2013) ‘Did David Cameron tell aides to “get rid of all the Green Crap”?’, Guardian, 21 November. Statin, N. (2015) ‘Have we reached a tipping point? The mainstreaming of Euroscepticism in the UK’, International Political Science Review, 36(3): 311–​23. Stevens, D. (2012), ‘Issue evolution in Britain: The debate on European Union integration, 1964–​2010’, European Journal of Political Research, 52(4): 536–​57. Stevens, D. and Banducci, S. (2013) ‘One voter and two choices: The impact of electoral context on the 2011 UK referendum’, Electoral Studies, 32(2): 274–​84.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

175

Stevens, D., Karp, J. and Hodgson, R. (2011) ‘Party leaders as movers and shakers in British campaigns? Results from the 2010 election’, Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 21(2): 125–​45. Strong, J. (2015) ‘Interpreting the Syria vote:  Parliament and British foreign policy’, International Affairs, 91(5): 1123–​39. Stuart, M. (2011) ‘The formation of the coalition’, in Lee, S. and Beech, M. (eds), The Cameron-​Clegg coalition: Coalition politics in the age of austerity, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2008) ‘Theorising party-​based Euroscepticism: Problems of definition, measurement and casuality’, in Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (eds), Opposing Europe: The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Taylor, A. (2005) ‘Stanley Baldwin, heresthetics and the realignment of British politics’, British Journal of Political Science, 35(3): 429–​63. Taylor, A. (2010) ‘British Conservatives, David Cameron and the politics of adaptation’, Representation, 46(4): 489–​96. Taylor, R. (2006) ‘Cameron refuses to apologise to UKIP’, Guardian, 4 April. Taylor-​Gooby, P. and Stoker, G. (2011) ‘The coalition programme: A new vision for Britain or politics as usual?’, Political Quarterly, 82(1): 4–​15. Thain, C. (2009) ‘A very peculiar British crisis? Institutions, ideas, and policy responses to the credit crunch’, British Politics, 4(4): 434–​49. Thaler, R. H. and Sunstein, C. R. (2008) Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness, New Haven: Yale University Press. ‘t Hart, P. and Tindall, K. (2009) ‘From market correction to global catastrophe: framing the economic downturn’, in ‘t Hart, P., Tindall, K. and Rhodes, R. (eds), Framing the global economic downturn: Crisis rhetoric and the politics of recessions, Canberra: ANU Press. Thatcher, M. (1987) Interview with Women’s Own. Margaret Thatcher Foundation, 8 June. Theakston, K. (2007) ‘What makes for an effective British prime minister?’, Quaderni di Scienza Politica, 14: 39–​61. Theakston, K. (2011) ‘Gordon Brown as prime minister: Political skills and leadership style’, British Politics, 6(1): 78–​100. Theakston, K. and Gill, M. (2006) ‘Rating 20th-​century British prime ministers’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 8(2): 193–​213. Theakston, K. and Gill, M. (2011) ‘The postwar premiership league’, Political Quarterly, 82(1): 67–​80. Theakston, K., Gill, M. and Atkins, J. (2014) ‘The ministerial foothills: Labour government junior ministers 1997–​2010’, Parliamentary Affairs, 67(3): 688–​707. Therien, J.-​P. (2002) ‘Debating foreign aid:  Right versus left’, Third World Quarterly, 23(3): 449–​66. Therien, J.-​P. and Noel, A. (2000) ‘Political parties and foreign aid’, American Political Science Review, 94(1): 151–​62. Thorpe, A. (2008) A history of the British Labour Party, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Tingley, D. (2010) ‘Donors and domestic politics: Political influences on foreign aid effort’, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 50(1): 40–​9. Tonge, J. (2017) ‘Supplying confidence or trouble? The deal between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Conservative Party’, Political Quarterly, 88(3): 412–​16. Tonge, J. and Geddes, A. (2015) ‘Conclusions: Economic narratives and party leaders’, in Geddes, A. and Tonge, J. (eds), Britain votes 2015, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

176

References

Torrance, D. (2014) 100 days of hope and fear: How Scotland’s referendum was lost and won, Edinburgh: Luath Press. Tournier-Sol, K. (2015) ‘Reworking the Eurosceptic and Conservative traditions into a populist narrative:  UKIP’s winning formula?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(1): 140–​56. Toynbee, P. and Walker, D. (2012) Dogma and disarray: Cameron at half time, London: Moun Caburn Publishing. Toynbee, P. and Walker, D. (2015) Cameron’s coup: How the Tories took Britain to the brink, London: Faber. Turner, J. (2000) The Tories and Europe, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Vail, M. (2015) ‘Between one-​nation Toryism and neoliberalism: The dilemmas of British Conservatism and Britain’s evolving place in Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(1): 106–​22. vanHeerde, J. and Hudson, D. (2010) ‘ “The righteous considereth the cause of the poor”? Public attitudes towards poverty in developing countries’, Political Studies, 58(3): 389–​409. Vine, J. (2013) It’s all news to me: How I got locked inside the BBC for 25 years, London: Simon & Schuster. Vowles, J. (2013) ‘Campaign claims, partisan cues, and media effects in the 2011 British electoral system referendum’, Electoral Studies, 32(2): 253–​64. Wall, S. (2008) A stranger in Europe: Britain and the EU from Thatcher to Blair, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ware, A. (2011) ‘The Big Society and Conservative politics: Back to the future or forward to the past’, Political Quarterly, 82(1): 82–​97. Warwick, P. V. and Druckman, J. N. (2001) ‘Portfolio salience and the proportionality of payoffs in coalition governments’, British Journal of Political Science, 31(4): 627–​49. Watt, N. (2011) ‘Naïve Liberal Democrats have lost their identity, says Tim Farron’, Guardian, 9 September. Watt, N. (2013) ‘Gay marriage:  MPs vote in favour leaves Cameron adrift from Tories’, Guardian, 6 February. Watt, N. and Traynor, I. (2013) ‘EU agrees historic budget deal after all night talks’, Guardian, 8 February. Watt, N. and Wintour, P. (2013) ‘Gay marriage row: UKIP plans to derail David Cameron’, Guardian, 12 December. Watt, P. (2010) Inside out:  My story of betrayal and cowardice at the heart of New Labour, London: Biteback. Webb, P. and Bale, T. (2014) ‘Why do Tories defect to UKIP? Conservative Party members and the temptations of the populist radical right’, Political Studies, 62(4): 961–​70. Wellings, B. and Baxendale, H. (2015) ‘Euroscepticism and the Anglosphere:  Traditions and dilemmas in contemporary English nationalism’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(1): 123–​39. Wellings, B. and Vines, E. (2016) ‘Populism and sovereignty: The EU act and the in-​out referendum, 2010–​2015’, Parliamentary Affairs, 69(2): 309–​26. Westwood, A. (2011) ‘Localism, social capital and the Big Society’, Local Economy, 26(8): 690–​701. Whiteley, P., Clarke, H., Sanders, D. and Stewart, M. (2012) ‘Britain says no: Voting in the AV ballot referendum’, Parliamentary Affairs, 65(2): 301–​22.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

References

177

Whiteley, P., Clarke, H., Sanders, D. and Stewart, M. (2013) Affluence, austerity and electoral change in Britain, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Whiteley, P., Stewart, M. C., Sanders, D. and Clarke, H. D. (2005) ‘The issue agenda and voting in 2005’, Parliamentary Affairs, 58(4): 802–​17. Willetts, D. (1992) Modern Conservatism, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Willetts, D. (1994) Civic Conservatism, London: Social Market Foundation. Willetts, D. (2002) ‘The new contours of British politics’, in Streeter, G. (ed.), There is such a thing as society: Twelve principles of compassionate Conservatism, London: Politicos. Williams, A., Goodwin, M. and Cloke, P. (2014) ‘Neo-​liberalism, Big Society and progressive localism’, Environment and Planning, 46(12): 2798–​815. Williams, B. (2015) The evolution of Conservative Party social policy, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Wilson, R. (2010) Five days to power, London: Biteback. Worcester, R., Mortimore, R., Baines, P. and Gill, M. (2011) Explaining Cameron’s coalition: How it came about, London: Biteback. Worcester, R., Mortimore, R., Baines, P. and Gill, M. (2017) Explaining Cameron’s catastrophe, London: Indie Books. Worthy, B. (2016) ‘Ending in failure? The performance of “takeover” prime ministers 1916–​ 2016’, Political Quarterly, 87(4): 509–​17. Wright, A. (2012) ‘Fantasies of empowerment: Mapping neoliberal discourse in the coalition government’s schools policy’, Journal of Education Policy, 27(3): 279–​94. Wright, O. (2014) ‘What became of Cameron’s Big Society network’, Independent, 22 July. Wring, D. and Deacon, D. (2010) ‘Patterns of press partisanship in the 2010 general election’, British Politics, 5(4): 436–​54. Wring, D., Mortimore, R. and Atkinson, S. (2011) Political communication in Britain:  The leader debates, the campaign and the media in the 2010 general election, Basingstoke: Palgrave. Yong, B. (2012a) ‘Why study the Conservative-​Liberal Democrat coalition’, in Hazell, R. and Yong, B. (eds), The politics of coalition, Oxford: Hart. Yong, B. (2012b) ‘Formation of the coalition’, in Hazell, R. and Yong, B. (eds), The politics of coalition, Oxford: Hart. Yong, B. (2012c) ‘The political parties’, in Hazell, R. and Yong, B. (eds), The politics of coalition, Oxford: Hart. Youngs, R. and Thomas-​Symonds, N. (2013) ‘The problem of the lame duck government: A critique of the Fixed-​term Parliaments Act’, Parliamentary Affairs, 66(3): 540–​56.

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Index

AAA rating 137 Alternative Vote Referendum (2011) 1, 72, 88, 93, 105, 108–​11, 131 see also electoral reform Alexander, Danny 5, 83, 89, 116–​17 Ashcroft, Michael 3 Attlee, Clement 4 austerity 5, 21, 32, 39, 41, 44, 48–​50, 55, 58, 64, 67–​8, 70–​3, 82–​4, 88, 99, 103, 139–​40, 142, 147 Balls, Ed 49, 116 banking crisis 5, 39, 44, 79, 99 Beckett, Margaret, 110 Big Government 8, 34, 40, 55, 58–​9, 62, 67, 141 Big Society 8, 32, 34, 55, 57–​9, 62–​73, 134, 141–​2 Blair, Tony 4, 12, 14, 35–​9, 42–​3, 45, 53–​5, 59, 71, 91, 96–​7, 112, 114, 12 Blond, Philip 60 Blunkett, David 110 Brady, Graham 27, 93, 95–​6 Brexit, 6, 32, 128–​9, 132, 134, 145–​7 Broken Britain 55, 58–​9, 62, 70 Brown, Gordon 5, 7, 36–​44, 53, 55, 73, 91, 97, 116, 136, 139 Browne, Lord /​Browne Report 85, 101 Budget, 2012 ‘omnishambles’ 49, 137 Cable, Vince 101, 139 Callaghan, James 96 Cameron, David 1–​11, 14–​28, 30–​6, 38–​50, 52–​5, 57–​77, 80–​5, 87–​90, 92–​7, 99, 101, 106–​47

Carney, Mark 129 Carswell, Douglas 122 Centre for Social Justice 61–​2, 71 Churchill, Winston 4, 147 Clarke, Kenneth 14, 29, 109, 124–​5, 144 Clegg, Nick 5, 26, 77, 80–​1, 83–​4, 88–​90, 93–​4, 100–​2, 104–​6, 108–​11, 116–​17, 139 Coalition Government 2010–​2015 Agenda Control, 8–​9, 72–​107, 134, 138–​9 Cabinet 76, 81–​2, 84, 89, 128, 139 negotiations, formation and agreement 5, 9, 23, 27, 72–​81, 84–​5, 88–​9, 93, 99, 103, 105, 108–​9, 111, 138 parliamentary defeats 96–​98 parliamentary rebellions /​cohesion /​ unity 9, 87–​107, 139–​40 Quad 88–​90 Conservative Party ‘A list’ 20 Annual Conference (2006) 121 Annual Conference (2008) 59 Annual Conference (2009) 40 Annual Conference (2011) 25 Annual Conference (2015) 53 Backbench 1922 Committee 27, 93–​6 Leadership Election (1997) 29 Leadership Election (2001) 29 Leadership Election (2005) 14–​15, 73 manifesto, 18, 25, 27, 77–​8, 92, 107 membership 15, 27, 29–​31 ‘nasty’ image 15, 31–​2, 135, 146 parliamentary rebellions /​management 9, 31, 86–​107, 125, 139–​40

Index

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Spring Conference (2015) 48 Whips Office 9, 90, 93–​5, 107 constituency equalisation 5, 88, 93, 111–​13, 139 Cooper, Yvette 50 Corbyn, Jeremy 4, 6, 53–​5, 128–​9, 147 Coulson, Andy 73 Crosby, Lynton 106 Darling, Alistair 40, 116 Davies, Philip 21 Davis, David 14–​15, 71, 101, 109 defence policy 8, 12, 24, 53, 79–​80, 84, 133 delegitimisation 7, 11, 34–​56, 59, 72, 134, 136–​7, 139, 141–​2, 146 depoliticisation 7–​8, 11, 57–​71, 134, 141 detoxification 7, 11–​33, 72, 132, 134–​6, 141, 146 disability 66, 141 Dorries, Nadine 32 Duffy, Gillian 44 Duncan Smith, Iain 12, 25, 29, 61, 82, 128 Eagle, Angela 32 economic growth 19, 34–​8, 41, 49–​50, 57–​8, 137–​8 education 8, 11, 35, 38, 58, 60–​1, 64, 78–​9, 82–​5, 99–​101, 103–​4, 123, 139 electoral reform 10, 75–​6, 85, 94, 103, 108–​11, 131, 138–​32, 144–​7 first past the post (FPTP) electoral system 5, 109, 130, 141–​2 English Question, Englishness, English votes for English laws 5, 52, 112–​14, 116–​18, 142–​3 Environment /​environmentalism 7, 17–​19, 21–​25, 30–​2 European and Monetary Union 118 European Economic Community 118–​19 European Elections (2009) 5 European Elections (2014) 5, 105, 122 European Union and European Referendum (2016) 1, 10, 92, 109, 118–​30, 133–​4, 140, 144–​7 Eurozone Crisis 100, 121, 124

179 Exchange Rate Mechanism 118–​19 Farage, Nigel 129, 145 Farron, Tim 101, 105 feminisation, 7, 17, 19–​21, 25, 30–​2 financial crash/​economic crash, 7, 10, 18, 31, 38–​42, 49, 55, 57, 64, 121, 136, 147 foodbanks 65–​6, 142 Foot, Michael 4, 54 Fox, Liam 14–​15, 84 Freer, Mike 26 Gaitskell, Hugh 4, 12, 54 Gale, Roger 27 General Election (1951) 132 General Election (1970) 132 General Election (February 1974) 113 General Election (1992) 132 General Election (1997) 35, 113, 120 General Election (2001) 34, 37, 121 General Election (2005) 3, 4, 34–​5, 37, 42, 112 General Election (2010) 1, 18–​20, 27, 30, 40–​1, 44, 51, 56–​7, 62–​3, 73–​4, 82, 85, 87, 99–​102, 105, 109–​10, 112, 123, 132, 136–​7, 139, 142, 145 General Election (2015) 1, 4, 20, 22, 32, 49, 51–​2, 88, 100, 106, 108, 111, 113, 117, 124–​6, 131, 136–​9, 142, 144–​5, 147 General Election (2017) 53, 132, 145–​7 Gove, Michael 82, 128 Grayling, Chris 128 Green Party 130 Greening, Justine 23–​4 Hague, William 4, 12, 25, 29, 72, 75, 81, 120 Harper, Mark 95 Hayes, John 19 health policy, National Health Service 8, 11, 21–​2, 35, 38, 48, 61, 78–​9, 82, 85, 129, 137, 139 Heath, Edward 4, 12, 90, 119–​20 heresthetics 8–​9, 107, 134, 145, 147 Hilton, Steve 73

Index

180

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Howard, Michael 4, 25, 54 Howarth, Gerard 24 House of Lords reform 5, 84, 88, 92–​4, 103, 111–​12, 139 housing /​homelessness 65–​6, 103, 137 Hughes, Simon 109 Huhne, Chris 75, 83–​4 immigration 2, 8, 15, 24, 28–​9, 31, 41, 44–​5, 50–​1, 79–​80, 122–​3, 125–​30, 137, 144, 146 inequality /​equality 20–​2, 25–​8, 41–​2, 60–​1, 63, 66, 78, 141–​2 international aid 2, 7, 17–​18, 21–​5, 30–​2, 58, 64, 79–​80, 84, 135 Iraq War 35, 41–​2, 55 James, Margot 26 Jenkin, Bernard 27 Johnson, Alan 47, 49 Johnson, Boris, 128–​9 Kendall, Liz 50 Kinnock, Neil 4, 12, 54 Labour Party 1, 3–​8, 10–​12, 14–​17, 20, 22–​3, 25, 32, 34–​62, 64, 69–​70, 72–​6, 90–​4, 96–​101, 103, 106–​10, 112–​24, 128–​34, 136–​9, 141–​7 Lansley, Andrew 82 Laws, David 26, 52, 75, 83–​4, 100 Leigh, Edward 27 Letwin, Oliver 60 Liberal Democrats 1–​5, 8–​10, 21, 23, 27–​8, 35, 46, 48, 50, 52, 55, 71–​85, 87–​90, 93–​6, 98–​116, 123–​4, 130–​1, 134, 138–​42, 145–​6 Llewellyn, Ed 75 Local Elections (2006) 17 Local Elections (2011) 105 Local Elections (2014) 110 Local Elections (2015) 105 London Riots (2011) 61 Macmillan, Harold 10, 119 Major, John 12, 16, 37, 54, 71, 96–​7, 119–​20, 122

Mandelson, Peter 40 May, Theresa 25, 81, 130, 144, 146 McLoughlin, Patrick 95 Messina, Jim 106 Miliband, David 45–​6, 56 Miliband, Ed 4, 7, 45–​56, 110–​11, 116, 124, 136–​7, 139, 147 ministers 9, 20–​1, 36, 76, 80–​6, 89–​90, 92–​3, 95–​6, 101, 104, 106, 127, 130 Mitchell, Andrew 23 Murdoch, Rupert 56 National Living Wage 142 Northern Powerhouse 66 nuclear power 76, 83 Nuttall, David 92 Obama, Barack 94 Oliver, Craig 132 opinion polls 13, 15, 43, 46, 48, 52, 63, 105, 115–​16, 122, 127, 131, 143 Osborne, George 19, 49–​50, 75, 81, 83, 116, 129 Parliament, Fixed Term 93, 111–​12 Paterson, Owen 19 Plaid Cymru 74 Portillo, Michael 29 Powell, Enoch 1 Prime Ministerial Debates, (2010), 43, 73 Prime Minister’s Questions 32, 44 Public expenditure cuts 7, 21–​4, 36–​8, 40–​1, 44, 49, 57, 61, 64, 66, 70, 99–​100, 103, 129, 141 Reckless, Mark 92, 122 Salmond, Alex 114–​16 Same Sex Marriage 7, 17, 25–​7, 30–​2, 92, 135, 147 Scottish Nationalism, independence and referendum 1, 2, 5, 10, 51–​2, 72, 106, 108, 113–​17, 130–​4, 137, 139–​40, 142–​4 Scottish Parliamentary Elections 51, 105, 110, 114–​15 Social and Democratic Labour Party 74

Downloaded from manchesterhive © Copyright protected It is illegal to copy or distribute this document

Index Sinn Fein 74 Sked, Alan 133 sleaze /​financial corruption, expenses scandal 3, 5, 10, 42, 56 Smith, John 4, 54 social care 8, 78–​9, 137 social justice 15, 35, 41, 59, 61, 82 Stunell, Andrew 75 Sturgeon, Nicola 52 Thatcher, Margaret, 4, 10, 12, 15–​16, 32, 37, 39, 59, 96, 147 Thatcherism 7, 14–​17, 29, 31, 39, 41, 60–​1, 69, 73, 114 Trident 66, 76 tuition fees 9, 26, 49, 55, 76, 80, 83, 85, 88, 100–​3, 105, 107–​8, 110, 138–​9

181 unemployment 34, 37, 51, 122, 137–​8 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 5, 10, 24, 26–​8, 45, 50–​2, 71, 108, 117–​18, 122–​5, 130, 132–​3, 137, 144–​6 Universal Credit 137 Villiers, Theresa 128 Vine, Jeremy 44 Welsh Assembly Elections (2011) 105 Whittingdale, John 128 Willets, David 60 Wilson, Harold 4, 12, 34, 54, 96, 125 Young, George 95