Byzantine diplomacy: papers of the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies 0860783383

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
Abbreviations
SECTION I
SECTION II
2. Byzantine diplomacy,A.D. 300-800: means and ends
Evangelos Chrysos
3. Byzantine diplomacy,A.D. 800-1204: means and ends
Jonathan Shepard
4. Byzantine diplomacy,A.D. 1204-1453: means and endsN. Oikonomides
often of Latin origin
linguistic abilities are not expressly mentioned
without
having to use an interpreter
SECTION III
5. Constantinople, Rome and the Franksin the seventh and eighth centuries
Herrin
By
the end of the sixth century, when Constantinople had abandoned Latinand only used Greek as the language of diplomacy, it was the mediumof communication that became more awkward.
9. K. Hopwood Low-level diplomacy between Byzantines and Ottoman Turks: the case of Bithynia
Section VI
Social Aspects
17. Dynastic marriages and political kinship
Ruth Macrides
INDEX
STOP

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{BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY Papers from the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, March 1990

edited by

Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin

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VARIORUM 1992

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"'S7J I,1)

Copyright

© 1992 by the Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies Hon. Secretary, Dr M.E. Mullett, Dept of Greek & Latin,

The Queen's University of Belfast, Belfast, Northern Ireland BT71NN All ri~hts reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a re~le~allsystehm, or ~ansmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mec amca, p otocopled, recorded, or otherwise without th . permission ofthe publisher. e pnor

CONTENTS Editors' Preface List of Abbreviations

Published by VARIORUM Ashgate Publishing Limited Gower House, Croft Road Aldershot, Hampshire GUll 3HR Great Britain

vii

ix

Section I; The Byzantine Notion of Diplomacy 1. A. Kazhdan

Ashgate Publishing Company Old Post Road Brookfield, Vermont 05036 USA

The notion of Byzantine diplomacy

3

Section 11: Pl1ases of Byzantine Diplomacy 2. E. Chrysos

ISBN 0-86078-338-3

3. J. Shepard

A CIP catalogu: record for this book is available from the British Library and the US Library of Congress.

4. N.Oikonomides

Byzantine diplomacy, AD. 300-800: means and ends Byzantine diplomacy, AD. 800-1204: means and ends Byzantine diplomacy, AD. 1204-1453: means and ends

25 41 73

Section Ill: Byzantium and Otl1ers 5. J. Herrin 6. T. Noonan 7. H. Kennedy Typeset by Printed by

Archaeological Services and Publishing 197 Great Western Road, Glasgow G4 9EB

8. S. Franklin

BiIling&Sons Ltd, Worcester

9. K. Hopwood SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION PUBLICATIONS 1

OF

BYZANTINE

Constantinople, Rome and the Franks in the seventh and eighth centuries Byzantium and the Khazars: a special relationship? Byzantine-Arab diplomacy in the Near East from the Islamic conquests to the mid eleventh century Diplomacy and ideology: Byzantium and the Russian church in the mid twelfth century Low-level diplomacy between Byzantines and Ottoman Turks: the case of Bithynia

91 109

133

145 151

STUDIES

Section IV: Sources on Diplomacy 10. R. Scott Diplomacy in the sixth century: the evidence of John Malalas Re-reading Constantine Porphyrogenitus 11. 1. Sevcenko Liudprand of Cremona-a diplomat? 12. C.Schummer The language of diplomacy 13. M.Mullett

159

167 197 203

vi

Section V: Art in Diplomacy 14. R. Cormack 15. A. Muthesius 16. J Lowden

But is it art? Silken diplomacy The luxury book as diplomatic gift

219 237 249

Preface

Section VI: Social Aspects 17. R. Macrides 18. J. Haldon

19. M. Whitby 20. D. Smythe

Dynastic marriages and political kinship 'Blood and ink': some observations on Byzantine attitudes towards warfare and diplomacy From frontier to palace: the personal role of the emperor in diplomacy Why do barbarians stand round the emperor at diplomatic receptions?

263

281 295

305

Section VII: T7u Less Obvious End 21. P. Antonopoulos The less obvious ends of Byzantine diplomacy Index

315 321

The contributions to this book derive from papers presented to the 24th annual Byzantine symposium, on the subject of 'Byzantine Diplomacy', held in Cambridge from 31 March - 2 April 1990. In common usage the very word 'Byzantine' suggests intricate diplomatic deviousness. Whether one finds this image of Byzantium seductive or repellent, one might at least suppose that the topic of Byzantine diplomacy would have been comprehensively explored and explained in books by Byzantinists. One would be wrong. The present book is intended to fill, 01' to begin to fill, an astonishing gap in the literature about Byzantium. The intention is grander than the achievement, and conspicuous gaps remain. We would have liked to include, for example, studies of the 'nuts and bolts' of diplomacy: of documents and seals, of finance, of diplomatic offices and the composition of embassies. Information on such matters is scattered through the volume, not gathered in thematic surveys. This is regrettable, but has been unavoidable in the circumstances. We also regret that some ccmtributions, commissioned and accepted for the present volume, are to be published elsewhere. They are: T.S. Brown, 'The evolution of diplomatic relations between Byzantium and the Lombard principalities in Southern Italy 774-1071', BMGS 17 (1993) N. de Lange, 'Byzantium in the Cairo Genizah', BMGS 16 (1992) C. Galatariotou, 'Travel and perception in Byzantium', DOP 47 (1993) R. Morris, 'Divine diplomacy in the late eleventh century', BMGS 16 (1992) We apologize for any inconvenience caused to readers or to these authors. Most authors were asked to confine footnotes to primmy sources and essential secondary literalure. Standard works and further general reading may be found in Sections I and n. In the present volume Byzantine proper names have been given in their Latinized form, except where a common English form exists; Greek words and terms have been transliterated as close to their Greek form as possible. For the transliteration of Slavonic we have used the Revised Library of Congress System, without diacritics.

•

viii

. TIll' pn~sl'nl volume marks an " that it is the first in tIll' Ill'W official publica tion se " lU1PfOlltant st~p, 111 , p 0 he SOCIety fa tl Iles , (' l' ~\" I " Ztll1 lilt' "lud1l's , publish ed on behalf 0 ' r 'le rOmotlOn of f the SOCIety by Variorum, We ,lI'l' must grall'fu l to Profess or Av "I C ameron for i 't' en , ~' 1 lWllng Us to offer / .1f~ll/l/ll/t' DII'/OIIII ICt/ for the . ' , 1 I 1 . dos was le s senes, ' , , lI1VO ved in the y e 'd ' gl've WIse l'l I Itlll'lal process ; and she h'lS d ance gUl n . , ' " SUpport. I'tnallv, snedal lhanks' ,'lI'e Cltle t 0 o'tllerwise an kn ,'. r , , ', unac owledged but W'll t s. sl'nlml contnb ulors: Miss S11e'l k 1 SOn for alll I a , 1e1' WOI' on the pre' int an:l M' C P,lt',llllll1 of the lvpescr ' f d Edwa al'olyn 155 ( ' r ' . J , l' 5, or mvaluable aSslsti\llCe 'vvith the Index,

List of Abbreviations AASS AElviA A!.

Acta Sanctorum Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi Anna Comne na, Alexiad, ed. and French tr. B. Leib I-III (Paris, 1937-4 5)

BCH

BF BMGS BSI

Byz Byz, and West

BZ

CCM CFHB CSHB DAI DAI: Comm, DC

Bulletin de Correspondance HelUnique Byzantinische Forschungen Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies Byzantinoslavica Byzan tion Byzantium and the West c. 850-1204. Proceedings of the XVIII Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies Oxford 30 March - 1 April 1984. ed. J.D. Howar d-John ston (Amste rdam, 1988) (= BF 12) Byzantinische Zeitschrift Cahiers de civilisation medievale Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae Consta ntine VU, De administrando imperio, ed. and tr. G.

Moravc sik and R.J.H. Jenkins (Washi ngton, D.e, 19672) De administrando imperio: Commental1j, ed. R.J.H. Jenkin s (Londo n, 1962) Consta ntine VII, De cerimoniis aulae byzantinae, ed. I.I. Reiske I (HOlm, 1829)

Deltion tes Historikes kai Etlmologikes Hetaireias tes Hellados ton Oaks Papers Dumbar DOP Hetaireias Byzantinon Spoudon Epeteris EEBS Historicorum Graecorum nta Fragme FHG Minores Fontes FM Harvard Ukrainian Studies HUS Jahrbucher for Geschichte Osteuropas JGO Jahrbuch der Osterreichischen Byzantinistik JOB Journal of Roman Studies JRS ed. J. Liudpr and, Ant. Liudpr and of Cremo na, Antapodosis, in Opera, 1915) er, Hanov g, (Leipzi schol. Becke1', MGH in usum

DIEE

xi

x Liudprand, Leg. Liudprand of Cremona, Legatio, in Opera, ed. J. Becker, MGH in usum schol. (Leipzig, Hanover, 1915) Libel' Pontificalis, ed. 1. Duchesne I-HI (Rome, 1886-92, LP repr. Paris, 1957) T.e. Lounghis, Les ambassades byzantines en Occident Lounghis

depuis la fondation des etats barbares jusqu' aux Croisades

Turtledove

The Chronicle of Theophanes, tr. H. Turtledove (Phila-

VV Vogt

Vizantiiskii Vremennik Le livre des cert§monies, ed. and French tr. A. Vagt I-II

Wright

The Works of Liudpmnd of Cremona, tr. F.A. Wright

WS

Die Welt der Slawen Zbornik Radova VizantoloSkog Instituta

delphia, 1982)

(Paris, 1935-39) (London, 1930)

(Athens, 1980)

MGH MM

Monumenta Germaniae Historica Miklosich-Miiller, Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi

Obolensky, 'Principles' D. Obolensky, 'The principles and methods of Byzantine diplomacy', Actes du XII Congres International des Etudes Byzantines I (Belgrade, 1963), 4561, repr. in his Byzantium and the Slavs (London, 1971) Oikonomides, Listes N. Oikonomides, Les listes de preseance byzantines des IX et X siecles (Paris, 1972)

PG

Patrologia Graeca Prosopographisches Lexikon der Palai%genzeit Patrologia Orientalis PO PseIIus, Clzron. Michael PseIIus, Chronographia, ed. and French tr. E. PLP

Renauld, I-II (Paris, 1926-28)

PSRL

RAC RE REAnn REB REG Reg. RESEE ROC RSBN Scyl.

Polnoe sobranie russkikh fetopisei Reallexikon fiir Antike und Christentul1t Paulys Realencyclopiidie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft Revue des Etudes Armeniennes Revue des Etudes Byzantines Revue des Etudes Grecques F. DOlger, Regesten del' Kaiserurkunden des ostromischen Reiches I-V (Munich, 1924-65) Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Europeennes Revue de [,Orient Chretien Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici JoIm Scylitzes, Synopsis Historian, ed. 1. Thurn (Berlin,

Sewter

New York, 1973) Anna Comnena, Alexiad, tr. E.R.A. Sewter (Harmondsworth, 1969)

SK

Seminllrium Kondakovianwn

Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. e. de Boor I-II (Leipzig, 1883-85) Theoph. Cont. Theophanes Continuatus, Chronographia, ed. 1. Bekker (Bonn, 1838) Theoph.

TM

Travaux et Memoires

ZRVI

-

Section I The Byzantine Notion of Diplomacy

"

,

1. The notion of Byzantine diplomacy

Alexander Kazhdan SOll1.e thirty years ago, at the Oc1wid congress of Byzantine studies, Dimitri Obolensky began his paper on Byzantine diplomacy with the words: 'The diplomacy of the Byzantine empire still awaits its his torian'.1 The statement remains valid today. I do not think we have come m.uch closer even to clarifying the problem, and I certainly do not expect my present contribution to fulfil this task or fill the gap. If one were to deal with the topic thoroughly, one would have to include a consideration of sources and historiography (as was pointed out in responses to Obolensky's Ochrid paper).2 If, however, one is restricted to a brief survey, what is the most appropriate structure and approach? Obolensky chose a regional approach, limiting his study to Byzantium's northern frontier, to a semicircle around the Black Sea. In his view the limitation was made necessary because of the general lack of preparatory work on Byzantine diplomacy.3 By contrast Professor Zakythinos, in his critique of Obolensky's paper, argued that the exclusion of other territories may lead to a distortion of the issues, since it may bring to the fore minor questions of local diplomacy and thereby obfuscate the main lines of Byzantine policy. 4 Thus if we intend to survey the notion of Byzantine diplomacy, and not just regional foreign affairs, we have to take into account the overall situation, whether or not we are able to base arguments on preparatory study. Local particularities should not obscure the overall pattern, nor should sweeping generalization obscure the existence of local and chronological distinctions. Jonathan Shepard5 has underlined the difference between the northern and western neighbours of Byzantium, on 1

Obolensky, 'Principles', 45.

2

Actes du XII Congres International des Etl/des ByZUl1 tines I (Belgrade, 1963), 302, 316f.

3

Obolensky, 'Principles', 45.

4 Actes du XII Congres, 314f. 5 J. Shepard, 'Information, disinformation and delay in Byzantine diplomacy', BF 10

(1985),234.

SECTION I

THE NOTION OF BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY

the one hand, and the Moslems, on the other; he raises two points of difference: the Moslems were equal or even superior to the Byzantines in wealth and culture and therefore less susceptible to the charm of the Byzantine diplomatic devices; and on the oriental frontier there was a confrontation of two creeds, whereas the northern and western neighbours subscribed to the same Christian creed as the Byzantines. We might discuss to what an extent this definition is precise or sufficient - this is not my purpose now. What really matters is the necessity to combine a perception of the general principles of Byzantine diplomacy with an awareness of its local particularities. Two supplementary points must be added. In the first place, a summary characterization of three major regions (west, north and east) is insufficient since each of them consisted of various political formations. For example, in the east Byzantium faced not only powerful and centralized states, professing alien religions, Iran, the caliphate, the Mongol empire, and finally Ottoman Turks but also small principalities such as Arab kingdoms of the fourth through the sixth centuries or Seljuk states in the twelfth century - quite sensitive, by the way, to the Byzantine 'childish display of wealth'. Western countries were also far from being uniform: the empire of Frederick Barbarossa required a different diplomatic approach from that which was appropriate in dealings with the Lombard principalities of south Italy, while Stefan Dusan's Serbia presented Byzantine diplomats with problems different from those which were presented by tiny and wealthy Dubrovnik. In the second place, the time factor must be introduced. The empire of Justinian I in the sixth century differed from the fifteenth-century empire of the Straits on the eve of its fall. This trite truism has momentous implications that we sometimes obscure by putting an emphasis on Byzantine traditionalism. Professor Moravcsik, in his commentary on Obolensky's paper, quoted an Italian author, Giovanni di Ravenna, who described the visit of the Emperor John V Palaeologus in 1366 to the Hungarian King Louis the Great. 6 Moravcsik stressed that the king met the emperor with extreme deference. I would add that the picture presented by Giovanni di Ravenna parallels the scene of submission of Renauld de Chatillon, prince of Antioch, before Manuel I in 11597 - and that thi~ ~:o:edure illustrates the preservation of the Byzantine ceremorual fIctIon of the emperor's prerogatives. The ceremonial traditionalism is obvious in this meeting. But the

extent to which Louis's polite deference influenced the results of negotiations is another question. In any case, the encounter described by Giovanni di Ravenna has another and in my view a more Significant meaning: we cannot imagine a late Roman emperor going to a foreign country as his own ambassador in order to solicit military help. John V's visit to Buda, however, was not exceptional. Emperors of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries played a very active diplomatic role, travelling to Italy and France. With Obolensky we can call tIus 'elasticity' ,8 or elasticite with Zakythinos9 but it represents a radical shift both in political situation and in diplomatic technique. The change is probably more important than the preservation of the ceremonial, the more so since in this case the preservation is characteristic of the Hungarian court rather than of the court of Constantinople. But if there was a change in Byzantine diplomacy two questions must be raised, even though they are not easily answered. The first question is: when did the change in Byzantine diplomacy occur? The second is: what constitutes the core of this change? Telemachos Lounghis raises the chronological question clearly. According to him, the change in diplomatic relations between Byzantium and the west took place in 752/3; the core of this transformation is the transition from the original imbalance (desequilibre) in east-west relations, which began to give way to a balanced situation.10 The book by Lounghis also implies that another change occurred during or after the Crusades, which form the later chronological sh"atum of the book. If we reverse Lounghis's definition, this second change can be described as a transition from a balanced situation to a new imbalance, when the west gained the upper hand and Byzantium appeared in the role of impoverished and feeble supplicant. My conclusion made on the basis of Lounghis's monograph has, however, a methodological weakness. We cannot automatically extend it to other areas: the occident entered the middle ages as a former part of the Roman empire and it needed some time to shake off these ideological fetters. Thus the purpose of this survey is not to describe Byzantine diplomacy in operationll but to ask the most general questions, while not ignoring local socio-political and temporal particularities. The most general question, of course, is the definition of the subject - what is Byzantine diplomacy?

4

8 Obolensky, 'Principles', 61.

6 Acles du XII Congres, 308£. See in a developed form: G. Moravcsik, SIt/dia Byzalllinu (Budapest, 1967), 344-9. 7 F. Chalandon, Les Comnime II (PariS, 1912), 444.

9 Acles, 317. 10 Lounghis, (146. 11

A topic for a monograph even if limited by space or time-span.

5

SECTIO N I

THE NOTIO N OF BYZANTINE DIPLO MACY

The question seems senseless and the answer self-evident, since every schoolchild is suppos ed to know what diplomacy is. But is it really so simple? G. Moravcsik, in his commentary on Obolen sky's paper, recommended for the study of diplomacy books 'concer ning Byzantine history, in its wholen ess or its parts, or concerning the relations of Byzantium with foreign peoples'.12 Is diplomacy identic al with foreign relations? If so, then how can we isolate diplom acy from the whole history of Byzantium, its 'war and peace', which, in its turn, is closely connected with the interna l development of the country ? Zakythinos argues, by contrast, that foreign policy and interna tional relations are not the same as 'la diplom a tie byzantine';13 he restricts our task to studying 'the techniq ue of foreign relations'. In other words, when we study Byzantine diplom acy the accent should be not what was happening but how it was happen ing. It is so easy to confuse the 'what' and the 'how', and even to substitute the 'how' for the 'what', the means of conducting relations with the relations themselves and their results - but then we find ourselves in the sphere of foreign policy, and the task of creating the history of Byzantineaiplomacy will remain in a deplorable state for yet anothe r thirty years. But what is the 'tec1mique' of foreign relations? Zakythinos14 lists the items that form in their comple xity this 'teclmique': his list contain s thirty three points among which some are only remotely related to diplomacy - shipwreck, for instanc e, or xenophobia, or heretics. Others can be combined into several major groups: diplomatic corresp ondenc e and diplomatic documents; organiz ation of missions; the rights of ambassadors; the etiquet te of receptions; forms of alliances - marria ges, commercial treaties, military contracts; the status of foreigners (mercenaries, pilgrims, trade colonies, fugitives); the frontier; the extradiplomatic activity (especially intelligence) of diplomatiC personneL15 To this list I would add the structu re of the retinue of ambass adors and its impact on cultural interchange. All these points are certainly of great import. The questio n is, however, whether they can be covere d in a concise survey or whethe r they deserve a series of monographs. Or - another possibility - perhap s they form independent units, rather than being interwoven into a comple x system? Is the organization of the frontier, for instance, someh ow

connec ted with nuptial diplomacy? And if it is, what is the backgr ound of this connection? In other words, can we move from the descrip tion of particu lar points to the search for the core - the 'princi ples' - of Byzantine diplomacy? Anothe r very general question to ask is that which concerns our overall assessm ent of Byzantine diplomacy. This questio n finds opposing solutions in moder n historiography. Obolen sky, in the abovementio ned paper, acknowledges 'failures' of Byzant ine diplom acy but empha sizes primar ily its 'achievements' .16 It s~ffices to c,oll~ct the epithet s he employ s to characterize these achievements: skIll and resourc efulnes s', 'wisdo m', 'admira ble summa ry', 'effectiveness', 'fines t and noblest hour', 'ingenious and elaborate mythol ogy', all leading . to the final conclusion: 'There can be no doubt that, on an overall view, Byzant ine diplom acy was outstandingly succe~sful'. By contrast, Lounghis flatly asserts that: 18 The lustory of Byzant me embass ies to the west was a failure (un echec).' The contras t could not be more stark: on the one hand, an outstan ding achiev ement, on the other, a comple te failure. How could two scholars reach such differing conclu sions? We can try to approa ch the solution of this contro versy 0:' two differe nt levels. The first is seemingly Simple: Obolen sky deals WIth the northe rn border of the Byzantine empire, Loungh is with its wes tern partner s. But is this 'territorial' distinction really so substan tial? When Loung his sums up his presentation19 he explain s what he means by the echec of Byzantine diplomacy; the Byzantines ceased to endeav our to conque r the west and began to negotiate with the west about the defenc e of their own territory. Let us apply this statem ent to the northern frontier: can we affirm that the situatio n there was very differe nt? Was Byzantine diplomacy in the norther n area, after Basil II or po.ssib ly Manue l I, aiming at the conquest of the lands of the Danub e, In the Crimea or the Caucasus? Certainly not. The objective of diplom acy here and in the west alike was survival, not conque st. The territorial distinc tion by itself does not provid e us with a convin cing explan ation of the mutual ly contradictory solutions. We must return to our first item - the definit ion of the concept. Do both scholars operate with the same notion of diplom acy, or do th~y use the same word but mean different phenom ena? For Loungl ns,

6

12 Acles, 302.

1:

13 Acles, 313.

14 Acles, 318.

See, e.g. A D. Lee, 'Embassies as evidence for the movement of military intelligence between the Roman and Sasanian empire', in P. Freeman and D. Kennedy , eds., TIle Defence of tile ROlllan and Byzantine East (Oxford, 1986), 455-61. 15

Obolensky, 'Principl es', 60. Ibid., 61. 18 Lounghis , 4. 19 Ibid., 454f.

16

17

7

.

8

SECTION! THE NOTION OF BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY

Byzantine diplomacy encompasses purely p l't' 1 .. 0 I ICa events relal' between pohtrcal powers as revealed in the a ti· f ' IOns Obolensky dwells primarily On ideological a::.d VI~. ~ ambassadors; foreign relations: the idea of 'barbarism' and oiko~~:~U:us aspects of ment of Orthodoxy, the bestowal of titles the cerem . e the advance;md so on. It is worth noting that the w~rds 'ChriS~:~ ~f ,rece~ti.on~, Christendom'2o are mentioned in the arti 1 30 t' Ity, ChnstIan, similar terms are absent (or almost absen~) ein LImes t,least, whereas Diplomacy for Obolensky is much more about im°~ngti s s :onograph. faith among the northern neighbours f tl P ar: ng t e Orthodox transmission of Greek civilization tha: ab le t;;;Ire and about the Byzantine interests in those territories 0 ou e encr~achment of bo~h materi~ and human, in the inte~es;s~; ~se of. theIr resou~ces, eVIdently failed in attempts to secure its oH' yzantIum: Byzantium ern area (as it failed in the west) but't p tIC~l influence m the northinfluence in Bulgaria, Serbia Rus IdmGanag~ to e.stablish its cultural ' an eorgta ThIs may I' th difference of evaluations suggested b Ob 1 exp am e what extent can we describe this y l' .0 ens yand Lounghis. But to diplomacy? Was it determined b re ~~~us ~n~ cultural impact as techniques for foreign relations? Or bPnnclples, methods and ferent sphere of international mfluence~es It elong to a completely difThe religiOUS aspect of Byzantine d' I many scholars. Unquestionabl it wa~P omacy has been stressed by acted as a mighty instrument or im eri mo~entous, and the church ing of the Christian creed' 't oP h a1 politIcs. But was the implant'idea' of Byzantine forei m I ~ rt o~o~ form the main goal or the E. Eickhoff?21 In other wgn dPohcy, as It IS presented in the book by or s, Was Chri t' . . purpose of Byzantine di lom? s IaruzatIon a means, or the acy. Whatever the answer, the question should be clearly asked. p

i

r-:

k

I .

If we assume religion as a back round 0 f '. " By.zant~ne dIplomacy We different depending on space and'f e rehgwus SItuatIon turns out to be a vast territory united by its cathol~:~~e:estwa~ds fro~ Byzantium lay around the papacy The bl d and IdeologIcally organized . . pro em of Byzanf Cl" . Ita1y did not exist at all d f . me 1l'Istian mIssions to '. , an rom the nmth tu ISsue m religious diplomacy he th cen ry onwards the m. a)'or hi re Was e pa 1 . story of reli o1 ous diplomacy b' h pa pnmacy. In the east the o' e s arpl . ' unti'1 t.he mid-seventh centu can Crn:;·. . y d'IVl'ded mto two periods: Egypt and Syria, and Byz:;:tium Is~an~ty was firmly established in c enshed strong expectations of

~ust deal with a certain difficulty. t~

~~ Not.to count 'ecclesiastical' or 'church' E. EICkhoff, Mach! und Se d

'. . n ung. Byzanllmsche Wellpolilik (Stuttgart, 1981), 2Sf.

9

implanting it in neighbouring lands, such as Axum, Himyar and even Persia. Although split into differing and warring denominations, Christians were influential and active beyond the imperial borders. Nina Garso'ian22 has emphasised the part played by bishops in the official diplomacy of the Late Roman empire on its oriental frontier; their missionary role was, probably, even more considerable. After the foundation of the caliphate the missionary task in the east practically ceased to exist. The best the Byzantine government and church could do was to assist and to maintain financially the surviving Christian communities within the caliphate. Islam gave the Arabs (and their successors, the Turks) a faith which helped to distinguish them from the Byzantines as peoples of two different worlds, and to justify their Holy War against the empire. Unlike the Catholic west and Moslem east the northern semicircle reveals a diversified religious world: Croatia, Hungary and Poland gravitating toward the papacy; Jewish-oriented Khazaria; pagan tribes of the steppe; Monophysite Armenians; multiple Moslem enclaves; and the Orthodox states of the southern Slavs, Kievan Rus and the Alans. Italian penetration into the Crimea and neighbouring regions in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries made the picture even more complicated. Byzantine religious diplomacy had different methods and goals in different neighbouring areas. Moreover, it was far from being uniform even within a single area, the northern semicircle. But if it was not to implant Orthodox Christianity, then what was the core, the overall principle, the main characteristic of Byzantine diplomacy? Like everything else in Byzantium, diplomacy was centralized, directed from the capital, carried out by imperial functionaries who received high titles, generous rewards, and variegated privileges. The ambassadorial speech of Theodore Metochites describing his voyage to the Serbian kral, Stefan Milutin, in 1299 shows how the Byzantine envoy conceived of his role. He acted at the behest of the emperor: the word basileus appears dozens of times in his text. 23 Metochites speaks of the emperor's benevolence and greamess 24, of the emperor's piety, noblesse and greatness,25 of the perfect and great emperor,26 of the orders

22 N. Garso'ian, 'Le role de l'hierarchie chretienne dans les rapports diplomatiques entre 13yzance et les Sassanides', REArm 10 (1973-74), 119-38. 23 Ed. 1. Mavromatis, La jondatioll de ['empire serbe. Le kraZj Mill/till (Thessalonica, 1978), 89-119; below, 77.

24 Ibid., 1.64. 25 Ibid., 1.720. 26 Ibid., 1.399-400.

10

SECTION I THE NOTION OF BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY

(entolat) of the emperor;27 envoys go to the emper 28 d or an are sent by th e emperor, 29 an d the honour received by an envoy' 1 . baSI'Z' f l ' . . IS C 1aractenzed as el.os, re ecting the Impenal authority. 30 This fourteenth-century text is permeated by ·'im . l' . It· h 1 'bl . perIa ternunology IS, owever, p aUSI e to ask to what extent und thi . . , . . . , f . ,er s tra d'Ihonal 31 cover, some prIvatIzatIon 0 dIplomatic service took I Nicetas Choniates32 tells an enigmatic story about P ace· · E . Phil I a eel' tam umathlUS oca es, an eparch of Constantinople who in 1197 er:voy to the German king; he asked Alexius' III to be allow:~\ o~t as an wIth the insignia of the eparch, and this produced Ch 0 J?urney Ys strange and ludicrous effect. Not only did Philocales' t:: I' ~ruates, a ve In Improper garb: he also travelled at his own expense (0 S- .) dure contradicted the traditional diplomatic 0 p on!a ..The Whole proceC' rgaruzatlOn. F ram ecaumenus s admonitions we learn that governors were entitled to conduct foreign affairs' the ad them and they could decide t; acce versary w~~l~ send envoys to embassy down 33 The governor of Pft a t:uce (elrene) or to turn the . ' a rontler district wo Id t bI" 1 relatrons with the neighbouring to arch s . . u es a IS 1 connaissance in his land in short!· t ~ end hIm. gIf!s, organize reEleventh-century diplo~acy d ~eace (elreneue) with him. 34 tion. epen e eavIly on the local administra-

/;:In

It is often said that Byzantine dl' 1 . . 1 P omacy had a 'u . r' lmpena character 35 which was emb d' d . . ruversa 1st or COincidence of the 'Roman . 0 .I~ m the Idea of the complete Christian world has been co::h::~ o';'It the civi1ize~ oikoumene. The as a complex hierarchy of states at the top of which stood th princes. But strangely enough ;;~~~r s~rroun~ed by the family of rather than expansionist. e uruversahsm was conservative I

Byzantine diplomacy was predomin 1 . catch-word 'oikoumene' t h ' ant y defenSIve. Certainly, the , e umversal empire (one G d b was popular until, at least Mich 1 VIII" 0 ,one asiieia), Constantinople. And cert ae SIll-starred reconquest of projects: Justinian I Bas~~ ~me erperors carried out expansionist - - - -____' _ ,anue I. But even these conquerors

'cl

l

27 Ibid., 1.358,399 421 815 28 Ibid., 1.133 802'

29

,.

,

.

Ibid., 1.298, 496. 3D Ibid., 1.277-8.

11

warred to restore rather than to expand the empire. Already in the late Roman empire the ideal of peace was cherished; and even though the land lived in a permanent state of war, nevertheless war was interpreted as an abnormal interlude between two regular peaceful situations. 36 It is probably significant that foreign princesses who married Byzantine emperors often changed their baptismal name to Irene, 'peace': Irene-Piroska of Hungary, the spouse of John II; Irene-Bertha of Sulzbach, married to Manuel Ii Irene-Jolanta of Montferrat, the wife of Andronicus II; Irene-Adelheid of Brunswick married to Andronicus IIP7 Of course, many authors described victories and hoped that the enemy would be defeated, and several saints such as Theodosius Coenobiarches, helped to bring about military victories, but neither the idea of Holy War, nor that of Noble War found fertile ground in Byzantium. Unlike western church fathers, St Basil denied the possibility of a 'just war'. Even though he did not require Christians to abstain from military service and accepted the necessity of fighting in defence of virtue and piety, he considered murder in war as a crime and established a penance for soldiers who killed an enemy on tl1e battlefield. 38 The Byzantine clergy was utterly forbidden from participating in military actions, and the Byzantines were shocked by western crusading bishops. Some military saints39 were honoured (especially from the eleventh century onward), and it is well-known that the warlike Nicephorus Phocas attempted to issue a law according to which soldiers killed in battle were proclaimed martyrs since, according to the chronicler, Nicephorus 'saw the salvation of the soul in war and only in war'. His project, however, encountered strong resistance from the church and failed. 4o Two major means served the purpose of defence in the late Roman empire; one, the erecting of a limes, is a purely military measure and so is not of concern here; another is the creation of a system of limitrophe states situated along the frontier. Again, I would like to stress: the limitrophe states were not a regional phenomenon. They appeared on all parts of the extended imperial border. Between the Roman empire and Persia there was the principality of the pl1ylarch Ghassanidsi on the upper Euphrates the autonomous Armenian satrapies existed until the reign of Justinian I, who transformed all of Byzantine Armenia, includ-

31 Cf. below 83-4 32N'

'

.

teetas Choniates, Historin, ed J ·L Van D' leten (Berlin, New York, 1975) 4783-11 Cecaumenus, Stralegikon ed G' 34 Ibid., 116.8. . . t avnn, (Moscow, 1972), 150.12-14 ' . . 33

L·t·.

"d E.g. I. Medvedev' 'Imperua.. . SUVere

't

t

.

d . n(.lro nykh otnosllenii (Leningrad, 1972), 415f. nt e v sre me veka', Problemy istorii mezhdllI

36

C. Dupont, 'Guerre et paix dans l'empire romain de 312

a 565

apres Jesus-Christ',

Rellue internationale des droits de l'antiquite 22 (1975), 189-221. 37 See below, 276. 38 T. C. McLin, 'Just War in Byzantine thought', Michigan Academicicm 13 (1981),485-9. 39 Demetrius, George, both Theodores, Procopius. 40 Scyl., 274.62-69.

12

SECTION I

THE NOTION OF BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY

~ng the satrapies, into four provinces. To what extent the elements of Indepe~dence were preserved is difficult to judge; at any rate, the

:v

Armemans ere able to confess Monophysitism. In the Crimea the dependent kIngdom of Bosporus continued in the sixth century to f tI k . t' h' . orm 1e ey-poIn In t ~ lIl:perIal defence against the Huns. Further to the we~t, new Germal11c kll:gdom~ remained, at least in appearance, territones of Romanjoederatl, and It is very sigru'ficant that in 476 Od when h oacer,1 e was i proc' aIme d king by his soldiers and deposed the nonU ,;estern emperor, immediately sent the imperial insignia to Const~:­ hnople.

E:v~ngelos Chrysos's masterly analysis of the treaty of 535 between Jushruan I an.d the Ostrogothic king of Italy Theodahad demonstrates that Constantinople took seriously its right to supreme jurisdiction over It.aly, despite th~ .actual. independence and stability of tI1e Ostrogothic kIngdom. CondItions hsted in the draft of the treaty assumed that T~eodahad had to send to the emperor annually a golden crown, to dIsp~tch ~,OOO warriors to serve the empire, to ask for the emperor's c~nflrmahon of any death sentence property confiscation of a priest OI ~ena~or and to ask for the emperor s confirmation of the bestowal of semo.r tItle~ Upon his subjects. TI1e draft required that the emperor be acclaimed m the theatre or hippodrome before the king and iliat statues of the king be erected only together with those of th~ emperor. Whatever U1e practical situation, the powerful Italian kingdom was construed as a vassal or limitrophe state of the empire. 41 . Less ~lear is the situation in Africa. Ammianus Marcellinus describes In d~taIl the war of. 373 between Mauretanian petty reges and the ~mpIr~, e?he~eral alh~nces and attacks. These independent Mauretantan. pnnclpal~he.s contmued to exist during the Vandal conquest of Afnc~, and stIll In 575 the Mauroi sent an embassy to Constantinople to eulogIze the e~peror. Ev~n though historians have a tendency to concentrate on mihtary conflIcts on the African border, peaceful relations probabl~ sp~nned the period between military actions. Th~ sl~uatlOn on the ~gyptian frontier resembles that in the provincia of Afnca .. here. the .empIre had to deal wiili the tribes of the Blemmyes, and agam histonans emphasize incessant skirmishes with these 'barbarians'. !hat the relations were not restricted to war is shown by Cosmas Indlcopleustes 42 who mentions the synallagai (treaties or commerce) of the Blemmyes with the Ethiopians. In 451/2 the

0:

41

E. Chrysos, 'Die Arnaler-Herrschaft in Italien und das Irnperium roman urn' Byz 51

(1981),430-74. See below, 33-4, 37-8,316. 42 Cosmas Indicopleustes, Christianike topographia, 11:21.

'

13

Blemmyes, defeated by the general Maximinus, were compelled to sign a peace treaty for a hundred years, and still in the sixth century they would come to ilie temple in Roman Philai to celebrate their gods. Moreover, the Blemmyes received payment in gold. 43 Epigraphic evidence - the inscription of Silko, basiliskos of the Nubians and all Ethiopians, and the so-called letter of Phonen, king of the Blemmyes - even U10ugh far from clear - allow us to suggest that there was a foedus between the Roman empire and local 'kinglets' of the fifth century. 44 More complex seem to be the relations of the late Roman empire with the Ethiopians (Axumites). Late Ethiopian tradition presents the Ethiopian negus Kaleb as equal to the emperor Justin I: allegedly they met in Jerusalem and divided the oikoumene between them. 45 In Malalas, however, the picture is different: he relates 46 that there are seven kingdoms (basileiai) of the Indians and Ethiopians; this means that the land consisted of several independent principalities. Ethiopians were staunch allies of the empire, and c.520 the soldiers of the negus Kaleb were brought on Roman ships to attack the Judaizing king of Himyar (an ally of Persia) and to implant in Himyar Christianity and proRoman sentiments. I have no intention of investigating the specific economic, political and religious relations that underlie these Roman-Ethiopian actions: suffice it to say that the late Roman empire was surrounded on all quarters by allied or foed~rate states which had their own rulers ('kings'), who received from the empire tribute, lands and various privileges, and were included in the Roman imperial ceremonial, i.e. would send ambassadors to participate in Constantinopolitan festivities. The empire sent Christian missions to its allies and evidently exercised cultural influence of divers kinds and degrees. This particular situation of a Mediterranean centralized empire surrounded by a string of foedemti that fenced off the civilized world of the Romans from the dangers of ilie outer world - whether it was another superpower, Persia, or illiterate savages of the north and south - determined tI1e principles of late Roman and Byzantine diplomacy, a diplomacy based on the concept of supremacy. Certainly, there were exceptions: Persia was the most significant of these, during the earlier 43 Procopius, De bello persico, I.19.32. 44 D. Letsios, Byzantio kai hi! Ertjthra Thalassa (Athens, 1988), 203-27. 451. Shahid, 'Byzantium in South Arabia', DOP 33 (1979), 66, repr. in Shahid's Byzantium and the Semitic Orient before the Rise of Islam (London, 1988), no. IX, 46 John Malalas, Chronograpllia, ed. 1. Dindorf (Bonn, 1831), 433.9-10. See also, on Byzantium's links with Ethiopia later in the sixth century, below, 161-2.

14

SECTION I

THE NOTION OF BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY

period. The question was not so much that of the nature of some Roman payment to the Persian king, even though Joshua Slylites found it necessary to deny that this payment formed a 'tribute'.47 But even in the eyes of the Romans, the Persian monarch was a fully-fledged basileus, and Persia a sovereign state. 48 Titled basileus, even archibasileus,49 the Persian shah was perceived systematically as the emperor's brother,50 even though this brotherly relationship could be reversed under the pressure of a crisis. In 591 Chosroes II addressed Maurice as the emperor's 'son and supplicant'51 and in 615, on the contrary, Heraclius asked the shah to accept him as 'a legitimate son'. 52 Unlike Persia other political formations were not considered proper states but were merely 'peoples' (ethne) and 'tribes' (gene). There is lively discussion as to whether they were only semi-autonomous and vassal administrative units or independent and sovereign states,53 and whether the Roman universalist oikoumene was replaced by the Christian oikoumene based on different principles. 54 Certainly, their factual independence varied in accordance with particular conditions of time and ~pace. Despite this broad gamut of concrete distinctions the predommant late Roman and Byzantine perception was of an inequality between the empire and the surrounding foederate principalities. The Greek authors called the borderland rulers hJrannoi, phylarchs, etlmarchs and so on, and considered them as military commanders appointed in Constantinople. 55 , Thes~ rulers were mostly termed'sons' of the emperor,56 the title of brother being reserved for the shah of Persia. R. Helm however at ConstantlUs U58 addressed the princes of" Axum as suggeste d ~th· brothers. He is probably mistaken: the letter as preserved by Athanas-

ius of Alexandria59 actually has, in the final clause, the greeting to 'revered brothers'. These brothers are the addressees of the letter, the princes Ezana (Azana) and Sazana: the term indicates nothing more than their relationship to one another, and not their hierarchical equality with the Roman emperor. The brothers are in no sense basileis: Athanasius flatly characterizes them as tyrannoi. 60 The 'family hierarchy' aimed at emphasising the emperor's ascendancy as the single lord and father in the oikoumene of little satellites. The system, however, left open tlle possibility of smart manoeuvring by 'barbarian' diplomats: thus the Avar envoy Targites accepted the game and suggested that his khan Bajan, being the emperor's 'son', possessed everything in common with his 'father' and had legitimate rights to Sirmium and annual tribute ('money'). 61 The family hierarchy' survived the decline of the foe derate system. It was in full swing in the tenth century, as is reflected in Constantine Porphyrogenitus's Book of Ceremonies 62 and in the titulahue of the Bulgarian ruler.63 The father-son terminology can be traced even in late Byzantine diplomatic correspondence. The lands of the satellite rulers, even those occupied by force, were considered as benevolently conceded to them by the emperor and therefore nothing more than imperial provinces. So their wars against the empire were mere rebellions (epanastaseis), a term that much later was applied even to the war of Kievan Rus against Byzantium in 1043. Peace treaties were compiled unilaterally, in the form of the emperor's ordinance (chrysobull); embassies were, to use Lounghis's word, unbalanced: they were carrying orders from the supreme master to his subordinates. The Byzantines conferred imperial titles upon their satellite rulers. Thus the south Italian princes of Salemo and Benevento, as well as rulers of Naples, Gaeta and Amalfi bore the title of imperialis patl'icius until the first half of the tenth century. Amalfi retained this title a little longer. 64

47Z R b' 'D' I

. . U In, Ip omacy and war in the relations between Byzantium and the Sassanids m the ~ifth century A.D.', in P. Freeman and D. Kennedy, eds., TI,e Defcnce of the Roman and Byzalltme East (Oxford, 1986), 686f. 18 E C h ' S 49' ?,sos, orne aspects of Roman-Persian relations', Klerollomia 8 (1976), 5-24. 50 Chromcon. Pasch~le, e~. 1. Dindorf (80nn, 1832), 708.15. 65. R. Helm m Antlke Dlplomalie, ed. E. Olshausen and H. Biller (Darmstadt, 1979), 365, n.

53 E. Chrysos, 54 Ibid., 172f.

'

,

.

Hi::a~~gl;i1~;~~~!~r Prage der fOderierten Staaten in der spateren romischen Kaiserzeit', Ibid., 365, n. 65.

58 Helm erroneously names him Constantine L

PG 25, col. 637A. Ibid., col. 636B; Cf. Letsios, Byzanlio, 167f. 61 Menander, fr. 12, 6.16-25, ed. R. C. Blockley (Liverpool, 1985),138. 62 G. Ostrogorsky, 'Die byzantinische Staatenhierarchie', SK 8 (1936),49-53; J. Ferluga, 'Lista adresa za strane vladare iz knjige a ceremonijama', ZRVI 12 (1970), 157-78. See, however, below, 37. 63 F. Dolger, 'Der Bulgarenherrscher als geistlicher Sohn des byzantinischen Kaisers', Sbornik l> pamet'na pro! Petflr Nikol> (Sofia, 1940), 219-32. 64 J. Deer, 'Zur Praxis der Verleihung des auswi:irtigen Patriziats durch den byzantinischen Kaiser', Archil>um historiae pontificiae 8 (1970), 9. 60

To Byzantion kai ho; Got/hai (Thessalonica 1972) 28-37

~~ R. Helm in Antike Diplomatie, 329.

I

59

51 Theophylact Simocatta, Risloriae, IV.11.11. 52 Chronieon Paseha/c, 709.15-16.

15

16

SECTION I

Communications between superpowers were conducted by letters and envoys. Theophylact Simocatta relates 65 that Maurice prevented Chosroes II from coming to Constantinople and stopped him at the border; but this action had no institutional reasons: Simocatta explains it by Maurice's desire to conceal his plans from the usurper Bahram. At any rate, satellite rulers would gladly visit Constantinople. Thus Athanaric erected a statue to his father in Constantinople and later, defeated by the Huns, surrendered to Theodosius I in 381 and came to Constantinople where he soon died. 66 Malchus of Philadelphia 67 tells a story of a certain Amorcesus (' Amr, son of Kays?), phylarch of the Saracens of Petra and vassal of the empire; Leo I invited him to Constantinople, received him at a meeting of the Senate, entertained him at his table, and exchanged gifts with him. 68 In the sixth century three neighbouring 'kings': Tzath of Lazica, Grepes of the Herules, and Grod of the Crimean Huns came to Constantinople to be baptized there and to be invested with their 'regalia' by the emperor. 69 According to Procopius70 Souartouas, former archon of the Herules, found refuge at the court of Justinian I, and together with him there came to Constantinople Amalafridas, nephew of Theodol'ic the Great and son of the king of the Thuringians. Herac1ius is said to have invited a khan of the Avars to Heracleia, where grandiose festivities took place; the khan used this opportunity to attack his hosts;71 his treacherous behaviour does not disprove the custom of satellite kings of visiting Byzantium. This custom continued to exist later: Tervel found a generous reception under Justinian Il, Olga of Kiev under Constantine VII, and Kilic Arslan under Manuel 1. The reception of Symeon of Bulgaria in Constantinople in August 913 is a .special .case. We do not know exactly what happened when the patrIarch Nlcholas Mysticus put his epiriptarion on the head of the ~ulgarian prrr:ce.72 1. BoziloV73 believes that Symeon was granted the title of the basl1eus of the Bulgarians, but we have no direct indication 65 TheophyJact Simocatta, Ristoriae, IV.13.2. 66 RE 1: 120f.; cf. Chrysos, To Byzantioll kai hoi Gol/hai, 140-6. 67 Malchus, fr. 1: FRG IV.113. :: r. Shahid, Byzantium and the Arabs in the fifth ce;ltury (Washington, D.C., 1989), 59-113. r. Engelhardt, Mission und Polilik in Byzallz (Munich, 1974), 80, 89. 70 Procopius, Wars VIII.2S.11. ;~ r. KuJak~vskii, Is/oriin Vizllnlii IlI, (Kiev, 1915) S4f. .. A. Staundo~-Zaphraka, Re synantese Symeoll kai Nikolaou Myslikoll [augoustos 913] sla plnrsJa Iou. byzanlmo-boulgarikou anlagonismou (Thessalonica, 1972); see the objections of A. Kazhdan In Sovelskoe slar'ianol'edenie, (1973), no. 6, 92f. 1 1::6). 7B~fZ.ilov 'L'ide?logie P?litique du tsar Symeon: Pax Syrneonica', Byzlllltilloblllgarica 8 ( , ., see also hIS Tsar SlnleOn Veliki (Sofia, 1983),106-08.

THE NOTION OF BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY

17

from the sources. The constitutional significance of the patriarch's action is of no importance to us here: what distinguishes this case from similar events is the fact that Symeon entered Constantinople as the result of a military invasion. Thus the cases of reception of foreign rulers in Constantinople are numerous, and probably deserve a special dissertation. By contrast, one cannot imagine a Byzantine emperor, before the fourteenth century, voyaging to a foreign capital for diplomatic negotiations or in order to be granted a title. The Palaeologan period brought a drastic change in the perception of the emperor's diplomatic mobility. Strangely enough, the history of Byzantine princely marriages has not yet been written, but even without a special monograph we can affirm that from the fourth to the seventh centuries princely marriages with 'barbarian' rulers were practically unknown: that of Germanus, Justinian 1's cousin, to Matasuntha, the widow of the Gothic king Vitigis, is an exceptional case. Emperors could, though, take as spouses women of Germanic blood living on the territory of the empire. For example, Eudoxia, daughter of the Frankish general Bauton was given to Arcadius. In the late seventh century a change of attitude occurred. Justinian II married a sister of the Khazar kl1agan; thereafter Constantine V took as his wife the daughter of another Khazar khagan. The marriage of Irene and Charlemagne was discussed, and it was not the concept of Byzantine supremacy that undermined the negotiations. Irene's son Constantine VI married a local girl, Maria from Paphlagonia; however, Maria's sister, that is the emperor's sister-in-law, was given to the Lombard duke, Arichis. This phenomenon deserves attention. Chronologically it coincides roughly with the date established by Lounghis for the transition to 'balanced' diplomacy in the west; territorially it encompasses a broader area including both the west and the north. Does it mean that the Byzantine perception of the outer world was in the process of transformation in the eighth century? At any rate, the new trend does not seem to have lasted for long. Emperors of the ninth century con· tinued to marry primarily within the Byzantine milieu, and Constantine VII disapproved of princely marriages with foreigners. Exceptions were rare, and usually made under duress: Peter of Bulgaria received Maria, the granddaughter of Romanus I, and Vladimir of Kiev took to wife Anna, Basil II's sister; in the mid-tenth century, Theophano, another princess, was married to the German emperor Otto n. Until the end of the eleventh century foreign princely marriages were infrequent. From the end of the eleventh century onwards foreign dynastic

18

THE NOTION OF BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY

SECTION I

alliances became more common. Martha-Maria, the Georgian princess, was the wife of two Byzantine rulers in succession. The wedding of Constantine Ducas to Robert Guiscard's daughter was arranged, although it did not take place. Nicephorus III betrothed his close relative to a Hungarian king or magnate. John II's spouse was a Hungarian princess; their son Manuel I married Bertha of Sulzbach and his second wife was a Latin princess from Antioch; his heir Alexius II married the daughter of the French king. Conversely, numerous ladies with imperial connections were betrothed to Latin nobles. If we want to express this shift in figures we can use the genealogical tables compiled by V. Grume1.74 111e chart of the Macedonian dynasty registers fifteen marriages of which only two were the unions of Byzantine princesses with foreign princes. The second table includes twenty-six marriages, of which eight are between Byzantine princesses and foreign lords (31 %) and six are between Byzantine nobles and foreign ladies (23%). Certainly, Grumel's charts are incomplete and a future monograph on Byzantine marital diplomacy will bring some alterations. But even now we can state that by the twelflh century the attitude toward foreign marriages had drastically changed: marriage became a fundamental instrument of Byzantine diplomacy. But not only did marital diplomacy itself undergo a radical change: its very basis, the system of satellite or foederate principalities, changed as well. We are unaware of any Byzantine satellite during the Palaeologan period. Moreover, the centralized core of the old system split and fell apart. The former unified empire consisted of numerous Greek, Latin, Slav and Turkish countries, forming a loose conglomerate poorly bound together by the 'family terminology' or hierarchy of states which ceased to reflect any reality. The main question in the history of Byzantine diplomacy is when the system of satellite principalities, of the Klientelkonige,75 ceased to exist. We must approach the problem step by step, region by region. The Arab invasion eliminated the chain of satellites from Palestine via Ethiopia to the province of Africa. One of the last limitrophe formations was the region of the Mardaites ~f ~ebanon who occupied a prominent place in Arabo-Byzantine negotIatIOns from 669 onwards. Whatever their origins, the Mardaites were warlike people who successfully protected the Byzantine frontier against Mu'awiyah and 'Abd al-Malik. Their military prowess 74 V. Grumel, La chronologie (Paris, 1958),363,364.

cf. below, 270-2. 75 See O.F. Winter, 'K1ienlelkonige im romischen und byzantinischen Reich' (1952),35-50. '

JOB 2

19

compelled caliphs to pay tribute to Byzantium,76 Justinian 1I, however, transferred the Mardaites to Bpirus, Cephalenia, the PelopOlmese, and Cilicia, where they served primarily as navy contingents. To what extent we can believe Theophanes 77 that Justinian removed the 'tagma of the Mardaites' from Lebanon at the instigation of Abd al-Malik, is difficult to judge; at any rate, Theophanes considers this action an extremely serious mistake. However, this was anything but a casual mistake. The system of limitrophe principalities on the eastern frontier of the empire was completely shaken, and for a certain period Byzantium and the caliphate were divided by a no-man's-land rather than by limitrophe principalities. There were no diplomatic relations with the population of this land, but by the ninth century small states began to reappear and to acquire a certain role in relations between the empire and the Arabs. One of these ephemeral formations was the Paulician state of Tephrike which was an Arab satellite rather than a Byzantine one, although we know of at least one mission sent to Tephrike. 78 The Armenian principalities seem to have been more stable; the Byzantine policy, however, was not to retain them as a barrier against foreign intruders but to incorporate them into the empire and to resettle the Armenian population on Byzantine territory - not only in the east of the empire but as far away from their original lands as Thrace. The Armenian barrier was demolished by the Byzantines in the eleventh century. The small Turkish states in Asia Minor in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries appear as Byzantium's equals, not as joederati, and Byzantine policy was to resettle tl1e Turks in the empire,79 to use them as soldiers, to baptize them, grant tl1em lands and titles - but not to employ them as limitrophe units. BO Justinian I tried to restore the allied kingdom of Bosporus in the Crimea. Thereafter Byzantium lost its positions in the Crimea and hegemony in the area passed to the Khazars. When Byzantium re conquered the region it was organized as a Byzantine theme, that of the klimata, and no satellite formation arose either in the district of Matracha, on the eastern shore of the Cimmerian Bosporus, or in the steppes north of the Crimea. The baptized and settled Alans and the pagan and nomadic Pechenegs and their successors the Uzes and I

76 M. Moosa, 'The relation of the Maronites of Lebanon to the Mardaites and al-Jarajima', Speculum 44 (1969), 597-9. 77 Theoph., 363.6-20. 78 Unless the story of Peter of Sicily is a fiction. 79 Eustathius of Thessalonica speaks of 'inner Persia'. BD See C. Brand, 'The Turkish element in Byzantium, eleventh-twelfth centuries', DOP 43 (1989),1-25.

20

SECTION I

Cumans could be adversaries and allies but not joederati, and when they penetrated into Byzant ium they did not form principalities along the border. Instead, like the Armenians, they received lands inside the country. .~here was no attemp t to impose foederate status upon Bulgaria. lrutIally ~ danger ous rival, it was defeated by 1018 and incorp orated in the empIre. The Comne nian expansion into the Balkans was accompanied not by the creatio n of satellite kingdoms but by territor ial annexation of Serbian and Hunga rian lands. Neither countr y would rec?ncile itself to territorial losses, and wars flared up again and again. NeIther Hunga ry nor Serbia appear ed as a protective barrier agains t the army of the third Crusad e of 1187. The change of diplomatic policy seems evident in Italy. The ascend ancy of the Lombards in Italy led to the creation of a series of small principalities such as Benevento, Spoleto, Gaeta, etc; in the ninth century these played a semi-independent role in relation to Byzantium, the Frankish empire and the Arabs. Partial Byzantine restora tion in south Italy took the form of imposing Byzantine admini stration and establishing the so-called katepanate. We are now in a positio n to sum up: from the eighth up to the eleventh century Byzant ium gradually abolished the chain of satellit e or foederate principalities on its borders. Thus the basis for imperial, unilateral or unequa l diplom acy passed away, even though terminological left-avers remain ed, sometimes in overt contradiction to the real situation. Negotiations acquired balanced shape, nuptial contacts and contracts reaching an unprec edente d level. The next move was from the policy of balance to that of soliciting, and the emperor's person al journeys became a frequen t tool of negotiations. 1. Medved,:v81 has indicated some alterations in Byzantine diplomacy. In the fIrst place, Byzantine treaties after 1261 lost the form of the cI:rysobull, the imperi al privilege; in the second place, Byzant ine dIplomacy abando ned the illusion of the father-son attitud e toward s the sult~n, and accepted the sultan as the emperor's friend and brother . ObVIously, these changes reflected the waning of the political respec t that the empero r used to enjoy. They also reflected the collapse of the s~stem of satellite states that had formed the backbo ne of Byzant ine dIplomacy. Profe~sor Obolen~ky and his fellow scholars, thirty years ago, emphaSIzed the stabIlity of the flexible and successful Byzantine diplo81 'K voprosu (1972), 134-9.

0

printsipa kh vizantiiskoi diplomatii nakanune padeniia imperii' VV 33 '

THE NOTIO N OF BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY

21

macy that cleverly employed Christianity to create the Byzant ine commo nwealt h of Orthodox states. Follow ing the sceptical approa ch of scholars like Lounghis and Medvedev, I would lay empha sis not on Byzantine tradition but on its transformation. The essence of late Roman diplomacy was the establishment of a chain of satellites around the unique empire identical with the civilized oikoumene. This chain ,;as broken, and, strangely enough , not just under the pressu re of foreIgn attacks but sometimes by governmental initiative within the empire . By the eleventh century Byzantium abando ned this basic diplom atic principle, and appeared as one among ' equal' Europ~an states. It l~st this balance in the predica ment of the fourtee nth and fifteen th centun es when it had no choice but to assume the role of a humbl e supplic ant.

Section II Phases of Byzantine Diplomacy

2. Byzantine diplomacy, A.D. 300-800: means and ends Evangelos Chrysos In her book on the political ideology of the Byzantine empire Helene Ahrweiler divided her text into seven chapters in chronological order under the following titles: universalism, nationalism, imperialism, Byzantine patriotism searching for new values, Greek and orthodox patriotism and finally, national utopia. 1 As with every schematic structure, this organization of the material includes a certain amount of bias. For it is rather biassed to flag the political ideology of, for instance, the period of Iconoclasm with the term 'nationalism', whichever way this term is understood. Nevertheless, the label 'universalism' for the first period of Byzantine history and until the accession of Leo III the Isaurian to the throne, does form a pointer to the right direction. For it is commonly accepted that in this early period the Byzantines understood their empire as comprising the whole Orbis Romanus, the oikoumene. This deeply rooted belief which Byzantium inherited from imperial Rome,2 defines also the fundamental aim of Byzantine foreign. policy towards the empire's neighbours and consequently all the efforts of Byzantine diplomacy. The ultimate end was always the preservation of the ecumenical state in its old outermost boundaries and its ancient grandeur. However, if we examine the term oikoumene more closely, things become more complex. For which is the oikoumene that Rome and Byzantium insisted on claiming throughout the centuries despite the upheavals of their history? Is it the whole world, the orbis terraruln, as imagined and mapped by Cosmas Indicopleustes 3 or designed for the famous mosaic of Nikopolis in Justinian's days?4 Or is it perhaps the Ahrweiler, L'ideologie poWique de /'empire byzantin (Paris, 1975). Vagt, 'Orbis Romanus. Zur Terminalogie des rornischen Imperialismus', Philosophic und Geschichte 22 (1922), 23f. 3 W. Walska-Conus, 'Geagraphie', RAC X, 186f. 4 E. Kitzinger, 'Studies on late antique and early Byzantine floor mosaics: I, Mosaics at Nicopolis', DOP 6 (1951), 100f. 1 H.

2 J.

26

SECTION II

Roman oikoumene th b' R shores of th M d'· e or IS oman us as it was extended around the e e Iterranean bas' h A ' eventually decided to ab In w .en ugustus. and late~ Hadnan conquering addition I andon t~e pol.lcy of expanSIOn, and, mstead of M '. a countnes lIke the Armenian and the esopotamlan klllgdoms th d l'b h b ' y e 1 erately preferred to transform . these nelg ours Into th , e tu 1b . '" e ac a oundanes of the empire? Or is it after all the . th .. '. ' , empIre In rts real d' Roman 01' B t' 1 ImenslOns, e specifIC tern tones under direct yzan me ru e at any given moment? The answer to this t' . dence in favour of al ques IOn IS. :r:O•t easy. Firstly, we can provide evirhetorical s h I three deflruhons of oikoumene from legal texts, peec es or even hist . al .. that the term'k _ onc wrItmgs. One gets the impression 01 oumene rema' d d l'b . me. e 1 erately ambIguous throughout the period. Second! th Y remain unchan ed ' P e .tende~cI~s and .goals of foreign policy did not each tun' t g '. arhal obJectrves dId change and were adapted e 0 new crrcumsta d' empire and th t nces accor mg to the real power of the . e s rength of it d but also according to the Personal preEerences 0 f the s a versanes I changing fo' l' emperors. n order to characterize the could Use ~elf!!1 po ICY aims in the period under investigation we rmadgeryd ebb and flow. Thus, the empire's foreign Policy can beeregar . e as m a st t f f l ' Constantine th G . a e 0 ow Ill, for mstance, the years of e reat dunng J 1'" . Justinian's rule t h : u.lan s reIgn, the fIrst period of 'c e reI~ of Maunce, the first period of Heraclius Constans II 1 ' , or onstantIlle V whir Was more in a stat f bb" e, on t 1e other hand, foreign policy cessors those of The ode. m the years of Cons tan tine the Great's suc, eo OSIUS and hi . years of Justinian's rei Tb' s successors, AnastaslUs, the last ten Th gn, 1 enus Il, Phocas, Constantine IV or Leo IV us we see on the one hand t1 J" ' . b d 1at uhan WIth the arrogance of youth scorned and eventualI cessors towards th P Y .a an oned the prudent policy of his predecampaign on PersI~ ers~anl5 sS~~ the Goths and lost his life during his f an SOl. lmllar wa th f who paid with his throne a '. s e ate 0 emperor Maurice fight the enemy on th . nd hi.s life for his conviction that he should On the other h de~ow~terntory beyond the Danube. 6 the Byzantines abanout'Jusgt~t. a~ preserves the ambiguous judgement of Iman s policy a 't . . . SI was VOIced after his death. They distinguished betw ful period Was when he ~~~ ~of penods of his reign. The first, successlost to the barbarians D . g l' or th.e reconquest of the Roman lands 'he became almost th~ fi~:~:~ ~: r~~rl~d he Was s.uch a good ruler that elS of ByzantIum to be emperor of

0:

SAm . , mIanus Marcellinus, XXlI.7,8 (the Goth Some aspects of Roman-Persian legal relaf ,s~~nd XX~1.12 (the Persians). Cf. E. Chrysos, 6 Theophylact Simocatta, VIII.6f. Ions, eronomla 8 (1976), 22£.

BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY AD. 300-800

27

the Romans in fact as well as in name'.7 Apparently, the peace Justinian had in mind was not a peace among equals but the classical pax Romana, which was to be established, if necessary, by force. This political tradition, which Virgil had articulated in the famous verse parcere devictis et debellare superbos (Am. VI. 853), remained alive until at least the age of Justinian. His renowned diplomat, Peter the Patrician, used it in an appropriate Greek translation when he described the Roman-Persian peace negotiations preceding the treaty of AD. 298. 8 In contrast, the last ten years of Justinian's rule are reviewed very critically by Agathias and his contemporaries because the aged emperor allegedly avoided military effort, neglected the army and preferred to divide his enemies and make them fight against one otheri and when that did not help, he bought peace by offering large concessions to them. 9 Here we have the classic application of the principle divide et impera. However, I should point out that this principle, though frequently applied by Rome, was not a Roman invention and that the very expression divide et impera, which sounds so typically Roman, was actually coined by nineteenth-century 'imperialists'! It is interesting to note that the image of Justinian which ultimately prevailed among later generations was the image of the powerful conqueror and not that of the aged peace~maker or peace-Iover. 10 This is obviously the reason why his name was given one hundred years later to Justinian Il, the grandson of Emperor Constans II who had personally brought the Byzantine army to Italy again for a new reconquista in 663 AD. However, the attitude of Constans II was not regarded by his son, Constantine IV, as a compulsory legacy- to follow by all means. When the threat of the Arab fleet, which had been dominating the shores of the Propontis for over five years, abated in 678 A.D., he decided to come to terms with the Arabs and sign the first formal peace treaty with them, acknowledging t11eir dominions in the Near East. It is the same emperor who, after the first unsuccessful war with the Bulgars, decided to accept immediately the facts and signed a significant peace treaty with them in 681 A.D. If we add to these initiatives his 7 Agathias, V.14.1. Cf. AveriJ Cameron, Aglltllias (Oxford, 1970), 124f. It is certainly not accidental that we find the core of this thought in the Getica of Jordanes, another of Justinian's contemporaries, applied, however, more correctly to Julius Caesar: 'Caesar vero, qui sibi primus omnium Romanum vindicavit imperium et pene omnem mundum suae dicioni subegit omniaque regna perdomuit' (Getica XI.68). 8 Peter the Patrician, fr. 1413. Cf. W. Ensslin, 'Zur Ostpolitik des Kaisers Diokletian', Sitzungsberichte Bayer. Akad. Wiss., pllilos.-hist. Kl. (Munich, 1942), 45f. 9 Agathias, V.14i Menander fr. 15i austin's) Novel 149 (a. 569). 10 Cf. G. Prinzing, 'Das Bild Justinians 1. in der Uberlieferung der Byzantiner vom 7. bis 15. Jahrhundert', FM 7 (1986), 70f.

28

SECTIONII

readiness to conclude at last a formal peace treaty with the Lombards and furthermore to come to good inter-state terms with the Avars Constantine N emerges as a remarkable personality who had th~ co~rage to m~ke a clean break with the empire's traditional claims of uruversal uruqueness and perennial rule over the Mediterranean world. ll Nevertheless, we mu~t emphaSize the fact that in general terms there app~ars a ~onstant dec1me and contraction of aspirations and aims in foreign polIcy. Under the pressure of political developments the empire moved from the initial stage of an absolute universal claim in11erited from Rome to the second stage of preserving unaltered the borders from the Heraclean Gates to the Tigris. Finally, it reached the third stage ~for the feelu:g~ of :ontemporary Byzantines a rather humiliating stage). that of confmmg Itself to defending the narrow territory which was left to the empire after the loss of extensive areas to rivals. Our reference to the empire's claims on three levels which we could call the maximum, medium and minimum level~ of ecumenical p~rspective, in close conjunction with its sterile political ideology, mIght l.e~d us to SUppose that the Byzantines with incurable political romantIcism spent all their military and political energy in searching for a lost paradise. This, however, would not be correct. For the prospect of an. absolute ecumenical donu'na t'Ion was never discussed . . . senously either m Byzantium, or even'm c1aSSlca . l'Impenal . Rome as a real progr~~e ~d as a real aim. Of course, the dynamism of the foreign po ICy which made the state shine forth as superpower made possible and even necess.ary diplomatic contacts and relations with distant and overseas c~untnes suc~ ~s .India and China12 or Ethiopia.13 For they hhelped polIsh the empire s mternational image and at the same time t ey . also serve d concrete commercial interests. "Nevertheless, the ~:~Ire never ~e:ms to have had the ambition or the plan to annex lands nd the or~gmal boundaries of the imperium inherited from Rome. us, the aIm of preserving the empire's original boundaries was by 't V I S t :n1ry n~ruhre, a defensive one. For this reason Dimitri Obolensk~ is cer al y ng t in describing Byz r ' 1 of its do . . , ' . an!Um s strugg e for the preservation ,. m~o~s ~s defenSIve Imperialism',14 if We understand by the t . erm Impenahsm merely th . t t' e m en Ion to retam the existing imperium

h

11 See my forthcoming study on this im r ' . . neighbours as initiated by C t ti IV P esslve shift of attitude towards the empire's 12. onsan ne . P. Schrelfier, 'Eine chinesische Beschreibun K . /slullbuler Mitteilullgen 39 (1989) 493-505 g onstantlfiopels aus dern 7. Jahrhundert', 13D G ' ..' . 14 Ob' I' LetslO~, B.yz~n/Jo km he Erythra Thlllassa, (Athens 1988) o ensky, Prmclples', 52. ' .

BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY A.D. 300-800

29

intact. The term was used in this sense in the nineteenth century - that is, without the element of aggressiveness inherent in the term 'imperialism' as defined by J. A Hobson at the very beginning of this century. 15 Finally, we should note that the last, minimal, aim of maintaining the empire within its reduced boundaries was facilitated by the provisional and temporary character which Byzantium always tried to give to unpleasant new realities. During negotiations Byzantine diplomats had great opportunities to use their skills in trying to stipulate that the status quo had only a provisional character. For example, in AD. 363 a peace treaty with the Persians was signed by Emperor Jovian. It contained the condition that a piece of Roman territory with a Roman city, Nisibis, should be officially ceded to the Persians, a condition which all eyewitnesses and later historians condemned as a disaster unprecedented in over a thousand years of previous Roman history. The Byzantine negotiators nonetheless managed to include in the treaty text the stipulation that the treaty should be concluded for only thirty years. This term proved later to be very useful for the diplomatic relations of the empire with the Persians. 16 As is well known, Byzantium spared no means in the fulfilment of its aims. The principle 'the end justifies the means', morally unj~stifiable but always current in political affairs, was, of course, valid in Byzantium too. Its application was rooted in the Byzantines' conviction that their aims were always as just as they were holy and consequently they would purify the means too. After all, the link between the aims of foreign policy and the high task of Christianizing the pagan world through Byzantine missionaries or even the duty of punishing the infidels who dared to insult the chosen people - pel'iousios laDS - of the Christian God, was believed to endow with sanctity the empire's diplomatic and even its military activities,17 Therefore, the expression sanctum imperium appears often in documents referring to the empire's relations with pagan peoples. 18 But what were the means that late Roman and Byzantine diplomacy 15 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism (London, New York, 1902). However, it was V.I. Lenin who first adapted this word in his political terminology as synonymous with political and economic aggression and introduced it to the international political vocabulary: V.I. Lenin, 'Der Imperialismus als hochstes Stadium des Kapitalismus', Werke XXII (Berlin, 1974), 189f. 16 Cf. E. Chrysos, 'Some aspects', 29f. 17 On the idea of the 'holy war' as it was launched in Byzantium's imperial rhetoric see A. Kolia-Dermitzaki The Byzantine 'Holy War'. The Idell (lnd Propagalion of Religious War in Byzantium [in Greek] (Athens, 1991). 18 Gregorii I Regis/rum I.16.a; cf. E. Schwartz, ed., Acta COllciliorunl Oecumenicorum IV.2 (Berlin, 1914), 132f.

30

SECTION II

BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY AD. 300-800

had a~ its. disposal? To start with, we must underline the fact that the organIZatIOn of the dI'pl oma t"IC servIce as an Impenal " . agency (as has been briefly but very accurately shown by Rudolf Helm)19 used the structure which was mo re or l . successfully in imperial ess'm operatIon 20 Roman too we th t f h . preRome. . " re e roo sot e pattern of norms which sCrIbed t1:le du t'Ies and the privileges of ambassadors during their passage and stay in a foreign country, their sacrosanct immunity and of course, a great deal of the ceremorua . 1 etIquette . . ' . applyIng to their achons. 21 The ~iplomatic service had always followed traditional patterns because It was obliged t 0 use th e establ'Ished protocol. Such use of con-' . ventional forms could enabl't . e I to cover the less noble political initiatIves beneath a mantle of lawfulness and solemnity On the ' . of . other hand ' dl'p1oma t'IC relatIons can grow. only on the basIs conceSSIOns, flexibility, rea d'JUs tment of objectIves . . and respect for one's p ailr mer' s conc~pts, customs and interests. Byzantine diplomats did not fa to be flexIble enou h . . g as the Circumstances demanded. Thus we know that In 395 AD R f' if! . per Onentem . . . u mus, prae ectus praetorzo went to meet the V"ISlgo thi c k'mg Alaric wearing Gothic-costume and military f22 d ress. In 561 A 0 th . the Persians was not only . ' . e peace treaty WIth d Sthlgneth in Roman fashion but also sealed more Persico.23 We should add at e ceremony of si . t d to b tt d gnmg reaty ocuments required religious oaths e u ere ~n~ the Byzantines were of course 'liberal' enough to accept non-ChrIstIan oaths of validation. 24 The Byzanrmes'tt'tud a I e was perhaps more flexible than that of their I

19 R. Helm, 'Untersuchungen iiber d .. . . romischen Reiches in der S" ., . e~. auswartJgen dlplomatischen Verkehr des 2Q Cf F M'II 'G patantike , Arclll v for Urkundenforscltung 12 (1932) 375-436. " I ar, overnment and diplo . hR' ' centuries' The Inlernalion I H' I R . macy In t e oman empIre during the first three 21 F ' a IS ory eVJelV 10 (1988) 345-77 or a comprehensive presentation f B' .' ' . instilutiolls de /'empire byzalltin P . 1949 0 yzanhne diplomacy see L. Brehier, Les studies Antike DipJomatie ed ~ ~:s;, ), 281-323. For the ancient period see the collected fact, Byzantine diploma' d" . s a~sen and H. Biller (Darmstadt, 1979). As a matter of ey oes not Simply co t' th R ". n mue e oman tradItIon but traces its forms to the international c o ' ( P

1

~ ~

i0 0

'l-

3 See H. Maguire, Earth and OCl!all. The Terrestrial World in Enrly Byzantine Art (London, 1987),75-6. See also C. Higgins, 'Some new thoughts on the Nature Goddess silk', and H. Granger-Taylor, 'The inscription on the Nature Goddess Silk', in G. Bonner, D. Rollason, C. Slancliffe, eds., St. Cuthbert, his Cult and !lis Community, (Woodbridge, 1989),329-37,339-41. In addition, see Muthesius, Eastern Silks in Western Shrines, 16-62, 104-08, and A. Muthesius,' A practical approach 10 Byzantine silk weaving', JOB 34 (1984), 235-540 4 The silks are discussed in A. Grabar, 'La soie byzantine de I' eveque Gunther a la cathedrale de Bamberg', Miinchener Jahrlmch 3, f.7. (1956), 7- 25; F. Guicherd, R. de Micheaux, 'The Mozac Hunter Silk', Bulletin, International Centre for tile Study of Ancient Textiles (C.I.E.T.A) 17 (1963), 14-16; S. Miiller-Christensen, The Bamberg Gun/her Shroud. Diocesan Museum pamphlet (Bamberg, 1966), If.; B. Schmedding, Mittelalterlicl1e Textilien in Kirchen und Kliistern der Scllweiz (Bern, 1978), 252-4; A. Geijer, A Histon; of Textile Art (Pasold, 1979), 134; M. Martiniani-Reber, Lyon, musee historique des tissus. Soieries sClssullides, coptes et byzantines V-XI siec/es (Paris, 1986), 109-11. 5 For this silk see A. Muthesius, Eastern Silks, 104-08; A. Muthesius, A History a/Byzantine Silk Weaving (Vienna, forthcoming); Higgins and Granger-Taylor as in n. 3 above; H. Granger-Taylor, 'The Earth and the Ocean Silk from the tomb of SI. Cuthbert at Durham;

SILKEN DIPLOMACY

SECTION V

240

241

diplomatic links between England and Byzantium that are little documented elsewhere, but it also indicates the type of silk which was considered suitable for diplomatic purposes. It has been suggested, plausibly enough, that the Durham 'Nature-Goddess' silk was one of two pallia graeca presented to the shrine of St Cuthbert by King Edmund in 944. 6 Stylistically and technically the silk belongs to the eighth or ninth century in date and the question is: was it sent to the English court at the time of its manufacture, or was it a piece carried to the west in the tenth century, two hundred years after its manufacture? It is known from documentary sources that silks were stored for centuries and reused not only in Byzantium, but also in the Islamic courts and indeed in the west, and of course St Cuthbert's relics were wrapped in the most costly pall that could be found in the h'easury at Durham on the occasion of his canonization in 1104,7 To prove that the Durham silk was first stored in Byzantium and later conveyed as a diplomatic gift to the west, further evidence is required, but this seems not unlikely in the light of what we know of other diplomatic silks. The large silk tapestry used as a shroud for Archbishop Gunther of Bamberg (died 1065), for example, appears to have been a diplomatic gift from the Emperor Constantine X (1059-67) to the Emperor Henry IV (1056-1106), carried by the envoy Archbishop Gunther, who unfortunately died on the return journey to Bamberg. It is reasonable to suggest that, both through necessity and as a sign of respect, the body of the archbishop was enveloped in the large tapestry to facilitate its transport home for burial. s The Bamberg Gunther shroud was removed from the archbishop's grave early this century and meticulously conserved. 9 Beckwith identified the subject matter of the silk as the triumphal entry of the Emperor Basil II into Athens and Constantinople, following his defeat of the Bulgarians in 1018.10 If the subject has been correctly identified, then it might be suggested that the piece was commissioned by the emperor himself, following his great victory. If this was the case, the tapestry would date between 1018, the year of victory and 1025, the time of Basil's death. Certainly, close parallels that can be made with drapery styles on the early-eleventh-century mosaics further details', in H. Granger-Taylor, L. Monnas, eds., Ancient and Medieval Textiles. Studies

ill Honour of Donald King (pasold, 1989), 151-66. 6 Granger-Taylor,

'The inscription', 341. 7 Muthesius, 'Practical approach', 250, nn. 43, 44. 8 Muthesius, Eastern Silks, 93-100. 9 S. Miiller-Christensen, Das Grab des Papstes Clements

n.

im Dom

ZII

Bamberg (Munich,

1960). 10 J.

Beckwith, Tile Art of Constantinople (London, 1968), 98.

Fig. 1 Aachen Cathedral Treasury, Elephant Silk. (Photo Dr A. Muthesius).

242

SILKEN DIPLOMACY

SECTION V

at Bosios Loukas near Delphi support a dating to this period. l l In addition, two of the inscribed Lion silks bear the names of Basil II and Constantine VIII, which underlines the fact that imperial silks definitely were produced under these emperors. 12 The curious thing about using the Gunther tapestry as a diplomatic gift in 1065 is that by then it would have been almost fifty years old. Was it the usual Byzantine practice to store splendid silks, pieces that indeed might have originally decorated the imperial palace, until a valuable diplomatic gift was called for, by which time the initial purpose of the silk would have been long forgotten? After all, to the westerners one victorious Byzantine entry would have looked much the same as another, and in any event, would not the general theme of Byzantine prowess have been clear for all to see? What did it matter whether Basil II or another Byzantine emperor appeared on the silk? A precious large-scale imperial silk wall-hanging almost 220cm. square could not have been lightly disposed of; it certainly would not have been suitable for sale on the open market. What better way to have 'killed two birds with one stone', than to have sent precious outdated imperial silks to the west in tlle guise of costly imperial gifts? TIle impression that Byzantium did so is heightened by the fact that at least one of the inscribed Lion silks, too, may not have been contemporary when sent to the west.1 3 The victorious and glorious emperor theme appeared frequently on eighth- to ninth-century Byzantine silks and it served as the subject of the Mozac imperial Hunter silk, presently housed in the Textile Museum at Lyons. 14 This silk has been identified with a piece that bore the seal of Pippin and which was presented to the relics of St Austremoine at Mozac in 764. It seems reasonable to accept that the silk was a diplomatic gift sent to Pippin in connection with a planned marriage alliance between Byzantium and the west. Negotiations for a nuptial alliance between the daughter of Pippin and Leo, son of Constantine V, were first documented in 765, a year after the translation of St Austremoine, but still the silk may well have been amongst diplomatic gifts, sent with envoys from Byzantium in 756-7. 15 The Mozac silk illustrates two important points. It indicates the type of political circumstances tllat prompted Byzantium to entrust valuable diplomatic silks to the west from an early date and it provides a nascent

243

'.f

11 Mulhesius, Enstem Si/ks, 95£. 12 Muthesius, 'Practical approach', 242f. 13 Muthesius, Enstem Silks, 24. 14 Muthesius, Enstem Silks, 101-73. 15 Reg. I, 339. See above, 100.

Fig. 2 Detail of the inscription on the elephant silk in Aachen Cathedral Treasury. Top - obverse; Bottom - reverse of the silk. (Photo Dr A. Muthesius).

244

SECTION V

SILKEN DIPLOMACY

245

example of 'silken nuptial diplomacy' in the service of east-west relations. It is not difficult to appreciate the delicate political position of Pippin in the 750s, subject as he was to both papal and Byzantine petitions in the face of Lombard attacks in Italy. In 754 by allying with the papacy, itself isolated from Byzantium through the Iconoclast activities of Constantine V, Pippin preempted the Byzantine annexation of Sicily, Calabria and Illyricum. The arrival of Byzantine envoys bearing gifts in 756-7 and the subsequent marriage proposals of 765 have to be seen against this background. It is important to note the special relationship built up between Byzantium and the west from the mid ninth to the eleventh century, in which both proposed and actual marriage alliances played an important part. 16 One may ask: does the Mozac silk imply the existence of similar diplomatic tactics a century earlier? How far can documented tenth-century Byzantine attitudes towards the west, and particularly the sentiments expressed in the De administrando imperio, be thought a natural consequence of ties established through numerous earlier 'silken diplomatic' contacts?17 Indeed, a constant diplomatic exchange was maintained between Byzantium and the west from the mid eighth to the thirteenth century. Particularly close relationships existed from the mid tenth century up to 1204, during which period only Henry I (919-36) does not appear to have exchanged envoys with Byzantium. It is remarkable but not surprising to find that no less than sixteen marriages were either negotiated or arranged between Byzantium and the west at different times between the eighth and the twelfth century.18 The surviving inscribed imperial Lion silks from a variety of Rhenish treasuries I have earlier suggested were diplomatic gifts sent to seal some of these nuptial contracts. 19 The series of Lion silks, both extant and documented, were vehicles for the expression of Byzantine imperial authority. The Lion motif itself, with small background tree form, found a classical precedent on ancient Greek vases and on Roman pavements, including one at Horkstow in Lincolnshire. The use of a purple ground for the Lion motifs in conjunction with the names of Byzantine rulers underlined imperial authority. Murex purple was the dye 16 J. Shepard, 'Aspects of Byzantine attitudes and policy towards the west in the tenth and eleventh centuries', Byz. and West, 67-118. 17 Muthesius, Eastern Silks, 346f.; W. Ohnsorge, Konstanlinopel und der Okzident (Darmstadt, 1966),49-92,208-26; Shepard, 'Byzantine policy', Byz. and West, 77. 18 Muthesius, Eastern Silks, 347f.; T. C. Lounghis, Les ambassades byzanlines ell Occident depuis la jondation des ,Hats barbares jusqu'aux Croisades (407-1096) (Athens, 1980); below, 266-72. 19 Muthesius, 'Practical approach', 250 n. 41.

Fig. 3 Lion silk, Diocesan Museum, Cologne. Top: view of th~ whole silk; below: detail of the inscription with the names of Bastl and Constantine, identified with Basil 11 and Constantine VIII (976-1025). (Photo Dr A. Muthesius).

246

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dye tradi~onally reserved for imperial use. 20 However, it is important to recogruze that murex was not necessarily employed on all imperial silks. The. Lion silk in the textile collection of Schloss Charlottenburg, west Berlm, for example, bears the inscription of Basil 11 and Constantine VIII but it is dyed with a mixture of madder and indogen and not with murex purple. 21 The question is, was this sent as a murex purple to an unsuspecting Latin court or were imitation purples usual on imperial silks destined to serve as diplomatic gifts? . The B?ok of the Prefec.t included strict provisions against the applicatIon of different categones of purples reserved for imperial use, and this in conjunction with the fact that the Basilics reinforced earlier prohibitions against illicit murex dyeing, suggests murex still in the tenth and the eleventh century was an imperially restricted category of dye.22 In fact the unfortunate experiences of Liudprand of Cremona, who unsuccessfully attempted to export prohibited murex purple-dyed silks from Byzantium, underlines the point that in the tenth century the imperial monopoly over such dyes still held strong. 23 In the case of the diplomatic silks one might enquire whether the Byzantine emperors were economizing by using imitation purples but at the same time taking advantage of the connotations implicit in the use of purple dye on an imperial silk. How far was it reasonable to think that the west would be fooled into belieVing a genuine murex purple, immensely rare and valuable, had been sent as a gift? This enquiry in turn leads on to a final question, which is: where were the imperial diplomatic silks actually produced? The use of imitation purples On imperial Lion silks is as puzzling as the use of murex purple on an uninscribed Griffin silk that somehow reached Sion cathedral treasury in the medieval period. 24 Were both categories of distinguished imperial silks made in a single workshop? The Book of the Prefect reveals that imperial silks were woven both in imperial workshops of the capital and under commission in the priVate workshops of the serikarioi. It seems that the eparch stamped all silk gar~ents m~de. in the city and that the serikarioi had an obligation to delIver certam SIlk garments to the imperial store. Some members of the

SILKEN DIPLOMACY

guild of serikarioi must have been in the habit of delivering inferior silks to this imperial store, however; that is, silks purchased outside the city rather than those made in their own workshops, for a special provision against this practice was included in the tenth-century regulations of the Book of the Prefect. 25 The Book of the Prefect also indicates that the serikarioi were dyeing various categories of purple cloths, albeit not true purples, and it is possible that they were commissioned to weave pieces like the inscribed Lion silks dyed with madder and indigo. These silks would have been sent to the imperial store mentioned in the Book of the Prefect, (probably identical with the Eidikon known from Theophanes Continuatus and the Book of Ceremonies), before being sent out to foreign courts. 26 The murex-dyed purple Griffin silk at Sion, on the other hand, was most likely an imperial workshop production. This silk has a distinctive medallion border motif of open palmettes characteristic of the Aachen Elephant silk, known from its inscription to be the work of imperial Byzantine weavers at Zeuxippus. 27 TIle high quality of the Sion piece technically, the use of a Griffin motif favoured in Byzantium and the appearance of murex dye all argue strongly for an imperial Byzantine centre of manufacture. There is no evidence that such silks were produced in Syria, although Griffin motifs do appear on some Islamic mountain crystals. 28 In the case of the Aachen Elephant silk, which was produced under the auspiCes of the eidikos Michael, there can be little doubt that it was destined for storage in the Eidikon. 29 Perhaps it was specially woven as a diplomatic gift, although there is no precise evidence to suggest exactly when it reached the west. It has been suggested that it was placed about the relics of Charlemagne in 1000 A.D. by Otto m.30 Of course particularly from the time of the marriage of Theophano to OUo II in 972, there would have been many opportunities for Byzantine silks to arrive in the west, although not all silks at Aachen are tenth-century Byzantine pieces from Theophano's dowry, as some have suggested. 31 It is not surprising to find diplomatic silks firmly entrenched in the 2S Nicole,

rel:vant legislation is recorded in Codex TIleodosial1us, tr. C. Pharr (Princeton, 1952) 10.21.3, and m Corpus Juris Civilis, Il, Codex Iustinianus, ed. P. Kruger (Berlin, 1915) 4.40.1. 21 Muthesius,'Practical approach', 243f., pI. 3. • 22 For ~he Book ofth~ Prefect see J. Nicole's edition (Geneva, 1891), repr. in Le lillredu prefet, mtroduchon by I. DUJ«ev (London, 1970), 35-8. For the legislation in the Basilics see G.E. and C.C.E. Heimbach, eds., Basilicorum Libri LX (Leipzig, 1833-70) 19.1.80. 3 2 With regard to Liudprand see: Leg., chaps. 53-55, pp. 204-05; Wright, 267- 8. 24 Schmedding, Mitlelalterliche Textilien, no. 236. 20 The

247

Livre du prefet, 8.1-2; 8.11.

Book of Ceremol1ies see F. Dolger, Beitriige zur Geschicl1te der byzantiniscl1en Finanz'llerwaltung (Leipzig, 1927), 35-9. 26 Theoph. Cont., IV, p. 173.13. For the Eidikon in the

27 Muthesius, 'Practical approach', 251£. 28 Schmedding, MittelalterIiche Textiliel1, 250-2. 29 Muthesius, 'Practical approach', 251. 30 Muthesius, 'Practical approach', 252f. 31 On the subject of Theophano's dowry, see H. Wentzel, 'Das byzantinische Erbe der Ottonischen Kaiser. Hypothesen iiber den Brautschatz der Theophanou', Aachener Kunstbliitter 43 (1972), 11-96. In addition see Muthesiu9, Eastern Silks, 355 n. 23.

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imperial palace of the capital in the tenth century. The Byzantine court itself was resplendent with magnificent silk furnishings and robes '~ilken diplomacy' was e.n:"bedded at the heart of Byzantine politics; s~ks were a ~owerful pohtIcal tool not only in the sphere of Byzantine dIplomacy WIth the west, but in her economic dealings with Italians Rus and Bulgarians alike. 32 Silk, trade and politics went hand in hand' as long as Byzantium required an ally to defend her far-flung territorial boundaries. The silks described in this survey serve only to underline how deeply entrenched was the practice of 'silken diplomacy' before the eleventh century, and to indicate what a powerful tool this lUXUry fabric was to become in skilled political hands.

16. The luxury book as diplomatic gift* Jolm Lowden In the history of the art of the middle ages, the question of the relationship between Byzantium and its neighbours is never far from the forefront of discussion. Art historians can often perceive, or think they can perceive, connections of various sorts in terms of, for example, technique, style, iconography, or ideology. But it is generally problematic to pursue these connections further in an attempt to define precisely what they mean and how they came about. A favoured deus ex machina in this situation is the illustrated manuscript: 1 such a work, it can be argued, would be easy to carry within and beyond the borders of the empire; could make a costly and splendid gift; might contain lots of pictures, providing plenty of stylistic and iconographic ideas; and then, in the course of time, might be destroyed or lost, like so much medieval material, leaving only its 'influence' for us to perceive. A discussion of Byzantine diplomacy provides the opportunity to reconsider these arguments, and specifically to ask: what was the importance of the illustrated or luxury book as diplomatic gift? The answer that will be proposed here suggests some significant modifications to the views expressed above. A proper treatment of this theme would require that we look at Byzantium and all its neighbours. The Slavonic, Georgian, Armenian, Syriac, and Cop tic worlds, in particular, deserve close scrutiny. But the limitations imposed by a short paper require a high degree of selectiVity, and only the relations between Byzantium and the Latin west can be

32 Discussed

in Muthesius, 'Mediterranean silk trade', 126-35.

* I am grateful to Judith Herrin and Ken Parry for their comments on the first version of this survey. 1 See the general remarks of, e.g. O. Demus, Byzantine Art and the West (New York, 1970), esp. 20-2; K. Weitzmann, 'The study of Byzantine book illumination, past, present, and future', in The Place of Book I/luminatiotl in Byzantine Art (princeton, 1975), 31-50; A. Grabar, 'L'asymetrie des relations de Byzance et de l'Occident dans la domaine des arts du moyen i1ge', in I. I-iutter, ed., Byzanz und der Wes/en. Sludien zur Kunst des europiiiscl1en Mittelalters (Vienna, 1984), 9-24.

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consid ered here. There are a few cases of surviving books which certainly were diplomatic gifts of some sort from Byzantium to the west, and four will the be investigated. The first I want to mention, and without doubt St of works te comple the of copy the 437, most import ant, is Paris. gr. by sent was which sius), -Diony Pseudo (the Dionysius the Areopa gite in the iconoclast empero r Michael rr with an embassy to Louis the Pious ructed reconst be can and one, ing intrigu an is gift 827.2 The story of this as follows, thanks to the work of Thery and Loenertz. 3 , In seeking to advance the popula rity of his iconoclast policies the of n positio ule iconod the ine underm to ting attemp Michael IT was for pope, to whom the suppor ters of icons in Byzantium tended to look in Louis encouragement. With this in mind he had sent an embassy to the to ce 824, setting out his position. The imperial legates made referen unworks of St Dionysius, hitherto, it would seem, unknow n or largely 4 saint the that r known to the Carolingians, and were amaze d to discove enjoyed a special venera tion from the Franki sh king and people; indeed in he had first conver ted Gaul, suffered martyr dom, and was present able remark a was this bodily form at Saint-Denis. fYIe now know that feat of hagiological wishful thinking, by which three Dionysiuses had merged into one.) In 825, under the direction of the abbot of Saint-Denis and archch aplain of Louis, Hilduin, a synod met at Paris and duly the found in favour of Michael's iconoclast position. In the course of were ion, translat Latin in ius, Dionys procee dings, two passages from cited in suppor t. s Loener tz propos ed that the knowledge of Dionysius displayed at the council was a direct result of the Byzantine embassy of 824, and even 6 propos ed to identify the probable translator. As it happens, this interes from Dionysius had passag al identic The . pretati on cannot be correct letter of 791 to famous his in n Hadria Pope already been cited by

LUXURY BOOK AS DIPLO MATIC GIFT

251

of Angilbert of St Riquier. 7 And Hadria n himsel f refers to the author8ity The ius. Dionys of use this the councils of his holy predec essors for And Paris council was thus merely repeati ng a part of Hadria n's letter.9 less a to due was 825 in ius Dionys of yet, althoug h Frankish knowle dge eless noneth was it ed, suppos been dramatic intervention than has highly significant. a By 827 the imperial legates were back in France, this time bringin g ly solemn was book The works. ius's Dionys presentation copy of St carried to Saint-Denis, where it arrived on the vigil of the saint's Feast, 10 with and perform ed eightee n miracu lous cures that night. Hildui n, the zed organi rapidly quite rs, speake Greek native the assistance of the also translation of Dionys ius's works, on Louis's instructions, and copy A writing of a syncretistic account of his paSSion and martyr dom. into of this latter was sent back to Consta ntinopl e, and was transla ted ll of cript manus Greek before 833 by Michae l the synkellos. The Paris Bald the s Charle Dionysius was retrans lated by John Scotus Erigena for by around 862.12 In terms of cultural history, the import ance of the arrival of Paris. gr. in 437 at Saint-Denis in 827 can hardly be exagge rated. A major strand cript. manus very this in ted the traditio n of mediev al though t origina its But in the narrow er art-historical terms of style and iconog raphy, cript manus uncial written ly careful a importance was nil. Paris.gr. 437 is completely devoid of the sort of illustra tion or decora tion that we might been consider essential for a lUXUry book. Of course, it would have , images on n positio his of view in Hr l Michae somewhat surpris ing had tions. illustra with chosen to send a copy es This story has an equally well-k nown sequel. Almos t six centuri and t, suppor and aid n wester g seekin was II l Manue later, the Emper or must was himself in Paris in 1400 and 1401-2.13 While at Saint-Denis, he in have been shown the manus cript of Dionys ius sent by Michae l Il, for ated 1407 he presen ted via his legate, Manue l Chryso loras, an illumin H. Feld,

cat. 6; H. Omont, 2 Bibliotheque Nationale, Byzance et la France medievale (Paris, 1958), a Louis le inople Constant de envoye ite 'Manusc rit des oeuvres de S. Denys I'Areopag D6bonnaire en 827', REG 17 (1904), 230-6. parisienne de 3 P.G. Thery, Etudes Dionysiennes I (Paris, 1932); R-J. Loenertz, 'La legende his Byzantina et FrallcoS. Denys I' Areopagite. Sa genese et son premier temoin', repr. in Graeca I (Rome, 1970), 177-80. Pippin in 758-63: MGH Epis!. 4 Pope Paul I had sent a copy of the Corpus Dionysiacum to very doubtful that there was is It 1-3. I, Etudes Thery, ~ n lII.1, 529 (ep. 24). See discussio anyone at Pippin's court able to read the text. S Loenertz, 'Legende ', 179; cf. MGH Cone. II.2, p. 512.31-5,36-41. 6 Loenertz , 'Legende ', 178-9.

's use of these texts, see 7 MGH Epist. V, p. 32.17 - p. 33.4. Recently, on Hadrian Der Ikonoklasmus des Wes/ens (Leiden, 1990), 23. oclast proceedi ngs of the councils 8 Loe. cit. The references are presuma bly to the anti-icon

ately no details under Gregory III (Rome, 731), and Stephen 1II (Later an, 769). Unfortun ; 720. 299-300) (and 297-8 XII, cilia Con Mansi, used: texts the of d have been preserve (II.xxv): MGH Carolini Libri the in point this of 9 Dionysius was not cited in discussio n 84-5. supp!., II. Cone. 10 Thery, Etudes I, 5-6. ite par S. Michel le Syncelle', 11 R-P. Loenertz, 'Le panegyr ique de S. Denys l' Areopag 149-62. 1970), (Rome, I repr. in Byzantina et Franco-Graeca 12 M. Cappuyns, Jean Scat Erigene (Louvain, Paris, 1933), 150-61. 174-99. 13J.W. Barker, Manue1 II Palaeologus (1391-1425) (New BrunSWick, 1969),

252

SECTION V LUXURY BOOK AS DIPLOMATIC GIFT

253

manuscript, now in the Louvre (fig. 1), as a gift to the abbey;14 It is a somewhat larger volume than Paris.gr.437 (273x200 mm, as against 238 x 155 mm), and definitely a luxury production. It is prefaced by fullpage miniatures of St Dionysius, dressed as a Greek bishop,ls and of the Byzantine imperial family, crowned and blessed by the Virgin and Child. 16 Although scarcely apparent in black and white reproductions, the workmanship in these miniatures is very fine. It represents, we may assume, the best that Byzantine artists were capable of in the first decade of the 15th century. But this manuscript also appears to have had no art-historical impact once it arrived in the west. I suppose it is not hard to understand the reasons (cf. figs. 1-2): even if the Louvre Dionysius had been accessible to leading Paris-based artists, such as the Limbourg brothers who worked for Jean, Duc de Berry, their interests, as represented by the Belles Heures, now in the Cloisters (Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York), were very different.17 The Limbourgs did not care about or for Byzantine art. In art-historical terms, Manuel's gift had arrived several centuries too late. To suppose that a luxury book arrived at the wrong time is to imply that there might have been a right time. Let us then consider the diminutive Psalter in Vienna (Osterreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. theo!. gr. 336), a luxury book illustrated with full-page miniatures of St Gereon (fig. 3), the Virgin and Child, Crucifixion, and David. 18 Easter tables date the making of the manuscript to 1077,19 and it is accepted as a high-quality Constantinopolitan production. The only oddity about it is the miniature of the un-Byzantine saint, Gereon. Gereon looks Byzantine enough, in his military dress, with his shield decorated with a pseudo-kufic ornament. And he is identified within the miniature in Greek: repecOv. Above the image, the Greek hand that wrote inscriptions alongside the Crucifixion miniature has provided a 14 Barker, Manuel II, 263-4, and fig. 20; I. Spatharakis, Corpus of Dated Illuminated Greek Manuscripts (Leiden, 1981), no. 278, figs. 492-4. (The manuscript is cited in the literature

Fi g. h1 P~ris, Musee. du Louvre, MR 416, fo1. 1r: St Dionysius (after Spat araklS, Corpus, flg. 492).

variously as Paris, Louvre, Ivoires A53, or lOO, or as Dept. des Obj~ts d' Art, MR 416.) 15 See further, C. Waiter, 'Three notes on the iconography of Dionysius the Areopagite', REB 48 (1990),255-74. 16 Spatharakis, Corpus, fig. 493; I. Spatharakis, The Portmit in Byzantine Illuminated Manuscripts (Leiden, 1976), 139-44; figs. 93-4. 17 M. Meiss, The Limbourgs and Their Contemporaries (New York, 1974), 102-42, on the Belles Heures; J. Porcher, Les Belles Heures de Jean de France, Due de Berry (Paris, 1953). 18 Oma71lenta Ecclesiae (Katalog zur Ausstellung des Schniitgen-Museums . . . ) II (Cologne, 1985), 253-4; cat. E41; A. Cutler, rile Aristocratic Psalters in Byzantium, (Paris, 1984), cat. 50, figs. 313-17. 19 J. Lowden, 'Observations on illustrated Byzantine Psalters', Art Bulletin 70 (1988), 242-5, on Easter Tables.

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LUXURY BOOK AS DIPLOMATIC GIFT

255

Fig. 3 Vienna, Osterreichische N ationalbibliothek, cod. theo!. gr. 336, fol. Ir: St Gereon (after Ornamenta, II 254, no. E41). sort of Latin translation: Sanctus (abbreviated) Gereon 111tirtys Christi (abbreviated). Both Gereon and mart1js have been given conspicuous accents, as though they were Greek words. And indeed mcirtys is only a transliteration of the Greek. It should have been rendered into Latin as martyr.

Fig. 2 New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art, The Cloisters, Belles Hetlres of Jean, Duc de Berry, fo1. 166v: Martyrdom of St Dionysius (after Porcher, Heures, pI. Cl).

There is another strange detail. The small miniature, less than 6 cm tall, has been given an unusual ornament in the top centre, not found in the other miniatures. This looks like a ring from which to suspend the image. It is as if we were looking at a reproduction in pigment and gold leaf on parchment of a precious c1oisonnee enamel of St Gereon, in-

256

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tended perhaps to be worn like an amulet around the neck. Such an object may once have existed, although it is not a necessary inference from the miniature. There can be no doubt that this little Psalter was intended for and went to the important church of St Gereon in Cologne, where it seems to have remained throughout the Middle Ages. 'The century or two after its production in 1077 was a period when western artists were very interested in Byzantine works. But the style, technique, and iconography of the little Psalter were never taken as a model, even in books made for St Gereon itself (fig. 4), so far as we can judge. 20 'That the Byzantine book was a gift seems certain, but it is likely to represent a personal gesture, rather than the state diplomacy involved in the two Dionysius manuscripts. Whatever the motive of the gift, the illustrations of this luxury volume seem to have gone unconsulted. The final example is again well known, if enigmatic. The New Testament mansucript Paris. Coisl. 22, is a late-12th-century production in what Carr has termed the Decorative style. 21 It is illustrated with fullpage miniatures of the evangelists (fig. 5), and slightIy smaller images for Acts and the Epistles. It used to be thought that the manuscript was a diplomatic'gift from Michael VIII to Louis IX, in part on the basis of the rendering of Michael's name and titles in the margin of the miniature of St Matthew, and various Latin notes on preceding folios. But the situation is more complex: Michael's name was written by an unskilful Latin hand, and the manuscript certainly never reached St Louis, for it was first recorded as in the possession of the Jesuits of Caen in the eighteenth century.22 It now seems that this twelfth-century New Testament may have been in France in 1269 as the working copy, albeit a splendid one, of John Parastron, the Greek Franciscan from Constantinople. 23 He acted at various times as legate of the Byzantine emperor to tile pope, and vice versa, in connection with tile union of the churches, and in particular at the Council of Lyons of 1274.24 According to tIus theory, John would not have brought the Coislin manuscript from Constantinople as a gift from emperor to king. Perhaps he decided on 20 E.g. Cologne, Historisches Archiv, Cod. W 244, a manuscript made at St Pantaleon in Cologne c.1140 for St Gereon: Ornamenta Il, cat. E62. See also Demus, Art, 22. 21 A. Weyl Carr, Byzantine Illumination, 1150-1250 (Chicago, 1987), cat. 93, fiche 4Cl-4C12. 22 Byzance, cat. 47. 23 PLP, no. 21910. 24 D.J. Geanakoplos, Emperor Midmel Palaeologus and the West (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 258-62.

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LUXURY BOOK AS DIPLOMATIC GIFT

259

Fig. 6 Wolfenbiittel, Staatsarchiv, Marriage document of Otto II and Theophano (detail) (after Schramm/Mtitherich, Denkmale, no. 72). that the spur of the mome~t to sell or make a gift of it, maybe intend ing and details, the know not do it should find its way to Louis IX. But we can we as far so view, from eared in any case, the manus cript disapp tell. Books, even lUXUry books, were never, I believe, an obviou s diplon matic gift (althou gh always a possibility) in the interpl ay betwee the for was This ge. langua and script of s cultures divided by barrier and simple reason that their ability to functio n as repositories of ideas s Textile read. be not could they if ed impair ly information was serious le desirab more much were le, examp for metal, s and objects in preciou Fig. 5 Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale, cod. Coislin 200, fol. 68r: St Luke (after V. Lazarev, Storia della pittura bizantina [Turin, 1967], fig. 374).

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giftS. 25 And relics, and the reliquaries that housed them, were very highly valued for a variety of reasons. 26 These were the sorts of objects which certainly did travel, and could carry the style, iconography, ideology, and techniques of Byzantium to its neighbours. Furthermore, such objects could then be publicly displayed for all to see and marvel at. Indeed, the display aspect was an important element in the 'trade' in this type of gift. Occasionally we get curious sidelights on the attitudes and procedures involved. There exists a copy of a wedding document for Otto n and Theophano from 972 (fig. 6), now in the Staatsarchiv, Wolfenbiittel. It is a magnificent piece, written in gold on a scroll of parchment dyed and painted in imitation of a precious Byzantine textile. 27 Tlus, we may deduce, was a copy intended to be displayed, not merely to serve as a record. Other documents of this sort had a strange fate. In 1049, Constantine Monomachus sent a letter to Henry HI, probably using gold ink on purple parchment. 28 The letter was so impressive in appearance that it was mounted and displayed as an altar frontal in Coslar Cathedral, while the gold seal, we are told, was melted down and turned into a chalice. We do not know exactly what the content of the letter was, but we may hazard a guess that much of the message was conveyed by the form alone: it made eloquent claims for the power and magnificence of the Byzantine emperor, claims that were publicly acknowledged in the use to which the letter was put. . But writing a book is very different from writing a letter, as we all know. And only in most unusual circumstances, we may judge, was an illustrated book considered appropriate as a diplomatic gift. Even the examples that were despatched may well have been inaccessible to those artists who might have drawn ideas from the images. The arthistorical significance of such gifts, therefore, was probably much slighter than is often supposed.

25 E.g.,

Michael Ir's embassy to Louis the Pious of 824: Loenertz, 'Legende', 178, with rers. Witness, for example, the Mosan setting of the Byzantine enamels and relics in Tile Sln!Ieiot Triptych, Exh. Cat. Pierpont Morgan Library (New York, 1980). 27 P.E. Schramm, F. Miitherich, Denkmnle der deutschen Kiinige und Kaiser (Munich, 1962), no. 72. 28 W. Ohnsorge, 'Die nach Goslar gelangte Auslandsschreiben des Konstantinos IX. Monomachos fUr Kaiser Heinrich Ill. von 1049', repr. in his Abendlnnd und Byznnz (Darmstadt, 1958),317-32. 26

Section VI Social Aspects

17. Dynastic marriages and political kinship Ruth Macri des at The Chronicle of the Morea, produc ed in the early fourtee nth century Greek of m criticis a Latin court in the Peloponnese, makes the following behaviour in matter s relating to friends hip and kinship: Who was ever heard to believe in a Romaios For the sake of love or friends hip or any kin relationship? Never trust a Romaios, in whatev er he may swear to you, For when he wants and wishes to finish you off, Then he makes you a baptism al sponso r or his adopte d brother, 1 Or he makes you an in-law to destroy you completely. in This genera l condem nation of the untrust worthi ness of the Greeks on attack the t, inciden specific a by their relationships was occasioned in William of Villehardouin by his Greek father-in-law, Michael Il, ruler to n attentio draws e passag the But . Epirus in the thirteenth century It cle. Chroni the of e attitud eek anti-Gr the issues which are wider than nship relatio in seen be can es allianc ge marria provides a remind er that also with the other available means of creatin g ties of kinship. TIus is baptislist which ations compil legal and s treatise ine reflected in Byzant mal sponsorship, adoption, and marria ge as types of kinship wluch of differ from blood relationships.2 TIlese ties were the main means s subject bringing those outside the family into it. Rulers as well as their subtheir entered into these relationslups and rulers formed them with jects as well as with foreigners. Yet marria ge is often singled out and studied in isolation, regard ed nt to as 'a mainst ay of Byzantine diplom acy? la commo n accom panime by H.E. Lurier, J. Schmitt (London, 1904), 260.3932-7. I have adapted the translatio n 187. 1964), London, York, (New a More of Chronicle The Crusaders as Conquerors, Pediasim os', FM 1 (1976), 140. 2 A. Schminck, 'Der Traktat Pen gC/man des Johannes 1958), 155. An exception to the dt, (Darmsta Byzanz und d Abendlan e, 3 W. Ohnsorg 'Zur Begriind ung familiarer Claude, D. by approach characterized here is the study m', in E.K. Chrysos and A. Herrsche chen barbaris und Kaiser dem zwischen gen Beziehun 25-56. 1989), , Cologne (Vienna, Schwarcz, eds., Das Reich und die Barbal'erl 1 Ed.

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~he creatio~ of ~iplomatic links in state politics', as if to imply that there something Inherently 'diplomatic' or 'political' about marriage alliances with foreigners as opposed to those contracted at home Besides, as the function of marriage alliances formed with foreign ruler~ appears to be obvious, some basic questions have not been asked, such as the frequency with which marriages versus other kin alliances were fo~med and the benefits which marriages brought or were expected to brmg. The best way to examine preconceptions on the subject and to find answers to the above questions is to see marriage in the context of other kin ties. Since marriage, baptismal sponsorship and adoption have common characteristics and shared functions, they can help to elucidate each other by analogy. Furthermore, these ties sometimes accompanied one other, working either in combination or in reaction to each other. Such cO~iderations can put the relative value of a marriage alliance in perspectIve and add another dimension to specific cases of the formation of kinship ties. Finally, a study of marriage alliances in this wider context can show that the differences between marriages contracted with ~oreign rulers and those contracted by the emperor's own subjects are d1~ferences of degree, not of kind. All marriages are political, as are other arranged' ties of kinship. Whether the relationship was that of in-laws (kedestia), godparent and natural parent (synteknia) 4, or adoptive brother and sister (adelphopoiia), it was an instrumental relationship which began with the ~esto,,:,al or acceptance of a favour - the offer to enter into a kin relationship. People chose as partners in these relationships friends or those whom they wanted to make friends, those with influence wealth and high soci~ status. A fourteenth-century churchman criticized this eye for ma.ten~ advantage when he said that people chose as godparents for theIr children the powerful and rich 'to have them as helpers in lime 5 of need'. Thus, emperors, patriarchs, bishops, holy men and local archontes are e best-documented godparents and adoptive brothers. The wealthy WIdow Danielis sought to create a tie of adoptive brotherhood between her son John and Basil whom she knew to be destined for the t~one.6 Sometimes the desirable qualities in the person with whom one wIshed to ally oneself in kinship were spiritual, as in the case of the IS

tt:

4 On synt:kniu, and for the generalizations on kin alliances which follow, see R. Macridcs, The Byzantine godfather', BMGS 11 (1987), 139-62. ~ Jo~eph Bryennius, Kephaiaia heptakis hepta, in Ta paraleipomena, ed. T. Mandakasis III (Leipzig, 1784), 107. 6 Theoph. Cont., 227-8; Scy1., 122-3. ,

DYNASTIC MARRIAGES

265

patriarch Thomas and Theodore of Sykeon/ or intellectual arid moral, as in the example of Romanus Diogenes and Nicephorus Bryennius. 8 The ties formed by baptismal sponsorship, adoption and marriage were created by ecclesiastical rites,9 and gift-giving accompanied the formation of the kin alliances. Each person gave according to his status and means. The peasant synteknoi of Constantine Ducas, despotls in independent Epirus in the first half of the thirteenth century, made gifts of poultry and fowl, hides and horses. 1o Emperors gave money, precious cloth and vessels, and court dignities. The obligation to reCiprocate was implicit in the creation of the relationship. The return~gift or favour, whether openly solicited or silently awaited, was, at the very least, an expression of goodwill. Danielis explained to Basil, when she asked him to adopt her son as his brother, 'I ask for nothing else from you than that you love, and have compassion for, me and mine.' When Basil became emperor he reciprocated by bestowing the rank of protospatharios on his adopted brother John and granting him open access (parresia) to him. ll It was to facilitate more frequent access to the empress Maria of Alania that Alexius Comnenus sought to be adopted by her in the critical days before his coup.n Some adoptions were contracted to make friends of enemies, in an effort to forestall coups, as happened in the rebellions of Isaac Comnenus and Nicephorus Bryennius. 13 The Emperor Justinian's sponsorship at baptism of the king of the Heruli and the king of the Huns brought military and strategic benefits. He created loyal clients in these northern tribes who could be counted on to protect Byzantine territory and provide Inilitary aIliance. 14 At their best, these kinship ties united the families of the original parties involved and also outlived them. The ties were remembered and continued by later generations. Thus Danielis kept up her relationship after Basil's death, when she continued to visit the palace in the reign of his son, Leo VI.15 The sons of Demetrius Tornices, who had been the 7 Vie

de Theodore de Sykeon, ed. A.J. Festugiere I (Brussels, 1970), 106.

8 AI.

Il, 196.11-18.

9 J. Goar, Euchologion sive rituale graecorum (Venice, 1730, repr. Graz, 1960), 287-91 (baptism), 314-22 (marriage), 706-08 (adelphopoiia). 10 Ed. A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, '5ymbole eis ten historian tes archiepiskopes Achridos', sbornik statei posviashchennykh V.N. Lamanskomu I (St. Petersburg, 1907), 243. 11 Scyl., 121-2;160-1. 12 AI. I, 63.12-66.10; 70.17-71.4; Macrides, 'The Byzantine godfather', 154-5. 13 Psellus, Chron. Il, 99-100; Nicephorus Bryennius, Historiarum Libri Quattuor, ed. P. Gautier (Brussels, 1975), 263.5-14. 14 A. Angenendt, Kaiserherrschaft und Konigstaufe (Berlin, New York, 1984),5-11. 15 Scyl., 161.94-8.

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emperor John Vatatzes's mesazon and had been termed 'brother' by him in his documents, continued to derive prestige from their father's relationship with the emperor, even after his death. 16 The imposter son of Romanus Diogenes tried to gain support for his cause by boasting of the help that his 'uncle' Bryennius, his father's adopted brother, would give him when he learned who he was. 17 But if the ties of arranged kinship were formed and functioned in the same way, they had the same weaknesses and could go wrong for the same reasons. These ties carried with them expectations of loyalty and cooperation which could be manipulated by an unscrupulous person literally to disarm the other party. The Chronicle of the Morea shows how one son-in-law was taken by surprise. Cecaumenus, too, writing in the eleventh century, reveals the manipulation of expectations in its worst form. He tells how a strategos who hoped to gain control over some fortresses in Dalmatia by winning over a Slav princeling, gave him gifts and finally offered to act as godfather to his newly-born child. The Slav readily agreed and suggested that they go to his home for the baptism but the strategos, sensing a trap, insisted that they meet on tile boundary of their respective territories. Thinking that he had thus outwitted the Slav, he made arrangements for his capture but in the end it was the Slav who got the better of him and took him captive. 18 Any discussion of the extent to which marriage alliances conform to the aspects of kin alliances set out above must begin with the pronouncement by Cons tan tine VII Porphyrogenitus, for it is the fullest and most explicit statement on marriage by a Byzantine ruler. His comments on the subject are made in the context of the three things which the tribes of the north may have tile affrontery to seek from the Byzantine state: imperial crowns and robes, Greek fire, and marriage alliances. He deals with each demand in turn, advising his son Romanus 11 to give the northerners an excuse based in each case on the authority of Constantine the Great. 19

Franks alone, for they alone were excepted by that great man, the holy Constantine, because he drew his origin from those parts; for there is much relationship and converse between Franks and Romans. And why did he order iliat with them alone the emperor of the Romans should intermarry? Because of the traditional fame and nobility of those lands and races. 20

266

Concerning this matter also a dread and authentic charge and ordinance of the great and holy Constantine is engraved upon the sacred table of the universal church of the Christians, St Sophia, that never shall an emperor of the Romans ally himself in marriage with a nation of customs differing from and alien to those of the Roman order, especially with one that is infidel and unbaptized, unless it be with the 16 George Pachymeres, 17 AI. Il, 196.2-20.

Relations lIistoriques, ed. A. Faillier I (Paris, 1984), 91.21-93.1.

Litavrin, Sovety i rasskazy Kekavmena (Moscow, 1972), 170.27-172.25. 19 On the invocation of Constantine the Great in this passage, see J. Shepard, 'Information, disinformation and delay in Byzantine diplomacy', BF 10 (1985), 239-40. 18 G.G.

All the same, Cons tan tine claims that there have been two breaches of this order, namely the marriage of Leo III with the daughter of the Khazar khagan and, more recent and more serious, the marriage of Maria, grand-daughter of the emperor Romanus I to Peter the Bulgarian. It is the latter marriage in particular which excites Constantine's anger and occasions an outburst against Romanus, his father-in-law who, he says, can only have arranged this union because he was a common, illiterate man, not bred in the palace. 21 Two aspects of Constantine's statement deserve close attention: the claim that the marriage of Maria was a serious breach in practice and the contention that only marriages with the Franks are appropriate for members of the Byzantine imperial family. It has been suggested that Constantine's outburst against the Bulgarian marriage has less to do with his love of Christian order or jealousy for the imperial dignity than with his hatred for his father-in-law who managed to prevent him from exercising sole imperial power for the greater part of his life. 22 Certainly Constantine does make errors ..,. in fact it was Constantine V and not his father Leo III who married a Khazar woman - and he is guilty of distortion when he objects to the Khazar and Bulgarian marriages on the grounds that the canons forbid them. Does he grossly exaggerate because of a personal grudge? A glance at the marriages which had taken place between foreigners and members of the reigning emperor's family up until Constantine's time shows that they can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Maria in 927 was the second Byzantine princess to be exported, but the first to go to a 'northern tribe'. She had been preceded at the end of the ninth century by Anna, daughter of Leo VI, Cons tan tine' s father, but Anna had gone to the west to become the wife of Louis III of Provence. 23 Thus 20 DAI, pp. 71-3. See also on this passage P. Magdalino, 'Hellenism and nationalism in Byzantium', in his Tradition and Transformation in Medieval Byzantium (London, 1991), no.

XIV, p. 5. 21 DAI, pp. 72-4. 22 DAI:Comm., 64. 23 C.W. Previte Or ton, 'Charles Constantine of Vienne', Englislt Historical Review 29 (1914),703-06; Ohnsorge, Abendland und Byzllnz, 227-54. For a convenient list of Byzantine-

western marriages in the ninth and tenth centuries, see W.H.R. von Collenberg, 'Wer war Theophano?', Genealogiscltes Jllltrbucll 64.4 (1964),59-60.

268

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the marriage of Maria was indeed an unprecedented event and the relatively long description of her marriage to Peter in Theophanes Continuatus underlines the novelty of the situation. 24 Imported brides before Constantine's time were no less uncommon: there were only two, the Khazar wives of Justinian II and Constantine V in the early and mid eighth century.25 As we have seen, Constantine did make an exception of marriage alliances with the west, and these were certainly more numerous, especially if one takes into consideration all those marriages which were negotiated, but did not result in a marriage. Beginning with the proposed marriage of Leo IV and the daughter of king Pippin III of the Franks in the eighth century, until the end of the tenth century, there were approximately ten negotiated and three achieved marriages with the west. 26 It has therefore been argued that these marriages were so common in comparison with others that Cons tan tine had to make a special provision for justifying them to other foreigners. Besides, Constantine could hardly object to such marriages because his own son Romanus 11 had been married to a westerner, Bertha, daughter of Hugh of Italy27 and his own father, Leo VI, had married his half-sister to a westerner. However, there is evidence to suggest that Constantine was not merely making the best of a bad situation or trying to justify an embarrassing inconsistency in Byzantine matrimonial behaviour. Firstly, his own behaviour suggests that marriages with the west were looked upon positively, for he negotiated a second western marriage for his son28 after the first marriage - arranged for Romanus II by his grandfather Romanus I - ended in the early death of Bertha. Furthermore, the fact

that a greater number of marriages were negotiated and achieved with the west than with any other ethnos both before and during Cons tantine's lifetime is itself an indication of the high esteem in which these marriages were held;29 for, of all the ethne with whom the Byzantines had dealings, the westerners were the only Christians with high enough rank and 'nobility', as Constantine says, to warrant marriage alliances with Byzantium. As the discussion of kin alliances above reveals, one did not willingly choose to contract kinship ties with one's inferiors. The greater number of marriage alliances with the west can also be better understood when seen in the context of the other available means of forming kinship ties. The sponsorship of the children of western rulers by Byzantine emperors was in effect ruled out by the difficulties and the impracticality of bringing infants to Constantinople. 30 Sponsorship by proxy was apparently not practised by Byzantine emperors who, on the contrary, tended to act as sponsors for chieftains and princes of northern barbarian tribes who came to the capital to be baptized. 31 Adoption-in-arms was another form of kin alliance contracted with westerners but this was obviously limited in its applicability and appears to have been used very infrequently.32 Thu~ marriage was practically the only form of kin tie open for alliances with westerners. A further consideration in the question of western marriages is the role played by Byzantine awareness of the kin alliances formed in the west not only through synteknia or compaternitas but also through sponsorship at confirmation. The latter tie - which did not exist in the east - increased the opportunities in the west to form kin alliances. Information about who was related to whom through these ties was certainly' available in Byzantium - Constantine VII mentions specific cases of baptismal sponsorship among the Franks and the Serbs 33 - and Byzantium moved quickly to counteract them. 34 It has been suggested

24 Theoph.

Cont., 414-15. 25 Theoph. 1,372.29-373.2; 426.14-16. See above, 112-13.

26 Marriages negotiated: 1. Leo IV and Gisela, Pippin's daughter (765); 2. Constantine (VI) and Rotrud, Charlemagne's daughter (771); 3. Euanthia, granddaughter of St Philaretus and Grimoald, duke of Benevento (married after 788); 4. the empress Irene and Charlemagne (802); 5. Theophylact, son of Michael I and a Frankish princess (811/812); 6. a daughter of Theophilus and Louis I! of Italy (853); 7. Constantine, son of Basil If and Ermengard, daughter of Louis II of Italy (869); 8. Anna, daughter of Leo VI and Louis III of Provence (married c. 900); 9. a son of Romanus I and a daughter of Marozia (930); 10. Theophano, niece of John Tzimisces, and Otto II (married 972); 11. Zoe and Otto III (996); 12. Ro~anus (Il) and Bertha, daughter of Hugh of Italy (married 943); 13. Romanus (Il) and Hadwlg, daughter of Henry I, duke of Bavaria (952). For references to the negotiations and marriages, see Lounghi~, 143-222, 471, 477, 479; now too, F. Tinnefeld, 'Byzantinische auswiirtige Heiratspolitik vom 9. zum 12. ]h. - Kontinuitiit und Wandel der Prinzipien und der praktischen Ziele', in Papers from Bechyne (1990), forthcoming. 27 DAI, p. 112.66-72; Theoph. Cont., 431.11-19; Scyl., 231; Lounghis, 201. 28 Lounghis, 202.

29 See the evaluation of the passage by J. Shepard, 'Aspects of Byzantine attitudes and policy towards the west in the tenth and eleventh centuries', in Byz. and West, 87-94. 30 Claude, 'Familiare Beziehungen' (as in n. 3), 38. 31 Ibid., 37-8; Angenendt, Kaisersc/laft und Kiinigstaufe (as in n. 14),5-11. 32 Claude, 'Familiare Beziehungen', 32-9; for twelfth-century examples, see J. Shepard, 'When Greek meets Greek: Alexius Comnenus and Bohemond in 1097-1098', BMGS 12 (1988),214. On adoption of a son/daughter versus adelpllOpoiia as an alliance, see also R.J. Macrides, 'Kinship by arrangement: the case of adoption', DOP 44 (1990), 109-18, esp.

117-18. 33 DAI, p. 112.54-56; pp. 156.81-158.1.

.

.

Demonstrated by Shepard, 'Information, disinformation and delay ID Byzantme diplomacy', (as in n. 19), 280-1. On the importance of ba~tismal kinship in the west, see J.H. Lynch, Godparents and Kinship ill Early Medieval Europe (Pnnceton, 1986), esp. 163-257. 34

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that the marriage proposal between Pippin's daughter Gisela and Leo IV was made to subvert or, at least, to temper papal-Frankish compaternitas. 35 Similarly, the marriage in 1006 of Maria, sister of Romanus Argyrus, and John, son of the doge of Venice, Peter Orseolo, has also been seen as a counterpoise or even challenge to the ties of co-parenthood which united the doge with the Ottonians, Otto III and his successor Henry H.36 Many other cases of Byzantine marriage alliances with the west could perhaps be seen in a similar context of competition in kinship claims. There is some evidence, too, that Byzantine emperors tried to enlist western bishops who came on embassy to Constantinople as godparents for their children. 37 Constantine VII's statement on marriage does, then, ring true both with regard to the positive esteem with which marriages with the west were regarded, and to the shocking breach with tradition which Maria's union with Peter the Bulgarian represented. Marriages with westerners continued after Constantine VII's time to be the most common, reaching a peak in the twelfth century, while marital unions with northerners did not cease to be both rare and undesirable. 38 However, it would be wrong to give the impression that marriages with foreigners were not sparingly contracted until the twelfth century. They increase in number and in range in the course of the eleventh century to include Venice, Georgia,39 and Hungary40 as recipients of Byzantine brides, while a Georgian and a Norman princess were respectively married and betrothed to heirs to the Byzantine throne in 35 J. Herrin, TIle Formation of Christendom (London, 1987), 381, 384, 387, and above, 100-01. 36 K. Leyser, 'The tenth century in Byzantine-western relationships', Relatiolls between East and West in the Middle Ages, ed. D. Baker (Edinburgh, 1973), 31-2; Angenendt, Kaiserschaft und Konigstaufe, 123-5. On this marriage see below, 279. 37 Vita Gebehardi et successorum eills, ed. G.H. Pertz, MGH SS XIII, 39. Archbishop Gebehard received, on the occasion of the baptism, a gift of a textile decorated with gold and precious gems. 38 See below, 273, for the marriage of Anna and Vladimir; see also the study by A. Kazhdan, which reexamines these marriages, drastically reducing the number of certain marriages with Russian princes: 'Rus' -Byzantine princely marriages in the eleventh and twelfth centuries', in Proceedings of the International Congress Commemorating the Milleniu11I of Christianity ill RU5'-Ukraine, HUS 12/13 (1988/89), 414-29. Marriages with the Bulgarians did not take place again until the late twelfth century, after Bulgarian independence from Byzantium. 39 George Cedrenus, Compendium Historiarum, ed. 1. Bekker II (Bonn, 1839), 489.2-6: marriage of Helen, a niece of the emperor Romanus 1II Argyrus, and Bagrat IV of Abasgia in the 10305. 40 The first Byzantine-Hungarian marriage in the 1060s was between a Synadena, niece of Botaneiates and a doux of Geza's: R. Krebl, Byzantillische Prinzessinnen in Ungarn zwisellen 1050-1200 und ihr Einfluss auf das Arpadellkonigreich (Vienna, 1979), 29.

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the second half of the century. Michael VII Ducas, himself the husband of the Georgian Maria, known as Maria of the 'Alans',41 arranged at least three marriages in the 1070s, one for his son Constantine to the daughter of Robert Guiscard,42 one for his sister Theodora and the Venetian doge Domenico Silvio,43 and another for Isaac, Alexius Cornnenus's brother, to a cousin of his Georgian wife. 44 The Comneni, however, were the first to realize the full potential of foreign marriage alliances. The three heirs to the throne were all betrothed and married to foreign women: John II to a Hungarian,45 Manuel to Bertha of Sulzbach46 and Maria of Antioch,47 and Alexius II to Agnes of France. 48 Alexius I not only arranged his sons' marriages 49 but also those of his two grandsons, Anna Comnena's sons, to princesses from the Caucasus. 50 Manuel himself sought his marriage alliances almost exclusively in the Latin world and mainly for female relatives. 51 In his reign, of the nine Comneni involved in these alliances, only two were males - Manuel himself and his son Alexius. Although Byzantium had earlier exported, or proposed to export, more brides than it had imported, in the late eleventh century and in the reigns of Alexius and John imported brides appear to be more common. These fluctuations were related to some extent to the greater availability of males or females but were also perhaps tied to other considerations: a father of a foreign bride would have more of an excuse' to attack Byzantium in the name of his kin ties and for the sake of his sympentheros or son-in-law at a time of weakness in the Byzantine court, as happened in the case of Robert Guiscard. 52 Perhaps, too, exporting I

Polemis, The Doukni (London, 1968), 46 and n. 43. below, 273-4, and V. von Falkenhausen, 'Olympias, eine normannische Prinzessin in Konstantinopel', Bisanzio e l'I/alin. Raceolta di sttldi in memoria di Agostillo Pertusi (Milan, 1982),56-72. 43 See D.M. Nicol, Byzantium and VeI1ice (Cambridge, 1988), 52-3; Polemis, Doukai, 54. 44 Al. J, 64.24-26. 45 Theodore Scoutariotes, Synopsis Cltrollike, ed. C.N. Sathas, Mesaionikif Bibliot11ekif VI (Paris, 1894, repr. Athens, 1972), 181.19-182.9. 46 Otto of Freising and Rahewin, Gesta Frederici, ed. F.J. Schmale (Darmstadt, 1965), 168-80; Theodore Prodromus, Historische Gedicllte, ed. W. H5randner (Vienna, 1974),320-2. 47 John Cinnamus, Epitome, ed. A. Meineke (Bonn, 1836), 208-11; WilIiam of Tyre, ed. R.B.C. Huygens (Turnhout, 1986),854-7. 48 William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 1010; Robert of Torigny, Chronic/e, ed. R. Howlett, Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry Il, and Richard I, IV (London, 1889), 279, 282. 49 A. Kazhdan, 'Russo-Byzantine princely marriages', 419-20. 50 John Zonaras, Epitome Historiafllm, ed. T. Biittner-Wobst III (Bonn, 1897), 761. K. Barzos, He genealogia ton Konlllenon I (Thessalonica, 1984), 308-17. 51 P. Magdalino, 'The phenomenon of Manuel I Cornnenus', in Byz. and West, 186, 190. 52 G. KoJias, 'Le motif et les raisons de I'invasion de Robert Guiscard en territoire 41 D.I. 42 See

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brides was more desirable because in this way a Byzantine ruler could establish a presence in the centres of power and beside the potentates he was trying to bring into his sphere of influence. This may have been Manuel's reason for exporting so many princesses. He married his four nieces to Henry of Babenberg,53 cousin of Frederick Barbarossa, to Baldwin III of Jerusalem,54 to Amalric,55 Baldwin's brother, and to Stephen of Hungary.56 Manuel had only one daughter but he made the most of her, negotiating four marriages with Bela of Hungary,57 Henry II of England,58 William II of Sicily, 59 the son of Frederick Barbarossa6o and, finally, to Renier of Montferrat. 61 Only the first betrothal and the last actually took place. Furthermore, the Comneni, and especially Manuel, appear to have been interested in arranging not only foreign marriages but also the internal marriages of their subjects. These took place either with the emperor's bleSSing or through his own match-making. 62 The Comnenian exploitation of marriage alliances - which was not without its critics 63 - can be sharply contrasted with the utter lack of interest in such relationships exhibited by another founder of a dynasty, Basil I who dedicated his four daughters to the monastic life and one of his sons to the priesthood. 64 One way to determine how the ties created by foreign marriages

functioned and what benefits were gained from them, is to examine the contexts in which they were proposed and how they were described. According to Cons tan tine VII, Romanus I 'excused' the marriage of Maria to Peter the Bulgarian by drawing attention to the great number of prisoners who had been ransomed 'by this act'.65 Clearly Constantine did not find this an adequate reason. Yet the marriage was instrumental in the conclusion of peace in 927, after fifteen years of war between Bulgaria and Byzantium. An end to hostilities was also achieved, it seems, by Anna's marriage to Vladirnir in 988. 66 From these two examples it is possible to argue that it was only when the stakes were highest, when the need to make peace was the function of a marriage, that princesses closest to the emperor were offered, for both Maria, daughter of Christopher, a co-emperor,67 and Anna, a born-in-thepurple sister of th.e emperors Basil II and Constantine VIII,68 were the highest in status of all Byzantine princesses given in marriage until the twelfth century. Indeed, it appears that making peace with a warring nation was only rarely a reason for contracting foreign marriages. Marriages with foreign rulers were more often motivated by a need to obtain powerful friends who would support one's interests. The offer to contract kinship ties was part of a 'package' which included gifts and solicited loyalty and military assistance upon receipt. Thus Alexius I wrote to many western rulers, military leaders, and to the pope with gifts and promises of more if they would oppose Robert Guiscard but, for the most powerful of all, the German emperor, Henry IV, he saved his most persuasive gifts and offers: 144,000 gold coins, with 216,000 more to come, a reliquary, silks, jewels and, in place of the son he did not yet have, his nephew as a bride-groom. The kinship tie served to reinforce the relationship. As Alexius put it, 'Each strengthened by the other, we shall become terrifying to our enemies and invincible with God's help.'69 In the same way, when Manuel I sought Kilic Arslan's symmachia in 1161, his numerous gifts of gold, precious cloths and silver drinking cups and plates were accompanied by his adoption of the sultan. 70

byzantin', Byz 36 (1966),424-30. 53 KJ. Heilig, 'Ostrom und das Deutsches Reich um die Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts', in Kaiserturn und Herzogsgwalt im Zeitalter Friederichs I, MGH Studien IX (Stuttgart, 1944), 162-6 and n. 92 below. 54 WiJliarn of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 834, 842-8. ss WilIiam of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 913; Cinnamus, ed. Meineke, 237-8. 56 Cinnarnus, ed. Meineke, 203. 57 Cinnamus, ed. Meineke, 214-15; Nicetas Choniates, Hislon'a, ed. J.-L. van Dieten (Berlin, New York, 1975), 112, 128, 137. 58 Annales Laudunenses, MGH SS XXVI, 446-7. 59 Romuald of Salemo, Chronicle, ed. CA. Garufi, Rerum Italicarum SCriptores VII pt. 1 (1909-35),261.

'

Cltronica regia C%niensis, ed. G. Waitz (Hanover, 1880), 123, 125. Amold of Liibeck, Chronica Slallorum, ed. G.H. Pertz (Hanover, 1868), 13. :~ William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 1010; Robert of Torigny, Chronicle, ed. Howlett, 285. . P. Magdalino, 'The phenomenon of Manuel I Comnenus', 190 and n. 66; idem, 711e Empire o/Manuel I Komnenos (Cambridge, forthcoming). • 63 In ~ poem writte~ for the sebastokratorissa Irene, Manganeius Prodromus expresses her distress In the foIJowmg strong terms: her child was seized from her arms by force and 'married to Charon, woe for the iJlegal, improper and illegitimate coupling!': E. Miller, Reel/eil des His/oriens des Croisades. Hisloriens grecs II (paris 1881) 768. 64 ' Palmi !I, 274; Theoph. Cont., 264.15-21; 275.20-2. On the other hand, Basil was not averse to creating other ties of kinship, through adelphopoiia (see above, 264-5) or by the 'cutting' of his son's hair: DC, 622.1-17.

273

60

I

I

DAI, p. 74.158-60. The Russian Primary Chronicle, tr. S.H. Cross and O.P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), 111-13. This version of events is upheld by D. Obolensky, 'Cherson and the conversion of the Rus': an anti-revisionist view', BMGS 13 (1989), 244-56 . 67 Theoph. Cont., 414.15-18; DAI:Comm., 69. 68 The Russian Primary Chronicle, 112. 69 Al., I, 132.24-136.5. 70 On the gifts: Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 120.90-121.22; Michael the Syrian, Cllronique, ed. J.-B. Chabot III (Paris, 1906; repr. Brussels, 1963), 319. On the adoption: Cinnarnus, ed. Meineke, 206-08, here at 208.7-8 (eispepoietm); Euthymius Malaces, oration for Manuel, in A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, Noc/es Petropolitnllae (St. Petersburg, 1913; repr. Leipzig, 1976), 65 66

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Thus, the desire to make those one feared, but also those one admired, friends was a major consideration behind most marriage alliances, as indeed other forms of arranged kinship. The friendship created in this way was an instrumental relationship which involved the exchange of favours, gifts, services. But the exchange was not one between equals. 71 For, whether Byzantium gave the bride away or received her, the act was a favour which put the other party in a subordinate position. This is sometimes stated explicitly in narrative sources which describe foreign marriages. Cedrenus comments on the marriage of Maria to the doge's son Jolm, 'the ethnos was thus made subject.'72 Likewise, Romanus II in his funeral speech on the death in 949 of his young bride Bertha-Eudocia, the daughter of King Hugh of Italy, says that through the marriage her countrymen became 'subject to the paternal ties.'73 The relationship of client and patron is also implied in the oaths which foreign in-laws swore. The chrysobull of 1074 which constitutes an agreement between Michael VII Ducas and Robert Guiscard on the marriage of Constantine Ducas to Olympias-Helen, states that Robert is to show the appropriate subjection and goodwill to Michael and to treat Byzantium's friends as well as its enemies as his own.74 This is also what Emperor Conrad III swore 'by word of mouth' and 'in writing' when he gave his niece Bertha in marriage to Manuel.75 Such an oath was taken also when other kinds of kin ties were contracted belween Byzantine and foreign rulers. 76 The goodwill and support produced by a marriage alliance made 167.10-11: 'ho de kai paida poieitai'. 71 See the discussion by M.E. Mullett, 'Byzantium: a friendly society?', Past and Presen/ 118 (1988),16-17; see also above, 228-30. 72 Cedrenus, ed. Bekker Il, 452.4-7: 'to ethnos houtBs hypopoioumenos'. 73 S.P. Lampros, ' Anekdotos monodia Romanou II epi t6 thanat6 tes prates autou syzygou Berthas', BCH 2 (1878), 269.25-26. 74 Michael Psellus, Scrip/a minora, ed. E. Kurtz and F. Drexl I (Milan, 1936), 330. 16-27. 75 Qtto of Freising, ed. Schmale, 170. 76 See above 273 for Manuel's adoption of Kilic Arslan; for the sultan's oaths see Cinnamus, ed. Meineke, 207.14; 208.5-16; Malaces, ed. Papadopoulos-Kerameus (as in n. 70) 165, 167.The formula 'friend of your friends and foe of your foes' sworn by the emperor's foreign kin is contained in agreements between Byzantium and client states attested from the late Roman period. See E. Chrysos, 'He Byzantine epikrateia kai ta synora tes autokratorias, (Scholio sto DAI, keph. 45 Peri Iberon)', Konslanliuos VIr lID Porphyrogennelos kai hi! Epocile IOU, ed. A. Markopoulos (Athens, 1989), 15-24; above 37-8. It is also in the oath sworn by a Byzantine subject to the emperor in the Palaeologan period: eN. Sathas, Meslliollike BibliothekiJ VI (Athens 1877, repr. 1972), 652-3 here at 652.19-20; N.G. Svoronos, 'Le serment de fidelite a l'empereur byzantin et sa significance constitutionelle', REB 9 (1951), 134, 137.

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275

possible the related benefits of familiarity and accessibility. William of Tyre shows how King Baldwin III of Jerusalem, Manuel 1's in-law through marriage to his niece, was an effective go-between with Manuel and other rulers in reconciling disagreements. 77 Favours could be solicited in the name of kinship and could be facilitated because of it. The 'goodwill and friendship for Conrad' which Manuel had felt was the reason given for his supporting his wife Bertha in her generosity and solicitude for Conrad's son, her nephew Frederick Barbarossa, after Conrad's death.78 It was precisely because of the favours which kin were expected to do for each other that John Ducas advised the emperor Nicephorus Botaneiates to marry Maria of the I Alans': she was 'a foreigner and did not have a crowd of relations by whom the emperor could be troubled.'79 Claims made in the name of kinship could of course also work to Byzantium's detriment, as when Otto II attempted in 981 to 'transfer' Apulia and Calabria to his authority, 'because of the kinship which he had with the emperor of the Greeks through his wife Theophano.'80 As has been shown, Byzantine marriage alliances with foreigners functioned in similar ways to other arranged forms of kinship. Foreign marriages also show parallels with the internal marriages of the emperor's subjects. These, too were arranged by parents or other relations with an eye to securing the best possible match. 81 As a result, betrothals often took place below the legal ages of 14 for boys and 12 for girls. A scholion to the Ecloga Basilicorum, completed by 1142, confirms the comparable behaviour of the emperor and his subjects in this matter when it states that while an emperor may betroth or marry his son to the eight- or ten-year old daughter of a powerful enemy who is about to overrun Byzantine territory, the emperor's subjects should not imitate what the emperor has done 'out of necessity'.82 Both imperial and other children who were betrothed under the legal age were brought up in the home of one or the other in-law. 83 77 William of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 847. 78 Rahewin, ed. Schmale (as in n. 46), 4.04. 79 Al. I, 107.21-6. 80 Annales Mllgdaburgenses s.a. 981, MGH SS XVI, 155; Lounghis, 217, 221. 81 On the choice of marriage partners by parents, the 'strategies' involved and the age of the children, see now A. Kiousopoulou, Ho thesmos lifs oikogelleias slen Epeiro kala lOll 13 aiona (Athens, 1990), 13-30. 82 Scholion to B.2.3.162: Ec/oga Basilicorum, ed. L. Burgmann (Frankfurt am Main 1988), 147. On the date of the work, see XVI-XVIII. 83 AIUla Comnena by her mother-in-law, Maria of the' Alans' (AI. I, 105.3-7); Theodora, the Caucasian wife of Anna's son John Ducas, by Anna and her mother, Irene Ducaina: Horandner, Theodoros Prodromos, 383.36-44. For two in-laws who took turns caring for their

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In one striking way, however, foreign brides and grooms did differ from the emperor's subjects upon marriage: they took a new name when they came to live in Constantinople. In some cases, the name change occurred upon baptism and conversion to Christianity, before the marriage. In others, however, it was not connected with conversion but simply with the marriage itself.84 Although various names were taken throughout the Byzantine period, certain ones were particularly popular. In the Comnenian period especially the name Irene seems to have been favoured: five foreign brides took this name. S5 It has been suggested that the name was a symbol of the 'peace' which it was hoped would be achieved through these marriages. 86 However, evidence from otiler examples indicates that foreign brides and grooms adopted names - whether upon conversion or marriage alone - which owed their symbolic value, if any, to a family or dynastic connection and not to an abstract concept. Thus, for example, Heraclius's son by Martina was married to Sahrvaraz's daughter Nike, a name which was indeed symbolic but also traditional in tile family of Heraclius. 87 In the case of Romanus Il's first wife, Bertha, tile family connection of the new name Eudocia is made clear by Constantine VII, who states that she was named after his (half-) sister and his grandmother. B8 A different kind of Byzantine dynastic symbolism is presented by the

under-age betrothed children, see MM Il, 511-12. 84 It is not clear whether marriages between eastern and western Christians involved any special ecclesiastical procedure which could have been the occasion of the adoption of a new name. The only direct comment on the church's attitude to these marriages is in Balsamon's scholion to canon 14 of Chalcedon: G.A. RhaIJes and M. PoUes, Syntllgma fOil theiiin kai /zieron kallonon Il (Athens, 1852, repr.1966) 253-4: a Latin who marries a Byzantine must abrogate his faith. See the discussion by S. Troianos, 'Die Mischehen in den heiligen Kanones', Kanon 6 (1983), 92-101, here at 100. G. Schmaltzbauer ('Zur byzantinischen Herrscheronomastik', BSl50 (1989), 219-20) suggests that the main reason for the change of name of a forei~,'n bride or groom in Byzantium was the need to have a name which was on the Byzantine liturgical calendar and which could therefore also be celebrated in the court ceremonial. This suggestion is compatible with the one I offer for the choice of a particular name. 85 The wives of John Il, Andronicus and Isaac, John's brothers; Manuel's first wife; and that of Manuel's brother, Alexius. For these Irenes see Barzos's (as in n. 50) genealogical table, and nos. 34,35, 36, 81, 74. 86 Above, 11. In general on name changes see G. Thoma, Namensiinderzmgen in Herrscllerjamilien des mitlelalterlicllen Europa (KolJmiinz, 1985), who does not, however, discuss the Comnenian 'Irenes'. 87 Nicephorus, Breviarium, ed. C. de Boor, 21; C. Mango, 'Deux etudes sur Byzance et la Perse sassanide', TM 9 (1985), 105. 88 DAI, p. 112.66-72 and Comm., 87.

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name of Justinian II's Khazar wife, Theodoras9 - that is, an attempt to create a parallel with the couple's Sixth-century imperial namesakes. A similar example can be seen in the adoption of the name Helen ~or Olympias, Guiscard's daughter, upon her betrothal to ~ons~antine Ducas.90 Bela, Manuel I's first son-in-law, betrotiled to Mana, his only child at the time, was renamed Alexius and was intended to succeed Manuel, in the absence of any male heirs. Alexius was not only the name of Manuel's grandfather but was also in keeping with the AIMA sequence of names.91 These examples show th~t the new. n~es were carefully chosen for their importance or symbo.hc value w~~ t~e new Byzantine family and provided a form of coheSlOn and sohdanty m that new family. It is therefore plausible to suggest that the vog~e for the name Irene among foreign brides in the Comnenan penod owes something to Irene Ducaina, the powerful wife of Alexius 1. Throughout the discussion of kin alliances, gift-giv~g has ~een shown to be a major aspect of the formation of the hes. ~arnage alliances also provided an opportunity for ti1.e exchange of gifts, both during negotiations and at the time of the marriage itself. Pa~ents or other relations provided the respective marriage gifts of bnde and groom, tile dowry (proix) and the donatio propter nuptias or hypobo~on.92 Although the exchange is better documented for the emperor s subjects, a few cases of imperial marriages provide enough material to s~ggest that the differences in this area, too, were ones of degree and not kind. A juxtaposition of the 'dowries' given by Mich~el .Psell~s for ~s adopted daughter and that provided by Psellus s unpenal pupil, Michael VII, for his son Constantine is instructive. Psellus's dowry on 89 Theoph., 90

372-3. . . ., .,. von Falkenhausen, 'Olympias, eine normanmsche Prmzessm m Konstantinopel (as m

n. 42), 72. , . . 91 On AIMA, see Choniates, ed. van Dielen, 169.89{. For Bela s title of despot (Cmnamus, ed. Meineke, 214.21-215.11), created for Bela as successor to the throne, see G. Ostrogorsky, 'Urum-Despotes. Die AnHinge der DespotenwUrde in Byzanz', BZ 44 (1957), 448-60. 92 The dowry and the donatio or hypollolon (the name for the donatio from the time of Leo VI), constituted the marriage properly of a couple. The value ~f donatio was fixed in relation to the value of the dowry and varied in Byzantine legislation from one of equal value in Justinianic law (Nov.97, pr.2) to 1/2 and 1/3 in later legal compil~tions. See J. Beaucamp, 'Proikoupobolon - hypobolon - hypobaIl5', in Aphier~ma slon !'lzko Sborono I (Rethyrnnon, 1986), 153-61. The only discussion of Byzantine foreign marna~es, fr0n: the point of view of dowry and donatio is by Heilig, 'Ostrom und ~as J?~uts:he R~lch , (as m n. 53) 113-79, who interprets, in particular, Frederick Barbarossa s ~nZlzle?!um Mznus to Henry of Babenberg in terms of Byzantine marriage property and mhent~~e. law. Unusual aspects of the privi/egium were its bestowal of the new duchy of Austna Jomtly on Henry and his Byzantine wife Theodora (see above, 272) and provision for the succession to devolve on their descendants.

th.e

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behalf of his daughter had a total value of 50 pounds - 10 in gold coins, 20 in various articles, and 20 in the form of the dignity of protospatharios for his son-in-law which brought an annual income of 72 nomismata. 93 Michael Ducas, in his chrysobull for Robert Guiscard, his future sympentheros, gave 43 court titles, and the income from these, to be distributed among Robert, his son, and others of their choice. Silk cloths were also included in the emperor's gift. 94 A more lavish dowry was prOVided by Manuel I for his niece Theodora, when he married her to Baldwin III of Jerusalem in 1158. William of Tyre describes the dos in detail. It amounted to 150,000 hyperpyra in value, 40,000 of which was given in the form of silks, gems and other lUXUry articles. 95 The marriage gift given by an emperor was not only similar in nature to that given by his wealthier subjects; it also resembled the gifts emperors gave upon proposing a military alliance with foreigners. Indeed, as has been mentioned above, kin alliances were most often suggested or concluded in the course of soliciting such help. In all these cases, the standard imperial gifts were cash, court titles, the income from them, jewels and silk96 but, it would appear from the extant examples, never land. That this was the case, at least until the thirteenth century, is confirmed by a member of the ecclesiastical hierarchy writing to John tlle Bastard, ruler in Thessaly, criticizing him for marriages he had arranged with the Latins. For these, he said, were bad enough in the past, but at least then the Byzantines had never given land away, only money.97 Land is, however, sometimes mentioned as the marriage gift of the foreign groom to the Byzantine bride. The best example of this is contained in the only surviving document which stipulates the marriage gift of a foreigner to a Byzantine princess - that issued by Otto II for Theophano, a niece of the emperor John Tzimisces,98 Otto's gift to 93 M.F. Hendy, Studies ill tile Byzalltille MOlletary Economy c.300-1450 (Cambridge, 1985), 216 and references, 218. 94 Psellus, Scripta Minora, ed. Kurtz and Drexl I, 331-2; H. Bibicou, 'Une page d'histoire diplomatique de Byzance au XIe siecle : Robert Guiscard et la pension des dignitaires', Byz 29-30 (1959-1960), 43-75. 95 Willium of Tyre, ed. Huygens, 843. 96 Hendy, Studies, 216-18, 270-1; cf. Michael VII's chrysobull (274 above) and Alexius 1's gifts to Henry IV (273 above). 97 C. Rapp, 'Ein bisher unbekannter Brief des Patriarchen Gregor von Zypern an Johannes IL, 5ebastokrator von Thessalien', BZ 81 (1988), p. 15.78-86. Earlier in the thirteenth century John Apocaucus had censured the Nicaeans for their marriage alliances with the Latin murderers to whom they even gave Byzantine lands: V.G. Vasilievskii, 'Epirotica saeculi XIII', VV 3 (1896), 266-7. 98 For the latest discussion of her relationship to the Byzantine emperor, see G. Wolf, 'Nochmals zur Frage: Wer war Theophano?', BZ 81 (1988),272-9.

279

Theophano in 972 consisted of a string of territories, some of which were his to give, others of which were not. These he gave to her to have in her own right and to alienate as she wished. 99 Of the lands listed, Istria would have been most important to Byzantine interests. But there is no evidence that any land passed into Byzantine control in this way through Theophano. . . . . Another case of the gift of land made by a foreign groom 1S Baldwm Ill's donation of Acre to Theodora, Manuel I's niece. According to William of Tyre, Baldwin confirmed that after his death she would h~ve Acre with all its appurtenances, in the name of a donatio propter nuptlas. Theodora did indee'd live in Acre after Baldwin's death, but the land remained part of the kingdom. 100 An area of major territorial interest to Byzantium which is mentioned in connection with the marriage gift of a foreign princess is Italy - probably Apulia and Calabria - which Cinnamus states Conrad III agreed to restore in 1148 to Bertha-Irene, Manuel's wife, as her marriage gift;101 Conrad was her relation and had betrothed her to the emperor. At the same time Manuel and Conrad concluded a treaty jointly to attack Roger II of Sicily. In private, Conrad may have agreed not to claim any conquest Manuel might make in his forthcoming campaign, on the grounds that Bertha had not yet received her dowry. These examples of marriage gifts, although not exhaustive, are representative and indicate that it was not in terms of territorial gains that Byzantium benefited from the marriage alliances it contracted with foreigners. When land was given to a Byzantine princess as a marriage gift, it appears to have been intended for her own use, as a recompense for her dowry, and did not subsequently become incorporated in the Byzantine empire. In a few cases Byzantium may have ~een given l~d directly as a result of a marriage, but this was Byzanbne land which had recently been invaded by the future in-law and was restored to Byzantium upon marriage,'as a wedding gift'. 102 In marriage alliances, as in the formation of other kin ties, Byzantium gave that which was most sought-after by foreigners - titles, money and 99 MGR Dip/omata (Hanover, 1888), no. 21, p. 29. See also a~ve, 260.

.., WilIiam of Tyre" ed. Huygens, 843; Cinnamus, ed. Memeke, 250.14; Helhg, Ostrom und das Deutsche Reich', 117. 101 Cinnamus, ed. Meineke, 87, uses the Homeric word, iledna, for dowry. 102 E.g. Vladimir of Kiev gave.'Cherson over to the Greeks again' as a 'wedding pres~nt for the princess': Russian Primary Cllrollicle (as in n. 66), 116. Likewise, when Isaac II marfled Margaret of Hungary in 1185, her father Bela gave as her dowry Byzantine lands he had invaded after Manuel's death in 1182-1183: G. Moravcsik, 'Pour une alliance byzantinohongroise (second moitie du XII siecle)', Byz 8 (1935), 561,566-7 and references. 100

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luxury items. If substantial or even minor territorial additions were not gained in return, marriage alliances did provide Byzantium with a presen~e at the ~~urts of foreign rulers which facilitated cooperation, goodwill and ffilhtary support. The significance of these alliances can best be summarized by reference to what has been said of friendship in Byzantium: they gave a 'tolerable emotional casing to functional relations~ps spu~ fr~m necessity, competition and insecurity.'103 The forn: mg of kin ties. through marriage, as through adoption and baptismal sponsorship, was as pervasive in imperial relations with foreigners as friendship was in Byzantine society.

18. 'Blood and ink': some observations on Byzantine attitudes, towards warfare and diplomacy* John Haldon The theme with which I shall be concerned here - which can be summarized somewhat dramatically in the couplet 'blood and ink' - is essentially that of war and diplomacy. It is apparent at the outset that a theme of such obvious relevance to the history and development of the Byzantine state has attracted the attention of a considerable number of scholars. Much excellent work dealing with many aspects of this area of Byzantine history has been produced; and I will therefore try merely to outline some of the fundamental features of the relationship between war and diplomacy and to suggest some awkward questions that might still be asked about this relationship, and some answers - or some ways towards such answers - which might possibly open up new approaches to aspects of the topic. The prevailing view of Byzantine diplomatic and military attitudes is that Byzantines, or at least, the dominant cultural elite, as their own writings on the subject attest, and apart from a brief moment during the tenth century (to which we will return), appear to have disliked fighting wars. If they could possibly avoid warfare, even at the cost of paying subsidies, they tended to do so. When this was not the case, both Byzantine writers themselves and modern commentators have been able to find reasons - even in such causes as character defects or personality traits of individual emperors. The failures of the Emperor Justin Il, for example, have been often ascribed to his arrogance and incipient or actual madness. 1 The accepted view, therefore - and one which I do not wish to challenge - is that Byzantine rulers preferred to use craft, intelligence, wiles,

103 MuIlett,

'Byzantium: a friendly society?' (n. 71),24.

• Following the editors' wise instructions, I have kept the notes to a minimum. The enormous range of secondary literature, which touches upon most aspects of the present paper has had, in consequence, to be reduced to the bare essentials. For general literature on Byzantine diplomacy, see the references in Sections I and n.. . .. 1 See e.g. A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire 284--602: a S~c!a/, Econo»,'lc and Admm~s­ trative Survey (Oxford, 1964), 306 (on Justin Il) and R.J.H. Jenkms, ByzantIum: tile Irnpena/ CenturiesA.D. 610-1071 (London, 1966), 100 (onlrene).

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bribery, ideological blackmail and countless other devices, rather than commit the~selves to set battles, o~ even warlike confrontations of any sort. Ev.en ill warfare, the ~redorrunant tendency is for armies to proceed WIth the utmost caution. The author of the Sixth-century Strategikon, ascribed to the Emperor Maurice (582-602), sums up this set of attitudes in a passage which compares warfare to hunting: 'Wild animals are taken by scouting, by nets, by laying in wait by stalking, by circling around, and by other such strategems rather than by sheer force. In waging war we should proceed in the same way, whethe~ the enemy be many or few. To try simply to overpower the enemy 111 the open, hand to hand and face to face, even though you ~ght. appear to win, is an enterprise which is very risky, and can result ill serIOUS harm. Apart from extreme emergency, it is ridiculous to try to gain a victory which is so costly and brings only empty glory.' 2 Now the obvious reason for Byzantine reluctance to fight wars was the strategic and economic situation of the state. Wars were immensely costly, and for ~ state whos: basic ~come was derived from agricultural productIon, and which remamed moreover relatively stable and at the same time very vulnerable to both natural and man-made disasters, they were to be avoided if at all possible. 3 From the strategic point of view, the Byzantine empire was surr~unded by potential enemies and actual aggressors throughout its history. Not only were the Byzantines themselves aware of this'I ~ For

the text, see G.T. Dennis, ed., and E. Gamillscheg, tr., Das StrategikolJ des Maurikios proem. For th~ translation see Maurice's Strategikon. Handbook of Byzantitle Mthtary Strategy, tr. GT. Denrus (Philadelphia, 1984), 65. 3 For a useful discussion of the geo-political constraints on states and their political elites see M. ~ann, The Sources of Social Power, I, A Histon) of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760 (C~brIdge, 1986). Of course, any analysis of the role of warfare must take in the whole polItical system, which both facilitates the maintenance of armies, of whatever sort and provides .the legitima~g political ideologies for making or not making war; ~d a comparative approach IS preferable. Ideally, the Byzantine state should be examined in a ~uch wider conte~t, and i:s internal power-relationships, as well as the military and politIcal sy~ter:'s of nel?hbourmg or comparable political systems - the caliphate at various stages ID Its evolutlOn, for example, and some of the western formations with which the empire was involved - looked at in greater detail. These points should be borne in mind in readi.ng the present, more narrowly-focused, contribution. In this respect, Mann's work proVIdes a valuable starting-point, as does some of the older literature on comparative state theory: see, for example, r:.J.M. CIaessen, P. Skalnik, eds., The Early State (The Hague, 1978); H.J.~. Claessen,.~. Skalnik, eds., The Study of the Slale (The Hague, 1981); R. Cohen, E.R. ServIce, ~~s., Ongms of the State. The Anthropology of Political Evolution (Philadelphia, 1978). For a crttique of some state-theorist approaches, including Mann, and an analysis of the r~lationships between state elites and state apparatuses in some medieval political formations, see J.P. Haldon, State Theory, State Autonomy and the Medie1Jal State (London, 1992). CYle~a: 1981), VII.

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283

foreigners from among the very barbarians who most threatened the empire saw it, and had to find some way of explaining for themselves the continued existence of a state and a city constantly threatened or actually besieged. Liudprand of Cremona expressed the position of the empire accurately enough when he described it as being surrounded by the fiercest of barbarians - Hungarians, Pechenegs, Khazars, Rus and so forth.4 And as well as these northern peoples the empire also had to contend with the Islamic powers to east and south. The empire was, geo-politically, therefore, entirely surrounded by potential enemies. And this fact had one obvious and crucial economic concomitant: the expense of defending a state in this situation was enormous, and it is not surprising that the history of the military and fiscal organization of the state is also the history of making ends meet, of 'crisis management' on a grand scale. Even in the sixth century, when the Roman state covered a much wider resource-area and had arguably far fewer enemies relative to those resources, an anonymous rnid-sixth-century writer noted that the greater part of the state's public revenues was devoted to maintaining the armies. It is the same writer who comments: 'when we are in absolutely no condition to continue fighting, we then choose to make peace, even though it may cause us some disadvantage. When faced with two evils, the lesser is to be chosen. Negotiating for peace may be chosen before other means, since it might very well offer the best prospect for protecting our own interests'.s A masterly summing up, I would say, of the basic motives behind Byzantine diplomatiC activity in times of apprehended war. And while there is no doubt that Byzantine society evolved and was transformed in a number of respects over the following centuries, this remained a leitmotif of the diplomatic and strategic policy of Byzantine rulers and ruling elites. 6 Byzantium's loss of most of its wealthiest provinces during the seventh century, its state of more or less constant warfare through much of the eighth and into the ninth century and its quest for new resources or, more accurately, the discovery of new ways of fully exploiting old ones, underlay the majority of the institutional and organizational changes and the social transformation of the seventh and eighth centuries. 7 In looking at Byzantine warfare and its relationship 4 Ant., 1.11, p. 9; Wright, 38. . . . 5 The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy, ed. and tr. GT. Dennls, ID Three Byzantme MiWan) Treatises (Washington D.C., 1985), paraphrasing 13 and 23. 6 d. J. Shepard, 'Information, disinformation and delay in Byzantine diplomacy', BF 10 (1985),233-93.

7 For an analysis of these changes, see J.F. Haldon,

Transformation of a Culture (Cambridge, 1990).

Byzantium in the Se1Jenth Century: the

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with Byzantine attitudes to diplomatic activity, I shall limit myself to the period up to the twelfth century, and particularly the ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries. Strategic and economic factors were, as one might expect, key to determining how Byzantine diplomacy worked and when it was set in train. This is a generally accepted view; and it is not hard to illustrate over the period from the sixth or seventh to the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries. Wherever possible, rulers preferred to negotiate with or pay off aggressors; and the conditions under which this policy was not at least attempted are few. When it failed, of course, the state might have recourse to arms. But even then, these were frequently the arms of allies or other friends. Even during war diplomatic activity did not necessarily cease; and where the. possibility existed, allies or peoples welldisposed towards the empire or its leaders of the moment, on however temporary a basis, could be brought into play against the immediate foe. This is especially obvious on the northern front, where against the Bulgars or Magyars or the Pechenegs, for example, the state could invoke the threat of other nomads to the east, such as the Khazars or Cumans, or of feared peoples such as the Kievan Rus. There is no need to enumerate the frequent occasions on which this approach paid off handsomely for the Byzantine state. Of course, it did not always work, and sometimes back-fired disastrously: in spite of the most strenuous and well thought-through diplomatic plotting war was often unavoidable. Indeed, the state was faced with often long periods of raiding, which devastated the economic structure and demographic pattern of the target areas. Most obviously, the southern Balkans suffered from Slav, Avar- and then Bulgar-led raiding or invasions throughout the seventh and much of the eighth century, although there were strenuous imperial counter-attacks; while in Asia, as already mentioned, the cultural and economic dislocation caused by Arab raiding in the period from about 640 to about 780 was widespread. In view of its strategic situation, therefore, and of its literary traditions, it is hardly surprising that diplomatic theory and practice gained a literary form and value, a literary form which has contributed greatly both to our own, as well as to Byzantines' image of their society and state. From the tactical and strategical manuals it is very evident that the Byzantines were quite clear about the disequilibrium in resources and manpower between themselves and their enemies. Byzantine military handbooks, even those which represent the archaizing and learned tradition rather than the contemporary, up-ta-date approach, invariably make reference to this problem. Generals are regularly exhorted not to

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give battle in unfavourable conditions, as one would anyway expect. s But there is also, underlying the prescriptive and descriptive elements of such manuals, a clear assumption that it is more often than not the Byzantines who are compelled to manoeuvre, to use delaying tactics, to employ ambushes and other strategems to even the odds stacked against them. One important question in this respect concerns the self-representation of these functional demands in Byzantine culture. Naturally, the way they were presented and articulated depe~ded o.n a vast range of assumptions and attitudes. We are hardly surpnsed: 81~en the stru~ture and the forms of Byzantine imperial ideology, WIth Its emphaSIS on Orthodoxy, Roman tradition (as understood from a Byzantine perspective) and God'sinterest in the fate of the Romans, the Chosen People, that many of the 'ways and means' of Byzantin~ diplo~acy and .w~rfare are ascribed to the ancient Romans or to particular fIgures enJoYlllg a particular respect and aura. Ninth- and tenth-century treatises. on imperial military expeditions claim, for example, th~t ~ey are followlllg the practices of Julius Caesar (that well-known ChrISti.ru: empero~) or ~f the great Constantine. 9 In Qhis manual De admml~trando Impeno Constantine VII ascribes fundamental features of Byzantine custom and practice to Constantine the Great; and, import~~ly, those ~ho encountered these features tended to believe the tradItIOn, even if they were less happy with the results. 10 Liudprand of Cremona's report on his two visits to the imperial court in the middle years of the tenth century illustrates the point clearly. 11 There is nothing odd in this, of course, since all cultures tend to seek legitimation for aspects of some or all of their curren~ prac~ce in ~e past. But Byzantines en masse have often been credIted Wlth. b~lllg peace-loving on principle, reluctant to fight ",:ars because ~~y dIshked the violence and bloodshed which accomparued them. This IS perhaps overstated, but it sums up a certain attitude which can be found in some modern literature. And I would argue that this is not only oversimplified and incorrect at a general level, but represe~ts the reverse of the less flattering response of the medieval west, particularly after the 8 Leo VI, Tactica, XX.12, PG 107, 1017a. Compare with Maurice, Strategikon VIIA. proem, esp. 8-12; tr. Dennis, 64. . .. .. 9 Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Three Treatises on Impenal Military Expeditions, ed., tr. and commentary by J.F. I-Ialdon (Vienna, 1990), Text B.3. 80-81, pp. 157, 164. 10 DAr chap. 13/32-3, 48f., 76f., I11f., pp. 66-71. For the importance of this particular aspect of the imperial symbolism, see the remarks of Shepard, 'Information, disinformation and deJay',240f. 11 Allt., 1.7; III.31; pp. 7f., 88; Wright 35f., 124.

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eleventh century, on the one hand, and of Enlightenment historians, On the ?the~. Acc?rdm,g to these traditions, the Byzantines were cowardly, sup me, effemmate and treacherous - a point of view which is obviously enough de~ermined ?y cu~tural prejudice or misunderstanding n:-0re .than anything. ~ut m. trymg to correct this false impression, histOrIans have sometImes gIVen an over-sympathetic and certainly anachronistic response. Byzantine political ideology did incorporate a worked-out theory of imperial and Christian Roman philanthropia, a theory - or perhaps better, a set of attitudes - which was essential to Byzantine ideas on warfare and on diplomacy, on the value of human life and the relationship between human action and divine will. 12 But I would argue that the history of the Byzantine use of diplomacy and warfare as complementary elements in a very serious and centurieslong game of survival shows that they were neither more nor less 'peace-loving' than any of their enemies, at least as far as any Supposed cultural character is concerned. As the Strategikon ascribed to the Emperor Maurice observes: 'do not be deceived by humane acts of the enemy ... '13 The Byzantines were, after all, constrained by their strategic location and their resources. Certain modes of political and military action were adopted w~c~, in the context of the philanthropic soteriology of eastern ChrIstian culture, represented to the Byzantines a moral code which was necessarily both ethically and functionally superior to that of their enemies. Michael Psellus makes no bones about praising the emperor Michael VII for his distaste for war and fighting. 14 Anna Comnena condemns as bad generalship purposefully provoking an en~my to. battle or armed conflict, when peace is supposedly the ultunate a~m of all warfare. IS And while, as has been pointed out by others, WrIters such as these - privileged members of a relatively small cultural elite - were quite capable of expressing very different views where appropriate to the dramatic purpose of their narrative, there is equally no reason to doubt the symbolic force of such statements for the readers or listeners attuned to this set of values. Byzantine military and diplomatic priorities, evolved in order to ensure the survival of a beleaguered state, were seen as both universally better and morally 12 There is a considerable literature on this concept and the various shades of meaning it evoked. See, .inler al., H. Hunger, 'Philantllropia. Eine griechische Wortpragung auf ihrem Wege VOn AIschylos bis Theodoros Metochites', Anzeiger der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenscha!len, phil.-hist. Klasse 100 (1963), 1-20. 13 Maurice, Slralegikall, VIII.I.23, tr. Dennis, 81 [23]. ~: Michael Psellus, Scripla minora, ed. E. Kurtz and F. Drexl I (Milan, 1936), 36. Al., XII.v.2; Ill, p. 68; Sewter, 381.

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superior. 16 This is certainly part of the western political-philosophical tradition, and recurs throughout the literature of the Hellenistic, Roman and Byzantine worlds. But it represented at the same time a sort of ideological sleight of hand aimed at a Byzantine literary readership. Peace on whose terms, after all? Anna knows the answer - her father's. And the official ideology, as expressed in tenth-century Constantinopolitan acclamations, for example, knew it too - peace was the peace of the Christian oikoumene ruled by the Roman emperors, God's appointees on earth. 17 Anna's statement is itself representative of a double standard within Byzantine culture on this point - she relished a detailed account of military action, especially where her father or the Byzantines come out on top. Leo the Deacon's sometimes pedantic account of the wars of the middle and later tenth century does not conceal the pride felt by the writer in the famous victories of those years; we should be surprised if none was felt. IS And the boastful threats of Nicephorus Il, representative, it is true, of a particular element in Byzantine society, as well as of the imperial power in general, are hardly shy of the glories of warfare, whatever the ideological-religious justification offered. This was part of the constant balancing act which the Byzantine ruling elite had to maintain: between retaining an adequate degree of threat, and selfconfidence in their own military abilities, on the one hand; and representing themselves as peace-loving and war-aVOiding (both to themselves and to outsiders) not because of faint-heartedness or cowardice, but because that is what their beliefs and their view of themselves actively demanded; and because God was, of course, ultimately on their side. 19 The latter is expressed most vividly by the patriarch Nicholas I, for example, in the early tenth century in a letter to the Bulgarian ruler Symeon. Nicholas stressed the awful fate awaiting those who dared challenge the legitimate, God-protected empire. The fact that temporary gains might be won by its enemies was unimportant - in the end,' th.e foes of the Roman world order were merely elements in God's divine 16 See O. Treitinger, Die aslriimische Kaiser- und Reichsideologie nacll illrer Gesla/tung im hiifiscllen Zeremoniell (repr. Darmstadt, 1956), 228f. 17 Treitinger, Kaiser- und Reichs/dealogie, 230f. 18 For Anna, see G. Buckler, Anna Comnena (Oxford, 1929), 14lf.; for the wars of John Tzimisces against the Russians, for example, see Leo the Deacon, HIs/or/ae, ed. CB. Hase (Bonn, 1828), 108-11; for Nicephorus Phocas, see especially the discussion in G. Dagron and H. Mihaescu, Le Irailt! sur la guerilla (De velita/Ione) de /'empereur Nicepllore Pllocas (963-969) (Paris, 1986), 259f., 284f. 19 A set of arguments presented most clearly by Treitinger, Kaiser- und Reicllsideologle, 230£.

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plan or tools of the Antichrist, doomed to extinction. 20 This very conscious and very clearly expounded double-edged approach had one great advantage: it meant that emperors had a readymade justification (quite apart from the logistical considerations that were involved) for refusing to fight or for breaking off hostilities, in order to employ other means to resolve a conflict. This is precisely the point made by the Sixth-century writer referred to above. It also seems to have worked well psychologically, since it was easy to flatter barbarians - even if not all the time - that the empire was taking them seriously if it wanted to negotiate. 21 And as every negotiator knows, a dialogue once started is difficult to break off without convincing ideological grounds. But this assumes, of course, that a consciousness of opinion and the views of either one's own subjects, soldiers or whatever, or of other powers, existed; and this was not always the case. Under these circumstances, other elements of Byzantine diplomacy could be brought to bear, in particular by calling upon the support of other, more distant political friends, whose support had been painstakingly and often very expensively purchased, sometimes over many years. All this diplomacy, of course, could only work under certain conditions. Most favourable to this was the existence of a wider patchwork of peoples and states of varying political-military strengths, anl0ng whom the Byzantines could foment rivalry and suspicion, as well as create alliances and reciprocal agreements. In other words, diplomacy functioned best when certain very broadly defined aims and standards of political and military behaviour provided a rough-and-ready set of common rules and ideas about what might be acceptable or not. Such sophistication was obviously not present throughout the medieval world with which the representatives of the Byzantine state had to deal. Nevertheless, the Byzantines themselves developed a crude model of the relative status and importance of the states with which they came into contact. In the west, the Roman tradition on which this was based, combined with the kinship ideology of rulers, produced the notion of the 'family of kings'. Such systems provided an ad hoc and somewhat arbitrary measure against which to judge particular acts. 22 And in this respect, and in the context of the spread of Christianity in one form or another across Europe between the sixth and the eleventh century, the north and west offered a much more fruitful field for diplomatic activ20 See Nicholas Patriarch of Constantinople, Letters, ed. and tr. R.J.H, Jenkins and L.G. Westerink (Washington D.C., 1973), 70f. 21 A point brought out in Shepard's 'Information, disinformation and delay', esp. 2421. 22 Cf. above, 37.

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ily: it is notable that Constantine VII places more emphasis on these

regions than on the east, for example, in his De administrando imperio. One obvious advantage the Byzantine state possessed was its sophisticated and complex administrative machinery which, while relatively inefficient by modern standards, far outstripped those of its northern and western neighbours in respect of resource extraction and distribution. This in itself reinforced the image of a mighty empire and added to the image of Byzantine superiority felt in these regions - an image, as we have seen, actively cultivated by Byzantine diplomacy. In this respect, the empire represented a more complex and a much more cohesive political system, and gained from this a considerable lead over its enemies, even when they outnumbered it in terms of men and materials, at least until the period of the Crusades. 23 The Islamic front, in contrast, presented fewer opportunities, certainly between the seventh and the tenth centuries. Partly, this reflects the fact that the caliphate also possessed an administrative apparatus for organising and allocating resources just as complex and as efficient, as that of the Byzantine state. Partly, it reflects the obvious fact that Islam, although by no means always able to present a united front, possessed in the concept of a Holy War against the unbeliever, the jihad, a symbolic element which was able, under most conditions, to bring together the most disparate elements of Moslem society, religiously, ethnically and culturally, in a single struggle against the in~ fidel. Internal ideological and power struggles could be papered over, for the sake of the general and common cause. And Islamic rulers also had, until the tenth century, no real need to avoid warfare, except on occasion, because of shortage of resources. On the contrary, there was a regular, if not always predictable flow of volunteers, both simple soldiers and leaders, for the jihad. Pious Moslems gained almost as much from participating in the jihad as from going on the pilgrimage to Mecca. Warfare against the Byzantines was axiomatically part of the political ideology of Umayyads, Abbasids and their successors in the tenth century and after.24 And it was precisely this ideological element 23 Of the fifty-three chapters of the DAI, for example, some thirty-seven ate concerned with western and northern neighbours, only fourteen with the east. Of the latter, four deal with the Caucasus or with Cyprus, while eight are taken from Theophanes's account of the first Arab conquests, or other earlier sources, and provide virtually ~o cont~mpora.ry information. For some approaches to comparative political systems In pre-mdustI'lal societies see the literature cited in n, 3 above. 24 See' J,F. Haldon and H. Kennedy, 'The Arab-Byzantine frontier in the eighth and ninth centuries: military organisation and society in the borderlands', ZRVI 19 (1980), 111, 114-15. Above, 133-4, 137-41,

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behind Islamic warfare in Asia Minor which made it so damaging to the empire. For while a frontier zone had evolved by the 720s, this was by no means the beginnings of co-existence. On the contraIY, the continued existence of an infidel power both demanded and justified'continuous' warfare, and this is what took place. Admittedly, from the later eighth century, many of the raids were very light and may have done little serious damage, either economically or otherwise, to the 'Byzantine' populations against which they were directed. It is true to say that for much of the ninth century the warfare took on a rather formalistic appearance, with imperial and caliphal expeditions and counterexpeditions, conducted against a background of constant commercial and cultural exchange and activity. But neither side lost the opportunity to intervene or interfere in the other's problems. Abbasid support for the Paulicians, and Byzantine attempts to foment rebellion in the caliphate during the reign of Theophilus between 829 and 842 provide typical examples. 25 In the tenth century the Byzantine state went on the offensive. It is worth recalling here that some of the reasons for this were internal social reasons and not simply the weaknesses and fragmentation of th~ caliphate, or the revived strength of the Byzantine state in some general sense. They are not simply strategic and political, in other words. For the most obvious difference between the eastern armies of the empire in the ninth and tenth centuries, and those of the seventh and eighth centuries, lies in their leaders. By the tenth century, a self-aware and clearly distinguishable elite of magnate clans had come to dominate the apparatus - and in particular, the military apparatus - of the Byzantine state. This is expressed most clearly in the persons of those who led the armies which reconquered such large areas from Islam in the tenth century.26 A sort of 'warrior-culture' had evolved in the Anatolian context where this elite had its roots, a culture bearing some resemblance to that of the nobility of western Europe in its attitude towards warfare. This elite carried with it an ideology of bravery and skill in fighting, ~lbeit ~xpresse~ in a particularly Byzantine form. Its set of self-glorifymg epIC narratives now became as significant in certain sections of society a~ the metropolitan literary culture of the educated society of Co~stru:tmop.le. To what extent this had been developing quietly in ASIa mmor smce the seventh century, and to what extent it represents 25 See the account in The Cambridge Medieval History IV.1, ed. J.M. Hussey (Cambridge 1966),710-14. ' 26 On the origins of this class during the seventh century, see Haldon, Byzantium ill the Seventh Century, 153-72, 395£., and F. Winkelmann, Quellenstudien zur herrschenden Klnsse l'on Byzanz Im S. und 9. Jahrllltndert (Berlin, 1987), esp. 143-219.

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any fundamental cultural differentiation between the provinces and the capital is difficult to say. That a suspicion of metropolitan culture on the part of a considerable segment of the prOVincial military elite existed is clear enough from the eleventh-century writings of the general and provincial magnate Cecaumenus, who remarks: 'do not wish to be a political man [by which he means a member of the Constantinopolitan .bureaucracy as much as an associate of the City itself]; for you cannot be a general and a clown at the same time'!27 And it is widely recognised that the frontier epic Digenis Akrites presents an even starker form of this 'warrior' ideology, and certainly drew its inspiration from the tradition which evolved over the three centuries which preceded its first known written version. 28 However, the differences between metropolitan and provincial . culture should not be exaggerated. In spite of their very contrastmg modes of self-representation, the different forms through whi~h these beliefs were articulated and the different social contexts which they expressed shared a common Christian and Hellenized traditio~. Both shared similar structures of family relationships and the loyaltIes that accompanied them; and both shared, at base, similar noti~ns. about public and private expressions of honour and shame: 29 It IS .mde~d partly because of this set of fundamental common motifs that, m spl~e of its dynamism in a provincial setting, the 'warrior: ~deol~gy wa~, m the context of the metropolitan society of the ruling ehte, faIrly rap~dly toned down and accommodated to the framework of Constantmopolitan administrative culhtre. To survive, it had to adopt metrop?litan values in order to attain legitimation and respect. The result was, the eleventh century and after, an interesting blend of two potentIally mutually exclusive and possibly antagonistic cultural traditions. The ruling elite of the Conmenian period could accommodate aspe~ts of both, as a result of a blend of aristocratic clan alliances and theones of imperial political service which Alexius I achieved dur~ng hi.s efforts to consolidate and to stabilise his rule. The process by which this occurred

lr:

27 See Cecaumenus, Strategikon, ed. B. Wassiliewsky and V. Jemstedt (St: Pe.ter~bur~, 1B96), 20.19-21 (- G.G. Litavrin, ed. and tr., Sovety I rasskllzl Kekllvmena. Soc1l1nente lIIzantiiskogo polkovodtsll XI veka [Moscow, 1972], chap. 5B); and esp.!. Sevcenko, 'Constantinople viewed from the eastern provinces in the Middle Byzantine period', HUS 3-4 (1979-BO), 712-41.', . 28 See, for example, A. Pertusi, 'Tra storia e leggenda: ~itai e ghazi. sulla frontiera orientale di Bisanzio' Actes du XIV Congres International des Etudes Byzantmes I (Bucarest, 1974), 2B5-302; and e;p. N. Oikonomides, 'L"'epopee" de Diglmes et la frontiere orientale de . ' Byzance aux X et XI siecies', TM 7 (1979), 377f. 29 See P. MagdaIino, 'Honour among Romaioi: the framework of SOCial values m the world of Digenes Akrites and Kekaumenos', BMGS 13 (1989),183-21B.

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was, of course, complex. It would involve us in an analysis of the social and economic conflicts between different elements within the state apparatus and the Church hierarchy from the tenth century on, and the modes of their cultural expression in the literary production of the time as well as the politics of the court. The struggles between emperors and dynatoi, the contradiction within the state between its reliance upon the social and economic group which threatened its authority and power most, and the strength of the imperial system and political ideology which hindered the development of any centrifugal tendencies led by that elite; the factionalism within as well as between so-called civil and military groupings in centr8J. and provincial administration: all would need to be taken into account. What is interesting from our point of view is that what I would refer to as an 'ideology of ink' was able to incorporate and transform an 'ideology of blood'. This brings us back to the title of this paper, and to one further observation. The opposition - or symmetry - between blood and ink ought not to be seen as just an opposition between war and and diplomacy. On the contrary, it represents an opposition between a culture whose political elite, whether in Constantinople or the provinces, is able, and wishes, to represent itself through literary forms and a literate administrative apparatus, and a semi-literate elite of warlords and warriors. I do not wish to over-estimate the numbers, relative to the population as a whole, who could actually attain levels of modern cultural literacy in a medieval context. But even Byzantine mountain warlords felt the need to be literate, even if the levels of literacy varied enormously, in order to feel that they shared a common identity: that they were RhOmaioi, and furthermore belonged to the leading element of their own society. And that inevitably pulled them into a wider set of literary traditions in which diplomatic, strategiC and political writings became of necessity relevant to their sense of identity and belonging. The very fact that an anonymous writer of a tenth-century treatise on guerrilla strategy in Anatolia could state that he was writing his work, even though the conditions to which it was best suited were no longer current, in case it was needed for future reference, is evidence for this; the more so in that the writer was a member or a client of one of the most famous magnate clans in the empire, the Phocases. 3o Unlike the Islamic world, however, Byzantine culture developed no theory of warfare as a necessary element in its ideological self-image. This lack was clear to the Byzantines themselves, in the tenth century at least, when the Emperor Nicephorus II tried to elevate already existing 30 Le

traitti sur la guerilla, ed. Dagron and Mihaescu, proem. 1.

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tendencies in respect of tlle Christian attitude to defending Orthodoxy and fighting for the faith into what amounted to a formal doctrine. The attempt was defeated, on coherent and legitimate theological groun.ds, by the patriarch. 31 But it is hardly a coincidence that the one penod when an ideology of warfare as a positive aspect of Christian culture was evolved - and therefore, by implication, an ideology of unlimited warfare against unbelievers - was also the time of greatest imperial expansion; it was also a period when the magnate aristocracy of the provinces both led and set the tone for the armies of the state. The empire was - if the policies of the emperors of the first half of the eleventh century are anything to go by - assumed to be impregnable and quite sure in its territorial gains. Nicephorus Il's efforts to define a new morality of warfare represent an attempt to legitimize the ideology of the warrior and the frontier, and therefore of the magnate clans, as opposed to that of the metropolitan political elite and what the borderers regarded as its Roman-Hellenistic, if Christianized, literary culture. One must emphasise that it was the very Christian and vely typically Byzantine notion of philanthropy that was, implicitly, most threatened by the ideas of the emperor Nicephorus II and his like. It was ~at characteristic more than any otl1er which encapsulated Byzantme diplomatic and strategic theory and practice. But it is also important to recall, as Dagron has pointed out, that the notion of the soldier dying for his faith and that of his fellow Christians was not simply a mid-tenth-century invention of the Anatolian military elite. Leo VI, in particular, in his discussion of the Islamic concept of Holy War, came close to proposing a similar approach for the Christian community, if only to stimulate Christian awareness of the Islamic danger, and to gain for Christians the advantages of such an apparently dynamic motif. 32 It is most unlikely that Nicephorus, who took this line 31 On the failure of a Byzantine notion of 'holy war' to develop (although there did evolve a concept of the just or righteous war, waged by the Chosen People against God's enemies on earth), certainly in the way in which it is commonly understood in the Islamic context, and on the ideological tensions which such notions engendered between Constantinople and the provinces in which they evolved, see Dagron's remarks in Le trait/! sur la guerilla, 284-7, with literature cited; cf. V. Laurent, 'L'idee de guerre sainte et la tradition byzantine', Revue historique du Sud-Est europeen 23 (1946), 71-98. For the most recent discussion of the whole concept in Byzantium, see A. Kolia-Dermitzaki, The Byzantine 'Holy War'. The Idea and Propagation of Religious War in Byzantium (Athens, 1991) (in Greek, with English summary). 32 For the role played by Leo VI, see the important discussion of G. Dagron, 'Byzance et le rnodele islamique au Xe siecle. A propos des Constitutions tactiques de l'empereur Leon VI', Comptes rendus des seances de I'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (Paris, 1983), 219-43.

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of :easonin~ s:veral steps ~r~er, 'Yas in the least aware of the implications of his Ideas. Had ~s :VIews, and those of the warrior-magnates of tI:e east, whateve~ theIr lIterary abilities and pretensions, come to dOmInate, the Byzantine culture with which we are familiar would have been .radically t:a:nsformed after the tenth century. . It IS, then, ~ifflcult to say whether Byzantines shed more blood than ink. They believed themselves to be shedders of ink in the first instance, of b~ood only in times of great need, and this is the picture that was transIDltted through their writings, both to contemporaries and to the modem historian. But we should remember that, while this was a carefully-polished :image as much as it was a reality, and expressed through Its own complex of cultural traditions, it was nevertheless grounded in the pragmatic needs of political survival. Blood and ink are merely .the symbolic or evocational reference points around which two competmg sets of cultural identities were focused.

19. From frontier to palace: the personal role of the emperor in diplomacy Michael Whitby Our perception of late Roman or early Byzantine diplomacy in action is shaped by pictures of grand confrontations between emperor or general and foreign representative. The encounter of Galerius with the envoy of the Persian king Narses in 297 might be taken as representative of successful late Roman diplomacy: Galerius, by luck or strategic skill, had overcome the Persian army and, more importantly, captured the royal baggage train including Narses's womenfolk; the Persian requested the return of the latter, and after an impressive explpsion of rage from Galerius peace was concluded on terms favourable to the Romans. 1 Three centuries later, in 572, a comparable encounter occurred between Justin II and the Persian Sebokht who requested payment of the subsidy agreed under the Fifty Years' Peace: the interview began auspiciously for the Romans when Sebokht's cap fell to the ground; Justin then treated Sebokht with contempt and utterly rejected his request for money.2 There are obvious similarities between the incidents with their combination of physical and verbal intimidation. Such behaviour could be taken as a natural feature of diplomacy, one that the Romans sometimes had to endure from others: thus in 448 Attila demoralized and confused the embassy on which the historian Priscus participated, or in 576 Turxanthus terrified Valentinus with an explosion about Roman duplicity that involved the Turk placing his ten fingers in his mouth. 3 However, there is one significant 1 Peter the Patrician, 13-14. Fragments of Peter are cited from FHG IV, ed. C. MUller (Paris, 1851); Eunapius, Priscus and Malchus from RC. Blockley, The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of tile Later Roman Empire II (Liverpool, 1983); Menander fro~ RC. Blockley, Tile History of Menander tile Guardsman (Liverpool, 1985). Malalas and Cllromcon Pascllale are cited by CSHB pages, Ammianus Res Gestae from the Loeb edition and translation by RC. Rolfe (3 vols, London, 1936-9), Nicephorus from C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1880), and Zosimus, New HistorI}, from the edition and translation by F. Paschoud (paris, 1971-89).

2 Menander, 16.1. 3 Priscus, 11.2.92-114, 132-221; Menander, 19.1.

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difference betwee n the successful Persian interviews of Galerius and the Justin, namely the change of location from a military camp near e, frontier to the audience chamber of the Great Palace at Constantinopl This change of Scene is significant and promp ts consideration of the import ant contribution to our interpretation of Roman diplomacy made by two overlap ping articles by Fergus MilIar: 'Emperors, frontiers and ter foreign relations, 31 RC. to AD, 378', Britannia 13 (1982),1-23 (hereaf empire Roman the 'Fro,ntiers'), ,and JGoverrune~t ,and dipl?m acy.in durmg the fIrst ~~e centur~es, InternatIOnal HIstory Review 10 (1988), y 345-7? (~ereafter DIplomacy), These. articles provide a complementar Roman of ptions presum and examm abon of the context, mecharucs, diplom acy down to the fourth century - Ammianus, Eunapi us, and in Zosimus are the last major sources to be exploited, MilIar, especially in r empero the by activity of ance 'Diploma~y', stresses the import pe~s~n, his central ~iplomatic role mirroring his dOminance of militaIY of actIvIty; person al IDvolvement remains vital until the death by gning campai active of nment abando fter Theod? sius I in 395, :vherea the Hono!lUs and Arcadlus ushers in the fifth-century crisis from which is articles two these in s analysi The ed, recover never wester n empire about ilIuminating,4 problems caused by our lack of knowledge of diplom atic practices are clearly stated, and assumptions which study it :no~e :ecent diplomacy might suggest are correctly challenged. Thus had AD, es IS diffIcult to prove that emperors in the first three centuri the access to sources of information about neighbouring states, or we obtain;5 means of storing and retrieving any information they might in are poorly informed about procedures used by empero rs ies embass Roman commu nicatin g with foreigners, about the conduct of the outside the empire, and even about something as basic as century fourthof a:ailabi1i~ of ~terpreters. And yet the nature his dIplomatic practIce may partly have evaded MilIar, since develop ing continu of chronological focus precluded consideration g much broader For example, MilIar's emphasis that Roman diplomacy is somethin ' embassies 'external that and peoples, foreign with than the question of Rome's relations s had with different should be considered alongside the 'internal' exchanges that emperor to investigations of communi.ties insid~ the empi~e i~ important; this deserves to be applied inside the Palace ~oman,dlplomacy In late antiquIty, A good example of a failed reception Solitary hurled a the Mare 35: Saints, Eastern the of Lives Ephesus, of IS prOVIded by John 631-3). 1924, 18, (PO Theodora and sack of gold at Justinian dossier of writing 5 Though tl,.e qualification at 'Diplomacy', 361 should be noted; the Wall might have 's Hadrian near outpost an even tablets from Vmdolan da suggests that archive would have central a of scale The ts, documen its for system filing of form some (e.g. cre~ted special problems, but emperors appreciated the value of superior information Zosunus, 3,4). 4

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ments in Roman diplomacy betwee n the fourth and seventh centuries aspects that may make late Roman diplomacy seem ne.arer to the m?re ine sophisticated and professional practices of ~e ~dd!e By~ant may theSIS, s empire: Galerius's behaviour, which fits neatly WIth MilIar le not be typical of all aspects of fourth- century practice, and it is arguab acy diplom l that some of the 'underd evelop ed' aspects of early imperia in now began to change. A closer examin ation ~f dipl~macy.may h:l~ papartiCI al lillpen of on unders tandin g the ramifications of the cessati this tion in warfar e after 395, and why the eastem empire coped with be will topics these of some to better than the west. Approaches sketched below. The picture of Galerius and the Persian can be paral~eled .on vari~us noccasions in the fourth century. The classic, quoted by Millar, IS Valenti 6 the 375: in ia Pannon in o Bregeti at envoys ian's encoun ter with Quadi ~­ empero r's majesty was intende d to terrify the tribesmen, but Valen carned was and xy apople of fit a d suffere , ian, infuria ted by their excuses off to die. The importance of such encounters is confirmed by various on pictures, mostly in Ammianus, of meetin gs of Julian or Valentinian the of or en, the Rhine, and ofValens on the Banub e, with various tribesm exelder Theodosius with the Mooris h rebel Firmus. The intenti on was 7 . ed achiev plicitly to cut the adversary down to size, and often this was But a qualification is necessary, namely tha~ such formal occasl~ns lIke lent themselves to literary presen tation, espeCIally by an author ceresque picture or Ammia nus who tended to empha size the grand mony, overlooking the munda ne but essential ground work ~at p~e­ ceded. S Thus it may be inferred that Valens's mid-D anube meeting wI~h ID Athana ric had been prepar ed by extensive lower-level contacts from oath an by ted preven was which the Goth explained how he d enterin g Roman territory. Person al meetings also had to ~e fol1~we ­ ~chieve ~ohd tee guaran not might h up, since a ceremonial triump subwhich ID here atmosp the shed establi st ments. Galerius's outbur e a sequen t negotiations would occur, but. it did not. dir~ctly produc the Pro~us, S. SlCOTIU by ed achiev were these treaty or concessions: and tian Dloc1e by court Persian the to Nisibis from envoy dispatched Galeriu s in 298. Interestingly Narses attemp ted to redress the diplo" 6 Amrnianus, 30.6, , quoted by Mlllar, Iuthungl the and Aurelian cf. 29.5.15; Firmus, on 7 E,g. Ammian us . d 'Frontier s',15. ~lymplO orus or e,g, s, embassie foreign of cs mechani the of e experienc with 8 Authors ation on personal Priscus, might be expected to offer a different emphaSis, For concentr tion of a fort on the construc ian's Valentin of account the cf. us, Ammian in activity imperial Neckar (28.2,2-4).

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matic balance by subjecting Sicorius to various delays wliile troops . were assembled, but Sicorius was not to be browbeaten and the crucial meeting at which Persian concessions were spelled out was eventually held inside the palace with only three Persians to witness the disgrace. 9 A comparable example is provided by negotiations between Constantius and Shapur in 357/8: in Ammianus10 the emphasis is on the rulers' exchange of personal letters, which are quoted in full; but these letters had to be carried by ambassadors, and Constantius followed the unsuccessful exchange with another embassy whose leading participants are recorded as the comes Prosper, Spectatus, a tribune and notary, and the philosopher Eustathius of Epiphania whose knowledge and oratorical talent were meant to impress the king. This second embassy is recorded in greater detail by Eunapius,ll where the actions of the emperor's representatives, especially Eustathius, are highlighted; Eustathius was no more successful than the imperial letter. Without the complementary activity of attendants, intermediaries, and envoys the diplomatic contribution of the emperor in person would have had limited effect. This impression of fourth-century diplomacy is much more in keeping with accounts in Priscus or Menander of fifth and sixth-century practice, for example the negotiations of Attila's envoy Edeco at Constantinople in 448: his meeting with Theodosius is briefly noted before important discussions begin with the imperial chamberlain Chrysaphius and the interpreter Vigilas,12 It is perhaps indicative of the importance of diplomacy at official level that in the 430s there might be competition for appointment as Roman envoy: during attempts to dissuade the Hun Rua from attacking, Plinthas the Goth and Dionysius, both magistri militum and ex-consuls, were keen to be selected and Plinthas sent a subordinate to the Huns to ensure that they should specifically ask for him as ambassador; he then wanted to take Epigenes, a man renowned for wisdom, as co-ambassador. 13 Another aspect of the emperor's personal involvement that requires consideration is the extent to which this was desirable and advantageous. A spectacular diplomatic triumph on a frontier was a benefit that might reinforce, or even replace, military victory, but Valentinian's death points to disadvantages: a frontier meeting might develop uncontrollably, and damage to Roman prestige would quickly be reported to the enemy. Meetings in mid-stream with tribal leaders might under9 Peter the Patrician, 10 Ammianus, 17.5. 11 Eunapius, Lives 12 Priscus, 11.1.

13 Prisclls, 2.

14.

of the Sophists, 465-6.

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mine rather than enhance imperial supremacy. 'Thus the mid-Danube meeting of Valens and Athanaric in 367 might have ~ppeared to demonstrate equality between the leaders: Valens thought it unbecoming and degrading for an emperor to have to cross t~ meet t~e tribesman,14 but he had been unable to force Athanaric to disregard l~s alleged oath against entering Roman territory, an ~ath ~a~ Athc:nanc was soon to break after the Huns destroyed his armles. Slmllarly m 374 Valentinian on board ship agreed terms with Macrianus on the banks of th Rhine 15 an encounter that from the tribal perspective showed the e;'peror ~pproaching their leader and hence being at a disadvantage. JuUan's negotiations with the Chamavi in 358 illustrate how such awkwardness might be overcome: although Julian had defeate~ the tribe and taken captives, he required a secure agreement to p.er~t the transport up the lower Rhine of food supplies from Bntam; th~ Chamavi were still hostile and JuUan had to keep out of arr~w ;ange, Julian demanded hostages and specified that he wante.d th: kmg ~ son, whom he had already captured although the Charr:avl beheve~ him to be dead; this plunged the tribesmen into despmr, and J~~an then ., achieved a great coup by producing the supposed~y dead son. The problems of personal diplomacy are also Il1ustra~~d by Jo~tan s dealings with Shapur in 363. Jovian was in a weak pOSItion, leadmg a starving army isolated in Persian territory. Malalas17 record~ that he entrusted negotiations to the patrician Arinthaeus bec~use ~s ;mperor he was too proud to make a peace treaty with the PerSIan kmg . By using an intermediary the emperor could maintain S?~~ self-respect at a time of great humiliation. It also avoided the pos~lblhty .~a~ Shapur II might contrive to re-enact the ultimate diplomatic h~mlhatio~ f.or the Romans, the scene of the captured emperor Valenar: submlttmg ~o Shapur I that was immortalized in stone at Naqsh-l Rus~am. This danger was to threaten the emperor Heraclius in 623 when his attem?t to orchestrate a personal meeting with the Avar khagan at Heracleta, with all the trappings of imperial ceremonial transported from Constantinople for the occasion, backfired and he had. to scu~t1e ba~k ignominiously to the walls of the capital, allegedly With the lmpenal crown under his arm. 1S 14 Ammianus, 27.5.9. 15 Ammianus, 30.3. . al' fJ r 's 16 Eunapius, 18.6, presenting a plausible account of the delibe~a~e theatrlc I~ 0 U lan . actions that is less evident in other sources: Peter the PatriCian, 18; Zoslmus, 3.4-8, Arnmianus, 17.8.5. 17 Malalas, 335. 18 Chronicon Paschale, 712-13; Nicephorus, 12.29-14.10.

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By contrast with such perils, negotiations at Constantinople could be c~refully.stage~managed: i~ was easier for the emperor, protected by the filters of lmperIal ceremorual, to take credit for successes or avoid blame for reverses. It is difficult to imagine how Theodosius II could have survived the pressure of Attila if he had been personally involved diplomatically or militarily, whereas from a distance mistakes could be blamed on subordinates, for example Vigilas the interpreter. 19 The diplomatic ~onfrontation between campaigning emperor and enemy should be vlewed as one way of emphasizing and publicizing imperial success. But other ways could be as effective. Attila's envoy Edeco is said to have been impressed by the luxury of the Great Palace at Constantinople,2o while the beauties of Hagia Sophia might have a comparable impact on foreign leaders being baptized into the Christian faith in it. The sight of the assembled population acclaiming the emperor in the Hippodrome was intended to make a similar contribution to diplomatic impreSSions, hence Heraclius's desire to be aCCompanied by the circus factions, the orchestrators of chanting, on his unfortunate expedition to Heracleia; Justinian in 556 punished his favoured Blue faction for protesting over a bread shortage at a Hippodrome meeting when Persian ambassadors happened to be present. 21 The attention devoted to the reception of ambassadors in the sixth century, Which might be inferred from accounts in the historians Procopius and Menander, is corroborated in some of the Sixth-century passages in Constantine Porphyrogenitus's Book of Ceremonies: 22 the movement of Persian envoys was controlled from their entry into the empire at Dara to their reception in Constantinople, where care is taken to describe the different roles of the various officials involved in preparing the meeting with the emperor. 23 We do not possess evidence from the fourth or fifth centuries to prove the existence then of such detailed arrangements, but it is likely that the sophisticated sixthcentury practices had been evolving gradually for decades before they were recorded by an unknown observer - and they probably continued to evolve subsequently. It is clear that by the reign of Theodosius II Roman diplomacy had become organized in some respects: the Romans had access to an interpreter, Vigilas, for their dealings with the Huns 24 even though the Hun federation was multilingual and leading Huns 19 Priscus, 15.1-2. 20 Priscus, 11.1.21-9.

21 Malalas, 488.6-14 89.

22 DC I.87, 23 Ibid., 89.

24 Priscus, 11.1-2.

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used Latin-speaking secretaries;25 diplomatic specialists seem to have emerged, Eslas and Edeco among the Huns, perhaps Nomus, Anatolius, or Senator among the Romans;26 Romans could locate their dealings with one neighbour within a much broader strategic view of the world and their interests - Attila was known to be negotiating with both parts of the empire, and his designs on Persia could also be assessed for their possible benefit, or damage, to eastern Roman interests, while Theodosius could attempt, unsuccessfully, to stir up trouble for the Huns by negotiating with their neighbours the Akatziri. 27 The long accounts of diplomatic activity in Priscus suggest that there was an audience in Constantinople interested in such matters. After 395 the establishment of the eastern emperor within Constantinople probably contributed to the standardization of practices that had previously been more haphazard, but that is not to say that fourth-century diplomacy was unprofessional: techniques for gathering information about enemy activity existed, personal missions by appropriate envoys as well as the more normal military scouts, and information about affairs abroad could prompt a Roman diplomatiC initiative; leakage of damaging information to the Persians would have reminded the Romans of the benefits of acquiring comparable material. 28 The spread of Christianity beyond the empire's frontiers created possible new contacts: the letter of Constantine to Shapur presupposes links between Christians in Persia and those in the Roman empire,29 and any knowledge gained from such contacts could have been used by the emperor in determining how best to handle the Persians and whether military action was practical. There may, furthermore, have been a more organized form of information gathering: Ammianus describes the arcani as men whose duty it had been to travel long distances and inform Roman leaders of disturbances among neighbouring peoples; they had been established long before their abolition by Valentinian, and Anunianus had said more about them in his lost 25 Priscus, 11.2.410-15; 13.3.17; 14.6-8. 14.31. 26 Priscus, 2.4-5; 11.1; 13.1.13-14. 27 Priscus, 11.2.575-636; 11.2.243-9. A comparable

example of strategic vision is offered by Justin Il's diplomacy before the outbreak of war with Persia in 572, when the Roman attack was co-ordinated with the actions of the Central Asian Turks and followed a revolt of the Persian Armenians. 28 Ammianus, 18.6; 16.9.3; 18.5.1-3. On this see A.D. Lee, 'Embassies as evidence for the movement of military intelligence between the Roman and Sasanian empires', in P. Freeman and D. Kennedy, eds., The Defence of the Romun and ByzunHne East (Oxford, 1986), 455-61. 29

For discussion, see T.D. Bames, 'Constantine and the Christians of Persia', JRS 75

(1985),126-36.

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account of Constantius. 3o Finally, if the early empire indeed lacked the bureaucratic infrastructure to co-ordinate diplomatic information and activity properly, the unification of various aspects of the bureaucracy under the control of the magister officiorum could have rectified this failing, since the magister was in charge of the writers of imperial communications as well as of messengers and interpreters. 31 Whether these various methods of gaining and using knowledge about the world outside provided the 'systematic sources of up-ta-date information', whose absence Millar notes in the earlier empire,32 is uncertain; the verdict would perhaps depend on what level of irregular contacts is required before a system is deemed to have emerged, but it is reasonable to argue that the more developed practices of the fifth and sixth centuries had roots in the fourth century. The transfer of diplomatic activity to the imperial capital was not, however, without occasional critics. Discussing Leo I's decision to allow the Arab Amorcesus to come to Constantinople, the historian Malchus complained that this had served to diminish imperial authority: if Amorcesus had been kept at a distance and handled through subordinates, he would have retained respect for the unknown majesty of the emperor as someone much greater than other men; contact with the emperor showed him to be human, and the opportunity to travel through the Roman empire revealed its riches and weaknesses. 33 Part of the problem was that Leo's reception had been too friendly and informal - a personal reception, an invitation to dine, and permission to attend a senate meeting - and most emperors probably avoided such errors through stricter adherence to ceremonial. A growing formalization of diplomatic meetings would have paralleled the changing nature of the emperor's contacts with his people: the emperor's relatively informal demeanour in a fourth-century army camp, to which John Chrysostom alludes, had ended,34 to be replaced by formal appearances in processions or the Hippodrome when acclamations were the most effective means of reaching the emperor directly. These changes should not evoke puzzlement: the fundamental role of the emperor, the basis for his control of millions of Civilians, was the maintenance of military authority and the provision of security. In the third and fourth centuries the best way of achieving this appeared to be personal leadership of the army. But acquisition of military glory in the

field had risks comparable to those of the personal diplomatic encounter - Julian and Valens both died on campaign. If emperors could annex whatever military· glory was available but yet avoid the dangers of personal participation, there migh~ be s.ignificant ~dvan­ tages. Part of the process whereby this was ~chi~ve~ ill Constanti~ople has been investigated by Michael McCorrruck ill his study of. Vlctory celebrations, which appear to have been most frequen,t .at tunes of crisis. 35 Other ceremonies are relevant, for example the rehglOus processions connected with Constantinople's acquisition of a collection of relics in the early f~~ century that served to link the emperor wit~ the religious life of his capital city.36 In this context the transfer of diplomatic exchanges from the frontier to the Great Palace should be seen as one of the ways in which eastern emperors managed to s~rmount military problems that might have defied direct personal mvolvement. 37

302

30 Ammianus, 28.3.8. 31 Priscus, 11.1.59-66. 32 'Frontiers', 19. 33 Malchus, 1. 34 Comm. in Matth. 2.2, PG 57/58, coI.26c. I owe this reference to Constanze Schummer.

McCormick, Eternal Victory (Cambridge, 1986), esp. chap. 2. E.g. Chronicon Paschale, 572-3, Joseph and Zachariah. 37 By contrast the secure, but relatively unimpressive, setting of Ravenna perhaps contributed to the contemporary western failure. 35 M. 36

20. Why do barbarians stand round the emperor at diplomatic receptions? D.e. Smythe Diplomacy is the formalized management of ritualized exchanges between two (not necessarily equal) power bases. As such, diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation, but it is also any skilful management in dealing with others. My purpose here is to ask why barbarians are so frequently mentioned, in eleventh- and twelfth-century histories, as surrounding the emperor or would-be emperor at ritualized exchanges. The facile explanation is that the barbarians are mentioned because they were there. However, the historians had ulterior motives in describing the main protagonists surrounded by 'the allied forces who had come to them from the nations'.1 Psellus's account of his embassy in 1057, on behalf of the Emperor Michael VI to Isaac Comnenus, who was in revolt, is the subject of a recent study by Roderick Beaton. 2 Upon the embassy's arrival at Nicomedia, they were greeted warmly 3 and were escorted directly to the fortified enclosure of the commanderi Psellus takes care to call Isaac merely 'the commander' not 'the emperor'.4 The embassy and their escort dismounted before Isaac's headquarters, and waited a moment. Psellus says the delay was due to Isaac's unwillingness to have too many people in the imperial tent, now that the sun had set.s Psellus describes Isaac Comnenus's tent as 'imperial', without explaining the reason for the change. The embassy was finally admitted. Isaac, though seated on a raised throne, was surrounded by only a few of his own bodyguards, and was dressed more as a soldier than as an emperor. 6 He rose slightly when the three emissaries entered and asked them to PsellU5, Chron., chap. 24, Il, p. 97.22-3. Ethnon is used in the sense of 'gentiles'. 2 R. Beaton, 'De Vulgari Eloquentia in twelfth-century Byzantium,' in Byz. and West, 261-8. 3 Psellus, Chron., chap. 20, Il, p. 94.4-5. 4 Psellus, Chron., chap. 20, Il, p. 94.11. S Psellu5, Chron., chap. 20, Il, p. 94.16. 6 Psellus, Chron., chap. 21, Il, p. 94.2-4. 1

306

sit. There followe d a few brief questions about their journey and some and remark s about Isaac's own position. He shared a glass with them, the as , amazed out went they r wonde then allowe d them to retire. No feet.7 their at ed shatter lay nial ceremo atic norms of Byzantine diplom The next day the ambassadors were summo ned again into Isaac's hoi presence. This was altogether a much more elaborate affair. It was the Isaac, 8 to adors ambass the escort to came tes boules protoi who of commander.9 They found themselves in a much larger tent, capable l imperia full the was then This ID troops. foreign its and holding an army r dignity of the Byzantine basileus kai autokrator, in his audience chambe amsurrou nded by armed men, drawn up in military formation. ll The doux the by bassad ors were required to wait at the entrance to the tent Jolm Comne nus, Isaac's brother and comma nder of his bodyguard. and John disapp eared for a momen t inside the tent, then reappe ared, by struck were withou t speakin g threw open the door; the ambass adors not has r, howeve , the unexpe cted sight of the massed troops.12 Psellus tent fully accepted tile proprie ty of Isaac's position: the sight within tile causes it and r), is worthy of a tyrant (not a duly established empero 13 shakin g fear rather than proper respect. The ambass adors were tilen is assailed by the acclamations of the troops.14 The scene within the tent a with throne, golden a on described. Isaac is ha basileus,15 seated in lost as ed describ is Isaac 6 footstool, and dressed magnificently.1 his though t and contemplation befitting a Byzantine emperor. Round s. Warrior of circles were tent, the person, as had been the case outside the from drawn nders, comma ant Closest to him were the import The nobility. In turn they were surrou nded by the front-line soldiers. the 'all of sed compo was circle final The next. light-a rmed troops came and Italians , nations the from them to come allied forces who had Tauroscythians, terrible both in their form and in their appear ance, both his alike glaring fiercely.'17 It was in this context that Psellus and Chron., chap. 21, Il, p. 9S.9f. be intentional. The senior councillors or the leaders of the senate: the ambiguit y may PselIus, C"ron., chap. 22, Il, p. 9S.4. 9 Psellus, Chron., chap. 22, Il, p. 9S.5. 10 PselIus, C11ron., chap. 22, Il, p. 9S.6-7. 11 PselIus, Chron., chap. 22,Il, p. 9S.7-15. 12 PselIus, CiJron., chap. 23, Il, p. 96.4-5. 13 PselIus, CiJron., chap. 23, Il, p. 96.S-6. 14 PselIus, Chron., chap. 23, Il, p. 96.6-12. 15 PseIIus, Chron., chap. 24, Il, p. 96.S. for 1saac Comnen us and 16 PselIus, C"ron., chap. 24, Il, p. 96.7":8; chap. SO, Il, pp. 113-14 dress, when dealing with ambassadors. 17 PseIIus, C11ron., chap. 24, Il, p. 97.22-5. 7 Psellus,

WHY DO BARBARIANS STAND ROUND

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8 embassy were require d to conduc t their diplomacy.1 Given that Isaac them with secret s entrust and later takes the ambass adors to one side of diplomacy, as show public a intimations,19 it is clear that there was well as more secret negotiations. to The substan ce of these negotiations is not my conCern here. I wish outer an by nded surrou Isaac t presen deal with why Psellus chose to even ring of foreigners. He did so to accentu ate the fact that Isaac, become to about was rebel,2o a only g though still strictly speakin emperor. In Psellus 's deSCription, the barbari an foreigners appear Do round the empero r to legitimize Isaac as the ecumenical emperor. s they fulfill a similar role elsewhere in the Chronographia? The Iberian purple recruit ed by Bardas Phocas comple ment his assump tion of the not and the imperi al crown, when he rebelle d against Basil n. But this is are they in the contex t of a diplomatic set-piece, and in any case 21 jOint the of t counte red effectively by Basil Il's Rus. Psellus 's accoun n of reign of Zoe and Theodo ra is an instanc e of the legitim izing functio barbari an guards in court ceremony. He states: In the outward form of government the sisters did as previous emperors had done, for both sat before the imperial tribune in one line, slightly indented to Theodora's side. And near them were the Rods and Sword-bearers, and the race who brandish an axe at the right shoulder.· Next stood the special favourites and those who organize things. Round [the women] on the outside came a guard, like a surrounding crown; this second rank was most faithful, and out of respect every one of them fixed their eyes on the ground. After them came the first senate and the order with privilege and then those of the second class and those of the third class, one after another, all in rows, separated by equal intervals. 22

s It was against this backdr op that busine ss was carried on: lawsuit with ces audien levied, n taxatio or t interes judged , questio ns of public ambass adors leading to divergence of views or to accords, and all other 23 duties that occupy those who exercise power. Some diplom acy is presen ted in Psellus 's descrip tion of Theodo ra's

8

18 PseIIus, C11roll., chap. 2S, Il, pp. 97-8. Cllroll., chap. 32, Il, pp. 102-03. 20 PseIIus, Chron., chap. 29, Il, p. 99.1-7. I, p. 9.3f. 21 PseIIus, C11ron., chap. 10, I, p. 7.13-19; also chap. 13, from 'the race who brandish 22 PseIIus, C11ron., chap. 3, I, p. 118.1-13. The guards drawn Varangia n guard had been the II Basil Under ns. Varangia are ' shoulder right the at axe an xon element was added Anglo-Sa an 1066, after Rus; Kievan compose d of Scandinavian and to the make-up of the Varangian guard. 23 PseIIus, Chron., chap. 3, I, p. 118.14-16. 19 PseIIus,

308

24 against ac~lamation as empres s in 1042. The people were in revolt

Michae.l Vi they knew he watche d over the senior empress (Theodora's t elder sIster Zoe) so they turned their attentio n to Theodora. Withou of r retaine family a as, confusion or tumult they placed Cabasil by Consta ntine VIII, at their head. Thoug h Cabasilas 'was not a Greek in went crowd The er'.25 charact noblest race, [he was] a person of the herself shut ra Theodo mob, the with nted search of Theodora. Confro away in a church, deaf to all entreaties. 26 The citizen army27 abando ned persua sion and threate ned force. Some of their number, draWing their her daggers, rushed in as if to kill her. Boldly they dragge d her from a in her clothed and open, the into out her t sanctuary, brough a g magnificent robe. Then they made her sit on a horse, and formin 29 Great the In . Church Great the to her led they her,28 circle all about the Church, r:ot just a part of the people, but the entire elite, ignoring .3D empress tyrant Mlchael V completely, proclaimed Theodora as Theodora, en route to be acclaimed as empress, is not strictly of surrou nded by barbarians. However, Psellus has made the point as ted presen is demos stressing Cabasilas's non-Greek origin, and the es. continu man sub-hu su?-Byzantine. This portrayal of the mob as ary in the Mlc~ael V and his uncle the nobilissimos had sought sanctu ed them encircl and church the StudlOn. Howev er, the crowd entered 3I of th~ sis antithe the is This like wild animals seeking to devour them. ical ecumen be to Soon Isaac, round presen ce of the barbari an soldiers the of citizens the d reduce has V empero r. The tyrann y of Michael beasts. than better Reigning City to little Diplom acy is provid ed by the newly appoin ted eparch, sent by ted Theodo ra to remove the refugees. 32 When fear of the mob preven to on invitati tory peremp rather first his them from complying with He: acy. diplom by them e convinc to tried he leave the church,33 laid aside his arrogance. and spoke to them with greater respect. He ion, [to swor~ by the Holy Rehcs and used all manner of persuas the would nor evil any suffer conVince them that] they would neither Chron., chap. 36, I, p. 108.1. 36, I, p. 108.12-13. 26 PseIlus, Chron., chap. 37, I, p. 108.1-4. 27 PseIlus, Chron., chap. 37, I, p. 108.4. 28 Psellus, Chron., chap. 37, I, p. 109.10. 29 PseIlus, Cllron., chap. 37, I, p. 108.4-10. 30 Psellus, Chroll., chap. 37, I, p. 109.11-14. 31 Psellus, Chron., chap. 41, I, p. 110.1-3. 32 PseIlus, Chron., chap. 44, I, p. 112.1-4. 33 PseIlus, Chron., chap. 44, I, p. 112.6-8. 24 Ho ... demos: Psellus, 25 PseIlus, Chron., chap.

WHY DO BARBARIANS STAND ROUND

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309

envoy treat them more severely than the occasion demanded. 34 When this approa ch also failed, the official resorte d to force. 'At his command, the mob laid hands on them and immed iately put their hands to breaking the law, houndi ng them out of the church like wild beasts.'3s Those accompanying the eparch were ashame d, but they had allowed the refugees to be handed over to the mob 'as if they concluded a treaty.'36 Psellus's description of the transfe r of power from Eudocia to -beMichael VII after the debacle of Manzik ert also shows a soon-to name not does Psellus ans. barbari by legitimized empero r surrou nded er, them as such: they are the 'househ old guards of the courts'.37 Howev each who and shields carry all who race 'the as he does describe them the have the heavy iron, single-edged short sword hangin g from off, heads their g shoutin and noise making , guards shoulder'.38 The went to Michael VII. Believing him to be in danger , they surrou nded him and took him to an upper part of the palace. 39 11ms Psellus portrays a person about to ascend tl1e throne surrou nded by barbarians. In the Theodo ra episode, Cabasilas stands was duty for foreigners with the great unwas hed, whilst Michael VII how shows V l carried off by the barbarians. The episod e with Michae was tyranny may so subver t the proper order of things that he who beasts. wild empero r is brough t down by citizens reduce d to Is Psellus alone in this manne r of empha sizing legitimacy by the use atic of barbari ans on the Byzantine side in set-pieces of diplom few are there History of Books Four exchange? In Niceph orus Bryennius's tion overt diplomatic exchanges. One might expect to find some descrip l Michae and a bolitiss Macrem a Eudoci n of set-piece negotiations betwee with deal to how on Ducas John Caesar VII, receiving the advice of ius Romanus IV Diogenes after the defeat at Manzikert,40 but Bryenn merely ts recoun ius Bryenn 41 c1osely. quite t follows Psellus's accoun how the palace guard, described as a race coming from a barbarian land near the Ocean, loyal to the emperors of the Romans from the beginning, all carrying shields and 34

Psellus, Chroll., chap. 44, I, p. 112.11-15.

35 Psellus, Chron., chap. 45, I, p. 113.2-5.

Chroll., chap. 45, I, p. 113.12. Chron., chap. 28, Il, p. 165.6-7. 38 Psellus, Chron., chap. 28, Il, p. 165.7-9. 39 Psellus, Chron., chap. 28, Il, p. 165.7-14. tr. P. Gauner (Brussels, 40 Nicepho rus Bryenniu s, Historiarum Libri Quattuor, ed. and 1975),1.18, pp. 119-21. 41 Cf. Psellus, Chron., chaps. 23-27, II, pp. 162-4. 36 Psellus,

37 Psellus,

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carrying a kind of axe at the shoulder, 42 ~scorted

the emperor to the upper parts of the palace surrounding hi a b:ock, proclaimed him emperor. 43 The close parallel Psellus s verSlOn means that this account cannot be used as a nonPsellan example of surrounding barbarians acting as legitimiz Th . d' 1 ers. . e major Ip omati~ set-piece of Bryennius's Four Books takes place ~ Book IV between NIcep~orus Bot~eiates' s embassy and Bryennius In 1078 at Theodoroupohs. The tmperial ambassadors sent th commander of the hetaireia ahead to announce their arrival 44 Bry . e d d hi . enruus or ere s troops to halt and, accompanied by his leading officers th commanders of the ff: e . Macedonians and the Thracians' and othBo~m and notables, he dIstanced himself from the main body of the army Tl others got down from their horses and arranged themselves round'hi he remained in the saddle. He bore no arms, but on his us=i ",:lnte ~ount and dressed as an emperor he presented a striking pIcture. ~e ax;nbassadors approached Bryennius and began to conduct theIr busmess. In this exchange Botaneiates is shown to hav to foreign troops: just before the dispatch of the embassyj46 In the. use of the commander of the hetaireia. Bryennius was not recogruzed as emperor, and was described surrounded by Thracians and Macedonians, not barbarians. If. there is little evidence in Bryennius's Four Books to support the thesIS barbarians as legitirnizers' Anna Comnena' s Al . dof surrounding . eXla prOVIdes some support. According to this account, Alexius I C~rnnenus ,,:,as unsure how to deal with the conspiracy undertaken by DlOgenes, wIth the help of the Empress Maria. Alexius decided upon a show of negotiation: And when the sun had peeped over the horizon, and had sprung up in g~ory, a.s many of them as were not contaminated with Diogenes's dIssolution gathere~ rou~d the emperor together with those who regul.arIy from anCIent times have been the imperial body-guard Leadmg th~ way to the imperial tent were those girded with swords; those carrymg spears ru;d those carrying the heavy iron short sword at the shoulder. 47 Some dIstance from the imperial throne they dressed

In

~lone

~ccess

~d

Wi~

:l~

an~

Libri Quat/uorI I.20I p. 123 •12-15 • Bryennius, Libri Quat/uor, I.20, p. 123.20-23. 2 p. 261.10-11. Though not made explicit here the 1 44•Bryennius •• ' Libri Quat/ uor, IV., letmrelfl. IS usually taken to mean the brotherhood of foreign imperial guards i e' the Varanglans. ' .. 45 Bryennius, Libri Quat/uor, IV.2, p. 261.14-18. 46B ryenruus, . L'b'Q I n lIat/uor, IV.2, p. 259.20£., with the Turkish emirs of Nicaea asked to supply 2,000 men. 47 The topic description of the Varangian guardsmen. 42 Bryennius, 43

311

themselves by troop into a crescent-shaped pattern, taking the emperor into their arms. Many of his relations, both of blood and close kindred, stood near the imperial throne on either side. Others, armour bearers, stood on the right and left. The emperor looked awe-inspiring on his seat, though he was dressed as a general, not as an emperor. He was not raised up very much, so the rest were not very excited. Just as gold covered the throne, it also covered his head. 48 The situation was delicate. The emperor was worried that such a mixed gathering might result in some terrible attempt. 49 However, he began speaking and his firm arguments won them over. The outcome was the dispatch of messengers 50 to blind Diogenes and Cecaumenus Catacalon. Here we see the various elements: the barbarian guards round the throne; messengers and negotiations; and an established imperial authority. Book 14 of the Alexiad describes a major set-piece of diplomacy. Sultan Malik-shah, having heard of Alexius's fame and having made trial of his prowess, was willing to sue for peace and sent an embassy. When the ambassadors from Persia arrived, the emperor, an aweinspiring figure, was seated on his throne, and the officers in charge of ceremonial arranged the soldiers in language groups, and set in order the axe-bearing barbarians. The ambassadors were then brought before the imperial tribunal. He (the emperor] asked them the usual questions about the sultan, and when he had heard their message, he agreed, as he wished to welcome peace with everyone. 51 Anna praises her father's negotiating skills, as he realized that the sultan's objectives would not be in the empire's interests. With much persuasive skill and great cleverness he defended his own position and, after a long discourse, brought the ambassadors round to his point of view.52 After a night to sleep on it, the envoys concluded the treaty. 53 The presence of axe-bearing barbarians at this diplomatic reception is to stress Alexius's position as ecumenical emperor, able to outwit the Turkish ambassadors with words, but with the barbarians soldiers displayed round him as the traditional threat. The Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus by Cinnamus records more diplomatic exchanges than Bryennius, but surrounding barbarians are noticeable only by their absence. When Manuel meets Louis VII of 48 Al.

IX.ix.2i Il, p. 181.11-28.

49 AI. IX.ix.4i Il, p. 182.15-19. 50 Aposteilantes: Al. IX.ix.6i Il,

p. 183.27.

51 AI. XIV.m.8; III, p. 158.5-13. 52 AI. XIV.iii.8; III, p. 158.12-18. 53 He symph5nia: Al. XIV.m.8; III, p. 158.23.

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France54 and Baldwin of Jerusalem55 no barbarian bodyguards are mentioned. The main description of a diplomatic set-piece is the personal embassy of Kilic Arslan II to Manuel at Constantinople in 1162. 56 A golden throne, encrusted with jewels, was raised on a splendid dais, on which Manuel sat, dressed in purple and gems. Rather than axe-bearing barbarians, Cinnamus records that: 'According to custom, the hierarchy stood on each side of the throne, the standing place of each regulated by birth and station in life.'57 Manuel was a well established emperor: the jewelled crown and the foreign lifeguards were details which might be safely omitted. 58 The description of the reconciliation between Renauld de Chatillon and Manuel mentions foreigners: There was such a marvel at that time, so many ambassadors having come there from the nations of Asia, from Khorasmia and from the Susians and Ekbatanians, from all of Media and Babylonia, whose ruler they call the Great Sultan, and from Nuradin, satrap of Aleppo, and from Yaghibasan, the leader of the tribe of the Persians, from the Abasgai and from the Iberians, even from the Palestinians and from the Armenians beyond Isauria. 59 Renauld came as a supplicant before the splendid dais of the imperial tent, and was eventually forgiven. From the work as a whole it is clear that Cinnamus saw Manuel as the legitimate ruler. The presence of the foreign ambassadors at this point is to remove from doubt Manuel's right as ecumenical emperor to judge Renauld de ChAtillon. Manuel was shown surrounded by 'a large company of axe-bearing barbarians' 60 at the entry into Antioch in 1159. The reason for their inclusion in this major piece of Manuel's diplomacy is obvious, whether to stress his position as overlord of Renauld de CMtillon and Baldwin lIt king ofJerusalem, or tnore prosaically as actual bodyguards. In conclusion, eleventh- and twelfth-century historians recorded the presence of barbarian axe-bearing imperial bodyguards in diplomatic exchanges to give added legitimacy to the occupant of the imperial throne. 54

John Cinnamus, Epitome Rerum, ed. A. Meineke (Bonn, 1836), 82-3; tr.

c. M.

Brand,

Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus (New York, 1976), 69. 55 Cinnamus, Rerum, 185; tr. Brand, 141. 56 Cinnamus, Rerum, 204-06; tr. Brand, 156.

57 Cinnamus, Rerum, 206; tr. Brand, 156. 58 Compare this description of Manuel without mention of crown or Varangians with Anna Comnena's description of her father atAI. IX. ix. 2; Il, p. 181.11-28. 59 Cinnarnus, Rerum, 183; tr. Brand, 139-40. 60 Cinnamus, Rerum, 187; tr. Brand, 143.

Section VII

The Less Obvious End

tin 21. The less obvious en ds of Byzan

e dip lom acy

P.T. An ton opo ulo s ciples, met hod s and objectives of In atte mpt ing to explain the prin ousto med to characterize each dipl Byzantine diplomacy, we are acc for as, , ure' 'fail a as a 'success' or matic episode in its long hist ory , a peace treaty, the aversion of war of ion clus con example, a successful is tive pec pers s Thi . sion ticu lar mis or the unsuccessful outcome of a par reliability of available sources, and s tude atti the by largely gov erne d or failure of a particular episode whi ch generally poi nt to the success assess it in relation to the original wit hou t bothering or wishing to of this tendency is that we too are objective. The natu ral consequence models of ideology and mechandra gge d into constructing gen eral ized the tactical patt ern to be followed isms which, supposedly, dete rmi ned s our mos t influential concept has in each particular situation. Per hap antine diplomacy, particularly evid bee n that of the 'lon g arm ' of Byz by ed rten sho has bee n drastically ent in the earl y period. This arm es in whi ch the executive arm of anc inst J. Shepard,l who examines t military raids against Byzantium Byzantine diplomacy failed to pre ven wou ld hack another piece from the in the mid dle Byzantine period. I rem aini ng length of this arm. cy existed, especially dur ing the To be sure, bureaucratic efficien inh erit ed a syst em of clearly defined early Byzantine period, whi ch had ch subsequently began to become offices, institutions and activities whi a com pete nt Ma ster of the Offices confused. Und er the guid anc e of is ful outcome. But the term ' success' there was a fair chance of a success esssucc a only not s race t that it emb relative, and I wou ld like to sug ges e ty in ada ptin g the original objectiv ibili flex ain cert a ful result, but also a to by red ucin g the scope of success to a given situation appropriately, the modified objective may take realistic 'possible' level. Par t of this e the least possible dam age to the form of an action which will pro vok BP 10 and delay in Byzantine diplomacy', Shepard, 'Information, disinformation ples. (1985),233-93, esp. 234 and cited exam 1

J.

316

SECTIONVll

existing status quo. I shall examine three examples of this from the sixth century. It must also be mentioned that reliable examples of this trend are extremely difficult to detect in our sources, and that a systematic search of all the fragmentary classicizing historians has proved fruitless. One. of the outstanding Masters of the Offices, celebrated for his legal educatIon and vast knowledge of ceremonial protocol, was Peter the Patrician, who for many years served as Master of the Offices and undertook several diplomatic missions on behalf of the Emperor Ju~tinian's government. In the year 534 he was sent to Italy to negotiate wIth the Ostrogoth queen Amalasuntha for her abdication and the country's return to direct imperial control. On his arrival there, however, he found that she had her cousin Theodahad as co-regent. Shortly afterwards she was strangled and Peter was left to negotiate the maintenance of peace solely with Theodahad. This move already forced a change of objective. Peter's original mission was to secure the progress of an existing plan, whereby Amalasuntha would surrender the ItaloGothic regnum to Byzantium, and would herself leave for Constantinople. Due to a change of circumstances he found himself negotiating with Theodahad, who, after the murder of Amalasuntl1a, was simultaneously threatened by war and put under pressure to make f~vourable concessions t~ ~e ~yzantines. The result of these negotiatIons :ras a trea.ty ,comprl~mg seven clauses which, unlike its appearance m ProcoplUs s GothIc War2 (where Theodahad emerges 'as its dictator), affirms by practical means imperial control over the Roman senate, clergy and populace, secures military aid with no need for payment from the imperial fiscus, and cedes Sicily to Byzantium. 3 The point to be made in this case is that we are faced with an ancient forerunner. of the 'salami' method in Byzantine diplomacy. Once it was re~ogruzed that the original objective could no longer be accomplished WIthout a costly war, Peter tried to modify it into a coexistence, covered by a ?ea~e treaty whose terms could, in the course of time, deprive the Got~c kmg of all .re~l power and secure a firm Byzantine grip over the ~falrs of,rtal~. 'Thfs mterpret~tion of. the events prior to the Gothic War, IS not so ObVlOUS from a plam readmg of the sources, and it requires a fairly complex analysis. In a later phase of his life Peter again undertook an extremely 21.6.1-6.

E. Chrysos, 'Die Amaler Herrschaft in Italien und das Imperium Romanum. Der Vertrag von 535',. Byz 51 (1981), 430-74. The role of Peter is also analyzed in detail in my recently publIshed book Petros Patrikios. Ho Byzantinos Diplomates, AxiomatoucllOs kni Syn.graphell5 (Athens, 1990), 72-87. It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss the events whIch followed and the reasons which led to the treaty's abandonment. 3

LESS OBVIOUS ENDS OF BYZANTINE DIPLOMACY

317

important diplomatic mission, this time as Justinian's Master of the Offices. He was the chief Byzantine negotiator in the conclusion of the peace treaty of A.D. 562 with Persia, whose terms have been preserv~d in the fragments of Menander Protector, forming a uniq~e d~cument In ancient historiography. The fifteen year~ o~ truce p:~cedmg It were sufficient for both states to determine theIr fmal pOSItIon and to prepare their points of insistence carefully. Thus one of Peter's ain::s, on whl.ch he thoroughly insisted and finally got his .way, was the e~dmg of LaZlca to the Byzantine sphere of influence. This course of action appears to have been well prepared because, as soon as Peter had f~ally sec~red Laziea, he immediately put forward a claim to the subordmate provmce of Suania. Suania had previously belonged to the Rom~, but, after a quarrel between the Lazi and the Roman general Marti:r:' the former declined to send the customary grain supply to the Suanl. As a result the latter tricked the Roman garrison and handed them~elves o~er to . . 552 or 553.4 The text of Menander is partIcularly mter. 'b' f the P erSlans In esting as it reveals, to a certain extent, Peter's 'less ObVIOUS 0 Jee :Ives and reflects a certain degree of embarrassment on the part of the Persian delegation. Here is the relevant passage of Menander. 5 'From this it must be agreed that Suarua belonged to ~he Ro~an~ from the first and should belong to them today. If we are m f~ll Justice tI:-e masters of Lazica, as you yourselves agr;e, the~ our chum t~ Sua~a which is subject to Lazica is equally valid. To this the Surenas repl~ed 'Rather, Romans, you are vexed that a people came o-;er to our. SIde freely and of their own volition.' The Zikh7 added, . The, Suam are autonomous and have never been subject to the Co1chian~. When the Zikh had spoken, Peter proposed, 'Zikh, if you do not w1sh tI:-e .name Suania to appear in the treaty document, say ~t y0';1 are ;-V1l;mg to hand over to me Lazica with its subject peoples ..The ZIkh .smd, If I do that, I shall give licence to raise the. iss~; o.f Iberia; Y~u w1ll b~ able to claim that it too, was subject to LaZlca. It 1S clear, saId Pet~r: you are not willing to rehlrn the whole of Lazica to us, only a part of It. The question remained unresolved, but Peter succeeded in ha:ing it referred to the Persian King Chosroes, whom he visited e: arly m.563. During the protracted negotiations at Ctesiphon m,,:,y pomts of Ideology relating to the status of subject peoples were raIsed. What ~~tters for our purpose is that Chosroes asked Peter why, during the VISIts of 4 See J.B. Bury, A History of the Later Roman Empire from the Death of711eodosius tlte Great to the Dea/h ofJustinian II (London, 1923, repr. New York 1958),117. . 5 R.c. Blockley, The History of Menander the Guardsman (Liverpool, 1985), 69. 6 Member of the Persian delegation. 7 Chief Persian delegate in the negotiations.

318

SECTION VII

several delegations, the Suanian question had never been raised to which Peter replied that a legally justified claim could not be put forward, so long as Chosroes was master of Lazica. It becomes clear that in this case there was a difference of opinion as t~ the ten~ ~azica. ~az~ca proper was th~ ~yzantines' 'obvious' objechve. Suama, if the ZI1