Byzantium, 1180-1204: 'The Sad Quarter of a Century'? 9789609538374

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Byzantium, 1180-1204: 'The Sad Quarter of a Century'?
 9789609538374

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NATIONAL HELLENIC RESEARCH FOUNDATION

INSTITUTE OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH SECTION OF BYZANTINE RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 22

BYZANTIUM, 1180-1204: 'THE SAD QUARTER OF A CENTURY'?

Edited by ALICIA SIMPSON

Universitiit Mflmter 1Mtihn /i;r Bm;.1tin-istik lli'IO NetJgrliziMik

ATHENS 2015



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CONTENTS

EuropeanSocialFund Co- financed by Greece and the European Union

This book forms part of the research project «The Reign of Isaac II Angelos ( 1185-95): Politics and Society in the Late Twelfth Century», implemented within the framework of the Action «Supporting Postdoctoral Researchers» of the Operational Program «Education and Lifelong Learning» ( Action's Beneficiary: General Secretariat for Research and Technology), and is co-financed by the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Greek State.

Edited by: Auc1A

SIMPSON

Word processing-layout:

CONSTANTINA SIMONETATOU

Distribution: The National Hellenic Research Foundation 48, Vassileos Konstantinou, 116 35 Athens fax: (+30) 210 7273629 e-mail: [email protected]

© The National Hellenic Research Foundation Institute of Historical Research 48, Vassileos Konstantinou, 116 35 Athens

ISSN 1106-1448 ISBN 978-960-9538-37-4

Prologue T AXIARCHIS G. KOLIAS, Director of the Instit u te of Historical Research

9

Abbreviations

11-12

ALICIA SIMPSON, Percep tions and Interpretations of the Late Twelfth Century in Modern Historiography

13- 34

VLADA STANKOVIC, Stronger than It A pp ears? Byzantium and its European Hinterland after the Death of Manuel I Komnenos

35- 48

DIMITRI KoROBEINIKov, The Byzantine-Seljuk Border in T imes of Trouble: Laodikeia in 117 4-1204

49-81

TELEMACHOS LouNGHIS, The Fate of the German-Byzantine Alliance in the Late Twelfth Century

83- 95

DEMETRIOS KYRITSES, Political and Constitutional Crisis at the End of the Twelfth Century

97- 111

M ICHAEL ANGOLD, The Anatomy of a Failed Coup: The Abortive U prising of John the Fat (31 July 1200)

113- 34

IuAS ANAGNOSTAKlS, 'From Tempe to Sparta': Power and Contestation prior to the Latin Conquest of 1204

135-57

Kosns SMYRLis, Sybaris on the Bosphoros: Luxury, Corruption and the Byza ntine State under the Angeloi ( 1185-1203)

159- 78

PAGONA PAPADOPOULOu, Coinage and the Economy at the End of the Twelfth Century: An Assessment

179- 94

PAUL MAGDALINO, Mon ey and the A ristocracy (1180-1 204)

195- 204

8

MAR[A GEROLYMATOU, Private Investment in Trade in the F inal Years of t he Twelfth Century

205- 20

GERASIMOS MERIANOS, Literary Allusions to Trade and Merchants: The 'Great Merchant' in Late Twelfth-Century Byzantium

221-43

KALLIRROE LINARDOU, A Resting Place for 'the First of the Angels': The Michaelion at Sosthenion

245- 59

NEKTARIOS ZARRAS, A Gem of Artistic Ekphrasis: Nicholas Mesarites' Description of t he Mosaics in the Church of the Holy Apostles at Constantinople

261- 82

PROLOGUE

The present volume originated as a workshop entitled Byzantium, 11801204: 'The Sad Quarter of a Century'? held at the National Hellenic Research Foundation in Athens on June 20 2014. The workshop was organized by Alicia Simpson as part of the research project 'The Reign of Isaac II A ngelos: Politics and Society in the Late Twelfth Century', funded by t he Operational Programme 'Supporting Postdoctoral Researchers' under the auspices of the General Secretariat for Research a nd Technology, and hosted by the Institute of Historical Research. Earlier versions of the papers published here were presented at the workshop with the exception of t hose subsequently written by M ichael A ngold a nd Dimitri Korobeinikov, bot h of whom kindly agreed to contribute to the volume. The volume seeks to revisit the critical period in Byzantine h istory t hat begins with the death of t he emperor Manuel I Komnenos in 1180 and ends with the capture of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade in 1204. Though brief in its time span and most often viewed through the prism of the Latin conquest, the period witnessed important developments both within the Byza ntine Empire itself and in the wider region of Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean world. Looking beyond Byzantine-Western relation s that have so far dominated the scholarship of the period, individual p ap ers examine themes ranging from the historiographical percept ion and interpretation of the late twelfth century, to the empire's changing relations wit h its neighbours, and the sign ificant shifts occurring in its p olitical a nd socia l life. They cover issues concerning the administration and economy of the empire and the relations between capita l and provinces; and investigate t he increasing importance of commerce along with the seemingly pervasive role of mon ey-making in Byzantine society. The art-h istorical papers rounding off the volume exa mine the renovation of two prominent monuments of Constantinople which occurred during t his period. Taxia rchis G. Kolias D irector of the Institute of Histor ical Research

ABBREVIATIONS

BF BMGS BNJ BS! Byz ByzBulg BZ

Byzantinische Forschungen Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies Byzantinisch -neugriechische Jahrbilcher Byzantinoslavica Byzantion Byzantinobulgarica Byzantinische Zeitschrift

CFHB CSHB

Corpus Fontium H istoriae Byzantinae Corpus Scriptorum H istoriae Byzantinae

DChAE

LlEAilov -rfj~ XQw-rwviufls- 'AQxaw)..oyiufls'E-raircCas-

D OLGER- WrRTH, Regesten

DOP JOB LMA MGH SRG MGHSS

MM ODE PG

PL

Regesten der Kaiserkunden des Ostromischen Reiches, II: Regesten van 10251204, rev. edn. P. WIRTH, Mun ich 1995 Dumbarton Oaks Papers Jahrbuch der Osterreichischen Byzantinistik Lexikon des Mittelalters, R. A uTY et al. (eds.), 9 vols., Munich- Stuttgart, 1977- 99

F.

DOLGER,

Monumenta Germaniae H istorica, Scriptores rerum Germanicarum Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Scriptores F. MrKLOSISCH and J. M OLLER, Acta et diplomata graeca medii aevi, 6 vols., Vienna, 1860- 90 Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, ed. A. KAZHDAN, 3 vols., Oxford- New York 1991 Patrologiae cursus completus, Series graeca, ed. J.-P. MTGNE, 161 vols., Par is 1857- 66 Patrologiae cursus completus, Series latina, ed. J.-P. MIGNE, 217 vols., Paris 1844-64

12

REB

TT

vv ZRVI

ABBREVIATIONS

Revue des Etudes Byzantines G. L. F. TAFEL and G. M. THOMAS, Urkunden zur iilteren Handels- und Staatgeschichte der Republik Venedig mit besonderen Beziehungen auf Byzanz und die Levante, 3 vols., Vienna 1856- 57; repr. Amsterdam 1964 Vizantiiskii Vremmenik Zbornik Radova Vizantoloskog Instituta

ALICIA SIMPSON

PERCEPTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE LATE TWELFTH CENTURY IN MODERN HISTORIOGRAPHY

In his review of Charles Brand's fundamental study of the late twelfth century in. Byzantine ,~istory, Robert Browning noted that the author set out to narrate the events of 'the sad quarter of a century' that elapsed between the death of the emperor Manuel I Komnenos (1143- 80) and the Fourth Crusade. In the process, he also traced the progressive deterioration of relations between the Byzantine Empire and Western Europe, which led to the conquest of Constantinople in 1204. 1 In fact , the latter aim is reflected in the title of the book in question, the now classic Byzantium Conf ronts the West, and as the author himself expressly stated in the p reface, the purpose of his work was to analyze the relations between the Byzantine Empire and the Western European states so that the underlying motivations of the Fourth Crusade became evident. 2 As such, the book very much focused on Byzantine foreign policy during this period, drawing a sharp distinction between two opposing strategies. The first was that of Manuel, who strove to develop an international web of alliances, and the second that of the usurper Andronikos I Komnenos (1183-5), who relied on a few powerful but questionable friends. Their successors, the Angeloi, are said to have swung back and forth between these two extremes and to have vainly attempted to hold off the rising power of the West amidst repeated onslaughts by the Turks, the Hungarians, and the Vlach-Bulgarians, and the t urmoil caused by the incessant revolts of the discontented provincial aristocracy.

1. R. BROWNING, in Speculum 44/1 (1969), 116. 2. C. M. B RAND, Byzantium Confronts the West, 1180-7 204, Ca mbridge MA J968, v.

14

ALICIA SIMPSON

For Brand, the history of the late twelfth century was therefore the history of the failure of Byzantine foreign policy as related through the tale of 'countless ambassadors and messengers [who] hastened to the West and returned; grandiose letters and humble pleadings dispatched to powers, great and small; manifold treaties drafted, emended, and accepted; [and] the threat of violence from mobs and armies [which] lurked in the background'. 3 His analysis has proved influential and enduring, so much so that the period 1180-1204 has been frequently perceived as a prelude to the Fourth Crusade. 4 Admittedly, there is very good reason for this. The Latin capture of Constantinople was a momentous event in Byzantine history and it is only natural for historians to seek the causes of the empire's fall in the territorial fragmentation and internal dissention that characterized the 'sad quarter of the century' that preceded it. The result, however, is that, on the one hand, Byzantine-Western relations have tended to take precedence over Byzantine relations with any other state or peoples, whether in the Balkans or in the Near East, and that they have frequently been approached in terms of Byzantine errors and weaknesses that allowed for the a rm ies of the Fourth Crusade to be diverted to Constantinople. On the other hand, the search for causes has turned inward to account for the collapse of the so-called 'Comnenian system' of government in the final decades of the twelfth century that resulted in the territorial fragmentation and fatal weakening of the empire. Scholarly discussions have tended to emphasize inherent structural weaknesses and related social and economic factors but have disagreed on points of substance. Whereas Michael Hendy saw the combination of a weakening central authority and an expanding peripheral economy as the key to the internal disintegration of the empire in the late twelfth century, 5 others remain unconvinced. The truth of the matter is that the state of the Byzantine economy in the final decades of the twelfth century still eludes us, 6 while the prevailing model of an expanding 3. BRAND, BCW, 232. 4. See the review of the relevant literature in M. ANGOLD, 'The State of Research. The Road to 1204: The Byzantine Background to the Fourth Crusade', Journal of Medieval

History 25/3 (1999), 257- 78. 5. M. F. H ENDY, Catalogue of Byzantine Coins in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection and the Whittemore Collection, IV/ 1, Wash in gton DC 1999, 8-9. 6. The only study dedicated to the economy of is that of J. H E RRJN, 'The Collapse of the

PERCEPTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE LATE TWELFTH CENTURY

15

economy and growing prosperity has itself been recently called into question.7 Factors such as the dramatic rise in rebellions and conspiracies, the growth of provincial separatism, and the increasing influence of the Constantinopolitan populace would seem to point to political rather than economic difficulties. But let us take things one at a time. In this brief survey, I will attempt to outline the main directions taken in recent lit erature and to identify continuing uncertainties with regard to some of the major issues of the late twelfth century in Byzantine history. As it stands, the narrative of Byzantine-Western relations in the final decades of the twelfth century is dominated by the question of the alliance between the successors of Manuel and Saladin, the powerful sultan of Egy pt and Syria (1174-93). The nature and terms of the alliance have been fiercely debated since the publication of Brand's pe~suasive thesis of a collusion between the Byzantines and Saladin against the crusader states, and in particular against the Third Crusade.8 The existence of the alliance, however, has rarely been disputed. This is important because the Byzantine-Muslim agreement is said to have marked a clear break with Manuel's long-term policy of accommodation with ( the Western powers, and has therefore been considered a realignment of Byzantine foreign policy, which in the best of circumstances was risky, a nd in the worst, treacherous. The most recent literature seems divided on the issue and, in this case, the devil is certainly in the details. Jonathan H arris argued against the existence of such an alliance, which he saw simply as a treaty of mutual recognition of religious privileges. He concluded that the Byzantine opposition to the crusade led by the German Emperor Frederick Ba rbarossa (1152- 90) was not motivated by the alliance with Saladin but by the potential but ver y Byzantine Empire in the Twelfth Century. A Study of a Medieval Economy', University of Birmingham Historical Journal 12/2 (1970), 186-203; updated in EADEM, Margins and Metropolis: Authority Across the Byzantine Empire, Princeton 2013, 111- 29. For new insights in to the coinage and economy of the period, see the contribution of Pagona Papadopoulou to this volume. 7. M. Wtt1rrnw, 'The Byzantine Economy (600-1 204)', in J. SHEPARD (ed.), The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire, c. 500-1492, Cambridge 2008, 490- 3. 8. C. M. BRAND, 'The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185- 1192: Opponents of the Third Crusade', Speculum 37 (1962), 167- 81.

ALICIA SIMPSO N

16

serious threat that the crusading army posed to the empire. In his negotiations with Saladin, however, the Byzantine emperor Isaac II Angelos (1185-95) attempted to capitalize on the situation by claiming that he was acting in the sultan's interests. But the latter was not so easily deceived, and Isaac's double dealing only earned him the enmity of the crusaders. 9 Paul Magdalino, picking up on the hitherto neglected evidence provided by the Greek sources, argued for a more substantive rapprochement between Saladin and Manuel's successors through which the latter hoped to obtain concessions in the Holy Land. In the case of Isaac, he emphasized the emperor's dependence on Dositheos, his Venetian-born patriarch, who was responsible for the reconciliation between Venice and Byzantium, and also for Isaac's plans of imperial restoration in Syria and Palestine. When the Third Crusade was launched Isaac started to play a double game with Frederick Barbarossa and Saladin, but when the German emperor did not oblige him, he decided that his only option was to obstruct the crusade. This resulted in the occupation and devastation of Byzantine lands, the weakening of the imperial position in the Balkans, and the hostility of the Latins.10 More recently, Savvas Neocleous has reconsidered the question through a detailed examination of the Latin and Arabic sources. He does much to discredit the Latin accounts, which he deems distorted, ignorant, and prejudicial, and emphatically rejects the existence of any sort of treaty, 11 religious or otherwise, between Manuel's successors and Saladin. More important, however, is· his reading of the Arabic sources, which focus on the relationship between the Byzantines and the Muslims rather than that between the Byzantines and the Latins. They provide evidence of regular diplomatic contacts and close relations but also of deceit and double-dealing between the Byzantine and Muslim courts. While it has always been clear that Saladin's principal aim was to deprive the crusader states of the Byzantine alliance, Isaac's motivation has been far from obvious. The Arabic sources 9. J. HARRIS, Byzantium and the Crusades, London- New York 2003, 121 ff. See also t he earlier views of H. MOHRING, Saladin und der dritte Kreuzzug, Wiesbaden 1980, 171- 8 8 and R.-J. L1Lm, Byzantium and the Crusader States, 1096- 1204, Oxford 1993, 230-42.

10. P. MAGDA LINO, 'Isaac JI , Saladin and Venice', in J. SHEPARD (ed.), The Expansion of

Orthodox Europe. Byzantium, the Balkans and Russia, Aldershot 2007, 93- 106. 11. S. NEocLEOUS, 'The Byzantines and Saladin: Opponents of the Third Crusade?', Crusades 9 (2010), 87- 106.

PERCEPTIONS A ND INTERPRETAT IONS OF T HE LAT E TWELFTH CENTURY

17

reveal that the emperor's requests centred on the transfer of ecclesiastical institutions in Jerusalem to the jurisdiction of Constantinople and a joint attack on the island of C yprus (in the hands of the self-proclaimed emperor Isaac Komnenos since 1184), both of which Saladin eventually agreed to fulfill. This explains why Isaac was so eager to warn the sultan about the impending crusade, and to give him assurances that he would oppose t he crusading armies. 12 Yet Isaac had earlier promised Henry II of England (1154-89) safe passage through his empire, markets and counsel. 13 Once he had concluded peace with Frederick Barbarossa in February 1190, Isaac wrote to the German emperor, proposing a joint attack against the rebellious Vlach-Bulgarians. 14 The following month he wrote to Saladin, assuring him that he had afflicted heavy casualties on Frederick's a rmy.15 Similarly, when the threat of the crusade had passed a nd Saladin was negotiating a treaty of alliance wit.b Guy of Lusignan, now ruler of Cyprus, the sultan reassured Guy not to give a ny credence to his dealings with the Greeks, for he had promised to help them regain Cyprus when the island was still held by his enemy. 16 If it can now be safely concluded that there was no formal ByzantineMuslim alliance against the crusades, this leaves open the question of the realignment of Byzantine foreign policy after 1180. Here we should take into consideration the negotiations between Manuel and Saladin in the 1170s, when the latter was apparently attempting to court Byzantine friendship through the offer of religious privileges in the t erritories under his authority, and possibly to forge a Byzantine-Muslim alliance against their common enemy, King William II of Sicily (1166- 89). 17 In 1186 Isaac failed to regain 12. The Chronicle of lbn al-Athlr for the Crusading period from al-Ka mil fi'l-Ta'rikh, part 2, trans. D. S. RJCHARDS, Crusade Texts in Translation 15, Farnham 2007, 374. 13. RALPH OF D1cETO, Opera Historica, ed. W. STUBBS, London 1876, 51-4. 14. The Crusade of Frederic Barbarossa: The History of the Expedition of the Emperor Frederic and R elated Texts, trans. G. A . LOUD, Crusade Texts in Translation 19, Farnham 2010, 94. 15. BAHA' AL-DIN lBN SHADDAD, The R are and Excellent History of Saladin, trans. D. S.

RICHARDS, Crusade Texts in Translation 7, Alclershot 2002, 122. 16. ABO SHAMA, Le livre des deuxjardins: histoire des deux regnes: celui de Naur ed Dtn

et celui de Sa /ah ed D fn, ed. and trans. A.-C. BARBIER DE MEYNARD, Recueil des H istoriens des Croisades Orientaux IV, Paris 1898, 510. Cf. S. NEOCLEous, 'The Byzantines and Saladin: Some Further Arguments', Al-Masaq 25/ 2 (201 3), 20 4- 21. 17. C f. D. JACOBY 'Diplomacy, Trade, Shipp ing and Espionage between Byzantium and

ALICIA SIMPSON

18

the island of Cyprus, and lost the bulk of the imperial fleet in the process because the Normans of Sicily came to the rescue of the usurper Isaac Komnenos.18 He then turned to Saladin. Was this a coincidence? Probably not. The reconquest of the strategic island of Cyprus was a principal concern for both Isaac and his successor Alexios III (1195-1203).19 Isaac negotiated with Saladin because the latter was the now master of the Near East and because they shared a common enemy.20 Alexios III, on the other hand, would later negotiate with Pope Innocent III (1198- 1216) because the pope was the only one that could force the king of Jerusalem, Amalric II (1197- 1205), to restore Cyprus to the empire. 21 In both cases, the selection of potential allies was dictated by the immediate political circumstances and should therefore not be taken to signal the realignment of Byzantine foreign policy. Having said that, it is obv.ious that the foreign policy of the Angeloi was opportunistic in nature and reactionary in principle, and this combination did not bode well for the future security of the empire. With regard to the northern Balkans, the Byzantine retreat in the late twelfth century has proved a highly contentious issue. The Vlach-Bulgarian rebellion, which eventually led to the establishment of the Second Bulgarian Empire, has received extensive attention but there remain several unresolved issues having to do with chronology, the ethnic composition of the rebels, Egypt in the Twelfth Century', in C. SCHOLZ and G. MAKRIS (eds.), IIOJ\YIIJ\EYPOX NOYZ.

PERCEPTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE LATE TWELFTH CENTURY

.19

and the origins of the revolt. Regarding the origins of the rebellion, it is no accident that the two most recent publications represent the opposing views in the historiographical controversy. On the one hand, Francesco Dall' Aglio contends that the ethnic dimension of the revolt was instrumental in the creation of the Second Bulgarian Empire and argues for the p re-existence of widespread discontent with imperial authority, and also of autonomous tendencies amongst the local population. He further suggests that this is what allowed a trivial or accidental cause, i.e. the extraordinary tax levied by Isaac II, to spark a rebellion of such massive proportions. 22 Max Ritter, on the other hand, sees the resentment caused by the extraordinary tax levy as the single most impor tant reason for the rebellion a nd does not assign any particular significance to ethnic aspects. He considers the revolt a case of regional disaffection turned into ethnic separatism because of t he continued success enjoyed by the rebels. 23 Written sources and archaeological evidence lend credence to the former view. Looking at the image of the Bulgarians in the literary sources of the eleventh and twelfth century, Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki observed that the Byzantine historians were unanimous in linking the rebellions of the Bulgarians with their inherent desire for autonomy from Byzantine rule. 24 This, of course, is also true of Niketas Choniates, whose description of the origins and initial stages of the Vlach- Bulgarian revolt forms the basis of Dall'Aglio's thesis. If the literary sources suggest that from the outset this

Miscellanea fur Peter Schreiner zu seinem 60. Geburtstag, Leipzig 2000, 86-95. On relig ious priv ileges, see D. TsouNGARAKIS, Life of Leontios, Patriarch of Jerusalem, Leiden 1993, 87.

22. F. DALL'Aouo, 'Qualche consideratione sulla fon dazione de! 'Secondo Regno

18. THEODOSIOS, Encomion, ed. I. SAKELLION and C. YIONIS, 'A.xoAove{a le()a t oii ()(JlOV iml

Bulgaro', Ricerche slavistiche 9 (2011), 55- 64. See also the earlier views of R. G u1LLA ND,

ewcp6QOV Jrat()6c; f/µwv XQWWOOVAOV toii eavµaiovoyoii, Athens 1884, 177. Cf. E. VRANOUSI,

'Byzance et Jes Ba lkans sous le regne d'Isaac II Ange (1185- 1195), in Actes du XII" Congres

Ta aywloyixa xdµeva wv odov Xowwoovlov, io()vtov tl],c; 1,v llaiµw µovijc;, Athens 1966,

international d'etudes byzantines, 3 vols., Belgrade 1964, II, 126- 7; G. CANKOVA-PETKOVA, 'La

148- 53; A. KIESEWETTER, 'Preludio alia quarta crociata? Megareites di Brindisi, Ma io di Cefalonia

liberation de la Bulgarie de la domi nat ion b yzantine', ByzBulg 5 (1978), 104; D . A NGEWV,

e le signoria sulle isole ionie (1185-1250)', in G. 0RTJ\LLI, G. RAVEGNANI and P. SCHREINER (eds.),

'Der Aufstand der Asener und die Wiederherstellung des bulgarischen Staates', Etudes

Quarta Crociata. Venezia-Bizanzio-Impero Lalino, Venice 2006, 332-3 and n. 67.

Balkaniques 21/III (1985), 9. 23. M. R ITTER, 'Die vlacho-bulgarischeRebellion und d ie Versuche ihrer N iederschlagung

19. So NmcLEous, 'Further Arguments', 219. 20. Cf. Chronicle of Ibn al-Athlr, 20 1: Isaac requested that 'there should be an