Cajetan on Sacred Doctrine 081323347X, 9780813233475

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Cajetan on Sacred Doctrine

Cajetan on Sacred Doctrine Hieromonk Gregory Hrynkiw Foreword by Andrew Hofer , OP

The Catholic University of America Press • Washington, D.C.

Copyright © 2020 The Catholic University of America Press All rights reserved The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standards for Information Science—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. Cataloging-in-Publication Data available from the Library of Congress ISBN 978-0-8132-3347-5

= For Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI theologian, hermit, and son of Daughter Zion

Contents

Contents

Contents Foreword by Andrew Hofer, OP  ix Abbreviations xvii

Introduction: Cajetan and Sacred Doctrine  1 A Renaissance Cardinal, Theologian, and Reformer in via Thomae [1] Cajetan and Sacred Doctrine  [6]

Part One: Sacred Doctrine is the Framework Chapter 1: Sacred Doctrine and Faith  19 Faith and Theology  [19] Cajetan on Faith  [29]

Chapter 2: Sacred Doctrine and the Church  37 Theologia and Oikonomia [39] Sacred Doctrine as the Church’s Framework  [46] The Prophetic Role of the Papacy  [55] Maiores and Minores [66]

Chapter 3: Sacred Doctrine and the Summa Theologiae 73 The Creed as the Summa Theologiae’s Framework  [73] Cajetan’s Rosetta Stone  [78]

Part Two: Sacred Doctrine as the Habit of Theology Chapter 4: The First Syllogism  87 Pseudo-Dionysian Helicoidal Contemplation  [87] The First Syllogism (ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, c.)  [93]

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viii  Contents The Necessity of Sacred Doctrine and a Critique of Scotus  [101] Contemplating the Wise and Beautiful bArbArA  [116]

Chapter 5: Theology—A Science and Wisdom  121 On the Nature of Science (In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4)  [121] Theology as a Subalternate Science (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2)  [130] Theologies of Light  [138] Arguments against Theology as a Science  [157] Theology Is a Single Science (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3)  [168] Theology Is Both Speculative and Practical (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4)  [176] Theology Compared to Philosophy (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5)  [181] Theology as a Unique Habit of Wisdom (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6)  [186] The Subject of Theology (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7)  [191] The Revelabilia [202]

Chapter 6: The Theological Method  209 The Act of Reasoning in Speculative Theology (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8)  [209] The Act of Judgment in Biblical Theology  [215] The Literal Sense of Scripture (In ST, I, q. 1, aa. 9–10)  [220] Cajetan—A Biblical-Ecumenical Theologian?  [228]

Conclusion: Perennial Truths in the End Times 241 Appendix 1: A Chronology of Cardinal Cajetan’s Life and Works  257 Appendix 2: Cajetan’s Commentary—In ST, Prima Pars, Quaestio 1, 1–3  267 Appendix 3: The Apostles’ Creed as the Architectonic Principle of the Summa Theologiae 287 Bibliography 301 Index of the Works of Cajetan  319 General Index  323

Andrew Hofer , OP

Foreword

Foreword Andrew Hofer, OP This book offers a landmark study on the most significant segment of the greatest work by the theologian singularly extolled at the Second Vatican Council, as taught by his leading commentator of all time. If all of these claims are true, this study certainly merits our attention, but I recognize they may require some justification, which I will provide before going on to discuss this present book and its author.

St. Thomas Aquinas’s Authority after the Second Vatican Council Nine years after the close of the Second Vatican Council, St. Paul VI proclaimed: “There can be no doubt that in God’s providential plan St. Thomas represents the high point of all Scholastic theology and philosophy and that his works are the main foundation on which all Christian teaching in the Church, then and now, can firmly rest and safely grow.”1 Such extraordinary praise follows upon the honor that the Second Vatican Council twice paid to Aquinas, in Optatam Totius and Gravissimum Educationis.2 “This was the first time an Ecumenical Council,” noted Paul VI, “had recommended an individual theologian, and St. Thomas was the one 1. Pope Paul VI, Lumen Ecclesiae, Apostolic Letter to the Rev. Vincent de Couesnongle, Master General of the Dominican Order (November 20, 1974), n. 13, appearing in English as “St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor for Our Age,” trans. Matthew O’Connell, in The Pope Speaks: The Church Documents Quarterly 19, no. 4 (1975): 287–307, at 296. 2. See Second Vatican Council, Optatam totius, Decree on Priestly Training (October 28, 1965), n. 16, and Gravissimum educationis, Declaration on Christian Education (October 28, 1965), n. 10.

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deemed worthy of the honor.”3 Whether theologians follow Aquinas or not, scholars must recognize his unique status within the history of Catholic theology—as understood at the Second Vatican Council and its implementation, such as in the Code of Canon Law for the Latin Church.4

The Summa Theologiae Available in multiple vernacular translations, widely accessible, and accompanied by both innumerable scholarly studies and popular writings on its topics, Aquinas’s unfinished Summa Theologiae is now commonly recognized as the culmination of his thought.5 Yet, such was arguably not the case for the first generations of Thomists, those who rallied behind Aquinas to form a school of thought when his first principles were being assailed. Aquinas had no student comparable to himself in magisterial insight, and even those who supported his legacy in those earliest controversies did not recognize the magnitude of the Summa’s achievement. For example, the Summa’s tertia pars pioneers in the West the collective use of the six ecumenical councils of the fourth through the seventh centuries,6 but those claiming to support Aquinas soon after his death did not follow his lead in incorporating his patristic sources.7 Although 3. Paul VI, Lumen Ecclesiae, n. 24 (“Angelic Doctor for Our Age,” 302). 4. The Code of Canon Law (January 25, 1983), which regards only the Latin Church (can. 1), says about priestly formation: “There are to be classes in dogmatic theology, always grounded in the written word of God together with sacred tradition; through these, students are to learn to penetrate more intimately the mysteries of salvation, especially with St. Thomas as a teacher” (can. 252 §3). 5. For two overviews of the Summa, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, OP, Aquinas’s Summa: Background, Structure, & Reception, trans. Benedict M. Guevin, OSB (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), and Bernard McGinn, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa theologiae: A Biography, Lives of Great Religious Books (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014). 6. See Martin Morard, “Thomas d’Aquin lecteur des conciles,” Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 98 (2005): 211–365. 7. Joseph P. Wawrykow, “Thomas Aquinas and Christology after 1277,” in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie unde Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des. 13. Jahrhundert. Studien und Texte, ed. Jan A. Aertsen, Kent Emery, Jr., and Andreas Speer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, vol. 28 (New York: Water de Gruyter, 2001), 299–319.

Foreword   xi efforts were made to show the development from Aquinas’s early to his late teaching, and many copies of the different parts of the Summa were produced, Dominicans in the first generations after Aquinas did not generally seem to grasp the massive Summa as a whole, and the friars—like other late-medieval teachers—continued to teach from the Sentences of Peter Lombard (d. 1160).8 Even the early fifteenth-century “Prince of Thomists,” Johannes Capreolus (d. 1444), made his major contribution, his Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis, by focusing on Thomas’s early Scriptum on the Sentences, albeit with additional arguments from many other works by Aquinas, including the Summa.9 The Thomistic school itself would mature when it realized that the Summa could be the basis of a whole program of study—displacing the twelfth-century Sentences.

The First Question of the Summa Theologiae Of the Summa’s 512 questions (containing 2,668 articles) that Aquinas was able to write before his death on March 7, 1274, one shines out in architectonic importance. Summa Theologiae I, q. 1, with its ten articles, stands apart, even from the Prima Pars. It serves as a sort of proemium or prelude to the symphonic work that follows in three parts. Aquinas suggests its uniqueness by putting his guide to the plan of the Summa between the first and second questions. The first question deals with what sacra doctrina is and its extent. I have had the joy of working on that question several times when teaching an introductory course to theology and in other settings, and I’ve found my students to be highly engaged in thinking 8. M. Michèle Mulchahey writes, “Throughout the fourteenth century the Sentences of Peter Lombard reigned supreme as set text in Dominican convent scholae.” See her “First the Bow is Bent in Study”: Dominican Education before 1350, Studies and Texts vol. 132 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1998), 166. 9. For the first English translation of a book-length selection of Capreolus’s Defensiones, with brief analyses in the foreword and translators’ introduction, see John Capreolus, On the Virtues, trans. Kevin White and Romanus Cessario, OP, with a foreword by Servais Pinckaers, OP (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2001).

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about what Aquinas means by sacra doctrina and what its relevance is for our theology now. As a good teacher, Aquinas has given us a text that not only propounds perennial principles, but also sets a model to raise additional objections, and ask further questions, in response to the needs of later eras.

The Summa’s Preeminent Commentator in Theological Controversy The one who launched the Thomistic school into a new era through his work on the Summa Theologiae, highlighting its allimportant first question, was Tommaso de Vio (d. 1534), commonly called Cajetan. According to Jean-Pierre Torrell, Cajetan’s commentary on the Summa was “the first to be a complete commentary and was, as a whole, quite remarkable.”10 It came to enjoy “quasiofficial status” by being printed in the critical Leonine edition of the Summa.11 For various reasons, Cajetan’s teaching, in its considerable breadth during a period of momentous change in Western Christianity, has admittedly had a mixed reception during his own lifetime and lasting to our own. For example, while some laud Cajetan as an expositor of Aquinas, others side with Étienne Gilson, who called Cajetan’s commentary “in every respect the consummate example of a corruptorium Thomae.”12 But the disputes that 10. Torrell, Aquinas’s Summa, 97. Mulchahey writes, “The first full commentary on the Summa written by a friar and heralding its elevation to textbook status was that of Thomas de Vio Cajetan” (Mulchahey, “First the Bow,” 166n111). 11. For the term “quasi-official,” see Romanus Cessario, OP, A Short History of Thomism (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 68. The Leonine edition of the Summa Theologiae was published in 1888–1906, vols. 4–12. 12. Letter of Gilson to Henri de Lubac, July 8, 1956, in Letters of Étienne Gilson to Henri de Lubac, With Commentary by Henri de Lubac, trans. Mary Emily Hamilton (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 24. Gilson’s Latin term evokes how the 1278 Correctorium fratris Thomae by the Franciscan William de la Mare (d. ca. 1290) was rebutted by rejoinder correctoria, including a work by Richard Knapwell (d. 1286) called Correctorium corruptorii fratris Thomae. See de Lubac’s commentary on Gilson’s remark in Letters, 29–31n4. Cf. Étienne Gilson, “Cajetan et l’humanisme théologique,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 22 (1955): 113–36, especially p. 136. Also for Gilson’s context, see Francesca Murphy, Art and Intellect in the Philosophy of Étienne Gilson (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2004), 270.

Foreword   xiii engaged Cajetan’s thinking and that have marked its study in successive generations have, in effect, only secured his place in history as the most influential interpreter of Aquinas. It has recently been affirmed that “the attention paid to Cajetan’s Commentary on the Summa and its intrinsic worth even today guarantees him primacy of place within the Thomist commentatorial tradition.”13 Pope Leo XIII (d. 1903), who established the commission that bears his name to publish the critical editions of Aquinas’s opera omnia, quoted Cajetan once in the encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879): “Among the Scholastic Doctors, the chief and master of all towers Thomas Aquinas, who, as Cajetan observes, because ‘he most venerated the ancient doctors of the Church, in a certain way seems to have inherited the intellect of all.’”14 With this stroke, Leo XIII highlights an accolade from the most renowned of Thomistic commentators that credits Aquinas’s genius to his respectful use of patristic sources. Whereas the neo-Scholastic–ressourcement controversy before the Second Vatican Council seemed to pit the Thomistic tradition against the patristic tradition, those theological fault lines are now seen to expose false dichotomies.15 Consider this example of a difference among Eastern Orthodox thinkers in receiving the Fathers and considering Thomas Aquinas. Georges Florovsky famously proposed a neo-patristic synthesis, which he described as ad mentem patrum, an expression seemingly counter13. Romanus Cessario, OP, and Cajetan Cuddy, OP, Thomas and the Thomists: The Achievement of Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters, Mapping the Tradition (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 2017), 82. 14. Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, Encyclical, On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy (August 4, 1879). Translation from w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/ documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris.html. Leo XIII cites Cajetan’s commentary on Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 148, a. 4. See Sancti Thomas Aquinatis doctoris angelici opera omnia, iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P.M. edita, cum commentariis Thomae de Vio Caietani Ordinis Praedicatorum, cura et studio fratrum eiusdem Ordinis, vol. 10 (Rome: De Propaganda Fide, 1899), 174. 15. See Thomas Joseph White, OP, “The Precarity of Wisdom: Modern Dominican Theology, Perspectivalism, and the Tasks of Reconstruction,” in Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life: Essays in Honor of Romanus Cessario, OP, ed. Reinhard Hütter and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 92–123.

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poising the Leonine impetus ad mentem Thomae.16 Marcus Plested has noted the tenor of Florovsky’s turn of phrase and insightfully remarked that one “might even go so far as to characterize his [Aquinas’s] theology as being ad mentem patrum.”17 This judgment by the preeminent Orthodox theologian on Aquinas and his reception in the Greek East, in effect, confirms what Cajetan thought.18 Now, in a further reconfiguration that abandons certain twentiethcentury theological polarities, Cajetan himself has received an able commentator who embodies a Greek patristic tradition.

Our Author and His Book Our book’s author, Hieromonk Gregory Hrynkiw, is Ukrainian Catholic and resides at the Hermitage of the Three Holy Hierarchs in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. As a monastic priest there, he lives what is called the “middle way” of contemplation and action modeled on the life of St. Gregory of Nazianzus (the Theologian). Hrynkiw sees the work of Thomas Aquinas on sacra doctrina, as well as Cajetan’s development of it, to be in continuity with the thought of the Theologian. Hrynkiw did his doctoral work at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas in Rome under the direction 16. For Georges Florovsky’s description, near the end of his life, of his theological program, reproduced from his handwriting, see Andrew Blane, “A Sketch of the Life of Georges Florovsky,” in Georges Florovsky: Russian Intellectual and Orthodox Churchman, ed. Andrew Blane (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1993), 11–217, at 153–55. For a re-evaluation of Florovsky’s contribution, see the work of the Aquinas Chair in Theology and Philosophy at the University of St. Thomas in Minnesota, Paul L. Gavrilyuk, Georges Florovsky and the Russian Religious Renaissance, Changing Paradigms in Historical and Systematic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), especially “Beyond the Polarizing Narrative,” pp. 259–71. 17. Marcus Plested, Orthodox Readings of Aquinas, Changing Paradigms in Historical and Systematic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 20. 18. For an argument that Aquinas is ad mentem Dei cum sanctis, with the sancti (such as the Greek Fathers of the Church) understood both in via and in patria, see my “Conclusion: Reading Thomas Aquinas and the Greek Fathers Together for the Renewal of Theology,” in Thomas Aquinas and the Greek Fathers, ed. Michael Dauphinais, Andrew Hofer, OP, and Roger Nutt (Ave Maria, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2019), 303–30, especially 306–11. Plested accurately writes that Aquinas is “careful not to elevate patristic authority above that of scripture but rather uses the Fathers in order to understand and explicate scripture correctly” (Orthodox Readings of Aquinas, 20–21).

Foreword   xv of the eminent Thomist and scholar of Cardinal Cajetan, Charles Morerod, former secretary general of the International Theological Commission and, since 2011, bishop of Lausanne, Geneva, and Fribourg. The present work builds upon Hrynkiw’s dissertation, “Cajetan on Sacred Doctrine (In ST, I, q. 1): An Original Contribution towards a Theology of ‘Light from Light’ by a Renaissance Cardinal and Theologian in via Thomae.” For this work, Hrynkiw won the 2014 St. Thomas Aquinas Dissertation Prize awarded by the Aquinas Center for Theological Renewal at Ave Maria University in Ave Maria, Florida. From this basis, Hrynkiw has given us the first published monograph devoted to Cajetan on the topic of the Summa’s first question. This book appears in the same year that the Catholic University of America Press inaugurates its series Early Modern Catholic Sources, co-edited by Ulrich L. Lehner and Trent Pomplun. That project provides translations of Catholic texts of theological interest written between 1450 and 1800. The coincidence of the publications suggests that now is a fitting time not to be satisfied with cursory and stereotypical accounts of the thinkers of this too-often neglected period of Catholic thought. A fresh look can be given to Cajetan, in particular, whose name is mentioned much more than his work is studied. Hrynkiw invites us to just such a new per­ spective. Hrynkiw studies Cajetan on sacred doctrine while remaining attuned to his development of Thomistic thought and to the ingenuity of Aquinas’s original text. Just as a teacher of the Summa’s first question today has particular emphases based upon the needs of an audience, so we see that Cajetan teaches not merely what Aquinas teaches, but addresses the new questions, distinctions, and controversies that had arisen since Aquinas’s lifetime.19 In the 19. It is incisively said: “The opening question of the Summa theologiae serves as a key hermeneutical tool for understanding his [Cajetan’s] theological reception of Aquinas.” Cajetan Cuddy, OP, “16th Century Reception of Aquinas by Cajetan,” in Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Matthew Levering and Marcus Plested (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

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legacy of Johannes Capreolus, Cajetan replies to many objections of Duns Scotus (d. 1308) and other interlocutors (such as Peter Aureol [d. 1322], Durandus of St. Pourçain [d. 1334], and Gregory of Rimini [d. 1358]), and offers his distinctive approach to Thomistic thinking. In his many contributions to the Cajetanian study of sacred doctrine, Hrynkiw highlights the intrinsic role of the magisterium within sacred doctrine, including reflection on papal infallibility in its prophetic manner, as well as the theologian’s role in explicating the articles of faith in service to the Church. Looking at the beginning of Cajetan’s commentary on the tertia pars, Hrynkiw finds what he calls the “Rosetta Stone” for deciphering the threefold structure of the Summa as orderly treatments of nature, grace, and the hypostatic union, thus expositing Cajetan’s emphasis on the integral role of Christ in Aquinas’s pedagogy. Near the end of his book, Hrynkiw applies this work on sacred doctrine to Cajetan’s De divina institutione pontificatus Romani Pontificis (1521), hailed by no less a critic than Erasmus (d. 1536) for its refraining from personal attacks and insults and for its astute exegetical arguments. Knowing what Cajetan expresses about sacred doctrine in his commentary on the Summa’s first question before the Protestant Reformation can assist us in thinking about his ways of addressing exegetical questions posed by his most famous contemporary opponent, Martin Luther (d. 1546). As another sympathetic interpreter of Cajetan writes, “Within his exposition of the first question of the Summa Theologiae, readers are given a glimpse of the mind and heart of Thomas de Vio Cajetan.”20 Indeed! Hieromonk Gregory Hrynkiw is to be thanked for this very helpful monograph, which affords insight into how this early sixteenth-century Thomistic commentator thinks and loves. 20. Cuddy, “16th Century Reception of Aquinas by Cajetan.” I am grateful to Father Cuddy for sharing a pre-publication draft of his essay and for other assistance given me for this foreword.

Abbreviations

Abbreviations

Abbreviations Works of Cajetan De comp. De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii cum apologia eiusdem tractatus De divina institutione De divina institutione pontificatus Romani pontificis super totam Ecclesiam a Christo in Petro De pot. neutra De potentia neutra, et de natura potentiae receptivae In I–II Cor.

Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. I–II ad Corinthios

In Eph.

Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. ad Ephesios

In Ex.

Commentaria in Exodum

In Gen.

Commentaria in Genesim

In Hest.

Commentaria in Hester

In Joan.

Commentaria in Joannem

In Luc.

Commentaria in Lucam

In Matth.

Commentaria in Matthaeum

In post. anal. Arist. In libros Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelicos additamenta In Ps. Liber Psalmorum ad verbum ex hebreo versorum In I-IV Reg.

Commentaria in Regum

In Rom.

Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. ad Romanos

In ST  Summa Theologiae cum commentariis Thomae De Vio Caietani Ordinis Praedicatorum, Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita (citations begin with the pars, quaestio, and articulus of the Summa Theologiae followed by the number in Cajetan’s commentary; e.g., In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n.1). In I–II Thess. Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. I–II ad Thessalonicenses Opera Omnia Opera Omnia quotquot in sacrae scripturae expositionem reperiuntur

xvii

xviii  Abbreviations Works of Aquinas Comp. theol.

Compendium theologiae

Contra impugn. Liber contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem De causis

Super librum De causis expositio

De decem praecep. Collationes in decem praeceptis, Reportatio Petri de Andria De div. nom.

Super librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus

De malo

Quaestiones disputatae de malo

De pot.

Quaestiones disputatae de potentia

De spirit. creat.

Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis

De trin.

Super libros Boethii De Trinitate

De ver.

Quaestiones disputatae de veritate

De virt.

Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus

In I–III De anima

Sentencia libri De anima

In I–X Ethic.

Sententia libri Ethicorum

In I–XII Metaph.

Sententia libri Metaphysicae

In I–VIII Phys.

Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum

In I–II Post. anal.

In Aristotelis libros posteriorum analyticorum

In I–IV Sent.

Super I–IV Sententiarum

In Symb. Apost. Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum, Reportatio Reginaldi de Piperno Qdl.

Quaestiones quodlibetales I–XII

SCG

Summa contra Gentiles

ST  Summa theologiae (citations begin with the pars, quaestio, articulus; in addition, c. = corpus, obj. = objectio, ad 1, 2, etc. = in response to objection 1, 2, etc., s.c. = sed contra; e.g., ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, c.). Super Col.

Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Colossenses lectura

Super I-II Cor.

Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura

Super decr. Expositio super primam et secundam decretalem ad archidiaconum Tudertinum Super Eph.

Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Ephesios lectura

Super Gal.

Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Galatas lectura

Super Heb.

Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Hebraeos lectura

Abbreviations   xix Super Ioan.

Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura

Super Is.

Super Isaiam

Super Matth. Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia Expositio in Matthaeum Super Ps.

In psalmos Davidis expositio

Super Rom.

Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Romanos lectura

Super I–II Thess. Super I–II Epistolam B. Pauli ad Thessalonicenses lectura Super I–II Tim. Super I–II Epistolam B. Pauli ad Timotheum lectura

Works of Other Scholastics Conflatum

Conflati ex angelico doctore S. Thoma (Prierias)

Defensiones Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis (Capreolus) La Opinio Opinio de difficultatibus contra doctrinam fratris (Natalis) Ord.

Ordinatio (Scotus)

Rep.

Reportata parisiensia (Scotus)

Other Sources CCC

Catechism of the Catholic Church

DS  Denzinger, H.—Schònmetzer, A., Enchiridion symbolorum DTC Dictionnaire de théologie catholique ETL

Ephemerides theologicae lovanienes

EV

Enchiridion Vaticanum

Mansi Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova Amplissima Collectio PG Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Graeca, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris) PL Patrologiae Cursus Completus: Series Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris) RSV  Revised Standard Version of the Bible—Second Catholic Edition (National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, 2006) SC

Sources chrétiennes

xx  Abbreviations Other Abbreviations cap.

capitula

ed./eds.

editor/editors

fol.

folio

fn./fnn. footnote/footnotes lect. lectio ms. manuscript n./nn. number/numbers no.

number (journal issues)

prol.

prologus

r rectus suppl.

supplement

s.v.

sub verbo

v versus vol./vols. volume/volumes

Cajetan on Sacred Doctrine

Introduction

Introduction

Introduction Cajetan and Sacred Doctrine For me, Cajetan was the king of distinctions, and, if I read him attentively, my Thomistic understanding did not extend much beyond him— that is to say Thomas himself as analyzed by this most intelligent interpreter. —Marie-Joseph Lagrange1

A Renaissance Cardinal, Theologian, and Reformer in via Thomae Cardinal Tommaso de Vio, commonly known as Cajetan, after his birthplace of Gaeta (Caieta in Latin), remains an underestimated and misunderstood figure. Indubitably, he was a key protagonist in a period of significant historical, cultural, and theological activity.2 As a papal legate, he sought financial and military support against the Turkish incursion into southeast Europe. In Augsburg, as Pope Leo X’s representative, he interrogated Luther. He was 1. Marie-Joseph Lagrange, Souvenirs personnels: Le père Lagrange au service de la Bible (Paris: Cerf, 1967), 283 (my translation). 2. In his dedication of the tertia pars (March 1522) to Pope Adrian VI, Cajetan comments on the dire state of Christian Europe: “. . . turpissimis moribus foedata, bonis spiritalibus destituta, ignorantiae tenebris obsessa, novis haeresum tempestatibus agitata, bellorum tumultibus inter Christianos principes concussa, Turcarum impietate labefacta ac diminuta existit.” Cajetan, In ST, III, Dedicatio, 2; citations from Summa theologicae cum commentariis Thomae De Vio Caietani Ordinis Praedicatorum, Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P.M. edita, vol. 4 (Rome: ex typographia polyglota, 1888).

1

2  Introduction even paraded stark naked on an ass and imprisoned by Charles V’s troops during the Sack of Rome.3 And it was his theological opinion Pope Clement VII sought concerning the validity of Henry VIII’s marriage to Catherine of Aragon.4 Prior to the fissure in religious unity caused by the Reformation, Western Europe experienced a rebirth known as the Renaissance. The Thomistic revival in the sixteenth century was characterized by no less of a surge in intellectual vitality. The “Thomism of the Renaissance” was a renaissance in every sense of the word: it was a return to its main sources—Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, and sacred Scripture.5 Yet, within this intellectually fecund period, many leading representatives of the Renaissance-Thomistic tradition were antagonistic to Cajetan’s views.6 My contention is that, despite Cajetan’s vital role as a theologian, biblical exegete, and reformer within the Renaissance Church and Renaissance Thomism, his profound insights into the nature of 3. See Micheal Tavuzzi, Prierias: The Life and Works of Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio, 1456–1527, Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies 16 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), 131. 4. See Cajetan, Ad serenissimum Angliae regem fideique defensorem Henricum nominis de coniugio cum relicta fratris and De coniugio regis Angliae cum relicta fratris sui, in Opuscula Omnia, vol. 3 (Antwerp: Ioannem Keerbergium, 1612), 171v–172r and 172r–174v. English translations in Cajetan Responds: A Reader in Reformation Controversy, ed. and trans. Jared Wicks (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1978), 175–88, 241–44. 5. “Thomism of the Renaissance” refers to “that phase in the continuing history of the Thomistic School which is demarcated by the death of Capreolus in 1444 and the opening of the Council of Trent in 1545.” Michael Tavuzzi, “Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic of the Thomism of the Renaissance,” Doctor communis 45, no. 2 (1992): 132–33. Cf. Guillaume de Tanoüarn, Cajetan: Le personnalisme intégral (Paris: Cerf, 2009), 19. 6. On Cajetan’s critics, see de Tanoüarn, Cajetan: Le personnalisme intégral, 74–92; Michael O’Connor, “Applauded Neither by Heretics, Nor by Catholics,” in Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries: Motive and Method (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 238–49; and Michael Tavuzzi’s various works, “Valentino da Camerino, O. P. (1438–1515): Teacher and Critic of Cajetan,” Traditio 49 (1994): 287–316; “Gaspare di Baldassare da Perugia, O. P. (1465–1531): A LittleKnown Adversary of Cajetan,” The Thomist 60, no. 4 (1996): 595–615; “Capréolus dans les écrits de Silvestro da Pierio O.P. (1456–1527),” in Jean Capréolus et son temps 1380–1444, Colloque de Rodez, Mémoire Dominicaine numéro spécial 1 (Paris: Cerf, 1997): 239–58; and Prierias: The Life and Works of Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio, 1456–1527, Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies 16 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997).

Introduction   3 sacred doctrine were never thoroughly examined.7 Throughout the vicissitudes of this prominent Dominican cardinal’s life, all of his main activities and contributions flowed from his acquired habit of theology, yet no study of him as a theologian in his own right was ever made. This book will set forth Cajetan’s thoughts on theology as expressed in his commentary on the first question of Aquinas’s Summa theologiae, on sacred doctrine (ST I, q.1, aa. 1–10), contextualized within his broader understanding of theology’s intrinsic relation to the structure of the faith and Church.8 Cajetan was born in mid-February, 1469.9 In 1484, he entered the Dominican Order in his hometown friary of San Domenico and changed his name to Tommaso from his baptismal name Giacomo, placing himself beneath the patronage of the local Dominican saint—Tommaso d’Aquino (St. Thomas Aquinas). After his novitiate, he studied in Naples, Bologna, and Padua, where—at the completion of his philosophical studies—he was received as a studens formalis on May 24, 1491.10 Cajetan’s academic abilities were immediately evident. His precocious advancement to various academic offices in Padua, however, was due more to fortuitous circumstances than to academic brilliance.11 His rapid ascent through the academic grades (tirocinium) of magister studentium (1492–93), baccalaureus sententiarum (1493–94), and finally magister regens (1494–95) at the early age of twenty-five can satisfactorily be attributed to the patronage of 7. Anthony Nemetz wrote a short, forty-page study, “Cajetan on the Nature of Theology” (unpublished Master of Arts diss., University of Chicago, 1948), which misses key points: sacred doctrine is the genus of revealed knowledge; and faith and theology are species of knowledge within that genus. The study never explains how the habit of theological science is generated. Finally, it lacks any reference to the historical debate on the question within Renaissance Thomism. 8. All citations for Aquinas’s Summa theologiae are taken from Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia cum hypertextibus in CD-ROM, ed. R. Busa (Milan: Editoria Electronica Editel, 1996). English translations (unless “my translation” is indicated) are taken from Summa Theologica, translated by The Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Sheed and Ward, 1981). 9. For a chronology of Cajetan’s life and literary works see appendix 1. 10. See Tavuzzi, “Valentino da Camerino,” 96. 11. Ibid.

4  Introduction Oliviero Carafa,12 the Dominican Order’s cardinal protector, and to sudden vacancies that needed to be filled.13 Within the vibrant intellectual milieu of Renaissance Padua, Cajetan intensified his study of Aristotle in order to confront the doctrines of the Scotist Franciscan Antonio Trombetta, and the Avveroist Nicoletto Vernia. Following a brief period, in which it is difficult to determine his whereabouts, Cajetan was appointed to the chair of theology in via Thomae at the University of Pavia at the beginning of the 1497–98 academic year.14 After a short sojourn at the monastery of Santa Maria della Grazia in Milan, Cajetan was appointed the Dominican Order’s procurator general—once again at the request of Cardinal Oliviero Carafa—in 1501.15 During this period in Rome as procurator general (1501–8), he preached ex officio every first Sunday of Lent and Advent during the Mass celebrated either at St. Peter’s Basilica or in the Sistine Chapel; he taught philosophy and theology at Rome’s Studium Urbis (known as La Sapienza after 1560);16 and, in 1507, he completed his commentary on the prima pars of Aquinas’s Summa theologiae.17 On June 10, 1508, Cajetan was elected master general of his order. During his generalate (1508–18), he acted strongly against the resurgent conciliarism that led to the Council of Pisa in 1511, and he participated in the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–17).18 On July 1, 12. Cardinal Oliviero Carafa (1430–1511), to whom Cajetan dedicated the prima pars of his commentary of the Summa theologiae, was a doctor of both civil and canon law. On December 29, 1458, he became archbishop of Naples. On September 18, 1467, Pope Paul II created him a cardinal. 13. See Tavuzzi, Prierias, 21, and “Valentino da Camerino,” 296–98. 14. See Tavuzzi, “Valentino da Camerino,” 299–300. 15. See Michael O’Connor, “Rhetoric and the Literary Sense: The Sacred Author’s Performance in Cajetan’s Exegesis of Scripture,” in Faithful Performances: Enacting Christian Tradition, ed. Trevor A. Hart and Steven R. Guthrie (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 112. 16. See O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 17. 17. Cajetan’s commentary on the prima pars, which he began in Pavia between 1497 and 1499, was completed in 1507. The first print of this commentary appeared in Venice in 1508. The completion and publishing dates for the remaining parts are as follows: In ST, I-II, 29 December 1511 (Venice, 1514); In ST, II-II, 26 February 1517 (Venice, 1518); In ST, III, 19 December 1520 (Venice, 1523). 18. At the Fifth Lateran Council, Cajetan had his own singular opinion regarding the

Introduction   5 1517, Pope Leo X created him a cardinal as part of a plan to restore dignity to the Sacred College of Cardinals, which had sunk to its lowest when Cardinal Alfonso Petrucci, along with four other cardinals, attempted to poison the pope.19 On April 26, 1518, Cajetan was sent as a papal legate to Emperor Maximilian and Christian II, king of Denmark. During his legateship, Cajetan met with Luther face-to-face three times in the Bavarian city of Augsburg (October 12–14, 1518). For a brief period (1523–24), under Pope Adrian VI, he served as a papal legate in Hungary with the mission of securing military action against the Turks. Even before the accession of the anti-imperialist Pope Clement VII on November 19, 1523, Cajetan’s authority as a diplomat in the papal court had already waned.20 The Medicean pope encouraged Cajetan to turn his theological talents toward sacred Scripture, on which he commented prolifically until his death on August 10, 1534.21 Cajetan played a key role in the Thomism of the Renaissance with the first-ever publication of a commentary on the entire ST, Papal Bull Apostolici regiminis (December 19, 1513): “non placet secunda pars bullae, praecipiens philosophis, ut publice persuadendo doceant veritatem fidei” (Mansi 32, 843D); cf. “Pomponazzi affair” in Tavuzzi, Prierias, 97–104; “Valentino da Camerino,” 303; and Renaissance Inquisitors: Dominican Inquisitors and Inquisitorial Districts in Northern Italy, 1474–1527, Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, vol. 134 (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2007), 119–20. Apostolici regiminis is cited in the papal encyclical Fides et ratio as an example of where philosophy is subject to the Church’s magisterium, see John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et ratio (September 14, 1998), n. 58. Cf. Charles Morerod, “Le discours de Cajetan au Ve concile de Lateran,” Revue thomiste 105, no. 4 (2005): 595–638. 19. See O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 44–45. 20. Cardinal Guilio di Guiliano Medici, future Pope Clement VII, blamed Cajetan— who was serving as a papal legate in Germany—for failing to prevent Charles V from being elected Holy Roman Emperor in May 1519; see Marvin O’Connell, “Cardinal Cajetan: Intellectual and Activist,” New Scholasticism 50, no. 3 (1976): 317. 21. Cajetan dedicated his first biblical commentary to Pope Clement VII; see Psalmi Davidici ad Hebraicam veritatem castigati et iuxta sensum quem litteralem dicunt ennarati (Venice: Giunta, 1530), Dedication, fol. 7v. Whether Cajetan’s biblical commentaries were a modified and scaled-down version of a larger project envisioned by Pope Clement VII to newly translate the Hebrew Scriptures remains to be verified: see André-François von Gunten, “La contribution des Hébreux a l’oeuvre exégétique de Cajetan,” in Histoire de l’exégèse au XVIe siècle, ed. O. Fatio and P. Fraenkel Etudes de philologie et d’histoire, vol. 34 (Geneva: Libraire Droz, 1978), 61–62.

6  Introduction and commentaries on the New Testament (with the exception of the Apocalypse) and a significant portion of the Old Testament.22 Furthermore, as a reformer, Cajetan sought renewal of the Renaissance Church by a return to Scripture and sound theology. During his time as procurator and master general, he sought the reform of the Dominican Order by stressing the serious study of Aquinas. Later on, as a cardinal, he foresaw ecclesiastical renewal through the election of bishops who are virtuous and sufficiently schooled in doctrine.23 According to Cajetan, ecclesiology and sacred doctrine are inseparably interwoven. He clearly recognized that the acquired habit of theology—the formal principle of both speculative theology and biblical exegesis—is instrumental in bringing about ecclesial renewal, animated, of course, by the Church’s uncreated source: the Trinity.

Cajetan and Sacred Doctrine According to Marie-Dominique Chenu, the author of the classic work La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, the grasping of the nature of sacred doctrine—the matter addressed in the opening question of the Summa theologiae (ST, I, q.1)—is essential for understanding Aquinas as a theologian, and the unveiling of the ST’s structure is the holy grail of Thomistic theology. To reveal the ST’s plan is to touch the mind of Aquinas. Nevertheless, Cajetan’s profound insights into Aquinas’s theological thought have yet to be acknowledged. He addressed how the articles of the Apostles’ Creed structure the entire ST; how a logical division of the first question unveils the essence of sacred doctrine and its methodology, which flows from the intellective acts of reasoning and judging within the divine light of revelation; and how the first syllogism of the ST, I, q.1 comprises the four causes of sacred doctrine and possesses the 22. See Jacques-Marie Vosté, “Cardinalis Caietanus Sacrae Scripturae interpres,” Angelicum 11, no. 4 (1934): 447–49. 23. See O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 75.

Introduction   7 potency to generate the habit of theology in one who reasons in the light of faith. The primary reason why no one dared touch Cajetan’s mind on sacred doctrine was because he was vilified by scholars such as Marie-Dominique Chenu, Étienne Gilson, and Henri de Lubac, all important participants in the twentieth-century debate on the nature of sacred doctrine and on the relation between the natural and supernatural.24 Concerning this latter point, as will be shown, Cajetan was wrongly accused of understanding human nature as an autonomous, self-sufficient, enclosed whole, whose only possible relation to the supernatural is through the miraculous—as if grace distorted human nature, rather than built upon it. In the modern debate on sacred doctrine, Cajetan was labelled the “corrupter” of Aquinas’s thought. Most contemporary studies on sacred doctrine merely repeat this caricature of Cajetan. As a result, a broad distrust of Renaissance Thomism hovers over contemporary Thomistic scholarship. The debate on the nature of sacred doctrine, however, cannot be limited to a merely twentieth-century Thomistic phenomenon. This very question was a source of deep contention and intense argument between Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio,25 whom I shall henceforth call Prierias, and Cajetan. Thus a Renaissance-Thomistic contribution on sacred doctrine constitutes an essential part of the effective history (Wirkungsgeschichte) of this particular theological reality. Moreover, determining the nature of sacred doctrine is important for theology in general, since it concerns theology’s essence: what it is and to what it extends. The Dominican Scholastic system was the Sitz im Leben of 24. See Ralph McInerny, “Gilson’s Attack on Cajetan,” “De Lubac and Cajetan,” and “The Chenu Case,” in Praeambula Fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 39–68, 69–90, and 108–125. 25. Silvestro Mazzolini da Prierio (1456–1527) was a Dominican friar who was appointed regent master (1487–1502) in Bologna. From 1503–08, he was prior in Milan, Verona, and Genoa. He also served as master of the Sacred Palace (1515–27). He is most remembered, however, as the church official delegated to respond to Luther’s ninety-five theses of December 1517—a response blamed for fanning the flames of the Reformation.

8  Introduction Aquinas’s ST. It is quite probable that he wrote it to broaden the dogmatic basis of his contemporaries’ narrow tradition of concentrating almost exclusively on practical or moral theology.26 The ST continued to live on in the schools of Scholastic thought because of St. Thomas’s defenders and faithful disciples. By the time of the Thomism of the Renaissance, the ST had become the subject of a reverential exposition, a Scholastic exercise that varied in form from literal commentary to original elaboration. There are diverse opinions regarding Aquinas’s intended audience for the ST. Nevertheless, it was clearly intended for those studying to be maiores, that is, persons invested with the authority to preach and teach sacred doctrine. It may well be that Aquinas had a broad spectrum of maiores in mind, beginning with the fratres communes at the level of the provincial studium, who were preparing for sacred orders, and extending to the more advanced students, progressing through the sequence of academic grades toward a master’s degree. Cajetan initiated his commentary on the ST just prior to his tenure at the Roman Studium Urbis. His intended audience was most probably those students working toward a master’s degree. Although his intended audience was most probably high-level students and budding theologians, Cajetan still held it necessary to explicate the ST, notwithstanding Aquinas’s pure style and formal way of expressing himself, on account of the profundity of its content and its elevated contemplation. He cautions that a cursory reading attains only a superficial understanding.27 In his commentary’s prologue, Cajetan states his intention to expound the ST according to its “most-beautiful order,” in which every theological question is distinctly treated in its own proper place, avoiding repetition. In fact, according to Cajetan, what makes the ST suitable for novices is not an easy, superficial, or introductory content, but 26. See Leonard. E. Boyle, The Setting of the “Summa theologiae” of Saint Thomas (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1982), 14–15. 27. See Cajetan, In ST, I, prefatio, 4.

Introduction   9 rather the beauty of its structure (ordo disciplinae).28 This Cajetanian distinction between the “most-beautiful order” for beginners and “profound content” for the advanced suggests that he too considered the ST as a pedagogical tool for the various levels of theological formation. Johannes Capreolus, the Prince of the Thomists, was an important authority for Cajetan.29 In fact, Cajetan’s commentary on the ST can be considered a continuation of the French Thomist’s work—Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis. He addresses many of the adversaries listed in Capreolus’s Defensiones. When Cajetan treats the doctrines of these various opponents, however, he has recourse not only to Capreolus’s Defensiones, but—more importantly—to the opponents’ original works. The principal adversaries of Capreolus that Cajetan confronts are Blessed Duns Scotus (c.1266–1308), the Subtle Doctor, a Franciscan philosopher and theologian, who influenced many thinkers especially in metaphysics and theology with his univocal concepts of being and the transcendentals; Durandus of St. Pourçain (1275?– 1334), a Dominican theologian and later bishop of Limoux, who was faithful to Aristotelian-Thomistic subjects and terminology, but who denied that articles of the faith could be the principles of a theological science and that theology, in itself supernatural, could be investigated by human reason; Peter Aureol (c.1280–1322), a Franciscan philosopher and theologian, known for his theory of esse apparens (apparent existence), a kind of non-real existence that founds his theory of epistemology; and Gregory of Rimini (c.1300–1358), an Augustinian philosopher and theologian, who argued against William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347) that the object of a science cannot be identified with the conclusion of a demonstra28. See Cajetan, In ST, prol., 5. 29. Johannes Capreolus (c.1380–1444) is a philosopher and theologian known for his Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis, a commentary on Aquinas’s work on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, where he defends Thomas against the criticisms of the various Scholastic traditions of the fourteenth century. The Thomistic school came to refer to him as the Princeps thomistarum, the Prince of the Thomists, on account of his fidelity to Aquinas’s doctrine.

10  Introduction tion, and against Walter Chatton (c.1290–1343) that it cannot be something outside of the mind. Nevertheless, in the midst of varying positions held by his predecessors and contemporaries on the nature of theology, Cajetan’s originality lies in his recognition of Capreolus’s grasp of our theology’s supernatural participation in the light and intelligibility of the Deity: that participation is the continuity between the theology of wayfarers, the theology of the blessed, and God’s theology.30 Concerning the division between these theologies, Cajetan critiques the position of Scotus, who argued that since God’s theology is formally one, no human theology could be subalternate to it. According to Scotus, each theology possesses its own unique primary object. Thus God’s theology and the human theologies, both in patria (theology of the blessed) and in via (theology of the wayfarer), remain completely separate theologies. Furthermore, in Scotus’s conception of theology in via, human reason, rather than being an instrumental or secondary efficient cause, is an independent and proportionate efficient cause that mixes with faith in both scriptural exegesis and speculative reasoning from the articles of faith. By diminishing the primary role of the divine light as the unique universal efficient cause within the theology of the wayfarer, Scotus unwittingly became a precursor of modern, rationalistic theology. If, in the theology of the wayfarer, human reason is not understood as an instrumental or secondary efficient cause, either it is to be taken as an independent and proportionate efficient cause, which is essentially rationalism, or its relevance is completely negated in relation to the faith, which is fideism. Thus, denying the subalternation of man’s theology to God’s theology and his divine light—for subalternation implies the instrumental and subordinate role of human reason within theology—ultimately 30. In the phrase “our theology” (theologia nostra), “our” refers to human nature. Following Cajetan’s lexicon, “our theology” will be used throughout this study. Moreover, Cajetan understands “our theology” as extending to both forms of human theology—our perfect theology in patria and our imperfect theology in via; see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. x; see appendix 2.

Introduction   11 leads to a breakdown of the hierarchical and harmonious relation between faith and reason. Cajetan’s critique of Scotus’s theology reaches down to its foundation: the Scotist univocal concept of being. The inclusion of God within the content of a univocal concept of being—an undetermined concept that embraces both finite and infinite being—is the untraversable chasm that lies between the via Scoti and the via Thomae. According to Aquinas, God simply transcends all created concepts, including a vague and undetermined concept of being, since God simply cannot be conceptualized. In conclusion, notwithstanding Cajetan’s key role within the Renaissance Church, his profound insights into the nature of theology were never fully examined. I intend to approach Cajetan as a theologian in his own right within the via Thomae. As Aquinas once exhorted a younger confrère: “Do not look from whom you heard it, but anything that is well said commit to memory.” Similarly, Cajetan humbly invites his readers in the prologue of his commentary on the ST: I am not so arrogant as to propose my own authority, but insofar as what I state here and elsewhere sufficient proof is given. Therefore, where I am found wanting, I would be grateful for your correction and help.31

This book is divided into two parts. Part 1 explores sacred doctrine as the framework of reality, both uncreated and created, which forms the backdrop to Cajetan’s theological worldview. Woven throughout part 1 are a few longer threads of Aquinas’s thought, which are necessary to better contextualize Cajetan’s grasp of sacred doctrine. These threads include how sacred law orders reality’s innate hierarchical relation between theologia and oikonomia and the teacher-pupil relationship of the maiores and the minores within the inherent hierarchical structure of the faith and of the Church. According to Cajetan, sacred doctrine is a supernaturally infused participation in the mind of God, in the Trinity’s own 31. Cajetan, In ST, prol., 5.

12  Introduction intelligibility and understanding of creation and salvation history. Chapter 1 expounds how this divine knowledge is communicated to humans through the act of revelation, which is the object and cause of faith in humans. Within Renaissance Thomism, there was an intense debate on the nature of theology: whether it was a mere extension of the virtue of faith or a distinct intellectual habit. Cajetan held that faith and theology are distinct species of knowledge within sacred doctrine. He understood sacred doctrine in a broad sense to be the whole genus of knowledge revealed by God. It is on the basis of the real distinction between faith and theology within sacred doctrine that Cajetan makes a key hermeneutical division of the first question of the ST. This chapter concludes with some important insights into the relationship between faith and theology in Cajetan’s commentary on the object of faith (In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1). Chapter 2 continues to explore sacred doctrine as the framework of reality, especially the real distinction and relation between the Deity and the economy of salvation history. The articles of faith concerning the Trinity (theologia) and the Incarnation (oikonomia) contain virtually the whole of theology. Within the framework of sacred doctrine, God reveals the Church as necessary (secundum quid) for the proposal and explication of the articles of faith. Cajetan’s contribution to the understanding of the prophetic role of the papacy in defining the articles of faith is highlighted. Finally, his grasp of the hierarchical transmission of sacred doctrine through the maiores, those entrusted with teaching sacred doctrine, to the minores, the recipients of the teaching, is set forth. Chapter 3 unveils the creedal structure of the entire Summa theologiae. Cajetan’s Rosetta Stone for interpreting the order of the articles of faith is based on the three modes of divine selfcommunication: creation, grace and the hypostatic union, and the dual aspects of human nature, namely its formal and historical modes of existence. This brings part 1 to an end: the principles of sacred doctrine, the articles of faith, are seen in their source—the Trinitarian order of origins—in their role structuring reality, in

Introduction   13 their inherent relation to the Church and the papacy, and finally as constituting the generative principle of the intellectual habit of theology. Part 2 focuses on the habit of theology in Cajetan’s commentary on the first question of the ST. Following Aquinas, he describes theology as a form of helicoidal contemplation—not purely natural, but rather perfected in our nature by the grace of divine illumination. Chapter 4 discusses how, contemplating the first demonstrative syllogism in the corpus of the first article of the ST, Cajetan unpacks the essence of Aquinas’s thought on sacred doctrine, illuminating the four causes that constitute sacred doctrine in wayfarers. Chapter 5 begins with a consideration of the nature of science (In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4). According to Cajetan, sacred doctrine as a science is understood to be a simple habit generated from the first theological syllogism (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1). Then the essence of sacred doctrine as a subalternate science is explored in detail (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2). As a subalternate science, theology in wayfarers participates in the theology of God and the theology of the blessed. This is in contrast with Scotus, who admits no overlapping between or participation in the various levels of theology. For Cajetan, man’s participation in the divine light of God’s theology, however, renders possible the unique speculative object of our theology. Thus, the formal object of the theology of wayfarers is the first and supreme foundation of divine causality, namely a participation through faith in the luminous order of origins of the Trinity, in and through which the habit of theology judges and orders revealed truths (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3). On account of this elevated formal object, theology can concurrently be both a speculative and a practical form of knowledge (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4), and it is eminently more dignified than any of the philosophical sciences, which are dependent on human reason alone (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5). Theology, or sacred doctrine as a science, is the greatest of all human wisdoms simply because it determines or judges in the light of the highest cause—the Trinity’s own light and intelligibility (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6). Chapter 5 con-

14  Introduction cludes with an important excursus on the meaning of the term revelabilia, which has known many and various interpretations within Thomism. Finally, the theological method is explicated in chapter 6, first, according to theology’s act of reasoning in demonstration and argumentation (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8); then, according to the act of judgment in biblical theology, especially in determining the literal sense of sacred Scripture (In ST, I, q. 1, aa. 9–10). This chapter concludes with a brief examination of the work Cajetan accomplished as a biblical exegete and of his “ecumenical” sensitivities toward Luther, when expounding the literal sense of Matthew 16:18–19, in his De divina institutione pontificatus Romani Pontificis. The conclusion of this book explores the ramifications of a theology understood to be a participation in the light and intelligibility of the Trinity, a participation that is ordered according not to any random philosophical system, but rather to its own inherent creedal hermeneutic. Cajetan testifies to what he called the welladvanced “dismantling of Christendom” by the spreading of heresies and schisms, and by the theological split between the via antiqua—a biblical-theological worldview handed down by Tradition, wherein faith fulfils reason in man, who is ordered to God—and the via moderna, wherein man is not understood as intrinsically ordered to God. A few brief observations are made on the symphony between the perennial theological truths in the works of Cajetan and of St. Gregory of Nazianzus, known as the Theologian, who was one of the main constructors of Christendom according to the Holy Spirit’s architectural plan of the Logos as Romanitas. Last, this book is intended to have Cajetan impart his method for reading and commenting on the ST. He shows how to define the essence of a question by making a proper division of the text. He separates the elements of the logical process, the arguments and syllogisms. He defines the terms employed by Aquinas and their relation to later developments in philosophical and theological terminology. He enriches the text with parallel passages from Aqui-

Introduction   15 nas and other sources. He grasps the function and effectiveness of the sed contra. He shows the link between the objections and their responses to the corpus of the article. Finally, he summarizes the contribution of the question and articles in relation to the theological milieu of his day. He is an exemplar of the ancient discipline of commentary on the text of a Master.

Part One

= Sacred Doctrine Is the Framework

The Framework

Sacred Doctrine and Faith

Chapter 1

Sacred Doctrine and Faith Faith and Theology Marie-Dominique Chenu’s historical-critical monograph, La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, remains one of the most influential modern studies on sacred doctrine.1 In the original 1927 edition, Chenu accented Aquinas’s innovative way of integrating the Aristotelian concept of science into sacred doctrine. He judged, however, that Aquinas uncritically adopted the term “sacred doctrine,” which Chenu treated as a vestige of a more ancient and ambiguous concept.2 Chenu preferred the term “theology,” which he narrowly defined as the scientific act of reasoning from the truths of the faith. Consequently, Chenu considered articles 9 and 10, concerning sacred Scripture, to be a rupture from the first eight articles of question 1 in the ST, which treated “theology” in the strict sense.3 In the second and third editions of 1943 and 1957, Chenu distances himself from his initial interpretation, without providing any explanation or indication to his readers that he had changed his view. Moreover, in the 1943 and 1957 editions, he readopts the 1. See Marie-Dominque Chenu, “La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen-âge 2 (1927): 31–71; the second and third editions: La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle (Paris: J. Vrin, 1943 and 1957). 2. See Chenu, “La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle,” (1927), 68. 3. Jacobus M. Ramírez was one of a few (including Francisco Muñiz, William Wallace, Kieran Conley and James Weisheipl) who took exception to Chenu’s excessive and rigid interpretation of theology as a science; see De hominis beatitudine, vol. 1 of Jacobus M. Ramírez, OP: Opera Omnia, ed. Victorino Rodríguez (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1972), 7n1.

19

20  The Framework term “sacred doctrine” as a broad concept whose content comprises all the various forms of sacred teaching that proceed from revelation. Thus Chenu’s understanding of theology as a science in the first question of the ST shifted from a narrow notion of a theological science, quasi-autonomous in its relation to revelation and faith, to an interpretation that emphasized theology’s place within the wider context of sacred doctrine, wherein theology is subalternate to faith, homogeneous and in an organic continuity with faith, on account of their common source: the divine light of revelation.4 Although Chenu limited his study to the thirteenth century, nevertheless, his silence concerning Capreolus’s teaching is unfortunate. Chenu’s stress—in his 1943 revision—on the continuity of man’s theology with God’s theology and the divine light parallels key aspects of Capreolus’s fifteenth-century doctrine.5 In his monograph, Chenu targets the first-generation Thomist Hervaeus Natalis as a representative of an exaggerated Aristotelian trend within the first Thomists,6 yet offers nothing from the second generation of Thomists led by Capreolus.7 Therefore a question does arise concerning Chenu’s sudden refocusing on the centrality of the theory of subalternation as the epistemic link between God’s theology and man’s theology in via and in patria: Was Chenu’s 1943 revision merely the result of an improved reapplication of the 4. See Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle (1943), 78–79. Cf. Henry Donneaud, “M.-D. Chenu et La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle,” Mémoire dominicaine 4, no. 1 (1994): 156–61. 5. See Henry Donneaud, “La théologie comme science chez Capreolus,” in Jean Capréolus et son temps 1380–1444, Colloque de Rodez, Mémoire Dominicaine numéro spécial 1 (Paris: Cerf, 1997): 125–26. 6. Hervaeus Natalis (c.1250–1323) entered the Dominican Order on April 29, 1276. In 1302, he was a baccalaureus under Meister Eckhart. In Paris, from 1307 to 1308, he taught as magister in theology, taking his position against John Duns Scotus and Durandus of St. Pourçain. In 1310, he defended Aquinas’s doctrine against Godfrey of Fontaines and Peter Aureol. From 1309 to 1318, he served as Provincial Superior in France. In 1318, at the General Chapter in Lione, he was elected general superior of the Dominican Order. Natalis conceded that theology was a subalternate science, but only largo modo and not in a proper sense: see “La Opinio de difficultatibus contra doctrinam fratris Thome di Erveo di Nédellec” (hereafter Natalis, “La Opinio”) (Edizione critica), in Disputa Teologica e Devozione e Utopia (sec. 14–16), ed. Paolo Piccari, Memorie Domenicane, Nova Serie 26 (1995): 22. 7. See Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle (1943), 78–79.

Sacred Doctrine and Faith   21 historical-critical method, or did Capreolus’s thought influence his modification? Prior to his 1943 revision, Chenu did have the opportunity at Le Saulchoir to become familiar with Yves Congar’s 1939 article on “Théologie,” written for the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, which positively appraised Cajetan’s teaching on sacred doctrine as deeply dependent on Capreolus, against that of John of St. Thomas.8 This fact alone raises the deeper question concerning the particular role of the historical-critical method within theology. The historical-critical method is an important tool for theology, yet it remains subordinate and secondary to the realities grasped in the divine light of revelation. In theology, the content of divine revelation must be first known through an assent of faith and only then—in a secondary or instrumental manner—can the human mind, elevated and illuminated by a participation in the divine light, reflect on particular theological realities as they are explicated within various historical periods. The inherent danger with the historical-critical method in general, and within Thomism in particular, has been a hermeneutic of suspicion by which the Renaissance and Baroque periods of Thomism are labelled a priori as hermetic Thomistic schools of thought, starved by a superficial exegesis of Aquinas’s works and, thus, as unable to reach the true core of any question for want of a historical-critical methodology. Theology cannot be reduced to a mere history of theological concepts. Theology functions both synchronically and diachronically on account of the transcendent nature of its principles, the articles of faith, and its participation in the divine light. In this regard, Aquinas’s exegetical maxim remains apropos: “the function of a good interpreter is not to consider the words, but rather the meaning.”9 It would be rash to assume the Renaissance Thomists were entirely ignorant of the historical roots of the words—the 8. See Fergus Kerr, “Yves Congar and Thomism,” in Yves Congar: Theologian of the Church, ed. Gabriel Flynn, Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs (Leuven: Peeters, 2005), 67–68. 9. Aquinas, Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia Expositio in Matthaeum (hereafter Super Matth.), cap. 27, lect. 1, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa.

22  The Framework theological and philosophical terms—employed by Aquinas. Moreover, the sense of Aquinas’s unique manner of applying the Aristotelian theory of subalternation as an epistemic key for the elucidation of the scientific use of reason within sacred doctrine was intensely debated and profoundly expounded within Renaissance Thomism. Therefore, the Renaissance-Thomistic theological reflection forms an essential part of the effective history of this particular question, which is important not only for Thomism, but for theology in general.10 Chenu wrestled his entire academic career with the dialectical tension between faith and reason.11 This inherent tension within sacred doctrine he sought to unite within what remained for him a vague and undefined “psychological circumincession.”12 Chenu clearly held that faith and theology are essentially diverse habits that share a consubstantiality within the light of revelation.13 Nevertheless, he never explicated how they are diverse and what is the nature of their relation to one another. Among the Renaissance Thomists, however, there arose an ardent dispute over these precise points: how do faith and theology differ, and how are they related. Unfortunately, Chenu’s a priori distrust of the later Scholasticism may have discouraged him from citing their insights. The Renaissance debate concerning the nature of the habit of theology intensified when Prierias published the first volume of his Conflatum in 1519. In all probability, he posed this very question against his principal target—Cajetan:14 “What is this doctrine? Is 10. The Lutheran pietist and founder of modern critical history, Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), suspicious of the ideology of progressivism and the inevitable deification of man through the process of history, emphatically argued that “every epoch is immediate to God.” See Malcom B. Yarnell III, The Formation of Christian Doctrine (Nashville, Tenn.: B&H Publishing Group, 2007), 160n37. 11. See Henry Donneaud, “La constitution dialectique de la théologie et son histoire selon M.-D. Chenu,” Revue thomiste 96, no. 1 (1996): 42; and Donneaud, “M. -D. Chenu et La Théologie,” 168–69. 12. Marie-Dominque Chenu, “Position de la théologie, ” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 24, no. 4 (1935): 232–33. 13. See Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle (1943), 8. 14. See Tavuzzi, Prierias, 92, 95. The Conflatum is Prierias’s annotated anthology of Aquinas’s works. This collection of texts was based on the Tabula aurea, compiled by

Sacred Doctrine and Faith   23 it the habit of faith? Or is it the habit of theology? Or is it both?”15 In his Conflatum, Prierias states that sacred doctrine—as a formal cause—is essentially one habit, which includes faith and theology. Faith and theology are not really distinct from each other, but only accidentally inasmuch as they both have one and the same simple object, which comprises the complex objects that cause their accidental differences. According to his interpretation, the habit of faith is a single formal cause that extends itself to both the articles of the faith and to the conclusions deduced from them, whose one simple object is the “first truth” (veritas prima), the object of faith.16 The pre-Renaissance Thomist, Hervaeus Natalis, an important authority for both Prierias and Cajetan, distinguished between a wide definition of faith that included theology and a strict definition that affirmed a real distinction between the habits of faith and theology: To the question, whether theology can be called a habit really distinct from the habit of faith, it can be said that faith can be taken in two ways. The first way, as a habit, by which something is believed either as by divine authority in itself or as deduced from such an authority. This way of accepting the habit of faith includes theology and faith properly so called, because concerning these things we have no other habit unless faith. In another way, faith can be taken in a more strict sense for the habit by which we assent to something revealed absolutely and not deduced from another; and theology as the habit of assenting by belief to something deduced from such an authority. And so theology and faith are said to be really distinct habits, [one] the habit of the principles and [the other] the habit of deduced conclusions from the principles, which is a science.17 Prierias’s master, Peter of Bergamo; see M. Tavuzzi, “Capréolus dans les écrits de Silvestro da Prierio,” 247. 15. Sylvestrus De Prierio, Conflati ex angelico doctore S. Thoma (henceforth Prierias, Conflatum), vol. 1 (Perugia: Girolamo di Francesco Cartolario, 1519), q. 1, a. 10, fol. 9r. 16. See Prierias, Conflatum, fol. 9r. The term veritas prima is not original to Aquinas, as it was used by masters before and during his time; cf. Guillelmus Altissiodrensis, Summa aurea, Prologus, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 16 (Paris - Grottaferrata, 1980–1985), 1:15; and Philippus Cancellarius, Summa de Bono, Corpus Philosophicum Aevi Medii (Bern: Editiones Francke, 1985). 17. Natalis, “La Opinio,” 46 (translations of this work are my own). Natalis explicates

24  The Framework Capreolus held that faith and theology share the same subject, namely God as the one simple, material object; nevertheless, they are essentially distinct habits on account of their diverse modes of knowing.18 In the Conflatum, Prierias makes no specific mention of either Natalis’s or Capreolus’s doctrine concerning the real distinction between faith and theology. This is significant, since Prierias is a devoted disciple of both of these Thomists.19 Thus he might have not wanted to draw undue attention to his dissenting point of view. Nonetheless, he clearly singles out Cajetan’s position: “certain ones say that sacred doctrine abstracts from both faith and science.”20 Indeed, in his commentary (1508), Cajetan affirms that sacred doctrine, as presented in article 1 (ST, I, q. 1), can be understood neither exclusively as faith, distinct from theology, nor as theology, distinct from faith; rather sacred doctrine is to be understood as a genus of knowledge revealed by God and necessary for man’s salvation. The extension of the term “sacred doctrine” in article 1 is wide and includes everything made known by God revealing the threefold meaning of the term theologia as found in St. Augustine: “Ad istam questionem respondent quidam per distincionem Augustini quod est triplex theologia: quedam est que est noticia eorum que ponuntur in canone [sacra scriptura]; et ista, ut dicunt, non distinguitur realiter a fide. Alia est theologia, que est habitus quo aliquis scit ex articulis fidei, sive ex hiis que sunt scripta in sacra scriptura, alia concludere que in istis implicite continentur. Et ista, ut dicunt, minus proprie dicitur theologia, saltem distincta realiter a prima, quia non videtur esse nisi quedam explicacio articulorum fidei, ut tactum est in opposito. Tercio modo, dicitur theologia habitus quidam adinventus, quo ex naturaliter cognitis scit aliquis deducere aliqua probabilia vel persuasiva ad defensionem fidei et ad ostendendum ipsam esse probabilem” (ibid., 45). Natalis’s intellectual opponent, Durandus of St. Pourçain, in the prologue to his Commentaria in IV libros Senteniarum, also presents to his readers these three meanings of theology. He expresses, however, his doubt in the so-called theology as a science; see Elizabeth Lowe, The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas: The Controversies between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourçain (New York: Routledge, 2004), 100–101. 18. See Capreolus, Defensiones Theologicae Divi Thomae Aquinatis (henceforth Capreolus, Defensiones), vol. 1, liber I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 1, tertia conclusion, ed. Ceslaus Paban and Thomas Pègues (Tours: Cottier, 1900–1908), 46b–48a. 19. See Tavuzzi, Prierias, 95. 20. Prierias, Conflatum, fol. 9r. Prierias usually referred to Cajetan by means of conventional expressions such as “quidam Thomistae” and “nonnulli Thomistae moderni”; see Tavuzzi, Prierias, 96, and “Capreolus dans les écrits de Silvestro da Prierio,” 250.

Sacred Doctrine and Faith   25 himself, abstracting from the specific aspects of faith and science. Furthermore, it is a knowledge formally revealed and contained virtually in its principles, the articles of faith.21 According to Cajetan, sacred doctrine in wayfarers is a revealed knowledge that is received and investigated by distinct habits that constitute its various formal causes, among which are the virtues of faith (the habit of the principles) and theology (the habit of the conclusions). Cajetan employs a division of ST, I, q. 1, as a hermeneutic of Aquinas’s thought on sacred doctrine, which begins with the nominal definition of sacred doctrine as a genus of knowledge (ST, I, q. 1, a. 1). Cajetan defines sacred doctrine as a revealed knowledge (material cause) received in humans through the divine light of revelation (universal efficient cause), which is necessary for them to order themselves to their supernatural final end—the beatific vision (final cause). Moreover this precise definition of sacred doctrine as a genus of knowledge is wide enough to embrace all its various species, which have their own proper place within the ST: the beatific vision, faith, prophecy, and theology, of which only the last is treated in ST, I, q. 1, aa. 2–10, explicating what it is (its formal objects quo and quod) and to what it extends (its methodology).22 Since faith, the habit of the principles, is treated later in the ST (II-II, qq. 1–16), St. Thomas begins article 2 (ST, I, q. 1, a. 2) with a discussion of the acquired habit of theology. In article 2 of his commentary, Cajetan argues that sacred doctrine cannot be taken as the whole genus of knowledge revealed by God. It would be foolish to ask whether the whole of revealed knowledge, including both the principles and the conclusions, is a science, since it is certain that science is not about the principles, but rather about the conclu21. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi; see appendix 2. 22. The habits that cause the specific differences within the genus of sacred doctrine are considered separately throughout the ST. The beatific vision, which is had in patria, is treated in ST, I, q. 12, aa. 1–13. Faith is treated in ST, II-II, qq. 1–16. Prophecy, the formal cause of revelation in via, is treated in ST, II-II, qq. 171–74. The habit of theology in wayfarers, a subalternate science in continuity with the theology of God and the blessed, generated by an acquired judgment from the articles of the faith (the principles), is treated in ST, I, q. 1, aa. 2–10.

an sit

(art. 1): Is it necessary?

quia

(art. 2): Is sacred doctrine a science?

An imperfect science; a subalternate science.

(art. 3 ): Is it intrinsically one science?

S pecial specific difference = ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum (obiectum quo).

(art. 4 ): Is it speculative or practical?

I t is a participation in God’s knowledge, which eminently contains the speculative and practical.

(art. 5 ): Is it the most noble of the sciences?

It is the only acquired science in the order of grace.

(art. 6): Is it wisdom?

It considers the Deity as highest cause.

(art. 7 ): What is its subject?1

The Deity as Deity (ratio deitatis).

(art. 8): Does it argue from reason?

Theology argues from authority by an act of reasoning.

(art. 9): Should it use metaphors?

 etaphors express the literal sense in a mode M congruent to human nature.

( art. 10): Whether sacred Scripture has plurality of senses under one word?

The literal sense is the foundation for the spiritual senses of sacred Scripture.

obiectum ut obiectum (quo)

quid est obiectum ut res (quod)

de modo

1. Basing himself on James Weisheipl’s division (“The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina in Summa Theologiae I, q. 1,” The Thomist 38, no. 1 [1974]: 65), Jean-Paul Torrell likewise divides the ST, I, q. 1, into aa. 2–6, as the generic definition, and a. 7, the subject, as the specific difference; see J.-P. Torrell, “Le savoir théologique chez saint Thomas,” Revue thomiste 96, no. 3 (1996): 366. According to Aquinas, however, it is the formal object, and not the material object or subject, that differentiates the sciences (“Non diversificabuntur scientiae secundum diversitatem materialem scibilium, sed secundum diversitatem eorum formalem”—In I Post. anal., lect., 41, n. 11). Hence the Weisheipl-Torrell scheme is simply untenable.

Sacred Doctrine and Faith   27 sions. Thus article 2 is about sacred doctrine as it is understood in article 1 (pro cognitio Dei revelata); however, the second article deals with sacred doctrine strictly in relation to the conclusions drawn from the articles of faith. Cajetan clearly states the sense of the question addressed in article 2: “Whether sacred doctrine, which we proved to be a necessary revealed knowledge, has the ratio of a science with respect to its conclusions or whether it is only an opinion, etc.?”23 It is here that Cajetan is criticized for introducing a distinction within the concept of sacred doctrine.24 He certainly does make a real distinction between the two co-principles of sacred doctrine in via: the habit of faith and the habit of theology, a habit acquired through the act of demonstrating from the articles of the faith. Cajetan understands Aquinas to be treating sacred doctrine, in ST, I, q. 1, aa. 2 to 10, as the same reality as in article 1 (a genus of knowledge), but in a strict and narrow sense as referring exclusively to its conclusions (a species of knowledge).25 Cajetan’s interpretation of article 2, as to whether sacred doctrine is a science, follows the rule of logic that holds “that predicates are in a subject by reason of the subject itself”;26 namely, sacred doctrine (a revealed knowledge), the subject of article 2, is examined inasmuch as it is a science, the predicate. The comprehension of the term sacred doctrine has increased qualitatively, while its extension has decreased proportionately to only the 23. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. i; see appendix 2. 24. See Henry Donneaud, “Insaisissable sacra doctrina?,” Revue thomiste 98, no. 1 (1998): 181; and Mark Johnson, “The Sapiential Character of Sacra Doctrina in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas: The Appropriation of Aristotle’s Intellectual Virtue of Wisdom” (unpublished PhD diss., University of Toronto, 1990), 184. 25. “Cajetan holds for the univocity of the term sacra doctrina throughout the first question of the Summa. Its meaning is the knowledge revealed by God prescinding from the specifications of this knowledge as faith and theology.” Gerald Van Ackeren, Sacra Doctrina: The Subject of the First Question of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas (Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1952), 25. See also James A. Weisheipl, “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina in Summa Theologiae I, q. 1,” The Thomist 38, no. 1 (1974): 57. 26. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. i; see appendix 2. Cf. Aquinas, In Aristotelis libros posteriorum analyticorum (hereafter In I Post. anal.), lect. 10, n. 8, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa.

28  The Framework conclusions. ST, I, q. 1, articles 2–10, are about sacred doctrine (a genus of knowledge) as it is known through the habit of theology (a species of knowledge). Grasping the essence of sacred doctrine in wayfarers as flowing from various formal causes, Cajetan underlines the incongruities that follow from trying to understand the term “sacred doctrine” in wayfarers as signifying either faith or theology exclusively. He points out that if sacred doctrine signifies faith alone, then two inconsistencies arise. The first is that St. Thomas would be asking the same question twice: in ST, I, q. 1, he asks if sacred doctrine is necessary and, once again, in the ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 3, he asks whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above natural reason. If Aquinas’s purpose in writing the ST, however, was to treat every theological question in its own proper place, avoiding any repetition, he would be uselessly reiterating questions.27 The second inconsistency is that sacred doctrine, if understood as faith alone, would be understood equivocally from article 2 onward, because in article 2, Aquinas establishes that sacred doctrine is a science. Furthermore, he would also contradict himself later in the ST, where he states that faith and science are not about the same things.28 On the other hand, if sacred doctrine were understood to signify theology alone, then faith without theology would not suffice for salvation. This is simply not true, since humans enlightened by the virtue of faith, whether they cultivate the habit of theology or not, can know and direct their actions toward their supernatural end.29 Thus, according to Cajetan’s interpretation, not only is sacred doctrine taken as a science and a unique habit really distinct from the virtue of faith, it also differs essentially from the natural habit of philosophical wisdom. Unlike philosophical wisdom, theology is not a primary part of a potential whole, but rather a separate habit, 27. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. v; see appendix 2. Cf. In ST, prol., 5. 28. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 5. 29. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. v; see appendix 2.

Sacred Doctrine and Faith   29 subordinated to the virtue of faith.30 Subsequently, theology nourishes, defends, strengthens, and begets faith, by explicating what is believed.31 Similar to the natural virtue of philosophical wisdom, however, theology is also acquired through study. It is generated through a judgment by way of knowledge. Its act of judgment, however, is made not merely in the natural light of reason, but rather in the divine light of revelation.32 Although theology judges in a human mode through the instrumentality of reason (per rationem), nevertheless, it lies within the genus of sacred doctrine, because it is generated from supernatural principles: the articles of faith.33 Some scholars have accused Cajetan of reducing sacred doctrine as a science to a theology of conclusions, quasi detached from the faith.34 This misconception, however, stems from a failure to grasp that theology, according to Cajetan, is a simple habit generated from the articles of faith and thus continually dependent on the habit of faith for its principles and medium of demonstration, the light of faith. Faith provides the epistemic foundation for sacred doctrine as a science in wayfarers insofar as the divine light of faith elevates the human intellect to know with certainty, yet without evidence, its supernatural speculative object, the revelation of the Deity, whose ratio is revealed through the articles of faith—the principles of this sacred science.35 Furthermore, as will be shown 30. In contrast to Cajetan, Prierias holds that theology forms a potential whole with faith, in a manner similar to metaphysics, which includes the habits of intellect and science; see Prierias, Conflatum, fol. 11r. 31. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi; see appendix 2. 32. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iv; see appendix 2. Hervaeus also holds that theology judges according to an infused light; see “La Opinio,” 44. 33. In an analogical way, theology is caused by its first principles—the articles of the faith—just as the habit of science is caused in the intellect moved by propositions per se nota; see Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 51 a. 2 c.; and Quaestiones disputatae de malo (hereafter De malo), q. 4, a. 2, ad 4–5, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. 34. See Reginald Schultes, Introductio in historiam dogmatum (Paris: Lethielleux, 1922), 106–7. See also Johannes Beumer, “Konklusionstheologie?” Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 63 (1939): 360–65; Albert Lang, “Die conclusio theologica in der Problemstellung der Spätscholastik,” Divus Thomas (Fr) 22 (1944): 257–90; Edward Schillebeeckx, Revelation and Theology (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1967), 131–36. 35. For Aquinas, the universals are the foundation for all the natural sciences:

30  The Framework in chapter 2, it is faith that structures the Church and thus contains theology’s ecclesiological dimension.

Cajetan on Faith Although he composed it much later (1517), Cajetan raises some interesting queries in his commentary on the object of faith (In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1), concerning the relation between faith’s object and theology’s object, that shed light on the nature of sacred doctrine as a science. He states that Aquinas seems ambiguous in his use of terms in this first article of ST, II-II, q. 1, for either he meant that the veritas prima is the object of the faith or—not being punctilious in his choice of words—he really intended to say that the Deity is the object of faith. In the ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, Aquinas seems to contradict what he states earlier in ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, where he places God under the ratio of the Deity to be the material object or subject of theology. Since the object of faith is the principle of theology, the veritas prima, it would seem, should also be the object of theology. In other words, if the ratio of the Deity, the object of theology, and the veritas prima, the object of faith, are really distinct, there would be no continuity between faith and theology. This would also be contrary to the notion of truth, since truth would be considered as something consequent to the Deity. Thus the ultimate resolution of the act of faith would not terminate in the Deity itself.36 Cajetan sets forth a second part to this first query: if, on the contrary, the veritas prima is a mere synonym for the term “Deity,” this too would be extremely unfitting, for theology would not be something formal in itself, lacking its own proper formal object. He crafts this two-part query to illustrate that the Deity indeed “. . . primo et principaliter, et sic scientia est de rationibus universalibus, supra quas fundatur” (Aquinas, Super libros Boethii De Trinitate [hereafter De trin.], q. 5, a. 4, ad 6, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa); while revelation is the epistemic foundation for sacred doctrine: “super quam fundatur sacra Scriptura seu doctrina” (ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2). 36. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. i; see appendix 2.

Sacred Doctrine and Faith   31 is the material object of both faith and theology, but that these two types of knowledge have diverse formal objects within the divine light of revelation. Theology is dependent on faith, for it is contained in the material object of faith, namely the articles of faith. Nevertheless, it is a knowledge formally distinct from faith precisely on account of its diverse formal object, that is to say its mode of knowing. According to Aquinas’s doctrine on faith, the veritas prima is faith’s one object, which has a two-fold relation to the human intellect: as formal object (id quo creditur) and as material object (id quod creditur). Faith’s formal object is the veritas prima, inasmuch as faith is a supernatural participation in the divine light, while its material object is “what” is revealed by God, that is to say the content of a divine discourse. Moreover, in the one object of the faith, the medium (id quo creditur) has a certain primacy over the content (id quod creditur) within this strict unity of the one object. What is principal is the authority “who” reveals “what” is assented to in faith.37 Cajetan sets forth an expression, relating these two aspects of the one object of the faith, that became standard among other Scholastics: divine revelation is both that “by which” (quo) man believes and “that which” (quod) is believed. Divine revelation is God’s speaking about himself, the veritas prima revealing itself. The same act of faith believes by God (credere Deo) and terminates in God (credere Deum). Thus the resolution of the faith is made simultaneously by means of both of these two inseparable aspects of the one object of faith—the veritas prima.38 Cajetan points out that all the theological virtues have the Deity as their subject or material object. Nonetheless, the question being asked here is whether God—as the formal object of the faith—is 37. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, c. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2; Super III Sententiarum (hereafter In III Sent.), d. 21, q. 2, a. 3, c., in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; De trin., q. 2, a. 3, c., and De trin., q. 3, a. 1, ad 4; Super Evangelium S. Ioannis lectura (hereafter Super Ioan.), cap. 4, lect. 5, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. 38. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. ix.

32  The Framework known under the ratio of the Deity or under the ratio of the truth?39 Cajetan maintains that to consider God as wisdom (the highest cause) is not the same as to consider him as truth. The veritas prima, as a transcendental property of the Divine Being, is another mode of signifying the Deity, while wisdom—a divine attribute—“adds” its ratio to the Deity. Thus wisdom is an attribute of the Deity, while being identical with the divine essence in an eminently virtual mode.40 The divine attributes, such as wisdom, justice, and the like, preeminently exist and have their ultimate foundation in the one, simple essence of God. Yet, as Cajetan maintains, the divine attributes are formally distinct not in a formal mode of being, but rather in a virtual mode of being, as an effect is virtually contained in its cause.41 Thus the divine attribute of wisdom is the epistemic foundation for the formal object of theology, by which its formal acts of contemplation, ordering, judgment, and demonstration terminate in the Deity—the material object or subject. Cajetan does not establish the distinction between faith and theology according to an ontological criterion—for the Deity is the material object of both faith and theology—but rather, following St. Thomas’s doctrine, he establishes the division of the supernatural species of knowledge according to an epistemological criterion: the diverse formal objects “by which” (quo) the human mind knows the Deity.42 The formal object of theology is God as wisdom, that 39. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. v. 40. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. v: “. . . deitas sit suprema ratio formalis in Deo” and “Ex his enim patet non sic se habere Deum ad esse sapientem sicut ad esse verum: quoniam esse sapientem addit naturam sapientiae supra naturam deitatis, licet sint idem realiter; sed esse verum non addit aliam naturam supra deitatem, sed ipsammet deitatem alio modo significat.” 41. All the divine perfections are eminently contained in the divine essence; see Cajetan, De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria, ed. Marie-Hyacinthe Laurent (Turin: Marietti, 1934), cap. 6, 184; and In ST, I, q. 13, a. 5, n. vii. 42.See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi. Probably under the influence of the Arabic philosopher Avicenna (cf. In VI Metaph., lect. 1), Aquinas establishes the division of the speculative sciences (physics, mathematics, and metaphysics) not according to an ontological criteria, as did Aristotle, but rather on an epistemological criterion, the rationes or the “intentional content” of universal concepts: cf. also Aquinas, De trin., 5, 1; Leo Elders, Faith and Science: An Introduction to St. Thomas’ “Expositio in Boethii De Trinitate” (Rome: Herder, 1974), 114; and Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics:

Sacred Doctrine and Faith   33 is to say, the highest cause wisely ordering all things,43 while the formal object of faith is God revealing himself to created intellects under the aspect of truth (sub ratione veritatis).44 As will be shown later on when explicating ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, Cajetan applies Aquinas’s epistemological hermeneutic to the divine light of revelation, which is simple in itself and a composite when participated in by the human mind. The divine light is a genus refracted into formally distinct species: The Deity corresponds to only one adequate formal object [ratio obiectum ut obiectum est], which is the divine light. The divine light, however, is not a species, but rather a genus that is divided into: the divine light as evident, the divine light as revealing (abstracting from both evidence and nonevidence) and the divine light as non-evident. The first is the formal object [ratio sub qua] of the theology of the blessed; the second,—of our theology; and the third,—of faith. Therefore, along with the unity of the material object [ratio obiectum ut res], there is the specific difference of formal objects, and, consequently, the specific difference of habits.45

In his commentary on ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, Cajetan touches on the roles of the intellect and will in the resolution of the act of faith. The act of faith in humans depends on the intellect for its resolution into the veritas prima and on the will for its resolution into a “good in itself,” the beatific vision.46 Furthermore, Cajetan points out that God’s act of revelation ad extra, an act of the divine substance, is both intellectual and volitional. God is not only the material object of the faith, but also the formal object, inasmuch as he freely chooses to speak about himself. It is a rich and interesting notion that what freely moves the human will in the assent of faith is the very goodness and freedom of the God who reveals and promises himself to humans as their supernatural final end. The relationship between the intellect and will was a Scholastic A Study in the Greek Background of Mediaeval Thought (Toronto: The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1951), 176. 43. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. viii; cf. Aquinas ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, c. 44. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. ix. 45. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. ix; see appendix 2. 46. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi.

34  The Framework question of great importance to the Renaissance humanists, who emphasized—along with the Scotists—the primacy of the will over the intellect. Frequently in his commentaries of the ST and sacred Scripture, Cajetan develops at length the role and importance of the will, but he clearly maintains a Thomistic understanding, in which the intellect is simply prior in the orders of nature and causality.47 Cajetan explains the rationale behind the term veritas prima.48 First of all, the term veritas prima specifies that faith is an intellectual virtue. Every intellectual virtue by nature must be infallible with respect to truth.49 Consequently, since the term “faith” in itself does not signify an indefectible relation to truth, it is necessary to ascribe to its object the appellation of veritas prima. Therefore, from the name fixed to its object, faith may be known to have an indefectible relation to truth. If it were only stated that God is the object of faith, it would not be clear that faith is indeed an intellectual virtue, since God can be also the object of opinion.50 Second, the object of faith is called the veritas prima because it appropriates to faith “God revealing the truth about himself” as the medium of its formal acts.51 This premise is based on the division 47. Michael O’Connor claims that Cajetan consistently shifted toward the more humanist opinion of granting priority to the will over the intellect; cf. Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 231. He does not take into account Cajetan’s clear distinction between the orders of nature and causality, in which the intellect and will relate to one another. Cajetan not only affirms, however, that in the order of nature the will follows the intellect (voluntas sequitur intellectum), but he goes on to clarify that the intellect is the proper subject of the will according to the first mode of perseity, namely, the will is included within the definition of the intellect: “medium est proprium subjectum voluntatis (intellectivum enim est per se primo volitivum)” (Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 19, a. 1, n. ii). Moreover, in the order of causality, Cajetan affirms—as does Aquinas—that the will, as an efficient cause, can indeed move the intellect toward an act of intellection; the good of the intellect, however, is simply prior in moving the will—according to final causality—because it specifies the will’s act: “bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis movens ipsam ut finis” (Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 82, a. 4, n. ii). To maintain that Cajetan opposed the Thomistic principle that everything willed by God is ordered according to his divine wisdom, would be the same as accusing him of blasphemy: “. . . dicere quod divina voluntas non procedat secundum ordinem sapientiae, quod est blasphemum.” Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (hereafter De ver.), q. 23, a. 6, c., in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. 48. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. vii. 49. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 3, c. 50. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. vii. 51. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. ix.

Sacred Doctrine and Faith   35 between faith and the other intellectual virtues according to their diverse formal objects quo. In like manner, the habit of theology appropriates “God as Wisdom” as its formal object. Another query that Cajetan raises in his commentary on ST, II-II, q. 1, is that Aquinas does not seem to specify whether the veritas prima is taken in an absolute sense, which extends to all possible things that can be believed (credibilia) through revelation, or in a narrow sense, which extends only to those things that indeed have been revealed.52 Cajetan responds that Aquinas employs both the absolute and narrow senses in the corpus of the article (ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1); namely, the object of faith is God revealing himself (the absolute sense) and nothing is to be believed in unless it is revealed by God (the narrow sense).53 It must be remembered that God in himself is the veritas prima in an absolute sense, without any limitation. The specification is “on the part of the things that are said” (ex parte rerum dictarum) by God, namely all those things revealed by him that pertain to the Christian religion. Revelation does not place in the things revealed anything other than a relation to the divine act of revelation.54 Revelation in God is a relation of reason only (secundum rationem tantum).55 Revelation, as the act of the veritas prima revealing itself, is an act of the divine substance (ad extra) that causes a relation of reason, a new effect, in the created intellect.56 Moreover, God’s act of revelation is the ontological foundation for the conformity of the human intellect to the Deity, concerning those arcane truths that simply exceed human comprehension or form part of the preambles of the faith. The divine act of revelation—a most real relation of reason in the Trinity—is the object and cause of the habit of faith in humans.57 Unlike creation, which is a real relation in crea52. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. ii. 53. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. ix. 54. Ibid. 55. In the same way, creation in God is also a relation of reason; see Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae de potentia (hereafter De pot.), q. 3, a. 3, c., in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. 56. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 28, a. 1, n. xiii. 57. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. ix.

36  The Framework tures, revelation exists only according to a relation of reason in the created intellect, because revelation is essentially a cognitive act. In conclusion, God’s originating act of revelation is the universal efficient cause of sacred doctrine, which is the material cause— the genus of revealed knowledge. Within sacred doctrine, there are a multitude of separate species or habits of knowledge. This insight into the nature of sacred doctrine as a genus of revealed knowledge allows Cajetan to maintain the real distinction between faith and theology and their proper order, in which faith generates theology and theology is continually dependent on faith as the habit of its principles and the medium of its demonstrations. Moreover, it is precisely this insight that enables Cajetan to make a proper hermeneutical division of the first question of the ST.

Sacred Doctrine and the Church

Chapter 2

Sacred Doctrine and the Church The real distinction and relation between faith and theology within sacred doctrine also has an ecclesial significance. In his commentary on faith (ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1), Cajetan raises a fundamental question: How can the veritas prima, simple and uncreated in itself, possibly be the sole object of faith, when it seems that the interpretation and teaching of the Church—although created entities—are also necessary?1 He responds by clarifying that two elements concur in the faith: the assent of the believer, which is the interior dimension, dependent on the infusion of the divine light; and the proposal and explication of those things that are to be believed, which is the exterior dimension, concomitant to the necessity of “hearing” the proposal of faith.2 Regarding the assent 1. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. iii. According to Aquinas, the veritas prima—as the material object of faith—has a dual mode of existence: as the Deity (res), it is non-composite and absolutely simple in itself; in the human intellect, it is a composite of propositions— the articles of faith (see Aquinas, De ver., q. 14, a. 12, c.). This epistemological solution of a dual mode of existence of the material object of faith guarantees the unchanging and permanent essence of the Deity, which is the terminus ad quem of faith in every period of salvation history (see ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2); the development in the conceptualization and expression of the object of faith as it was revealed in progressive stages up until the definitive explication in Christ; and the continual explication of the definitive revelation— up until the end of time—by means of the habit of theology concerning what is virtually contained in the articles of faith (see De ver., q. 14, a. 12, c.). 2. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. x. Cf. Aquinas ST, II-II, q. 6, a. 1, c; De ver., q. 18 a. 3 c; De trin., q. 3, a. 1, ad 4; In III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 3, qc. 1, c.; Quaestiones quodlibetales II (hereafter Qdl. II), q. 4, a. 1, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; and Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 6, a. 1, nn. ii and iii. In contrast, Scotus understands faith to be a habit with an internal distinction concerning the intensity of assent between infused faith, which is of divine origin, and acquired faith, which is dependent on man’s natural powers.

37

38  The Framework of faith, the teaching authority of the Church is not the motive by which the believer assents to the truths of the faith.3 The believer assents to God’s authority, for he is the agent, the object, the end, and the rule of faith.4 The Church merely ministers to revelation as a created, infallible rule of faith, which unerringly proposes and explicates what indeed has been revealed by God. Therefore, the Three-Personed God, who speaks to man, reveals the created, infallible rule of faith—namely, the Church’s God-given authority to teach those revealed realities that are to be believed. Hence, two infallible rules concur in faith: divine revelation and the authority of the Church. The only difference between them is that revelation is the formal object of faith, while the authority of the Church ministers to the object of faith.5 In other words, divine revelation is the infallible rule of faith per se, while the interpretation and teaching of the Church is a created, infallible rule per accidens:6 “Although the universal Church cannot err in the knowledge of faith, nevertheless, she is not the rule of faith; rather divine doctrine alone to which she adheres is the rule of faith.”7 The Church’s magisterium is not the formal object of faith. Acquired faith—by natural means—is sufficient, however, to grasp both the authority of Scripture and its tradition within the community; cf. Scotus, Ordinatio (hereafter Ord.), III (III/2), d. 23, q. un., n. 18, in Opera Omnia: editio minor, ed. Giovanni Lauriola. Alberobello (Bari: Alberobello, 1998–2003). 3. To highlight this point, Cajetan introduces Durandus of St. Pourçain’s argument, which maintains that the doctrinal authority of the Church forms part of the formal object of faith; cf. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. iii. 4. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. x. 5. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. x.; cf. also In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. xii. 6. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. x. Cajetan’s doctrine on the magisterium as a “created infallible rule” is taken directly from Aquinas: “Manifestum est autem quod ille qui inhaeret doctrinae Ecclesiae tanquam infallibili regulae, omnibus assentit quae Ecclesia docet. Alioquin, si de his quae Ecclesia docet quae vult tenet et quae vult non tenet, non iam inhaeret Ecclesiae doctrinae sicut infallibili regulae, sed propriae voluntati” (Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 5, a. 3, c; italics are my own); cf. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 5, a. 3, n. i. The Church’s magisterium contains relatively few teachings that are rooted in the charism of papal infallibility and which require the assent of theological faith. The bulk of the Church’s magisterium is merely ordered to the manifestation and explication of these revealed truths, which demand various levels of assent. For Cajetan’s doctrine on this point, see the section below, “Maiores and Minores.” 7. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 6, n. un.

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   39 However, it falls within the material object of faith and, as a created, infallible rule, it ministers to faith’s material object: faith adheres to God, the revealer of the articles of faith; and among the articles of faith is the holiness of the one Catholic Church; its holiness, however, cannot be rightly understood without [including] the interpretation and teaching of the faith; consequently, whoever adheres to God as the revealer of the articles of faith also believes that the Church cannot err in [matters of] faith; therefore, the interpretation and doctrine [of the Church] is an infallible rule in proposing and explicating what is to be believed.8

Theologia and Oikonomia In order to comprehend the relation between the veritas prima in itself and the Church’s magisterium as minister to the material object of faith, one must first grasp the real distinction and inherent hierarchical relation between the Deity (theologia) and the economy of salvation history (oikonomia), and their intrinsic connection to the two main hermeneutical principles of theology: namely, the articles of faith concerning the Trinity (theologia) and the Incarnation (oikonomia).9 According to Aquinas, divine wisdom providentially ordered that revelation be hierarchically mediated; and, consequently, sacred doctrine’s two main hermeneutical principles contain the innate hierarchical structure of the Church and her theology.10 8. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. x. The intrinsic link between the right interpretation of the faith and the holiness of the Church is established by Aquinas, In Symb. Apost., a. 9. 9. Aquinas does not employ the terms theologia and oikonomia. Nonetheless, their theological import is present throughout the ST in the structuring role of the two main articles of faith, namely the Trinity and the Incarnation; see Aquinas ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 8. For a comparison of Aquinas’s technical expressions of the “end” and “means” to the Greek Fathers’ distinction between theologia and oikonomia, see Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas d’Aquin, Maître spirituel (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1996), 18. 10. Revelation is the main presupposition of the entire Summa theologiae, and it is innately hierarchical. Even if God willed to reveal himself to each intellectual creature individually and immediately, there would still be a hierarchical order and relation between God and each recipient of that particular revelation; see Aquinas, ST, III, q. 42, a. 1, c. Moreover, revelation made through intermediaries—that is to say, by means of instrumental or

40  The Framework On March 3, 1256, in his first inaugural lecture as a magister in actu regens, St. Thomas pronounced a discourse imbued with Pseudo-Dionysian contemplation, Rigans montes de superioribus suis, where he set forth the innate hierarchical structure of revelation as a most sacred divine law (lex divinitatis sacratissima): The King and Lord of the heavens set down this law from all eternity that the gifts of his providence should come to the lower through intermediaries. Hence, Dionysius in the Celestial Hierarchy, Chapter 5, says, “It is the most sacred law of the divinity that things in the middle should be led to his most divine light by first things.” This is found to be a law not only in spiritual things but also in corporeal. Hence, Augustine in The Trinity: “Therefore, as the more crass and least are ruled in a given order by more subtle bodies, so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life.’ Therefore, in the psalm the Lord proposed this law observed in the communication of spiritual wisdom in a metaphor of bodily things: ‘Watering the mountains. . . .’” It is plain to the senses that from the highest clouds rain flows forth by which the mountains and rivers are refreshed and send themselves forth so that the satiated earth can bear fruit. Similarly, from the heights of divine wisdom the minds of the learned, represented by the mountains, are watered, by whose ministry the light of divine wisdom reached to the minds of those who listen.11

The ontological foundation for this first hermeneutical principle—the innate hierarchical structure of revelation—lies deep within the Trinity’s order of origins (ordo originis). Without implying any sort of Trinitarian subordinationism, Aquinas affirms that the Father alone is the unique fount and authority of the Deity ad intra—the principium non de principio.12 Furthermore, the Trinity secondary causes—is an even greater manifestation of God’s power; see Aquinas, ST, III, q. 42, a. 1, ad 2. 11. Thomas Aquinas, Breve Principium, “Rigans montes de superioribus,” Proemium, published in English as “On the Commendation of Sacred Scripture,” in Selected Writings, ed. and trans. Ralph McInerny (New York: Penguin, 1998), 13. 12. Within the ordo originis of Trinity, Aquinas describes the Father as the “fount,” “principle,” and “author” of the Deity; see Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 1, c.; Super librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus (hereafter De div. nom.), c. 2, lect. 2, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; In I Sent., d. 31, q. 2, a. 1, c.; In IV Sent., d. 48, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4; Summa contra Gentiles (hereafter SCG), 4, cap. 10, n. 4, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; and De div. nom., c. 2, lect. 4.

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   41 (theologia) is the principle ad extra of the effects of creation and salvation within the economy (oikonomia).13 Inspired by the PseudoDionysian thearchical order, Aquinas sets forth his explication of the intrinsic unity between theologia and oikonomia, ontology and salvation history.14 In his commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate (c. 1257–59), Aquinas commences with the relation between the uncreated primal nativity (prima nativitas) within the Trinity to both the order of created reality (ordo rerum) and the order of the discipline (ordo disciplinae):15 The matter of this work is the Trinity of Persons in the one, divine essence, that Trinity which has its source in the primal nativity in which divine wisdom is eternally generated by the Father. “The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived” (Prv 8:24), and: “This day have I begotten you” (Ps 2:7). This nativity is the beginning of every other nativity, as it is the only one involving perfect participation in the nature of the generator: but all others are imperfect according as the one generated receives either a part of the substance of the generator, or only a similitude: from this it follows that from the aforesaid nativity, every other is derived by a kind of imitation; and thus: “Of whom all paternity in heaven and in earth is named” (Eph. 3: 15); and on this account the Son is called the first-born of every creature (Col. 1:15) so that the origin of nativity and its imitation might be designated, but not according to the same meaning of generation; and therefore it is aptly said: “I will seek her out from the beginning of her birth.” “The Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways” (Prv 8:22); for not only of creatures is the aforesaid nativity the beginning [ordo re13. Aquinas, Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Timotheum lectura (hereafter Super I Tim.), cap. 6, lect. 2, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; cf. Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Galatas lectura (hereafter Super Gal.), cap. 1, lect. 1, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. 14. There is a deep underlying Pseudo-Dionysian matrix in Aquinas’s theological thought, especially the intrinsic relation between the ontological and historical structures of reality (order, law and hierarchy) and the speculative and practical principles of theology, see René Roques, L’univers dionsyien: structure hierarchique du monde selon le Pseudodenys (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1983), 39. 15. Concluding his examination of the prologue of Aquinas’s Super Boetium De Trinitate, Inos Biffi highlights the relation between theologia and oikonomia, ontology and history, see I misteri di Cristo in Tommaso D’Aquino (Milano: Jaca Books, 1994), 56–57.

42  The Framework rum], but even of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Generator and the Generated. But in saying this, he does not say: “I will seek out the beginning of nativity,” but “from the beginning” signifies that his search is not limited by initiation of this kind of nativity, but that, beginning from this, he proceeds to others, for his doctrine is divided into three parts [ordo disciplinae]. The first part, concerning the Trinity of Persons, from the procession of whom every other nativity and procession are derived, is contained in that book which we possess at hand, so far as anything can be known about the Trinity and Unity.16

In Pseudo-Dionysian style, Aquinas affirms that the celestial and ecclesiastical hierarchies are purified, illumined, and perfected through the act of communicating sacred doctrine in a hierarchical manner from the highest intellectual creature down to the lowest.17 Thus, the communication of spiritual wisdom within the angelic order is both paternal (magister–discipulus) and hierarchical in nature.18 Moreover, since the angels are ontologically situated between God and man, it is fitting that they exercise a mediatory office within the hierarchy of creation and salvation.19 Thus, the Old Law (lex vetus) was revealed through the mediation of the holy angels,20 on account of its imperfect, preparatory, and pedagogical 16. Aquinas, De trin., prol., n. 3. English translation by Rose E. Brennan, https://www .logicmuseum.com/authors/aquinas/superboethiumq1.htm. 17. Appropriating this Pseudo-Dionysian theological perspective, Aquinas states that hierarchical action (efficient causality) is necessary for the communication of revealed knowledge. Moreover, the perfection (final cause) of the hierarchy itself consists in the assumption of this revealed knowledge (material cause), see Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, c. 18. See Aquinas, Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Ephesios lectura (hereafter Super Eph.), cap. 3 lect. 4, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. 19. Cf. Aquinas, ST, III, q. 22, a. 1, ad 1; and In IV Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 2, ad 4. The hierarchical order of created natures determines the order of the discipline in the prima pars: “Post considerationem creaturae spiritualis et corporalis, considerandum est de homine, qui ex spirituali et corporali substantia componitur” (Aquinas, ST, I, q. 75, prol.). Cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 79, a. 1; ST, I, q. 85, a. 1; and ST, I, q. 87, a. 1. 20. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 111, a. 1, ad 1; cf. Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Hebraeos lectura (hereafter Super Heb.), cap. 2, lect. 1, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; and ST, II-II, q. 172, a. 2, c. Cajetan commenting on ST, II-II, q. 172, a. 2, makes the distinction that only God illuminates the human mind immediately through the light of faith and prophecy, while the angels illuminate the human mind by strengthening it and

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   43 nature,21 while the definitive revelation of the New Law (lex nova), whose nature is perfect and consummate, was predestined to be communicated by Christ himself,22 immediately and viva voce to the Jews and, after his Passion and Resurrection, to the gentiles through the mediation of his holy apostles and disciples.23 According to Aquinas, Christ is the principal teacher of the faith and the legislator of the lex nova.24 He definitively explicated the articles of faith by his very existence, and through his words and deeds.25 According to his divinity, the Word and Wisdom eternally generated from the Father are the principle and authority,26 through teaching it what has already been revealed; cf. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 172, a. 2, n. iii. 21. The Old Law (lex vetus)—although a revealed law—is founded on and embraces the entire natural law (lex naturae), with the addition, however, of divine instruction; see Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 100, a. 1, c. In a similar manner, the two main truths—God exists eternally and, in his providence, he remunerates the good and punishes the wicked (these truths are known by reason in the natural law and by revelation in the Old Law; see ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7)—forms the ground of the lex nova’s explicit belief in the two main mysteries of the faith, namely, the Trinity and salvation through the mystery of the Incarnation (see ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 8). According to Aquinas, the principles of sacred doctrine in the Old Law were the Ten Commandments, which virtually contained other theological conclusions; see Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 100, a. 3, c.; cf. Aquinas, Collationes in decem praeceptis, Reportatio Petri de Andria (hereafter De decem praecep.), prol., in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa, and Sententia libri Ethicorum VI (hereafter In VI Ethic.), lect. 7, n. 3, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. 22. See Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 98, a. 3, c. Cf. SGC, III, cap. 154, SGC, IV, cap. 55, De ver., q. 12, a. 8; Super Isaiam (hereafter Super Is.), cap. 6, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CDROM, ed. Busa; Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia Expositio in Matthaeum (hereafter Super Matth.), cap. 2, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; Super Gal., cap. 3, lect. 1; Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Colossenses lectura (hereafter Super Col.), cap. 2, lect. 4, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. 23. See Aquinas, ST, III, q. 42, a. 1, c. 24. On Christ as teacher, see Aquinas, ST, III, q. 7, a. 7, c. and Breve Principium, “Rigans montes de superioribus,” cap. 2. Aquinas explicates Christ’s authorship of our faith in two ways: first, Christ teaches through his words and, second, he infuses his doctrine in the hearts of those who believe. Christ is also the consummation of the faith in two ways: first, by confirming the truth of his doctrine with miracles and, second, by perfecting faith in glory; cf. Super Heb., cap. 12, lect. 1. On Christ as legislator, see Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 108, a. 1, c. 25. See Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 5. 26. See Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 32, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2. Cf. De trin., prol., n. 3 and Breve Principium, “Rigans montes de superioribus,” cap. 1.

44  The Framework together with the Father and the Holy Spirit, of revelation within the economy ad extra;27 and the Incarnate Word and Wisdom, on account of the hypostatic union, is the unique instrumental and exemplary cause of revelation.28 Since the Incarnation is the most eminent mode of divine self-communication,29 Christocentrism is the second essential hermeneutic principle of sacred doctrine within both the economy of salvation history (oikonomia) and the order of the discipline (ordo disciplinae). Likewise, Cajetan affirms that Christ is the “Instrument of the Deity.”30 He is both the Word of God (ad intra) and the Word of all things (ad extra).31 He is the principal doctor of the faith and first in the order of the theology of the blessed.32 Furthermore, he is the terminus in the progress of revelation, as the consummation of grace, truth, and the fullness of time.33 Christ’s divinity is manifest through his most excellent mode of teaching, which is not merely in an exterior manner, like that of angelic and human teachers, but primarily in an interior mode, for he directly illuminates the human mind.34 Christ’s doctrine is etched into the hearts of the faithful by the Holy Spirit, who is sent by Christ to instruct them.35 27. See Aquinas, Super Ioan., cap. 1, lect. 1; cf. Super Ioan., cap. 15, lect. 1. Aquinas is very precise in not assigning the subject of theology exclusively to the Word, who is the Second Person of the Trinity; rather, the subject of theology is the Triune God—theologia in se; see ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, c.; cf. André Hayen, San Tommaso e la vita della chiesa oggi (Milan: Jaca Book, 1993), 111. 28. See Aquinas, SCG, 4, cap. 41. Cf. ST, III, q. 7, a. 7, ad 1. 29. See Aquinas, Super Heb., cap 1, lect. 1. 30. For a study on Cajetan’s Christology, see Marcel Nieden, Organum Deitatis: Die Christologie des Thomas De Vio Cajetan (Leiden: Brill, 1997). 31. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 8, n. vii. 32. See Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 7, a. 7, n. i. According to Cajetan, Christ’s words found not only the faith, but as Perfect Man, Christ was a comprehensor, namely one of the blessed who “sees” with evidence, in the beatific vision, the articles of faith. Thus, Christ’s own “theology of the blessed” founds our theology in via; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi; see appendix 2. When Aquinas states that sacred doctrine as a science proceeds from principles known in the light of the higher science of God and the blessed, he is primarily thinking of Christ, who possesses both the theology of God and the theology of the blessed without mixture; cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 2. 33. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, n. ii. 34. See Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 42, a. 4, n. iii. 35. See Aquinas, Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura II (hereafter Super II

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   45 Sacred doctrine is the end to which the Scriptures are ordered: “For Scriptures are ordained, as to an end, unto the imprinting of doctrine in the hearts of the hearers.”36 Thus, sacred Scripture has a secondary and subordinate role in relation to the lex nova,37 which is inscribed immediately by God onto the hearts of the faithful (sensus fidei/sensus fidelium).38 Scripture is a divinely inspired and inerrant vehicle of revelation to which the faithful adhere without evidence.39 The virtue of faith is the modus intelligendi of both the Uncreated (theologia) and created (oikonomia) realities signified and revealed through the words of Tradition and Scripture.40 Moreover, the articles of the faith, a constituent of the lex nova, when assented to by faith, initiate the beatific vision, which is man’s final end within the order of grace, and which essentially consists in the mysteries of the Godhead (theologia) and Christ’s Incarnation (oikonomia).41 Consequently, the Trinity and the Incarnation are the two founding principles of the Church, which is essentially, according to Aquinas, the congregation of the faithful (congregatio fidelium)—the Cor.), cap. 3, lect. 1, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. Within the economy ad extra, all authority belongs to the entire Trinity. Nevertheless, as Aquinas maintains, authority is also attributed in a particular manner to the Holy Spirit: as the author of prophecy (cf. ST, II-II, q. 172, a. 6, ad 1; De ver., q. 12, a. 10, obj. 7); as author of sacred Scripture (De pot., q. 4, a. 1, c., Qdl 7, q. 6, a. 1, ad 5; Qdl 7, q. 6, a. 3, c., Super Is., lect., 1; In psalmos Davidis expositio (hereafter Super Ps.), Prologus, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; as the author of the law (Super II Cor., cap. 3, lect. 3); as the author of life (Super Ioan., cap. 6, lect. 4; Super Gal., cap. 6, lect. 2); as the author of gifts (Super I Cor., cap. 12, lect. 1); as the author of graces (Super I Cor., cap. 12, lect. 1), as the author of perfect human actions (ST, III, q. 41, a. 2, ad 2); and as the agent of Christ’s conception and birth (Super Matth., lect. 4). 36. Aquinas, ST, III, q. 42, a. 4, c. 37. “Et ideo dicendum est quod principaliter nova lex est lex indita, secundario autem est lex scripta” (Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 106, a. 1 c.). 38. Aquinas does not use the terms sensum fidei and sensum fidelium, but the content of these concepts is based on the indefectibility of the faith in the individual (cf. ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3) and in the Church as a whole (cf. ST, II-II, q. 174, a. 6). 39. “. . . modus significandi vocum non consequatur immediate modum essendi rerum, sed mediante modo intelligenti” (Aquinas, Sententia libri Metaphysicae VII (hereafter In VII Metaph.), lect. 1, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. Cf. ST, I, q. 34, a. 1, c., and De ver., q. 4, a. 1. 40. Cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 12, a. 13. 41. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 8, c.

46  The Framework community of those on whose hearts is inscribed the lex nova and who participate in the law of grace (lex gratiae).42

Sacred Doctrine as the Church’s Framework The order of origins within the Trinity (theologia) ontologically grounds the hierarchical structure of revelation, the first hermeneutical principle, and, consequently, determines the hierarchical structure of the Church, in both its angelic and human orders,43 as they flow from the wellspring and authority of the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit. The essence of the second hermeneutic principle—Christocentrism—is that the fullness of truth, the definitive explication of the articles of faith, and grace (conferred by the sacraments) that found the Church are in and through Christ.44 He is the head, the principle, and the authority of the Church, the congregation of the faithful.45 Cajetan affirms that the foundation of the Church belongs simply and totally to Christ, while certain other members participate in the Church’s edification in a secondary and instrumental manner.46 Consequently, in the economy of salvation history, these 42. See Aquinas, Qdl. 4, q. 8, a. 2, c. 43. See Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 13, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1, s.c. 3; cf. ST, III, q. 8, a. 4, c. 44. See Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, qc. 5, c. 45. See Aquinas, ST, III, q. 8, a. 6. c. For some key passages from Aquinas on the Church as the congregatio fidelium; see ST, III, q. 8, a. 4, ad 2; ST, III, q. 70, a. 1, c.; Compendium theologiae (hereafter Comp. theol.), lib. 1, cap. 147, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; Super Ioan., cap. 14, lect. 1; Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Thessalonicenses lectura (hereafter Super I Thess.), cap. 1, lect. 1, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CDROM, ed. Busa; Expositio in Symbolum Apostolorum, Reportatio Reginaldi de Piperno (hereafter In Symb. Apost.), a. 9, c. , in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa In his commentary on Genesis, Cajetan writes: “. . . hoc est congregationis iustorum hominum in una fide, spe et caritate Dei; haec enim viva domus Dei, quae incepit ab Abel iusto” (Cajetan, In Gen., 28.12), cited in Anton Bodem, “Exkurs: Kirche seit Abel,” in Das Wesen der Kirche nach Kardinal Cajetan (Trier: Paulinus Verlag, 1971), 109–12. Cf. Yves Congar, L’Eglise: De saint Augustine à l’époque moderne (Paris: Cerf, 1970), 231–41; and Esquisses du Mystère de l’Eglise (Paris: Cerf, 1953), 59–91. 46. See Cajetan, De divina institutione pontificatus Romani pontificis super totam Ecclesiam a Christo in Petro (hereafter De divina institutione), ed. Friedrich Lauchert (Münster in Westfalen: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1925), 36; cf. Aquinas In Symb. Apost., a. 9.

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   47 certain individuals—called to participate in the founding of Christ’s Church as “mediators” in the communication of sacred doctrine— are granted a superior intensity and perfection in the infused knowledge of faith through the charism of prophecy, according to their prior and posterior chronological proximity to Christ, namely, according to the Christocentric hermeneutical principle.47 After the Fall, the faithful—more distant in time prior to the coming of Christ—were granted a less explicit knowledge of revelation. Conversely, with the Incarnation of Christ, those nearest to Him in time, such as the apostles, were granted a more perfect and explicit revelation than all prior and subsequent generations.48 According to Aquinas, St. John the Baptist was the terminus of the Old Testament and the inception of the New. He enjoyed, as did the apostles, on account of his proximity to Christ, a greater participation in the infused knowledge of the mysteries of faith. The Baptist was the greatest of the prophets, however, not on account of the charism of prophecy, but rather on account of his personal sanctity, that is to say his meritorious life in sanctifying grace, which began when Christ sanctified him while still within St. Elisabeth’s womb.49 According to Aquinas, Moses, the Doctor of the Jews, and St. Paul, the Doctor of the Gentiles, were granted higher prophetic gifts than the Baptist, having both suffered the rapture of the beatific vision and having participated, albeit transiently, in the theology of the blessed.50 Aquinas’s sacred law of the chronological proximity to Christ in the economy of salvation history is the Christocentric hermeneutic by which Cajetan hierarchically orders and determines the authorities within sacred doctrine.51 Cajetan also refers to the diachron47. Aquinas sets forth this principle of authority as based on the prior and posterior chronological proximity to Christ; cf. ST, II-II, q. 174, a. 6, c. 48. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, n. ii. 49. Aquinas clearly states that John the Baptist belongs to the New Testament, see ST, II-II, q. 174, a. 4, ad 3. He also refers to John the Baptist as terminus of the Old Law and the beginning of the New Law; see ST, III, q. 38, a. 1, ad 2. 50. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 175, a. 3, ad 1. Cf. Super II Cor., cap. 12, lect. 1; In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 7, ad 5; and De ver., q. 10, a. 11, ad 1. 51. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, n. ii.

48  The Framework ical progression of revelation within the economy of salvation history. Revelation’s diachronical progression in the Old Testament is intrinsically contained within the Christocentric principle, culminating in the fullness of grace and truth in Christ.52 Aquinas divides salvation history into three main periods: before the law (ante legem), under the law (sub lege), and under grace (sub gratia).53 Each period is initiated by a more perfect revelation of the Deity: in the period before the law (ante legem), the revelation made to Abraham was the highest in that period; in the period under the law (sub lege), the revelation made to Moses was simply the highest not only in that particular period, but within the entire span of the Old Testament; finally, in the period under grace (sub gratia), the faith of the entire Church has its terminus in the definitive revelation in Christ, entrusted immediately to the apostles and evangelists.54 According to Cajetan, the one and same faith is present throughout all periods of salvation history in the Church’s principal members, the prophets, apostles, and evangelists, who are mediators of Christ’s revelation of the veritas prima and co-authors of sacred Scripture through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit:55 “that our 52. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, n. v. Cf. In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. x. 53. In his commentary on Isaiah, one of his earliest works, written when he was a cursor biblicus at Cologne prior his departure to Paris in 1252, Aquinas divided the historical periods of humanity into four: “Potest ergo quadruplex tempus distingui. . . . Primum ante legem scriptam et idolatriam. . . ; Secundum tempus est sub lege scripta. . . ; Tertium tempus fuit sub prophetis. . . ; Quartum tempus est sub gratia” (Aquinas, Super Is., cap. 1, lect. 3). In his subsequent writings, Aquinas assigns only three historical periods of time; see Catena aurea in quatuor Evangelia Expositio in Ioannem, (hereafter Super Ioan.) cap. 2, lect. 1, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 7, c.; SCG, 4, cap. 55, n. 11; Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Hebraeos lectura (hereafter Super Heb.), cap. 11, lect. 2; Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Romanos lectura (hereafter Super Rom.) cap. 7, lect. 2, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. 54. “Similiter enim Iesus Christus per seipsum et exterius et interius docuit Apostolos, qui, lumine infuso fulti, scripserunt: aperuit enim illis sensum ut intelligerent Scripturam [Luc. cap. xxiv, vers. 45], et Spiritus Sanctus lumine mentes eorum illustravit, ut docerent verbo et scripto reliquos” (Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 42, a. 4, n. iii). Cf. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 174, a. 6. 55. “Ut subiuncta dicta intelligamus dicta quidem esse hominis, sed inspiratione divina dicta. Quemadmodum ergo in apostolis Spiritus Sanctus in die Pentecoste datus locutus est, ita et in Davide. . . . Non solum interna locutio Spiritus Sancti in eo describitur,

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   49 faith adheres to the revelation made to the Church, includes that it adheres to the revelation made to the principal members of the Church, namely, the prophets, apostles, and evangelists.”56 According to Aquinas, the Old and New Laws are related to one another as the imperfect to the perfect within same species of divine law.57 Moreover, both testaments are united under the same final end or cause, namely the beatific vision attainable only through the grace of Christ.58 Hence there is only one faith, and only one Church.59 Within each and every one of the three periods of salvation history (ante legem, sub lege, sub gratia), there were always certain individuals who belonged to the congregation of the faithful and, thus, were subject to the law of faith (lex fidei) and the law of grace (lex gratiae).60 From the moment of their creation, our protoparents Adam and Eve were recipients of a primal revelation and, thus, were members of the one church.61 For Aquinas, the necessity of revelation (the efficient cause) and a sacred doctrine (the material cause) is never the result of the “wound of ignorance” caused by original sin.62 Man’s supernatural call to participate in the dised etiam quod illa interna locutio prodit extra in exteriori sermone” (Cajetan, Commentaria in Regum [hereafter In II Reg.] 23.2, in Opera Omnia, 2:169a). Cf. O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 131. 56. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 5, n. v. According to Cajetan, the prophets, apostles, and evangelists form the principle of Tradition, namely that which is to be handed down orally and in sacred Scripture; see Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 42, a. 4, n. iii. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. viii; and In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, n. ii. 57. See Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 91, a. 5, c. 58. See Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 98, a. 2, c. 59. See Cajetan, De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii cum apologia eiusdem tractatus (hereafter De comp.), ed. V. M. I. Pollet (Rome: Institutum Angelicum, 1936), n. 417. Cf. Aquinas, De ver., q. 14, a. 12, c. 60. See Cajetan, In ST., I-II, q. 106, a. 3, n. un. Cf. Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 106, a. 3, ad 2, and ST, I-II, q. 106, a. 1, ad 3. 61. Adam received the faith interiorly and was entrusted to communicate it to Eve and their potential offspring in the state of innocence; see Aquinas, De ver., q. 18, aa. 2–3. On the faith of the ancients and moderns as the basis of one church; see Aquinas, De ver., q. 14, a. 12, c. 62. See Aquinas, De ver., q. 6, a. 6, c. Cajetan defines this predestination to a supernatural end as: “divina ab aeterno praeordinatio eorum quae per gratiam sunt fienda in tempore” (In ST, III, q. 24, a. 1, n. xi).

50  The Framework vine nature through grace and to direct his actions toward his ultimate perfection in the beatific vision is an effect of predestination, which is willed by God from all eternity. Hence, our prelapsarian proto-parents believed explicitly that their supernatural end was ultimately to be attained in and through the Incarnation and, consequentially, they also explicitly believed in the Trinity.63 In other words, within the economy of salvation history, from the creation of Adam and Eve to the end of the world, there were, there are, and there will be those who explicitly believe in the Trinity and the Incarnation.64 Following Aquinas, Cajetan perceives the transmission of divine wisdom to be a flowing down hierarchically from the theology of God and the blessed through to the prophets, apostles, and evangelists, who received from God immediately and with certainty, by means of the transient charism of prophecy, the revelation of those truths to-be-believed-in.65 In the order of grace, this immediate reception and communication of the doctrine of faith in and through the prophets, apostles, and evangelists forms the secondary foundation of the Church. It is on the authority divinely granted to these principal members of the Church that sacred doctrine is communicated through both oral Tradition and sacred Scripture.66 63. For the prelapsarian belief in the Incarnate Son; see Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 7, c., and ST, I, q. 94, a. 3. For the prelapsarian belief in the Trinity, see ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 8. 64. Per Erik Persson argues that Aquinas’s use of the past tense in the first article (“quod necessarium fuit ad humanam salutem,” ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, c.) seems to echo back to a distant time before the Fall; cf. Persson, Sacra doctrina: Reason and Revelation in Aquinas, trans. Ross Mackenzie (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), 34. 65. The gift of prophecy is transient; cf. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 3, n. i and ii. It is given by God to the prophet without any mediation (cf. In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 6, n. i) and it is certain (cf. In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 5, n. ii and v). 66. For Cajetan on Tradition and Scripture; see O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 130–31; and Johannes Beumer, “Suffizienz und Insuffizienz der heiligen Schrift nach Kardinal Thomas de Vio Cajetan,” Gregorianum 45, no. 4 (1964): 816–24. Aquinas clearly holds a dual mode of the transmission of revelation, namely through Tradition and Scripture; cf. De div. nom., cap. 1, lect. 2; De div. nom., cap. 2, lect. 2; De div. nom., cap. 1, lect. 3; ST, III, q. 25 a. 3 ad 4; ST, III, q. 64, a. 2, ad 1; ST, III, q. 78, a. 3, ad 9; In IV Sent., d. 8, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 1; In IV Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, qc. 1, ad 1; Super II Thess., cap. 2, lect. 3. Cf. Étienne Ménard, La tradition: révélation, écriture, église selon saint Thomas d’Aquin, in Studia 18 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964).

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   51 Hence the prophets, apostles, and evangelists—who collectively form the created principle and authority of the Church’s hierarchical Tradition—and sacred Scripture constitute the first necessary condition for guaranteeing the certainty of the material object of faith.67 The subsequent determination by the Church’s magisterium, whose principle is the papacy, constitutes the second necessary condition for guaranteeing the integrity of the explication and the proposition of the veritas prima—the one simple object of faith.68 Both the magisterium of the Church and the Tradition–sacred Scripture tandem are created conditions for the guaranteed communication of the faith, while the light of divine revelation, immediately infused by God, is the primary efficient cause of the doctrine of the faith.69 Tradition—constituted in the persons of the apostles, evangelists, and prophets—and sacred Scripture are the two modes by which divine revelation is communicated.70 According to Cajetan, apostolic Tradition regulates sacred Scripture, while both apostolic Tradition and sacred Scripture together regulate the Church’s magisterium.71 Aquinas’s reference to the canonical Scriptures as the only rule of faith cannot be equated to the Reformation principle of sola scriptura, but rather suggest that sacred Scripture, since it contains the substance of the faith immediately entrusted by Christ 67. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 5, n. v. 68. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 5, a. 3, n. i. 69. For Aquinas on the “doctrine of the faith” (doctrina fidei), see ST, II-II. q. 1, a. 7; ST, II-II. q. 16, a. 1, ad 4; In III Sent., d. 25 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 1, obj. 2; De div. nom., cap. 1, lect. 1; Super Heb., cap. 6, lect. 2. In particular, the substance of the “doctrine of the faith” is composed of the basic rudiments that all the faithful are held to believe explicitly; see In IV Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1, c. These rudiments of the faith are to be taught in the catechetical instruction preceding baptism; see In IV Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, s.c. 1. They are the articles of faith, which form the principles of sacred doctrine as a science; see ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, c. These articles of faith are gathered together in what is called the Symbol of Faith or Creed; see ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 9, c. They are a summary of the contents of sacred Scripture; see In IV Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 1; and ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 9, ad 1. 70. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2. 71. “Thomas de Vio pense que le charisme apostolique garantit l’authenticité d’un écrit” (André-François von Gunten, “La contribution des Hébreux a l’oeuvre exégétique de Cajetan,” 54–56). On Cajetan and the canon of the Bible at the Council of Trent, see O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 244–46.

52  The Framework to the apostles and evangelists, is an infallible rule of faith for the Church.72 Fundamental in both Aquinas’s and, subsequently, in Cajetan’s ordering of the relation between Tradition and Scripture is the primacy of place given to oral Tradition—all that Christ immediately and viva voce communicated to the apostles—over the written text.73 According to Cajetan, sacred Scripture is canonical insofar as it was handed down immediately to the apostles, the instrumental principles of Tradition. Thus, the canon of Scripture was subsequently determined and defined by the Church’s magisterium on the basis of apostolic Tradition. As early as October 12, 1511, Cajetan clearly maintained that the canon of Scripture was revealed to the apostles and clearly not to the pope. Thus, the biblical canon is contained within apostolic Tradition.74 This is why when Cajetan affirms that it is “from the authority of the Church that we have all the books of Scripture,” he means that the Church’s authority on questions of canonicity flows from apostolic Tradition.75 Consequently, Cajetan never held an “ecclesiastical fideism,” wherein the Church’s magisterium is exalted over the authority of sacred Scripture.76 Furthermore, he knew his own 72. Sacred Scripture is a rule of faith because of the authority given by God immediately to its human authors, the apostles, evangelists and prophets, who teach in the “person” of the entire Church. Aquinas contrasts the apocryphal writings to the canonical by their authorship (auctoritas); see Aquinas, Super Ioan., cap. 21, lect. 6. 73. See Aquinas, ST, III, q. 42, a. 4. 74. “Apostolis, non papae, condendi libros sacrae Scripturae concessum est, dicente illi Domino quod Spiritus Sanctus doceret eos omnia et ‘omnem veritatem’.” Cajetan, De comp., n. 55. 75. “Ex authoritate siquidem ecclesiae habemus omnes libros sacrae scripturae; nam evangelium Ioannis nescirem magis quam Bartholomaei, nisi me authoritas ecclesiae admoneret.” Cajetan, De erroribus contingentibus in eucharistia sacramento, in Opuscula omnia, vol. 2 (Antwerp: Ioannem Keerbergium, 1612), 105ra–b. 76. Citing St. Augustine, Cajetan affirms: “Evangelio non crederem, nisi me auctoritas Ecclesiae admoneret.” In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. v; cf. St. Augustine, Fundamentum, PL 42:176. During the medieval period, this passage from St. Augustine inspired what Yves Congar termed a certain “ecclesiastical fideism,” in which the authority of the Church’s magisterium was placed over the authority of sacred Scripture; see Congar, La Tradition et les traditiones, vol. 2 (Paris: Cerf, 2010), 274. As Congar notes, however, Cajetan was not an ecclesiastical fideist. This is evident in his firm opposition to Durandus’s argument that the doctrinal authority of the Church forms part of the formal object quo of faith; cf. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. iii. This type of “ecclesiastical fideism,” however, was present in Prierias. In

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   53 limitations on questions of canonicity and adhered to St. Jerome’s authority in the matter as an echo of apostolic Tradition.77 In conclusion, the substance or material object of the faith exists ontologically as the Deity’s own intelligibility, the theology of God, which includes all future contingents—the economy. Within the economy of grace, the theology of God is participated in through hierarchically distinct modes of knowing: (1) in Christ’s human mind, inasmuch as he was perfect man from his conception and, thus, always enjoyed the beatific vision, together with all those members of the heavenly Church, who participate in the theology of the blessed;78 (2) in the prophets, apostles, and evangelists, who—through the charism of prophecy—received immediately and with certainty sacred doctrine in order to further communicate it through both oral Tradition and sacred Scripture; (3) in the minds of the faithful as the lex nova, which is known with certainty through an interior act of faith (sensus fidei); (4) in the collective mind of the Church as a quasi persona (sensus fidelium—fides Ecclesiae);79 and (5) in the post-apostolic Church’s magisterium, united and grounded in the papacy’s prophetic charism of infallibility. his response to Luther’s ninety-five theses (In presumptuoas Martini Luther conclusiones de potestate pape dialogus, published in Rome in 1518), in the third of four fundamenta, in the introductory section, Prierias states: “He who does not hold the teaching of the Roman Church and the pope as an infallible rule of faith, from which even Holy Scripture draws its power and authority, he is a heretic” (cited in Tavuzzi, Prierias, 111). 77. See Cajetan, Commentaria in Hester (hereafter In Hest.), 10.3, in Opera Omnia, 2:400b, and Responsiones ad censuras XVI articulorum sub nomine theologorum Parisiensium editas, Magistro Ioanni regent Moguntini missa, vol. 5 (Lyons: Iacobus et Petrus Prost, 1639), 470. For a summary of Cajetan’s doctrine on canonicity and Scripture, especially of his reliance on St. Jerome, see O’Connor, “Authorship and Canonicity,” chapter 8 in Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 148–51. 78. Christ was simultaneously a “comprehensor” who enjoyed the theology of the blessed, the beatific vision, while being a “viator” on this earth; see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xi. 79. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 9, ad 3. Cajetan affirms: “unus siquidem novus homo integratur ex omnibus Christianis: qui est ipsum Christi corpus, quod est ecclesia” (Cajetan, Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. ad Ephesios [hereafter In Eph.], 2.15, in Opera Omnia, 5:228a); “ex Christi capite et nobis membris constituitur una persona mystica” (In ST, III, q. 1, a. 2, n. xiii); see also Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. I–II ad Corinthios (hereafter In I Cor.), 12.12, in Opera Omnia, 5:128a–129b. For Cajetan’s doctrine on the Mystical Body of Christ, see Anton Bodem, Das Wesen der Kirche nach Kardinal Cajetan, 113–75.

54  The Framework The integral and infallible proposition and explication of the material object of the faith, however, belongs simply and primarily to Christ; secondarily to the prophets, apostles, and evangelists, who handed down Christ’s doctrine through oral Tradition and sacred Scripture; and tertiarily, in a strictly ministerial mode, to the papal charism of infallibility. This last point Aquinas concisely teaches when responding to the query on whether the defining and ordering of the articles in the Creed pertain to the pope: The truth of the faith is sufficiently explicated in the doctrine of Christ and the apostles [the primary and secondary infallible foundations of the Church]. But since, according to 2 Peter 3:16, some corrupt men pervert the doctrine and other Scriptures to their own destruction, it was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly against the errors which arose [hence papal infallibility is a guarantor of the unity of faith and thus unity of the Church].80

In summary, following Aquinas’s thought, Cajetan maintains that the Church has a threefold foundation that is Christocentric, hierarchical, and personalistic. The Church’s authority flows down from its authors or living principles: Christ; the prophets, apostles, and evangelists; and, finally, the pope. The formal cause of this tripartite foundation is based on the diverse formal modes by which the material object of the faith is infallibly communicated.81 Thus, the constitution of the Church and the spiritual communication of sacred doctrine are inseparably interwoven. Cajetan states that the phrase “the foundation of the Church” has three modes of meaning:82 (1) Christ, to whom the foundation 80. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, ad 1. 81. Cornelius Ernst identifies the veritas prima, the articles of the faith, and the canonical Scriptures as the three modes of revelation at the basis of theology; see “Metaphor and Ontology in Sacra Doctrina,” The Thomist 38, no. 3 (1974): 404–5. Ernst’s interpretation corresponds with Cajetan’s understanding: the veritas prima is the simple, non-composite ontological fundament; the articles of faith exist as a plurality in the created intellect through various modes of participation in the divine light of revelation (beatific vision, prophecy, faith); and the canonical Scriptures are a specific form of the prophetic mode by which the articles of faith are a written record of salvation history. 82. Cf. Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 36; and In I Cor., 3.11, in Opera Omnia, 5:94b–95a.

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   55 of the Church belongs simply and absolutely, to the exclusion of all others, since he alone teaches in an eminent mode, as both formal object quod and quo,83 and since only in him are the theologia Dei (as perfect God) and the theologia beatorum (as perfect Man) united without mixture;84 (2) the prophets and apostles, who are the foundation of the Church in a secondary manner, because Christ entrusted to them immediately and infallibly, through the charism of prophecy, his definitive revelation of the material object of faith (articuli fidei vel sacra Scriptura); and, (3) the pope, as the principle and authority of the Church’s continuing magisterium, ministering to the revealed Word by defining, proposing, and explicating with certainty the articles of faith according to a prophetic mode of divine assistance (infallibilitas).85

The Prophetic Role of the Papacy While serving as master general of the Dominican Order, Cajetan first developed his theological doctrine on the ecclesiological significance of papal primacy in a treatise entitled De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii, completed on October 12, 1511.86 It was published a month later, following the first session of the 83. Cajetan’s formula “divina revelatio est quo et quod creditur” (Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. xi) corresponds well with the Second Vatican Council’s affirmation: “By this revelation [material object] then, the deepest truth about God and the salvation of man shines out [formal object] for our sake in Christ, who is both the mediator and the fullness of all revelation [i.e., Christ is the formal object quo and quod].” Vatican Council II, Dei Verbum, November 18, 1965, n. 2; English text available at www.vatican.va/archive/ hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651118_dei-verbum_en.html. 84. In Christ, the God-Man, the theologies of God and man touch; and in Christ are the theologies of the Old Testament and natural religions (inasmuch as they contain truth) preserved and raised to a completely new level. The Christocentric hermeneutic principle informs the theology of wayfarers with its cruciform dimensions; i.e., its vertical dimension (its continuity with the theology of God), and its horizontal dimension (its continuity throughout the entire span of salvation history). 85. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, n. v. According to Cajetan, the divine assistance granted to the papacy is the principle or fount for the Church’s authority as the created infallible rule of the faith: “auctoritas Ecclesiae est infallibilis regula” (In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, n. x). 86. See Cajetan, De comp. For an English translation, see Conciliarism and Papalism, ed. James H. Burns and Thomas M. Izbicki, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought Cambridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

56  The Framework Conciliabulum of Pisa (November 1511), in which the French bishops sought to depose Pope Julius II. The German church historian Hubert Jedin proclaimed that it was a momentous event when Cajetan—one of the most prominent theologians of his time— intervened in the debate at Pisa and theologically rescued ecclesiology from the canonists.87 Quasi-concurrently with the anti-Pisan treatise, Cajetan composed his commentary on ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, the locus classicus for Aquinas’s treatment of papal authority in defining the material object of faith. On February 18, 1521, Cajetan completed a second treatise on the papacy, this time against Luther, entitled De divina institutione pontificatus totius ecclesiae in persona Petri apostoli.88 The Dutch Renaissance humanist Erasmus preferred this latter work to the anti-Pisan, praising it as a model of objectivity, brevity, and erudition.89 In general, Cajetan theologized an ecclesiology centered on the monarchical-paternal principle, which flows from the most sacred divine law of the hierarchical communication of sacred doctrine (the first hermeneutic principle) and which is concretized in the Universal Church’s ministerial authority in determining, proposing, and explicating the material object of faith.90 Within the decade 87. See Hubert Jedin, “Zur Entwicklung der Kirchenbegriffs im 16 Jahrhundert,” Relazioni del X Congresso internazionale di scienze storiche, vol. 4 (Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1955), 61; cf. Cajetan, De comp., n. 7. 88. Cajetan, De divina institutione pontificatus Romani pontificis super totam Ecclesiam a Christo in Petrum (1521), ed. Friedrich Lauchert (Münster in Westfalen: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1925). 89. Erasmus thought Cajetan’s anti-Pisan tractate, De comparatione auctoritatis Papae et Concilii (1511), was immoderate in tone: “[Luther] made bold to speak, with some moderation, of the power of the Roman Pontiff; but on this the other party had previously written with no moderation at all, the leaders of them being three Dominicans, Alvarus, Silvester, and the cardinal of San Sisto [Cajetan].” Epistle 1033, nn. 157–60, in The Correspondence of Erasmus, vol. 7, Letters 993–1121, trans. Roger A. B. Mynors (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 113. He praised, however, De divina institutione pontificatus totius ecclesiae in persona petri apostolici; see Epistle 1225, nn. 215–20, in The Correspondence of Erasmus, vol. 8, Letters 1122–1251, trans. Roger A. B. Mynors (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 276. 90. Gerhard Hennig opines that Cajetan’s argument for a papal monarchy is Aristotelian in inspiration; see Cajetan und Luther: Ein historischer Beitrag zur Begegnung von Thomismus und Reformation (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1966), 18. This is a dubious claim in the light of José Arturo Domínguez Asensio’s study, which demonstrates that Cajetan’s doctrine on

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   57 span (1511–1521) of these three essential works on the role of papal primacy, Cajetan’s theological reflection remained consistent with a slight, yet key shift in emphasis. He increasingly accented the papacy’s prophetic and foundational role (officium fundamenti) within the Universal Church as the created, infallible rule of the faith. In his early anti-Pisan work, De comparatione, Cajetan emphasized that the Church’s monarchical structure is a direct result of the positive will of Christ, who immediately confers on the pope the authority to be his vicar on earth.91 In addressing the heresy of conciliarism, Cajetan focused on the pope’s supreme ecclesial power within a head-body (caput-corpus) and fount-participation (fons-participatio) schema. From the Decretum Gratiani, Cajetan repeatedly cites Pope Leo the Great’s concept of the papacy as the head from which flows Christ’s gifts to the entire body of the Church: But the Lord wanted the sacrament of this service to pertain to the office of all the apostles so he located it principally in most blessed Peter, the highest of all the apostles, so that he might pour forth his gifts from him, as though from the head to the whole body.92

Basing himself on both the principle, set forth in the Decretum Gratiani, that only the pope can authorize a council, and Aquinas’s own formulation of the total dependency of Church councils on papal authority,93 Cajetan argues that the pope, as the vicar of Christ, holds the plenitude of ecclesial power, and all other ecclesial powers are but a participation therein:94 papal monarchy is primarily based on sacred Scripture and the Fathers; see “Infalibilidad y potestad magisterial en la polémica anticonciliarista de Cayetano,” Communio 14, no. 1 (1981): 30–31. 91. See Cajetan, De comp., n. 12. Cf. Peter as the Vicar of Christ: De comp., nn. 9, 55, 516, 519 and 543; the Roman Pontiff as the Vicar of Christ, cf. De comp., nn. 12, 53, 93, 136, 191, 508, 516, 519, 521, 550, 557, 564, 591, 677, and 799; the papacy as immediately from Christ, cf. De comp., nn. 7, 516–17, 563 92. Leo I, Ita Dominus, PL 54:629. Cf. Cajetan, De comp., nn. 10, 21, 77, 106, 128, 267. 93. See Aquinas, Liber contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem (hereafter Contra impugn.), pars 2, cap. 3, ad 23, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. Cajetan cites this text; see De comp., nn. 92, 106, 194, 228. 94. As was noted, only the pope receives “the whole of the power of the Universal Church” (tota potestas Ecclesiae universalis) immediately from Christ (De comp., n. 311);

58  The Framework The pope’s power is the total power of the Universal Church and other [ecclesial] powers participate in a part of his care [for the Universal Church].95

According to De comparatione, as the head of the apostles and the vicar of Christ,96 Peter was granted—immediately by Christ—the supreme power to shepherd the Universal Church.97 Likewise, St. Peter’s successor, the pope (papa—pater), as Christ’s vicar, is the created head and fount from which continually flows the power and unity of the post-apostolic Universal Church. The ontological foundation and exemplary cause of this papal-centric ecclesiology is ultimately the heavenly Father as the fount and authority of the entire Deity— the principium non de principio.98 Cajetan refers to the pope as the son of the whole Church (filius Ecclesiae intergrae), immediately generated from Christ, as the true head of the Church, and as the father of the Church (pater reliquae Ecclesiae).99 The pope embodies within himself attributes of both the Father and the Son. Just as the Father and the Son are the “one principle” from which the Holy Spirit proceeds,100 likewise the pope, in an analogical manner, is a single, created fount from which proceeds the authority and unity of the entire post-apostolic Church. hence only Christ has power over the pope (De comp., nn. 290–95). That is why the Church cannot regulate the power of the pope (De comp., nn. 165, 180, 182, 186, 206), nor judge the pope (De comp., nn. 148–49, 364). Although in the case of heresy (De comp., n. 660): “Papa haereticus non est ipso facto depositus” (De comp., nn. 272, 275), “sed deponendus” (De comp., nn. 275, 385, 400, 405). Bishops are “vicarii immediati Christ secundum quid” (De comp., n. 561). They are nominated by the pope (De comp., n. 203) and, thus, can be removed by the pope (De comp., n. 295). 95. “Potestas Papae est tota potestas Ecclesiae universalis et aliae potestates sunt participationes ipsius in partem sollicitudinis” (Cajetan, De comp., n. 137). See also De comp., n. 677. 96. See Cajetan, De comp., n. 34. For the differences between the power of Peter and the power of the other apostles; see De comp., nn. 35–42. 97. On the pope as pastor, gubernator, and rector of the Universal Church, see Cajetan, De comp., nn. 13, 84, 96, 108, 116, 155, 194, 469, 520, and 535. 98. The ontological-trinitarian foundation for papal primacy is laid out in Aquinas: “. . . patri appropriatur qui est etiam fons totius deitatis; et ideo competit Petro, quod est caput apostolorum, sicut pater Trinitatis” (Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, c.); cf. In De div. nom., cap. 2, lect. 2; Contra errores Graecorum, 1, cap. 2 and pars altera, cap. 32. 99. See Cajetan, De comp., n. 595. 100. See Aquinas, Contra errores Graecorum, pars altera, cap. 23; cf. also ST, I, q. 36, a. 4.

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   59 In a unique passage from Contra errores Graecorum, Aquinas resolves the hierarchical aspect (pater ecclesiae, auctoritas, fons) and the Christological aspect (filius ecclesiae, vicarius Christi) inherent in papal primacy back into their ontological fundament and exemplar cause—the order of origins within the Trinity (theologia); namely, back into the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son: The error of those who say that the Vicar of Christ, the Pontiff of the Roman Church, does not have a primacy over the Universal Church is similar to the error of those who say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son. For Christ himself, the Son of God, consecrates and marks her as his own with the Holy Spirit, as it were with his own character and seal. . . . And in like manner the Vicar of Christ by his primacy and providence as a faithful servant keeps the Universal Church subject to Christ.101

As will be shown, St. Peter and his successors “mark” and “seal,” through the instrumental causality of their prophetic confession of faith, both sacred doctrine and the Church, which are intrinsically interwoven. St Peter’s confessio fidei in Matthew 16:16 (“You are the Christ, the Son of the living God”) simultaneously expresses and explicates both the hierarchical and Christological aspects of the one material object of faith, namely the articles of faith in the Trinity (theologia) and the Incarnation (oikonomia), as well as the hierarchical and Christological aspects of the papacy. Just as the Father and Son are one principle from which proceeds the Holy Spirit, likewise the papacy is a single principle from which flows the unity of the Universal Church. In De comparatione, Cajetan focuses on the key aspect of the pope’s pastoral care of the Universal Church, which belongs uniquely and exclusively to his papal office, and not to his person.102 In the order of instrumental causality, the papacy builds up 101. See Aquinas, Contra Errores Graecorum, pars altera, cap. 32. 102. The hypothetical problem of an heretical pope gave rise to Jean Gerson’s (1363– 1429) theory of conciliarism. To counter this movement, Cajetan stressed the distinction between a pope’s personal sinfulness (error personalis in gratia), including the fact that he could personally err in matters of faith (fides personalis), and his superior papal office of authoritatively determining—through a divinely assisted judgment (fides in iudicio auctoritative)—the material object of the faith, which the entire Church is required to hold as a

60  The Framework Christ’s Church by authoritatively determining the principles of sacred doctrine, namely the articles of faith. Through the divine assistance of the Holy Spirit (the primary efficient cause), coupled with the instrumental causality of Christ’s prayer (a secondary efficient cause), papal authority indefectibly determines (sententialiter determinare),103 for the common good of the Universal Church, that which belongs to the material object of faith.104 Cajetan’s commentary on the ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, is a condensation of the doctrine he expressed in De comparatione. The papacy receives immediately from Christ the supreme authority over the Universal Church.105 Moreover, the office of the papacy is a created, monarchical principle of authority, guided by the divine assistance of the Holy Spirit, from which—in accord with the Pseudo-Dionysian divine law of hierarchical mediation106—flows the Church’s ministerial function as the created, infallible rule of faith by which she defines simply and irrevocably by means of a prophetic judgment those truths that are to-be-believed-in with certainty. matter of faith (inconcussa fide). According to Cajetan, only this particular papal act of authoritatively determining the material object of faith is coextensive with the pope’s office of building up the Church (aedificatio Ecclesiae); see Cajetan, De comp., n. 181. 103. James H. Burns and Thomas M. Izbicki translate the phrase sententialiter determinare as “determining finally what must be held and what must be rejected concerning the faith” (Conciliarism and Papalism, 41). My translation as “indefectibly determines” conveys a sense that the prophetic gift of papal infallibility unerringly points toward the truth in defining the articles of faith, while retaining an openness to ever great precision. According to Aquinas, all the intellectual virtues have an “indefectible” relation to truth (see ST, I, q. 85, a. 6, c). Finally, Cajetan simply preferred sententialiter determinare over finaliter determinare; see Yves Congar, “Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Infallibility of the Papal Magisterium: Summa Theol., II-II, q. 1, a. 10,” The Thomist 38, no. 1 (1974): 82–83. Other verbs applied to the office of Peter by Aquinas are “ordinare” (“Videtur quod non pertineat ad summum pontificem fidei symbolum ordinare,” ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, obj. 1) and “edere” (“editio symboli ad auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinet,” ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, s.c.). 104. See Cajetan, De comp., nn. 132–35; cf. also De comp., nn. 178, 197, 211. Following St. Augustine and Aquinas, Cajetan attributes papal indefectibility in matters of faith to Christ’s promised prayer to sustain Peter (Lk 22:31; cf. De comp., n. 650) and directly to the “divine assistance” of the Holy Spirit (De comp., nn. 133, 135, 178, 190, 192, 642). Cajetan finds these principles and conclusion in Aquinas; see Aquinas ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 9, s.c.; ST, II-II, q. 5, a. 3, c.; ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 6, ad 3; ST, II-II, q. 11, a. 2, ad 3; ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, c. 105. Cajetan understands the papacy to be established immediately by God and not by the ministry of the apostles, nor by the Church; see Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, n. iii. 106. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, n. v.

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   61 Following Aquinas’s Pseudo-Dionysian-inspired ecclesiological model, which orders the various charisms according to the divine law of hierarchical mediation,107 Cajetan defines papal infallibility as a prophetic judgment or charism, by which the pope, suffering a state of rapture:108 exceeds himself, as did David, who exceeded himself when he judged himself and all men to be liars, saying: “I said in my excess: Every man is a liar” [Ps 115, 2]. Such are those [truths] of the faith, which the pope, not by mere papal authority, but from the papacy as it is stands under the divine assistance for the teaching of the true faith; [the pope] defines by judging in matters of faith, exceeding himself; and, on account of this, he determines [matters of faith] . . . simply and irrevocably, and, thus, binds himself and all other [believers].109

Although papal infallibility is a prophetic charism, Cajetan vigorously maintains that it remains subordinate to sacred Scripture and limited only to matters of the faith (quae sunt fidei).110 He strongly negates, however, any opposition between sacred Scripture and papal infallibility, stressing their connection in the material object of faith, while maintaining their diversity according to the mode by which they receive the material object of faith. Any form of knowledge includes both the receiving of things 107. It is not accidental that within the ST, Aquinas includes the “beautiful order” (cf. ST, II-II, q. 183, a. 2, c.) of the Church’s diverse states of life (cf. ST, II-II, qq. 179–82) and the perfection (cf. ST, II-II, qq. 183–89) of its own members as flowing from and founded on the various charisms (“gratiae gratis datae,” cf. ST, II-II, qq. 171–78) given to her for the orthodox teaching of sacred doctrine (“gratiae gratis datae ordinantur ad fidei et spiritualis doctrinae manifestationem,” ST, III, q. 7, a. 7, c.). 108. Aquinas set forth three modes by which the human mind contemplates divine realities in rapture: see ST, II-II, q. 175, a. 3, ad 1. Papal primacy is a rapture of the second order, wherein divine truth is contemplated through intelligible effects, namely the divine revelation made through Tradition and sacred Scripture. The propositions explicating the divine truth contained in revelation are determined through a judgment made by divine assistance. The divine assistance is the efficient cause of this particular rapture; see ST, II-II, q. 175, q. 1, a. 1, c. 109. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, n. v. It is interesting to note that Vatican I also defined papal infallibility in terms of “divine assistance,” see Vatican Council I, Pastor aeternus, n. 3070 (July 18, 1870). 110. Cajetan, De comp., n. 181. As José A. Domínguez Asensio points out, the phrase “quae sunt fidei” in Cajetan includes morals; see “Infalibilidad y potestad magisterial,” 47.

62  The Framework known (acceptio cognitorum) and the judgment of those things received (iudicium de acceptis).111 Thus, divine revelation includes an “immediate” proposal and explication by God of the material object of faith to the prophets and the apostles, who accept this knowledge with evident certainty through a prophetic judgment (iudicium de acceptis). On the other hand, the papacy receives the material object of divine revelation as “mediated” (acceptio cognitorum) through apostolic Tradition and sacred Scripture (the depositum fidei), while infallibly determining, by means of a prophetic judgment (iudicium de acceptis per assistentiam divinam), in order to hand down without error to the congregation of the faithful that “this or that” in “this or that” sense is indeed revealed. This distinction between the prophetic judgments (iudicii de acceptis) involved in divine revelation (acceptio cognitorum immediata) and those involved in papal infallibility (acceptio cognitorum mediata) finds expression in Vatican Council I: “Indeed the Holy Spirit was not promised to the successors of Peter by way of revelation, that they may declare a new doctrine [acceptio cognitorum immediata], but by way of assistance, that they may keep with holiness and explain with faithfulness the revelation handed down to the apostles, that is, the deposit of faith [acceptio cognitorum mediata].”112 According to Cajetan, papal infallibility is clearly dependent on and subordinate to the authority of sacred Scripture and Tradition.113 Moreover, Tradition–sacred Scripture and the Church’s magisterium are the necessary conditions—not simply, but as regards man’s mode of knowing—by which the veritas prima is integrally and infallibly proposed and explicated in a mediated manner to the faithful.114 More specifically, the papacy, as the principle of the Universal Church, is the necessary condition for definitively 111. Cf. Aquinas, De ver., q. 12, a. 7, c. 112. Vatican Council I, Pastor aeternus, n. 3070 (July 18, 1870). 113. Ulrich Horst’s critique of Cajetan’s doctrine on papal infallibility—as allowing “no kind of limitation or condition”—is not accurate; see Horst, The Dominicans and the Pope: Papal Teaching Authority in the Medieval and Early Modern Thomist Tradition, trans. James D. Mixson (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 3. 114. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 5, a. 3, n. i. Cf. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 5, a. 3, c.

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   63 and infallibly teaching what the faithful are to believe (de fide).115 Thus, in the Church, the papacy is a condition sine qua non for guaranteeing the integrity of the spiritual communication of sacred doctrine; and papal infallibility, inasmuch as it is subordinate to and in harmony with sacred Scripture, is a condition sine qua non for theologizing and biblical exegesis. The intrinsic relation between papal infallibility and sacred Scripture was a contentious point for Luther.116 As noted above, the controversy with Luther gave Cajetan an occasion to re-elaborate his ecclesiological focus from the head-body schema of De comparatione to the foundation-edifice schema of De divina institutione. Cajetan confronts Luther as a biblical exegete.117 He does an elaborate exegesis of Matthew 16:18–19, which will be treated in greater detail in a later section. It is a wonderful example of Cajetan as a biblical theologian commenting on the literal sense and its relation to the spiritual senses of sacred Scripture. In brief, Cajetan divides the pericope of Matthew 16:18–19 into two parts.118 The first part delineates the essential relation between the office of founding the Church (officium fundamenti) granted to the person of St. Peter in a qualified sense,119 and his unique pro115. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 6, n. un. 116. Luther objected to the fact that the pope was granted by God the power to infallibly define and add “new articles” to the Creed. He equated “new articles” with “new truths,” that is to say, with new objects of faith. He did not believe “the power to infallibly define” to be an explication of what was already implicitly contained in the Apostles’ Creed; see José Arturo Domínguez Asensio, “Infalibilidad y determinatio de fide en la polémica antiluterana del Cardenal Cayetano,” Archivo Teológico Granadino 44, no. 1 (1981): 35. It should be noted that Luther, nevertheless, respected the authority of the Creed; cf. Santos Sabugal, Credo: La fede della Chiesa (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2009), 35. 117. Cajetan begins the entire treatise by challenging those who dogmatize that papal authority was not given to “the man” but rather to “a mediating gift” or ministry; see De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 3. He then initiates his response by establishing that such a position is heretical, because it simply goes against the testimony of the Gospels; ibid., 5. 118. See Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 10. 119. Christ is the simple and absolute foundation of the Church. St. Peter and his successors are a foundation of the Church in a qualified and passive sense, inasmuch as Christ himself “will build his Church” (aedificabo ecclesiam meam) on their profession of faith (mediante fide), which is in itself a gift from God (fides donum Dei est; see Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 15, 84). Concerning St. Peter’s successors, see ibid., 12.

64  The Framework phetic profession of the two main articles of faith,120 namely the Incarnation (tu es Christus) and the Trinity (filius Dei vivi), made by his adhering to a divine revelation that was “more intimate than he was to himself.”121 The second part concerns the office of the keys (officium clavium) or the exercise of juridical power within the Church, a power given to the person of St. Peter in an absolute sense, without qualification.122 This clear distinction between the pope’s power of jurisdiction (officium clavium) and his power to define (officium fundamenti) is a key development in Cajetan’s doctrine on papal infallibility.123 Regarding the relation between the veritas prima in se and the Church’s magisterium, of particular interest is the substantial identity between St. Peter’s prophetic profession of faith and his officium fundamenti of the Church. Moreover, St. Peter’s confessio fidei and its indefectible permanence in his successors constitutes both the substance of the faith and the substance of the Church: when defining [truths] of the Christian faith, inerrancy flows from the firmness in faith of the Roman Pontiff’s person as ordered to the Church; since, in this mode of defining, the faith of the Universal Church is constituted and through it [this mode of defining] Christ’s Church is built by Christ Himself on the rock of the Apostolic See. Thus, it is impossible that the Universal Church err [in matters of] faith.124

The Church’s defining of the faith is nothing other than a declaration of what is contained in the faith given to us by Christ.125 The determination of new articles to the Creed does not introduce new truths, but only explicates what was already revealed by God 120. Cf. Aquinas, De ver., q. 12, a. 7, c. 121. Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 6–7. Cf. ibid., 83–85. 122. See ibid., 12–13. 123. Concerning the officium fundamenti, see Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 7–15, 20, 22, 23, 26, 29 36, and 39; and Domínguez Asensio, “Infalibilidad y determinatio de fide,” 51. It is also interesting to note Cajetan’s influence on the First Vatican Council’s dogmatic constitution, Pastor aeternus; see especially Prologus de institutione et fundamento Ecclesiae, in Vatican Council I, Pastor aeternus, n. 3051 (July 18, 1870). 124. Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 83. 125. Ibid., 85.

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   65 to the apostles and prophets.126 This specific type of explication or determination of the articles of faith by the Universal Church is in the very person of the Roman Pontiff as the Church’s foundation and universal pastor.127 Beginning in chapter 8 of De divina institutione, Cajetan argues that Christ’s promise of a pastor for his flock (Jn 21:15–17) grounds—by divine decree—St. Peter’s successors, the bishops of Rome, within the office of founding (officium fundamenti), thus guaranteeing the continual presence within the post-apostolic Church of this prophetic gift and power to define the articles of the faith.128 A decade after De divina institutione, in his commentary on St. Paul’s letter to the Romans in 1532, Cajetan highlighted that the prophetic nature of papal infallibility (as an instrumental cause) in proposing and explicating the truths of the faith guarantees that it is God himself (as the efficient cause)—and not mere man—who defines what is to be believed in the Universal Church.129

Maiores and Minores Cajetan’s commentaries on faith in the In ST accent the hierarchical transmission of the veritas prima within the Church and the inherent teacher-pupil relationship within sacred doctrine, which is grounded in theology’s subalternation to the mediating habit of faith:130 126. See Cajetan, In Rom., 10:17, in Opera Omnia, 5:63a. 127. See Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 83. 128. Cajetan’s defense of papal and ecclesial indefectibility in teaching the faith shifts from the Gospel of St. Matthew to that of St. John; cf. De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 54. Cajetan lists three ways (the literal sense of sacred Scripture, the authority of the saints, and Church councils) in which Christ’s words to St. Peter in Jn 21:15–17 are understood likewise to be said about his successors; see De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 69–71. 129. Cajetan makes it very clear that God himself both inclines the heart to believe through grace and determines what-is-to-be-believed through the mediation of the apostles and prophets; see Cajetan, Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. ad Romanos (hereafter In Rom.), 10:17, in Opera Omnia, 5:63a. 130. In responding to whether it is necessary for humans to have faith, Aquinas equates growth in faith that leads to eternal beatitude as a movement from imperfect

66  The Framework Accordingly, it is necessary, by the sweet disposition of the divine wisdom that orders all things, that from part of the human race certain men [prophets, apostles, and evangelists] would have a revelation from God of those [truths] which pertain to faith in such a manner that they would be certain with evidence that God revealed this [truth] and from them all others would be instructed as disciples by their masters. Naturally men learn from other men and so divine wisdom governs by means of lesser beings.131

For Cajetan—as for Aquinas—the hierarchical structure of the Church and the hierarchical structure of the faith are inseparable. Aquinas maintains that God in his wisdom and providence so ordered the Church that within the economy of salvation history the maiores would communicate—by handing down (tradire)—sacred doctrine to the minores.132 God establishes the maiores variously through the divine revelation immediately given them (apostles, evangelists, and prophets), the dignity of their office (bishops, priests, and deacons), or the ministry bestowed on them to teach of the faith (theologians and preachers).133 Further, the maiores, as teachers of sacred doctrine, are morally obliged to have a more explicit knowledge of the substance of the faith than are the minores.134 Thus, on account of the mediated character of revelation, the hierarchical order between the maiores and the minores within the structure of the Church is based on their diverse obligations regarding the explication of the articles of faith.135 In every period of salvation history all the faithful were held to believe explicitly in the One God and his divine providence,136 but only within the present order of grace initiated by Christ’s Incarknowledge to perfect knowledge, beginning with the premise that “it is necessary for the disciple to believe”; see Aquinas, De ver., q. 14, a. 10, c. 131. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 5, n. v. 132. See Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 4, s.c. 1. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 2 a. 6, ad 3; De ver., q. 14, a. 11. 133. See Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 3. 134. See Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 3, s.c. 135. See Aquinas, De ver., q. 14, a. 12, c., and ad 6. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 6, c. and q. 16, a. 2, ad 2. 136. See Aquinas, De ver., q. 14, a. 12, c.; and ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, c.

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   67 nation, however, are all the faithful (maiores and minores) held to believe explicitly in the Trinity and the Incarnation’s redemptive aspect; that is to say, all the members of Christ’s Church are held to believe explicitly and commemorate liturgically the articles of faith as contained in the Creed.137 Aquinas expresses the dual aspect of the lex orandi–lex credendi formula in terms of a lex gratiae–lex fidei symbiosis, which comprises the lex nova, embracing the precepts of natural law, the articles of faith, and the sacraments.138 With the promulgation of the lex fidei through Christ’s definitive explication of the articles of faith,139 Aquinas maintained that in the postapostolic Church certain revealed truths require an explicit assent of faith simply because they pertain to the substance of the faith per se, principally, or directly,140 while he acknowledged other revealed truths do not require such an explicit assent of faith, but rather are believed in implicitly (although their negation would be contrary to the faith), since they pertain accidentally, secondarily, or indirectly to the substance of the faith.141 In brief, the veritas prima—which is 137. See Aquinas, De ver., q. 14, a. 12, c. 138. See Aquinas, Qdl. 4, q. 8, a. 2, c. Cf. Emilio Panella, “La Lex nova tra storia ed ermeneutica: Le occasioni dell’esegesi di S. Tommaso d’Aquino,” Memorie Dominicane 6 (1975): 11–106. 139. See Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 5. 140. In the post-apostolic Church, all of the faithful (maiores et minores) are required to believe explicitly in what pertains per se, principally, or directly to the substance of the faith, namely the articles of the Creed; see Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1, c.; and ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 5, c. Aquinas uses the terms per se, principaliter, and directe synonymously in regard to what substantially or explicitly belongs to the material object of faith; see In III Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 2, c; ST, I, q. 32, a. 4, c.; ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1; ST, II-II, q. 8, a. 2, c.; ST, II-II, q. 11, a. 2, c.; Super I Cor., cap. 11, lect. 4 and lect. 9. 141. Aquinas uses the terms accidentally, secondarily, or indirectly synonymously in regard to what is ordered to the manifestation of the articles of the faith (see In II Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 2, c.; ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 5, c.; ST, II-II, q. 11, a. 2, c.; Super I Cor., cap. 11, 1ect. 9). In Aquinas, the term implicite certainly includes what is ordered to the manifestation of the articles of the faith in an accidental, secondary, or indirect manner. These secondary revealed truths are not to be distinguished as articles of faith (see ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1 and De ver., q. 14, a. 11, c.). Aquinas also uses the term implicite, however, in a narrower sense, as pertaining solely to the articles of the faith, when he states that some articles of the faith are implicitly contained in other articles (see In III Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3, ad 2 and ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, c.). In addition, Aquinas employs the term implicite to indicate how the definitions of faith made by the Church are contained in the articles of the faith just as conclusions are contained in the principles (see In IV Sent., d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, ad 6).

68  The Framework simple in se—is received into the human mind through a plurality of distinct enunciations, some of which are substantial to the faith (the articles of faith), while others are ordered to the manifestation of the articles of the faith.142 As was noted, this key distinction within the material object of faith—per se, principally, or directly versus accidentally, secondarily, or indirectly—is a constant throughout Aquinas’s entire theological corpus.143 Likewise, Cajetan maintains: there are two genera of revealed truths that pertain to the faith; namely directly or indirectly. A false opinion concerning the first genus is heresy, if it were held with maximum pertinacity. Concerning the second genus [of truths that pertain to the faith], two things can be said: firstly, before they are considered or determined [by the Church’s magisterium] a false opinion against them would not be heretical, if no pertinacity be shown; secondly, after [their] manifestation by the Church, an error of this kind would be heresy.144

In commenting on the nature of heresy as treated in the ST, Cajetan states that propositions can be against the faith in themselves (secundum se) in two distinct modes: either they are directly contrary to the articles of the faith and sacred Scripture, or they are directly contrary to the determination of the faith made by the Church.145 He goes on to clarify that some propositions are contrary to the faith in themselves (secundum se) and as known by us (quoad nos), since their opposition to the faith has been made manifest to us; other propositions are contrary to the faith in themselves (secundum se) but are not known by us (quoad nos), since their opposition to the faith has not been made manifest. If and when, however, such propositions, which are contrary to the faith merely secundum se and not quoad 142. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1. 143. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 32, a. 4, c; ST, II-II, q. 8, a. 2, c.; ST, II-II q. 2, a. 5, c.; ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1. 144. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 32, a. 4, n. ii. Aquinas raises the objection that St. John Damascenus taught against the filioque (“ex Filio autem Spiritum Sanctum non dicimus”; ST, I, q. 36, a. 2, ad 3), to which Cajetan responds that Damascenus taught this prior to the Magisterium’s definition; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 36, a. 2, n. xxviii. 145. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 11, a. 1, n. ii.

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   69 nos, are made manifest to us by the Church’s magisterium, then any pertinacious denial of them would be heretical (e.g., the filioque).146 According to Cajetan the infallible propositions of the faith occur in only three forms: the articles of faith, sacred Scripture, and the determination of the Church.147 Hence they are determined either by divine revelation itself or through the prophetic charism of infallibility and divine assistance granted to the papacy. It is worth noting that in the motu proprio Ad tuendam fidem (May 28, 1998), concerning the new formulation of the profession of faith—a restatement of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed with the addition of three propositions that stipulate the various order of truths to which the believer must adhere— Pope St. John Paul II explicated, by an act of authentic magisterium, this very distinction within the material object of faith: “truths divinely and formally revealed,” requiring “the assent of theological faith,” and Church doctrine on faith and morals based on faith in the Holy Spirit’s assistance to the Church’s magisterium, requiring “firm and definitive assent.”148 For Cajetan, as for Aquinas, this distinction within the material object of faith—between those truths that pertain to the faith per se and those that pertain to the faith in a secondary manner or as ordered to the manifestation of the revealed truths per se—establishes a “hierarchy of truths,” which is an expression of the intrinsic link between these two orders of revealed truths (direct and indirect) within the faith.149 When commenting on sacred doctrine in the In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, Cajetan restates this distinction within the material object of faith. Sacred doctrine, as a whole, contains both orders of revealed truth, namely those that pertain per se to the faith (the formally revealed) and those that are virtually contained in the principles, which is why: 146. See ibid. Aquinas affirms this point very clearly, see De pot., q. 10, a. 4, ad 13. 147. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 11, a. 1, n. ii. Cf. José Arturo Domínguez Asensio, “Amplitud objetiva de las nociones de fe y herejía en la Teologia del Cardenal Cayetano,” Archivo Teológico Granadino 46 (1983): 22–23. 148. John Paul II, Motu Proprio Ad tuendam fidem (May 28, 1998), nn. 2–3. 149. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 8, a. 2, n. un.

70  The Framework sacred doctrine neither can be taken as faith, as distinct from theology, nor as theology, as distinct from faith. Rather it is to be taken as knowledge revealed by God, either formally or virtually, as having the ratio of a discipline or doctrine, abstracting from the ratio of things to be believed and known. . . . [sacred doctrine] is necessary for salvation, since knowledge of this kind, as a revealed discipline, abstracts from things to be believed and known. It is [revealed knowledge] both formally, in itself, by reason of things revealed, and virtually, in its principles.150

As was shown, Cajetan argues that the term “sacred doctrine” as employed in ST, I, q. 1, a. 2 (whether sacred doctrine is a science) cannot be taken as the whole genus of knowledge revealed by God, since it would seem foolish to ask whether the whole of revealed knowledge, including both the principles and the conclusions, is a science, since it is certain that science is not about the principles, but rather the conclusions. Cajetan makes a real distinction between the two co-principles of sacred doctrine’s formal cause in wayfarers: the habit of faith and the habit of theology, acquired by demonstration from the articles of the faith. Hence the distinction between the habits of faith and theology is rooted in the distinction within the material object of faith, that is to say, the distinction between the principles (the articles of faith) and the conclusions of theology, which are virtually contained within the principles.151 Aquinas maintains that the explication of the articles of faith is twofold: first, as regards the substance of the articles of faith, according to which the articles are known distinctly; second, regarding those things that are implicitly contained in and essentially follow from the truths contained in the articles.152 The first explication of the substance of the faith is established by the authority of divine revelation itself. The second explication consists in expressing those truths that are implicitly contained in and are concomitant with the articles of faith.153 150. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi. 151. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xii. 152. See Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 3. 153. See Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 5.

Sacred Doctrine and the Church   71 Within the post-apostolic Church, Cajetan explains that there are three modes or levels of the explication of the propositions of the faith. The first two modes are an explication of the substance of the faith (determinatio fidei): the primary mode of this type of explication is through the authority of divine revelation itself (doctrina Christi et apostolorum),154 and the secondary mode of this type of explication—totally dependent on the primary mode—is through the divine assistance granted to papal authority. As was shown above, the Church’s determination or definition of the faith is nothing other than a declaration of what is contained in the faith given to us by Christ, who is the primary foundation of the Church. The determination of new articles in the Creed does not introduce new truths, but only explicates what was already revealed by God to the apostles and prophets, who form the secondary foundation of the Church. This specific type of explication or determination of the articles of faith by the Universal Church, which subsists in the Roman Pontiff ex officio fundamenti, is the third foundation of the Church. There is a third form of the explication of the propositions of the faith that is completely dependent on both the primary and secondary modes of the explication of the substance of the faith, and which proceeds from the virtue of theology acquired by theologians to help nourish, defend, and strengthen the faith.155 As Cajetan states: For this science [theology], according to Augustine. . . not only nourishes, defends, and strengthens the faith, but also begets it. . . Although faith is an inclination infused by God towards belief, nevertheless, it is from hearing the preaching of Christ that what is to be believed [credibilia] is attained, as [is stated] in Rom. 10, 17 and in St. Thomas’s commentary. . . . Theology, therefore, is included in the faith as begetting it. From this, it can be inferred that any adult believer, explicitly believing [in the articles of faith], is a theologian; not simply, but in a certain sense, as participating in theology, that is to say in its principles.156

154. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1 a. 10 ad 1. 155. See Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 23 q. 3, a. 2, ad 1 and In III Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 3. 156. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi; see appendix 2.

72  The Framework Theology is an acquired judgment concerning the conclusions contained within the articles of faith. This particular mode of explication of the faith is entirely dependent on the infallible modes of the explication that constitute the tripartite foundation of the Church (Christ’s teaching, apostolic teaching both in oral and written form, and the divine assistance granted to papal infallibility) and, consequently, is entirely dependent on the three infallible forms of the propositions of the faith (articles of the faith, sacred Scripture, and the Church’s magisterium).157 The office of theologian is a particular mode of explication of the faith that aids—in an advisory capacity—the Church’s magisterium. In conclusion, among Cajetan’s unique contributions to theology are his grasp of the intrinsic role of the magisterium within the structure of the Church and sacred doctrine, and the role of the theologian in the service of the Church and the development of faith. There is a moral necessity for the Church in every age that certain members (principally bishops) acquire the habit of theology in order to explicate the faith within their particular historical and cultural context.158 As a theologian, Cajetan himself aided in the development of the Church’s doctrine on papal infallibility, defining it as part of the Church’s foundation, which ministers to the revealed Word in a prophetic manner.159 157. On account of theology’s dependence on the infallible propositions of the faith, its scientific conclusions are more certain—although lacking evidence—than the conclusions of the natural sciences, which enjoy a greater evidence; see Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 3. 158. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 185, a. 4, n. iv. Cf. Aquinas, ST, III, q. 67, a. 2, ad 1. 159. Cf. Bishop Vincent Ferrer Gasser, The Gift of Infallibility, trans. James T. O’Connor (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 26–27; and Wicks, Cajetan Responds, 9–10.

Chapter 3

Sacred Doctrine and the Summa Theologiae The Creed as the Summa Theologiae’s Framework The Deity is the architectonic principle of the ST’s structure (the ordo disciplinae). The divine author is sacred doctrine’s ultimate authority (the formal object) and subject (the material object), from which flows sacred doctrine’s structuring principles, the articles of faith (the suppositions), and every theological conclusion virtually contained within them.1 Everything in sacred doctrine as a wisdom is most properly studied under the formal object of the Deity as the highest cause. Cajetan declares that sacred doctrine: is a science that determines truths about God [the subject] according to those things that are known by God alone; it is the science concerning God from what is proper to God; and, therefore, it merits to be said that it determines most properly about God. For this kind [of science] has the properties of the first and supreme foundations of divine causality [the formal object], according to which—it is said—it determines most properly about God according to the highest cause.2 1. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. vi; and In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. iii; see appendix 2. Aquinas in various places defines the speculative principles as dignitates and as the most certain of principles in a science; see In III Metaph., lect. 5, n. 5, and In I Post an., lect. 5, n. 6. Since, however, the principles of sacred doctrine in via are known in the superior theology of God and the blessed, they can be referred to as suppositions; see Aquinas, In I Post. an., lect. 5, n. 8. The properties of the subject (passiones subiecti), however, are the conclusions scientifically demonstrated from the principles; see Aquinas, De trin., pars 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3; In I Post anal., lect 15, n. 3; and Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. iii; see appendix 2. 2. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. iv.

73

74  The Framework The Trinitarian order of origins ad intra—the supreme foundation of divine causality—is the principle and highest cause that orders created reality (ordo rerum) ad extra—the oikonomia.3 Thus, the effects of both creation and salvation (ad extra) are ultimately ordered according to the intimate life of the Trinity (ad intra)4— the exemplar, efficient, and final cause—through the mediation of the Incarnate Word and Wisdom, the exemplar and instrumental cause of both creation and salvation (the Christocentric principle). Discussion on the ST’s structure is a relatively recent Thomistic phenomenon, beginning with M.-D. Chenu’s 1939 article “Le plan de la Somme théologique de saint Thomas” published in the Revue thomiste.5 As was stated above, within the diverse periods of Thomism various topics gained more intensity than others and, thus, were dealt with more explicitly and adequately. One possible explanation why the ST ’s structure was not openly treated by the Re­naissance Thomists is simply because it was obvious that the articles of faith—as Aquinas so frequently states—are the principles of theology and, thus, form the foundational pillars for the ST’s overarching structure and scientific method.6 In his Proemium Medita3. Within the ST’s pedagogical-scientific method, the ordo disciplinae corresponds with the ordo rerum; see Yves Congar, “Le moment “économique” et le moment “ontologique” dans la Sacra Doctrina (Révélation, Théologie, Somme théologique),” in Mélanges offres à M.-D. Chenu, maître in Théologie (Paris, 1967): 135–187. Cf. Aquinas’s commentary on the Fourth Lateran Council’s (1215) profession of faith Firmiter; Expositio super primam et secundam decretalem ad archidiaconum Tudertinum (hereafter Super decr.), n. 1, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. 4. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 32, 1, ad 3. 5. Marie-Dominque Chenu, “Le plan de la Somme théologique de saint Thomas,” Revue thomiste 47 (1939): 93–107. For extensive chronological bibliographies concerning this debate on the structure of the ST, see Brian Johnstone, “The Debate on the Structure of the Summa theologiae of St. Thomas Aquinas: From Chenu (1939) to Metz (1998),” in Aquinas as Authority, ed. Paul van Geest, Harm Goris, and Carlo Leget (Leuven: Peeters, 2002), 187–88; and Aldo Vendemiati, “La struttura della Summa theologiae di San Tommaso D’Aquino,” Salesianum 73 (2011): 278–80. 6. Here is a sampling of some of the important passages in Aquinas: In I Sent., q. 1, a. 3, qc. 2, ad 2; In I Sent., q. 1, a. 3, qc. 3, ad 1; In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4; In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 3, obj. 2; In III Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 2; In III Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, c.; In III Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 4; In III Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1, ad 1; ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, c.; ST, II-II, q. 8, a. 6, obj. 2.; Qdl., IV, q. 9, a. 3 arg.; De trin, pars 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4; De trin, pars 1 q. 2 a. 2 ad 5; De trin, pars 1, q. 2, a. 3, obj. 7; Super I Cor., cap. 12, lect. 2; Super Heb. [rep. vulgata], cap. 5, lect. 2; Super Heb. [rep. vulgata], cap. 11, lect. 1.

Sacred Doctrine and the Summa Theologiae   75 tio to his commentary on the ST, the Baroque Thomist Dominigo Bañez (1528–1604) refers twice explicitly to Cajetan’s influence on his comprehension of the ST. Following Cajetan’s lead, he goes on to explain that the order of ST is best adapted to beginners, because its foundational pillars are the articles of the Creed.7 The articles of faith were first revealed in their immutable substance to our proto-parents before the Fall, after which they were communicated to the Old Testament prophets, and finally to the apostles and evangelists in their definitive form through Christ.8 They are continually handed down through the medium of apostolic Tradition and sacred Scripture, and are ordered into various creedal formulae by the Church’s magisterium through the papacy’s prophetic charism of infallibility. They are theology’s main hermeneutic, containing the order between the majesty of the Deity (theologia) and the Christocentric economy of salvation history (oikonomia). Within this primal order between theologia and oikonomia, the ST’s creedal structure harmonizes the orders of nature, grace, and glory—the framework of salvation history, whose center and consummation is Christ. The ST’s creedal structure also integrates various metaphysical notions and universal truths, turning the water of philosophy into the wine of theology.9 7. Domingo Bañez, Scholastica commentaria in Iam partem angelici doctoris D. Thomæ usque ad 64 qu., (Venice: 1585), Proœmium. 8. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. x. 9. An example of a metaphysical notion integrated into the ST is the exitus-reditus model, where God is understood to be the principle and end of all things. Aldo Vendemiati discusses at length Chenu’s application of the exitus-reditus model used by Aquinas in the Scriptum super Sententiis to the ST; see Vendemiati, “La struttura della Summa theologiae,” 238–46. The metaphysical notion of the exitus-reditus model is interwoven throughout the ST; however, it is not its unifying hermeneutic. First of all, it fails from a lexiographical point of view, since Aquinas had dropped the terminology already in the last couple of books of the Sentences. More importantly, the divine causality of the Majesty of God (theologia), from which flows nature, grace, and glory (oikonomia) through and in Christ (the Christocentric principle) are the main theological and historical hermeneutical keys revealed in the articles of the Creed. As was already mentioned, Domingo Bañez (1528–1604), from the first generation of post-Cajetanian Thomists, still understood the structure of the ST to be constituted from the articles of faith, while already the second generation of post-Cajetanian Thomists— such as John of St. Thomas (1589–1644), a clear precursor to Chenu (see “Introduction

76  The Framework Furthermore, the habit of theology interweaves within the ST’s overarching creedal structure the finer threads of each and every single question and article. According to the light of divine causality and the intrinsic order found within the articles of faith, it determines and orders the causal relation between the secondary truths or conclusions virtually contained within the articles of faith. The ST’s entire ordo disciplinae emerges from the transmission of the inherent content and order of the articles of the faith (suppositiones), and from the explication and ordering of the theological conclusions—in the light of the highest cause (theologia)—by means of the habit of theology.10 Aquinas clearly states that within the Symbol of Faith a theological order is discovered, when contemplated in the light of the highest of all the causes (the final cause), which is the beatific vision.11 This corresponds to Aquinas’s understanding of theology even within the context of the Old Law, whose necessity (the very same necessity of a sacred doctrine as in ST, I, q. 1, a. 1) was caused by man’s supernatural and final end—eternal beatitude.12 The Ten Commandments, the precepts or principles of the Old Law, were also distinguished from and ordered to one another in relation to God’s majesty (theologia) and man’s relation to man within salvation history (oikonomia).13 à l’étude de saint Thomas d’Aquin,” in Publications de l’institut d’études médievales, vol. 11 [Montréal: Université de Montréal, 1950] 262n1) obfuscated the role of the articles of faith by employing a circumgyrat (exitus-reditus) model of God’s three-fold causality (efficient, final, and salvific) as the structuring principle of the ST, see John of St. Thomas, Cursus theologicus in Summam theologicam D. Thomae, vol. 1 (Paris: Vivès, 1883), 191. The circumgyrat or exitus-reditus model does not contradict the article-of-faith model, but it does lose its theological and historical richness and its direct relation to divine revelation. 10. The ordo disciplinae does not mean the imposition of a random or personal order on the subject matter, but rather the term disciplinae is used by Aquinas in relation to an order or structure received, in this case, from God, the Author; see Aquinas, De ver., q. 11, a. 1, c., and In III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1. 11. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q.1, a. 7, c. and ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 7, c. 12. The Ten Commandments are the principles of sacred doctrine in the Old Law that virtually contain the theological conclusions; see Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 100, a. 3, c. For supernatural beatitude as the final cause of the Old Law, see ST, I-II, q. 98, a. 1, c. and ST, I-II, q. 99, a. 1, c. 13. See Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 100, a. 4, c.

Sacred Doctrine and the Summa Theologiae   77 In his authoritative work on creedal formulae, Early Christian Creeds, John N. D. Kelly notes that by the twelfth century the Apostles’ Creed enjoyed “a practical monopoly in Western Europe” and “was the official text of the creed at Rome itself.”14 Kelly affirms that when Aquinas wrote his exposition of it (Collationes in Symbolum Apostolorum), he adopted the textus receptus of the Apostles’ Creed as the basis of his work.15 This commentary on the Creed— written in 1271, just a few years before his death—is a veritable synthesis of his theology.16 According to Aquinas, the Creed is a collection of faith’s essential truths.17 It is necessary, in a certain sense, so that the substance of the faith can be more readily proposed to all, lest anyone be left ignorant of this saving doctrine.18 It is not an addition to sacred Scripture, but rather a summary of the articles of faith that inform sacred Scripture.19 Moreover, the entire Church, quasi ex persona, is entrusted with the confession of faith as contained in the Creed.20 The substance of the Creed is not a work of the Church, nor a product of her liturgy, nor a result of her theological reflection, but rather it is the definitive revelation and consummate explication of the faith made through and in Christ, which he immediately handed down to his apostles.21 The Apostles’ Creed as such may not have been composed by the apostles; nonetheless, all the articles of faith were directly taught and handed down by the apostles in both oral and written form. Thus apostolic Tradition informed the various confessions of faith present within the primitive Church, many of 14. John N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (London: Continuum, 2006), 426–27. Cf. Luigi A. Redigonda, “Credo in Deum. Esposizione del Simbolo degli Apostoli di S. Tommaso d’Aquino o. p.,” Sacra Doctrina 20 (1975): 99–170. 15. See Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 427. 16. See Sabugal, Credo: La fede della Chiesa, 61. 17. Cajetan underscores that the articles form a symbol of faith, because they are gathered under one unifying aspect or ratio; cf. In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 8, n. un. 18. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 9, c. 19. See Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 1 and ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 9, ad 1. 20. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 9, ad 3. 21. See Sabugal, Credo: La fede della Chiesa, 12.

78  The Framework which were recorded in the New Testament.22 The post-apostolic defining, ordering, and editing of the Creed, however, pertains solely to the authority of the pope as ministering to the faith.23 The Church’s magisterium, however, under the divine assistance given to the pope’s prophetic office, is a specifically different mode of teaching, subordinate to both sacred Scripture and apostolic Tradition. The Creed is the hermeneutic for the proper interpretation and explication of sacred Scripture.24 Thus, papal authority, which determines the articles of the Creed, is a necessary condition for biblical exegesis and theologizing. Correspondingly, the papacy also has a ministerial role in the ordo disciplinae and the ordo ecclesiae, that is to say, in the magisterium and governance of the Church. Just as the Creed, so also the Church’s magisterium is not something added to the faith, but rather it emerges from the oikonomia of the faith.25 As was stated above, for both Aquinas and Cajetan, the Church’s structure is intrinsically related to the structure and communication of the faith.

Cajetan’s Rosetta Stone An important text for understanding Cajetan’s grasp of the ST’s ordo disciplinae is his commentary on the first question of ST’s tertia pars (In ST, III, q. 1). For Aquinas, the tertia pars is not a theological afterthought, for it treats of the Incarnation, and the Incarnation (Christocentrism) is a key architectonic principle and theological forethought for the entire ST. Christ, the Son of God incarnate through the grace of union, is predestined from all eter22. For an extensive summary of the creedal statements in the New Testament, see Sabugal, Credo: La fede della Chiesa, 12–18. Moreover, due to the Creed’s deep roots within sacred Scripture, it always has been and remains actual and central in the ecumenical dialogue; see ibid., 35. 23. Cf. Aquinas ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10. 24. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 5, a. 3, n. i. Cf. In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, n. iv. 25. See Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum veritatis (May 24, 1990), n. 14.

Sacred Doctrine and the Summa Theologiae   79 nity as a remedy for sin.26 Thus Christocentrism is a structuring principle from the very beginning in both the ordo rerum and ordo disciplinae.27 Moreover, Christ is the consummation of the entire theological endeavour.28 Cajetan brilliantly observes that within the ST (especially the I-II and II-II) the entire movement of human nature—including humans from the “formal” point of view and as “concrete” individuals exercising their true co-creative liberty, a synergy between the divine and human wills, within the Church— finds its terminus and effective principle in the Incarnation: the movement of human nature—from the imperfect [state] to the perfect— is in a twofold manner: first, in respect to human nature itself [the formal aspect], as distinguished from the individual person; second, in respect to the individual human person [the concrete/historical aspect]. According to the first movement, the Incarnation is its [i.e., human nature’s] terminus, since, in the work of the Incarnation human nature is assumed by God. According to the second movement, the glory of both the soul and body in the future world is the terminus, when humans will be consummately glorified. In this second movement, the mystery of the Incarnation is not the terminus, but the effective principle, since Christ leads all humans to consummate glory through his resurrection, etc. On account of the first movement, it would not be apt for God to become incarnate at the beginning of the world [cf. ST, III, q. 1, a. 5]. On account of the second movement, it would not be apt to defer the Incarnation to the end of the world.29

In this text, Cajetan brilliantly explicates the Christocentrism of the tertia pars within the ST’s “most-beautiful order.” According to him, the relation between the order of divine providence and the order of divine predestination lays a foundation for the supreme mode of union between God and man in the grace of union—the Incarnation, which was predestined from all eternity for the redemption of sin: 26. See Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 24, a. 1, n. iv. 27. See Aquinas, ST, III, q, 24, a. 1, c. Cf. Barbara Hallensleben, “Die Prädestination Christi und der Christen,” in Communicatio: Anthropologie und Gnadenlehre bei Thomas de Vio Cajetan, Reformationsgeschichtliche Studien und Texte 123 (Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1985), 292–98. 28. See Aquinas, ST, III, Prologus. 29. Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 1, a. 6, n. un.

80  The Framework If we would more perspicaciously consider the fact that in the universe there are three orders—namely, the order of nature, the order of grace, and the order of God and creature together, then we would see that the second [order] presupposes the first [order], and the third [order] presupposes the other two [orders]. Similarly, the preordaining and prescience of the first [order] is presupposed to the preordaining and prescience of the second [order]; likewise, the preordaining and prescience of the third [order] presupposes the preordaining and prescience of the other two [orders]. God first ordered the universe according to the order of nature; since the universe—according to such an order—does not attain to the divine fruition, he superadded the order of grace; and, since such an order does not pertain to the union in the highest mode possible with God, he preordained man [creatura] to the personal union with God. Wherefore, since sins pertain partly to the order of nature and partly to the order of grace, inasmuch as [sin] is opposed [to nature and grace], consequently, the predestination of Jesus Christ as the Son of God presupposes the prescience of future sins. . .30

Thus Cajetan provides two additional hermeneutical keys for determining the order of the articles of faith within the ST’s structure (ordo disciplinae): first, the dual movement of human nature (in the absolute, formal sense and the concrete, historical sense) and, second, the three-tiered order of the universe based on the Deity’s diverse modes of self-communication ad extra (nature, grace, and the hypostatic union).31 This Cajetanian Rosetta stone 30. Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 1, a. 3, n. vi. On concept of person in Cajetan, see Thomas U. Mullaney, “Created Personality: The Unity of Thomistic Tradition,” The New Scholasticism 29, no. 4 (1955): 369–402. Guillaume de Tanoüarn’s entire thesis is based on the exaggerated claim that Cajetan is the “inventor of personalism”; however, de Tanoüarn fails to note Cajetan’s dependence on and continuity with Capreolus’s doctrine; see Cajetan: Le personnalisme integral, 16–17. Moreover, de Tanoüarn makes no reference at all to Capreolus or Dominic Flanders when examining Cajetan’s doctrine of analogy, nor does he consult any important English studies on the topic. 31. This three-tiered order of the universe based on the Deity’s diverse modes of communicating itself ad extra is found in Aquinas’s commentary on the Letter to the Hebrews (written probably between 1265–1268 in Rome); cf. Super Heb., cap. 1, lect. 1. Cf. also Max Seckler, Le salut et l’histoire, La pensée de saint Thomas d’Aquin sur la théologie de l’histoire, Cogitatio Fidei 21 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1967), 37; and Vendemiati, “The Struttura della Summa theologiae,” 266–67. While in basic agreement with Vendemiati’s assessment of the structuring role of God’s three-tiered self-communication within the ST, Vendemiati’s reconstruction of the ST according to the plan of a gothic cathedral is surprisingly

Sacred Doctrine and the Summa Theologiae   81 for interpreting the ST fits well with Aquinas’s own structural comments given within the various prologues of the ST and with his own division and ordering of the articles of faith as set forth in ST, II-II, q. 1, aa. 6–8, especially the first main division and hermeneutical principle of the entire ST, namely the order between the majesty of the divinity (theologia) and the mystery of Christ’s humanity (oikonomia). As was stated, according to Cajetan divine revelation is both that “by which” man believes and “what” he believes.32 Every act of faith, by means of a participation in the divine light (credere Deo), terminates in the Deity (credere Deum).33 Similarly, theological resolution, by means of the divine light of the first and supreme foundation of divine causality (the formal object), terminates in the Deity, the scientific foundation of all reality and the subject (the material object) of our theology in via. The articles of faith are an imprint of the divine mind, a constituent of the infused lex nova, and the suppositiones of our theology in via.34 The creedal propositions are not a pure similitude, but rather the assimilation of the human mind to God’s intimate knowledge of himself (theologia) and his knowledge of creation/ salvation history as conceived and consummated in the Incarnation (oikonomia).35 In the ST, the articles of faith, as expressed in the Creed and known in the divine light of faith, contain the theological order and structure of both Uncreated (theologia) and created realities (oikonomia), including all the multifarious theological ersatz; see “The Struttura della Summa theologiae,” 266–67. It is clearly more consistent with Aquinas’s own affirmations to place the articles of faith as the structuring principles of the ST rather than Vendemiati’s imaginary gothic arches with Christ as the high altar. Furthermore, Cajetan’s dual movement of human nature in relation to Christ’s Incarnation perfectly highlights the Christocentric principle of movement within the ST’s secunda and tertia pars. 32. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. xi. 33. Ibid. 34. Cajetan uses the notions of impressio and sigillio—as employed by Aquinas (cf. ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2, and De trin., . 3, a. 1, ad 4)—to express the link between our theology and that of God and the blessed; see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. v. 35. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. v.

82  The Framework concepts (i.e., grace as a theological structure36 and the order of predestination) and metaphysical notions (i.e., exitus-reditus and causality). See appendix 3 for a chart that maps out the theological order of reality (ordo rerum) and of theology (ordo disciplinae) as revealed in Aquinas’s own structural comments and Cajetan’s hermeneutical insights as to precisely how the articles of the Apostles’ Creed form the framework of the ST. Similar to metaphysics, theology does not argue in order to prove its principles, simply because its principles—the articles of faith—are grasped through faith’s non-discursive assent. According to Cajetan, while the deduction of conclusions from the articles of faith is due to the instrumental causality of human reason, nevertheless, the ultimate resolution of the theological syllogism reaches its terminus by means of a positive assent of faith, which guarantees its epistemic continuity with its subject, the Deity. 37 Without this resolution in the divine light of faith, theology would never achieve its status as a subalternate science. Theological conclusions are assented to because they are known through another (per alium notum), namely, the articles of faith.38 The conclusion of this chapter on the ST’s structure brings to an end part 1, on sacred doctrine as the framework. Sacred doctrine, whose origin is in the Trinitarian order of origins, structures both reality (ordo rerum) and theology (ordo disciplinae). Within sacred doctrine, theology is generated and acquired through reasoning from the articles of faith. In turn, theology nourishes, defends, strengthens, and begets faith by explicating what is virtually contained in the Creed.39 As was highlighted above, according to 36. For more on the role of grace as a theological structure, see Jean Tonneau, “Où commence dans la Somme le traité de la grâce,” Bulletin du Cercle Thomiste Saint-Nicholas de Caen 67 (1974): 3–11; Thomas F. O’Meara, “Grace as a Theological Structure in the Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 55, no. 1 (1988): 130–53; Romanus Cessario, “Is Aquinas’s Summa only about Grace?” in Ordo Sapientiae et Amoris, ed. Carlos-Josaphat Pinto de Oliveira (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1993), 197–209. 37. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. xii. 38. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xii. 39. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi.

Sacred Doctrine and the Summa Theologiae   83 Cajetan, the articles of faith are the architectonic principles that structure the Church within the sacred time and space of the oikonomia.40 The Symbol of Faith is a summa of the formally revealed principles of both theologia and the oikonomia, through which, by means of the divine light of revelation, man participates in God’s theology. Part 1 set the overarching context or framework for part 2, in which the habit of theology in Cajetan’s commentary on the first question of the ST—what is sacred doctrine and to what does it extend—will be expounded in detail. 40. In commenting on the pericope about the two disciples’ encounter with the risen Christ on the road to Emmaus, Cajetan notes how the articles of faith recorded in the lex vetus necessarily were fulfilled in the lex nova “because so it was written” and must necessarily “be preached in the future,” since the same articles of faith necessarily structure the Church; see Commentaria in Lucam (hereafter In Luc.) 24, in Opera Omnia, 4:275–76.

Part Two

= Sacred Doctrine as the Habit of Theolog y

The Habit of Theology

The First Syllogism

Chapter 4

The First Syllogism Pseudo-Dionysian Helicoidal Contemplation In his inaugural lecture as a new magister in sacra pagina, Aquinas locates the essential link between sacred doctrine and contemplation within the participation in and transmission of divine wisdom.1 Aquinas affirms that “doctrine and preaching are derived from the fullness of contemplation.”2 In fact, throughout his entire lifetime, he makes use of the Pseudo-Dionysian metaphor of helicoidal movement to describe sacred doctrine’s unique contemplative act.3 His most succinct description of this particular act of contemplation is found in the ST: In the soul, he [Pseudo-Dionysius] places a helicoidal movement, similarly composed of the linear [discursive human reasoning] and circular [infused divine contemplation], insofar as it uses divine illuminations in reasoning.4

Aquinas integrates the three Pseudo-Dionysian movements of contemplation—circular, helicoidal, and linear—within an 1. See Aquinas, Breve Principium, “Rigans montes de superioribus,” Proemium. 2. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 188, a. 6. c. 3. St. Thomas uses this Pseudo-Dionysian metaphor of theology as helicoidal movement for the first time in the Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum (In I Sent., dist. 37, q. 4, a. 1), written at the beginning of his first Parisian sojourn, from 1252 to 1254; next in De div. nom. (c. 4, lect. 7), written from 1256 and 1259; then, in the Quaestiones disputates de veritate (q. 8, a. 15 ad 3um), written between 1261 to 1265; also in the ST, II-II, q. 180, a. 6, written around 1271–72; and, for the last time, in the Postilla super Psalmos, in his commentary on Psalm 26 (n. 6). This last work was written near the end of St. Thomas’s life, around 1273. 4. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 180, a. 6, ad 2.

87

88  The Habit of Theology Aristotelian-inspired anthropology. His genius is idiosyncratic in that it is able to synthesize what is true in distinct, though not exclusive, traditions of thought. Then, since habits are known to exist from their acts, he traces sacred doctrine’s act of helicoidal contemplation back to its principle—the habit of theology.5 In order to determine, however, whether theology as a wisdom is indeed a virtue or habit and not wisdom as the gift of the Holy Spirit, St. Thomas applies a distinction between two possible types of judgment, namely by way of knowledge and by way of instinct: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral sciences might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. . . . The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine, which is acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation.6

According to Aquinas, the gift of wisdom is a supernatural disposition or habit by which the human intellect—moved by a divine 5. See Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1. Cf. In II Sent., d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, sol.; In IV Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1, qua 2, ad 1; Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus (hereafter De virt.), q. un., a. 12, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; and Super I Cor., cap. 1, lect. 3. 6. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3. Cf. ST, II-II, q. 46, a. 3. c., and II-II, q. 45, a. 2. c. Both types of judgment are described in other terms by Aquinas. The judgment per modum cognitionis is also called: “secundum perfectum usum rationis” (ST, II-II, q. 45, a. 2, c.), “cognitio veritatis . . . speculativa tantum” (ST, I, q. 64, a. 1, c.), “una pure speculativa” (ST, II-II, q. 162, a. 3, ad 1), acquired “per studium” (ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3 and II-II, q. 45, a. 1, ad 2), “per rationis inquisitionem” (ST, II-II, q. 45, a. 2, c.). However, the judgment per modum inclinationis is at times called: “per quandam connaturalitatem” (ST, I-II, q. 65, a. 1, c.), “cognitio affectiva” (ST, II-II, q. 162, a. 3, ad 1), “notitia experimentalis” (ST, II-II, q. 97, a. 2, ad 2), “per modum naturae” (In III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 3, sol. a. 2, ad 2), “ex instinctu” (ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ad 3), “per amorem” (ST, I-II, q. 27, a. 4, c.), “quasi ex habitu” (In III Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 3, sol. 2, ad 2um). See Inos Biffi, Teologia, storia e contemplazione in Tommaso D’Aquino, in La Costruzione della Teologia, vol. 3 (Milano: Jaca Book, 1995), 89– 90, and Anthony Moreno, “The Nature of St. Thomas’ Knowledge ‘Per Connaturalitatem’,” Angelicum 48, no. 1 (1970): 44.

The First Syllogism   89 inclination—judges with certainty divine things as they are known in the light of the ultimate and highest cause.7 The gift of wisdom’s act is what Pseudo-Dionysius identifies as a circular movement of contemplation.8 It presupposes the virtue of faith and perfects faith’s imperfect knowledge of divine things “affectively” and “experimentally” through the gift of wisdom’s union with charity.9 Through the gift of wisdom humans can “know” and “taste” the divine goodness connaturally through charity.10 The intellect, moved by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit through the gift of wisdom, is brought into unifying contact with the will (informed by charity), and thus contemplates with a certain connaturality the object of the will, which is the divine goodness itself.11 Hence 7. Aquinas makes use of various terms to refer to the gift of wisdom’s material object: res divinae (ST, II-II, q. 45, a. 4, c.); causa altissima (ST, II-II, q. 45, a. 1, c.); finis ultimus (ST, II-II, q. 45, a. 4, ad 1); rationes divinae (ST, II-II, q. 45, a. 3, ad 3). It is important to note that the subject or material object, that is, the Deity, is identical for both the gift of wisdom and theological wisdom. The formal object is what distinguishes them. The gift of wisdom judges by the light of the highest cause in a divine mode, while theology judges in a human mode. The gifts of the Holy Spirit, as dispositions or habits, differ from the infused virtues in that they confer a divine mode (ab inspiratione divina) of activity, whereas the virtues function in a human mode according to reason (per rationem); see Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 1, ad 4. 8. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 180, a. 6, ad 2. 9. The affective knowledge of the gift of wisdom would not be possible without the Deity previously being known by the intellect through faith; Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 45, a. 1, ad 2; ST, II-II, q. 68, a. 4, ad 3; ST, II-II, q. 68, a. 8, c. The imperfection of faith lies in the human intellect’s nature of knowing through concepts. Thus the perfection of faith’s knowledge could not be by the further addition of concepts. Rather, faith is perfected by an apophatic or negative, non-conceptual, affective knowledge by means of the gift of wisdom informed by charity in the order of grace: “In statu viae Deum per essentiam amamus, non videmus” (Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5). Cf. ST, I, q. 43, a. 3, c. Thus, even in the light of faith, God paradoxically remains in a light inaccessible to the shadows and darkness of our ignorance; cf. Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4, and Super I Tim., cap. 6, lect. 3. 10. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 45, a. 2, c., and ST, II-II, q. 45, a. 4, c. 11. The human soul, created in the image of the Trinity, is the subject of this unity of intellect and will. Thus, theologically considered, the human soul possesses a very imperfect vestige of the Trinitarian relations; cf. Aquinas, SCG, 4, cap. 26. The unity of the human intellect and will in the order of grace occurs through the virtues of charity (will) and wisdom (intellect). In the natural order, the virtues are unified through a dialectical deliberation between the intellect and the will: simple apprehension of the good (intellect) → simple volition (will) → synderesis (the infallible natural law) or primordial conscience (intellect) → intention of the end, the immediate obedience of the will to the

90  The Habit of Theology peace, which is formally an effect of charity, is also a result of wisdom’s ordering all things according to its affective contemplation.12 Souls that have experienced this form of wisdom (infused contemplation) have also tasted and enjoyed its fruit: peace, restfulness, hesychia. As summed up by the psalmist: “Taste and see that the Lord is good” (Ps 33:9).13 Obviously, this affective and circular act of infused contemplation, effected in a non-discursive mode through the gift of wisdom, is incomparably superior to theology’s discursive act of helicoidal contemplation.14 Hence a simple and uneducated believer, lacking any theological knowledge acquired through study, may possess through the gift of wisdom and its infused contemplation a more profound knowledge of divine things than does a theologian.15 Nevertheless, although the virtue of theology and the gift of wisdom are distinct, they are also highly complementary.16 Cajetan makes reference to the unity and complementarity of these two types of wisdom in the person of Hierotheus, Pseudo-Dionysius’s disciple: “Master Dionysius was induced to praise Hierotheus for not only his intellectual learning, but also the knowledge he suffered through divine affection.”17 According to Aquinas, the natural virtue of philosophical wisnatural law (will) → counsel regarding the means (intellect) → consent to the means (will) → ultimate practical judgment or prudence (intellect) → election (will) → command to apply general knowledge (the natural law) to willing and operating in particular as the measure of the concrete moral act (intellect) → active use, the carrying out of the command (will) → awareness of positive good (intellect) → passive use or execution (will) → possession (intellect) → fruition (will); cf. Aquinas, ST, I-II, qq. 8–16. 12. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 29, a. 3, c., and ST, II-II, q. 45, a. 6, ad 1. 13. See Aquinas, Super Ps, 33, n. 9. 14. The gift of wisdom is afforded primacy over theology because the gifts are simply necessary for salvation; see Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 68, a. 2, c. Theology is necessary only in a certain sense (secundum quid) for salvation, while faith is simply necessary for salvation; see Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 3. This is precisely why understanding the relation between theology and faith within sacred doctrine is key. 15. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, c., and ST, II-II, q. 45, a. 2, c. 16. The acquired judgment of theology, which is principally in the speculative order, is in need of perfection also in the affective order by grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit; see Aquinas, Super Heb., c. 5, lect. 2, n. 273, and In III Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, qua 1, ad 1. 17. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. vi.

The First Syllogism   91 dom—the linear contemplation of discursive reasoning—is a virtue of the speculative intellect.18 It is distinct from—yet related to—the two other intellectual virtues of the speculative intellect, namely understanding (intellectus) and science (scientia). It differs from understanding insofar as understanding considers truth as known in itself (per se notum) and not as known through another (per alium notum).19 On the other hand, though it is similar to science in that it attains truth through self-evident propositions (per alium notum) by the inquiry of reason, it differs from science, nevertheless, insofar as science terminates with knowledge in only some particular genus, while wisdom terminates in the first and highest cause.20 Moreover, natural wisdom is a certain science that judges both the conclusions of the various habits of science and the first principles known by the habit of understanding.21 By judging, evaluating, and defending both the first principles of understanding and the conclusions of the sciences, philosophical wisdom possesses something proper to itself by addition (ex additione), that is to say by an added regulatory function as regards the other speculative virtues.22 This regulatory function distinguishes it in an eminent way from both understanding and science. In philosophical wisdom, as a potential whole, both understanding and science are contained beneath it, just as the more principle part contains beneath itself the secondary elements.23 Furthermore, the natural virtue of philosophical wisdom is a simple virtue. It is not an integral whole or a composite made up 18. See Aquinas, In I Metaph., lect. 1, n. 34, and In I Post. anal., lect. 44, n. 405. For the difference between the speculative and practical sciences, see Aquinas, De trin., pars II, q. 5, a. 1, c. For linear contemplation, see ST, II-II, q. 180, a. 6, ad 3. 19. See Aquinas, In IV Ethic., lect. 5, n. 1179. 20. See Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, c. 21. See Aquinas, ST, I-II. q. 57, a. 2, ad 1. 22. See Aquinas, De trin., q. 2, a. 2. ad 1. Joseph Owens states the added feature that wisdom has in contrast to science is its “regulatory function . . . in regard to all other sciences.” See Owens, “A Note on Aquinas. In Boeth. de Trin., 2, 2, ad 1um,” The New Scholasticism 59, no. 1 (1985): 102. Cf. Aquinas In II Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4; ST, I-II, q. 66, a. 5, c.; ST, II-II, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4. 23. Cf. Carl A. Lofy, “The Meaning of ‘Potential Whole’ in St. Thomas Aquinas,” The Modern Schoolman 37, no. 1 (1959): 44n24.

92  The Habit of Theology of the other speculative virtues.24 Nonetheless, it exercises in a more excellent way the various and multitude operations of both understanding and science, with the addition of its own regulatory function and its own proper acts of contemplation and ordering. Philosophical wisdom is strictly a speculative science. It is contrasted, however, to other speculative sciences by the property of having knowledge not just through causes, but through the highest causes.25 Finally, another term for philosophical wisdom is metaphysics—a single, speculative discipline within the plurality of philosophical disciplines.26 As was already noted, in contrast to Prierias, whose position holds that theology is not really distinct from faith, Cajetan maintains that theology is not a primary part of a potential whole, but rather a separate habit, subordinated to the virtue of faith.27 Theology is similar to the natural virtue of philosophical wisdom insofar as it is likewise acquired through study and generated through a judgment by way of knowledge. Theology’s act of judgment is, however, not effected merely in the natural light of reason, but rather primarily in and through the divine light of revelation. Although theology judges in a human mode through the instrumentality of reason, nevertheless, it lies within the genus of sacred doctrine, because it is generated from supernatural principles, the articles of faith, and its primary efficient cause flows from the human mind’s participation in the divine light of revelation. In conclusion, following Aquinas, Cajetan likewise descriptively defines sacred doctrine’s theological act in terms of the PseudoDionysian concept of helicoidal contemplation: 24. Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2. Cf. Lofy, “The Meaning of “Potential Whole’,” 41–42. 25. Aquinas, De trin., q. 2, a. 2. ad 1. Cf. Joseph Owen, “A Note on Aquinas,” 107; and Armand Maurer, The Division and Methods of the Sciences (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1963), 43n19. 26. Philosophia prima, metaphysica, scientia divina, and theologia are the four terms that Aquinas uses for the same identical science, namely philosophical wisdom; cf. ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2. 27. See part 1, chapter 1, the section on “Faith and Theology.”

The First Syllogism   93 not consisting in the purely natural, but rather in our nature as perfected by the grace of divine illuminations. . . . according to a participation in the divine light our mind is elevated higher, however, not without the use of phantasms. So the circular movement, the uniform contemplation of God, is preserved together with our contemplation [i.e., linear, discursive reasoning].28

The First Syllogism (ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, c.) Following Pseudo-Dionysius, Aquinas employed both dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms in theology. He maintains, however, that the theology of ST concerns primarily demonstrative syllogisms.29 The first syllogism in the body of article one (ST, I, q. 1) is a perfect example: humans are directed to God, as to a certain end that surpasses the grasp of reason: “The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee” (Isaiah 64:4). But the end must first be known by humans who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of humans that certain truths, which exceed human reason, should be made known to them by divine revelation.30

Cajetan reformulates the syllogism as follows: 28. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 180, a. 6, n. iv. 29. In his letter to Bishop Titus, Pseudo-Dionysius acknowledges two types of theology: one, symbolical and initiative; the other, philosophical and demonstrative; see Epistle 9.1, PG 3:1105 D. For Aquinas’s frequent use of this text, see Paul Rorem, “An Influence of Peter Lombard on the Biblical Hermeneutics of Thomas Aquinas,” Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa 16 (1980): 429–34. In speaking of demonstrative theology, Aquinas divides its modes of argumentation, according to the Pseudo-Dionysian division of persuasion (dialectics) and demonstration; cf. ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2. Notice that this theological science concerns demonstrations and not mere dialectics. Even Gregory Palamas (1296–1359), the preeminent Byzantine theologian and defender of hesychasm, arguing against the nominalism of Barlaam, held that demonstrative or apodictic syllogisms are at the basis of all theology; see Katerina Ierodiakonou, “The Anti-Logical Movement of the Fourteenth Century,” in Byzantine Philosophy and Its Ancient Sources, ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 219–36, especially 228–31; and Antonis Fyrigos, “Gregorio Palamas e il ‘palamismo,’” Eastern Theological Journal 1, no. 2 (2015): 205–41, especially 205–13. 30. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, c.

94  The Habit of Theology To be ordered to God as to an end unknown by natural reason, which is to be attained by one’s own intention and action, requires a supernatural discipline by which the end would be known and one’s operations directed towards it. Humans are of this kind. Therefore. The minor premise is proven from Isaiah 64 [:4].31

Cajetan provides two important keys for deciphering Aquinas’s first syllogism: (1) the minor premise is a revealed premise; (2) the minor and middle terms. The first indication is clear. The minor premise is the revealed truth about mankind’s universal call to salvation, which is supernatural beatitude: “humans are those ordered to God as to an end unknown by natural reason, which is to be attained by one’s own intention and actions.” Indeed, Aquinas establishes this minor premise—a truth of the faith—on the authority of sacred Scripture: “The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee” (Isaiah 64: 4).32 The second indication regards the minor and middle terms. The statement “humans are of this kind” implies that humans (the minor term)—within the divine wisdom’s economy of grace—are indeed among “those ordered to God as to an end unknown by natural reason, which is to be attained by one’s own intention and actions” (the middle term). Cajetan’s explicit expression of the middle term is according to Aquinas’s intent: it is a certain end that exceeds the capacity of human reason. This grasping of the “certain end” as a supernatural end is extremely important in avoiding the fallacy of an ambiguous middle term. In the light of these indications given by Cajetan, Aquinas’s first argument can be formulated according to its syllogistic mood and figure. Now, the best way to determine the syllogism’s mood and 31. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. iv; see appendix 2. 32. Throughout his entire theological endeavor, Aquinas cites Isaiah 64:4 as a biblical text that reveals the supernatural nature of the beatific vision, grace, and glory, all of which exceed the natural capacity of man. In the prologue of his commentary on the Sentences (c. 1252–1256), he refers to the glory experienced in the beatific vision as a “drunkenness,” because it exceeds all measure of reason and desire; cf. Aquinas, In I Sent., prol.; SCG, 4, cap. 17; Super Eph., cap. 2, lect. 2; ST, III, q. 55, a. 1, c.

The First Syllogism   95 figure is first to identify the conclusion along with its subject and predicate. The conclusion in Aquinas’s first syllogism is: “Hence it was necessary for the salvation of humans that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to them by divine revelation.” A basic and universal rule must be followed: the wording may be changed if necessary, but never the meaning. Hence Cajetan reformulates Aquinas’s conclusion into its logical form as a universal affirmative proposition (A): All humans are those that require a supernatural discipline, by which the end would be known and one’s operations directed toward it.”33 In brief, for humans, sacred doctrine is a revealed knowledge necessary for salvation, because— according to Aquinas—it is a knowledge of truths that, for the most part, exceed human reason, but that constitute and lead to man’s deification.34 The subject of the conclusion is the minor term, found also in the minor premise. As indicated by Cajetan, Aquinas begins this syllogism with the minor premise: “Firstly, indeed, because humans are directed to God, as to a certain end that surpasses the grasp of human reason.”35 Cajetan transcribes the minor premise 33. To allow readers to better follow the structure of the syllogism, in the subsequent discussion the middle term is in bold, the minor term is in italics, and the major term is underlined. The superscript “d” marks a distributed term, while the superscript “u” marks an undistributed term. The middle term must be distributed at least once. 34. According to Aquinas, the ultimate perfection of man consists in the knowledge of truth; cf. Comp. theol., I, c. 1; ST, I-II, q. 3, a. 2, c.; SGC, IV, c. 42. That is why the beatific vision is also the end and ultimate perfection of revelation; cf. ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 4, ad 2, and ST, II-II, q. 173, a. 1, c. Moreover, the beatific vision is simply unattainable without revelation, since it transcends man’s natural capacity; cf. ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, c.; ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 3; SCG, 3, cap. 154; De ver., q. 12, a. 1, ad 3. Some authors accuse Aquinas of making a “flagrant exception” as regards Christ’s human psychology by placing in him the beatific vision; see Jean-Pierre Torrell, Le Christ en ses mystères: La vie et l’oeuvre de Jésus selon saint Thomas d’Aquin, vol. 1 (Paris: Desclèe, 1999), 138–40. According to Aquinas, however, Christ is Perfect Man, because his human knowledge from conception was perfected by the beatific vision. For Christ could not be the author and cause of human perfection (deiformitas/theosis) if during his earthly mission he had only faith and not the beatific vision of which eternal beatitude consists and which he came to preach as the Good News; cf. Aquinas, Comp. theol., I, c. 216. 35. It is also worth noting that it is erroneous to attribute the article of faith exclusively to the major premise; cf. Reginaldus Garrigou-Lagrange, “De methodo sancti Thomae

96  The Habit of Theology into its logical form as a universal affirmative proposition (A) with “humans” being the minor term: All humans d are those ordered to God as to an end unknown by natural reason, which is to be attained by one’s own intention and actionsu. The remaining premise of the syllogism to be formulated is the major premise, containing the major term, which is the predicate of the conclusion. Here one must be careful. Aquinas states the major premise in purely philosophical terms: “But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end.” Cajetan rewrites it into its logical form as a universal affirmative proposition (A). In addition, he places it in a different genus of knowledge, namely in the supernatural order of revelation: Those ordered to God as to an end unknown by natural reason, which is to be attained by one’s own intention and actiond, are those that require a supernatural doctrine by which the end would be known and one’s operations directed towards it.u Is Cajetan’s reformulation of the major premise within the supernatural order of knowledge justifiable? The answer is yes, since Cajetan’s theological expression of the major premise can be linked with Aquinas’s philosophical expression of the major premise within a ponendo ponens argument: If P, then Q; P; therefore, Q. Their varying expressions of the major premise of the first syllogism are complementary: Aquinas states the philosophical antecedent (P), while Cajetan affirms the theological consequent (Q). Thus, (P) if an end is a thing that must be known by humans in order for them to direct their thoughts and actions toward it, then (Q) a supernatural end must be supernaturally made known to humans in order to direct their thoughts and actions toward that kind of end. The antecedent of this ponendo ponens argument (Aquinas’s expression of the major premise) is a metaphysical truth based on the definition of the final end or beatitude of an intellectual creature speciatim de structura articulorum Summae theologiae,” Angelicum 5, no. 1 (1928) (extractum ex periodico): 16.

The First Syllogism   97 as including both the intellectual creature’s knowledge of the end and the ordering of its own intentions and acts toward that end: “But the end must first be known by humans who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end.”36 As regards the supernatural order, this truth (that humans are to attain their supernatural end by a multitude of human acts) cannot be deduced simply from human nature, since it is solely contingent on divine wisdom.37 Thus, the consequent of the ponendo ponens argument (Cajetan’s theological expression of the major premise), in order to be known with certainty, must necessarily be revealed. For, as Aquinas states, God, acting in the supernatural order of grace, could have made the human will to have a right tendency to its supernatural end and, simultaneously, attain that end without having to freely order a multitude of human acts toward that end.38 Nonetheless, God in his infinite wisdom willed—in both the natural order and the supernatural order of grace—that humans should attain their end by freely ordering their acts toward that end. Hence this implied ponendo ponens argument is dependent on a revealed premise, the consequent. If the consequent was not made known by revelation, the argument could not have been even postulated. Cajetan brilliantly intuited this link between the metaphysical antecedent given by Aquinas and the theological consequent that he ultimately employs in the first syllogism, wherein the middle term is unambiguously expressed as a supernatural end. This accords with Aquinas’s explicit intention, for he himself states the middle term in the minor premise as a revealed truth concerning “a certain end that surpasses the grasp of human reason.”39 Hence the first syllogism is a theological demonstration that links the necessity ad finem of having a supernatural doctrine (the major term, the material cause) to human nature (the minor term, the subject, man as supernaturally ordered to the Deity) through the medium 36. Aquinas ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, c. 37. See Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, c. 38. See Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 5, a. 7, c. 39. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, c.

98  The Habit of Theology of its supernatural end (the middle term, the final cause) as determined by divine wisdom. The following is the first syllogism written out in its entirety as expressed by Aquinas and as formulated by Cajetan: Major premise: Aquinas: (A) The endd must be first known by humans, who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end u (philosophical antecedent). Cajetan: (A) Those ordered to God as to an end unknown by natural reason, which is to be attained by one’s own intention and actiond, are those that require a super­natural discipline by which the [supernatural] end would be known and one’s operations directed toward it u (revealed consequent). [The fourth mode of per se predication.] Minor premise: Aquinas: (A) Humans d are directed to God, as to a certain end that surpasses the grasp of reasonu. Cajetan: (A) All humans d are those ordered to God as to an end unknown by natural reason, which is to be attained by one’s own intention and actionsu. [The first mode of per se predication.] Conclusion: Aquinas: (A) Hence it was necessary for the salvation of humans, that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to them by divine revelation.u Cajetan: (A) All humans d are those that require a supernatural discipline by which the [supernatural] end would be known and one’s operations directed towards it.u [The second mode of per se predication.] This syllogism is a first figure bArbArA:

The First Syllogism   99 (A) M-P (A) S-M Therefore, (A) S-P. The major premise in Cajetan’s interpretation is stated as a theological proposition known in light of divine revelation and, thus, deduced with certainty from the more universal metaphysical antecedent given by Aquinas. The minor premise introduces a particular revealed truth, namely “all humans are ordered to God as to an unknown end by natural reason,” whose content is further explicated by the major premise. Hence both the minor and major premises of this first syllogism are true and certain on the basis of revelation, because the middle term contained in both premises is a revealed truth: “a certain end that surpasses the grasp of human reason.” Furthermore, a bArbArA is a valid mood of a first-figure syllogism; therefore, if its premises are true, then its conclusion necessarily must also be true. Cajetan’s reformulation of ST’s first demonstrative syllogism corresponds to the modes of per se predication, which are intrinsically connected to the four causes.40 According to Cajetan, sacred doctrine is a science that proceeds from principles per se nota to the Deity.41 This is why theological suppositions and conclusions 40. Per se in the first mode pertains to the intrinsic causality of the form or essence; the second mode pertains to material causality; the fourth mode pertains to efficient causality; cf. Aquinas, In I Post. anal., lect. 10, nn. 3–7. Aquinas dismisses per se in the third mode as relevant to science because it pertains to a “mode of existing” and not to a “mode of predicating”; ibid., n. 6. As a point of interest, Cajetan points out that “humanity” is united with the Word in the third mode insofar as “humanity” exists in the Word not per accidens, but per se, namely, “humanity” is united with the Word hypostatically, which means substantially, according to the third mode of per se; cf. Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 2, a. 6, n. ix. 41. Guy Mansini denies that, for Aquinas, the first principles of theology such as creation, the Incarnation, and man’s call to supernatural beatitude are per se nota for any intellect, divine or human; see Mansini, “Are the Principles of Sacra Doctrina Per Se Nota?” The Thomist 74, no. 3 (2010): 414. Cajetan holds that the articles of faith are known by the Deity per se in their “presentiality,” including all that is either contingent or necessary; see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 14, a. 13, n. xxiv. Mansini also claims that Aquinas “avoids—I want to say sedulously avoids—characterizing the articles of the creed as premises that are per se nota or probati, evident as proved from per se nota principles, or following along Realities whose intelligibility could be expressed in per se nota principles” (Mansini, “Are the Principles of Sacra Doctrina Per Se Nota?,” 426). This is false, since Aquinas clearly affirms the opposite; cf. ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2.

100  The Habit of Theology resolve in the Deity, inasmuch as the Deity, as the first cause, is neither a necessary cause simpliciter, nor a contingent cause, but rather a superior cause.42 In the scientific syllogism bArbArA, the major premise predicates an attribute (signified by the major term) to the subject (signified by the middle term) according to the fourth mode of per se predication. This mode of predication pertains to efficient causality, namely when a proper effect is attributed to its proper cause. Hence a supernatural discipline (sacred doctrine) is the proper effect in a created intellect ordered to a supernatural end (the proper cause): Those ordered to God as to an end unknown by natural reason, which is to be attained by one’s own intention and action (the middle term), are those that require a supernatural discipline by which the [supernatural] end would be known and one’s operations directed toward it (the major term, the per se attribute). According to the fourth mode of per se predication, a supernatural discipline belongs per se to a created intellect ordered to a supernatural end by virtue of an extrinsic efficient cause—the Deity. In the minor premise, the per se predication is of the subject’s definition (the middle term) to the minor term according to the first mode, which pertains to the intrinsic causality of the form or essence. Being ordered to an end above reason (the beatific vision—the middle term) is part of the theological definition of humans (the minor term), who—within the order of grace—are called to participate in the divine nature: All humans are those ordered to God as to an end unknown by natural reason, which is to be attained by one’s own intention and actions. Just as being a rational animal belongs to humans in the natural order, similarly, in the supernatural order of grace, being an intellectual creature ordered to God as to an end unknown by natural reason belongs—in a certain sense—“naturally” to humans, when considered by the theologian.43 This is why Cajetan asserts: “In St. Thomas’s doctrine, 42. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 14, a. 13, n. xxiv. 43. Based on Aquinas’s interpretation of St. Augustine in De ver., q. 14, a. 10, ad 1,

The First Syllogism   101 as stated in the first article of his work [ST I, q. 1, a. 1. c.], humans are not naturally, but obedientially ordered to that [supernatural] beatitude.”44 This forms the basis of Cajetan’s theological anthropology.45 Finally, the conclusion predicates an attribute or property (the major term) to the subject (the minor term) according to the second mode of per se predication, which pertains to material causality. Hence what is scientifically known through this syllogism is that humans (the minor term) fall within the definition of “those that require a supernatural discipline” (the major term): All humans are those that require a supernatural discipline by which the [supernatural] end would be known and one’s operations directed toward it. The theological definition of man—established in the revealed minor premise—is the cause by which this attribute (the major term) is predicated per se to the subject.

The Necessity of Sacred Doctrine and a Critique of Scotus Cajetan’s hermeneutic of the first syllogism is consistent. The first syllogism concludes that humans (the minor term and subject of the conclusion) must necessarily be given a revealed doctrine (the major term and the material cause) to know and order themselves to an end that exceeds their natural capacity (the middle term and final cause). This conclusion, therefore, implies that humans must indeed have a capacity to receive and know such a revealed doctrine. This innate receptive capacity in humans to be elevated by the omnipotence of God—without any inherent contradiction to their nature as creature—to know and order themselves to a suCajetan maintains that humans have a “remote” proportion or “natural” capacity secundum quid for justification within the present supernatural order of grace; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 113, a. 10, n. v, and In ST, I-II, q. 113, a. 3, n. iii. 44. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 1, n. ix. 45. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 9, a. 2, n. iv; also see Hallensleben, Communicatio: Anthropologie und Gnadenlehre bei Thomas de Vio Cajetan, 166–71, on man’s “capax boni universalis” and Cajetan’s “Teoleologisch-ekstatische Anthropologie in philosophischer Sicht.”

102  The Habit of Theology pernatural end is what the scholastics called an obediential potency.46 That is why Cajetan, in commenting on ST, I, q. 12, a. 1, makes specific reference to ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, when stating, “In St. Thomas’s doctrine, as stated in the first article of his work [ST, I, q. 1, a. 1. c.], humans are not naturally, but obedientially ordered to that [supernatural] beatitude.”47 In brief, the conclusion of the necessity of a revealed doctrine is ultimately dependent on God’s wisdom and goodness in knowing and willing the elevation of man, through his obediential potency, to a higher participation in the Deity within the order of grace. Thus, human nature, as known in the supernatural light of divine revelation, is the ontological foundation for the various formal causes of sacred doctrine, including the habit of an acquired theological wisdom, which Aquinas seeks to define and explicate in articles 2–7 of the first question of the ST. Cajetan illustrates the necessity of sacred doctrine for human salvation in the light of two distinctions: the first, between the two principal genera of human knowledge in via, namely one genus in the order of nature and the other in the order of grace;48 the second is the twofold distinction of the necessity ad finem into ad esse and ad bene esse.49 The two principal genera of human knowledge in via concerning God (including humankind’s twofold beatitude) proceed from a dual mode of divine communication of the various intrinsic principles—both natural and supernatural—by which humans are enabled to know the veritas prima: the first is the infusion of the light of the agent intellect in the natural order, and the second is the infusion of the divine light of revelation and the supernatural virtues in the 46. For Cajetan’s definition of obediential potency, see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. ix; see appendix 2. As Cajetan states later on in the ST, an obediential potency is not within the order of the natural potencies, but rather is ordered to the divine potency. Moreover, unlike the natural potencies, an obediential potency is not always realized; cf. In ST, III, q. 1, a. 3, n. ii. 47. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 1, n. ix. 48. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a.1, ad 2; Cf. SCG, 1, cap. 3. The twofold genera of knowledge of God are the basis for a twofold contemplation of God; cf. In I Sent., q. 1, a. 1, c. 49. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, nn. ii and iii; see appendix 2.

The First Syllogism   103 order of grace.50 This dual mode of divine communication has its origin in God’s twofold activity ad extra as the author of nature and author of grace.51 This dual mode of divine authorship refers to two distinct created effects that found the real distinction between the order of creation and the order of grace, that is to say, between the natural and supernatural. This real distinction between the orders of creation and grace implies no division within the Deity, the one cause and author, and no ontological contradiction in man. God, as the author of grace, is the efficient, exemplar, and final cause of a new effect or new presence in humans.52 As the efficient and exemplar cause of grace, he elevates and perfects humans, the imago Dei, by a new participation in his divine nature.53 God perfects the human soul and its faculties of the intellect and will with the intrinsic principles of grace and the theological and moral virtues by which humans can know and order themselves to their supernatural end, the beatific vision (the final cause).54 In the first article of the In ST, Cajetan highlights the perfection of human nature in the order of grace by a new participation in the divine nature through the elevation of man’s obediential potency. At this point, he purposely introduces into his commentary Scotus’s controversial position on humankind’s natural ability to know its supernatural end.55 In critiquing Scotus’s anthropology, Cajetan sets in relief the role of the obediential potency, which must be elevated in order that humans may receive an intrinsically supernatural knowledge, namely sacred doctrine (the material cause), which is necessary (ad finem) for humans to direct their in50. See Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 109, a. 1 ad 1. Cf. Super Ioan., cap. 1, lect. 3; SCG, 1, cap. 3; ST, I, q. 94, a. 1, c; Super Ioan., cap. 1, lect. 10; Super Rom., cap. 3, lect. 1. 51. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 89, a. 1, ad 3. The same is true as regards the angels; cf. De malo, q. 16, a. 4, ad 14. 52. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 43, a. 3. 53. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 93, a. 6, c. Now, humans, as an image of God, are naturally in a remote proportion inasmuch as they have an obediential potency for grace (cf. De malo, q. 2, a. 12, c.) and the beatific vision (cf. ST, III, q. 9, a. 2, c.). 54. See Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 62, a. 3, c., and ST, I-II, q. 62, a. 3, obj. 1 and ad 1. 55. Cf. Scotus, Reportata parisiensia (hereafter Rep.) I (II/2), prol., q. 3, in Opera Omnia: editio minor, ed. Giovanni Lauriola Alberobello (Bari: Alberobello, 1998–2003), n. 228.

104  The Habit of Theology tentions and actions towards the beatific vision (the middle term and final cause). Cajetan is not original in his treatment of Scotus on this particular question. In fact, he draws heavily from Capreolus’s Defensiones.56 By introducing this controversy into this first article, however, he underlines a key hermeneutical principle—the real distinction between the orders of nature and those of grace. This hermeneutical principle determines the first main division in the ST by differentiating sacred doctrine from the philosophical doctrines. Cajetan refers to question 1 of Scotus’s Prologue to the Sentences: “Whether humans in their present state need to be supernaturally inspired with some doctrine they could not attain by the natural light of the intellect?”57 In his typical dialectical fashion, Scotus develops the question in the form of a controversy between the philosophers and theologians.58 The philosophers hold that humankind’s natural knowledge is sufficient for them to know and order themselves to their final end, which is a perfection of nature. The theologians, on the other hand, maintain that grace and revelation are necessary for humans to know and order themselves to their final end, which is a supernatural perfection.59 Scotus agrees with the theologians that there is a necessity for a revealed doctrine of humankind’s final end; however, the necessity of revelation is not because this doctrine is intrinsically supernatural, that is to say above the natural capacity of humans, but rather because it remains hidden because of man’s present fallen state.60 Accordingly, revelation is a consequence of humankind’s fallen nature.61 Furthermore, 56. Cf. Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:2a–61b. 57. Scotus, Ord., I (III/1), prol., q. un., n. 1. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. i; see appendix 2. 58. For two good summaries of the development of Scotus’s thought in the light of the Condemnation of 1277 and the controversy between the philosophers and theologians, see Olivier Boulnois, Duns Scoto: Il rigore della carità (Milan: Jaca Book, 1999), 27–66, and Luigi Iammarrone, Giovanni Duns Scotus metafisico e teologo: Le tematiche fondamentali della sua filosofia e teologia (Rome: Miscellanea Francescana, 2003), 5–20. 59. Scotus, Ord., I (III/1), prol., q. un., n. 6. 60. Scotus, Ord., IV (III/2), d. 49, q. 8, n. 4. 61. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. i; see Appendix 2. Cf. De potentia neutra, et de natura

The First Syllogism   105 Scotus sides with the philosophers on the natural knowability of the ultimate final end of humans, giving three proofs in support of his claim, to which Cajetan responds. Scotus’s first proof is based on the authority of St. Augustine, who, in his De praedestinatione sanctorum, writes: “To be able to have faith, as to be able to have charity is of the nature of man; therefore, to have grace is of the faithful.”62 He interprets this passage of St. Augustine to mean that humans have a natural passive potency in terms of a natural inclination for a supernatural final end without, however, necessarily having a corresponding natural active power. He agrees with the philosophers on the natural knowability of the ultimate final end of humans; nevertheless, he disagrees with them on their unlimited application of the Aristotelian axiom that natural passive potencies always correspond to natural agents.63 As part of his theological method, Cajetan does affirm that humans have a natural desire for the beatific vision within the order of grace; nevertheless, he underlines that human nature has only an obediential potency for the beatific vision. In commenting on whether any created intellect can see God’s essence, Cajetan affirms that Aquinas treats this question strictly theologically—and not philosophically—throughout the ST.64 Moreover, he denies that humans have an innate natural desire and, consequently, a natural agency to actualize this natural passive potency.65 Finally, he affirms that only when elevated by grace is the obediential potency of man’s intellectual nature “formally” enabled to “connaturally” desire the vision of God.66 potentiae receptivae, q. 2 ad quartum, in Opuscula Omnia, vol. 3 (Antwerpen: apud Ioannem Keerbergium, 1612), 153va-b. 62. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vii; see appendix 2. Cf. Scotus, Ord., I (III/1), prol., q. un., n. 28. 63. Scotus, Ord., IV (III/2), d. 49, q. 11, n. 540. Cf. Aristotle, De anima (3, c. 5, 430a10–14); Metaph. V (c. 12, 1019a15–1019b15); De caelo I (c. 4, 271a 32–33); and Aquinas, De virt., q. un., a. 10, ad 13. Scotus constructs an argument against the philosophers to demonstrate the inapplicability of this Aristotelian thesis to the possible intellect’s natural capacity to know all things, including the Deity; see Ord., I (III/1), prol., q. un., n. 4. 64. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 1, n. x. 65. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. ix. 66. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 1, n. x.

106  The Habit of Theology According to Lawrence Feingold, however, Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 3, a. 8, seems to have changed his interpretation regarding his earlier commentary, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 1, conceding “a truly natural desire to see God that is not dependent on knowledge of Revelation.”67 This fundamental shift in Cajetan’s treatment of natural desire in In ST, I-II, q. 3, a. 8, however, cannot be affirmed.68 The crux of this question—in Cajetan’s own words—is that the natural desire cannot exceed the powers of nature. In ST, I-II, q. 3, a. 8, Cajetan maintains that the natural desire is natural according to its human subject secundum quid, inasmuch as humans have an obediential potency or capacity for beatitude (capax dei); but it is “formally” natural according to its human subject only within the order of grace, that is, within its proper theological context, wherein man is supernaturally ordered to the beatific vision.69 To put it simply, Cajetan does not specifically develop the natural desire to see God as—what later generations will term—a non-deliberate elicited desire of the will.70 Thus, for Cajetan, humans have a natural desire for the beatific vision within the order of grace. This is in contrast to Scotus’s understanding of a natural inclination as a natural passive potency without a necessarily corresponding natural active potency. As will be demonstrated, Scotus maintains that all possible objects or ends of the human intellect and will, including the beatific vision, are natural and correspond to a natural passive potency. It is only the agent that supernaturally reduces the natural potency to act. In accordance with Aquinas, Cajetan denies the existence of both 67. Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters (Ave Maria, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2010), 178. 68. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 3, a. 8, n. i 69. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 3, a. 8, n. i. 70. According to others, Cajetan denies man the possibility of a natural desire in a pure state of nature; see Xantes Mariales, Controversiae ad universam Summam theologiae D. Thomae Aquinatis, Ecclesiae Doctoris (Venice, 1624), 71. Indeed, Cajetan’s interpretation does hold firmly to Aquinas’s definition of the natural desire in the Sentences: “Desiderium autem naturale non potest esse nisi quae naturaliter haberi potest” (In III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4). Cajetan underscores that the natural desire derives from a natural form and is always directed to an object proportionate to its nature; see de Tanoüarn, Cajetan: Le personnalisme intégral, 645–48.

The First Syllogism   107 a natural passive potency and a violent potency for supernatural perfections, and affirms that supernatural perfections can be received in intellectual creatures only through an obediential potency.71 In responding to Scotus’s first argument, Cajetan clarifies that St. Augustine did not say that it is “natural” to man to have faith, but rather that it is “of the nature of man.”72 He goes on to explain that there is a difference between a potency of nature and a natural potency. A potency of nature refers to the subject of the potency, whereas a natural potency refers to a mode of acting. Cajetan agrees that man has a potency of nature secundum quid (a remote proportion) for faith and charity inasmuch as he is an intellectual creature, namely, inasmuch as the supernatural perfections such as grace, faith, and charity are non-contradictory or non-repugnant to his intellectual nature. A lion, Cajetan gives for an example, which is non-rational by nature, does not even have a remote proportion for such supernatural perfections and, thus, could never be elevated to such perfections.73 Hence there must be a potency or receptive capacity in the 71. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. ix; see appendix 2. For Aquinas’s twofold division of the receptive capacity or passive potency in creatures into natural passive potency and obediential potency, see ST, III, q. 11, a. 1 c.; De ver., q. 8, a. 12, ad 4; In III Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4. 72. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. x; see appendix 2. In chapter 5 of De praedestinatione sanctorum (PL 44:968), St. Augustine clearly is arguing that humans have the capacity of nature for faith (secundum quid or a remote proportion), but it is not a natural passive potency. Faith is not in human nature, but rather is infused by grace. This is why some humans differ from others, namely, while some are believers, others are not. In De veritate, Aquinas states an objection that for humans to reach their proper final end, they do not need faith, since sufficient means to attain their final end are given to each thing’s nature when God creates them. He responds by stating that human nature has all that is necessary for it to attain that end which is within the power of its nature, namely a natural final end. Human nature has the principles capable of causing that end, which is proportionate to its nature. For that end that exceeds the capacity of human nature, however, there are principles in human nature (the intellect and will) which are not a cause of that end, but which give humans a capacity for those things that do bring them to that end above their nature. Aquinas then cites as an authority St. Augustine’s De praedestinatione sanctorum (the above passage) with the understanding that it is a remote capacity and not a natural passive potency in humans; cf. Aquinas, De ver., q. 14, a. 10, ad 1. Cajetan’s commentary on ST, I-II, q. 113, a. 10, echoes Aquinas’s interpretation of St. Augustine in De ver., q. 14, a. 10, ad 1, where he maintains that humans have a remote proportion or natural capacity secundum quid for justification within the present super­ natural order of grace; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 113, a. 10, n. v. 73. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. x; see appendix 2.

108  The Habit of Theology intellectual nature of humans that can be elevated and ordered to supernatural perfections such as grace and the beatific vision, even though the means or mode of its realization is not natural, but supernatural. Obediential potency is that innate receptive capacity that can be actualized by the omnipotence of God without any contradiction intrinsic to the nature of the creature. Many have attacked Cajetan for a flagrant deviation from Aquinas in his use of this concept.74 This particular use of the concept of obediential potency, however, not only predates Aquinas, but more importantly is employed by him in precisely the same manner.75 Scotus’s second proof of the natural knowability of man’s supernatural end is based on desire. He states that man naturally desires that end which is called supernatural. Therefore that end must be naturally knowable.76 According to Cajetan, Scotus falls into a petitio principii by assuming what needs to be demonstrated. Scotus applies the principle that everything naturally desires its own perfection, presupposing that there is a maximum natural inclination for man’s maximum perfection—the beatific vision.77 He has not 74. For the “Contestation of Cajetan’s Position,” see Feingold, The Natural Desire, 102–5. Cf. also Olivier Boulnois, “Puissance neutre et puissance obédientielle: De l’homme à Dieu selon Duns Scot et Cajétan,” in Rationalisme analogique et humanisme théologique: La culture de Thomas de Vio ‘Il Gaetano’, Actes du Colloque de Naples, November 1–3, 1990, ed. Bruno Pinchard and Saverio Ricci (Naples: Vivarium, 1993), 62–69. 75. Cf. Louis-Bertrand Gillon, “Aux origines de la ‘Puissance Obédientielle’,” Revue thomiste 55, no. 2 (1947): 304. When Aquinas was a student in Cologne, St. Albert the Great—commenting on Dionysius’s De divinis nominibus (c. 1250)—employed the concept of obediential potency to the human intellect’s capacity for the beatific vision; cf. Albertus Magnus, Opera omnia, vol. 37, pars I, ed. Paulus Simon (Monasterii Westfalorum in Aedibus Aschendorff, 1972), col. 13b, 56–66. For Aquinas on obediential potency: In III Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4; In III Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 1; De ver., q. 8, a. 4, ad 13; De ver., q. 8, a. 12, ad 4; De ver., q. 29, a. 3, ad 3; ST, III, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3; ST, III, q. 11, a. 1, c.; Comp. theol., I, c. 104; De virt., q. 1, a. 10, ad 13. For some examples of the use of obediential potency in two other prominent Thomists, see Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:18b–20a, and Franciscus de Sylvestris Ferrariensis, Commentaria in Libros Quattuor Contra Gentiles, in S. Thomae Aquinatis Summa contra Gentiles, vol. 13 (Rome: ex typographia polyglota et al, 1918), I, cap. 5, n. v. 76. See Scotus, Ord., I (III/1), prol., q. un., n. 29. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. viii, see De potentia neutra, et de natura potentiae receptivae in duas quaestiones divisus (hereafter De pot. neutra), in Opuscula omnia Thomae de Vio Caietani Cardinalis tituli Sancti Sixti (Lyon, 1587), 207a–b. 77. For a more detailed analysis of Scotus’s argument, see Feingold, The Natural Desire, 51–53.

The First Syllogism   109 demonstrated, however, that supernatural perfections, such as grace and glory, are proportionate to man’s natural inclination. Following Capreolus’s lead, Cajetan responds to Scotus’s argument by affirming the principle of proportionality: perfect knowledge of the efficient and final cause can be known only when it concerns a creature’s proportionate final end.78 He stresses the principle of proportionality to illustrate that for Aquinas the necessity of sacred doctrine is based on a proportion between the means and the end. Moreover, Cajetan perceives Aquinas’s genius in interpreting the principle of proportionality—as expressed in the Aristotelian-metaphysical axiom that in every nature, where there is a passive principle, there must likewise be an active principle—within the light of the theological-hermeneutical principle of the distinction between the natural and the supernatural.79 This is the essence of the ponendo ponens argument concerning the major premise of the first syllogism, in which Aquinas expresses the antecedent in philosophical terms and Cajetan expresses the consequent in theological terms. This is also a perfect example of how the 78. See Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:18b. 79. Cajetan attributes this principle to Aristotle; see Cajetan, De pot. neutra, 207b. At times, Aquinas cites Averroes as the source of this principle; cf. Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 2; In IV Sent., q. 43, q. 1, a. 1, qua 3; De ver., q. 18, a. 2; De pot., q. 6, a. 1, obj. 18; at other times, he attributes it to Aristotle; cf. In libros Physicorum III (hereafter In III Physics.), c. 1, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. Henri de Lubac claims that Cajetan deviates from Aquinas’s doctrine by over-extending this Aristotelian metaphysical principle of proportionality, which was meant exclusively for non-rational creatures and not intellectual natures; see de Lubac, Surnaturel: Études historiques (Paris: Aubier Éditions Montaigne, 1946), 181–87. Nevertheless, Aquinas himself applies it both to the human soul and to the angels: De ver., q. 12, a. 3 ad 18; De ver., q. 18, aa. 2 and 5; Comp. theol., I, c. 104; De virt., q. 1, a. 10, ad 13. Cf. Feingold, The Natural Desire, 162–65. Finally, Scotus’s denial of the universal validity of this principle (cf. Ord., I [III/1], prol., q. un., n. 15) is based on his concept of natural passive potencies, which is broad enough to include what Aquinas and Cajetan divide into either natural or obediential potencies. For Scotus, a natural passive potency is always proportionate to a supernatural end, because the end is achieved by the agent alone and does not require an elevation of man’s potencies. For Aquinas and Cajetan, man’s obediential potency must be elevated and made proportionate in order for him to know and desire his supernatural end. Thus, Scotus differs from Aquinas and Cajetan in that the latter pair maintain an analogical harmony between philosophical and revealed truths, which is based on the harmonious relation between the natural and supernatural orders.

110  The Habit of Theology water of philosophy is converted into the wine of theology, namely how metaphysical principles are applied analogically to theological truths within the higher light of divine revelation.80 With all this in mind, Cajetan elucidates the transition from the natural order into the supernatural by underscoring the elevation of the obediential potency in humans: “In St. Thomas’s doctrine, as stated in the first article of his work [ST, I, q. 1, a. 1. c.], humans are not naturally, but obedientially ordered to that [supernatural] beatitude.”81 God bestows on humans the super-added intrinsic principles of grace and the theological virtues, enabling them to proportionately know and desire their supernatural end. According to Aquinas, the supernatural end of humans is intrinsically supernatural. It simply exceeds the natural capacity of intellectual creatures.82 With this truth in mind, Cajetan critiques Scotus’s third and last proof by establishing his definition of the supernatural in contrast to Scotus’s. Scotus’s concept of the supernatural can be summed up as: not directly applicable to acts, objects, and potencies, but only to agents and their mode of operation. . . . Given this premise, it follows necessarily that if we abstract from the agent and consider only the relation of the potency to the act the vision of God will be neither violent [contrary to a natural inclination] nor neutral [neither naturally inclining towards nor contrary to], and therefore must be a natural act for man’s intellect!83

In brief, for Scotus all possible objects or ends of the human intellect and will, including the beatific vision, are natural. It is only the agent that supernaturally reduces the natural potency to act.84 80. Cf. Aquinas, De trin. q. 2, a. 3, ad 5. 81. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 1, n. ix. 82. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, c. Cf. also SCG, 3, cap. 152; SCG, 3, cap. 149; SCG, 4, cap. 1; Super Gal., cap. 5, v. 16, lect. 4; Super I Cor., cap. 2, lect. 2; In I Ethic., lect. 9; De ver., q. 14, a. 2; De ver., q. 14, a. 10, ad 3; In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 4, qua 3; In III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 3, qua 1 c. and ad 2. 83. Feingold, The Natural Desire, 54. Cf. Guido Alliney, Giovanni Duns Scoto: Introduzione al pensiero filosofico (Bari: Edizione di Pagina, 2012), 37–40. 84. See Scotus, Ord., I (III/1), prol., q. un., n. 75–76. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. viii; see appendix 2.

The First Syllogism   111 According to Cajetan, however, the supernatural is found in comparing potency to act, for there are indeed some acts and objects that are supernatural in their own genus, such as grace and glory.85 Thus, as was stated, intellectual creatures receive supernatural perfections by the elevation of their obediential potency, because a natural potency would be clearly disproportionate to any super­ natural perfections, and a violent or artificial potency would mean that such supernatural perfections would be contrary to man’s intellectual nature.86 While denying the existence of both a natural passive and a violent potency for supernatural perfections, Cajetan affirms that supernatural perfections can be received in intellectual creatures through the elevation of an obediential potency. For according to him, both the object (the Deity) and the speculative-contemplative acts within sacred doctrine are intrinsically supernatural; and, consequently, sacred doctrine differs in genus from the philosophical disciplines. Furthermore, Cajetan differentiates between that which is supernatural in itself and that which is supernatural according to its mode of realization.87 Something is supernatural in itself if it can never be connatural to a creature, such as grace, the theological virtues, glory, and the like. On the other hand, something is supernatural in its mode of realization if it concerns a natural perfection, which is actualized by an agent’s acting above the natural order, such as giving sight to the blind or raising a person from the dead.88 Cajetan concludes that if there is no natural potency in creatures to acts that are supernatural in their mode of realization, such as miracles, then there is even less natural capacity in creatures for acts whose objects are supernatural intrinsically and not just in their mode of realization.89 85. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. x; see appendix 2. Cf. De pot. neutra, 207b. 86. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. ix; see appendix 2. 87. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 5, n. vi-xii, and De pot. neutra, 207b. 88. See Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 76, a. 7, n. vi. 89. See Cajetan, De pot. neutra, 207b. According to Cajetan obediential potency is not synonymous with potency for miracles. He clearly distinguishes between the supernatural

112  The Habit of Theology With this distinction in mind, Cajetan unveils the limitations of Scotus’s definition of the supernatural, which is confined only to the mode of realization.90 For Cajetan, grace, the beatific vision, the theological virtues, and sacred doctrine are all intrinsically supernatural. They simply transcend the natural capacity of humans.91 Therefore it is necessary that humans be made proportionate to receive such perfections through the elevation of their obediential potency. In other words, only the reality of an obediential potency maintains the gratuitousness of the super-added perfections such as grace and the theological virtues, by which humans know and direct themselves toward the beatific vision.92 Moreover, it is only by the gratuitous elevation into the order of grace (the order of salvation or the supernatural order) that the term “necessary” can be understood in reference to sacred doctrine. Cajetan explains that the term “necessary” in ST I, q. 1, a. 1 c., can be taken either simpliciter, in an absolute sense, or ad finem, in a certain sense as being necessary to attain an end.93 He affirms that in article 1 the term “necessary” is understood by Aquinas in the second sense, that is, ad finem. This distinction between necessary simpliciter and necessary ad finem is essential for grasping the intrinsically supernatural nature of sacred doctrine. Something is by mode of realization and the supernatural in se. Thus, Henri de Lubac’s criticism that Cajetan reduces our elevation by grace to know and order ourselves to the beatific vision as a particular instance of the miraculous (cf. de Lubac, Surnaturel, 182) is totally unfounded; cf. Hallensleben, Communicatio: Anthropologie und Gnadenlehre bei Thomas de Vio Cajetan, 308n41, and Feingold, The Natural Desire, 121n61. 90. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 4, n. xii. Scotus similarly defines the supernatural solely in relation to the agent; cf. Ord., I (III/1), prol., q. un., n. 75–76. 91. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 4, n. vi. In this passage Cajetan explains the necessity of the augmentation of the intellectual light for the beatific vision. The same is analogically true of sacred doctrine. Sacred doctrine, including theology, knows its intrinsically supernatural material object (the Deity) by an augmentation of the intellectual light within the divine light of revelation, the formal object of sacred doctrine. In other words, the resolution of sacred doctrine’s acts into its supernatural object, the Deity, is possible only by means of a participation in the divine light of revelation, which is supernatural in se. 92. For Aquinas grace is “doubly” gratuitous insofar as it is not a debitum naturae; cf. ST, I-II, q. 111, a. 1, ad 2. 93. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. i; see appendix 2. Cajetan makes use of a similar division of the term “necessary,” when discussing “Whether It Was Necessary for Christ to Suffer for the Deliverance of the Human Race”; cf. In ST, III, q. 46, a. 1, n. un.

The First Syllogism   113 necessary simpliciter when it belongs to the essence, to the form, or to the matter of a thing.94 If sacred doctrine were necessary simpliciter for humans, it would mean that it would be a debitum naturae and something proportionate to human nature.95 However, sacred doctrine, as a knowledge that includes humankind’s supernatural final end and other intrinsically supernatural truths, is simply above the natural capacity of humans. Sacred doctrine does not arise primarily from the agent intellect (the principle of the natural sciences), but rather from the divine light of revelation. Hence it is necessary, but only ad finem, that is, in a conditional sense, insofar as this revealed knowledge depends solely on an extrinsic cause—God, who freely reveals himself as the supernatural final end of humankind and who gratuitously actualizes the obediential potency in humans so that they may receive an intrinsically supernatural doctrine in order to know and order themselves proportionately to their supernatural end.96 In addition, Cajetan comments on Scotus’s affirmation that Aquinas saves the distinction between sacred doctrine and the philosophical disciplines, insofar as they are different modes of knowing, but fails to establish the necessity of sacred doctrine.97 Cajetan paraphrases Scotus’s argument, which is based on the Scotian doctrine of man’s natural capacity for the beatific vision: “All being is knowable through the physical [philosophical] disciplines; 94. See Aquinas, In V Metaph., lect. 6. 95. Cajetan distinguishes things that are debitum naturae from things that are supernatural; see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 62, a. 2, n. ii. For this same distinction between debitum naturae and the supernatural in Aquinas: cf. Comp. theol., I, c. 214; De trin., q. 3, a. 1 et ad 2; In IV Sent., d. 46, q. 1, a. 2, qua . 1. 96. In his commentary on the infused knowledge in the soul of Christ, Cajetan seems to hold that the act of knowing revelation is an act proportionate to the human soul; cf. Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 11, a. 1, n. ii. (For Boulnois’s critique of this passage, see “Puissance neutre et puissance obédientielle,” 68.) A little further on in his commentary on ST, III, q. 11, a. 1, however, Cajetan indeed states that no creature whatsoever has a debitum naturae for the beatific vision; cf. Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 11, a. 1, n. ii. Moreover, for Cajetan revelation is natural only on the supposition of man’s elevation by grace to a supernatural end; see In ST, III, q. 9, a. 3, n. iii. Cf. In ST, III, q. 9, a. 2, n. iv, where Cajetan defines obediential potency to be a natural potency secundum quid, but not simpliciter. 97. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. xiii; see appendix 2.

114  The Habit of Theology therefore, nothing remains to be known by a revealed doctrine; consequently, it is not necessary.”98 Cajetan responds with a pair of distinctions. The first is between all beings that are knowable and all beings that are knowable within the philosophical disciplines. Cajetan affirms that Scotus errs by identifying all beings that are knowable with all beings that are knowable within the philosophical disciplines. The second distinction is between knowing all beings in every mode and knowing all beings by the light of the agent intellect, namely the particular mode of knowing within the philosophical disciplines. Cajetan simply negates the implication of Scotus’s argument that the philosophical disciplines know all beings in every mode.99 In brief, Cajetan affirms that intrinsically supernatural realities can be known only in the higher light of divine revelation.100 Cajetan explicates Aquinas’s subsequent distinction of necessary to an end (ad finem) into ad esse and ad bene esse. As he points out, St. Thomas reaches two conclusions in the body of article 1 as to why sacred doctrine is necessary to an end. In the first conclusion, sacred doctrine is taken in the sense of necessary to an end ad esse: namely, as a revealed doctrine of all those things that simply exceed human reason, which are necessary so that humans might know and direct their actions toward their supernatural final end.101 In the second conclusion, sacred doctrine is taken in the sense of necessary to an end ad bene esse: namely, as a revealed doctrine of certain things about God, which also can be investigated by human reason and which are also necessary in order that all humans might direct their intentions and actions toward their supernatural end.102 Cajetan makes specific reference to the Summa contra Gentiles, where Aquinas sets forth his arguments on how the truths 98. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. xii; see appendix 2. 99. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. xii; see appendix 2. This pair of distinctions has its foundation in Aquinas; see De ver., q. 18, a. 1, c. 100. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. xiv; see appendix 2. 101. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. ii; cf. also In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. iii; see appendix 2. 102. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. ii; see appendix 2.

The First Syllogism   115 about God discovered by reason—the preambles of faith—would be known only by a few, after a long period of time and effort, and with the admixture of many errors.103 Hence there is a moral necessity (ad bene esse) for the revelation of these naturally accessible truths about God for the salvation of all humans, simply because not every single human person could arrive at the totality of the knowledge of those truths.104 The correlation between the two genera of knowledge about God in via—natural and supernatural—can be known and ordered only in the higher light of revelation, which renders present to the intellect the theological-hermeneutical principle of the distinction between the orders of nature and grace. Only in the light of revelation is the harmonious relation between nature and grace illuminated; only from this higher perspective are faith and reason seen without paradox; since only in the divine light of revelation does the horizon even appear between these two orders. It is precisely because these two orders are really distinct that their relation can be perceived and ordered.105 Thus, Cajetan interprets Aquinas’s juxtaposition of the philosophical disciplines and sacred doctrine in article 1, not only as an Aristotelian-methodological movement from what is better known to us (the philosophical disciplines) to what is least known to us (sacred doctrine),106 but also as a transition from the natural order 103. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. xi; see appendix 2. Aquinas defines the preambles of the faith as those things about God that can be known by reason; see ST, I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1. Commenting on this text of Aquinas, Cajetan states that the preambles of the faith and the articles of faith are essentially the same secundum se. They differ, however, in the manner or mode by which they are known, namely either by the natural light of reason or by the divine light of faith; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 2, a. 1, n. vi. 104. Cajetan’s commentary on Aquinas’s response to objection 1 offers a reason for the moral necessity of a revelation of divine things that are accessible to human reason by distinguishing between the human race in general and human beings individually; cf. In ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 4, n. un. 105. Cajetan notes that order presupposes distinction; cf. In ST, I, q. 16, a. 4, n. ii. The fact that the natural and supernatural orders are distinct implies they are also similar. They are two diverse orders of participation in the divine nature that are analogically similar. Grace presupposes nature, because it perfects human nature so that man can participate in the divine nature according to a higher order of perfection. 106. See Aquinas, De trin., q. 6, a. 4, c.

116  The Habit of Theology to the order of grace. The term “physical disciplines” in article 1, as Cajetan points out, includes all those things that can be known naturally by the light of the agent intellect, as distinct from the intrinsically supernatural knowledge of those things that can be known only by the light of divine revelation.107

Contemplating the Wise and Beautiful bArbArA Wisdom “reacheth from end to end mightily and ordereth all things sweetly” (Wisdom 8:1, Douay Rheims Version) is one of Aquinas’s preferred passages of Scripture for illustrating the harmonious relation between nature and grace.108 Just as God in his wisdom harmoniously orchestrates these distinct orders, so likewise man, elevated by grace, seeks to harmoniously and hierarchically order the relation of causes between the articles of faith according to its own creedal hermeneutic (ordo disciplinae). The query posed in ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, is a new question unique to Aquinas and not found in his predecessors. Its sole purpose is to demonstrate the existence of a sacred doctrine.109 This first article is in itself an act of wisdom that establishes the necessity of sacred doctrine (the material cause) through the medium of the first syllogism’s middle term, which is mankind’s universal call to an intrinsically supernatural end—the beatific vision (the final cause). The first syllogism contains the essence of Aquinas’s thought on sacred doctrine, and Cajetan, as a theologian and highly trained logician, contemplates it. In his commentary, Cajetan describes sacred doctrine as a wide and comprehensive revealed knowledge of God, abstracting from the aspects of being believed and scientifically known. He goes on to define it more succinctly as “a knowledge formally revealed and virtually contained in its principles.”110 107. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. i; see appendix 2. 108. See Aquinas, Super Rom., cap. 9, lect. 3; ST, I-II, q. 110, a. 2, c.; ST, II-II, q. 23, a. 2, c.; Super Ps 9, n. 11; In I Sent., proem.; In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1 a. 3, qua, 1 c. 109. See Johnson, “The Sapiential Character of Sacra Doctrina,” 242. 110. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi; see appendix 2.

The First Syllogism   117 He perceives the sapiential nature of sacred doctrine within the first syllogism as reasoning in the divine light of faith, namely, the deduction or explication of a conclusion through the instrumental causality of reason from a formally revealed principle, an article of faith. This first syllogism also manifests that sacred doctrine is indeed virtually contained in the faith and is a part of what is to be believed (crediblilia). The conclusion of the syllogism is an object of faith. It is a revealed truth that there is a necessity ad finem to have a revealed doctrine in order that humans could know and order their acts toward a supernatural end.111 Hence the first syllogism is also an example of sacred doctrine exercising its sapiential office of ministering to the faith by explicating what is virtually contained in the articles of faith.112 Cajetan’s commentary also brings to light the universal efficient cause of sacred doctrine. In the conclusion of the syllogism, Aquinas states that a certain end which exceeds the comprehension of reason must necessarily be made known by divine revelation. If the conclusion is something to be believed, then the syllogism’s medium of demonstration must be proportionate. Thus Cajetan logically concludes that the medium of demonstration—the universal efficient cause—is the divine light of revelation.113 This is why sacred doctrine differs in genus from the philosophical disciplines, which are known by the natural light of the agent intellect. This also explains the insufficiency of the philosophical sciences in knowing things that are intrinsically supernatural. The universal efficient cause is what primarily determines sacred doctrine’s method and order. Sacred doctrine’s methodology is theological: it reasons from divinely revealed principles. In the sed contra of article 1, Aquinas employs the testimony of the author 111. Cf. Vatican Council I, Dei Filius (April, 24, 1870), nn. 3000–3045, and Vatican Council II, Dei Verbum (November 18, 1965), n. 6. 112. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi; see appendix 2. 113. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. vi, and In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. iv; see appendix 2. Cf. Aquinas, In IV Metaph., lect. 1, n. 13.

118  The Habit of Theology of sacred Scripture (2 Tm 3:16) in order to establish the necessity of a revealed doctrine.114 Sacred doctrine is necessary simply because God, as its ultimate authority, wisely and gratuitously willed himself to be man’s supernatural end and, thus, granted humans the means to order themselves to the beatific vision. Sacred doctrine can be known only through the light of divine revelation (the universal efficient cause), because it simply depends on the sapiential mind and gracious will of God and cannot be derived from human nature.115 Thus Aquinas concludes that sacred doctrine is a knowledge that is divinely inspired.116 Every valid theological conclusion—for us wayfarers on this side of heaven—must be rooted in the faith. In fact, the purpose of this first syllogism (ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, c.) is to resolve (resolutio in via iudicii) a composite into its universal principles or causes. In the conclusion, the material cause (sacred doctrine) is distinguished—through predication—from its final cause (the minor term expressing mankind’s universal call to supernatural beatitude). Thus the first syllogism is an act of wisdom, a discovery of the order of the highest causes by an acquired judgment (through reason as the instrumental or secondary efficient cause) effected through a participation in the divine light of the highest cause (the universal efficient cause) from principles believed in—the articles of faith (suppositiones). Furthermore, in sacred doctrine not only the theological conclusion is a matter of faith, but also the premises. Even the minor term in the first syllogism, humans, is understood within a theological anthropology. The light of divine revelation is the primary efficient cause of the theological demonstrative syllogism that converts the water of philosophy into the wine of theology. In conclusion, Cajetan’s commentary clearly emphasizes sacred doctrine’s place in the supernatural order of grace. As was pointed 114. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, s.c. Cf. Leo Elders, “Structure et fonction de l’argument ‘sed contra’ dans la Somme Théologique de Saint Thomas,” Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 80 (1977): 245–60. 115. See Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 1, a. 3, n. ix. 116. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, s.c.

The First Syllogism   119 out above, only in the divine light of revelation can the distinction between the natural and supernatural orders be perceived, while preserving the autonomy of both philosophy and sacred doctrine. Furthermore, it is within this real distinction of orders that sacred doctrine’s sapiential nature is grasped, because only in the divine light of the highest cause can faith and reason be judged and ordered. According to Cajetan, by reasoning in the light of divine revelation, the definition of sacred doctrine is determined to be a revealed knowledge, abstracting from both being believed and being scientifically known.117 This definition of sacred doctrine is coextensive. It is characterized by a comprehension of all the parts intimately interwoven within it and explicable only by reference to the whole of it. It is a definition that is wide enough to include all the diverse species of revealed knowledge: the beatific vision, faith, prophecy, theology, and so forth. That is why Cajetan states, “Both here [in article 1] and in the subsequent articles sacred doctrine is understood univocally.”118 The first syllogism of ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, c., acts as a prism, fracturing the solid-white light of revelation into its various hues.119 Hence “wise” can be attributed to the first syllogism insofar as it acts as an instrument that helps generate theology and discover the order of causes. “Beauty”—understood as the mind’s perceiving and contemplating the order, integrity, and harmony of a thing’s form120—can also be appropriated to this first syllogism. If quality literature and even software codes can evoke an experience of beauty, so too can this valid bArbArA be—in a certain sense—beau117. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi; see appendix 2. 118. Ibid. 119. J. R. R. Tolkien speaks of the human mind as “the refracted light / through whom is splintered from a single White / to many hues, and endlessly combined / in living shapes that move from mind to mind.” Tolkien, “Mythopoeia,” in Tree and Leaf, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001), 96. Similarly, the finite human mind splinters the light of revelation (a genus) into various hues (species), that is to say, into the various forms (prophecy, theological wisdom, faith) by which the human mind formally participates in the divine light; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. ix. 120. Cf. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 180, a. 2 ad 3; ST, I, q. 5, a. 4 ad 1; ST, I-II, q. 27, a. 1 ad 3.

120  The Habit of Theology tiful. When the splendor of the truth of its matter and the order, integrity, and harmony of its form are grasped together, they render present to the human mind the beautiful order of sacred doctrine, namely, the order of revealed truths in their relation to the Deity as the highest cause. Finally, Cajetan as a theologian, and not merely as a highly trained logician, contemplates the content and form of the first syllogism. What is made evident from Cajetan’s formulation of the first syllogism are the four causes that constitute sacred doctrine in the wayfarer: the final cause is the supernatural end to which mankind is called by God; the efficient causes are the divine light of revelation (universal efficient cause) and human reason (secondary efficient or instrumental cause); the material cause is sacred doctrine as a revealed knowledge of the Deity (the subject). In the next chapter, theology, as a formal cause of sacred doctrine, will be examined insofar as it is a habit of science and, more specifically, a wisdom.

A Science and Wisdom

Chapter 5

Theolog y—A Science and Wisdom On the Nature of Science (In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4) Aquinas’s particular application of the Aristotelian concept of science within the domain of sacred doctrine—a new development within thirteenth-century Western theology—became a point of contention both within and outside of the Order of Preachers. It was one of many disputed points in Aquinas’s works that necessitated that the 1313 General Chapter of the Dominican Order lend its extrinsic authority (legislation) to St. Thomas’s intrinsic authority (doctrine) to hold in abeyance dissenting confrères.1 A multitude of interpretations have arisen regarding Aquinas’s understanding of this particular doctrine. Some have denied theology the dignity of a science in wayfarers (Scotus, Durandus of St. Pourçain), while others attributed to Aquinas an unqualified univocal concept of science in wayfarers (John of St. Thomas) that obscured theology’s subalternate nature and thus its continuity with and dependency on the virtue of faith.2 In addition, other difficulties arose, especially concerning the understanding of the unity of theology as a science; namely, is theology one by virtue of its subject (Scotus), or by a merely logical systematization of its principles and conclusions into a body of knowledge (Ockham),3 or by its essence as a single, simple, and stable habit (Cajetan)?4 1. Cf. Lowe, The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas, 129–31. 2. See Jean-Pierre Torrell, La teologia cattolica (Milan: Jaca Book, 1998), 32. 3. See Armand Maurer, “Ockham’s Conception of the Unity of Science,” Medieval Studies 20, no. 1 (1958): 112. 4. See Yves Congar, A History of Theology, trans. H. Guntrie (New York: Doubleday, 1968), 122–24.

121

122  The Habit of Theology Before commencing our explication of Cajetan’s understanding of sacred doctrine as a science, we must briefly clarify Aquinas’s use of the term “science,” especially in ST, I, q. 1. First of all, science (scientia) is an analogical term. The first question of the ST contains examples of its analogical usage: “hence that certain part of philosophy called theology or the divine science” (unde quaedam pars philosophiae dicitur theologia, sive scientia divina)5—here, scientia divina, referring to metaphysics, is taken in the narrow and proper sense of the term to be a certain and evident natural knowledge in humans, acquired through discursive reasoning from principles per se nota. There is also the broader usage of the term scientia: “sacred doctrine is a certain imprint of divine knowledge” (sacra doctrina sit velut quaedam impressio divinae scientiae).6 Divina scientia is taken here to be the nondiscursive knowledge that God has of himself, which—when infused in wayfarers—is a certain (yet without evidence or vision) imprint of God’s knowledge, in which humans participate through the habits of prophecy and faith: “besides the philosophical disciplines, there is another science divinely inspired” (praeter philosophicas disciplinas, esse aliam scientiam divinitus inspiratam).7 The essence of ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, is that Aquinas predicates to sacred doctrine the term science (scientia) according to its Aristotelian usage as a single and simple habit of the intellect, by which conclusions are known from and in self-evident first principles.8 Aquinas qualifies this affirmation, however, by stating that it is a subordinate science: sacred doctrine is a science. It is known, however, that the genus of science is twofold. There are some which proceed from principles known by the natural light of the intellect [science in the narrow and proper sense of the term], such as arithmetic and geometry, etc. There are some which 5. ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 2. 6. ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2. 7. ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, s.c. 8. See Aquinas, In VI Ethic., lect. 3. Cf. De trin., q. 1, a. 2, c.; and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6.3, 1139b14–35.

A Science and Wisdom   123 proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science [in a qualified sense, with the condition of being subalternate]; thus, the science of perspective proceeds from principles known through geometry, and music from principles known through arithmetic. It is according to this [latter] mode that sacred doctrine is known as a science [in a qualified sense as a subalternate science], because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, which is the science [in the broader sense, as a certain and evident nondiscursive knowledge] of God and the blessed.”9

According to Aquinas, science is a single, simple, and stable intellectual habit (quo quis agit), and only in a derived or secondary sense is it that which is held (id quod habitu tenetur) or known by that habit, namely the conclusions.10 The habit of science is essentially the quality or form through which a multitude of conclusions are derived and known. Only in a secondary sense is it the conclusions themselves and their ordered relation to one another, inasmuch as one conclusion flows from another.11 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, Aquinas understands sacred doctrine as a science to be the habit of conclusions acquired through demonstration from its principles— the articles of faith. Likewise Cajetan understands Aquinas’s predication of the term science to sacred doctrine as primarily in the sense of a habit. As was already noted, Cajetan interprets article 2 of the ST I, q. 1, to be the first logical step in determining a particular species of science within the genus of sacred doctrine. Assiduous in explicating Aquinas’s use of words, Cajetan begins by defining his terms, and the first term is “science.”12 In citing Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, he indicates that Aquinas intends the term science in the proper or formal sense as an intellectual virtue, that is to say an essentially simple habit of conclusions acquired through demonstration from its principles.13 9. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, c. 10. In ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 1, c., when discussing the essence of natural law, Aquinas defines the primary and secondary meanings of the term “habit.” 11. See Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, ad 3. 12. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. i; see appendix 2. 13. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6.6, 1140b30; and Aquinas, In VI Ethic., lect. 5.

124  The Habit of Theology One must be careful, for although Cajetan refers many times to “the conclusions” in his commentary on article 2, he never affirms that article 2 of the ST is essentially about the secondary sense of the term science, namely “the conclusions.” On the contrary, he clearly states that article 2 is about whether sacred doctrine has the ratio of a science in the primary sense of the term, that is to say whether it is a habit: “Thus, the sense of the question is: Whether sacred doctrine, which we proved to be necessary [article 1], has the ratio of a science with respect to its conclusions; or whether it is only an opinion, etc.”14 In his commentary on ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, Cajetan sets forth two opposing positions concerning the nature of science, between which his contemporaries in via Thomae oscillated: some held that the habit of science is essentially an ordered aggregate of intelligible species (the secondary sense—id quod habitu tenetur), while others held that the habit of science is essentially a simple quality that enables the intellect to employ and order the intelligible species in a certain manner (the primary sense—quo quis agit).15 Once again, Cajetan, following Capreolus’s lead, held the habit of science to be a simple quality.16 These two diverse notions of science took their origin in an earlier debate that occurred shortly after St. Thomas’s death. The Dominican friar Bernard of Auvergne set out to defend Aquinas’s 14. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. i; see appendix 2. Cajetan holds that sacred doctrine contains a species of science and not merely an opinion. It is, however, a subalternate science, which has certain, although not evident, principles; cf. In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, n. ii. 15. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. ii. Cajetan mentions a third camp, outside of the two Thomistic camps; Peter Aureol would be a typical member of this third camp. He held that the unity of science is a unity of order between a collection of many habits (a habit for each proposition); cf. Maurer, “Ockham’s Conception of the Unity of Science,” 102n16. 16. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. v. Cf. Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:34b. Armand Maurer misinterprets this passage in Capreolus and wrongly places him among the modernist Thomists; cf. “The Unity of a Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists,” in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974, Commemorative Studies, vol. 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 273–74. Capreolus clearly maintains that the habit of science is essentially a simple quality; cf. Defensiones, 1:43b. Cf. Charles D. Robertson, “John Capreolus: Prince of Thomists or Corruptor of Thomism?,” Nova et Vetera, English Edition, 12, no. 3 (2014): 837–61.

A Science and Wisdom   125 doctrine of science against the anti-mendicant Henry of Ghent.17 It was the Henry of Ghent, however, that maintained the primary sense of the term science as a simple quality or habit of the intellect,18 while Bernard of Auvergne maintained the secondary sense of science as an appropriate ordering of the intelligible species.19 Despite Bernard of Auvergne’s high regard among the Renaissance scholastics, concerning this particular doctrine both Capreolus and Cajetan sided with Henry of Ghent, who—ironically—was a participant in the commission established by Bishop Tempier that condemned some of Aquinas’s other doctrines on March 7, 1277. In his commentary on ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, Cajetan explicates four points: (1) the habit of science as a simple quality of the intellect; (2) the manner by which the habit of science knows a multitude of conclusions; (3) how the habit of science is distinct from and related to the intelligible species; (4) the resolution of any apparent contradictions in St. Thomas’s doctrine.20 1. Cajetan states that those who negate that a science is essentially a simple quality or habit of the intellect end up placing it in the category of relation, as an ordered collection of intelligible species. This clearly contradicts Aquinas’s doctrine: 17. Bernard of Auvergne (a.k.a. Bernardus de Gannato, Bernardus Clarmontensis, Bernardus de Alvernia; born in Gannato in the province of Auvergne, died around 1304) was a Dominican philosopher and theologian. In 1303 he was the prior in the Dominican convent of St. Jacques in Paris. On November 25, 1304, he was chosen to be a bishop by the cathedral chapter in Clermont, but he never occupied his bishopric. For Henry of Ghent (b. 1217?, d. 1293), see Pasquale Porro, “Henry of Ghent,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2014 ed., ed. Edward N. Zalta, online at https:// plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/henry-ghent/. 18. See Henry of Ghent, Quolibet IX, q. 4, fol. 355rv, cited in Maurer, “The Unity of a Science,” 276n26. Cajetan employs Henry of Ghent’s example of “whiteness.” Similar to whiteness extending to other objects, the habit of science is generated from the first act that produces it and merely extends itself to any further conclusions. Moreover, just as whiteness can be present more intensely in one part and less in another part of the same subject, so also the habit of science can more intensely know one conclusion and less intensely another; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. xiv. 19. See Bernard of Auvergne, Contra Dicta Henrici de Gandava quibus Impugnat Thomam, Quolibet IX, q. 4, ms Troyes 662, fol. 123rab, and ibid., fol. 123 ra., cited in Maurer, “The Unity of a Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists,” 276n27. 20. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. v.

126  The Habit of Theology If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity. But since this multiplicity is ordered to one thing, which the habit principally considers; thus a habit is a simple quality, not composed of several habits, even though it extends to a multitude. For a habit does not extend to a multitude unless in relation to one formal aspect from which it derives its unity.21

Cajetan warns that one must be careful not to confuse the intelligible species—which are also qualities—with the habit of science, which is a simple quality of the intellect and not a composite of intellectual species.22 Moreover, it is the habit of science that extends itself to a multitude of intelligible species, uniting and ordering them under its one formal object.23 Understanding the habit of science to be primarily a simple quality is essential to Cajetan’s interpretation of ST, I, q. 1, a. 2: “Whether sacred doctrine is a science, namely a simple intellectual habit?”24 Moreover, the distinction between the primary and secondary senses of the habit of science provides a hermeneutic for comprehending how the simple habit of theology (the primary sense) instrumentally aids in structuring theology according to its ordo disciplinae through the ordering of the causal relations—ac21. Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, c (my translation). Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. vii. 22. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. vi. For Cajetan’s response to those who held that intelligible species (formal concepts) are identical with universals, the objective content of a concept or the intelligible in act (the esse obiective), see In ST, I, q. 79, a. 3, n. xii. The esse obiective is not a concept, but rather the reality that founds the formal concept, just as human nature, the esse obiective, founds the formal concept of “man”; see Serge-Thomas Bonino, “Le concept d’étant et la connaissance de Dieu d’après Jean Cabrol (Capreolus),” Revue thomiste 95, no. 1 (1995): 117. As regards the divine ideas, Cajetan maintained they are the esse obiective of things according to a divine mode, since there cannot exist formal concepts in God; cf. In ST, I, q. 15, a. 1, n. viii. Both Cajetan and Prierias accord with Natalis’s Liber de intentionibus, that the intelligible species (formal concepts) are not identical with first intentions, the universal in praedicando. Capreolus likewise maintains this distinction between the formal concept and the objective concept (esse obiective); see Domenic D’Ettore, “The Fifteenth-Century Thomist Dispute over Participation in an Analogous Concept: Jean Capreolus, Dominic of Flanders, and Paul Soncinas,” Mediaeval Studies 76 (2014): 248; and Tavuzzi, “Hervaeus Natalis,” 144–45. 23. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. vi. 24. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. i.

A Science and Wisdom   127 cording to its formal object—between theology’s principles and conclusions (the secondary sense). 2. The one, simple habit of science extends itself to a multitude of diverse conclusions through a process of augmentation of other conclusions, which are the potential parts of the habit of science as a whole.25 The habit of science, once generated by the first syllogism, is in potency to know other conclusions and to grasp more intensely each of these conclusions in particular. Thus the habit of science is perfected in intensity, when it penetrates more profoundly a particular conclusion, and in extension, when it deduces additional conclusions.26 It should be noted, however, that an erroneous conclusion diminishes the habit of a science, while an erroneous conclusion in the first syllogism fails to even generate the habit of science, for—as Cajetan notes—there is a distinction between the medium of a particular conclusion and the medium of a science in general, which is obtained through the demonstration of the first syllogism.27 3. Cajetan assigns a fourfold relation between the habit of science and the intelligible species: (a) as effect to cause; (b) as cause to effect; (c) as the perfective to that which is initiatory; (d) as a whole to its potential parts.28 In order to explain the first two relations of (a) effect to cause and (b) cause to effect, Cajetan states that the habit of science has a dual collection of intelligible species: first, as an ordered collection of parts within a single demonstration; and second, as an ordered collection of diverse demonstrations.29 The first collection of intelligible species is the demonstrative syllogism. Moreover, the first demonstrative syllogism generates the habit of science by causing scientific knowledge, which is an effect of the first demonstra25. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. viii. Cf. Aquinas, ST I-II. q. 52, a. 2, c. 26. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, nn. xiii and xiv. 27. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 5, a. 3, n. iii. Similarly, the habit of faith is weakened by error and annihilated by heresy; see In ST, II-II, q. 11, a. 1, n. ii. 28. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. xiii. 29. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. ix.

128  The Habit of Theology tion.30 All subsequent demonstrations merely augment and perfect the existing habit either extensively or intensively.31 The second collection of intelligible species—the multitude of demonstrative syllogisms—is an effect of the simple habit of science. The intellect, acquiring a habit of science from the first demonstration, is now ordered by a new habit or quality toward a particular speculative object. Hence the habit of science produces an ordered unity (of intelligible species) from this multitude of subsequent demonstrations, according to the particular formal object (ratio formalis quo) of the science.32 The third relation—(c) as the perfective to that which is initiatory—is between the habit of science and the intelligible species within the possible intellect, inasmuch as the proper object of the habit of a science is also a partial object of the possible intellect. A particular speculative object is known first to the intellect through the intelligible species contained in the first demonstration; then, the habit of science—generated by the first demonstration—remains in the possible intellect in a stable manner, ordering the intelligible species in all subsequent demonstrations according to that particular speculative object or formal object (ratio formalis quo). This is what Cajetan means when he states that the habit of science completes or perfects that which was initiated in the intellect.33 The final relation—(d) as a whole to its potential parts—exists insofar as the intelligible species are the potential parts of the habit of a science. Cajetan states that in a science two things concur: first, the assimilation of the intellect to reality, and second, the determination of the intellective acts of composition, division, and discursive reasoning toward reality that is known. The assimilation of the intellect to the reality is through the intelligible species, while the habit of a science per se determines and coordinates the intellective 30. See Aquinas, In I Post. anal., lect. 41, n. 1. 31. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. ix. 32. Ibid. 33. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. ix.

A Science and Wisdom   129 acts of composition, division, and discursive reasoning concerning these certain intelligible species (science’s potential parts) according to the science’s particular speculative object as it is known under a certain aspect (the ratio formalis quo), which for theology is the first and supreme foundation of divine causality.34 4. Cajetan makes an interesting observation on the development of doctrine in Aquinas concerning the nature of science. He states that it is quite possible that St. Thomas before the composition of the ST had understood the habit of science to be an ordered set of intelligible species, but later on in the ST Aquinas affirms that the habit of science is primarily and essentially a simple quality or habit.35 By analyzing passages from the Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, Cajetan observes that Aquinas states that the habit of science is related to the intelligible species just as the whole is related to its potential parts,36 and that an ordering of the intelligible species (within the first syllogism) produces a habit.37 Both of these texts, Cajetan maintains, can be easily interpreted according to Aquinas’s later doctrine on science in ST, if it is remembered that the intelligible species (in the first syllogism) are the beginning of the habit of science and not the habit itself, and that the intelligible species are potential parts of the habit of science, which are ordered according to a science’s formal object.38 According to Cajetan’s insights on the nature of science, sacred doctrine as a science is understood to be a simple habit generated from the first theological syllogism. It extends to a multitude of conclusions through a process of augmentation both intensively and extensively. Finally, theology’s ordered unity flows from the unity of its formal object (ratio formalis quo)—the first and supreme foundation of divine causality. 34. Ibid. 35. See Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. xii. 36. Aquinas, De ver., q. 8, a. 16, ad 4. 37. See Aquinas, De ver., q. 24, a. 4, ad 9; and Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. xii. 38. Ibid.

130  The Habit of Theology

Theology as a Subalternate Science (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2) Having defined the general nature of science, Cajetan highlights that the term “science” in ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, is employed by Aquinas according to its usage in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and Nicomachean Ethics:39 Thus, it is known that the concept of science in the absolute sense—as it is distinguished from the other intellectual habits or virtues—has its conclusions through another (per alium), that is to say through its principles, since every science necessarily arises from its principles. From this, it follows that neither subalternating, nor subalternate sciences have evidence of their conclusions from and in themselves, but rather they are aided by the habit of the principles.40

For according to Aquinas, paradigmatic science is the result of syllogistic reasoning from premises formed through per se predication.41 Moreover, he holds a twofold genus of science: There are some [sciences] which proceed from principles known by the natural light of the intellect, such as arithmetic and geometry and the such; and there are some [sciences] which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science; . . . it is according to this [latter] that sacred doctrine is known as a science, because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, which is the science of God and the blessed.42 39. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. i; see appendix 2. Cf. Aquinas, In I Post. anal., lect. 41, n. 11, and In VI Ethic. lect. 3. Cajetan purposely cites Aristotle’s sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics to establish that sacred doctrine as a wisdom is essentially a science, because it arrives at conclusions per alium, yet differs from the other sciences in that it terminates in the first and highest cause. By contrast, Scotus adopts Aristotle’s discourse in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics in order to establish the subjective component of certainty caused by faith and, thus, that our theology in via fails to be a science in the strict sense (lacking necessity). Rather, it is a wisdom—a potential whole, which includes both the principles and conclusions; cf. Giovanni Salmeri, “Nessuna luce. Fede, teologia e contemplazione in Giovanni Duns Scoto,” in Elaborare l’esperienza di Dio. Atti del Convegno (Parma, 20–21 marzo 2009), http://mondodomani.org/teologia/salmeri. htm. 40. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2. 41. See Aquinas, In II Post. anal., lect. 13, nn. 5 and 6. 42. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, c.

A Science and Wisdom   131 Sacred doctrine as a science in wayfarers is subalternate, because its principles are not known per se. In his demonstrations for the existence of God, Aquinas points out that—in via—God’s existence simply cannot be known by humans per se.43 Hence he introduces a key distinction. A thing can be known per se in two modes: secundum se and quoad nos (in itself and by us), or secundum se and non quoad nos (in itself and not by us).44 In the first case, when the quiddity of a thing is known secundum se and quoad nos, then we can predicate propositions to its subject per se. In the second case, when the quiddity of a thing is known secundum se, but non quoad nos, we still can predicate per se propositions to that subject not known quoad nos either by the predication of an effect to a cause in the natural light of the intellect (the fourth mode per se predication employed in the demonstrations quia for the existence of God), or through the medium of the divine light (the formal object) of a higher science, where the revealed truths in the subalternate science are likewise predicated per se to the Deity by means of predicating an effect to a cause (quia).45 Cajetan observes that the articles of faith can also be known in two modes: secundum se and ut crediti (in themselves and insofar as they are believed).46 Now, the articles of the faith secundum se are simply the per se principles of our theology in patria, while the articles of the faith are the principles per accidens of our theology in via, insofar as they are believed in (ut crediti); that is to say, they are known with certainty—yet without evidence or vision—through the mediating habit of faith.47 Thus, theology as a science in via does not know its principles per se. Not every science needs to begin, however, with propositions per se nota, as Aquinas states: But one science is contained in another in a different way when it is subalternated to it—when, that is, causes are assigned in the higher science 43. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 2. 44. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 2, a. 1, c. 45. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 2, a. 1, n. v. Cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, ad 1. 46. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 2, a. 2, n. ii. 47. On why faith gives a higher knowledge of God than does natural reason, see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 13, n. 2.

132  The Habit of Theology for those things about which only the fact (quia) is known in the inferior [subalternate] science.48

It is within this particular epistemic context that Cajetan defines a subalternating science (subalternans) as a science that proceeds immediately from principles per se nota, while a subalternate science (subalternata) is a science that proceeds from principles not known per se, but rather through the light of a higher science, just as music is subalternate to the principles known in arithmetic, or as optics is subalternate to the principles known in geometry.49 As was stated, it is of the nature of the habit of science, in the absolute sense, not to possess evidence of its conclusions in itself, but rather its scientific conclusions are always from and in the principles of another habit, namely the habit of understanding (intellectus).50 The habit of the superior or subalternating science differs from the inferior or subalternate science in that its conclusions are visible from and in its principles immediately, without the aid of a mediating habit. On the other hand, the conclusions of the subalternate science are known from and in principles received through a mediating habit. According to Cajetan, this is the essential and per se difference between the subalternating and subalternate sciences.51 Cajetan lists two subsequent conditions that follow from this essential and per se difference. The first condition is that a subalternate science knows through demonstrations quia or a posteriori (from effect to cause), while the subalternating science knows through demonstrations propter quid or a priori (from cause to effect). The second condition is that between a subalternating and a subalternate science there is an “accidental difference superadded” to the subject of the science.52 These two subsequent conditions filtered down to Cajetan pri48. Aquinas, De trin., pars III, q. 5, a. 1, ad 5. 49. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. ii; cf. also In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2. 50. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2. Cf. Aquinas, In I Post. anal., lect. 44, n. 3. 51. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2. 52. Ibid.

A Science and Wisdom   133 marily through St. Albert the Great and Aquinas. In his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Cajetan mentions three conditions for subalternation as formulated by St. Albert, while attributing to Aquinas a fourth—the more essential or primary—condition. The three Albertan conditions are: (1) the subject of a subalternate science contains the subject of the subalternating, with the addition of a difference to the nature or matter determined, as the visible is added to the nature of a line in optics (whose subject is “visible” lines); (2) that which is added by the subalternate science must be of a genus other than that to which it is added (as the “visible” is of another genus than the nature of the immaterial line considered in geometry); (3) that which is added by the subalternate science is not a property that flows from the nature to which it is added (as in optics the “visible” is not a property per se of a line; moreover, in any one science both the subject and its properties would be treated together under the same formal object).53 The fourth condition—stressed by Aquinas—is that the subalternating science is called propter quid with regard to its principles, while the subalternate science receives or knows its principles quia.54 In his commentary on ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, however, Cajetan condenses these four conditions into two. The first and more essential condition—namely that the subalternate science knows through demonstrations quia or a posteriori (from effect to cause), while the subalternating science knows through demonstrations propter quid or a priori (from cause to effect)—Cajetan sees as the foundation for 53. See Albertus Magnus, Analytica Posteriori, in Opera omnia, ed. Augustus Borgnet, vol. 2 (Paris: Vives, 1890), 86a–86b. It is quite possible that St. Albert the Great did know about Robert Grosseteste’s Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum—or other treatises influenced by the Lincolniensis (1168–1253)—for which this superadded accidental difference was the key to understanding the nature of a subalternate science. His understanding of subalternate science is based on the superadded (superadditur) condition of accidents that are added over and above the subject of the subalternating science; cf. Steven Livesey, Theology and Science in the Fourteenth Century: Three Questions on the Unity and Subalternation of the Sciences from John of Reading’s Commentary on the Sentences (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 33. 54. Cajetan summarizes the three Albertan conditions for subalternation, adding a fourth from Aquinas; see Commentaria in Posteriora Analytica Aristotelis (hereafter In post. anal. Arist.) ed. E. Babin and W. Baumgaertner, vol. 2 (Québec City: Les Editions de l’Université Laval, 1951), 427.

134  The Habit of Theology the three additional conditions given by St. Albert the Great. The second condition—concerning the accidental difference superadded to the subject—Cajetan treats separately, since there arose many doubts as to how this accidental difference is to be understood.55 As regards the first condition, in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics and Super Boetium de Trintate, Aquinas clearly teaches that the subalternating sciences, which know through arguments propter quid (from cause to effect), must demonstrate those things that are assumed as causes in the inferior or subalternate sciences, whose arguments are from the effect to the cause, or quia.56 In Aquinas’s understanding, the theology of the blessed—which includes Christ, as a comprehensor, and both Moses and St. Paul, who suffered rapture as a foundation for their particular prophetic ministries—plays a crucial role as the proximate foundation for our theology in via, by guaranteeing its status as a scientific knowledge within the same species, while God’s theology is the supra-genus and ultimate foundation for our theology both in via and in patria: “all science is had through some self-evident principle, and, by consequence, through vision.”57 Cajetan adds two elements that concur with this first condition: (1) science—in an absolute sense—lacks evidence in and from itself, since evidence of the principles is through the habit of understanding (intellectus); (2) this lack of evidence of the principles is due to the mediation of the proximate principles (as occurs in our theology in via by means of the virtue of faith). What is the formal ratio in both the subalternating and the subalternate science is that they are simple scientific habits, whose material object is the conclusions, while the evidence of their principles is through the habit of understanding. Even the perfected habit of our theology in patria—which is the same, identical habit or species of sacred doctrine as a science that was acquired in via through the first theo55. See Cajetan, In post. anal. Arist., 2:431. 56. See Aquinas, In I Post. anal., lect. 25, n. 4; and De trin., pars 3, q. 5, a. 1, ad 5. 57. Aquinas, ST, II-II q. 1, a. 5, c.

A Science and Wisdom   135 logical syllogism—remains dependent on the per se and immediate grasp of its principles (the articles of faith) within the divine light of glory.58 In our theology in via, the second condition is that an accidental difference is superadded to the knowing subject. In our theology in patria, the divine light of revelation is evident, while in our theology in via, it is obscured. As to this second subsequent condition, it has been claimed that Aquinas nowhere affirms a superadded accidental difference in his treatment of subalternation.59 In De veritate, however, Aquinas does indeed affirm a formal difference between the formal object of faith (non-visum) and the formal object of the beatific vision (evidens). Capreolus grounds within this formal difference the subsequent condition of a superadded accidental difference as regards the subalternation of our theology in via to our theology in patria.60 As was noted above, the essence of faith is that the intellect lacks evidence of its object, and thus the intellect is moved by the will to assent; while the essence of the beatific vision is immediate evidence or vision. Cajetan deduces an additional six conclusions from the nature of the habit of science. The first conclusion is that every science receives its scientific status from the epistemic continuation with a superior habit, since—within this continuity—only the superior science has evidence of its conclusions. Thus “demonstration” is what is continued between the subalternate and subalternating sciences; it is not the discursive mode of our theology in via.61 The blessed see the theological conclusions in their principles without discursive reasoning, while theologians in via deduce theological conclusions from the principles through syllogistic reasoning; nonetheless, the demonstrations and conclusions remain the same.62 In theological demonstration, the middle term is the nexus between the subalternating and subalternate science. Through the 58. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2. 59. See Livesey, Theology and Science in the Fourteenth Century, 36. 60. See Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:14a. 61. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2. 62. Ibid. Cf. In ST, I, q. 12, a. 8, n. xi.

136  The Habit of Theology mediation of faith, the middle term (the subject) in the subalternate science of our theology in via receives the superadded accidental condition of being revealed without evidence. By means of this superadded accidental condition or formal difference in the mode of knowing, the subject of our theology in patria—the Deity as Deity—is wholly incorporated into the subalternate science of our theology in via. Hence the second conclusion—deduced by Cajetan—follows closely on the first; namely, the subalternate science is in continuation with the superior science according to the same formal object, and it relates to the subalternating science as the imperfect to the perfect.63 As a result, it is quite correct to say that the resolution of the theological demonstration does not terminate in the proposition or article of faith, but in the reality or subject.64 Through theological resolution in the light of faith, the articles of faith (known quia) come to be properly understood in continuation with the light of the beatific vision, in which the substance of the articles of faith is known propter quid. Thus, demonstration from the articles of faith in our theology in via is a demonstration quia; while in our theology in patria, it is an argument propter quid.65 Our theology in patria—even though its principles are immediately evident (propter quid)—still exists within the superadded accidental condition of being revealed (immediately through the deifying participation in the lumen gloriae) in relation to the superior and subalternating science or theology of God, which is his natural knowledge of himself.66 As was already mentioned, revelation—according to Aquinas—is not the result of the Fall (as it is for Scotus), but necessary ad finem within the order of grace and glory, in which man is called to the supernatural end of the beatific vision. Based on this, Cajetan brilliantly grasped that sacred doc63. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2. 64. Cf. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2, and ST, II-II, a. 6, s.c. 65. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2. 66. It is interesting to note that the addition to the subject is within “the knower”; see Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:14a.

A Science and Wisdom   137 trine is essentially a genus of the revealed knowledge of God (who is supra-genus), which includes various species such as prophecy, faith, theology, and the beatific vision. A third conclusion is that the habit per se of the proximate principles of the subalternate science is the subalternating scientific habit.67 Our theology secundum se—namely, the theology of the blessed—possesses the articles of faith by participating immediately and per se in theology secundum se, which is God’s natural knowledge of himself. The fourth conclusion is that the subalternating and subalternate sciences are opposed not necessarily on the part of the material object (ratio formalis quod), nor on the part of the knowing subject, but rather on the part of the condition of their mediums, since the subalternating science (the theology of the blessed) is joined immediately to the principles per se notis (in the lumen gloriae), while subalternate science (theology in wayfarers) is joined to its principles through the mediation of another habit: faith.68 The fifth conclusion is that the subalternate and subalternating sciences can coexist in the same created intellect (just as geometry and optics, or mathematics and music), since they are not opposed to one another on the part of the knowing subject.69 The imperfection of our theology in via is perfected through vision in our theology in patria. The acquired habit of our theology is not annihilated in the beatific vision. Faith and perfect science are incompatible, while the beatific vision and perfect science are perfectly compatible. The perfection of a science lies in the per se evidence of its principles. This does not mean that a theologian is simultaneously a wayfarer and comprehensor. Rather, the habit of theological science that was acquired in via (through discursive reasoning) is perfected by its continuation within the light of glory. By contrast, Scotus argued that indeed subalternate and sub­ alternating sciences can coexist simultaneously in the same created 67. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid.

138  The Habit of Theology intellect, but our theology in patria cannot coexist with our theology in via, otherwise the same created intellect would be simultaneously a comprehensor and a viator.70 According to Scotus, within the knowing subject there is no epistemic nexus between the theology of the blessed (the comprehensor) and the theology of the wayfarer (the viator). The primary subject of both these theologies is the Deity; nevertheless, they are of radically different orders and modes of knowledge. The wayfarer’s primary object—infinite being (ens infinitum)—is known according to abstractive cognition, while the theology of the blessed’s primary object—the Deity—is known through intuitive cognition. An additional sixth conclusion is that the proximate principles of the subalternate science can be known by two habits: in the superior science through the beatific vision and through the mediating habit of faith.71

Theologies of Light In his commentary on ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, Cajetan also highlights how Aquinas—by introducing the modification of subalternation— ultimately grounds our theology in the subalternating theology of God and the theology of the blessed.72 As was shown, the first syllogism instrumentally generates the acquired habit of theology, but the universal efficient cause of its generation is the infused presence of the divine light of revelation. This supernatural participation in the light and intelligibility of the Deity is the nexus between our theology in via (an imperfect participation), our theology in patria, and God’s theology.73 God’s act of self-revelation 70. Following Scotus, Peter Aureol states the identical objection, which is recorded by Capreolus, see Defensiones, 1:14a. In brief, the proper habit of the proximate principles of theology is the light of glory. The light of faith is merely a mediating habit of the principles; see Donneaud, “La théologie comme science chez Capreolus,” 113. 71. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2. 72. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iv; see appendix 2. 73. For Aquinas on this nexus as a participation (imperfect in via and perfect in patria) in the divine light, see De ver., q. 14, a. 9, ad 2.

A Science and Wisdom   139 is the ontological and epistemological foundation for the ultimate conformity of the human intellect to the Deity within the order of grace. Revelation—an act of the divine substance—is the cause of the object of faith in humans, which includes both the arcane truths about God that simply exceed human comprehension and the preambles of the faith, which can also be demonstrated by human reason. Furthermore, even for our theology in patria revelation remains an accidental difference; namely, the theology of the blessed remains a participation in the revelation of God’s theology, which is the Deity’s natural self-knowledge.74 Aquinas’s ingenious integration within an Aristotelian epistemology of the Neoplatonic notions of participation and similitude, the Stoic concept of connaturality (connaturalitas-oikeiosis),75 and 74. Regarding theology in humans, Capreolus’s lexicon is: scientia/theologia beatorum, comprehensoris or sanctorum and scientia/theologia nostra or viatoris. He maintains that “theologia nostra [viatoris] ex continuatione procedit ad divinam visionem” (Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:15a), which forms the basis for Cajetan’s affirmation: “sequitur quod theologia beatorum et nostra conveniant in una ratione formali obiecti ut obiectum est, et consequenter sint una scientia secundum speciem specialissimam” (Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. viii; see appendix 2). Since they are one science, Cajetan extends the phrase theologia nostra to mean both forms (perfect and imperfect) of human theology; cf. In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. x; see appendix 2. Moreover, according to Cajetan, theologia quoad nos would correspond to theologia nostra (beatorum et viatoris), while theologia in se would correspond to God’s knowledge or theology of himself; cf. ibid. It should be noted that according to Scotus, scientia in se (God’s theology) and scientia quoad nos refer to two entirely distinct modes and orders of theology. Moreover, within the scientia quoad nos, the theology of the blessed and the theology of wayfarers are likewise of two distinct modes and orders, totally independent of one another and without influence on one another. 75. “Maximilian Forschner (2004) suggests that the Stoic theory of oikeiosis, mediated by Cicero and Seneca, informed Thomas Aquinas’s concept of inclinationes naturales” (Boris Maslov, “Prisvoenie k Bogu / Oikeiosis pros theon: The Afterlife of a Stoic concept in Old Rus’,” in Translation and Tradition in “Slavia Orthodoxa,” ed. Valentina Izmirlieva and Boris Gasparov (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2012), 18. Within supernatural order, and on the basis of a new proportionality caused by grace, man is inclined in a connatural way to the vision of God; cf. De ver., q. 27, a. 2. Moreover, in the beatific vision or deification, the light of glory makes the blessed like unto God; cf. ST, I, q. 12, a. 5. c. Cajetan more explicitly states: “Proportio inter lumen gloriae et divinum essentiam, non in esse naturale, sed in esse intelligibili, est proportio proprii connaturale ad naturam a qua fluit” (In ST, I, q. 12, a. 5, n. xi). The phrase connaturale ad naturam corresponds with oikeiosis pros theon. Hence, when speaking of the order of grace, Aquinas’s and Cajetan’s use of the term “connaturality” corresponds with St. Gregory of Nazianzus’s use of the term oikeiosis within theosis; see below, my “Conclusion.”

140  The Habit of Theology the modified-Augustinian theory of illumination form the noetic basis for Cajetan’s own grasp of theology’s formal object (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum) as a participation in the divine light of revelation, which begins with faith and culminates in the beatific vision. Moreover, it was precisely the rejection of Henry of Ghent’s retro-Augustinian theory of illumination (particularly his concept of a lumen medium within theology) that motivated Scotus to theorize a theology in which the divine light (as the sufficient cause) remains exclusively within theology’s primary subject—the Deity.76 Thus, for both Cajetan and Scotus, one’s understanding of the beatific vision ultimately determines the nature of theology as a science in humans. In order to highlight the relation of our theology to the beatific vision, Cajetan sets forth two objections against the subalternate nature of our theology in via: the first objection is centered around the diversity between our theology in via and the theologies of God and the blessed; the second objection is that the distinction between these various theologies do not meet the required conditions for subalternation.77 Concerning the diversity between our theology in via, our theology in patria, and the theology of God, Cajetan sets forth the position of Scotus, who argues that since the science or theology of God is formally one, no other science can be subalternate to it.78 In his opposition to commentators who took a Neoplatonic approach to the works of Aristotle (among them Aquinas, who sought a unification of the various theologies within an analogical notion of science), Scotus held that the various forms of 76. Cf. Stephen Dumont, “Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” Speculum 64, no. 3 (1989): 579–99. In his own doctrine, Scotus limits divine illumination to the action of the divine intellect on knowable objects—giving those objects their intelligibility (esse intelligibile)—and not in the created intellect itself. Divine illumination is that in virtue of which secondarily the objects produced move the intellect in actuality. For Scotus, illumination is only in the “prime object” itself, which is why the human mind does not need any elevation (by a participation in the light of glory) when it has intuitive cognition of the divine essence, namely the beatific vision; cf. Alexander W. Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus: Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages (London: Continuum, 2009), 76–77. 77. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vii; see appendix 2. 78. Ibid.

A Science and Wisdom   141 theology are of radically different orders and independent from one another: where one theology ends, the other begins.79 According to Scotus, on account of our present fallen state, wayfarers cannot know the quiddity of God—the Deity. Therefore, theology in via requires a substitute for the primary subject.80 Hence a first known object is supplied by metaphysics; infinite being (ens infinitum) is theology in via’s primary subject, because this is “the most perfect concept of God” that man is capable of forming.81 The concept of infinite being becomes the first known object of both the necessary and contingent truths of theology in via.82 Infinite being, however, as the first known object is inadequate to cause the habit of theological science. It is a sufficient enough representation or substitute, however, to transform the object of faith into the object of a science—rather a knowledge or wisdom—only in the broadest sense of the term, since true science, according to Scotus, requires evident and intuitive knowledge of the primary subject.83 In addition, according to Scotus, theology in via is a practical science, since infinite being (ens infinitum) in its singularity (as the primary object) is principally to be loved (out of a metaphysical necessity, since God necessarily loves himself),84 and, thus, it grounds and guides man’s right actions.85 79. Ibid. 80. See Edward O’Connor, “The Scientific Character of Theology according to Scotus,” in De doctrina Ioannis Duns Scoti. Acta Congressus Scotistici Internationalis Oxonii et Edimburgi 11–17 Sept. 1966 celebrati, vol. 3, (Rome: Commissionis Scotisticae), 10–11. Cf. Alliney, Giovanni Duns Scoto: Introduzione al pensiero filosofico, 24; Iammarrone, Giovanni Duns Scotus metafisico e teologo, 749; Giovanni Lauriola, “Introduzione al concetto di scienza in generale nelle ‘Questioni sulla metafisica’ di D. Scoto,” Studi Francescani 77 (1980): 51–86; and “Introduzione al concetto di scienza in generale nella Lectura e nell’Ordinatio di D. Scoto,” Studi Francescani 78 (1981): 47–121. 81. See Scotus, Ord., I (III/1), prol., q. 3, n. 243. Cf. O’Connor, “The Scientific Character of Theology,” 37–38; and Alliney, Giovanni Duns Scoto: Introduzione al pensiero filosofico, 46. 82. Cf. Scotus, Ord., I (III/1), prol., q. 3, n. 249. 83. Cf. Iammarrone, Giovanni Duns Scotus metafisico e teologo, 76; O’Connor, “The Scientific Character of Theology,” 40; and Boulnois, Duns Scoto: Il rigore della carità, 97–98. 84. See Iammarrone, Giovanni Duns Scotus metafisico e teologo, 774. 85. According to Scotus theology, a practical science, in view of its end, is more noble than any speculative science; cf. Scotus, Ord., 1 (III/1), prol., pars quinta, q. 2, n. 472, and Boulnois, Duns Scoto: Il rigore della carità, 128.

142  The Habit of Theology For Scotus, theology in via is a type of wisdom that can coexist with the habit of faith.86 Its first known object—infinite being as known through abstractive cognition—is limited to what is revealed in the Bible about infinite being’s singularity (the primary object of metaphysics is infinite being in its universality).87 This theological wisdom is a habit generated by discursive reasoning from the articles of faith revealed in Scripture and is distinct from the Scotian notions of both infused and acquired faith.88 Moreover, it functions—in a natural mode—for the purpose of interpreting Scripture, by making deductions from Scripture and solving objections made against Scripture.89 Hence there is no need for theology in via to continue in patria, because the quiddity of the Deity (the primary subject in patria) will be known immediately through intuitive cognition. Furthermore, revelation will cease.90 Finally, since every theology—according to Scotus—possesses its own diverse primary subject, God’s theology, the theology of the blessed, the theology of wayfarers (with merely a “first known object,” thus, lacking the nature of a true science), and metaphysics remain completely separate sciences or types of knowledge.91 86. See Scotus, Ord., III (III/2), d. 24, n. 62. Scotus adopts Aristotle’s discourse in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics in order to establish the subjective component of certainty caused by faith, and thus our theology in via is not a science in the strict sense (lacking necessity), but rather a wisdom that includes both the principles and conclusions; see Salmeri, “Nessuna luce.” Cf. also Iammarrone, Giovanni Duns Scotus metafisico e teologo, 763–64. 87. Cf. Alliney, Giovanni Duns Scoto: Introduzione al pensiero filosofico, 45–46. 88. See Scotus, Rep., III (II/2), d. 24, q. un., nn. 16–17. According to Scotus, theology in via presupposes at least “acquired faith,” which, through natural means, grasps both the authority of Scripture and its tradition within the community; cf. Scotus, Ord., III (III/2), d. 23, q. un., n. 18. 89. Scotus, Ord., III (III/2), d. 24, n. 62–63, and Rep., III (II/2), d. 24, q. un., n. 21. Cf. Salmeri, “Nessuna luce,” and Iammarrone, Giovanni Duns Scotus metafisico e teologo, 763. 90. According to Scotus, the impossibility of evidence of the Deity in wayfarers simply nullifies our theology not only as a science, but even as a subalternate science; cf. Rep., III (II/2), d. 24, q. un., n. 13. 91. Boulnois, Duns Scoto: Il rigore della carità, 135. According to Scotus, our theology in via is an abstractive knowledge of the Deity—in his singularity (in contrast to the intuitive knowledge of the blessed). Our theology in via is known through revelation, but it presupposes the metaphysical concept of ens infinitum. It is a science—or rather a wisdom—in a very broad sense in that it is about man’s highest good—thus, it is practical in nature; and

A Science and Wisdom   143 As was stated, in the absence of the intuitive cognition of God, our theology in via must accept from metaphysics its provisory first known object, which provides a foundation for our theology in via’s abstractive cognition of God, abstracting from the actual presence and existence of the subject. According to Scotus, God is the natural object of the human intellect, but because of our present fallen state and wounded nature, theological truths must be revealed to man through sacred Scripture. These revealed truths (including both necessary and contingent truths) must be expressed in a human language that is comprehensible so that it is possible to create an epistemic structure of concepts by employing: the mechanism of ordering natural concepts that is available to us in our present state in order to reconstruct, analogically, the order between “theological” concepts, or at least to infer the existence of such an order between them, even though this material is not directly accessible to our intellect.92

For this metaphysical mechanism to function within our theology in via, Scotus lays strong emphasis on his doctrine of the univocity of being93—including the univocity of transcendentals such as the convertible properties (oneness, truth, goodness), absolute perfections (intellect and will), and disjunctive characteristics (infinite/finite, potency/act, necessary/contingent, natural/free)—all of which guarantee univocal middle terms common to both God and creatures,94 although these univocal terms differ in their init is not bound by the strict requirements of demonstration, being concerned with contingent truths, such as the Incarnation; cf. ibid., 106. 92. Oleg Bychkov, “The Nature of Theology in Duns Scotus and his Franciscan Predecessors,” Franciscan Studies 66 (2008): 54. 93. Scotus arrives at his univocal concept of being when refuting Henry of Ghent’s necessity of a confrontation of concepts (one set of concepts concerning creatures, another concerning God through a mediating divine illumination), which forms the basis for his doctrine of analogical predication to God; see Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, 19. What is common to Scotus and Henry of Ghent, however, is a certain conceptualization of God: for Scotus, in a univocal manner; for Henry, in—what he terms—an analogical manner, which includes a set of ideas concerning God impressed on the human mind through a divine illumination. 94. Cf. Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, 105–9. For a good summary of

144  The Habit of Theology tensity.95 According to Scotus, the structure of our theology in via is modeled on metaphysics.96 Hence human reason is the primary efficient cause in structuring theology in via. As will be shown, according to Scotus, God’s quiddity—the primary subject of our theology in via—is not known intuitively by wayfarers; however, infinite being—the first known object of theology in via—can be known in an abstractive manner. Nevertheless, it is inadequate—according to our present fallen state—to be the sufficient cause of theology’s structure.97 Infinite being as a representation of the object of faith, however, is sufficient enough to infer a logical order for theology’s epistemic structure primarily through the efficient causality of human reason.98 In contrast, for Aquinas and Cajetan, the structure of theology flows from the articles of faith and ultimately from theology’s subject in se, the Deity as known in the divine light of revelation. Human reason is merely the instrumental or secondary efficient cause in explicating the causal order virtually contained within its principles, and—through the primary efficient cause of the divine light of revelation—theological reasoning resolves into the Deity, the subject of sacred doctrine as a science. The ultimate difference between the theology of the blessed and that of wayfarers—according to Scotus—is based on the distinction transcendentals in Scotus, see Alliney, Giovanni Duns Scoto: Introduzione al pensiero filosofico, 64–69. 95. See Alliney, Giovanni Duns Scoto: Introduzione al pensiero filosofico, 78–79. For Scotus, ens infinitum is a “modality of existence” within the common concept of being; cf. Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, 107–8. This modality of existence, however, “is a lesser distinction [than a real distinction] that acknowledges degrees of intensity within one and the same nature” (Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, 106). Scotus affirms: “An infinite being is that which exceeds any finite being whatsoever not in some limited degree but in a measure beyond what is either defined or can be defined. . . . In this fashion, by contrast, the infinite exceeds the finite in being beyond any relative measure or proportion that could be assigned” (Quodl., 5.9, trans. in Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, 119). The fact that infinite being exists “in a measure beyond what is either defined or can be defined” is precisely why Cajetan negates the very possibility of a “common concept of being” that includes the Deity, because such a concept would be void of any noetic content (esse obiective), no matter how “abstract” that common concept might be. 96. See Scotus, Rep., III (II/2), d. 24, q. un., n. 16. Cf. Iammarrone, Giovanni Duns Scotus metafisico e teologo, 762. 97. See Iammarrone, Giovanni Duns Scotus metafisico e teologo, 751. 98. See Boulnois, Duns Scoto: Il rigore della carità, 79.

A Science and Wisdom   145 between intuitive and abstractive cognition. As Giovanni Salmeri notes, an exaggerated importance has been placed on the Prologue of Scotus’s Ordinatio, and too little attention has been focused on the questions concerning the beatific vision, where Scotus negates not only any conceptualization (intelligible species) of the Deity in the beatific vision, but also the necessity of a created light of glory, as a qualitative elevation of the human mind.99 In Scotus’s anthropology, humans are naturally created for and ordered to supernatural beatitude. There is no need for an elevation or illumination of the human intellect in order to attain the vision of the divine quiddity. Thus the ultimate consummation of human perfection, theosis or divinization, does not require any perfecting of the human intellect as such other than the epistemic passage from abstractive cognition to intuitive cognition, namely to the knowledge of the Deity in its actual existence. Cajetan tears at the foundations of Scotus’s conception of theology both in via and in patria in his commentary on ST, I, q. 12, concerning how God is known by the blessed in the beatific vision. First of all, he addresses Scotus’s admitted possibility of conceptualizing infinite being, in a concrete and distinct manner as required for his theology in via’s first known object, and also the possibility of conceptualizing the divine perfections and attributes.100 Cajetan explains that an intellectual species is a similitude, and not a sign, that produces knowledge through assimilation. Therefore, if knowledge is to be quiddative, then it is necessary that the similitude of a particular species be in the knower formally and eminently. This is why material things—which man can know naturally 99. See Salmeri, “Nessuna luce.” 100. Within his “common concept of being,” Scotus distinguishes the infinite being of God from the finite being of creatures as intrinsic modes of being; see Scotus, Lectura, in Opera Omnia: editio minor, ed. Giovanni Lauriola. Alberobello (Bari: Alberobello, 1998–2003), I (III/1), d. 8, pars prima, q. 3, n. 129. For Aquinas and Cajetan, God’s Being, however, is indeed “more formal” and “more common” than being through participation, or what Aquinas terms ens commune; see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 4, a. 1, n. v. Ipsum Esse is the actuality of every form, of all instances of ens commune, and thus resists any “form” of conceptualization which would imply potency, that is to say, a real distinction between God’s esse and essentia.

146  The Habit of Theology through formal abstraction—have a nobler mode of existence (as immaterial) in the human mind than in reality.101 For this same reason, however, an intellect of an inferior order cannot naturally know a quiddity of a higher or more superior order: How could infinite being possibly have a mode of existence in a created intellect other than its esse naturale—natural mode of being?102 In other words, how can there be a created similitude of Ipsum Esse Subsistens? Clearly, it is a metaphysical impossibility for a created intellect to possess a similitude of infinite perfection.103 The quiddity of God, the Deity, can be known only in its esse naturale—natural mode of being. Moreover, this is why Scotus’s univocal concept of being, the object of his metaphysics and foundation for his theology in via, is void of any mental content (esse obiective) or link to the reality that founds his univocal concept.104 Infinite being simply cannot be conceptualized, because the divine essence is its esse obiective, its own intelligibility.105 The inconceivability of God’s essence is why all theological discourse, according to Aquinas, must be analogical as expounded in the Pseudo-Dionysian triplex via of causality, negation, and excellence (via causalitatis, remotionis et eminentiae). This is also why Cajetan affirms that our theology in via, as helicoidal contemplation, remains dependent on phantasms, that is to say, it is dependent on created concepts attributed analogically to God: the human mind “helicoidal-ly” ascends to God “as the cause of all things, by transcendence and by negation.”106 On the other hand, 101. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 2, n. vii. 102. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 2, n. viii. 103. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 2, n. x. Scotus admits the possibility of a “confused” concept of ens infinitum as the foundation for his theology in via. Cajetan rightly notes, however, that Scotus fails to distinguish that a “formal infinity” can be either an infinity of form or an infinity of esse or act; see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 7, a. 1, n. x. 104. Cf. Peter King, “Duns Scotus on Mental Concept,” In Duns Scotus à Paris (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004), 25; http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/articles/Scotus_on_Mental _Content.pdf. 105. Even the divine ideas are God’s esse obiective, the esse naturale ipsius Dei; see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 15, a. 1, n. viii. 106. Aquinas, De trin., q. 1, a. 2, c. 2. For similarity between Cajetan’s and Capreolus’s doctrine on analogous concepts, see D’Ettore, “The Fifteenth-Century Thomist Dispute,” 271–73.

A Science and Wisdom   147 for Scotus, because ens infinitum can be grasped in a concrete and distinct manner, even transcendentals signify ideas of attributes and perfections of being that are univocal to God and creatures.107 According to Aquinas and Cajetan, the conceptualization of God’s essence is a metaphysical impossibility. Moreover, the transcendental properties of being and the ten categories are conceptual additions to the content of the metaphysical concept of created being—the ratio entis; hence the transcendentals—the category of substance and qualities such as wisdom and the like—can be predicated to God only analogically.108 Some contemporary studies tend to focus on the similarities between Aquinas and Scotus.109 This is possible only if one completely denies the fact that Scotus’s entire theological system is based on a metaphysical impossibility, namely that humans can have a concept of being without having determined whether that being is finite or infinite. The possible conceptualization of God, which is what Scotus’s univocal concept of being implies, is an untraversable chasm lying between the via Thomae and the via Scoti. According to Aquinas, the Deity is above being (supra ens). God is above ens commune, precisely because created being is common 107. In general, Scotus confuses the pre-metaphysical concept of being for the speculative object of metaphysics; see Hallensleben, Communicatio: Anthropologie und Gnadenlehre bei Thomas de Vio Cajetan, 80. Scotus holds that transcendental terms signify concepts of the attributes of being that are univocal to both God and creatures; cf. Ord. I, (III/1), d. 3, pars prima, q. 2, n. 26, and Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, 105 and 110. 108. Cf. Michael Tavuzzi, “Aquinas on the Operation of Additio,” The New Scholasticism 62, no. 3 (1988): 315–16. The subject of sacred doctrine is the quiddity of the Deity, the ratio deitatis. The Deity can be known to exist through created effects (an sit), but not quid sit. Thus, if created intellects are “predestined” to know the quiddity of the Deity (i.e., if they are ordered toward the supernatural beatitude of the beatific vision), the Deity must necessarily reveal itself, which is why sacred doctrine—as a genus of knowledge—is the cognitio revelata Dei, distinct from philosophical knowledge. Moreover, since Ipsum Esse Subsistens is “more formal” and “more common” than any created form or concept (Dei quidditas est ipsum esse, unde est supra intellectum), our language about God can be only analogical. Created perfections—such as “being”—are attributed to the Deity in a super-eminently virtual mode (causa prima est supra ens), because God—as Pure Act—is “more formal” and “more common” than any created form; cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 4, a. 1, c. 109. See Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, 120, and Allan Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1946), 31n2.

148  The Habit of Theology (commune) and not one (unum). Thus there cannot metaphysically exist a mediating concept of Ipsum Esse Subsistens simply because there is no composition of being (esse) and essence, nor potency in God.110 This truth alone necessitates the created intellect’s participation per se in the elevating presence of the divine light, enabling man to know connaturally the quiddity of God,111 mankind’s ultimate perfection and deification, within the supernatural order of grace and glory without the mediation of any representation or similitude from God’s part.112 In brief, the Deity, whose nature is his being (natura . . . est suum esse), cannot be the form of anything in the order of being (in genere entium); nevertheless, in the order of knowing (in genere intelligibilium), the Deity is an intellectual species not just unto itself, but also with respect to those created intellects that are deified through their minds’ immediate union with the divine essence in the divine light of glory.113 110. In his commentary on Aquinas’s ST, I, q. 4, a. 1, Cajetan brilliantly perceives that the term commune (as regards being) can be understood in only two ways, either per modum potentiae or per modum actus, while Scotus argues for a third type of community of being that is simultaneously per modum potentiae and per modum actus; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 4, a. 1, n. v. Scotus’s “common concept of being” simply goes against the principle of non­ contradiction. There can be no third community of being, whose noetic content (esse obiective) is simultaneously a “community in the manner of act” and a “community in the manner of potency.” For Aquinas and Cajetan, ens commune—as the concept of being in general—is the subject of metaphysics, whose esse obiective is the sharing in a common existential actuality, of participating in esse ut actus entis. Thus, the one necessary constituent of the content of the concept of being in general is the condition of “participating in” (what Aquinas refers to as) esse commune. Ens commune—the most “common concept” possible or definable—is dependent on Ipsum Esse Subsistens being communissimum (“more common” and “un-definable”—cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 8, a. 1, ad 2). Thus, Aquinas’s metaphysical resolutio secundum rem—a demonstration quia, terminating in the seizure of Ipsum Esse Subsistens— provides the epistemological status of certitude necessary for the subsequent metaphysical resolutio secundum rationem, which terminates in positive seizure, not through demonstration, but rather as an “intellectual grasping” (propositio immediate) that the ratio entis is the condition of participating in esse commune; cf. Aquinas, Super librum De causis expositio (hereafter De causis) , lect. 6, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. 111. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 6, nn. xi and xii. 112. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 2, n. xii. 113. For Cajetan, the light of glory is the formal and efficient cause of deification; see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 5, n. i. On the other hand, according to Scotus’s doctrine on science, the “primary subject” is the sole sufficient cause. Thus, Scotus denies not only the medium of a concept in the beatific vision, but also the necessity of an added light of glory,

A Science and Wisdom   149 On account of the diverse grades of being and modes of knowing, theology secundum se, the Deity’s knowledge of itself, is most certainly not identical to our theology in patria, nor is our theology in via identical to either.114 Although they differ, they are not so radically separate as Scotus maintains, but rather between them exists an order and a nexus within the participation through the imprint of divine knowledge (impressio divinae scientiae).115 For this reason, Cajetan warns novices in sacred doctrine that theology secundum se is distinct from our theology (theologia nostra). For theology secundum se is simply the natural knowledge or theology that God has of himself, which is the ultimate ontological and epistemological foundation of our theology. In the phrase “our theology,” “our” refers to human nature, including its elevated states of grace and glory and their corresponding modes of knowing. Our theology in via is in an imperfect state, while our theology in patria is in a perfected state; both, however, are within the same since the intuitive cognition of the “primary subject”—the Deity—is the Light; cf. Scotus, Ord., IV (III/2), d. 49, n. 535; and Salmeri, “Nessuna luce.” A few years after Scotus’s death, the Council of Vienne (October 16, 1312) condemned the errors of the Beghards and Beguines concerning the state of perfection. Salmeri defends Scotus from the first part of the fifth opinion condemned, namely “any intellectual nature in itself is naturally blessed” (DS 895); cf. Salmeri, “Nessuna luce.” The second part of the fifth opinion condemned—namely “the soul does not need the light of glory to elevate it to see God and enjoy Him blissfully” (DS 895)—Salmeri simply waves off by stating that this condemnation is confined to a theological panorama very distant from Scotus. Cajetan notes, however, that the substance of this latter opinion, which was condemned, equally applies to Scotus and his followers. Understanding that the Church has “determined” this doctrine as heretical, Cajetan maintains that this teaching of Scotus’s—on the non-necessity of the light of glory and the non-necessity of an elevation of the human mind for the beatific vision—is no longer tenable as a theological opinion; see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 6, n. ix. 114. The diverse modes and orders of knowledge arise from the various grades of being, since the thing known is in the knower according to its mode of being; see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 4, n. iv. Cf. Aquinas, De ver., q. 1, a. 2, c. 115. Cajetan uses the notions of impressio and sigillio—as employed by Aquinas (see ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2, and De trin., q. 3, a. 1, ad 4)—to express the nexus (continuatio) between our theology and that of God and the blessed; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. v. Following Capreolus, Cajetan never employs Aquinas’s use of the notion of transfusio to express the transmission of knowledge, from the teacher to the disciple, in sacred doctrine; cf. Donneaud, “La théologie comme science chez Capreolus,” 121. For Aquinas’s use of the term transfusio in relation to sacred doctrine, see In II Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, c; De ver., q. 11, a. 1, ad 6; De ver., q. 11, a. 4, ad 3; De ver., q. 27, a. 3, ad 2.

150  The Habit of Theology species of theology. Our theology in via lacks evidence of its principles and thus believes in them; while our theology in patria knows or sees the articles of faith per se, since the blessed have immediate evidence of them in the beatific vision. Our theology in via is caused by a continuation in the material object (the articles of faith) and a participation in the divine light of revelation, which illuminates the articles of faith, the principles known per se by the blessed. The divine light of revelation—abstracted from both the clarity of vision in the blessed and the obscurity of faith (non visum) in wayfarers— is the formal object (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum) of “our theology” in an absolute sense. This point concerning the divine light as the formal object for both forms of our theology is key for understanding how our theology in via can be an acquired habit, yet operate proportionately within the supernatural order of grace. Cajetan raises the objection of certain persons who claim that our theology in via and our theology in patria are not contained within the same univocal notion of science, inasmuch as they seem to be different species, since, according to Aquinas, acquired and infused virtues are of different species.116 Cajetan responds by noting that our theology in via can be understood in a certain sense “to be and not to be” a science. It is not a science according to the perfect essence or ratio of science, since it does not resolve its conclusions into self-evident principles; nevertheless, as an imperfect science, it falls within the latitude of the notion of science.117 As we have seen above, the Old and New Laws are related to one another as the imperfect to the perfect within the same species of 116. Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 33 q. 1 a. 2 qc. 4 c. 117. For this latitude of imperfection and perfection within the notion of theology as a science, see Aquinas, De ver., q. 14, a. 10 c. Capreolus sets forth the position adopted by Cajetan that sacred doctrine is a subalternate (imperfect) science in via, perfected by its continuation with our theology in patria; see Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:15a. Certain recent critical editions of Aquinas’s works reveal that he progressively admitted the existence of an imperfection in the theology of wayfarers, namely that it falls short of the perfect ratio of a science; see Francisco J. Romero Carrasquillo, “La sacra Doctrina como ciencia imperfecta quoad nos en Tomás de Aquino: Nuevas reflexiones a partir de algunas ediciones críticas recientes,” Tópicos, revista de filosofía 52 (2017): 68–87.

A Science and Wisdom   151 divine law.118 Similarly, the imperfection of our theology in via is related to the perfection of our theology in patria, within the same species of our theology, on account of their continuity within the divine light of revelation.119 In fact, Cajetan states that although the mediating habit of faith—the habit of the principles of theology per accidens—will not remain in heaven, nonetheless, our acquired habit of theology will remain, because the same formal object (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum) of theology as a science remains, namely our participation in the divine light.120 In the beatific vision, however, our imperfect theology in via will be perfected in patria through the immediate vision and evidence of the principles per se, together with the cessation of discursive reasoning. Rejecting the diversity of theologies required for subalternation, Peter Aureol argued that the subject of a subalternate science must add something to the subject of the subalternating science, just as music adds the quality of sound to quantity as studied in arithmetic. Without any apparent addition, however, our theology in via treats the exact same subject as does God’s theology, namely the Deity; hence our theology in via simply is not a subalternate science.121 Cajetan responds by establishing that the subject of our theology in via does indeed add a certain mode to the subject of our theology in an absolute sense; that is to say, if the subject of our theology in via is the aggregate of both the material and formal objects, then its subject is understood to be Deus revelatus: God (the material object) as revealed (the formal object).122 Thus, revelation is the superadded accidental difference to the subject or material object (the Deity) of both of our theologies. Moreover, in our theology in patria, the divine light of revelation is evident, while in our theology in via, it is obscure. As was stated, subalternation in sacred doctrine does not con118. See Aquinas, ST, I-II, q. 91, a. 5, c. 119. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xiii. 120. See Aquinas, De div. nom., cap. 2, lect. 4. 121. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vii; see appendix 2. Cf. Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:7a. 122. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xiii; see appendix 2.

152  The Habit of Theology trast with Aristotle’s exposition of this matter in his Posterior Analytics. The subject of our theology in patria—the Deity—descends into our theology in via, since in both our theologies the material object is altogether the same.123 As Cajetan affirms, the unity of a science consists in the aggregate of the material object (ratio formalis obiecti ut res) and the formal object (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum). Although the Deity is the material object of both our theologies, nevertheless, in both theologies the formal object or the mode of knowing differs, since God is immediately seen by the blessed, while wayfarers believe in God through the obscure light of faith. Nonetheless, Deus revelatus, abstracting from both clarity and obscurity, is the essence (ratio) of our theology in an absolute sense.124 Cajetan states that Scotus argues against subalternation in sacred doctrine on two fronts. First, a subalternate science must depend on the subalternating science as its cause. Within Scotus’s concept of theology, our theology in via is not caused by the object, potency, subject, or light of the theology of the blessed.125 Second, Scotus argues that subalternating and subalternate sciences must be able to simultaneously coexist in the same subject-person, who knows both the subalternate discipline and the superior science.126 However, the same subject-knower cannot simultaneously be a comprehensor (by vision) and a viator (by faith).127 To the first of Scotus’s arguments (regarding the subalternating science as the proper cause of the subalternate), Cajetan states that God’s theology is indeed the proper and superior cause of our theology on account of its perfect evidence and certainty, namely God’s own self-intelligibility.128 Hence the term science is predicated analogically to God by removing all imperfections inherent in 123. Ibid. 124. Ibid. 125. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vii; see appendix 2. Cf. Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:9a–b. 126. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vi. 127. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vii. Cf. Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:9a-b. 128. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. xii.

A Science and Wisdom   153 “our” mode of knowing, such as revelation and discursive reasoning.129 Similarly, it is not necessary that principles of our theology in via be the conclusions of our theology in patria, that is to say, the result of discursive reasoning in the blessed. Rather, it is sufficient that our theology in patria sees and knows the principles as evident and the conclusions as virtually contained in those principles per se notis. Our theology in via is acquired through discursive and syllogistic reasoning and is perfected by its continuation within our theology in patria’s immediate and nondiscursive mode of knowing.130 It is worth examining these various theologies in relation to Christ, in whom the theologia Dei (perfect God) and the theologia beatorum (perfect man or comprehensor) are united without mixture. While on his earthly mission, Christ—as both comprehensor and viator—never possessed the mediating habit of faith. Thus he never possessed our theology in its imperfect state.131 Moreover, since the use of reason is merely instrumental in our theology and what is formal is the participation in the divine light of revelation, Christ did not need to acquire our theology through syllogistic reasoning,132 but—since the power of discursive reasoning (ad usum) was not frustrated in him—he could make use of theological syllogisms, if he so willed.133 Therefore, all those believers in via—who acquired the habit of theology through discursive or syllogistic reasoning (the secondary or instrumental cause) in the divine light of faith (the primary efficient cause)—have a vital dependence on, an intimate participation in, and a continuity with Christ’s theology (ut theologia Dei et ut theologia beati), which is our theology’s proper and exemplar cause. The acquired habit of theology is essentially a simple quality, enabling the human intellect—set in motion as an instrumental 129. Cf. Aquinas, De ver., q. 2, a. 11. 130. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xi; see appendix 2. 131. See Aquinas, ST, III, q. 9, a. 2, c. 132. See Aquinas, ST, III, q. 11, a. 2, c. 133. See Aquinas, ST, III, q. 11, a. 3, c.

154  The Habit of Theology cause by the presence of the divine light of revelation (universal efficient cause)—to unite and order a multitude of intelligible species (hence, the necessary recourse to phantasms) according to its infused formal object, the highest cause.134 Thus, our theology in via and our theology in patria are one and the same species of knowledge within the supernatural order of revelation. Without the perfection of divine revelation by vision in patria, however, there could be no imperfect theology as a science in via. They differ only inasmuch as one is in an imperfect state, lacking evidence and vision of the articles of faith and depending on the discursive mode of reasoning; while the other is in a perfected state, knowing the articles of faith per se and the conclusions— virtually contained in the articles of faith—immediately, without discursive reasoning. The theology of God, the Deity’s natural self-knowledge, is the ultimate foundation for our theology both in patria and in via, since God’s act of self-revelation is the scientific ground for the entire order of revelation. Sacred doctrine is simply the communication of and the participation in the theology of God. As was already mentioned, Scotus’s second argument—that faith and proper science simply cannot stand together—is founded on his understanding that the primary object of any proper science must be known intuitively, while faith’s primary object—infinite being—is known in merely an abstractive, non-intuitive mode: “Science in the proper sense requires that the object be evident.”135 Furthermore, according to Scotus, theology in via cannot be a subalternate science, because there is simply no causal continuation or relation with the theology of the blessed. He accuses Aquinas of contradicting himself in the ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, when affirming 134. In responding to an objection by Aureol, who argued that the “infusion” of the divine light caused theology’s specific unity, Cajetan clarifies that the “light of revelation” is related to a science in two ways: first, as an efficient cause and, second, as a ratio or mode of knowing. These two ways concur in our theology, since its mode of knowing (formal object) is infused by the divine light. Nevertheless, it is the ratio or mode of knowing that confects the unity of a science, not the fact that it is infused through the efficient causality of the divine light; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. xiv; see appendix 2. 135. Scotus, Rep., III (II/2), d. 24, q. un., n. 59.

A Science and Wisdom   155 that faith and science cannot be about the same truths, while simultaneously maintaining that our theology in via is indeed a subalternate science through the mediating habit of faith.136 Scotus concludes that Aquinas tries to avoid the contradiction by claiming that our theology in patria cannot be together with faith, while our theology in via—the subalternate science of wayfarers—can coexist with faith. In his commentary on ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, Cajetan replies to Scotus by clarifying that in this particular question St. Thomas is speaking of science simpliciter. When Aquinas holds that perfect science cannot stand together with faith, he does not contradict himself for two reasons: first, faith and theology are not about the same truths, because faith is about the principles, while theology about the conclusions derived from those principles; second, theology in via is in an imperfect state.137 Theology in via’s imperfect status is because its conclusions cannot be resolved into principles that are evident per se.138 Furthermore, if the essence of faith is what is not seen (non visum) and the essence of perfect science is what is seen (visum), they obviously cannot coexist.139 Theology in via, however, as a subalternate science, lacks the condition of evidence. Hence it not only can coexist with faith but it also is dependent on the obscure light of faith as the mediating habit of its principles. In heaven, our theology will not only remain, but will be in a perfected state, on account of the evidence of its principles in the beatific vision; then, faith will cease to exist. The light of glory is the proper habit of the proximate principles of theology, the articles of faith, while the light of faith is merely a mediating habit of the principles per accidens.140 Finally, Cajetan includes Durandus’s argument against the diversity of theologies necessary for subalternation. Durandus held 136. See Scotus, Ord., III (III/2), d. 24, q. un., n. 21–24. 137. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, n. ii. 138. Cf. Aquinas, De trin., pars I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 5. 139. See Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, c. 140. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xii; see appendix 2.

156  The Habit of Theology that theological truths (theologalia—God is Triune, etc.) can never be known propter quid. Thus, as regards the theologalia, there can never be any type of subalternation, since the subalternating science must know the theological truths propter quid. Moreover, contingent propositions, such as “Christ became incarnate on account of (or propter quid) our salvation,” are known propter quid according to the same mode in both the theology in patria and the theology in via. Hence concerning contingent theological propositions, there is no subalternation of one science propter quid to another quia, since both are propter quid.141 Cajetan responds to Durandus’s argument by negating that the theological truths (theologalia) cannot be known propter quid. In the theology of the blessed, both the theological truths and contingent truths are known propter quid with evidence in the beatific vision; while wayfarers know both the theological truths and contingent truths merely quia, that is to say without evidence through the habit of faith.142 The corollary alluded to—within Cajetan’s commentary of article 2—is that sacred doctrine as a subalternate science “believes in” its principles, which have been revealed by God.143 Within the essential condition for subalternation—that the conclusions of a subalternate science are known in a mediated manner from and in principles received through a mediating habit—Cajetan notes that two things concur: (1) a lack of evidence in se, since evidence is in and through another habit, namely the habit of the understanding (intellectus); (2) the mediation of the proximate principles, which is the cause of the lack of evidence in se. The first of these, however, is formal; the second, material. As was noted, on this side of heaven, the proximate principles of theology, the articles of faith, are mediated in a mode without evidence through the habit of faith.144 This 141. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vii; see appendix 2. Cf. Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:7b–8a. 142. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xiii; see appendix 2. Cf. Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:15b. 143. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iv and v; see appendix 2. 144. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2.

A Science and Wisdom   157 is the essence of Aquinas’s doctrine on subalternation as presented in Super Boetium de Trinitate: Understanding (intellectus) is the principle of every science; it is always primary, but it is not always the proximate principle. Sometimes the proximate principle of a science is belief (fides), as is clear in the subalternate sciences. For the proximate principle of [a subalternate science’s] conclusions proceeds from belief in truths known in a higher science, which has those truths with certainty through understanding (intellectus).145

Just as the supernatural habit of faith seeds eternal life, similarly our theology in via initiates our theology in patria.146

Arguments against Theology as a Science In the concluding section of his commentary of ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, Cajetan responds to a series of objections—taken from Capreolus’s Defensiones—concerning theology’s fulfilment of the Aristotelian conditions for scientific knowledge.147 The first objection concerns the object of sacred doctrine as a science. Cajetan restates Peter Aureol’s argument: “Science is about necessary things; however, [sacred doctrine] is about contingent things, for example, the Incarnation, predestination, glorification, etc.”148 Cajetan responds: “The Incarnation and other realities of this kind are in themselves contingent; however, as they fall within this science, they are necessary; for whatsoever is known by God is necessary, as will be shown in [ST, I], q. 14, a. 13.”149 In ST, I, q. 14, a. 13, Aquinas states that God knows 145. Aquinas, De trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad 7. 146. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xii; see appendix 2. Basing himself on Aquinas’s De ver., q. 14, a. 10, Capreolus expresses the same thought; see Defensiones, 1:12a. 147. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vi; see appendix 2. In his response to these objections, Cajetan also includes Scotus’s doctrine (cf. Scotus, Reportata parisiensia, prol. q. 1 n. 4, in Opera Omnia, vol. 22 [Paris: Ludovicum Vivès, 1891], 8ab), which is based on the Aristotelian conditions of science; cf. O’Connor, “The Scientific Character of Theology according to Scotus,” 4n3. 148. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vi; see appendix 2. Cf. Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:7b. 149. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xii; see appendix 2.

158  The Habit of Theology all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself . . . because his glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality.150

Therefore, insofar as a thing is now in act—and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present—neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge.151

According to Cajetan, if humans did not participate in God’s knowledge through the divine light of revelation, our theology in via simply would not be within the latitude of a science, since it would not possess contingent truths as the object of certain knowledge. God—as the first cause—is neither a necessary cause simpliciter, nor a contingent cause, but rather a superior cause. He is a free cause (causa libera) within a more excellent genus and more eminent mode of causality. The divine will is—as Cajetan expounds—“a cause so effective, that its command causes both the necessary and contingent.”152 Thus, revealed truths, on account of their relation to God’s knowledge of them, are necessary. Cajetan gives the example of Socrates’s movement, which—in itself—is simply contingent. Nonetheless, Socrates’s movement can be known with necessity and certainty by an intellect to which it is present.153 As Aquinas maintains, God—in his eternity—knows all things in their presentiality. Obviously, revelation does not reveal every single contingent reality; rather only certain contingent truths (the acta et passa Christi, etc.) are revealed—as necessary and certain—to those created intellects that supernaturally participate in the divine light of revelation. Hence, in the supernatural order of grace, being an intellectual creature ordered to God as to an end unknown by 150. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 14, a. 13, c. 151. Ibid. 152. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 14, a. 13, n. xxiv; this is Cajetan’s response to the moderni (Scotus, Ockham, etc.), who place contingency within God’s will. 153. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 14, a. 13, n. xxvii.

A Science and Wisdom   159 natural reason belongs necessarily to humans, when considered by the theologian.154 Revelation is the noetic foundation for Cajetan’s theological anthropology. Revelation—an act (including singular, contingent things or events) by which God reveals his own knowledge—is the cause and scientific foundation of our theology both in via and in patria. Science, in the Aristotelian sense of the term, is about necessary things.155 Thus, for Cajetan, revelation grounds the necessity of the object of sacred doctrine in God’s knowledge.156 As was established above, the object of sacred doctrine—including our theology as a science—is God’s knowledge revealed (cognitio Dei revelata). By contrast, Scotus—in his conception of theology in via—abandons the necessity of the object for the necessity of the proposition. According to Scotus, one part of theology concerns necessary truths (the Trinity, etc.) and another concerns contingent truths (Incarnation, etc.).157 Thus, theology in via for Scotus is not a science in the strict sense, because the wayfarer’s knowledge of theological contingents lacks necessity—that is to say, there is no evidence. Nevertheless, it is a type of science, or rather a wisdom, inasmuch as it remains opposed to both faith and opinion.158 Theology’s function is to interpret, explain, and defend its revealed principles, either by explicating Scripture with Scripture or by expounding Scripture by mixing with the other sciences.159 In Scotus’s understanding, theology in via is completely independent from the 154. Cajetan maintains that humans have a “remote” proportion or “natural” capacity secundum quid for justification within the present supernatural order of grace; see In ST, I-II, q. 113, a. 10, n. v. 155. See Aquinas, In I Post. anal., lect. 13, n. 1. 156. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 14, a. 13, n. xxvii. 157. For Scotus every theology (God’s, the blessed’s and the wayfarer’s) is divided into two parts: necessary truths and contingent truths, see Scotus, Ord., I (III/1), prol., pars secunda, q. un, nn. 150–53. Cf. Boulnois, Duns Scoto: Il rigore della carità, 95–108. 158. As was already set forth, Scotus criticizes the Thomistic position that faith and science concerning the same subject cannot coexist simultaneously in the same person, because Aquinas does seems to allow for an exception to the rule, namely, that faith and theology in via (with the ratio of a science) can coexist, because our theology in via is an imperfect, subalternate science; cf. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, n. ii. 159. See O’Connor, “The Scientific Character of Theology,” 35.

160  The Habit of Theology theology of the blessed. The metaphysical concept of infinite being is substituted for its primary subject, the Deity, transforming the object of faith (revealed in naturally knowable terms) into the object of a theological science, wherein logical deductions are made naturally by human reason according to the model and structure of metaphysics. In this sense, Scotus is more of an exaggerated logician, who personifies the frustration of the human mind unable to get behind the articles of faith and grasp the proper nature of the “ens infinitum” which alone can provide the ultimate reason for the doctrines of theology.160

The nominalist William of Ockham—reducing the notion of the universal to a mere property of concepts (without any foundation in reality)—takes Scotus’s position even further and makes propositions the object of science.161 For Ockham, the object of a science is the conclusion; while the subject is the subject-term in the conclusion. Thus, according to Ockham, theology is simply not a science, since the quiddity of God cannot be known intuitively. In Scotus’s theology in via, human reason does not require an elevation or illumination in order to function proportionately within revelation, since revelation is structured according to man’s natural mode of knowing. Similarly, in Ockham’s theology in via, human reason is confined to the sphere of concepts, unable to resolve into the reality or subject—the Deity—but merely into a nominal representation (quid nominis).162 According to Cajetan, human reason 160. O’Connor, “The Scientific Character of Theology according to Scotus,” 46. 161. See Maurer, “Ockham’s Conception of the Unity of Science,” 99. 162. “From the distinction between the acts [proper to faith and those proper to theology] it cannot be proved that theology is a science. For every [properly theological] act that a believer has can be had by a non-believer who is trained in theology. After all, such a non-believer could defend and confirm the faith, persuade believers and non-believers, and reply to the arguments of heretics and non-believers in just the way that any believer could. And yet it is obvious that such a non-believer would not have scientia properly speaking. Therefore, from such acts it cannot be proved that theology is a science properly speaking” (William of Ockham, Ordinatio I, prologue, q. 7, Opera Theologica, 1, p. 190, lines 16–22, translation cited from Alfred J. Freddoso, “Ockham on Faith and Reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. Paul V. Spade [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 326–49, https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/papers/f&rcam.htm).

A Science and Wisdom   161 is elevated by a participation in the divine light of revelation and functions as an instrumental cause. Under the influence of PseudoDionysius and Aquinas, Cajetan understood that sacred doctrine as a science “does not remain within the purely natural, but rather our nature is perfected by the grace of divine illumination.”163 In Cajetan’s understanding, every science—in the Aristotelian sense—has a subject (material object) and a corresponding formal object, which together constitute a science’s one object. The subject of a science is the reality or entity (the res), which is the terminus of the intellective act of the scientific knowledge. In theology, the subject is not something common to a plurality of things (as ens commune in metaphysics), but rather a singular quiddity—the Deity, the most simple and immaterial of all possible subjects. The formal object is the aspect under which (sub qua) the subject is considered. In our theology (taken in an absolute sense), the Deity is considered under the aspect of divine revelation. It is precisely through a participation in the divine light that the theologian’s scientific knowledge finds its terminus in the Deity and not merely in the propositions. Within the imprint of divine knowledge (impressio divinae scientiae) communicated in the divine light of revelation—albeit without vision or evidence in via—the necessity required for theology to be a science finds its foundation in God’s own knowledge.164 The second objection concerns the principles of sacred doctrine as a science.165 Cajetan summarizes the argument: science is from principles known per se; thus, the habit of the principles is superior to the habit of the conclusions. This argument implies that if the principles are known merely through faith, then the conclusions cannot be known scientifically. Capreolus summarizes Peter Aureol’s same objection: 163. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 180, a. 6, n. iv. For Aquinas’s description of the human mind’s union with the divine mind, which begins through faith and ends in vision, see De div. nom., c. 7, lect. 4. 164. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. iii. 165. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vi; see appendix 2.

162  The Habit of Theology The habit of the principles is higher and nobler than the habit of the conclusions . . . for knowledge of the principles causes the knowledge of the conclusion. However, the certainty of something known through belief is not higher than scientific knowledge; it is an inferior grade of knowledge to believe rather than to know. . . . Therefore, it is impossible that a scientific conclusion can be known through a scientific habit—even [though it be] a subalternate science—from principles that are merely believed in, that is to say they are held by the habit of faith.166

Cajetan’s response to this second objection is based on the continuity between our theology in via and in patria: this science is from [principles] per se notis, that is to say from evident truths [known by the blessed and] mediated [through faith]; this suffices according to I Topics [in Aristotle’s Organon]: demonstration is composed of propositions per se notis or of statements made credible on account of these [propositions per se notis].167 The habit of the principles per se is higher than this science, whose habit of the principles—namely faith—is per accidens; faith is a higher knowledge with respect to its adherence [to the principles],168 although not with respect to evidence [of the principles].169

Cajetan refers to those early Thomists, like Hervaeus Natalis, who maintained that our theology in via is a subalternate science merely secundum quid, because the absence of evident principles deprives theology of its scientific character.170 A similar position was held by Gregory of Rimini, who maintained that our theology in via is not a science, but merely a believing habit that precluded speculation and whose sole purpose was the glorification of God.171 166. Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:5b. 167. In his commentary on Aristotle, Aquinas highlights that demonstration must necessarily proceed from principles that are immediate either straightway or through middle terms; see In I Post. anal., lect. 4, n. 14. 168. For the precedence of the habit of faith over the other intellectual habits in via on the part of the object, the potency, and the habit, see Aquinas, De ver., q. 14, a. 2, ad 3. 169. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xii; see appendix 2. 170. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. viii; see appendix 2. 171. See Gordon Leff, “Gregory of Rimini: A Fourteenth-Century Augustian,” Revue des études Augustiniennes 7 (1961), 169. Cf. Gordon Leff, Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth Century Thought (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1961), esp. chapter 6 on “The Status of Theology.” Capreolus, in his Defensiones, had a particular preoccupation with Gregory of Rimini, which obviously trickled down to Cajetan.

A Science and Wisdom   163 As was shown above, for Scotus, the lack of evidence disqualified theology in via as a true science; however, he classified it as a type of wisdom, which enjoyed a certainty similarity to faith. According to Cajetan, theology in via is indeed a subalternate science whose principles are mediated through the habit of faith, which is essentially a certain knowledge of things not seen. This inherent lack of evidence—essential to faith—renders theology in via to be imperfect; nonetheless, it remains well within the latitude of the concept of science. In article 2, Aquinas does not prove that sacred doctrine is a science, but rather that it is a subalternate science. As Cajetan notes, the qualification of subalternate science includes the notion that it is a science in an imperfect state.172 The third objection concerns the aspect of certainty within sacred doctrine as a science.173 Some have claimed that a theologian’s knowledge is based on the mere supposition that the articles of the faith are true. Peter Aureol stated that sacred doctrine is a science of mere logical consequences or inferences and not necessary demonstrative conclusions. Cajetan responds that the theologian knows not mere logical consequences or inferences, but rather he knows subalternately, which is not knowledge by dialectical demonstration, but demonstration from evident principles that are known in a higher science. Thus, as Cajetan teaches, such knowledge is indeed imperfect but is in continuity with a higher and more perfect science. If sacred doctrine as a science is not in continuation with the subalternating, it is not an intellectual virtue. If it is in continuity, through subalternation, with the subalternating science, however, it is the beginning of an intellectual virtue and, therefore, tends to the same species of virtue, namely perfect science. This is the essence of Aquinas’s doctrine in De veritate: This must be kept in mind when considering the relation between Cajetan and Luther, since Luther was formed in the via Gregorii; cf. Heiko A. Oberman, “Headwaters of the Reformation: Initia Lutheri—Initia Reformationis,” in Luther and the Dawn of the Modern Era: Papers for the Fourth International Congress for Luther Research, ed. Heiko A. Oberman (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 87–88. 172. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. ix; see appendix 2. 173. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vi; see appendix 2.

164  The Habit of Theology One who has a subalternate science does not perfectly possess the character of knowing unless his knowledge is united in some way with the knowledge of one who has the subalternating science. Nonetheless, the one who knows on the lower level is not said to have scientific knowledge about those things which he presupposes, but about the necessary conclusions which are drawn from the presupposed principles. In this sense, also, one who believes can be said to have scientific knowledge about those things which he concludes from the articles of faith.174

The fourth objection concerns the mode of sacred doctrine as a science.175 Because our theology in via uses a discursive mode of reasoning, Scotus held, premises that are believed in—taken from sacred Scripture or the articles of faith—yield conclusions that are also believed in, but not demonstrated. Thus, not a theological habit of science, but rather a habit of wisdom is generated by the theological syllogism. As a wisdom, it is distinct from both faith and science, yet is more certain than opinion, resembling more an intellection of the principles, than a science of conclusions.176 Moreover, according to Scotus, discursive or syllogistic reasoning is simply not a condition for theology in se or God’s theology. Nevertheless, discursive or syllogistic reasoning is a condition of our theology in patria, as an atemporal, simultaneous intellection of both the principles and conclusions.177 Similar to Scotus’s doctrine, according to Cajetan God’s theology has none of the imperfections of our theology, such as discursive reasoning.178 In contrast to what Scotus teaches, however, for Cajetan the perfect state of theology in the blessed is also without discursive reasoning,179 while the imperfect state of theology 174. Aquinas, De ver., q. 14, a. 9, ad 3. English translation by James V. McGlynn (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/QDdeVer14.htm. 175. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vi; see appendix 2. 176. See Scotus, Rep., III (II/2), d. 24, q. u., n. 17. Cf. Boulnois, Duns Scoto: Il rigore della carità, 110. 177. According to Scotus, the theology of the blessed fulfils all four of the Aristotelian conditions of science: certainty, evidence, necessity, and discursive reasoning; cf. Bychkov, “The Nature of Theology in Duns Scotus and his Franciscan Predecessors,” 39. 178. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xi; see appendix 2. 179. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, nn. xi and xiii; see appendix 2.

A Science and Wisdom   165 in wayfarers necessarily depends on discursive reasoning. 180 As was shown above, demonstration is what is continued between the subalternate and subalternating theologies and not the discursive mode of our theology in via.181 The blessed know and see the theological conclusions in the principles without the use of discursive reasoning, while theologians in via deduce theological conclusions from the principles through syllogistic reasoning.182 Nevertheless, the demonstrations and conclusions remain the same. According to Scotus, faith equally assents to all revealed truths without distinguishing whether one truth flows from another.183 For Cajetan, by contrast, the formal distinction between the articles of faith and the conclusions of theology is grounded within the structure of faith’s material object, which requires two levels of assent or explication: one, which is primary and explicit, regarding the articles of faith; and the other, which is secondary and implicit, regarding what is virtually contained in the articles of faith, the principles. Thus, Cajetan affirms: 180. In the beatific vision our minds will simply be “in act.” Part of the imperfection of theology in via is discursive reasoning’s movement toward the conclusion; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2. 181. “Demonstratio enim est quae continuat; non curando modo actu vel potentia” (Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii). According to Cajetan discursive reasoning is not an essential condition of our theology as a science; demonstration, however, is. In heaven, the blessed will know and see immediately—non curando modo actu vel potentia—the conclusions from and in the principles. As Cajetan states, science knows the conclusions, faith concerns the principles. Hence it is demonstration of the conclusions (per modum cognitionis) and not discursive reasoning per se that distinguishes our theology as a science from faith and the beatific vision. The same is true for angels, who can know demonstrations (demonstrative syllogisms) without discursive reasoning; see Aquinas ST, I, q. 58, a. 4, c. and ST, I, q. 58, a. 3, ad 2. This point is important because many Thomists wrongly place discursive reasoning in the definition of theology. How do these Thomists explain the continuity between our theology in via, which has its principles through the mediation of faith, and theological demonstration through the medium of the syllogism—and our theology in patria, which knows and sees immediately—non curando modo actu vel potentia— the demonstration of the conclusions from and in its principles per se nota? Franciscus P. Muñiz is one such example within Thomism, who considers discursive reasoning as something formal in the definition of theology; see “De diversis muneribus S. Theologiae secundum doctrinam D. Thomae,” Angelicum 24 , no. 2/3 (1947): 111, 113. 182. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2. 183. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vi; see appendix 2.

166  The Habit of Theology in sacred Scripture [whose formal cause is prophecy] demonstrations are transmitted virtually; and another habit [theology] is generated from the faith [the habit of the principles], by the deduction of conclusions from the articles of the faith. Neither is it true that we assent to all things equally or in the same mode. We assent to the articles not on account of another; we assent to the conclusions—about which alone is this science, however, on account of the articles. Since it is said [by some] that we equally assent to the demonstrations and the propositions, we respond: if all things are simply proposed for belief, our theology in se indeed would be a science, since its conclusions secundum se would be deduced from the articles of the faith; with respect to us, however, it would not be a science, but rather faith; furthermore, we would assent to all things not only equally, but also in the same mode. It is true that the articles are proposed to us simply for belief; other [truths], however, are deduced from the articles; thus, we do not assent to the principles and the conclusions in the same mode; nor do we equally assent to those conclusions that are proved and [those] that are not proved. On this account, concerning those not proved, diverse opinions are tolerated in sacred doctrine. . . . Finally . . . we do not hold that faith and science concern the same things simultaneously, because faith concerns the articles, while science concerns the conclusions.184

In conclusion, the doctrine of subalternation is the hermeneutic for explicating the relation between faith and several of the other modes of sacred doctrine such as these:185 the relation between faith and theology, which extends to theological demonstration (modus disputativus),186 biblical exegesis (modus iudicativus), and preaching (which employs the modus narrativus, admonitorius, exhortatorius et praeceptivus);187 the relation between faith, theology, and prayer (modus deprecativus vel laudativus);188 and the relation 184. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xii; see appendix 2. 185. In the Prooemium to his commentary on the Psalms, Aquinas mentions some of the various modes of sacred doctrine contained in sacred Scripture, see Super Ps, Prooemium. 186. According to Aquinas, St. Paul syllogizes in his epistles; cf. Super Gal., cap. 3, lect. 4, and Super Rom., cap. 8, lect. 1. 187. Peter the Chanter (†1197) provides a good description of the medieval lectio and its link to the disputatio and praedicatio; see Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), 208. 188. In his fifth chapter, entitled, “La teologia come preghiera alla scuola di San Tommaso,” Jean Leclercq observes that prayer is the link between science and faith in theology. It

A Science and Wisdom   167 between faith and enculturation (modus communicationis idiomatum Christi).189 Cajetan’s explication of Aquinas’s use of the Aristotelian concept of subalternation in theology highlights faith’s superior and architectonic role. In Scotus’s conception of our theology in via, however, human reason—rather than being an instrumental or secondary efficient cause—is an independent and proportionate efficient cause that mixes with faith both in scriptural exegesis and when reasoning from the articles of faith (the dialectical syllogism). By diminishing the primary role of the divine light as the unique universal efficient cause within our theology in via, Scotus unwittingly becomes a precursor of modern, rationalistic theology. Herein lies the foundation for the radical separation between faith and reason within the supernatural order; for if—in our theology— human reason is not understood as an instrumental or secondary efficient cause, either it is taken as an independent and proportionate efficient cause (rationalism), or its relevance is completely negated in relation to the faith (fideism).190 Denying the doctrine of subalternation in theology—which implies the instrumental and subordinate role of human reason—ultimately leads to a rupture in the hierarchical relation between faith and reason.191 is the preliminary and habitual religious state of soul in the theologian; see Leclercq, Il pensiero che contempla, (Abbazia di S. Benedetto, Seregno: Jaca Book, 2013), 125–26. 189. Grace does not destroy nature; it perfects nature. Thus, grace transforms the individual, including his own culture, into the Body of Christ. Borrowing a concept from the Council of Ephesus, namely the communicatio idiomatum (in Christ divine and human attributes are predicated of one and the same subject, that is to say there is a perfect exchange of properties, an communicatio idiomatum, in such a way that the human nature physically belongs to the Word), Cajetan held that, in an analogical manner, there is a communicatio idiomatum of Christ with each and every member of the Mystical Body; cf. Anton Bodem, “Die ekklesiologische Idiomenkommunikation,” in Das Wesen der Kirche nach Kardinal Cajetan, Trierer Theologische Studien, Band 25 (Trier: Paulinus - Verlag, 1971), 132–35. The communicatio idiomatum of Christ with his Mystical Body forms the ontological basis for Cajetan’s literal interpretation of Psalms as speaking of Christ and his Church and for Cajetan’s doctrine on indulgences; cf. In ST, III et Suppl, De thesauro indulgentiarum, q. 3, n. ii, 361a. 190. For the resurgence of fideism, see John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Fides et ratio (September 14, 1998), n. 52; for the latent fideism “in the scant consideration accorded to speculative theology;” see ibid., n. 55; and for the lure of rationalism, see ibid., nn. 54–55. 191. Aquinas clearly assigns to human reason the role of an instrumental cause within the supernatural order of grace; see De trin., pars 1, pr. 2.

168  The Habit of Theology

Theology Is a Single Science (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3) Most probably under the influence of the Arabic philosopher Avicenna, Aquinas discerned the division of the speculative sciences in the natural order (physics, mathematics, and metaphysics) not according to an ontological principle, but rather according to an epistemological principle—the formal object (ratio formalis obiecti).192 In the speculative sciences of the natural order, the intellectual operations of total abstraction, formal abstraction, and separation are the diverse mental acts that render accessible their speculative objects through various instances of removal from matter and motion, and, in this manner, they determine the diversity of the speculative sciences.193 According to this particular doctrine, there is a distinction within the one, simple object of any speculative habit: first, taken from the part of the object known, it is the material object (the id quod), also referred to as the subject of a science, in which the cognitive act terminates; second, taken from the part of the knowing subject, it is the formal object, or that by which (id quo) the object is known, and which constitutes the formal cause of the division of the sciences. These are two inseparable elements of the one object that engages the intellect. A variety in terms is employed by Thomists regarding these two elements of the one simple object.194 192. See Aquinas, In VI Metaph, lect. 1, n. 1165. Cf. also Aquinas, Sentencia libri De anima (hereafter De anima), III, 10, n. 433, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; In II Metaph., lect. 1, n. 993 b 20; In I Post. anal., lect., 41, n. 11; and De. trin., q. 5, a. 1, c. 193. The distinction of formal objects is in the difference between intellectual acts; Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de anima, a. 13, c. in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa. Cf. De. trin., q. 5, a. 3, c. The difference between philosophical theology and “our theology” is that in the latter, the Deity, who can in no way exist in union with matter and motion (and thus has no need of an intellective act of separation), is the subject of our theology in the created intellect by means of revelation; while the subject of philosophical theology, ens commune, which sometimes is found in matter and motion, is separated from matter and motion by the intellective judgment of separation; cf. De trin., q. 5, a. 4, c. 194. For the material object: in Aquinas, obiectum materialis or id quod; in Cajetan, ratio formalis obiecti ut res or ratio formalis ut quae; in Natalis, formalitas obiecti ex parte ipsius rei cognite; in Prierias, formalis ratio subiecti ut res. For the formal object: in Aquinas, obiectum formalis, id quo, or id per quod; in Cajetan,

A Science and Wisdom   169 Like Aquinas, the Renaissance Thomists maintained the symmetry between the natural and supernatural orders, which are neither identical nor mutually exclusive, but rather the natural order is subsumed into the order of grace, inasmuch as grace presupposes nature. Thus, the division of the speculative sciences or types of knowledge in the order of grace is likewise determined by an epistemological principle, namely the formal object (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum).195 As was shown above, Prierias equates the simple object of theology with both the material and formal object of faith, concluding that they are essentially one and the same habit, only accidentally distinct according to diverse complex objects (obiecta complexa) within the one simple object (obiectum simplex).196 One must be careful in understanding that when Prierias speaks of the simple object, he means both the formal and the material objects taken as one.197 Hence both faith and theological science—according to him—have not only the same material object or subject, namely the Deity,198 but also the same formal object or mode of knowability, that is to say, by means of revelation.199 Within the mode of knowability through revelation, however, faith extends to both the principles and the conclusions of theology.200 Thus, on account of the heightened unity of the simple object, there is merely an accidental distinction between faith and theology. In contrast, Hervaeus Natalis held that the habits of faith and theology are really, and not merely accidentally, distinct. According to him, faith and theology have the same material object or subject. In his work Opinio de difficultatibus contra doctrinam fratris Thome, he writes eleven detailed articles discussing the subject of ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum or ratio formalis sub qua; in Natalis, formalitas obiecti ex parte modi quo; in Prierias, formalis ratio obiecti ut obiectum id quo. 195. Cajetan’s usage of the expression ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum is based on Aquinas’s De trin., pars III, q. 5, a. 1, c. 196. See Prierias, Conflatum, fol. 9r. 197. Ibid., fol. 12rv. 198. Ibid., fol. 13rv. 199. Ibid., fol. 11r. 200. Ibid., fol. 10v–11r.

170  The Habit of Theology theology. He affirms that God is indeed the subject of theology, namely, that into which all things are resolved. He adds, however, that the resolution into the subject is according to diverse modes of knowability.201 The particular mode of knowability of theology’s formal object is that which distinguishes it from the other supernatural speculative sciences, while the divine light of revelation is the universal efficient cause of all the diverse species of knowledge within the supernatural order.202 Thus he also affirms that while theology and the beatific vision have the same subject (the Deity), they differ according to their particular modes of knowability.203 Likewise theology is really distinct from faith, although they both have the same subject (the Deity) and are both known through the divine light of revelation, the universal efficient cause.204 In summary, Natalis differs from Prierias in that for him the particular mode of knowability, the formal object, constitutes an essential and not merely an accidental difference between theology and faith.205 Capreolus provides a tripartite division of the formal object (ratio formalis objecti) for all sciences in general. The first meaning of the formal object (ratio formalis objecti) is the mode of knowing on the part of the knowing subject. It is not the definition, nor the quiddity, nor a concept, but rather the mode of knowing (the ratio cognoscendi). The second meaning is the quiddity of the reality itself (ut res), which is first and per se in the object, just as color is in the visible object. The third meaning is the definition, not as the quiddity of the reality itself (non ut res est), but rather as the speculative object (ut est objectium, vel scibile, or cognoscibile). In this last sense, the formal object (or ratio formalis objecti ut obiectum) is the conceptual content—the speculative object (objectum specu201. Natalis, “La Opinio,” 62. 202. Hervaeus sets out the principle that just as in the natural order the agent intellect is the universal efficient cause of all the natural sciences, so in the order of grace the divine light of revelation is the universal cause of all the sciences. It is the formal object, the mode of knowability, that distinguishes the sciences in both orders; cf. Natalis, “La Opinio,” 59. 203. Ibid., 68. 204. Ibid., 82–83. 205. Ibid., 74.

A Science and Wisdom   171 labile), the esse obiective or the universal in praedicando in the natural sciences, which is grasped through the causality of the mode of knowing or ratio cognoscendi (the first meaning) and predicated to those entities or realities that instantiate it (the second meaning), the material object (ut res).206 When addressing the question of theology’s subject in his Defensiones, Capreolus sets forth the same threefold division of the formal object (ratio formalis objecti) as regards theology: (1) the material object known (ratio cognita) is the Deity (the ratio Dei), the essence (or quod quid est) of the divine being; (2) the mode of knowning (the ratio cognoscendi) is the divine light of revelation; and (3) the formal object (ratio formalis objecti) through which theological knowledge occurs, namely the speculative object (obiectum speculabile), also referred to as the revelabile, is the condition of supernaturally participating in the revealed knowledge of God, the imprint of divine knowledge (impressio divinae scientiae).207 The diversity of formal objects as the epistemic criterion for the division of the sciences is key to the Cajetanian understanding of the specific unity of theology as one habit, which is the essence of article 3.208 He adopts a bipartite division: (1) the quiddity of the thing itself (quidditativam sibi ut res est), which is equivalent to Capreolus’s ratio cognita or the Deity as the material object or subject; and (2) the quiddity itself under the aspect of the speculative object (quidditativam autem sibi ut est sub genere scibilis), which embraces both the speculative object (obiectum speculabile or ratio fomalis obiecti ut obiectum) and the mode of knowing (the ratio cognoscendi).209 Moreover, developing Aquinas’s application of the Aristotelian principle—that the unity of a potency or habit is to be considered according to its object, not materially, but rather according to the formal object210—Cajetan concludes that the habit of 206. See Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:47b. 207. See Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:49a. 208. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. i; see appendix 2. 209. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. v; see appendix 2. 210. “The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not, indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object. For example,

172  The Habit of Theology theology is one according to its mode of knowing (ratio cognoscendi) through the medium or illumination of divine revelation, which attains to its theological-speculative object (scibile theologicum), the divinely revealed (divinitus revelabilia).211 Since the material object (ratio formalis obiecti ut res) or the subject will not be treated until article 7, and since article 1 treated sacred doctrine as the whole genus of revealed knowledge, and article 2 established that within this genus of revealed knowledge there is a specific species of knowledge that is a subalternate science,212 therefore, article 3 commences with the divine light of revelation as the medium (sub qua) that determines the specific unity of the habit of theology in its speculative or formal object (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum), and which resolves into its subject or material object, the Deity.213 Cajetan defends Aquinas against the accusation of equivocating in the corpus of article 3.214 St. Thomas illustrates the antecedent of his argument—the unity of a potency or habit is to be considered according to its object, not materially, but according to the formal aspect or ratio of the object—with the example of sight or vision, stated, however, in terms of the material object, namely that man, ass, stone come together in the one formal aspect (ratio) of being colored—the object of vision.215 The visible per se is vision’s single object: color is the material aspect of the visible, while light is the formal aspect, that is to say, that which renders color visible.216 Hence Cajetan negates the accusation of equivocation: first, because the consequent—sacred doctrine is one science—is clearly stated in terms of the formal object (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum), namely all things that are divinely revealed are communicatman, ass, stone agree in the one precise formality of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight” (Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, c.). 211. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. iv; see appendix 2. Cf. In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. v and n. vii; see appendix 2. 212. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. viii; see appendix 2. 213. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. vii; see appendix 2. 214. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. vi; see appendix 2. 215. See Aquinas, ST I, q. 1, a. 3, c. 216. See Aquinas, De malo, q. 2, a. 2, ad. 11; and Sentencia libri De sensu et sensato, lect. 6, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa.

A Science and Wisdom   173 ed in the one formal object of this science; second, because the example of vision employed in the proof of the antecedent—the unity of a potency or habit is according to the formal object—is based on the presupposition that the material object is both better known and convertible with the formal object.217 Regarding this latter proposition—that the material object (ratio formalis obiecti ut res) and the formal object (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum) are convertible—Cajetan holds that it is a true when understood that the speculative ratio of the formal object is an equivalence (adequatio) to the ratio or quiddity of the reality itself. For if there is no equivalence between the ratio of the formal object (ut obiectum) and the thing or reality (ut res), then there is no convertibility.218 Cajetan observes that as regards the Deity, the material object (ratio formalis obiecti ut res), there corresponds only one adequate formal object (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum), namely, the divine light. The divine light, however, is not a species, but rather a genus, encompassing the divine light as evident (evidens), the divine light as revealing (as revelans, abstracting from evidence and nonevidence), and the divine light as not evident (inevidens). Consequently, the divine light as evident is the formal object of the beatific vision; the divine light as revealing (abstracting from evidence and non-evidence) is the formal object of our theology; and the divine light as not evident is the formal object of faith. All three of these species of supernatural knowledge in humans, differentiated by the specific difference in their formal objects (rationes formales obiecti ut obiectum), have the same material object (ratio formalis obiecti ut res)—the Deity. Thus the Deity is only adequately convertible with the divine light in se, the theologia Dei; it is not adequately convertible with these other various species of super­ natural knowledge, species which result from the defectiveness of the created intellect participating in the divine light.219 217. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. vii; see appendix 2. 218. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. ix; see appendix 2. 219. Ibid.

174  The Habit of Theology This also explains why within sacred doctrine, as a genus of revealed knowledge about God, there are various species of knowledge. The various intellective habits (beatific vision, prophecy, faith, theology) in the supernatural order are determined not by their unity in the Deity as the material object, nor by the universal efficient causality of the divine light of revelation (as highlighted by St. Albert the Great and Peter Aureol),220 but by their own specific formal object (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum).221 As previously noted, Cajetan establishes that ST, I, q. 1, aa. 2–7, is about the unique intellectual virtue of theology, a habit acquired through demonstration from the articles of faith. Moreover, our theology in via is an imperfect science, proceeding from principles which are certain, although non-evident, but to which faith has assented, and which are thus received subalternately from the theology of the blessed, who have evidence of the Deity in the beatific vision. Hence theology is distinct from faith on account of its mode of knowing. Faith believes in the Deity through assent and without evidence, while theology in via knows truths and conclusions concerning the Deity through an acquired judgment, that is to say, by the instrumental causality of human reason under the specific aspect of the first and supreme foundation of divine causality (art. 6) as revealed in the divine light (the universal efficient cause, abstracting from both clarity and obscurity). Moreover, theology is not identical to the beatific vision; the latter is knowledge of the Deity through the light of glory, which deifies man (theosis) by augmenting his intellectual powers so that the intellectual species is God’s quiddity, the Deity as seen immediately with evidence and complete certainty. In addition, according to Aquinas, there is a hierarchical order among the diverse forms of knowledge of the Deity, an order that is determined primarily by the level of certainty achieved by their 220. Cajetan presents their objections In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. xiii, and responds In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. xv; see appendix 2. 221. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. xiv; see appendix 2.

A Science and Wisdom   175 particular acts of judgment (iudicium de acceptis), and secondarily by their reception of the material content (acceptio cognitiorum).222 Within the genus of revelation, theology’s acquired judgment by way of knowledge (with human reason as an instrumental cause) is the least certain, even though it is set in motion by the efficient causality of the divine light of revelation and its principles (the articles of faith), which are certain in themselves, but received in man through the mediation of faith, that is to say, without evidence. Faith’s cognitive act is a more certain nondiscursive assent of the intellect illumined by the divine light of revelation and moved by the will through grace to something not evident in se. Faith receives its material object through the mediation of prophecy (Christ, apostolic Tradition, and Scripture).223 The cognitive gifts of the Holy Spirit, while dependent on faith for their material object, judge with certainty by divine inclination.224 Prophecy receives its knowledge through sensible forms, imaginary forms, and even by the direct impression of intelligible species, but judges by an immediate impression of divine light on the human mind.225 The beatific vision has the highest degree of certainty possible for created intellects: because it is elevated by a participation in the divine light of glory, the created intellect sees (videre) and knows (intelligere) the divine essence without mediation.226 Finally, there is God’s wholly comprehensive knowledge of himself, the theologia Dei, which is the foundation for all the other diverse forms of knowledge of the Deity. Thus it is clear why theology is entirely dependent on the assent of faith, the more certain judgments of prophecy (the apostles’ and prophets’ oral and written record of sacred Scripture), the vision of the blessed (especially Christ, Moses, and St. Paul), and, ultimately, the theologia Dei. In conclusion, the acquired habit of theology is generated by its initial act of helicoidal contemplation by means of the first theo222. Cf. Aquinas, De ver., q. 12, a. 7, c. 223. Cf. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 4, a. 8, c. and ad 3. 224. Cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 3. 225. Cf. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 173, a. 2, c. 226. Cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 12, a,. 2, c.

176  The Habit of Theology logical syllogism (art. 1). In article 3, the formal object of theology was determined to be the divine light as revealing (the ratio cognoscendi), which renders present its speculative or formal object (the ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum). In the following articles, 4 and 5, Cajetan will demonstrate that, on account of the higher order of this divine light, theology is eminently speculative and practical (article 4), and thus it is the most dignified of all human sciences (article 5). In article 6, however, theology’s unique and most special species of speculative object (una species specialissima scibilis) within the divine light of revelation will be determined, namely, the first and supreme foundation of divine causality, the formal object by which sacred doctrine as a theological science and wisdom judges and orders revealed truths about God according to the highest cause.

Theology Is Both Speculative and Practical (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4) In the middle of the twentieth century, there was some debate as to why St. Thomas—in his earliest works—held the speculative and practical intellects to be separate potencies.227 By the time he commenced the ST and onwards, however, he clearly maintained that the practical intellect is essentially an extension of the speculative intellect.228 This essential unity of the speculative and practical intellects forms the ontological foundation within the created intellect for Aquinas’s affirmation, in ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, that sacred doctrine is essentially one scientific habit, extending to both 227. For a brief history of this debate, see John E. Naus, The Nature of the Practical Intellect according to St. Thomas Aquinas (Rome: Libreria Editrice dell’Università Gregoriana, 1959), 17–34. Cf. G. Queneau, “Origine de la sentence Intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus et date du Commentaire du De anima de S. Albert le Grand,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 21 (1954), 307–12. 228. In the ST, Aquinas clearly states the unity of the practical and speculative intellects in terms of an extension; see ST, I-II, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1. Cf. ST, I, q. 79, a. 11. From early on, however, Aquinas maintains that their distinction is according to their proper ends. The speculative intellect is ordered solely to knowing truth, while the practical intellect is ordered toward action; cf. De trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 4; Sententia libri Politicorum I, n. 6, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; ST, I, q. 14, a. 16; In I De anima, lect. 1; In II Ethiç., lect 2.

A Science and Wisdom   177 speculative and practical knowledge according to a higher mode of knowing:229 Sacred doctrine—being one—extends to things that belong to different philosophical sciences, because what [the philosophical sciences] consider under diverse formal aspects, [sacred doctrine as one science] considers under one formal aspect; namely, insofar as they are known through the divine light. Hence although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless, sacred doctrine includes both, just as God, by one and the same science, knows both himself and his works. Furthermore, it is more speculative than practical, since it is principally concerned with divine things more than with human acts; although it does treat the latter, however, inasmuch as man is ordered by them to the perfect knowledge of God, in which consists beatitude.230

Cajetan notes that article 4 contains two conclusions: sacred doctrine as a higher science is neither purely practical nor purely speculative, but eminently and formally speculative and practical; however, in a certain sense, it is more speculative than practical.231 Before demonstrating these conclusions, Cajetan provides definitions of both speculative and practical knowledge based on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: the proper end of speculative knowledge is simply to know; the proper end of practical knowledge is to act, either through the will or the executive powers.232 He explains that the practical and speculative intellects are not diverse faculties, nor are they properties that arise from essential differences.233 Following Capreolus, Cajetan sets forth an example taken from Aquinas’s ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2. Just as the human senses are divided into the sensus communis (the common or unifying sense) and the 229. If the speculative and practical intellects were separate potencies, sacred doctrine as a science—within this hypothetical system—could not possibly exist as a single scientific habit, but rather two distinct habits would be required to perfect the speculative and practical intellects accordingly. Hence the essential unity of the speculative and practical intellects is the ontological foundation for a single habit of theology. The formal cause of theology’s being neither purely practical nor purely speculative is due rather to the nature of the divine light itself, which exists in a higher and more eminent mode. 230. Aquinas ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, c. 231. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. ii. Cf. In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. vi. 232. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. i. 233. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. iii.

178  The Habit of Theology proper senses (the five exterior senses), so too knowledge is first divided into infinite knowledge and finite knowledge; and, only subsequently, the latter (finite knowledge) is further divided into the speculative and the practical.234 The reason finite knowledge is divided into the speculative and the practical is that a finite formal object cannot simultaneously contain both the speculative and practical conditions of a science. Speculative sciences such as metaphysics, mathematics, astronomy, and the like, simply do not have action as their proper end. Likewise prudence, as a practical knowledge, is ordered to action as its proper end.235 In commenting on the ST, I, q. 14, a. 16, Cajetan states that besides these particular sciences or forms of knowledge that are purely speculative (speculativa tantum) or purely practical (practica tantum), there are sciences or forms of knowledge that are principally speculative or practical and only in a certain sense (secundum quid) practical or speculative.236 As Capreolus aptly notes, however, no finite science can be simultaneously principally practical and principally speculative according to its principal end; a finite science must essentially be one or the other.237 On the other hand, if the formal object of a science is infinite, then both the speculative and practical aspects are contained within it according to an eminently higher mode. Just as the diversity of sense knowledge coming in through the five external senses is known by the one internal sense—the sensus communis—within a higher order of knowledge, so also the speculative and practical, which are formally different, are known by this sacred science within a higher order of knowledge, wherein the one formal object eminently contains both the speculative and practical. Cajetan also develops this point in his commentary on the ST, I, 234. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. iii. From Aquinas, Capreolus takes up the comparison of the common sense (sensus communis) to the formal object of sacred doctrine as a science, which in a higher mode extends to both the speculative and practical; see Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:30a-b. Cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2. 235. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. iii. 236. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 14, a. 16, n. ii. 237. See Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:30b.

A Science and Wisdom   179 q. 14, a. 16, where Aquinas states that God’s knowledge of himself is purely speculative, while his knowledge of creation and salvation is both speculative and practical.238 Here Cajetan notes that God’s knowledge can be taken in two ways. In an absolute sense, his knowledge is one and simple, eminently containing within itself every perfection, including both the speculative and practical. In relation to what is known, as regards the divine essence, knowledge is only speculative; as regards the knowledge of things other than himself (such as creation and salvation), it is also practical. Hence the first conclusion of article 4 is that sacred doctrine, being one science of a higher order, extends to both the speculative and practical. Under one universal (communis) formal object, this sacred science extends to all things speculative and practical, inasmuch as they are divinely revealed. Being one and extending to both the speculative and practical, sacred doctrine as a science or wisdom is similar to the knowledge of God, who knows both himself and his works. Cajetan highlights that the proof of this argument lies in the fact that our theology is nothing other than a certain imprint of God’s knowledge. This impression of the divine knowledge is not a pure similitude, but rather an assimilation of a copy to its exemplar. The subject of this sacred science is the Deity, and the light under which it is known, the formal object, is a participation in the very light and intelligibility of the Godhead.239 On account of the elevated unity of the divine light, however, theology extends to both the speculative and the practical, as does God’s own knowledge.240 The second conclusion, contained in article 4, is that theology is more speculative than practical. The reason for this is twofold: first, sacred doctrine as a science principally concerns knowledge of the Deity; second, it treats human acts inasmuch as they are ordered to the contemplation of the Deity in eternal beatitude, just 238. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 14, a. 16, c. For a similar treatment of God’s knowledge from the perspective of practical knowledge, see De ver., a. 3, a. 3, c. 239. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. v. 240. Ibid.

180  The Habit of Theology as the oikonomia is ordered to theologia.241 Cajetan stresses that the essence of this second conclusion, in both of its parts, is also contained within the unity per se of the formal object of this science, which excludes any interpretations that understand theology as a mere aggregation of the speculative and practical.242 If our theology (including biblical exegesis) is not essentially one, but an aggregation—he rhetorically asks—on what grounds then can it be deduced that our theology is identified with the knowledge of God?243 Cajetan argues that, according to Aquinas, our theology in via— like the infused gift of wisdom—is an extension of faith.244 He cites ST, II-II, q. 45, a. 3, ad 1, where Aquinas expressly states that the infused gift of wisdom is of a higher order than both speculative and practical knowledge, according to the same reasoning employed in ST, I, q. 1, a. 4; namely, the formal object of a higher order extends to a multitude.245 Cajetan brilliantly observes that Aquinas’s implementation of Aristotelian philosophy—in the explication of the eminently speculative and practical nature of sacred doctrine as a science—is entirely subject to the structure of revelation. Within the eminently speculative and practical nature of theology, the speculative, namely theologia or the majesty of the Godhead, contains the practical, that is to say, the oikonomia, which includes both creation and salvation. The oneness of the formal object, as a participation in the eminently speculative and practical divine light of revelation, gives a unity of order to the ST (the ordo disciplinae), which is based on the structure of revelation, that is to say, on the order contained in the articles of the Creed (the material object). Thus, theology as one science consists in the unity of its formal and material objects. 241. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. vi. 242. “The nominalists along with Durandus [cf. In Proem. I Sent., q. 3] admit that theology consists of two sciences, one of which is speculative and the other practical.” Reginald Garriguo-Lagrange, The One God: A Commentary on the First Part of St. Thomas’ Theological Summa (St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1943), 61. 243. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. vii. 244. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 4, a. 2, n. iii. 245. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 8, a. 3, n. un.

A Science and Wisdom   181 Cajetan states that those who are excessively philosophical in this matter fail to grasp the eminent and higher nature of theology as a participation in God’s infinite knowledge and, therefore, they artificially divide theology into the practical, the speculative, and the affective.246 Cajetan refers specifically to Scotus’s highly nuanced division of theology, in which our theology in via is determined to be a practical science.247 He also makes mention of those who understand theology to be eminently affective, primarily referring to St. Albert the Great, who declared: “This science is properly affective, that is to say of truth which has not been secluded from the concept of the good; hence it perfects both the understanding and affection.”248

Theology Compared to Philosophy (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5) Summarizing the previous article (ST, I, q. 1, a. 4), Cajetan states that sacred doctrine possesses two things: first, it is a knowledge of a higher order than the philosophical or finite sciences, and, second, it contains formally and eminently the conditions of both speculative and practical knowledge. Cajetan understands article 5 in continuation with article 4, concluding that theology, on account of its higher order and eminent manner of containing the speculative and practical, is more dignified than the philosophical sciences as regards all human knowledge, both speculative and practical.249 Cajetan sets forth the principle that among the speculative sciences one is more dignified than another on account of its certitude and the dignity of its subject matter. In his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, Cajetan determines that philosophical psychology’s dignity—in relation to the other philosophical sciences—is second 246. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. ix. 247. Ibid. For a more detailed account of Scotus’s highly nuanced doctrine on theology as a practical science, see Iammarrone, “La teologia come scienza pratica,” chap. 8 in Giovanni Duns Scotus metafisico e teologo, 747–91; and Alliney, Giovanni Duns Scoto: Introduzione al pensiero filosofico, 48–52. 248. Congar, A History of Theology, 126. 249. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5, n. i and ii.

182  The Habit of Theology only to metaphysics, since the latter’s formal object, the ratio entis, is simply more noble than philosophical psychology’s formal object, which follows on being, namely life and understanding. Theology—which formally and eminently contains the conditions of both the speculative and practical sciences—exceeds the philosophical sciences both as regards their certainty and the dignity of their subject matter, because it possesses its certainty and subject matter through a participation in the infallible divine light, while the philosophical sciences are known through the light of human reason. Therefore, theology is simply more certain and its subject more noble, that is to say, the Deity is the most simple and immaterial of all possible subjects.250 It is important to note that, according to Cajetan, theology acts principally through the infallible divine light (the ratio cognoscendi) and only secondarily or instrumentally through the light of human reason. Theology reasons to conclusions virtually contained within the articles of faith. This particular mode of explication of the faith is entirely dependent for its material object on the infallible modes of the explication that constitute the tripartite foundation of the Church: Christ’s teaching, apostolic teaching both in oral and written form, and the divine assistance granted to papal infallibility. Consequently, faith is dependent also on the three infallible forms of the propositions of the faith: the articles of the faith, sacred Scripture, and the Church’s magisterium.251 As already mentioned, some scholars accuse Cajetan of reducing sacred doctrine as a science to a theology of conclusions quasidetached from the faith. This misconception, however, stems from 250. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5, n. iii. “Ut S. Thomas in prima parte q. 4. art 1 and secundo docuit, esse est perfectissima omnium, et comparatur ad omnes, ut actus ad potentiam. Unde cum scientia de anima sit de vivere et intelligere, et metaphysica sit formaliter de esse sequitur quod metaphysica sit noblior.” Cajetan, De anima, in Commentaria in libros Aristotelis “De anima”: nouissime recognita, cunctisque erroribus expurgata (Compluti: Ferdinandum Ramirez typographo, et bibliopola, 1583), fol. 9r. 251. On account of theology’s dependency on the infallible propositions of the faith, its scientific conclusions are more certain, although lacking evidence in wayfarers, than are the conclusions of the natural sciences, which have greater evidence; cf. Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 3.

A Science and Wisdom   183 a failure to grasp that theology, according to Cajetan, is a simple habit generated from the articles of faith and thus is continually dependent on the habit of faith for its principles and medium of demonstration, which is the divine light. Faith provides the epistemic foundation for theology in wayfarers through its participation in an imprint of divine knowledge.252 Theology primarily concerns those truths that exceed human reason. The philosophical sciences, on the other hand, fall within the light of the agent intellect. Hence theology simply treats a more dignified subject—the Deity. As the basis for this reasoning, Cajetan cites Aquinas’s frequent reference to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, wherein the relation between the created intellect and God’s intelligibility is likened to that of an owl’s eye to sunlight.253 For those realities that exceed the power of the human intellect are the most manifest and lucid in themselves, just as the intellectual substances, which remain unknown to humans on account of their excellence, are much more dignified than those realities that man is able to abstract from matter.254 Theology also treats realities other than God that are more dignified inasmuch as they are revealed by God.255 As regards the second part of the conclusion, concerning the dignity of sacred doctrine as a practical science, Cajetan condenses it into the following argument: if sacred doctrine’s end is the ultimate and highest, then all the practical sciences would be subordinate to it. Sacred doctrine’s end is the beatific vision (the ultimate final cause and end); therefore, all the other practical sciences are indeed subordinate to it.256 252. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. iv; see appendix 2. 253. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5, n. iii. One of Aquinas’s first usages of this Aristotelian metaphor was to stress faith’s role in granting man a knowledge of the divine, which exceeds his natural capacity; see In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 5. 254. In contrast to Scotus, Aquinas maintains that the most excellent and supremely manifest intelligibility of the divine essence, exceeding the natural capacity of all created intellects, requires that created intellects be elevated by the divine light of glory in order to see the Deity; cf. Aquinas, SCG, III, cap. 54, n. 9; De ver., q. 12, a. 12, ad 11; Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis, a. 10, ad 7, in Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia in CD-ROM, ed. Busa; De trin., pars 3, q. 5, a. 4, c., and pars 3, q. 6 a. 3, ad 5; De causis, prol. 255. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5, n. iii. 256. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5, n. v.

184  The Habit of Theology Cajetan clarifies the distinction concerning the ends, namely between the end of a work (finis operis) and the end or intention of the agent (finis operantis).257 Eternal beatitude is not the ultimate end for every agent (finis operantis), since many persons act contrary to it, even in things done according to right reason (finis operis). Nevertheless, all ends or intentions for acting and all ends of works to be done are ordained to the good of reason (ad bonum rationis), which is ultimately ordered to eternal beatitude. Hence Aquinas cautiously states that the ends of all the other sciences in an absolute sense, and not the ends or intentions of the agents, are ordered to eternal beatitude.258 As was highlighted above, Aquinas stated—in ST, I, q. 1, a. 4— that sacred doctrine as a science is more speculative than practical, because in theology human acts are treated inasmuch as they are ordered to the contemplation of God. Cajetan further explicates this statement in the light of the distinction between interior and exterior ends. For humans to attain their ultimate interior end (the act of contemplating the Deity), they must first be ordered to the Deity as to their ultimate exterior end.259 Thus the ultimate exterior end of sacred doctrine, as a practical science, is the beatific vision of the Deity; while the ultimate interior end of sacred doctrine, as a speculative science, is the interior act of contemplating the Deity in the beatific vision. Aquinas maintains that theology is more speculative than practical, since the practical intellect is essentially an extension of the speculative intellect. Thus the speculative intellect’s interior end, the act of contemplating the Deity, orders the practical intellect to its exterior end of beatitude, guaranteeing that the Deity is the proximate end from which all of theology’s acts receive their species.260 In concluding his commentary on article 5, Cajetan makes two 257. Cf. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 141, a. 6, ad 1; and In II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 1, c. 258. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5, n. vi. 259. Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 2, c. 260. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5, n. vi.

A Science and Wisdom   185 distinctions concerning Aquinas’s response to the second objection, which reads: This science [theology] can receive (accipere) from the philosophical disciplines, not as if it stood in need of them, but rather to make more manifest what is taught in this science. For it does not receive its principles from other sciences, but immediately from God through revelation. Thus it does not receive from other sciences as if they were its superior, but makes use of them as its inferiors or handmaidens: just as the master sciences (architectonicae) make use of the sciences that supply their materials (subministrantibus), as political science [employs] military science. Thus this [science] uses them [other inferior sciences] not on account of its own defect or insufficiency, but on account of the defect of our intellect, which is more easily led by what is known through natural reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that which is above reason, which are the teachings of this science.261

Cajetan notes that the verb “to receive” (accipere) in the text is understood in a twofold manner: to receive from a superior science or to receive from an inferior science. A second distinction, concerning the reason that theology receives from the other sciences, is also twofold: either on account of a defect or insufficiency in itself or due to a defect coming in from another source as, for example, our intellect.262 Our theology, as an inferior subordinate science in relation to God’s superior theology, receives from him its principles immediately through revelation on account of an insufficiency in itself. On the other hand, our theology as a superior science in relation to the inferior philosophical sciences receives from them principles as extraneous to itself, and makes use of them not because of any deficiency in itself, but rather because of the deficiency in our intellect, which is more easily guided by its own natural knowledge when treating those truths that exceed man’s natural capacity. Thus, there is a need in our theology in via for recourse to phantasms and for the use of metaphorical and analogical language. Nevertheless, 261. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2. 262. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5, n. vii.

186  The Habit of Theology there is no mixing—as Scotus affirms—of philosophy with the higher science of theology, but rather the philosophical sciences are employed as instruments or servants.263

Theology as a Unique Habit of Wisdom (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6) Referring to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Cajetan defines wisdom as a knowledge that orders and judges other forms of knowledge as their head or principle.264 He affirms that article 6 arrives at just one conclusion: sacred doctrine as a science is the greatest of all human wisdoms not merely in some genus, but simply.265 Cajetan sets forth a hypothetical argument: if theology determines what is most proper to God according to the highest cause (the antecedent), then it is the greatest wisdom (the consequent).266 As to the antecedent, Cajetan affirms that indeed theology determines truths about God, not merely as he is known through creation, but primarily and most properly according to God’s own natural knowledge of himself. The intelligibility and light of God, arcane to creatures, are most proper to God in the orders both of knowledge and of being. Hence, within the universal efficient causality of the divine light of revelation, theology determines truths about God according to what is known to him alone (the antecedent); therefore, it merits to be called a wisdom, since it determines, judges, and orders what is most proper to God according to the first and supreme foundation of divine causality, namely the highest cause and our theology’s formal object (the consequent).267 Cajetan cautions that the phrase “according to what is the high263. “Illi qui utuntur philosophicis documentis in sacra Scriptura redigendo in obsequium fidei, non miscent aquam vino, sed convertunt aquam in vinum” (Aquinas, De trin., q. 2, a. 3, ad 5um). For Aquinas’s doctrine on mixed elements, see ST, I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. viii. 264. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. i. 265. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. ii. 266. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. iii. 267. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. iv.

A Science and Wisdom   187 est cause” could be explicated in two ways. The first is in reference to God as the subject (the material object) of theology. It would be false, however, to assume that article 6 is referring to the subject or material object, since—according to Aquinas—the Deity (ratio deitatis) or theology’s subject is the essence of article 7. The second way is in reference to a special aspect or species of knowledge.268 This special aspect of the divine light of revelation is that by which (id quo) the Deity (id quod) is known through the habit of theology. Cajetan states that the formal object of theology is grounded in the first and supreme foundation of divine causality.269 Cajetan observes that the first and supreme foundation for the divine causality of creation and salvation (created effects) is the Holy Triad’s order of origins (ordo originis).270 Hence what is most formal in theology is a supernatural participation in the Trinity’s own light and intelligibility, the Light from Light, as expressed in the Nicene Creed. Our theology’s formal object is the condition of participating through Christ in the theologia Dei. The divine light of revelation is the means by which our theology’s speculative object—the imprint of divine knowledge or the revelabilia—is participated in by the human mind.271 Therefore, in theology, everything revealed about God is determined, judged, and ordered according to this participation in the light and intelligibility of God’s theology, which is essentially the Trinity’s order of origins (ordo originis). In article 6, Aquinas explicates theology’s very essence by fully determining its formal object (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum). The infusion of the divine light under the aspect (ratio) of the first and supreme foundation of divine causality is that which sets it apart formally from all other species of supernatural knowledge.272 268. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. vii; see appendix 2. In explicating wisdom as the highest cause, Cajetan states that it is a special aspect of the Deity; cf., In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. v; see appendix 2. 269. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. iv. 270. “Non enim potest aliter originis ordo salvari, nisi altera sit a Patre et Filio” (Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 36, a. 2, n. xxix). 271. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. v; and In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. ii and n. iv; see appendix 2. 272. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. ix; see appendix 2.

188  The Habit of Theology Only the Deity is perfectly convertible with its own divine light, since God’s intelligibility is his essence. This is why the Deity as a material object or subject simply exceeds the finite species of both the formal objects of faith and the beatific vision. Creatures supernaturally participate in God’s intimate knowledge of himself under a diminished light.273 Although the Deity is infinitely knowable, even when a created individual participates in the light of glory, the Deity is knowable only to a certain limit with respect to each individual.274 Similarly, within the light of faith sacred doctrine has knowledge of the Deity within certain confines.275 The act of infusion into the human mind of that certain imprint of divine knowledge does not account for the unity of theology any more than it would for the unity of geometry if God were to infuse that into the human mind. What makes the habit of a science one— like geometry—is its formal object and not the accidental mode of infusion. Cajetan notes that, in theology, the formal object—on account of its supernatural nature—must necessarily be infused: because this science is not had unless through infusion; and things known and assented to are under the divine light as their mode of knowability. Thus the unity of theology is inferred in the text from the unity of the divine light—not as infusing it—but as it is the formal object (sub qua), whose mode will be explained above [in article 6].276

Hence the substance of article 6 is the explication of the formal object. Theology orders and judges according to what is most proper to God, namely according to the first and supreme foundation of divine causality. Consequently, the theologian has the office of determining, judging, and ordering revealed truths concerning the Deity according to the highest cause of the entire universe through a participation in the divine intelligibility or light.277 Finally, since the intellective acts within theology are through the human mode 273. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, n. v. 274. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 12, a. 6. 275. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. v. Cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 12, a. 13. 276. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. xiv; see appendix 2. 277. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. xv; see appendix 2.

A Science and Wisdom   189 of judging (per modum cognitionis), it is simply the greatest of all human wisdoms.278 As Cajetan states, theology “does not remain within the purely natural, but rather our nature is perfected by the grace of divine illumination.”279 The human mind’s role as an instrumental cause is the only way to understand how theology is an acquired habit, whose speculative object is infused through the divine light of revelation.280 In conclusion, Cajetan’s explication of the intrinsic unity of theology’s formal object within the divine light of revelation—beginning in article 2 (as a subalternate science) and culminating in article 6 (as a wisdom)—is a succinct summary of Aquinas’s reintegration of the Platonic-Augustinian dualism between science and wisdom within an Aristotelian psychological realism: “Wisdom is not contrasted with science as though they were opposed to each other, but because wisdom adds an additional note to science.”281 Similar to the speculative virtue of natural wisdom or metaphysics, theology exercises its scientific act of deducing truths from principles per se nota and, like metaphysics, it does not prove its own principles. It possesses, however, the additional regulatory function of judging, evaluating, and defending those same principles. Unlike natural wisdom, which is a potential whole—containing both understanding and science beneath it as the more principle part contains under itself the secondary part—theology is a habit distinct from both the beatific vision (the habit of its principles per se) and faith (the habit of its principles per accidens). In the sed contra of ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, Aquinas introduces St. Augustine’s definition of theology as “not only nourishing, defend278. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 1. On account of theology’s “human” mode of judgment, it is simply the greatest among the “human” wisdoms. Since wisdom as the gift of the Holy Spirit operates according to a divine mode of judgment, Aquinas does not rank it among the specifically “human” wisdoms. 279. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 180, a. 6, n. iv. 280. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2. Aquinas clearly assigns to human reason an instrumental causality within sacred doctrine; cf. De trin., pars 1 pr. 2; SCG, IV, cap. 41; and ST, III, q. 62, a. 1 ad 2. 281. Aquinas, De trin., q. 2, a. 2. ad 1. Cf. J. Owens, “A Note on Aquinas,” 107.

190  The Habit of Theology ing, and strengthening the faith, but also begetting it.”282 Cajetan comments: For this science [theology], according to Augustine, not only nourishes, defends, and strengthens the faith, but also begets it. . . . Theology, therefore, is included in the faith as begetting it. From this, it can be inferred that any adult believer, explicitly believing [in the articles of faith], is a theologian, not simply, but in a certain sense as participating in theology, i.e., in accordance with its principles.283

Cajetan’s explication of St. Augustine’s definition of theological science highlights the clear distinction between faith and theology, and that each believer is potentially a theologian. The believer actually acquires the habit of theology by reasoning from the articles of faith. This habit of theology, acquired through argumentation (treated in article 8), extends itself to biblical exegesis through its additional regulatory function of judging (and not proving) its principles, that is to say by determining and commenting on the literal sense of sacred Scripture (as treated in articles 9 and 10).284 Finally, as was noted, the formal object has its ontological foundation in the divine attribute of wisdom. It is contained within the Deity (the ratio deitatis), which is theology’s subject or material object.285 This explains the intrinsic link between these two aspects of theology’s one speculative object. In sacred doctrine, all things are treated of under the aspect of God (sub ratione Dei), either because they concern God himself or because they are ordered to God (ordinem ad Deum) as their beginning and end. Therefore, it follows that God is the sole subject of this science.286 Our mind’s participation in the light of divine wisdom (the formal object or ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum) is the aspect by which (sub qua) the order virtually contained in the Deity (material object or ratio formalis obiec282. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, s.c. 283. Cajetan, ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi; see appendix 2. 284. John of St. Thomas’s reduction of the formal object to the mere deduction of conclusions led to Chenu’s 1927 interpretation of articles 9 and 10 as a rupture within question 1; see Congar, A History of Theology, 158–59. 285. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. iv. 286. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, c.

A Science and Wisdom   191 ti ut res) is explicated: in brief, the Trinity’s order of origins (ordo originis) structures theology’s ordo disciplinae.

The Subject of Theology (In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7) Cajetan restates the essential question posed by Aquinas in article 7: “The subject stands for the formal subject; and God is to be taken formally, that is to say inasmuch as he is God; therefore, the sense [of article 7] is: Whether God, inasmuch as [he is] God, is the formal subject of this science.”287 A little further on, he reformulates the question: “It is asked whether God under the ratio of his own quiddity is the formal subject of this science, so that the quiddity of God is the material object of this science.”288 In his commentary on ST, I, q. 1, from articles 3 to 6, Cajetan highlighted that theology as a habit receives its unity and dignity from its formal object (ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum), that is to say, from the first and supreme foundation of divine causality communicated through the divine light of revelation. The ordering of the entire first question is a movement from the factual existence (quia) of the habit of theology into the two aspects of its one speculative object. A certain primacy is given to the formal object, because it is the more formal aspect. The terminus of theology’s scientific act is the material object (ratio formalis obiecti ut res) or the subject, which is God’s quiddity. Thus, the habit of theology derives its unity from its formal object; while the unity of a theology’s operations or movement (from its principles to its conclusions) is derived from the unity of its subject or material object,289 which, in the case of theology, is the Deity (ratio deitatis), God’s natural mode of being (esse naturale).290 This is why in our theology—in its perfected state—in patria, the Deity is the intellectual species to which 287. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. i. 288. Ibid. 289. The unity of a science’s operations is in its subject, and the unity of the scientific habit is in its formal object quo; cf. Aquinas, In I Post. anal., c. 1, lect. 41, n. 7 and n. 11; and Van Ackeren, Sacra Doctrina, 108. 290. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 15, a. 1, n. viii.

192  The Habit of Theology the human mind is united without mediation in the divine light of glory. On the other hand, in our theology in via, the Deity is mediated through the divine light of faith. In via, this imprint of divine knowledge is received into the human mind according to man’s own proper mode of knowing, that is to say in a composite way through propositions formed by the intellectual acts of combining and dividing concepts understood analogically. Moreover, the imprint of divine knowledge is not a conceptualization of the Deity (which is absolutely simple secundum se), but rather it refers to the articles of faith (the propositions or suppositiones), which mediate to the human mind—through the virtue of faith—the content of God’s discourse, a participation (without vision) in God’s own knowledge of himself. Thus the articles of faith are the principles per accidens of theology; in patria, however, the articles of faith are the principles per se.291 It is interesting to note that Capreolus, in his Defensiones, makes no mention whatsoever of Scotus’s doctrine on God as the subject of theology. Yet Scotus attributed the greatest importance to the subject of a science.292 Cajetan employs, however, Scotus’s definition of the subject of theology as a contrast to better highlight the importance of Aquinas’s doctrine. As was stated above, according to Scotus, the primary subject of theology in se is God as the infinitely perfect good, who—out of metaphysical necessity—loves himself.293 Hence, with some irony, Cajetan initiates his commentary of ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, stating that “for the good of [sacred] doctrine, let us grasp what is meant by ‘inasmuch as He is God’ from Scotus’s own declaration [of theology’s subject] in his prologue to the Sentences.” Whereupon Cajetan summarizes Scotus’s argument that the material object of theology is the quiddity of God and not some specific ratio or formality of God:

291. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xi and n. xii; see appendix 2. 292. Cf. O’Connor, “The Scientific Character of Theology,” 5. 293. See Scotus, Ord., I (III/1), prol., pars quinta, q. 2, n. 401. Cf. Boulnois, Duns Scoto: Il rigore della carità, 128; and Iammarrone, Giovanni Duns Scotus metafisico e teologo, 774.

A Science and Wisdom   193 Man can be taken in a fourfold manner: first, as a rational animal, and so he is understood by reason of his quiddity inasmuch as he is man; second, as a substance, and so he is conceived in common (with other substances); third, as naturally gentle, and so he is conceived accidentally, because gentleness is an accident or property of man; fourth, as the noblest of animals, and so he is understood in relation to others.294

Following Scotus’s lead, Cajetan progressively eliminates the last three senses—in reverse order—in which God can be considered: God could be considered as the highest cause (as the principium essendi in metaphysics) and thus he would be considered in relation to what is ad extra; he could be considered according to one of his divine attributes (wise, good, just) and thus he would be considered quasi per accidens; he could be considered as first being or pure act and—once again—he would be considered as the cause or principle, in a relational manner, of the ratio entis, the subject of metaphysics.295 Hence Cajetan concludes—in total agreement with Scotus—that God, as the subject of theology, is to considered in the first mode: Indeed, it is according to the first [mode], according to the nature, the knowledge of all things and the foundation of all things: this quiddity which we are talking about is called the Deity. And so, asking whether God under the ratio of the Deity, as distinguished against the ratio of the good [according to Scotus], etc., is the subject of this science; hence it is asked, whether God under the ratio of his own quiddity is the formal subject of this science, so that the quiddity of God is the material object (ratio formalis huius subiecti ut res).296

In the previous article (article 6), Cajetan identified the formal object as a special ratio of the Deity by which (sub qua) the entire subject or material object—the Deity—is considered. According to Cajetan, the divine attribute of wisdom grounds the formal object of our theology in the Deity. Since, according to Scotus, the subject is the sufficient cause of an entire science, he is forced to add 294. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. i. 295. Ibid. 296. Ibid.

194  The Habit of Theology a special ratio to a science’s subject. Hence, for Scotus, the subject of theology in se is God as the infinitely perfect good. What Cajetan finds ironic is that Scotus determined that the subject of a science must the quiddity, then he reduced the subject of theology in se to a special ratio or property of the Deity. For schoolmen like Aquinas and Cajetan—and, theoretically, even for Scotus—the quiddity in reality (in re) is the foundation of the universal as knowable (in scibile), which is the subject of a science. In metaphysics an “insight” about God is derived—in the light of human reason—by a judgment of negative separation that culminates in a positive judgment or the resolutio metaphysica secundum rem, which can be formulated in a demonstration quia: not all beings are constituted of potency, matter, mutability, and so on (what Cajetan terms the ex communibus compositae);297 there must be a Being that has no potency, matter, mutability, or the like (remotiones);298 therefore, this Being is Ipsum Esse Subsistens or Pure Act. This is an insight into the divine essence.299 Ipsum Esse Subsistens, however, is not the subject of metaphysics, but rather the principle of being (prinicipium essendi) of all that constitutes the subject matter of metaphysics.300 In order to arrive at the speculative object of metaphysics, yet another judgment of negative separation—which progressively separates or removes, without positive exclusion, various non-constituent notions from the concept of being in general—must occur together with yet another positive judgment, the resolutio metaphysica secundum rationem, or positive seizure (in via iudicii) of the ratio entis, the speculative or formal object of metaphysics.301 The ratio entis is the simple condition of participating in esse commune. It comprises all entities in which the ratio entis is found and which fall under the quasi-generic concept of being.302 297. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. v. 298. For Aquinas remotio is synonymous with separatio; cf. De trin., q. 6, a. 2, c. 299. See Aquinas, In Meta., lib. 4, lect. 5, n. 6. Cf. Tavuzzi, “Aquinas on Resolution in Metaphysics,” The Thomist 55, no. 2 (1991): 212. 300. See Aquinas, De causis, lect. 6. 301. Cf. Tavuzzi, “Aquinas on Resolution in Metaphysics,” 216–17. 302. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. x; see appendix 2.

A Science and Wisdom   195 This quasi-generic concept of ens commune (the esse subiective or formal concept, which is an “accident” inhering in the soul) is not to be identified with the ratio entis, which is the esse obiective, the content of the concept, the very reality that initiates the concept.303 Moreover, God simply falls outside the speculative object of metaphysics, the ratio entis. Hence the necessity of a divine science—other than the philosophical divine science of metaphysics304—based on a participation in divine revelation, which assimilates the human mind to the divine intellect.305 Cajetan dismisses the objection that Aquinas, in the prologue to his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, was affirming what others were proposing to be the conditions of the subject: that theology’s subject is divine being (ens divinum) knowable through inspiration. According to Cajetan, Aquinas was merely restating the opinion of others, since St. Thomas clearly affirms in his commentary on the Sentences that the Deity (ratio deitatis) is the subject of sacred doctrine as a science:306 “the more something touches the true ratio of the divinity, the more principally it is considered in this science.”307 As was noted above, Cajetan negates not only the possibility of a common concept of being (ens commune) that would include the Deity, since such a formal concept (esse subiective) would be void of any noetic content (esse obiective), but he also negates any possibility of an esse subiective (a formal concept) such as an ens divinum, reaffirming that ratio deitatis is simply God’s esse obiective or natural mode of being. This is why Cajetan distances Aquinas from the phrase ens divinum. In fact, Aquinas employed the phrase only twice and both times early on in the Sentences.308 Clearly for Cajetan, God’s quiddity is his esse obiective, which is called the Deity or ratio deitatis.309 303. Cf. Tavuzzi, “Aquinas on Resolution in Metaphysics,” 200. 304. See Aquinas, De trin., q. 5, a. 4, c. Cf. ST, I, q. 1, a. 1. 305. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. v. Cf. Aquinas, De div. nom., cap. 2, lect. 4. 306. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. iv. 307. Aquinas, In I Sent., prol. q. 1, a. 4, c. 308. See Aquinas, In I Sent., prol. q. 1, a. 4, c.; and In II Sent., d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, ad 4. 309. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. iv.

196  The Habit of Theology According to Cajetan, the Deity (ratio deitatis) as theology’s subject is a singular being (esse singulare) upon which all things considered in this science are predicated.310 Thus the Deity is instantiated only in God and thus is predicated to God directly (in recto), while everything else considered in theology is predicated to God indirectly (in oblique), that is to say of God (Dei), to God (ad Deum), or from God (a Deo). Cajetan cites an example from Aristotle’s IV Metaphysics of things predicated to one common subject. Health, which is an accidental property in humans, is predicated to urine, which is a sign of health, to medication, which causes health, and food, which preserves health.311 Thus Cajetan indicates that the superadded accidental difference of revelation to certain things and events is sufficient to save their common predication (in obliquo) to the Deity.312 As Aquinas states, “those things which have one term predicated of them in common, not univocally but analogously, belong to the consideration of one science.”313 As was stated above, this is why Cajetan maintains in the In ST a theological anthropology that is revealed, wherein “humans are not naturally, but obedientially ordered” to a supernatural end, the beatific vision, and are elevated to an even greater proper proportionality with the Deity.314 Gregory of Rimini objected that if God were indeed the subject of our theology, then every possible thing would fall under it. It would be a universal science, since an infinity of truths are knowable in the Deity.315 Cajetan’s response is that only the Deity is adequately convertible with the divine light. The Deity is not adequate310. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. iii. 311. Cajetan is building on Aquinas’s teaching from In I Sent., prol. q. 1, a. 4, c., and In IV Metaph., lect. 1, nn. 8–9. 312. Although in De nominum analogia Cajetan clearly rejects the “health” in animals and medicine as a model of analogy used in scientific demonstration in the natural sciences; nonetheless, he uses this model as regards the superadded difference of revelation in the supernatural order as a sufficient proportional unity to guarantee the scientific nature of our theology. For analogy as a unity of proper proportionality, see D’Ettore, “The Fifteenth-Century Thomist Dispute,” 273. 313. Aquinas, In IV Metaph., lect. 1, n. 6. 314. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 1, n. ix. 315. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. iv.

A Science and Wisdom   197 ly convertible with our theology, an inadequacy that results from the defectiveness of our intellect’s participation in the divine light of revelation.316 The extension of the material object or subject of theology (the Deity) is absolute; nevertheless, the formal object of revelation in our theology is what measures, or limits, the extension of our theology in via and in patria.317 According to Scotus, the unity and the distinction of the sciences comes exclusively from the primary subject. The theology of the blessed’s primary object is the divine quiddity and—when manifest to a proportionate intellect—it is a sufficient cause, virtually containing all the truths of theology.318 The problem for the Subtle Doctor is that our theology in via lacks a primary object, not being rooted in the vision of the divine essence, and thus it has merely a first known object, ens infinitum, which does not virtually contain all the truths that pertain to theology’s subject. Hence it follows that our theology in via is not a science and, not having evidence of the divine essence, it is ordered according to the methodology of metaphysics. Cajetan makes a clear distinction between Scotus’s and Aquinas’s understanding of the notion of “virtually containing.” He rejects Scotus’s notion that the ratio of the formal subject of a science must virtually contain all the truths, including the principles and conclusions, that pertain to that science.319 Scotus affirms that the subject, as virtually containing all the truths pertaining to a science, is the sufficient cause of that science for two reasons: (1) the subject contains the immediate propositions, which are the principles virtually containing the whole science; (2) the subject is the adequate cause of the habit. Therefore, it virtually contains the entire habit. According to this opinion, there are as many sciences as there are species, and not only for the species of things completely sepa316. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. ix and n. xi; see appendix 2. 317. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. v. 318. See O’Connor, “The Scientific Character of Theology,” 9. Cf. Scotus, Rep., I (II/2), prol., q. 2, nn. 140–207. 319. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. ix.

198  The Habit of Theology rate in themselves, but also for all formal essences of things which are not virtually contained in another. Thus the science of animals could consider only the properties of animals as such, because they alone are virtually contained in the universal concept of animal; while separate sciences (habits) would be required to consider an ox inasmuch as it is an ox and a lion inasmuch as it is a lion.320 Cajetan’s criticism seems to be based on Scotus’s earliest understanding of the habit of science as given in his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. By the time of Scotus’s more nuanced version in the Ordinatio, the first object is considered an adequate object, because it virtually contains all the objects per se.321 Nevertheless, what is essential is Cajetan’s criticism of Scotus’s notion that the subject, virtually containing all the truths pertaining to a science, is the sufficient cause of that science. In contrast, as was shown above, Aquinas divides the sciences according to an epistemological principle, the formal object, and not according to an ontological principle, that is to say, not as separate realities or entities. Thus the subject or material object of a science requires two conditions: (1) it is the ratio to which all things in a science are ordered, and (2) it virtually contains the whole science, not as Scotus’s sufficient cause in itself, but rather as sufficient cause in the sense of a first cause (causa prima) within its own proper order. The subject is simply sufficient in se, as a first cause, and in those who participate in it through the proximate principles. The Deity (ratio deitatis) is absolutely simple secundum se. As Cajetan states, the Deity in se is a sufficient cause within its own order of being, as a superior and first cause. Nonetheless, the Deity (ratio deitatis), taken on its own, does not suffice for the entire effect, just as the sun, which is the universal cause of Socrates, requires secondary and univocal causes such as Socrates’s parents for his generation.322 The Deity, like the sun, is a first cause 320. Ibid. 321. See Scotus, Ord., I (III/1), d. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 183. Cf. Alliney, Giovanni Duns Scoto, 24–25. 322. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. x. For the causal role of the sun in the formation of man, Aquinas often quotes Aristotle’s Physics II, c. 2, 194b14; see ST, I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 1.

A Science and Wisdom   199 and non-univocal universal agent, which transcends all genera.323 Moreover, the Deity, as an intelligent, free, and superior analogical agent, is a complete and sufficient cause in se, virtually containing all truths, inasmuch as divine wisdom is the first principle for the determination of all existing forms.324 The first principles of sacred doctrine are received into the human mind according to man’s own proper mode of knowing, that is to say, in a composite way through propositions—namely the articles of faith, which are theology’s proximate principles or suppositiones. Since the articles of faith in via are known through the mediation of faith, they are the principles per accidens of theology; in patria, however, they are the principles per se. Cajetan concludes that theology’s subject, as the scientific foundation and adequate cause, virtually contains the whole habit in two modes: (1) inasmuch as the Deity in se is the first and superior cause of the whole of this science (just as the sun virtually contains the whole man); and (2) inasmuch as the subject (the Deity) is known by the minds of those who participate in it through the articles of faith, the proximate principles of this science.325 Truths are known from theology’s principles not only immediately or per se through the beatific vision, but also through the secondary causality of the habit of science. The Deity is the primary root for all truths pertaining to sacred doctrine within the genus of revealed knowledge.326 The articles of faith are revealed principles, verbally expressing truths concerning the Deity. They take the place of the definition in theology. Hence the Deity is the subject of both the principles and the conclusions derived by the habit of theology.327 The habit of theology is acquired through the first demonstrative syllogism. Knowledge of all further theological conclusions generates no additional habit, but rather perfects the same habit 323. Cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 25, a. 2, ad 2; and ST, I, q. 3. a. 5; and ST, I, q. 4, a. 3. 324. Cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 44, a. 3. 325. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. xii. 326. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. x. 327. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. viii.

200  The Habit of Theology in intensity (knowing the conclusions more profoundly) and by extension (deducing additional conclusions). Thus the intellect— through the habit of theology—is determined toward a particular speculative object, in which its scientific act of knowing terminates. Theology’s particular speculative object is the Deity (ratio deitatis) known under a certain aspect in the divine light, because theology determines, judges, and orders what is most proper to God according to the first and supreme foundation of divine causality (the formal object).328 When commenting on article 2, Cajetan expressed the unity of the one speculative object: “The subject of our theology is according to the total aggregate taken from the material and formal objects; and thus the subject is Deus revelatus.”329 Thus, the subject underlying all forms of speculative knowledge in the supernatural order is the Deity as revealed. Each species of supernatural knowledge differs, however, according as its speculative object is determined by its particular mode of knowing (ratio cognoscendi). The particular speculative object of our theology is the Deity (ratio deitatis) according to the first and supreme foundation of divine causality, the order of origins in the Trinity (article 6). Thus, our theology’s most special species of knowledge (in patria and in via) is found within the revelabilia, the formal object of sacred doctrine taken as a genus of knowledge.330 As was already noted, the first theological syllogism generates the habit of theology. The major premise (of a philosophical nature) in the first theological syllogism of the ST explicates the virtual content of the revealed minor premise, an article of faith, by demonstrating that the Deity or ratio deitatis (the subject), as the final end (the middle term), is the cause of sacred doctrine (the material cause) within humans, who are ordered by God toward the beatific vision (in accordance with this revealed theological anthropology). 328. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. xi. 329. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xiii. 330. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. viii; see appendix 2.

A Science and Wisdom   201 The human mind’s elevation and participation in the light of divine wisdom (the formal object) is the aspect by which the order virtually contained in the Deity (ratio deitatis), or material object, is explicated instrumentally by human reason, which is a secondary efficient cause. Cajetan sums up the essence of article 7 when he concludes: “everything . . . is resolved formally into the subject assigned, [that is to say] everything [in this science] is to be treated as ordered to God.”331 As was noted, there is an intrinsic link between the two aspects of theology’s one speculative object. In sacred doctrine, everything is treated under the aspect of God (sub ratione Dei), either because the truths concern God himself (in recto) or because they concern things that are ordered to God (ordo ad Deum) as their beginning and end. Thus, the structure of the ST is virtually contained in the articles of faith. In his prologue to the ST, Aquinas states: we purpose in this work to treat of whatever belongs to the Christian religion, in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners [that is to say, “according to the ordo disciplinae” and not “according as the plan of the book might require (the Sentences), or according to a disputatio”] . . . to set forth whatever is included in this sacred doctrine as briefly and clearly as the matter [the articles of faith] gives leave to its order (materia patietur).332

This differs greatly from Scotus’s imposition of a metaphysical mechanism to analogically order theological concepts and also explains why Scotus attached little importance to the function of explication in theology.333 In our summary of this chapter on the nature of sacred doctrine as a science some of the key elements highlighted by Cajetan are to be noted. In contrast to Scotus, in his doctrine of completely isolated and separate theologies, Cajetan stressed that, as a subalternate science, the theology of wayfarers is in continuity with and participates in the theology of God and the theology of the blessed. More331. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. xiii. 332. Aquinas, ST, I, Prologus. 333. See O’Connor, “The Scientific Character of Theology,” 5.

202  The Habit of Theology over, because of man’s participation in God’s theology, namely, in the Trinity’s own light and intelligibility, the formal object of the theology of wayfarers is the first and supreme foundation of divine causality, the Deity as highest cause, in and through which the habit of theology judges and orders revealed truths. Furthermore, on account of this elevated formal object, the theology of wayfarers is concomitantly both a speculative and practical form of knowledge and is eminently more dignified than any human science, which is dependent on reason alone. Finally, to conclude this chapter, it is important to state Cajetan’s grasp of the term revelabilia, which has known many and various interpretations within Thomism.

The Revelabilia All forms of speculative knowledge within the supernatural order of revelation concern the revelabilia, that is to say, sacred doctrine’s speculative object taken in an absolute sense.334 Within Thomism, however, there have appeared various interpretations of the term revelabilia.335 In via Thomae, until the sixteenth century, the prevalent interpretation of the term revelabilia was as the formal object of sacred doctrine taken as a genus of knowledge; namely, it referred to those truths known through the divine light of revelation.336 According to this reading, revelabilia and revelata differed merely in a subtle and nuanced manner—grammatically and semantically—as two expressions of the one speculative object of sacred doctrine. In this vein, Capreolus defined revelabilia primarily as the one 334. Aquinas employs the term revelabilia only twice: ST I, q. 1, a. 3, c., and ST I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2. 335. Donneaud briefly traced the history of the Thomistic debate on the meaning of revelabilia, focusing primarily on Gilson’s self-contradictions and false accusations regarding Cajetan’s interpretation of the term: Donneaud, “Note sur le revelabile selon Étienne Gilson,” Revue thomiste 96, no. 4 (1996): 633–52. Cf. also Étienne Gilson, Le Thomisme. Introduction à la philsophie de saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1942 and 1965); and Gilson, “Note sur le revelabile selon Cajétan,” Mediaeval Studies 15 (1953): 199–206. 336. Cf. Donneaud, “Note sur le revelabile selon Étienne Gilson,” 634–35.

A Science and Wisdom   203 speculative or formal object: “Revelabile is the ratio of the object or subject of theology; [it is] the object knowable to the theologian, since it falls within that revealed speculative species, the knowable through revelation.”337 Prierias identified the revelabilia to be the formal object in theology.338 Likewise, Cajetan maintained that revelabilia referred to the one formal object: the reason why theology is one science is taken from the unity of the formal object, which is the light of divine revelation [the universal formal cause] and thus all things are considered in theology inasmuch as they are divinely revealable (divinitus revelabilia).339

This is consistent with Cajetan’s understanding of the two aspects of the one object of the faith: “divine revelation is both that by which (quo) man believes and that which (quod) is believed.”340 The revealed doctrine, according to Cajetan, is more specifically known by the habit of theology under the aspect of God as the highest cause (ST I, q. 1, a. 6). Thus our theology’s most special species of knowledge (in patria and in via) is grounded within the wider notion of the revelabilia, which abstracts from both its principles and its conclusions.341 During the Baroque period of Thomism, John of St. Thomas introduced a distinction between revelatum, as the formal object of faith, and revelabilia, as the formal object of the theological science of the conclusions.342 He artificially combined two separate 337. Capreolus, Defensiones, 1:58a–b. Bonnefoy wrongly identifies Capreolus as the origin of the separation of the revelata (the formal object of faith) from the revelabilia (the formal object of theology); cf. Jean-François Bonnefoy, “La théologie comme science et l’explication de la foi selon saint Thomas d’Aquin,” Ephemerides theologicae lovanienes 14 (1937): 437–38. 338. See Prierias, Conflatum, fol. 9v, 13rv. 339. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. v. Cf. In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. vi; In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. vii; In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. xiii; and In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. iv. In his commentary on the Sentences (1493), Cajetan writes: “dicitur ut qua, rationis formalis ut obiectum, seu ut scibilis est, est revelabilitas. . .”; In libros I-IV Sententiarum (Parigi, Bibl. nationale, ms. Lat. 3076), fol. 26. 340. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. xi. Cf. also In ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 9, n. v. 341. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. i; see appendix 2. Cf. In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. xiv; and In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi; see appendix 2. 342. See Joannes a S. Thoma, Cursus theologicus, q. 1, disp. 2, a. 7, ix (Paris: Vivès, 1883), 1:482b.

204  The Habit of Theology distinctions. He identified the distinction of revelata and revelabilia with the distinction between formal and virtual revelation, thus obfuscating the unity and continuity between faith and theology.343 This particular interpretation was prevalent within the via Thomae until well into the twentieth century.344 In his 1937 article critiquing M.-D. Chenu’s Théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle (the 1927 edition), Jean-François Bonnefoy introduced yet a third interpretation: while maintaining that both the revelata and revelabilia are formally revealed, he posited that revelata were those revealed truths that simply exceed human reason, and revelabilia, those revealed truths that can be investigated by reason. Bonnefoy demonstrated that Aquinas never distinguished the notion of revelabilia, as truths that are virtually revealed (the object of theology), from revelata, as truths that are formally revealed (sacred Scripture and dogma).345 Contemporaneously (1938), Louis Charlier reexamined the terms revelabilia and revelata in Aquinas. Like Bonnefoy, he clearly eliminated the possibility that revelabilia is linked to any notion of virtual revelation, but, unlike Bonnefoy, he declared that revelabilia and revelata are synonymous.346 Congar agreed with Charlier’s return to this pre-Baroque interpretation. Congar rejected, however, 343. Donneaud, “Note sur le revelabile selon Étienne Gilson,” 634. In his 1943 edition, Chenu accents the difficulty with John of St. Thomas’s interpretation of revelata and revelabile, which he had at first fully adopted in his 1927 edition of La Théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle; cf. Chenu, La Théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, (1943), 90–91. Both Congar and Gilson seem to have influenced Chenu’s change in understanding the relation between revelata and revelabilia in Aquinas, although Chenu does not comment on the substantial difference between Congar’s and Gilson’s positions; cf. Chenu, La Théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, (1943), 91n1; and Congar, A History of Theology, 156–59. 344. Cf. Donneaud, “Note sur le revelabile selon Étienne Gilson,” 634–35. In his 1927 edition, Chenu was still very much “an ingenuous prisoner of this baroque scholastic heritage” (ibid., 635); cf. Chenu, La Théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, (1927): 58. Other followers of John of St. Thomas’s doctrine include Ambroise Gardeil, Le Donné révélé et la théologie, (Juvisy: Éditions du Cerf, 1932), xx, fn. 1; and Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, 57. 345. Jean-François Bonnefoy, “La théologie comme science et l’explication de la foi,” ETL 14 (1937): 437–38. Cf. Donneaud, “Note sur le revelabile selon Étienne Gilson,” 635–36. 346. See Louis Charlier, Essai sur le problème théologique (Thuillies, Belgium: Ramgal, 1938), 146.

A Science and Wisdom   205 Bonnefoy’s division between revelata (revealed truths that simply exceed human reason) and revelabilia (revealed truths that are accessible to human reason) because it was a vestige of John of Saint Thomas.347 In 1942, Étienne Gilson entered the debate with the fourth edition of his book Le Thomisme, where he partially perpetuated Bonnefoy’s interpretation, while setting forth what he considered “the exact signification” of Aquinas’s use of revelata and revelabilia “beyond the distraction of the commentators both ancient and modern.”348 His interpretation was dependent on his conception of Christian philosophy, namely the status of philosophy within sacred doctrine. According to Gilson, the revelata are truths immediately revealed by God in holy Scripture and the articles of faith; while, on the other hand, revelabilia is all human knowledge that can be subsumed within theology’s proper end.349 This interpretation perpetuated Bonnefoy’s division of revelata and revelabilia, since, in Gilson’s interpretation, as in Bonnefoy’s, holy Scripture and the articles of faith belong simply to the revelata; Gilson, unlike Bonnefoy, however, holds that the term revelabilia pertains not merely to those revealed truths that are accessible to human reason (the praeambula fidei), but it formally embraces all the human sciences.350 In 1953, Gilson published his “Note sur le Revelabile selon Cajetan,” in which he falsely attributed to Cajetan a distinction between revelabilia (the truths of salvation that are inaccessible to human reason) and the demonstrabilia (the truths that are accessible to human reason).351 According to Gilson, Cajetan—by means of this false distinction—isolated all the truths accessible to philosophy solely to the genus of natural theology.352 He charged Cajetan with creating a philosophy completely separate and independent from 347. See Yves Congar, book review in Bulletin thomiste, vol. 5 (1938): 496 and 501n2. 348. Cf. Donneaud, “Note sur le revelabile selon Étienne Gilson,” 637. 349. See Gilson, Le Thomisme (1942), 23. 350. Ibid., 24. 351. See Gilson, “Note sur le revelabile selon Cajetan,” 203. 352. Ibid.

206  The Habit of Theology theology and, thus, with sinning against true Christian philosophy.353 In fact, Gilson—in his 1953 article—did not undertake any analysis whatsoever of Cajetan’s interpretation of revelabilia and revelatum, but rather introduced this false distinction (attributing it to Cajetan) as a springboard from which he set forth yet another interpretation of his own, without ever mentioning how this new interpretation differed from his previous one (“the exact signification”) in the 1942 edition of Le Thomisme. According to this new interpretation, all opposition disappeared between the terms revelabilia (all truths accessible to human reason) and revelatum (revealed truths inaccessible to human reason).354 Gilson simply extended his notion of revelabilia, which included all philosophical truths that can be employed in theology, to now embrace the entire content of the revelata, namely all revealed truths inaccessible to human reason. Thus, according to this new Gilsonian reading, revelabilia lost its strictly philosophical character and its opposition to the revelata, since it now integrated all knowledge within the divinely revealed (the divinitus revelabilia).355 In the light of this new interpretation, it is clear why Gilson criticized Cajetan for excluding the demonstrabilia from the notion of revelabile.356 Gilson indeed vilified Cajetan as the one responsible for completely excluding those things that can be demonstrated by human reason (the demonstrabilia) from those things that are divinely revealed (the revelabilia). The only problem with this new Gilsonian interpretation, however, is that Cajetan never held that the demonstrabilia concerning God are outside of the domain of the revelabilia. According to Cajetan, the demonstrabilia about God are opposed not to the revelabilia, but rather to the revelabilia tantum—namely, those truths that are known only through revelation. Cajetan main353. Cf. Donneaud, “Note sur le revelabile selon Étienne Gilson,” 642. 354. Ibid., 643. 355. Ibid. 356. Cf. Gilson, “Note sur le revelabile selon Cajetan,” 203–4.

A Science and Wisdom   207 tains that certain truths about God, which are knowable through the light of human reason (demonstrabilia), can be known also by the light of divine revelation; therefore, they are also in the domain of the revelabilia.357 These certain truths that pertain to both the demonstrabilia and the revelabilia about God have a double formal object (two diverse modes by which they are known); nevertheless, they concern the same reality (res). Thus the essence of Cajetan’s doctrine is that within the revelata (all truths that are known through the light of revelation) there are certain truths that are known by revelation alone (revelabilia tantum), while others, the demonstrabilia, can be known also through the light of human reason: There are principally two genera of knowledge about God: certain things are known by demonstration; others are not known unless [nisi] through revelation: these [truths] are the Trinity of Persons, the beatitude promised us, the mysteries of the Incarnation and Redemption. Those [the former, the demonstrabilia] are that God is One, Immortal, etc. The first conclusion is posited by reason of revealed knowledge only [revelabilium tantum]; the second conclusion is posited by reason of demonstrated knowledge.358

As previously noted, Cajetan held that the notion of revelabilia refers to the one formal object of divine revelation in an absolute sense. According to him, divine revelation is both that by which (the formal object) man believes and that which is believed (the material object). Moreover, as was shown, when commenting on ST I, q. 1, a. 6, Cajetan determined that the most special species of speculative object, or the formal object of the habit of theology, is a participation in the light of God’s wisdom (Deus ut causans), which is included within the wider notion of the revelabilia. Within divine revelation, however, there is a further distinction 357. Cajetan states that the preambles of the faith and the articles of faith are essentially the same secundum se. They differ, however, in the manner or mode by which (id quo) they are known, that is, either by the natural light of reason or by the divine light of faith; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi; see appendix 2. 358. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. iii; see appendix 2.

208  The Habit of Theology between what is formally revealed and what is virtually revealed.359 Formally revealed truths can also be virtually contained in the more primary articles of faith, which is why the distinction between formal and virtual revelation is not identical to the distinction between truths that are revealed principally (per se or directly) and truths that are revealed secondarily (per accidens or indirectly). While formal revelation is indeed principally revealed, virtual revelation is not entirely identical with truths that are revealed secondarily (these particular truths by nature are not definable as articles of faith), since some formally revealed truths (articles of faith) are indeed virtually contained in other more primary articles of faith (as an effect is in its cause), just as the Incarnation is contained in the mystery of the Trinity, or the general resurrection is contained in the article of faith concerning Christ’s resurrection. Furthermore, concerning revealed truths in via, there exist unequal modes of assent: the articles of faith are assented to without the instrumental causality of discursive reasoning (non propter aliud), while theological conclusions are assented to inasmuch as they are derived from the articles of faith (propter articulos). It is important to bear all these distinctions in mind when Cajetan explicates the intellective acts of reasoning and judgment that constitute theology’s methodology. 359. Congar sums up well Cajetan’s thought on this point: Congar, A History of Theology, 156. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi, and In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xii; see appendix 2.

Method

Chapter 6

The Theological Method The Act of Reasoning in Speculative Theology (In ST, I. q. 1, a. 8) In his commentary on ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, Cajetan made reference to Scotus, who held that premises that are believed in—taken either from sacred Scripture or the articles of faith—yield conclusions that are also believed in, but not demonstrated. Thus, according to Scotus, no theological habit of science is generated by the theological syllogism, but rather a habit—distinct from faith—that is a type of wisdom, which is more certain than opinion. Moreover, for Scotus, syllogistic reasoning is not a necessary condition for theological wisdom in via. For Cajetan, the mode of syllogistic reasoning is not a necessary condition for theology taken in an absolute sense. It is, however, a necessary condition for our theology in via. As was already shown, “demonstration,” but not the discursive mode of reasoning, is what is continued between the subalternate and subalternating theologies. The blessed see theological conclusions immediately in their principles without syllogistic reasoning, while theologians in via deduce theological conclusions from their principles through discursive reasoning; nevertheless, the demonstrations and conclusions remain the same both in via and in patria.1 In the corpus of article 8, the first conclusion to which Cajetan refers is that sacred doctrine does not argue in order to prove its 1. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii; see appendix 2.

209

210  The Habit of Theology principles, but rather it argues to prove the conclusions deduced from its principles. Cajetan repeats the Aristotelian axiom: “No science proves its own principles.”2 Aquinas explicates his understanding of proofs and solutions within theology in comparison to metaphysics. The supreme philosophical science does not prove its own principle—its speculative object (obiectum speculabile)—through demonstration, but rather grasps it with certainty (in modo intellectualiter) through a highly sophisticated conjecture that presupposes, and is founded on, the demonstrations quia of Ipsum Esse Subsistens.3 Similarly, the principles of theology as a science or wisdom—the articles of faith—are grasped also with certainty (in modo intellectualiter) through the nondiscursive assent of faith. After the more complete introduction of Aristotle’s psychological and anthropological works within Western Christendom during the thirteenth century,4 William of Auxerre, in his Summa aurea, was able to establish that there are indeed demonstrations based on faith, namely conclusions deduced from the articles of faith: [Theology], therefore, has the articles [of faith] as its principles, which, nevertheless, are principles only for the faithful, because they are per se nota to the faithful and thus require no extrinsic proof.5

William of Auxerre’s theologizing contributed to the key identification of the object of faith with the veritas prima, and the articles of faith with the principles of theology.6 This proportion between the articles of faith and the principles of theology (articuli : : principia) formed the epistemic hermeneutic for Aquinas’s conception of sacred doctrine as a science. Furthermore, since God reveals the articles of faith through sacred Tradition and Scripture—in via—there 2. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. iii. Cf. Aquinas, In I Post. anal., lect. 21, n. 5. 3. Cf. Tavuzzi, “Aquinas on Resolution in Metaphysics,” 223–24. 4. For the three stages of the introduction of Aristotle to Western Christendom, see Congar, A History of Theology, 59–61. 5. Guillelmus Autissiodorensis, Summa aurea in IV libros Sententiarum (Paris Philippe Pigouchet [14.-1518?], 3 IV 1500/1501), III, tr. 3, cap. 1, qu. 1, fol. 131vb. Cf. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2. 6. See Chenu, La théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle (1943), 61–62.

Method   211 is nothing superior to this science and its principles. Therefore, Aquinas affirms with great confidence: “Since sacred Scripture, therefore, has no superior, it can dispute with those who negate it.”7 Sacred Scripture virtually contains sacred doctrine’s method of argumentation; that is to say, the articles of faith expressed in Scripture virtually contain all subsequent theological arguments and conclusions.8 Regarding the second half of this first conclusion, Cajetan states that Aquinas confirms that sacred doctrine argues from its principles to its conclusions. Aquinas bases his argument on the authority of the Apostle St. Paul, who—in 1 Cor 15:12ff—“argued that the general resurrection is proven from Christ’s resurrection.”9 In commenting on this Pauline passage, Aquinas links the effect of the general resurrection to Christ’s resurrection within the order of instrumental and secondary causality (including meritorial and exemplar causality), while the principal efficient cause is God himself.10 The Deity could have willed outside of this particular order of causes, which is why the articles of faith necessarily form the principles of sacred doctrine and are the most proper authority in sacred doctrine, since they alone reveal God’s wisdom, the ontological foundation for sacred doctrine’s principles as necessary truths.11 Cajetan does not further develop the content of this first conclusion—that theology deduces its conclusions from the articles of 7. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, c. 8. “Quoniam in Sacra Scriptura traduntur demonstrationes virtualiter” (Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xii; see appendix 2). 9. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, c. Aquinas gives as an example a theological argument derived from Christ’s resurrection, which is an article of faith (“On the third day he rose from the dead”) and the principle or cause of the resurrection of the dead, which is likewise an article of faith (the resurrection of the body). For Aquinas’s references to St. Paul’s syllogizing in his epistles, see Super Gal., cap. 3, lect. 4 and Super Rom., cap. 8, lect 1. For Scripture as the normative point of departure for theological argumentation in Aquinas, see Wilhelmus G. B. M. Valkenburg, Words of the Living God: Place and Function of the Holy Scripture in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas, Publications of the Thomas Instituut te Utrecht, n.s., 6 (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 223–24. 10. See Aquinas, Super I Cor. [reportatio vulgata], cap. 15, lect. 2. 11. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.

212  The Habit of Theology faith—simply because the explication of the causes is the primary intellectual exercise of the entire ST.12 Explication or syllogistic argumentation, however, is not the only intellectual operation of the habit of theology. As was already noted, Congar astutely observed that the Baroque Thomistic reduction of the formal object of theology to virtual revelation was absent in both Capreolus and Cajetan. This interpretation, made predominant by John of St. Thomas, though already present in Bañez (1509?–1560) and Suárez (1548–1617), became standard among the majority of Thomists until Chenu’s 1943 edition of Théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle.13 This hermeneutic completely eclipsed the interpretation of Capreolus and Cajetan. The main problem with this reduction is that it downgrades theology to merely a habit of new conclusions virtually revealed. Even though Aquinas and Cajetan use the expression “the habit of the conclusions” (habitus conclusionum) in relation to theology as a science, it is never to the exclusion of theology’s other intellective acts as a wisdom, such as ordering and judging.14 Moreover, the revealed light of the principles remains linked with the theological conclusions. In Cajetan, the formal object is not virtual revelation, but rather a broader participation in the divine light of God’s wisdom (Deus ut causans), which is included within the more general notion of the revelabilia. The second conclusion (in the body of article 8) is that sacred doctrine disputes by defending against those who negate some of its principles (the articles of faith) but concede others.15 The third conclusion is that sacred doctrine defends its principles by solving 12. For the explicative and declarative role of theology, see Congar, A History of Theology, 100–102, and Martin Grabmann, “De theologia ut scientia argumentiva secundum S. Albertum Magnum et S. Thomam Aquinatem,” Angelicum 14, no. 1/2 (1937): 37–60. 13. Cf. Congar, A History of Theology, 156–60. 14. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. i; see appendix 2. Cajetan highlights that theology is a wisdom, which orders and judges; cf. In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. i. Aquinas held in his commentary on the Sentences that theology is a “habit of conclusions,” see In I Sent., q. 1, a. 3, qc. 2, ad 3. The fact that he drops the phrase “habit of conclusions” in the ST does not necessarily indicate that he stopped considering sacred doctrine to be a habit of conclusions, but rather that—as a “wisdom”—it is not limited to merely deducing conclusions. 15. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. ii.

Method   213 the difficulties raised by those who negate all of its principles (the articles of faith).16 First of all, Cajetan clarifies the difference between a demonstration, which is the resolution of a conclusion into its principles, and a solution to an objection, which is merely showing that something does not appear to be false, without proving with certainty that it is true.17 Thus metaphysics defends its own principles against those who negate some of them and solves the objections of those who negate all the principles of metaphysics, by pointing out that they do not appear to be false.18 Aquinas states: It is to be considered, however, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, i.e., metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concedes nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can solve his objections.19

Likewise sacred doctrine, a science that knows no superior, offers both demonstrations and solutions. It defends against those who negate one or some of its principles (the articles of faith) while conceding other truths (articles) known through revelation. In sacred doctrine, heresy is confronted within the interconnected fabric of the faith by arguing from one article of faith to another. It can only offer to solve the objections raised by those who completely negate all of the articles of faith.20 In his commentary, Cajetan focuses primarily on solutions when dealing with philosophers who negate all revealed truths. In light of Aquinas’s confident affirmation (that sacred doctrine is founded on infallible truth), Cajetan holds that all objections 16. Ibid. Cajetan notes that the principles refer to the articles of faith, as they exist as a multiplicity in the human mind, and not to the veritas prima, which is simple in itself. 17. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. iv. 18. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. iii. 19. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, c. 20. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. iii.

214  The Habit of Theology raised against the faith can be solved, because the truths of the faith can at least be shown not to appear false. Cajetan distinguishes two methods for this type of defense of the faith or apologetics against philosophers who deny all the truths of the faith. One way is from truths believed in, that is to say, according to a “theological” approach. Cajetan gives the example that if an opponent affirms that a nature can only be one hypostasis numerically, we could respond, “I deny it, because God is Triune.” That would be a theological solution that basically solves nothing, unless the opponent would come to believe. The second way of defending the faith against the philosophers is from propositions known by reason, either simply or as regards a particular matter, by responding: “I negate that [a nature must only be one hypostasis numerically] in an infinite nature.” This paradoxical statement—that an infinite nature can have a plurality of persons—cannot be known, since there is no effective medium to demonstrate it. This is how a theologian solves objections from propositions known by reason concerning a particular matter: if an opponent were to question the accidents of the bread and wine remaining in the Eucharist, a theologian might respond by affirming that the accidents are not there on account of the form and matter of Christ’s Body and Blood, but rather they are sustained miraculously, by a relation to the first cause—God.21 Cajetan stresses that Aquinas is saying that when sacred doctrine defends itself from those who totally negate the articles of faith, it should do so not according to the so-called theological manner, from truths of the faith (ex creditis), but rather from propositions known by reason. Cajetan negates all criticism that such a solution according to reason would be not proper to the theologian, simply because sacred doctrine as the highest science employs extraneous arguments and principles in a ministerial manner. He acknowledges that certain persons are uncomfortable with this position, because they fail to make the distinction between demonstration and solution. In those particular cases where rev21. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. iv.

Method   215 elation is completely denied, there can be no demonstration from the articles of faith, but the theologian can offer solutions without ever having to contradict an article of faith.22 Once again, this confidence in the theologian’s ability to offer solutions to such objections is founded on sacred doctrine’s participation in infallible truth. Although such proposed solutions are not directly derived from the articles of faith, nevertheless, the truths of the faith assented to by the theologian provide an occasion for the intellect to uncover the defects in their opponent’s reasoning in order to propose a solution.23 Cajetan notes that the Summa contra Gentiles is a theological exercise in this type of defense of the faith.24

The Act of Judgment in Biblical Theology In his book, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries: Motive and Method, Michael O’Connor does well by contextualizing Cajetan’s scriptural commentaries within the Renaissance’s return the sources (ad fontes) and application of newly acquired methods.25 He also debunks the myth that the primary motive behind Cajetan’s development as a scripture scholar was the influence of Luther and the Protestant Reformation. Cajetan’s interest in Scripture was principally theological and pastoral, rather than polemical.26 O’Connor’s study 22. Ibid. 23. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. v. 24. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, praefatio, 4. For the defense of the faith as one of the functions of sacred doctrine as a science, see Congar, A History of Theology, 99. 25. See O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 60. 26. O’Connor cites examples of this conventional view of Cajetan as a biblical polemicist, see Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 2n4. Jared Wicks notes that Cajetan’s interest in Scripture could well have been an integral part of the Renaissance renewal of Scholasticism; see Wicks, Cajetan Responds, 262n76. Other works that address Cajetan’s role as a Scripture scholar include Paul F. Grendler, “Italian Biblical Humanism and the Papacy, 1515–1535,” in Biblical Humanism and Scholasticism in the Age of Erasmus, ed. Erika Rummel (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 227–76, especially 254–55; and Allan K. Jenkins and Patrick Preston, Biblical Scholarship and the Church: A Sixteenth-Century Crisis of Authority (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), especially chapter 6: “The Origin and Development of Catharinus’s Polemic Against Cajetan.”

216  The Habit of Theology focuses strictly on the motives and methods of Cajetan’s biblical exegesis. The methodology of Cajetan’s commentary on ST, I, q. 1, aa. 8–10, however, better contextualizes the intrinsic link between theological speculation (article 8) and biblical exegesis (articles 9–10). In fact, the fluid passage within Cajetan’s own theological labors from speculative theology to scriptural exegesis was consistent with the Dominican ratio studiorum and with Aquinas’s own theological method.27 O’Connor rightly notes that for Cajetan theological speculation is distinct from scriptural commentary.28 Nevertheless, Cajetan maintains a continuity and unity between these two distinct intellective acts within their single formal cause, that is to say, within the unique habit of theology. Theological speculation flows from theology’s act of reasoning, while commentary on the literal sense of sacred Scripture flows from its act of judgment. Furthermore, speculative theology’s act of reasoning is dependent on and in continuity with biblical exegesis: “Since—as Cajetan notes—in sacred Scripture demonstrations are virtually handed down.”29 These two distinct intellective acts—theological or syllogistic reasoning and biblical or exegetical judgment—have the same formal cause, namely, the habit of theology.30 Moreover, they also flow from the same principles, the articles of faith. Hence they are 27. In his encyclical letter following the General Chapter of 1513 (Genoa) concerning the reform of religious life, Cajetan stressed the importance of study and doctrine, detailing that the order of studies should be taken moving from grammar, to logic and philosophy, then moral and speculative theology, and finally Scripture: “Ponite siquidem non voces tantum, sed corda vestra in eius virtute expulsiva vitiorum, genitrice virtutum, duceque certissima ad caelestem patriam, et distribuite domos eius, ut quasi in quibusdam habitaculis distributi, alii grammaticae, alii logicae, alii philosophiae, alii casibus conscientiae, alii subtilibus theologiae quaestionibus, alii sacrae bibliae lectioni, studii sui praecipuas partes impendendo discant, ut in distributis domibus confessorum, praedicatorum, lectorum, doctorum, pastorumque praeesse et prodesse possint” (Monumenta Ordinis Praedicatorum Historica, vol. 9, 94), as cited in O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 32n5. 28. See Michael O’Connor, “Exegesis, Doctrine and Reform in the Biblical Commentaries of Cardinal Cajetan (1469–1534)” (PhD. diss., University of Oxford, 1997), 27. 29. Cajetan, ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xii. 30. Speculative theology and biblical exegesis are “one science” because of the unity of the habit; cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. i.

Method   217 united in the same subject, the Deity (ratio deitatis). Just as the articles of faith are revealed through the habit of prophecy, likewise revelation itself is most properly interpreted through the habit of prophecy.31 For Aquinas and Cajetan, prophecy is the one source for both apostolic Tradition and sacred Scripture.32 Thus prophetic judgment is what ultimately determines the literal sense of the canonical Scriptures, because it is ultimately God alone who is the revealer and the Church’s uncreated, infallible rule of faith.33 The prophets, apostles, and evangelists (the secondary foundation of the Church)—as Christ’s co-mediators of revelation and co-authors (instrumentaliter) of sacred Scripture—form the first necessary and created condition for founding the certainty of faith: “that our faith adheres to the revelation made to the Church, includes that it adheres to the revelation made to the principal members of the Church, namely the prophets, apostles, and evangelists.”34 The second necessary and created condition for guaranteeing the integrity of the faith is the Church’s magisterium, founded on 31. “[P]ropheta autem ea quae sibi sub lumine divinae revelationis apparent, non secundum proprii iudicii interpretationem & dicit & scribit. . . . Veri enim prophetae aguntur à Spiritu Sancto ad interpretandum quae eis revelantur: & sic totum quod est prophetiae, Spiritui Sancto tribuitur” (Cajetan, In I Petri, 1.20–21, in Opera Omnia, 5:383a–b). Influenced by Cajetan’s De divina institutione (1522), Erasmus—in his Hyperaspistes Diatribae adversus servum arbitrium M. Lutheri (A Diatribe or Sermon Concerning Free Will) of 1526—argues against Luther that both sides of the debate (Catholic and Protestant) claim erudite and virtuous members, yet the sense of Scripture still requires the gift of prophecy, even in these post-apostolic times, for its correct interpretation, which—he ultimately concludes—is to be found in the Church’s hierarchy; cf. Discourse on Free Will: Erasmus—Luther, trans. and ed. E. F. Winter (London: Continuum, 1989), 13–14. In addition, Erasmus warns Luther not to usurp from God the role of sole interpreter; see Hyperaspistes, book 1, Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 76, ed. Charles Trinkaus (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1999), 204–5. 32. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, III, q. 42, a. 4, n. iii; In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. viii; and In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, n. ii. 33. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. x. 34. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 5, n. v. Scripture’s human authors—including their intentions—are a secondary or instrumental cause. Thus, human judgment does not determine the literal sense of sacred Scripture: “Ut subiuncta dicta intelligamus dicta quidem esse hominis, sed inspiratione divina dicta. Quemadmodum ergo in apostolis Spiritus Sanctus in die Pentecoste datus locutus est, ita et in Davide [. . .]. Non solum interna locutio Spiritus Sancti in eo describitur, sed etiam quod illa interna locutio prodit extra in exteriori sermone.” Cajetan, In II Reg., 23:2, in Opera Omnia, 2:169a. Cf. In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 1, n. un.

218  The Habit of Theology papal infallibility—the Church’s created infallible rule of faith. Papal infallibility is likewise a prophetic charism, dependent on apostolic Tradition and sacred Scripture for its material object. As will be shown, the literal sense is primarily what God as the author of sacred Scripture intends to make manifest to humans—in written form—as mediated through the charism of prophecy. The theologian, as a believer, is totally dependent on the prophetic revelation of the articles of faith. Moreover, the Creed, a summa of the substance of the faith, is the proper interpretation or hermeneutic of sacred Scripture.35 According to Aquinas, it is through the articles of faith (as its proximate principles) that theology resolves into its subject, the Deity (ratio deitatis). Cajetan’s understanding of the habit of theology—that it is acquired through syllogistic reasoning and extends itself to scriptural exegesis through its additional regulatory function of judging its principles—not only is key for grasping the unity of the first question of the ST (sacred doctrine: what it is and to what does it extend),36 but it also bears witness to the perennial tradition of the Church’s theological mode of biblical exegesis (prevalent in the Patristic period), which judges (without proving) its principles according to a creedal hermeneutic that is grasped in the divine light of faith, the imprint of divine knowledge. During Cajetan’s lifetime, the instruments for Scripture study may have improved, for example, a return to the original languages and the availability of better translations; nevertheless, the acquired theological judgment involved in commenting on the literal sense of Scripture (as revealed and interpreted by the prophets, apostles, and evangelists) remained the prerogative and competence of the magister in sacra pagina on account of his more explicit knowledge of the faith. The theologian’s explication of the literal sense of Scripture is of an auxiliary or supporting nature in relation to the Church’s magisterium. Moreover, a theologian’s scriptural commentary is never 35. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 5, a. 3, n. i. Cf. Aquinas, ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, n. iv. 36. John of St. Thomas’s limitation of the formal object to the scientific conclusions influenced Chenu’s 1927 interpretation of articles 9 and 10 as a rupture within ST, I, q. 1.

Method   219 to be equated to the prophetic determination of the literal sense through divine inspiration, nor to the prophetic charism of papal infallibility (a gift of discernment and not of inspiration). This is why Cajetan rebukes certain non-theologian translators of Scripture, who—overstepping their role—attempt to explicate Scripture’s literal sense: “it is your office not to explicate, but to translate.”37 In his mid-fifties, Cajetan sought to improve his own biblical language skills.38 Feeling pressed for time, however, he employed Hebrew and Greek scholars to assist him.39 This is in accord with the Thomistic methodology of a superior or architectonic science, namely the habit of theology, employing the inferior sciences. Clearly, for Cajetan, knowledge of biblical languages has its advantages, but it does not make a scriptural exegete; rather, the habit of theology, generated from the first theological syllogism, is the formal cause of biblical exegesis.40 In conclusion, for Cajetan as a Renaissance Thomist, Scholasticism and biblical humanism were never opposed. Cajetan embellished his acquired habit of theology with the latest Renaissance scriptural developments, and thus he is listed among the Italian biblical humanists.41 37. “Testor ego quod inter hos labores dicebatur mihi ab interpretibus, Dictio Hebraica sonat hoc, sed non apparet sensus nisi mutetur in hoc alterum. Respondebam ego auditis omnibus significationibus, Non sit vobis curae si sensus non apparet, quia non est vestri officii exponere, sed interpretare: interpretamini mihi sicut iacet, et relinquatis expositoribus curam intelligendi textum sic obscurum. Si ego non intellexero, alius intelliget. Sic quod curavi ut de verbo ad verbum textum haberem Psalterii, qualem habent Habraei: utinam assecutus sim” (Cajetan, Liber Psalmorum ad verbum ex hebreo versorum [hereafter In Ps.], Prooemium, in Opera Omnia, 3:1b). 38. Cf. O’Connor, “Rhetoric and the Literary Sense,” 109. 39. See Cajetan, In Ps, Prooemium, Opera Omnia, 3:1a. For more on Cajetan’s biblical assistants, Jean Danielo and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, see Grendler, “Italian Biblical Humanism and the Papacy, 1515–1535,” 255–57, and O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 142–43. 40. The collaboration between a theologian or exegete and a language scholar is to be viewed according to the relation of theology, an architectonic science, to an inferior science such as the knowledge of languages. As was mentioned, according to Cajetan, the theologian, magister in sacra pagina, had the competence to judge the literal sense, while the expert in biblical languages could better translate the word. This explains the mutual need for collaboration; or, in the one who is both theologian and linguist, the proper ordering of those sciences. 41. Cf. Grendler, “Italian Biblical Humanism and the Papacy, 1515–1535,” 254.

220  The Habit of Theology

The Literal Sense of Sacred Scripture (In ST, I, q. 1, aa. 9–10) Sacred doctrine is based on authority, and, as was just established, God, through prophecy (both by divine revelation, the uncreated rule of faith, and by papal infallibility, the created rule of faith), authoritatively determines both the literal and spiritual senses of the canonical Scriptures.42 Both the literal and spiritual senses of Scripture together compose the material object of faith; that is to say, the truths that they express—both manifest (literal) and hidden (spiritual)—are what God as the author of sacred Scripture intends to communicate to mankind through his divine act of revelation.43 In his commentary on ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, Cajetan begins with the simple affirmation that in sacred doctrine, God alone—as author—has the power to accommodate both words and things to the signification of something else.44 Hence, in contrast to the use of language in the philosophical sciences, a single word or passage inspired by God can possess a multitude of senses. In fact, this division of the God-inspired senses of Scripture is grounded in the distinction between words and things: the signification of words founds the literal sense, while the signification of things founds the mystical or spiritual sense.45 The literal sense is primary among the senses of sacred Scripture, because by manifestly teaching the truths of the faith it lays the ground for the three spiritual senses: allegorical, moral, and 42. The prophet is a fully human instrument of the Deity; thus, prophecy includes— and exceeds—the prophet’s intention. Cajetan describes a double divine action and a double human passivity involved in prophecy: namely, divine inspiration in the human will and divine revelation in the human intellect; cf. In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 1, n. un. 43. Cf. Aquinas, Qdl., 7, q. 6, a. 1 c. 44. Both Aquinas and Cajetan hold that the literal sense in sacred Scripture is primarily what God intends; Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, c., and Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. I. Cf. O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 168–69. According to Aquinas, the human authors of Scripture, namely the prophets, did not comprehend all that the Holy Spirit intended to reveal through visions and words; cf. ST, II-II, q. 173, a. 4, c. Concerning the deficiency of human authors’ comprehension of all that the Holy Spirit intended to reveal, see Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 173, a. 4, n. un. 45. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. I. Cf. In Gal., 4.24, in Opera Omnia, 5:213a.

Method   221 anagogical.46 As Aquinas states, “nothing necessary to the faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward manifestly by Scripture in its literal sense.”47 The literal sense is “whereby words signify things” and it alone is the foundation for theological argumentation.48 The literal sense includes metaphor.49 Metaphors are “not said according to their proper signification, but rather according to some similitude to their proper signification.”50 From the book of Genesis (3:1–15), Cajetan gives the example that the word “serpent” is not intended to literally mean the reptile, but rather the term is used metaphorically to literally mean the devil.51 Likewise the punishment “to crawl on its belly” is also employed metaphorically to literally signify the casting down of the devil. Cajetan states that the text demands such an interpretation, otherwise the entire pericope would be understood in purely an infantile manner.52 46. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. i. 47. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, ad 1. 48. Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 20. Cf. Cajetan, In Joan., 2.4, in Opera Omnia, 4:297b; and Commentaria in Matthaeum (hereafter In Matth.), 19.9, in Opera Omnia, 4:86a. 49. Vincent Carraud wrongly maintained that Cajetan’s identification of the metaphorical sense with the literal is in opposition to Aquinas’s understanding; cf. Carraud, “Métaphore et sens littéral selon Cajétan,” in Pinchard and Ricci, Rationalisme analogique et humanisme théologique: La culture de Thomas de Vio ‘Il Gaetano’, 204. 50. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 9, n. i. 51. See Cajetan, Commentaria in Genesim (hereafter In Gen.), 3.1, in Opera Omnia, 1:24a–b. 52. “Perspicaciter contemplare, prudens lector, has poenas, et perpendes puerile esse intelligere has poenas illatas animali irrationali, quem serpentem vocamus, ut hinc firmeris in intellectu metaphorici sermonis, tum hic, tum superius, ubi textus ipse ad metaphoricum sensum non solum invitat sed cogit” (Cajetan, In Gen., 3.15, in Opera Omnia, 1:29b). Cajetan “is concerned lest the mysteries of faith be dismissed as fables and that those who might otherwise embrace the Christian faith would be discouraged by exegesis that was puerile, ridiculous and absurd” (O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 185). “Sunt autem sensus isti metaphorici non solum sobrii secundum sacram scripturam, sed non parum utiles Christianae fidei professioni, praecipue coram sapientibus huius mundi; percipientes enim quod haec non ut litera sonat sed metaphorice dicta intelligimus ac credimus, non horrent haec de costa Adam, et serpente tanquam fabellas, sed venerantur mysteria et facilius ea quae sunt fidei complectuntur” (Cajetan, In Gen., 3.1, in Opera Omnia, 1:25a). Cajetan’s principle of “Scripture interpreting Scripture” can be applied to Genesis’s metaphorical reference to the “serpent.” In the Book of Revelation, there is a parallel passage that better explicates its meaning: “the huge dragon, the ancient serpent,

222  The Habit of Theology Aristotle prohibited the use of metaphors in the natural sciences. In sacred doctrine, however, they are—in a certain sense—necessary and useful, not because of any deficiency in sacred doctrine, but because of a deficiency in the human mind, which is more easily guided by its own natural knowledge into those truths that exceed man’s natural capacity. Therefore, in our theology, just as there is a necessity (secundum quid) for recourse to phantasms and analogical language, likewise there is a necessity (secundum quid) for the use of metaphors in sacred doctrine, inasmuch as metaphorical language better facilitates the communication of truths that exceed man’s natural knowledge.53 Since the three spiritual senses of Scripture (allegorical, moral, and anagogical) are founded on the literal sense, they can never contradict it.54 Moreover, it must be noted that through the spiritual senses God also teaches truths of the faith, but sometimes in a purposely obscure manner.55 The spiritual sense, in general, is “whereby things signified by words have themselves a signification.”56 Developing this latter point, Cajetan states that within the spiritual sense a “thing” stands as a sign of another “thing.” Things can become signs in two ways: first, in the very generation of the thing itself, that is to say, the thing generated becomes simultaneously both a reality and a sign of yet another thing or reality (just as the paschal lamb is a figure of Christ);57 second, a thing or realiwho is called the Devil and Satan, the deceiver of the whole world” (Rv 12:9, RSV). This is also the understanding expressed in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, n. 391. 53. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 9, nn. iii–iv. 54. See Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, c. 55. On preventing unbelievers from ridiculing the truth of the faith, see Aquinas, Qdl., 7, q. 6, a. 1, ad 2. 56. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, c. 57. Commenting on the “paschal lamb” in Jn 19:36, Cajetan notes that the evangelist would have never employed the figure of the “paschal lamb,” which is the literal sense of Exodus 12:46, in a spiritual or mystical sense to the crucified Christ, if it had not been the indubitable intention of the Holy Spirit (see Cajetan, Commentaria in Joannem [hereafter In Joan.], 19.36, in Opera Omnia, 4:420b). As was mentioned above, God—the author of sacred Scripture—also reveals and teaches through the spiritual senses. This is why Cajetan freely invokes “the indubitable intention of the Holy Spirit,” because—as author—the Holy

Method   223 ty already existing becomes a sign through the ascription of a new meaning (e.g., the cross as representing medical aid). This latter way of being a sign is not proper to sacred doctrine, since it is not proper to God; rather, it is well within the capacity of humans to assign new meanings or significations to already existing things or realities.58 The first way of accommodating things or realities to significations—that is to say, by the very generation of a thing or reality itself—can also be understood in two ways: either universally or particularly. The particular mode of this type of accommodation does not exceed the capacity of humans, since anyone can perform an act or artificially construct an object in order to signify some other thing or reality (as the apple icon signifies the Apple Inc. brand). The universal mode—on the other hand—is proper to God alone, since it exceeds the natural capacity of creatures and thus is proper to sacred doctrine. For example, historical events narrated in revelation often signify other realities.59 The historical event wherein Spirit foreshadows in the Old Testament the future fulfillment that will be manifestly revealed later on in the literal sense in the New Testament. This is a perfect example of the universal mode of accommodating realities to significations—which far exceeds the natural capacity of creatures—whereby the reality of the “paschal lamb” and the historical event of the Exodus in the Old Testament signify the reality of the crucified Christ, our Paschal lamb, and the fulfillment in his new exodus in the New Testament. Cajetan’s strenuous effort to determine the literal sense in his biblical commentaries was not to negate the role of the spiritual sense, but rather to eradicate any abuse of the spiritual sense. When the spiritual or mystical sense loses its mooring in the literal sense, the organic continuity between the Old and New Testaments is misrepresented. Typology—so beloved to the Church Fathers—is founded on the concrete realities revealed in the literal sense of the Old Testament, and these same past realities prefigure or symbolize— and this is the wondrous depth of their spiritual sense—an even greater fulfillment and unveiling in the realities of the New Testament. For Michael O’Connor’s critique of Cajetan’s exegesis of “paschal lamb” in John 19:36; see Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 171–72. O’Connor presumes that Cajetan’s “professed exclusiveness with which he approaches the literal sense” (ibid., 169) all but negates any positive role to the spiritual sense “in opening up the meaning of scripture” and that it is something “to be used only as a last resort” (ibid., 170). 58. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. ii. 59. Cajetan comments on the passage in Luke where Christ opens the apostles’ mind to the sense of Scriptures: “Et dixit eis. Summarie colligit scripta ad propositum. Quoniam sic scriptum est. Non solum dicit sic scriptum est, sed assumit pro ratione, dicendo, quoniam sic scriptum est. Et significatur per sic dispositio, modus et ordo gestatum et

224  The Habit of Theology from the rock flowed water for the Israelites in the desert is a sign of Christ, who is the fount of spiritual water, as the Apostle taught: “For they drank from the supernatural rock which followed them, and the rock was Christ” (1 Cor, 10:4, RSV).60 In addition, Cajetan concludes that the literal sense of a single word or passage can be multiple.61 In sacred doctrine, the literal sense is that which the author intended. Since the author of sacred Scripture is God, whose intellect comprehends simultaneously a multiplicity, therefore, in sacred doctrine, the literal sense can be multiple.62 However, an obvious doubt arises from this affirmation: namely, if there could be a variety of literal interpretations for any particular passage, which interpretation would be correct?63 This fact that the literal sense could include many explanations can be taken in two ways. First, in an absolute sense—as St. Augustine held—a multitude of explanations within the literal sense simply attests to the dignity of the author.64 Second, the various possible literal senses are to be examined in relation to other biblical texts (Scripture interprets Scripture) which manifestly reveal and teach—according to the literal sense—the truths of faith. When comparing parallel passages of Scripture, some interpretations could be excluded as being repugnant if they clearly contradict the manifest teaching (literal sense) of other biblical texts. As was statgerendarum rerum quae subiunguntur. Et sic oportebat. Consequentiae vis significatur coniunctione vim affirmationis habente: ac oportebat illum ordinem, illum modum, illam dispositionem servare quae servata est, quia sic scriptum erat. Christum pati et resurgere à mortuis tertia die” (Cajetan, In Luc., 24.46, in Opera Omnia, 4:275b). 60. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. ii. 61. Aquinas sets forth some principles regarding a multiple literal sense; see De pot., q. 4, a. 1, c. 62. “Non inconvenit in una littera Scripturae, secundum sensum litteralem, esse plures sensus” (Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. iii). 63. “Circa hanc conclusionem occurrit dubium. Quia si sensus litteralis potest multiplicari, nulla erit certitudo quis sensus sit intentus ad litteram, quolibet praeferente suam expositionem interpretationi alterius: cum enim de intentione Dei non aliter constet, oportebit omnes litterae expositiones ut litterales acceptare, aut nullam” (Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. iv). 64. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. v; . Cf. Aquinas De pot., q. 4, a. 1, c.; and Aurelius Augustinus, Confessionum, bk. 12, chap. 31, in Opera Omnia, PL 32.

Method   225 ed above, somewhere in Scripture everything necessary to the faith is put forward manifestly in its literal sense, even though some passages seem to possess a multitude of possible literal explanations. If a comparison of scriptural texts does not clarify the meaning of a passage, then the authority of the Church—through its ministry to the Word—can certify and determine the literal sense of that particular text.65 As was shown above, Cajetan vigorously maintains that the Church’s magisterium—founded on the prophetic charism of papal infallibility—remains subordinate to sacred Scripture. Thus he strongly negates any opposition between sacred Scripture and the Church’s magisterium, stressing their identification in faith’s material object. In his biblical commentaries, Cajetan likewise seeks a consonance between passages within the unity of Scripture (Scripture interprets Scripture) and a harmony with the Church’s magisterium (dogma as an interpretation of Scripture).66 In the introduction to his commentary on the psalms, Cajetan sets forth some Augustinian-inspired principles for commenting on Scripture’s literal sense. He states that two aspects of Scripture—in harmony with right reason—must be kept in mind: the material and the formal aspects.67 As regards the material aspect of sacred Scripture, 65. “. . . quoniam fidei actus coniungitur obiecto materiali, idest creditis, per hoc medium, quia Deus dixit seu revelavit; et ipse habitus fidei inclinat mentem ad assentiendum propositis propterea quia Deus sic revelavit; sed quod haec vel illa, in hoc vel illo sensu, sint revelata, quia Ecclesia sic tradit credimus. Et rursus revelatio divina est infallibilis regula per se conveniens fidei: sensus autem Ecclesiae per accidens convenit fidei, ex parte idest nostri, quibus haec proponuntur. . . .” (Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. x); cf. In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. iv. 66. “Rursum scriptum est. Scripturam citasti; scito hanc scripturam non esse solam, et oportere scripturam scripturae consentire” (Cajetan, In Matth., 4.7, in Opera Omnia, 4:17a). “Scripturus super quinque libros Mosi iuxta sensum literalem, novumque scripturae sensum quandoque illaturus, sub sanctae matris ecclesiae ac apostolicae sedis censura, rogo lectores ne preacipites detestentur aliquid, sed librent omnia apud sacram scripturam, apud Christianae fidei veritatem, apud catholicae ecclesiae documenta ac mores. Etsi quando occurrerit novus sensus textui consonus, nec a sacra scriptura, nec ab ecclesiae doctrina dissonus quamvis a torrente doctorum sacrorum alienus, aequos se praebeant censores” (Cajetan, In Pentateuchum, Preface, in Opera Omnia, 1:1a). 67. “Circa sensum autem literalis duo (ambo rationi consentanea: altera circum rem: alterum circa modum) servare oportet” (Cajetan, In Ps, Prooemium, in Opera Omnia, 3:3a).

226  The Habit of Theology God instrumentally moves the prophet according to the totality of his being, incorporating all of the prophet’s human knowledge, talents, and skills; thus, if the prophet writes a song, the song is the material unit of that particular prophetic revelation.68 As regards the formal modes of certainty concerning the literal sense of the psalms, Cajetan lists four: (1) the revealed title of the psalm indicates the theme; (2) a consonance with the revealed authority of the New Testament; (3) the apostolic rule (regula apostolica); (4) the general setting of the psalm. Cajetan places special emphasis on the second (Scripture interprets Scripture) and third (the apostolic rule) modes for analyzing or commenting on the literal sense.69 The principle of Scripture interpreting Scripture (n. 2) presupposes a consonance with the apostolic rule (n. 3), since both are formal modes of prophetic certainty—that is to say, they are the two aspects of divine revelation.70 As was stated above, Cajetan’s biblical commentaries also seek a harmony with the Church’s magiste68. “Circa rem quidem, quod quilibet Psalmus habet unicam materiam, & non saltat de genere in genus. . . . Exigit quidem materiae subiectae ipsa unius cantici ratio, probat communis usus scribentium exposcitque divina sapientia disponens omnia suaviter ac per hoc movens prophetam ad scribendum, prout homini congruit scribere unum canticum, quod est servare unitatem materiae in uno eademque cantico” (Cajetan, In Ps, Prooemium, in Opera Omnia, 3:3a). 69. “Circa modum verò, meminisse decet: quòd quemadmodum homo docilis non parem exigit certitudinem in omnibus . . . ita docilis nullus exiget hic evidentem, omnimodam certitudinem: sed admittet certitudinem ex contextu partium consurgentem. . . . Primò ex titulo Psalmi, quando titutus materiam significat Psalmi. Et haec via sufficeret si omnes Psalmi tales haberent titulos. . . . Secundò ex autoritate sacrae Scripturae in novo Testamento. . . . Tertiò ex regula Apostolica. . . . Quo fit, ut ex horum apostolorum usu regulam didicerimus: quod psalmus quilibet Davidis ea de ipso dicens, quae de eo non verificantur, sed de Christo, intelligendus sit ad litteram de Messia. Et per locum ab opposito, quilibet Davidis psalmus in prima persona ea dicens de ipso quae de ipsomet verificantur, intelligendus est ad litteram de ipso Davide. . . . Quartò colligendo materiam ex contextu psalmi. Ubi enim quaelibet aliarum dictarum viarum decerit, hanc inquirere oportet materiam psalmi. Quocirca per has vias sensum litteralem investigavi, & exposui utcunque” (Cajetan, In Ps, Prooemium, in Opera Omnia, 3:3a–b). 70. As was mentioned above, the “apostolic rule” or “canon of faith”—the Creed—is necessary for determining the literal sense of sacred Scripture. Interpretation is an intellective act of judgment. If there is no reference point or “measure of truth” (Irenaeus, Adversus Haeresis, 1, 22, 1: κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας), a judgment on the “divine meaning” of any passage in sacred Scripture—which, according to Aquinas, is the literal sense and simply exceeds human reason—cannot be made.

Method   227 rium—a necessary created condition for guaranteeing the integrity of the material object of faith. Luther regarded Scripture as a sufficient cause (sola scriptura) of the material object of faith. In addition, he held the habit of faith (sola fide) as a sufficient formal mode for the interpretation of Scripture with absolute certainty.71 This drastically differs from Aquinas’s notion of a virtual material sufficiency in Scripture—“sola canonica scriptura est regula fidei.”72 In brief, sacred Scripture— the written expression of the material object of faith—virtually contains the whole of theology. Aquinas even affirms that the psalms alone virtually contain “all of theology,” “the whole of Scripture” and “that it almost seems the Gospel”; they contain the complete and universal doctrine of creation, providence, reparation through the Incarnation, and glorification.73 As was noted, when dealing with Scotus’s notion of the subject of a science as a sufficient cause in itself, Cajetan argued that the subject of theology as a science— the articles of faith—virtually contain the whole of theology, not as a sufficient cause in se, but rather as dependent on and in continuity with the secondary causality of the habit of theology, by which (quo) theological conclusions are deduced from the articles of faith. According to Cajetan, the articles of faith virtually contain the whole of theology, inasmuch they are a certain participation in 71. “When it is said that Luther’s sola scriptura is part of the Occamistic heritage, the basis for such an assumption can be found only in a letter Luther wrote his teacher Trutvetter on 9 May 1518. In answer to Trutvetter’s obviously severe criticisms of the Ninety-five Theses, Luther says that Trutvetter was indeed the very first to teach him that ‘one owes faith only to the canonical books, and a serious hearing to all others (authorities).’ Now apart from the fact that it is a common medieval dictum that only the literal sense of Holy Scripture can provide for a theological assertio, it is precisely Ockham and the Occamists, in contradistinction to the nominalist Gregory of Rimini, who uphold Scripture and tradition as the basis of theology. Hence Trutvetter’s teaching on this point is by no means an ‘extra-occamisticum.’ Rather to the contrary! Luther reminds his teacher of a basic principle which, when carried through, means the reform—or the end—of all scholastic theology” (Oberman, “Headwaters of the Reformation: Initia Lutheri—Initia Reformationis,” 63–64); and “A new conception of the role of Scripture arises amid the initia reformationis. . . . With Luther and consonant with a never-forgotten medieval tradition, Scripture is read as the only convincing basis for settling theological questions. But among those involved in the initia reformationis, Scripture is elevated to the same rank as sola gratia and sola fide” (ibid., 49). 72. Aquinas, Super Ioan., cap. 21, lect. 6. 73. Aquinas, Super Ps, prol.

228  The Habit of Theology God’s own knowledge of himself. Nonetheless, in our theology in via the articles of faith are known under a certain aspect or formal mode, that is to say, according to the first and supreme foundation of divine causality. This is why and how the articles of faith come to form the macrostructure of the ST (ordo disciplinae). Moreover, faith’s certain knowledge of the articles of faith is totally dependent on the mediation and formal causality of prophecy (Christ, apostolic Tradition, and Scripture). Thus, the theologian—as a believer— is ultimately dependent on God as revealer and uncreated rule of faith, who communicates to humankind his own intimate knowledge of himself through the necessary and created conditions of sacred Scripture and the apostolic rule, and who also guarantees the material object of faith through the Church’s magisterium—the created rule of faith. Thus, prophecy is the formal mode for the certitude of sacred Scripture’s literal sense and thus is the foundation of theological demonstration.74 This completes the section on the theological method, which embraces both reasoning in theology and judgment in biblical exegesis. The concluding section of this chapter will unite Cajetan’s theological reasoning, biblical exegesis, and his “ecumenical” sensitivities toward Luther in a brief examination of his explication of the literal sense of Matthew 16:18–19 in his De divina institutione pontificatus Romani Pontificis.

Cajetan—A Biblical-Ecumenical Theologian? A closer examination of Cajetan’s work as a biblical exegete reveals an ecumenical sensitivity to the theological realities raised by Luther in particular. 74. Michael O’Connor notes Cajetan’s distrust of sibylline oracles and the cabala; see Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 216–19. The cause of this distrust is simply that these prophecies do not belong to the faith and do not possess the “divine certitude” needed for theological argumentation or preaching: “. . . hoc solum dicendum occurit, quod Sybyllae, quae hic inter daemonum prophetas computantur, superius, in qu. II, art. 7, ad 3, inter personas in fide Christi explicite salvatas computari videntur. Materias siquidem haec, incerta cum sit, quoniam de individuis non pertinentibus ad fidem est” (Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 172, a. 6, n. un.).

Method   229 Recently a book written by the Reverend Cardinal of St. Sixtus has appeared, which completely refrains from attacking persons and avoids all insults. He treats his subject cleanly with arguments and texts of authorities, matching his astuteness with laborious effort. Would that Luther were attacked by six hundred books like this, which illuminate the subject without striking riots. Everyone would want to learn.75

These words are taken from a letter written on August 13, 1521 by the Dutch Renaissance humanist Desiderius Erasmus. Considering Erasmus’s strong anti-Scholastic stance, his high praise of Cajetan’s De divina institutione pontificatus Romani Pontificis (February 18, 1521)—a systematic refutation of Luther’s theological and biblical arguments against the divine institution of papal primacy— as a model of objectivity, brevity, and erudition is significant.76 In fact, Cajetan’s De divina institutione certainly influenced Erasmus’s own exegesis of Mt 16:18–19.77 In his 1516 Annotationes, Erasmus was astounded at those who so easily twisted these verses in favor of the papacy.78 In his 1522 Paraphrase on Matthew, however, Erasmus significantly changes his position, affirming that Peter, the prince of the apostolic order, was indeed personally granted—through an inspiration from the Heavenly Father—the sure confession 75. Erasmus, Epistle 1225, nn. 215–20, in The Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 1122– 1251, vol. 8, trans. Roger A. B. Mynors (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 276. 76. In De divina institutione, Cajetan “framed his teaching in the light of Luther’s rejection of papal primacy.” Michael Miller, The Divine Right of the Papacy in Recent Ecumenical Theology (Rome: Università Gregoriana Editrice, 1980), 30. The papal bull Exsurge Domine (1520) condemned the following statement (n. 25 of the 41 condemned propositions) attributed to Luther: “Romanus Pontifex, Petri successor, non est Christi vicarius super omnes totius mundi ecclesias ab ipso Christo in beato Petro institutus” (DS 1475). 77. See Erasmus, Contemporaries of Erasmus: A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation, vols. 1–3, ed. Peter G. Bietenholz and Thomas B. Deutscher (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 1:240–41. Cf. André-François von Gunten, “Cajétan dans la correspondance d’Erasme,” in Pinchard and Ricci, Rationalisme analogique et humanisme théologique: La culture de Thomas de Vio ‘Il Gaetano’, 297–323. 78. “Therefore I am astonished that there are those who twist this verse to the pope (in whom, no, doubt, they seek the founder of the Christian faith in the first place. But not on this one man, but on all Christians, which Origen elegantly points out in this first homily of those which we have [1519 addition].) But there are those to whom nothing is enough save what is out of proportion . . .” (Erasmus, Annotationes on the New Testament; translation quoted from Jenkins and Preston, Biblical Scholarship and the Church, 249). For Cajetan’s familiarity with Erasmus’s Annotationes, see O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 135.

230  The Habit of Theology of Christ’s identity according to a certain and indubitable judgement: You, He says, who ought to know rightly about me, who do you say that I am? Here Simon Peter, as he was the most loved by Jesus, [and] as the future prince of the apostolic order, responded in the name of all: Thou art the very Christ, the Son of the living God, not bringing forth a suspicion, but rather confessing with a certain and indubitable judgment [sententia] that he is the Messiah promised by the prophets, and—in a singular manner— the Son of God. Jesus, delighting in this glad and solid profession, Blessed art thou—he says—Simon, son of John. This word is not given to you (tibi) by human affection, but rather the Heavenly Father placed it—by a secret inspiration—in [your] mind. For no one—in a worthy manner—knows the Son, except by the inspiration of the Father, who alone knows the Son. And not desiring to be thankless for the marvellous testimony with which you adorned me, I affirm that you are truly Peter [te vere Petrum esse], that is to say the solid rock: not wavering here and there according to the opinions of the common people: on this rock of your profession [saxo tuae professionis], I will build my church—that is to say—my house and palace, that such a communion is fixed onto an immovable foundation, which no powers from the reign of Tartarus can prevail against.79

Equally telling is the stony silence on the Protestant side regarding Cajetan’s De divina institutione.80 Sometimes the best—or only— defense against a good argument is to ignore it. Hence, De divina institutione deserves a second look not only because of its direct influence on Cajetan’s contemporaries and its future influence on the First Vatican Council’s dogmatic pronouncement on papal primacy and infallibility, but also because of its perennial ecumenical spirit.81 79. Erasmus, “Paraphrase on Matthew,” chap. 16, in Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami Opera Omnia Emendatiora Et Avctiora, vol. 7, ed. Jean Le Clerc and Wallace K. Ferguson (Charleston, S.C.: Nabu Press, 2011), 92–93; translation is my own. 80. See Wicks, Cajetan Responds, 31. 81. Archbishop Vincent Ferrer Gasser’s relatio to the council fathers of Vatican I, on July 11, 1870, cites chapters 9 and 11 of Cajetan’s Comparison (cf. Acta et Decreta Sacrosancti Oecumeni Concilii Vaticani, 7 [Freiburg: Herder, 1892], 391). Cajetan’s De divina institutione, however, more clearly expounds that papal primacy is immediately from God and revealed in sacred Scripture. Fidelity to the truth of the faith concerning the divine institution of the papacy is both a motivator and guarantor of a true ecumenical spirit; cf. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Ut unum sint (May 25, 1995), 14.

Method   231 It may seem not only anachronistic, but also very paradoxical and provocative to refer to Cajetan as ecumenical. Nevertheless, in his Oxford address “St. Thomas Aquinas and the Spirit of Ecumenism,” Yves Congar’s reasons for speaking—with great caution— of Aquinas and the spirit of ecumenism, are equally, or even more, applicable to Cajetan.82 Congar notes that in ecumenism “one must hold to more ‘catholic’ principles of orthodoxy and judgment,” which is why Aquinas “awarded theological marks” to his opponents with care.83 A lack of theological precision was the reasoning behind Cajetan’s opposition to the global condemnation of the forty-one propositions in Exsurge Domine, the declaration which ineffectively threatened Luther with excommunication.84 “If ecumenism lives”—as Congar states—“in the recognition of the other and the effort to understand him,”85 then it can be noted that Cajetan truly endeavored “to discriminate between Luther’s gauche formulations that could well disturb the faithful (piis auribus offensiva) and clear-cut matters of error or heresy.”86 In De divina institutione, Cajetan’s main thesis is that the authority of the pope is immediately from God and revealed in sacred Scripture.87 It is with this authentic evangelical insight that he debates Luther. Cajetan puts into practice the theological method expounded in ST I, q. 1, a. 8, by defending sacred doctrine against Luther’s negation of one of its divinely revealed principles. He confronts Luther’s heresy— concerning the divine institution of the papacy by the will and deed of Christ—within the interconnected fabric of sacred Scripture.88 82. See Yves Congar, “St. Thomas Aquinas and the Spirit of Ecumenism,” New Blackfriars 55, no. 648 (1974): 201. 83. Ibid., 203 84. See Wicks, Cajetan Responds, 30. 85. Congar, “St. Thomas Aquinas and the Spirit of Ecumenism,” 201. 86. Wicks, Cajetan Responds, 30. 87. Cf. Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 15. 88. In commenting on the nature of heresy as addressed in the ST, Cajetan states that propositions can be against the faith secundum se in two distinct modes: either they are directly contrary to the articles of the faith and sacred Scripture or they are directly contrary to the determination of the faith made by the Church; see Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 11, a. 1, n. ii. According to Cajetan, Luther’s denial of the divine institution of papal primacy was a heresy because it went directly contrary to the literal sense of sacred Scripture. As

232  The Habit of Theology Luther’s theological method demanded the absolute clarity and perfect certainty of sacred Scripture, so that the people of God, the hidden Church, could objectively know the path of salvation without any dependency on an ecclesiastical hierarchy (who, according to Luther, were not discharging their office for the most part) for the correct sense or interpretation of sacred Scripture.89 In his exegesis of Matthew 16:18–19 in De divina institutione, Cajetan openly admits—along with St. Augustine—that the literal sense of this passage is obscure and that the spiritual sense is much more clear. He goes on to argue, however, that it would be intolerable for the spiritual sense to exclude the literal. It is beyond the scope of this present study to examine Cajetan’s entire scriptural contribution in De divina institutione; therefore, we will focus on the literal and spiritual senses of Matthew, 16:18–19 as explicated in chapter 3: “The Keys are Promised not only to the Person of the Church, but also to the Person of Peter in se.”90 As noted above, the controversy with Luther gave Cajetan an occasion to reframe his ecclesiological focus from the head-body (caput-corpus) schema of De comparatione (1511) to the foundationedifice (fundamentum-aedificium) schema of De divina institutione (1522). A key development in this shift was Cajetan’s clear distinction between the pope’s power to define (officium fundamenti) and his power of jurisdiction (officium clavium). As regards the officium clavium, Luther affirmed that the Universal Church—and not PeErasmus notes: “Luther recognizes no authority of any author . . . except that of the canonical books” (Desiderius Erasmus, “The Free Will,” In Discourse on Free Will: Erasmus-Luther, by Desiderius Erasmus and Martin Luther, ed. & trans. Ernst F. Winter [London: Continuum 2007], 12). Thus, Cajetan addresses Luther’s denial of the divine institution of papal primacy—by the will and deed of Christ—with a detailed exegesis of the literal sense of Matthew 16:16–18. 89. See Martin Luther, “Refutation of Erasmus’ Introduction,” in Discourse on Free Will, ed. Winter, 101. As regards the “hidden church” and the unity of the Church made visible by the soul of the Church, which is charity; see Charles Morerod, “La controverse entre Cajétan et Luther à propos de l’excommunication à Ausbourg,” in Pinchard and Ricci, Rationalisme analogique et humanisme théologique: La culture de Thomas de Vio ‘Il Gaetano’, 273–74; and Charles Journet, “L’âme créée de l’Église selon Cajétan,” Revue thomiste 17 (1934–1935): 266–74. 90. Cf. Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 16–25.

Method   233 ter—was given the power of the keys.91 Moreover, this also seems to be the consensus of the Church Fathers.92 Cajetan states that the Church Fathers’ understanding that Peter—when accepting the keys—signifies the Church can be comprehended in two ways: first, that the Church accepts the keys when Peter accepts the keys; second, that the person of Peter does not accept the keys (implying that only the person of the Church accepts the keys). To negate the first way, which has the consensus of the Church Fathers, would be erroneous; while to affirm the second, that the person of Peter does not accept the keys, would be not merely erroneous but heretical, since it would negate the Gospel’s historical sense; that is to say, the literal sense would be converted into the spiritual.93 Cajetan declares that when it is said to Peter, “And I will give to you the keys” (Et tibi dabo claves—Mt 16:19), if indeed by Peter— not in his own person but merely through him—the person of the Church is signified, and if it is held that Peter is understood in the spiritual (parabolicus) sense rather than the historical or literal sense, then all sorts of license could be taken to convert any literal or historical passage of Scripture into the spiritual sense. For even Christ’s death and resurrection could then be taken as a mere parables; since we die through sin, and the resurrection would thus signify our rising to new life. Such license would destroy the faith in the historical events as narrated in sacred Scripture.94 Some biblical passages are simply meant as parables and thus require a metaphorical reading as their literal sense. Cajetan cites 91. “Patet ergo testimonio omnium publico, non Petro, sed ecclesiae esse claves traditas, non Romanae, sed universali et cuilibet” (Luther’s Resolutio as quoted in De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 16n1), and “Vides ergo adhuc nihil ad Petrum proprie pertinere, nisi quod commune organum est omnium apostolorum” (ibid., 19n1). 92. As was noted above, in his 1519 addition to the Annotationes, Erasmus argued that Origen held that not to this “one man” (Peter), but to all Christians was given the sure confession of faith. In De divina institutione, Cajetan refers to St. Augustine’s De doctrina christiana, 1.1, 17 (PL 34:25), and also to Cyprian’s authority that the Universal Church, not just Peter, was given the power of the keys; see Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 19. 93. See Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 19. 94. Ibid., 19–20.

234  The Habit of Theology from Luke 15 the example of the prodigal son, in whom is signified the sinner.95 Biblical parables, by their context, are clearly not historical narratives. On the other hand, narrated historical events (the literal sense) in Scripture can indeed signify other things or realities (in a spiritual sense), just as the crossing through the Red Sea signifies man’s passage from vice to virtue.96 Hence all care must be taken to correctly establish the things, events, or persons narrated in the literal or historical sense, because they form the foundation on which the spiritual senses are superadded. As was also stated, the literal sense is the foundation for theological argument. By contrast, the spiritual sense is for the edification of the faithful and not for argumentation in theological disputes.97 Therefore, for an orthodox understanding of the truth of the faith revealed in Matthew 16:18–19, it is necessary to maintain the historical sense and not to convert the person of Peter into a parabolic figure. In the literal and historical sense of this particular evangelical narrative—our Lord’s questioning of his disciples in the district of Caesarea Philippi—it is said that Jesus first listened to the other disciples’ responses and finally to Peter’s response, which was inspired by the Heavenly Father; then, Jesus promised to Peter the keys of the kingdom of heaven. The truth revealed in the literal sense is that to the person of Peter this promise was spoken, and thus only on the historical Peter can the spiritual or mystical sense of him signifying or representing the Church be superadded. In a similar manner, the historical Martha signifies the active life, and the historical Mary, the contemplative life. Moreover, it is through Peter that the keys are promised to the person of the Church (the spiritual sense), because, first of all, they were historically promised to the person of Peter (the literal sense).98 It would be intolerable for the mystical sense to exclude the literal sense, that is to affirm that the keys were promised to the 95. Ibid., 20. 96. Ibid. 97. Ibid. 98. Ibid., 20–21.

Method   235 person of the Church, while denying that they were first promised to the historical person of Peter.99 The consensus of the Church Fathers—which correctly affirms that the keys were promised to the person of the Church (in the spiritual sense)—does not contradict the literal sense that Peter first accepted the keys in his own person.100 Referring to St. Augustine’s commentary on Psalm 108, Cajetan highlights that St. Augustine identified a twofold sense in Matthew 16:19: the literal sense—which is verified in Christ’s words “to you, namely to Peter, I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven” (tibi id est Petro dabo claves regni coelorum)—and the mystical or spiritual sense—which is verified within those same words (through the person of Peter): “to you, namely to the Church signified by you, I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven” (tibi id est ecclesie significate per te dabo claves regni coelorum). The literal and spiritual senses of this passage are not juxtaposed to one another as if one is true and the other false; but rather to suggest that one is more clear than the other. In fact, St. Augustine held that—in Matthew 16:19—the mystical or spiritual sense was more clear than the literal: certain things are said concerning the Apostle Peter—which seem to properly belong to him—but do not have a clear meaning (illustrem intellectum) except when referred to the Church—of which his person is known to be the figure, on account of the primacy he has among the disciples; as when [it was said]: To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven.101 99. “Has autem Petri conditiones trahere mistica interpretatione ad ecclesiam, quamvis sustineri possit, intollerabile tamen est, ut sensus misticus excludat litteralem, Petrus excludat seipsam, auditor excludat eum qui audit, et Symon Ioannis vertatur in parabolicam personam” (Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 21). 100. “Unde Cypriani, Hieronymi et Augustini dicta quae obiiciendo allata sunt, verissima sunt, sed iuxta sensum misticum. Sed non adversantur senui litterali, quo (ut evangelica testatur historia) ipse Petrus in propria persona, cui revelatio facta est, respondit, claviumque promissionem accepit” (Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 23). 101. St. Aurelius Augustinus, “In Psalmo CVIII,” Ennarationes in Psalmos, Opera Omnia, PL 36:1431–32: “Sicut enim quaedam dicuntur quae ad apostolum Petrum proprie pertinere videantur, nec tamen habent illustrem intellectum, nisi cum referuntur ad Ecclesiam, cuius ille agnoscitur in figura gestasse personam, propter primatum quem in discipulis habuit; sicuti est: Tibi dabo claves regni coelorum.”

236  The Habit of Theology This lack of a clear meaning does not deny the truth of the literal or historical sense—that the keys are first given to the person of Peter—but does account for the prominence of the spiritual sense in the explications of the Church Fathers.102 To St. Cyprian’s affirmation—that the unity of the apostles, and not just one apostle, accepted the keys—Cajetan applies the same reasoning: if you negate that the one Peter received the keys, you negate the literal sense and the historicity of the Gospel.103 According to Cajetan, the unity of the Church flows from the one who literally received the keys, namely the person of Peter.104 Thus, as a biblical exegete, Cajetan contributed to the dogmatic development of the Church’s more profound understanding of the divine institution of papal infallibility and primacy as regards both its officium fundamenti and officium clavium. The essence of Cajetan’s exegetical and theological insights on the papacy are consonant with the First Vatican Council’s magisterium: For no one can be in doubt, indeed it was known in every age [perennial] that the holy and most blessed Peter, prince and head of the apostles, the pillar of faith and the foundation of the Catholic Church, received the keys of the kingdom from our Lord Jesus Christ, the saviour and redeemer of the human race, and that to this day and for ever he lives and presides and exercises judgment in his successors the bishops of the holy Roman see, which he founded and consecrated with his blood [the martyriological structure of papal primacy].105

Cajetan’s explication of the relation between the order of the Church (hierarchical and Christocentric) and the order of our theology (ordo disciplinae)106 as flowing from and subalternate to 102. See Cajetan, De divina institutione, ed. Lauchert, 23–24. 103. Ibid., 19. 104. Ibid., 43. 105. Vatican Council I, Pastor aeternus, n. 3056 (July 18, 1870). Joseph Ratzinger describes the “martyriological structure” of papal primacy in Church, Ecumenism and Politics (Middlegreen, U.K.: St Paul Publications, 1988), 37–38. 106. As was shown above, the articles of faith—those concerning the Trinity (theologia, the ordo originis) and the Incarnation (oikonomia)—are the structuring principles of the ordo disciplinae. The certitude of articles of faith is guaranteed through the charism of prophecy, which is attributed to the person of the Holy Spirit.

Method   237 the order of origins—the theologia Dei—is what makes his singular contribution toward a more profound understanding of sacred doctrine original, perennial, and ecumenical, that is to say, universal or catholic. As was affirmed above, theology—like metaphysics—does not prove its own principles. They are grasped (in modo intellectualiter) through the habit of faith and judged in an intellective act that flows from the habit of theology, and are all the while dependent on prophecy for the certitude of the truths of the faith. To deny the Petrine ministry its place within the structure of the faith and the structure of the Church is to deny what belongs to the revealed divine economy (τάξις θεολογίας); thus, the negation of the Petrine ministry has always been considered as heretical (well before it was defined at Vatican I) because it simply contradicts the literal and historical sense of sacred Scripture. In his 1527 commentary on Matthew 16:18–19, Cajetan summarizes his earlier doctrinal understanding of the papacy without, however, engaging in any polemics whatsoever.107 His goal in his scriptural commentaries was to explicate the literal sense. Cajetan was also well aware of the temptation for the papacy to gravitate toward the mundane.108 Hence, in Cajetan’s commentary on Matthew, he introduces some qualifications to the papacy, as Michael O’Connor notes: “the gates of hell may certainly not prevail against the Church; but this is not a promise that temporal powers, wealth and comforts will be preserved;”109 “[a]ny temporal power claimed by Peter can only be justified if it is necessary to the kingdom of heaven;”110 the pope’s “power to bind on earth” is qualified 107. “Vide huius lectionis mysteria per nos latius discussa in opusculo De institutione pontificatus a Iesu Christo, ne eadem repetamus” (Cajetan, In Matth., 16.18, in Opera Omnia, 4:76a). 108. Cf. O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 86, and Morerod, Cajetan et Luther en 1518, 18–20. 109. Cajetan, In Matth., 16.18, in Opera Omnia, 4:76a: “‘Non dicit adversus delicias, divitias, temporalesque potentatus eius, sed adversus eam, quae constat ex congregatione fidelium in una fide, spe et charitate. Immo quanto contra ecclesiae temporalia magis praevaluerunt, tanto magis ecclesiae aucta est numero, vel merito, ut patet in actibus apostolorum, gestis martyrum et comparatione ecclesiae divitis ad olim pauperem.” Translation by O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 86. 110. Cajetan, In Matth., 16.19, in Opera Omnia, 4:76b: “Tota Petri potestas refertur ad

238  The Habit of Theology by excluding “any power over those under the earth, in hell, and in purgatory,” and any suggestion “that such binding and loosing [of those under the earth, etc.] would be automatically ratified in heaven is not only foolish but blasphemous;”111 and, finally, “Peter must confirm, not dominate; the other apostles are his brothers, not his subjects.”112 In his commentaries on Exodus and Leviticus, Cajetan also rejects as unscriptural the link—prevalent during the Renaissance—between the high priest Aaron’s headgear and the papal triple tiara: the tiara was made of silk and gold, when only linen is prescribed in Scripture.113 In conclusion, St. John Paul II’s call—in his encyclical letter Ut unum sint—for “the whole lesson of the Gospel . . . [to] be constantly read anew, so that the exercise of the Petrine ministry may lose regnum coelorum, ad gubernandum mundum in ordine ad regnum coelorum, in ordine ad salutem animarum, in ordine ad ea quibus regnum coelorum in hominibus servatur ac augetur quae constant esse bona spiritualia. Quo fit ut temporalia non comprehendantur sub potestate Petri, nisi relata ad spiritualia.” Translation by O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 86. 111. Cajetan, In Matth., 16.19, in Opera Omnia, 4:76b: “Limitabitur hinc potestas Petri ad ea quae super terram liganda, aut solvenda sunt, ad differentiam eorum quae sunt sub terra, qualia sunt quae sunt apud inferos aut purgatorium. Illa enim sicut exempta sunt a cognitione Petri, non enim potest Petrus cognoscere causas eorum, ita exempta sunt a iurisdictione Petri. Transierunt siquidem a foro militantis ecclesiae ad forum Iesu Christi regnantis in coelo”; and “Admiranda efficacia ut ligatio a Petro facta super terram penetret coelos, sed tam stupenda efficacia quemadmodum terribilis est ligatio a Petro, ita libranda traditur ab ipso Petro. Colligere siquidem hinc potest, et debet quod non ad libitum ligat super terram, sed tunc tantum quando vinculum ratificatur in coelis, alioquin voluntarias immo etiam malas Petri ligationes et solutiones, coelestis cogeretur curia approbare, quod est non solum stultum, sed blasphemum.” Translation by O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 87. 112. Cajetan, In Luc., 22.32, in Opera Omnia, 4:265a: “Officium confirmandi fratres praedicit futurum Petri. Et hinc tollit occasionem recidivae contentionis. Sed vide quod non subditos sed fratres vult haberi reliquos a Petro. Vide quod officium non dominandi, sed confirmandi in bono fidei, spei et charitatis praenunciat ac mandat.” Translation by O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 87–88. 113. “Veruntamen in litera, neque hic, neque in Levit. tam octavo quam decimoseptimo invenitur cidaris, nisi linea. Multa enim de his ornamentis referuntur quae faciliter reiici possunt, quia scripturae authoritate carent. Distinguitur tamen in mitram et pileum, seu tiaram, ut patebit” (Cajetan, In Ex., 28.4, I, 238a); “Ubi clare vides non sericam, aut auream, sed lineam scribi mitram pontificis” (In Ex., 28.39, I, 242b); “Attende prudens lector quod in sancto sanctorum Pontifex nec auratis nec sericis utebatur, sed mere lineis” (Commentaria in Leviticum, 16.4, in Opera Omnia, 1:307a). Cf. O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 90–91.

Method   239 nothing of its authenticity and transparency,”114 should include Cajetan’s various theological works on the papacy—and most especially his reading anew of the Gospels in his biblical commentaries—as an important testimony in the patient and fraternal dialogue on this subject.115 It is beyond the scope of this book, but it would also be fruitful to examine Cajetan’s doctrine on papal primacy and infallibility in the light of the Second Vatican Council’s development of doctrine on the episcopal college, most especially with reference to how episcopal collegiality is bound by previous papal and magisterial acts. As Cajetan noted, every pope binds himself and his successors when he exercises the papal charism of defining matters of faith on account of the divine assistance present in that act, which is handed down in the Church through the divine light of Tradition, preserving a continuity and unity of faith in every epoch.116 As a biblical exegete, Cajetan sought to hear (sentire cum ecclesia) the Heavenly Father’s voice—as recorded in Holy Writ—unveiling, within the economy of salvation history, the divine institution of the papacy; as a speculative theologian, he sought to explicate— from that divinely revealed article of faith concerning the Petrine ministry—what is perennial and universal (catholic) in the papacy’s officium fundamenti and officium clavium; and, as a theologian in the service of the suffering Renaissance Church, he sought the Church’s renewal by a return to its origins and through a profound analysis of what was reformable in the papacy and in the Church itself.117 Cajetan’s life-long labor—as a speculative theologian, bib114. John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Ut unum sint (May 25, 1995), n. 93. 115. Ibid., n. 96. 116. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, n. v. 117. Cf. “1.2 Cajetan et la réforme de l’Eglise,” in Morerod, Cajetan et Luther en 1518, 15– 22. O’Connor comments on Cajetan’s thoughts on the reform of the liturgy: “He complains about the excesses of some liturgical music: it is better to have none at all, than to have an unintelligible cacophony. He claims the authority of Paul in support of vernacular prayers (echoing the opinion, but not the tone, of Erasmus on the same passage). Where prayers are said publicly, in the hearing of both clergy and people, it would contribute more to the building up of the Church if they were said in the vernacular” (O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 80–81). On liturgical music, see Cajetan, In I Cor., 13.19, in Opera

240  The Habit of Theology lical exegete, and church reformer—took its origin in and flowed from his acquired habit of theology, which was the particular object of this present study. Omnia, 5:137a–b. On prayers said in the vernacular, see In I Cor., 14.17, in Opera Omnia, 5:137a: “dici lingua communi clericis et populo, quam dici latine;” cf. also Responsiones, in Opera Omnia, 470. For Cajetan’s thoughts on communion under both species and clerical marriage, see O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 53, and Wicks, Cajetan Responds, 288n5.

Conclusion

Conclusion

Conclusion Perennial Truths in the End Times

Cajetan played a key role in the Thomism of the Renaissance with the first-ever publication of a commentary on the entire ST, part of a deliberate plan to promote and increase Aquinas’s influence in the Church. As a highly trained logician and theologian, he unpacked from within the ST”s opening syllogism sacred doctrine’s four causes. He also set forth a coherent division of the ten articles of the first question. He touched the mind of Aquinas when revealing the articles of the Apostles’ Creed as the macrostructure underlying the whole ST. In addition, Cajetan’s accomplishments as a biblical exegete made him a true Renaissance scholar and a forerunner in the ecumenical dialogue with the Protestants. Finally, his grasp of the nature of theology—its perennial aspects and intrinsic relation to the faith and the Church—continue to make him an important interlocutor in today’s search for unity within a plurality of theologies. As a theologian in his own right, Cajetan was influenced by his own particular Sitz im Leben. He suffered along with the Renaissance Church, most especially during the Sack of Rome in 1527. He regarded this apocalyptic event as God’s just chastisement of Rome’s corrupt clergy.1 His insightful biblical and theological explication 1. The Sack of Rome marked the end of maturity and beginning of old age not only for the Renaissance, but also for Cajetan. Prior to the Sack, Cajetan had written the first two chapters of his commentary on the Gospel of Matthew in Rome. After the Sack, he fled to Gaeta, where he continued the Matthean commentary. In his commentary on chapter 5, we find his only reflection on the Sack: “Experimur et speciali modo hoc nunc nos Ecclesiae

241

242  Conclusion of the office of the papacy not only contributed to the future development of doctrine regarding the papal charism of infallibility, but it also enabled him, during his lifetime, to distinguish between the papal office and the pope as a mere man who was never promised by Christ the charism of impeccability, and who could personally err in matters of faith. Cajetan never yielded to passive scandal even in the presence of Renaissance popes, some of whom were the most disreputable in the Church’s long history. In Gaeta, less than a year after the Sack, commenting on Luke 18:8—“when the Son of man comes, will he find faith on earth?”—he made this dire observation: This passage makes me apprehensive that the falling away of Christian faith, of which we are the witness—something not in its initial stages but far advanced—will not be remedied but will continue to spread. I am not a Prophet, nor am I the son of a Prophet, but we seem to be travelling headlong toward the fulfillment of this text. A great part of the world is certainly Mohammedan and the small part left to Christians is filled with so many heresies, schisms, and abuses that the number of true believers now seems very small. Now I call true believers those who profess the Christian faith both in words and deeds.2

According to Cajetan, the narrative of the progressive historical decline of Christendom is a revealed truth.3 This theological praelati Romae, in praedam, direptionem atque captivitatem dati, non infidelibus, sed Christianis iustissimo Dei iudicio: quia quum in sal terrae electi essemus, evanuimus ac ad nihilum utiles nisi ad externas cerimonias externaque bona. Conculcati etiam corporali captivitate sumus, cum direptione et captivitate totius urbis, die 6. Maii, hoc anno 1527” (Cajetan, In Matth., 5.13, in Opera Omnia, 4:24a). For more on the Sack of Rome and Cajetan, see O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, 74–75. 2. Cajetan, In Luc., 8.18; translation from William Seaver, “Cardinal Cajetan Renaissance Man,” Dominicana 44, no. 4 (1959): 366. 3. Cf. Cajetan, Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. II ad Thessalonicenses (hereafter In II Thess.), 2.3, in Omnia Opera, 5:286b. The Catechism of the Catholic Church clearly teaches that the “kingdom will be fulfilled, then, not by a historic triumph of the Church through a progressive ascendancy, but only by God’s victory over the final unleashing of evil” (CCC 677), which will include the unveiling “of the “mystery of iniquity” in the form of a religious deception offering men an apparent solution to their problems at the price of apostasy from the truth” (CCC 675). For a detailed study and critique—through various, yet intrinsically intertwined, domains such as theology, ecclesiology, morality, economics and education—of the predominant crypto-Hegelian worldview that presupposes a supersessionist model of historical progressivism, see Brad S. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How

Conclusion   243 truth—that we live in the last days or end times—is in opposition to the “ideology of progressivism,” which is detached from the reality of divine revelation and the mind of God, the very foundation of sacred doctrine and Cajetan’s theological worldview. Christendom was defined as the Roman Empire transfigured—as Aquinas taught—from the temporal into the spiritual through the preaching of the Gospel.4 Consequently, the “apostasy” that St. Paul catechizes about in his second letter to the Thessalonians, Cajetan interprets as a rebellion against or departure from the spiritual Roman Empire, namely the Oecumenical or Catholic Church.5 Nevertheless, at every stage of Cajetan’s theological ministry in the Church, he labored in Christian hope, mindful of the worsening state of intra-mundane affairs and aware that the resolution of history is ultimately outside of history.6 Creation and salvation history have their beginning and end in theologia—the inner life and intelligibility of the Trinity. Thus, in hope and not polemics, he critiqued Blessed John Duns Scotus, whose doctrine extinguished our theology’s participation in the divine light.7 As was noted, Scotus (1265–1308) separated and isolated God’s theology from our a Religious Revolution Secularized Society (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012). Cf. also Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948). 4. See Aquinas, Super II Thess., cap. 1, lect. 1. 5. See Cajetan, In II Thess., 2.3, in Opera Omnia, 5:286b. For a magisterial account of the role of Christendom as the converted Roman Empire; of the first signs of the great apostasy in the refusal of civil recognition of the Holy See’s authority in spiritual matters; and of the loss of a social profession of the Catholic faith by Christian nations, see Cardinal Henry Edward Manning’s series of four lectures published in 1861 and dedicated to John Henry Newman, reprinted as The Pope and the Antichrist: The Present Crisis of The Holy See Tested by Prophecy (Sainte-Croix du Mont, France: Tradibooks, 2007). 6. On Christian hope and the question of the end of history, see Josef Pieper, The End of Time: A Meditation on the Philosophy of History, trans. Michael Bullock (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999). In Über die Schwierigkeit heute zu glauben (cited in Joseph Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology: Approaches to Understanding Its Role in the Light of Present Controversy, trans. Adrian Walker [San Francisco: Ignatius Press 1995], 29), Josef Pieper made the apocalyptic statement that, at the end of history, faith will be the preserve of reason. 7. “Verba quoque erroris, falsitatis, deceptionis, ignorantiae, et aliorum huiusmodi, non contra personas, sed contra opiniones, et hoc etiam quatenus minus solidae sunt vel apparent, interpretanda esse volo: quoniam personis nullo pacto, opinionibus vero non nisi dissonant, adversari intendo” (Cajetan, In ST, prol., 5).

244  Conclusion theology. Since man’s intellect no longer was seen as participating in God’s own intelligibility or light, it did not take much for another Franciscan friar, William of Ockham (1300–1350), to further separate God from man with his new concept of freedom, involving a liberty of indifference (libertas indifferentiae) toward intrinsic good and evil.8 The Protestant Reformation was preceded by this theological fissure between the via antiqua—which understood man as ordered toward God as his supernatural end (theosis), and as endowed with a freedom, based on the intrinsic principles of the virtues and grace, to perform intrinsically good acts—and the via moderna, which understood both God’s and man’s freedom as indeterminate regarding intrinsic good and evil. In Ockham’s concept of freedom, man was no longer seen as intrinsically ordered, by nature and grace, to the good. External law became the sole criterion of the good, and morality became legalism. Hence, with goodness uprooted from its ontological foundation in God and nature, the law of the strongest became the sole rule (Machiavellianism).9 Within this milieu of decadent Scholasticism, wherein man suffered a progressive theological separation from God, Luther—heavily influenced in his initial theological formation by the Augustinian-nominalist Gregory of Rimini—denied the role of reason in theology (fideism). He also denied the intrinsic principle of free will in man and thus attributed to humans a purely extrinsic justification. Little wonder that Luther, although clinging to St. Augustine, selectively dismissed other Church Fathers, especially those like St. Gregory of Nazianzus, who defended the use of reason in theology, the value of pagan classical writers, and man’s 8. For the link between the metaphysical univocity of Scotus and neo-Darwinian atheism, see Amos Funkenstein, Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986). In his Regensburg address, Pope Benedict XVI noted the correlation between the voluntarism of Scotus and Ockham and the Islamic theology of Ibn Hazm; see Benedict, Papal Speech Meeting with the Representatives of Science at the University of Regensburg (September 12, 2006). 9. The latest offspring of the via moderna is the dictatorship of relativism, which abhors that Truth—the veritas prima—is a personal God; see Pope Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter Spe salvi (November 30, 2007), n. 5.

Conclusion   245 participation in the divine nature through theosis.10 Thus, Luther tersely concluded—Nazianzenus est nihil.11 The Renaissance was marked in particular by the humanist’s call for a return to the rhetorical culture not only of classical literature, but also of the works of the Church Fathers. Despite the lack of a focused return to patristics as a source within Renaissance Thomism, nonetheless there remains an affinity and symphony between Aquinas, Cajetan, and the Fathers concerning the nature of theology.12 Cajetan saw no opposition between Aquinas and the Church Fathers.13 On the contrary, according to him, Aquinas con10. “Faith completes our reasoning”: Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 29.21, in Grégoire de Nazianze: Discours 27–31, ed. Paul Gallay and Maurice Jourjon, Sources chrétiennes (hereafter SC) 250 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1978), 224; (my translation). For a sampling of Gregory’s thought: on the value of pagan classical writers, see Oration 2.7 in Grégoire de Nazianze: Discours 1–3, ed. Jean Bernardi, SC 247 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1978), 96–98, and Susanna Elm, Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church: Emperor Julian, Gregory of Nazianzus, and the Vision of Rome (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 162–63; on pagan philosophy as a handmaiden of theology and the “[s]tripping the roses of Hellenism of all their thorns,” see John A. McGuckin, “The Strategic Adaptation of Deification in the Cappadocians,” in Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions, ed. Michael J. Christensen and Jeffery A. Wittung (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2008), 112n20; and on the doctrine of theosis, see Oration 42.17, in Grégoire de Nazianze: Discours 42–43, ed. Jean Bernardi, SC 384 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1992), 86, and Vladimir Kharlamov, “Rhetorical Application of Theosis in Greek Patristic Theology,” in Christensen and Wittung, Partakers of the Divine Nature, 115–31, especially 123–28. All English translations of Gregory’s Orations are taken from A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1995); online http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3102.htm; unless “my translation” is indicated. 11. Luther, Luther’s Works, Weimarer Ausgabe, Tischreden, vol. 5, 154; cited in E. P. Meijering, Melanchthon and Patristic Thought: The Doctrines of Christ and Grace, and the Trinity and the Creation (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 63. The author notes that “Erasmus lists him [Nazianzus] amongst the greatest exegetes of the Bible” (ibid.). 12. The principle of the symphony of saints was common among the Renaissance Eastern hierarchs, such as Cardinal Bessarion, Cardinal Isidore of Kyiv, and John Beccus, the Patriarch of Constantinople, who sought a harmony between the teachings of the Greeks and the Latins; cf. Jacquilyne E Martin, “Cardinal Bessarion, Mystical Theology and Spiritual Union between East and West” (PhD. diss., University of Manitoba, 2000), 111–12, especially fn. 32. Cf. also Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 86. 13. In book 4 of his Eloquentiae (composed between 1435 and 1444) and in his Encomium s. Thomae, delivered from the pulpit in S. Maria sopra Minerva on March 7, 1457 (the feast of St. Thomas Aquinas), Lorenzo Valla sowed the modern bias of the irreconcilable opposition between the Patristics and the Scholastics; cf. Salvatore I. Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla: Umanesimo, riforma e controriforma. Studi e testi, (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 2002), 161; and Charles Stinger, Humanism and the Church Fathers: Ambrogio Traversari

246  Conclusion tinued the via antiqua by submitting to their doctrine and by assimilating, in a certain manner, the intellect of all the Fathers.14 It may be surprising to some, but, echoing these thoughts of Cajetan, Blessed Paul VI cast the mantle of the Church’s own post-Vatican-II magisterial authority over Aquinas’s doctrine in a manner uniquely greater than over any other individual Church Father or Doctor.15 During the Renaissance, the phrase “new learning” was synonymous not with humanism, but rather with Protestant theology. The humanists sought a “rebirth” or “renaissance” of the old: the via antiqua.16 This is why the Scholastic Cajetan and the humanist Erasmus found so much common ground.17 On the other hand, in his Augsburg Treatises of 1518, Cajetan had already accused Luther of constructing a “new church” on account of a “new confession” which breached the oecumenical communion (communio catholica).18 The continuity of Tradition is a manifestation of theology’s continuity with the divine light. The unity of faith is the foundation for a hermeneutic of complementariness between the Church Fathers and Thomism.19 Thus Cajetan’s theological labor was not a mere continuation of Capreolus’s defense of Aquinas’s doctrine, but rather a perpetuation of the via antiqua, a biblical-theological worldview, handed (1386–1439) and Christian Antiquity in the Italian Renaissance (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 59–60. 14. See Cajetan, In ST, II-II, q. 148, a. 4, n. vi. For Aquinas’s dependency on the Greek Fathers, see Godefroid Geenen, “Thomas D’Aquin et les Pères,” DTC 15/1:738–61; and Rosario Scognamiglio, “Prezenza dei Padri Greci in S. Tommaso,” in Istituto San Tommaso Studi 1995, ed. Dietrich Lorenz (Roma: Pontificia Università S. Tommaso D’Aquino, 1995), 17–44. 15. Cf. Paul VI, Apostolic Letter Lumen Ecclesiae (November 20, 1974), n. 22. 16. Cf. Diarmaid MacCulloch, Reformation: Europe’s House Divided (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 76–77. 17. On the misconception that Erasmus’s theological renewal entailed the complete rejection of Scholastic theology and its great figures, see Thomas Scheck, “Erasmus’s Edition of Origen,” in Tradition and the Rule of Faith in the Early Church, ed. Ronnie J. Rombs and Alexander Y. Hwang (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 311–13. 18. Cf. Wicks, Cajetan Responds, 268n17. 19. On the theological symphony between the Church Fathers and the Scholastic doctors, see the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Istruzione sullo studio dei Padri della Chiesa nella formazione sacerdotale (November 10, 1989), n. 60.

Conclusion   247 down through Tradition and echoed in Aquinas. St. Gregory of Nazianzus—known as the Theologian, a preeminent representative of the via antiqua and chief constructor of Christendom, and so emphatically rejected by Luther—makes a good candidate for a few reflections on the theological symphony created by his and Cajetan’s ideas on the permanent nature of theology, so that we might better highlight Cajetan’s lasting contributions. How one answers the question “what is sacred doctrine and to what does it extend?” defines how one grasps reality. The ontological foundation for Nazianzus’s and Cajetan’s theologies is the Trinity’s order of origins: theologia, the Trinity’s most intimate life, structures the economy of creation and salvation—the oikonomia.20 As was stated, sacred doctrine, whose source is the Trinity’s order of origins, is the framework of both creation and salvation—the order of reality (ordo rerum), and consequently the order of theology (ordo disciplinae). Cajetan’s originality, namely his rootedness in the origins, lies in his profound comprehension and articulation of the intrinsic relation between theologia and the oikonomia: “There is no other order of origins that can save, unless from the Father and the Son.”21 Our theology’s participation in and continuity with the divine light—the order of origins of Light from Light—is the formal object of our theology, while the articles of the Creed constitute its material object and virtually contain theology’s entire structure (ordo disciplinae). Hence, the Creed is the overarching hermeneutical key to reality, which harmoniously embraces philosophy and the other sciences.22 20. The ontological separation of the “immanent Trinity” in theologia and the “economic Trinity” in the oikonomia, often employed in the Catholic Trinitarian theology, is simply non-patristic in origin and inspiration; see Bruce Marshall, “The Unity of the Triune God: Reviving an Ancient Question,” The Thomist 74, no. 1 (2010): 8; and Christopher A. Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See Light (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 201. 21. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 36, a. 2, n. xxix. The ordo originis is a theological-structuring thread that weaves through the entire ST; cf. Aquinas, ST, I, q. 41, a. 1, ad 1; De pot., q. 10, a. 5, c.; Super Ioan., cap. 15, lect., 5. 22. The Creed is a summa, a summary of the divine Weltanschauung; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 1, ad 1.

248  Conclusion The Orthodox patristic scholar John Behr argues that ancient Church theology and biblical exegesis were structured as a rule according to the articles of faith.23 It is interesting to note that while Nazianzus’s theological orations follow various and random themes, nonetheless, his theological work of poetry, his most distinctive and creative opus, the Arcane Poems, possesses a creedal and syllogistic structure.24 As regards the creedal structure, Nazianzus is clearly influenced by Origen.25 He understands the “theological order” (τάξις θεολογίας) to be contained in the progressive revelation of the articles of faith.26 Moreover, he made good use of Aristotelian logic throughout the poems, as frequent syllogisms and enthymemes contribute to their structure.27 Finally, his choice of Homeric verse as a medium for “handing down” these divine truths possibly points to his desire to elucidate and locate the Christian creed and the role of the Logos symphonically within the oral poetic stream of the ancient tradition that flows through Homer. In harmony with Clement of Alexandria’s “song of the Logos,” Nazianzus 23. See John Behr, The Way to Nicea (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir Seminary Press, 2001), 33–35. The early Church Fathers consistently referred to a “rule of faith” (regula fidei—Tertullian, adv. Prax., 3) or a “canon of truth” (κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας–Irenaeus, Adversus Haeresis, 1, 22, 1) or an “ecclesiastical canon” (κανὼν εκκλησιαστικος—Clement of Alexandria, In Strom. 1.19.96; 6.15.125; 6.18.165; 7.7.41; 7.15.90; 7.16.105). Each of these various expressions of the same reality is intrinsically linked to the “canon of Scripture” (κανὼν τῶν γραφῶν), see Jonathan J. Armstrong, “The Relation of the κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας to the κανὼν τῶν γραφῶν,” in Tradition and the Rule of Faith in the Early Church, ed. Ronnie J. Rombs and Alexander Y. Hwang (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 30–47. 24. See Brian E. Daley, SJ, “Systematic Theology in Homeric Dress: Poemata Arcana,” in Re-Reading Gregory of Nazianzus: Essays on History, Theology, and Culture, ed. Christopher Beeley, 3–12 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012). 25. Origen’s De Principiis form the backcloth for the content and structure of Nazianzus’s Arcane Poems: 1. On First Principles; 2. On the Son; 3. On the Spirit; 4. On the Cosmos; 5. On Providence; 6. On the Rational Natures; 7. On the Soul; 8. On the Testaments and the Epiphany of Christ. Cf. Daley, “Systematic Theology in Homeric Dress,” 9–11. 26. Nazianzus, Oration, 31.27; see SC 250:328. 27. See Johannes Focken, “De Gregorii Nazianzeni orationum et carminum dogmaticorum argumentandi ratione” (PhD. diss., Nuremberg: In Universitate Friderica Guilelma Berolinensi, 1912). On the role of Aristotle’s epistemology in Nazianzus’s theological method, see Anna Usacheva, Knowledge, Language and Intellection from Origen to Gregory Nazianzen: A Selective Survey, Early Christianity in the Context of Antiquity 18 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2017).

Conclusion   249 takes up his role as an instrument of the Spirit, the true architect of Christendom, in defining the Logos as Romanitas.28 Theology is not an expression of a particular culture, but rather an enculturation of the faith. This understanding forms the basis of Nazianzus’s doctrine of the Logos as Romanitas, in which all ethnicities are at home and “in which all could borrow the best from one another for the greater good of Christian Rome.”29 Thus, in one culture or particular church, there can coexist more than one valid theological school of thought, since the organic structure of the truth—the articles of the Creed—transcends man and, thus, transcends the various cultures and particular churches into which the unity of faith in the one Logos is enculturated: “Unity rests in faith, while theology is the domain of pluralism;”30 “And only pluralism in relation to unity is great.”31 Like Cajetan, Nazianzus attributes to the person of Peter, the indestructible rock, a foundational role in the Romanitas as the one who received the keys.32 Although the Theologian writes little about the papacy, nonetheless, he does affirm an oecumenical primacy of the Bishop of Rome in matters of faith: Regarding the faith which they uphold, the ancient Rome has kept a straight course from of old, and still does so, uniting the whole West by 28. For Nazianzus’s universal vision of Romanitas as the Roman oikoumene created by and for the Logos and saved through the healing power of the Trinity, the most potent pharmakon, see Elm, Sons of Hellenism, 147–212. For Clements’s “song of the Logos,” see Leonardo Lugaresi, “Canto del Logos, dramma soteriologico e conoscenza di fede in Clemente Alessandrino,” in Dal Logos dei Greci e dei Romani al Logos di Dio, ed. Roberto Radice and Alfredo Valvo (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2011), 243–76. 29. Elm, Sons of Hellenism, 395–96. 30. Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 93. 31. Ibid., 98. Cajetan recognized a legitimate pluralism in theology within the unity of faith: “Nec aeque assentimus conclusionibus probatis et non probatis: propter quod circa non probatas tanta opinionum diversitas in sacra doctrina toleratur” (Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xii). 32. Nazianzus says of St. Peter: “Consider the disciples of Christ, all of whom were great and worthy of being chosen, yet one is called the Rock, and [to him] are entrusted the foundations of the Church” (Oration 32.18, in Grégoire de Nazianze: Discours 32–37, ed. Claudio Moreschini, SC 318 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1985], 122); and “Peter (became the unbreakable rock) to whom the keys were given” (Carminum, lib. 1, PG 37:485) (my translations).

250  Conclusion sound teaching, as is just, since she presides over all and guards the universal divine harmony.33

Sacred doctrine—as the Trinity’s self-revelation of its own theology within the economy of salvation history—is Christocentric, hierarchical, and personalistic. As Cajetan maintains, sacred doctrine’s authority flows from a tiered order of persons who form the tripartite foundation of the Church: Christ; the prophets, apostles, and evangelists; and the pope. Thus, the hierarchical constitution of the Church and the spiritual communication of sacred doctrine are inseparably interwoven. Unity ends when the interconnection between God’s theology and our theology is broken, and when theologians separate themselves from the one faith and one Church. Theological cacophony ensues from the failure to hold in harmony the inherent tensions within the whole symphony of truth—such as the tension between faith and reason. Cajetan stresses the essential link between ecclesiology and the communication of sacred doctrine, especially as they pertain to the intrinsic role of the papacy in guaranteeing the proposal and explication of the faith. Likewise, there is an intrinsic and symphonic relation between the particular churches and the Universal Church, with the papacy as the guarantor of unity and the engine of pluralism.34 Thus, Cajetan’s profound grasp of the interconnectedness of the unity of theology and the unity of the Church is indispensable in the renewed search for the unity of theology in an ever more fragmented aggregation of theologies.35 A legitimate 33. Cited from Laurent Cleenewerck, His Broken Body: Understanding and Healing the Schism between the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches; An Orthodox Perspective (Diegem-Brussels: Euclid University Press, 2007), 295n3. Cf. Nazianzus, Carminum, lib. 2, PG 37:565–70. Carolinne White translates the same passage: “With regard to faith, one of them has long been / and still is on the right path, uniting the whole West by means of the message of salvation, / and (as is right for the principal among all the churches), worshipping the whole harmony of God.” White, Gregory of Nazianzus: Autobiographical Poems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 53. 34. Cf. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Litterae ad Catholicae Ecclesiae episcopos de aliquibus aspectibus Ecclesiae prout est communion (May 28, 1992), n. 9 and n. 17; and Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 88–90. 35. Cf. International Theological Commission, Theology Today: Perspectives, Principles

Conclusion   251 theological pluralism exists only where there is a unity in faith and sacramental worship, where the Creed is commemorated liturgically.36 As was pointed out, Scotus unwittingly became a precursor of modern, rationalistic theology by diminishing the primary role of the divine light in theology. His denial of the doctrine of subalternation in theology led to the radical separation between faith and reason. This erosion in the harmonious relation between faith and reason was a main cause of decadent Scholasticism. For, if—in theology—human reason is not understood as an instrumental or secondary efficient cause, it is either taken as an independent and proportionate efficient cause (rationalism) or its relevance is completely negated in relation to the faith (fideism). According to Nazianzus, “faith completes our reasoning;”37 and the perfection of our theology is in man’s ultimate end—divinization. Theosis, a term coined by the Theologian, refers to man’s deification through the union of his intellect (nous) with God; this union corresponds to Cajetan’s understanding of the beatific vision.38 Thus, the Gregorian concept of theosis is the noetic foundation and final cause in Cajetan’s theologizing.39 As was and Criteria (November 29, 2011), nn. 74–85. Also relevant are Joseph Ratzinger’s comments: “. . . the interconnection between church and theology is the issue: whenever this unity comes to an end, any other kind of unity will necessarily lose its roots.” Ratzinger, “Luther and the Unity of the Churches: An Interview with Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger,” Communio: International Catholic Review 11, no. 3 (1984): 216. 36. Cf. Aquinas, De ver., q. 14, a. 12, c.; and Ratzinger, The Nature and Mission of Theology, 93. 37. Nazianzus, Oration 29.21; see SC 250:224. 38. See Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 12, a. 5, n. i. On the Aristotelian sense of Nazianzus’s Oration 28.17, see Maximus the Confessor, On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua, vol. 1, ed. and trans. Nicholas Constas (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014), 97–99; and Anna Usacheva, “The Body of Nous: Gregory Nazianzen’s Concept of the Human Mind in the Context of Peripatetic Philosophy,” in The Legacies of Aristotle as Constitutive Element of European Rationality, ed. V. Petroff (Moscow: Aquilon Press, 2018), 245. Cf. also Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 224–25. 39. In his sermon for Epiphany (Oration 38.7, in Grégoire de Nazianze: Discours 38–41, ed. Claudio Moreschini, SC 358 [Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1990], 114–16), Nazianzus delivers a baptismal catechesis—decidedly cataphatic in nature—on the distinctiveness of Christian belief and its positive knowledge of God through revelation. This catechetical exposition

252  Conclusion demonstrated above, according to Cajetan, the beatific vision is the epistemic ground for our theology as a science, since our imperfect theology in via will be perfected in patria through the immediate vision and evidence of its principles—the articles of faith. In the ongoing debate concerning the relation between the natural and the supernatural in Aquinas, Cajetan’s voice had been silenced because of his vilification by scholars such as Chenu, Gilson, and de Lubac.40 Recent studies, however, have allowed Cajetan to speak.41 He understood that man’s supernatural elevation through grace perfects his natural desire to see God as first cause, not by suppressing or contradicting the desire, but by superabundantly fulfilling it. According to Cajetan, there is an integration of man’s natural end by its perfection and elevation within man’s supernatural vocation to theosis. Glory presupposes grace, and grace presupposes nature within the order of the divine predestination of mankind to the beatific vision through the Incarnation of Christ. He states: God . . . does not have himself as two separate final ends: since grace presupposes and perfects nature, it is as if [God] as man’s natural end is also bears a striking similarity to opening structure of prima pars of the ST, qq. 1–13: it begins with God’s existence; then, per via remotionis, shows how He is not; and concludes with how He can be positively known, in this life and in the afterlife, and how He can be named. 40. For an account of Henri de Lubac’s “flawed” interpretation of the interrelation between nature and grace in Aquinas, see Matthew Bernard Mulcahy, Aquinas’s Notion of Pure Nature and the Christian Integralism of Henri de Lubac: Not Everything Is Grace, American University Studies (New York: Peter Lang, 2011), especially 147–78; and Feingold, “The Natural Desire,” especially chapters 17 and 18. 41. Ralph McInerny argued that Étienne Gilson, Henri de Lubac, and Marie-Dominique Chenu, in propagating their conception of a Christian philosophy (with “a tendency to disparage the natural in favor of the supernatural”), singled out Cajetan as the main “corrupter” of Aquinas’s doctrine; cf. McInerny, Praeambula Fidei: Thomism and the God of the Philosophers (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006). For other recent studies that have challenged some of the already “traditional” criticisms of Cajetan, see Feingold, “The Natural Desire,” especially chapters 9 and 10, which make a strong case against Henri de Lubac’s criticism of Cajetan’s teaching on obediential potency as a deviance from St. Thomas (cf. H. De Lubac, Surnaturel, 137); Henry Donneaud reevaluates Étienne Gilson’s criticism of Cajetan, in “Note sur le revelabile selon Étienne Gilson,” 633–52; Joshua Hochschild’s The Semantics of Analogy: Rereading Cajetan’s “De Nominum Analogia” (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 2010) gives an alternate paradigm for reading Cajetan’s work on analogy.

Conclusion   253 quasi in genere his ultimate end; [the natural] subordinates itself as an end to the ultimate end of revealed beatitude.42

In addition, the correlation between the two genera of knowledge about God in via—natural and supernatural—can be known and ordered only in the higher light of revelation, since only from this higher perspective are faith and reason seen without paradox. Hence revelation is the noetic foundation for Cajetan’s theological anthropology, just as it is for Nazianzus, who understands man as ordered towards the beatific vision—theosis. Moreover, Cajetan’s understanding of the relation between nature and grace is reflected in the Second Vatican Council’s Gaudium et spes, wherein a proper human autonomy is maintained within mankind’s supernatural vocation to participate in the divine nature through and in Christ.43 Precisely because of his well-defined grasp of the relation between the natural and supernatural, further study of Cajetan’s doctrine could offer important insights into questions such as the relation between church and state, especially on the matter of religious liberty, and on socio-economic questions.44 Like Aquinas, Cajetan has a holistic vision of theology that involves the theologian’s entire being and thus is part of the theologian’s own progressive divinization. It must be remembered that according to Cajetan our theology in via is perfected in patria. When Cajetan translated verse 2 of the first Psalm, regarding the blessed, he accented that “in the doctrine of the Lord is his will” (Ps 1:2). Cajetan argued that the Hebrew word torah or law in this verse could also be translated as “doctrine”: “since it regards things that are taught; . . . the law [torah] is not from an act of binding, . . . but rather from an act of teaching.”45 Thus, Cajetan comments: 42. Cajetan, In ST, I-II, q. 71, a. 6, n. ix. 43. See Vatican Council II, Gaudium et spes (December 7, 1965), n. 36 and n. 22. 44. There is a need for a study of Cajetan’s economic works, written from 1498–1500, see appendix 1. 45. Cajetan, In Ps., 1.2 in Omnia Opera, 3:6b: “Ubi scito semel pro semper, quod dictio Hebraica interpretata doctrina, vere significat doctrinam, quia ad docendum spectat: sed apud Hebraeos appropriatur ad significandum divinam legem, cum dicitur doctrina Domini. Ita quod legem non ab actu ligandi aut legendi sed ab actu docendi significant. Et bene ad differentiam

254  Conclusion We are good not because we possess a good intellect, but rather because our will is good. For our will is right and good when regulated by the law [doctrine] of the Lord. Thus, the prophet attributes goodness to a man inasmuch as his will conforms to the law of the Lord, and he denotes this with the preposition in, when stating: in the law of the Lord is his will. Therefore our wills should be in the law of the Lord and not merely under the law, because [our wills] are under the law, whether we will it or not, since we are all subject to the law even when our wills are set against the Lord. To be in the law, however, is to be as a lover is in the law that is loved; or as the one who desires is in the law that is desired; or as the one who rejoices is in the law that causes delight; and, finally, as a free subject is in the Ruler, by embracing the rule as his own.46

In his fourth oration, Nazianzus employed a similar holistic vision regarding the vocation of the lover of God, the true philosopher, who is called to assimilate a “familiarity (oikeiosis) towards the beautiful for the sake of the beautiful itself.”47 Both Cajetan and Nazianzus hold that all the faithful are potential theologians; nevertheless, they both agree that few are theologians in the strict sense. Only those virtuous believers who have acquired the habit of theology and are trained to reason and judge in the divine light of faith can be called theologians. The Theologian states: Not to every one, my friends, does it belong to philosophize about God, not to every one; the Subject is not so cheap and low; and I will add, not before every audience, nor at all times, nor on all points; but on certain occasions, and before certain persons, and within certain limits.48 humanarum legum, quae non docent sed ligant: lex enim divina non ad obligandum, sed ad docendum humanum genus a divino processit lumine” (italics indicate sections quoted). 46. Ibid. 47. Nazianzus, Oration 4.60, in Grégoire de Nazianze: Discours 4–5, Contre Julien, ed. Jean Bernardi, SC 309 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1983), 168; translation is my own. 48. Nazianzus, Oration 27.3; see SC 250:76. Cf. Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi; see appendix 2. For Nazianzus, “[a] catharsis of mind, soul, and body that is not also translated into philanthropic works is not a ‘purification,’ but a ‘defilement.’” Donald Winslow, The Dynamics of Salvation: A Study in Gregory of Nazianzus (Philadelphia: The Philadelphia Patristics Foundations, 1979), 153. Nazianzus’s askesis-philanthropic model of the philosophical life parallels the Dominicans’ motto: “to give to others the fruit of contemplation” (“contemplata aliis tradere”—cf. ST, II-II, q. 188, a. 6, c.). To his last breath, Cajetan exercised his diakonia or philanthropia in the Church as primarily a theologian in via Thomae.

Conclusion   255 Despite Cajetan’s vital role as a theologian, biblical exegete, and reformer within the Renaissance Church and Renaissance Thomism, his profound insights into the nature of sacred doctrine were never thoroughly examined. This was due partly to the difficulty of entering into the world of Renaissance-Thomistic thought, its particular terminology and speculative subtleties, and also partly to the fact that, during the last century, Cajetan was scorned as the corruptor of Aquinas’s doctrine. Hopefully this study has brought to light the key elements of Cajetan’s thoughts on the nature of theology in continuity with the via Thomae and the broader stream of the via antiqua. He is a serious and noteworthy commentator of Aquinas and sacred Scripture. Finally, as a theologian, his originality is in his defense of sacred doctrine’s continuity with the light and intelligibility of the Trinity’s order of origins. He understood that our theology’s ordo disciplinae is contained in the framework of the Trinity’s relation to creation and salvation history as professed in the Creed. Thus, Cajetan’s unique theological voice harmonizes with the perennial truths at play within the wider theological symphony of the oecumenical Church.

Appendix 1

Cajetan’s Life and Works

Appendix 1 A Chronology of Cardinal Cajetan’s Life and Works mid-February 1469—born in Gaeta, Naples 1 1484—entered Dominican Order in his hometown friary of San Domenico Maggiore 1485—began studies in logic in the studium generale at the convent of San Domenico Maggiore in Naples June 18, 1488—arrived at the monastery of San Domenico in Bologna as a student of philosophy December 4, 1488—returned to Gaeta for a short period of convalescence from an illness 1491—ordained a priest May 24, 1491—received as a studens artium (studens formalis) at St. Augustine’s Monastery in Padua 1492—appointed magister studentium pro tertio anno January 21, 1493—baccalaureus sententiarum at St. Augustine’s Monastery (Padua) ad legendum sententias pro gradu et forma magistri pro tertio anno: In libros I-IV Sententiarum (unedited s. XV: Paris, BNF, Ms. lat. 3076) March 19, 1493—received as a baccalaureus at the university in Padua with a dispensation super dilatione temporis in cursu lecturae 1494 (Pentecost)—disputation against Pico della Mirandola in Ferrara October 7, 1494—magister regens (regens studentium) at St. Augustine’s Monastery (Padua) 1. For some modern biographical material on Cajetan, see Michael O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, xii–xvi and 11–60; Eckehart Stöve, “De Vio, Tommaso,” in Dizionario Biographico degli Italiani 39:567–78; Jared Wicks, “Cajetan: A Biographical Essay,” in Cajetan Responds, 3–42; Wicks, “Roman Reactions to Luther: the First Year (1518),” Catholic Historical Review 69 (1983): 521–62; and Wicks, Cajetan und die Anfänge der Reformation (Münster: Aschendorff, 1983).

257

258  Appendix 1 1494–95—held the chair of metaphysics in via Thomae at the university (Padua) —visited Verona, Bressanone, Bergamo, Brescia, and Mantua 1496—In librum de ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis (published in Venice) March 7, 1496—In reliquum libri secundi (lect. 3–14) peri hermeneias ?—An in rebus naturalibus detur potentia neutra, et an potentia receptiva actuum supernaturalium sit naturalis? ?—De praecepto eleemosynae ?—In libros Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelicos additamenta 1497—In Isagogen Porphyrii (dedicated to Cardinal Oliviero Carafa) 1497–98—held chair of theology in via Thomae at the University of Pavia January 9, 1498—In Praedicamenta Aristotelis ?—Commentaria in VIII libros Physicorum Aristotelis ?—Commentaria in IV libros De coelo et mundo Aristotelis ?—Commentaria Super Metaphysicam July 13, 1498—De monte pietatis September 1, 1498—De nominum analogia September 10, 1499—De Dei gloriosi infinitate intensiva End of 1499—Santa Maria della Grazia in Milan November 6, 1499—De subjecto naturalis philosophiae (finished in Milan) December 9, 1499—De cambiis March 13, 1500—Utrum per votum quo quis promittit offerre aliquid alicui particulari imagini B. Virginis sit acquisitum jus illi Ecclesiae? (Mantua) March 16, 1500—De maleficiis April 2, 1500—Utrum in usura transferatur dominium? April 6, 1500—Utrum nutuans sub spe aliquid ultra sortem habendi non aliter mutuaturus absque tamen conventione sit usurarius mentalis? April 8, 1500—Utrum usurarius mentalis teneatur ad restitutionem? April 14, 1500—Utrum omnia bona usurarii sint obligata eis a quibus usurae extortae sunt? April 18, 1500—Utrum altero haerede usararii non potente restituere, alter teneatur in solidum? April 24, 1500—Utrum quando licet petere damnum lucri cessantis, possit peti totum lucrum cessans? April 24, 1500—Utrum circumstantia diei festi sit necessario confitenda? August 24, 1500—De usu spiritualium

Cajetan’s Life and Works   259 September 29, 1500—De novitiis December 18, 1500—De voto non nubendi June 1501—Procurator General of the Dominican Order; taught theology and philosophy at La Sapienza in Rome 1st Sunday of Advent, 1501—Oratio de vi cultus divini et orationes efficacia, coram Alexandro VI 1st Sunday of Lent, 1502—Oratio de causa et origine mali et cur homines plura et majora mala invaserint magis quam coetera animalia, coram Alexandro VI 1st Sunday of Advent, 1502—Oratio de unione Verbi cum natura humana, coram Alexandro VI 1st Sunday of Advent, 1503—Oratio de immortalitate animarum, coram Julio II September 23, 1504—De sigillo confessionis 1st Sunday of Advent, 1504—Oratio de modo quo animae patiantur ab igne corporeo et de corporum cruciatu, coram Julio II December 26, 1504—De simonia, q. 1 December 28, 1504—De simonia, q. 2 January 4, 1505—De simonia, q. 3 April 12, 1505—De dispensatione matrimonii in Occidentali Ecclesia October 22, 1505—Quantum valeat matrimonium contractum a juvene post religionis ingressum et egressum (Gaeta) July 17, 1506—De spasmo B. V. Mariae August 24, 1506—Utrum quilibet utens spirituali seu actus spirituales exercens in peccato mortali peccet mortaliter? April 24, 1507—De matrimonio May 2, 1507—In ST, I (publ. Venice, 1508, dedicated to Cardinal Oliviero Carafa) August 20, 1507—Vicar General of the Dominican Order June 10, 1508—Master General of the Dominican Order August 27, 1508—De natura voti et unitate numerali peccati actus exterioris (Florence) February 25, 1509—Commentaria in III libros Aristotelis De anima (publ. Venice, 1510) February 27, 1509—De conceptu entis ad Mag. Franciscum Ferrariensis (Rome) October 13, 1509—De pollutione ex auditione confessionis proveniente (Florence)

260  Appendix 1 October 16, 1509—De usura et in veniali pertinacia et publico delicto (Florence) November 20, 1509—De sacri ordinis collatione (Pisa) November 20, 1509—De missa celebratione q. 1 (Pisa) December 1, 1510—De missa celebratione q. 2 (Rome) October 12, 1511—Tractatus de comparatione authoritatis papae et concilii (Rome) December 29, 1511—In ST, I-II (publ. Venice, 1514, dedicated to Cardinal Nicolas de Fiesci) May 3, 1512–17—Fifth Lateran Council May 16, 1512—Oratio in secunda sessione concilii lateranensis habita (Rome) November 11, 1512—De vinculo perservandi in religione cum quis hoc proposuerit (Rome) November 19, 1512—Apologia tractatus de comparata auctoritate papae et concilii (Rome) February 21, 1513—death of Pope Julius II March 11, 1513—election of Pope Leo X (Cardinal Giovanni Medici) March 14, 1513—De reddendo debito inter conjuges altero eorum existente adultero December 19, 1513—expressed his non placet to the decree Apostolici regiminis of the eighth session of Lateran V December 20, 1513—De jure petendi debitum matrimonii ab aldulterio. Ad R. Patrum Fratrem Cherubinum de Florentia, divini verbi concionatorem May 2, 1514—Responsio de quinque dubiis, ad Mag. Conradum Koellin September 21, 1514—De negando religionis ingressu et professione judeis alias idoneis ad haec. Ad R. Patrem Fratrem Matthiam de Pace. S. Theologiae Salmanticensem Regentem (Siena) November 3, 1514—De modo exolvendi et dicendi horas canonicas in choro April 1, 1515—De recipientium et solventium pro locatis pecuniis quinque pro centum, salvo capitali, ad Mag. Conradum Koellin August 1515—De conceptione B. Mariae Virginis, ad Leonem X February 26, 1517—In ST, II-II (publ. Venice, 1518, dedicated to Pope Leo X) December 8, 1517—Tractatus de indulgentiis (dedicated to Cardinal Guilio de’ Medici) May 1517—Cardinals Alfonso Petrucci, Soderini, and Sauli involved in a conspiracy against the life of Pope Leo X July 1, 1517—created a cardinal by Pope Leo X

Cajetan’s Life and Works   261 February 8, 1518—granted the administration of the Archdiocese of Palermo February, 13–14 1518—De obligatione et observatione praeceptorum tam in religione quam extra q. 1 et q. 2 February 16, 1518—De annua pensionis venditione ex beneficio ecclesiastico debita (Rome) March 4, 1518—De contritione (Rome) April 26, 1518—nominated papal legate to the Emperor Maximilian and Christian II, King of Denmark August 5, 1518—addressed the Diet in Augsburg asking for the support of the German princes against the Turks mid-August 1518—Emperor Maximillian wrote to Pope Leo X, describing Luther as pertinax August 23, 1518—two papal letters: one to Prince Friedrich the Wise of Electoral Saxony; the other to Cajetan, opening the processus summarius and granting him wide-ranging powers including excommunication and interdict August/September 1518—Cajetan studied Luther’s Explanations of the Ninetyfive Theses (August) and Sermo de poenitentia (Lent 1518), resulting in the Augsburg Treatises September 25, 1518—An omnes animae in purgatorio sint certae de sua salute? (Augsburg) September 26, 1518—Utrum ad fructuosam absolutionem in sacramento poenitentiae exigatur fides? (Augsburg) September 29, 1518—Utrum sit praesumptionis confiteri venialia et omnia mortalia? (Augsburg) —Utrum indulgentia absolvendo ab injunctis poenitentiis, absolvat a poena debita peccato apud divinam justitiam? (Augsburg) September 30, 1518—Utrum poenitentia imposita a confessore, si non impleatur in hac vita exsolvenda sit in alia vita? (Augsburg) October 1, 1518—Utrum sacramentalis absolutionis effectus sit remissio culpae? (Augsburg) October 2, 1518—Utrum dare operam ad consequendas indulgentias sit imperfectionis? (Augsburg) October 7, 1518—Utrum occurenti pauperi negans eleemonsynam, quam tamen dat pro indulgentia consequenda peccet? (Augsburg) —De thesauro indulgentiarum (Augsburg) October 8, 1518—Utrum confessurus peccata sua, id potissimum debeat cogitare quid faceret si non esset praeceptum confitendi? (Augsburg) October 12–14, 1518—three face-to-face meetings (paterne non iudicialiter) with Luther —Utrum justus timendo poenam peccet? Utrum imperfecta charitas

262  Appendix 1 necessario deferat secum post mortem timorem poenalem? (Augsburg) October 15, 1518—Utrum papa auctoritate clavium det indulgentiam animabus in purgatorio (Augsburg) October 17, 1518—Utrum in purgatorio possit esse meritum? (Augsburg) October 29, 1518—Utrum excommunicatio privet participatione interiori fidelium? (Augsburg) November 9, 1518—Leo X issued papal bull Cum postquam, based on Cajetan’s draft January 12, 1519—death of Maximilian I February/March 1519—distributed Cum postquam (promulgated in Linz, Austria) March 22, 1519—Utrum Apostolica Sedes in sacris canonibus abutatur verbis S. Scripturae? (written in Mainz as a response to Luther’s Acta Augustana) June 28, 1519—election of Charles V November 5, 1519—De nominandis complicibus a reo in aliquo judicio et de eorum sententia, ad R. Patrem Fratrem Cherubinum de Florentia, divini verbi concionatorem (Rome) November 20, 1519—Utrum ob plenariam indulgentium concessam pro defunctis, et acceptatam a vivis pro certis defuntis, animae illorum defunctorum in purgatorio existentes liberentur? December 19, 1519—dismissal from the Archdiocese of Palermo 1519–1520?—De valore orationum dictarum ab audientibus missam in die festo April 13, 1520—granted the administration of the Diocese of Gaeta May 1520—four-member commission worked on draft condemning fortyone propositions of Luther; Cajetan outvoted in his attempt to award theological marks (scandalous formulation, error, heresy) to Luther’s various doctrines June 15, 1520—Exsurge Domine December 19, 1520—Quaestiones de sacramentis (Rome) December 19, 1520—In ST, III (publ. Venice, 1523, dedicated to Adrian Florensz Dedel, who would become Pope Adrian VI) January 3, 1521—Decet Romanum Pontificem, Luther’s excommunication February 9, 1521—In quorumdam locorum contradictorium super Commento II-II explanationes distributivae ad Mag. Conradum Koellin (Rome) February 18, 1521—De divina institutione pontificatus Romani pontificis super totam Ecclesiam a Christo in Petro (Rome) June 6, 1521—Responsio super quinque Martini Lutheri articulos (Rome) 1521–1522?—Responsio super quaedam dicta in laudem S. Joseph ad

Cajetan’s Life and Works   263 Reverendissimum Dominum Nicolaum de Flisco (Cardinal Nicolas de Fiesci died on 15 June 1524) December 1, 1521—death of Pope Leo X January 9, 1522—election of Pope Adrian VI. Earlier that day, Cajetan made a dramatic speech to the cardinals, revealing that Adrian Florensz Dedel was the choice of the Emperor Charles. June 2, 1522—In quorumdam locorum in Commento II-II sibi invicem oppugnantium conciliationes. Ad Mag. Conradum Koellin (Rome) November 23, 1522—Solutiones quorumdam locorum sibi invicem adversantium incommentariis S.Thomae contentorum, ad fratrem Jacobum Crecton Scotum, lectorem theologiae December 27, 1522—Utrum homo superiori teneatur obedire in his quibus oportet se exponere periculo mortis (Rome) May 8, 1523—nominated legate to Louis II, King of Hungary and Bohemia, seeking military aid against the Turks September 14, 1523—death of Pope Adrian VI November 19, 1523—election of Pope Clement VII (Giulio de’ Medici) November 22, 1523—Summula de peccatis (dedicated to Pope Clement VII; present day Bratislava, Slovakia, then a part of Hungary) June 15, 1524—Ientacula Novi Testamenti literalis expositio (VillachAustria) 1525—De erroribus contingentibus in eucharistiae sacramento 1525—Instructio nuntii circa errores libelli de coena Domini Easter, April 21, 1527—Liber Psalmorum ad verbum ex hebreo versorum (dedicated to Pope Clement VII) May 1527—Sack of Rome; Cajetan imprisoned; ransomed by Pope Clement VII November 13, 1527—Commentaria in Matthaeum (two chapters were written before Cajetan retired to Gaeta). December 2, 1527—Commentaria in Marcum (Gaeta) January 25, 1528—Commentaria in Lucam (Gaeta) May 16, 1528—Commentaria in Joannem (Gaeta) August 6, 1528—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. ad Romanos (Gaeta)2 October 1528—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. I ad Corinthios (Gaeta) December 1528—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. II ad Corinthios (Gaeta) January 24, 1529—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. ad Galatas (Gaeta) February 9, 1529—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. ad Ephesios (Gaeta) February 19, 1529—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. ad Philippenses (Gaeta) March 5, 1529—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. ad Colossenses (Gaeta) 2. For this dating of the commentary on Romans, see O’Connor, Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries, xv.

264  Appendix 1 March 12, 1529—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. I ad Thessalonicenses (Gaeta) March 17, 1529—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. II ad Thessalonicenses (Gaeta) March 31, 1529—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. I ad Thimotheum (Gaeta) April 29, 1529—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. II ad Thimotheum (Gaeta) May 5, 1529—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. ad Titum (Gaeta) May 7, 1529—Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. ad Philemonem (Gaeta) June 1, 1529—Commentaria in Epistolam ad Hebreos (Gaeta) June 3, 1529—Commentaria in Epistolam S. Jacobi (Gaeta) June 29, 1529—Commentaria in Acta Apostolorum (Gaeta) July 15, 1529—Commentaria in Epistolam I S. Petri (Gaeta) July 20, 1529—Commentaria in Epistolam II S. Petri (Gaeta) August 13, 1529—Commentaria in Epistolam I S. Joannis (Gaeta) ?—Commentaria in Epistolam II-III S. Joannis Presbyteri (Gaeta) August 17, 1529—Commentaria in Epistolam S. Judae (Gaeta) October 1529—returned to Rome November 27, 1529—De rebus in bello injusto raptis ad fratrem Thomam Ragusinum March 13, 1530—De coniugio regis Angliae cum relicta fratris sui, ad Clementem VII ?—Commentaria in Genesim ?—Commentaria in Exodum ?—Commentaria in Leviticum ?—Commentaria in Numerum ?—Commentaria in Deuteronomium May 3, 1531—De missae sacrificio et ritu adversus Lutheranos ad Clementem VII June 24, 1531—Commentaria in librum Josuae July 13, 1531—Commentaria in Judices July 1531—Commentaria in librum Ruth (simple translation) August 25, 1531—De communione sub utraque specie. De invocatione Sanctorum, adversus Lutheranos, ad Clementem VII October 7, 1531—Commentaria in I et II Regum October 23, 1531—appointed Cardinal Protector of the Dominicans November 11, 1531—Commentaria in III Regum (= I Samuel ) December 16, 1531—Commentaria in IV Regum (= II Samuel ) January 17, 1532—Commentaria in I Paralipomenon (= I Chronicles) March 5, 1532—Commentaria in II Paralipomenon (= II Chronicles) April 19, 1532—Commentaria in librum Hezrae

Cajetan’s Life and Works   265 May 15, 1532—De fide et operibus adversus Lutheranos, ad Clementem VII 1532—Commentaria in librum Nehemiae July 19, 1532—Commentaria in Hester March 31, 1533— Commentaria in librum Job December 30, 153[4]3—Responsio ad quosdam articulos nomine Theologorum parisiensium editos, ad Magisterum Joannem Studii Moguntini Regentem missas January 21, 1534—Ad Serenissimum Angliae regem fideique defensorem Henricum ejus nominis VIII de conjugio cum relicta fratris Sententia April 6, 1534—Commentaria in Parabolas Salomonis June 23, 1534—Commentaria in Ecclesias 1534—Commentaria in Isaiam (Chapters 1–3; unfinished) August 9, 1534—received the last rites August 10, 1534—died; buried in the crypt of Santa Maria sopra Minerva 3. According to Roman usage, the new year began on Christmas Day.

Appendix 2

Cajetan’s Commentary

Appendix 2 Cajetan’s Commentary—In ST, Prima Pars, Quaestio 1, 1–3 Articulus 1 In titulo huius primi articuli, tres terminos nota.1 Primo ly necessarium. Dupliciter enim sumitur V Metaphys.* [Cap. VI - Didot lib. IV, cap. V, n. i, 3] et simipliciter, et ad finem. Hic sumitur secundo modo. Secundo ly physicas* [Cf. supra not. γ] disciplinas. Dupliciter namque scientia potest dici physica seu naturalis, quod idem est: obiective, et sic est una pars scientiae, distincta, VI Metaphys.* [Cap. I - Did. lib. V, cap. I, n. 7] contra mathematicam et metaphysicam; et effective, quia secundum se nata est esse a principio naturali scientiarum, idest lumine intellectus agentis. Et sic distinguitur physicum contra supernaturale. Et hoc modo sumitur in proposito, ubi physicae disciplinae appellantur omnes notitiae acquisibiles lumine intellectus. Tertio ly aliam doctrinam. Non dicit scientiam, opinionem aut fidem: quod bene notandum esse, in dubitando apparebit* [Cf. n. v sq.]. II. In corpore sunt duae conclusiones responsivae quaesito affirmative. Prima est: Necessarium est ad humanam salutem, esse doctrinam per revelationem acceptam de multis quae humanam rationem excedunt. - Secunda est* [Cf. n. xi]: Necessarium est ad humanam salutem, esse doctrinam per revelationem de his quae de Deo etiam naturali ratione investigari possunt. III. Antequam probentur conclusiones, ad evidentiam distinctionis et sufficientiae conclusionum, nota duas distinctiones. Prima est ex I Contra Gentiles, cap. III. Duo sunt genera cognoscibilium de Deo principaliter: quaedam demonstrabilia; quaedam non nisi per revelationem cognoscibilia. Ista sunt Trinitas Personarum, beatitudo nobis promis1. Cajetan, Commentaria in Summa Theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, Summa Theologiae, ed. Leonina, vol. 4 (Rome: ex typographia polyglota, 1888), 5–34. The complete text is available at https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/repedleo.html.

267

268  Appendix 2 sa, Incarnationis et Redemptionis mysteria: illa vero sunt, Deum esse unum, immortalem, etc. Ratione revelabilium tantum, posita est prima conclusio: ratione vero demonstrabilium, posita est secunda. - Altera distinctio est ex V Metaphys.* [Cap. VI - Didot lib. IV, Cap. V, n. 1]. Necessarium ad finem dupliciter: ad esse, et ad bene esse. In prima conclusione sumitur necessarium primo modo: in secunda, secundo modo. IV. His praehabitis, probatur prima conclusio ex littera. Ordinatum ad Deum ut finem ignotum ratione naturali, consequendum tamen propria intentione et actione, eget supernaturali disciplina, qua finem cognoscat et operationes in illum dirigat: homo est huiusmodi: ergo. Probatur minor ex lxiv cap. Isaiae. V. Circa hanc conclusionem dubium statim occurrit, quid intelligatur hic nomine sacrae doctrinae seu disciplinae. Aut enim intelligitur fides, aut theologia. Si fides, sequuntur duo inconvenentia. Primum est, quod idem bis quaereretur: nam in IIa IIae, qu. II, art. 3, quaeretur an credere aliquid supernaturale sit necessarium ad salutem. Secundum est quod aequivoce sumitur sacra doctrina in hoc et in sequentibus articulis: nam constat quod in eis non sumitur pro fide - Si theologia, sequeretur quod fides absque theologia non sufficeret ad salutem hominis: quod est falsum. Sequela patet: quia in littera dicitur quod illa doctrina est necessaria ad salutem humanam. Falsitas vero consequentis et ex se patet, et ex ratione in littera assignata convincitur: quia scilicet homo potest intentiones et actiones suas per fidei cognitionem in finem supernaturalem dirigere. VI. Ad hoc dicendum est quod sacra doctrina neque sumitur pro fide, ut distinguitur contra theologiam; neque pro theologia, ut distinguitur contra fidem: sed sumitur pro cognitione a Deo revelata, sive formaliter sive virtualiter, ut habet rationem disciplinae et doctrinae, abstrahendo a ratione crediti et sciti. Cognitio enim qua egemus ad salutem, prout a Deo docente in homine suscipitur, doctrina est et disciplina, iuxta illud Ioan. vi* [vers. 45]: Omnis qui audivit a Patre et didicit, venit ad me. Et de hac dicitur in conclusione hac, quod est necessaria ad salutem. Et quoniam cognitio huiusmodi, ut disciplina est revelata, abstrahit a ratione credendi et sciendi; et a ratione revelati formaliter, idest in seipso, et virtualiter, idest in suis principiis: ideo hoc in loco, ubi de doctrina revelata praeter physicas disciplinas quaeritur, ad nullum horum licet determinate descendere. Et sic aliud formaliter quaeritur hic, et aliud quaeretur inferius in IIa IIae: quia hic de doctrina, ibi de credere. Et univoce sumitur hic sacra

Cajetan’s Commentary   269 doctrina et in sequenti articulo. Nec sequitur quod theologia ut distinguitur contra fidem, sit necessaria; sed quod theologia ut abstrahit a fide et scientia, sit necessaria ad salutem; quod constat esse verum, propter rationem in littera assignatam. Nec valet: fides sufficit: ergo theologia non requiritur: tum quoniam in fide clauditur theologia, ut hic sumitur, sicut animal in homine; tum quoniam scientia haec, apud Augustinum XIV de Trinitate* [Cap. I], non solum nutrit, defendit et roborat fidem, sed gignit eandem. Et vere sic est ex parte credibilium. Fides enim, licet sit a Deo infundente inclinationem ad credendum, est tamen ex auditu per verbum Christi quoad credibilia, ut ad Rom. x habetur, in littera* [vers. 17] et a S. Thoma** [ibid., lect. II]. Et sic theologia clauditur in fide, ut gignens eam. Et si inferatur: ergo quilibet fidelis adultus explicite credens etc. est theologus: dicendum est quod non simpliciter; sed particeps est theologiae secundum quid etc., scilicet secundum principia etc. VII. Circa hanc partem, est advertendum quod Scotus, in I qu. Prologi Primi Sententiarum, nec a conclusione nec a ratione discordat: sed a causa quare finis ille est nobis naturaliter occultus. Nos enim dicimus quod ideo finis ille est nobis naturaliter occultus, quia est supernaturalis finis animae nostrae: et propterea, quantumcumque perfecte nota esset nobis natura nostrae animae quoad naturalia, nunquam cognosceretur sub ratione qua ordinatur in talem finem; quia extra naturalium latitudinem est tam finis quam illa animae ratio. Ipse vero tenet illum finem esse naturalem nostrae animae, quamvis supernaturaliter adipiscendum. Et tamen esse naturaliter incognitum: quia anima nostra non nobis naturaliter est nota, saltem pro statu isto, sub illa propria et speciali ratione, qua ordinatur ad illum finem. VIII. Quod autem finis ille sit naturalis, probat tripliciter. Primo auctoritate Augustini (in libro de Praedestinatione Sanctorum)* [Cap. V]: Proinde posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere caritatem, naturae est hominum; habere autem gratiae est fidelium. - Secundo ex appetitu. Homo naturaliter appetit illum finem quem dicis supernaturalem: ergo est ei naturalis. - Tertio ex ratione naturalitatis. Potentia, comparata ad actum, aut est naturalis, aut violenta, aut neutra; nec est ibi aliqua supernaturalitas: ergo intellectus, seu anima, naturaliter ordinatur ad visionem Dei, seu fruitionem. Antecedens quoad partem affirmativam, declaratur: quia potentia aut inclinatur ad talem actum, aut repugnat tali actui, aut neutraliter se habet: si primo modo, est naturalis; si secundo, violenta; si tertio, neutra. Quoad partem vero negativam, declaratur. Differentia naturalitatis a supernaturalitate attenditur penes compara-

270  Appendix 2 tionem potentiae ad agens naturaliter vel supernaturaliter impressivum in talem potentiam: igitur comparando potentiam ad actum, nulla est supernaturalitas. Consequentia vero probatur ex eo quod anima inclinatur in omnem suam, et praecipue summam perfectionem, qualis est actus fruitionis Dei, etc. IX. Ad evidentiam huius difficultatis, scito quod apud nos potentia aut est naturalis, aut violenta, aut obedientialis: et hoc tam in comparatione ad actum quam ad agens: nec aliqua est in rerum natura potentia neutra, omissis artificialibus, ut in quaestione de Potentia Neutra * [Opusc. Caiet. vol. III, tract. III, qu. I (Venice, 1612)] iuxta hunc articulum, dicetur. Vocatur autem potentia obedientialis, aptitudo rei ad hoc ut in ea fiat quidquid faciendum ordinaverit Deus. Et secundum talem potentiam, anima nostra dicitur in potentia ad beatitudinem pollicitam, et finem supernaturalem, et alia huiusmodi. X. Unde ad primum Scoti* [Cf. n. viii] dicitur, quod Augustinus non dixit quod posse habere fidem sit naturale homini, sed quod sit naturae hominum. Aliud est enim potentiam esse naturae, et aliud esse naturalem: primum enim significat subiectum potentiae, secundum autem modum potentiae. Et ideo primum est verum in proposito: secundum vero falsum. Potentia siquidem illa obedientialis ad fidem et caritatem, est in natura hominum, quia intellectiva est: non autem in natura leonina, quoniam sibi repugnat. Et hoc intendebat Augustinus. - Ad secundum, negatur antecedens. - Ad tertium vero, negatur assumptum, et quoad tertium membrum partis affirmativae, et quoad partem negativam. Supernaturalitas siquidem attenditur etiam conferendo potentiam ad actum: quoniam sunt quidam actus qui ex genere suo sunt simpliciter supernaturales, ut gratia, gloria, et alia huiusmodi, ut in alia quaestione* [Tract. supra cit. qu. II] patebit. XI. Secunda autem conclusio* [Cf. n. ii] probatur. Disciplina qua communius * [Cf. sup. not. μ], citius et tutius pervenitur ab hominibus ad cognitionem divinorum demonstrabilium, est homini necessaria: disciplina revelata est huiusmodi: ergo. - Omnia patent in littera; et diffusius in I Contra Gent., Cap. IV. XII. In responsione ad secundum, adverte quod argumentum erat hoc: Omne ens est scibile per physicas disciplinas; ergo non restat aliquid scibile per doctrinam revelatam; et consequenter non est necessaria. - Consequentia prima probatur: quia nihil scitur nisi verum, quod cum ente convertitur. Antecedens vero patet VI Metaphys.* [Cap. I - Did. lib. V, Cap. I], et inductive.

Cajetan’s Commentary   271 Ad hoc autem dupliciter responderi potest, secundum quod antecedens dupliciter distingui potest. Primo sic. Omne ens, secundum omnia quae sunt cognoscibilia; vel non secundum omnia, sed abstrahibilia tantum a sensibilibus, est scibile per physicas disciplinas. In primo sensu est falsum: in secundo verum. - Secundo sic. Omne ens omni modo; vel non omni modo, sed inquantum illucescere potest per lumen intellectus agentis, est scibile per physicas disciplinas. In primo sensu est falsum: in secundo verum. - Quamvis autem utramque responsionem argumentum recipiat, placuit tamen Auctori secundam responsionem adhibere, non primam explicite: tum ut ex propriis huius articuli, lumine scilicet divinae revelationis oppositas difficultates solveret; tum quia prima responsio iam in corpore articuli, in prima conclusione, habebatur. XIII. Verumtamen Scotus, in Primo, qu. I Prologi, in solutione secundi argumenti pro philosophis, hanc responsionem reprehendit: eo quod secundum eam non salvatur necessitas theologiae, quam argumentum infringere intendebat. - Probat autem hoc sic. Ex hac responsione nihil aliud habetur nisi eadem per theologiam et alias scientias cognosci, quamvis alio modo; sicut per astrologiam et physicam scitur quod terra est rotunda. Ergo non salvatur necessitas, sed distinctio theologiae ab aliis. Tenet consequentia, ex proportionalitate a te assignata: quoniam ex quo illa conclusio terra est rotunda, est scita per alteram scientiarum, reliqua non est necessaria respectu illius, quoad sciendam conclusionem, quamvis sit distincta. XIV. Ad hoc respondetur, quod diversitatem modi sciendi diversitas obiecti formaliter sumpti, seu rationis formalis obiecti, comitatur (compatiendo tamen quandoque identitatem aliquo modo alicuius conclusionis), si adaequata est ratio modo. Aut saltem comitatur diversitas multarum veritatum scibilium, si inadaequata est, ut inferius art. 3* [In Comment.] patet. Unde eaedem res, sub diversis rationibus cognoscendi acceptae, diversitatem cognoscibilium inducunt. Et propterea, dicendo quod est diversa ratio cognoscibilis, implicite insinuavit alietatem quoque cognoscibilium, quam iam in prima conclusione expresserat. Et propter hoc negatur antecedens: quoniam ex hac responsione, quamvis explicite non habeatur nisi diversitas modi cognoscendi, implicite tamen habetur etiam diversitas cognoscibilium. Ad exemplum autem de astrologia, licet dici posset quod exemplorum non requiritur assimilatio in omnibus, tamen, exemplum sequendo, dicitur quod, sicut astrologia alio lumine quam physica in aliquam

272  Appendix 2 conclusionem coincidit, et non in omnes; sic theologia, alio lumine, et easdem veritates quas aliae scientiae, et alias veritates de eisdem rebus considerat. Et sic, quemadmodum astrologia, quamvis coincidat quoad materiam in aliquam conclusionem physicam, quia tamen alio lumine, et consequenter alias veritates considerat, est non solum diversa, sed necessaria scientia: sic et theologia est ab aliis diversa, et necessaria.

Articulus 2 In titulo huius secundi articuli, nota duos terminos: primo ly scientia; secundo ly sacra doctrina. Scientia enim sumitur hic proprie, ut est intellectualis virtus (VI Ethic.* [Cap. VI, n. 1]), et habitus conclusionum per demonstrationem acquisibilis ex principiis. Et quoniam talia sunt subiecta qualia permittuntur a praedicatis, consequens est quod ly sacra doctrina sumatur hic pro doctrina revelata ut est conclusionum. Neque enim sumitur pro tota (quoniam stultum videtur quaerere an tota cognitio, claudens in se principia et conclusiones, sit scientia, cum constet principiorum non esse scientiam): sed pro ipsa absolute, ut in primo articulo [Cf. comment. n. vi], respectu ad conclusiones. Ita quod sensus quaestionis est: An sacra doctrina, quam probavimus necessariam, quoad conclusiones suas habeat rationem scientiae; an non, sed opinionis, etc. Et sic idem omnino est subiectum quaestionis et conclusionis responsivae: et quaestiones aequantur vere scitis, juxta doctrinam II Poster.* [Cap. I, n. 1]. II. In corpore, proposita conclusione responsiva, tria facit: primo ponitur unica distinctio; secundo modificatur conclusio responsiva* (Cf. n. iv); tertio deducitur corollarium (Cf. n. v). Distinctio est: Scientia duplex, subalternans et subalternata, ex I Poster.* [Cap. XIII, n. 13]. Differentia inter has est, quod subalternans procedit ex propositionibus per se notis: subalternata vero ex principiis notis, non per se, sed lumine superioris scientiae: ut patet in arithmetica et musica, geometria et perspectiva. III. Circa hanc distinctionem ac differentiam, vide quod ex propria ratione scientiae absolute nascitur haec differentia assignata in littera: et propterea tanquam prima et essentialis differentia inter subalternantem et subalternatam suscipienda est: et ex his oportet omnes difflcultates solvi, si doctrina vera est. Scito igitur quod de ratione scientiae absolute, ut distinguitur contra alios habitus seu virtutes intellectuales, est habere conclusiones visibiles in alio, idest in principiis: quoniam omnis

Cajetan’s Commentary   273 scientia ex principiis oritur necessario. Et ex hoc sequitur quod nec scientia subalternans nec subalternata, habet evidentiam conclusionum in seipsis; sed adiuta habitu principiorum. Verum in hoc differunt, quod subalternantis conclusiones visibiles sunt ex et in principiis immediate, idest absque alio medio habitu: subalternatae vero conclusiones visibiles sunt ex et in principiis per se notis mediate, mediante scilicet habitu scientifico subalternante. Et haec est essentialis et per se differentia inter subalternantem et subalternatam scientiam. Ceterae autem conditiones sunt consequentes; aut sunt talis subalternae, non subalternae ut sic: puta quod una dicat quia, et altera propter quid; aut quod obiectum addat differentiam accidentalem extraneam. Haec namque est conditio subalternationis quoad obiectum: illa vero subalternationis quoad principia, gratia materiae, ut infra patebit. Essentiale ergo omni scientiae proprie dictae, idest discursivae, est habere conclusiones visibiles, non in et ex se, sed in et ex alio. Et ex his deducuntur quinque. Primo quod omnis scientia est scientia ex sua continuatione ad habitum superiorem. Quoniam nonnisi ex illa continuatione evidentiam habet conclusionum; et ut dicitur I Poster.* [Cap. II, n. 8], non sciet non habens demonstrationem demonstrabilium. Demonstratio enim est quae continuat; non curando modo actu vel potentia. - Secundo quod scientia subalternata est scientia ex continuatione, seu continuabilitate, ad scientiam superiorem, eadem ratione. - Tertio quod per se habitus principiorum proximorum subalternatae est habitus scientificus subalternans. - Quarto quod scientia subalternans et subalternata non necessario opponuntur ex parte obiecti, nec ex parte subiecti, sed potius ex parte conditionum medii: quia scilicet medium in subalternante immediate iungitur principiis per se notis, subalternatae vero mediate, mediante scilicet habitu alterius speciei. - Quinto quod subalternata et subalternans sunt compossibiles in eodem subiecto: quia non opponuntur ex parte subiecti. - Et ex his deducitur sextum, quod principia proxima subalternatae possunt duplici habitu cognosci, scilicet scientia superiori, et fide; ut in littera expresse dicitur, dum in corollario ponitur fides de principiis, et in distinctione ponitur lumen superioris scientiae de eisdem. Sed scientia superior est eorum habitus per se, quia ex essentiali comparatione, ex qua habet subalternata quod sit scientia: fides vero est eorum habitus per accidens, quia ratione subiecti in quo est, puta perspectivi non geometrae. Est autem unum hic advertendum, quod in prima et essentiali conditione subalternatae scientiae concurrunt duo. Primum est inev-

274  Appendix 2 identia in se, cum evidentia ex et in alio: secundum est mediatio principiorum proximorum, quae est causa illius inevidentiae in se. Sed primum horum est formale, et consequenter omnino semper requisitum: secundum autem est materiale. Si enim posset salvari illa inevidentia cum visibilitate in alio, absque mediatione, nihil minus subalternaretur illi: quia, ut iam patet ex dictis, penes illum modum evidentiae est essentialis et per se differentia inter subalternantem et subalternatam. Et hinc sequitur quod non oportet principia subalternata ex formali ratione subalternationis habere propter quid: sed sat est esse illo modo propositiones inevidentes et visibiles. IV. Conclusio modificata* [Cf. n. ii] est: Sacra doctrina est scientia, subalternata scientiae Dei et beatorum. - Probatur. Habitus acquisitus ex principiis notis lumine scientiae Dei et beatorum, est scientia subalternata illi: sacra doctrina est huiusmodi: ergo. V. Corollarium* [Cf. ibid.] est: Sacra doctrina credit principia revelata sibi a Deo. - Probatur ex conditione subalterni artificis: musica credit principia tradita sibi ab arithmetico: ergo, etc. VI. Circa hunc articulum, adverte conclusionem responsivam habere duas partes: scilicet et quod theologia est scientia; et quod est subalternata scientiae Dei. Contra quidem primam partem multipliciter arguitur a Durando, Aureolo et Gregorio de Arimino, ut habes hic a Capreolo* [Prol. Sent., qu. 1], ex conditionibus ipsius scire et demonstrationis assignatis I Poster.* [Cap. II] et VI Ethic.** [Cap. VI]. - Ex parte obiecti. Quia scientia est de necessariis: ista est de contingentibus, puta Incarnatione, praedestinatione, glorificatione, etc. - Ex parte principiorum. Tum quia scientia est ex per se notis: tum quia habitus principiorum scientiae est superior habitu conclusionis - Ex parte certitudinis. Tum quia sciens scit se scire: tum quia scientia est virtus intellectualis. Et si dicatur quod theologus scit se scire ex suppositione, scilicet si articuli fidei sunt veri: ergo, inquit Aureolus, ista est scientia consequentiarum, et non consequentium; et necessitatis consequentiae, et non consequentis; et, breviter, illationum, non rerum. - Ex parte modi. Sacra doctrina, inquit Scotus, in III Sent., dist. xxiv, qu. unica, non est tradita per discursum syllogisticum; sed omnibus aeque assentimus, ita quod non uni propter aliud: ergo. Antecedens manifestatur. Quia licet arguatur I ad Corinth. Cap. XV, et a doctoribus, nulla tamen maior certitudo est probatae quam probantis, aut probatae et non probatae sed simpliciter propositae: quod in scientia non contingit. - Ex parte demum subiecti. Fides et scientia, apud te, non stant simul, inquit Scotus ibidem, et qu. III Prologi Primi: ergo.

Cajetan’s Commentary   275 VII. Contra secundam autem partem, seu minorem allatae rationis* [Cf. n. praec. et iv], multipliciter arguitur** [cf. n. xiii], impugnando duo: primo diversitatem theologiae nostrae a theologia Dei et beatorum; secundo, quod distinctio illa quae est inter eas, qualiscumque sit, non est distinctio cum requisitis conditionibus ad subalternantem et subalternatam. Scotus igitur, in I Sent., qu. III Prologi, dupliciter invehit contra primum. Scientia Dei non potest esse nisi una formaliter: igitur nulla est subalternata. Antecedens patet: quia deitas non est nisi una ratio formalis. - Praeterea, de eisdem veritatibus primo impossibile est esse subalternantem et subalternatam, quia ubi illa desinit, haec incipit: istae sunt de eisdem: ergo. Haec duo motiva simul ab Aureolo innuuntur* [Cf. Capreolum ubi supra] sub alia forma, sic. Subiectum subalternatae addit ad subiectum subalternantis: sed subiectum theologiae nostrae non addit: ergo. Contra secundum autem, Scotus ibidem, et in III ubi supra* [Cf. n. praec.], dupliciter arguit. Scientia subalternata dependet a subalternante ut a causa: ista non dependet sic a scientia beatorum: ergo. Probatur minor. Causa scientiae non est nisi obiectum, potentia, subiectum, vel lumen: quorum nullum est scientia illorum. - Praeterea, subalternata et subalternans sunt compossibiles in eodem subiecto: istae non sunt compossibiles: ergo. Probatur minor. Quia sequeretur quod idem esset simul comprehensor et viator. Demum contra idem arguit Durandus* [Cf. Capreolum ubi supra]. Subalternans dicit propter quid, et subalternata quia: istae non sic se habent: ergo. Probatur minor. Quia theologalia non habent propter quid: et si habent, idem dicimus nos et beati; puta propter quid Christus est incarnatus, scilicet propter humanam salutem, etc. VIII. Ad evidentiam hujus difficultatis, scito duo. Primum est, quod theologia nostra potest dupliciter considerari: uno modo secundum se; alio modo ut in nobis viatoribus. Si consideretur secundum se, sic procul dubio est scientia subalternata scientiae beatae quoad evidentiam, cum ex eius continuabilitate scientiae rationem induat, dum procedit ex principiis secundum se notis lumine beato. Et contra hoc paucae aut nullae rationes militant: quoniam primae rationes infringunt theologiam nostram in nobis non esse scientiam; secundae vero non esse subalternatam totaliter, non quoad aliquid. - Si autem consideretur ut in nobis viatoribus, sic difficultates motae emergunt. Et putatur quod etiam apud sanctum Thomam, sic accepta non sit scientia nisi aequiv-

276  Appendix 2 oce, ut alibi* [III Sent., d. xxxiii, qu. I, a. 2, qu-a 4] ipse dicere videtur: nec sit subalternata nisi secundum quid, scilicet quoad evidentiam. Et si haec considerentur, facilis esset quaestionis solutio. IX. Verum mihi videtur aliter esse interpretandum sanctum Thomam, quoad secundum praecipue punctum* [Cf. n. seq.]. Nam quoad primum punctum, scilicet quod theologia nostra, ut in nobis viatoribus, non sit aut sit scientia, utraque pars potest, sane intellecta, dici: et quod non est scientia (scilicet non habet scientiae rationem perfectam, quia non vere scit, qui non potest resolvere in principia evidentia: et hoc intendit ubicumque hoc innuit); et quod est scientia imperfecta, ratione status praesentis; scientia enim imperfecta non est extra latitudinem scientiae. Et hoc affirmavit hic littera. Et ne daretur occasio male intelligendi, cum fuisset tantum quaesitum utrum esset scientia, responsum est affirmative cum adversativa subiuncta; ut completa responsio esset cum conditione specificante, et non absolute. Non enim probavit quod est scientia, sed quod est scientia subalternata; ut ex qualitate adiuncta intelligeres imperfectionem quam in statu hoc habet. X. Quoad secundum vero punctum, de subalternatione, videtur mihi quod de subalternatione simpliciter intendat littera. Tum quoniam de tali distinxerat ante conclusionem: tum quia, ut patet ex dictis* [n. iii], subalternatio quoad evidentiam oritur ex ratione scientiae. Et propterea tenendum arbitror quod theologia nostra, secundum se, est vere scientia simpliciter subalterna: ut in nobis vero viatoribus, est scientia imperfecte, sed simpliciter subalterna. Tu autem, novitie, cum disputas, cave ne fallaris, pro eadem accipiens theologiam secundum se, et theologiam nostram secundum se. Haec enim valde differunt. Quoniam theologia secundum se est scientia quam nata est parere deitas secundum se: et haec est theologia quam Deus de seipso habet. Sed theologia nostra distinguitur, si ly nostra demonstret humanam naturam simpliciter, in theologiam beatorum et viatorum. Non oportet autem distingui, si ly nostra demonstret viatores: et sic accipitur in proposito. Haec tamen potest accipi secundum se, et ut in nobis viatoribus. Habes autem distinctionem hanc ultimam ex littera, dum in corollario manifeste loquitur de theologia nostra ut in nobis viatoribus, quorum est credere principia; et in conclusione responsiva locutus est de eadem secundum se: convenit siquidem ei secundum se, oriri ex principiis notis secundum se lumine superioris scientiae, etc. XI. Secundum* [Cf. n. viii] est quod, quia omnia nostra, translata in Deum, seclusis imperfectionibus transferri intelliguntur, consequens

Cajetan’s Commentary   277 est et quod scientia ratione evidentiae et certitudinis, non quoad discursus imperfectionem; et quod subalternare, non quoad discursu demonstrativo probare principia subalternatae, sed quoad evidentiam illorum, et causalitatem notitiae eorum in aliis, transferatur in Dei scientiam. Ac per hoc, non oportet ex subalternatione quod principia theologiae nostrae sint conclusiones theologiae beatorum: sed sat est quod sint propositiones evidentes theologiae beatorum. Sicut si geometria absque discursu esset, haberet quam nunc habet evidentiam de principiis perspectivae, sed non eodem modo: et nihil minus subalternans esset. Quia igitur conclusiones theologales procedunt ex articulis fidei ut principiis non in se evidentibus, sed in scientia Dei et beatorum, consequens est quod habet essentialem conditionem constitutivam scientiae subalternatae* [Cf. n. iii]; et quod est scientia ex continuatione ad scientiam Dei et beatorum; et quod habitus per se principiorum eius est scientia divina, habitus vero per accidens eorum est fides; et quod non opponitur scientiae beatae ex parte obiecti nec subiecti, sed secundum evidentiam et inevidentiam negative; et quod sunt compossibiles in eodem subiecto simul. Nec est idem iudicium de scientia subalternata et fide. Quoniam lumen divinum absolute est per se ratio formalis huius notitiae, inquantum scientifica est: lumen autem divinum obumbratum est per se ratio assensus fidei, quae per accidens est, ut dictum est* [ibidem.], habitus principiorum horum. Et ideo habitus principiorum non remanebit in patria: scientia autem acquisita ex eis remanebit, iuxta illud Hieronymi* [Epist. LIII, (al. CIII) ad Paulinum]: Discamus in terris etc. XII. Unde ad rationes in oppositum contra primam partem inductas* [n. vi], singillatim, propter novitios, respondendo dicitur. Et ad primum dicitur, quod Incarnatio, et alia huiusmodi secundum se contingentia, ut subsunt huic scientiae, sunt necessaria; quemadmodum ut scita a Deo sunt necessaria, ut in quaestione xiv* [art. 13] patebit. Ad secundum vero, iam patet quod ista scientia est ex per se notis, idest evidentibus, mediate: et hoc sufficit, iuxta illud I Topic.* [Cap. I]: demonstratio est ex per se notis, vel ex his quae per illa fidem sumpserunt. – Habitus quoque per se principiorum huius scientiae est altior ipsa; quidquid sit de habitu per accidens, idest fide; quae dici potest altior scientia quoad adhaesionem, licet non quoad evidentiam. Ad tertium autem dicitur, quod theologus scit se scire, non conditionaliter, sed subalterne: hoc autem non est scire illationes tantum, sed illata ex principiis evidentibus in superiori scientia. Nec plus potest

278  Appendix 2 inferri ex tali inevidentia, nisi quod tale scire non est perfectum, nisi continuetur cum superiori scientia: quod non solum concedimus, sed docemus. - Et similiter dicimus quod scientia subalterna, usquequo non continuatur subalternanti, non est virtus intellectualis, sed inchoatio virtutis intellectualis: et ideo spectat ad eandem virtutis speciem, scilicet scientiam. Ad quartum, quod est Scoti, negatur antecedens. Quoniam in Sacra Scriptura traduntur demonstrationes virtualiter; et generatur alius habitus a fide, ex deductione conclusionum ex articulis fidei. Nec est verum quod omnibus assentiamus aeque, seu eodem modo. Quoniam articulis assentimus non propter aliud: conclusionibus autem, de quibus solis est haec scientia, assentimus propter articulos. Et cum dicitur quod aeque assentimus probatis et simpliciter propositis, respondetur: Si omnia simpliciter credenda proponerentur, theologia nostra in se quidem esset scientia, quia conclusiones suae secundum se natae sunt deduci ex articulis fidei; sed quoad nos non esset scientia, sed fides; et non solum aeque, sed eodem modo assentiremus omnibus. Verum quia de facto articuli proponuntur nobis simpliciter credendi, cetera autem ut ex articulis deducenda, ideo non eodem modo assentimus principiis et conclusionibus. Nec aeque assentimus conclusionibus probatis et non probatis: propter quod circa non probatas tanta opinionum diversitas in sacra doctrina toleratur. Et propterea est scientia non solum in se, sed quoad nos; imperfecta tamen. Ad ultimum autem, iam patet quod non ponimus fidem et scientiam de eodem simul: quia fides est de articulis, scientia autem de conclusionibus. XIII. Ad argumenta vero contra secundam partem* [Cf. n. vii], respondendo dicitur quod scientia de Deo adaequata non potest esse nisi una: inadaequata vero potest multiplicari. Talis autem est theologia. - Vel dicatur, et melius, quamvis in idem redeat, quod antecedens est simpliciter falsum. Quoniam ad unitatem scientiae requiritur et unitas rationis formalis obiecti ut res, et unitas rationis formalis obiecti ut obiectum, ut in sequenti patebit articulo* [Cf. comment. n. iii sqq.]. In proposito autem, quamvis deitas sit una ratio formalis obiecti utriusque theologiae ut res est, alia tamen et alia est ratio formalis eiusdem obiecti ut obiectum est, in utraque theologia. Quoniam Deus ut clare visus obiicitur beatis: Deus autem ut revelatus, abstrahendo a claritate et obumbratione, obiicitur theologiae nostrae absolute sumptae. Ad secundum dicitur, quod theologia nostra et beatorum non sunt

Cajetan’s Commentary   279 de eisdem veritatibus: prout manifeste patet de veritatibus articulorum fidei, de quibus est theologia beatorum, non nostra. Et per haec patet responsio ad formam argumenti Aureoli. Concedi siquidem potest quod subiectum theologiae nostrae addit aliquo modo ad subiectum theologiae beatorum, accipiendo subiectum nostrae theologiae pro toto aggregato ex subiecto ut re et ut obiecto: sic enim subiectum est Deus revelatus; revelationem autem constat addere differentiam accidentalem. At si pertinaciter ex parte obiecti ut res est, additionem talem quis exigat in subiecto subalternatae, negatur assumptum universaliter; licet in quibusdam verificetur. Nec oppositum dicitur I Poster.* [Cap. VII, n. 4]: sed docetur ibidem quod una scientia non descendit in aliam, nisi subiectum sit sub subiecto simpliciter vel sic; quod concedimus, dum dicimus scientiam beatorum descendere in nostram, quia formale subiectum ut res est omnino idem utrobique, et ut obiectum huius, est sub obiecto illius. Ad reliqua vero obiecta contra secundum punctum, dicitur quod ista scientia dependet a theologia beatorum ut a lumine: et quod sunt compossibiles simul in eodem. Nec sequitur quod idem sit simul viator et comprehensor: sed sit simul comprehensor, et habens scientiam quam acquisivit in via, alio modo, non solum propter exclusionem discursus, sed propter perfectionem quam ex continuatione ad scientiam beatorum sortitur. Ad ultimum Durandi, negatur theologales conclusiones non habere propter quid, quidquid sit de principiis. Et si idem propter quid nos et beati dicamus, non tamen eodem modo: quia illi evidenter, nos autem absque evidentia. At si principia dicatur oportere habere propter quid, responsum est* (n. iii) quod sufficit quod non sint evidentia in subalternata, sed in subalternante. Et hoc loquendo de propter quid proprie: nulla namque est propositio pure theologalis, quae non habeat aliquo modo propter quid. Et sic patet responsio ad omnia obiecta.

Articulus 3 In titulo nota duos terminos, scilicet subiectum et praedicatum: ly enim sacra doctrina sumitur pro tota scientia theologica; ly una supponit pro unitate specifica speciei specialissimae. Et adverte caute quod hic non quaeritur utrum sit una simplex qualitas, sed utrum sit una scientia secundum speciem; quidquid sit de modo unitatis ipsius scientiae

280  Appendix 2 in communi, an scilicet sit una unitate simplicitatis, an unitate ordinis, etc. Nihil enim refert ad propositum quid quisque sentiat. Sat est hic discutere an theologia sit scientia una secundum speciem specialissimam; an non, sed sit divisibilis in multas species; et, ut mathematica dividitur in geometriam, arithmeticam etc., ita haec dividatur in scientias plures, puta de Deo, de Christo, de moribus. II. In corpore est una conclusio, responsiva quaesito affirmative: Sacra doctrina est scientia una. - Probatur. Unitas potentiae et habitus est secundum unitatem rationis formalis obiecti: ergo sacra doctrina est scientia una. Antecedens declaratur in potentia visiva et ratione formali sui obiecti. - Consequentia vero probatur. Omnia considerata in sacra doctrina, communicant in una ratione formali obiecti huius scientiae, scilicet lumine divinae revelationis: ergo. III. Ad evidentiam huius rationis, nota duplicem esse rationem formalem obiecti in scientia: alteram obiecti ut res, alteram obiecti ut obiectum; vel alteram ut quae, alteram ut sub qua. Ratio formalis obiecti ut res, seu quae, est ratio rei obiectae quae primo terminat actum illius habitus, et ex qua fluunt passiones illius subiecti, et quae est medium in prima demonstratione; ut entitas in metaphysica, quantitas in mathematica, et mobilitas in naturali. Ratio autem formalis obiecti ut obiectum, vel sub qua, est immaterialitas talis, seu talis modus abstrahendi et definiendi: puta sine omni materia in metaphysica, cum materia intelligibili tantum in mathematica, et cum materia sensibili, non tamen hac, in naturali. IV. Necessitas autem, qualitas et distinctio harum rationum sumenda est ex distinctione duorum generum, in quibus oportet locare obiectum scientiae. Oportet enim quod formaliter sit talis res, taliter scibilis. Et ideo oportet quod habeat et rationem formalem constituentem formaliter ipsam in tali esse reali, et rationem formalem constituentem formaliter ipsam in tali esse scibili; ut sic reponatur et in genere rerum et in genere scibilium; quemadmodum obiectum sensus est in duobus generibus, scilicet sub passibili qualitate et sub sensibili. Aliae namque sunt differentiae et species passibilis qualitatis, et aliae sensibilis. Illius enim sunt species color, sonus, odor, etc.: istius vero species sunt visibile, audibile, odorabile. Illius differentiae sunt constitutivae rerum obiectarum: istius differentiae nihil ponunt in ipsis rebus obiectis. Illae rursus constituunt subiecta, istae passiones, iuxta illud II de Anima* [Cap. VII, n. 1], ubi visibile praedicatum secundi modi per se, seu passio, ponitur coloris. Et quemadmodum sensus distinctio et multiplicatio

Cajetan’s Commentary   281 non attenditur secundum quamcumque divisionem sensibilis qualitatis, sed solum secundum illam in illa quinque, ex quibus fluit divisio per se sensibilis in eo quod sensibile (per proprias scilicet differentias ipsius sensibilis, puta taliter immutativum esse sensus, etc.), quoniam sensus dicitur dividi secundum divisionem sensibilis inquantum sensibile: ita obiectum scientiae est in genere entis et in genere speculabilis, ita quod haec duo genera aliis et aliis differentiis propriis dividuntur in proprias species. Entis enim differentiae propriae sunt constitutivae entium in suis generibus realibus, sicut esse per se constituit substantiam, et esse in alio accidens, etc.: speculabilis autem propriae differentiae nihil ponunt in entibus. Unde illae intrinsece constituunt subiecta, istae constituunt quasi passiones eorum: quandoquidem et speculabilitas entis passio est. Et propterea illa sola entis divisio diversificat habitus speculativos; quae infert propriam divisionem speculabilis ut speculabile est, per proprias differentias ipsius speculabilis: quae penes diversitatem modi abstrahendi a materia sumuntur VI Metaphys.* [Cap. I - Did. lib. V, c. I, n. 4 sqq.]. Ita quod primo dividitur ratio entis in entitatem simpliciter, quantitatem, et mobilitatem, et deitatem. Et ex hac fluit alia divisio scibilis, in scibile per lumen metaphysicale, idest medium illustratum per abstractionem ab omni materia; et per lumen mathematicum, idest medium illustratum immaterialitate sensibili, obumbratum tamen materia intelligibili; et per lumen physicum obumbratum, idest medium obumbratum materia sensibili, illustratum autem ex separatione individualium conditionum; et per lumen divinum, idest medium divino lumine fulgens, quod scibile theologicum constituit. V. Habet igitur obiectum scientiae duplicem rationem formalem: alteram quidditativam sibi ut res est; alteram denominativam sui simpliciter, quidditativam autem sibi ut est sub genere scibilis; quod est esse sub genere obiecti, quoniam, scibile species est obiecti. Et ideo dictum est quod altera est obiecti ut obiectum est. Et quoniam, quemadmodum sensus distinguitur secundum distinctionem sensibilis ut sic, ita scientia dividitur secundum divisionem scibilis ut sic; ita quod ubi est una species specialissima scibilis, ibi oportet esse unam tantum speciem scientiae quemadmodum etiam in sensu et sensibili accidit; et ubi plures differentiae scibilis ut sic reperiuntur, diversas oportet scientiae species ponere: et si his adiunxeris quod differentiae scibilis ut sic, sunt ipsae rationes formales obiecti scibilis ut obiectum est: de necessitate sequitur quod unitas et diversitas specifica scientiarum attendantur penes unitatem et diversitatem rationum formalium obiectorum ut obiecta

282  Appendix 2 sunt; vel, quod idem est, rationum formalium sub quibus res sciuntur. - Et hoc est quod in littera dicitur, dum ratio quare theologia sit una scientia, assignatur ex unitate rationis formalis sub qua, seu obiecti ut obiectum, idest luminis divinae revelationis: omnia enim dicuntur considerari in theologia inquantum sunt divinitus revelabilia. Et sic patet vis et sensus rationis allatae in littera. VI. Circa hanc rationem sic expositam, occurrit triplex dubium: primum circa ipsam rationem; secundum circa antecedens* [Cf. n. xii]; tertium circa propositionem assumptam in probatione consequentiae* [Cf. n. xiii]. Et sunt singillatim absolvenda, ordine proposito. Circa rationem igitur litterae* [Cf. n. ii] dubium occurrit, quia in aequivocationem cecidit. Quoniam in antecedente loquitur de ratione formali obiecti ut res est (ut patet ex eius probatione in visu: assumitur namque coloris ratio pro ratione formali visibilis; coloris autem ratio est ratio formalis visibilis inquantum res, ut patet): probatio vero consequentiae loquitur de ratione formali obiecti ut obiectum est; quoniam revelabilitatem subsumit esse rationem formalem obiecti theologiae. Ergo manifeste committitur aequivocatio, sub ratione formali obiecti ut res subsumendo rationem formalem obiecti ut obiectum. VII. Ad hoc dicitur, negando assumptum. Quoniam antecedens supponit indistincte pro ratione formali obiecti sive ut res, sive ut obiectum: quamvis sit manifestatum quoad rationem formalem obiecti ut res; tum quia notior est; tum quia convertibiliter se consequenter illae duae rationes formales, ut subiectum et passio, ut dictum est* [n. iv]. Et propterea absque aequivocatione subsumi potuit de ratione formali obiecti ut obiectum est, scilicet revelabilitate. Et merito magis ratio obiecti ut obiectum subsumpta est, quam ratio obiecti ut res. Tum quia ratio obiecti theologici ut res, adhuc non est assignata, sed in articulo 7 discutienda erat: alia vero est assignata et in 1 et in 2 articulo. Tum quia ratio illius ut res, non infert speciem specialissimam obiecti ut sic, et consequenter nec speciem specialissimam scientiae, ut nunc nunc* [n. ix] patebit: et sic non habuisset intentum suum. VIII. Sed contra responsionem insurgit maior difficultas. Quoniam si verum est quod ratio formalis obiecti ut res, et ratio eius ut obiectum, se habent ut subiectum et passio convertibiliter, ut praefata responsio sustinet, et prius* [n. iv] est dictum; sequitur quod theologia beatorum et nostra conveniant in una ratione formali obiecti ut obiectum est, et consequenter sint una scientia secundum speciem specialissimam. Et

Cajetan’s Commentary   283 consequenter ruit tota subalternatio articuli praecedentis, ut ibi* [Cf. comment. n. vii] arguebat Scotus: quia idem non subalternatur sibi. - Probatur sequela sic. Istae theologiae conveniunt in ratione formali obiecti ut res, quia deitas est ratio formalis utrobique: ergo in ratione formali obiecti ut obiectum. Patet consequentia. Quia illae duae rationes formales convertibiliter se inferunt, ut subiectum et passio, secundum dicta: oportet enim convenientia in unitate subiecti, quod conveniant in unitate passionis illius, quoniam inseparabilis est passio a subiecto. IX. Ad hoc dicitur, quod illa propositio, scilicet: ratio formalis obiecti ut res, et ratio eius ut obiectum, sunt convertibilis etc., verissima est, sane intellecta, scilicet de ratione formali obiecti ut sic adaequata rationi formali rei. Secus autem est de ratione formali obiecti ut obiectum inadaequata rationi formali obiecti ut res (si contingit aliquod obiectum habere rationem inadaequatam): quoniam inadaequatam non oportet converti cum ratione rei; sed inferre quidem illam, et non necessario inferri ab illa. Sic autem est in proposito. Quia deitati respondet una tantum ratio formalis adaequata obiecti ut obiectum est, et haec est lumen divinum: sed illa ratio formalis non est una specie, sed genere; et dividitur in lumen divinum evidens, et lumen divinum revelans (abstrahendo ab evidentia et inevidentia), et lumen divinum inevidens. Et primum est ratio sub qua theologiae beatorum, secundum nostrae, tertium fidei. Et propterea, cum unitate rationis formalis obiecti ut res, stat diversitas specifica rationum formalium obiecti illius ut obiectum; et consequenter diversitas specifica habituum. Et ideo, quamvis deitas convertatur cum illa ratione adaequata, et mutuo se inferant, non tamen convertitur cum aliqua specie illius. Et consequenter nullam earum determinate infert, sed infertur a singulis. Valet enim: Deus sub ratione deitatis est obiectum talis scientiae, ergo sub lumine divino, et e converso: sed non valet, ergo sub lumine evidenti; aut, ergo sub lumine revelationis, etc. X. Et ut scias radicem responsionis huius, adverte quod, licet duae rationes formales saepius nominatae se habeant convertibiliter ut subiectum et passio, non tamen convertibiliter se habent in gradu unitatis; ita quod, si altera una est unitate specifica specialissime, altera quoque sit sic una; et si altera est una genere, quod reliqua quoque sit una generice. Imo totum oppositum in pluribus apparet. Nam in obiecto metaphysicae, ratio entis est una minus quam genere: et tamen ratio suae speculabilitatis, scilicet abstractio a materia sensibili et intelligibili, est una secundum speciem specialissimam. Et idem apparet in geometria et arithmetica, quarum subiecta habent unitatem genericam ut res, et

284  Appendix 2 speciei atomae ut obiecta. Et per oppositum quandoque ratio rei est una secundum speciem atomam, et ratio obiecti ut sic est una secundum genus; ut in proposito contingit de deitate et lumine divino. Et merito opposito modo obiectum theologiae se habet ad obiecta praedictarum scientiarum: quia obiectum formale ut res est, infinitum est. Consonat quippe rationi ut rei species infinita excedat species obiecti finitas, quamvis adaequetur generi. XI. Posset quoque dici quod ratio formalis obiecti dupliciter assignatur: scilicet ex parte obiecti, et haec convertibiliter se habet ad rationem rei; vel ex parte defectivae potentiae, et haec non convertitur, sed infert rationem formalem rei, et non infertur ab illa. Sic autem est in proposito. Quia deitas et lumen divinum convertuntur: sed deitas et lumen divinum sic, non convertuntur; sed tale lumen infert et claudit in se deitatem, non autem e converso. Et ideo licitum fuisset etiam sub ratione formali rei subsumere lumen revelationis: quoniam in hoc clauditur illa. XII. Circa antecedens* [Cf. n. ii, vi] est dubium, habens campum valde magnum, de unitate et diversitate habitus et potentiae ex obiecto: et propterea oporteret de hoc facere potius quaestionem specialem. Sat sit hic, quod antecedens illud ex II de Anima* [Cap. IV, n. 1] habetur, ubi potentiae per actus, et actus per obiecta distingui dicuntur: idem est enim de actu et habitu iudicium quoad hoc. XIII. Circa propositionem assumptam in probatione consequentiae* [Cf. n. ii. iv], scilicet: omnia considerata in sacra doctrina conveniunt in una ratione formali, idest revelabilitate divina, dupliciter dubitatur: primo contra ipsam in se; secundo contra ipsam ut applicatur ad inferendum unitatem specificam theologiae. Contra ipsam quidem in se, arguit Albertus Magnus in I Libro Summae suae Theologiae* [qu. III, membr. 2]. Revelabilitas nihil ponit in re revelata: ergo non est ratio formalis. Tenet sequela, quia ratio formalis ponit aliquid in obiecto cuius est ratio. Deinde arguit Aureolus* [Prol. Sent., qu. III, art. 3]. Lumen divinum se habet ad theologiam ut intellectus agens ad scientias aquistas: ergo non est ratio formalis. Praeterea, Deus se habet ut praeceptor: ergo sua revelatio non est ratio formalis. Contra ipsam autem ut infert unitatem scientiae, arguit Aureolus* [Ibid.]. Si Deus revelaret simul philosophiam et geometriam, non propterea esset una scientia: ergo ex unitate revelationis non sequitur unitas scientiae, etc. XIV. Pro evidentia responsionum ad has obiectiones, ultra praedic-

Cajetan’s Commentary   285 ta, scito quod lumen divinae revelationis dupliciter comparari potest ad aliquam scientiam. Primo, ut infundens ad infusum, seu causa efficiens ad effectum. Et sic non dat unitatem scientiae: quoniam potest omnes scientias, quantumcumque diversas, infundere. Alio modo, ut ratio seu modus cognoscendi obiecti, sub quo, seu qua, attingatur res revelata a cognoscente. Et sic dat unitatem scientiae. Et quamvis ista duplex comparatio concurrat hic simul, non tamen oportet semper simul concurrere. Si enim Deus revelaret mihi geometriam, non propterea revelatio esset ratio sub qua obiecti geometriae meae: quoniam ego scirem geometricalia sub illamet ratione formali, qua alii geometrae scirent. Sed in theologia concurrit utraque comparatio: quoniam et haec scientia non nisi per infusionem habita est; et res scitae in ea omnes attinguntur, et eis assentitur, ut subsunt divino lumini, ut modo cognoscibilitatis earum. Et propterea unitas theologiae infertur in littera ex unitate divini luminis, non ut infundens est, sed ut est ratio formalis sub qua, modo superius exposito. XV. Et ex his patet facile responsio ad obiecta* [Cf. n. xiii]. Nam ratio Alberti aequivocat de ratione obiecti, ex conditionibus rationis formalis obiecti ut res, excludendo rationem formalem obiecti ut obiectum, etc. - Prima autem ratio Aureoli deficit: quia lumen divinum se habet ut intellectus agens, sed non tantum; sed etiam ut ratio formalis obiecti ut obiectum est. - Secunda vero eodem modo deficit: quia praeceptoris illuminatio hic non solum est infusio, sed ratio rei infusae sub qua. Et rursus, falsum est quod ab uno praeceptore ut sic, possint plures scientiae provenire. Ad ultimum autem Aureoli, iam patet quod consequentia nihil valet: quia lumen divinum, infundendo physicam simul et mathematicam, non concurrit ut ratio obiecti ut obiectum est, sed ut infundens tantum, etc.

Appendix 3 Appendix 3

The Apostles’ Creed The Apostles’ Creed

Appendix 3 The Apostles’ Creed as the Architectonic Principle of the Summa Theologiae The following chart is divided into three sections. The first column indicates the order between theologia, the majesty of the divinity, and the oikonomia, creation and salvation history. The order of the Summa theologiae (ordo disciplinae) embraces the entire ontological order (ordo rerum), including the Uncreated Trinity (theologia) and created reality (oikonomia), along with the order of salvation history (oikonomia). The second column provides Aquinas’s various structural notes within the ST that map out the order of the discipline (ordo disciplinae). The third column indicates the order in which the articles of faith from the Apostles’ Creed occur in the ST, along with some additional comments on the structure.

The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

The Ordo Disciplinae according to Aquinas’s Various Prologues and ST, II-II, q. 1, aa. 6–8

The Order of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed as Found throughout the ST

Aquinas begins the ST, stating that: “we purpose in this work to treat of whatever belongs to the Christian religion, in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners [i.e., “according to the ordo disciplinae” and not “according to the plan that the book (i.e., Peter Lombard’s Sentences) might require, nor according to a disputed question (disputatio)”], . . . to set forth whatever is included in

287

288  Appendix 3 The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

The intrinsic link between the majesty of the divinity (theologia) and the economy of creation and salvation history (oikonomia) finds expression in the fact that the articles of faith concerning creation and salvation history (including the Incarnation) are virtually or implicitly contained in the articles of faith concerning the majesty of the divinity (theologia).

The Ordo Disciplinae according to Aquinas’s Various Prologues and ST, II-II, q. 1, aa. 6–8

this sacred doctrine as briefly and clearly as the matter [the articles of faith] gives leave to its order (secundum quod materia patietur)”1 (ST, I, Prologus). “The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: The same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. 6, 9). In like manner all the articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God’s existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to Hebrews: He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him. For existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness

The Order of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed as Found throughout the ST

The ordo disciplinae of the ST, whose principles are the articles of faith, is determined according to the final cause of all things—the Deity (the material object)—as known and revealed in the divine light of the first and supreme foundation of divine causality-wisdom (the formal object).

Sacred doctrine is innately hierarchical. This fact grounds Vatican II’s teaching on the hierarchy of truths. All the truths of the faith are virtually contained in and ordered to the majesty of the divinity. This is why Vatican II recommends that “in order to throw as full a light as possible on the mysteries of salvation, the students should learn to examine more deeply, with the help of speculation and with St. Thomas as teacher, all aspects of these mysteries, and to perceive their inter-

The Apostles’ Creed   289 The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

The Ordo Disciplinae according to Aquinas’s Various Prologues and ST, II-II, q. 1, aa. 6–8

consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for man’s salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth. Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on: since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained, albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them” (ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, c.). Thus, the first main division and hermeneutical principle structuring the ST is the intrinsic order between the two

The articles of faith concerning the (I.) majesty of the divinity (theologia) virtually contain the articles of faith concerning

The Order of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed as Found throughout the ST

connection” (Optatam totius, n. 16).

290  Appendix 3 The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

main articles of faith: the majesty of the divinity (theologia) and the mystery of Christ’s humanity (oikonomia).

The Ordo Disciplinae according to Aquinas’s Various Prologues and ST, II-II, q. 1, aa. 6–8

The Order of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed as Found throughout the ST

the (II.) mystery of Christ’s humanity (oikonomia): “. . . to the faith pertain those things, the vision of which we shall enjoy in eternal life and by which we are lead to eternal life [the final cause]. Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. (I.) secret of the Divinity (occultum divinitatis), of whose vision we are made blessed; and the (II.) mystery of Christ’s humanity (mysterium humanitatis Christi). . . . Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith (prima distinctio credibilium) is that some concern the majesty of the Divinity, while others pertain to the mystery of Christ’s humanity” (ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 8, c.). Concerning the (I.) majesty of the divinity: “Now with regard to the majesty of the divinity, three things are proposed for our belief: first, [I.a.] the unity of the divinity, to which the first article of the faith refers [= ST, I, qq. 3–26]; second, [I.b.] the trinity of persons, to which

The order of origins (ordo originis) of the divine persons is the first and superior cause of both creation (see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 45, a. 6, n. 2) and salvation (ibid., In ST, I, q. 36, a. 2, n. xxix).

The Apostles’ Creed   291 The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

The Ordo Disciplinae according to Aquinas’s Various Prologues and ST, II-II, q. 1, aa. 6–8

three articles refer [= ST, I, qq. 27–43]; third, [I.c.] the works proper to the divinity. The first of which [the works proper to the divinity] refers to the [A.] order of nature (ad esse naturae), in relation to which the article about creation is proposed to us [= ST, I, qq. 44–119 and I-II, qq. 1–105]; the second refers to the [B.] order of grace (ad esse gratiae), in relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in one article [= ST, I-II, qq. 106–114 and II-II, qq. 1–189]; the third refers to the [C.] order of glory (ad esse gloriae), and in relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting [= Suppl., qq. 69–99]” (ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 8, c.). The previous division (ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 8, c.) is mirrored in ST, I, q. 2, Prologus: “Because the goal of sacred doctrine is to hand down the knowledge of

The Order of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed as Found throughout the ST

292  Appendix 3 The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

The Ordo Disciplinae according to Aquinas’s Various Prologues and ST, II-II, q. 1, aa. 6–8

God [Dei cognitionem tradere], not only as He is in himself, but also as He is the principle and end of all things, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said; therefore, in the explication of this doctrine we shall treat: first, God [I. The Majesty of the Divinity]; second, the movement of rational creatures in God [The majesty of the divinity is the beginning of all things and their last end, especially of rational creatures ];2 third, Christ [II. The Mystery of Christ’s Humanity], Who as man, is our way to God” (ST, I, q. 2, Prologus).

Theologia—The Order of Origins ad intra

I. Majesty of the Divinity (Theologia) Everything in the ST is virtually contained in the majesty of the divinity, including the works of nature, grace, and glory: “Now with regard to the majesty of the divinity, three things are prosed for our belief: first, the unity of the Divinity, to which the first article [of the faith] refers; second,

The Order of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed as Found throughout the ST

The Apostles’ Creed   293 The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

The Ordo Disciplinae according to Aquinas’s Various Prologues and ST, II-II, q. 1, aa. 6–8

The Order of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed as Found throughout the ST

the trinity of persons, to which three articles refer; third, the works proper to the divinity” (ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 8, c.). The Prologue of ST, I, q. 2 corresponds to this wider division of ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 8, c.: “The consideration of the Deity will be threefold: first, we will consider whatever pertains to [I.a.] the divine essence; second, those things that pertains to [I.b.] the distinctions of persons; third, those things that pertain to [I.c.] the processions of creatures from Him” (ST, I, q. 2, Prologus). The Order of the Twelve Articles of the Apostles’ Creed in the ST I.a. Unity of the Divinity “Concerning the divine essence, we must consider: first, whether God exists; second, the mode of his existence, or rather what it is not; third, whatever pertains to his operations,

i) I believe in God

294  Appendix 3 The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

The Ordo Disciplinae according to Aquinas’s Various Prologues and ST, II-II, q. 1, aa. 6–8

The Order of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed as Found throughout the ST

namely, his knowledge, will and power” (ST, I, q. 2, Prologus). — ST, I, qq. 2–26: q. 2: Whether God exists qq. 3–11: How God is or rather how He is not q. 12: How God is known by us q. 13: The divine names qq. 14–25: God’s actions qq. 14–18: God’s knowledge qq. 19–24: God’s will q. 25: God’s power q. 26: The divine beatitude

Theologia—The Order of Origins ad intra

I.b. Trinity of the Persons (cognitio Dei in se; ad intra): — ST, I, qq. 27–43, those things that pertain to the distinction of the persons: q. 27: The procession of the divine persons q. 28: The relations of origins qq. 29–43: The divine persons

ii) — Father Almighty — and in Jesus Christ, His only Son, our Lord — in the Holy Spirit

The Apostles’ Creed   295 The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

The Ordo Disciplinae according to Aquinas’s Various Prologues and ST, II-II, q. 1, aa. 6–8

qq. 29–38: in comparison to the essence qq. 39–41: in comparison to their relations qq. 42–43: in comparison to the notional acts In the divine missions, the order of origins (ordo originis) is the principle of all reality outside of the Trinity (ad extra): “mission, in its essence, includes the procession from another; and, in the divinity, according to origin” (ST, I, q. 43, a. 4, c.). As Cajetan states: “We are not saved by any other order than the order of origins in the Trinity” (see In ST, I, q. 36, a. 2, n. xxix).

Oikonomia—The Works of the Divinity ad extra

I.c. Works Proper to the Divinity (oikonomia) “. . . the works proper to the Divinity. The first of which refers to the [A.] order of nature [ad esse naturae], in relation to which the article about creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the [B.] order of grace [ad esse gratiae], in relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in

The Order of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed as Found throughout the ST

296  Appendix 3 The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

The Ordo Disciplinae according to Aquinas’s Various Prologues and ST, II-II, q. 1, aa. 6–8

The Order of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed as Found throughout the ST

one article; the third refers to the [C.] order of glory [ad esse gloriae], and in realtion to this another article is proposed to us concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting” (ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 8, c.).

Oikonomia—The Works of the Divinity ad extra

A. Order of Nature — ST, I, qq. 44–119

iii) Creator of heaven and earth3

B. Order of Grace “Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orthodoxa 2.12), man is said to be made in God’s image, in so far as the image implies ‘an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement’: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions” (ST, I-II, Prologus).

Aquinas now begins to unpack the article of faith:

— S T, I-II, qq. 1–97 man’s final end (ante legem)

It is important to note that the main divisions of salvation history in the ST are implicitly

— ST, I-II, qq. 98–105 lex vetus (sub lege)

iv) The holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins.

The Church is an effect of grace: see ST, I-II. q. 91, a. 4, ad 1.

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The Order of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed as Found throughout the ST

— ST, I-II, qq. 106–114 lex nova (sub gratia)

contained within the order of grace: ante legem, sub lege and sub gratia.

— ST, II-II, qq. 1–189 (sub gratia)

Oikonomia—The Works of the Divinity ad extra

II. Mystery of Christ’s Incarnation The Grace of Union Christ is the terminus of the order of nature and the effective principle of the orders of grace and glory. “In like manner, with regard to Christ’s human nature, there are seven articles, the first of which refers to Christ’s incarnation or conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His coming for the judgment” (ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 8, c.).

Oikonomia—The Works of the Divinity ad extra

“For as much as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to ‘save His people from their sins’ (Matt. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed unto us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby

Cajetan provides two additional hermeneutical keys for determining the order of the articles of faith (ordo disciplinae) within the ST: first, the dual movement of human nature (in the absolute/ formal sense and the concrete-historical sense) and, second, the three-tiered order of the universe based on the Deity’s diverse modes of self-communication ad extra (nature, graceglory and the hypostatic union); see In ST, III, q. 1, a. 6, n. un.

298  Appendix 3 The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

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we may attain to the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the consideration of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race. Concerning this we must consider 1) the Saviour himself [II.a.]; 2) the sacraments by which we attain to our salvation [II.b.]; 3) the end of immortal life to which we attain by the resurrection [II.c.]. Concerning the first [II.a.], a double consideration occurs: the first, about the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our salvation [II.a.i.]; the second, about such things as were done and suffered by our Saviour [II.a.ii.]” (ST, III, Prologus).

Interrupting his explication of article of faith—iv) The holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins, Aquinas inserts in the ST the content of the seven articles of faith regarding Christ’s human nature:

The Apostles’ Creed   299 The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

Oikonomia—The Works of the Divinity ad extra

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The Order of the Articles of the Apostles’ Creed as Found throughout the ST

II.a. The Saviour II.a.i. The Mystery of the Incarnation — ST, III, qq. 1–26

1) — Who was conceived by the Holy Spirit

II.a.ii. Acta et passa Christi The Virginal Birth — ST, III, qq. 27–45

2) — born of the Virgin Mary

The Passion, Death and Burial — ST, III, qq. 46–51

3) — suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died, and was buried

The Descent into Hell — ST, III, q. 52

4) — he descended to the dead

The Resurrection — ST, III, qq. 53–56 4

5) — on the third day he rose from the dead

The Ascension — ST, III, qq. 57–58

6) — he ascended into heaven, he is seated at the right hand of the Father

The Last Judgment — ST, III, q. 59

7) — and he will come to judge the living and the dead.

II.b. the sacraments, through which salvation is given — ST, III, qq. 60–90 and ST, Suppl., qq. 1–68 “After considering those things that concern the mystery of the incarnate Word, we must consider the sacraments of the Church which derive their efficacy from the Word incarnate Himself

With Christ established as the effective principle of grace and glory, Aquinas returns to finish unpacking the sacraments from the article of faith iv) the holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins.

300  Appendix 3 The Order between Theologia and Oikonomia

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[acta et passa Christi]” (ST, III, q. 60, Prologus).5

Oikonomia—The Works of the Divinity ad extra

C. Order of Glory — ST, Suppl., qq. 69–99 II.c. Immortal life “After what had been stated about the sacraments, which free man from the death of guilt, subsequently the resurrection must be spoken about, through which man is freed from the death of punishment” (ST, Suppl., q. 69, Prologus).

v) — the resurrection of the body, and the life ever­lasting. Amen.

1. Commenting on the prologues of ST, I, Aldo Vendemiati notes that “as the matter gives leave to its order” (secundum quod materia patietur) signifies “according to the order of the discipline” (secundum ordinem disciplinae), which corresponds to the “order of reality” (ordo rerum); see “La struttura della Summa Theologiae di San Tommaso D’Aquino,” 262. 2. Concerning the Prologus of ST, I, q. 2, Ghislain Lafont notes that the movement of creatures in God is not simply a study of God as man’s final end, but also includes the spiritual growth of man into God’s image; see Structures et méthode dans la Somme théologique de saint Thomas (Brouges: Desclée De Brouwer, 1961), 472. 3. The entire “order of nature” in the ST (qq. 44–119) is virtually contained in and deduced from this one article of faith: “God created heaven and earth.” In order to explain the vast content of this one article, Cajetan clearly admits the possibility of a multiple literal sense. He affirms that a theologian/exegete should never exclude any other interpretations that are actually or possibly true, and, in the case of an obscurity caused by the multitude of literal senses, the Church is promised the divine assistance for certifying what is the literal meaning of the text; see Cajetan, In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. v., and Aquinas, De pot., q. 4, a. 1, c. 4. Aquinas establishes the general resurrection of all humankind from the article of faith, which professes Christ’s resurrection. Christ’s humanity is the instrumental cause of the order of glory; see Aquinas, ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, c. This point also illustrates the hierarchy of truths contained within in the Creed itself. 5. The sacraments receive their efficacy from the Mysteries of the Incarnate Word, the acta et passa Christi. Once again the ST is ordered according to a hierarchy of truths derived from the articles of faith; in this case, the sacraments flow from the articles pertaining to the Incarnation and the acta et passa Christi.

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Index of the Works of Cajetan

Index of the Works of Cajetan

Index of the Works of Cajetan Commentaria in Exodum 28.4, I, 238a: 238n113 28.39, I, 242b: 238n113 Commentaria in Genesim 3.1: 221n52 3.15: 221n52 16.19: 237, 237n110 28.12: 46n45 Commentaria in Leviticum 16.4: 238n113 Commentaria in Lucam 8.18: 242 22.32: 238n112 24: 83n40 24.46: 223n59 Commentaria in Matthaeum 4.7: 225n66 5.13: 241n1 16.18: 237, 237n107, 237n109 16.19: 238, 238n111 Commentaria in Posteriora Analytica Aristotelis, 133 Commentaria in Regum 23:2: 217n34 23.2: 49n55 Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. I ad Corinthios 14.16: 240n117

Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. ad Romanos 10.17: 65n129 Commentaria in S. Pauli Ep. II ad Thessalonicenses 2,3: 241n2 De comparatione auctoritatis papae et concilii cum apologia eiusdem tractatus, 56, 56n89, 57, 58, 58nn95–97, 59–60, 60n104, 63, 232 n. 55: 52n74 n. 181: 60n102, 62 n. 311: 58n94 n. 417: 49n59 n. 595: 59 De divina institutione pontificatus Romani pontificis, xvi, 56, 63, 63n117, 64–65, 217n31, 229, 229n76, 230n81, 231, 232, 235n99, 235n100, 236 De erroribus contingentibus in eucharistia sacramento 105ra–b: 52n75 De nominum analogia, 196n312 De potentia neutra, et de natura potentiae receptivae 207b: 109n79, 111 q. 4, a.1, c: 45n35 In Pentateuchum Mosis iuxta sensum Preface: 225n66

319

320  

Index of the Works of Cajetan

Liber Psalmorum ad verbum ex hebreo versorum 1.2: 253n45 3:1b: 219n37 3:3:, 225n67, 226n68 3:3a–b: 226n69 Summa Theologiae cum commentariis Thomae . . . In ST, I, praefatio: 8, 215 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1: 25, 70 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. i: 104, 112, 116 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. ii: 102 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. iii: 102, 207 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. iv: 29, 94 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. v: 28 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi: 29, 70, 71–72, 82, 117, 190, 203, 207n357 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. vii: 105 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. ix: 102n46, 107, 111 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. x: 107, 111 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. xi: 115n103 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 1, n. xii: 114 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. i: 27, 123, 124, 130n39, 203, 212 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. ii: 132 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iii: 123, 130, 132, 135, 136, 137, 138, 156, 165, 165n181, 209 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. iv: 138, 156 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vii: 151 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. v: 156 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vi: 152, 157, 161, 163, 164, 165 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. vii: 140, 152, 156 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. ix: 163 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. x: 139n74 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xi: 153, 164, 192 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xii: 82, 157, 166, 192, 216 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 2, n. xiii: 151, 164, 200

In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3: 168–76 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. i: 171, 216 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. ii: 187 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. iv: 172, 183, 187 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. v: 171, 172, 187n268, 203 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. vi: 172, 203 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. vii: 172, 173, 187, 203 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. viii: 139n74, 172 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. ix: 119n119, 173, 187, 197 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. x: 194 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. xi: 197 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. xiii: 174n220, 203 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. xiv: 154, 174, 188, 203 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 3, n. xv: 174n220, 188 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4: 176–81 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. i: 177n231 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. ii: 177 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. iii: 177n231, 178 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. iv: 203 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. v: 81, 81n34, 149n115, 179, 187, 195 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. vi: 177n231, 180 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 4, n. vii: 180 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5: 28, 181–86 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5, n. iii: 182n250, 183 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5, n. v: 183 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5, n. vi: 184 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 5, n. vii: 185 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6: 186–91 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. i: 186, 212n14 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. ii: 186 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. iii: 186 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. iv: 73, 186, 187 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, n. v: 194 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7: 191–202 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. i: 191, 193 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. iii: 161, 196

Index of the Works of Cajetan   321 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. iv: 195, 196 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. v: 188, 197 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. viii: 199 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. ix: 197 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. x: 198, 199 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. xi: 200 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. xii: 152, 199 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 7, n. xiii: 201 In ST, I. q. 1, a. 8: 209–15 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. ii: 212 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. iii: 210, 213 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. iv: 213, 214 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. v: 215 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 8, n. vi: 117 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 9, n. i: 221 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 9, n. iii: 222 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 9, n. iv: 222 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. i: 221 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. ii: 224 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. iii: 224n62 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. iv: 224n63 In ST, I, q. 1, a. 10, n. v: 52n76, 224 In ST, I, q. 1, aa. 9–10: 220–28 In ST, I, q. 2, a. 1, n. v: 131 In ST, I, q. 2, a. 2, n. ii: 131 In ST, I, q. 4, a. 1, n. v: 145, 148 In ST, I, q. 5, a. 3, n. i: 38 In ST, I, q. 7, a. 1, n. x: 146n103 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 1, n. ix: 101, 102, 110, 196 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 2, n. vii: 146 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 2, n. viii: 146 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 2, n. x: 146 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 4, n. iv: 149n114 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 4, n. vi: 112n91 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 4, n. xii: 112 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 5, n. i: 148n113 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 5, n. vi–xii: 111 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 5, n. xi: 139n75 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 6, n. ix: 149n113 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 6, n xi: 148 In ST, I, q. 12, a. 6, n xii: 148

In ST, I, q. 12, a. 8, n. xi: 135 In ST, I, q. 14, a. 13, n. xxiv: 99n41, 100, 158 In ST, I, q. 14, a. 13, n. xxvii: 158, 159 In ST, I, q. 15, a. 1, n. viii: 126n22, 191 In ST, I, q. 16, a. 4, n. ii: 115n105 In ST, I, q. 19, a. 1, n. ii: 34n47 In ST, I, q. 28, a. 1, n. xiii: 35 In ST, I, q. 32, a. 4, n. ii: 68 In ST, I, q. 36, a. 2, n. xxix: 187, 247n20 In ST, I, q. 42, a. 4., n. iii: 48n54 In ST, I, q. 62, a. 2, n. ii: 113n95 In ST, I, q. 82, a. 4, n. ii: 34n47 In ST, I-II, q. 3, a. 8: 106 In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4: 121–29 In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. ii: 124n15 In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. v: 124n16, 125 In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. vi: 126 In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. viii: 127 In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. ix: 127, 128 In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. xiii: 127 In ST, I-II, q. 54, a. 4, n. xiv: 127 In ST, I-II, q. 71, a. 6, n. ix: 252–53 In ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 1, c: 123 In ST, I-II, q. 106, a. 3, n. un.: 49n60 In ST, I-II, q. 113, a. 10, n. v: 107n72, 159 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1: 37 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. i: 30 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. ii: 35 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. iii: 37n1, 38, 53n76 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. v: 32 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. vi: 32, 33 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. vii: 34 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. viii: 33, 49n56, 217 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. ix: 31, 33, 34, 35

322  

Index of the Works of Cajetan

In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. x: 37n2, 38, 39n10, 48, 217, 225n65 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. xi: 55n83, 81, 203 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 1, n. xii: 82 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 3, c: 34 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 5, n. ii: 155, 159n158 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, n. ii: 48, 49n56, 217 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 7, n. v: 48, 188 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, n. iii: 60n105 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, n. v: 55n85 In ST, II-II, q. 1, a. 10, n. x: 55n85 In ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 6, n. un: 63 In ST, II-II, q. 2, a. 9, n. v: 203 In ST, II-II, q. 2. a. 8, n. vii: 44 In ST, II-II, q. 4, a. 2, n. iii: 180 In ST, II-II, q. 5, a. 3, n. i: 51, 63, 218 In ST, II-II, q. 5, a. 3, n. iii: 127 In ST, II-II, q. 6, a. 1, nn ii, iii: 37n2 In ST, II-II, q. 8, a. 3, n. un: 180 In ST, II-II, q. 11, a. 1, n. ii: 127, 231n88 In ST, II-II, q. 148, a. 4, n. vi: 246 In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 1, n. un: 217n34, 220n42

In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 3, n. i: 50n64 In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 3, n. ii: 50n65 In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 5, n. v: 49n56, 50n65, 51, 66, 217 In ST, II-II, q. 171, a. 6, n. i: 50n65 In ST, II-II, q. 172, a. 2, n. iii: 42n20 In ST, II-II, q. 172, a. 6, n. un: 228n74 In ST, II-II, q. 173, a. 4, n. un: 220n44 In ST, II-II, q. 180, a. 6, n. iv: 93, 161, 189 In ST, III, Dedicatio, 2: 1n2 In ST, III, prol., 5: 11 In ST, III, q. 1: 78–79 In ST, III, q. 1. a. 2, n. x: 10 In ST, III, q. 1, a. 3, n. vi: 80 In ST, III, q. 1, a. 3, n. ix: 118 In ST, III, q. 1, a. 6, n. un: 79 In ST, III, q. 2, a. 6, n. ix: 99n40 In ST, III, q. 7, a. 7. n. i: 44n32 In ST, III, q. 9, a. 2, n. iv: 101n45 In ST, III, q. 11, a. 1, n. ii: 113n96 In ST, III, q. 24, a. 1, n. iv: 79 In ST, III, q. 42, a. 4, n. iii: 49n56, 217 In ST, III, q. 46, a. 1, n. un: 112n93

General Index

General Index

General Index Abraham, 48 Ackeren, Gerald Van, 27n25 Adam, 49, 50 Adrian VI, 1n2, 5 Ad tuendam fidem (John Paul II), 69 Aeterni Patris (Leo XIII), xiii Albert the Great, 132, 133n53, 134, 174, 181 angels, 42–43 Annotationes (Erasmus), 229 Apostle’s Creed, 6, 54, 63n116, 65, 67, 71, 73–78, 218, 226n70, 241, 247, 249 Apostolici regiminis (Leo X), 5n18 Aquinas, Thomas: Apostle’s Creed in, 77; Chenu and, 19–20; Christ in, 43–44, 95n34; Code of Canon Law and, x; Duns Scotus and, 154–55; faith in, 43–45, 51n69, 54, 66n130, 67, 68n141, 70–71; historical periods in, 48; John the Baptist in, 47; magisterium in, 38, 38n6; Natalis and, 20; nativity in, 41–42; papacy in, 61n108; Paul VI on, ix; revelabilia in, 202n334; revelation in, 39n10, 40, 42–43, 67; sacra doctrina in, 73n1, 116–17, 126, 131, 166n185, 176–77, 184; salvation history in, 48; science in, 121–26, 131–32, 163–64; Scripture in, 52; Second Vatican Council and authority of, ix–xvi; subalternation in, 157; Trinity in, 40–41; veritas prima in, 37n1. See also Summa Theologiae; Thomism Arcane Poems (Gregory of Nazianzus), 248 Aristotle, 122–23, 130, 140, 142n86, 152, 162, 181–83, 222

Augustine, 24n17, 52n76, 71, 105, 107, 189–90, 224, 232, 233n92, 235, 244 Aureol, Peter, 9, 20n6, 124n15, 138n70, 151, 154n134, 157, 163, 174 Averroes, 109n79 Avicenna, 168 Bañez, Dominigo, 74–75, 212 Behr, John, 248 Benedict XVI, 244n8. See also Ratzinger, Joseph Bernard of Auvergne, 124–25 Bessarion, 245n12 Boethius, 41 Bonnefoy, Jean-François, 203n337, 204 Breve Principium (Aquinas), 87 Cajetan: as biblical-ecumenical theologian, 228–40; biography of, 3–5; Christ in, 44–45; Church in, 46–47; Clement VII and, 2, 5; as controversial, xii–xiv; Duns Scotus and, 145–46; faith in, 30–38, 48–49, 69–71, 80–81, 131, 162, 165n181, 166, 207n357, 227–28; Gilson on, xii; grace in, 103–4; heresy in, 68–69; Incarnation in, 79–80; in Leo XIII, xiii; Luther and, 1, 5; papacy in, 56–61; papal infallibility in, 61–63; Prierias and, 22–23; as protagonist, 1–2; reason in, 160–61; revelation in, 81, 113n96, 154n134, 158–59; sacra doctrina in, 24–25, 27–30, 56–57, 73, 136–37, 161, 250–51; salvation history in, 48–49; science in, 123– 29, 132–36, 152, 161–62, 165n181, 166; Scripture in, 52–53, 216n27

323

324  General Index Cajetan’s Biblical Commentaries (O’Connor), 215–16 Capreolus, Johannes, xi, 2n5, 9, 104, 109, 124, 125, 138n70, 149n115, 157; Chenu and, 20–21; Duns Scotus and, 192; revelabilia in, 202–3; sacra doctrina in, 178n234; science in, 170–71; theology in, 24, 139n74, 150n117, 170–71, 192 Carafa, Oliviero, 4 Carraud, Vincent, 221n49 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 222n52, 242n3 Celestial Hierarchy (Dionysius), 40 Charles V, 2 Charlier, Louis, 204–5 Chatton, Walter, 10 Chenu, Marie-Dominique, 6–7, 19–21, 74, 190n284, 204, 212, 218n36, 252 Christocentrism, 46, 48, 54, 55n84, 79, 250 Church: in Cajetan, 46–47; Christ and, 46–47, 55; faith and, 38–39, 57, 65– 66; foundation of, 54–55, 64n119; in Luther, 232–33; magisterium of, 38, 51, 62–64, 225–28; papacy and, 57–59, 63; Peter and, 233, 237; sacra doctrina and, 37–72; sacra doctrina as framework of, 46–55; theology and, 236–37 Church Fathers, 223n57, 233, 235–36, 244–46, 248n23 Cicero, 139n75 Clement of Alexandria, 248–49 Clement VII, 2, 5 Code of Canon Law: Aquinas and, x Collationes in Symbolum Apostolorum (Kelly), 77 Colossians, Letter to the, 41 Commentaria in IV libros Senteniarum (Durandus of St. Pourçain), 24n17 conciliarism, 4, 57, 60n102

Conflatum (Prierias), 22–24 Congar, Yves, 21, 53n76, 204–5, 208n359, 231 Conley, Kieran, 19n3 connaturality, 139–40 Contra errores Graecorum (Aquinas), 59 Corinthians, First Letter to the, 211, 224 creation, 35–36, 74 Cyprian, 233n92, 235n100, 236 David, 61 De anima (Aristotle), 181–82 Decretum Gratiani (Leo I), 57 De doctrina christiana (Augustine), 233n92 Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis (Capreolus), xi, 9, 104, 157, 171, 192 de Lubac, Henri, 7, 109n79, 112n89, 252 demonstration, 162n167, 165, 209, 213 De praedestinatione sanctorum (Augustine), 105, 107n72 De Trinitate (Boethius), 41 Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, 21 Dionysius, 40 Domínguez Asensio, José Arturo, 57n90, 62n110, 63n116 Duns Scotus, John, 9–11, 20n6, 103–16, 104n58, 105n63, 109n79, 130n39, 193–94, 197–98, 243–44, 251; Aquinas and, 154–55; being in, 143n93, 144n95, 146–47, 148n110, 149; Cajetan and, 145–46; faith in, 37n2, 142, 159n158, 165; God in, 143; illumination in, 140n76; sacra doctrina in, 113–14; science in, 137–38, 141, 148n113, 159n158, 198; theology in, 121, 139n74, 140, 142n88, 142nn90–91, 143–45, 152, 159–64, 192 Durandus of St. Pourçain, 9, 20n6, 24n17, 121, 154–56, 180n242

General Index   325 Early Christian Creeds (Kelly), 77 ecclesiology, 56–57 Eckhart, Meister, 20n6 economy of salvation history. See oikonomia Ephesians, Letter to the, 41 Ephesus, Council of, 167n189 Erasmus, xvi, 56, 217n31, 229–30, 233n92, 239n117 Ernst, Cornelius, 54n81 Eucharist, 214 Eve, 49–50 exitus-reditus model, 75n9 Exodus, Book of, 222n57, 238 Exsurge Domine (Leo X), 229n76, 231 faith: Apostles’ Creed and, 77–78; in Aquinas, 30–31, 43–45, 51n69, 54, 66n130, 67, 68n141, 70–71; articles of, 75, 80–82, 83n40, 99n41, 131, 136, 156–57, 164, 192, 201, 216, 227– 28, 236n106, 248; assent of, 37–38; in Augustine, 107n72; in Cajetan, 30–38, 48–49, 69–71, 80–81, 131, 162, 165n181, 166, 207n357, 227–28; in Capreolus, 24; Christ and, 43–44, 54; Church and, 38–39, 57, 65–66; “doctrine of,” 51n69; in Duns Scotus, 142, 159n158, 165; in Ernst, 54n81; in Gregory of Nazianzus, 245n10, 251; Holy Spirit and, 236n106; in John Paul II, 69; magisterium and, 38–39; papacy and, 249–50; Peter and, 64–65, 234; philosophy and, 213–14; in Prierias, 23; prophecy and, 175; reason vs., 22; revelation and, 38–39, 45–46, 139, 208; sacra doctrina and, 27–30, 214–15; salvation history and, 48–49; science and, 155, 166; Scripture and, 51–52, 75, 142, 210–11; theology and, 19–30, 53–54, 72, 136, 142, 156–57, 180,

182n251, 211–12, 227–28; theology vs., 174; Tradition and, 51; Trinity and, 38–39; veritas prima and, 34–35, 37, 68; in William of Auxerre, 210–11 Fall, 47, 75, 104–5, 141, 143 Father: papacy and, 59; revelation and, 44 Feingold, Lawrence, 106 fideism, 10, 52, 53n76, 167, 244 Fides et ratio (John Paul II), 167n190 Fifth Lateran Council, 4 First Vatican Council, 62, 64n123, 230n81, 236–37 Florovsky, Georges, xiii Focken, Johannes, 248n27 Forschner, Maximilian, 139n75 Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, 180n242 Gasser, Vincent Ferrer, 230n81 General Chapter of 1513 (Genoa), 216n27 Genesis, Book of, 46n45, 221 Gerson, Jean, 60n102 Gilson, Étienne, xii, 7, 202n335, 204n343, 205–6, 252 God: being of, 145n100, 146–48, 194–96; conceptualization of, 147; essence of, 147; faith and authority of, 38; grace and, 103; as highest cause, 26, 32–33, 73–74, 76, 186, 193; knowledge of, by God, 179, 227–28; prophecy and, 225–26; science and, 152–53; as veritas prima, 35. See also Father; Holy Spirit; theologia; theology Godfrey of Fontaines, 20n6 grace: God and, 103; human nature and, 103–4, 115n105; miracles and, 112n89; nature and, 167n189; proportionality and, 139n75; reason and, 167n191 Gravissimum Educationis (Second Vatican Council), ix

326  General Index Gregory of Nazianzus, xiv, 244–45, 247–51, 254 Gregory of Rimini, 9, 162, 196–97, 244 Grosseteste, Robert, 133n53 habit: science as, 123–29, 132–33; theology as, 164, 168–69, 171–76, 199–200; theology as, of wisdom, 186–91 Hallensleben, Barbara, 101n45 Hennig, Gerhard, 57n90 Henry of Ghent, 125, 140, 143n93 Henry VIII, 2 heresy, 68–69, 231 historical-critical method, 21–22 Holy Spirit: faith and, 236n106; papacy and, 60–61; reason and, 175; revelation and, 44 Hrynkiw, Gregory, xiv–xvi humanism, 34n47, 219, 245 human nature, 79, 81n31, 103–4, 107n72, 115n105 Hyperaspistes Diatribae adversus servum arbitrium M. Lutheri (Erasmus), 217n31 illumination, 140, 140n76 In Aristotelis libros posteriorum analyticorum (Aquinas), 134, 162n167, 191n289 Incarnation: in Cajetan, 79–80; human nature and, 79, 81n31; in psalms, 227; revelation and, 47; science and, 157. See also oikonomia In psalmos Davidis expositio (Aquinas), 166n185 intellect: will and, 33–34 Isaiah, Book of, 94 Isidore of Kyiv, 245n12 Jerome, 53 Jesus Christ: in Aquinas, 43–44, 95n34;

in Cajetan, 44–45; Church and, 46–47, 55; faith and, 43–44, 54; humanity of, 81, 95n34; papacy and, 60; Peter and, 234; resurrection of, 211n9; revelation and, 43–45; theology and, 153. See also Son John, Gospel of, 65, 222–23n57 John of St. Thomas, 75n9, 121, 190n284, 203–4, 212, 218n36 John Paul II, 69, 167n190, 238–39 John the Baptist, 47 John XI Beccus, 245n12 Julius II, 56 Kelly, John N. D., 77 Knapwell, Richard, xiin12 Lagrange, Marie-Joseph, 1 lamb, paschal, 222n57 Lateran Council, Fifth. See Fifth Lateran Council Leclercq, Jean, 166n188 Leo I, 57 Leo X, 5, 229n76 Leo XIII, xiii Leviticus, Book of, 238 liturgical reform, 239n117 Lombard, Peter, xi, 9n29 Luke, Gospel of, 223, 234, 242 Luther, Martin, xvi, 1, 5, 215, 231, 246; Church in, 232–33; condemnation by Leo X, 229n76; in Congar, 231; in Erasmus, 56n89, 229; Mazzolini and, 7n25; papacy and, 232–33; papal infallibility and, 63; Scripture and, 231–32; Scripture in, 227 maiores, 66–72 Mansini, Guy, 99n41 Mare, William de la, xiin12 Martha, 234 Mary, 234

General Index   327 Matthew, Gospel of, 59, 63–64, 65n128, 229, 232–35, 237 Maurer, Armand, 124n16 Mazzolini da Prierio, Silvestro. See Prierias, Sylvester McInerny, Ralph, 252n41 metaphor, 221–22, 233–34 Metaphysics (Aristotle), 183 Miller, Michael, 229n76 minores, 66–72 miracles, 111 Morerod, Charles, xv Moses, 47–48 Mulchahey, M. Michèle, xin8, xiin10 Muñis, Francisco, 19n3, 165n181 Natalis, Hervaeus, 20, 23, 162, 169–70 nativity, 41–42 Nemetz, Anthony, 3n7 Neoplatonism, 139–40 neo-Scholasticism, xiii New Law, 42–45, 49, 150–51 Nicene Creed, 69 Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle), 123, 130, 142n86 nominalism, 93n29, 160, 180n242, 244 “Note sur la Revelabile selon Cajetan” (Gilson), 205 obediential potency, 102, 107, 109n79, 110, 111n89 Oberman, Heiko A., 163n171, 227n71 O’Connor, Michael, 34n47, 215–16, 221n52, 228n74, 239n117 oikeiosis, 139, 254 oikonomia: theologia and, 39–46, 247; and theology as speculative, 179–80; Trinity and, 74 Old Law, 42–43, 49, 76, 150–51 Opinio de difficultatibus contra doctrinam fratris Thome (Natalis), 169–70

Optatam Totius (Second Vatican Council), ix Origen, 248 Palamas, Gregory, 93n29 papacy, 55–65, 218, 230–33, 237–39, 249–51 papal infallibility, 61–63, 230, 236 Paraphrase on Matthew (Erasmus), 229–30 participation, 139–40 “paschal lamb,” 222n57 Paul, 47, 65, 211, 239n117, 243 Paul VI, ix, 246 personalism, 80n30 Persson, Erik, 50n64 Peter, 58–59, 64–65, 229, 233–38, 249 Peter the Chanter, 166n187 Petrucci, Alfonso, 5 philosophy: theology vs., 181–86 Pisa, Conciliabulum of, 56 Pisa, Council of, 4 “Plan de la Somme théologique de saint Thomas, Le” (Chenu), 74 Plested, Marcus, xiv pluralism, 249–51 Posterior Analytics (Aristotle), 130, 152 Prierias, Sylvester, 7, 22–24, 29n30, 53n76, 169–70, 203 Proemium Mediatio (Bañez), 74–75 prophecy, 50, 55–65, 175, 218, 225–26 proportionality, 109, 113n96, 139n75 Proverbs, Book of, 41–42 Psalms, Book of, 41, 61, 226–27, 235, 253 Pseudo-Dionysius, 41, 61, 87–93, 146, 161 Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis (Aquinas), 183n254 Quaestiones disputatae de potentia (Aquinas), 224n61

328  General Index Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (Aquinas), 107n72, 129, 135, 163–64 Ramírez, Jacobus M., 19n3 Ranke, Leopold von, 22n10 ratio entis, 147, 148n110, 182, 193–95 Ratzinger, Joseph, 251n35. See also Benedict XVI reason: beatitude and, 184; in Cajetan, 160–61; in Duns Scotus, 167; faith vs., 22; grace and, 167n191; Holy Spirit and, 175; in Ockham, 160–61; revelation and, 35–36; sacra doctrina and, 22; theology and, 182–83, 209–15 Reformation, 2, 7n25, 215, 244 relativism, 244n9 Renaissance, 2, 5–6, 11, 74–75, 245–46 resurrection, 211n9 revelabilia, 171–72, 187, 200, 202–8 revelation, 33–34; in Aquinas, 39n10, 40, 42–43, 67; in Cajetan, 81, 113n96, 154n134, 158–59; Christ and, 43–45; diachronical progression of, 48; in Ernst, 54n81; faith and, 38–39, 45–46, 139, 208; Fall and, 104–5; as hierarchical, 39n10, 40; Incarnation and, 47; papacy and, 62; proportionality and, 113n96; sacra doctrina and, 119, 136– 37; science and, 154n134, 158–59; Scripture and, 45; theology and, 180–81; Trinity and, 35–36, 40–41, 44; in Vatican II, 55n83 Revelation, Book of, 221n52 Rigans montes de superioribus suis (Aquinas), 40 Sack of Rome, 2, 241–42 sacra doctrina, xi, 6–11; in Aquinas, 24–28, 73n1, 116–17, 126, 131, 166n185, 176–77, 184; in Cajetan,

24–25, 27–30, 56–57, 70, 73, 136–37, 161, 250–51; in Capreolus, 178n234; in Chenu, 19–20; Church and, 37–72; as Church framework, 46–55; defined, 3n7, 11–12; in Duns Scotus, 113–14; faith and, 27–30, 214–15; as necessity, 114–15; necessity of, 101– 16; reason and, 22; revelabilia and, 171–72, 187, 200, 202–8; revelation and, 119, 136–37; salvation and, 102; as science, 73, 122, 124, 129, 131, 156–58, 161, 164, 183–84; Scripture and, 50; species of knowledge in, 174; Tradition and, 50 Sacred College of Cardinals, 5 Salmeri, Giovanni, 145, 149n113 salvation history, 48–50, 67 Scholasticism, 22, 219, 244, 251 science: in Aquinas, 121–25, 130–32, 163–64, 213; in Aristotle, 122, 130; in Aureol, 157; in Bernard of Auvergne, 124–25; in Cajetan, 123–29, 132–36, 152, 161–62, 165n181, 166; in Capreolus, 124n16, 170–71; in Duns Scotus, 137–38, 141, 159n158, 198; faith and, 155, 166; God and, 152–53; as habit, 123–29, 132–33; intelligible species in, 127–28; in Natalis, 170n202; nature of, 121–29; in Ockham, 160; revelation and, 154n134, 158–59; sacra doctrina as, 73, 122, 124, 129, 131, 156–58, 161, 164, 183–84; theology as, 19, 121, 130–38, 140–41, 159–60, 163, 168– 76; theology as, arguments against, 157–76; wisdom and, 189 Scotus. See Duns Scotus, John Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum (Aquinas), 87 Scriptum super Sententiis (Aquinas), xi Scripture: Apostles’ Creed and, 226n70; in Aquinas, 52; in Cajetan, 52–53,

General Index   329 216n27; in Ernst, 54n81; faith and, 51–52, 75, 142, 210–11; interpreting Scripture, 226–27; literal sense of, 220–28; in Luther, 227; Luther and, 231–32; papacy and, 63; revelation and, 45; sacra doctrina and, 50. See also New Law; Old Law Second Vatican Council, ix–xvi, 55n83, 239, 246 Seneca, 139n75 senses, 177–78 Sentences (Lombard), xi, xin8, 9n29 Sententia libri Metaphysicae (Aquinas), 45n39, 196 Sententia libri Politicorum I (Aquinas), 176n228 similitude, 139–40 Son: papacy and, 59 Stoicism, 139–40 Suárez, Francisco, 212 subalternation, 22, 66, 82, 130–38, 140, 150n117, 151–53, 155–57, 163, 166–67, 251 Summa aurea (William of Auxerre), 210 Summa contra Gentiles (Aquinas), 114–15, 183n254, 215 Summa Theologiae (Aquinas): Apostles’ Creed and, 54, 73–78; Chenu and, 19–20; faith in, 30–31; first question of, xi–xii; first syllogism of, 93–101, 116–17; importance of, x–xi; intended audience of, 8; object formality in, 171n210; resurrection in, 211n9; revelation and, 39n10; sacra doctrina and, 6–7, 24–28, 126; science in, 122–23, 126, 130, 213; speculative intellect in, 176n228; structure and study of, 74–75; on Summa Theologiae, 201; tertia pars of, 78–79; theology in, 25–27; veritas prima in, 37n1. See also Aquinas, Thomas

Super Isaiam (Aquinas), 48n53 Super libros Boethii De Trinitate (Aquinas), 41, 134, 157, 169n195, 176n228, 189n280, 194n298 Super librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus (Aquinas), 87, 87n3 Super I–IV Sententiarum (Aquinas), 94n32, 182n251, 195 Tanoüarn, Guillaume de, 80n30 Ten Commandments, 76 theologia: oikonomia and, 39–46, 247 Théologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, La (Chenu), 6, 19–20, 204, 212 theology: in Augustine, 189–90; in Capreolus, 24, 139n74, 150n117, 170– 71, 192; Christ and, 153; Church and, 236–37; defined, 19; demonstrative, 93n29; in Duns Scotus, 139n74, 141–45, 152, 159–64, 192; faith and, 19–30, 53–54, 72, 136, 142, 156–57, 180, 182n251, 211–12, 227–28; faith vs., 174; in Gilson, 205–6; as God’s knowledge, 179, 181; as habit, 153–54, 164, 168–69, 171–76, 199– 200; as habit of wisdom, 186–91; as helicoidal movement, 87–93, 146–47; historical-critical method in, 21–22; judgment and, 215–19; in Leclercq, 166n188; of light, 138–57; in Natalis, 23; philosophy vs., 181–86; as practical, 176–81; in Pseudo-Dionysius, 93n29; reason and, 182–83; revelation and, 180–81; as science, 19, 121, 130–38, 140–41, 159–60, 163, 168–76; as science, arguments against, 157–76; speculative, 6, 167n190, 209–15; as speculative, 176–81; subject of, 191–202; Trinity and, 187 theosis, 251–52

330  General Index Thomism: Baroque, 21; Chenu and, 20; of Renaissance, 2, 5–6, 21–22, 74–75; revival of, 2; Summa Theologiae and, xi Thomisme, Le (Gilson), 205–6 Timothy, Second Letter to, 118 Tolkien, J. R. R., 119n119 Torrell, Jean-Pierre, xii, 26 Tradition, 49n56, 50–52, 62–63, 75, 77–78, 175, 210–11, 217–18 Trent, Council of, 2n5 Trinity: in Aquinas, 40–41; economic, 247n20; faith and, 38–39; immanent, 247n20; order of origins, 12–13, 40, 46, 59, 74, 82, 187, 191, 200, 247; revelation and, 35–36, 40–41, 44; theology and, 187 Trombetta, Antonio, 4 Trutvetter, Jodocus, 227n71

Valla, Lorenzo, 245n13 Vatican I. See First Vatican Council Vatican II. See Second Vatican Council Vendemiati, Aldo, 75n9, 80n31 veritas prima, 23, 30–32, 34–35, 37, 49, 68; in Ernst, 54n81; faith and, 210; knowledge and, 102–3; relativism and, 244n9 Vernia, Nicoletto, 4 Vienne, Council of, 149n113 Wallace, William, 19n3 Weisheipl, James, 19n3, 26 Wicks, Jared, 215n26 William of Auxerre, 210–11 William of Ockham, 9–10, 121, 160–61, 227n71, 244 wisdom, 116–20; theology as habit of, 186–91 Wisdom, Book of, 116

Ut unum sint (John Paul II), 238–39

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Cajetan on Sacred Doctrine was designed in Filosofia with Valentina display type and composed by Kachergis Book Design of Pittsboro, North Carolina. It was printed on 55-pound Natural Offset and bound by Maple Press of York, Pennsylvania.