Calcidius on Matter His Doctrine and Sources: a Chapter in the History of Platonism [Reprint ed.] 9789004017214, 9004017216

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CALCIDIUS ON MATTER HIS DOCTRINE AND SOURCES

PHILOSOPHIAANTIQUA A SERIES OF MONOGRAPHS ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY EDITED BY

W.

J. VERDENIUS

AND

J. H. WASZINK

VOLUME IX

J.C. M. VAN WINDEN

0. F. M.

CALCIDIUS ON MATTER HIS DOCTRINE AND SOURCES A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF PLATONISM

LEIDEN E. J.BRILL 1965

CALCIDIUSON MATTER HIS DOCTRINEAND SOURCES A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF PLATONISM

BY

]. C. M. VAN WINDEN 0. F. M.

PHOTOMECHANICAL REPRINT

LEIDEN

E.

J. BRILL 1965

Copyright 1965by E.].

Brill,Leiden, Netherlands.

All rights reserved. No part of this bookreproduced may be or translated in any form, ~y print, photoprint, microfilm any or other meanswithout written permission from the publisher.

PRINTED

IN THE

NETHERLANDS

My sincere thanks are due to Fr. B. de Goede, o.f.m., Leiden, and Fr. Dr. S. J. P. van Dijk, o.f.m., London, for the English translation of the work, to Dr. J. Hazelden Walker for her advice and hospitality at Swinton House, Berwickshire, Scotland, to Fr. E. Vrancken, o.f.m., Weert, for the accurate typing of the manuscript, to Mrs. M. A. F. Drewes-Timp, Rotterdam, for her assistance at the correction of proofs, and, last but not least, to the printer and his most experienced staff.

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

• .

.

.

The Timaeus and Calcidius. A survey of their history The problem . . . . . . . . . . . Survey of the commentary as such . THE

TREATISE

ON MATTER

Structure of the treatise . Analysis and inYestigation of sources I. Introductory paraphrase . . . . . a) Outline of the treatise . . . . b) Relation between matter and Providence c) Names of matter . . . . . . . d) The real forms and their images e) The third principle: matter . . . f) Intelligibility of matter. . . . . 2.

Historical and systematical treatise. a) Historical part . . . . . . . . oc) Matter was made: The Jews. ~) Matter was not made . . . . oc0t)It consists of small parts ~~) Matter is continuous (1) Matter has qualities and form (2) Matter has neither quality nor form. (a) Aristotle . (b) The Stoics . . . . . (c) Pythagoras . . . . . (d) The opinion of Plato. (at) One interpretation (~) The other interpretation b) Systematic part . . . . . . «) The principles in general . . . . . . . oc«) Two ways of arguing . . . . . . . ~~) Matter is found by means of resolutio. n) The Maker and the exemplar are discovered by means of compositio . . . . . . . . .

l

1

5 10 24 24

28

29 29 33 39

40

45 49

51 51 52

66 66

69 71

75 75 93 103

l2I l2I

124 128 128 128

131 134

VIII

CONTENTS

88) The principles . . . . . . . e:e:) The real principles . . . . . ~) Calcidius' own treatise on matter cxcx)Its name and variability . ~~) Matter without quality . . . yy) Refutation of the Stoa . . . 88) Matter eternal and unlimited. e:F.) Matter without increase or decrease. ~~) Matter neither expands nor shrinks . "lll) Matter v-roc;,CXMCX: x.o:l. El; ov-roc; y(yve:'t"O:L 7tOCV't'IX, 8uvocµe:L µev-roLl>v-roc;,h µ~ l>v-roc;8e: Eve:pye:(~.So there are two ways of be>I

>I

coming: I) out of what is not, but only per accidens; 2 J out of what is possibly. Iu Calcidius corresponds to this the beginning of the second phrase Alia vero ratione and, further, the terms effectus and possibilitas. For the rest Calcidius is, again, more diffuse and, discussing the subiect in a different way, he certainly is not clearer than Aristotle. UT CUM AES is a stereotype example in this matter, e.g., Phys. 190 a 25; Met. 1013 b 6-9; De gen. an.724 a 23; Polit. 1256 a 9-n; see also Bii.umker, o.c., p. 252, n. 3. ALIQUATENUS EST, ALIQUATENUS NON EST What was just said about definite forms of being (est statua et non est statua) is now applied to being itself (est et non est). In general, this paragraph has the same characteristics as the preceding one: arduous and verbose, it clarifies in no way Aristotle's words; there are, however, no striking inaccuracies. [286] Because we thought these things necessary for an explanation of Aristotle's doctrine concerning the principles of things, which includes matter, we have been careful to treat them first. Aristotle's own words show the need for doing so, for he argues thus: "We think that matter should be distinguished from privation, in the sense that matter is not something existing by itself but rather accidentally, whereas privation is nonexisting in the proper and absolute sense; and, furthermore, that matter has something which approaches essence, while privation possesses no essence at all. According to others, he says, privation and matter are the same, but they are wrong, for they call it 'small and great' and reduce two things to be kept separately, to one and the same thing; and they think that one thing underlies all corporeal things. For although they divide it into a bigger and a smaller part, so that there are two, yet only one thing is indicated of this duality, the other is omitted. For matter is, like a mother, cooperating in the formation of bodies, but privation does not cooperate in the formation; it hinders rather and thwarts it, for as the form is divine and desirable, privation contradicts it, while matter, yearning for

PARAGRAPH

286

form and adornment, desires it by its own nature. Further, if privation should desire the form, it would needs desire its own opposite, and every opposite entails destruction . Therefore, privation will not long for its ruin. Nor does the form long for itself, for it is a full and perfect good, and whatever longs for a thing must lack something.

So only mati.er can desire adornment, just as the female desires the male, and what is shapeless longs for beauty. Meanwhile, the shapelessness of matter is accidental rather than essential to it. No doubt, matter comes to be and perishes. When it comes to he, it exists to some extent, and when it perishes, it does to some extent not exist; and its ruin proceeds from the privation which is inseparable from it. Matter itself is potentially immortal and without a beginning, not by nature, because it was necessary that, underlying all things which come to be, some older substratum should exist from which things could arise and come-to-be. Now such is this nature of matter. Therefore, matter necessarily existed before it originated, because everything else arises out of it; and if a thing dissolves and perishes, it must finally return to this substratum: consequently it will also have perished before its ruin and dissolution. First of all Calcidius' translation should be compared with the text of Aristotle, Phys. 192 a 3 ss. NOBIS ERGO VIDETUR

DIVIDUA

ESSE SILVA CARENTIAE, ITA UT SILVA NON SIT EXISTENS QUID, SED EX ACCIDENT!, CARENTIA

VERO PRINCIPALITER

ET OMNINO NIHIL, ET SILVA QUID EM PRO PE HABEA T ESSENTIAM, CARENTIAE NULLA PRORSUM SIT SUBSTANTIA.

~µ&i:c; µev yocp UA'1)V)(IXL OTEpY)µixTcx (f)"IJO'LV e:lvixt, xixt TO 1totouv xixt TO 1tcxcrx.ov.Alexander of Aphrodisias attacks the Stoic theory that

both principles, God and matter, are corporeal (S. V.F. II 310). Plutarch also states that, according to the Stoa, God and matter alike are corporeal. QUIA FACIAT, DEUM, QUIA FIAT, SILVAM FORE Seneca, Ep. 65, 23: N empe universa ex materia et ex deo constant. Deus ista temperat, quae circumfusa rectorem secuntur et ducem. Potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est deus, quam materia patiens dei. QUORUM AB RE What precedes was a general introduction similar to the preface (312, ro ss.) of the treatise on Aristotle. AIUNT ENIM Calcidius refers to the well-known argument of the Stoics (cp. Baumker, o.c., p. 330) but fails to express himself clearly: "as all copper things are copper and all silver ones silver, so all bodily things are material". The second half of his simile should have been an argument: "so all bodily are body; body we call 'matter', so matter is a body". The difference between things can, ultimately, be reduced to being body in a greater or lesser degree (corpulentior = awµixTLXWTe:poc;).This is illustrated in the example of the bronze statue which Aristotle uses in a somewhat different way. This statue is a corpus formatum (et qualitate praeditum). Its material is bronze, a corpus informe sed compos qualitatis, which, based in its turn on matter, is corpus alone. Thus the three degrees in corporeality are : r) corpus, 2) corpus compos qualitatis, 3) corpus formatum. Of mere corpus Calcidius says that, according to the Stoa, it is cohaerens sine qualitate, patibile totum et commutabile. COHAERENS = continuus cp. par. 275. SINE QUALITATE = &1totoc;. The formula of the Stoa is awµix &1totov (cp. Baumker, o.c., p. 333). PATIBILE TOTUM ET COMMUTABILE As to the relation of this phrase to ipso statu pruprio manentewhich occurs further on, we may refer to the discussion of par. 268 (299, 18) : cum a natura propria non recedat (p. 32). The solution given there also holds for the present passage on the Stoa. SILVAM SIMUL ET ESSENTIAM Aristotle also speaks of matter as ouab: hut with some reserve, Met. 1029 a Is.: fLCXALO'TIX ycxp 8oxe:i: e:LVIXL OUO'(IX TO ur.oxdµe:vov 1tpWTOV.TOLOUTOV 8e Tp61tov µev Ttvix ~ UA"IJ'Aeye:TixL .•• For the Stoa oua(1Xis the mere essence of things. (The contrast 1totouv-1tcxox.ovtoo is primarily

PARAGRAPH

289

95

Aristotelian but also used by the Stoics in their own way. Baumker says (o.c., p. 331): "Wahrend aber Aristoteles die Materie in erster Linie im Gegensatz zu der bestimmenden Form betrachtet, neben welchem Gegensatz der des Aktiven und des Passiven erst in zweiter Reihe inbetracht kommt, liegt bei den Stoikem die Sache umgekehrt. Weil ... der Begriff der Formalursache ihnen in den der thatigen Kraft sich auflost, so ist ihnen die Materie vor allem das Leidende". Cp. J. Moreau, L'.Ame du Monde de Platon aux Stoiciens, Paris, 1939, p. 135, n. ro ). For the oua(ocof everything is awµoc,is 1howv oua(ocv,'")V UAl)V s.V.F. II UAl),(Diog. Laert., VII 139: TY)V 300). HACTENUS DEFINIENTES Calcidius gives four definitions, the first three of which seem to belong together. One may even feel to these three definitions, inclined to add ipso statu proprio manente which may be a threefold attempt to express the same thing, though each has its characteristic. QUOD SUBIACET CORPORI CUNCTO reminds us of Aristotle's u1toxdµe:vov1tpw-rnv(cp. p. 31 ). EX QUO SUNT CUNCTA CORPORA This is, of course, the E~ OUof Aristotle. E~~c;(l"t'Lal)7t0'TOUV y(ve:"t'otL See also Diog. Laert., VII 150: UAl)ae:Ea'TL (S. V.F. II 316). IN QUO Here one thinks of the Platonic ev c'fl. As in the passage just quoted one is strongly reminded, again, of Calcidius' own description in par. 268, which was founded on Plato's OCU'T~V cxd 1tpo~OV't'CXL notice how this summary is greatly superior to that of the preceding section. [294] The Stoics also criticize Plato for saying that, because exemplars of all things exist of old in another sublime and most excellent substance, the sensible world was made by God after an immortal exemplar. In their opinion, no exemplar is needed, because a fertilizing reason, pervading an entirely susceptible nature, brought the whole world and all that it contains into existence. This is what the Stoics say about matter and the principles of things, partly basing themselves on Plato, partly expressing thoughts of their own. And thus it is easy to understand that they could not have an inkling of a divine power and an incorporeal being more powerful than all bodies, more powerful even than all seeds. It is in this way that they arrived at the impious opinion, viz., that God is identical with or even an inseparable quality of matter, that He passes through it as seed through the genitals, and that He is both origin and cause of everything that comes into being, not only of what is bad but also of what is shameful and obscene, and that He does and suffers everything, even what is shameful. The ugliness of this doctrine will be more patent still after the explanation of Plato's doctrine. REPREHENDUNT "The Stoics", Calcidius says, "blame Plato who, on account of the existence of a sublime reality containing within itself the exemplars of everything, assumes that the world was made after an immortal example, for, so they say, no example was needed for the creation of the world. SEMINUM RATIO seems a variant of the well-known ratio seminalis. It mostly occurs in the but the singular is also plural as a translation of MyoL a1tepµcx-rLxo(,

102

THE TREATISE ON MATTER

found, for instance in Diog. Laert., VII 136: XOtLwcrm:p EV't'TI yovn ' L 'O') e:ov 0"1te:pµ0t"t'LXOV ' "t'O 0"1ti:;pµ0t m:pLe:x_e:"t'OtL, OU"t'WXOtL"t'OU"t'OV SC. "t'OV Myov ISvT0t "t''JUx6crµou ... However, seminum ratiomay also be taken in the sense of 'a system of seeds'. In which case Calcidius must have I

"

'

-

(

taken the metaphor in a concrete sense; the accent, then, is on seminum rather than on ratio. The words vel etiam seminibiis efficaciorem (323, 19) definitely· favour the latter interpretation. HAEC STOICI DE SIL VA Once more a similarity with the passage de sententia on Aristotle should be noted: H aec A ristotelis s£lva (319, 20). As there, Calcidius continues here with a criticism of the relevant doctrine. PARTIM A PLATONE USURPANTES, namely that part in the Stoic doctrine which is in accordance with Plato's doctrine, or rather with Calci. ~ \ l mans, f r. 20 ) : ·o 6e:oc:;o u.e:v1tpwToc:;e:v EIXUT(p WV e:tTt"LV IX7t/\OUc; OLIX TO E!XUT rruyytyv6µe:voc;OLOAOU µ~ 7t0Te:e:LV!XL OL1Xtpe:T6c;. 0 6e:oc;µ£VTOL0 oe:unpoc; xcxt TPLToc;&mtv de;· c;uµATIOUCX:OL OUcW. v. d. Wielen, De Ideegetallen van Plato, Amsterdam. rg.p: C. J. de Vogel, Problems concerning later Platonism, in i\tfnern. ll).l9, p. 197-210. See also the quotation from Simplicius, above, p. 43j. QUAM DUITATEM Numenius broaches the subject wht·lher matit\r was ge11erated or not. He distinguishes between matter in an unarranged state and matter in an ordered state. In au 1111arrangf'dstate it is aequaeva deo. fhus, Numenius belongs to the philos0phers who took the secondary matter (i.e., the chaus) of the Tirnac~is as a concrete thing. Before God ordered the world, there was a clisorderly matter, a chaos. \Vhether this is a 'before' of time does not appear from Numenius. Atticus is much dearer; with Lr.emans we may refer to Proclus, in Tim. I 283, 27 D: TO µF:v7tAl)µµe:AWvL1te:LOoµevoucrLv • ~ l J:: oLIX XOCL

< e ,I, \ y\ CXU'l'OU 7tVOL1JV ',,W"/)c; Xott eyev&'l'OO (T.\I pw1toc;&tc;'i'UX'YJ" .,,wrrotv;I, 24: Xott t

-

\

I

~

J

d1t&\I o eeoc; 'E~otyotye'l'W ~ y1j lf!UX~"~Cil(jot\lXot'l'~yevoc;, 'l'&'t'p µ~ awµotTL µ~OE TIX awµotTOIXLV&'t'IXL yiyv6µ&Vl);

ib., 331 b 24-25: oµo).oyouµ.&VlJ8e:XIXL-tji ix£a6~a&L~ 't'OUnupot; "(£V&O'Lt;.

Calcidius, on the other hand, states that, appealing to the same experience, Plato rejected the complete cycle. But as has been noted, he did so because of the geometrical figure of earth.

[325] Plato, however, goes deeper into this mutual change of the elements, saying: "And if the materials thus lend to each other, in some kind of cycle, the kindling forces of generation and do not persevere in the same form, how can a certain idea of them be formed, free of all doubt? Surely none". Just so; for let us image that this fire (i.e., of our sensible world) is pure fire unmixed with another element, as Heraclitus thinks, or pure water, as Thales believes, or pure air, as Anaximenes presumes; "if", he says, "we take these things to be always the same and immutable, we shall get muddled in many inextricable errors". Hence one ought not to agree easily with regard to such natures, nor at once take for certain, what seems to be no more than a probability. So what can guard us from error? The following argument can: that there is essence and also quality, and that these two are different. Essence is the substance of a thing, quality that which comes to and appears in things, having a substance. When now we observe, as always whenever we look closely into that part of nature (viz., the elements), and see that a part of it departs from itself and changes into another material, e.g., fire, we shall not denote this material, as something stable and unchanging, with a definite pronoun, such as 'this' or 'that' for these pronouns denote an essence-but, in denoting them, we shall use rather that pronoun proper to quality, not 'this' but 'such', not 'that' but 'of this or that nature'. For with fire the change undergone is not loss of essence but of quality. When fire becomes air, it changes into a different or opposite material, for it is certain that the essence in itself has nothing opposed to

THE TREATISE ON MATTER

itself: rather opposite things are turning round the same essence. Thus the change and variation affect not the essence but the quality, in which both variety and opposition are found. It is the same with the other elements; none has an essence of its own, and we always use the demonstrative pronouns referring to essence rather than those relating to quality by sheer force of habit. These four bodies are in a perpetual and ceaseless flux; they change by variation before they are given a name, like a mountain stream driven on by some irresistible force. SUMPSIT TAMEN At the end of par. 323 Calcidius remarks that Plato has yet to enter into the details of this question. These are now discussed. His actual words are: "He has, however, taken in hand something else in order to . . . .. . DE MUTUA ELEMENTORUM Cp. 346, 23-24: Initium quaesEX ALIO IN ALIUD CONVERSIONE tionis adripit ex reciproca de alio in aliud elementorum conversione, which refers to those passages where he discusses the way leading to knowledge and in so doing assumes that this way was already indicated by Plato in the present passage. AIT ENIM Tim. 49C: XUXAOV TE:OU't"Cu OLCXOLOOVTCX de; tDJ..yfA.cx, we; -, 1! !! \ µ6vov ocpt µ,; xal ciTcixT I \ I I I I '> L-'l ~\ \ 1-, I 'Tljc; l:'EI\TLOVoc; TO xpexToc; E.7J G>.7J - xwpot 31, 39, 145, 220, 241 GA7J1tpw't"l)100, 14 6 I 00 GA7J7tp.wv} 35, 98 usus = natura, see silva Vestigia corporum 236, 241 vis (vires) 117, 173