Businessmen and Politics in the Rhineland, 1789-1834 [Course Book ed.] 9781400853786

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Tables
List of Maps
Acknowledgments
A Note on Manuscript Sources and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
Part I. From the Old Regime to Union with France
2. The Old Regime on the Rhine
3. From Invasion to Annexation
Part II. French Rule on the Rhine
4. Businessmen, Politics, and Administration in Napoleonic France
5. Businessmen and the Politics of Semiofficial Institutions
6. The Integration of the Rhenish Business Community into France
Part III. Rhenish Business and Prussian Rule on the Rhine
7. Interregnum: Sack and the Introduction of Prussian Rule
8. Businessmen, Politics, and Administration in Prussia
9. Businessmen, Self-Administrative Institutions, and Prussian Politics
10. Conclusion: The Integration of the Rhenish Business Community into Prussia
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Businessmen and Politics in the Rhineland,

1789-1834

Businessmen and Politics in the Rhineland,

1789-1834

By Jeffry M. Diefendorf

PRINCETON PRINCETON,

UNIVERSITY NEW

PRESS

JERSEY

Copyright © 1980 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book Publication of this book has been aided by a grant from The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation This book has been composed in V.I.P. Monticello Clothbound editions of Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and binding materials are chosen for strength and durability Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

To Barbara and Elizabeth

Contents

List of Tables List of Maps Acknowledgments A Note on Manuscript Sources and Abbreviations

xi xii xiii xv

1. Introduction

3

PART I. FROM THE OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

2. The Old Regime on the Rhine The Heritage of the Old Regime City Politics in the Late Eighteenth Century

23 23 36

3. From Invasion to Annexation Renewed Occupation: The Struggle for Independence Hoche and the End of the Old Regime Creation of the Cologne Merchants' Committee

50 53 70 74

PART II. FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

4. Businessmen, Politics, and Administration in Napoleonic France Campo Formio: Annexation and the Introduction of French Government The Structure of Napoleonic Government Napoleonic Administration and Businessmen Notability and the Advisory System Businessmen and Notability in the Roer Department

84 92 102 110 125

5. Businessmen and the Politics of Semiofficial Institutions

134

83

viii

CONTENTS

The Formation of Business Institutions in Cologne Representation of Business Interests: Aachen and Crefeld Commercial Courts and Labor Arbitration Boards The Struggle over Cologne's Trading Privileges Business Institutions and Politics in the Roer Department 6. The Integration of the Rhenish Business Community into France The Transformation of Political Allegiance Notability, Political Commitment, and Social Rewards The Legacy of Two Decades of French Rule

135

147 159 165 181

185 186 195 203

PART III. RHENISH BUSINESS AND PRUSSIAN RULE ON THE RHINE 7. Interregnum: Sack and the Introduction of Prussian Rule Installation of the Provisional Government EmergencyWarMeasures Sack and the Rhenish Business Community: The Status of Institutions Sack and the Rhenish Business Community: Promotion of the Economy Political Impact of the Transition Period

225 238

8. Businessmen, Politics, and Administration in Prussia The Legacy of the Prussian Reform Movement The Prussian Bureaucracy and the Rhineland Businessmen in Local Government Businessmen in the Provincial Diet Continuity and Transformation of Political Institutions

243 244 261 268 279 284

9. Businessmen, Self-Administrative Institutions, and Prussian Politics

289

213 215 219 221

CONTENTS

The Chambers of Commerce: Institutional Development and Personnel The Commercial Courts The Labor Arbitration Boards Government, Business, and the Economy of the Rhineland Business Institutions and Business Politics

ΐχ

289 307 310 313 332

10. Conclusion: The Integration of the Rhenish Business Community into Prussia

334

Bibliography Index

357 387

LIST OF TABLES

1. Roer Department Senators and Members of the Corps Legislatif 2. Members of the Conseil General: Occupation 3. Candidates for President of an Electoral College: Occupation 4. Candidates for President of an Electoral College: Age and Personal Fortune 5. Nominees for President of an Electoral College: Occupation, Age, Wealth (in francs) 6. Electoral Colleges: Occupation 7. Delegations from Aachen, Crefeld, and Cologne to the Electoral Colleges: Occupation 8. Urban Representation 9. RepresentationofBusinessmen 10. Notability on the Left Bank 11. The Forty-six Leading Manufacturers in the Roer Department, 1810 12. The Petition Campaign of 1798 13. Crefeld Town Council, 1815-1834 14. RepresentationintheProvincialDietbyCity 15. Representation in the Provincial Diet by Government District 16. New Memberships in the Club Aachener Casino by Occupation

112 115 117 118 120 122 124 127 128 130 157 191 273 281 282 337

LIST OF MAPS

1. The Left Bank of the Rhine, 1813 2. The Prussian Rhine Provinces, 1818

Acknowledgments

THE research that resulted in this book began several years ago when I was seeking a topic for my dissertation at the University of California at Berkeley. Since then many people have encouraged, assisted, and prodded me through the long process of research, writing, and revision. I owe them all a debt of gratitude. Gerald Feldman took me on as a dissertation student and strongly sup­ ported me along the way. Wolfgang Sauer, Hans Rosenberg, and Reinhard Bendix all made helpful suggestions and offered neces­ sary criticism of the dissertation; Peter Paret, Mark Edwards, Hugh West, Hans Heilbronner, and Darrett Rutman helped in the later stages of revision. My thanks also go to the many archivists and librarians— German, French, and American—who assisted me in locating materials. I am especially grateful to Klara van Eyll and her staff at the Rheinisch-Westfalisches Wirtschaftsarchiv in Cologne for providing me with a most congenial working environment for the year that I was a fixture in their reading room. Their efforts, and the generous friendship of Claus and Hildegard Caspers, turned Cologne into a home for me. I wish also to acknowledge with thanks a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies and a Faculty Summer Fellowship from the University of New Hampshire, which sup­ ported my work in its final stages. Catherine Bergstrom did an admirable job of typing the manuscript, and David Avery pre­ pared the fine maps. Finally, words are inadequate to express my appreciation to my aunt, Elizabeth S. Rosenfield, and to my wife, Barbara Boonstoppel Diefendorf. The former's love of proper usage and her several well-worn dictionaries saw her through many hours of

xiv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

labor, turning my often Germanicized prose into readable Eng­ lish. My wife is an historian in her own right, and she has pa­ tiently offered what has always proved constructive criticism. It is often hardest to accept criticism from those closest to you. The sensitivity and sympathy of these two women was such that our personal relations were never strained by the work on the manu­ script, and it is to them that I dedicate the book. Such errors of fact and interpretation that remain are my own.

A Note on Manuscript Sources and Abbreviations When citing manuscript sources in the footnotes, I have used the following procedure. The abbreviation of the archive is fol­ lowed by the designation (letter, number, or words) of the gen­ eral series or collection and then by the designation of each subse­ quent subdivision, each separated by a slash (/). Where individual documents lacked a page number consistent with the numbering system of the collection, I have identified them by listing the names of the correspondents and/or dates. For example, in the Rheinisch-Westfalisches Wirtschaftsarchiv in Cologne, almost all of the documents in the section that includes the archive of the chamber of commerce were ordered and numbered by archivists since 1900. When I have cited documents from the few volumes that have not been given such numbers, I have listed corre­ spondents and dates rather than use the number from the original registry, assuming that that number was to be found. ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES:

AN BN HSAD HSAD-K HSAK HASK RWWA SaA SaK

Archives Nationales (Paris, France) Bibliotheque Nationale (Paris, France) Hauptstaatsarchiv Dusseldorf Hauptstaatsarchiv Dusseldorf, Zweigstelle Schloss Kalkum Hauptstaatsarchiv Koblenz Historisches Archiv der Stadt Koln Rheinisch-Westfalisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (Cologne) Stadtarchiv Aachen Stadtarchiv Krefeld

Businessmen and Politics in the Rhineland, 1789-1834

1.

Introduction

IN the fall of 1808 Prussia was still reeling from her catastrophic defeat at the hands of Napoleon. Her government had withdrawn to Konigsberg, and the king looked to a group of reform-minded officials led by Baron vom Stein to salvage what was left. Stein and his colleagues argued that Prussia's weakness was a natural consequence of the fact that the crown and bureaucracy had de­ prived the population of any voice in its own government. As a result, "love and eagerness for public affairs, all communal spirit, every feeling for making a sacrifice for the whole has been lost. Just to be a citizen has not been considered an honor for a long time now. On the contrary, one expected everything from the state, but without trusting in its measures and without true en­ thusiasm for the constitution."1 This situation had to be rectified if Prussia was to survive. Stein believed that "the participation of the nation in law making and administration cultivates a love of the constitution, a correct public opinion about national affairs, and the capability in many individual citizens to administer its business."2 Because experience in public life had been lacking for so long, it was imperative to begin by creating opportunities for 1 Kari Freiherr vom Stein, Britfe und Amtliche Schriften, ed. Erich Botzenhart etal., 9 vols. (Stuttgart, 1957-74), 2, pt. 1:931. 2 Ibid., p. 854. A useful discussion of the reform era may be found in Marion Gray's recent articles, "Government by Property Owners: Prussian Plans for Con­ stitutional Reform on the County, Provincial and National Levels in 1808," Jour­ nal of Modern History 48 (1976) and "Schroetter, Schon and Society: Aristocratic Liberalism versus Middle-Class Liberalism in Prussia, 1808," Central European History 6 (1973).

4

INTRODUCTION

participation of the people in local government. Prussia's people would then marshal their energies, defeat Bonaparte, and restore the Hohenzollerns to their proper place among the great powers of Europe. Thus, in the opinion of the policy makers of Prussia's reform era, participation in the affairs of local government was to provide an indispensable political education for the inexperienced, selfcentered subjects of the crown and to transform them into true citizens. This was an idea common to many political thinkers in nineteenth-century Europe. De Tocqueville praised local gov­ ernment in America for creating a "taste for authority" and an in­ terest "in the common weal."3 John Stuart Mill argued that an active central government, communicating with local institu­ tions, "completes the efficacy of local self-government as a means of instruction, by accustoming the people not only to judge of par­ ticular facts, but to understand and apply, and feel practically the value of, principles." It "teaches them by experience how public affairs must be carried on."4 The subject of the present study is the political education—to continue that nineteenth-century metaphor—of the business community on the Left Bank of the Rhine during the period be­ tween the French Revolution of 1789 and the formation of the German Customs Union of 1834. More specifically, it is a de­ tailed study of the political experiences of solidly established mer­ chants, bankers, and manufacturers in the three cities of Cologne, 3 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Richard D. Heffner (New York, Mentor abr. ed., 1956), p. 60. 4 John Stuart Mill, "M. de Tocqueville on Democracy in America," in The Phi­ losophy of John Stuart Mill, ed. Marshall Cohen (New York, 1961), pp. 140-41. One also finds the concept of practical political education in Karl von Altenstein's thinking on political reform in 1807, in J. C. Hoffmann's ideas on tax reform in Prussia in 1820, and in Friedrich List's ideas on the rise of industry. See Karl Baron von Altenstein, "Basic Organization of Internal Constitutional Relations (Sept. 11, 1807)," in Europe in the Nineteenth Century, vol. 1, ed. Eugene N. An­ derson et at. (New York, 1961), 37; Reinhard Koselleck, Preussen zwischen Re­ form und Revolution (Stuttgart, 1967), p. 534; and Guido de Ruggiero, The His­ tory of European Liberalism, trans. R. G. Collinwood (Boston, 1959), p. 246.

INTRODUCTION

5

Crefeld, and Aachen. As we shall see, their practical political edu­ cation consisted, not of academic study, but of active participation in decision making through semipublic representative institu­ tions, through officeholding, and through individual contacts with government figures.5 The object of this political activity was to articulate interests and to secure the adoption of policies favor­ able to business either through obtaining or preventing the state's intervention in the economy. More often than not businessmen realized their goals, and success in business and politics was re­ warded with prestige on the local, regional, and national levels. 5 In a state where sovereignty and political power are concentrated in a monarch, at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy, and where parliamentary bodies are weak or nonexistent, we need a broad definition of what is political, one that includes not just the ultimate decision-making authority but the mechanisms through which interests were articulated, laws administered, conflicts regulated or reduced, and officials recruited and trained. Within French and Prussian bureau­ cratic rule, these functions were served by city councils, chambers of commerce, and other institutions that were not always part of the centralized government. Such "self-administrative'' institutions, as they came to be called, enjoyed some of the independence of private persons, while they had public responsibilities and were dependent upon the official bureaucracy. The activities of these institutions, I believe, can rightly be considered political. See Gordon A. Craig, "Political His­ tory," in The Historian and the Worid of the Twentieth Century, Daedalus (spring 1971):110; see also Otto Henrich von der Gablentz, "Macht, Gestaltung und Recht: Die drei Wuraeln des politischen Denkens," in Die Entstehung des modernen souveranen Staates, Hanns Hubert Hofmann, ed. (Cologne, 1967), pp. 59, 68; Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York, 1964), p. 73; Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, 1975), p. 32. See also David Apter's The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965), p. 232; "Radicalization and Embourgeoisement: Some Hypotheses for a Comparative Study of History," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 1 (winter 1971):269; and Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968), p. 29. On the question of Selbstverwaltung, see Otto Most, Die Selbstverwaltung der Wirtschaft in den Industrie- und Handdskammem, 3rd ed. (Jena, 1927), p. 89; Ernst Rudolf Huber, Selbstverwaltung der Wirtschaft (Stuttgart, 1958), p. 7; Ludwig Minaty, Die Industrie- und Handelskammem als Trager wirtschaftXicher Selbstverwaltung (Diss. Cologne, 1932), pp. 4-7; Wolfram Fischer, Untemehmerschaft, Selbstverwaltung und Staat (Berlin, 1964), pp. 34-35; Heinrich Heffter, Die deutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart, 1969).

6

INTRODUCTION

Experiences such as these, very much what Stein had in mind, help to account for the political behavior of these leaders of the middle class during the subsequent decades and to explain the ul­ timate integration of the Rhenish businessman into the Prussian state. They also help to explain why liberalism in Germany did not develop in conformity with French and English liberalism, and to throw some light on the German variant of liberalism. Anglo-Saxon self-government, extolled by Mill and de Tocqueville, meant liberal, participatory democracy, something that eluded the Germans throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century. The failure of Western-style liberal democ­ racy to take root in Germany is a subject of such importance to German historians that it has been studied many times—so often, in fact, that it has been dubbed the "German question" or the "German problem."6 The answers offered by historians have gen­ erally rested on comparisons with a normative model derived primarily from English, and to a lesser degree from French, liberalism. Comparisons of the Continent with England were as common to men living in the nineteenth century as they are to historians today. It was also common to see a close relation be­ tween socioeconomic structure and the institutions of govern­ ment.7 Marx and Engels, however, were the ones who combined 6 For examples see Gerhard Ritter, The German Problem, trans. Siguard Burckhardt (Columbus, Ohio, 1965); Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (Garden City, N.Y., 1967); Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom (Boston, 1957); and Gabriel A. Almond, "The Politics of German Busi­ ness," in West German Leadership and Foreign Policy, ed. Hans Speier and W. Phillips Davison (Evanston, 111., 1957). 7 Liberal-minded bureaucrats in Prussia were attracted to English selfgovernment (as they understood it) and to the writings of Adam Smith. In the first half of the century, businessmen and officials from Germany regularly visited the leading industrial power. See Ludwig Freiherr von Vincke, Darstellung der innern VerwaltungGrossbritanniens, intro. B. G. Niebuhr (Berlin, 1815), p. 149; Gray, "Schroetter, Schon and Society," p. 63, and "Government by Property Owners," p. 32; Martin Schumacher, Auslandsreisen deutscher Unternehmer 1750-1851 unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung von Rheinland und Westfalen (Co­ logne, 1968); Carl William Hasek, The Introduction of Adam Smith's Doctrines into

INTRODUCTION

7

the industrial revolution, the rise of the new bourgeoisie, and the French tradition of revolutionary political emancipation into a powerful model of modernization that has held the attention of nearly all historians since, even when they reject it. The Marxian model assumes that English and French history reveal a "normal" development in which certain forms of eco­ nomic, social, political, and intellectual change should occur more or less together and in linear fashion.8 According to the model, the bourgeoisie, unless defective in some respect, is presumed to be progressive, individualistic, and resolutely opposed to bureau­ cracy, aristocracy, and autocracy. It is also presumed to be practi­ cal, and materialistic, yet highly principled and anxious to seize political power and leadership. The model entrepreneur is pre­ sumed to be economically liberal, standing firmly on the doctrine of laissez faire and opposing state intervention in the economy. The answer to the German question has been sought, then, in deviations from this model, although the model is sometimes more implicit than explicit.9 Historians commonly argue, for Germany (New York, 1925); and F. Gunter Eyck, "English and French Influ­ ences in German Liberalism before 1848," Journal of the History of Ideas 18 (1957). 8 For some of the large literature on modernization (broadly based on this model), see Dean C. Tipps, "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective,"Comparative Studies in Society and History 15 (1973); Lester M. Salamon,"Comparative History and the Theory of Moderniza­ tion," World Politics 23 (1970); S. N. Eisenstadt, "Studies of Modernization and Sociological Theory," History and Theory 13 (1974); Karl W. Deutsch, "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Social Integration," World Politics 5 (1953), and "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 55 (1961); Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York, 1966). See also Richard Ashcraft, "Marx and Weber on Liberalism as Bourgeois Ideology," Comparative Studies in Society and History 14(1972). 9 Eugene N. and Pauline R. Anderson, Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), p. 395; Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, 1840-1945 (New York, 1969), p. 20; William L. Langer, Political and Social Upheaval, 1832-1852 (New York, 1969), pp. 54-56; and Peter N. Stearns, The European Experience Since 1815 (New York, 1972), pp. 46-60, 62.

8

INTRODUCTION

example, that liberalism failed in Germany because the bourgeoi­ sie failed to develop along proper lines. This was due, they say, to a defect in the bourgeois class, to a defect in bourgeois conscious­ ness, or to both. The view most often advanced is that German liberalism, at least before 1848, "was predominantly an intellec­ tual movement, and preeminently a movement of intellectuals."10 According to this view, liberalism had its roots in academia, not in a strong, sizable middle class involved in trade and industry. This was because German industrialization came too late, in the 1840s or even after 1850.11 The bourgeoisie, and with it liberalism, was deprived of a strong social and economic base, and it lacked practical experience in the harsh real world. Bourgeois intellectuals stood virtually alone in liberalism's struggle with bu­ reaucratic absolutism, dooming their reform efforts to failure—the collapse of the revolution of 1848 being the most significant and spectacular example.12 Therefore successful liberalizing reform could come only from above or from outside, initiated by the 10 Krieger, p. 293. For similar views, see Heinrich Treitschke, History of Ger­ many in the Nineteenth Century, 7 vols., trans. Exlen and Cedar Paul (London, 1919), 2:15. 11 See, for example, David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 193ff.; W. O. Henderson, The Industrial Revolution in Europe (Chicago, 1961), pp. 29ff.; J. H. Clapham, Economic Development of France and Germany, 1815-1914, 4th ed. (Cambridge, 1961), passim; also Wolfgang Sauer, "Das Problem des deutschen Nationalstaates," in Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Cologne, 1966), p. 417; Ernest K. Bramsted, Aristocracy and Middle Classes in Germany, rev. ed. (Chicago, 1964), p. 44; Otto Pflanze, Bismarck and the Development of Germany (Princeton, 1963), p. 24; Heinrich Heffter, p. 168; Dahrendorf, pp. 47, 57. 12 Friedrich Meinecke, "The Year 1848 in German History: Reflections on a Centenary," Review of Politics 10 (1948):475ff.; Wilhelm Mommsen, Grdsse und Versagen des deutschen Burgertums (Stuttgart, 1949), pp. 165, 216ff.; Rudolf Stadelmann, Soziale und politische Geschichte der Revolution von 1848 (Munich, 1948), p. 187; Reinhold Aris, History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789 to 1815 (London, 1936), p. 35; Jacques Droz,VAllemagne et la Revolution franQatse (Paris, 1949), pp. 9, 20-21; and Ludwig Beutin, "Das Biirgertum als Gesellschaftsstand im 19. Jahrhundert," in Gesammelte Schriften zur Wirtschaftsund Sozialgeschichte, ed. Hermann Kellenbenz (Cologne, 1963), p. 288.

INTRODUCTION

9

liberal-minded members of the socially aristocratic bureaucracy. Due to its faulty development as a class, the bourgeoisie had to depend on the older and stronger elites.13 An alternative view is that German liberalism failed because bourgeois consciousness was defective, regardless of whether the bourgeois class should be regarded as defective. The middle class of the small territorial towns, caught up in a web of social and economic traditionalism, was sufficiently strong but was conser­ vative and particularist in outlook, rather than liberal.14 The eco­ nomic bourgeoisie of larger states like Prussia adopted the values of the aristocracy and acquiesced in autocratic rule because of cowardice in the face of increasingly militant workers and artisans or because of materialistic opportunism.15 And bourgeois intel­ lectuals failed to become independent of the values and ideas of the aristocracy, because of "immature German liberal thinking in general"—the concentration on moral rather than institutional questions and the facile reconciliation of freedom with existing authority—or because of an unrealistic cosmopolitanism or na­ tionalism. The bourgeoisie failed to develop its own "social and political standards." It never made the "solidary demands of a new political class," and thus lost its "revolutionary potential."16 13 Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy (Boston, 1966); Koselleck; and Karl-Georg Faber, "Strukturprobleme des deutschen Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhunderts," Der Staat 14 (1975). 14 Mack Walker, German Home Towns (Ithaca, 1971). 15 Theodore S. Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution·, Reaction (Princeton, 1958), pp. 138, 187-89; P. H. Noyes, Organization and Revolution (Princeton, 1966); Lothar Gall, "Liberalismus und burgerliche Gesellschaft," Historische Zeitschrift 220 (1975):346; Jacques Droz, "Liberale Anschauungen zur Wahlrechtsfrage und das preussische Dreiklassenwahlrecht," and Karl Griewank, "Ursachen. und Folgen des Scheiterns der deutschen Revolution von 1848," both in Moderne deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (1815-1918), ed. Ernst-Wolfgang Bockenforde (Cologne, 1972). Friedrich Engels offered a classic picture of the belated bour­ geoisie turning to the upper class out of fear of the proletariat. See The German Revolutions, ed. and intro. Leonard Krieger (Chicago, 1967), p. 7. 16 Krieger, pp. 76-77, 105; Dahrendorf, p. 52; Sauer, p. 409. According to Veit Valentin, 1848: Chapters of Germany History, trans. Ethel Talbot Schaf-

10

INTRODUCTION

The bourgeoisie is seen as defective, therefore, in that it did not provide the right kind of leadership at the right time, that it did not develop its own proper set of values, and that entrepreneurs depended on the authoritarian state for economic assistance. Whether or not we accept the Marxian model as normative, these explanations and interpretations still depend for their valid­ ity on definitions and assumptions about which there is little or no agreement. They depend, for instance, on how the bourgeoisie or middle class is defined and on how its social and economic strength is measured. This in turn depends on how industrializa­ tion is defined and measured, and what dates are used to bracket it. The "bourgeoisie," however, has been variously defined, and the weakness of the German bourgeoisie disputed. And though historians have increasingly made industrialization the "leit­ motif" of modern German history, there is no real consensus on precisely when German industrialization began or how to con­ ceptualize and measure its early phases.17 Certainly the industrial revolution began earlier in some parts of Germany than in others. fauer (London, 1940), p. 428, the middle class came to believe "in its own politi­ cal inefficiency." See also Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance, trans. Charles Fullman (New York, 1962), p. 225; Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, pp. 207, 215; Richard Tilly, Financial Institutions and Industrialization in the Rhineland 1815-1866 (Madison, 1966), p. 138; Hans Rosenberg, Rudolf Haym und die Anfange des klassischen Liberalismus, Historische Zeitschrift supp. 31 (Munich, 1933), p. 146; Beutin, p. 297. The East German historian Dietrich Eichholtz feels that by virtue of their social class, businessmen naturally should oppose the nobility. Cooperation between the bureaucracy and business thus is seen as the clever corruption of the Junkers by their class enemies, the bourgeoi­ sie. See his Junker und Bourgeoisie vor 1848 in der preussischen Eisenbahngeschichte (Berlin, 1962), pp. 125-38. "Walter G. HoiFman, "The Take-Off in Germany," in The Economics of Take-Off into Sustained Growth, ed. W. W. Rostow (London, 1963); Knut Borchardt, "Germany 1700-1917," in The Fontana Economic History of Europe, ed. Carlo M. Cipolla, vol. 4, pt. 1, The Emergence of Industrial Societies (Glasgow, 1972); W. O. Henderson, The Rise of German Industrial Power, 1834-1914 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975); and Friedrich-Wilhelm Henning, "Die Wirtschaftsstruktur mitteleuropaischer Gebiete an der Wende zum 19. Jahrhundert unter besonderer Berucksichtigung des gewerblichen Bereichs," in Beitrage

INTRODUCTION

11

Furthermore, if German "liberal thinking" is to be judged im­ mature, then it is necessary to define liberalism. In the nineteenth century, except when used as a specific party label, liberal and liberalism carried vague and often contradictory meanings.18 Today some scholars depict liberalism in terms of concrete politi­ cal goals and programs including demands for constitutional and representative government, civil rights, and ministerial responsi­ bility, or, more abstractly, for "political emancipation in the state," "freedom secured through law," and "an end to unearned privilege and unproductive social restrictions."19 Others argue against defining liberalism in terms of positive political demands for participation in government, preferring to define it in terms of a seeking for freedom from arbitrary authority.20 So here again there is no agreement. zu Wirtschaftswachstum und Wirtschaftsstruktur im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Wolfram Fischer (Berlin, 1971); Felix Gilbert, "Awareness of the Industrial Age in Imperial Germany," paper read at the 91st Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, December 29, 1976. 18 Detractors, for example, used liberal, revolutionary, and radical as synonyms. See G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, "Liberalism, Nationalism and Socialism: The Birth of Three Words," The Review of Politics 32 (1970); David G. Smith, "Liberalism," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 9 (n.p., 1968); Fritz Valjavec, Die Entstehung der politischen Stromungen in Deutsehland 17701815 (Munich, 1951); Faber, "Strukturprobleme des deutschen Liberalismus"; and the essays in Lothar Gall, ed., Liberalismus (Cologne, 1976). 18Theodor Schieder, "Das Verhaltnis von gesellschafdicher und politischer Verfassung und die Krise des biirgerlichen Liberalismus," Historische Zeitschrift 177 (1954): 50; Harold J. Laski, The Rise of Liberalism (New York, 1936); An­ drew Lees, Revolution and Reflection (The Hague, 1974); and James J. Sheehan, "Partei, Volk, and Staat: Some Reflections on the Relationship between Liberal Thought and Action in Vormarz," in Sozialgeschichte Heute, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Gottingen, 1974), p. 163. Among the most stimulating recent treat­ ments of German liberalism in the Vormarz are to be found in Sheehan's articles "Liberalism and Society in Germany, 1815-1848," Journal of Modem History 45 (1973), and "Liberalism and the City in Nineteenth-Century Germany,"Past and Present 51 (1971), and in his recent book, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1978). 20 Gall, "Liberalismus und burgerliche Gesellschaft," p. 325, defines liberalism as "the spontaneous combination of like-minded individuals whose main goal was

12

INTRODUCTION

And finally, there is the question of just what political entity we are talking about when we talk of "Germany." Throughout the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century there was no Germany, only a loose confederation of states that differed greatly in size, so­ cial condition, and degree of economic development.21 There was a diversity of experience. Recent research suggests that relations between states and entrepreneurs were varied and extremely complex, especially in the period of early industrialization. States sometimes helped but also often hindered economic change, and entrepreneurs sometimes sought and sometimes opposed inter­ vention by government.22 This lack of consensus on terms and definitions makes comthe establishment of a representative constitutional state with the rights of inter­ vention in the individual acts of its members and in the relations between individ­ uals negatively defined and clearly outlined in a catalog of basic rights, whereby the extent of these rights of intervention was directed away from the individual, conceived in an idealistic form as being freely and responsibly capable of acting in every spiritual as well as material respect." See also F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London, 1960), pp. 11-22; Franz Schnabel, Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, 4 vols. (Freiburg, 1929-37), 2:92-93; Ruggiero, p. 359. In "Theologischer Rationalismus und vormarzlicher Vulgarliberalismus," Politiscke Denkstmmungen im deutschen Vormarz (Gottingen, 1972), Hans Rosenberg points out that liberalism had several, sometimes contradictory mean­ ings, yet he still asserts the need and possibility of grasping the "essence" of liberalism, of speaking of "dem Liberalismus." 21 Krieger and Henri Braunschwig, for example, both encountered difficulty trying to combine Prussian with German history in this period. See Henri Braunschwig, Enlightenment and Romanticism in Eighteenth Century Prussia, trans. Frank Jellinek (Chicago, 1974). 22 An important collection of articles on the question of early industrialization is to be found in Peter Kriedte, Hans Medick, and Jiirgen Schlumbohm, lndustrialisierung vor der lndustrialisierung (Gottingen, 1977). See also Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); W. O. Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution in Prussia (Liverpool, 1958). A useful survey of the Marxist literature on the role of the Prussian state in modernization may be found in Jiirgen Kocka, "Preussischer Staat und Modernisierung im Vormarz: Marxistisch-Ieninistische Interpretationen und ihre Probleme," in SoziaJgeschichte Heute, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Gottingen, 1974).

INTRODUCTION

13

parisons with a model difficult and the results questionable. Moreover, while models have their advantages, there is always the temptation to look more at the model than at actual events. It seems potentially more profitable in the present case to study the actual political, social, economic, and intellectual behavior of the bourgeoisie in a specific region of Germany during a specific pe­ riod of time; to see what their political education did consist of; and to observe what sorts of liberal institutions actually devel­ oped, and how. Although a regional study cannot by itself solve the larger question of the failure of liberal democracy, it avoids many of the complex problems encountered by scholars working on a broader level, making possible a clearer if more limited pic­ ture, and thereby contributing to a solution of the larger problem. The region chosen for this study—the Rhineland—was not typical of all of Germany, but it was particularly important. Eco­ nomically it was one of the most advanced areas and had the most contact with the West, especially as a result of the Napoleonic era. The Rhenish bourgeoisie was relatively strong, both socially and economically, and it was not limited to intellectuals, though Rhenish entrepreneurs have at times been described as spokes­ men of intellectual liberalism and even as "ideologists."23 In the decades before 1848, the stirrings of industrialization coincided there with early liberalism; businessmen were active politically, and men like David Hansemann, Ludolf Camphausen, Gustav von Mevissen, and Hermann von Beckerath were central 23 Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, pp. 59, 101; Retre Ay?oberry, "Probleme der Sozialschichtung in Koln im Zeitalter der Friihindustrialisierung," in Wirtschafts-und Sozialgeschichtliche Probleme der friihen Industrialisierung, ed. Wolfram Fischer (Berlin, 1968), pp. 514-15; Heinz Boberach,WaMrechtsfrage im Vormarz (Diisseldorf, 1959), p. 64; both Treitschke, 7:435ff., and Ernst Rudolf Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte sat 1789, 4 vols. (Stuttgart, 1960), 2:394-95, name the same Rhenish businessmen as the most prominent liberal leaders in Prussia in 1848. The best study of Rhenish liberalism, that of Jacques Droz, Liberalisme rhenan 1815-1848 (Paris, 1940), deals more with the history of political ideas than the kind of political education I am concerned with here.

14

INTRODUCTION

figures.24 An examination of the origins of Rhenish patterns of political behavior and leadership during the early years of eco­ nomic modernization yields insights into the meaning of liberal politics and helps to clarify the issues of bourgeois political and economic initiative. And a closer look at the process by which Rhinelanders became Prussian patriots helps to explain the proc­ ess of nation building and social and political integration. All of this helps our understanding of the German problem—the failure of liberal democracy. From 1789 to 1834, the Left Bank of the Rhine experienced an enormous amount of change, change that broke it free of the old regime and set the course for its future. In 1789 the Germanspeaking world was still contained within the institutions of the thousand-year-old Holy Roman Empire. In spite of some at­ tempts at reform by absolutist monarchs in Prussia and Austria and in spite of an upsurge of economic activity in some areas, the structure of German social, political, and economic life remained largely patriarchal and corporate. It was a structure based on cus­ tom, privilege, and law, and on the provisions of the Treaty of Westphalia. The Rhineland, dominated by petty ecclesiastical princes, was notorious for particularism and backwardness.25 24 The major biographies of the liberal Rhenish businessmen are Alexander Bergengriin, David Hansemann (Berlin, 1901); Bergengrun, Staatsminister Au­ gust Freiherrvonder Heydt (Leipzig, 1908); Louis Berger, Deralte Harkort (Leip­ zig, 1891); Wolfgang Kollmann, Friedrich Harkort (Diisseldorf, 1964); Joseph Hansen, Gustav von Mevissen, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1906); Mathieu Schwann,Ludolf Camphausen als Wirtschafispolitiker (Essen, 1915); Anna Caspa ry, Ludolf Camphausens Leben nach seinem schriftlichen Nachlass (Stuttgart, 1902); and Heinz Boberach, "Hermann von Beckerath (1801-1870)," Rheinische Lebensbilder, vol. 2 (Diisseldorf, 1966). See also Erich Brandenberg, ed., Konig Friedrich Wilhelm IVs Briefwechsel mit Ludolf Camphausen (Berlin, 1906); Bernard Poll, ed., David Hansemann, 1790, 1864, 1964 (Aachen, 1964); Johanna Koster, Der rheinische Friihliberalismus und die soziale Frage (Berlin, 1938); and Donald G. Rohr, The Origins of Social Liberalism in Germany (Chicago, 1963). 25 For some contemporary views, see Joseph Hansen, Quellen zur Gesehichte des Rheirdandes im Zeitalter der framosisehen Revolution, 1780-1801 (Bonn, 193139), l:79n, 928n. (Henceforth cited as Hansen, Quellen).

INTRODUCTION

·

15

Only five years later French armies abolished most (though not all) of the old social and economic privileges along with the exist­ ing state system. Modern legal codes were introduced, and corpo­ rate institutions were either destroyed or so reformed that partici­ pation depended upon occupation rather than upon birth. In 1797 the Rhineland was annexed to France and Rhinelanders be­ came French citizens. When Napoleon was defeated and the French withdrew, the Congress of Vienna simplified the political map of Germany and awarded the major part of the Rhineland to Prussia, forcing its inhabitants to adjust to still another set of con­ ditions. Although Napoleon had created a vassal state in the Kingdom of Westphalia, the Right Bank had never been fully integrated with France. French political practice on the Right Bank, though similar in many respects to that on the Left Bank, had differed in that residents on the eastern shore had not experienced union with a powerful nation-state, nor had all of the major French in­ stitutions been fully established there.26 The Left Bank of the Rhine had been divided into four administrative areas called de­ partments. In 1815, when Prussia was given territory on both sides of the Rhine, it acquired the entire Roer and virtually all of the Sarre departments and the Rhine and Moselle department. The rest was divided among Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, and Nassau, but only in Prussia were most of the French reforms retained. Within the new Prussian territory, the cities of greatest economic importance were Cologne, Aachen, and Crefeld. Cologne, the largest city in the Rhineland, was the major trading center on the river; Aachen and Crefeld were the leading manufacturing cen­ ters on the Left Bank. All three were located in what had been the 26 See Charles Schmidt, Le Grand-Duche de Berg (1806-1813) (Paris, 1905); Elisabeth Fehrenbach, Traditionale Gesellschaft und revolutiondres Recht (Got­ tingen, 1974); Helmut Berding, Napoleonische Herrsehafts- und Gesellsehaftspolitik im Konigreieh Westfalen 1807-1813 (Gottingen, 1973); and Rudolf Goecke, Das Grossherzogtum Berg unter Joachim Murat, Napoleon I und Louis Napoleon 1806-1813 (Cologne, 1877).

16

INTRODUCTION

Roer department under the French. These cities are therefore log­ ical locations in which to examine the Left Bank business com­ munity during the period of transition. By restricting the inquiry to three important and at the same time representative cities, the experiences of the middle class can be studied in sufficient detail to provide a solid analysis of its political education.27 The year chosen for the end of this study is significant on sev­ eral counts. Under Prussian sponsorship the German Customs Union was formed in 1834. As the last of the great reforms begun by the generation of progressive Prussian administrators that had come to power during the Napoleonic period, the Customs Union marked a turning from internal economic and political consolida­ tion and integration to expansion of Prussia's relations with her neighbors. By 1834 the territories gained by Prussia at the Con­ gress of Vienna had been absorbed successfully, and the Customs Union bridged the geographical discontinuity in the monarchy. By that date too, Rhenish particularism had been transformed into French and then Prussian citizenship. By creating a new na­ tional market for trade, the Customs Union marked the end of the long depression that had followed the Napoleonic wars. Eco­ nomic conditions improved and, stimulated partly by Prussian influence and partly by dynamic forces that had survived from the period of French rule, Rhenish entrepreneurs took the lead in in­ troducing railroads, steamships, and new banking and insurance techniques in Prussia and in neighboring German states. Popula­ tion growth and geographic mobility contributed to increased urbanization and economic growth as the Prussian Rhineland be27 Bruno Kuske, "Die Rheinische Stadte," in Geschichte des Rheinlandes von der dltesten Zeit bis zur Gegenwart, Hermann Aubin et al., 2 vols. (Essen, 1922), 2:71; Otto Hintze and Gustav Schmoller, eds., Die preussische Seidenindustrie im 18. Jahrhundert, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1892), 3:665; Richard Wolfferts, "Wilhelm von Humboldtim gastfreien Hause von der Leyen in Krefeld (1789)," Die Heimat 8, no. 3 (1929):207. Only Mainz rivaled these three cities in economic importance on the Left Bank, and it became part of Hesse in 1815. Neither Koblenz, Trier, nor Bonn obtained great significance as trading or manufacturing centers.

INTRODUCTION

17

came the most industrialized and perhaps most modern area in Germany.28 In both a political and economic sense, therefore, the creation of the Customs Union can be seen as concluding the Rhineland's long period of transition from the old regime. In his detailed study of Rhenish-Westphalian entrepreneurs, Friedrich Zunkel declares that "the political behavior of the Rhineland-Westphalian entrepreneurial class during the 1830s and 1840s can only be understood in terms of the political experi­ ences which the two provinces had had since the time of the French Revolution."29 However, since Zunkel, like other histo­ rians, has concentrated his attention on the middle third of the nineteenth century, he has examined only briefly the relationship between government and businessmen during the critical transi­ tional decades prior to 1834.30 The purpose of this present study of the earlier period is twofold: to show the character of the early liberalism of Rhenish businessmen, and, of greater importance, to show how concrete experience provided an important part of the German bourgeoisie with a lasting and fateful political education. 28 Alfred Kriiger Das kolner Bankiergewerbe vom Endedes 18. Jahrhunderts bis 1 1875 (Essen, 1925), p. 15, argues that the modernization of Cologne's banking establishments, at least in terms of investment practices, had been completed by around 1830. 29Friedrich Zunkel, Der rheinisch-westfalische Untemehmer 1834-1879 (Co­ logne, 1962), p. 133. 30 Students of Rhenish history offer diametrically opposed views on the rela­ tionship between government and business in the early nineteenth century. John Gillis, Friedrich Zunkel, and James Sheehan stress a close working relationship between local government and business; Richard Tilly argues the reverse. See John Gillis, The Prussian Bureaucracy in Crisis, 1840-1860 (Stanford, 1971), p. 17; Zunkel's Der rheinisch-westfalische Untemehmer, p. 198, and his "Beamtenschaft und Untemehmertum beim Aufbau der Ruhrindustrie 1849-1880," Tradition 9 (1964):264-67; Sheehan's "Liberalism and Society," pp. 500-501, and "Liberalism and the City," pp. 118-20; and Richard Tilly, "The Political Elconomy of Public Finance and the Industrialization of Prussia, 1815-1866," Journal of Economic History 26 (1966):496. The conclusions reached by Rhenish scholars working in the first half of the twentieth century must be viewed with caution; their work was often influenced by Francophobia or Francophilia. For example, see Wilhelm Steffens, "Die linksrheinischen Provinzen Preussens unter

18

INTRODUCTION

There are several conceptual ambiguities in the sources that must be faced before beginning. It is important to know from the outset what is meant by such terms as businessman and middle class. The term businessman, for example, can have a number of meanings. As commonly used by historians of the nineteenth cen­ tury, it includes "all those whose main occupation was manufac­ turing, commerce, or banking."31 For the period under consider­ ation, however, these occupational descriptions cannot be very precise. Most bankers were also merchants, as were most factory owners or manufacturers. The term manufacturer might apply to a master artisan or merchant who employed more journeymen than the limit allowed by the guild, or it might indicate a mer­ chant engaged in a putting-out system.32 Sidestepping the prob­ lem by using the label entrepreneurs is not helpful, for this term connotes an innovator whose improvements led to dramatically increased production of goods.33 As such, the term is too openended; it includes any and all social groups. The problem is complicated by variations in usage. French and Prussian censuses do not always distinguish between manufac­ turers and factory owners or between manufacturers and mer­ chants. Most commonly the word merchant (Kaufmann in Ger­ man or negociant in French) meant a man with merchant's rights or a credit standing that allowed him to engage in wholesale franzosischer Herrschaft 1794-1802," Rheinische Vierteljahrsblatter 19 (1954):402, 411, and Hansen, Quellen, 4:1299. 31 Lenore OiBoyle, "The Middle Class in Western Europe, 1815-1848," American Historical Review 71 (1966):828n. 32 Philomene Beckers, "Parteien und Parteikampf in der Reichstadt Aachen im letzten Jahrhundert ihres Bestehens," Zeitsehrift des Aaehener Geschichtsvereins 56 (1935): 109. See also Rudolf Forberger, "Zur Auseinandersetzung iiber das Problem des Obergangs von der Manufaktur zur Fabrik," in Beitrage zur deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, ed. E. Giersiepen (Berlin, 1962), pp. 174-76. 33 Wolfgang Zorn, "Typen und Entwicklungskrafte deutschen Unternehmertums im 19. Jahrhunderts," Vierteljahrssehrift fur Soaal- und Wirtsehaftsgesehichte 44 (1957):61.

INTRODUCTION

19

trade, which, in turn, might or might not be related to the putting-out industry. Finally, there was little to prevent a petty shopkeeper from using the term merchant, even if he lacked the requisite credit standing, and sometimes such occupational labels appear in the documents. Consequently, while businessmen will mean here mainly bankers, merchants of recognized standing, or manufacturers (including merchant/manufacturers), some unavoidable ambiguities will remain. A related question is to what extent businessmen fall within the definition of middle class or, to use the French and German words, bourgeoisie, Burgertum, or Mittelstand.34 The difficulty with these words is that they would include for this period not only businessmen but professional men (including most intellec­ tuals), civil servants or lower-level state officials, and sometimes master artisans. James Sheehan has defined Burgertum as "nonaristocratic groups with a comfortable income and a secure place in an economic, cultural, or governmental institution."35 How­ ever, some businessmen obtained noble status and privileges without abandoning their occupation or ceasing to be notables (Honoratioren) in their own communities. It is not suitable, then, to label them either middle or upper class; in some sense they are both, and income level cannot differentiate between the two. The same is true of the old urban patriciates, the dominant families of some towns.36 Finally, to interpret Biirger as "town citizen" is 34 For penetrating discussions of these and related terms, see Manfred Riedel, "Biirger, Staatsbiirger, Biirgertum," and "Gesellschaft, Biirgerliche," in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, ed. Otto Brunner et al., vols. 1 and 2 (Stuttgart, 1973-75); and Heinrich August Winkler, 'Biirgertum," in Sowjetsystem und demokratische Gesellschaft, ed. Claus Dieter Kernig, vol. 1 (Freiburg, 1966). Also Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England, trans. W. 0. Henderson and W. H. Chaloner (Stanford, 1968), p. 5. 35 James J. Sheehan, "Conflict and Cohesion Among German Elites in the Nineteenth Century," in Robert J. Bezucha, ed., Modem European Social History (Lexington, Mass., 1972), p. 25. 36 Schieder, "Das VerMtnis von gesellschaftlicher und politischer Verfassung,"p. 65; Walker, German Home Tovms, pp. 27-28, 59-61. In his "Liberalism

20

INTRODUCTION

also imprecise, since after the French invasion of the Rhineland, all residents were citizens. Indeed, the meaning of the phrase bourgeois society was changing in the first half of the nineteenth century.37 Thus, while there are obvious connections between the business community and the various concepts of middle class, no clear-cut class definitions can be made, and we can avoid some of the problems inherent in a "class analysis" by focusing on busi­ nessmen as an occupational group rather than a class. At the same time, the relationship between the concepts of businessmen and middle class is such that we can nevertheless learn about a sig­ nificant segment of the German middle class by studying busi­ nessmen in the Rhineland. and the City in Nineteenth-Century Germany," p. 119, James Sheehan defines HonoraHoren as "men who possessed both a secure position in local society and a sense of belonging to a leadership group." 37 See Lothar Gall, "Liberalismus und biirgerliche Gesellschaft."

Part I From the Old Regime to Union with France

2. The Old Regime on the Rhine

IN the winter of 1792, the armies of the French Republic marched into the Rhineland. Though driven out very shortly by the Austrians, the French returned in the autumn of 1794 and for the next twenty years occupied the Left Bank of the Rhine. In many respects the French invasion caused a decisive break with the past, as centuries of traditional institutions, ways of thinking and acting were swept away. Revolutionary reform was imposed from the outside, from Paris, but it struck deep roots in the Rhineland in a fairly short time. This suggests that there was con­ siderable continuity from the old regime to the new. The struc­ ture of old political institutions, the tensions caused by the con­ flict between new economic and cultural trends and traditional types of behavior, and the political disputes of the last half of the eighteenth century all combined to make Rhinelanders suscepti­ ble to French innovations and to influence their responses to the challenges posed by French rule. A brief look at conditions in Aachen, Cologne, and Crefeld during those years will give an idea of the soil in which the French sought to plant the tree of liberty. The Heritage of the Old Regime At the time of the French Revolution, the Rhineland was a complex mixture of political, economic, and religious units. One scholar lists "4 imperial electorates, 9 dukedoms, 3 principalities, 6 princely abbeys and imperial religious foundations, 3 imperial

24

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

cities, 18 earldoms subject only to the emperor, 38 independent manors," and many smaller units possessing varying degrees of sovereignty.1 This Kleinstaaterei, this dappled political map of petty states, naturally affected the character of life within each state. Aachen and Cologne were free imperial cities, tracing their status as direct subjects of the Holy Roman emperor back to the late Middle Ages. In both cities government rested in the hands of councils made up of members of the local guilds, and the coun­ cils elected and supervised mayors and magistrates to carry out the actual administration of city affairs. The right of citizenship was conferred only upon men who were Catholic, self-sup­ porting, and members of the town guilds. Wealthy merchants and nobles as well as artisans belonged to the guilds and thereby participated in city government; citizenship thus had a corporate basis that was not one of estate or class.2 At least for the citizenry, 1 Max Bar, Die Behordenverfassung der Rheinprovtnz seit 1815 (Bonn, 1919), p. 1. 2 Aachen enjoyed a constitution based upon the Gaffelbrief of 1450, which es­ tablished the independence of the city. The right of citizenship was conferred only upon men who were Catholic, self-supporting, and members of one of the city's fourteen guilds (Gaffdn). Each guild elected eight delegates to the "Great Coun­ cil" (Grosser Rat)·, two of the eight were also members of the "Small Council" (Kleiner Rat). The "Great Council" met only on special occasions to elect the "Small Council." The actual governing power in the city resided in the latter council, the two mayors, and the magistrates, or administrators. The mayors, the Biirgerbiirgermeister and the Schdffenbiirgermeister, as well as the magistrates were chosen and supervised by the "Small Council." The Schoffenbiirgermeister had to be chosen from among the thirteen members of the SchoffenstiM, or high court. The structure of Cologne's government was similar to that of Aachen's. Accord­ ing to the founding patents of 1396 and 1513, the forty-nine-member council of the city was to be chosen each year by the citizenry and, as in Aachen, citizens had to be self-supporting, Catholic, and members of one of the city's twenty-two guilds. (A survey of 1779 showed some 4,300 citizens registered on the guild membership rolls out of a total population of roughly 50,000 inhabitants.) The council in turn elected from among its members six mayors, only two of whom were actually active at one time, and other city officials. For decisions on very im­ portant matters, the council was joined by two additional delegates from each guild (the "44"). See Georg Weingartner, Zur Geschiehte der kolner Zunftunruhen am Ende des 18.Jahrhunderts (Diss. Miinster, 1913), p. 2; Bar, pp. 25ff.; Hansen,

OLD REGIME ON THE RHINE

25

strong local traditions of self-government gave a specific meaning to the concepts of nation, fatherland, and patria; residents of a city referred to the city itself, rather than to the amorphous German Empire, as their "nation" or "fatherland."3 While both cities, then, were republican city-states, neither en­ joyed complete sovereignty. In Aachen the yearly election of the mayors and magistrates was subject to the approval of the prince-protector of the city, the duke of Jiilich and Pfalz-Bayern. Cologne's protector was the elector and archbishop of Cologne. This ecclesiastical prince, who resided in Bonn and whose ter­ ritories surrounded the city, had legal sovereignty only over the civil high court, the members of which he appointed. However, the lofty masonry of the archbishop's cathedral, its gothic towers still unfinished, stood in the center of the town and reminded residents of his authority, just as in Aachen, Charlemagne's cathedral symbolized that city's ties to the Empire. Both cities had repeatedly fought the Empire and the Church for the right to maintain their own courts independent of ecclesiastical law, and both had resisted outside interference in local affairs, especially the imposition of forced loans and taxes. When unable to solve their internal disputes, however, both had recourse to the Em­ pire's court system, including the imperial privy council in Vi­ enna and the imperial supreme court in Wetzlar. Moreover, the Empire maintained an ambassador, or resident, in the Rhineland who reported to Vienna on the state of local affairs.4 Enforced guild membership and religious intolerance not only helped to structure the political life of Cologne and Aachen, but affected their economic life as well. Since the Middle Ages, Aachen had been the center of the trading and manufacturing Quellen, 1:38-41; Herbert Milz, Das kolner Grossgewerbe von 1750 bis 1835 (Co­ logne, 1962), p. 11; Karl Teppe, "Zur Charakterisierung der lokalen Unruhen in Aachen 1786 bis 1792," Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsvereins 82 (1972). 3 Hansen, Quellen, l:444n, 649-51. 4 Hansen, Quellen, 1:18*, 110-12; Clemens Theodor Perthes, Politisehe Zustande und Personen in Deutsehland zur Zeit der frartzostschen Herrschaft, vol. 1 (Gotha, 1862), 129ff.; Kuske, p. 85.

26

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

areas that included what is now much of Belgium and the north­ ern EiflFel. Aachen boasted strong cloth, brass, and needle indus­ tries, all of which were guild organized, with both the mer­ chant/manufacturers and the actual artisans belonging to the guilds. The guilds, by controlling the number of apprentices, re­ stricted the size of each firm and, by requiring that a certain number of guildsmen be employed even in bad times, reduced the economic flexibility of the firms. All three industries produced goods from high quality raw materials that had to be imported. This made the local economy dependent upon the tariff practices of neighboring states.5 During the Reformation, most of the rising entrepreneurs in Aachen became Protestants, and that confession even obtained a majority in the city government. Emperor Rudolf II reacted to this situation by intervening in 1598 and 1614 and establishing Catholicism as the only tolerated religion in Aachen. The Protes­ tant businessmen gradually withdrew to small neighboring towns such as Burtscheid, Eupen, Duren, Vaals, and Monschau (also known as Montjoie), where they found both freedom of religion and freedom from guild restrictions.6 The von Clermonts in 5

See Max Barkhausen, "Der Aufstieg der rheinischen Industrie im 18. Jahrhundert," Rheinische Vierteljahrsblatter 19 (1954): 149-59; Herbert Kisch, "The Textile Industries in Silesia and the Rhineland: A Comparative Study in Industri­ alization," Journal of Emnomic History, 19 (1959) and "Growth Deterrents of a Medieval Heritage: The Aachen-Area Woolen Trades before 1790," Journal of Economic History, 24 (1964); Alphons Thun, Die Industrie am Niederrhein und ihrer Arbeiter, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1879), 2, pt. 1; Joseph Koch, "Geschichte der Aachener Nahnadelzunft und Nahnadelindustrie bis zur Aufhebung der Ziinft in der franzosischen Zeit (1798)," Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsvereins 41 (1920):16-122; Joseph Strauch, Die Aachener Tuchindustrie wahrend der fran­ zosischen Herrschaft (1794-1815) (Diss. Miinster, 1922); and Teppe, pp. 41£f. 6 Ironically, the very Kleinstaaterei which so restricted the political development of the Rhineland facilitated economic growth by permitting the existence of toler­ ant, guild-free states in close proximity to the older, intolerant trading centers. En­ trepreneurs needed only to move a short distance from an uncongenial milieu to find more favorable conditions. See David Landes, "Japan and Europe: Contrasts in Industrialization," in The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan, ed. William W. Lockwood (Princeton, 1965), p. 137.

OLD REGIME ON THE RHINE

27

Vaals, the Scheiblers in Monschau, and the Lowenichs of Burtscheid, for example, turned these freedoms to their advan­ tage and built cloth manufactories of world reknown.7 The exodus of Aachen's most innovative entrepreneurs left the city's economy controlled primarily by guilds, which were more inter­ ested in security than in development. It is important to note, however, that Aachen's economy did not stagnate completely. Some Catholic entrepreneurs in the town circumvented the re­ strictions of the guilds by having members of the same family be­ long to different guilds. This made possible larger firms because artisans and apprentices from different guilds could all work under a single roof. The cloth, brass, and needle manufactories were thus able to continue, though on a smaller scale than in the outlying towns, and the city remained a trade center. It is not surprising, however, that the abolition of the guild system by the French brought a resurgence of Aachen's industry. In Cologne, as in Aachen, both Protestants and innovative en­ trepreneurs faced the obstacles of religious intolerance and guild domination of the economy. Following the Treaty of Westphalia and a subsequent city-council decision in 1714, Protestants were not allowed to practice their religion within the city walls, nor were they allowed to become artisans, engage in retail trade, or practice the business of forwarding or transshipping goods—the most profitable business in Cologne. On the one hand, religious restrictions and guild opposition to large-scale manufacturing drove away such entrepreneurs as the Andreas family, who moved their silk firm to Miilheim on the Rhine in the early eight­ eenth century. On the other hand, the remaining Protestant families came to dominate the wholesale trade, the only trade left open to them.8 Protestant success in this field contributed to arti7 See

Kisch, "Growth Deterrents." Gothein, Verfassungs- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Stadt Cdln vom Untergange der Retchsfreiheit bis zur Errichtung des Deutsehen Reiehes, in Die Stadt Coin im ersten Jahrhundert unter preussiseher Herrschaft 1815-1915, vol. 1, pt. 1 (Cologne, 1916), 55ff.; Mathieu Schwann, Gesehichte der Kolner Handelskammer 8 Eberhard

28

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

san hostility toward this successful minority in the 1780s. It is also interesting that of Cologne's leading Catholic merchant/ manufacturers, many were of French or Italian origin: the Dumonts, Foveaux, Boisserees, Farinas, Molinaris, and Cassinones.9 Members of these families held public office both before and after the French marched through the city gates in 1794. Trade in Cologne was directly related to the town's "staple right" (Stapelrecht) and "transshipment right" (Umschlagsrecht), medieval privileges that together supported Cologne's economy. The staple right, originally designed to guarantee the provision­ ing of the city, was the right to require all merchant vessels pass­ ing Cologne on the Rhine to unload their cargo and offer the mer­ chandise for sale for several days in the city's warehouse, where anyone could buy it. The shipper could then reload and continue his voyage. By the eighteenth century, shippers were usually al­ lowed to pay a fee instead of offering their goods for sale, and in exchange Cologne merchants were given the right to act as for­ warding agents, collecting commissions on each transshipment. Cologne's claim to the privilege of collecting transshipment commissions was reinforced by her strategic position on the Rhine. Upriver from the Low Countries toward Basel, the Rhine became narrower and swifter, making it necessary to transfer car­ goes to progressively smaller boats when going upstream; when going downstream it was economically more efficient to shift car­ goes to larger boats when possible. The physical geography of the Rhine was such that the two transfer points had to be somewhere near Cologne and Mainz, and since those cities already enjoyed the staple right, which entailed the unloading of cargo, they also became the transfer points for Rhine shipping.10 (Cologne, 1906), pp. 30-31; Milz, p. 79. About one-fifth of the city's 250 major merchants were Protestants. For a broad treatment of Cologne's economic history, see Hermann Kellenbenz and Klara van Eyll, eds., Zwei Jahrtausande Kolner Wirtschaft, 2 vols. (Cologne, 1975). " Gothein, p. 61. 10 Ibid., p. 67. Gothein points out that already in the late eighteenth century the

OLD REGIME ON THE RHINE

29

The staple and transshipment rights were a virtual guarantee that Cologne would remain a major trading center, and the city was prepared to use force to insure that all Rhine traffic observed these rights. The considerable harbor activity supported a large number of dock workers, warehousemen, and others associated with shipping, and the city treasury was supported by fees charged for use of port facilities. Since most shipping originated in the market towns of Holland or in Frankfurt, the great mer­ chant houses of Cologne came to specialize almost exclusively in forwarding or transshipment, taking advantage of the forced un­ loading of Rhine ships by acting as middlemen. Dutch colonial goods and spices, South German textiles and metal products, and Italian luxury goods were the most important forwarded cargoes. The wholesale merchants, who were for the most part Protestant, dealt with the Dutch and Frankfurt forwarding agents, and also arranged their own shipments of goods produced in Cologne and the middle Rhineland—wines, tobacco products, leather goods, and textiles. The health of Cologne's economy was therefore dependent upon the Rhine trade, not upon manufacture, and when rising river tolls in the eighteenth century forced traders to seek other north-south routes, Cologne's prosperity was seriously en­ dangered. In 1783, J. C. Riesbeck, though certainly exaggerat­ ing, declared that Cologne was "at least a century behind the rest of Germany," both economically and culturally.11 More than half the land inside the city walls was still used for agriculture— mostly vineyards and vegetable gardens—and for lack of money many of the homes and public buildings were very poorly mainDutch had developed a medium-sized barge capable of making the entire trip to Frankfurt, though these boats were not in general use. Steam power, of course, made transshipment by use of several boats unnecessary. There were forty-one toll stations on the Rhine between Neuenberg and Rotterdam. For Mainz, see F. G. Dreyfus, Societes et mentalites a Mayence dans la seeonde moitie du XVlIle Steele (Paris, 1968), pp. 158-95. 11 Cited in Hansen, Quellen, l:79n.

30

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

tained. Georg Forster, visiting Cologne in 1790, described the city (with obvious anticlerical feeling) as a "gloomy, sad, halfdepopulated rity" with "numerous bands of immoral and ignor­ ant beggars" and filled with useless and parasitic clergy.12 We should not accept this picture too uncritically. The effects of the Seven Years' War and of disputes with the elector undoubt­ edly hurt the city's trade, as did increased river tolls, and Cologne had lost the glow of its days as a leading Hansa town. It is true, too, that the Catholic Church was overly conspicuous; in 1790 there existed in Cologne thirty major churches, fifty-eight monas­ teries and convents, and forty-nine chapels, all for a population of between forty thousand and fifty thousand.13 On the other hand, the city had retained its special trading privileges, and there were many very prosperous merchant houses. Perhaps it comes closer to the truth to speak of a decline in Cologne as compared with a general boom in the lower Rhineland at the end of the eighteenth century.14 At the forefront of this economic boom stood the silk industry of our third city, Crefeld. Since the early eighteenth century, Crefeld had been ruled by Prussia. The tiny Earldom of Mors, in which Crefeld was located, was under the jurisdiction of the Prussian War and Domains Boards for the Duchy of Cleve. The 12 Ibid., l:928n. See also Richard Buttner, Die Sakularisation der kolner geistlichen Institutional (Cologne, 1971), pp. 12,18; and Axel Kxihn, Jakobiner im Rheinland (Stuttgart, 1976), pp. 24-28. 13 A recent study estimates that of Cologne's 40,000 or so inhabitants in 1794, 2,500 were churchmen and that perhaps up to one-third of the population re­ ceived charity. Buttner, pp. 12-14; HSAK: 241071179/9ff., 36-37. Aachen also contained more than twenty religious orders. For conditions in Aachen, see Anton Josef Dorsch, Statistique du departement de la Roer (Cologne, 1804), pp. 48-50, and Teppe, pp. 41-42. 14 Barkhausen, "Aufstieg der rheinischen Industrie," pp. 136-37; Kisch, "Tex­ tile Industries in Silesia and the Rhineland," pp. 556-57; Kuske, p. 191. Dreyfus, pp. 191£f., and T.C.W. Blanning, Reform and Revolution in Mainz, 1743-1803 (New York, 1974), pp. 73ff., both note economic improvement in the Rhineland after 1750.

OLD REGIME ON THE RHINE

31

members of this Prussian administration, as well as the town magistrates, were appointed by Berlin. Both Protestants and Catholics were allowed to live and practice their faith in Crefeld, but only members of the Lutheran Church were eligible to hold governmental office.15 Thus the Mennonite community, which had come to Crefeld from Holland and Jiilich-Berg during the last half of the seventeenth century and completely controlled the town's economy, was excluded from direct political activity. Moreover, since the Mennonite faith taught against the holding of state office, Crefeld's Mennonites had not sought to have the political restrictions against them changed.16 The Mennonites, however, did devote their energy and talent to the economy. Tak­ ing advantage of the absence of guilds and religious discrimina­ tion, they built up a thriving silk industry. The town's most important family, Mennonites by the name of von der Leyen, had settled in Crefeld in 1654. At first they were only merchants trading silk and linen at the Frankfurt fair, but by 1715, Friedrich von der Leyen had become a merchant/manu­ facturer (Verleger) producing first silk and linen goods and then silk goods alone. Most of the raw silk purchased by the firm was put out to weavers in towns near Crefeld but some was processed in the city by artisans concentrated in factory buildings (Fabriken) constructed by the entrepreneurs. The finished products, silk cloth and ribbons, were then sold in Frankfurt. The firm grew rapidly. In 1731 it had a capital investment of 37,800 imperial thalers and an account balance of 147,861 thalers; by 1756 those figures had grown to 297,485 and 520,363, respectively. The last available balance sheet listed the firm's capital assets in 1794 15 Bar,

p. 30; Barkhausen, "Aufstieg der rheinischen Industrie," p. 174. Kurschat, Das Haus FriedHch und Heinrich von der Leyen in Krrfeld (Frankfurt am Main, 1933), p. 88; Herbert Kisch, "Prussian Mercantilism and the Rise of the Krefeld Silk Industry: Variations Upon an Eighteenth-Century Theme," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, n.s., 58, pt. 7 (1968): 20. 16 Wilhelm

32

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

at 1,279,932 thalers, plus another 437,300 thalers from creditors, or more than double the 1756 figures—an enormous sum for this period. The family controlled 80 to 90 percent of the town's silk output, and by 1763 employed some 2,700 of Crefeld's 6,000 in­ habitants.17 The growth of the von der Leyen firm naturally invited com­ petitors. In 1749, Franz Heinrich Heydweiller, the son-in-law of the widow of Peter von der Leyen, took over the silk-stocking factory owned by the widow. The main branch of the von der Leyen family thereupon obtained a government order that en­ joined Heydweiller from competing with the parent firm. He sur­ vived the effect of this decree by shifting to the production of vel­ vet ribbon. The firm grew rapidly after the Seven Years' War, and in 1786 Heydweiller's son-in-law Ludwig Maximilian Rigal was brought into the company. Rigal was a French refugee with the title of kurpfalzischer Titular-Hofkammerrath and owner of a silk factory and wine and wool business in Heidelberg. Another firm, that of Cornelius and Johannes Floh also grew out of the von der Leyen business. Having inherited a factory from Johann von der Leyen at his death in 1764, the Floh brothers began to produce silk ribbon and cloth under the von der Leyen name. The von der Leyen family protested to Prussian authorities, and a cabinet order of 1765 enjoined the Floh brothers from using the von der Leyen mark and from producing wares in direct competi­ tion with the main company. The Flohs subsequently specialized in velvet and some silk products unlike those of the von der Leyens. Cornelius Floh enlarged his firm by taking his son-in-law Isaac de Greiff as a partner in 1780, and it thereby became the second biggest firm in the town.18 To be sure, even on this scale, production was not fully "mod17Barkhausen, "Aufstieg der rheinischen Industrie," pp. 160-65; Kurschat, pp. 12-13; Kisch, "Prussian Mercantilism," pp. 22ff.; Beckers, p. 109. 18 Hintze and Schmoller, 2:595, 621-24; Richard Wolfferts, "Geschichte der Familien Floh und von Lowenich,nDieHeimat 8 (1929):136-38.

OLD REGIME ON THE RHINE

33

ern." There were no mechanized, steam-powered factories com­ parable to those being built in England, though there are in­ stances before 1790 of textile factories in the Rhineland that used water power and machines built on English models.19 Neverthe­ less, Crefeld's sophisticated putting-out industry had attained a world market, developed technical and entrepreneurial skills, and brought considerable wealth to the surrounding areas. In spite of diverse economic and political conditions, one finds that Rhenish businessmen had certain things in common. Be­ cause the Rhineland lacked a strong, prominent landed nobility, such as that of Prussia, businessmen were often at the top of the local social ladder. Prosperous businessmen could live "nobly," and business reasons encouraged them to do so. Wholesale trade or manufacturing in a putting-out system required large capital reserves, and in order to obtain a good credit status with banking firms in the distant market cities of Frankfurt or Holland, many entrepreneurs tended to imitate an aristocratic style of life. Some, indeed, were ennobled—Bernard Scheibler of Monschau by the Elector Karl Theodor in 1781, Martin Guaita of Aachen by Em­ peror Francis I in 1754, the von der Leyen brothers both enno­ bled and raised to the rank of privy commercial counselors by the Prussian king in 1786, and Peter von Lowenich of Crefeld enno­ bled by Prussia in 1789.20 Ennoblement, at least in the last dec19 Gerhard Adelmann, "Strukturwandlungen der rheinischen Leinen und Baumwollgewerbe zu Beginn der Industrialisierung," Vierteljahrsschrift ftir Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 53 (1966):168; Horst Beau, Das Leistungswissen des friihindustriellen Unternehmertums in Rheinland und Westfalen (Cologne, 1959), pp. 37ff. For a somewhat schematic but helpful attempt to define such con­ cepts asManufaktur, Fabrik, Verlag, see Forberger, pp. 171-89. Franklin F. Mendels uses the term proto-industrialization to describe growth in a putting-out sys­ tem prior to the Industrial Revolution. See Mendels, "Proto-industrialization: The First Phase of the Industrialization Process "Journal of Economic History 32 (1972):241-62, and the essays in Kriedte, Medick, and Schlumbohm. 20 Barkhausen, "Aufstieg der rheinischen Industrie," pp. 154-55, 169; Kurschat, pp. 19, 39. The patents of nobility entitled the holders to use regional, rather than local courts as courts of first recourse. This gave them an advantage

34

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

ades of the century, did not however entail withdrawal from busi­ ness to a purely rentier status. Rather it indicated the existence of a growing grande bourgeoisie, solidly rooted in business and con­ solidated by marriage alliances between successful families. For example, the von der Leyens, Flohs, Heydweillers, and de Greiffs of Crefeld, the von Lowenichs of Burtscheid and Crefeld, and the Herstatts of Cologne were all related by marriage.21 Leading businessmen also had frequent contact with the nobil­ ity and with other bourgeois groups. The von der Leyen house, for example, was graced by social visits from such luminaries as the young Wilhelm von Humboldt and the Prussian diplomat Christian von Dohm.22 Many businessmen from all three cities, Protestants and Catholics alike, belonged either to a Masonic lodge, to the Illuminati, or to a reading society, where they min­ gled with noblemen, members of old patrician families, local offi­ cials, and local writers and intellectuals.23 The ostensible purpose over poorer plantiffs because the plaintiff had to bear the costs of travel to a differ­ ent town. See also Hermann A. Freiherr von Fiirth, Beitrdge und Material zur Geschichte der Aachener Patrizier-Familien, 3 vols. (Aachen, 1882-90), 2:80-82. 21 Wolfferts, "Floh und von Lowenich," pp. 136-37; Kurschat, p. 38. For pat­ terns of alliances by marriage, see the material in Hermann F. Macco, Geschichte und Genealogie der Familie Pastor (Aachen, 1915), and Geschichte und Genealogie der Familie Peltzer (Aachen, 1901). 22 Wolfferts, "Humboldt," pp. 207ff. 23 In Aaehen the Masons or Illuminati included members of the von Lowenich family, Johann Pastor, G. Charles Springsfeld, Alois van Houtem, J. Korfgen (all future leaders after 1792 in the chamber of commerce and in public office), the publisher Gerhard Dautzenberg, the future French Subprefect A. Dorsch, and Freiherr von Witte, the leader of Aachen's "New Party." The Masons in Cologne included: the Herstatts; the merchants and councilmen H. J. Dumont, J. N. Dumont, Johann Schiilgen, J. J. Uelpenich, Franz Joseph Weyer; the Hofrat Fuchs (also involved in the merchants' effort to organize in 1791); Mayor von Hilgers; the councilman, Fiskalriehter, and future subprefect of Cologne Reiner von Klespe; and the notary Dominicus Oestges. The Cologne lodge in 1778 met in the same building on the Heumarkt as did the merchants' reading circle. The Grefeld lodge was founded jointly by Peter von Lowenich and Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen. Members of the Crefeld reading societies included the Beckeraths, Johann Hunzinger, and Abraham Sohmann. The Bonn reading society, led by

OLD REGIME ON THE RHINE

35

of these associations was the discussion and dissemination of En­ lightenment ideas, and it is clear that some progressive ideas were assimilated. Wilhelm von Humboldt was favorably impressed by the wide-ranging, advanced ideas discussed at the von der Leyen table, and the Crefeld reading society discussed a variety of En­ lightenment topics. The Aachen businessman Johann Friedrich Jacobi was a son of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, an Enlightenment philosopher befriended by Goethe and the diplomat Dohm. Dohm was also a student of the Enlightenment, and while in Aachen he formed an intellectual "circle" that included the younger Jacobi and other businessmen.24 Though a remarkable number of their members subsequently held public office after the French invasion, one should not attrib­ ute any direct political influence to the Enlightenment societies. Participants in these societies, of course, tended to be favorable toward moderate reform and conversant with French culture, but the societies themselves were not political and certainly not revolutionary.25 Businessmen, intellectuals, rentiers, officials, J. P. Eichhoff (publisher of the Bonner Intelligemblatt) corresponded with Peletier and J. J. von Wittgenstein of Cologne and Nikolaus Cromm and Cornelius von Guaita of Aachen (all future officeholders under the French). Eichhoff was the brother of Johann Joseph Eichhoff, a member of the Bonn Illuminati since 1784 and the personal cook of the Elector Max Franz. J. J. Eichhofflater became a tariff administrator for the French. There were at least nine reading societies or clubs with libraries founded in the middle Rhineland and Berg between 1779 and 1790. See BN: MS Franc-Mafonnerie/FMs533, 1, 6, 10, 77; Hansen1QufWen, 1:41, 44, 65, 217, 293n; Wolfferts, "Humboldt," p. 216; Valjavec, pp. 229ff.; Elduard Arens and Wilhelm Janssen, Geschichte des Club Aaehener Casino, 2nd ed. en­ larged by Carl von Pelser-Berensberg et al. (Aachen, 1964), pp. 90-95; and Klaus Epstein, The Genesis of German Conservatism (Princeton, 1966), p. 93. 24 Wolfferts, "Humboldt," pp. 208-13. 25 In May 1788, in the midst of the Cologne conflict over Protestant toleration, the Bannerherrn asked the council to take measures against the local Masons. This indicated that the artisans (and the Church) at least believed the Masons to be politically dangerous. In July 1790, the Cologne Freemasons sent Councilman Klespe, a member of their lodge, congratulations on the occasion of his election as mayor, expressing pride that a Mason should win such an office and alluding not unfavorably to similarities between revolutionary Paris and the recent unrest in

36

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

members of old patrician families and liberal-minded aristocrats associated freely with one another. This perhaps helped create a certain amount of mutual understanding that transcended any clearly drawn class or caste distinctions and proved valuable when they were faced with the trials of invasion and occupation.26

City Politics in the Late Eighteenth Century During the last decades of the eighteenth century, Aachen and Cologne were beset by political disputes that required outside in­ tervention. The disputes in question were over religious tolera­ tion, the nature of the city governments, economic change, and the maintenance of local rights and privileges. These issues were not peculiar to Aachen and Cologne; other German cities had many of the same problems.27 They are worth examining in some detail, however, because they show the vitality and the weak­ nesses of the old institutions as well as the existence of internal pressures for change. Moreover, they indicate an increasingly acCologne. Epstein, p. 86, states that "the statutes of most lodges specifically pro­ hibited their members from engaging in political or religious conflict," but obvi­ ously this was not binding for Cologne or Aachen. See also Hermann Oncken, "Deutsche und rheinische Probleme im Zeitalter der franzosischen Revolution," Sitzungsberichte der Preussische Akademie der Wissensehaften (1936-37), 86ff.; Braunschwig, pp. 38-40; Blanning, pp. 195-203; K. Gerteis, "Bildung und Revo­ lution: Die deutschen Lesegesellschaften am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts," Archiv fiir Kuiturgeschichte 53 (1971); and Hansen, Quellen, 1:292, 649-51. 26 See the suggestive article by Thomas Nipperdey, "Verein als soziale Struktur in Deutschland im spaten 18. u. friihen 19. Jahrhundert," in Geschichtswissenschaft u. Vereinswesen im 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Hartmut Boockmann et al. (Gottingen, 1972); also Hans Gerth, Biirgerliehe lntelligem. um 1800, introduc­ tion and enlarged bibliography by Ulrich Hermann (Gottingen, 1976), pp. 40ff., for similar developments at the universities. 27 Walker, German Home Towns·, Otto Brunner, "Souveranitatsproblem und Sozialstruktur in den deutschen Reichsstadten der friiheren Neuzeit," Vierteljahrssehrift fur Sozial- und Wirtsehaftsgesehichte 50 (1963); H. P. Liebel, "The Bourgeoisie in Southwestern Germany, 1500-1789: A Rising Class?" Interna­ tional Review of Social History 10 (1965); and Gerald Lyman Soliday, A Commu­ nity in Conflict (Hanover, N. H., 1974).

OLX) REGIME ON THE RHINE

37

tive role played by innovative businessmen, often Protestants, in local political affairs. Many of these businessmen were to repre­ sent their cities in the first dealings with the French, and their behavior then resembles their behavior during this earlier period. In the case of Aachen, economic, political and religious issues all came together. The city had been plagued by labor disputes between manufacturers and artisans during the 1760s and 1770s, and unrest among cloth cutters and weavers employed by the Scheiblers, Protestant entrepreneurs in nearby Monschau, had spread to Aachen. The predominantly rural and Catholic workers faced rising prices, a housing scarcity, and an influx of new work­ ers who hoped to benefit from the manufacturing boom that was going on. The unrest abated after wages were raised and after the boom itself eased the job shortage, but tension persisted in Aachen, where the guild structure hindered adjustments in the labor market.28 Aachen's government proved unresponsive to the difficulties. During the eighteenth century, the city had become more an oligarchy than a limited democracy.29 In spite of a statute limiting tenure of mayors and magistrates to one year, incumbents had used bribery, pressure, and personal influence to insure repeated reelection. As a result, in the 1780s a conflict developed between the supporters of Stephen Dominikus Dauven, who had served as mayor continuously for over ten years, and a faction that was led by two members of the town's highest court, Freiherr von Witte and M.F.J. von Lonneux, and included some ambitious mer­ chants and manufacturers. The factions were designated by con28 Barkhausen, "Aufstieg der rheinischen Industrie," pp. 156-57; Beckers, p. 109; Kisch, "Growth Deterrents"; and Strauch. 29 The "constitutional conflict" in Aachen is thoroughly discussed by Teppe, with material to be found in Fiirth, 1:146-237, 389-561. Also Walker, German Home Towns, pp. 27-28, 60-61, 123ff.; Beckers, pp. 104-31; Hansen, Quellen, 1:110-12, 225-27; and Curt Eder, Die Tatigkeit der aachener BehHrden wahrend der ersten Jahre der framdsischen Fremdherrschaft (Diss. Marburg i. H., 1917), pp. 11-12.

38

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

temporaries as the "Old Party" and the "New Party," respec­ tively. The election of 1786 saw both "parties" using coercion, bribery, and even resorting to street fighting. Though victory went to the New Party, Dauven refused to abandon his office. Physically ousted by his rivals, he appealed for help to the impe­ rial courts, which sided with him and reversed the election. The New Party refused to accept the decision, and the city was left with two governments. Finally, in 1792 the imperial court in Wetzlar intervened and asked Christian von Dohm, a member of the court as well as Prussia's representative in the Rhineland and director of Cleve, to mediate and restore peace. Dohm was in fact already involved in Aachen's affairs because of a religious dispute that was brewing concurrently. In Decem­ ber 1787, the pastor of the Protestant community in Aachen had petitioned King Frederick William II of Prussia to have Dohm intercede with the Aachen city council to try to persuade it to grant toleration for Aachen's Protestants, as the city council of Cologne had recently decided to do for the Protestants of that city. The king ordered Dohm to intercede, and the Aachen Prot­ estants themselves petitioned the city council, but no action was taken on the issue. Five years later, in his effort to resolve the con­ flict over the mayoralty, Dohm drew up a new constitution for Aachen which addressed itself to all of Aachen's problems. Sympathetic with the New Party, some of whom were Protes­ tants, Dohm provided in his constitution for a simplified form of city elections and for religious toleration of Protestants. Possibly at the suggestion of his friends Johann Arnold von Clermont and Johann Friedrich Jacobi (Clermont's son-in-law), partners in an important Vaals cloth firm, which had a branch in Aachen, Dohm also provided for the creation of a Committee of Commerce (Handelsausschuss). This committee, to be made up of mer­ chant/manufacturers from the city's important cloth and needle industries and several wholesale merchants, was to be an exten­ sion of the city government and was intended to resolve the

OLD REGIME ON THE RHINE

39

town's labor problems.30 On February 17, 1792, ten months be­ fore the French invasion, the imperial court ordered Dohm's con­ stitution instituted, but the city council, the city's protector Karl Theodor von Pfalzbayern, and several of the guilds protested the order as a violation of Aachen's traditional democracy and her rights as a free imperial city. The dispute continued another six months, until most parties agreed to a compromise, but the con­ stitution had still not gone into effect when, with the arrival of the French, Dohm's proposed constitution was put aside.31 The prolonged conflict in Aachen makes several important fea­ tures of political life stand out. Religious, economic, and political issues were intertwined, and the need for change grew out of local dynamics. The decision-making process involved petitions, per­ sonal influence, group initiative, and authoritarian decrees from beyond the city walls. The "reform" party sought intervention that took the form of an outsider familiar with and sympathetic to them; those wishing to retain old institutions appealed to other outside authorities sympathetic with tradition. Finally, progres­ sive, Protestant businessmen, excluded by political tradition, were involved in all aspects of the conflict, and we find the first efforts of businessmen to organize in order to regulate their own group interests. Many of the same kinds of political behavior can be found in Cologne. As in Aachen, religion, governmental reform, hostility between businessmen and artisans, and relations with external authorities were the problems that combined to create political tension. The areas of conflict were complex and overlapping, with 30 Albert Huyskens, 125 Jahre Industrie und Handelskammerzu Aachen, vol. 1 (Aachen, 1929), 6; Franz Oppenheim, "Die Beziehungen Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis und seiner Familie zu Aachen," Zeitschrift des Aaehener Geschichtsvereins 16 (1894):139-42. Jacobi, it should be noted, was the oldest son of the Diisseldorf philosopher and Hoflammerrai F. H. Jacobi, who had also married a Clermont and derived part of his income from the firm. See Barkhausen, "Aufstieg der rheinischen Industrie," pp. 140, 159. 31 Hansen, Quellen, 2:68, 313-16.

40

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

Cologne's businessmen almost simultaneously supporting and opposing the city council, and the council fluctuating in its policies in respect to artisans and business. Several of the conflicts in this city during the two decades before the French invasion are worth looking at, because many of the business leaders who would later become politically prominent were already active in these disputes, and many key issues were raised. On October 20, 1781, Emperor Joseph II had issued an edict granting, in principle, the right of Protestants in his dominions to practice their religion so long as they did not disturb the predom­ inantly Catholic citizenry.32 Subsequently, a group of Cologne Protestants led by the merchants Kaspar Heinrich Bemberg, Friedrich Karl Peletier (who also acted as the representative of the Wiirttemberg court in Cologne), and Johann David Herstatt, petitioned the Cologne council for permission to build a church, to conduct services, and to hire a schoolteacher. They also asked that Protestants be allowed to enter the forwarding trade and to build factories, especially for woolen products. Both occupations had been legally reserved for Catholics. The council granted the request in December of 1787. The council and mayor, and sepa­ rately, the Protestants, wrote to both the emperor and the Elector Max Franz asking for approval of the council decision, and ap­ proval was promptly granted by the imperial privy council. This action let loose a flood of protests. The heads of the guilds (the Bannerherrn), some of whom were city councilors, protested that the decision was an illegal innovation in the city's constitu­ tion, and they expressed concern over the possible growth of Protestant economic power; the Biirgerliche Deputatschaft, a citi­ zen's committee of guildsmen, appealed for a reversal of the deci­ sion; the Catholic clergy argued that the decision violated the rights of the new Archbishop Max Franz, and he himself lodged a 3a

Sources and commentary on the political unrest in Cologne are to be found in Hansen, Quellen, 1:13-16,90,209-14,218-24,228ff., 239-58,266,278-80,342, 400-401, 416, 424-27. See also Kuhn, pp. 28-30.

OLD REGIME ON THE RHINE

41

similar protest. Joseph II, however, officially confirmed the grant­ ing of tolerance, but he also hedged, stating that it was to be "without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Cologne Elector and Archbishop or to the rights of any other party." The city government responded to the protests. It answered the clergy by asserting its legal right to grant religious toleration. In answer to the archbishop, the city council argued that the Peace of Osnabriick of 1672 and various imperial court decisions in the eighteenth century clearly granted to Cologne, as a "full member of the imperial diet" (reichsstandischer Reichsstand) and free imperial city, the sovereignty (Territorial-Superioritatsbesiiz) to make a decision on religious practice. But faced with growing anti-Protestant hostility among the town's Catholic artisans, the city council began to back down in April of 1788 and asked the guild representatives to join it in voting on the matter. The en­ larged council then voted to reverse the earlier ruling. The dispute, however, was not yet settled. In March 1789, the emperor ordered the city to stay by its earlier decision and to allow Protestants to practice their religion and to build both a church and a school in Cologne. Thus, although Cologne was supposedly a sovereign city, the emperor set aside the decision of its government. Five months later, with hostility against them still rising, the leaders of the Protestant community, in the inter­ est of public order, voluntarily withdrew their original petition, relinquished the right to build a church, and ordered their as­ sociates in Vienna not to pursue the matter further. Even this concession did not end the matter. Encouraged by their success in the dispute, artisans in the guilds now presented the council with a series of demands. These included not only further economic re­ strictions against Protestant businessmen but also economies in city administration, a reform in collection of taxes, proper budget accounting, and a ban on the simultaneous holding of the offices of councilman and guild chairman (Bannerherr). These demands were, in fact, of long standing. As in Aachen,

42

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

custom and corruption in the eighteenth century had led to the almost automatic reelection of many members of the town coun­ cil, and some of those councilmen were also Bannerherrn, guild chairmen enjoying life tenure. While in theory the Bannerherrn were to supervise the activities of the city council and insure their legality and propriety, the overlap of personnel in the two organi­ zations prevented any real supervision, and the poorer artisans felt altogether unrepresented. In 1770, artisans in eighteen of the guilds met, and each guild chose two delegates to meet regularly and devise means of fight­ ing what was seen as oligarchical government, mismanagement of the city finances and the city debt, and a deteriorating city econ­ omy.33 This assembly, designed for protest, was called the Bxirgerlvche Deputatschaft. Some twenty-four hundred guild members voted their support of the assembly and its undertak­ ings, which consisted principally of a lengthy suit before the im­ perial privy council in Vienna. The members of the Deputatschaft were mostly artisans; the heart of their complaint seems to have been that wealthy merchants, including some guild chairmen, were contriving to use the city government for their exclusive ad­ vantage. They also protested against a merchant's reading club that had been meeting since 1776 in a house in the Haymarket, charging that the merchants were using this organization to fix prices. The same building had served as a meeting place for the local Freemasons, and thus also appeared suspicious to the arti­ sans. The decision went against the Deputatschaft in 1784, although the privy council did order some reforms in city finances and al­ lowed the Deputatschaft to continue to watch for abuses. Un­ daunted by the adverse decision, the Deputatschaft proposed a 33 Weingartner, pp. 19-30, 54-58; Hansen, Quellen, 1:38-41; see also L. Ennen, Frankreich und der Niederrhein, 2 vols. (Cologne and Neuss, 1855), 2:467ff.; L. Ennen, Gesehiehte der Stadt Kdln (Dusseldorf, 1880), pp. 408-15; and Epstein, pp. 286-87.

OLD REGIME ON THE RHINE

43

plan for farming out the collection of excise taxes to high-bidding guilds, a plan that would have given the artisans control over government finances. The town council, under pressure from Vi­ enna to increase its income and pay off the city debt, at first enter­ tained the plan, but an alarmed group of Catholic and Protestant merchants led a drive to have it rejected. The merchant spokes­ men, Johann David Herstatt (one of the Protestant leaders in the toleration dispute), Heinrich Birkenstock, and Heinrich Joseph von Wittgenstein, argued that increased excise taxes would in­ crease freight costs and drive commerce from the city. The plan for farming out taxes was rejected, and the demands of the Deputatschaft remained unsatisfied. Artisan discontent per­ sisted, and by 1789, there was talk of achieving the desired re­ forms "in the Parisian manner."34 The tension caused by the con­ flict over toleration of Protestants, the tension between the guilds and the council, the news that the imperial court had ordered Dohm to intervene in the political dispute in Aachen, and the re­ ports of the revolutionary events in Paris, all combined to cause street riots in Cologne on October 5,1789. Finally, in December, Emperor Joseph II decided to support the position of the city council against the Deputatsehaft, ordered the suppression of un­ rest, and declared the Deputatschaft disbanded. In these religious and constitutional disputes, the town council, Bannerherrn, and merchants were opposed by the Church, the elector, and the artisans, and Protestants were opposed by Catholics. Other issues aligned Protestant and Catholic busi­ nessmen together with the elector against the city council. In 1787, an attempt by Max Franz, the new elector and archbishop, to use the city's refusal to cash some municipal bonds as an excuse to bring the city under his sovereignty resulted in a power strug­ gle between the city council and the archbishop. By applying economic pressure—banning export of foodstuffs from the elec34

Hansen, Quellen, 1:426, 451, 580-81; Weingartner, p. 76.

44

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

torate to Cologne, confiscating "illegal" imports, and ordering construction of a road around the city so that shipment of goods would bypass the city proper—Max Franz caused a drastic reduc­ tion in trade and thoroughly alarmed the business community.35 A second struggle began at about the same time between Co­ logne's merchants and the Dutch boatmen, who raised shipping rates on the Rhine, and yet another conflict developed in early 1791 between these same merchants and the local boatmen, who were paid according to the weight of the shipment. They com­ plained that the forwarding firms were cheating them by listing shipments at less than their actual weight. The city council sided with the local boatmen on the issue of weights, deciding in May to set up a scale in the harbor for the mandatory weighing of all shipments. A fee paid by the merchants for the use of the scale would provide the city with much-wanted revenue. The angry merchants, who feared that this new cost, on top of the higher shipping rates, would drive trade from Cologne, found an ally in Max Franz, who feared a loss of customs income if trade were de­ creased.36 One important result of these conflicts was the first attempt of the merchant community in Cologne to organize in behalf of its interests. In March 1791, fifty-four Cologne merchants chose four "commissioners" as representatives to deal with their prob­ lems: Friedrich Carl Heimann, Josef Anton Send, Maximilian H. Cassinone, and Johann Baptist Hirn. They were assisted by the lawyer Johann Baptist Fuchs, electoral privy councilor and judge on the city's high court. Seven months later, sixty-nine merchants met, chose four new commissioners, and petitioned the city gov­ ernment for permission to form a permanent Commercial Com­ mittee (Handlungskollegium). They retained Fuchs to present the petition. It was denied, however, and the council threatened to fine anyone who allowed a further meeting of merchants in his Quellen, 1:866-70. Ibid.; RWWA: 1/1/1/6.

35 Hansen, 36

OLD REGIME ON THE RHINE

45

house.37 Though unsuccessful, the merchants did not abandon their effort to create a legally recognized body designed to influ­ ence political decisions. This plan was to be revived in 1797 and would meet with French approval; moreover, many of the busi­ nessmen involved in the early organizational efforts would hold public office during the French period.38 The contest over the freight scale and freight rates was won by the merchants (and the elector) on the eve of the French invasion, but the significance of the contest lies in the intensity of the politi­ cal activity in the last decades of the old regime. No clear-cut alignments emerged in Cologne. Leading Protestant and Cath­ olic merchants joined forces, at least initially, to support religious toleration. The same men backed the city council in its contest with the artisans in the Deputatsehaft. Both issues led to the inter­ vention of the Empire and the elector. On the other hand, many of the same businessmen were at odds with the council over the freight scale and were supported by the elector. Traditional means—petitions, court injunctions—were used to influence de­ cision making, but here, as in Aachen, businessmen began to organize. The need for some sort of reform was becoming increasingly clear in both cities, and the initiative came from within, though in the absence of external stimuli it could not succeed. In both Aachen and Cologne anonymous pamphlets published around 37 Johann Baptist Fuchs, Erinnerungen aus dem Leben eines kdlner Juristen (Cologne, 1912), p. 205n; RWWA: 1/1/1/4; Schwann, HanMskammer, p. 20. 38 Schwann, Handdskammer, pp. 1-3. Schwann reprints in Appendix 1, pp. 448ff., the names of those signing the October petition, as well as the names of others whose names appeared on petitions in connection with the freight scale. These lists include the names of most of the Cologne businessmen who later be­ came leaders in the chamber of commerce and in the French political bodies: the old commissioners, Heimann, Send, Cassinone, Him; the new commissioners, Franz Joseph Weyer, Christian Heinrich Speymann, Johann Stohr, and Johann Alois Leven; and also P. Bemberg, J. E. Birckenstock, H. J. Dumont, J. Effertz, J. M. Farina, F. Foveaux, G. Moll, J. J. Peuchen, A. Schaaflhausen, E. C. and W. Schiill, and H. J. von Wittgenstein.

46

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

1790 pointed out the deleterious effects of economic restric­ tions.39 But we should note that what was sought was an end to harmful privileges and restrictions, not necessarily an end to all privileges and restrictions. Pressure for change came from many directions. The desire for change was not ideological, nor was there any desire to replace a traditional society with a more mod­ ern one. The French, intent on abolishing all "feudal" institutions and privileges, expected many welcoming voices on the Rhine. That they were not greeted with open arms was because they were forcing Rhinelanders to decide not just what of the old order to change, but also what to retain—a difficult question. So far we have examined the relationship between political structure and political behavior as manifested in the factional dis­ putes that rocked Cologne and Aachen at the end of the eight­ eenth century. During the time that these cities, at least by con­ temporary standards, were becoming political hotbeds, Crefeld's public face was one of solidarity and quiet.40 In Crefeld, relations between government and businessmen were focused on the dom­ inant Mennonite family, the von der Leyens, and were insepara­ ble from the economic affairs of that family. We have already mentioned incidents when the von der Leyens appealed to the Prussian state for help against firms that grew out of the parent company. The von der Leyens were no more dis­ posed to welcome direct competition from outside the family than from relatives. In late 1759, the brothers von Beckerath, owners of the firm of Gerhard Lingen and Company, began to compete with the von der Leyens by using silk-weaving machines and by enticing some former von der Leyen employees to work for them. The von der Leyens appealed to the Cleve board and obtained a ruling that enjoined the Beckeraths from direct competition, al­ leging that the Beckeraths had corrupted workers, inducing them 39

Ibid., pp. 23ff.; Hansen, Quellen, l:322n, 868n. See Wilhelm von Humboldt's impression of Crefeld in Richard Wolfferts, "Humboldt." 40

OLD REGIME ON THE RHINE

47

to reveal the secrets of the older firm. The Beckeraths appealed to Berlin, as did the von der Leyens. The latter's virtual monopoly of the silk trade was allowed to stand, and the Beckeraths had to be satisfied with an invitation to move their factory to Branden­ burg.41 The von der Leyens' success in getting the government to help them eliminate competition can be attributed to the increasingly close relations between their family and the Prussian bureaucracy and monarchy. The extraordinary growth of such an important company could hardly go unnoticed in the mercantilist-oriented Prussia of Friedrich the Great. In 1754 Friedrich and Heinrich von der Leyen were granted the privilege of initiating a suit in the Prussian regional courts, rather than the town court, and in 1755 both were awarded the title of Commercienrathe (commercial counselors).42 As Commercienrathe they were asked to submit re­ ports advising the district administration on economic matters. In 1774 a cabinet order granted the title of Commereienrathe to the next generation of von der Leyen brothers and encouraged them too "to submit from time to time their thoughts and suggestions" on governmental and economic problems. The family, for its part, sent gifts of wine and silk cloth to the king, the crown prince, and ministers in Berlin. In this way the von der Leyens built up a network of personal relations that enabled them to intimidate and dominate the town government, despite the fact that their reli­ gion prevented them from holding public office.43 The economic consequences of the political relationship be­ tween the von der Leyens and the Berlin government should not, however, be overestimated. Restrictions imposed on potential competitors in the town itself did not prevent these entrepreneurs 41 Hansen,

Quellen, 2:599-612; Fritz Horst, Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Kreises Krefdd sett der Wiedervereinigung mit Preussen (1815) (Diss. Cologne, 1929), pp. 79-80. 42 Hintze and Schmoller, 2:597-648; Kurschat, p. 14. 43 Kisch, "Prussian Mercantilism," p. 40; Wolfferts, "Humboldt," p. 211.

48

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

from developing important textile firms. Furthermore, the rise of the Crefeld textile industry was not the result of the policies of Prussian mercantilism but rather the result of private initiative functioning under conditions of comparative economic freedom from guild domination and export/import restrictions.44 In fact, Prussian mercantilism worked against Crefeld's interests in 1768 when, in order to protect Berlin industry, Prussia banned the ex­ portation of all Rhenish-Westphalian manufactured goods across the Weser. The von der Leyens responded with petitions to ministers, to Berlin privy councilors, to the governments of Gelders-Mors and Cleve, and finally to the king, claiming that the prohibition would bring great hardship to the firm. However, neither the influence of the von der Leyens nor their exaggerated claims produced results, and the prohibitions against the export of Crefeld goods were in effect at various times up to the Revolu­ tion.45 In contrast to Aachen and Cologne, then, local politics in Crefeld was marked by the domination of one family, which had created a useful, indirect working relationship with both the bureaucrats and the sovereign. In spite of restrictions, religion did not seem to be an issue, nor is there evidence of labor unrest. The merchant/manufacturers do not seem to have attempted to form any permanent organization to represent their interests. On the other hand, it must be remembered that virtually all the leading businessmen in this small city were related by both faith and fam­ ily ties. These relationships were important later when under French rule all the town's entrepreneurs were faced with the problem of how best to promote their own interests. Increasingly enlightened and self-conscious, leading busi­ nessmen of all three cities before 1792 had become a class of nota­ bles that enjoyed social prestige and played an expanding role in 44 Both Hintze and Schmoller, 3:102, and Barkhausen, "Aufstieg der rheinischen Industrie," p. 163, concur in this judgment. 45 Hintze and Schmoller, 2:631-35.

OLD REGIME ON THE RHINE

49

community affairs. Concerned about the conflict between their present economic privileges and the potential advantages of eco­ nomic freedom, and advocating freedom of conscience for all, businessmen in Aachen and Cologne had begun to try to influ­ ence government decision making through concerted group ac­ tion. In Crefeld, the political style of the Mennonite business families tended toward indirect, personal relations with bureau­ crats. In all three cities, however, individual and group initiative—whether in politics, industry, or trade—was con­ fronted with traditional institutions and privileges that restricted new opportunities. The French would sweep away these obsta­ cles and at the same time bring with them a system of government and a style of politics that depended directly upon the cooperation of local notables. The Rhineland business community would be presented with the problem of whether to embrace new and alien institutions or to try to preserve what was best in the old regime.

3. From Invasion to Annexation

ON April 20, 1792, the Legislative Assembly of revolutionary France declared war on the Austrian emperor and thereby initi­ ated a conflict that dramatically changed the history of the Rhineland. Whatever the views of the Rhinelanders about events in Paris, by mid-December of 1792, when French soldiers neared Aachen, the Rhenish governments had to decide upon a course of action. The free cities of Aachen and Cologne had remained neu­ tral in the war, but their prince-protectors were allied with the Austrians and were in retreat. As a possession of Prussia, one of France's declared enemies, Crefeld could only expect the worst. None of the three towns had any means of resisting the invaders; they had to attempt to persuade the French to respect their lives, their property, and their institutions. In this attempt Cologne and Aachen could at least draw upon their experience in resisting the intervention of outside German authorities in their internal affairs during the decades prior to the French invasion. On December 16, 1792, Aachen was occupied by French sol­ diers under the command first of General Desforest and then of General Dampierre. The French National Convention had in­ structed its armies in occupied territory to abolish all guilds, feudal dues and privileges, and to arrange for the election of popu­ lar governments, but Aachen sought to avoid all this by appealing to the generals. Mayor J. M. Kreitz wrote to Desforest to argue that the convention instructions were not really applicable to Aachen: "Sovereignty resides here in the people. . . . Thus you see, General, that in Aachen the form of government is free,

FROM INVASION TO ANNEXATION

51

purely democratic, and popular, and in that we are equals."1 Aachen was already a republic, Kreitz claimed, and did not need reforming. To make this more convincing he translated the Ger­ man word for guilds (and guilds did play a role in the city's gov­ ernment) as sections. Apparently Kreitz's efforts were undermined by two former leaders of the New Party, the lawyer Joseph Vossen and the cloth merchant Nikolaus Cromm. Both had been imprisoned briefly in 1788-89 by the old oligarchy, and, frustrated in their earlier at­ tempts to change the structure of local political institutions, they now sought to exploit the presence of the French to effect such changes, and they seem to have been instrumental in convincing the French that Aachen's popular democracy was a fiction.2 Gen­ eral Dampierre dissolved the city council, divided the city into electoral districts, and ordered elections held. Most of the popula­ tion simply ignored the elections, which forced repeated ballot­ ing, but by the end of January 1793, a new six-member magis­ tracy had been chosen. The new mayor was Stephan Beissel, a needle manufacturer and member of the New Party. Dampierre also created a "Club of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" to pro­ mote the ideals of the Revolution, but Aachen's leading citizens, including the business community, avoided the club and its polit­ ical discussions.3 French requisitions of food and supplies, the quartering of troops, the tearing down of a local monument, and the abolition of the old city government all helped to make the invaders unpopular. Commanded by General Lamarliere, a French army unit en­ tered Crefeld on December 18, two days after the occupation of Aachen. Crefeld was unable to claim neutrality, and indeed some 1

Hansen, Quellen, 2:295, 676. Ibid., 3:427n; also August Pauls, "Beitrage zur Haltung der Aachener Bevolkerung wahrend der Fremdherrschaft, 1792-1814," Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsvereins 63 (1950):48. 3 Hansen, Quellen, 2:682-83, 692-96, 713; Teppe, pp. 59ff.; also Alois Neissner, Zwanzig Jahre Franzosenherrschaft 1794-1814 (Aachen, 1907), pp. 44-45. 2

52

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

town officials had fled. Remaining officials were forced to collect food and supplies for the occupying army, a task in which they were aided by the French. In addition, Lamarliere levied on the town a forced "contribution" of 300,000 Dutch gulden, and to insure payment he seized as hostages several of the leading citi­ zens, including the textile magnates Conrad Isaak von der Leyen and Peter von Lowenich. Crefeld's businessmen were the only possible source of funds sufficient to satisfy the general, and all of the major silk and textile firms contributed. The payments, how­ ever, depleted the firms' working capital, making it necessary for the Flohs and the von der Leyens to borrow 225,000 gulden from a Frankfurt banker. This loan was not fully repaid until 1822.4 As it turned out, Cologne enjoyed a stroke of luck in that win­ ter of 1792—the French occupied Aachen and Crefeld but not Cologne. Nevertheless, a letter from the city government to French General Dumouriez in Liege gives an indication of the course that Cologne would have taken had the French arrived at the city gates, and this course is consistent with Cologne's policy in late 1794 when the French did occupy the city. Claiming to represent "the free republic of Cologne," the city council pointed out that it had first refused to supply munitions to the Austrians when their troops had been in the area and had yielded military supplies only when forced to do so. By the same token Cologne would be strictly neutral toward the French and would willingly receive and quarter the French army if Dumouriez would agree to respect the rights of persons and property and, above all, to re­ spect the integrity of the governing institutions of the city repub­ lic.5 Though they had rejected a similar plea from Aachen, the French might have accepted Cologne's offer; they did leave Co­ logne's government alone for some time after they seized the town 4 Kurschat, p. 22; Gottfried Buschbell and Karl Heinzelmann, Geschichte der Stadt Krefeld von der Fraraosenzeit (1794) bis um das Jahr 1870 (Crefeld, 1954), pp. 23-24. 5 Hansen, Quellen, 2:670-73.

FROM INVASION TO ANNEXATION

53

in 1794. The first French plans for Cologne became irrelevant, however, when French armies were driven from the Rhineland by the Austrians in March 1793. When the French departed, the Rhineland returned to normal. The Prussians returned to Crefeld. In Aachen, Beissel promptly resigned and returned his mayoral office to Kreitz, allowing the old government to salve the wounds left by three months of occu­ pation and the battle that was fought in and around the town dur­ ing the French retreat.6 What was to be learned from the first French invasion? On the one hand, the French were fully pre­ pared to overturn ancient political institutions while imposing huge financial burdens. On the other hand, they were willing to cooperate with local residents who seemed to share their revolu­ tionary ideals. In any case, the Rhineland's military vulnerability was evident. Renewed Occupation: The Struggle for Independence

The war returned to the Rhineland in the fall of 1794, with the French convincingly victorious. Aachen was reoccupied on Sep­ tember 23; Cologne was seized on October 6 and Crefeld reoc­ cupied three days later. Until the end of 1797, however, no one in the Rhineland, including the French, knew what the ultimate political status of that area would be.7 There were several pos­ sibilities, ranging from a return of the old regime to full annexa­ tion by France. Without themselves being of one mind on their goals, the French were guided by two considerations, one practi­ cal and the other ideological. For the support of their armies they needed to draw on the area's resources as efficiently as possible; 6 Ibid., 2:783n. The town council apparently tried, without success, to banish those who had welcomed the French. See Neissner, p. 65. 7 For the course of events in Mainz, the most radical of the Rhenish cities, see Dreyfus, Blanning, and Walter Grab, "Eroberung oder Befreiung? Deutsche Jakobiner und die Franzosenherrschaft im Rheinland 1792-1799," Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte 10 (1970).

54

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

for ideological reasons they wished to modernize Rhenish institu­ tions by introducing the principles embodied in the Revolution. These two considerations in combination produced a political policy that was often fraught with inconsistencies and that would ultimately require the cooperation of the leaders of the business communities in the most important cities. The assets, talents, education, and progressive inclinations of these Rhinelanders were indispensable to the success of the French. By the same token, the very magnitude of the monetary "con­ tributions" and material requisitions being exacted made it ex­ pedient for the business community to cooperate with the French, although Cologne's businessmen took longer to learn this lesson than did those of Aachen and Crefeld. By cooperating, busi­ nessmen could hope to have a hand in determining policies and in applying policies to concrete situations. This was a better course than to sit back passively, allowing themselves to be victimized by an invader who had no understanding of local issues and prob­ lems. One of the most important steps taken after the seizure of the Rhineland was the institution of a unified administration for the whole area. Frecine, a "representative on mission" from Paris, es­ tablished a twelve-member "central administration" for the terri­ tory between the Maas and Roer rivers, and this agency was soon given jurisdiction over most of the Left Bank. The central admin­ istration had its headquarters in Aachen and included several im­ portant merchants and manufacturers from the Aachen area, mostly supporters of Aachen's New Party. Many of these men would continue to play prominent roles under French rule: J. A. Clermont of Vaals, who was shortly joined on the commission by his son-in-law J. F. Jacobi of Aachen, Nikolaus Cromm of Aachen, W. E. Wiedenfeld of Burtscheid, Adolph Schleicher of Stolberg, and Hermann Pelzer of Eschweiler.8 8

Hansen, Quellen, 3:286-90, 426n.

FROM INVASION TO ANNEXATION

55

As members of the central administration, these Rhenish busi­ nessmen had to broaden their political perspectives to encompass the needs and wishes of the whole region. They could no longer focus their attention solely on their own towns as they had done traditionally. It is likely that the presence of several Aacheners in the central administration helped to reduce the burden placed on that city, but generally the central administration sought to aid the Rhineland as a whole. When, for example, the representative on mission Peres demanded a contribution of 30 million livres from the Rhineland, members of the central administration went to Paris to appeal the size of the levy. They met with the Commit­ tee of Public Safety and declared the willingness of the Rhineland to pay one-third the original amount; the 10 million livres would then be assessed upon property owners by knowledgeable native Rhinelanders, that is, by the central administration rather than the representatives on mission. This offer was supported by another representative on mission, Gillet, and accepted by the Committee of Public Safety. Because some monies already paid were to be figured as part of the 10 million, the result of the Paris delegation's negotiation was greeted in the Rhineland as a great achievement.9 Shortly after being established, the central administration is­ sued a proclamation, probably composed by Cromm and the Aachen lawyer Joseph Vossen, also a member of that body, prom­ ising that both local law and French decrees would be re­ spected.10 In practice, however, when it came to the affairs of the towns, this could not always be done. In 1794 the French faced a different political situation in each of the three cities of Cologne, 9 Ibid., 3:356n, 532-37. Cologne's Mayor Dumont, also in Paris, protested that the members of the central administration had no authority to offer such a contri­ bution from a Rhenish population that had not been consulted. He probably feared that the Aachen-dominated central administration would ask Cologne to pay a large share of the levy. 10 Ibid., 3:286-90.

56

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

Aachen, and Crefeld. Since Crefeld had not been governed by local residents, the French had to construct a new local govern­ ment to replace that of the departing Prussians. On the other hand they found a town largely free of "feudal" institutions such as guilds, a town supported by manufacturing, a town dominated by wealthy, progressive, enlightened Mennonite merchant families. Success in Crefeld, therefore, required that they either win or force the cooperation and support of these families. In Aachen the old elite had been challenged repeatedly by the strong reformist New Party and consequently did not enjoy the support of the entire population. The New Party had been strengthened by support from reform-minded Protestant entrepreneurs from the immediate area around Aachen, and it included men who in 1792 had already demonstrated their willingness to work with the French. By appealing to these reformist groups, the conquer­ ors were able immediately to replace the old city government with a new and friendly municipal administration. In Cologne, in spite of recent political challenges, the old city government in­ stitutions remained strong and popular, although here too the French found an enlightened, reform-minded business commu­ nity that included Protestant merchants. At the outset the French chose to leave the Cologne council alone, as long as it cooperated with them. The primary concern of the French was the support of the ar­ mies, and much of the burden fell on the towns. The winter of 1794-95 brought extreme hardship to the population of the oc­ cupied territory. The harvest had been poor, and prolonged bad weather necessitated the use of fuel reserves for heating. Worst of all, the French army quartered on the Left Bank drew its entire support from that area. Grain, produce, medicine, clothing, firewood, and livestock were requisitioned; housing had to be provided for officers, and large sums in taxes and forced loans were to be paid in hard currency. Furthermore, merchants and peasants were required to accept assignats, the revolutionary cur-

FROM INVASION TO ANNEXATION

57

rency, in payments for goods "purchased" by the troops. The "General Maximum" law of September 29, 1793, had frozen prices and wages and fixed the value of the assignat, but the print­ ing of too much of this paper currency had made it virtually worthless. The Rhinelanders preferred to hoard food and goods rather than accept worthless money.11 Crefeld was particularly hard hit because the greater part of Jourdan's army was encamped in that area. Some of the former Prussian officials placed themselves at the service of the French and helped to raise most of the forced loans by collecting taxes.12 The wealthy Mennonite textile manufacturers were most directly threatened and had taken various steps to protect themselves, forewarned by the costly experience of the three-month occupa­ tion in 1793. The contents of the company warehouses had been transferred to Elberfeld, Duisburg, and other locations on the Right Bank, and in August and September of 1794 the Heydweillers, the Rigals, the Flohs, the Beckeraths, and most of the von der Leyen family followed their inventories. Friedrich Hein11 See

Eder, pp. 64ff.; Buschbell and Heinzelmann, pp. 12ff.; and Hansen,

Quellen, 3:757-72. The true extent of that exploitation cannot be determined,

however, because the Rhinelanders lacked the means to do a systematic account­ ing, and the French of course minimized the value of the goods they confiscated. In a letter to the directory of March 13, 1796, asking for a reduction in contribu­ tions, Vossen, Cromm, and Bouget detiled the extent of the loss to the Rhineland after 17 months of war and occupation: Food and supplies Food and supplies Monies confiscated Military contributions Damage to countryside Loss due to inflation of assignats Total 12 Wilhelm

54,650,000 livres (in assignats, official rate) 117,730,000 3,000,000

10,000,000 22,950,000 49,185,000 257,515,000 livres valued in hard currency

Steffens, "Die linksrheinischen Provinzen," p. 422.

58

FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

rich von Conrad von der Leyen and Peter von Lowenich re­ mained behind to represent the companies and to receive the on­ coming French. These precautions, however, were only partly successful; the conquerors were able to force the return of most of the emigrants, if not the return of all their goods. They demanded lists of all residents absent from Crefeld and of all the property of the missing businessmen. Businessmen who did not return promptly were to have their assets confiscated. By the time the Basel peace treaty was signed on April 5, 1795, Crefeld's entre­ preneurs had returned from the Right Bank to try to cope with what would obviously be an indefinite occupation of their home­ land.13 The most immediate concern of Crefeld's businessmen was to try to reduce the impact of the French taxation. With most of their inventories stored on the Right Bank, the manufacturers were able, when required to declare the value of their property and as­ sets, to give deceptively low figures. The von der Leyens, for example, estimated their worth at 300,000 livres; the Rigals es­ timated theirs at 75,000; and the estimated value of all property in the town came to 2,765,970 livres—all figures vastly lower than those on the books of the town's companies in 1794 or those that the firms would claim later, after French rule was firmly es­ tablished and it was to their advantage to look wealthy.14 The merchants also sought to reduce the size of their contribution by sending Peter von Lowenich to Brussels to negotiate with civilian officials. But most effective was the influence of wealthy mer­ chants on the French generals quartered in their homes, the best homes in the city. Jourdan, for instance, was quartered in the home of Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen, who used his fluency in French and probably his knowledge of current Enlightenment ideas (he was a founding member of the local Masonic lodge) to 13 14

Kurschat, pp. 43-45. Buschbell and Heinzelmann, p. 18.

FROM INVASION TO ANNEXATION

59

charm his "guest" and obtain relief for himself and the town from the army's demands.15 In spite of such relief as von der Leyen was able to secure, the Crefeld merchant/manufacturers suffered from the disruption of their enterprises and the sealing off of their markets to the East. Feeling a paternalistic responsibility toward their workers and fearing the loss of trade secrets should their employees change firms, the von der Leyens continued to pay reduced wages even when no work was done. Soon, however, the French required everyone to use assignats as wage payments. This left the artisan population at the mercy of the winter, unable to pay for the barest necessities. At this point the textile merchants generously con­ tributed 10,000 thalers to purchase food to alleviate the misery of the poor. The situation for all was finally eased in the spring when the Maximum was abolished, the assignat allowed to float in value, and the size of the town's contribution reduced.16 The significance of the first years of French rule in Crefeld, however, did not really lie in the economic hardships that the town had to endure. The economic damage apparently was not so great that it could not be made up quickly.17 Of greater impor­ tance was the gradual assumption of political responsibility by the Mennonites, who had previously not been directly involved in politics. Now manufacturers like the von der Leyens had to seek relief for the town, not just for their own firms, and they had to deal with the occupying authorities that had been given formal administrative rights on the Left Bank by the Treaty of Basel. That they did so can be seen in a petition which originated in Cre­ feld on October 12, 1796. According to a French decree of the previous month, no public official was to hold more than one pub­ lic office at a time. The petitioners, complaining that observance 15 Hermann Keussen, "Crefeld vor 100 Jahren," Beitrage zur Geschiehte Crefdds und des Niederrheins (Cologne, 1898), pp. 250, 259. le Ibid., pp. 245-47; Elder, pp. 100-101. 17 Steffens, "Die linksrheinischen Provinzen," p. 440.

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FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

of this decree in Crefeld would overburden and complicate local government and make it too expensive considering the already oppressive burden of the contributions, asked that the decree be revoked.18 Noteworthy here is the list of signatories under the collective title: "Les Deputes de la Bourgeoisie de Crefeld." Among the twenty or so who signed the petition can be found the names of virtually all the major manufacturers of the city—von den Westen, von Lowenich, Sohmann, Rigal, von der Leyen, von Beckerath, de Greiff. In the face of the French conquerors, the Mennonite businessmen now presented themselves as deputies of the citizenry! Conditions of course were different in Cologne and Aachen, where the French were dealing with independent cities. As the French approached her gates, Aachen abounded in rumors that the city was to be destroyed. The city council empowered Cromm and Vossen, the Francophiles who had collaborated with the French in 1792, to meet with General Jourdan and Representa­ tive on Mission Gillet in order to coordinate and regulate the entry of French troops. Cromm and Vossen succeeded in persuad­ ing the French general to send most of his army around the city, sparing Aachen much expense, and both were gratefully thanked and awarded positions by the city council, even though they be­ longed to the New Party.19 Soon, however, the French dissolved 18

HSAK.: 2418/148/11. Pauls, pp. 42ff., convincingly refutes the story present in most of the sec­ ondary works that Vossen and Cromm saved Aachen from complete destruction by the French when they returned to the Rhine. This story is based primarily upon an account published by Vossen in 1830 in a successful attempt to change the image of himself as a Francophile. According to Vossen, the Convention, the Committee of Public Safety, and Robespierre had ordered the razing of Aachen because Aachen citizens had engaged in sniper fire on the French troops during the retreat of 1793. Vossen claimed that, while he was trying to dissuade Jourdan from destroying the city, a Colonel Mariete appeared and explained that when he had been wounded in 1793, generous Aacheners had hidden and nursed him and helped him to safety. Moved by this story, Jourdan supposedly disobeyed the or­ ders of the Convention and agreed to bypass the city. Pauls uses reports by Gillet, 19 A.

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61

the old government, just as they had two years before, and insti­ tuted a new municipal government. It was dominated by mem­ bers of the New Party including the important merchant/ manufacturers Franz Pelzer, Jacob Friedrich Kolb, and Franz Heinrich Startz. A wine merchant, Theodor Bettendorff, served as mayor until he and Startz were appointed to the new regional administration as representatives of the whole Aachen district. At this point Kolb was made mayor. Another member of the city government was Gerhard Dautzenberg, the brother of Franz Dautzenberg, the radical publisher of the Aachener Zuschaner and partisan of the revolution. Apparently the new town government did its best to satisfy French demands for money and supplies, though at times it was unable to fulfill all of the requisition orders. In a move reminiscent of events that had taken place in France, a Comite de surveillance was created to watch for violations of the law by the citizenry or by the new city administration. Its membership was a mixture of French soldiers and local citizens, most of whom were artisans, but Servais van Houtem, a leading cloth manufacturer, was also a member of the committee.20 Businessmen thus moved very quickly into positions of authority in Aachen, and they constantly mediated between the community and the demanding French. Cologne's effort to resist the forced contributions and requisi­ tions coincided with an intense campaign to maintain the inde­ pendence of the city's traditional institutions. As a consequence, who was Jourdan's superior, to show that the French discounted the possibility that Aacheners had fired on their soldiers in 1793; they believed rather that French deserters were the culprits. Thus there was no reason for the French to seek revenge on Aachen. Pauls searched the speeches, letters, and minutes of the Committees of Public Safety and Security and of the Convention and found that no threat to Aachen was ever made. For the earlier version, see E. Pauls, "Aus der Zeit der Fremdherrschaft Der 2. Marz 1793 und seine Folgen fur Aachen," Zeiischrift des Aachener Gesehiehtsvereins 10 (1888):213£f.; Eder, p. 21; and Neissner, pp. 84-86. 20 Eder, pp. 26-27, 30n. Some former magistrates had fled the French armies. See Neissner, p. 71; Hansen, Quellen, 3:315-18, and HSAK: 241157148/5.

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FROM OLD REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

the struggle in Cologne was more pronounced than in the other cities, and because it is well documented it can be followed in de­ tail. By 1796 a variety of maneuvers by the city council, including the sending of a delegation to Paris, produced four noteworthy developments: (1) major changes in both the structure and per­ sonnel of city government; (2) a growing importance of Protes­ tant businessmen in city affairs; (3) a corresponding growth in the role played by self-conscious (or group-conscious), reformminded businessmen of both Catholic and Protestant religions; and (4) a shift in opinion on the issues of local sovereignty and political loyalties. The first responses to the French presence in Cologne were much like those in Aachen. The city council wrote to General Jourdan proclaiming the neutrality of the city and placing it under the protection of the French army. The city asked that the property of both citizens and clergy, the practice of religion, and the city's "constitution republicaine" should not be interfered with. It also dispatched a delegation including the merchants Friedrich Carl Heimann and Abraham Schaaffhausen to Aachen to meet with Jourdan and the representatives on mission to seek fair treatment for the city. Representative Gillet replied that property and institutions would be respected, but he asked for a list of all city revenues and assets, and a list of all officials. Absent officials would be given fourteen days to return before they were declared emigrants and their property confiscated. As in Aachen, a Comite de surveillance would supervise the compliance with French decrees.21 In January 1795, a new contribution was levied by the Bonn District Administration, a body created by the Aachen Central Administration to enforce French measures in the area of the old electorate. Cologne's city council responded with a flood of peti­ tions overflowing with flattery and paeans to the principles of the 21

Hansen, Quellen, 3:257ff.

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63

revolution. Mayor J.M.N. Dumont, a former merchant, appealed to Representative on Mission Frecine on behalf of "the love of lib­ erty, the love of [his] free fatherland and its just and hereditary laws." The appeal was seconded in a letter to the National Con­ vention in Paris, which included complaints about the confisca­ tion of the city library and the seizure of a cherished Rubens painting. The letter began: "Representatives! A free people on the banks of the Rhine, a people free for twenty centuries, appeals to your justice, your promises, your principles," and went on to explain that Cologne was being taxed unfairly in comparison with the territory of the electorate. Placing the historically free city of Cologne under the jurisdiction of Bonn, its traditional rival, was seen as a violation of Cologne's freedom and a great financial in­ justice. Seeking to use all possible avenues of influence, the coun­ cil also sent similar letters to the Aachen Central Administration and to the representatives on mission. To the latter the council also noted that the occupation of the Rhineland had completely disrupted commerce, the life-blood of the city, endangering the supply of foodstuffs and impoverishing the merchants.22 Thus far the efforts of the city were quite similar to its efforts in the disputes with the elector and imperial authorities in previous decades, though of course the language used showed a sensitive­ ness to the revolutionary style of the French republic. The council took a somewhat more radical step on February 2, when it de­ cided to send Dumont and the merchant Johann Stohr as dele­ gates to Paris to represent the interests of the city in the capital of its conquerors. This went well beyond the kind of lobbying pre­ viously attempted by the Rhenish towns. The delegates' instruc­ tions were firm and, in the circumstances, hopelessly unrealistic. They were ordered to see that: (a) The Free City Cologne and her boundaries be freed from the contributions; and moreover that (b) the city in her repub" Ibid., 3:355, 359-62.

64

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lican and democratic government, in her freedom, her laws and customs, be protected, supported, maintained, and thereby left alone, without the least alteration or disturbance; (c) the city be withdrawn and freed from the yoke of the Bonn District Ad­ ministration, which had been newly constructed in the area of the Cologne Electorate.23 They took with them fifteen hundred copies of a lengthy essay presenting the city's case, its arguments buttressed by quotations from Roman and Enlightenment authorities on the nature of de­ mocracy and liberty. The essay concluded that while it was both necessary and good for France to overturn local autocratic or des­ potic institutions, there was no such necessity in the case of the free city of Cologne, because there were no such institutions there.24 The course of the frustrating and frustrated mission can be fol­ lowed through the periodic reports sent back by the delegates. They appeared before the Committee of Public Safety and before various legislative committees, and submitted copies of Cologne's constitution in French and German versions. On March 19, for example, Dumont addressed the National Convention in a flow­ ery, rhetorical appeal that invoked the principles of the Revolu­ tion and the promises of the National Convention to respect the institutions of Cologne.25 Yet in spite of the affability of officials, in spite of the enthusiastic reception by the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention, Dumont and Stohr had to report that the affairs of the city were not receiving attention. Her future, including her political independence and the staple right, 23 Stohr, the owner of a freight-forwarding business and a member of the coun­ cil, had been one of the merchant community's "commissioners" in their 1791 dis­ pute with the council over the freight scale. HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/ 4298/34; printed in Hansen, Quellen, 3:344-45. 24 Hansen, Quellen, 3:366ff. 25 Ibid., 3:423-25, 445ff.; HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/4298/23-24, 39. Dumont and Stohr even wrote to the city council to ask that they be pardoned for translating the word Zunft (guild) as section.

FROM INVASION TO ANNEXATION

65

appeared uncertain, and differences between the Committee of Public Safety and the National Convention made it advisable for Cologne to pursue its aims by once again appealing to the Aachen Central Administration.26 Stohr decided to return to Cologne, and Dumont remained in Paris alone. Though Cologne had gained no relief, she had gained experi­ ence. The envoys had met with France's highest officials on their own ground and speaking their language. As a result, Cologne's awareness of the French political style and the realities of dealing with the French was considerably advanced. Rhenish political horizons were being widened. This can be seen clearly in Dumont's changing reactions to the rumors that France might annex the Rhineland without compensation to the princes and sovereign cities involved.27 At first Dumont discounted the likelihood of annexation. To Cologne he wrote that should France try to annex the Rhine, it would be "in the eyes of future generations a political crime per­ petrated against humanity." As such, it would be inconsistent with France's professed belief in the rights of man and would be morally unacceptable to the French people.28 However, when word was spread that the staple right was to be abolished, he was soon moved to use the press to combat the annexationists in Paris. On September 1, he published a letter in Nouvelles Politiques signed by "un habitant de la rive gauche du Rhin," in which he protested that no one could speak for the inhabitants of the Rhineland until a representative assembly acceptable to the Rhinelanders had been convened. Short of local unanimity in its favor, an26 HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/4298/32, 122; Hansen, Quellen, 3:477, 513-15. Dumont now also had to contend with a delegation representing the countryside of the electorate of Cologne and hostile to the city's interests. 27 Hansen, Quellen, 3:578. An article in the official journal Moniteur claimed that annexation was the solution to the problem of economic decline caused by the tariff policies of the petty Rhenish states and by the staple rights of Cologne and Mainz. 28 Ibid., 3:563.

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nexation would be a brutal violation of local rights and wishes, and also a violation of the great principles of the Revolution.29 Here is a direct appeal to popular sovereignty—an idea foreign to traditional Rhenish experience! Dumont followed up the letter by publishing a pamphlet elaborating on his earlier arguments. Based in part on Rousseau's Social Contract, the pamphlet con­ tended that France, by annexing the Rhineland, would become too big and thereby ungovernable. The true borders of a nation were not its "natural frontiers" (currently the favorite argument for annexation); borders were not rivers or mountains but were historically and culturally determined, and only thus could they be based upon true justice and honor.30 The valiant efforts of Dumont to resist the encroachments of a dynamic French administration came to a rather sudden and un­ successful end. On December 14, only a little more than two weeks after a "successful" interview with the minister of extraor­ dinary affairs, Dumont was placed under house arrest on the or­ ders of the new Directory. His house was guarded, his papers sealed. Neither Dumont nor the council could discover the rea­ sons, though Dumont suspected that his antiannexationist stand and accusations against him by Aachen and Bonn Francophiles were responsible. Appeals to the Directory and to the minister of foreign affairs were ineffectual. Dumont was not released until June 1796, when Police Minister Cochon told him that he was no longer recognized as a representative of Cologne. He was given three days to leave Paris.31 The excuse for no longer recognizing the validity of Dumont's credentials was that the Cologne government he represented had been dissolved in May. The city council had been less adroit than its Paris delegation in adapting itself to the French style of politics 29

Ibid., 3:579-82. 3:629-39; and HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/4298/206ff. 31 HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/4298/213, 262-76; and Hansen, Quellen, 3:702-3n. 30 Ibid.,

FROM INVASION TO ANNEXATION

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and in responding to French demands. In August of the previous year a new contribution had been demanded of Cologne. The city council had relied upon Dumont to obtain relief and was now un­ able to agree on the means of raising the necessary sum. The council's slow and inefficient process of decision making in­ furiated Representative on Mission Meynard, and when members of the council started to go from door to door asking for dona­ tions, he denounced the action as a form of begging that was humiliating to the French nation. Meanwhile, a group of promi­ nent merchants, some of whom were council members, declared themselves unable to advance money to the city. This group in­ cluded the leading strategists in resisting the French demands: J. J. Wittgenstein, M. Cassinone, F. Herstatt, B. Boisseree, F. C. Heimann, and H. Birkenstock. Meynard complained to the Committee of Public Safety that "we receive many demonstra­ tions of zeal, but no money," and by the end of August the repre­ sentatives on mission, the Aachen Central Administration, and the Bonn District Administration all demanded reforms in the structure of Cologne's government.32 Shortly thereafter, Meynard decided that the Cologne financial records should be audited in the hope of finding new sources of income. (In Aachen and Crefeld most of the money to meet new contributions had been collected out of increased taxes.) He en­ trusted the audit to the Bonn District Administration headed by J. J. Eichhoff. A four-man auditing commission was appointed, two of whose members were Bonn citizens; the third member was J. B. Fuchs, the former judge on the electorate's high court in Cologne; the fourth was J. Rethel, a Strasbourger who came to Cologne with the French armies, was a close friend of Fuchs, and lived in his house. The city council declined to cooperate with the commission on the grounds that except for Rethel, the commis­ sioners had all been connected with the former elector's govern32

Hansen, Quellen, 3:599, 607-8.

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ment. For one thing, since the future of the Rhineland was unde­ cided, it was possible that the electorate would be reestablished, and in that case it would be disadvantageous to Cologne's citizens for officials of the electorate to have inspected the books. Finally, the council labeled Fuchs "a known enemy of the city" and de­ nounced him as a troublemaker because he had opposed the council in the freight-scale dispute of 1792. When the new com­ mission threatened to use force if necessary, the city appealed to Meynard, who agreed to appoint a new commission made up of Rethel and two Aacheners.33 Cologne, however, still failed to cooperate. Finally, in April 1796, the Directory authorized Joubert, the government com­ missioner (a title replacing that of representative on mission), to replace the old city government with a new municipal govern­ ment. First Joubert tried to force payment of the contribution without waiting for the audit by arresting three mayors and four prominent merchants and taking them as hostages to Aachen. Two weeks later, however, when this ploy failed, the old gov­ ernment was replaced by a new administration headed by Mayor J. J. Wittgenstein and including four merchants. Several of these men had been obstructionists, but now they realized that the game was up and formed a special commission to resolve remain­ ing difficulties on raising money.34 And, of course, since Co­ logne's centuries-old government no longer existed, Dumont could no longer be considered its representative; on this pretext he was released and told to return to the Rhineland. As we have seen, neither the lobbying of the Paris delegation nor the obstructionist tactics of the city council was successful. Cologne's traditional form of government was abolished; French taxes were collected and reforms were pushed through. The re­ sistance to the French had been led by a coalition of city officials, like mayors Dumont and Wittgenstein, and prosperous mer33

Ibid., 3:658-69.

34

Ibid., 3:786-95.

FROM INVASION TO ANNEXATION

69

chants, like F. C. Heimann. Many of the latter had never held office, some were Protestants, and their involvement in politics had begun only in the years just prior to the French Revolution. These were the men who had learned from the failures of 179496 that the haughty assertions of complete independence had to be abandoned, that only through genuine cooperation with the French could crucial city and mercantile interests be protected. It was the recognition of this fact, not mere opportunism or passive acquiescence, that brought about a changed attitude. The lesson of cooperation was learned only gradually, but once learned, it stuck. The coalition of former resistors supplied a steady stream of public officeholders participating in the French regime on the Rhine.35 35 Ibid., 3:258n. The future careers of Dumont and Wittgenstein, the former mayor chosen to head the new administration, were symptomatic of events to come. Wittgenstein served Cologne either as president of its administration or as mayor during nearly the entire French period. Dumont became a councilor to the prefect when that system was introduced into the Rhineland. He was also the pub­ lisher of the official gazette of the Roer department to which Cologne, Crefeld, and Aachen later belonged. The long-lasting cooperation between these men and the French has presented problems for Rhenish historians concerned with the ques­ tion of national loyalties. Eberhard Gothein, author of the most important history of the city of Cologne, claimed that neither man had "a true affection for French rule" but rather that they were both "practical cosmopolitans" (p. 33). Justus Hashagen, Das Rheinland und die franzosische Herrschaft (Bonn, 1908), pp. 26-27, saw Dumont as the stalwart defender of the old German constitution and only reluctantly conceded that later Dumont had praise for Napoleon. The truth is that Wittgenstein and Dumont, like other Cologne "patriots" and clear-sighted men in Aachen and Crefeld, apparently realized after their first experiences with French rule that resistance could only be painful, but that genuine cooperation could bring tangible benefits to their native cities. Historians who have con­ demned the Rhenish acceptance of the French occupations as "but an example of the longstanding German habit of accepting any kind of de facto authority" are surely being unfair (Epstein, p. 458). The institutions of the imperial free cities, like the armies of the German Empire, had to give way. (Perhaps as a consequence both of his failure in Paris and of the dissolution of the old council that had employed him, Dumont found that his request for compensation for his expenses as Cologne's representative was ignored. He later appealed in 1803 to the com­ munal government and in 1809 to the prefect, but without success. Finally in

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Hoche and the End of the Old Regime Ironically, just when Cologne's leaders had accepted the new regime, the old institutions were restored to them, though only for a short time. In February of 1797, General Hoche became the new French commander in the Rhineland. The beginning of his brief rule, cut short by his death, gave the residents of the Rhineland reason for optimism. On March 21, 1797 (1 Germinal, V by the French calendar), Hoche abolished the previous Rhine Cen­ tral Administration in Aachen and substituted for it a body called the middle commission. At the same time, he granted petitions asking that the old constitutions of Cologne, Aachen, and other cities be restored. He returned the control of church property in Aachen and Cologne to the clergy, thus reversing the unpopular program of secularization, and he gave the city governments con­ trol over the public domain.36 The Rhenish cities were not allowed to enjoy for long the com­ forting return of their old, familiar institutions. On April 4, Hoche decreed that Protestants in Cologne would be allowed to build a church and worship freely, thereby stirring up the reli­ gious conflicts that had led to the riots in 1788-89.37 Even more unsettling, in April and May the general levied new contributions of 3 million livres on the Rhineland. Both Cologne and Aachen considered these contributions oppressive even before they were raised to 8 million and then to 12 million livres. When the new 1815 the general government commission of the Rhineland, which had taken over the administration of the area after the French were driven out, ordered Cologne to reimburse its former mayor and representative for his efforts. Dumont at this time held the title of "Landes Direktorialrath." See HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/4298/283; and 4299/50, 77, 87. 36 All five members of the middle commission were in the French service; none were Rhinelanders. Hansen, Quellen, 3:901-10; Eder, p. 37. On the reaction to secularization and to the Cult of the Supreme Being in Aachen, see Neissner, pp. 107ff. 37 Hansen, Quellen, 3:940-42.

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71

middle commission threatened to take over the collection of Co­ logne's indirect taxes (the main source of city income), the city government was spurred to action. The Cologne city council sent protests to Hoche, in which it declared that if he treated the city fairly and generously Cologne could be his "San Marino." (San Marino was the Italian city re­ public that had drawn attention to itself by its devotion to the ris­ ing star of Napoleon. He and Hoche were rivals at that time for the leadership of the French army.) Both Aachen and Cologne discussed sending new deputations off to Paris to lobby for a re­ duction in the size of the contribution. Some members of the now defunct Aachen Central Administration, along with Cologne's Dumont, began to agitate for the creation of a republican state on the Rhine, which by its independence would be free of the forced contributions to the French military.38 None of this brought re­ lief. The middle commission in Bonn appointed "substitute commissioners" for Aachen and Cologne to oversee local adminis­ tration, enforce the collection of the contributions, and reform local financial practices. The Cologne commissioner was J. Rethel (the one member of the 1795 audit commission acceptable to the city), and the Aachen commissioner was Antoine Estienne.39 In Aachen, Hoche's restoration of the old town government had returned the Old Party to power. Its decision as to the way in which the assessment of the new contribution was to be appor­ tioned led to an immediate protest from several leading merchants and manufacturers who favored complete union with France. Estienne supported their contention that the apportionment was ex­ tremely arbitrary and harmful to business, and he used this issue as an excuse to order new elections in Aachen and adjacent Burtscheid. The New Party emerged victorious once again, and a group of manufacturers, members of the Aachen Masonic lodge, and sympathizers with the French took over the administration of 38 Ibid.,

3:955ff.

39 Ibid.,

3:999ff., 1032.

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local affairs. In this way the business community was mollified, and Estienne obtained the cooperation of the city.40 Events in Cologne after Rethel's appointment were almost a replay of those of the previous year. Rethel's first step was to re­ quest permission to attend the council's meetings in order to see that the problem of the contributions was handled promptly and directly. He was refused on the ground that the old constitution prohibited foreigners from attending such meetings. In midAugust he reported to his Bonn superiors that the obstacles to payment of the contribution were the "gothic routine" of the city council and the "egotism of the patricians and rentiers," who wanted commerce to bear the lion's share of the burden. He asked the middle commission to permit him to use force, and permission was granted on August 19.41 First Rethel formed a committee consisting of two representatives of each artisan guild to inspect the financial records of the city. He then placed the city's four mayors and the secretaries of the city council under arrest and had them transported to Bonn, where they remained under guard for the next two weeks. The arrests, however, had little effect on the delaying tactics of the city, apart from causing indignant protests. After a few days Rethel complained that Cologne's "insistance on maintaining its gothic authority at the expense of the authority of the French gov­ ernment reaches the point of eluding all manner of executing" the middle commission's instructions on the reform of city finances.42 The impasse was finally broken on September 5, 1797, when Rethel and the middle commission abolished the old city govern­ ment, which was never again revived. The reason given was that "instead of viewing itself as a mere administrative body subordi­ nate to the French government, [the city council]... saw itself as a government which, according to the prerogatives of its constitu40

Ibid., 3:1115-17, 1201-3, and 4:51-52. Ibid., 3:1040, 1055, 1111-13, 1120-30, 1137-45. 42 Ibid., 3:1141. 41

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73

tion, had the power to oppose French higher authorities at will."43 A thirteen-member magistracy was established in its place. Seven of the members were merchants, and several of the new magistrates were active members of the group led by the merchant F. C. Heimann that had previously led the resistance against the French. Payment of the contribution and release of the hostages followed within three days. With the appointment of the new magistracy, the door was open to reform. A nine-man commission was set up to discuss the general reorganization of city government. The commission in­ cluded three artisans, three "academics" (Gelehrten), and three merchants. Moderate reformers on the commission included the three merchants and the former Judge J. B. Fuchs; the artisan members were more radical, wanting broader rights, fewer and less discriminatory taxes, and price controls on food staples. The magistracy and commission agreed in principle with the radicals, but they postponed tax reform and price controls because of the financial pinch caused by the contributions. Magistracy meetings were made public, and city bookkeeping was modernized.44 Thus everywhere French forms of administration had replaced traditional institutions. By the fall of 1797, only the establishment of a new state in the Rhineland offered a possible means of staving off outright annexation. This idea had the backing of General Hoche, who saw a Rhenish state as a counterpart to Napoleon's state-building in Italy. A Cisrhenane Republic was created, but this time, only the most democratic and radical activists were en­ thusiastic about the project. Earlier supporters like Dumont now recognized the advantages of union with France. Moreover, in Cologne the partisans of the Cisrhenane Republic had joined 43 Quoted in Ludwig Kass, Die Organisation der allgemeinen Staatsverwaltung aufdem linken Rheinufer durch die Franzosen viahrend der Besetzung 1792 bis zum Frieden von Luneville (1801) (Diss. Giessen, 1929), pp. 124-25. 44 Hansen, Quellen, 3:1148-51,1165-69,1176-82, and 4:26,94,133-36. For a recent study of radicalism in Cologne at this time, see Kuhn.

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forces with the radical artisans, thereby alienating both the local merchant community and the heads of the old guilds. Since the project had no broad support, Hoche's death on September 19, 1797, meant the demise of the Cisrhenane Republic, which sur­ vived only another four days. The small democratic movement soon lost all significance.45 Creation of the Cologne Merchants' Committee

By the time union with France drew near, the business com­ munity, more than any other group, was in a position to benefit from French rule. Their sense of common social and political in­ terests had begun to develop in the reading and Masonic societies and in the controversies of the 1780s. Their sense of common economic interests was forged in the struggle to counter French taxes and requisitions. When the French upset traditional politi­ cal institutions, the merchants and manufacturers of Aachen, Cologne, and Crefeld accepted an increasing amount of political leadership and responsibility, and they demonstrated an ability to learn steadily from their experiences in dealing with the French. Cologne's merchants proved particularly adaptable to the new situation. It will be recalled that a group of merchants had sought to organize in 1791 and had met with opposition from the city council. These businessmen continued to act collectively in behalf of their own interests and those of the city. In 1795, bypassing official channels, they asked Fuchs (whom the city council was denouncing as its enemy) to mediate on their behalf with French authorities.46 On August 12, 1796, 24 merchants petitioned the 45 Hansen, Quellen, 3:1047ff., 1056, 1091, 1109, and 4:31, 191-92, 335. Inhis effort to see the democratic movement as an early "mass party," Kuhn, I think, exaggerates its importance, though he correctly points out the continuity between the artisan unrest of the 1770s and 1780s and the democratic movement during the early years of French rule. 46 HSAD: Lande z. Maas u. Rhein/912/Memorial of Dec. 10, 1795 (20 Vendemiaire, IV).

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75

city administration for permission to create a HandlungsCollegium, or trade commission, to try to revive the trade that had suffered a disastrous decline since the beginning of the war. The Handlungs-Collegium was to be established "under protection of the authorities, nourished by [the administration's] paternal well-wishes, and staffed by men of proven honest and upright thinking, who would place the common good in all cases above their own personal interests."47 By putting the proposed commit­ tee under the benevolent protection of the town administration, the merchants hoped to avoid official interference in its activities. In exchange, they pledged that the committee would act respon­ sibly and give the interests of the city the highest priority. The proposed committee would thus occupy a middle ground be­ tween official, governmental institutions and the private concerns of individual businessmen. The now familiar name of Friedrich Carl Heimann stood at the top of the list of petitioners. Other signers included Nicolaus Joseph Hahn, Hermann, Lohnis, and Johann Stohr, who had been Dumont's companion on the unsuccessful Paris delegation, and several leading Protestant merchants were also signers. Perhaps because Heimann was in bad repute with some parts of the population for supposedly sympathizing with the French, no action was taken on the petition, but the wording of the petition, like the names of the petitioners, was to appear again.48 The right moment came with Rethel's tenure as special com­ missioner in Cologne. As a first step, the Protestant merchant Wilhelm Schiill, in whose house Rethel currently resided, pre­ sented the magistracy with a memorial on behalf of the business community, in which he offered arguments for granting full reli­ gious, economic, and political rights to Protestants. The magis47 Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 37. A commercial commission had been estab­ lished in Mainz in 1746 and may have served as a model. See Blanning, p. 279. 48 Hermann Kellenbenz and Klara van Eyll, Die Geschichte der unternehmensehen Selbstverwaltung in Koln 1797-1914 (Cologne, 1972), p. 25.

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tracy endorsed Schiill's petition, finally bringing religious tolera­ tion to Cologne.49 Then, on October 28, 1797, Schiill submitted a petition drawn up by Heimann asking official sanction for a permanent merchants' committee that was to include Protestant merchants. This was a revised version of the earlier, unsuccessful proposal for the Handlungs-Collegium. Approval was granted on November 5, and three days later 35 merchants (out of the 250 holders of "merchant's rights" who were invited) met to choose the eight members of the Handelsvorstand, or merchants' commit­ tee. Four of the eight were Catholic, including Heimann, the president, Georg Kugelgen, Nikolaus Hahn, and Franz Josef Weyer. The four Protestants were Wilhelm Schull, Peter Bemberg, Hermann Lohnis, and Jakob Peuchen.50 The bylaws and statement of purpose of the new organization, based on a draft by Schiill,were presented in the form of a printed pamphlet to the magistracy and approved on December 17.51 As with the earlier proposals for such an organization, the underly­ ing premise was that the "well-being of trade" and the "wellbeing of the state" were inseparable. ("Wohl des Handels zum Wohl des Staates.") Because of this premise the founders claimed that the new committee had a special reciprocal relationship be­ tween itself and the magistracy, a relationship that has endured until the present. The goals set forth in the pamphlet show that the government was expected to pursue policies that would ben­ efit trade and thereby benefit the entire city. The merchants' committee also asked for virtually unrestricted freedom of trade: 49 Hansen,

Quellen, 4:143-44, 295-97. Also Fuchs, pp. 207-8. Hansen, Quellen, 4:145, 297-98; Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 42-43; Kellenbenz and Eyll, pp. 25-26, with facsimile reproduction of protocol facing p. 24. See also EUly Mohrmann, "Studie zu den ersten organisatorischen Bestrebungen der Bourgeoisie in einigen Stadten des Rheinlandes," in Beitrage zur deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, ed. E. Giersiepen (Berlin, 1962). 51 RWWA: 1/1/2/15; also Kellenbenz and Eyll, pp. 26-27; Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 44-45; Hansen, Quellen, 4:297-98. 50

FROM INVASION TO ANNEXATION

77

prohibition of monopolies, abolition of religious restrictions on entrepreneurs, and abolition of bans on exports or imports.52 The pamphlet asked for relatively low duties, to be adjusted according to the relative prosperity of each kind of trade. Thus the right to collect duties was conceded in exchange for the state's assuming the duty of aiding business. The merchants' committee also pro­ posed a uniform currency and unified, simplified duties, taxes, weights, and measures—all matters that in their present unsys­ tematic condition restricted trade and prosperity and that later would be the object of one of Napoleon's reforms. In return for the city government's aiding business, the mer­ chants pledged themselves to assume public responsibility. They asked to be allowed to reform and supervise the administration of public warehouses, the post office, and the customs offices. Com­ missioners to supervise the activities of the harbor and trade facili­ ties were to be appointed by the magistracy but subject to the au­ thority of the committee. The committee was also to establish an office to mediate commercial disputes before they went to court. This was desirable since regular civil judges lacked business ex­ pertise, while out-of-court settlements were not damaging to a party's credit standing. These provisions established the merchants' committee as an unpaid unofficial extension of the government, concerned with the public economy. Accountability was to be effected by the opening of books and minutes to inspection by the magistracy or any recognized merchant at any time. Furthermore, one half of the membership was to be elected each year, the president every three months, though reelection was permissable. Such poten­ tially rapid turnover made the participation of the entire business community essential to the committee's functioning successfully. 52 This in spite of a continued adherence to the staple right! Thus the mer­ chants' committee placed itself in a self-contradictory position on trade freedom, a position that plagued Cologne for the next thirty-four years. All "feudal" privi­ leges except their own should be abolished.

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All accredited merchants, in proportion to the size of their firms, were to contribute to the support of the committee—its rooms, records, secretary, and small library—and except in cases of ex­ ceptional hardship a merchant elected to the committee was re­ quired to serve. Founded five years before the creation of the French chambers of commerce in the Rhineland and ten years before Stein's reform of urban government in Prussia, the merchants' committee al­ ready embodied some of the basic characteristics of the "selfadministrative" institutions that would become so important in Prussian history. It combined a certain freedom of action on eco­ nomic matters with an assumption of public duties and accounta­ bility. Its members were to represent simultaneously the interests of their own merchant community and the interests of their city. They were to be private citizens but were to function as lay bureaucrats with official tasks. The relationship of the merchants' committee to the government was based on mutual respect and cooperation, not on subservience or opposition. The committee and its successor institutions combined political initiative with political responsibility, thus giving those who participated in those institutions a type of political education that would not be easily forgotten.53 As we note the political precocity of the Cologne merchants, we should recall the seeds of change that had been sown in Crefeld and Aachen as well. In those cities, too, the pressures of the contributions and requisitions and the intervention of French au­ thorities in local politics and administration had pushed reformminded, cooperative businessmen to the fore. In all three cities Protestant entrepreneurs, Freemasons, and members of the read­ ing societies assumed more and more important roles in local af­ fairs. Businessmen in all three cities sought some means of retain­ ing a degree of independence. In Crefeld and Aachen, however, 53 Minaty, pp. 4-7; Most, p. 89; Huber, Selbstverxvaltung, pp. 7-9; W. Fischer, pp. 34-35.

FROM INVASION TO ANNEXATION

79

these trends did not find such clear institutional expression as in Cologne. In Crefeld this was due to the unresolved question of sovereignty and the antipolitical doctrines of the Mennonites; in Aachen it was probably due to the early relationship between members of the New Party and the French. In any event, by 1797 a combination of predominantly new men and some of the more liberal-minded members of the old elite had assumed leadership. In Aachen, for example, only a small number of the city councilmen from 1786 were still involved in city government ten years later.54 One point must be stressed. The importance of popular sovereignty was not one of the lessons that most Rhenish busi­ nessmen learned from their experiences with the French. The pe­ riod of strong republicanism in France was also the period of greatest exploitation of the Rhineland. The French brought re­ forms, but they brought them as conquerors. Rhenish spokesmen like Dumont used the principle of popular sovereignty to try to defend traditional institutions and privileges that did not really embody that principle at all. The true democrats and republicans in the Rhineland were few in number and lacked real support. The notables of Aachen, Crefeld, and Cologne adapted them­ selves to the French regime after republicanism had waned in France. Finally, even after French-style institutions had been in­ troduced, Rhinelanders were not entirely trusted; special com­ missioners remained in the Rhineland to insure that French authority was respected. However great the advance over the traditional forms of urban political life, truly free and equal citi­ zenship for all was not something the Rhineland experienced under French rule. Nevertheless, it is clear that nearly five troubled, uncertain years of war and occupation had brought a considerable amount of change to the Left Bank of the Rhine. The old town institu54 Fiirth,

1:217-26.

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FROM OLU REGIME TO UNION WITH FRANCE

tions were gone, the guilds were gone, religious toleration was the law. It is also clear that many Rhinelanders welcomed these changes because they had sought such reforms even before the French arrived. But those best able in the end to adapt to the changes were not the radical democrats but the moderates, men such as the founders of Cologne's merchants' committee or Crefeld's Mennonites. The moderates, including most of the business community, viewed the French as conquerors, not liberators, but they also decided to face what had happened with realism and determination.

Part II French Rule on the Rhine

4. Businessmen, Politics, and Administration in Napoleonic France

ON October 28, 1797, the same day that the petition requesting the creation of the Cologne Merchants' Committee was submitted for approval, the news of the signing of the Treaty of Campo Formio was published: the Holy Roman Empire had ceded the Left Bank of the Rhine to France. Campo Formio brought to an end that phase of the French occupation during which the Rhineland had been considered primarily as foreign territory to be exploited economically and to be manipulated according to the changing tides of France's military and political fortunes in Europe. The Left Bank of the Rhine was now to be fully inte­ grated with the French nation. What had been simply coopera­ tion with the French now was transformed into public service within a centralized administration, and what had been unsys­ tematic social and economic reforms were brought into line with the reconstruction of public life in France. Integration took place in two overlapping stages. The first stage, lasting until 1802, can be characterized as one of tutelage. Local administration was regularized, and France welcomed the Rhineland's inhabitants as Frenchmen. But special commissioners still remained to supervise the administration of the newly an­ nexed territory and to make sure that the Rhinelanders really be­ came Frenchmen in thought and practice. The prefecture system was introduced in 1800, and with the recalling of the last special commissioner in 1802, the Left Bank of the Rhine was treated like the rest of France. In order to follow the process of integra-

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tion and the role played by businessmen in that process, we shall begin by examining the creation of new administrative and gov­ ernmental structures in the Rhineland after Campo Formio, the selection of personnel, the extent to which, at least in a formal sense, the personnel of those structures was made up of busi­ nessmen, and in a broad sense the degree to which the adminis­ trative apparatus was sensitive to the needs of the business com­ munity. Campo Formio: Annexation and the Introduction of French Government On November 4, 1797, shortly after Campo Formio, the French Directory appointed Franz Joseph Rudler, a native of Al­ sace, as government commissioner for the Rhineland. Rudler, who was close to the Directory and a man with considerable ad­ ministrative experience, was given broad power. He was in­ structed to introduce a uniform administration in the Rhineland, to organize the area into departments and cantons, to establish a system of courts, and to create an administration for the public domain. He was also to choose the personnel to staff the adminis­ tration, subject to confirmation from Paris. And, lastly, he was to report directly to, and only to, the minister of justice.1 Upon hearing the news of Rudler's appointment and instruc­ tions, General Augereau, the military commandant after Hoche's death, ordered the middle commission in Bonn and its subordi­ nate commissioners in Aachen and Cologne to remain in office until Rudler's arrival and then to disband. The transition from military to civilian rule was completed when Rudler arrived in 1 Hansen, Quellen, 4:299-302. At the time of his appointment Rudler was a member of the court of cassation in Paris. He had previously been a member of the Legislative Assembly, a judge in Colmar, president of the directory in the depart­ ment of Haut-Rhin, and vice-president of the revolutionary tribunal in Paris dur­ ing Thermidor.

Map 1

The Left Bank of the Rhine-1813 Rhine River

State Department Arrondissement

GRAND DUCHY OF BERG

DUCHY OF NASSAU

RHINE AND MOSELLE DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENT OF MONT TONNERRE

SOURCE: Based on Josef Niessen, Geschichtlicher Handatlas der deutschen Lander

am Rheirt (Mittel- und Niederrhein) (Cologne, 1946), p. 40.

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FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

Aachen on December 4, one month after his appointment. As his first official act, he published a proclamation to the residents of the Rhineland which outlined the intentions of the French govern­ ment. Printed in both French and German, the announcement promised uniform, fair, and efficient administration and justice. Paternalistic government was to be guaranteed by a system of jus­ tices of the peace who would be available to hear complaints from all parties. All remaining feudal dues and practices were hence­ forth abolished, and religious toleration was granted to all. Rudler promised, furthermore, to select qualified, competent officials familiar with local conditions and willing to consider local needs.2 The plan for territorial division of the Rhineland was outlined in a letter from Justice Minister Lambrecht to Rudler on Decem­ ber 13 and published by Rudler on January 23, 1798 (4 Pluviose, VI).3 The Left Bank was to be broken up into the Roer, Mont Tonnerre, Sarre, and Rhine and Moselle departments. Their respective capitals were to be Aachen, Mainz, Trier, and Koblenz. The Roer department was the largest. It had forty can­ tons, a population of over one-half million, and contained the cities of Cologne, Crefeld, and Aachen. Although Cologne was the largest city in the department, Aachen was selected by Lambrecht as the capital. This was in part because the central admin­ istration had already served there and in part, perhaps, because of the symbolic value of making Charlemagne's capital and the old imperial coronation city once again a seat of government. Cologne had to be content with having within her walls the major depart­ mental civil and criminal courts. The highest officials of the department were the five members of a new central administration in Aachen. This body was subor­ dinate to Rhine Commissioner Rudler and his successors. Of the five members, three were Rhenish—P. Wasserfall of the Cologne magistracy, J. Bouget of the Bonn Middle Commission, and 2 Ibid., 3 Ibid.,

4:331, 402, 415-18. Proclamation of 21 Frimaire, VI. 4:329, 426, 509-10, 519.

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N. Cromm, the former merchant and central administrator from Aachen who had worked with the French in 1794. All three had been in Paris in November of 1797, protesting a new contribu­ tion levied by General Augereau. While there, they had expressed what they claimed to be Rhenish opinions on the yet unan­ nounced plans for the new administrative structure and bound­ aries, and Cromm and Wasserfall had each tried to get his own city named by Lambrecht as the departmental capital. The dele­ gation did obtain some relief on the contribution. Furthermore, Lambrecht strongly recommended to Rudler that all three be ap­ pointed to the central administration, and to this Rudler agreed.4 The other two members of the central administration were H. J. Cogels and L. P. Caselli. The former was a native of the Low Countries and had been a professor in Brussels. He then served as an official in Brussels before being recommended by the justice minister to the Roer department post. Caselli had come to the Rhineland from Lille in 1795 as the national agent attached to the original central administration in Aachen. He had proved to be an energetic, diplomatic, and able administrator, who got along well with the residents of Aachen; he had actively con­ cerned himself with a wide range of local problems, such as public lands and public health and sanitation in Aachen, as well as with contributions and tax reform; and he enjoyed an especially good reputation among the merchant/manufacturers in the Aachen and Monschau areas for having intervened on behalf of the entrepre­ neurs against striking workers and artisans.5 In the selection of the members of the central administration of the department, it appears that Rudler held to his promise to find good men sympathetic to local needs. If we include Anton Josef Dorsch, who was named directory commissioner attached to the 4

Ibid., 4:274-79, 329, 508-13. Ibid., 4:481n, 59-60. When the central administration was disbanded by Hoche, Caselli became a commissar with the Julich administration in Diiren prior to his appointment by Rudler. 5

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central administration, as a member of that body, then four of the six members were native Rhinelanders.6 All had administrative experience; Cromm, Bouget, and Dorsch (a Mainz Jacobin) had served on the earlier central administration, and all but the new­ comer Cogels already enjoyed some degree of support among the inhabitants. Of the native Rhinelanders only Cromm had been a businessman, while the others had academic or legal back­ grounds. Though businessmen did not predominate in the central ad­ ministration, they were prominent in local administration.7 In Cologne, where Rethel was entrusted with the choice of person­ nel, six of the seven administrators were local merchants; the seventh member and president was Fuchs, Rethel's friend and the lawyer of the merchants' committee. Five of the merchants had been associated with the effort to found that committee, and two of them, Peuchen and Schull, were among those elected to it.8 In Aachen, Commissioner Estienne consulted with Rudler and then named as municipal administrators men who previously had not been involved in that city's political strife but whose sym8 Ibid., 4:550. Similarly Rudler's choices of justices for the court system were native Rhinelanders. Maximilian Kempis, the former Cologne mayor, was named president of the criminal court in spite of his very unenthusiastic cooperation with earlier French administrators. For the career of Dorsch, see Helmut Mathy, "An­ ton Joseph Dorsch (1758-1819)," Maimer Zeitschrifl 62 (1967). 7 The local administrative unit was called a canton, but cities were given what was called a municipal administration. 8 Fuchs was replaced in December, 1798, by Dr. E. Simons, a professor of med­ icine. For the following six years Fuchs was a teacher at the central school in Cologne. In 1800 he was named president of the arrondissement council in the prefecture system; in 1803 and 1808 he was president of a "section" of Cologne's electoral college. See Hansen, Quellen, 4:605-6, 977; Fuchs, pp. 69n, 207-9. In Hansen it is unclear whether Wilhelm Schiill or Everhard Caspar Schiill was named a municipal administrator. Given Rethel's close relations with the former, I assume that it was Wilhelm, though both Schiills were closely associated with the merchants' committee. Gothein, p. 29, always critical of the French, claimed that in appointing Fuchs, Rethel had selected the "most hated man" in Cologne (ubest-gehasste Mann"), a description belied by the favor Fuchs enjoyed with the business community.

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

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pathies he knew. At least three of the seven appointees were busi­ nessmen, and six belonged (as did Estienne) either to the "Cercle de la Reunion" (a club formed to promote French political ideas and union with France) or to the local Masonic order, or to both. Jacob Kolb, a merchant and cloth manufacturer, was appointed president but served for only five months. Upon his resignation, the post was taken by Johann Friedrich Jacobi, another cloth producer and the man who earlier had mediated the labor dis­ putes of 1788-90 and had briefly served in the first central admin­ istration.9 With this appointment and while continuing to direct the affairs of his firm, Jacobi began a long and steady career of public service to his city and the Rhineland. Rudler selected Johann Friedrich Toscani to introduce the new system of municipal administration in Crefeld.10 Toscani, a lan­ guage and drama teacher who had only come to Crefeld from Karlsruhe in 1794, had served there as a political commissar. In late March 1798, wrongly believing that he had the power to ap­ point the new officials directly, Toscani named five manufacturers to the municipal administration: Ludwig M. Rigal, A. W. Seheuten, M. v. Wyck, Isaak de Greiff, and Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen. The appointments were promptly set aside by Rudler, and on April 14 Toscani nominated in the proper fashion a new slate for Rudler's approval: Rigal as president, together with Anton de Greiff, Martin Leydel, Friedrich Heydweiller, and Gerhard Hunzinger, all cloth manufacturers.11 From the names 9 Hansen, Quellen, 4:484, 599-600, 978. Twenty-one of the fifty-four members of the "Cercle de la Reunion" were merchants. See Kuhn, p. 61n. 10 While still in Paris, Rudler was told that the former Prussian territories were not to fall under his jurisdiction, but Justice Minister Lambrecht wrote that that area too was to be included as part of the Roer department. Hansen, Quellen, 4:302. 11 Ibid., 4:614; Buschbell and Heinzelmann, pp. 42-43; Kurschat, p. 51; SaK: XIV/Franzosische Fremdherrschaft/1/52/7. A year later Rigal was replaced as president by Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen, Crefeld's leading citizen, and he had as his chief aide another manufacturer, Conrad Sohmann.

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on both slates it is evident that Toscani, perhaps because of the briefness of his tenure in Crefeld, found it simplest to appoint the cloth manufacturers who occupied the dominant position in Crefeld society. But what was more important, the Mennonite businessmen themselves, obviously aware that with the loss of Prussian sovereignty over them they needed to become active in making political decisions, abandoned their practice of refusing office. We can see, then, that throughout the Roer department the majority of administrative officials were natives of the Rhineland and that in the largest cities they were predominantly local busi­ nessmen. At the same time, it must be stressed that there was an inconsistency in French policy. The French recognized that if the Rhineland were to be integrated with France, local inhabitants had to be allowed to participate in the management of their own affairs. Nonetheless, because they distrusted the readiness of Rhenish officials to fit themselves into the French system of cen­ tralized bureaucratic rule, they imposed crippling restrictions on them. Whether at the municipal or department level, adminis­ trators were permitted to concern themselves only with local af­ fairs. Official correspondence outside the department was to be directed to the interior minister through the agency of the gov­ ernment commissioner. Correspondents were instructed always to use a modest and respectiul tone due authorities of higher rank, and discussion of issues relating to the entire republic or to the political future of the annexed territories was expressly forbid­ den.12 Rhinelanders were thus reminded that they did not yet enjoy full citizenship. At his own request, Rudler was transferred back to Paris, where he became a state councilor, and in March 1799, J. J. Marquis of Lorraine was named to succeed him. The new com­ missioner of government spoke no German nor was he familiar 12

K'ass, pp. 154-55.

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

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with the Rhineland; he thus had to rely heavily upon aides.13 And, unlike Rudler, Marquis quickly made enemies among the populace. On March 30 he announced a new forced contribution, of which the Roer department was to pay 3,370,000 francs. The central administration in Aachen and the municipal administra­ tions of Cologne and Aachen all promptly protested against the levy, arguing that the earlier contributions and military requisi­ tions had already severely damaged the department's economy and that the new Rhine tariff border, by cutting off eastern mar­ kets and restricting the importation of key raw materials, had paralyzed both industry and commerce. The new contribution therefore represented an impossible economic burden that the cities could not bear. In August, Marquis was replaced by Joseph Lakanal, who ignored the protests and announced his readiness to take hostages and to use troops for confiscations of property as a means of collecting the contributions from the resisting towns.14 This new attempt at exploitation of the Rhineland, an attempt that certainly seemed to reverse the policy of integration begun by Rudler, was ended by Napoleon's coup of 18 Brumaire (Novem­ ber 9, 1799), which put in question the authority of the govern­ ment commissioner. By the end of November the new consuls responded to complaints against Lakanal and appointed L. T. Dubois-Dubais in his place. This commissioner had not yet reached Mainz when he was recalled to Paris and, on December 22,1799, Henri Shee was named in his stead. Shee had formerly been the president of the middle commission in Bonn and was therefore familiar with Rhenish problems and enjoyed the respect of the most prominent people in the Roer department. When the Consulate created the prefecture system in April of 1800 (Con­ stitution of the Year VIII), Shee wrote to Napoleon and the jus­ tice minister arguing that the same system used in the interior of France should be used in the Rhineland, since it would bring bet13 14

Hansen, Quellen, 4:1015-17. Ibid., 4:1136-41, 1151, 1164, 1186ff.

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ter administration. In May the consuls agreed to She'e's proposal, and on June 22 Napoleon, with Shee's advice, appointed the first officials of the prefecture of the Roer department.15 The Rhine departments had not yet achieved a status fully equal to that of the other French departments. The Consulate de­ cided to retain a commissioner for the four departments, though in other respects Rhenish administration was now identical with administration in the rest of France. On the Rhine the prefects and departmental officials were to communicate with the commis­ sioner, who would then communicate with the relevant minis­ tries. French commissioners remained in the Rhineland until the fall of 1802. Shee, called to Paris as a state councilor in Septem­ ber 1800, was replaced by Jean Baptiste Jollivet, who was fol­ lowed after a year and a half in office by Jeanbon Saint-Andre, who had been a member of the Committee of Public Safety. Like Shee, Jollivet and Saint-Andre were respected in the Rhineland as fair and honest administrators, and Saint-Andre' subsequently served as prefect in Mainz. The Treaty of Luneville on February 9, 1801, marked the formal cession of the Left Bank to France, and in Paris Shee argued before the Corps Le'gislatif that the four Rhine departments should be declared "integral parts" of France.16 The end of the commissioner system that fall made the Rhine departments lull members of the French nation, a state of affairs that lasted for the next twelve years. The Structure of Napoleonic Government In order to determine the role played by businessmen in the new administrative structure of the Roer department we have to examine the components and personnel of that system. The struc15

Ibid., 4:1239, 1242, 1268-81. 4:1293-94; Bar, p. 45; see also the biography of Saint-Andre: L. Levy-Schneider1Lf Conventionnel Jeanbon Saint-Andre, 2 vols. (Paris, 1901), es­ pecially vol. 2, and Archives pari ementai res, 2nd series (1800-1860) (Paris, 1869), 2:500-501. 16Ibid.,

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ture was made up of parallel institutions. One set provided actual administration; the other set provided advisory bodies that gave a semblance of local participation in government. The changes in the structure brought by the transition from the Consulate (Con­ stitution of the Year VIII) to the Life Consulate (Constitution of the Year X) to the Empire (and Constitution of the Year XII) had to do primarily with the powers of Napoleon. Because these changes made little difference in departmental administration, it is possible for our purposes simply to disregard them.17 Napoleon Bonaparte was of course the chief of state, whether as first consul or as emperor, and in practice he enjoyed almost un­ limited power. He governed through ministers with the assist­ ance of his Council of State, a resurrection of the old Council of the King. The thirty to fifty councilors of state served as a na­ tional administrative court. They discussed—often in the pres­ ence of Napoleon—all pieces of legislation, including the great Napoleonic codes. The Council of State also supervised all as­ pects of public administration and sent councilors out "on mis­ sion" to oversee special projects. In short, with its legislative, bu­ reaucratic, and judicial functions, the Council of State was the most important political body in France. However, because no one from the Roer department served as a minister or as a state councilor, the ministries and Council of State are of interest here only in those instances when Roer-department businessmen had contact with them. Some such cases will be discussed later. On the departmental level, the prefect was the chief officer, supervising government in his department and reporting directly to ministries in Paris. He was aided by a general secretary, who was appointed by Paris and could therefore serve as an independ­ ent check on the prefect, and by a prefecture council. The four or five members of the council were nominated by the prefect and appointed by Napoleon. This council was supposed to render a 17 See Jacques Godechot, Les Institutions de la France sous la Revolution et ΓEmpire, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1968), pp. 561-99; Kass, pp. 168ff.; Bar, pp. 41ff.

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kind of administrative justice, reviewing disputes between private persons and members of the administration, particularly in cases involving taxes, public works, and public lands.18 It was not in­ tended to be an advisory board for the prefect, but often it was just that. The Roer department was divided along the lines used by Rudler into four arrondissements, or administrative districts: Aachen (Aix-Ia-Chapelle), Cologne, Crefeld, and Cleve. Each was named for its chief town, which was the seat of government for the district. The Roer prefect lived in Aachen, the department capital, and was also the chief officer for that arrondissement. The arrondissements of Cologne, Crefeld, and Cleve were all assigned subprefects to supervise administration. (In 1809 in all French departments, a subprefecture was established in the arrondisse­ ment of the capital city. However, the subprefect had little to do, since most of his work was done either by the prefect or by the prefect's staff.) The arrondissements, in turn, were divided into cantons and communes. Cantons were electoral and judicial units created dur­ ing the directory and subsequently consolidated and reduced in number by the Napoleonic regime. Communes were the Napoleonic designation for local administrative units that were much like parishes. Small villages in a rural area were combined into a commune, and several communes might be included in a canton. Large towns were in themselves both communes and can­ tons, and the words were often interchanged. Aachen, Cologne, and Crefeld were the only communes in the department that did not include outside villages. All communes were headed by a mayor and several aides. The prefect appointed the mayor and aides for communes of less than five thousand inhabitants; for communes (that is, cities) with more inhabitants than that, he nominated individuals for appointment by Paris.19 On each of the three levels—department, arrondissement, 18 Brian

Chapman, The Prefects and Provincial France (London, 1955), p. 21. pp. 595-96; Dorsch, pp. 7ff.

19 Godechot,

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commune—the chief official built a staff made up of directors for taxes, finances, roads, bridges, and forests, inspectors of weights and measures, postal officials, and so on. The most important ad­ ministrative work, however, was done on the departmental or communal level, while the function of the subprefect and his staff tended to be more supervisory in nature.20 There was, of course, a system of law courts set up in the de­ partments. Each canton had a justice of the peace, who, along with the mayor, adjudicated minor matters. Major civil suits and some criminal cases were brought before a district court (Tri­ bunal de premiere instance) in the capital town in each arrondissement, while major criminal cases were presented before the departmental criminal court in Cologne. There were appeals courts in Trier and Liege, and courts of last resort in Paris.21 Of special interest to us is the addition of commercial courts and labor arbitration boards (Conseils des pnuThommes) during the course of the Napoleonic period. The bench in these courts, un­ like the bench in regular courts, was composed of unpaid busi­ nessmen and artisans rather than lawyers.22 The administrative side of the prefecture system, then, had sev­ eral distinct formal characteristics. The system was strongly cen­ tralized, with the chain of authority passing from mayor to sub­ prefect, to prefect, and then to minister. The prefect appointed many department officials; others he nominated for appointment 20Bar, pp. 49-52; Nicolas Richardson, The French Prefectoral Corps, 18141830 (Cambridge, 1966), p. 29. 21 Bar, pp. 52-57; Dorsch, pp. 86-90. 22 Karl-Georg Faber, "Verwaltungs- und Justizbeamte auf dem linken Rheinufer wahrend der Franzosischen Herrschaft," in Aus Gesehiehte und Landeskunde (Bonn, 1960), pp. 361, 364, 355. Faber analyzed a survey made by Com­ missioner General Shee of the new appointees to office in 1800, and his conclu­ sions merit repeating here. There were 899 officials who appeared in the survey, 250 of whom were Roer officials. Included were members of the central adminis­ tration of the department, special commissioners, officials, and secretaries assigned to the canton administration, judges, notaries, prosecutors, clerks, and bailiffs. Nearly one-half were involved in the administration of justice. Most of these al­ ready held some office in 1789, and most served throughout the French period.

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by Napoleon. A citizen with a grievance or a request could always address himself to the appropriate administrator, and appeals on administrative decisions were referred to the next official up the ladder. As we shall see, however, appeals were often made on all levels simultaneously. As long as there was a special commis­ sioner for the Rhine departments—that is, until September 1802—that commissioner could overrule any member of the de­ partment administration, including the prefect. Because power was concentrated in the hands of a few nonelected individuals, this system could have become tyrannical, especially if the ap­ pointed officials were unfamiliar with local conditions or hostile toward local wishes, though this seems not to have happened. If officials bowed to local interests, on the other hand, the cen­ tralized administration could be, and usually was, an efficient in­ strument for meeting Rhenish needs. Formal participation in public affairs came, for most French citizens, through the complex system of advisory bodies that paralleled the administrative bodies of the prefecture system. The advisory bodies lacked real decision-making power, but by no means can they be dismissed as a sham. The citizenry participated in the selection of the notables that sat in the bodies, and those notables in turn influenced the process of government, even if they did not determine it. By meeting on various levels with their peers, discussing and making recommendations on urban, pro­ vincial, or even national issues, they gained a considerable amount of political experience. These activities did much to help define the sense of citizenship and nationhood that appeared on the Left Bank in the Napoleonic period. At the top of the complex national system of advisory councils and electoral colleges were three national legislative bodies: the Tribunate, the Senate, and the Corps Le'gislatif. As with the Council of State, no Roer-department citizen sat in the Tribunate at any time, so it need not concern us further.23 The constitution 23

Archives parlementaires, 1:1-5, 9:729.

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provided for a Senate of sixty to eighty members, appointed for life and given an income of 25,000 francs taken from the revenue of the national domain. The Senate was to vote on the constitu­ tionality of laws and to select the 300 members of the Corps Legislatif. All its debates were to be secret. The members of the Corps Le'gislatif met when called into session by the administra­ tion; they were to serve five-year terms and to be paid 10,000 francs per annum. Each department was to have at least one legis­ lator. The Corps had the power to reject or decree proposed laws submitted to it by the Tribunate or the government. Also, it was to vote on military and commercial treaties, on alliances, and on the budget. Its proceedings were to be public, but it was not permitted to debate issues until 1807. Thereafter it was to have the right to debate matters submitted to it, but the administration called it into session less and less frequently. Its sessions had ceased altogether by 1812. Clearly, the real legislative powers of the Senate and Corps Legislatif were very limited. For the most part these bodies could not themselves initiate legislation but could only respond to ini­ tiatives taken by the administration. Moreover, by a process to be examined in detail, senators and legislators owed their appoint­ ments to Napoleon. This further lessened any possibility of oppo­ sition to Napoleon. In general, the Corps and Senate followed rather docilely Napoleon's lead and that of his ministers. On the other hand, it is also clear that appointment to the Senate or Corps Legislatif brought prestige and a handsome income. Ap­ pointment to the Senate was often used by Napoleon as a reward for distinguished service. Among the senators were two Bonapartes, Napoleon's coconsuls Sieyes and Ducos, and a large number of former ministers.24 After 1808, when a hereditary no­ bility was reestablished in France, all senators were given the rank of count of the Empire, and some legislators were also enno24

Adolphe Robert and Gaston Cougny, Dtctwnnaire des parlementaires franQais, 5 vols. (Paris, 1889), 5:574.

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bled. Furthermore, personal contact in Paris with officials in the ministries and the Council of State gave senators and legislators the possibility of influencing government decisions indirectly, at least for the benefit of their own constituents. Ludwig Maxi­ milian Rigal, the senator from the Roer department, on many oc­ casions used his influence in behalf of Rhenish citizens.25 Within each department, participation in government was lim­ ited to the workings of advisory bodies in the form of municipal councils, arrondissement councils, and a departmental council known as the Conseil General. These councils, whose members served five-year terms, met for only fifteen days each year. Decision-making prerogatives were few, being limited to taxation and the apportioning of taxes within each council's jurisdiction, but these responsibilities were not unimportant. For example, the national finance ministry would determine that a department was responsible for collecting a certain sum to be raised through di­ rect and indirect taxes. To this sum the prefect would add the budget for the departmental administration, and the Conseil General would then divide the total tax burden among the arrondissements of the department. If the existing tax rates on property did not yield funds sufficient to cover the department's budget, the Conseil General could, within fixed limits, raise the tax rate a few centimes and could advise the prefect on possible changes in the department's budget. Moreover, the Conseil General ruled on petitions from lower councils complaining about unfair appor­ tionment. There was a similar process in the arrondissement and canton councils, where each council started with the tax appor­ tionment handed down from above.26 In the Roer department 25 See, for example, AN/FlbII/Roer 5/Rigal to Min. of Interior, 1 Thermidor, XII, on an appointment in Cologne; or HSAD: Roer Dept/DWMin. des Innern/B89/Rigal to Min. of Interior, 15 Prairial, X, on sale of public land in Crefeld. Also HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/I/Generalrat 3/Conseil General/XI/Decision of Council on 19 Floreal, XI, to send to Rigal a copy of letter sent to Finance Minis­ ter Gaudin appealing a tax matter. 26 Kass, pp. 173£f. For this process in the Conseil General of the Roer depart­ ment, see HSAD: Roer Dept/DWGeneralrat 3/Session of Year XI, Report of 26

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this financial decision making gained particular significance— especially for the many urban delegates—when Prefect Me'chin asked the Conseil General to oversee the systematic reduction of communal debts in the department. The largest debts were those of Cologne and Aachen, incurred in order to pay the heavy forced loans and requisitions of the earlier occupation period.27 The Conseil Ge'neral enjoyed prestige considerably higher than that of the lesser councils. During their brief meeting periods all councils could prepare reports containing advice and comments on all aspects of government within the relevant administrative territory, but this advice was not binding on the mayor, subprefect, or prefect. However, while the Roer Conseil General submitted yearly reports to the minister of the interior covering such topics as agriculture, commerce, hospital administration, welfare for the poor, public works, roads and bridges, school administration, and demographic change in the department, it seems that the arrondissement and municipal councils seldom made use of their right to submit reports and comments to the Conseil General.28 The members of the Roer Conseil General worked with (and Floreal, XI. The principle was determined in Paris, the department budget by the prefect and the Conseil General. The total was then divided into fixed, variable, and extraordinary expenses. In the Year XI, appeals were filed by fifteen com­ munes. Arrondissement

Aachen Cologne Crefeld Cleve Total Principal Dept. Budget 27

Real Property Tax

Other Taxes

967,331.36 francs 1,054,018.50 746,777.76 512,272.38

183,726.48 francs 152,548.21 152,986.67 83,274.86

3,280,400.00 2,780,000.00

572,536.22 485,200.00

500,400.00

87,336.22

HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/I/Generalrat 5/Mechin to Conseil General, 20 Ger­ minal, XII. Aachen and Cologne debts totalled 17,281,101 francs, plus 610,203 francs annual interest. 28 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/I/Generalrat 1-13. Very few reports from the lesser

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on occasion dined with) the prefect during the Conseil's sessions, and the Conseil enjoyed the privilege of direct correspondence with the ministeries in Paris. Appeals and reports on various mat­ ters were at times addressed to the ministers of finance, culture, and justice, to the foreign minister, to the minister of the interior, and even to Napoleon himself. The Conseil General thus pro­ vided leading Roer-department residents with certain access to the highest powers in France and provided a forum, however lim­ ited, for the discussion of departmental needs and interests.29 In­ sofar as possible, it represented the general interests of the de­ partment when dealing with the national government, and it served as the highest representative body within the department. The Conseil General was thus an innovation in several senses. It helped to represent the public opinion of the entire department, it dealt with wide-ranging affairs of state, and it did so in a man­ ner that broke from the pre-1789 pattern of councils that did nothing more than submit petitions primarily for the redress of grievances. Businessmen, landowners, lawyers, and officials worked with each other on committees and made recommenda­ tions that went beyond the narrow interests of each councilor. The range of issues discussed, the high quality of the council's membership, and the obvious seriousness of the council's efforts argue that the Roer Conseil General had an importance—and consequently a prestige—far greater than its two-week meeting period and its limited constitutional powers suggest. Indeed, until the Prussians created the provincial diet in the 1820s, the Conseil General was the only assembly where matters of general departmental interest could be debated. This made it a well-liked institution in the Rhineland.30 councils are present in the archives. Godechot, p. 594, made a similar judgment about the activity level of the lesser councils. 29 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/I/Generalrat 1/Simon to Conseil General, 21 Prairial, IX; see also HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/I/Generalrat/5/10; and AN/F'V/Roer 1/ Address to Napoleon, Dec. 14, 1807. 30 Gothein, p. 50.

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The complex selection procedure for senators, legislators, and the councilors on each department level was devised by Sieyes, one of Napoleon's coconsuls after Brumaire. Sieyes's system was designed to maintain the appearance of popular sovereignty while withholding the substance: all citizens were given a voice in the selection of their representatives, but the final choice was left to Napoleon, thus depriving the citizens of real power. The follow­ ing will show how complex the system really was. The Constitu­ tion of the Year VIII declared all men twenty-one years of age who had been born on French territory and who had resided in a canton for one year to be citizens. The body of registered citizens in a canton made up a canton assembly, which was to meet just once to choose one-tenth of its number to be "communal nota­ bles." The department's communal notables were in turn to select one-tenth of their number to be national notables. Once drawn up, the lists of notables were permanent, except for an awkward provision for modification. Members of the Tribunate and Corps Legislatif were to be chosen by the Senate from the lists of na­ tional and departmental notables respectively. Napoleon was then to use the departmental and communal lists of notables to appoint the first Conseil General in each department as well as arrondissement and municipal councils. Because the lists were not fin­ ished until 1802, the Senate chose the first tribunes and legis­ lators without reference to notables, and the senators themselves were selected for the most part by Sieyes and Roger Ducos (con­ suls until December 1799), and Cambaceres and Lebrun (con­ suls with Napoleon after December 1799)—all with Napoleon's approval. By 1804 the election procedure had been modified. The com­ munal notables chosen previously became the permanent canton assembly. This body met every five years to elect justices of the peace and to nominate two candidates for each place in the munic­ ipal councils, the nominees taken from the list of one hundred "most taxed" persons in the commune. The canton assembly also nominated members of department and arrondissement electoral

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colleges. Again the nominees were chosen from lists of the most highly taxed residents of the communes or the department, with Napoleon reserving the right to appoint a small number of elec­ tors directly. Appointment to an electoral college, as to the canton assembly, was for life. Candidates for the office of president of each electoral college were nominated by the prefect and ap­ pointed by the emperor. The presidents served five-year terms (the colleges met only every five years), and the prefect selected his nominees from a list of the most prominent (marquant) men in the department. Once assembled, the electoral colleges nominated candidates for each seat in the Senate, Corps Legislatif, Conseil General, and arrondissement councils of the department. Napoleon then chose the departmental and arrondissement councilors from among the nominees. He could heed or disregard nominations for the senato­ rial appointments, but the total number of senators in any case had to be kept within prescribed limits. If there was no vacancy no new senator was named. The Senate, finally, chose the legis­ lators from the nomination lists of the department. The powers of the electoral colleges were obviously not great, but nonetheless they were a new phenomenon in the Rhineland. For the first time large numbers of the area's most notable citizens were brought together for political deliberations. The process helped overcome the particularism so characteristic of Rhenish cities and principalities before the French invasion. Participants were now required to think of themselves as members of a large province and of a great nation, an exercise not easily forgotten. Napoleonic Administration and Businessmen In analyzing the participation of businessmen in Napoleonic government, the most obvious thing to consider is the extent to which they held administrative office. But equally important was the responsiveness of officeholders to local needs, including those

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of the business community. The period between 1792 and 1800 had seen Frenchmen assume the positions of greatest responsibil­ ity, with native Rhinelanders filling lesser administrative posts and with businessmen predominating on the urban level. This pattern continued in the prefecture system. In contrast to the ear­ lier, exploitative period of French rule, however, Napoleonic administrators were much more responsive to the problems of the Left Bank. During the Napoleonic period the Roer department had five prefects: Simon (1800-1802), Me'chin (1802-4), Laumond (1804-6), Lameth (1806-9), and Ladoucette (1809-14). All were of French origin and thus came to the Roer department as outsiders. Because the prefect served not only as the chief national official in the department but also as the representative of the department in dealings with Paris, it was most important that he be open and sympathetic to the wishes of the department's citizens—otherwise he would appear to be simply a foreign ad­ ministrator. That the French prefects took their responsibility toward their subjects seriously will be documented further in the discussion of the chambers of commerce, but for now the attitude of the prefects is sufficiently illustrated in an address by Mechin submitted on May 9, 1803, to the Conseil General, the depart­ ment's highest-ranking advisory body. Me'chin's address covered more than forty folio pages, which alone suggests that he did not dismiss the Conseil General as un­ important, in spite of its inherent limitations. The prefect prom­ ised that he would strive to bring both good government and prosperity to the department. He then offered a statement of prin­ ciples which were, he said, embodied in the constitution of the republic and which would be at the heart of his administration: "There are those who profess a very false doctrine that pretends to separate the interests of the people from those of the government. The government is strong only in the strength of the nation; it is happy only in its welfare; it is rich only in the nation's opu-

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lence."31 Because of what he saw as the identity of public and governmental interest, Mechin encouraged the members of the Conseil General "to express their opinions about the state of the needs of the department." The Conseil should submit to all ap­ propriate authorities its observations on any pressing matter. Fur­ thermore, because Mechin considered that the deliberations of the Conseil had a "serious and important character," he sought "frank and complete opinions" and offered to make members of the administration available to answer questions of the Conseil on financial and other matters. Information so obtained would assist the department administration in one of its important functions, which was to get the Corps Legislatif and the Council of State to act in its favor. Mechin's attitude toward his office and duties (reminiscent of Rudler's as evidenced in his first address to the department in De­ cember 1797) was shared by other Roer prefects. Full considera­ tion was given to opinions and recommendations from the advi­ sory branch of the department's government. This was especially so during 1802 and 1803 when counselor to the prefect Johann Friedrich Jacobi (the Aachen cloth manufacturer and former head of that town's municipal administration) served as acting prefect and thus managed the affairs of the department. In a letter to Jean Chaptal, the minister of the interior, the Conseil General of the department gave Jacobi the highest praise for his efforts as acting prefect during Simon's illness. Indeed, during 1802 the French government offered Counselor Jacobi the post of prefect of the department of Ain, an honor Jacobi declined.32 Roerdepartment merchants and manufacturers, furthermore, could expect a sympathetic hearing not only from Jacobi but from other counselors to the prefect such as Rethel (the former Cologne commissioner who had supported the merchants' committee and 31 For the report, see HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/I/Generalrat 3/Session of Conseil General, XI (1802-3). 32 Oppenheim, p. 153; HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/I/Generalrat 2/Letter of 5 Prairial, X; Robert and Cougny, 3:389.

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befriended many of its members), J.M.N. Dumont (the former Cologne mayor and merchant who had been a delegate to Paris in 1795), Ignaz van Houtem and Jacob Kolb (both Aachen cloth producers).33 The result was not only an administration attentive to local conditions, but one that produced cooperation and respect for the prefecture system of administrators and advisors from the department's citizens. A similar relationship between administrators and citizenry was found on the arrondissement and communal levels. The arrondissements of Crefeld and Cologne each had two subprefects between 1800 and 1814. All four were natives of the department, though none had business backgrounds. Jakob Bouget, the first Crefeld subprefect (1800-1804), had served in the Bonn Middle Commission and in the Aachen Central Administration during the period of the French occupation before annexation. His suc­ cessor, Joseph Jordans (1804-14), came from an old patrician family in Neuss, and he quickly allied himself with the leading manufacturing circles in Crefeld by marrying the daughter of Gottschalk Floh, then mayor and the town's second-wealthiest silk producer.34 The first Cologne subprefect, A. Sybertz (1800-1803) had been a judge on Cologne's civil court, while the second, Reiner Klespe (1807-14), had served as mayor of Co­ logne several times before the French occupation. The subprefect of Aachen, appointed in 1809, was von Lommessem, an oldregime nobleman and former Aachen mayor. These subprefects were of course familiar with local problems and consistendy supported the petitions of arrondissement councils, municipal councils, and mayors when those petitions were sent to higher au­ thorities.35 33 Hansen, Quellen, 4:1281; Oppenheim, p. 155n; Gothein, p. 33; AN/FlbII/ Roer 4/List of the 100 most taxed. 34 Buschbell and Heinzelmann, p. 89. 35 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/I/Min. des Innern/B89/Reclamations re. sale of public lands in Crefeld, Year X and 1809-11. Also HSAD: Roer Dept/DVI/Generalrat 2/Appeal of Cologne on tax assessment, Year IX; and HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/!/

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The mayors of Aachen, Crefeld, and Cologne were all natives of those cities, and all but one came from a business background. In Crefeld, Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen served as mayor be­ tween 1800 and 1805, assisted by Conrad Sohmann and H. v. Beckerath.36 All three were leading silk manufacturers. Von der Leyen was followed by Gottschalk Floh, whose aides, Isaak de Greiif and Franz Rigal, were also silk manufacturers. One of the three Aachen mayors, von Lommessem, had been a nobleman under the Holy Roman Empire, but the other two mayors, Jacob Friedrich Kolb and Cornelius von Guaita, had both been manu­ facturers, as had an aide, Edmund Joseph Kelleter.37 In fact, when Prefect Lameth in September 1807 submitted to the inte­ rior minister a list of nominees for the offices of mayor and aide to the mayor, all but one of the Crefeld nominees had backgrounds in manufacturing, and in Aachen there were only two nominees who had not been either a merchant or a manufacturer.38 The choice of a businessman for city office was not determined solely by his success as an entrepreneur. The French were concerned with wealth and prominence, but they were also con­ cerned with commitment to the French administrative system. This they evidently found in Aachen's and Crefeld's business leaders, although the prefect did urge that Aachen's current mayor in 1807, the noble von Lommessem, be replaced because of his great age and because he "was not used to the forms of French administration." At the same time the prefect complained Generalrat 10/Plan for reorganization of rural mayories in Crefeld arrondissement, 1810. 36 Kurschat, p. 51; Buschbell and Heinzelman, p. 90. 37 Bernard Poll, ed., Geschichte Aachens in Daten (Aachen, 1965), pp. 114-17. Guaita appears in most of the nomination lists as a "rentier." His business back­ ground is suggested, however, by his membership in the commercial court at the time of his appointment as mayor. His family owned a needle factory, but most likely Guaita had retired from leadership of the firm. See AN/lbII/Roer 3/2; Cle­ mens Bruckner, Zur Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Regierungsbearks Aachen (Cologne, 1967), p. 187n. 38 AN/FlbII/Roer 3/2.

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that Cologne's Mayor Wittgenstein and Subprefect Klespe had too many habits of thought developed during their service in Co­ logne before the Revolution. However, since neither was disposed to resign, and since it would create a bad impression if they were forced out, the prefect recommended that they be allowed to con­ tinue in office but promised that he would observe their activities very closely.39 It seems that the search for a mayor for Cologne presented the French with special problems. The solution of the difficulty shows the kind of individual the French wished to place in office versus the kind the Rhinelanders wanted, and it also suggests something about the relation of Cologne's businessmen to the new mayoral system. On July 1, 1800, twenty-nine Cologne citi­ zens wrote a letter to the justice minister asking that he name Rethel (the former commissioner, now counselor to the prefect) as the first mayor of Cologne. They said that in the midst of the difficulties of the occupation, Rethel had always had "the objec­ tivity of an honest man," and they praised him for "the sincerity of his concern for the welfare of a city overwhelmed with vexations." He had stabilized government, promoted industry and com­ merce, brought tranquillity, and inspired the confidence of the residents.40 This letter is interesting for several reasons. First, nearly all of the letter's signers were businessmen, iticluding the bankers J. D. Herstatt and Abraham Schaaffhausen, and several of the founders of the merchants' committee. Thus the letter indicates that much of the business community endorsed Rethel's efforts on behalf of business. Second, these businessmen commended Rethel, though it was he who had finally abolished Cologne's ancient constitu­ tion. Clearly, then, Cologne's tenacious clinging to tradition that had made the city stubbornly resist the French was past. Third, the signers of the letter were obviously not concerned that an out39 AN/FlbIl/Roer 3/Lameth to Min. of Interior, Sept. 27, 1807. As noted above, Lommessem became subprefect of Aachen, primarily an honorary position. 40 AN/FlbII/Roer 5/Letter of 12 Messidor, VIII.

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sider might be made mayor, as long as they knew they could work with him. The recommendation was ignored, and the first consul ap­ pointed Schaaffhausen as mayor, to be aided by F. Herwegh (a rentier) and the merchants B. Boisseree and J. D. Herstatt.41 Both Schaaffhausen and Herwegh declined, leaving the city gov­ ernment in the hands of the two remaining aides, with Herstatt as acting mayor. Boisseree had been a member of the merchants' committee, and he and Herstatt invited the committee to join in celebrating the installation of the new city government. The committee in turn congratulated the two businessmen on their appointments as mayoral aides.42 The merchants' committee then wrote to Subprefect Sybertz and to Jollivet, the current commis­ sioner general of the Rhine departments, recommending for mayor either J.M.N. Dumont (the former mayor, merchant, and later counselor to the prefect) or the committee's own president, Johann Stohr, both of whom had represented the city in Paris in 1795.43 Prefect Simon, however, complained to Jollivet that of the four candidates for the vacant position, Dumont, J. J. Wittgenstein, and J. P. Kramer were "too opposed to the princi­ ples of republican government to enable one to choose wisely among them," and Stohr was alleged to have had poor credit standing and a poor reputation as a merchant. Consequently, Simon recommended the lawyer J. B. Fuchs, or, if necessary, Kramer, a merchant who had served in the old Cologne senate.44 41 SchaafThausen, ironically, was apparently one of the leading violators of the French tariff. See Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 99. 42 RWWA: 1/1/5/167, 169. 43 RWWA: 1/1/5/177, 179, 209; AN/FlbII/Roer 1/Chamber of Commerce to Jollivet, Nov. 15, 1800. 44 AN/FlbII/Roer 1/Letter of 5 Pluviose, IX. The allegation about Stohr is curi­ ous, given his presidency of the merchants' committee. Fuchs had earlier served as president of the municipal administration and was a friend of many committee members, having acted as attorney for the committee. Dumont and Wittgenstein had been arrested by Rethel to force payment of contributions in 1797, but Schaaffhausen had suffered the same fate at the hands of Joubert in 1796. Both

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The choice finally fell on Kramer who, as we shall see in the following chapter, quarreled with Stohr and the merchants' committee. However, after only two years Kramer died in office, necessitating a new search. Mechin, then prefect, recommended either Wittgenstein or Dumont, but especially the former, appar­ ently feeling that an active merchant like Dumont as mayor might hinder the collection of customs duties on the Rhine. Wittgen­ stein qualified on this score, having retired from business in favor of his son. He was appointed and served as mayor of Cologne from 1803 to the end of the French period, being repeatedly con­ firmed in office. However, though Boisseree remained an aide, most of those nominated to replace Herstatt at his resignation were not merchants but rentiers.45 The prefects remained wary of placing Cologne's merchants in office. Within the Roer department, then, nearly all appointees below the prefects were natives and had high standing in their com­ munities.46 Some nobles of the old regime received appointments, such as von Lommessem of Aachen. Napoleonic respect for wealth and social position of course favored the old nobility in predominantly rural areas, especially the arrondissement of Cleve, but wealth and position favored manufacturers as well in Crefeld and Aachen.47 Some officials had held administrative positions before the French invasion, during the transitional period be­ tween 1792 and 1800, or at both times. Cologne's Wittgenstein and Dumont, for example, had been involved in the city govern­ ment before the Revolution. Few, however, had been professional career bureaucrats in spite of their earlier service.48 Outstanding Wittgenstein and Kramer had served in the city administration created by Joubert in 1796. See Hansen, Quellen, 3:786-95. 45 AN/FlbII/Roer 5/Mechin to Min. of Interior, 1 Thermidor, XI; AN/FlbII/ Roer 3/Liste des candidates, Sept. 11, 1807. 46 See also Faber, "Verwaltungs- und Justizbeamte," p. 355. 47 See AN/FlcIII/Roer 2/2/List of 73 most distinguished persons, Aug., 1809. 48 Faber, in his study of 1800 officeholders, found that of the central adminis­ trators, presidents, secretaries, and commissioners in the canton administrations of

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FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

success in manufacturing or commerce and public service under the old regime or especially during the French occupation indi­ cated a capability for administration and in all likelihood an abil­ ity to command the respect and cooperation of fellow citizens. Francophilia was clearly not a requirement; some who had been outright opponents of French rule found that a willingness to cooperate on a practical basis in conjunction with high standing, integrity, and capability sufficed for appointment to office. Fi­ nally, businessmen played a major role in Napoleonic government in the Roer department. Their participation in the centralized bu­ reaucratic structure of a large, dynamic nation-state provided members of the Rhenish business community with easy access to political decision makers while giving them concrete experience in the art of government. Notability and the Advisory System

Relatively few individuals held actual administrative positions in the centralized bureaucracy, but roughly 1 percent of house­ hold heads in the Roer department were involved to some degree in the system of legislative, advisory, and electoral assemblies.49 Appointments were based upon lists of the most highly taxed citi­ zens, combined with recommendations from various officials. We can thus gain a better understanding of the official perception of notability in the Rhineland by analyzing the process through which appointments were made.50 We shall seek to determine the the Roer department, 36% had been officeholders before 1789, 25% had been students or schoolboys, 16% had business backgrounds, 6% were teachers, and 6% landed proprietors. "Verwaltungs- und Justizbeamte," p. 364. 49 Few records pertaining to the arrondissement councils, much less full mem­ bership lists, came to light, so they must be passed over. Nor did the archives yield the names of the communal notables (the canton assembly). The estimates of de­ partmental population run between 520,000 and 580,000. Hansen, following French practice, figured 5 persons per household, or 104,000 to 116,000 house­ holds. The 901 electors make up .78% to .88% of the household heads of the de­ partment. Hansen, Quellen, 4:811-15; Biittner, p. 20; Dorsch, pp. 38-39. 50 It should be remembered that by "businessmen" we mean a merchant or

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

111

extent to which businessmen participated in the system and whether they played a role greater than might be predicted on the basis of the tax lists. Moreover, we may ask whether the cities of Aachen, Cologne, and Crefeld were overrepresented in propor­ tion to their population size or to the number of their residents on the tax lists. The appointees can be divided into three groups according to their relative prestige and importance. Senators, legislators, councilors general, and presidents of the electoral colleges form the top group. They enjoyed high social standing and consider­ able wealth, and many held administrative offices. Such men at­ tracted departmental or national notice, which in turn enabled them to move upward socially and financially and thereby gain increased influence. Forming the second group were members of the electoral colleges, which owed their prestige both to their making nominations for high positions and to their having most members of the most important assemblies. The members of the municipal councils form the final group; their jurisdiction was limited to town affairs. During the fourteen years of Napoleonic rule, six delegates from the Roer department sat in the Corps Le'gislatif and three in the Senate. L. M. Rigal of Crefeld was the sole appointee to the Corps Le'gislatif in 1800, and in 1804 he moved up to the Senate, leaving only eight individuals to consider. They are listed in table 1. Several observations can be made about the selection of merchant/manufacturer holding merchants' rights. Holders of such patents were sufficiently well established in reputation and wealth to enjoy a good credit rating. Some wealthy businessmen (hommes d'affaires) became rentiers, living off securi­ ties, and some became landed proprietors, with income from real property. Also, some former noblemen adopted the titles of proprietor or rentier. In short, there were no distinct lines of demarcation between social categories during the Napoleonic period, a fact that tends to make statistics imprecise. See M. Vovelle and D. Roche, "Bourgeois, Rentiers, and Property Owners: Elements for Defin­ ing a Social Category at the End of the Eighteenth Century," in New Perspectives on the French Revolution, ed. Jetfry Kaplow (New York, 1965), pp. 38-45.

Office, Date

Senate, 1810-14

Corps Legislatif, 1804-10

Senate, 1806

Corps Legislatif, 1810-14

Belderbusch, Charles Leopold

Bouget, Jakob

De Loe, Edmond

Jacobi, Johann Friedrich counselor to prefect; pres., dept. electoral college; pres., consistory general of Augsburg Confession

president, Conseil General; estate owner

subprefect, Crefeld

prefect, dept. of Oise

Occupation Given at Time of Appointment

cloth manufacturer, Aachen

count and estate owner, Wissen

member of regency of electorate of Cologne in Bonn

count; diplomat for elector of Cologne to court of Louis XVI; landed proprietor

Pre-1789 Occupation and Titles

Roer Department Senators and Members of the Corps Legislatif

Name

TABLE 1

dept., Cleve

?

Crefeld, Aachen

dept.

Nominated by Electoral College of

Corps Legislatif, 1800-04; Senate, 1804

Corps Legislatif, 1804-9

Corps Legislatif, 1804-14

Rigal, Ludwig

Salm-Dyck, Joseph

Von der Leyen, Friedrich Heinrich von F. mayor of Crefeld; pres. of canton assembly; member, Conseil Gen.

member, Conseil Gen.; landed proprietor

pres., muni, admin., Crefeld, 1800; Corps Leg., 1804

member, Conseil Gen.; pres., canton assembly, Aachen; pres., arrond. electoral college

silk manufacturer, Crefeld

dept. Cleve, Crefeld

dept.

1800—none; 1804—dept.

silk manufacturer, Crefeld count, electorate of Cologne; landed proprietor

dept., Aachen, Cleve

cloth manufacturer; 1st syndic, director of chancellery in Aachen

AN/CC31/29/Report of 30 Ventose, XII; AN/Flc III/Roer 2/Candidates, 1810; also Arens and Janssen, p. 111.

SOURCE: Robert, 1-5: s.v.; Archives parliamentaires, 1-14: s.v.; Max Braubach, Maria Theresiasjungster Sohn Max Fram (Vienna, 1961), p. 97; Roger Dufraisse, "Les notables de la rive gauche du Rhin a l'epoque napoleonienne," La France a Fepoque napoleonienne, Revue (THistoire Moderne et Contemporaine 17 (special issue, July-September 1970): 768-69; AN/CCl3/160/Session 28 Germinal, XII; AN/CC29/5/15;

Corps Legislatif, 1804-14

Peltzer, Mathias

114

FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

senators and legislators. All of the eight were native Rhinelanders. Before the French invasion, three had been merchant/ manufacturers, three had been landed noblemen, one had been a local official, and one had been both a cloth producer and an officeholder. Thus half of the department's representatives in Paris came from the business community, although all eight are listed in the French sources as holding prestigious public office at the time of their appointment. It appears that appointment as a legislator or senator was in part a reward for previous service. In­ deed, of the thirty-one candidates put forward by the electoral col­ leges for appointment to the Corps Legislatif, thirteen held judi­ cial office, fourteen held an administrative position, and one was an army officer. Two of the remaining candidates were described as proprietors of estates, and one was a rentier. Seven candidates had business backgrounds, and it is interesting that four of these in fact were selected, while none of those with strictly legal back­ grounds were chosen. Lastly, we should note that no nominee of the electoral college of the arrondissement of Cologne received an appointment to national office. Though Bouget, Salm-Dyck, and Belderbusch had been associated with the Cologne Electorate before 1789, their nominations did not come from the Cologne college. When we turn to the Conseil General (table 2), the most im­ portant advisory body in the department, we find that nearly half of its members during the Napoleonic period came from the ranks of businessmen, and more than one fourth were merchants or manufacturers from the three cities of Aachen, Cologne, and Crefeld. The businessmen/mayors from those cities were all mem­ bers, as were the wealthiest bankers and property owners from those towns. In fact, residents of those cities account for 45 per­ cent of the members of the Conseil General. Significantly, "mem­ ber of the Conseil Gene'ral" often appears as the current occupa­ tion or special qualification when members were nominated for other positions, such as the Corps Legislatif. Appointment to the

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

TABLE 2

115

Members of the Conseil General: Occupation City of Residence

Occupation, Pre-1789

Aachen

Merchant/manufacturer Landed proprietor Rentier Official Unknown

4"

Total

Cologne

Crefdd

Other

Total

—

6 11

—

—

4

—

3 2 5b

—

—

—

—

—

4

10

—

1 4

17 13 5 1 4

4

22

40

SOURCE: Compiled from HSAD: Roer Dept/Generalrat 1-13; AN/FLCV/Roer 1/ Conseil General, Year IX; AN/FIbII/Roer 3/Counseil General, 1810; AN/FlbII/ Roer 2/List of officials, 7 Thermidor, XII. a Mathias Peltzer of Aachen was a partner in a cloth-producing firm and prior to the French invasion also held offices in the city government. b J. J. Wittgenstein of Cologne had retired from commerce prior to the invasion.

Conseil General, then, was clearly a mark of distinction, confirm­ ing what we have already said about that institution.51 Approximately equal in prestige to membership in the Conseil 51 See Andre-Jean Tudesq, Les Conseillers generaux en France au temps de Guizot (Paris, 1967). Tudesq reached a number of conclusions that are interesting

to compare with our analysis of the Roer department Conseil General. For all of France there were 2,399 councilors general in 1840. Of that group, 28% were landed proprietors, 39% belonged to the legal profession, 14% were businessmen, 8% active or former officers, 6% active or former functionaries, and 5% were asso­ ciated with the medical profession (pp. 111-13). However, in leading industrial or commercial departments such as Gironde (Bordeaux), Bouches du Rhone (Mar­ seilles), Haut-Rhin (Colmar), and Bas-Rhin (Strasbourg) businessmen made up one-third or more of the members (pp. 146-47). Businessmen were relatively richer than other councilors (pp. 154-58). The Conseils Generaux, according to Tudesq, served as a "petit parlement," protecting local interests against the central government and helping reconcile government wishes with those of the populace. A Conseil General was an inter­ mediary between the government and the people, between Paris and a province. "It represented an organ of information, of contact with local opinion" (pp. 274, 30-31). Though limited in real power, it was nevertheless very important, was treated seriously, and brought members "a certain prestige and durable influence" (p. 13). Tudesq's conclusions thus generally agree with ours on the nature and function of the Conseils Generaux.

116

FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

General was the presidency of an electoral college. The nominees for these positions were taken from a list, prepared by the prefect, of the most distinguished {plus marquant) individuals in the de­ partment. The data on which the selection was based in 1809 are extant and allow us to follow the process. In that year seventythree names appeared on the initial list, from which four men were nominated for the departmental and each arrondissement college. The information in the list is summarized in tables 3, 4, and 5 using the categories present in the list. The occupational data in table 3 lend themselves to a number of observations. At the time the prefect composed the list, over half of the candidates held office or were army officers. This con­ trasts markedly with the pre-1789 occupations, where 80 percent of the candidates were described as businessmen or proprietaries (landed proprietors or estate owners). Though these men con­ tinued to derive income from their businesses or properties, they had become increasingly involved in government as political op­ portunities expanded under the French. It should be noted that Cleve, economically the least developed and most rural of the arrondissements, was represented on the list mainly by land­ owners. On the other hand, the relatively small percentage of businessmen from Cologne is surprising, since the large city of Cologne was a major commercial center. Perhaps this again re­ flects some mistrust of Cologne's merchants. Table 4 compares the candidates according to age and personal fortune. The individuals were grouped under their pre-1789 oc­ cupations, first because those occupations were the main sources of wealth, and second, because many of those listed as officials in 1809 were in fact also businessmen or estate owners. No signifi­ cant differences appear in terms of age distribution, though we should bear in mind that a forty-eight-year-old individual had ex­ perienced some sixteen years of French rule by 1809, and that twenty-four of the candidates were but twenty years of age in

117

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

TABLE 3 Candidates for President of an Electoral College: Occupation Aachen

Residence by Arrondissement Cologne Crefeld Cleve

Total

Number of Candidates

27

16

13

7 (44%) 3 (19%) 6 (37%)

8 (62%) 4 (31%) 1 ( 8%)

8 1 7 1

(47%) 41 (56%) ( 6%) 13 (18%) (41%) 17 (23%) ( 6%) 2 ( 3%)

Occupation (1789-1809) Official/officer 19 (70%) Businessman 10 (37%) Estateowner 5 (19%) Other 1 ( 4%)

7 (44%) 3 (19%) 6 (37%) 1(6%)

8 (62%) 6 (46%) 2 (15%)

8 1 9 1

(47%) 42 (58%) ( 6%) 20 (27%) (53%) 22 (30%) ( 6%) 3 ( 4%)

Occupation (pre-1789) Official/officer 4 Businessman 11 Estate owner 8 Other 5

1 5 9 2

Occupation (1809) 18 (67%) Official/officer (19%) Businessman Estate owner (11%) Other ( 4%)

(15%) (41%) (30%) (19%)

( 6%) (31%) (56%) (13%)

17

1 ( 6%) 6 (46%) 6 (46%) 1 ( 8%)

73

6 ( 8%)

1 ( 6%) 23 (32%)

12 (71%) 35 (48%) 3 (18%) 11 (15%)

SOURCE: See AN/FlcIII/Roer 2/2, and AN/CC41/144/1 for the relevant documents. NOTE: In several cases more than one occupation was given per man and has been so recorded here. For several individuals occupation was deduced from a title and other data in the list. Thus, where "Baron" appears as the occupation in 1789, and where that individual was an estate owner between 1789 and 1809, his occupation for 1789 has been counted as estate owner. Presidents of electoral colleges were ennobled as barons, but the positions were less influential than membership in the Conseil General.

1789. In terms of wealth, however, we find that men with busi­ ness backgrounds were generally more affluent than those with other occupational backgrounds. The presence on the list of five businessmen with fortunes of more than one million francs (four of them from the town of Crefeld!) skews the averages for Crefeld and for businessmen. Note the large difference between Crefeld

233,333 390,909 307,143 140,000

312,692

42.7 46.5 48.3 48

46.3 (27)

Official/officer Businessman Estate owner Other

389,028" 48.2 (73) 278,235

48.5 (17)

753,846

48.1 (13)

344,375

51.4 (16)

295,000 580,435 324,412 136,000 46.6 47.7 48.4 52.6 400,000 200,000 310,833 133,333

48 36 47.8 55.7

800,000 1,208,333 291,666

38 51.8 46

175,000 320,000 377,778

62 47.8 51

Mean Wealth (francs) Mean Age ( years)

Totalc

Mean Wealth (francs)

Mean Wealth (francs)

Mean Age ( years)

Mean Age (years)

Cleve Mean Age ( years)

Residence by Arrondissement Crefeld

Mean Wealth (francs)

Cologne

a Occupations of 1789 were chosen here, even though the personal fortune pertains to 1809, because many of the occupations listed for 1809 were not in fact primary sources of wealth. Four young men who became army officers, however, are included here in the category "official/officer," though in 1789 they were students. The category "other" includes four lawyers and one clergyman. b No figure was given for the personal fortune of one Aachen candidate. c Standard deviations for all candidates: age, 9.91 years; wealth, 412,136 francs. " Median for wealth for all candidates: 300,000 francs.

SOURCE: Same as for Table 3.

All candidates No. candidates

Mean Wealth (francs)

Mean Age ( years)

Occupation in 1789a

Aachenh

TABLE 4 Candidates for President of an Electoral College: Age and Personal Fortune

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

119

and Cleve, the difference between a leading manufacturing dis­ trict and a backward rural district.52 Several final observations can be made about the entire list. Of the seventy-three candidates, thirty-eight (or 52 percent) resided in the capital of an arrondissement, including eighteen of the twenty-three men with business backgrounds and seventeen of the thirty-five landed proprietors, most of the latter as govern­ ment officials. It appears that the notables of the department tended to gravitate to the seats of power. We should also note that noble titles were listed as pre-1789 qualifications for ten individ­ uals but as special qualifications for only three men in 1809. On the other hand, in 1809 six men were listed as members of the Conseil General, and membership in a chamber of commerce, commercial court, or labor arbitration board appeared as the spe­ cial qualification for four of the businessmen. The list of seventy-three candidates was reduced to a list of twenty candidates for appointment by Napoleon (table 5). The pre-1789 backgrounds of these twenty are similar proportionally to the pre-1789 backgrounds of the original group and include seven businessmen and nine estate owners. The 1809 qualifica­ tions, however, show only one to be an active businessman; the other six and all three grouped here under "other" had obtained official posts by 1809. Seven of the twenty either had had noble tides before 1789 or obtained them by 1809, and four nominees held the rank of general in 1809. Half of the nominees resided in the cities of Aachen, Cologne, or Crefeld, including all seven with business backgrounds. Moreover the nominees were somewhat older and considerably more affluent than the average individual on the list of seventy-three candidates, with Crefeld's wealthy manufacturers again skewing the figures. Indeed, wealth mayhave been the primary factor in the final appointments; the four arrondissement presidents were the wealthiest of the nominees. 52

See Dufraisse, p. 764, for an analysis of data from 1803.

FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

120

TABLE 5 Nominees for President of an Electoral College: Occupation, Age, Wealth (in francs)

Occupation (1789)

Official/officer Mean age (1809) Mean wealth (1809) Businessman Mean age (1809) Mean wealth (1809) Estate owner Mean age (1809) Mean wealth (1809) Other Mean age (1809) Mean wealth (1809) Total Mean Age (1809) Mean Wealth (1809)

Department

Aachen

Nominee for College of Cologne Crefeld

Cleve

2 54 375,000 2 51 800,000

2 52.5 450,000 1 68 400,000 1 36 400,000

1 58 200,000 1 2 60 56.5 500,000 2,250,000 2 1 3 54 45 48 150,000 450,000 700,000 1 1 38 66 800,000 200,000

4 52.5 587,500

4 52 425,000

4 4 4 56.5 49 53 525,000 1,362,500 387,500

3

3

2

1

1

4

4

Total

1 58 200,000 7 55 950,000 9 52 544,444 3 47 466,667 20 52.6 657,500

Occupation (1809) Official/officer Businessman Estate owner Other Total

2

2 1 1

1 3

11 1 8

4

4

4

20

SOURCE: Same as Table 3.

Three of the appointees had been estate owners prior to 1789: Le Grand of the department college, Hompesch for Cologne, and Cotzhausen for Cleve. Von Guaita of Aachen and Floh of Crefeld were both mayors who had been manufacturers. The process for selecting the presidents of the electoral colleges shows clearly the charactersitics of notability on the higher levels in the French system: high social status, wealth, and, generally, some affiliation with the system (the holding of some administra­ tive, judicial, or advisory office). In rural areas these criteria favored landed proprietors; in urban areas they favored busi-

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

121

nessmen and officials. Relatively few of the chief notables were career officials, while leading businessmen and estate owners at­ tained virtual equality with each other in the eyes of the French as the most important citizens in the Roer department. It should be noted, by the way, that the list of the seventy-three candidates does not in fact contain all of the highest notables in the depart­ ment. Only two of the seven most important and wealthy manu­ facturers in the department, as reported by the prefect in 1810, are on the list, and the most glaring omission is that of Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen, the wealthiest man in the department and a legislator. Also the names of the legislators Bouget and Salm-Dyck do not appear. Only thirteen men who at some time served on the Conseil General appear also on the 1809 list oiplns marquants. The omissions are striking, but the characteristics of notability would not be changed by their inclusion. Let us now turn to the electoral colleges themselves. Appoint­ ments were for life; hence the college memberships remained essentially unchanged throughout the Napoleonic period. The 1809 rolls include current occupation and place of residence (the data have been summarized in tables 6 and 7). In both the de­ partmental and arrondissement colleges we find that officials and businessmen are the best-represented groups, with officials gen­ erally more important in the arrondissement colleges. Most of those listed under "official" were not former businessmen or land­ owners (as was the case with the members of the Conseil General and the candidates for the presidency of an electoral college) but were career bureaucrats or men professionally trained to be ad­ ministrators of justice. In the department college, both landed proprietors and businessmen were better represented, the number of businessmen nearly equalling the number of officials. Also noteworthy is the large percentage of electors of the depart­ ment college for whom the only occupation given is an advisory office of some kind. Lastly, in the arrondissement of Cologne there are again surprisingly few merchants.

180

( 1%) ( 8%) (10%) ( 4%) (52%)

( 8%)

b Negotiant,

180

( 5%) ( 3%) ( 3%) (20%) (30%)

(24%)

176

40 12 10 ( 6%) 5 ( 3%) 13 ( 7%)

36 6 8 5 6 35

Crefeld

marchand, banquier.

71 23 11 ( 6%) 5 ( 3%) 15 ( 8%)

1 15 18 7

14

Cologne

( 2%) ( 2%) ( 4%) ( 6%) (56%)

(15%)

c

126

( 3%) ( 4%) ( 6%) (10%) (44%)

(18%)

662

219 69 30 ( 5%) 23 ( 3%) 53 ( 8%)

89 28 23 26 37 65

Total

239 15

49 13 2 ( 1%) 32 (13%) 3 ( 1%)

( 2%) (16%) (16%) ( 6%) (26%)

f

901 15

268 82 32 ( 4%) 55 ( 6%) 56 ( 6%)

( 3%) ( 7%) ( 8%) ( 9%) (39%)

(20%) 124 52 28 64 76 79

(25%) 35 24 5 38 39 14

Total Colleges

Dept. College

Dyer, distiller, tanner, miller, carpenter, miner.

59 12 1 ( 1%) 5 ( 4%) 11 ( 9%)

3 3 5 8

19

Cleve

Mayor and aides, tax officials, clerks, army officers, customs, domains, welfare administrators. Judge, baillif, notary. g President of electoral college, canton assembly, municipal or arrondissement councilor. 11 Grocer, archivist, boatman, employee, pharmacist, librarian, teacher, doctor, minister, priest, innkeeper, particulier.

e

" Cultivateur,fermier.

d

SOURCE: AN/FlcIII/Roer 2/50. Business, as homme d'affaires.

Individuals Double entries

( 6%) ( 2%) ( 4%) ( 8%) (39%)

(26%)

49 22 8 ( 4%) 8 ( 4%) 14 ( 8%)

20 22 11 3 8 15

Aachen

Arrondissement Electoral Colleges

Electoral Colleges: Occupation

Business" Merchantb Manufacturer Artisanc Rentier Landed proprietor Farmer" Paid official administrative & militarye judicial' Lawyer Advisory post8 Otherh

Occupation

TABLE 6

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

123

Paying particular attention to the delegations from the towns of Aachen, Cologne, and Crefeld (table 7), we note that in the de­ partmental college, businessmen are better represented than offi­ cials and in fact surpass them in number, though again we find Cologne going against the trend. In the arrondissement colleges businessmen are fewer than officials but outnumber other occupa­ tional groups. Most of the lawyers in those colleges were from Cologne and Aachen and were currently practicing before the departmental criminal and appeals courts in these cities. Lastly, the delegations from the three cities are the largest in their respec­ tive arrondissement colleges and in the department college (where the next-largest delegations were those from Duren with eight, Cleve with six, and Neuss with five electors). Thus it ap­ pears that in the Roer department businessmen were strongly represented in the electoral colleges, that the three largest towns were especially well represented, and that a major part of these delegations came from the business communities of Cologne, Crefeld, and Aachen. Certainly we would expect businessmen to have been predom­ inant on the local level, within their own town assemblies, and for the most part this was the case. Throughout the Napoleonic peri­ od, three-fourths of the Crefeld town council was made up of businessmen, mostly silk and cloth manufacturers. In Aachen and Cologne, at least two-thirds were businessmen, with merchants predominant in the latter town and manufacturers of cloth and needles in the former. The remaining third or less included mas­ ter artisans, rentiers, minor officials, notaries, and lawyers. The proportion of businessmen in these cities may well have been higher than it appears, because a number of merchants became rentiers when they turned over their firms to sons or partners. This is especially true in Cologne, where several such men do not appear in the tax lists as businessmen.53 53 AN/FlbII/Roer 2/Elections of Year XI; SaK; XIV/Franzosische Fremdherrschaft 2/1/1 (2 Vendemiaire, XI); HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/Conseil

38 3

a

Occupational classifications as in table 6.

SOURCE: Same as for Table 6.

Individuals Double entries

(38%)

(34%)

29 2

10 1

3 10 1 ( 3%) 5 (17%) 1 ( 3%)

2 6 4 (11%) 2 ( 5%) 1 ( 3%)

6 7 6 (16%) 2 ( 5%) 5 (13%)

(45%)

Dept.

(21%)

Arrond.

City of Aachen

59 2

5 ( 8%)

14 9 9 (15%)

29 2

9 1 1 ( 3%) 4 (14%)

(34%)

7 (24%) 1 ( 3%)

10 (17%) 1 ( 2%) (39%)

7 1

(28%)

Dept.

13

(22%)

Arrond.

City of Cologne

9 1

1 (11%) (56%) 2 3

1 3

(44%)

Arrond.

(18%)

11 3

3 (27%)

2

2 7

(82%)

Dept.

City of Crefeld

Delegations from Aachen, Crefeld, and Cologne to the Electoral Colleges: Occupation

Business merchant manufacturer Artisan Rentier Landed proprietor Farmer Paid official Admin. & military Judicial Lawyer Advisory post Other

Occupationa

TABLE 7

( 4%) (11%) ( 2%) ( 1%) (39%)

106 6

22 19 15 (14%) 2 ( 2%) 10 ( 9%)

16 9 4 12 2 1

(24%)

Arrond.

Dept.

69 7

(33%) 21 2 1 ( 1%) 7 (10%)

(43%) 12 18 1 ( 1%) 12 (17%) 2 ( 3%)

Total

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

125

Businessmen also predominated in Aachen and Crefeld when it came to the selection of presidents for the canton assemblies (local equivalents of the electoral colleges), though this was not the case in Cologne. In 1806, for example, the canton assembly of Aachen was divided into two "sections" and the Cologne assembly into four "sections"; the canton assembly of Crefeld was not divided. Four of the six nominees for canton president in Aachen and two of the three nominees for canton president in Crefeld had business backgrounds. The remaining three nominees included a judge, one career official, and an estate owner. Eight of these nine men were currently involved in government in some way, and all were credited with substantial fortunes. In Cologne, however, five of the twelve nominees were rentiers and four were career officials. Three nominees had business backgrounds, but two of these, the Wittgenstein brothers, had retired from their family firm. Only the banker Abraham Schaaffhausen was active in business. Five of the twelve were not involved in government, though again all were relatively wealthy. Of the men appointed president, a lawyer, a rentier, and two officials were chosen in Cologne; in Crefeld a manufacturer; in Aachen an official and a manufac­ turer.54 Once again Cologne's merchants were shortchanged. Businessmen and Notability in the Roer Department Thus far the analysis of the system of advisory and electoral as­ semblies has been focused on the relative importance of busiMunicipal/4013/Oct. 22, 1811; HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/Conseil Municipal/4429/22 Ventose, XIII; HASK: Franzdsische Verwaltung/Conseil Municipal/4053/April 1, 1807; HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/Conseil Municipal/4300/20 Germinal, XII; HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/Conseil Municipal/4428/25 Frimaire, IX; Helmut Croon, "Krefelder Burgertum im Wandel des 19. Jahrhunderts," Die Heijnat: Zeitschrift fiir niederrheinisehe Heimatspflege 14 (1958):22, 28-29. 54 AN/FlbII/Roer 3/4/List of Candidates, April 15, 1806. Interestingly, the same document shows that of twenty-six nominees for the presidency of a canton outside of the city of Cologne but in that arrondisement, ten lived in the city of Cologne. Only five of the twenty-six were merchants.

126

FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

nessmen, and we have seen that the participation of businessmen on all levels was extensive. But we must also ask whether the in­ volvement of businessmen was in any way unusual, considering the nature of the French system. The system was designed to draw notables, defined primarily in terms of wealth and achieve­ ment, into a political relationship with the state. How well did that system work with respect to the representation of busi­ nessmen? A rough answer to this question can be obtained first by de­ termining whether Aachen, Cologne, and Crefeld were in any sense fairly represented as cities in departmental and arrondissement assemblies and second by examining the representation of businessmen in those assemblies and in their respective town's delegations to the assemblies. There are two available standards for measuring "fairness" of representation, though neither is per­ fect: population figures and lists of the most taxed. Because there was no accurate census, population estimates for the period differ, and comparisons therefore are only approximate. Since electors and councilors were generally selected from the "most taxed" lists, we can compare the number of appointees with business backgrounds with the number of businessmen on the tax lists, but here too the comparison is only an approximation. We would ex­ pect that all those appearing on the departmental "most taxed" list would also appear on their respective communal lists, but in fact for the cities of Cologne, Crefeld, and Aachen only 73 percent to 57 percent appear on both lists.55 Moreover, some electors and councilors, such as RigaI or Jacobi, do not appear on communal lists at all. The tax lists, in short, were used as guidelines by the French but did not restrict their choices. Nonetheless, they can give us some indication of whether or not businessmen were fairly represented in the various assemblies. 55

AN/FlcIII/Roer 2; AN/FlbII/Roer 4, Lists of 550 most taxed in department and 100 most taxed in communes. Of the businessmen, 83% on the department list are on the communal list.

127

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

The data pertaining to the representation of the three largest towns are contained in table 8. It is clear that at the departmental level the three leading cities were represented much better than their respective populations warranted. In relation to the depart­ mental "most taxed" list, Aachen was fairly represented, Cologne rather underrepresented in the departmental college but overrepresented on the Conseil General, and Crefeld overrepresented in both assemblies. On the arrondissement level and on the basis of population, all three cities were overrepresented in the arron­ dissement delegations to the electoral college, and Aachen and Cologne were somewhat overrepresented in their respective ar­ rondissement electoral colleges. Thus it appears that a large pro­ portion of the notables of the department came from the most im­ portant towns, just as a large proportion of the highest notables (the "most distinguished" citizens worthy of consideration for a presidency of an electoral college) came from those same towns. When we examine the representation of businessmen within the delegations to the various assemblies (table 9), considerable variation appears. In relation to the tax lists, Aachen's busiTABLE 8

Urban Representation Aachen

% % % %

of department population of 550 highest taxed in department of department electors of councilors general

% of arrondissement population % of arrondissement electors % of arrondissement delegation to dept. electoral college AN/FlcIII/Roer

Cologne

4.5 12 12 10

8 15 12 25

21.3 21

27.5 33

34

45

Crefeld 1.5 2.5 5 10 5 5 20

SOURCE: Compiled from 2/List of 550 most taxed; population (for 1804) estimates in Hansen, Quellen, 4:426, 519, 684n, 811-15; Buttner, pp. 20, 40; Kuske, p. 71; Hintze and Schmoller, 3:665; Richard Zeyss, Die Entstehung der Handelskammem und die Industrie am Niederrhein wahrend der frataosischen Herrschaft (Leipzig, 1907), pp. 46n, 47. Other data from Tables 2, 6, and 7 above.

128 TABLE 9

FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

RepresentationofBusinessmen Businessmen Residing in Cologne Crefeld Aachen

% of 550 highest taxed from respective city % of councilors genera) from respective city % of department electors from respective city % of 100 highest taxed in city % of municipal councilors % of town delegation to arrondissement college

51

55

86

100

30

100

45

28

82

57 ?

64 63

72 76

21

22

44

SOURCE: AN/FlbII/Roer 4. Lists of 100 highest taxed in Aachen, Cologne, and Crefeld; see also tables 2 and 7.

nessmen were somewhat underrepresented in the departmental college and overrepresented in the Conseil General. The total number of individuals from Crefeld was small, and it appears that the businessmen of that city were probably fairly represented in the departmental college and as municipal councilors, and that they monopolized Crefeld's representation on the Conseil Gene­ ral. Cologne's businessmen were underrepresented as councilors general and as departmental electors—very significantly in the latter instance. Only on Cologne's municipal council were they overrepresented. Finally, businessmen from all three cities were very much underrepresented as arrondissement electors. The comparative data suggest that, for the most part, the selec­ tion process within the French advisory system worked fairly well within its own framework. On the departmental level, delegations from Aachen, Cologne, and Crefeld and businessmen from those cities were especially prominent—a reflection of their wealth and standing. Businessmen apparently sought and gained higherlevel appointments while, as was to be expected, dominating the communal level appointments. On the higher levels, appoint­ ments brought more prestige and influence than on the arron-

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

129

dissement level, where there was a preponderance of lesser bureaucrats. In Crefeld, the dominance of the great silk and cloth producers is evident at the department level, the level at which most of the appointments of manufacturers were made. On the other hand, the French reluctance to appoint Cologne's busi­ nessmen to higher posts is again apparent. With this exception it appears that Roer businessmen could be satisfied with their role in the system of advisory bodies. Indeed, a comparison of the elec­ toral colleges in all four Rhenish departments shows the position of businessmen to be strongest in the Roer department, though it appears that the system worked in about the same way through­ out the Left Bank of the Rhine. (See table IO.)56 Appointment to an electoral college, local or departmental as­ sembly, or even to administrative office is, of course, only one in­ dication of the formal participation of businessmen in the complex French political arena. How the system functioned in dealing with concrete political and economic issues was perhaps even more important in determining the degree to which the Rhineland, and Rhenish businessmen, were successfully integrated with France, and the following chapter will be devoted to the ef­ forts of businessmen to realize their specific goals. Meanwhile, a number of observations can be made from this discussion of in­ stitutions and personnel. When, in 1797, Commissioner Rudler and then Napoleon's government moved to integrate the Left Bank of the Rhine with France, they decided that the best way to do this was to involve the leading personalities of the Rhine departments in the gov­ ernmental process while retaining the real power in Paris. This tactic was of course applied in all parts of France in the effort to unify the nation behind Napoleon. Except for those holding administrative posts, Rhinelanders could discuss political issues but not make binding decisions; they could nominate fellow citi56 For the character of the French system on the Right Bank, see Schmidt, Berg, 96ff., and Berding.

33 8 11

152

22 16 15

239A

Total electors (N =) 151

35 5 25

14% 21

139

34 6 21

22% 18

662

16 4 16

21% 44

Roer 1809

439

?

?

365

31 ?

20% 42 16 ?

14% 50

640

?

?

17

15% 49

Arrond. Electoral Colleges Rhine and Mont Sarre Tonnerre Moselle 1810 1812 1811

SOURCE: Roer department data interpolated from table 6. For other departments, see Dufraisse, pp. 766-67. a Two occupations were tabulated for 6% of the departmental electors.

18% 30

27% 26

Departmental Electoral College Rhine and Mont Roer Moselle Sarre Tonnerre 1809 1812 1812 1805

Notability on the Left Bank

Merchant, manufacturer, artisan Functionary Landed proprietor, farmer Rentier Other

Occupation

TABLE 10

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

131

zens for office but not elect them. In short, there was little real self-government (in an English sense) in the French system, but under certain conditions there could be considerable selfadministration. If Paris did not intervene too often in departmen­ tal affairs, if the prefects tried to represent the interests of the de­ partment, if most administrators came from the ranks of the most prestigious and successful leaders of the district or towns, and if those administrators were honest, conscientious, and worked for the good of their communities, then the effect of the prefecture system would closely resemble self-government and would func­ tion as efficient self-administration of law under the national codes. Morover, we should not forget that before the French inva­ sion the Rhenish cities were already used to the intervention of outsiders, and that just before the French arrived the dominant groups in Cologne and Aachen had been under attack as too oligarchic. Under the Holy Roman Empire, Rhenish leaders were accustomed to influence decision making through appeals and pe­ titions. The Rhinelanders, then, had nothing in their past experi­ ence to lead them to expect democratic self-government.57 Certainly it was the intention of Napoleon and his advisors that the prefecture system should be self-administrating if not selfgoverning, and at least in the Roer department it generally worked that way. The system, as we have seen, involved the "no­ tables" of the department on all levels, in public administration and in the advisory system. Most notables were established, prominent businessmen, large landowners, or government offi­ cials; notability combined social prestige, wealth, financial suc­ cess, and experience in administration (either in government or business). On the one hand, the reliance on local notables gave the people the "illusion of sovereignty," an illusion that contrib­ uted to the popularity of Napoleonic rule.58 This popularity was 57 In German the word Selbstverwaltung is used for both self-government and self-administration, an ambiguity which has confused much of the discussion of the development of political institutions in nineteenth-century Germany. 58 Godechot, p. 573; Faber, "Verwaltungs- und Justizbeamte," p. 384; Dufiaisse, p. 258.

132

FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

enhanced by the fact that many of the same notables had held government posts before 1789, during the Revolutionary period, and then under Napoleon. This continuity lessened the disruptive impact of the break with old established institutions. The nota­ bles themselves accepted and participated in the system because of the public recognition of their social standing and because they actually had an opportunity to influence policy, either as advisors or administrators. For the business community in the Roer department, fur­ thermore, the prefecture system brought an expanded range of opportunity. To be sure, some businessmen from old families in Cologne and Aachen had participated in city government before the Revolution, and the von der Leyens had indirectly dominated the political life of Crefeld, but the new system considerably in­ creased the number of businessmen active in town affairs. Previ­ ously excluded Protestants, innovative entrepreneurs, and am­ bitious young merchants shared offices and responsibility with those of the old families who had reconciled themselves to the new regime during the transitional years between 1792 and 1800. In Crefeld, indirect domination by the von der Leyens gave way as many manufacturers came to participate in political affairs. The Mennonite community for the first time was firmly and di­ rectly involved in political life, even sending Rigal and F. H. von der Leyen to Paris. Businessmen from the three major cities were now involved in government outside their own towns. Indeed, several business leaders held prestigious posts in the national cap­ ital, and one—Jacobi—served on occasion as acting prefect. On these levels businessmen were the political equals of the old titled estate owners with whom they worked. For many businessmen, therefore, the prefecture system made possible social and political mobility that had not been possible under the old regime. It is clear that the role played by businessmen from Cologne, Crefeld, and Aachen was very substantial. Businessmen held places in administration and in the advisory bodies often out of

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

133

proportion to their numbers in the department or in those cities, but considering their rank in their communities, their role was appropriate. Certain individuals, moreover, held very important posts—Jacobi and Guaita of Aachen; von der Leyen, Rigal, and Floh of Crefeld; Dumont, Wittgenstein, and Schaaffhausen of Cologne, to name but a few. Their experiences in the French sys­ tem, even with the limited autonomy allowed the Rhineland, gave these men an introduction to political life on a scale far greater than had been possible in the fragmented Rhineland of the old re­ gime. In this sense the French occupation was a political break with the past from which there was no turning back.

5. Businessmen and the Politics of Semiofficial Institutions

IN 1797 the French law prohibiting all private economic associa­ tions (such as guilds and trade associations) had been introduced in the Rhineland, but despite the prohibition, various semiprivate business-oriented institutions appeared in the Roer department, as they did in the rest of France. They were created with govern­ ment approval because official interests coincided with private in­ terests. On the one hand, businessmen sought prosperity for themselves and their communities through self-regulation and cooperation with government; on the other hand, the government recognized the potential benefits of economy in administration and the efficiency of allowing the business world to manage its own affairs. Moreover, the government wanted the cooperation of expert businessmen to so stimulate the economy that it would outstrip the economies of France's enemies—especially Britain. Consequently, during the years of Napoleonic rule, a number of institutions were created that enabled businessmen to enjoy a special relationship with government: councils of commerce, chambers of commerce, consultative chambers of manufacturing, commercial courts, and labor arbitration boards. These institu­ tions were not intended so much to be part of the government administration as to complement government. All these institu­ tions performed some official tasks while serving as semiprivate associations "regulated" by the administration. Among other things they were to reconcile the public and the private interests when they were at variance and thus to promote both. The busi-

POUTICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

135

nessmen participating in these institutions functioned as lay bureaucrats, benefiting from some of the prerogatives of govern­ ment officials yet also constricted by the limitations on citizenship in Napoleon's France. We need now to determine the impact that these businessoriented institutions had upon the political life of the Roer de­ partment and the extent to which they facilitated the integration of the Rhineland with France.1 To do this we need to look at the legal foundations and internal developments of these institutions and at some of their activities and methods. Because the Cologne Chamber of Commerce was the most active and most important of the semiofficial institutions on the Left Bank, special attention will be devoted to events in that city.2

The Formation of Business Institutions in Cologne The Cologne Merchants' Committee, it will be recalled, was officially sanctioned by the town's magistracy and by the political commissioner, Rethel, in November of 1797. Naturally, since the stated purpose of the committee was to revitalize Cologne's trade, most of its work concerned economic problems that affected all businessmen in the city. A few examples will show the nature of 1 Wolfram Fischer rightly insists on seeing the history of the chambers of com­ merce in terms of political and constitutional history (Verfassungsgeschichte) as well as economic history. See his Untemehmerschaft, Selbstverwaltung und Stoat. 2 Cologne's merchants' committee and chamber of commerce have been explored extensively by other historians, notably Schwann, Eyll and Kellenbenz, and Pitsch. Schwann's presentation is often disorganized, his sources are not listed, and at times his interpretations are questionable. Later studies, however, rely upon him heavily. This, plus the different emphasis in the present study, make a reworking of the chamber of commerce archive essential. Huyskens's his­ tory of the Aachen Chamber is inadequate for the early period but must be used in the absence of many documents. Zeyss presents a better examination of the found­ ing of the Aachen and Crefeld Chambers, but his emphasis differs from the present work. A few selected documents of note are included in the appendix of Zeyss's book.

136

FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

its undertakings. In December of 1797, shortly after taking office, the members of the committee met with the leading bankers in the city to work out an agreement on regulating local currency exchange rates. The committee also negotiated new freight rates with boatmen on the Rhine and Moselle. Another project sug­ gested by the merchants' committee was the establishment of a "Rhine and Harbor Commission." The merchants' committee nominated the merchants Schiill and Engel as commissioners and drew up organizational plans for the harbor commission and reg­ ulatory ordinances for the use of the wharves, cranes, and the bonded warehouses.3 All of these agreements facilitated the wholesale forwarding trade and helped to establish good relations between the merchants and other groups. The merchants' committee also represented Cologne's busi­ nessmen in their relations with government officialdom. As Rhine Commissioner Rudler gradually replaced the forced contributions with regular taxes, including a property tax, the merchants' committee negotiated with Rudler, Rethel, and the municipal administration to have the tax rate lowered on business proper­ ties. The committee also took care that it had a representative in the contributions commission which apportioned the taxes and helped with assessments. Furthermore, the committee strongly urged the municipal administration to publish and disseminate all changes in the law. With respect to laws that affected trade, the committee offered to take the responsibility for informing the town's merchants. Extensive negotiations were conducted with customs officials over the provisions and enforcement of a new stamp tax on river trade. When a ship laden with goods owned by 3 RWWA: 1/1/4/42; 1/1/13/53, 61; Schwann, Handdskammer, pp. 79ff. Notall of the suggestions of the merchants' committee were accepted by the city, but the merchants Johann Theodor Martini and Johann Baptist Farina, both favorable toward the committee, were named harbor commissioners in September 1798. See RWWA: 1/53/2/63. See Hermann Schaefer, "Die Farinas des Hauses 'Farina Gegeniiber,'" Rheinisch-westfdlische Wirtschaftsbiographien, vol. 2 (Miinster, 1937), 164.

POLITICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

137

Cologne merchants was seized in Oberwinter (a town above Co­ logne, where the ship was forced to land owing to adverse ice conditions), the committee conducted a campaign of appeals to the Rhine commissioners, customs officials, and the finance minis­ ter in Paris, and when results were unsatisfactory the case was carried to the courts. Over 900 pages of documents in the chamber of commerce archive pertaining to the Oberwinter sei­ zure testify to the energy of the merchants' committee.4 It is ironic that as a result of its hard work the committee seemed to achieve higher standing with the city government than with the city merchants. On the one hand, Rethel and the munic­ ipal administration always invited the committee to be present at important public ceremonies, ranging from national holidays to the swearing in of new officials, and on several occasions city offi­ cials thanked the committee for its service in behalf of the general interests of Cologne.5 On the other hand, the committee experi­ enced great difficulty, especially for its first year, in finding enough merchants to serve as committee members. In fact, only 19 of the 250 businessmen with merchants' rights took part in the election of new members in November of 1798. The committee also had trouble getting financial support. Its expenses were sup­ posed to be paid by a contribution from all who had merchants' rights, the amount to be six, five, or four thalers, depending on the size of the firm. Lacking legal means of making collections, the committee asked for voluntary payments. The first year about 60 percent of those in the upper two "classes" did pay, but 80 percent of the smaller firms did not. In December 1799, only 40 of the 250 patented merchants contributed, forcing the commit­ tee to issue numerous appeals for funds.6 The committee's dis4 Hansen, Quellen, 4:614; RWWA: 1/1/3/16, 18, 19, 28; 1/1/5/37; 1/1/2/170; l/23b/l/2. See also RWWA: 1/1/4; 1/53/2; and 1/1/20/passim. 5 RWWA: 1/1/5/14-19; 1/1/6/44; l/24"Vl6/144-46; and 1/1/5/206. ' Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 86, 90-91; Kellenbenz and Eyll, pp. 31-32. Abraham Schaaffhausen, of course, did sit on the new commercial court. Also RWWA: 1/1/8/6" and 1/1/3/50, 80.

138

FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

tress is evident in a letter written to two retiring members, asking them to stay on: "We feel strongly the necessity to be supported in our projects, especially in those upon which the welfare of our community depends, through the continued participation of men who combine the desired knowledge with the proper zeal for the interests of their fellow citizens. It would, therefore, pain us very much to see a useful institution go to ruin through a dearth of true patriotism."7 The lack of support is puzzling, especially since the committee could list a number of successes in changing regulations that had adversely affected trade.8 Several plausible explanations for the problems of the committee have been suggested—the great time demands on members, the distressingly high turnover of person­ nel, illness of members and potential members, the economic burdens on many merchants as a result of new tariffs.9 To these we can add another: suspicion or distrust of the committee's founders. Heimann, the first president and leading personality on the committee, had made enemies earlier by appearing too friendly toward the French. Moreover, in 1799 his daughter mar­ ried Anton Franz Rudler, the brother of the Rhine commissioner and himself a French official. Two other committee presidents during the first year, WiIhelm Schiill (who resigned immediately because of illness), and Hermann Lohnis, were Protestants; Heimann and Franz Josef Weyer were both Freemasons and sympathetic toward the Protestants. At times of economic crisis in Cologne, there had always been many Catholic merchants who resisted the efforts of Protestants to obtain full citizenship, much less positions of leadership.10 It may be too that the Oberwinter 7

Quoted in Schwann, Handetskammery p. 87. See Annual Report, RWWA: 1/1/2/26; 1/1/6/22, 67. 9 Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 85, 87-88; Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 32; see RWWA: 1/1/2/passim, for correspondence on membership. 10Hermann Kellenbenz, "Johann Friedrich Carl Heimann," Neue Deutsche Biographie (Berlin, 1968); Kellenbenz and Eyll, pp. 28-29. Furthermore, some merchants who might have entered the committee were members of the municipal 8

POLITICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

139

campaign backfired. Several committee members, including Heimann, had goods on the boat in question, and the committee had gone to considerable expense to win compensation from the customs authorities. The costly appeals campaign might have lost the committee some support among less-wealthy merchants.11 The problems of the merchants' committee were compounded when Interior Minister Chaptal decided in June 1801 to establish a nationwide system of "Councils of Commerce" (Conseils de commerce). The councils were charged with the preparation of memoranda to aid the ministry in the execution of its administra­ tive duties; that is, the councils' work was to be "purely consulta­ tive and confidential" and not actually administrative. The Roer department was to have councils in Cologne and Aachen, with their composition left to the prefect. Consequently, in October the Cologne Council of Commerce was formed by order of Acting Prefect Jacobi. Its merchant membership included, among others, former merchants' committee members Lohnis and Boisseree.12 The council of commerce and the merchants' committee were to be served by the same secretary, Hages, to assure con­ tinuity of effort and purpose between the two institutions. The committee prompdy wrote to the council, expressing pleasure at its formation and urging cooperation between the two bodies to obtain modification in tariff policy. However, for some time such cooperation proved impossible, because in November Cologne's new Mayor Kramer, the nominal head of the council, sought to abolish the merchants' committee and confiscate its ar­ chives and property. This move was apparently the result of ill administration. Johann Jakob Peuchen, for example, left the committee to join the city government, where he felt he might use his influence to assist the committee, which in fact he did on several occasions. See for example RWWA: 1/1/2/93. 11 RWWA: 1/1/22/338; Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 91. 12 RWWA: 1/2/1/1; Kellenbenz and Eyll, pp. 40-41; Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 132ff. For Chaptal's many ambitious plans while minister of the interior (1800-1804), see Jean Pigeire, La Vie et Foeuvre de Chaptal (Paris, 1931), pp. 395-410. HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/III/Unterprafektur Koln/VII; RWWA: 1/1/6/86.

140

FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

will between Kramer and Committee Chairman Stohr.13 The committee, appealing for its life to the prefect and eventually the Rhine Commissioner Saint-Andre', argued that it was a "free soci­ ety of merchants" working both for the "public good" and for the specific interests of Cologne's merchant economy. It differed from the council in that the council's sphere of interest was the econ­ omy of the entire Roer department, while the committee was most concerned with Cologne. Neither the committee nor the new council was an administrative body directly under the mayor's office, though the mayor might properly supervise the work of both. The new council, Acting Prefect Jacobi (himself a merchant), Subprefect Sybertz, and Saint-Andre all agreed with the commit­ tee on the merits of retaining a "free society" to work on behalf of Cologne's interests. The committee was to remain in existence, its archives and furniture were returned, but it was given a new name, the chamber of commerce. It agreed to limit its competence to local matters, while the council agreed to use committee/ chamber memoranda and reports in preparing its "general opin­ ions" for the interior minister. As a gesture to Kramer, Stohr was not reelected to the new chamber, although this deprived the or­ ganization of the man who had served as president for over two years. Even with this concession, the conflict was not resolved until May, and by that time the financial straits of the committee/ chamber of commerce were increasingly severe. It was now work­ ing in conjunction with the council, which was supported from the city budget rather than by voluntary contributions.14 This made voluntary contributions for the expenses of the committee/ 13RWWA: 1/1/11/48. For an account of this conflict see Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 132-48. The appropriate documents are found in RWWA: 1/ 1/6/88-197; 1/1/7/16, 32-47; and in HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/III/Unterprafektur Koln/VII/l. 14 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/III/Unterprafektur Koln/VII/agreement of 19 Nivose, X; RWWA: 1/1/6/175. See RWWA: l/2/l/19ff., for budget of council of com­ merce.

POLITICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

141

chamber all the more difficult to collect, because some merchants could not see the point of supporting two such similar institu­ tions. Nevertheless, the committee/chamber continued to func­ tion until mid-1803. During the one and one-half years of its existence, the Cologne Council of Commerce (aided by the "old," or first chamber of commerce) was involved in some extremely important projects. For example, in December 1801, it was consulted when Interior Minister Chaptal solicited opinions on the formation of large mercantile companies like the East India Company, on potential trade with America, and on navigation laws and tariffs. A month later Chaptal circulated the proposed Commercial Code and sought the advice of the councils of commerce on modifications.15 That such matters were entrusted to the Rhine councils is a good indication that, in the eyes of the French, the Rhineland was now a part of the French nation. For its part, the council responded with energy. The prefect had decided that the Cologne Council should be responsible for gathering information in the Cologne and Crefeld arrondissements, while the Aachen Council should have responsibility for the Aachen and Cleve arrondissements. The Cologne Council subsequently received permission to open correspondence with the mayors of the towns in its jurisdiction and began soliciting information and opinions on the Commercial Code, tariffs, and other economic matters. It also suggested to its Aachen counter­ part that mutual consultation would be very advantageous in ob­ taining the best results for the department, and with this Aachen agreed.16 From the silk manufacturers of Crefeld came an especially lengthy letter offering suggestions for modifications of the Com­ mercial Code. Many of the Crefeld suggestions were incorporated in Cologne's twenty-eight page letter of advice to Chaptal, 15

RWWA. 1/1/7/24; 1/2/3/22. 1/2/1/5-17, and 1/2/2/53-59.

16 RWWA:

142

FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

though without an acknowledgment of their origin. And when the code finally went into effect, the council was instrumental in introducing and enforcing some of its provisions, such as those for use of the metric system of weights and measures and for uniform rates of currency exchange.17 In addition, the council authored lengthy essays detailing the impact of the French tariff system on the Roer economy. High tariffs and prohibitions on raw material imports, it was argued, were ruining both industry and commerce; the proposed solution required tariff reform, the construction of a Rhine-Meuse canal to bypass the Dutch bottleneck on the Rhine, and, as might be ex­ pected, the preservation of Cologne's transit rights. Furthermore, the council suggested that it sound out local informed opinion and "present the definitive result to the government."18 Cologne's merchants, represented by the council, had the official ear of the national government (not merely that of local officials) and in­ tended to make the most of it. The council of commerce, the committee/chamber of com­ merce, and the town government also worked hard together in Cologne's interests. A good illustration is their joint effort to re­ solve finally the Oberwinter affair and to secure the creation of a "free harbor" in Cologne, where goods could be transshipped free from the interference of customs officials. In February 1802, the chamber of commerce wrote to both Finance Minister Gaudin and Rhine General Commissioner Saint-Andre complaining about the government's handling of the Oberwinter confiscation: "un precede si impolitique, si injuste ne peut pas etre celui du gouvernement franqais." They appealed for an end to the matter that could conform with "principles of justice, honor, and politics (de politique)." 19 17 RWWA:

1/2/3/55«·., 86, 152ff.; 1/1/16/1-64. Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division, 2 Bureau, 6 Handel/2/62ff.; RWWA: 1/2/2/3; 1/2/1/40; and 1/2/3/68-80, on problems with the Batavian Re­ public. 19RWWA: 1/1/7/68,81. 18 HSAD:

POLITICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

143

Then, in early May, it was learned that Councilors of State Roederer, Shee, and Franfais de Nantes were scheduled to visit the Rhineland. Because all were known to be sympathetic to Rhenish interests, the mayor, the town council, the council of commerce, and the chamber of commerce agreed to send a joint delegation to Mainz to receive them. The delegation was to be headed by the jurist Heinrich G. W. Daniels and to include members of the merchants' organizations. The merchants, who stood to benefit, were to pay the cost of the delegation.20 Before Cologne's delegation had departed for Mainz, the Mainz Council of Commerce wrote to say that the three coun­ cilors of state were not coming but that Commissioner SaintAndre' had granted Mainz a free harbor. Further, Mainz reported that Saint-Andre and customs administrator Maguieu would soon visit Cologne.21 The council and chamber of commerce quickly composed memoranda, hoping to be as successful as Mainz. Upon arrival in Cologne, Saint-Andre and Maguieu were handsomely entertained, and they discussed the problems of Co­ logne's economy with the city administration, the chamber and council of commerce, and F. C. Heimann, who represented the Oberwinter interests. The outcome of the discussions was that Saint-Andre granted Cologne the much-hoped-for free harbor. Moreover, he agreed not to exact penalites from Cologne (in­ curred by smuggling) if the city would in turn compensate the owners of the Oberwinter cargo out of its own funds.22 The suc­ cess of these negotiations was due to cooperation between the city council, the mayor, the "advisory" council of commerce, and the "free society of merchants" in the chamber of commerce. The line between official and private activity was thoroughly blurred. Not long thereafter, both the chamber of commerce and the council of commerce were abolished in favor of still another in20

RWWA: 1/2/3/80-87; 1/53/6/210. RWWA: 1/2/3/95; and 1/2/3/98, 100, 114, 117. 22 Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 187-89.

21

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FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

stitution. In a decree of December 24,1802 (3 Nivose, XI), Inte­ rior Minister Chaptal created chambers of commerce in twentytwo major French cities. Initially no Rhenish cities were included, but on April 27, 1803, that was corrected. Chambers of com­ merce were established in both Cologne and Mainz. According to the original decree, a chamber was to have fifteen members if the city's population was over fifty thousand, nine members if under fifty thousand (like Cologne and Mainz). Members had to have been in business for over ten years, and they were elected (or nominated) by the majority vote of an assembly of forty to sixty notables from business circles. The prefect, or in his absence the mayor, was president of the chamber and chose the notables for the first election. Appointment was made by the interior minister from among those nominated. The duties of the chambers in­ cluded: presentation of opinions and reports on measures to aid commerce, supervision of public projects affecting the economy, and the execution of laws bearing on commerce. Significantly, the chambers were accorded direct access to the interior minister.23 The election in Cologne occurred on May 24; by July 21 Chaptal had given his approval of the nominees and the new members were sworn in. Nearly all had served either in the mer­ chants' committee, the council of commerce, or the "old" chamber of commerce, all of which were now superseded by the new in­ stitution. During the remaining years of French rule, twentythree men served in the Cologne Chamber of Commerce, but the institution was in fact dominated by the strong personalities of four men: Friedrich Carl Heimann, Bernard Boissere'e, Peter Heinrich Merkens, and Wittgenstein, mayor and president of the chamber. Wittgenstein's interest in and cooperation with the 23 RWWA:

1/3/1/3; Richard von Kaufmann,Die Vertretungderxvirtschaftlichen Interessen in den Staaien Europas, die Reorganisation der Handels- und Gewerbekammern und die Bildung eines volkswirtschaftliehen Centralorgans in DeutschIand (Berlin, 1879), pp. 23-24·; RWWA: 1/3/1/7; Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 45; Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 187-88.

POLITICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

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chamber lent it considerable security and prestige and insured its readiness to cooperate with the government of the city. He pre­ sided over most meetings until 1806, when his close friend Heimann became vice-president. Wittgenstein deferred to Heimann for the next five years. Heimann, of course, had led the drive for the creation of such an institution even before the French annexed the Rhineland; he had founded the merchants' commit­ tee and kept it going. Although his strong will and French orien­ tation caused tension among chamber members and within the larger business community, his leadership was appreciated and won the chamber's respect.24 Boisseree (after Heimann, vicepresident for a year) served in the chamber from 1803 to 1813 and again from 1818 to 1836. His career combined public office, a place in the chamber, and business success. During the French period Boisseree was one of the aides to the mayor, while under the Prussian rule he was a member of the city council. Merkens first entered the chamber in 1810, and along with Heimann's son Johann Philipp (who entered in 1812) provided a new genera­ tion of leadership that carried over into the Prussian period. Merkens had only come to Cologne in 1792, but he was apprenticed in the firm of E. C. Schiill, who in 1797 had presented to the Co­ logne magistracy the petition asking for recognition of the com­ mittee.25 The most important, time-consuming activity of the chamber of commerce was its continuing struggle to maintain the staple right and to gain modifications in the tariff system. A host of other activities—the administration of the harbor facilities, the regula24 See

Kellenbenz and Eyll, pp. 48-49. Ibid., pp. 47-50; Heinz Grupe, "P. H. Merkens (1778-1854)," Rheinischwestfalische Wirtschaftsbiograpfiien, vol. 5 (Munster, 1953), 3-8. Heimann, a wholesaler and forwarding agent, had investments in a black-powder factory. Boisseree, head of a wide-ranging mercantile house, in 1826 joined Merkens in founding the Prussian-Rhenish Steamship Company, of which he served as di­ rector. Merkens was also involved with Johann Philipp Heimann in founding an insurance firm and in the Cologne-Diisseldorf Steamship Company. 25

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tion of currency exchange, assistance to local firms, and so on— were continuations of the work of the former merchants' commit­ tee. There are, however, two developments which should not go unmentioned. First, it appeared in 1811 that at long last the problem of the Dutch bottleneck on the Rhine might be solved. A commission was established to oversee the construction of the northern canal, which was to join the Rhine and the Meuse, bypassing Holland.26 In October 1809, State Councilor Mole had been appointed gen­ eral director of bridges and roads, and the chamber had congratu­ lated him on his appointment, acclaiming his selection as a new proof of Napoleon's wisdom and perspicacity. When the canal commission was created, Mole responded by appointing Co­ logne's Mayor Wittgenstein and Friedrich Carl Heimann of the chamber of commerce as members. Both men subsequently went to Paris for conferences on the project. The canal was actually be­ gun, but it was never finished. Work on it was stopped when Napoleon began toying with the idea of simply annexing Holland to France. The appointments and the subsequent journey to Paris, however, emphasized once again the relative ease of access to high government circles, and the commitment of the French to the integration of the Rhineland into the nation. A second important development was the establishment of a bourse, or mercantile exchange, in Cologne. From April through August 1811, the chamber petitioned officials at various levels for a bourse, and Heimann apparently discussed it with the interior minister during his trip to Paris for negotiations on the northern canal.27 In late October Napoleon visited Cologne, and the re­ quest for a bourse was included in the petitions presented to him on behalf of the chamber by Moll, then its vice-president. The tone of the petitions is interesting, for while they contain the 26 RWWA: l/24a/6/10, 142; Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 341-44; Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 55. 27 RWWA: 1/25/1/Letters of April 3 and 29, May 30, August 19 and 21, 1811.

POLITICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

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patriotic, laudatory phraseology typical of the Napoleonic era, it is evident that the petitioners are confident of their full French citi­ zenship and of their right to place their requests before the em­ peror.28 In a decree of November 4, 1811, Napoleon endorsed the es­ tablishment of a bourse in Cologne.29 The chamber was to super­ vise its operations and make recommendations for the appoint­ ment of the necessary staff. Both the chamber and the commercial court provided references for candidates seeking these jobs. Job patronage was not new to the chamber; since 1804 it had been recommending men for positions in the harbor administration and as verifiers of the new metric system of weights and measures. Indeed, the chamber had become so used to having its recom­ mendations accepted that it ceased to propose more candidates than there were job openings. This practice drew a rebuke from Subprefect Klespe—for presumption.30 Its "presumption" sug­ gests the extent to which the chamber of commerce considered itself a privileged extension of government administration.

Representation of Business Interests: Aachen and Crefeld Though it took time for the Cologne Merchants' Committee and its successor institutions to win the support of that city's businessmen, throughout the Empire the chamber of commerce was firmly established as the body to speak for local economic in28 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/26; RWWA: l/24a/6/178; also Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 335-36; Zeyss, pp. 265-68. 29RWWA: 1/25/1/Klespe to Chamber, Dec. 9, 1811; Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 54. 30 See AN/F12/979°/6, 7. RWWA: 1/23/6/36,49,51; 1/25/1/LettersofMay 11, 18, 20, 1812. The planning for the bourse actually came to naught at this time. The military defeat of the French and the subsequent political and economic changes postponed the opening of the bourse until after annexation of the city by Prussia.

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terests. In contrast, similar institutions in Aachen and Crefeld were never as influential as in Cologne. It appears that busi­ nessmen in those two cities relied more heavily upon the efforts of well-placed individuals than upon the efforts of institutions. Both cities, as manufacturing centers, viewed with alarm the potential economic consequences of France's annexation of the Left Bank. Making the Rhine a tariff border threatened their supplies of raw materials and their export markets to the east. In January 1798, the Prussian king offered Crefeld's manufacturers the chance to emigrate to Berlin and also offered to provide them with build­ ings for use as factories. The manufacturers as a group (that is, the von der Leyens, FIoh, Rigal, Heydweiller, Lingen and de Greiff) all declined, both because of religious affiliations in the Crefeld area and because the complex putting-out system was too closely tied to the surrounding countryside to survive such a move. They sought instead, through appeals to Stein and Heinitz, to keep open the possibility of exporting to Prussia. In this they enjoyed only partial success—Prussia had decided to treat the Left Bank as foreign territory, though Heinitz did allow some Crefeld exports into Prussian territory west of the Weser.31 At the same time that Crefeld, seeking to maintain its German contacts, was appealing to Prussia, the city's silk manufacturers were appealing to the Rhine Commissioners Rudler and Marquis and to Interior Minister Francois de Neufchateau. Like Cologne's petitions, these appeals contained flattery of the officials to whom they were addressed and paeans to the wisdom and justice of the Republic. Their aim was to secure changes in French economic policy that would put Crefeld's silk industry on at least a competi­ tive basis with Right Bank producers who could avoid the tariff.32 Aachen's cloth and needle manufacturers behaved similarly. In August 1797, businessmen in Aachen submitted petitions to Commissioner Rudler, asking for changes in the restrictions on 31 32

Hintze and Schmoller, 2:668-71. HSAK: 241ff/771/l, IS, 19, 29.

POLITICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

149

the importing of raw materials and on the exporting of finished goods. Though the petitions were backed by the Aachen magis­ tracy, the mayor, and the department administrators, the requests were denied.33 Thus the businessmen of both Aachen and Crefeld needed assistance in attaining their goals. When the prefecture system was introduced in the Rhineland, business leaders of both Crefeld and Aachen sought the help of the Conseil General of the department. At its first meeting in June of 1801, Crefeld was represented by Rigal; Aachen was rep­ resented by the manufacturer de Greiff and by Peltzer, a former town official and part owner of a factory; and Cologne was repre­ sented by four delegates, one of whom was Lohnis, a former member of the merchants' committee. All three cities had pre­ pared for the session by submitting memoranda in behalf of local economic interests (commerce and the staple right in Cologne, silk production in Crefeld, needle and cloth manufacture in Aachen).34 Broad changes in tariff administration and rates were requested, including reductions in tariffs on tobacco leaves, raw silk, and steel wire for needles; the easing of export restrictions; and the granting of free docks and warehouses for Cologne. When the Conseil General submitted to Paris its report of over a hun­ dred pages, together with copies of the various memoranda, it endorsed the requests of all three cities. The Conseil General, unfortunately, had no power to imple­ ment the proposals in its report. Cologne's businessmen, as we have seen, reacted by using the council of commerce and the first chamber of commerce to obtain some concessions from French authorities, and Aachen might have done the same. The Aachen Council of Commerce was founded in late 1801, and its leading member was Jacobi, the cloth manufacturer, former mayor, and counselor to the prefect. Mayor Kolb was the presiding officer, 33

HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/I/Generalrat 1/IX. AN/FlcV/Roer 1/1-9; RWWA: 1/1/5/259, 261; HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/I/ Generalrat 1/Petition Crefeld; HSAK: Franzosische Verwaltung/623/18, 27. 34

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and Cornelius Guaita, another manufacturer and a future mayor, was a member. Yet the council seems not to have been very ac­ tive, and when the chamber-of-commerce law was promulgated in late 1802, the council ceased to meet, even though the Aachen Consultative Chamber for Manufacturing was not established until mid-1804.35 It appears that Crefeld's businessmen were affronted at not hav­ ing a council of commerce for their town. When Cologne sent J. D. Herstatt (a banker with close personal contacts in Crefeld) to Crefeld to solicit endorsement for Cologne's proposals for tariff modifications, von der Leyen let the proposals circulate and then noted belatedly that the particular changes set forth were princi­ pally of interest to Cologne. Consequently Crefeld's businessmen declined to endorse the proposals.36 Instead, the Crefeld mer­ chants and manufacturers sent their own petition to Interior Minister Chaptal. The petitioners asserted that as long as the Rhinelanders were considered to be opposed to the French and were consequently governed by a commissioner general, they could not hope to see themselves as part of the "single family" of Frenchmen, nor to have their basic and most pressing interests receive fair consideration. The French government, they com­ plained, had not paid attention to the true talents, much less the interests, of the local residents. Instead of political commissioners "who are guided only by their employees, strangers like them to the Rhineland,. . . would it not have been much more natural to assist the government commissioners with a council composed of several local residents either noted for their service to the public or expected to be most interested in the public welfare by virtue of their possessions or their stake in commerce?" The Crefeld manu­ facturers asked: (1) that the government permit direct communication between itself and the Rhineland for all affairs of state; (2) that the Rhineland be represented by deputies who, at the same time 35

Huyskens, pp. 19-39.

36

RWWA: 1/53/6/160, 167.

POUTICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

151

that they have the honor of contributing through their agency to French legislation, can serve the government by giving it confidential information about the personnel as well as about the material of public administration in the Rhineland; (3) that for the choice of these persons it would be best to consult public opinion in addition to particular recommendations; . . . (4) afterwards one should either consult the true state of affairs in this area [the Rhineland], or even better, convoke a special commission of educated inhabitants to propose to the govern­ ment the principal points which should be the object of the changes to be made in commercial laws of the interior and in the matters to be negotiated with foreign powers.37 The petition was signed by von der Leyen as mayor, by the members of the municipal council of Crefeld (all manufacturers), and by other leading merchants and manufacturers who were members of the departmental Conseil Gene'ral or the arrondissement council—the men, in other words, currently entrusted with the affairs of local government and now demanding a full voice in departmental, Rhenish, and national government. An appropriate institution for meeting these demands seemed to be at hand in mid-1804, when the French established a system of Chambres consultatrves pour Ies manufactures, fabriques, arts et metiers in industrial centers. Each chamber was to be made up of six members who had for at least five years either run a manufac­ turing establishment or been independently established in a trade. A manufacturing town in which a consultative chamber was established was to pay the budget and provide a suitable meeting place, and the town's mayor was to act as chairman. The function of the institution was to advise the government on means of encouraging manufacture, much as the chambers of commerce were to provide advice on trade.38 37

AN/F12/2411/Dos. 1; pays translated in this context as "Rhineland." RWWA: 1/3/1/13; Zeyss, p. 27; Kaufmann, p. 24, gives decree date as April 12, 1803. 38

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Consultative chambers were duly established in Crefeld on June 12,1804, and in Aachen (for Aachen-Burtscheid) nine days later. As we might expect, the great silk manufacturers domi­ nated Crefeld's chamber, whereas in Aachen the seats were di­ vided between cloth and needle manufacturers.39 Enthusiasm for the new chamber was low in Aachen; no one appeared at the mayor's first invitation to elect the consultative chamber, and only fifteen showed up at the second invitation. In neither city did the chamber display energy comparable to that of the Cologne Chamber of Commerce. Why was this so? One reason seems to be that in a short time the manufacturers of Aachen and Crefeld proved capable of mak­ ing the necessary adjustments to the new economic conditions. In his 1805 report to the ConseiI General, Prefect Mechin expressed pleasure over the many concessions won by the department in tariff matters affecting manufacturing. He continued: "Current circumstances do not permit us to weary the government by plac­ ing new demands. Nevertheless, there are three things which are impossible to postpone. One is related to the forwarding trade on the Left Bank; the second is maintenance of the transshipment right for Cologne; the third is the postponement of the 'free har­ bor' in that city." These problems needed the council's attention because of the possible loss of trade to the other side of the Rhine.40 The report indicates that the most urgent economic de­ mands of the Aachen and Crefeld areas, presented in 1801, had been largely satisfied by 1805, while the situation in Cologne re­ mained precarious. A second reason may have been the role played by a few prom­ inent businessmen in representing the interests of Aachen and Crefeld. Unlike the chambers of commerce, the consultative 39

Zeyss, pp. 36-40; Huyskens, pp. 39-40. HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/I/Generalrat 5/Mechin to Conseil General, 27 Ger­ minal, XII [sic] (XIII, or 1805). Chaptal had provided some relief for Crefeld by lowering tariffs on silk in 1802. See Kurschat, p. 60. 40

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chambers did not have the privilege of communicating directly with Paris; their communications went first through the mayor and then through the prefect.41 Aachen and Crefeld businessmen, however, were able to bypass this bottleneck. In November 1801, Crefeld's silk manufacturer L. M. Rigal was named as the Roer department's sole delegate to the first session of the Corps Legislatif.42 A few months later, when the Cologne Chamber of Com­ merce solicited Crefeld's support in a joint effort to stave off a French tobacco monopoly, Mayor von der Leyen and the tobacco merchants of Crefeld declined to cooperate, because Rigal was al­ ready representing their interests in Paris.43 And when Rigal be­ came a senator, his place as a legislator was taken by Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen. In 1811, von der Leyen was named to the national Conseil desfabriques et manufactures ("council on fac­ tories and manufactories") in Paris.44 Furthermore, J. J. Bouget, Crefeld's subprefect and a man very familiar with economic inter­ ests in Aachen and Cologne, also entered the Corps Legislatif in 1804. Aachen for its part could rely on Johann Friedrich Jacobi for assistance. Between 1801 and 1803 he was often acting pre­ fect, and during most of the Napoleonic period he was the closest advisor to the prefect. Aachen's Mathias Peltzer and Jacobi both became members of the Corps Legislatif. Cologne never did have a representative in the Corps Legislatif. Indeed, as we have seen, the French were reluctant even to appoint an active merchant as mayor of that town. It would seem that for these various reasons 41 In 1807, the Aachen Consultative Chamber sought to move its meetings out of the city hall and thereby gain greater independence from the town government. The move was not approved by the prefect. See Zeyss, pp. 51-52. 42 Rigal's appointment announced in Kolnische Zeitung, Nov. 14, 1801 (23 Brumaire, X); RWWA: 1/1/5/256. 43 For Cologne's tobacco trade, see August Boerner, Kolner Tabakhandel und Tabakgewerbe 1628-1919 (Essen, 1919); and Milz, pp. 50-55. The relevant cor­ respondence for the period from 1800 to 1802 is to be found in RWWA; 1/2/2; 1/1/7; and 1/53/5, passim. 44 AN/F12/194/Proces verbaux des seances.

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Aachen and Crefeld may have had less need than Cologne for a special institution to represent their interests. This is not to imply that businessmen in Aachen and Crefeld did not utilize the consultative chambers at all, only that they were less actively interested than their Cologne colleagues. The chambers did function. Between 1792 and annexation, Rhenish businessmen had suffered from direct exploitation and the disrup­ tion of trading patterns. The chambers of commerce and the con­ sultative chambers were instrumental in reversing that situation. When Napoleon visited Aachen in September 1804, his reception was partly organized by the consultative chamber, which also ar­ ranged for him to visit factories in the Aachen area. Napoleon subsequently established a fund to encourage industry, and sev­ eral Aachen entrepreneurs applied to this fund with success. For example, Charles Nellessen, on the basis of impressive credentials (cloth manufacturer, member of the departmental electoral col­ lege, member of the consultative chamber, and judge on the com­ mercial court) was granted 10,000 francs to help him to rebuild after a fire razed his plant.45 Other manufacturers in Aachen and Crefeld were granted permission to buy vacant convents or sec­ ularized church lands at low prices. This was to enable them to start mechanized, factory-style production with all phases of cloth production under one roof. Undertakings of this kind remained exceptional in an economy still dominated by the putting-out sys­ tem, but they attracted considerable public attention.46 The government sent to the Cologne Chamber of Commerce and the Aachen and Crefeld Consultative Chambers frequent re45

AN/F12/1618/Dos. 7/Petition of June 10, 1808. Less than one-fourth of the total sales of secularized land, however, were to men with "bourgeois" occupations (merchants, manufacturers, shopkeepers, pro­ fessions), and of these most were small plots of land in the countryside acquired as country estates or residences. See WHma Klompen, Die Siikularisation im Arrondissement Krefeld 1794-1814 (Kempen, 1962), pp. 204-5; Max Barkhausen, "Die sieben bedeutendsten Fabrikanten des Roerdepartements," Rheinische Vierieljahrsbliitter 25 (1960): 102-3. 46

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ports on new inventions of machinery and new chemical process­ es. The chambers on their part provided Paris with a stream of statistics on the status of manufacturing—the number of plants and workers, the value of goods produced, amounts of capital invested, changing commodity prices, etc.47 The consultative chambers assisted the government in organizing industrial exhi­ bitions, which took place in Aachen (as capital of the department) in 1807, 1810, and 1813. Judges for the awarding of prizes came from the chambers.48 When Rhenish manufacturers finally lost their last American markets in 1809, and when, in 1812, exporta­ tion to Russia seemed a real possibility, the consultative chambers and the Cologne Chamber of Commerce were the channels through which discussion of potential new markets was carried on.49 How successful were these endeavors in stimulating economic growth? There is considerable evidence to suggest that the Roer department enjoyed a boom during the later Napoleonic period. The 1811 census for the department listed 650,000 inhabitants (up 75,000 from Dorsch's estimate of 1804), with 2,500 man­ ufacturing firms employing 65,000 workers and producing goods worth 75 million francs.50 A list of the leading manufacturers in the department was prepared in 1810 by the prefect for the pur47 See for example, Zeyss, pp. 74-90; Milz, pp. 99-127; also HSAD; Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/7/9, 10, 15, 17, 33, 45, 49. 48 RWWA: 1/26/1 and 2; and 1/26/122/passim; HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/ Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/7 Industrie/vols. 8-13. Also Zeyss, pp. 64ff.; Strauch, pp. 90ff.; and Godechot, pp. 671-75. 49RWWA; 1/25/5/Prefect to Cologne Chamber of Commerce, Oct. 6, 1812; HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/29/2-4, and 30/passim; Kurschat, p. 66. 50 Herbert Kisch, "The Impact of the French on the Lower Rhine Textile District—Some Comments on Economic Development and Social Change," Eco­ nomic History Review, 2nd series, 15 (1962):323; figures also accepted by Fran­ cois Crouzet, "Wars, Blockade, and Economic Change in Europe, 1792-1815," Journal of Economic History 24 (1964):583.

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pose of selecting a delegate to the new national Conseil des fabriques et manufactures. The statistics given in the list are obvi­ ously only approximations, but they indicate the size of the de­ partment's largest firms. (See table 11.) Forty-six firms appear on the list, of which six valued their annual production at over 1 mil­ lion francs. Thirty-two of the firms were described as old, but fourteen or nearly one-third were new. The forty-six firms valued their production at over 23 million francs; they employed nearly 17,000 workers, more than a fifth of whom worked in a "special establishment"—presumably a factory.51 The average number of employees in each "special establishment" was seventy-seven. Such figures suggest the onset of industrialization. During the years between 1789 and 1811 the value of Aachen's wool production doubled. In Crefeld both the popula­ tion and the number of silk firms doubled. Manufacturers from Aachen and Crefeld represented over half of the capital and total production value of the forty-six leading firms in the department. The Continental blockade drastically reduced Cologne's river trade (though we do not know to what extent smuggling took up some of the slack), but whereas manufacturing had been negligi­ ble before 1778, in 1811 Cologne claimed 416 manufacturing firms, employing 13,704 workers and producing goods valued at around 15 million francs. Capital investment in Cologne had doubled since 1789, investment in cotton taking the greatest leap. Seven cotton-spinning firms were founded between 1799 and 1805. Cologne merchants may have invested in "industrial" enterprises to compensate for the decline of river trade. Cologne's tobacco processors fought a long and unsuccessful battle, first to get lower tariffs on imported leaf tobacco and then to stave off a 51 AN/F12/937/9. Estimates were necessary since firms were reluctant to reveal details about their internal affairs. Kisch, "Impact of the French," pp. 312, 316. Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen was named to the council, but he appears hardly to have played a part in the deliberations. AN/F12/194/Proces verbaux des seances du Conseil des fabriques et manufactures.

38 375

45 270

Crefeld (6 firms) Mean Total 900 5,400

160 (?)a 1,600 (?)a

108 1,290

289 13,272

Other Workers, Including Day Laborers

866,667 5,200,000

362,000 3,620,000

625,000 7,500,000

507,826 23,360,000

Value of Annual Product (francs)

SOURCE: AN/F12/937/9. a The estimates for the number of workers in Cologne are the most questionable on the list.

0/6

6/4

Cologne (10 firms) Mean Total

77 3,552

Workers in "Special Establishment"

60 717

3/9

14/32

Firms Founded: After 17891 Before 1789

The Forty-six Leading Manufacturers in the Roer Department, 1810

Aachen (12 firms) Mean Total

Department (46 firms) Mean Total

TABLE 11

1,090,000 6,540,000

215,500 2,155,000

516,667 6,200,000

487,717 22,435,000

Capital (francs)

41,000 246,000

27,800 278,000

38,500 462,000

32,239 1,483,000

Annual Revenue (francs)

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state monopoly, but many of these businessmen were compen­ sated with official positions in the imperial tobacco monopoly.52 The economic incentives offered businessmen on the Left Bank, plus the Rhine tariff border, led many entrepreneurs from the Duchy of Berg to cross the river and resettle in the Roer depart­ ment, where they would have a better market for their products. Cologne especially benefited from this migration.53 The quick growth of business on the Left Bank, however, did not have very secure foundations. This can be seen in the almost panicked response of the Roer department to the proposed annex­ ation of the Duchy of Berg in late 1810. Needle manufacturers from Aachen now complained to the national council on factories and manufactories that they were being undercut by products imported from Berg, and they sought either a tax or prohibition on such goods. The council, after a lengthy discussion, declined to act on the grounds that the manufacturers' plight was probably the result of a general crisis in commerce and manufacturing. The Cologne Chamber of Commerce registered a similar complaint with the minister of manufacturing on behalf of her cotton indus­ try, and Aachen's cloth producers asked the minister for an exclu­ sive license for production—both without success.54 Roer manu­ facturers, led by Cologne, determined to appeal directly to the emperor during his visit of September 1811. In a reversal of its frequent attacks on the French tariff system, the Cologne Chamber of Commerce praised the tariff for creating new indus­ try and encouraging the relocation of entrepreneurs from Berg to the Left Bank. It argued that if Berg were annexed, those entre­ preneurs might well return to Berg, where they would enjoy ac52 Christian Eckert, "Rheinschiffahrt im XIX. Jahrhundert," Schmollers staatsund sozialTvissenschaftliche Forschungen 18, no. 5 (1900):556; Milz, p. 97; see also tables in Milz, pp. 99ff., for details on all branches of "Gewerbe." 53 RWWA: 1/26/1, 2, 3/passim. 54 AN/F12/194/Proces verbaux des seances du Conseil des fabriques et manufac­ tures, p. 155; RWWA: 1/26/2/Chamber to Min. of Manufacturing, Nov. 18, 1812; SaA: Registratur Cremer IV/21/3-4.

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cess to French markets plus the advantage of a skilled work force long disciplined to factory production. Such a move would cause unemployment and mendicity on the Left Bank. Union with Berg, definitely not in the economic interests of the Roer depart­ ment, was justifiable only "in conformity with the grand political vision of the French government." Napoleon had sought to stimu­ late and regulate industrial production for political purposes. Now that the industrial boom was threatened, he was asked to moderate his political ambitions to protect the industry he had encouraged.55 The Left Bank succeeded in staving off the plan for annexation of Berg, but this success was not to be enjoyed for long. By the end of 1811, the boom was evidently over, and in 1812 industrial production began to drop.56 With Napoleon's defeat in Russia, the Continental blockade, which had been protecting Left Bank industry, began to crumble. Supplies of raw materials like cotton became scarce, and trading patterns were disrupted. A new period of economic uncertainty set in. Commercial Courts and Labor Arbitration Boards Whereas the chambers of commerce and consultative chambers were designed to promote industry and trade, commercial courts and labor arbitration boards were established to resolve economic conflicts. Commercial courts had existed in major French cities for over two hundred years. The French sanctioned the creation of a twelve-member commercial court in Aachen in October of 1794, shortly after the reoccupation of the Rhineland. The court 55 AN/F12/549-50/57, 58ff., 64ff., 95; HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/29/19-26; Zeyss, pp. 133, 261-68; Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 335-36. 56 The Duchy of Berg, much more than the Left Bank, suffered from French economic policy, which helped fuel a revolt in 1813. French officials in Berg did their best to help businessmen, but with little success. See Schmidt, Berg, pp. 232ff.

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was to adjudicate commercial disputes pertaining to matters in­ volving less than 300 francs, but on occasion it went beyond legal issues and sought to represent local trade and industrial interests. In any case, it ceased to exist by early 1797.57 Cologne's commer­ cial court was established in September 1797. During the first half of that year the merchants' committee had been providing expert advice on commercial suits, and it greeted the creation of the new court as "a great blessing," expecting it to complement the work of the committee.58 The merchant/judges were elected by an assembly of some thirty leading merchants, and the results of the election were submitted to Commissioner Rudler for approval. Like the merchants' committee, the court was an in­ stitution that had official, legally recognized functions, was responsible to the public, and brought its members prestige and administrative experience. It was independent of the merchants' committee institutionally, but there was always considerable overlapping of personnel. The commercial court in Aachen was revived in 1805, and one was created in Crefeld in 1810 under provisions of the Napoleonic Code de commerce (promulgated in the Rhineland in 1804). The formation of Aachen's commercial court is interesting in two respects. First, Counselor to the Prefect Jacobi protested the election of Ignaz van Houtem as president of the court on the grounds that most of his votes had come from "mere" merchants (or commergants) rather than from first- or second-class "true" merchants (negotiants). Most merchants "properly speaking" (i.e., negotiants) were Protestants and deserved a larger voice in the court; moreover the Protestants could be trusted not to exer­ cise a religious bias, because they generally were "wise, moderate, and prudent."59 Jacobi's protest, which reveals the continuing ex57

Strauch, p. 73; Zeyss, pp. 201-3. RWWA: 1/1/5/25-49; Hansen, Quellen, 4:649; Schwann,Handelskammer, p. 78; HASK: Franzdsische Verwaltung/2268/14, 17, 26. 59 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/8/5, 54. 58

POLITICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

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istence of religious and class tensions within Aachen's merchant circles, was apparently unsuccessful, and the court took office as elected. Second, the commercial court in Aachen brought, two men into the public light who would later become prominent mayors. One elected as a judge was the needle manufactuer Cornelius Guaita, who became Aachen's mayor and chairman of the consultative chamber in 1808. The other was Adolf Steinberger. With the backing of Jacobi, Peltzer, Rethel, and a number of judicial offi­ cials, he was the successful candidate for the post of clerk to the court.60 He held office as mayor of Cologne from 1823 to 1848, and it seems likely that his early experience with Aachen's busi­ nessmen helped to smooth the way for his friendly relations with businessmen in Cologne. The procedure for selecting suitable electors for a commercial court had been changed by the time the first Crefeld Court was chosen. An 1808 modification in the Commercial Code empow­ ered the subprefect to select from business circles twenty-five "no­ tables" in cities with fewer than fifteen thousand residents, plus one notable per one thousand residents above that level, and these notables in turn elected the judges on the court. Thus by limiting the number of electors and having them chosen by the subprefect, the government ensured the election of leading businessmen to the court. In fact, many of the most important businessmen in the Roer department served as unpaid lay judges. The commercial court was a prestigious body, like the city council, chamber of commerce, or consultative chamber, and many men served in all three at one time or another.61 60

HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/8/27,

31. 61 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/16/ Justice Min. to Prefect, April 7, 1810; HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/III/Unterprafektur Koln/VII/2/Handelsgericht/Decree of Aug. 10,1810. Forthenamesofthejudges in Aachen and Crefeld, see Strauch, pp. 74-75 and Zeyss, p. 206n.

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While the commercial courts could resolve disputes between merchants (or between merchant/manufacturers), there was still a need for an institution to regulate labor relations. The abolition of guilds early in the Revolution had supposedly established a free labor force, but the desire for increased production led to the reintroduction of controls. The model for such an institution was the Conseil des prud^hommes (Gewebegericht, Rat der Geiverbeverstandigen, or labor arbitration board) created in Lyons on March 18, 1806. The board was composed of factory owners (including those running a putting-out system) and master artisans from Lyons's silk industry, with the owners enjoying a numerical ad­ vantage. The board was empowered to arbitrate minor labor dis­ putes, to take measures to prevent both theft of raw materials by workers and adulteration of products by owners, and to introduce and monitor labor books in order to stabilize the labor market. In addition, the board was empowered to make inspection tours of factories in order to prepare industrial statistics for the govern­ ment. The board was placed under the jurisdiction of the local chamber of commerce or consultative chamber for manufac­ turing.62 On May 31, 1806, the Roer Prefect Lameth asked Aachen's mayor to inform the consultative chamber of the law establishing the Lyons Labor Arbitration Board and to ask whether the law might be applicable to Aachen's needle and cloth manufactories. Having received no response, the prefect repeated his request a year later. He wondered, he said, whether the lack of response was due to inactivity on the part of the chamber or whether it was because the consultative chamber was already serving as the "or­ gan of the factory owners."63 The chamber finally replied, calling 62 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/11/Min. of Int. to Prefects, Sept. 1, 1809; Richard Bahr, "Gewerbegericht, Kaufmannsgericht, Einigungsamt. Ein Beitrag zur Rechts- und Sozialgeschichte Deutschlands im 19. Jahrhundert," Schmollers stoats- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschungen 23, no. 5 (1905):4-5; Milz, pp. 87-89; Zeyss, pp. 21 Iff. 63 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/12/1/27.

POLITICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

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Lameth's attention to the proposal for a law to regulate local in­ dustry that had been presented to the interior minister by Peltzer, the legislator from Aachen. Following this they actually re­ quested the creation of a labor board. The request was repeated in December of 1807 and January of 1808, along with a request that the proposed law for industrial regulation be approved. The emperor gave his approval in April, and in July 1808, the first labor board in the Roer department was elected in Aachen by an assembly of manufacturers and master artisans, with cloth pro­ ducer Frederick Deusner chosen as president. The Lyons law was modified to fit Aachen's industrial character.64 The course of events in Crefeld was similar to that in Aachen. The interior minister wrote the prefect, soliciting opinion on measures that might benefit the silk industry. The request was passed to Subprefect Jordans and by him to the consultative chamber. The result was a petition for a labor arbitration board tailored to fit Crefeld's silk industry. Jordans (Mayor Floh's sonin-law) strongly supported the petition, and the Crefeld Board was created by a decree of January 19,1811. Elections took place the following June.65 In Cologne the initiative came from the prefect. In October 1810, Subprefect Klespe' informed the chamber of commerce and the mayor of the prefect's interest in establishing a labor board. Wittgenstein wrote Aachen's mayor asking for information on the board there. The information that was elicited provided the basis for a proposal drawn up by the chamber of commerce. By June of the following year the proposal won imperial approval, and the board was constituted in August 1811. The Cologne Board was 64HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/12/1/ 15-23, 37-72; AN/FN12/1618/Conseil des prud'hommes Coln-Aachen/Chambre consultative to Prefect, Jan. 12, 1808. 65 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/15/1-17; Wolfferts, "Floh," p. 138; Hintze and Schmoller, 2:671; Zeyss, pp. 272-78; AN/ FN12/1618/Conseil des prud'hommes Crefeld/Chambre consultative to Jordans, Aug. 16, 1810, and Decree of Jan. 19,1811.

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composed of manufacturers and master artisans of the city's new cloth industry.66 The reasons for interest in the labor boards were similar for all three cities. The Revolution having freed labor of all restrictions, master artisans had set up their own shops whenever possible, thereby freeing themselves from the control of the old firms that had effectively monopolized industry. The process of freeing themselves seems to have been helped along at times by the theft of some of the raw material (wool, silk, cotton, wire, etc.) belong­ ing to the established firms, and also by the "theft" of what were considered family or firm secrets. The Aachen Conseil des prudTiommes, in pushing for strict policing regulations, argued that it was essential to control the workers because they were be­ traying "the secrets of our factories, the fruit of our national indus­ try," and the conseil demanded "repressive measures against workers traitorous to their fatherland."67 The Crefeld silk pro­ ducers, through the consultative chamber, pointed out that while the old firms watched over their workers strictly, the new firms lacked the moral and economic power to enforce discipline. This was creating an uncontrolled labor market for the whole industry. The competition between large, old firms and small, new ones lacking any reputation was obviously damaging everyone— manufacturers and workers alike. Laborers changed jobs, stole secrets and materials, and helped lower the quality of the finished goods. Hence it was necessary to maintain "harsh police regulations, the means of forming good 66

HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/14/ Napoleonic Decree of April 26, 1811, Decree of Prefect, June 1, 1811, Letter from Cologne Chamber of Commerce to Prefect, Jan. 24, 1811, Mayoral Decree, Nov. 21, 1810, and Klespe to Prefect, Aug. 21, 1811; AN/F12/1618/Conseil des prud'hommes Coin-Aachen/Petition of Jan. 24, 1811, Confirmation of mem­ bership, Aug. 23, 1811; HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/2164/Rat der Gewerbeverstandigen/6-41. For composition, see Milz, p. 88. 67 HSAD: Roer Dept/Dz/II/Prafektur/lII Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/12/1/ 138.

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workers."68 Because workers were free to move around, the Crefeld and Aachen Labor Arbitration Boards soon sought to extend their jurisdictions to nearby towns in order to prevent circumven­ tion of the regulations. Aachen was allowed to add Borcette, but Crefeld's request for extended jurisdiction was denied. Instead, labor boards were created in other Roer towns: Stolberg, Duren, Monschau, Wesel, Neuss, Gladbach, and Kaldenkirchen.69 It appears that the labor arbitration boards were active and very successful in resolving labor disputes at least from the point of view of management. In December 1811 and January 1812, the prefect collected statistics on the conciliatory activities of the labor boards. At that time only 26 out of 999 reported cases remained unresolved or had been taken to court. The composition of the Aachen and Crefeld boards, in which the owners of the old firms predominated, made it easier to protect the labor supply of those firms, and this in turn reduced the threat of competition from new, small firms. No wonder that Conrad Sohman, the wealthy silk producer, mayoral aide, and president of the Crefeld Labor Board could assure the subprefect that the board was of great value and was becoming more and more important.70 The Struggle over Cologne's Trading Pnvileges Before attempting a general evaluation of the impact of various business institutions upon the political integration of the Rhenish business community with France, it will be useful to examine in detail the long campaign of Cologne's merchants to protect that 68 AN/F12/1618/Conseil des prud'hommes Crefeld/Crefeld Consultative Chamber to Jordans, Aug. 16, 1800. 69 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/12/1/88, 109, 126; HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/ 12, 13, and 15/33-37; AN/F12/1618/Conseil des prud'hommes Aachen/passim. 70HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/n/Prafektur/M Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/11/ Prefect Ladoucette to subprefects of the Dept., Dec. 28, 1811; Sohmann to subprefect, Jan. 4, 1812. Statistics on the effectiveness of the Conseils des prud'-

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city's ancient trading privileges on the Rhine. Only by carefully following this well-documented effort can one get a full sense of the extent of the interaction between private businessmen and government officials and a sense of the political tactics and style of both. The most pressing problem faced by the young merchants' committee in late 1797 was how to keep France from making the Rhine its tariff border, a natural consequence of having made the Rhine its political border through the annexation of the Left Bank. Such a move, if coupled with the loss of Cologne's trading privileges, the staple and transfer rights, would be a disaster for the city's economy. As we have seen, the transshipment of goods between Holland and the Upper Rhine, along with the transfer of goods into appropriately sized vessels, had long been the mainstay of Cologne's merchant houses and had supported many boatmen and laborers. Obviously, shippers would cling to the Right Bank or use overland routes to avoid paying French tariffs in Cologne. Furthermore, what industry Cologne did have, such as leather tanning or tobacco processing, was dependent upon imported raw materials. Even many of Cologne's basic staples came from the Right Bank. Trade had already been hurt by the series of wars in which France had been engaged; the tariff border seemed to threaten ruin. To meet this threat, the merchants' committee in late December of 1797 began a prolonged cam­ paign to influence French tariff policy in favor of Cologne. hommes were presented in the following form, and they also are printed in Zeyss, p. 218.

City

Aachen Crefeld Cologne

Reporting No. Cases Period

8/16/0812/28/11 7/26/1112/21/11 8/12/111/1/12

No. Conciliated

No. Unresolved

To Court

Appeals

2 confirmed by tribunal

720

716

1

3

66

63

2

1

213

194

11

8

POLITICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

167

The argument presented by the committee to the various gov­ ernmental authorities was relatively simple and remained basi­ cally unchanged through the French period. Supported by busi­ nessmen from other cities, the committee contended that the tariff border would drive trade to the other side of the Rhine. In mak­ ing raw materials prohibitively expensive, the tariffs would force Left Bank industry either to relocate onto the Right Bank or to compete to their disadvantage with industry on the Right Bank, especially that of the Duchy of Berg. In any case, the new French cities on the Left Bank would suffer, while the cities across the Rhine such as Dusseldorf, Duisburg, and Frankfurt would benefit at their expense. Moreover, as trade declined, the revenues de­ rived from tariffs would fall far short of what the French antici­ pated.71 These basic arguments were repeated often, especially upon the arrival of new officials unacquainted with conditions in the Rhineland or when France and other countries entered into new negotiations that affected Rhine trade. We have already seen evidence that the fears of the Cologne merchants that the Rhineland's trade would be ruined by the tariff were exaggerated. Nev­ ertheless, Cologne worked energetically to preserve its privileges, and the tactics used by the merchants' committee and later by the chamber of commerce show the increasing political sophistication and awareness of Cologne's merchants. On December 28, 1797, shortly after having constituted itself, the merchants' committee decided to submit to Commissioner Rethel a memorandum detailing the possible impact of a Rhine tariff border.72 The initial step was to provide the government with enough accurate information to make the adoption of an en­ lightened policy possible. Carrying their idea further, the com­ mittee proposed to Rethel the formation of an assembly of "negocians sages et experimentes, de patriotes eclaires" chosen from all the principal cities in the new departments to collect and provide 71 See, for example, RWWA: 1/53/1/77 (summarized in Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 65-70). 72 RWWA: 1/1/2/26; Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 50.

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information. Though such an assembly never met, the Cologne Merchants' Committee did invite merchants in the major towns in the Rhineland, including merchants in Holland, to join the committee in its effort to supply the government with information and in its attempt to influence tariff policy. The effort to build a broad and active coalition of businessmen in the four Rhenish departments was only partially successful. A merchants' committee was formed in Mainz in January, and here the common interest in preserving the staple and transfer privi­ leges did provide a basis for cooperation with Cologne. Subse­ quently the two merchants' committees regularly exchanged memoranda, reports, and correspondence on the status of negotia­ tions with government officials.73 Crefeld's silk manufacturers and tobacco merchants cooperated by analyzing the possible ef­ fects of the tariff border on their industries, and asking that the committee seek the free import of raw materials.74 Merchants in most of the other cities, however, either did not answer Cologne's letter, or were only willing to provide information on local condi­ tions. At this time they were content to let the merchants' com­ mittee act as the chief spokesman for economic interests in the Rhineland, preferring to "wait and see" rather than involve them­ selves actively in its efforts.75 When Rhine Commissioner Rudler asked the committee to prepare a general report on trade and the Rhenish economy, the committee used opinions and information gathered from sources in other towns as well as those gathered from Cologne's busi­ nessmen. Committee members and supporters submitted reports on various branches of Cologne's economy, such as the wine trade, trade in coal and iron, and textile production. The commit­ tee also met with the municipal administration to discuss prob­ lems of trade on the river. In the initial draft of the report, Lohnis, then committee president, placed the tariff question in a broad 73

See RWWA: l/23b/16/4; and 1/53/1/54. RWWA: 1/53/1/13, 33. 75 Schwann, Handdskammer, p. 60; RWWA: 1/1/5/13; and 1/53/1/passim.

74

POLITICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

169

political context: "Is the placement of the French tariff border on the Rhine reconcilable or irreconcilable with the internal condi­ tions of the conquered lands, or even with the interests of the French Republic as we at this time perceive them?"76 Lohnis's answer to this question, contained in the actual memorandum to Rudler, was that the new tariff border "would be irreconcilable with the well-being of the commercial cities on the Rhine.... To draw foreign trade into one's own land is one of the basic principles of every clear-thinking government. All policies must be oriented toward this principle, and one will only be able to achieve this important goal when one seeks to stimulate the na­ tional economy through every possible kind of encouragement."77 What the merchants' committee recognized, and what they hoped the new government would recognize, was that henceforth eco­ nomic policy should not be determined on purely national consid­ erations, nor on purely local considerations, if both the national and local interests were to be well served. The problem, in other words, was how to reconcile local and national interests. A second interesting feature of Lohnis's draft, apparent though less pro­ nounced in the final report, is his attempt to buttress the argu­ ment against the tariff border both by referring to Cologne's long history as a trading center and by invoking current economic theory.78 In this respect Lohnis's draft bears a strong resemblance to the memoranda composed and submitted by the old Cologne city government in its 1795 struggle to retain Cologne's inde­ pendence. The committee's report was sent to Rudler on April 12, 1798, and other copies or summaries were sent to the cities with which the committee had corresponded and to all other "constituted au­ thorities and persons who have influence in these matters."79 By 76RWWA:

1/53/1/15, 19,42; 1/1/5/12; Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 64. RWWA: 1/53/1/77; Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 70. 78 Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 64-65. 79 Description of the campaign in annual report, RWWA; 1/1/2/26; for Rudler's report, see RWWA: 1/53/1/77, 91-100. 77

170

FRENCH KULE ON THE RHINE

that date, however, it was already clear that French policy, quite apart from the tariff, was hurting Cologne. On March 21, Rudler had announced the Directory decree banning all commerce with English goods, which was an important part of the Rhine trade. The committee therefore followed its report to Rudler with an appeal asking the commissioner to help alleviate the growing economic crisis in Cologne.80 In this appeal, the merchants' committee expressed the hope that Cologne would be granted a "free harbor," where goods would be transshipped free of duties and without a ban on Eng­ lish wares, and declared that Cologne would willingly compen­ sate the French by as much as 200,000 francs for any loss of tariff revenue.81 Rudler supported the committee's position and on May 9 recommended to Paris that Cologne and Mainz be granted "free harbors" in compensation for the loss of their staple rights were they to be denied. That same day, however, the Directory decided to move the tariff border to the Rhine, effective July 3. The only privilege granted Cologne, Mainz, and Koblenz was that of building bonded warehouses, where for a fee freight being forwarded but not imported could be stored without the payment of full duties.82 The granting of bonded warehouses was not enough to satisfy Cologne's merchants. The ban on English goods remained, some duty still had to be paid on freight being forwarded, and proce­ dures involved with the warehouses were costly and timeconsuming and therefore harmful to the efficient transshipment of goods. The merchants' committee had won encouragement from Rudler but it had not yet won its case. It prepared to send a dele­ gation to Mainz to meet with Rudler and wrote to its Mainz counterpart asking for support in behalf of the old trading privi80

Hansen, Quellen, 4:630; RWWA: 1/1/5/33. Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 60-61, 71-72. 82 Hansen, Quellen, 4:848-49; RWWA: 1/53/1/128; Schwann,Handelskammer, p. 93; Gothein, pp. 64-66. 81

POLITICS OF SEMIOFFICIAL INSTITUTIONS

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leges. A new petition was sent to Rudler, asking that he either confirm the staple and transfer rights or else respect the wishes of Cologne and Mainz regarding harbor procedures, facilities, and regulations. On July 2, before an answer arrived from Rudler, the new Cologne customs inspector, Colard, appeared in Cologne, and two days later the dreaded tariff border went into effect.83 The merchants' committee responded by renewing its efforts. Two members were dispatched to the Rhine customs director in Bonn to argue the position of Cologne. On the day the tariff was imposed, an extraordinary meeting was held. Those present included the merchant-dominated municipal administration, Commissioner Rethel, Heimann and Lohnis for the merchants' committee, and Colard. The meeting resulted in strong city sup­ port for the activities of the merchants' committee and, more im­ portant, the support of Customs Inspector Colard.84 With this backing, committee members Boisseree and Cassinone were sent to Mainz on July 8 to lobby with Rudler. Rudler surprised Cologne by arriving in that city on July 12, while the delegation was still on its way to Mainz to see him. He promptly met with officials and the merchants' committee to hear their wishes. The tone of the negotiations is shown by the phras­ ing of a petition asking Rudler for him to approve the construc­ tion of an all-year harbor in Cologne. The petition is interesting because it is reminiscent of the style of earlier city council peti­ tions. It is also reminiscent of the political petitions urging full union with France that were collected in Crefeld and Aachen dur­ ing the spring and in Cologne in June. Building an all-weather harbor (needed because of ice on the river during winter) had been proposed before, the petition noted, but the proposal had been blocked by Cologne's "oligarchical system of administra­ tion." Today, however, where Cologne's "political regeneration 83

RWWA: 1/53/1/150; 1/23Ύ16/4; and 1/1/3/16; Schwann, Handelskammer,

p. 73. 84

RWWA: 1/53/1/117, 125-29, 154; Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 75.

172

FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

had broken all its chains and united its destiny with that of a mighty republic, where today the genius of liberty gives birth every day to projects which amaze the universe," Cologne could revive this great project with every confidence in its completion.85 The concerted effort to win over Rudler was largely successful. Of importance was that between July 12 and August 9 Rudler confirmed the continuation of the staple and transfer rights, facilitated the forwarding trade by greatly easing restrictions, simplified tariff procedure, obtained lower duties on some raw materials, and permitted trade in some goods where it had been prohibited. All boats still had to stop in Cologne, and this ap­ peared to guarantee that the city would remain the major trans­ shipment point on the lower Rhine, while Mainz retained its rights on the upper Rhine. The merchants' committee won over not only Rudler, but also Colin, the national customs director. While touring the Rhine in mid-August, Colin met with the mer­ chants' committee and, like all important officials, was presented with memoranda.86 He then promised that upon his return to Paris he would try to assist Cologne in getting the tariff structure changed; thereafter the merchants' committee frequently sent pe­ titions and reports to him. For the moment, Cologne's economy appeared to have been saved. And the Roer department business community, led by the Cologne Merchants' Committee, had gained important friends in Rudler, Colard, Colin, and in the local and departmental governments. The next threat to Cologne's privileges came not from French policy but from Cologne's rivals, particularly the city of Diisseldorf on the Right Bank. The merchants of Diisseldorf sought 85

RWWA: 1/1/14733. of Rudler's decisions were affirmed by the Directory in mid-August. Kellenbenz and Eyll, pp. 33-36, argue that the efforts of the committee were un­ successful. The changes in tariff policy and procedures belie this, and the commit­ tee in its annual report considered the results a substantial if not unqualified achievement See RWWA: 1/53/1/194-95; and 1/53/2/14, 33, 35, 43-51, 56; Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 56-57, 76-78, 89, 92. 86 Many

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agreements with Dutch merchants and boatmen whereby upward-bound boats would stop in Diisseldorf rather than Co­ logne to transfer their cargoes into smaller vessels, in this way avoiding the French tariffs. Dusseldorf counted on Cologne's not being able to enforce her privileges and on the reluctance of the French to enforce them on her behalf. The Dusseldorf plan in­ spired renewed effort by the Cologne Merchants' Committee.87 First the committee persuaded Commissioners Rudler and Rethel to intercede with the Dutch government in Cologne's behalf. Rethel did his best, presenting the argument that the proposed agreement between Dusseldorf and Dutch shippers could en­ danger good relations between France and Holland. This ex­ ceeded the powers of a "simple municipality." The French inte­ rior and justice ministers, however, tended to agree with the Dutch, and they ordered Rhine Commissioner Marquis to pre­ vent Cologne from restricting freedom of commerce on the Rhine. The committee then tried direct negotiations with Dutch mer­ chants, offering better freight rates, shipping procedures, and currency exchanges if the Dutch would bypass Diisseldorf. The Cologne town administrators wrote to their official counterparts in Holland. These efforts finally paid off, and agreements were reached between shippers in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Co­ logne. Moreover, the merchants' committee succeeded in getting officials in Duisburg (on the Right Bank) to persuade Prussia to raise duties on vessels leaving Diisseldorf harbor. There followed a war of memoranda and petitions between Dusseldorf and the Duchy of Berg on the one side and the mer­ chants' committees of Cologne and Mainz on the other. The Left Bank merchants continued to woo the Dutch merchants and gov­ ernment, while seeking support from French officials on all levels. In mid-1801, Cologne even used armed force, with the sanction 87 The relevant documents may be found in RWWA: l/23b/16; 1/1/18; and 1/2/4. See also Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 128-29, 207-13.

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of the prefect and general commissioner of the Rhine, to enforce the staple right against Diisseldorf shippers. Cologne emerged victorious in the contest with Dusseldorf, but there were no guarantees that the trading privileges would be protected in the future. The issue of the staple and transfer rights flared up again in the spring of 1803, when the Mainz Merchants' Committee informed Cologne that the representatives of the German Empire at Rastatt were seeking to put an end to the Rhine privileges. Once again, the interior minister expressed a desire to hear arguments favor­ ing the retention of the privileges of Mainz and Cologne. The Cologne Chamber of Commerce, which had succeeded both the merchants' committee and the Conseil de commerce in May, en­ listed the assistance of the Colognejurist H. G. Daniels. (Daniels later served on the appeals court in Paris and subsequently be­ came general prosecutor at the appeals court in Brussels.) Daniels composed a pamphlet defending the privileges. He hoped to pre­ sent it to his friend Cretet, the councilor of state then carrying on some of the negotiations on behalf of France.88 The arguments of Daniels and the chamber of commerce were sent to Paris, while in Aachen they were presented to Prefect Mechin by H. J. Foveaux, one of the chamber's members. The only really new point was the contention that if the privileges had to be abolished, then France should at least grant Cologne a customs-inspection station, which would force boats still to stop at Cologne. There, for natural reasons, they would transfer their cargoes to smaller vessels for the trip up river. Mechin responded by declaring his willingness to help. He suggested that because Cologne's cause was poorly understood in Paris, the chamber of commerce should immediately send a delegate to that city. 88RWWA: 1/23Ύ16/226; and 1/1/17/41-43; Eckert, "Rheinschiffart," pp. 15-19; Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 201n, 219. See AN/F12/608 for Daniels's essay. The Mainz Chamber of Commerce, in regular contact with Co­ logne, was working closely with the Mont Tonnerre Prefect Jeanbon Saint-Andre. See RWWA: l/23b/17/57.

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Meanwhile, Mechin had learned from Cretet that Cologne's privileges were in danger. He persuaded Cretet to postpone any decision by the Rhine Commission until Cologne and Mainz had been heard from, and again he urged Cologne to empower some­ one in Paris to represent her. Thus prodded, the Cologne Chamber asked Korfgen, the Roer department archivist who was then in Paris, to represent Cologne and the staple right and to collaborate with the delegate from Mainz.89 A three-way correspondence was carried on between the chamber of commerce in Cologne, the chamber in Mainz, and the representatives in Paris through the spring of 1804.90 The Co­ logne Chamber was asked by both Cretet and Interior Minister Chaptal for information on tariffs, the general administration of the customs border, and the river trade. The chamber replied by pleading for retention of the staple right and sending Korfgen thirty copies of a memorial defending the privilege. Then, perhaps feeling desperate, the chamber dispatched another forty copies of the memorial to Korfgen, asking him to give them to all members of the negotiating commission, to the three consuls, to the ministers of finance, interior, and foreign relations (Tal­ leyrand), and to a number of councilors of state considered to be friendly to Cologne. Other copies were sent to the chambers of Mainz, Strasbourg, and Paris. Korfgen, meanwhile, had ex­ pressed confidence that the staple and transfer rights would be re­ tained without difficulty. Korfgen's confidence was misplaced. On August 27, he wrote the chamber expressing fear that Cologne's cause was lost. The "Rhein Octroi" agreements had indeed been signed on August 15, 1804, and the old privileges abolished in favor of a uniform 89 RWWA:

l/23b/17/passim; Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 53; Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 222. 90 See AN/F12/608 for correspondence between the chambers of commerce and government officials. Also RWWA; 1/53/8/1-5, 89; and 1/53/7/Chaptal to Chamber of Commerce, 21 Nivose, XII; l/23b/17/65-107; and Eckert, "Rheinschiffart," pp. 19ff.

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tariff system on the Rhine. The campaign, however, did not end. Cretet assured Mechin that all rights held by Cologne and Mainz would be preserved. Since Napoleon's long-awaited visit to Co­ logne was announced for mid-September, it was obvious that the next step was to persuade him directly. Napoleon had been expected since May of 1803 (when the chambers of commerce had been established). Herstatt, the banker and at that time acting mayor, had asked the chamber to help prepare a list of requests for Napoleon. Moreover, he had in­ dicated that Cologne should plan a reception that would not be a show of luxury but which would honestly indicate the deplorable economic conditions in the city. When Mechin wrote Mayor Wittgenstein on August 25, 1804, informing him of Napoleon's impending visit, the prefect suggested a grand reception appro­ priate to the great importance of the city. Further, he felt that the chamber was best qualified to draw up petitions on behalf of Co­ logne, and he declared: "If we formulate only just demands which are not in opposition to the interests of national commerce, then success is certain." Shordy thereafter, the mayor's aide Boisseree informed the chamber that Napoleon had agreed to all of the de­ mands presented by Aachen. He felt therefore that the chamber should prepare the Cologne requests carefully and should also make preparations for a grand ball for the newly proclaimed emperor.91 In their petition, submitted on behalf of the whole city, the chamber argued the desirability of restoring Cologne to its de­ served rank among the leading cities of France. Napoleon was highly praised, together with his family, and was compared favor­ ably with the first Roman Caesar. "At the foot of the imperial throne" the chamber made its requests, and they were many: re­ tention of the staple and transfer rights; construction of an all91

RWWA: 1/1/5/248; 1/25/4/Mechin to Chamber, 7 Fructidor, XII; and Boisseree to Chamber, 20 Fructidor, XII. The chamber declined to host a ball due to lack of funds and a proper place. See Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 235.

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weather harbor; unrestricted right to forward goods—including English wares—along the river as long as they were not imported into France; the right to export grain, spirits, and beer to markets in Germany; easing of tariff provisions on all goods, especially co­ lonial products and raw materials; simplification of customs pro­ cedures and formalities; construction of a canal joining the Rhine and Meuse rivers, thus bypassing the troublesome Batavian Re­ public that sat at the mouth of the Rhine; construction of new harbor facilities, or conversion of nationally owned buildings for that purpose; moving the department capital from Aachen to Cologne and the appeals court from Trier to Cologne; the con­ struction of a new academy for law, music, medicine, and the arts, and a new city hospital.92 These rather sweeping requests were presented to Napoleon in an audience with the mayor and chamber of commerce on Sep­ tember 14, 1804, with Heimann, Peuchen, and Daniels apparendy acting as spokesmen. The results of the audience can be found in letters written September 19 from Cretet (deputy minis­ ter of the interior, councilor of state, and director of bridges and roads) to the chamber and to the mayor. Napoleon was impressed with the claims of Cologne and acknowledged the need to return it to a glittering position on the Rhine. Some of the requests, such as moving the department capital or creating a new academy, were denied; others, such as the joining of the Rhine and Meuse, moving the appeals court, and modifying the tariff system were promised further consideration. Most significantly, the emperor showed a wish to stimulate Cologne's industry and commerce. He therefore confirmed the transfer right, approved the building of an all-weather harbor (to be built with city funds augmented by income from the new Rhine Octroi), and donated nationally owned buildings for new warehouses for the harbor. In short, 92 HASK: Franzdsische Verwaltung/4053/Petition to Napoleon; RWWA: 1/25/4/Petition of 27 Fructidor, XII; Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 236-37.

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Napoleon circumvented the work of the French-German agree­ ment on the Rhine and guaranteed Cologne the important ancient privilege of transshipment, thereby insuring prosperity. All boats would still have to stop and unload in Cologne, even though the staple right was abolished.93 Mayor Wittgenstein promptly issued a proclamation to the in­ habitants of the city, declaring that Napoleon's decision in behalf of "the welfare of the Vaterstadtn was an occasion for joy and for love of the emperor.94 As Napoleon moved to Mainz, the mayor and the chamber vice-president, Cassinone, followed to lobby among the emperor's aides and ministers and make sure that Co­ logne's concessions were not endangered by petitions from other towns on the Rhine. A published list of 658 persons who crowded into Mainz at the time of Napoleon's stay there includes ministers, court aides, French generals, noblemen, and officials of all ranks, a large number of Rhenish officials (both French and German), diplomats, merchants, and bankers.95 Amidst this social whirl of French and Rhenish political figures, Cologne's representatives succeeded in hanging on to their gains. When the "Convention sur l'octroi de navigation du Rhin" went into effect on November 1,1805, Cologne seemed to enjoy a strong position. Twelve tariff stations (including one in Cologne and one in Mainz) replaced the previous thirty-one stations, and tariffs were to be levied by weight—a system adopted in Prussia in 1818. The staple right was abolished in its literal form—that boats had to unload and ofFer their goods for sale—but all vessels had to stop in Cologne and transfer cargoes as before. The trans­ fer right, or Umschlagsrecht, thus remained. Special transit and unloading fees were abolished, but crane, scale, dock and ware93 HASK:

Franzosische Verwaltung/4053/Cretet to Mayor and Chamber, 2 Complementaire, XII. 91 HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/4053/Proclamation from the Mayor to the city, 4 Complementaire, XII. 95 See HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/4011.

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house fees were allowed. The long-sought "free harbor" facilities were opened in April, with the celebration announced in Rhine newspapers and in letters to merchants in all leading trading towns. Henceforth, the Cologne Chamber declared, all goods, in­ cluding English goods, could be unloaded, stored, and reloaded free of customs formalities and fear of confiscation. Thanks were sent to Colin, to the prefect, and especially to Commissioner Saint-Andre, who had first sanctioned the free harbor and had re­ cently arranged for covering the cost of its construction. There was even talk of a monument to be erected in honor of the em­ peror's generosity toward the city of Cologne.96 The jubilation of the Cologne business community was prema­ ture. The war with England had resumed in 1803, and Napoleon soon began the setting up of the Continental blockade. By closing off all trade in English and colonial goods after 1807, the bloc­ kade undid many of the commercial gains on the Rhine. A new threat to the rest of the Rhine trade came from the Right Bank. Napoleon established Murat as Duke of Berg, and in 1806 Murat authorized direct shipping between Dusseldorf and Frankfurt. The Cologne Chamber of Commerce wrote to him, protesting that such a practice was at variance with Napoleon's decision to preserve Cologne's trading rights. And once more the chamber enlisted the aid of Daniels, now alternate prosecutor at the Impe­ rial Court of Cassation in Paris, asking him to see Cretet and speak for Cologne's interests. Daniels did so and was finally able to assure Cologne that Napoleon's earlier decision would be re­ spected.97 In fact, the imperial sanction of Cologne's trading privileges on the Rhine remained in effect throughout the French period. The chamber, constantly vigilant in watching for challenges from rival 96 Eckert, "Rheinschiffart," pp. 22, 25-26; Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 238-43. 87 Schwann, Handdskammer, p. 246; Eckert, "Rheinschiffart," pp. 55-56; RWWA: l/23b/17/146, 151-58.

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cities, maintained a steady correspondence with French officials to ensure Cologne's position. Memoranda on various aspects of Rhine trade were dispatched to Paris, where they received the serious consideration of upper-level bureaucrats in the interior ministry. The chamber enjoyed a series of minor successes in bringing about changes of tariff and shipping regulations and at all times worked hard for Cologne's interests.98 The new general inspector for the "octroi" was Eichhoff, the former mayor and subprefect of Bonn. The Cologne Chamber ini­ tially congratulated him on his appointment but subsequently it often disagreed with what was seen as his petty bureaucratic rigidity in administering the Rhine navigation regulations. And the chamber was successful several times in exerting enough pressure through their contacts in Paris to force Eichhoff to back down." When the annexation of Holland was proposed in 1809, the chamber endorsed the plan, hoping that Dutch tolls and fees would be abolished. The northern canal joining the Rhine and Meuse would be unnecessary, and the chamber predicted a trade resurgence to match the days of the Hanseatic League. But when Holland was annexed and the tolls remained, the chamber worked just as enthusiastically to see that Cologne's transfer right would be enforced against the Dutch.100 As late as mid-1813, with the Empire collapsing, the chamber was still sending off to Napoleon, to the empress, and to the ministers of commerce, manufactures, and finance lengthy memoranda supporting the transfer right of the city.101 98 See AN/Fla/304-11/Chef de la 2eme Div. to Min. of Int. CoquebertMonbret, Oct. 4, 1807. See also RWWA: l/24a/4/137, 149; l/24a/5/10-75, l/23d/28/64-89; and 1/53/147171-84. 99 RWWA; 1/53/8/148, 158, and l/23c/21/42. Eichhoff, however, was never "the most hated man in Cologne," as Gothein argued. Gothein, p. 75. 100 RWWA: l/24a/6/15; Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 337-38. 101 AN/F'7608/Letters of March IOand 15, 1813; RWWA: l/23b/18/64, 126, 152, and 1/53/11/167, 168.

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Business Institutions and Politics in the Roer Department The campaign of Cologne's merchants to save the city's trading privileges illustrates just how important the semiofficial business institutions had become. When the merchants' committee was founded, it was a "free society," not part of the official hierarchy. Soon, however, the committee and its offspring the commercial court were given or assumed a variety of official tasks. Before long, the committee, the council of commerce, and the successor to both, the chamber of commerce, were advising the government on legislation, publishing and actually administering new laws, administering public commercial facilities, dispersing job patron­ age, adjudicating commercial disputes, and constantly supplying the government with economic information. In these activities Cologne was joined by the consultative chambers of manufactur­ ing in Crefeld and Aachen, though those bodies did not enjoy di­ rect access to the interior minister, as did the Cologne Chamber of Commerce. And, in addition to their official activities, the busi­ nessmen's institutions never ceased to use whatever means were available to protect or further local interests. However official some of their functions, the institutions continued to be made up of unpaid, elected businessmen still active in commerce or man­ ufacturing. Moreover the horizons of the institutions were no longer lim­ ited to the local purview. On the contrary, as political opportuni­ ties expanded during the Napoleonic period, so did the vision of the Rhenish businessmen and so did the sphere in which they worked. They jostled each other for leadership in the department; they did their best to influence not only mayors but subprefects, prefects, the Conseil General, the Rhine commissioner in Mainz, the ministers in Paris, and Napoleon himself; they even mixed in foreign affairs, dealing directly with Dutch or Prussian officials for the purpose of winning markets, preserving privileges, or putting pressure on rival cities like Dusseldorf.

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The structure and style of the chambers of commerce and con­ sultative chambers owed something to the pre-Revolutionary past of free cities and small principalities. They presented legal and historical arguments to relevant authorities much as the imperial cities once appealed lawsuits to Vienna. The tone of their argu­ ments always reflected the political and economic uncertainty of the times—demands, appeals to republican principles, proclama­ tions of patriotic zeal, were mixed with cries of dire need. The merchants and merchant/manufacturers, however, used the lan­ guage of the French Republic and Empire, and assumed the posture of French citizens with increasing ease and confidence. Arguments were presented in essays and memoranda, both in manuscript ^nd printed form. Delegations of merchants or hired lobbyists were sent to Aachen, Mainz, and Paris to represent Rhenish interests. National legislators like Rigal, von der Leyen, Jacobi, and Peltzer were called upon to solve the economic prob­ lems of their cities and their department. The commercial and consultative chambers felt free to propose new laws, or even play host to the emperor during his visits to the department.102 Rhenish businessmen, in short, came to see themselves as occupy­ ing a uniquely advantageous position in the political structure of Napoleonic France. Cologne's chamber claimed it was an institu­ tion "which stood in unmediated union with the government" (welche mit der Regierung in unmittelbarer Verbindung steht).103 Reichsunmittelbarkeit, the immediate relationship of the imperial cities to the emperor, had become Staatsunmittelbarkeit, the im­ mediate access to governmental decision makers enjoyed by the privileged institutions of businessmen. Indeed, it was no longer entirely clear that the business institu­ tions were not part of the government rather than mere consulta­ tive bodies. Interior Minister Champagny in 1806 claimed that 102 103

See RWWA: l/23c/20/103, 109; 1/53/12/111. RWWA: 1/1/6/197 (Oct. 13, 1803).

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because the Cologne Chamber was part of the administration, it was now prohibited from printing its essays. His Majesty the Emperor instructs me, gentlemen, to inform you that no document or memoir should be printed, either in the collective name of the chamber, or in the name of a commis­ sion formed within it, or as a report which would have been submitted to it by one of its members, without my express authorization. The work of the chambers of commerce belongs to the ad­ ministration; projects have attained their goal when they have been submitted for consideration by it; it is for the higher au­ thority to judge the inconveniences or advantages of their pub­ lication. Publication, useless in itself, is furthermore the most inconvenient way of bringing to His Majesty's [attention] views or remonstrances; a printed memoir, by the simple fact that it is an appeal to opinion, no longer is one to authority.104 Here Champagny captures the essence of political participation in a system of bureaucratic absolutism. Privileged groups were guaranteed the possibility of working through the bureaucracy; they were expected not to work against it. Unlike traditional corporatism, the new business institutions were supposed not to be self-interested. They were to help bridge the gap between the modern state and the economy while maintaining a posture of public responsibility.105 The character, the style, the scope, and the tone of the activities of the various business institutions were directly instrumental in furthering the political integration of the Rhineland with France. Particular local economic interests came to be seen as identical with the general interests of the cities, the department, and the nation. Businessmen on the Left Bank of the Rhine developed a 104 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/Il/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/8/76; also RWWA: 1/3/1/36. Printed in Zeyss, p. 254. 105 yj Fischer, pp. 7-9.

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clear sense of belonging to a large, powerful state. A need to evolve suitable methods and tactics for operating within that state, a need for concern with public affairs as well as commercial affairs was creating a new type of personality, the fusion of politi­ cian and businessman in the Wirtschaftspolitiker.106 Through the semiofficial, semipublic business institutions, France secured the participation of nearly all leading businessmen, and at the same time provided a political education for the Rhenish population. Gradually but surely these business institutions earned a place of respected economic and political leadership in the towns and in the Roer department. 106 Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 59, 62, 93, 343. The ambiguous character of self-administrative institutions can be seen in several of the words used by scholars to describe their fields of activity: Wirtschaftspolitik, Sozialpolitik, and Finanzpolitik. Politik here means something less than "politics" in the English sense, but also more than "policy." Carl J. Friedrich translated the three terms as decision making in the areas of "business regulation," "social reform," and "finan­ cial matters"; the translation fails to convey in English the fact that these areas lie somewhere between the public and private domains, and in some way combine the two. Public policy, moreover, follows political decision making, and insofar as self-administrative institutions participated in such decision making, it can be ar­ gued that the Politik in Wirtschaftspolitik, Sozialpolitik, and Finanzpolitik comes closer to "politics" than "policy," though the words carry both meanings. Carl J. Friedrich,Constitutional GovemmentandDemocracy, rev. ed. (New York, 1950), p. 477. See also Ludwig Puppke, Sozialpolitik and soziale Anschauungen fruhindustrieller Untemehmer in Rheinland-Westfalen (Cologne, 1966), pp. 60ff.; Max Weber, "Zum Begriff der Sozialpolitik," in Wirtsehaftstheorie und Wirt­ schaftspolitik, Valentin F. Wagner and Fritz Marbach, eds. (Bern, 1953). In a different context Hans-Ulrich Wehler, in describing a company director, de­ scribed an "ideal"Wirtschaftspolitiker: "Bismark, Germany, politics, the economy, the iron industry, and the 'Bochumer Verein' [the firm involved]" were "for him one and the same thing." See Wehler, Bismarck und der Imperialismus (Cologne, 1969), p. 97.

6. The Integration of the Rhenish Business Community into France

THE previous two chapters have concentrated on the participa­ tion of the business community in a variety of official and semioffi­ cial institutions through which businessmen were able to influ­ ence the decision-making process of the French state. Merchants and manufacturers took advantage of the new opportunities of­ fered by the French political system to pursue their own aims and those of their towns and department. Political activities, encour­ aged by the French, were not confined, however, solely to par­ ticipation in administrative, legislative, and advisory institutions. Unlike the ancient institutions of the old regime, the political cre­ ations of the Revolution, the Republic, and the Empire could not claim legitimacy or command loyalty on the basis of tradition. Therefore the political integration of the Rhineland required the generation of new loyalties. Activities of the sort already dis­ cussed certainly helped to promote allegiance to France, but the French used other means also to influence political sentiment. Frequent celebrations, holidays, oath-taking ceremonies, and other sorts of social gatherings were used to bring local notables together to demonstrate their support for the new rulers of the Rhineland. Such activities were a kind of public theater, where the actors were influenced by the fact of participation and the onlookers were influenced by the apparent solidarity and en­ thusiasm of those on the stage.

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The Transformation of Political Allegiance When the French decided in 1797 to annex the Left Bank, they did not wish to appear as conquerors. Rather they wished it to appear that they were responding to the wishes of the Rhinelanders themselves. They wished also, of course, to staff the new administration with respected, experienced, capable men, men acceptable to local residents but also willing to join the French service. The partisans of the movement for a Cisrhenane Repub­ lic, who had from the beginning endorsed the reforms of the Rev­ olution and had favored either union with France or formation of a republic closely allied to France, enjoyed very little popular support in most of the Rhineland.1 Consequently the French had to turn to men who had, in several cases, fought stubbornly to maintain the independence and integrity of local institutions dur­ ing the first years of the French occupation. Cologne's Wittgen­ stein and Dumont had been jailed for resisting the French mone­ tary levies; many of Crefeld's business leaders had returned from sanctuaries on the Right Bank only under the threat that their property would be confiscated. Such men were now co-opted into the French system and expected to execute faithfully the laws of France. As a first step, soon after Campo Formio, General Augereau ordered the agents of the Bonn Middle Commission to administer an oath of allegiance to all officials and government employees on the Left Bank. (An exception was made for the Prussian ter­ ritories, whose fate was still unclear.) In late November and early December 1797, Commissioners Estienne in Aachen and Rethel in Cologne complied. In Aachen only the judges of the synod court refused to take the oath, but in Cologne, most of the militia officers, judges of the electoral court and lower courts, and some council employees refused, rather than violate their previous 1 See Kuhn; Hansen, Quellen, 4:189-91, 361; Droz, VAllemagne et la Revolu­ tion franqaise, pp. 217ff.

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oaths of office, from which they had not been formally released. In both cities, those that refused to take the oath were dismissed, and the commissioners, with Rudler's approval, used this convenient purge of old officials as an excuse to simplify the court structure of both cities.2 All public officials subsequently appointed by Com­ missioner General Rudler had to swear allegiance to the French constitution and swear to their hatred of monarchy. They did so in public ceremonies, thus making their commitment to the new order known to their communities. The question of official loyalty to France was resolved in this way, but the problem of popular political sentiment was more complicated. To show that popular sovereignty actually existed there had to be convincing evidence that popular opinion was sought and listened to. Therefore in March 1798, Minister Lambrecht asked Rudler to solicit as many petitions as possible re­ questing union with France.3 Rudler passed Lambrecht's order along to the political commissioners in the four Rhine depart­ ments. In the Roer department the desired petitions were slow in coming forth, an indication of the lack of broad support for union with France. It proved particularly difficult to collect petitions in Cologne. Model petitions composed by M. Venedy were submitted to the municipal administration and circulated in the town, but there were few signers. In mid-May Venedy appealed to the city 2

Hansen, Quellen, 4:388. of these manifestations of support of French policy and of the annexation of the Left Bank must be evaluated carefully, for as Hansen has cautioned in his col­ lection of the 1798 petitions, the French used those materials during and after World War I to support their policy of encouraging Rhenish separatism. Con­ sequently, for both French and German historians the issue of loyalties in 1798 entered into the debates over nationalism in the twentieth century. See Hansen, Quellen, 4:65911. Hansen devotes 161 pages (pp. 659-820) in his collection of documents to these petitions, the largest section in the four volumes devoted to a particular problem. This reflects his desire to provide an antidote to French prop­ aganda after World War I. HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/3992/passim; Han­ sen, Quellen, 4:391, 397-98. 3 All

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government for assistance, asking that all officials and public employees be required to sign the petitions as confirmation of their earlier loyalty oaths and that signatures be collected doorto-door by town officials. Not until mid-June were the signed pe­ titions finally forwarded to Rudler. Still, there were only 1,991 signatures, and duplications reduced the number of individuals represented to 1,226. The total is hardly impressive, considering that there were around 7,800 qualified voters and that the peti­ tions had the backing of the local administration. Some signatures included a note of reservation; others lacked a full name, perhaps to conceal identity. Apart from those merchants then holding office, and thus obliged to sign, it appears that few of Cologne's leading businessmen subscribed to the petition.4 There are several possible reasons for the small number of signers. Former Cisrhenane supporters, like Venedy, were among the collectors of signatures, and the Cisrhenane movement had not been popular in Cologne, especially among the mer­ chants.5 Probably of much more importance was the fact that the circulation of the petitions coincided with France's announcement of her decision to make the Rhine the national tariff border. To Cologne's merchants, union with France seemed to promise more harm than good. Annexation and the Rhine tariff border had a somewhat differ­ ent meaning for businessmen in the primarily manufacturing towns of Aachen and Crefeld. While the tariff meant the loss of markets east of the Rhine, this loss would be offset by access to the large national market of France. Also an aggressive tariff policy might protect industry against competition. Clear economic ad­ vantages, in other words, helped to engender enthusiasm for an­ nexation. The petitions circulated in Aachen and in the surround­ ing manufacturing towns were signed by many of their leading 4

Hansen, Quellen, 4:681-87; AN/FlcIII/Roer 3. Franzosische Verwaltung/4308/32; Kuhn, pp. 120-21.

5 HASK:

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businessmen. Already in October of 1797, thirty-six merchants and manufacturers from Burtscheid had signed a letter to Estienne favoring full union with France. Subsequently republican political clubs known as "Constitutional Circles" were formed in Aachen, Stolberg, and Burtscheid, and the union petitions were written by members of these societies. The lists of signatures were not lengthy but they were impressive. Kolb, Nellessen, the Peltzers, Cromm, the Startzes, van Houtem, and the Schleichers, Springsfeld, Schmalhausen, Wiedenfeld—in short, the men of affairs who dominated the economy and government in the Aachen area approved of the annexation of the Left Bank.6 In the case of Crefeld, the signing of the petition was an inter­ esting reversal of loyalties. Until the news of the Campo Formio provisions reached them in December of 1797, both the French and the local inhabitants had considered Crefeld as merely oc­ cupied territory. The silk manufacturers continued to correspond with Prussian officials and profess their love for Prussia.7 By April of 1798, however, the manufacturers had accepted places in Crefeld's municipal administration, had sworn the oath of loyalty to France, and were not averse to signing petitions of union. One petition was submitted by the Crefeld Constitutional Circle, founded in April by the merchant Engelbert vom Bruck and the local Commissioner Toscani. The petition was signed by ninetyone persons, including the members of the municipal administra­ tion and manufacturers, who were also members of the circle. Gottschalk Floh submitted a separate letter endorsing the circle's petition, as did the von Beckeraths, the von der Leyens, and Peter von Lowenich.8 These three letters are so similar as to suggest either a single author or at least collaboration. They differ from the petition of the constitutional circle principally in arguing that the republic's commitment to the general welfare would lead it to 6 7 8

Hansen, Quellen, 4:189-91, 484n, 538-39; AN/FlcIII/Roer 3. Hintze and Schmoller, 2:667-69. Hansen, Quellen, 4:688; AN/FICIII/Roer 3.

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encourage Crefeld's commerce and industry—the source of all well-being in that city. The von der Leyen letter is typical: We respect and cherish the principles of the Constitution of the Year III as well as this constitution itself. In swearing the oath of fidelity to the republic, we have declared the intention of liv­ ing under its laws and of being faithful observers of them. We hope that the republic will not be long in attaining the general happiness, which is the purpose of its creation. Finally, relative to the community to which we are most particularly attached, we suppose that the results of the annexation will be nothing less than encouraging for its commerce, its industry, and its manufacturing, precious sources of all well-being which it has enjoyed. Thus we do not hesitate, upon the invitation of the municipality, to accede to the present address. Abandoned by their former sovereign, the manufacturers of Crefeld prepared to make the best of their situation.9 In spite of support from key individuals, the petition campaign as a whole was not a success. Only heads of households were sup­ posedly eligible to sign petitions, and in the Roer department, the largest of the Rhine departments, about 11 percent of those eligi­ ble signed—half the percentage that signed in all four depart­ ments (table 12). Only 10 percent of the communities of the Roer department submitted petitions at all, compared to 28 percent for all Rhine departments. Cologne's endorsement of the petitions was stronger than that of the Roer department as a whole, but this was the result of considerable official pressure. Nor was there broad support for union with France in Aachen or Crefeld, cities that hoped to benefit economically from annexation. 9 Buschbell and Heinzelmann, p. 43; Kurschat, p. 88. Kurschat contends that for the von der Leyens it would be false to speak of a "national feeling," "national will," or "national character." Rather the family honored and respected the dy­ nasty more than Prussia as a nation, and Buschbell argues that the willingness to sign the loyalty oath and the union petitions was in part due to resentment at hav­ ing been abandoned by their former sovereign.

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TABLE 12

The Petition Campaign of 1798 Household Headsa

Cologne (city) Aachen (city) Crefeld (city) Roer department Mont Tonnerre department Sarre department Rhine and Moselle department All Rhine departments

7,769 4,682 1,489 106,298 68,663 43,837 40,658 259,456

Signatures 1,226 (15.8%) 250 ( 5.3%) 97 ( 6.5%) 11,629 31,173 11,256 2,679 56,737

(10.9%) (45.4%) (25.7%) ( 6.6%) (21.9%)

SOURCE: Hansen, Quellen, 4: 811-15. I have used Hansen's exact figures to compute percentages. Minor inaccuracies in the census or in the number of signatures would not significantly change the meaning of the results. a Computed on the basis of five persons per household.

It seems obvious from the result of the petition campaign that there was no mandate for French rule in 1798. However, the oaths and petitions, being public commitments, led some Rhinelanders who otherwise might not have done so to take an open stand on their political affiliation. The participation of nota­ bles in the public celebration of French holidays—the "Festival of the Sovereignty of the People," Bastille Day, the "Celebration of Agriculture," the celebrations of the victories of French armies, and many others—further dramatized for the general public the notables' political position. The municipal administrators (most of whom were businessmen), court officials and school faculties, delegations from citizens' committees and, in the case of Cologne, representatives of the merchants' committee were firmly "invited" to be present for an inevitable parade, banquet, and round of speeches. After March of 1798 these celebrations became stand­ ard features of French rule and continued after Napoleon's rise to power.10 The activities of "patriotic" societies were also intended to influence public opinion. In the constitutional circles, French 10 See, for example, RWWA: 1/1/5/38, 40; Hansen, Quellen, 4:621; Buschbell and Heinzelmann, p. 67. Also RWWA: 1/1/5/14-19.

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officials joined Rhenish intellectuals, professional men, town offi­ cials, and businessmen, and though the activities of the societies were short-lived (due to Napoleon's coup of 18 Brumaire— November 9, 1799—after which the societies, as derivatives of the Jacobin clubs, were banned), they provided a conspicuous meeting place for those notables ready to accept French rule. Businessmen were involved in all of these affairs, though to a lesser degree in Cologne than in Aachen and Crefeld.11 As the Revolutionary era gave way to the Napoleonic, the need to coerce demonstrations of loyalty decreased. Peace, the new administrative system, the Concordat with the Pope, and the Napoleonic codes brought stability and prosperity to the Left Bank.12 Voting in the Napoleonic plebiscites suggests growing acceptance of French rule. Although there was government in­ volvement in the "balloting," there was not the same kind of pres­ sure on the Rhinelanders to sign as in the petition campaign. (In Cologne and Crefeld the ballots were collected by the mayor's office, in Aachen by the justices of the peace.) Certainly there was an increase in the number of signatures in comparison with 1798. In Crefeld, for example, 885 voted for and only 2 against the "Life Consulate" in 1802. In Cologne, businessmen were prominent among the 3,422 voters in the election for the "Life Consulate," in contrast to 1798, when the names of Cologne's merchants were missing from the union petitions. Results of a second plebiscite endorsing Napoleon's imperial title were similar in form and scope.13 11 Hansen, Quellen, 4:482-83, 534; HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/4308/1, 31. According to Kuhn, pp. 60-61, only 13.4% of the members of the Cologne Constitutional Circle were merchants, while in Aachen 39% were merchants. 12 Max Braubach, "Vom Westfalischen Frieden bis zum Wiener Kongress (1648-1815)," in Rheinische Geschiehte, ed. Franz Petri and Georg Droege, vol. 2 (Diisseldorf, 1976), 335. 13 For the Life Consulate see AN/B"/606a, 607, 608; HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/3997/Mayor to subprefect, 11 Prairial, X; for the hereditary title of emperor, see AN/B"/807a and 807b.

INTEGRATION OF RHENISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY

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Also indicative of changing feelings toward French rule is a new, positive attitude toward the many patriotic celebrations. In Cologne, for example, the merchants' committee in early 1799 re­ fused the requests of the city administration that it participate in the celebration of the frequent national holidays. The excuse given was that the committee's small membership was too busy with the work of the committee, to which the city replied: "We cannot refrain, citizens, from pointing out to you that the national holidays should merit the sacrifice of work which can occupy re­ publicans on the days which are celebrated, and we expect of your patriotism and your enlightened principles that, as consuming as your occupations can be, you will be able to find a moment to at­ tend the procession, which will march from the town hall to the temple, where the usual oath will be taken by the public offi­ cials."14 In spite of subsequent grumbling, the committee did send a delegation to represent it at such ceremonial occasions. But in 1803, the council of commerce responded very willingly to an invitation to attend the installation of the judges for the Tribunal of First Instance. In the invitation the subprefect said that the council's presence would "inspire the public respect owed to this beneficial institution of government and to the choices [of judges] of the First Consul."15 By 1811, the Cologne merchants were not only attending ceremonial functions but also helping to pay for them, as the various "days" came to be celebrated with fireworks, balls, and the distribution of sweets, as well as with processions. Indeed, appearance in the ceremonies had attained such impor­ tance as evidence of status that the Cologne Labor Arbitration Board demanded a special place in public spectacles comparable to that accorded to the chamber of commerce. The Council of State, with the approval of Napoleon, ultimately denied the re­ quest on the ground that the board members were "functionaries of a special nature, neither of the judicial nor of the administrative 14 RWWA:

1/1/5/87, IlOff.

15

RWWA: 1/1/7/158.

194

FRENCH RULE ON THE RHINE

order," and that such ambiguity made the assignment of a special role impossible.16 What is significant is the fact that the artisans and manufacturers on the Cologne Labor Board, representing two groups that had profited from the industrial boom, wished to affirm their political position publicly. Other kinds of evidence point in the same direction. In 1804, when Napoleon ascended the imperial throne, officials through­ out the Roer department joined in sending letters of congratula­ tions. Prominent among the letters was a lengthy one from Aachen, printed in French and German and signed by local and departmental officials, including many businessmen who held po­ sitions in the advisory councils.17 And in an 1803 letter to Napo­ leon, Cologne's J.M.N. Dumont, the former mayor who had so stubbornly fought to preserve Cologne's independence in 1795, applauded the wisdom of adopting French law in the Rhineland and remarked that he "treasured a precious memory of the per­ sonal acquaintance" he had had with Napoleon on an earlier occa­ sion.18 We do not hear of officials refusing to swear fidelity to Napoleon as some had refused to swear allegiance to France in 1797 and 1798. In fact, the members of the semiofficial institu­ tions—the chambers of commerce and the like—willingly took oaths like those of the salaried government officials pledging their faith in Napoleon and their obedience to the French (and, of course, now their own) national laws.19 The irritation and re­ sentment at being required to participate in patriotic ceremonies, so clearly present in 1798, was just as clearly gone by the latter part of Napoleon's reign. It is hard, therefore, to avoid the conclu16 HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/2167/Klespe to Conseil des prud'hommes, Dec. 31, 1812. 17 AN/F,cIII/Roer 3/Over 50 letters from the Year XII. Roger Dufraisse dis­ cusses the enthusiasm for Napoleon in his 'Temoignages sur Ie culte de Napoleon dans Ies pays de la rive gauche du Rhin (1797-1811)," Jahrbuch fur westdeutsche Landesgeschichte 2 (1976):255-60. 18 AN/F'bII/Roer 5/Dumont to the First Consul, 17 Floreal, XI. 19RWWA: 1/3/1/193.

INTEGRATION OF RHENISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY

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sion that Napoleonic France had won real popularity among the notables of the Roer department, officials and businessmen alike.

Notability, Political Commitment, and Social Rewards No doubt much of the enthusiasm for Napoleonic rule must be attributed to concrete improvements in political and economic conditions on the Left Bank. But the French also proved adroit at consolidating their position among the city notables by exploiting the relationship between political commitment and social stand­ ing. As we have seen, appointment to prestigious offices—such as the council general—both rewarded and further encouraged pub­ lic service. There were, however, a number of other ways of rewarding notability. Quite early in the Napoleonic regime and accompanying the easing of restrictions on "private" associations, the French en­ couraged a resurgence of Masonry. Local lodges began to meet again, and membership increased gradually throughout the dec­ ade from 1800 to 1810. In both Cologne and Aachen (Crefelders joined the Aachen lodge), the Masonic lodges served a sociopolit­ ical function. Leading businessmen, including those most promi­ nent in semiofficial institutions, gathered with high judicial and public officials on a voluntary, social basis. This provided an op­ portunity to discuss French ideas and political problems. At the same time membership itself brought considerable prestige. In­ deed, the successive heads of the national lodge were Louis Bonaparte, Joseph Bonaparte, and the former Consul Cambaceres.20 The character of the membership in Cologne and Aachen is noteworthy. An 1802 Cologne list, containing the names of ninety-five lodge members, shows thirty-four merchants and an 20 Godechot, p. 730; Pierre Chevallier, Histoire de la Frane-Maqonnerie fran(aise. La Magonnerie (Paris, 1974), pp. 12-15, 46.

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equal number of paid government officials. An 1805 Aachen list of seventy-two members includes twenty-five officials and twenty-four merchants or merchant/manufacturers. In both towns the remaining members were for the most part lawyers, professors, soldiers, or artists. Among the officials were both na­ tive residents and men of French origin, especially in the depart­ ment capital. Prefect Mechin belonged to the Aachen lodge; Mayor J. P. Kramer and Subprefect Klespe belonged in Co­ logne. The businessmen included the same wealthy merchants whom we have encountered repeatedly as members of the cham­ bers of commerce, the consultative chambers for manufacturing, the commercial courts, or as officeholders—men such as Friedrich Carl Heimann, J.M.N. Dumont, and Bernard Boisseree of Co­ logne, C. F. Deusner, Heinrich Schmalhausen of Aachen, Peter von Lowenich and Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen of Crefeld. The most important businessmen of Monschau, Borcette, and Stolberg also belonged to the Aachen lodge.21 Appointment to special commissions also brought prestige and social recognition along with a few public duties. Industrial exhi­ bitions and competitions were organized to encourage new inven­ tions and production of goods of high quality. The prize jury for 1810, for example, included Prefect Ladoucette, Ignaz van Houtem, president of the Aachen Commercial Court, Mayor von Guaita of Aachen, the manufacturer Cornelius de GreifiF of Cre­ feld, and a number of other leading manufacturers from the de­ partment.22 Businessmen also appeared as unpaid members of town and arrondissement welfare bureaus or conscription com21 See lists in BN: MS Franc-Mafonnerie/FM2/533, 534, 535/Dossiers for Aixla-Chapelle, Lodge de la Concorde; for Cologne, Lodge du Secret des Trois Rois. See also Winfried Dotzauer, "Die Mitglieder der kolner Freimaurerlogen, insbesondere der Loge 'Le Secret des trois Rois1' vom Ende des Alten Reiches bis zu den Freiheitskriegen," JaArfrucA des Kolnischen Geschichtsverans 44 (1973). 22 J.C.F. Ladoucette, Voyage fait en 1813 et 1814 dans Ie pays entre Meuse et Rhin, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1868), pp. 252-56. For the competitions see also Zeyss, pp. 64-72, and documents in HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/7 Industrie/8.

INTEGRATION OF RHENISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY

197

missions, alongside city officials and town councilmen.23 It is not surprising that businessmen served in such organizations, but their willingness to do so helped to confirm their social standing in their communities. Perhaps the most dramatic opportunities for combining politi­ cal commitment and social prestige came during royal visits to the Rhineland. When Napoleon's wife Josephine arrived to visit the spa in Aachen in July 1804, she was met by the top department and town officials, and special events were organized to celebrate her presence. An honor guard was also established for her. Twenty-six of its thirty-eight members were businessmen, including eight of the ten officers and the commander, Joseph von Fuerth—a cloth producer and member of the consultative chamber for manufacturing. Former Mayors Kolb and von Lommessem were guardsmen, as were Prefect Mechin's brother and the future member of the Corps Legislatif, Mathias Peltzer. This troop served as Napoleon's honor guard when he entered Aachen in September, and it was revived again for Napoleon's last visit in 1811, when the emperor—accompanied by the new Empress Marie-Louise—was at the peak of his power.24 Serving in the honor guard was obviously desirable. To be sure, some of those invited to join declined, either because of a reluctance to take time from business affairs, or because of the expense of pro­ viding a horse, uniform, and arms, but other merchants made large donations to help equip the guard and to ensure that their sons would be members. In at least one instance the Aachen Con­ sultative Chamber intervened with the prefect to obtain mem­ bership in the guard for one merchant's son.25 23

See, for example, Buschbell and Heinzelmann, pp. 73,96. Neissner, pp. 146-53, 175ff. 25 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/III/Unterprafektur Aachen/38/Lists of members and donors. Special attention was accorded G. Charles Springsfeld for large donations (Letter from Guaita to Ladoucette, May 22, 1813). Petition supporting candi­ dacy of son of Jacques Mauss, another large donor: Chambre consultative to Ladoucette1 May 11, 1813. 24

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The situation in Cologne was similar. When Napoleon visited that city in 1804, wealthy merchants and bankers took the oppor­ tunity to provide lodging for the most distinguished members of his entourage, and in this way to make themselves known. The interior minister stayed with Wittgenstein, the royal chamberlain with Schaaffhausen, other important noblemen with Heimann, Herstatt, Engels, and Farina.26 A table of contributions by "les diffe'rens Corps et les administrations publiques" for Napoleon's reception in October 1811 shows that the Cologne Chamber of Commerce contributed 200 louis d'or, four times that given by the next-largest donor, the mayor and city council.27 Predomi­ nant in the lists of the members of Cologne's honor guard are the same merchants, or their sons, who were to be found on the rolls of the chamber of commerce, commercial court, or city council. A Herstatt headed the guard, which included such familiar names as Heimann, Peuchen, Boisseree, Cassinone, Schiill, Dumont, Weyer, and Mumm.28 Only in Crefeld was the town honor guard not completely dominated by the scions of the great manufac­ turers, presumably because of Mennonite strictures against bear­ ing arms. Even so, the rolls included a Heydweiller and a Beckerath son, and when in Crefeld, Napoleon lodged in the von der Leyen house.29 In a regime where success might depend on a per­ sonal contacts, acquaintance with the emperor and his close as­ sociates was highly valued. The sense of belonging to a great nation was enhanced by the participation of Rhenish representatives in the affairs of the na­ tional capital. A unit of Aachen's honor guard attended Napo­ leon's imperial coronation. Aachen's Mayor von Guaitajourneyed 26

HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/4013/54. HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/III/Unterprafektur Koln/133/Wittgenstein to subprefect, Oct. 21, 1811. 28 HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/4000/42, 56, 120; HSAD: Roer Dept/ D2/III/Unterprafektur Koln/133/"Etat des personnes . . . de la Garde d'honneur de la ville de Cologne," 1813. 29 SaK: XIV/Franzosische Fremdherrschaft/2:62/127, 212. 27

INTEGRATION OF RHENISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY

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to Paris for Napoleon's marriage to Marie-Louise and had an audience with the emperor at that time. The vice-president of the chamber of commerce in Cologne, Friedrich Heimann, was selected by the city council to join Mayor Wittgenstein and Wilhelm de Kaldenberg as official delegates to the festivities marking the baptism of Napoleon's son, the King of Rome. At the same time a public celebration and banquet for local notables was held in Cologne "in the name of commerce." As late as the fall of 1813, Aachen sent a delegation consisting of the manufacturers Startz and Deusner (of the consultative chamber for manufactur­ ing and the labor arbitration board) and the lawyer Geuljans to Paris for a public celebration.30 Finally, the combination of political commitment to the new regime, service in some area of administration or government, personal wealth and local prestige brought the possibility—a pos­ sibility open to all—of being rewarded with a title or with enno­ blement. In May 1802, Napoleon had created the Legion of Honor, appointment to which meant great prestige and an annual income ranging from 500 francs to 5,000 francs, depending upon rank.31 The prestige brought by an appointment to the Legion of Honor can be illustrated by the list of those especially invited to the public initiation ceremony of Mayor Wittgenstein in Novem­ ber 1804 in Cologne. At the top of the list was a military detach­ ment, the commandant and officers of the honor guard, the mayor's assistants, the city councilors and the chamber of com­ merce, followed by officials from the administration of welfare, hospitals, schools, the port and customs officials, and police com­ missioners.32 In short, the whole town hierarchy assembled to pay honor to the appointee! 30 AN/FlcIII/Roer 4/Extrait du protocole des deliberations du Conseil munici­ pal, 1811, Aachen Deputation, Oct. 30, 1813; RWWA: l/24a/6/129-36; Niessner, pp. 168, 172-73. 31 The legion was supported by income from secularized church and feudal lands set aside by the state for that purpose. 32 HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/1045/11.

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In March 1808, hereditary nobility was reintroduced in France. At least two former noblemen, Count Salm-Dyck and Count Loe, had their titles reinstated, and presidents of electoral colleges and mayors of selected major cities were made barons. The road to hereditary title at the lowest level—that of chevalier—was through the Legion of Honor. All appointees to the Legion received the title of chevalier and thus obtained heredi­ tary nobility for their families.33 Very few titles were conferred in the Roer department. In addi­ tion to the former noblemen whose titles were restored, several men with business backgrounds were ennobled. L. M. Rigal of Crefeld, the first department representative to the Corps Legislatif and subsequently a senator, was made a count; Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen of Crefeld and Johann Friedrich Jacobi of Aachen were made chevaliers, the former becoming a baron in 1813; Cologne's Mayor Wittgenstein was made a chevalier and then a baron. Some nonnatives of the department were also hon­ ored, notably Prefect Ladoucette and some high-ranking officers temporarily stationed on the Rhine.34 Naturally, others who found the French regime compatible with their beliefs and ambitions hoped for such honors. In 1811, at the peak of his career, Friedrich Carl Heimann sought ap­ pointment to the Legion through the agency of the interior minis­ ter. Heimann presented himself as president of the chamber of commerce, member of the department's electoral college, member of the commission for the Canal du Nord, councilor and deputy of the city of Cologne, writing: "After having filled different public functions during a succession of years, honored with the esteem of 33 Godechot, pp. 502-3, 603-5, 698-99; Klompen, p. 69; Pierre Durye, "Les Chevaliers dans la noblesse imperiale,"La France a Vepoque napoleonienne, Revue (ΓHistoire Moderne et Contemporaine 17 (special issue, July-September 1970): 673-74. 34 See Archives parliamentaires, 9:73; Emile Companion, Liste de membres de ία noblesse imperiale (Paris, 1889). Jacobi, strangely, is not listed by Compardon, though his title appears in the minutes of the Corps Legislatif.

INTEGRATION OF RHENISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY

201

my fellow citizens, and enjoying an independent fortune, what remains desirable to me would be if His Majesty wished to find in my services sufficient cause to accord to me that mark of honor­ able distinction with which he rewards merit."35 Similarly, Ber­ nard Scheibler, a Monschau cloth manufacturer, member of the department electoral college, and an officer in Aachen's honor guard asked that Napoleon appoint him to the Legion of Honor. Scheibler's request was supported by Prefect Ladoucette, who declared that Scheibler was "animated by the feelings of a true Frenchman," and the interior minister supported the request on the grounds that Scheibler: (1) employed six thousand workers, (2) was the first to introduce new textile machinery in his area, (3) produced fine products, (4) belonged to a family honored with privileges and titles by foreign princes even before union with France, and (5) was respected by others for acts that were beneficial to his workmen.36 In both cases, we find the familiar combination of wealth, involvement in public administration, and success in business accompanied by aspirations for appropriate social prestige. Although in these two cases the hoped-for title was not conferred, the fact that successful, ambitious businessmen could at least aspire to French noble rank is indicative of the ex­ tent to which the Rhenish business community was integrated with France. The year 1811 marked the peak of French and Napoleonic in­ fluence in Europe. The following year saw the emperor defeated in Russia and the collapse of the Continental blockade. Both con­ tributed to the political and economic instability that charac­ terized the last two years of Napoleonic rule. Yet it is an indica­ tion of the success of French rule that the Roer department stuck by its new country till the end, when Austrian and Russian troops 35

AN/FlcIII/Roer 4/Heimann to Min. of Interior, June 15, 1811. AN/F12/1618/Dos. 19/Scheibler to Min. of Interior, Nov. 7, 1811; Minister of Interior to Comte de la Cepede, Grand Chevalier de la Legion d'Honneur, Jan. 36

20, 1811.

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crossed the Rhine in February 1814 and seized the Left Bank. As late as August 1813, merchants from Aachen, Crefeld, and Co­ logne continued to correspond enthusiastically with the prefect about the possibility of a new export market in Russia. Crefeld, in February 1813, was still collecting horses for Napoleon's armies and affirming its allegiance to the emperor. Crefeld's Mayor Floh, himself a manufacturer, could confidently report to the prefect in October 1813 that in spite of severe shortages of industrial raw materials and food, textile workers were in generally good spirits, and that everyone had faith in Napoleon's ability to bring peace. Work continued on a Crefeld monument to Napoleon until October, and his birthday was celebrated even in August 1814, more than six months after the French evacuated the Rhineland.37 Prefect Ladoucette reported that at the time of evacuation Aachen remained generally loyal to France. When Ladoucette departed from the capital of the Roer department, he was escorted by Mayor von Guaita and local notables who wished the prefect and France well. The city's population did resist being drafted into the army that Napoleon was raising for a last-ditch effort against the oncoming allies, and farmers hid horses and supplies, but it seems that they did so not out of disaffection from the French but rather to avoid further losses. On the other hand, taxes were collected in Aachen up to the last moment and virtually all officials, including the native Rhinelanders, remained at their posts until relieved by the French or by allied administrators.38 Ladoucette found Cologne also still supporting Napoleon after his defeat in Russia, in spite of the "desolation" of business. In January 1813, the prefect urged Cologne to imitate Paris and 37 HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/30/ Correspondence from Oct. 6, 1812, to Aug. 6, 1813; and 2 Bureau/7 Industrie/ 19. According to Buschbell and Heinzelmann, p. 73, 608 residents of Crefeld served in Napoleon's armies. Draft resisters, mainly at the end, numbered some­ where between 24 and 111. 38 A. Pauls, pp. 91ff.; Neissner, pp. 186-87; Ladoucette, p. 229.

INTEGRATION OF RHENISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY

203

subscribe to the cost of fielding thirty to forty cavalrymen. When the mayor asked the chamber of commerce to raise the funds, the chamber first balked, arguing that the economic crises since 1811, the scarcity of specie, and the effects of the new war were depressing the newly created textile industry and making contri­ butions impossible. Unemployed workers had to be supported, Rhine trade had virtually ceased, and those merchants who had bought public lands now had to provision the army of the Rhine and could not even pay their taxes. Therefore, in spite of con­ tinued confidence in Napoleon, the chamber felt that Cologne's businessmen simply could not afford the same support as could cities of the interior. Nevertheless, when the Cologne city council voted 100,000 francs for military support, the chamber assisted in raising the sum.39 It is clear, then, that the business communities of Cologne, Aachen, and Crefeld genuinely supported the Napoleonic regime in a French Rhineland. The French legal and political systems, the structure of the social hierarchy and the social rewards, and the official emphasis on economic growth in both industry and commerce combined to produce an atmosphere particularly com­ fortable for Rhenish entrepreneurs. These businessmen were sincere when they used the "proud phrases" of the Napoleonic pe­ riod, and all three cities remained loyal until the occupation by allied troops.40 The Legacy of Two Decades of French Rule In 1814, when the French fled from the Rhineland in defeat, they left behind a great record of achievement. The Rhineland of 39 Ladoucette, pp. 218CT.; RWWA: 1/25/4/Chamber of Commerce to ?, n.d., Protocol no. 5591; Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 347. 40 Kisch, "Impact of the French," p. 326, rightly argues that the Rhineland bourgeoisie "learned to appreciate the advantages of republican and subsequent imperial government," but he overstates his case when he declares: "Indeed, never before, nor for that matter ever again, were the Rhineland capitalists to enjoy a

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the old regime—particularistic, tradition- and status-bound, filled with tension between the progressive forces of social and eco­ nomic change and the inhibiting forces of privilege and legal re­ striction inherited from the Middle Ages and the age of religious wars—outwardly had been transformed almost beyond recogni­ tion. In the place of imperial cities, ecclesiastical states, and petty principalities, the French had created departments held together and tied to the national capital by uniform centralized govern­ ment administration and by a common codified law. A system of public and private institutions had combined to create a regional economy, a regional society, and a regional polity that was inte­ grated with the French nation. The integration of the notables of the Roer department was furthered by their participation in pri­ vate and semiofficial institutions designed especially to satisfy the needs of the business community, by participation in official ad­ ministration throughout the governmental hierarchy, and by France's use of public demonstrations and social rewards to ob­ tain political loyalty. In each case the French owed part of their success to the fact that it was possible to fit traditional patterns of social and political behavior into a larger, unified institutional framework where personal, local, regional, and national interests could be reconciled. In spite of the diversity of political life in the prerevolutionary Rhineland there were certain common features to be found in the three cities under discussion. Active citizenship in Aachen and Cologne had been corporate; while both cities had been relatively autonomous, the sovereignty of each had been limited, as we have seen, by its political place in the Holy Roman Empire. As a dis­ tant possession of Prussia, Crefeld had not been autonomous. In all three cities, however, both the maintenance of tradition and the initiation of change depended for the most part on personal regime as favorably disposed towards entrepreneurial initiative." The develop­ ments under subsequent Prussian rule belie that judgment. See also Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 341-43.

INTEGRATION OF RHENISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY

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and corporate influence, petitions, and legal appeals to various administrative and judicial bodies and, finally, on the intervention of outside authorities called on to resolve issues that defied solu­ tion by local institutions. There was much that did not change under the French. It was simply that the "rules" of political decision making were cen­ tralized and made more or less uniform for the whole area. Deci­ sions were still based on informal contacts, lobbying, petitions, and legal appeals; to realize one's interests it was still necessary to work through bureaucratic and judicial channels. What was new was the scope of the French system and its orientation toward modernization instead of tradition. Though the system was more productive for some groups, particularly Rhenish businessmen, than for others, it brought virtually all residents into contact with the state. Witness the large number of Rhinelanders participating in councils and electoral colleges, voting in plebiscites, joining in or witnessing public ceremonies of a political nature. Also, the French took seriously their pledge of good, efficient, responsive (if not institutionally responsible) government. This is to be seen in the broad-ranging reforms in school and hospital administration, the introduction of a uniform legal system, the introduction of the metric system of weights and measures, the secularization of church property and functions, and so on. This system was especially well suited to the businessmen of Cologne, Crefeld, and Aachen. French institutions, such as the chambers of commerce and the commercial courts, filled needs that had been expressed by businessmen immediately before the Revolution. The destruction of religious barriers, in conjunction with the demands of the new regime, brought Protestant busi­ nessmen into the public arena and made possible greater cohesion within the business communities, even though at times, as in Cologne, it took several years for this cohesion to develop. The French system depended upon the cooperation of local notables, and in the Rhenish cities the notables were to a great extent

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Catholic and Protestant wholesale merchants, bankers, and merchant/manufacturers. These men associated with each other in the semiofficial institutions, in the system of advisory and elec­ toral councils, and in local societies such as the Masons or Illuminati; here again the French could build upon a movement predating the annexation of the Rhineland to France. Busi­ nessmen had an opportunity to move upward socially, and this continued the pattern of ennoblement begun under the Holy Roman Empire. Most children of businessmen married within their social group, but some marriages were contracted with French officials new to the Rhine. Significantly, the economic and social standing of businessmen as notables in their cities, arrondissements, and department was duly recognized and confirmed by appointments to administrative or advisory office within the prefecture. Also the objectives and style of French political life in the Roer department worked eventually to the advantage of businessmen. The purpose of the initial occupation of the Left Bank was as much fiscal exploitation as military strategy, and attempts of businessmen to moderate that exploitation or to turn it to their own advantage naturally forced them into intimate contact with their conquerors. Subsequent annexation, in the context of the economic contest with England, the push for industrial develop­ ment, and the business problems arising in a border department continued to make businessmen the group most closely involved with official decision making and the execution of state economic policy. Also, the style of French political life proved comfortable to the business community. Memoranda and petitions, lobbying delegations, legal appeals and the use of personal contacts, or dis­ cussions of issues and planning of strategy within assemblies of their peers were all methods used by businessmen before the French invasion and were put to good advantage within the French system. These methods enabled businessmen, already ac­ customed to dealing with distant markets and conversant with

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the French Enlightenment, to display their facility in the use of the French language and their openness to new ideas and technological and legal advances, and to consider ideas that ranged far beyond the walls of their own cities. In short, the struc­ ture, purpose, and style of French political institutions combined to create a special place for Rhenish businessmen. Dominant no­ tables in their own cities, they joined officials and large land­ owners as the notables of the department, helping to lend the Left Bank of the Rhine a social coherence that paralleled its institu­ tional coherence. The integration of businessmen was absolutely essential to the creation of the French nation on the Rhine. If it is true, then, that French rule was "the great school, in which the political sense of the Rhenish population was ma­ tured," that schooling was of the utmost importance for the busi­ ness community.41 First, the rewards of integration into a large, strong nation were clearly evident to businessmen enjoying the prosperity of the Napoleonic period. Belonging to such a nation greatly extended the sphere in which businessmen could realize their ambitions, whether economic, social, or political. Second, businessmen became accustomed to government of a special nature. French government was centralized, bureaucratic, hierarchical, and ultimately autocratic. Yet these qualities were tempered by the presence of administrators and an administrative spirit that fostered mutual respect between government and citi­ zens. There were established channels through which expressions of opinion and interest were easily communicated, and busi­ nessmen could reasonably expect some degree of success for their own initiatives. Especially in the economic sphere, the French en­ couraged self-administration within the department.42 41 Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 343; Kisch, "Impact of the French," p. 327, attributed Rhenish "resilience and progress" to "training . . . in the school of the French Republic and Empire." 42 This is true, even if city self-administration was in some ways more restricted than either before the Revolution or under the Prussian system of town adminis-

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Those who participated in the semiofficial institutions served as lay bureaucrats representing the interests of the state, the general citizenry, and the individual members of the business community. Their function was to reconcile public policy and responsibility with private interests, although they were neither career officials nor elected officeholders. And because of their position in the semiofficial bodies and in the advisory system, businessmen had a taste of power. They could claim a degree of Staatsunmittelbarkeit (or access to the instruments of the state) not enjoyed by all citizens. This was a privilege to be carefully preserved and not abused; abuse brought admonitions and disciplinary action, as when the Cologne Chamber of Commerce stepped out of line by appealing in print to public opinion. At the same time it widened the gap between prominent, established merchants and mer­ chant/manufacturers and lesser merchants, shopkeepers, and arti­ sans. This gap was made more pronounced by the social rewards available to the wealthiest and most successful businessmen. Thus businessmen, as distinct from petty shopkeepers, began to coalesce as a class, with a consciousness of their status and posi­ tion. Even within a bureaucratic polity, political influence was not shared by all.43 Third, for businessmen French rule made possible the com­ patibility, if not the complete identity, of national, regional, and town interests with the interests of the business community and the interests of individual firms. Political decisions on social and economic policy were made within the system of government administration. Businessmen developed a pragmatic but genuine liking for this kind of political decision making. It worked for them well enough at least to make them accept the fact that they were forbidden to appeal to the general public standing outside the system, a public lacking Staatsunmittelbarkeit. Opposition to tration devised by Stein. French self-administration does not deserve the flatly de­ rogatory judgment given by Kass, p. 198, or Bar, p. 49. 43 For a contrasting interpretation see Droz, Liberalisme rhenan, p. 25.

INTEGRATION OF RHENISH BUSINESS COMMUNITY

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specific policies was a loyal opposition as long as the channels of communication with the state remained open, and the state was flexible and responsive, as was the case under French rule. And, as we shall see, it was precisely because Prussia largely adopted the French system in the Rhineland that loyalty to France could be transformed into loyalty to Prussia after 1815. Under Prussia, as under France, cooperation and opposition could both exist within the confines of bureaucratic government.

Part III Rhenish Business and Prussian Rule on the Rhine

7. Interregnum: Sack and the Introduction of Prussian Rule

IN January 1814, the twenty years that had begun with conquest by a republican army and that had given way to benevolent Napoleonic rule came to an end. The Left Bank of the Rhine, with its French laws and institutions, with French as the lan­ guage of government, business, and culture, infused with the style of Napoleon's Grand Empire, was abandoned to France's enemies. It was unlikely that the French loyalties and French style of doing things, all of which had been so carefully cultivated during the previous two decades, could simply be swept aside or packed up and sent across the border in the baggage of the re­ treating French armies. Moreover, just as twenty years earlier Rhinelanders had been faced with an indeterminant period of mil­ itary requisitions, forced loans and emergency taxes, and the quartering of troops, those same burdens were now imposed by the arriving allies; and Rhinelanders had no reason to expect that Russian Cossacks would be more welcome guests in their land than the sans-culottes armies of 1792. Quite naturally each city, each social group sought to protect its own interests as far as pos­ sible. The collapse of Napoleon's empire left the Rhineland in the hands of a coalition led by the deeply conservative Tsar Alexan­ der and Austrian Foreign Minister Metternich. Pending a final peace treaty, however, it was Prussia that took the responsibility for governing most of the territory under consideration. And, as has already been noted, it was to Prussia that the Congress of

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Vienna ultimately awarded the Rhineland north of the Palatine. Those parts of the Left Bank that had once belonged to Prussia, and they included Crefeld, might have welcomed the prospect of rejoining the state of Frederick the Great, but the memory of Prussia's 1795 renunciation of her Rhenish lands in the Treaty of Basel served to dampen enthusiasm.1 Besides, it was not at all certain that former territorial boundaries would be restored, and those living on the Left Bank did not know whether their land would be treated as conquered territory or as a newly liberated part of Germany. Would new states be formed, or would former sovereigns return to claim their rights and perhaps seek retribu­ tion against those who had collaborated with the French? Prussia had been gready weakened by her defeats at the hands of Napoleon, but she had found new strength in the struggle to free her territory from the French. In 1815, however, the nation was divided in several senses. The king and many of his East Prussian Junker advisors were conservative, traditional, and sus­ picious of change, while other high officials, including Chancellor Hardenberg, advocated continuing reforms designed to revitalize national energy. The acquisition of extensive territories on the Rhine meant that Prussia was divided geographically as well, and she faced the arduous task of reconciling her laws, institutions, social hierarchies, and economic trends with those of the Rhineland. Moreover, the Rhineland was itself divided; Napoleonic institutions were far more solidly rooted in the Left Bank than in Berg and Westphalia. The fact that in a remarkably short time the Prussians suc­ ceeded in overcoming these difficulties and in winning the coop­ eration, respect, and eventually the loyalty of the Left Bank, is a tribute to the policies and administration of the men charged with administering the former French departments on the Rhine. Of most significance was Johann August Sack's tenure as General Governor and Oberprasident (or chief administrator) in the Rhine1

Joseph Hansen,Prmssen und Rheinland von 1815-1915 (Bonn, 1918), p. 9.

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land. Sack administered the Rhineland between March 1814 and March 1816, and in ways and for reasons to be discussed shortly, he pursued a course that he hoped would benefit the area under his charge, a course relatively independent of decision making in Berlin. His departure for a new post in Pomerania, which meant reduced autonomy for the Rhineland and greater reliance on the national capital, helped to set the tone for the years to come. To understand the success of the new administration and to as­ sess its impact on relations between the Prussian government and the Rhenish business communities, it is necessary to examine the installation of the new government, the character of emergency wartime measures, and the policies and acts that especially af­ fected businessmen and the economy of the Left Bank. We should keep in mind, however, that in contrast with the French in 1792 and 1794, the allies did not face the entrenched resistance bred by centuries of tradition-bound behavior, ancient institutions, and privileges. These had been swept away by the French, and adher­ ence to French innovations was based more on their effectiveness than on tradition or on a fear of change. Installation of the Provisional Government After the Battle of Leipzig, at which Napoleon was defeated by the coalition, the victorious allies signed the Leipzig Convention providing for the administration of those states that lacked a legitimate ruler and that had not joined the coalition. As proposed by Baron vom Stein and Wilhelm von Humboldt, the convention placed Saxony and other Rheinbund states under the direct rule of a central administration to be headed by Stein. Stein, in turn, was to divide the territory into governorships, appointing a gov­ ernor general for each and apportioning those posts among the major powers of the coalition.2 The governors general were to 2 Peter Graf von Kielmansegg, Stein und die Zentralverwaltung, 1813-1814 (Stuttgart, 1964), pp. 21-22.

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administer their territories with an eye to securing fiscal, material, and moral support for the war effort against Napoleon. In November 1813, it was decided that an invasion of France was necessary, and four governorships were proposed for the Left Bank of the Rhine: (1) the Upper Rhine, including the former departments of Haut-Rhin and Bas-Rhin; (2) Middle Rhine, in­ cluding the departments of Mont Tonnerre, Sarre, and Rhinet-Moselle; (3) Lower Rhine, including the Roer, Ourthe, and Meuse-Inferieure departments; and (4) Burgundy. The adminis­ trative measures proposed by Stein for the new governorships were dictated not by a fear of unrest or resistance to the allies, but rather by a desire to smooth the process of transition and to win the loyalty of the former French citizens of what Stein saw as the German national (as well as the allied) cause.3 Stein expected the flight of most French-born officials; these he wished to replace with Germans of property and education who were opposed to Napoleon. Lesser, native-born officials would be retained in office and supervised by specially appointed commis­ sioners to assure their reliability. Stein proposed to replace the prefects with commissioners, except in the departments adminis­ tered by the governors general themselves. The prefecture coun­ cils were retained to assist the governor general or commis­ sioners. The arrondissement and departmental councils were abolished, but each department in a governorship was to send five deputies to a new advisory council called the Landesdeputation, which was supposed to assist in raising war supplies and meeting other emergencies. French was to be replaced by German. This entailed the renaming of all offices, even where the incumbent officer was not replaced. French law and the French tax system were to be retained on a provisional basis, though the salt and to­ bacco monopolies were suspended.4 3

Ibid., pp. 98-99, 103. Ibid., pp. 100-103; Fritz Vollheim, Die provisorische Verwaltung am Niederund Mittelrhein wahrend der Jahre 1814 bis 1816 (Bonn, 1912), pp. 19-24; Bar, pp. 69ff. 4

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Stein appointed Johann August Sack as governor general of the Lower Rhine, an appointment that took full effect when Sack reached Aachen, the capital of the Lower Rhine governorship, in mid-March 1814. In June, Sack became governor general of the Middle Rhine as well, taking over the office from Justus Griiner. Sack was a career Prussian official, a friend of Stein's, and a sup­ porter of Stein's efforts at reform. After Prussia proclaimed its an­ nexation of the Rhineland north of the Moselle on April 15,1815, Sack continued to administer the Lower and Middle Rhine as governor general until June 30,1815; from that date until March 23, 1816, he governed the same area, now known as the Konigliche-Preussische Rheinprovinzen, as Oberprdsident, or senior president.5 As governor general and as Oberprdsident, Sack attempted to implement Stein's policies, and the methods he used went far to­ ward reassuring the public, especially the business community. In making new appointments, he tended to favor men with judi­ cial backgrounds who hailed from old, well-established families, and he did not hesitate to choose men who had held office under the French regime. Of the five special commissioners in the Roer department, three had been officials of the French courts, one had been a subprefect, and one a tax receiver. More than half of the officials from the French period remained in office.6 In Aachen, where his arrival in 1814 had been greeted by a grand ball hosted by the mayor, the city council and the consultative chamber for 5 See Gustav H. Pertz, Das Leben des Ministers Freiherm vom Stein, 6 vols. (Berlin, 1851), 3:556-58, for Sack's first public proclamation. Among Gruner's four close counselors were Sack's brother and Georg Arnold Jacobi, the brother of Aachen's J. F. Jacobi. See Bar, pp. 70-73, 86ff.; Vollheim, pp. 6, 13, 15. See also Stein, vols. 4 and 5, and Wilhelm StefFens, Brirfwechsel Sachs mit Stein und Gneisenau, 1807-1817 (Stettin, 1931), for correspondence between Sack and Stein. 6 Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, 1:126, comments that "the Reform movement was a party of administrative jurists (Verwaltungsjuristen), the Restoration move­ ment one of Justajuristen.'" Also Vollheim, pp. 26-28; Faber, "Verwaltungs- und Justizbeamte," pp. 359, 379-82.

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manufacturing, Sack kept on the former cloth manufacturer von Guaita as mayor.7 Crefeld, to be sure, saw two mayoral changes, but neither was particularly unsettling. Silk manufacturer Gottschalk Floh, mayor since 1805, resigned in 1814 in favor of Gerhard Hunzinger, a cloth manufacturer, and Hunzinger was replaced within a year by J. B. Heydweiller. Heydweiller was a justice of the peace (in keeping with Sack's tendency to favor the judiciary), but he was married to a Hunzinger, and there were leading silk producers in his family.8 Cologne's Mayor Wittgen­ stein was replaced in 1815 by appeals court Judge Carl von Mylius, of an old Cologne family. This was evidently because of Wittgenstein's reputed Francophilia.9 Sack's conciliatory attitude can also be seen in his organization of the festivities in Aachen on May 15, 1815, in celebration of union with Prussia. To represent the populace in swearing an oath of allegiance to their new monarch, Sack invited church, school, and court officials, delegates from the city councils of large towns, all the mayors, and the presidents and one member from each chamber of commerce. The notables of the province, includ­ ing leading businessmen and former French officials, were thus gathered together to acknowledge the political changeover, while, at the same time, their sense of belonging to a regional and national polity was reinforced. It was Aachen, the coronation city for the Holy Roman Empire, that witnessed this ceremonial con­ firmation of the end of the particularism of the old German Em­ pire.10 7

Poll1 DaiCTJ, p. 120; Neissner, p. 188. The Heydweillers were related by marriage to the von der Leyens, the Rigals, the Sohmanns, and later in the century to the de Greiffs and the von Beckeraths. Floh, long a leading figure in Crefeld, was slightly compromised when his son-inlaw, former Subprefect Jordans, secretly left for France upon learning of Napo­ leon's return from Elba. See Buschbell and Heinzelmann, pp. 157, 163, 166, and the genealogies in their index. 9 Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 48; Gothein, p. 33, declares that Wittgenstein was never a real friend of the French, but he offers no convincing evidence. 10 See Bar, p. 99; Buschbell and Heinzelmann, p. 160; Schwann, Handelskam8

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Emergency War Measures The way in which Sack handled the sticky problem of raising funds and supplies for the war effort also testifies to his skill in making the change in regimes as smooth as possible. With the aid of the Landesdeputation and the former prefecture council, Sack raised several million francs in taxes and loans. An 1815 list of persons "selected as deputies" and given special travel passes in order to help raise these funds shows that the six "deputies" of the merchant class were all members of chambers of commerce and included Nellessen of Aachen, F. C. Heimann and J. J. Moll of Cologne, and B. von Scheibler of Eupen. Mayors and town depu­ ties included von Guaita, Wildt, Springsfeld, and von Lommessem of Aachen, and von Mylius and SchaafBiausen of Cologne.11 Sack was following Stein's recommendation to choose men of property and education; that nearly all of the deputies had held office under the French regime did not matter. Heimann was selected, for example, even though in his home town he had been forced to wage a publicity campaign to prove that he had not been unduly sympathetic to the French in 1794.12 Moreover, since the French system had encouraged businessmen to find their way into administrative or political positions (as was the case with von Guaita, Springsfeld, Wildt, and SchaafBhausen), and since many of them had retained their former posts, merchants and manufacmer, p. 374; Kellenbenz and Eyll, following p. 56, reprint part of the announce­ ment of the ceremony. See also W. Harless, "Die Huldigung der Rheinlande zu Aachen am 15. Mai 1815," Zeitschrift des Bergischen Geschichtsvereins 2 (1865), for a description of the ceremony. 11 Kielmansegg, p. 140; Gothein, p. 107; HSAD-K: Oberprasidium Koln/ 161/lff. The governor general and later Prussian authorities failed for some time to note the distinction between full-fledged chambers of commerce (of which there was only the one, in Cologne) and consultative chambers for manufacturing (as in Aachen, Crefeld, and elsewhere). All were referred to as chambers of commerce, though only the Cologne Chamber under French law had the right of direct corre­ spondence with ministers. 12 Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 359.

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turers had a strong voice in determining how the war taxes and loans were to be assessed. Being consulted about war taxes and forced loans did not, of course, make the Left Bank business community any happier about having to empty its pockets. The Cologne Chamber of Commerce complained bitterly to Sack in April 1814 that Co­ logne's trade was being taxed far too heavily in comparison with the lighter levies on booming manufacturing centers like Aachen. Sack mildly rejected the complaint with the comment that the forced loan would be repaid in two months anyway.13 At about the same time, Boelling, Sack's commissioner for the Roer de­ partment, in pursuance of a plan initiated by Stein, was asking the Cologne Chamber of Commerce to prepare detailed lists of the types and values of goods requisitioned by the retreating French armies. These lists were for the purpose of seeking com­ pensation from Louis XVIII, whose crown had been returned to him by the victorious allies. For nearly three years the chamber worked toward this goal. It selected Antoine Keil, a former imperial-court official, to act as Cologne's representative. Keil's ef­ forts, which even included an interview with Prussian Chancellor Hardenberg, encouraged the chamber to seek compensation for French requisitions as far back as 1794. Because of Keil's re­ markable effectiveness, the chamber could report in February 1817 "that already the greater part of the total compensation in this case (more than one million francs) has been repaid to the owners of the goods" requisitioned by the French in 1813. This proved to Cologne's merchants that they could "rejoice about the mighty protection given them under such a wise and powerful government" (namely, Prussia), and the chamber thanked the royal government on behalf of Cologne's merchant houses.14 This was typical of the administration under Sack. Taxes, 13 RWWA:

1/26/5/29, 31; Gothein, p. 108. l/23e/41/Correspondence of March 18, Oct. 14, 1814, Sept. 23 and 30, 1815, Feb. 22, 1817. 14 RWWA:

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loans, and supplies were collected in spite of complaints, but at the same time efforts were made to provide quick repayment or other forms of compensation. As a result the governor general, local officials, and businessmen cooperated in meeting the de­ mands of the new regime. In Aachen, a special commission headed by Mayor von Guaita and including many prominent manufacturers (Startz, Nellessen, Deusner, Wildenstein) super­ vised the quartering and provisioning of troops.15 In Cologne the chamber of commerce itself helped to administer the forced loan and requisition of supplies in 1815 and thus took the brunt of many complaints. Also, until 1822, it handled the repayment of these loans and requisitions.16 By securing the cooperation of Rhenish leaders, by looking to their qualifications and ignoring, if possible, their previous ties with the French, Sack succeeded in making the impact of the emergency war measures and the instal­ lation of a new administration far less traumatic than the Rhinelanders might have expected and certainly less traumatic than their experiences of 1792-97 under the French. Sack and the Rhenish Business Community: The Status of Institutions Most important by far in determining the attitude of Rhenish businessmen toward the separation of the Left Bank from France were two commitments made to them by Sack and by the Prus­ sian government. One was a promise to permit the continued ex­ istence of the chambers of commerce and other business institu­ tions created by the French; the other was a promise to promote Rhenish trade and industry as much as possible. In both cases the question was whether the commitments would really be carried out, an uncertainty that caused businessmen considerable anxiety. 15 W. Briining, "Aachen wahrend der Fremdherrschaft und der Befreiungskriege," Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsvereins 19(1897):191, 197. 16 RWWA: l/23e/43, 44, 45/passim.

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Initially, the future of the chambers of commerce looked quite good. Correspondence between the chambers and Sack on the emergency tax and loan issues began immediately after his arrival, and we have already seen that the Cologne Chamber helped to administer the war measures in 1815. Toward the end of 1814, the Cologne Chamber had won Sack's endorsement of its inten­ tion to continue "as before its work for the welfare of local com­ merce," and he promised "his best support."17 While Schaafifhausen was in Aachen serving as the chamber's delegate to the ceremony of union with Prussia, he delivered a letter to Sack in which the chamber presented its budget for his approval and explained the previous system of obtaining official sanction for expenditures.18 In spite of Sack's favorable attitude, however, the chamber con­ tinued to seek reassurances. When the annual election of new members, scheduled for 1815, was postponed because the politi­ cal and economic status of the Rhineland was still in flux, Sack was asked to confirm the continuation of the old members in office. The chamber made other requests as well. They reminded Sack that according to the terms of its founding under French law, the chamber of commerce represented the entire merchant community and therefore should be allowed to correspond di­ rectly with a high ministry. Moreover, the chamber urged Sack to establish some sort of regional assembly of businessmen, elected by the entire business community, to advise the govern­ ment on matters concerning trade and industry.19 (The chamber had in mind something like the defunct French national Council for Manufacturers or the similarly abolished departmental Coun­ cil General.) In his reply Sack confirmed the list of chamber members and stated that, in his opinion, there would be no diffi­ culty in retaining institutions such as the chamber "with few modifications" within the Prussian state. The chamber could, in 17 Quoted 18

in Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 79. 19 RWWA: 1/3/2/19, 38. RWWA: 1/3/2/34.

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other words, correspond with the minister of finance, but Sack did not endorse the idea of a regional businessmen's assembly.20 The Aachen and Crefeld Consultative Chambers for Manufactur­ ing seem to have retained their existing memberships. Businessmen also sought assurances that the commercial courts would be allowed to continue. In 1815 the Cologne Chamber prepared a memorial in favor of retaining a special commercial legal code and mechanism for adjusting business disputes. The memorial contended that the Prussian Civil Code (Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch) was entirely inadequate for the regulation of property rights in commerce. The commercial courts, under the Commer­ cial Code, on the other hand, provided speedy decisions with low administrative and court costs, and required a minimum of legal expertise. Therefore the chamber recommended that periodic election of judges for a commercial court be continued, adding that it would be ideal if the president of the court could be both an official of the state with full knowledge of legal forms and proce­ dures and a man immersed in the daily life of the businessman. Finally, the chamber suggested that the government appoint to the court of appeals at least three merchants, known for their fair­ ness, impartiality, and business experience, and with full voice and vote.21 Cologne's businessmen had reason to expect an affirmative reply to this petition. In February 1815, a new president had been chosen for the Aachen Commercial Court, certainly with Sack's approval.22 Moreover, Sack had refused to publish in the official Rhineland Gazette the September 1814 patent ordering that the Prussian General Legal Code of 1794 be introduced in Prussia's new territories. Sack consistently opposed Justice Minister von Kircheisen in this matter. Like most other Prussian officials in the Rhineland, Sack found French (Napoleonic) law superior to the Prussian, and he allowed the commercial court to 20 22

RWWA: 1/3/2/40. Poll1Daien, p. 123.

21

RWWA: 1/26/5/1.

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continue to function, though without the changes suggested by Cologne. Yet it would be wrong to conclude that Sack always followed the lead of the business community. For example, in early 1816 he refused to support the Cologne Chamber of Commerce when a new Prussian tax supervisor lodged a criminal complaint against one of the chamber's members, J. J. Moll, who had been acting as inspector of the exercise tax. The new supervisor, a man named Hardung, accused Moll of failing to follow correct procedures and thereby allowing funds to be misused. In its appeal to Sack to quash the case, the chamber made a strong attack on Hardung and the rigidity of his principles. The chamber reported that Hardung "always held to the principles of that school in which he had been trained" (that is, his academic preparation for state serv­ ice). After having resorted to "a great deal" of legal chicanery in dealings with the merchant class, the chamber went on, he had been reminded by Moll, "not in his own private interest but as a representative of commerce" what "the limits of his duties" were. Hardung, according to the chamber, then insulted both Moll and his deceased predecessor "with flippant insolence" and hauled Moll into court. Moll appealed to Boelling, the commissioner of the governorship, who was disposed to forget the whole matter, as, in the words of the chamber, "a prudent and responsible rep­ resentative of a liberal government is in any case authorized to do." Hardung, however, demanded that the court impose some penalty. The chamber thereupon warned Sack that a judgment against a highly respectable man like Moll would create "a highly unfavorable impression on the public."23 The underlying problem here was that under French rule the chamber had helped to administer the exercise taxes on commer­ cial goods. The income obtained supported Cologne's annual budget. Under former Mayor Wittgenstein, the city government 23

RWWA: 1/8/11/191.

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and the chamber of commerce had been intimate partners in man­ aging Cologne's affairs and promoting the welfare of both the city and the business community. Therefore Hardung's attack on Moll was simultaneously an attack on that cozy relationship be­ tween chamber and government, a threat to the flexible division of jurisdiction between administrative and commercial law, a threat to the reputation of the chamber of commerce, and an indi­ cation of the fact that a petty Prussian official had the power to damage the professional integrity of a businessman of long stand­ ing in the community. To the chamber's surprise, Sack found that the attack on Hardung was insulting, not only to Hardung in the exercise of his office, but also to the "public authorities." It would have been better, Sack declared, if the chamber had first examined all the facts and presented proofs against Hardung. Un­ less it could be shown that he misused his office in the Moll affair, no action against him could be considered.24 Subsequently, the court decided against Moll, though due to mitigating circum­ stances it levied only a small fine. The whole affair demonstrated to businessmen that the legal advantages they had enjoyed under Napoleonic commercial law were precarious indeed. Sack and the Rhenish Business Community: Promotion of the Economy The chambers of commerce, of course, were not concerned solely with preserving their own status; they hoped also to per­ suade the new rulers to enact measures that would stimulate the economy of the Rhineland. Upon learning of Sack's appointment as governor general, the Cologne Chamber wrote to him on March 20, 1814, offering its congratulations. That so capable an official had been named to such a sensitive post proved the good will of the allies, and the chamber hoped Sack would give special 24RWWA:

1/8/11/193.

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consideration to the interests and needs of commerce. In his prompt reply Sack declared: "I will always see it as my special duty to support trade and industry, the soul of all life and virtue in the society of the state, and to that end I will seek to remove all possible restrictions and to cultivate the freedom and security of trade and industry. Proposals related to this I will at all times happily accept and have laid out for my special consideration."25 Similar sentiments were expressed by Prussian Chancellor Hardenberg, writing from Vienna to Aachen's Mayor von Guaita on November 28, 1814, in response to a letter from the Aachen Chamber of Commerce (Consultative Chamber for Manufac­ turers). Hardenberg declared: I am so completely convinced of the importance of [a liberal free trade policy] for the welfare of the nation, that I shall not let a single occasion pass by without bringing up the matter for discussion and directing it to the desired conclusion.... I wish nothing more ardently than that Your Honor will find proof in these proceedings that the Prussian government knows no more urgent business than to comply through an open and lib­ eral attitude with the wishes of a class which, through its industry and activity, has established the well-being of the state and thereby earns the most preeminent claims to universal es­ teem.26 Official promises such as these, however encouraging, waited on action. The major issues, as far as the Left Bank was con­ cerned, were tariff policy and the fate of the old trading privileges on the Rhine. Here Sack's energetic efforts won the support of Rhenish businessmen, while the Prussian government was found wanting. The governor general sought local expert opinion and acted upon it; high Prussian officials seemed motivated more by 25

RWWA: 1/26/5/24, 25. Registratur Cremer/IV/31/16.

26 SaA:

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economic theory or the fiscal needs of the central government than the expressed wishes of businessmen. While studying at the Universities of Gottingen or Konigsberg, Hardenberg, Finance Minister Biilow, Stein's confidants Schon and Schrotter, and other officials had been strongly influenced by the writing of Adam Smith. Sack had studied at Halle, which was more oriented toward cameralism and protectionism, and it is perhaps for this reason that he remained more sensitive to the needs of industry than other officials of the reform era in Prussia.27 On the Right Bank a tariff arrangement between the Duchies of Berg and Miinster, which eliminated internal tolls and set border tariffs at a low uniform level, had already been concluded. Sack proposed to Biilow that this arrangement be extended to the en­ tire Lower and Middle Rhine governorships, though both Sack and Commissioner Boelling favored duties on exports and for­ warded goods alone. These duties, they felt, placed the burden on foreigners, while import duties weighed on their own subjects.28 Biilow replied on August 12,1814, acknowledging the urgent need for tariff measures to protect and encourage Rhenish indus­ try and commerce and authorizing Sack to implement a provi­ sional tariff. He agreed to a tariff union between the Prussiancontrolled territories on the Left and Right Banks that would abolish internal tolls in favor of a border duty, and he recom­ mended an import duty alone instead of both import and export duties, as presently existed on the Right Bank. He thought that a simple 12-gulden per hundred-weight duty on packaged or man­ ufactured goods, a lesser rate on transit goods, and perhaps no fee at all for raw materials would give enough protection to local 27 See Wilhelm Treue, "Adam Smith in Deutschland. Zum Problem des 'Politischen Professors' zwischen 1776 und 1810," in Deutschland und Europa, ed. Werner Conze (Diisseldorf, 1951); Gray, "Schroetter, Schon, and Society," pp. 62-63; Hasek, pp. 106ff.; Gertz, pp. 40ff. 28 Wilhelm Lindner, "Das Zollgesetz von 1818 und Handel und Industrie am Niederrhein," Westdeutsche Zeitschriftfur Geschiehte und Kunst 30 (1911 ):314ff.

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manufacturers. He was willing, however, to defer to Sack's judgment.29 Sack then asked his senior counselor, Johann Friedrich Jacobi, who had held so many posts under the French, to invite delegates from the chambers of commerce of Cologne, Aachen, Crefeld, Monschau, Verviers, and Liege to come to Aachen for a confer­ ence on tariffs.30 Sack had hoped to gain support for his own posi­ tion, but Rhenish business sentiment supported neither Sack nor Biilow. Held on August 25, the conference went on record as op­ posing uniform import and export duties, favoring indirect over direct taxation, favoring duty-free forwarding of goods shipped through the tariff union, and endorsing abolition of internal tolls and special river and road fees. On other questions, however, there was no unanimity. Cologne wanted no import duties, Cre­ feld demanded no export duties and a protective tariff on imports, while Aachen stood somewhere between the two.31 Thus for the time being the tariff question remained unre­ solved, in spite of follow-up correspondence between the Aachen and Cologne Chambers and Boelling. Therefore a new tariff con­ ference was scheduled for January, 1815. Before that meeting took place, Sack succeeded in concluding between the Low Countries and the territories of which Sack was governor general a tariff agreement that kept the border between Dutch Belgium and the Left Bank open for a year. Rhenish manufactured goods were then exported into France from Belgium in spite of the French protective tariff. Because of Aachen's location close to the 29 RWWA:

1/54/1/Chamber of Commerce to Sack, Dec. 30, 1814. Lambert P. Peters, "Die Grundziige der Zollpolitik der Handelskammer zu Koln 1813/14-1870/71" (Diplomarbeit, Cologne, 1969), p. 30. 31 RWWA: 1/5471/Jacobi to Chamber of Commerce, Aug. 20, 1814, and Jacobi to Chamber of Commerce, Aug. 26, 1814; Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 360. Heimann and Merkens attended from Cologne. See also Lindner, pp. 320-21; Gothein, pp. 165-66; Wilhelm Treue, Wirtschaftszustande und Wirtschaftspolitik in Pretissen 1815-25, Vierteljahrsschrift fur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgesehiehte, suppl. 31 (Stuttgart, 1937), pp. 75-76. 30 See

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border, this greatly benefited her economy and it also benefited the silk industry of Crefeld. Both cities were thus able to retain, at least temporarily, their former French markets, and this eased the economic crisis that had set in with the fall of the Continental blockade and the consequent influx of English textiles.32 The scheduled tariff conference opened in Diisseldorf on Janu­ ary 16, 1815. Its purpose was to advise the government on possi­ ble modifications of the tariff arrangements with Belgium and in the Rhineland. This meeting, intended to be the first of several, is extraordinary on several counts. First, the conference brought together for the first time nota­ bles from both banks of the Rhine. Leading businessmen from Berg and Munster included Josua Hasenclever, Wilhelm Carstanjans, and Peter Eberhard Miillensieffen. The Lower and Middle Rhine (the Left Bank) was represented by three delegates from Liege, Bernard von Scheibler from Eupen, Carl Lenzmann from Monschau, and G. H. Koch from the Cologne Chamber of Commerce.33 The gathering resembled to some extent the French Council General of the departments, but it was also the forerunner of a later conference that was called to advise on the composition of the provincial diet, and of the meeting of the diet itself. It was a small but significant step toward the formation of the Rhine province, even before the area had been ceded to Prussia. Second, though Sack's government was represented by several officials (tariff and tax directors from both banks and Commis32 Karl Brinkman, Die preussische Handelspolitik vor dem Zollverein und der Wiederaufbau vor hundert Jahren (Berlin, 1922), pp. 46-48; Ernst Moritz Klingenburg, Die Entstehung der deutsch-niederlandischen Grenze im Zusammenhang mit der Neuordnung des niederlandisch-niederrheinischen Raumes 18131815 (Diss. Bonn, 1940), pp. 139-40. J. G. Heydweiller, a silk producer representing Crefeld interests, had earlier gone to Paris and obtained favorable treatment from Talleyrand for Crefeld's products. 33 See RWWA: 1/5471/Koch to Chamber of Commerce, Jan. 20, 1815, and Protocol and petitions of conference.

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sioner Boelling), members of the conference felt free to develop independent positions. Eventually the delegates submitted a number of reports that differed from the ideas of the government. Prussia's Minister Biilow, for example, had recommended a sim­ ple tariff system based on the weight of the goods shipped, not on their value. The delegates, in a unanimous opinion, agreed that a system based on weight was feasible, but they recommended a lower rate than that proposed by Biilow. They reserved for a fu­ ture conference recommendations as to which articles in trade de­ served special consideration on import duties, which should be free of all duties, which might benefit from export duties, and which should not be imported at all. Moreover, the conference did not limit itself strictly to discussing tariff questions. It went on record as opposing consumption taxes, a business tax, and excise taxes. Third, the meeting provided a forum for expressing a collective judgment about Sack's administration. A special petition com­ posed by the delegates of the Left Bank noted that the war of 1814 had split apart what was previously a single economic unit, thereby creating great hardships for manufacturers and workers. However, petitions to Sack had resulted in the beneficial tariff ar­ rangement with Belgium, and this brought forth the following comment: The joy which the news [of the treaty] spread throughout the entire governorship could alone already serve as proof that this treaty is advantageous for us. . . . All of [the important cloth, silk, and iron-finishing factories] stood nearly at a standstill when the treaty with Belgium was concluded; now they are once again set in motion, and they are operating again precisely because under the agreement with Belgium the products of our industry, with the exception of a few articles, freely found entry into that land. Therefore, the delegates wished to thank Sack on behalf of busi­ ness and all inhabitants for his "wise and fatherly administration

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of our land and for his contribution to the treaty concluded with Belgium." The sentiment of the conference, as reported by Koch to the Cologne Chamber of Commerce on January 20, was that the business community could clearly hope for continued "protec­ tion and support" from the "well-intended" government, and for future adjustments in the tariff situation to be made on the basis of "local conditions." The favorable impression made by Sack was strengthened in April 1815, shortly after Prussia had acquired the Rhineland at the Congress of Vienna, when J. F. Jacobi was named a special commissioner to draw up a new tariff system for the Prussian ter­ ritories on the Rhine.34 He promptly wrote to all Rhenish cham­ bers of commerce and consultative chambers for manufacturing to ask for any information—preferably hard data—that would help him in his new task. He declared that, given the difficulty of con­ structing a new tariff system, one "could not begin any better than if, with complete confidence in the chosen representatives of commerce in the affected provinces, he asked them to assist him in quickly fulfilling the benevolent intentions of [their] elevated monarch."35 The chambers, of course, complied with Jacobi's re­ quest, undoubtedly seeing his assignment as a significant gesture of good faith toward the business community of the Rhineland on the part of their new ruler. Meanwhile, the issue of trading privileges on the Rhine had been resolved at the Congress of Vienna. That the staple and transshipment rights of Cologne and Mainz were doomed was 34

Lindner, p. 325. RWWA: 1/54/1/Jacobi to Chamber of Commerce, April 10 and 22, 1815, and June 22, 1815. Cologne's chamber submitted earlier memorials quite promptly, requesting more time to collect new information. To this Jacobi gladly agreed, but on June 22, 1815, two months later, Jacobi wrote to the chamber complaining that he had not yet received the promised materials, though he had heard from all other chambers. He asked whether the chamber had perhaps sent their requests and information directly to the minister. A marginal note on the earlier letter of April 10 suggests that the Cologne Chamber had sent the re­ quested information directly to Sack. 35

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probably a foregone conclusion. Article 5 of the Treaty of Paris of May 30, 1814, had contained the fateful clause stating that the Rhine was to be free "jusqu'a la mer." Nonetheless, Cologne, Mainz, and Sack had done their best to defend the privileges "in a moment when a thousand political interests cross each other," as the Cologne Chamber of Commerce once put it.36 The Congress formally opened in October 1814, but already in August Cologne had sent petitions to Metternich and Hardenberg asking for the preservation of the staple right, and arguing that only a combination of privilege and a general treaty could make firm, rational trade arrangements possible. The chamber also retained its old friend Daniels, the jurist serving on the Brus­ sels appeals court, to act on its behalf in Vienna. Unfortunately Daniels soon had to leave Vienna, and he turned over Cologne's affairs to a former imperial diplomat named von Hinsberg.37 Von Hinsberg was soon joined by another representative of the Lower Rhine, J. J. Eichhoff, the former director of the Rheinsehijffahrtsoktroi under the French. On November 28, Sack wrote to the various chambers of commerce, saying that he hoped to per­ suade the Congress of Vienna to establish conditions that would help the Rhenish economy, conditions that might include some kind of protective tariff as a basis for negotiations with France. To this end he had appointed Eichhofif to represent the business community in his governorship in Vienna. Having already writ­ ten to Stein and to the Prussian king, Sack urged the chambers to provide Eichhoff with detailed economic reports and to contri­ bute 450 francs from each chamber by way of support.38 All but 36RWWA: l/24b/19/l 1; Eckert, "Rheinschiffart," p. 79; see G. A. Kertesz, ed., Documents in thePolitical History of the European Continent, 1815-1939 (Ox­ ford, 1968), pp. 2-5, for an abridged text of the treaty. 37 RWWA: l/23b/19/22, 29-32. For Cologne's effort in Vienna, see Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 367-73. Also Gerhard Schopkens, "Die Tatigkeit der Handelskammer zu Koln auf dem Gebiet der Rheinschiffart vom Wiener Kongress bis zum Abschluss der revidierten Rheinschiffartsakte, 1814/15-1868" (Diplomarbeit, Cologne, 1967/68), pp. 32-33. 38 SaA: Registrator Cremer/IV/31/18; RWWA: 1/26/5/49.

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one of the chambers complied with the request. Only Cologne re­ fused, perhaps because of hopes of Hinsberg's success, or perhaps because the chamber distrusted Eichhoff, with whom it had had many dealings during the previous twenty years.39 Cologne's decision may not have been a wise one, because Hinsberg proved ineffective and ill-informed.40 In any case, Eich­ hoff and Mainz's delegate were equally unable to prevent the newly formed international Rhine commission from deciding unanimously to abolish all river fees and transshipment and staple rights. The Rhine was to be free, and states with borders on the river could levy tariffs no higher than the 1804 Octroi Conven­ tion.41 Cologne protested to Hardenberg and the Prussian king, but to no avail. Finally, on June 19, the day after the Battle of Waterloo, Hardenberg explained to the chamber the reasons for ending the privileges. In addition to the general principle of free­ ing trade, there were the provisions about the Rhine in the Treaty of Paris and the needs of other Rhenish cities. Cologne, he felt, would prosper anyway from increased trade, since the natural reasons for reloading in Cologne had not changed.42 Cologne's long battle over the staple right, begun when the French first in­ vaded the Rhineland, appeared to be over. Attention was focused all the more on Jacobi's project for a new Rhenish tariff. Having heard the opinions expressed by Rhenish economic in­ terest, Jacobi proposed a tariff system intended to benefit both manufacturing and commerce. He based his suggestions on three principles. First, the state should draw the maximum advantage from duties on goods forwarded through Prussia but without in any way reducing or damaging that trade. Second, exports should be nearly duty-free, except in those few cases where a specific domestic industry might benefit from an export duty. Third, im39 Gothein,

p. 153; Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 370; RWWA: l/32b/19/39. l/23b/19/39, 43; 1/26/5/58. 41 Eckert, "Rheinschiffart," pp. 83ff. Frankfurt, on the other hand, called the privilege obsolete. 42RWWA: l/23b/19/71. 40 RWWA:

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port of both consumer necessities and raw materials for domestic industry should likewise bear only a small burden but, on the other hand, all those goods should be taxed "which only serve fashion, which we can do without, or which we can ourselves produce—that is, those manufactured articles which are produced just as well in this province as in foreign lands, or which could be with a little encouragement."43 The duties levied on exports, for­ warded goods, and essential imports should be only high enough to cover the costs of inspection and tariff administration, no higher. A differential tariff, adjusted to the value and character of each item in trade, was therefore essential. Border inspection would of course be necessary, but Jacobi dismissed the objection that his system would bring high administrative costs. Inspec­ tions, he felt, were intrinsic to any tariff system, and careful in­ spection would discourage smuggling, would not hurt legitimate commerce, and would still protect and stimulate industry. To be sure, not everyone was pleased with Jacobi's proposal. The Cologne and Diisseldorf merchant communities sent memo­ randa to Jacobi urging greater freedom for Rhine trade and ob­ jecting to provisions in Jacobi's proposal that, they felt, favored manufacturers from Berg who wanted a privileged market pro­ tected by prohibitive tariffs. Cloth producers from Aachen, Crefeld, Stolberg, and Monschau pressed for a bilateral trade agree­ ment with France that would guarantee access to French markets for Left Bank manufactured goods.44 Nevertheless, Jacobi's pro­ posal was an important step. Himself a businessman, he had called on the advice and experience of his Rhenish colleagues in fulfilling his commission. It seemed that businessmen could ex­ pect to participate in the formulation of Prussia's economic policies. 43 RWWA:

1/54/1/Memorial from Jacobi, Aug. 14, 1815. 1/54/1/Diisseldorf Chamber to Cologne Chamber, Sept. 10, 1815, and Cologne memorial, Sept. 20, 1815; Klingenberg, p. 140; Brinkman, pp. 102-3. 44 RWWA:

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Berlin, however, had its own ideas. After only a year, Sack's trade arrangement with Belgium was allowed to lapse. This led Holland to move in the direction of a general tariff border against Prussia. Jacobi now found himself being asked by Cologne and Diisseldorf to act as a lobbyist on behalf of Rhenish merchants in new negotiations with Holland.45 Moreover, it was soon clear to Jacobi that Finance Minister Biilow was ignoring Jacobi's care­ fully prepared tariff proposal in favor of his own simple import tariff based on weight. Jacobi reacted by composing a fascinating essay in which he defended his own proposal and presented his objections to what he felt was a high, prohibitive import tariff.46 The economic and political insight expressed in the essay, unique in that uncer­ tain transition period, was derived from a broad perspective— Rhenish, Prussian, and German. Jacobi did not state views that were simply representative of Aachen or of Left Bank manufac­ turers. His outlook was rather that of a Rhenish businessman, now long experienced in national economic policy, who was called upon to represent the best and most advanced ideas of the whole Rhenish business community. The essay reflects the Rhenish experience of the previous twenty-five years. Jacobi was aware of the regressive aspects of the guild-dominated old regime, but he also recognized the fact that the Kleinstaaterei, the multiple-state system of the old re­ gime, brought a great deal of personal and economic freedom along with particularism. The French had proved that a common national economy, free of internal tolls, was beneficial but that the excesses of the Napoleonic blockade should be avoided. Internal freedom combined with a liberal tariff policy toward foreigners was best. Jacobi began his essay by announcing his willingness to give his "unlimited endorsement" to Finance Minister Bulow's import 45 46

RWWA: 1/53/15/38, 58. RWWA: 1/54/1/Memorial by Jacobi.

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tariff, because there was a pressing need to resolve the issue at last and to construct a tariff system for the Rhineland. Noting with a hint of bitterness that Biilow had also ignored the advice of the provincial tariff directors and the suggestions put forth by the January assembly of Rhenish merchants (both having urged a much lower tariff rate), Jacobi asked for either a reconsideration of his own proposals or a modification of Biilow's tariff based on an analysis of the probable consequences of a high tariff. Here his own words most clearly impart the tone and spirit of his argu­ ment. "There is a general complaint that many branches of Ger­ man industry would be hard pressed by the tariff walls of foreign states; consequently the expectation of many manufacturers to find protection and help against this evil through equal countermeasures is very understandable, and if there is talk about the introduction of a common German tariff wall, there is by all means much to be said for such a measure." The arguments against protective tarifls, however, were strong. Jacobi noted that in fact industrial activity had been greatest in places like the Rhineland and Saxony where there had been "the most unconditional freedom." Moreover, with the abo­ lition of the old German imperial constitution, there was nothing to prevent every state from enacting its own protective tariffs. "But what would become of German trade and industry if each of the remaining 30 or 40 states of the German confederation wanted its own trade policy according to its individual domestic or foreign trade relations and methods and according to the differ­ ent views of its administrators and then, based on this policy, con­ structed a prohibitive tariff, surrounding its territory with tariff inspectors, and caused abundantly irritating suffering at each border entry, departure, or through passage, according to arbi­ trariness, ill-humour, or in response to friction with neighbors?" The answer, Jacobi felt, was obvious. Mutually armed against each other with protective tariffs, each German state would see its economy turn inward, shrink, and atrophy, while those states

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that were especially dependent on foreign trade suffered most. Through "the blessing of heaven, the advantages of geography, the most unconditional personal freedom, based on the independ­ ence of property, and a fortunate ordering of social relations re­ tained with rare wisdom," the Rhineland had become a showcase of prosperity "of which there is no equal in Germany and all told very few on the inhabited earth." But cut off from the rest of Prus­ sia, as it was, the Rhineland was almost completely dependent on foreign trade for the import of raw materials and for the export of all manufactured goods in excess of what the local population could absorb. The unilateral introduction of a protective tariff by Prussia would bring little real benefit and would threaten trade with complete disaster. Indeed, such a tariff would entice resi­ dents of border regions (such as Jacobi's native Aachen) to en­ gage in massive smuggling, "a game of chance" that would undermine the relations between "ruler and subjects" and destroy public order altogether. This, Jacobi undoubtedly knew, was a prime concern of Prussia's rulers after 1815; he hoped it might be the decisive argument in persuading the Berlin authorities to modify their tariff plans to fit Rhenish needs. No response to Jacobi's essay was forthcoming from Berlin. Indeed, Jacobi's effort was the last of the major Rhenish initiatives begun by Sack for the purpose of constructing regional economic policy. Henceforth tariff policy was initiated in Berlin, with little consultation of Rhenish interests. In March 1816, only a few days before Sack was removed as Rhenish Oberprasident, Jacobi was appointed as Prussia's representative to the new Rhine commis­ sion in Mainz. The appointment, which was obtained through Jacobi's friendship with Wilhelm von Humboldt, an old family friend and Prussia's first delegate to the Rhine commission, re­ moved him from his strong position in the Rhine province. When the Cologne Chamber sent him congratulations on his new posi­ tion, Jacobi expressed his thanks for the well-wishes and declared resignedly that his working principle would be "live and let

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live."47 The failure of his tariff project and his departure from the Prussian Rhineland indicated once again the uncertain position of Rhenish business interests in the new post-1815 Prussia. Political Impact of the Transition Period Ambiguity, perhaps, is the best word to describe the political situation in the Rhineland during this period of transition to Prussian rule. As we have seen, Sack did his best to win the al­ legiance of the Rhineland to the Prussian cause. His success in administering the unpopular wartime measures, his toleration of former French officials, his endorsement of Rhenish business in­ stitutions, and his efforts on behalf of the Rhenish economy have already been cited. And there were other achievements that should be noted. Sack's presence in Aachen, for example, helped to lure virtually all of that town's leading citizens, including most of the members of the chamber of commerce, the commercial court, and the labor arbitration board into the local militia.48 Moreover, Sack pointed with pride to the women's auxiliary that he and his wife had sponsored in the Rhineland. This associa­ tion was created in the spring of 1814 to care for sick and wounded soldiers; thereafter it directed its attention very success­ fully to the care of lost and foundling children. In a letter written on March 20, 1816, just three days before his removal as Rhenish Oberprasident, Sack noted that the auxiliary was composed "in part of the wives of the same officials who had been employed by the French administration, in part of the wives of the most distin­ guished merchants and factory owners of this city [Aachen]," and he singled out for praise the wife of the manufacturer Leonard Startz. Other manufacturers from Aachen whose wives were members included von Guaita, van Houtem, and Kelleter; the Cologne branch included the wives of Mumm, SchaaShausen, 47 RWWA: 48

1/26/5/192,214. SaA: Oberburgermeisterakten/16/l/I/Lists of Aug. 18, 1815.

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Schiill, and von Wittgenstein, and the Crefeld branch had a von der Leyen as chairman. Sack's wife was the provincial chairman, and the Oberprasident was himself so pleased with the auxiliary that he recommended "improvement in education and upbring­ ing of the female sex among all classes of the people."49 This or­ ganization testifies to Sack's ability to win the Rhinelanders to his side and to obtain the cooperation of the business community. The political impact of Sack's work, however, was offset by the actions of Berlin officials. Indeed, to the Rhineland, Prussian be­ havior must have appeared as a series of broken promises or dis­ appointed hopes. Thus where Sack granted Cologne's request to have the appeals court in that city, Hardenberg turned down a petition that Cologne's university and bishopric be restored. He also refused to make Cologne a provincial capital on the grounds that the city lacked a proper building and that Cologne had a his­ tory of promoting her own independence and her own rather than regional interests.50 Whereas Sack had taken energetic measures to bolster both manufacturing and trade, Hardenberg and Bvilow procrastinated. They promised prompt action on such matters as a trade treaty with France and Rhine traffic through Holland but then deferred these matters for leisurely consideration.51 Even more serious, nothing came of the promises made in April and May 1815, when the crown declared that Rhinelanders would have the right to consent to taxation and that some form of national and provincial representation would be established. There was considerable support among Rhenish notables for some sort of representative assembly.52 Hardenberg took the first steps toward fulfillment of these promises when, in early July, he asked Rhenish officials to appoint six representatives from each of 49 HSAD-K:

Regierung Aachen/Prasidialbiiro/54/5-ll. pp. 114, 121-22; RWWA: 1/26/5/27. 51 RWWA: 1/8/11/148; 1/26/5/104, 127, 180. 52 Alfred Hermann, "Die Rheinlander und die preussische Verfassungsfrage 1815-1823," Annalen des Historischen Vereins fiir den Niederrhein 120 (1932):95-104. 50 Gothein,

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three estates (farmers, city dwellers, and noble manor owners); these men were to attend an imminent meeting to discuss reform­ ing the old estates into a new representative body for the Rhineland. Sack was told to choose men on the basis of independent income, love of the fatherland, and freedom from local prejudice. Collaborators with the French were to be excluded. Although Sack did not appoint a single "city" representative from Aachen, Cologne, or Crefeld, he did appoint Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen of Crefeld, as one of the six delegates from the noble estate. However, the renewed war with Napoleon, coupled with grow­ ing fear of what a "constituent assembly" might do, led Hardenberg to postpone the meeting indefinitely. The expectations of the Rhineland, which had enjoyed at least limited representation under the French, had been raised falsely.53 Uncertainty over the political status of the Rhineland was com­ pounded when the king not only reneged on his constitutional promise in this way, but also banned the Rheinischer Merkur, a nationalist, constitutionalist journal published in Koblenz by Joseph Goerres. The Rhineland had expected that freedom of speech and freedom of the press would be granted when Napoleonic censorship ended.54 Even more indicative of Berlin's growing conservatism and dis­ trust of the new provinces was Sack's dismissal. For the most part Sack had been highly successful during his tenure on the Rhine. He had administered unpopular wartime measures. But at the same time he had won the respect and cooperation of leading 53 HSAD-K: Oberprasidium Koln/161/102-3; Reinhold K. Weitz Der nieder1 rheinische und westfalisehe Adel im ersten preussischen Verfassungskampf 18151823/24 (Diss. Bonn, 1970), pp. 64-65. 54 Fritz Hartung, "Der preussischer Staat und seine westlichen Provinzen," in StaatsbildendeKraftederNeuzeit (Berlin, 1961), p. 424; Joseph Hansen, "Von der franzosischen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart," in Geschichte des Rheinlandes von der altesten Zeit bis zur Gegenwart, Hermann Aubin et al., vol. 1 (Essen, 1922), 277; Walter Simon, The Failure of the Prussian Reform Movement, 1807-1819 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1955), p. 109.

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Rhinelanders, largely through his willingness to utilize French institutions and former French officials. As the French had learned, securing participation of leading citizens in decision making and administration was the best means of getting political support and, in the long run, winning loyalty.55 Sack's activities, however, had also earned him enemies in Ber­ lin. He had rebuffed Justice Minister Kircheisen on the introduc­ tion of Prussian law in the new Rhenish territories, even reinstat­ ing the jury system in Berg after it had been abolished.56 He had acted almost as an independent sovereign in concluding the tariff pact with the Netherlands, and his ideas on tariffs differed from those prevailing in Berlin. Finally, he was at odds with Count Solms-Laubach, the man scheduled to become the second Rhenish Oberprasident, over jurisdictional boundaries.57 Sack had built strong regional support, but in Berlin his backers were from the reform circle that was meeting increasing opposition. As a result, it was decided to transfer Sack to Pomerania. This simultaneously reduced Rhenish autonomy and increased de­ pendence on Berlin for the solution of problems that were pecul­ iarly Rhenish. However, not all of Sack's policies were reversed. In June 1816, Chancellor Hardenberg sponsored the formation of a new justice commission (Immediat-Justiz-Kommission) to study the advisability of introducing the Prussian General Code to replace the Napoleonic Code.58 Until its work was done, French law was to prevail on the Rhine, and French institutions like the chambers of commerce were to continue to exist and func55 Bar, pp. 121-22, notes that many Rhenish cities and chambers of commerce wrote to Berlin supporting Sack's retention as administrative head in the Rhine provinces. 56 Ernst Landsberg, Dte Gutachten der Rheinisehen Immediat-Justiz-Kommission und der Kampf um die rheinisehe Reehts- und Geriehtsverfassung, 1814 bis 1819 (Bonn, 1914), pp. xxiv-xxv. See also Steffens, Briefweehsel Sacks, p. 82n. 57 For the rivalry between Sack and Solms, see August Klein, Friedrieh Grafzu Solms-Laubaeh (1815-1822) (Cologne, 1936). 58 Landsberg, p. xxxix.

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tion. Sack's transfer, in short, must be seen primarily as an asser­ tion of Prussian and royal authority over regional interests. Like other Rhinelanders, the businessmen of Cologne, Aachen, and Crefeld had accepted Sack as the symbol and representative of Prussian authority and as the proponent of a special role for the Rhineland in Prussia. The removal of that symbol seemed to sig­ nal an end to the illusion of Rhenish autonomy, and Rhinelanders now waited to see whether Rhenish institutions could be recon­ ciled with the structure of Prussian authority and with Berlin's perception of Prussia's needs.

8. Businessmen, Politics, and Administration in Prussia

THE removal of Sack from his position as Oberprasident in the spring of 1816 brought to an end the brief transitional period that had been characterized by regional autonomy and great authority in the provincial administration. Sack had acted as a spokesman for Rhenish interests, and he had won the respect of Rhenish no­ tables. After his departure the Rhineland was exposed to the full range of political currents existing in post-Napoleonic Prussia. Berlin wanted to integrate the newly acquired Rhenish territories with the Prussian state, but because of the long period of French occupation the Rhineland was not entirely trusted, and although Berlin wanted to unify and harmonize legal and governmental in­ stitutions in all parts of the monarchy, it proved expedient to allow the Rhineland to retain many institutions of French origin. Rhinelanders rejected the Prussian form of urban self-government in favor of the French mayoral system and rejected the Prus­ sian general code in favor of the Napoleonic codes. Moreover, while fighting to retain their own institutions, the Rhinelanders demanded through their spokesmen a constitution and a greater political representation on both the provincial and national levels. These were the major issues that animated political discussion in the Rhineland. They derived in part from differences between the Prussian and Rhenish experiences during the Napoleonic era, and in part they can be traced to divergent impulses within the Prussian reform movement. Discussion of these issues helped to mold the thinking of early Rhenish liberals about the political

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process and about Prussia. In combination with debates on broad political issues, the actual working of the administration gave to political life in the first two decades of Prussian rule the character of paradox, compromise, and ambivalence. Prussia succeeded in integrating her new territories, but on the Left Bank she did not produce unrestrained enthusiasm for the new regime.

The Legacy of the Prussian Reform Movement

In order to comprehend the impact of Prussian rule on the Rhine, it is necessary first to devote some attention to the reform movement. The reformers, their achievements, and their failures have been the subject of many studies, the results of which need not be repeated here.1 It is sufficient to note that, for the most part, the reform movement was a response to the disastrous defeat of Prussia's armies by Napoleon in 1806, and to discuss briefly some of the conflicting trends within the movement itself. The once-proud state of Frederick the Great found both her armies and her territories greatly reduced in size and her freedom of ac­ tion virtually gone. Reluctantly, in October 1807, Frederick Wil­ liam III turned to Baron vom Stein for leadership. Stein hailed from Nassau in the Rhineland; he was not Prussian but an impe­ rial knight who had entered Prussian service. His origins, his in­ dependence of mind, and the nature of his proposals made him distasteful to the king and to many conservative royal advisors. He had been a minister from 1804 to early in 1807, when he was dismissed for what amounted to insubordination. His recall as first minister in October was prompted by Prussia's helplessness 1 This summary of reform-era studies is based primarily upon: Koselleck; Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy·, HeiFter; Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte·, Simon; Ernst Klein, Von der Reform zur Restauration (Berlin, 1965); Gerhard Ritter, Stein, eine politische Biographie, 2 vols. (Stuttgart, 1931); Friedrich Meinecke, The Age of German Liberation, 1795-1815, ed. and intro. Peter Paret, trans. Peter Paret and Helmuth Fischer (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977); and Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (New York, 1976).

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Map 2 PrussianRhine Provinces-1818 Rhine River

Cleve

Boundories

PROVINCE

State Provinctal

Crefeld

PROVINCE OF

Dijsseldorf

WESTPHALIA

JULICHCLEVEBERG

Cologne

PRUSSIA

Koblenz.\,

NASSAU

PROVINCE OF THE

FRANKFURT

LOWER RHINE Mainz

HESSE \

LUXEMBURG Trier

BAVARIAN PALATINATE

FRANCE 40 km

SOURCE: Based on Niessen, p. 41; and Franz Petri and Georg Droege, eds., Rheinische Geschichte, 2 vols. (Diisseldorf, 1976-78), 2:373.

before Napoleon, and thirteen months later Napoleon forced his ouster. Stein was of course not the only reformer; he was joined by Gneisenau, Scharnhorst, Boyen (all military officers), Hardenberg, Theodor von Schon, and Wilhelm von Humboldt, to name a few. Nevertheless, in spite of his brief tenure in office, Stein was the guiding spirit behind all but the military reforms.

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The reformers' immediate goals were to rejuvenate, to re­ vitalize the Prussian spirit, and to restore the state's economic and fiscal strength, upon which rearmament might be based. To reach these goals, Stein and the reformers determined first to stimulate the economy by doing away with the corporate restric­ tions and the outdated privileges that encumbered it, and second to obtain the participation of all propertied classes in the adminis­ tration of government. It was hoped that the first would increase tax revenues, while the second would reduce administrative costs, bolster the credit of the state, and form "correct public opinion about national affairs."2 Successive edicts (some proclaimed after Stein's departure) abolished all corporate obstacles to occupa­ tional mobility, provided tax reforms, abolished the guilds, eman­ cipated the peasantry, and provided reforms in education and municipal government.3 The impact of these reforms varied, depending on the means of implementation and the amount of resistance encountered— especially from the old nobility. In combination with basic army reforms, however, they effected the restoration of Prussian power and made possible Prussian participation in the defeat of Napo­ leon. For the purposes of this study, the important thing is that there was a considerable degree of similarity between what the Left Bank of the Rhine experienced under the French and what Prussia experienced under the reformers. This similarity certainly facilitated the integration of the Rhineland with Prussia, although conflicts within the reform movement also produced tension be­ tween Prussia and her new lands. The most obvious areas of similarity were social and economic. The French, like the Prussians, instituted equality of occupa­ tional opportunity and abolished corporate institutions and feudal privileges. They had also instituted agrarian reforms, against 2 Stein,

2, pt. 2:854. See also p. 764 and pt. 1:393. Koselleck, pp. 58-59, 168, 279; HefFter, pp. 204-5; Meinecke, German Liber­ ation, pp. 49-50. 3

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which the Rhenish landed nobility—relatively few in comparison with Prussia's—had put up little resistance.4 The policies intro­ duced by the reformers were thus, in large part, meant to modern­ ize social and economic conditions in the older parts of Prussia, which would have made them more like those in the Rhineland. However, when it came to the political reforms initiated by Stein, the situation was more complicated. Stein and his sup­ porters had before them two examples, England and Napoleonic France. Napoleon provided a model of how to tie an economically innovative, ambitious middle class to an authoritarian state through a mixture of authoritarian and relatively liberal institu­ tions. Though real power in France remained in the hands of the centralized bureaucracy, the complex system of electoral as­ semblies and advisory councils, ranging from the local to the na­ tional level, brought the notables of the society together to discuss various issues. These assemblies helped to bridge the gap be­ tween the sovereign monarch and the society, to integrate the propertied classes into the state, and to develop a sense of nation­ hood and national purpose. The English provided a model of ex­ tensive local self-government and a national parliament, both composed exclusively of men of property, "wise and practicalminded men, under the control of the public," and without a rigid and burdensome bureaucracy.5 In a sense, what the reformers proposed was a combination of the two, adjusted to German circumstances. Stein sought the political regeneration of Prussia and a strengthened monarchy. He envisaged a series of reforms that would build by stages a con­ stitutional state with an active, patriotic citizenry. Initially men of property and education (and not just the nobility) would begin to share governmental responsibility on the local level through par­ ticipation in the administration of taxes, police, and other public 4

See Weitz, pp. 28-50. pp. 150-51; Gray, "Schroetter, Schon and Society."

5 Vincke,

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affairs. Later, as these men gained political experience, and as economic growth enabled increasing numbers to own property, the old estates of the realm would be reformed and given consul­ tative, advisory powers on the regional and then national levels. Increasing participation in public affairs would educate the citi­ zenry politically. Though the king would remain sovereign, polit­ ical cooperation between the public and the state bureaucracy would unify and strengthen the state. These were the ideas be­ hind Stein's reform of Prussian local government, the first step in the political regeneration of the nation.6 A second kind of reform was directed toward a more efficient administration of government from the top down. Here the key figure was Hardenberg, chancellor from Stein's departure until his death in 1822. Stein too had wanted efficient government. He had sponsored the abolition of collegial administration at the ministerial level in favor of specialized ministries, each headed by one man who was responsible to the king for the administration of his ministry. However, Stein's primary interest was in reform and regeneration at the lower levels, in the cities and the countryside, while Hardenberg was more concerned with reorganization of the Prussian bureaucracy. For him the importance of the new ministerial system lay in the fact that it meant a more centralized, smoother running bureaucratic system.7 Always jealous of his own power and wanting to retain per­ sonal control of Prussian policy, Hardenberg forged an adminis­ trative bureaucracy that brought many of the social and economic 6 Dieter Schwab, Die iiSelbstverwaltungsidee" des Freiherrn vom Stein und ihre geistigen Grundlage (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 113-15. See also, Gray, "Government by Property Owners"; Hans Boldt, Deutsche Staatslehre im Vormarz (Diisseldorf, 1975); Hartwig Brandt, Landstandische Reprasentation im deutschen Vormarz (Neuwied, 1968); and Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy, ed. and intra. Gordon A. Craig, trans. Grete Heinz (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977). 7 See E. Klein, pp. 8-14, 313-19; Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy, p. 203.

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reforms to fruition, but at the same time he neglected to encour­ age political initiatives from below. Like Stein, Hardenberg wanted eventually to see the formation of a constitutional state, but first he wanted to complete the reconstitution of the bureau­ cracy. Until Prussia was "ready," political decision making had to be administrative decision making, not decision making by repre­ sentative assemblies.8 In 1811 Hardenberg had called an assembly of notables to Ber­ lin to advise the government on financial reform, but the ensuing disagreements between the urban and agrarian representatives convinced him of Prussia's political immaturity.9 He was unwill­ ing to put up with the kind of slow, argumentative decision mak­ ing that is a corollary of parliamentary government. A profes­ sional, efficient, centralized bureaucracy was much easier to deal with and control. Moreover, after 1815 Hardenberg was under pressure from strong conservatives who sought to block or stall the reform movement altogether, because they felt that Napo­ leon's defeat had made further reform unnecessary. When, in 1819, Hardenberg came into conflict with the most active reform spokesmen—Humboldt and Boyen—the conservatives backed the chancellor, insured the defeat of continued reform, and then helped to isolate Hardenberg from the reform movement during his remaining years in office. It is not surprising, then, that the political path taken by Prus­ sia after 1815 was tortuous. Supporters of Stein's ideas, Hardenberg, the forces of conservative reaction, and provincial political leaders all pursued different goals. The issue with the potentially broadest impact was that of constitutionalism and political repre­ sentation. In 1815, at the time of annexation, the king had prom­ ised that the consent of the state's inhabitants (including that of 8

Koselleck, pp. 164-65; Krieger, pp. 220-21. the 1811 assembly and for the 1812 "intermediate national representa­ tion," another assembly that failed to accomplish anything, see E. Klein, pp. 178-79; Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, 1:299-302; Koselleck, pp. 174-75. 9 For

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the Rhinelanders) would be sought on matters of taxation and that some form of provincial and national representation would be granted. This commitment was made publicly; the question was what kind of representation would be granted, and when. Some officials hoped to build a form of representation into the Staatsrat, or Council of State, the body that stood at the top of Prussia's administrative pyramid. Made up of the ministers, the crown prince, the Oberprasidenten, and other high officials, the Staatsrat was supposedly the highest advisory body to the king. The Oberprasident was the highest official in a province. He was both the representative of the ministry in the provinces and the representative of the province in the Staatsrat. Thus he func­ tioned in much the same way as the representatives on mission and the commissioner for the Rhine departments had functioned during the early years of French rule, and as the special commis­ sioners had functioned under the governors general during the transitional period after Napoleon's defeat. Recognizing this, res­ idents of the new western territories flooded the Oberprasidenten with petitions to be communicated to the central government. In the absence of a national legislature, the Oberprasidenten were thus in a position to turn the Staatsrat into a "legislature of bureaucrats," to use the phrase of Reinhard Koselleck.10 The Staatsrat first met in June 1817, at the height of the discussion of a constitution. Encouraged by Humboldt and Beyme, the ten Oberprasidenten submitted memoranda calling for further reforms and seeking a greater advisory role for themselves. Some, like Vincke in Westphalia, sought to increase their real power and turn their positions into something like those of the French pre­ fects.11 Naturally, Hardenberg rejected this. It detracted from the 10 Koselleck, pp. 223-30, 267; Heffter, pp. 122-23; E. Klein, p. 190. See also Kreiger, p. 221; Gray, "Schroetter, Schon, and Society," p. 76; and Willerd Fann, "The Rise of the Prussian Ministry, 1806-1827," in Sozialgeschichte Heute, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Gottingen, 1974), p. 123. 11 Koselleck, pp. 229-37.

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authority of the chancellor and the ministers in the centralized bureaucracy. And, it will be recalled, the problem with Sack had been that he sympathized with regional interests to the point of endangering national policy. As a result, Hardenberg did not grant the Oberprasidenten additional authority, and the Staatsrat fell in importance, serving only to block measures initiated by the throne. The citizens of the Rhineland, of course, were not privy to the discussions of the ruling circles in Berlin. They were aware only that the granting of a constitution was being postponed and that it seemed the king was still interested in redeeming his promise of provincial and national representation. In August 1817, Baron von Altenstein journeyed from Berlin to the Rhine to gather opin­ ions on this issue. He reported a widespread desire for a constitu­ tion that would provide a means by which Rhinelanders could in­ fluence legislation at both provincial and national levels. City councils and local officials composed petitions requesting creation of a provincial diet that would respond to Rhenish needs. The pe­ titions argued that eligibility should be based on ownership of property—both landed and mercantile—and education. Rhenish notables would thus be represented much as they were under the French. Cologne's city council even asked the king to allow the French councils general of the departments to meet as a provi­ sional diet until such time as the councils could be modified to conform better with the wishes of the inhabitants and the wishes of the king. Furthermore, the petitions requested that the deliber­ ations of a diet, and political activities generally, be public.12 The very fact that the government solicited opinions on the 12 Eduard Hemmerle, Die Rheinlander und die preussische Verfassungsfrage auf dem ersten Vereinigten Landtag (1847) (Bonn, 1912), p. 12; Alfred Stern, "Die preussische Verfassungsfrage im Jahre 1817 und die Rundreise von Altenstein, Klewiz, Beyme," Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschaft 9, no. 1 (1893):67£f.; Hermann, "Rheinlander und die preussische Verfassungsfrage," pp. 104ff.

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issue of representation raised expectations that something was to be done and that Rhenish opinions were of consequence. These expectations were not fulfilled. Fears of a Jacobin revolt in 1818, pressures from Metternich in Vienna, the resistance of conserva­ tive ministers and representatives of the East Prussian Junkers, and the conservatism of the iponarch all combined to thwart plans for a constitution.13 Indeed, not until the Revolution of 1848 forced it upon them did the king and his ministers deem Prussia ready for political representation on the national level. Instead, the government finally moved to establish provincial diets alone. The structure of these provincial diets varied, depending on what sort of estates or assemblies had previously existed in each prov­ ince. In the case of the Rhine province, a new province made up of many formerly sovereign territories and lacking traditional es­ tates, it was necessary to create an entirely new institution. Con­ sequently, in late 1822 the government called an assembly of Rhineland notables to Berlin to advise on the composition of the promised diet. This group of notables was a far cry from the French assemblies of notables. Only five of the twenty men had come from the busi­ ness world, and of these, Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen of Crefeld was now considered a titled landowner rather than a manufacturer. The rest were noblemen, estate owners, or officials, which gave the assembly a conservative, rural cast.14 Fur­ thermore, rather than being allowed to determine its own agenda, the group was asked to comment on thirty-three questions pre­ sented to it by the government. This enabled the government in most cases to elicit the recommendations that it wanted. For 13 Koselleck,

pp. 151, 189, 267, 276-77, 319, 323-24; Heffter, pp. 207-8. Hasenclever, ed., "Zur Entstehung der rheinischen Provinzialstande. Aktenstuke iiber die Beratungen der rheinischen Notabeln in Berlin im Novem­ ber und Dezember 1822, zur Zusammensetzung und Zusammenberufung der Provinzialstande," Westdeutsche Zeitschrift fiir Geschiehte und Kunst 25 (1906):198ff. 14 Adolf

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example, the assembly was asked how many estates could be identified or defined for the Rhine province. But in the very next question, it was asked how many delegates should represent each estate, assuming that they were four in number: (a) old noble families, (b) owners of entailed estates or manors (Rittergutsbesitzer), (c) residents of cities, and (d) remaining rural property owners. The assembly replied by recommending that the second, third, and fourth estates each have twenty-five representatives. (In the first diet representatives of four noble families made up the first estate; thereafter five families were represented.)15 The gov­ ernment did not ask whether ownership of land should be a qual­ ification for election as a representative of the third estate (the cities); it asked "which conditions, in terms of wealth and landownership as well as business occupation, are necessary."16 The assembly could do nothing but help define these qualifications. Nor was the assembly of notables asked to advise on the powers of the provincial diet. These were narrowly defined by the gov­ ernment. The diet could discuss laws proposed by the govern­ ment that might affect personal and property rights and taxation, but only to the extent that these matters pertained to the prov­ ince. The diet could submit requests and petitions to the king on matters that affected the welfare and interests of the entire prov­ ince or a part thereof, and it could discuss communal affairs if it had the king's prior consent. Issues of national importance were thus beyond its competence. A two-thirds majority was needed to pass any resolution. This made it possible for the nobility and es­ tate owners to defeat any resolution they objected to. Diet deci­ sions, even those that pertained solely to provincial affairs, were only advisory, not binding on the government.17 The diet was finally instituted more or less on the lines recom­ mended by the assembly of notables, though with a few changes. 15

Udo Klausa, "Die Verwaltung der Provinz," in Das Rheinland in preussischer Zeii, ed. Walter Frost (Cologne, 1965), p. 81; Bar, pp. 556ff. 16 Hasenclever, p. 209. 17 Ibid., p. 224.

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Instead of having the presiding officer elected by the diet, as the notables recommended, Prussia appointed a marshal from the ranks of the first or second estate. A subcommittee that included most of the Left Bank notables, all of the businessmen, and all but one of the nonnobles presented a special petition asking for at least limited publication of the debates in an official organ of the government, but the petition was denied. Publication of the min­ utes of the debates was forbidden, and such summaries as might appear were not to identify speakers by name.18 The government and the notables, however, were in agreement on the eligibility requirements for election to the diet and for the right to vote for delegates. The requirements for membership in the third estate interest us particularly because they applied to Cologne, Aachen, and Crefeld. All representatives to the diet from all four estates had to own landed property. In addition, representatives of the cities had to have paid a combined land and business tax of at least thirty thalers, no less than eighteen thalers of which was business tax, and they must have managed their own firms for ten years. Mayors and other local government officials were eligible for elec­ tion to the diet, and they were exempted from the tax re­ quirements. As a result of these qualifications, businessmen whose capital was liquid and not tied up in real estate, individuals living off interest from investments, and most educated professionals—the class of "intelligence"—were excluded. Given the close relations between local government and busi­ nessmen, restricting eligibility in this way meant that urban rep­ resentation in the diet could become representation of established economic interests rather than representation of the general pub18 Ibid., pp. 229-32. They also asked for more autonomy for city governments in the Rhineland. Helmut Kramer, Fraktionsbindungen in den deutschen Volksvertretungen 1819-1849 (Berlin, 1968), pp. 16-20, argues that these limitations, plus actual procedure used during meetings, helped prevent the growth of political coalitions in the diets.

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lie. Indeed, the representation of special interests lay at the heart of a system that conceived of representation in terms of estates.19 This tendency was strengthened by the urban franchise, which required that a voter be thirty years of age, have an unspotted reputation, and have paid the necessary taxes for ten consecutive years. Poorer artisans, workers, small shopkeepers, and the like were thus excluded, as of course were the unemployed. The busi­ nessmen and officials eligible for election made no effort to democ­ ratize the franchise, however much they tried to increase the power actually exercised by the diet.20 The other great political issues in the Rhineland were the pos­ sible introduction of the Prussian General Code and the Prussian system of urban self-government advocated by Stein. When the Rhineland was annexed, Prussia's plans to eliminate French institutions and French law and to establish administrative uni­ formity for the entire state seemed to offer fiscal savings and a smoother integration of the new territories. Rhenish notables, however, joined forces with Prussian officials serving on the Rhine to block these plans and defend the legacy of Napoleonic rule. And, in respect both to law and city government, the de­ fense was based in part on principle and in part on experience and self-interest. The decision to retain the French legal codes in the Rhineland was the result of the work of the Immediat-Justiz-Kommission— the special commission created by Hardenberg in response to the dispute between Sack and Justice Minister Kircheisen over the introduction of Prussian law. The commission was made up of six members, all from the judiciary and all with experience in the 19 Hasenclever, pp. 209-10; Weitz, pp. 218-24; Koselleck, p. 342; Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy, p. 207n. 20 Hasenclever, p. 212; Karl-Georg Faber, Die Rheinlande zwischen Restauration und Revolution (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp. 116-17. In Cologne in 1830, only 393 residents met the tax requirements for voting. All but 141 were excluded for other reasons, and of these only 71 turned up to vote. H ASK: 400/II/24D/1.

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Rhineland. As his representative to the commission, Hardenberg decided upon Heinrich Gottfried Wilhelm Daniels, the Cologne lawyer whom we have encountered previously as the author of es­ says favoring Cologne's staple right and as Cologne's lobbyist for a brief time at the Congress of Vienna. Now the general prosecutor on the court of appeals in Brussels, Daniels joined the commission only after getting a commitment that the Rhineland appeals court would be located in Cologne and that he would be its presiding officer.21 Daniels proved to be the guiding influence in the commission, in the ministerial committee set up to examine the reports of the commission, and in the preparation of a special report supporting the commission's choice of French over Prussian law. It was largely because of Daniels's influence (reinforced by timely peti­ tions from Cologne, Trier, and high-ranking provincial officials), that the Allgemeine Landrecht was not introduced on the Left Bank of the Rhine. Daniels and the commission, Rhenish nota­ bles in local government, provincial officials, and decision makers in Berlin all recognized that the Napoleonic codes were better suited to Rhenish social and economic conditions. Rhinelanders had become used to equality before the law and the unhindered movement of men and property. The jury system was popular both as a means of resisting arbitrary administration of the law and, since jurors were drawn from the ranks of property owners, as insurance that the law would deal severely with those who committed crimes against property.22 The issue, as far as the structure of local government was con­ cerned, was whether to introduce Stein's pattern of town self21

Landsberg, pp. lvi-lvii. Ibid., pp. xciii-cxvii, 353ff., and final cabinet order of August 3, 1818, pp. 367ff.; Hansen, Preussen und Rheinland, pp. 37-40; Droz, Liberalism, pp. 84, 117-26; on the jury system see Dirk Blasius, "Der Kampf um die Geschworenengerichte im Vormarz," in Sozialgeschichte Heute, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Gottingen, 1974). 22

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administration. French towns, it will be recalled, were governed by an appointed mayor who was advised by a council on taxation and budgetary matters. In towns of more than five thousand in­ habitants, the prefect appointed half of the council, and the other half was elected by an electoral college. Only the hundred highest taxed citizens were eligible to be elected or appointed to the town council. The system devised by Stein provided for the election of the entire council by local notables owning land and paying fairly high taxes of 150 to 200 thalers per year. The council in turn would choose the city magistrates, who were supposed to form an administrative college dependent on the council. Thus there was no mayor at the head of city administration. Stein distrusted the French system with its strong mayor, but at the same time he fa­ vored a council and magistracy composed of local men of affairs rather than academically trained, professional bureaucrats who had little practical experience with the real needs of a city. This system, of course, was based on Stein's idea of getting men of property to participate in government, the step that was to start Prussia's rejuvenation.23 On the face of it, the Stein system offered a greater degree of political participation and local autonomy than did the French system. Why, then, did the Rhinelanders and provincial officials prefer the latter? For one thing, they had long been used to a mayoral system. Even before the French invasion many selfgoverning cities like Aachen had had strong, virtually irremova­ ble mayors, in spite of laws that were supposed to limit the mayor's power. Then, during the French period the mayors of most towns had been highly respected local citizens, usually former businessmen, who made every effort to remain in frequent and close contact with local notables. The mayors had done their 23

Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, 1:175; Gerhard Ritter, Stein, 1:385-88; Heffter, pp. 92ff. See Schwab, p. 133, and Gray, "Government by Property Owners," on the connection of property and the capacity for politics in Stein's thought.

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best to represent their cities before higher authorities. And fin­ ally, the mayoralty system had proved efficient in managing city affairs while still being accessible to citizen initiatives.24 To Rhinelanders the Stein system had its disadvantages. It re­ served to the central government the right to organize and ad­ minister the police force in large cities. Also the central govern­ ment could overturn local elections to the magistracy and declare newly passed town laws invalid. The magistracy was thus weakened to such a degree that, in a large town, it might lack enough power and independence to do a good job. Moreover, implementation of the Stein system in the Rhineland also would have meant introducing legal distinctions between residents in a town and residents in the countryside. The French system made no such distinctions, giving all citizens equal legal standing. This legal equality of its citizens fitted the actual social and economic conditions of the economically advanced Rhineland, where the putting-out system tied the rural hinterland to the towns.25 In short, the limitations of the Stein system made it the less at­ tractive of the two. While the strong mayoralty system was not self-government, Berlin's right to intervene and to control police power meant that the Stein system, though so called, was not in fact self-government either. Rather, it was self-administration, de­ signed to give city residents a taste of politics while control was retained in Berlin.26 Rhenish preference for the French mayoralty 24 Franz Steinbach and Erich Becker, Geschichtliche Grundtagen der kommunaIen Selbstverwaltung in Deutschland (Bonn, 1932), pp. 181-88, argue that what the French brought was similar to what had developed earlier, and hence the acceptance of the French system. 25 Steinbach and Becker, p. 176; Koselleck, p. 580; Karl-Georg Faber, "Die kommunale Selbstverwaltung in der Rheinprovinz im 19. Jahrhundert," Rheinische Vierteljahrsblatter 30 (1965):136ff. 26 On this see Ritter, Stein, l:383ff.; Ritter's article "Der Freiherr vom Stein und die politischen reform Programme des Ancien Regime in Frankreich," Historisehe Zeitsehrift 137, 138 (1928-29); Schwab; Boberach, Wahlreehtsfragen, p. 46. Simon, pp. 29ff., translates Selbstverwaltung as self-government, I think incor­ rectly. Even though Stein may have been thinking of the English system, he did

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system was by no means the paradox that one noted historian finds it to be; it was a preference based on satisfactory experience with one form and reasonable objections to another.27 With some changes, the form of local government brought by the French survived until 1845, but the issue of local government continued to be the subject of debate. Suggestions for modifica­ tions came from both Berlin and the Rhineland. In 1828, the year he was appointed to the Aachen city council for the first time, David Hansemann composed one of his first political memoranda. In it he criticized the French government for giving the central government (through the appointment of the mayor) too much room for interference in local affairs. At the same time, he criticized the Stein system on the ground that voting qualifica­ tions were too democratic and that it did not provide a strong enough executive. Hansemann favored a franchise limited to the most highly taxed citizens, though perhaps not limited to the list of the hundred men currently eligible for appointment to the town council.28 The memorandum was sent to local officials and to Berlin, but Hansemann's suggestions were not followed. In 1831, still hoping to reconcile the differences between Rhenish and Prussian institutions, Berlin offered the Rhineland a choice between their current system, the Stein plan, and a revised form of city government based on the Stein plan. Most high pro­ vincial officials, including the Oberprasident and the district presi­ dents, remained opposed to the legal separation of town and countryside and urged retention of the French system, despite their distrust of the Rhenish town councils, which were domi­ nated by wealthy businessmen.29 An assembly of delegates from not copy it. See also Mack Walker, "Napoleonic Germany and the Hometown Communities," Central European History 2 (1969). 27 Faber, "Kommunale Selbstverwaltung," p. 135. 28 Bergengriin, Hansemann, pp. 79-80; Boberach, Wahlrechtsfragen, p. 55. 29 Heffter, pp. 214-15; Koselleck, pp. 578-79; Helmut Croon, "Rheinische Stadte," in Das Rheinland in preussischer Zeit, ed. Walter Frost (Cologne, 1965), pp. 90-96. See also Horst Lademacher, "Die nordlichen Rheinlande von der

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nineteen Rhenish cities called together by the government to con­ sider adoption of the revised city government plan also wanted to keep the French mayoralty system. In addition, the assembly de­ manded that: (a) all members of the city council be elected; (b) the council have the right to petition the mayor; and (c) the coun­ cil have permission to meet whenever it wished and not just at the request of the mayor.30 Peter Heinrich Merkens, the leader of the Cologne Chamber of Commerce, had acted as a spokesman for the assembly of city del­ egates, and when the issue came before the diet, Merkens con­ tinued his defense of the French system. Appealing to principles of civil equality and citizenship, he pointed out that several years before the beginning of the Prussian reform movement "the Rhine Province and the Left Bank in particular obtained . . . the blessing of the emancipation of the cities, the confirmation of the rights of the citizen, and the maximum of enviable liberty. . . . Because of the French occupation, we have become attached to the idea of full citizenship (Staatsbiirgertum), which, in turn, has awakened in us a love of the public welfare and respect for the law." This sense of having full citizenship, Merkens declared, was now threatened by the Prussian desire to introduce a distinction between the legal rights of rural and urban residents. "The per­ sistence of French institutions during the last thirty years has given Rhinelanders a feeling for the equality of rights upon which our entire social organization rests."31 The diet rejected both the original and revised Stein plans for municipal government. In addition to the demands made by the assembly of city delegates, the diet proposed three classes of fran­ chise for city elections, based on the percentage of total taxes paid Rheinprovinz bis zur Bildung des Landschaftsverbandes Rheinland (18151953)," in Rheinische Geschichte, ed. Franz Petri and Georg Droege, vol. 2 (Diisseldorf, 1976), 513ff. 30 Gothein, p. 225; Grupe, p. 19. 31 Quoted in Droz,Liberalisme rhenan, pp. 137-39; also in Gothein, p. 225.

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by each class, thus insuring the predominance of property own­ ers. This proposal was rejected by Berlin, but it should be noted that the idea was incorporated into the 1845 city-government plan that was introduced in the Rhineland and was also one pro­ totype for the later Prussian general franchise. In 1831, however, the French system was left in force, although the definition of town citizenship was broadened to include all residents, and the minimum income level, upon which the franchise was based, was lowered to the point where virtually all town residents were eligi­ ble to vote in city elections.32 This was the opposite of the re­ stricted franchise advocated by Merkens and the diet. Here again the Rhineland had to be satisfied with a com­ promise. The French mayoralty system was retained, but with modifications that gave Berlin increased control over local affairs. Rhenish notables had had to be satisfied with limited self-admin­ istration, not self-government, just as they had to be satisfied with limited provincial representation, not national representation or true parliamentarianism. The high expectations of 1815 were not realized. At the same time opportunities for political activity had not disappeared. The Prussian Bureaucracy and the Rhineland In the absence of true legislative bodies and of real local selfgovernment, public affairs rested primarily in the hands of the Prussian bureaucracy. Consequently the success of Rhenish busi­ nessmen in presenting and defending their own interests and those of their communities depended largely on the abilities and attitudes of administrators. This situation, of course, was identical to that during the period of French rule. And, just as the French had earned the cooperation of the inhabitants of the Left Bank by appointing—at least in most cases—capable officials, so during 32 Gothein,

p. 230; Hansen, Preussen und Rheinland, p. 60; Koselleck, p. 580; Boberach, Wahlrechtsfragen, p. 102; Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, 1:176-77.

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the first two decades of Prussian rule Rhinelanders became accus­ tomed to an administration that was usually staffed by able men. The Prussian administration was headed by the ministers and their bureaus and the Staatsrat, which had already been dis­ cussed. For business affairs the two most important ministries were finance and trade, the latter functioning only from 1817 to 1825, when it was abolished. Sack, as we noted in the previous chapter, had allowed businessmen in the chambers of commerce to correspond directly with the ministers, as they had done under French rule, and this practice continued. Rhenish businessmen thus had considerable contact with top government officials. Be­ cause economic and financial reforms were among the most suc­ cessful products of the reform era, it is significant that the minis­ ters with whom Rhenish businessmen dealt most often were those who continued to represent the reform spirit within the increas­ ingly conservative Staatsrat. This, in turn, earned them the trust of the Rhinelanders, even when their ideas were not in line with those of Rhenish interests.33 Between 1815 and 1825, businessmen worked regularly with Count Ludwig von Biilow, finance minister until 1817 and minister of trade from 1817 to 1825. Biilow, who had served under Jerome Bonaparte in the Kingdom of Westphalia before entering Prussian service, was a partisan of the reform movement, as befitted a cousin of Hardenberg. Businessmen also worked with Friedrich Christian von Motz and Karl Georg Maassen, finance ministers from 1825 to 1830 and 1830 to 1835 respec­ tively. Both men had served the French in Westphalia; both were associates of Westphalian Oberprasident Vincke, and both were supporters of the reform movement. All three ministers advocated a liberal trade policy and tax reform, and all three were open to initiatives from outside the ministerial ranks. For example, when Biilow approved the creation of a stock exchange in Cologne in 33 Gothein, p. 181. Billow's differences with Jacobi and Sack were recounted in the previous chapter.

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1820, he declared: "It will be very pleasant for me, in considering the statutes, to comply with the wishes of the local merchant community to the extent that the existing constitution allows."34 The business community's relations were less cordial with Wilhelm von Klewitz, finance minister from 1817 to 1825, and with Friedrich von Schuckmann, the interior minister from 1814 to 1834 and the official responsible between 1830 and 1834 for handling many of the problems formerly handled by the nowdefunct ministry for trade and industry. In neither case, however, were relations bad enough to turn businessmen against the bureaucracy. On the provincial level businessmen, like most Rhinelanders, had reason to be satisfied with the individual officials appointed by Berlin, but the structure of the administration evolved in a way that was less acceptable. The first Oberpriisidenten, as the highest ranking provincial officials, had considerable influence on the administrative changes. Their instructions were to supervise the work of the district governments (Bezirksregierungen) and to in­ sure unity, expedience, and efficiency. These directives, together with the preferences of the Oberprasidenten themselves, led to several changes in administrative jurisdictions that were detri­ mental to Left Bank cities. After Sack's dismissal, two provinces were formed in the Rhineland. The Lower Rhine, which was placed under the Oberprasident Baron Karl von Ingersleben, included the three district governments of Koblenz, Trier, and Aachen. Ingersleben made Koblenz, the old residence city of the archbishop of Cologne, his capital. Thus Aachen lost the status of provincial capital, which it had under the French and under Sack, to become the seat of a district government. The province of Jiilich-Cleve-Berg included the districts of Cologne, Dusseldorf, and Cleve. Its Oberprasident, 34 RWWΑ: 1/23Ύ22/196; Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, new ed.; Koselleck, pp. 219-22; Huber, Verfassungsgeschichte, 1:140; A. Klein, "Solms-Laubach," p. 70.

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Count Friedrich Christian zu Solms-Laubach, made Cologne his capital. But Crefeld, before 1792 one of Prussia's proudest pos­ sessions and under the French an arrondissement capital, became a mere county seat within a district.35 When Solms-Laubach died in 1822, the two Rhenish prov­ inces were combined under Ingersleben with Koblenz the capital, though the administrative area was not officially known as the "Rhine Province" until 1830. The district of Cleve was consoli­ dated with that of Dusseldorf. And Cologne, the largest city in the Rhineland, became like Aachen no more than the seat of a dis­ trict government. It was painful for her to see her old rival Ko­ blenz become provincial capital and to see Bonn chosen as the site of a new university.36 However, it was not only civic pride that was affected by these administrative changes. The shift of provin­ cial officials to new locations was a real inconvenience to the busi­ ness community since businessmen needed frequently to deal with officials. Ingersleben died in 1831, and the new Oberprasident was Philipp von Pestel, the former Dusseldorf district president and one-time prefect in the Kingdom of Westphalia. Pestel was Oberprasident until 1834; his successor, Baron Karl von Bodelschwingh, was a Westphalian nobleman who had been a Regierungsprasident in Trier and in 1842 went on to become finance minister.37 The actual administration of government was in the hands of the district presidents, not the Oberprasidenten. Though it was the duty of the Oberprasident to supervise the work of the district governments in his province, he was not the immediate super­ visor of the district presidents. He could, however, exert pressure 35

Bar, pp. 132-33. See RWWA: l/23d/31/140, in which the Cologne Chamber of Commerce threatened Hardenberg with the deterioration of political loyalty if Cologne should cease to be the residence of the Oberprasident. 37 Bar, pp. 144-45, 152ff. 36

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on them because they had to correspond with Berlin through him. The office of Oberprasident thus served as a sort of buffer be­ tween district officials and the ministers in Berlin. The district presidents were responsible directly to Berlin. They not only ad­ ministered law, they also proposed legislation to be enacted in Berlin, considered legislation proposed elsewhere, and acted as spokesmen for their districts. And they served as the channel through which information and petitions were passed on, by way of the Oberprasidenten, to higher officials, including the minis­ ters.38 Between 1817 and 1825, the administrative apparatus was made up of two large divisions: the first dealt with matters relat­ ing to internal security, public order and health, rural police, town administration, religious minorities, military affairs, statis­ tics, censorship, and school and church administration; the second division dealt with government finances and taxes, trans­ portation, forestry, industrial and trade regulation, and official bookkeeping. In the old Prussian tradition, the councilors (Rate) for each subsection met with the district president in plenary ses­ sion to vote on issues, and all shared responsibility for decisions. This division of responsibilities was changed under a cabinet order of December 31, 1825. On the recommendation of District President Pestel of Dusseldorf, and of the Rhenish lmmediatJustiz-Kommission, divisions were established for: (a) internal af­ fairs; (b) church and school administration; (c) indirect taxation; (d) direct taxation, domains, and forests; and (e) the budget and bookkeeping. At the instigation of Pestel, trade and industry were placed under a taxation division, on the grounds that eco­ nomic policy affected the welfare of the whole state, not just gov­ ernment finances. This system was in part modeled after the French prefecture 38 Koselleck, pp. 229-239; Bar, pp. 138ff.; Theodor Ilgen, "Organisation der staatlichen Verwaltung und der Selbstverwaltung," in Der Rheinprovinz, 18151915, ed. Joseph Hansen, vol. 1 (Bonn, 1917), 143.

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system, the district presidents being made responsible for admin­ istration in their districts. Collegial decision making was retained, however, to prevent the district president from acquiring as much power as the prefects had had. And the Prussian system lacked a regional institution like the prefecture council that afforded op­ portunities for direct political participation by local notables who were not trained for government service.39 During the period under study, Aachen had only one district president, von Reimann, an associate of Sack's from Berg and a man who supported the reform movement. Pestel was district president in Diisseldorf (with jurisdiction over Crefeld) from 1826 to 1831, when he became Oberprasident. Cologne had two district presidents: Ludwig von Hagen, from 1816 to 1825, fol­ lowed by David Heinrich Delius, from 1825 to 1834. Von Hagen had the reputation of being a drinker and gambler; his duties were carried out by subordinates. Delius had been a member of the Rheinschijfahrtskommission in Mainz, where he had suc­ ceeded Aachen's J. F. Jacobi. Like Reimann and Sack, Delius had participated in the provisional administration on the Rhine from 1814 to 1816 and was a proponent of liberal economic policies.40 The divisions of the district government were staffed by profes­ sional bureaucrats, men who had passed the university examina­ tions that qualified them for entry into the state bureaucracy. Un­ like the French administrations, which drew very liberally upon local notables of all occupations and which often therefore in­ cluded businessmen, the Prussian bureaucracy was academically trained and did not offer administrative opportunities for Rhenish 39 Bar, pp. 183-89; Koselleck, pp. 246-50, 260. The transfer of economic af­ fairs to the internal division partly corresponded to a similar transfer on the ministerial level when the trade ministry was dissolved in 1825. See also HSAD-K: Oberprasidium Kbln/Reg. Cleve/I Abteilung/Letter from Cleve Dis­ trict Government to Interior Minister Schuckmann, Feb. 15, 1818, complaining about the lack of an equivalent of the prefecture council. 40 Bar, pp. 198-99; Kellenbenz and Eyll, pp. 57-58.

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merchants or manufacturers—for their university-trained sons of the next generation, perhaps, but not for the current, untrained entrepreneurs. This did not mean, of course, that native Rhinelanders who had the requisite academic training could not be­ come government councilors and assessors. An 1822 list of offi­ cials from the six Rhenish districts shows fifty-four of ninety-nine to be natives; a study of Rhineland administration indicates that for the hundred-year period between 1815 and 1915, 59 percent of the councilors and assessors of the six districts were Rhinelanders by birth.41 The strongest point in favor of the Prussian administrative structure at the district and provincial levels was the choice of personnel. Oberprasident Solms-Laubach is a case in point. He was a native of the Rhineland, loved its people, and loved the city of Cologne. A friend of Stein's, Solms-Laubach shared his belief in corporatism and his desire for extensive political reform at the local level. He strongly supported greater authority and au­ tonomy for provincial administrations, and he approved of close contact between officials and the local population to keep the gov­ ernment aware of regional problems and interests.42 Because of his personal interest in the problems of the province, he sought, for example, to convince Hardenberg that in the representative diet promised to the Rhineland, the nobility would have to be given a less important position than they had in the diets of other parts of Prussia. This was because the Rhineland had compara­ tively few nobles who owned manors. In 1817, Solms-Laubach called together a conference made up of provincial officials and 41 Bar, pp. 173-80; Ilgen, p. 95; HSAK: 403/43/3; 403/75/140; 403/76/118; August Klein, Die Personalpolitik der Hohemollemmonarckie bei der Kolner Regierung (Diisseldorf, 1967), pp. 34ff.; and John A. Armstrong, The European Administrative Elite (Princeton, 1973), pp. 202-7. 42 Walter Gerschler, Das preussische Oberprasidium der Provim Julich-KleveBerg in Koln 1816-1822 (Cologne, 1967), pp. 29ff.; also Alfred Hermann, "Graf zu Solms-Laubach," Annalen des Historischen Vereins fiir den Niederrhein 87 (1909); A. Klein, "Solms-Laubach."

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mayors to try to influence the tax-reform legislation then being discussed in Berlin. The effort, unfortunately, was wasted, since the overriding concern of Klewitz, the finance minister, was the national debt, and he had little sympathy with special treatment for the new provinces.43 Nevertheless, Solms-Laubach helped to strengthen the belief that in disputes with Berlin provincial offi­ cials were allies of the citizenry. Like Solms-Laubach, Delius, Pestel, Reimann, and Ingersleben all had reputations as honest administrators very sympa­ thetic to Rhenish interests and needs. All four were natives of the Right Bank and had experience with or had served in the French administration of the Kingdom of Westphalia. They were thus familiar both with the Rhineland and with the strengths and weaknesses of French law and institutions. The presence of such men helped to reduce Rhenish suspicions of Prussian bureau­ cratic practice that were aroused by the gruff behavior of lesser career officials.44 Businessmen in Local Government It was on the local level, in town government, that businessmen could hope to participate directly in political affairs, although here, too, officeholding was increasingly professionalized. Busi­ nessmen played only a small role in the county (Kreis) govern­ ment that was set up to bridge the administrative gap between district and local government. This gap had been filled by the 43 Gerschler,

pp. 66ff., 132-35. p. 232. Droz, Liberalisme rhenan, p. 71, argues that some officials were liberal, "but it is no less true that the rigidity and brutality of the Prussian bureaucracy quite often disconcerted the Rheinlanders." A "closed class," Prus­ sian officials were noted for "their hostility with respect to all civil liberties, their hatred of the bourgeoisie, which sought political emancipation." The picture painted by Droz is certainly an unfair exaggeration of negative aspects of bureau­ cratic rule in the Rhineland. None of the men mentioned above could be called "brutal." 44 Gothein,

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subprefectures under the French system. In the countryside the supervision of police, taxation, and some judiciary functions was the responsibility of the Landrat, or county councilor—an estate owner appointed by the king but nominated by the county "diet" (.Kreisstandische Versammlung, or Kreistag). This assembly was composed of members of the local nobility, other estate owners, and representatives of the towns and countryside, all of whom were to be officials. If a county lacked a qualified estate owner (as was often the case in the Rhineland, where the social structure differed widely from that of the rest of Prussia), some other prop­ erty owner could be appointed. In such cases it was possible for a businessman to become a Landrat, as happened, for example, in the county of Malmedy.45 The effect of these administrative changes on the Left Bank and especially on the three cities we have been discussing was not very great. Under the French system, small, rural villages in the Roer department had been consolidated for administrative pur­ poses under a single mayor, and this practice was continued under the Prussians, in spite of offers from Berlin to introduce the less centralized Prussian system, which gave greater local control but less efficiency.46 Therefore, in some cases the mayors rivaled the Landrate in importance. In the large cities, moreover, the country diet was chaired by the mayor, not the Landrat, and its limited advisory powers on taxation were largely assumed by the city councils. Aachen and Cologne, in fact, did not have proper Landrate at all, their functions being assigned to the police presi­ dent. The institution of police presidents was a second modifica­ tion of the mayoralty system. The French mayors had supervised the local police, but in large towns the Prussians appointed a police director or president responsible to Berlin. This is an indi45

Bar, pp. 220-25; HSAK: 403/5404/127. Georg Rolef, Die rheinische Landgemeindeverfassung seit der franzosischen Zeit (Diss. Berlin, 1912-13), pp. 27-41. 46

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cation that even though Berlin appointed Rhenish mayors, it still feared that the local governments might be too strong.47 How important were businessmen among the political figures on the local level? In Crefeld, neither of the Landrate were busi­ nessmen (Heydweiller, 1816-17; Cappe, 1817-33), though Heydweiller was related to leading Crefeld cloth producers. Heydweiller's brother, a lawyer by profession, was Crefeld's mayor from 1815 to 1818, when he was replaced by K. A. Jungblut, a career bureaucrat, who stayed in office until 1833. Both Landrat Cappe and Mayor Jungblut were appointed to straighten out Crefeld's municipal finances, which had been en­ tangled ever since 1792 with the finances of the silk producers who had loaned money to the city. The Heydweiller family itself had been one of the creditors. With Cappe and Jungblut in office, for the first time since 1794 Crefeld had neither native Crefelders nor manufacturers at the head of local government. However, as an outsider, Mayor Jungblut relied on aides who were silk or cloth producers from the old families: de Greifif, Rigal, Sohmann, Scheibler. Leading historians of Crefeld state that these aides to the mayors were the most important political figures in the town during the first third of the nineteenth century. But we should note also that Landrat Cappe was guided by the great Mennonite businessmen, especially the von der Leyens, who were by then the most prominent "landed nobles" in the area.48 Aachen's LandratlVoXice Director von Coels (1818-48) and Cologne's Police Directors von Struensee (1816-31) and Heister (1833-46) did not have business backgrounds, nor were they na­ tives. Until 1820, Aachen's mayor was von Guaita, the former cloth manufacturer who had held the office since 1808. From 47 See Heffter, pp. 30, 131-32, on Kreistage; and Bar, pp. 237ff., 326. In late 1833, on the recommendation of Oberprasident Pestel, the mayors of Cologne and Aachen were given back their supervisory powers over the local police administra­ tion. 48 Buschbell, pp. 170-71, 180-82; Helmut Croon, "Biirgertum und Verwaltung in den Stadten des Ruhrgebietes im 19. Jahrhundert," Tradition 9 (1964):16,28.

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1820 to 1832 two adjunct mayors took over the duties of mayor. Of these, Franz Wilhelm Daniels was a lawyer and notary, but Christian Oeder was a merchant dealing in wool and dyestuffs.49 From 1832 until 1848 the office of mayor was held by Edmund Emundts, a privy councilor, former judge, and a general prosecutor. In Cologne, as in Aachen and Crefeld, the trend was away from appointment of local businessmen to public office and toward ap­ pointment of professional bureaucrats. We noted in the previous chapter that shortly after the French defeat, Wittgenstein had been replaced by Carl Joseph von Mylius, a jurist. Mylius was resentful, as was the entire city, when von Struensee was ap­ pointed as police president in 1816 and when some of what had been the mayor's prerogatives and functions were transferred to him. Indeed, the two adjunct mayors, Riegeler and Herstatt (both merchants), resigned pardy because of Struensee's appointment. Their places were taken by the former police officer, Franz Rudolf von Monschaw, and Caspar Langen, a merchant and wool-yarn manufacturer.50 Mylius kept up a running battle with provincial and Berlin authorities in an effort to abolish Struensee's position. He composed a lengthy essay supporting his own position and also advocating an elected city council based on a restricted fran­ chise. A dispute in late 1818 and 1819 between the Cologne city council and the chamber of commerce was the final straw; Mylius resigned to return to the appeals court bench.51 Langen and Monschaw then administered the office of the mayor until 1823, when a new mayor was appointed. The new mayor was Adolf Steinberger, who served until 1848. 49 Huyskens, p. 133; Bar, pp. 289ff., lists Daniels and, I think incorrectly, a man named Solders instead of Oeder as adjunct mayors. 50 Gothein, pp. 125CF.; Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 420; and RWWA: 1/3/2/79 and 1/3/3/272. We should note that in 1817 the merchants of Mag­ deburg, where Struensee had also been police president, trusted him to obtain from the Cologne Chamber of Commerce information that might facilitate the cre­ ation of a similar chamber of commerce in Magdeburg. 51 Gothein, pp. 131-37.

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Interestingly, Steinberger's first important job had been as secre­ tary to the Aachen Commercial Court in 1805. In order to obtain that post he used as references Acting Prefect Jacobi, Legislator Peltzer, several councilors to the prefect, and several leading judi­ cial officials. It appears, therefore, that he was familiar with French law, with the workings of the Aachen business commu­ nity, and with many of the notables of the French Roer depart­ ment.52 After three years with the commercial court he moved to Cologne to become a notary. When the chamber of commerce congratulated Steinberger on his appointment as mayor, he as­ sured the members of the chamber that he "not only did not fail to recognize but rather acknowledged with deepest conviction and joy the intimate connection between the welfare of our great im­ portant city and that of the merchant community."53 In his his­ tory of Cologne, Eberhard Gothein contends that though a good and honest man, Steinberger was a weak mayor. During his ten­ ure the key figures in the city were District President Delius, Struensee, District Councilor J. B. Fuchs, Fuchs's son and the city's secretary, Johann Peter Fuchs, and the members of the chamber of commerce. Certainly, Delius, J. B. Fuchs, and the chamber cooperated on important decisions, but usually Struen­ see and Steinberger raised no obstacles. An old friend of Co­ logne's merchants, Fuchs was responsible primarily for school and church matters, but he also supervised elections to the com­ mercial court, the chamber of commerce, and the labor arbitration board.54 As we would expect, businessmen dominated the town council, where eligibility was based on wealth, and appointment (now by the district government rather than the prefect) was based on so­ cial standing. For Crefeld, the historian Helmut Croon has pro­ vided a list of town-council members and their occupations after 1815; this information is summarized in table 13. The one large 52

HSAD: Roer Dept/D2/II/Prafektur/III Division/2 Bureau/6 Handel/8/27-31. RWWA: l/23f/48/Letter of Nov. 15, 1823. 54 Gothein, pp. 218-20; A. Klein,Personalpolitik, pp. 30ff.; and Fuchs, p. 215. 53

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

TABLE 13

Crefeld Town Council, 1815-1834

Businessmen Merchants Manufacturers Artisansa Landed proprietors Farmers Administrative officials Judicial officials Lawyers Othersb Total

273

Number

Percent

16 39 11 1 9 2 1 1 4

19 46 13 1 11 2 1 1 5

84

99

SOURCE: Croon, "Biirgertum und Verwaltung," pp. 22, 29-31. a Brewer, dyer, baker, grocer/distiller, druggist, tinsmith, butcher. " Doctor, rector, two without occupation.

landowner in the council was a von der Leyen, now one of the nobility. An 1817 roll of the Cologne city council shows 74 per­ cent to be businessmen, and similar figures hold for Aachen.55 The pattern set in the French period, whereby at least two-thirds of the members of the councils of the major cities were made up of businessmen, continued under Prussia. Many of those sitting in the town councils were holdovers from the French period, but important newcomers were able to obtain seats. Several notable examples come to mind. The Cockerill fam­ ily moved from England to Liege (then part of France) during the Napoleonic period. Machine builders, they supplied the Lower Rhineland first with textile machinery built after English models and later with some of its first steam engines. In 1813 one Cockerill son married the daughter of the Aachen cloth and needle manufacturer, P. H. Pastor. When he moved to Aachen in 1825, he was quickly invited to join the town council, perhaps to insure his staying (along with his skills and capital).56 David Hanse55

RWWA: l/23d/30/l 10; SaA: Oberburgermeisterakten/44/2. p. 160.

56 Bruckner,

274

RHENISH BUSINESS AND PRUSSIAN RULE

mann, later a leader of Rhineland liberalism, first moved to Aachen from Rheda in Berg in 1817 to open his own business as a wool merchant, and eleven years later he was appointed to the city council.57 Ludolf Camphausen, who became Prussian minis­ ter president in 1848, first came to Cologne from a small town near Aachen in 1830. Only a year later he was appointed to the city council, where he was a prominent figure until 1847, when he left for Berlin.58 The town councils, in other words, did pro­ vide political opportunities for dynamic young businessmen with recognized abilities. Businessmen in the Left Bank's three largest cities thus re­ tained control of the city councils, though they lost the office of the mayor to academically trained jurists or civil servants. In any case, local governments continued to work well for the business communities, as they had under the French. Events in Aachen suggest very close cooperation between the mayor, the city council, and businessmen, especially those in the chamber of commerce. This is not too surprising, since the mayor was automatically the president of the chamber of commerce and chaired its meetings, but it is clear that cooperation between the institutions went beyond their formal ties. For example, in 1818 the Aachen Council selected Mayor von Guaita, the merchant Johann Peltzer, and a lawyer named Miiller to present to Chan­ cellor Hardenberg a petition "on behalf of the factories and trades of the city," asking for lower state taxes and greater autonomy in local taxation. Von Guaita, representing Aachen's business inter­ ests, subsequently submitted the petition and received an interest­ ing reply from Hardenberg: "According to the corporate con­ stitution which His Majesty the King intends to introduce in the Rhine provinces, just attention will be accorded to the cities rela­ tive to their political importance and thereby without a doubt due 57 Bergengriin,

Hansemann, pp. 32-33, 76. Angermann, "Gottfried Ludolf Camphausen und Otto v. Camp­ hausen," Neue Deutsche Biographie. 58 Erich

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

275

consideration will be given to the conditions of the city Aachen."59 Ifhis answer is any indication, Hardenberg was aware that the economic and political interests of the Rhineland towns were nearly identical. Daniels, the lawyer who followed von Guaita as Aachen's mayor, was also attentive to business needs, as was the town council during his tenure. In 1828 the mayor, the council, and the chamber of commerce dispatched David Hansemann (now both a councilman and a chamber member) and the forester Wilhelm StefiFens to Berlin to try to counter Cologne's proposal for a central provincial wool market that would exclude Aachen. The delegation to the capital met with several officials, including Ministers Altenstein and Schuckmann, and succeeded in thwart­ ing Cologne's plans.60 Apart from the mission's success, Hansemann strengthened his personal contacts with Berlin officials, and the Aachen town council saw its importance as a local representa­ tive body confirmed by the welcome accorded its delegates. Ironi­ cally, Daniels thought the town council of such importance that in 1830 he asked the Aachen district government to deprive Hansemann of his seat because of his poor attendance—a request granted over Hansemann's protests.61 The most dramatic incident in Aachen during the first two decades of Prussian rule provides a good illustration of the coop­ eration that existed between businessmen, the city council, and city officials. At the end of August 1830, some 80 to 100 young artisans staged a riot to protest work conditions, underemploy­ ment, a possible wage cut, and the growing riches of some needle and cloth manufacturers. As 4,000 looked on, the rioters attacked 59 SaA: eoSaA:

C)berburgermeisterakten/41/10/4, 10. Oberburgermeisterakten/41/10/15, 18; Bergengriin, Hansemann, pp.

88-89. 61 Bergengnin, Hansemann, pp. 76-77. Oeder, the other mayor prior to Emundt's 1832 appointment to the office, was himself a wool merchant and con­ tinued along the same lines as von Guaita and Daniels.

276

RHENISH BUSINESS AND PRUSSIAN RULE

Cockerill's house, stormed the jail, and released some poor pris­ oners jailed for minor offenses. Soldiers were called in, and peace was restored at a cost of seven dead and many wounded. To help maintain order, the town notables and the city government formed a militia. Of the 230 members, 86 (37 percent) were state or city employees, 57 (25 percent) were professional men, mer­ chants, or manufacturers, and the rest were artisans or laborers not employed in needle or cloth production. In addition, the mayor encouraged the Aachen Chamber of Commerce and Labor Arbitration Board to formulate rules for regulating wage changes in order to prevent sudden drops that might spark unrest. The rioting, which was in no way politically motivated, did not re­ occur, and the town's notables could congratulate themselves on their performance.62 An almost identical riot, with an almost identical response by businessmen and officials, had taken place in Crefeld two years earlier. On November 4, 1828, workers from textile factories staged a riot to protest a lowering of wages. The entrepreneurs claimed the reduction was necessary to make Crefeld's products competitive with Italian, French, and Swiss textiles. The home of the manager of the von Rigal and Heydweiller firm was sacked, and other homes were damaged. Order was finally restored the next day by troops sent from Dusseldorf.63 In a special meeting, the town council then voted to create a voluntary security force, and Adjunct Mayor Sohmann, Coun­ cilman Melsbach, and Wilhelm de GreifF were commissioned to implement the plan. Melsbach was a tax collector, the other two 62 Heinrich Volkmann, "Wirtschaftlicher Strukturwandel und sozialer Konflikt in der Friihindustrialisierung. Eine Fallstudie zum aachener Aufruhr von 1830,"

in Soziologie und Sozialgeschichte, ed. Peter Christian Ludz, Kolner Zeitsehriftfiir Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, vol. 16, special issue (Opladen, 1972); Gothein, pp. 408-9. 63 See Heinrich Rosen, "Der Aufstand der Krefelder 'Seidenfabrikarbeiter,' 1828, und die Bildung einer 'Sicherheitswache,'" Die Heimat 36 (1965):33-61, for collected documents about the riot.

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

277

were silk manufacturers. Mayor Jungblut then invited the heads of the major factories to a series of meetings to discuss the unrest and to draw up plans for quartering the troops until all was quiet. This gave the manufacturers an opportunity to compose a long letter to the Landrat, thanking him for calling in troops and jus­ tifying their own position. When District President Pestel not only approved of the security force but suggested that participa­ tion by the town's propertied citizens be mandatory and that the costs be paid for out of the city treasury, the force was quickly organized. The security force was made up of two divisions of two sections each, four twenty-two-man units. Of the four "commanders" and four alternate "commanders," only one (Wilhelm de Greiff) was a silk manufacturer, two were merchants (Adam ter Meer and Heinrich Elskes), one a tax collector (Melsbach), and one a lawyer (Rittmann). The remaining three were listed as book­ keepers, a term used in the large textile firms to include those employed in management. In this case the three "bookkeepers" were sons of the important silk manufacturers (Friedrich von Beckerath, Peter Hunzinger, and Gustav Schmalhausen).64 Of the entire security force, leaders included, nineteen (22 percent) were textile manufacturers, sixteen (18 percent) merchants, forty (45 percent) managers in the textile firms, and thirteen (15 per­ cent) notaries, lawyers, officials, and the like. As constituted, the security force was clearly an instrument of Crefeld's business in­ terests, and it is typical of the town's history that when faced with social unrest the local business establishment had the combined weight of the mayor, the Landrat, and the district president sol­ idly behind them. Indeed, the real locus of political power in Crefeld was, as it had long been, in the small circle of old Mennonite silk and cloth 64 The documents printed by Rosen use the word comptmr for accounts man­ agers, or bookkeepers.

278

RHENISH BUSINESS AND PRUSSIAN RULE

manufacturers. These men, the von der Leyens, Rigals, de Greiffs, Heydweillers, Scheiblers, and others met informally in two merchants' "societies," where they discussed the political issues that came before the town council, the chamber of com­ merce, and the mayor. All three—council, chamber, and mayor—followed the lead of the old families, which meant, of course, that there was no conflict between business interests and local government. It also meant, however, that lesser business­ men who did succeed in gaining a seat on the town council or in the chamber of commerce had comparatively little influence.65 Relations between businessmen and local government in Co­ logne were usually, though not always, harmonious. Mayors Mylius and Steinberger, District President Delius, Councilor Fuchs, and even Police Director Struensee normally worked closely with Cologne's merchants. This meant that the officials worked closely with the chamber of commerce, whose mem­ bers—more than in any other city—were the spokesmen for busi­ ness. There were moments of tension, however. In an attempt to encourage trade in 1818, Mylius on his own authority relaxed the staple right for certain goods and eased harbor procedures. The way in which he acted irritated the chamber of commerce more than the substance of his actions, but the disagreement speeded his resignation. The chamber also quarreled with Caspar Langen, acting comayor until Steinberger was appointed, even though Langen was himself a prominent businessman and a former member of the chamber.66 On the whole, however, many of the key decisions affecting Cologne were made jointly by local offi­ cials and the chamber of commerce. It seems clear that despite the fact that the mayoralty system did not permit true self-government, Rhenish businessmen had good reason to be satisfied with the French system. The mayors 65

Croon, "Biirgertum und Verwaltung," pp. 16-18. Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 421-23; Gothein, "Rheinschiffart," p. 117. 66

p.

161;

Eckert,

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

279

were no longer local businessmen, nor were the Landrate, but the influence of the business community was so great and the identity of interests between business and government so strong that the office of the mayor still served the interests of the urban economy efficiently. In practice, neither the Stein system nor the 1831 re­ vised system could offer more. Here, perhaps, was the strongest reason for the mayoralty system having the continued support of such men as Merkens. Its efficient functioning was more impor­ tant than the issue of civil equality and the distinction between town and country.67 Businessmen in the Provincial Diet Outside the town walls, the only opportunity for public politi­ cal activity was election to the provincial diet. The qualifications for election placed businessmen in a very advantageous position within the third estate, the twenty-five seats of which were appor­ tioned as follows: the city of Cologne was assigned two seats; Aachen, Dusseldorf, Koblenz, Trier, Barmen, Elberfeld, and Crefeld had one each; and the remaining sixteen seats were as­ signed to rural electoral districts in which several small towns voted together for a single delegate.68 With the exception of Trier and Koblenz, the cities named above were the main commercial and industrial centers in the Rhineland. They usually sent busi­ nessmen to the diet, and some of the rural districts did the same. Businessmen could not, of course, hope for representation in the diet comparable to the representation they enjoyed during the French period, when businessmen made up 43 percent of the councilors general and 25 percent of the departmental electoral college. In the Rhineland diet, after all, 69 percent of the seats 67 Droz, Liberalisme rhenan, p. 141, argues that for the ideas of citizenship and civil equality the Rhineland liberals "did not hesitate to sacrifice the practical advantages which the Prussian system offered to the cities." 68 Bar, p. 560.

280

RHENISH BUSINESS AND PRUSSIAN RULE

were reserved for noblemen, owners of entailed estates, and rep­ resentatives of rural parts of the province, while the third estate included some officials as well as businessmen.69 The landed no­ bility was given a clear advantage by the Prussian system. The real losers, however, were not businessmen but the peasantry and the urban artisans and workers. The twenty-five diet delegates of the fourth estate represented three-fourths of the province's popu­ lation, which was largely rural, and the artisan and working classes were disfranchised by the tax qualifications for voting within the third estate. Indeed, it can be argued that the towns— and businessmen—were at worst only marginally underrepresented. This can be demonstrated by using figures published in 1833 by David Hansemann in his book Preussen und Frankreich.10 These figures pertained to 1829 and were derived from official sources. The data are summarized in tables 14 and 15. Within the third estate, the representation of the cities of Aachen and Cologne was low in proportion to population and to land and business taxes (the two taxes upon which the urban franchise was based), while Crefeld and the three major cities on the Right Bank had representation in close proportion to taxation and popu­ lation. Within the diet as a whole, the six cities appear to have been fairly represented. When the data is broken down by gov­ ernment districts, it appears that the districts of Koblenz and Trier were somewhat overrepresented, but also that the third es­ tate was somewhat overrepresented in the diet, at least in com­ parison to population and land and business taxes. In short, while the cities were better served by the French system (where Co­ logne, Aachen, and Crefeld, with 14 percent of the Roer depart­ ment's population, sent 45 percent of the delegates to the council general), the Prussian system was not particularly unfair to Rhenish cities. 69 See, for example, Johannes Horion, Die rheinische Provinziaiverwaltung (Dusseldorf, 1925), p. 11. 70 (Leipzig, 1833).

SOURCE : Hansemann, tables I-VIII.

Land and business taxes paid % of province (3,025,722 thalers) % of third estate (700,299 thalers)

Population % of province (2,172,545 inhabitants) % of third estate (586,044 inhabitants) 3%

.8% 3.3%

1.8% 7.9%

3.2%

13.6%

23,452

6.2% 55,144

8.9%

95,526

.8%

17,976

1 1% 4%

Crefeld

1.7%

36,730

1 1% 4%

Aachen

2.4%

52,297

2 3% 8%

Cologne

Representation in the Provincial Diet by City

Diet seats % of diet (80 seats) % of third estate (25 seats)

TABLE 14

4.4%

1%

30,603

4.4%

1.2%

25,550

1 1% 4%

Dusseldorf

3.1%

.7%

21,634

4.3%

1.2%

3.8%

.8%

26,356

4.5%

1.3%

29,255

1 1% 4%

1 1% 4% 25,090

Elberfdd

Barmen

SOURCE: Same as for Table 14.

Land and business taxes paid % of province (3,025,772 thalers) % of third estate (700,299 thalers)

Population % of province (2,172,545 inhabitants) % of third estate (586,044 inhabitants)

4.3% 18.7%

5.4%

23.3%

131,176

16.1%

17.1%

163,498

4.3%

94,441

4 5% 16%

Aachen

4.6%

100,408

4 5% 16%

Cologne

11.5%

2.7%

80,248

12.6%

3.4%

74,054

4 5% 16%

Koblenz

Representation in the Provincial Diet by Government District

Diet seats % of diet (80 seats) % of third estate (25 seats)

TABLE 15

39.4%

9.1%

275,702

47.1%

12.7%

276,211

10 13% 40%

Dusseldorf

7.1%

1.6%

49,675

7%

1.9%

40,920

3 4% 12%

Trier

100%

23.1%

700,299

100%

27%

586,044

25 31% 100%

3rd Estate

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

283

In any case, Left Bank businessmen made up in the quality of their delegates what they lacked in numbers. Crefeld successively sent Peter von Lowenich, Gerhard Hunzinger, and Peter de Greiff, and Aachen sent Jacob Springsfeld; all were men experi­ enced in business affairs and with experience in local government. After 1830 Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen was elected to rep­ resent the second estate, and some members representing the fourth estate were close to Rhenish business circles. The man who became the spokesman for the third estate and one of the leaders of the entire diet was Peter Heinrich Merkens of Cologne, who was ably supported by Cologne's other delegate, Georg Koch. It is also worth noting that a bureaucratic ruling possibly de­ prived the diet of another outstanding leader. In 1831 David Hansemann was elected as the alternate delegate from Aachen. However, he had not owned his house for ten years and con­ sequently had to seek special dispensation to be eligible for election. The dispensation was not granted, perhaps because gov­ ernment officials distrusted men like Hansemann who were out­ spoken and made their ideas public. Hansemann had already begun to prepare for the diet by studying taxation and representa­ tion under France and Prussia. When his election was disallowed, he decided to publish his study, which caused him further dif­ ficulties with the government, as we shall see later on.71 The strong position of businessmen in the diet is borne out by what they did as members of the assembly. Merkens led the diet in the successful fight to retain the mayoralty system. He led the struggle to retain the Napoleonic codes, and especially the provi­ sions for open jury trials, equality before the law, separation of powers, and independence of the judiciary from the administra­ tion. The urban representatives succeeded in getting large 71

Bergengriin, Hansemann, pp. 121-22; Hansen, Preussen und Rheinland, pp. 70-71. Droz, Liberalisme rhenan, p. 137, exaggerates when he says that the bu­ reaucracy waged a "war without mercy" against Hansemann.

284

RHENISH BUSINESS AND PRUSSIAN RULE

majorities in support of petitions seeking tax relief for some indus­ tries and towns, state aid to encourage mechanized manufactur­ ing, the retention of the Commercial Code, and the extension of the network of chambers of commerce and labor arbitration boards. And Merkens also spoke out on behalf of equal rights for Protestants and Jews.72 In diet votes between 1826 and 1833 on the retention of French law, the Commercial Code, and the mayoralty system, the third estate was consistently joined by most of the fourth estate and a part of the second.73 None of this, of course, should be taken to mean that the diet functioned as a true legislature. Its powers were restricted, and major pieces of legislation under consideration by the ministers in Berlin were never put before it for debate. There was no assur­ ance that the diet's petitions to the throne would be acted on, and if the assembly showed too much initiative, it was reprimanded by the king.74 The diet did, however, help to establish a provin­ cial political elite that could influence public opinion. And even if this elite was at times opposed to specific Prussian policies, Rhenish businessmen, landowners, and noblemen participated in the political system and came to identify with it. Continuity and Transformation of Political Institutions

After two decades of Prussian rule on the Rhine, many French innovations in law and political structure, particularly on the level of local government, were still largely intact. In spite of the turn toward reactionary policies in Berlin, in spite of unfulfilled prom­ ises, Prussia did not appear to be arbitrarily unresponsive to 72 Grupe, pp. 16-17; Hansen, Preussen und Rheinland, p. 60; Johann Daniel Rumpf, Landtagsverhandlungen der Provinzialstande der preussischen Monarchic., 3rd ser., Die erste Provinziallandtagsverhandlungen der Provinz Westfalen und der rheinischen Provinzen im Jahre 1827, 9 vols. (Berlin, 1828), 4:191ff. 73 Droz,Liberalisme rhenan, pp. 120-24, 140. 74 See Rumpf, 4:238ff.; Adolf Arndt, "Der Anteil der Stande an der Gesetzgebung in Preussen 1823-1848," Archiv fur dffentliches Recht 17 (1902).

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

285

Rhenish wants. There were, however, subtle changes that, while they helped to integrate the Rhineland with Prussia, prepared the ground for future discontent within the Prussian system. Political offices, and in the Prussian context this meant ad­ ministrative offices, tended more and more to fall into the hands of professional bureaucrats. There were fewer opportunities for businessmen to engage in political activity, and the wave of busi­ nessmen that entered public life under the French lessened. In the cities this sometimes meant that in spite of the powerful position of the mayor, town notables worked more with his adjuncts than with the mayor himself. In the case of Cologne, businessmen at times bypassed the mayor's office altogether and dealt with the district president or Oberprasident. Moreover, although most of these professional administrators were Rhinelanders, many were new to their jobs. The French had introduced new institutions but had kept much of the personnel of the old regime. This had helped to buttress the popularity of the French system as com­ pared with the Prussian.75 The shift toward professionalization of the bureaucracy was accompanied also by a decline in the political importance of the Left Bank. Under the French, the three most important economic centers there—Aachen, Cologne, and Crefeld—had been made key administrative centers. All three, as we have seen, lost much of their administrative importance under Prussia. In Berlin and on the Rhine, this deemphasizing of the former centers of French rule on the Left Bank was seen as a symbol of Prussian distrust of her new western acquisitions.76 In both the Prussian system and the French prefecture system, citizens meeting in town councils or provincial assemblies had far 75 Faber,

"Verwaltungs- und Justizbeamte," p. 359. After 1830, Aachen, Cologne, and Trier were singled out by the interior minister as the main points in the Rhineland requiring special attention "from a police perspective." See Joseph Hansen, ed., Rheinische Briefe und Akten zur Gesehichte der politischen Bewegung 1830-1850, 2 vols. (Essen, 1919-42), 1:115. (Henceforth cited as Hansen, RBA.) 76

286

RHENISH BUSINESS AND PRUSSIAN RULE

less influence on law making than did key bureaucrats. The French system was more strongly centralized than the Prussian, but in both systems officials had enough leeway and autonomy to enable them to work on behalf of local interests as well as to ad­ minister decisions made on high. Even the officials that were not natives of the Rhineland tended to be won over to the Rhenish perspective. Consequently, in spite of the limited powers of their representative bodies, both systems could and often did work to the satisfaction of local inhabitants. Where the bureaucracy proved arbitrary and insensitive in formulating and enforcing laws and policies, it was criticized; where it encouraged local ini­ tiatives, was sensitive to local needs, and flexible in applying policies to local conditions, the bureaucracy earned praise, re­ spect, and cooperation. And this situation, quite apart from any actual similarity between French and Prussian institutions, re­ sembles quite closely the situation on the Left Bank of the Rhine under Napoleonic rule. In practice, both systems allowed for considerable local control over local affairs, though this control stopped short of constituting real self-government. We have to remember that a key problem for the Napoleonic and Prussian systems was the fact that sovereignty resided solely in the monarch and, by legal extension, in his bureaucracy. The French system tried to bridge the gap be­ tween the sovereign emperor and the society by a complex system of advisory and electoral assemblies that ranged from the local to the national level. Delegates to these assemblies represented the whole population and not a single occupational group, economic interest, or estate. Stein had hoped to construct a similar system, starting with local self-administration. His failure to achieve this left Prussia with the unresolved problem of how to improve the liaison between the sovereign and the citizenry. In the absence of a national parliament, with the powers of the king circumscribed by the powers of his ministers, and with citi­ zenship in its political sense confined to the local level, the bu-

BUSINESSMEN, POLITICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

287

reaucracy controlled the flow of initiatives and information from the local to the national level. It made decisions and issued decrees—the equivalent of planning and enacting legislation. It supervised administrative policies and the enforcement of law. The result was the equation of politics with administration, and bureaucrats saw themselves, not the monarch or the citizenry, as the incorporation of the state. Only the bureaucracy really enjoyed immediate access to the sovereign and his ministers (S taatsunmittelbarkeit).7 7

This problem was clearly stated by Count Joseph zu SalmDyck in an address sent to the crown prince in 1831. Salm-Dyck held one of the five inherited seats in the first estate of the Rhenish diet. Under the French he had held a number of positions: mem­ ber of the Corps Legislatif, councilor general, president of a can­ ton assembly. A nobleman from the electorate of Cologne before the Revolution, he was made by Napoleon a chevalier and then count. In the diet he was associated closely with Merkens and Koch, and his 1831 address to the crown prince earned him a re­ buke from the king for choosing associates and promoting ideas unworthy of his proper estate.78 Salm-Dyck was a man with a broad experience in political life, and the monarchy saw his ad­ dress as typical of the Rhenish liberals. Salm-Dyck pointed out that after 1801 the French had allowed the Rhine departments to have senators and legislators who "ad­ vised" on all kinds of national legislation. "In each department still other authorities were introduced, through which the domes­ tic budget was directed or controlled, and so the inhabitants of this province possessed a direct and effective influence on all af­ fairs of the state and of the department."79 Salm-Dyck felt he could speak for the majority of the diet and all loyal subjects of the Prussian king in asserting that: "(1) precisely the creation of a na77

Koselleck, p. 263; Walker, German Home Towns, pp. 197, 215; Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy, pp. 24, 205-10; Heffter, p. 210. 78 Hansen, RBA, 1:89-93. " Ibid., 1:82.

288

RHENISH BUSINESS AND PRUSSIAN RULE

tional diet would be the strongest means of moving aside damag­ ing differences [between the eastern and western parts of Prussia] and of blending the otherwise agglomerated parts of the monar­ chy into a whole; (2) namely, through no other bond can the Rhine provinces be joined more closely to Prussia; (3) today a representative constitution for the nation is supported by the en­ tire force of the spirit of the times."80 Just as "France's power and the influence it exercises on its neighbors is found in its liberal institutions," so Prussia would gain in power and prestige from introducing liberal institutions of its own. The provincial diets were not the answer to the problem faced by Salm-Dyck, Merkens, and those other leaders in the diets con­ sidered by the crown to be liberals. The power of the diets was severely limited, their resolutions greeted with distrust or simply ignored. The corporate organization of the diets, the nature of the franchise, and the requirements for election were meant to pre­ vent them from representing the whole population (though some delegates like Merkens tried to do just that). There was, how­ ever, another alternative to changes in the system of representa­ tion. Political opportunities could be made available within bureaucratic channels. Rhenish businessmen, with their own rep­ resentative institutions, had access to such opportunities. Under the Prussians, as under the French, the exercise of political influ­ ence through semiofficial, self-administrative institutions went far to reduce the pressure for changes in the character of government politics. 80

Ibid., 1:86.

9 Businessmen, Self-Administrative Institutions, and Prussian Politics

WHEN the Prussian government decided in mid-1816 to retain French law and French legal institutions in the Rhineland, the continued existence of the chambers of commerce, the commer­ cial courts, and the labor arbitration boards was also assured. However, as the Rhenish businessmen knew, this decision was by no means final. Prussia still hoped to introduce her own legal sys­ tem on the Rhine and to replace the French mayoralty system with the Stein plan for town government. Consequently, Rhenish businessmen had to pursue their own interests through their special institutions of French origin and at the same time defend those institutions in the face of Prussian at­ tempts to revise them. The struggle over the self-administrative institutions for business was very much a part of the broader polit­ ical contest between Rhenish interests and institutions and Prus­ sian law and policies. The many businessmen who were members of city councils and also members of chambers of commerce or commercial courts had no difficulty seeing the connection.

The Chambers of Commerce: Institutional Development and Personnel We have already seen that the Cologne Chamber of Commerce had sought and received explicit approval of their existence from Governor GeneralIOberprasident Sack, and that the Aachen and Crefeld Consultative Chambers for Manufacturing (now also

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called Chambers of Commerce) had also continued to function. Between 1816 and 1831, however, the continued survival of the chambers was uncertain. As required by the Commercial Code and the founding statutes of the chambers, the annual budgets and the protocols of the membership elections were submitted to the government for approval. Approval was regularly granted, implying acceptance of the institutions without actually accord­ ing them formal recognition.1 The Berlin government was certainly aware that such recogni­ tion was desired. For example, during the famous audience with Hardenberg on January 12, 1818, when Joseph Goerres and others presented the "Address of the City and County of Koblenz to His Majesty the King," the chancellor urged the merchants present to send him "special data" about complaints and requests of the business community. They replied by asking Prussia to fol­ low the French procedure of requesting formal memoranda from the chambers of commerce before an important tariff or economic measure was enacted.2 As was the case with the differences over the form of city gov­ ernment, what lay behind the denial of formal recognition was the desire in Berlin to have uniform laws and institutions for the whole monarchy. In the eastern part of Prussia, an 1811 ordi­ nance had abolished the old merchant guilds and created volun­ tary, elected "merchants' corporations." These corporations were self-perpetuating, current members determining how many new members would be elected. Membership in a merchants' corpora­ tion automatically granted "merchants' rights," such as the legal right to change currency or to obtain a discount on exchange from the Prussian Bank, both crucial for large-scale wholesalers, manu1 Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 79; Reiner Ottens, "Die innere Geschichte der Kolner Handelskammer" (Diplomarbeit, Cologne, 1969), pp. 86-87. 2 Joseph Goerres, Die Obergabe der Adresse der Stadt Coblenz und der Laruischaft an Se. Majestat den Konig in offentlicher Audienz bei Sr. Durchl. den Fiirsten Staatskanzler am 12. Januar 1818 (n.p., 1818), p. 32.

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facturers, and bankers. Finally, the members of the corporation chose from their number a committee of elders that managed the affairs of the corporation and actively worked on behalf of busi­ ness interests.3 The merchants' corporations obviously differed from the French chamber-of-commerce system in several ways, even though the purposes of the system were similar—to encourage businessmen to define their collective interests and to assist the government in making and administering laws. In the Rhineland, a selected group of businessmen already holding merchants' rights and belonging to the business tax class A elected the chamber. The local government, not the chamber of commerce, granted merchants' rights (though the chamber often made rec­ ommendations). A chamber of commerce thus resembled the committee of elders, but no real equivalent of the merchants' cor­ porations existed in the Rhineland. In the west, the Handelsstand or business community for which the chambers spoke was illdefined. This too bothered the central government, which was trying to reorganize Prussian society into a system of estates. It was for this reason that approval of the chambers of commerce remained provisional, extended from year to year. The Cologne Chamber of Commerce was the main defender of the French system. In Crefeld the chamber played a role sec­ ondary to that played by the old families, whose influence was exerted through the city council, the offices of the adjunct mayors, and the private merchants' societies, as well as through the chamber. The Aachen Chamber too seems not to have been very active.4 We should recall that the Crefeld and Aachen Chambers 3 Paul Grabski, Geschichtliche Entwieklung der Handelskammer in Preussen bis zur konigliehen Verordnung vom 11. Februar 1848 (Diss. Berlin, 1907), pp. 16-18; Hartmut Kaeble, Berliner Unternehmer wahrend der friihen Industrialisierung (Berlin, 1972), p. 87. 4 See Huyskens, pp. 66-75, for a brief discussion of the Aachen Chamber in this period.

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had originally been consultative chambers for manufacturing, and as such they had not had the right to correspond routinely and directly with the ministries. Though they were called chambers of commerce by the Prussians after 1815, it was unclear what rights they actually enjoyed. This uncertainty may well have accounted in part for a level of activity lower than that of the Co­ logne Chamber of Commerce, which, as we shall see, was always assertive about its prerogatives. Moreover, in Cologne the chamber of commerce during the French period had become the main, indeed practically the exclusive, spokesman of the mer­ chant community, and that gave it both the incentive and strength to fight for its position. Two incidents, the conflict over the business tax in 1821 and 1822 and the conflict over the chamber budget in 1827, are worth examining, because they helped to set the tone for the major confrontation of 1831, when Prussia finally imposed changes on the chamber. In May 1820, Prussia announced a new business tax to replace the existing patent tax, and in January 1821, the Cologne mayor's office (in the persons of Monschaw and Langen, since Mayor Steinberger had not yet been appointed) asked the chamber of commerce for a list of businessmen eligible for taxa­ tion under the new law.5 Soon thereafter the chamber supplied a list of 171 men with merchants' rights. This was not considered enough, however. The mayor's office nearly doubled the number of names, increasing it to 334, a figure obtained by dividing the mean tax of 30 thalers for first-class merchants into 10,000 thalers, the sum that the city was supposed to raise. The chamber, led by Peter Merkens, protested this move on two grounds. First, that it was unjust, since the list of 334 names included many rentiers, shopkeepers, and even artisans that simply could not af­ ford to pay any business tax. Second, that the chamber was for 5 For the class tax, see Erwin von Beckerath, "Die preussische Klassensteuer und die Geschichte ihrer Reform bis 1851," Schmollers stoats- und sozialwissenschaftliehe Forsehungen 163 (1912).

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good reason offended because many nonentities (minor mer­ chants) were being raised into the first class of businessmen, a class that should be reserved for old, established, prosperous firms. To these arguments a third can be added. The amount of tax to be paid by the whole first class was determined by multiply­ ing the number of men in the class by 30 thalers, and that sum was then apportioned within the class by a commission chosen by local authorities (in the rest of Prussia by the elected town magis­ trates). Consequently, the fewer the number of "first class" busi­ nessmen, the less the total tax due from the group and, presum­ ably, the less the wealthier businessmen would have to pay. The chamber thus had an incentive to keep the tax base low.6 What followed was a protracted struggle between the chamber on one side and the mayor's office, supported by the district gov­ ernment, on the other. The latter finally insisted on a tax list of 282 names. The chamber refused to allow its apportioning commission, elected by the original 171 first-class merchants, to apportion taxes among those who had not voted to elect the commission. Ordered to elect a new commission, the chamber re­ fused. Supported now by the finance minister, the district gov­ ernment appointed its own commission. This the chamber re­ fused to recognize as legal on the grounds that the chamber and the city council, instead of the mayor and district government, were the proper communal authorities to give assent to tax meas­ ures. On November 5, Merkens, speaking for the chamber, declared to Oberprasident Solms-Laubach that Cologne's busi­ nessmen preferred to oppose the execution of the tax by the gov­ ernment's "unlawful commission" rather than comply voluntarily. 6 The same process led the merchants' corporations to restrict the election of new members, which automatically enlarged the size of the first tax class. New, rising entrepreneurs found entry into a merchants' corporation difficult. See Kaeble, pp. 84-85, for this process in Berlin. The events in Cologne are summarized in Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 424-28, with much of the summary taken from a letter from Merkens to Oberprasident Solms-Laubach on November 5, 1821. That letter, and other documents are found in RWWA: 1/51/1 and 2.

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When Solms-Laubach disallowed the protest of the Chamber and ordered compliance with the commission's decision, the chamber appealed directly to Hardenberg and to his "recognized love of justice." The chamber argued that it was resisting the government commision not out of "a spirit of opposition within the local business community as someone has perhaps informed the finance minister," but rather because of the "legal principle" that a commission could not make decisions on taxation without the consent of those to be taxed. The chamber also asked Trade Minister Biilow to support it against the finance minister. On January 20, a full year after the dispute had begun, Hardenberg ordered Cologne's merchants to comply with the gov­ ernment commission's decisions. The chamber of commerce, he said, could help determine the law, especially local law, but it must not oppose the fiscal interests of the state. Moreover, the chamber was "not yet competent" to bring complaints against higher authorities who were fulfilling their duty. At most, the chamber could appeal to the district government, which repre­ sented "the spirit of the Prussian laws and its fiscal interests." Two days later Biilow wrote to support the positions of Hardenberg and the finance minister. What is revealed by this conflict over the business tax? First, the chamber clearly saw itself as the direct representative of the "true" business community—the older, established firms. Sec­ ond, it felt (rather patronizingly) in a position to determine what was just taxation for lesser businessmen. Third, struggling against the combined authority of the mayor's office, the district government, the Oberprasident, and the finance minister, it felt that it, not the administration, represented the rule of law. Fourth, in claiming the right to consent to taxation, the chamber was speaking as a representative of private citizens. Hardenberg, in rejecting the chamber's position, was treating it as a bearer of public authority, but one subordinate to district officials. The conflict over the business tax, therefore, helped define the place of

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the chamber both in respect to Cologne's entire business commu­ nity and in respect to the lines of political authority in the state.7 Even though the chamber lost its case, antagonizing the bureau­ cracy in the process, it may well have solidified its position. When Bulow's trade ministry was abolished at his resignation in 1825, the Rhineland feared that the entire French Commercial Code and with it the chambers of commerce would be lost.8 That was not the case, however, and the next real threat seems to have come again from local officials. Unexpectedly, and without prece­ dent, Cologne's Mayor Steinberger demanded that the chamber of commerce prepare the ledgers showing its operating accounts for the last five years for an audit.9 The chamber had always sub­ mitted its budget for approval, but the entries had been lumped into general categories of postage, salaries, office supplies, and the like. The mayor now said that the government needed to know the exact nature of each expenditure. How much paper, how many letters, how much ink, and how much sealing wax had been used? Was the salary of Secretary Hages really appropriate for the amount of work done? The chamber was thoroughly insulted. It pointed out that it had never kept such detailed records, and even the French pre­ fects had enough faith in the integrity of the chamber's members not to make such demands. Steinberger and the district govern­ ment, which had ordered the audit, felt insulted in turn by the reply and declared flatly that compliance was a simple matter of proper form and therefore necessary. In refusing to obey the 7

A less important but interesting result of this conflict was that when an elec­ tion was scheduled in 1829 to elect new members of the tax-apportioning commit­ tee, Merkens, as president of the chamber, wrote to its members urging them to attend the election meeting and to bring their friends so"that the number of repre­ sentatives of the most prominent commercial houses will be brought to as high a level as possible in the upcoming meeting." See RWWA: 1/51/1/letter from Mer­ kens, Nov. 27, 1829. 8 RWWA: 1/27/4/Merkens to Chamber of Commerce, April 19, 1825. 9 For this dispute see Schwann, Handetskammer, pp. 440-42.

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legitimate order of the government, the chamber as a lesser au­ thority was overstepping its limits and jeopardizing its position. Merkens was outraged. He appealed to District Government President Delius to overturn the order of the mayor, and Delius made some effort to smooth over the differences between Steinberger and the chamber. He acknowledged to Merkens that the tone of Prussian bureaucratic language was sometimes harsh, but assured him that all authorities had from time to time to prepare such detailed accounts for inspection in Berlin. The request to the chamber was in no way extraordinary or a reflection on the repu­ tation of the chamber. By his reply Delius confirmed once again the chamber's position as part of the administration, even though he was unable to improve relations between the mayor and the chamber. The battle over the continued existence and independence of the chambers reached its climax in 1832-33, when the chambers received official recognition but had some changes forced upon them. This particular conflict developed out of the successful drive by businessmen in Elberfeld and Dusseldorf to create chambers of commerce on the Right Bank.10 Both the Rhenish and Westphalian diets of 1826-27 had called for retention and ex­ tension of the chamber-of-commerce system. In 1827 the city of Elberfeld petitioned the interior minister for permission to set up a chamber. Initially, the petition foundered because of the inabil­ ity of Elberfeld and Berlin to agree on the question of who had merchants' rights and was eligible for election. However, in May of 1830 royal approval was granted for a joint Elberfeld/Barmen Chamber, and in 1831 a similar chamber was established in Dusseldorf. Elberfeld's businessmen had set a number of goals. They wished to have experienced men in their chamber and to give the greatest influence to the largest firms, but they did not want to 10 For the following see Grabski, pp. 18-34; and HSAD-K: Regierung Dusseldorf/I/2049/23-30.

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exclude any branch of business. Moreover, they wished to avoid excessive intervention of the government, such as could occur under the French system, where the initial election was from an assembly of notables carefully selected by the prefect or mayor. The bylaws for the chambers in Elberfeld and Dusseldorf stipu­ lated that to be eligible for election a businessman must be at least thirty years of age and have been in business at least five years. The franchise was granted to all businessmen who paid at least twelve thalers of business tax. That meant, for example, that in Elberfeld two-hundred "first class" businessmen (with mer­ chants' rights) and seventy-one lesser retail merchants could nominate candidates and vote; in Barmen 179 "first class" and thirty-one lesser businessmen could do so. Merchants as well as manufacturers were eligible to vote and to be elected. Furthermore, the chambers were to elect their own presidents, though the mayor (who was president of the chamber in the French system), would have the right to attend and serve as chairman when he wished. As in the French system, elections and the budget had to be confirmed by the interior minister, and the chambers were to be supported out of a surcharge on the business tax. The functions of the new chambers were to be similar to those of the French chambers, but with two exceptions. First, the chambers had the right to correspond "directly with the minister [unmittelbar an die Ministerium]" only in urgent cases, rather than routinely as did the French chambers. Second, each chamber was to produce an annual report for the interior minister on its ac­ tivities and on the state of the economy. With the approval of the Elberfeld/Barmen and Diisseldorf Chambers of Commerce, the Prussian government committed it­ self to a growing network of institutions to represent the interests of business without insisting that all such institutions be exactly alike. However, it was decided to apply some of the rules of the new chambers, particularly the franchise requirements and the right of the chamber to choose its own president, to the already

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existing institutions on the Left Bank.11 In 1833 and 1834, the Aachen and Crefeld Consultative Chambers for Manufacturing were finally converted officially into chambers of commerce, with bylaws like those of Elberfeld/Barmen and Dusseldorf.12 Cologne's chamber once again presented difficulties. In mid1832, new elections were held to fill the five places of chamber members whose terms had expired. Not all of the new electoral regulations were followed, because Mayor Steinberger hoped to keep most of the old members in office. Even so, the election was a disaster. None of the retiring members were reelected, and all but one of the newly elected members, the cotton manufacturer Wilhelm Anton Norrenberg, declined to take office. As a result, the old members simply continued in office until the spring of the following year. Meanwhile, longtime chamber members began to campaign against the new chamber of commerce ordinances.13 On September 3, 1832, Merkens, vice-president of the Co­ logne Chamber, wrote to the interior minister to argue that the electoral provisions of the Right Bank chamber system should not be applied to Cologne.14 Merkens pointed out that 1,347 busi­ nessmen paid at least 12 thalers business tax in Cologne. Of a total of 29,904 thalers paid, 125 merchants paid 6,972 thalers, 88 paid 2,640 thalers, and 264 small merchants paid 4,698 thalers. 11 RWWA: 1/3/6/26. Zunkel, Der rheinisch-westfiilische Unternehmer, pp. 150-51, argues that the government was trying to prevent a strengthening of the chambers as "the main instrument representing economic/political interests." The broad franchise for the chambers potentially might have weakened the role of the largest firms, but in practice it did not. Moreover, the extension of the chamber system suggests that the government hoped to win the business community's close cooperation. 12 HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/I/7801/Aachen Chamber of Commerce to Int. Min., June 5, 1833, and Schuckmann to Reg. Aachen, Nov. 9, 1833; Manfred Erdmann, Die verfassungspolitisehe Funktion der Wirtschaftsverbiinde in Deutschland, 1815-1871 (Berlin, 1968), p. 100. 13 For summaries of this dispute, see Ottens, pp. 140-57; Kellenbenz and Eyll, pp. 80-81, 87-89. 14 RWWA: 1/3/6/33.

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Thus, half of the business tax was paid by merchants holding merchants' rights, but this group made up only one-third of the eligible voters for chamber elections under the new system. If this "misproportion" were not bad enough, Merkens asked the minis­ ter (and this is an indication of his irritation) to read through the more than fifty occupations that made up the list of those paying 12 thalers business tax. Alongside bankers, merchants, and manufacturers were petty restaurateurs, artisans, fruit peddlers, dealers in second-hand goods, harpists, and organists, to name but a few. If this whole motley group were allowed to choose the chamber members, Merkens contended, the work, independence, and honor of this valuable institution would be jeopardized. Merkens then contrasted the French system with the one about to be implemented. The French had excluded occupations other than commerce from the chambers, and had provided that mem­ bers be elected from among forty to sixty "of the most excellent merchants and wholesalers" with reputations for independence of mind, business ability, patriotism, and the willingness to consider the public good. Because of the importance of commerce in the state, the French had granted the right of "immediate communica­ tion . . . with the government [in UNMITTELBAREM Verkehr . . . mit dem gouvernement]" only to the representatives of commerce in the chambers of commerce.15 In manufacturing centers the consultative chambers for manufacturing had been established, but since their importance was less than that of the chambers of commerce, they were denied immediate access to the central gov­ ernment and had to correspond through subprefects. Both this hierarchy and the distinction between the branches of business, Merkens argued, was "wise and practical" and should be re­ tained. The ministerial response to the chamber's letter was negative. The French system of self-perpetuating membership "did not 15

Ibid. Emphasis in original.

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recommend itself either on principle or in experience." Moreover, the broader electoral base of the Elberfeld/Barmen/Dusseldorf bylaws allowed the chambers to respond better to the economic needs of lesser but rising businessmen. Why, the minister wanted to know, should the qualifications of electors of the chamber, "merely a monitoring and advisory authority," be far more re­ stricted than those of city councils and magistracies, which exer­ cised important police and administrative functions?16 Giving as their reason the inadequate response of the minister to their petition, ten members of Cologne's chamber submitted their resignations. Among them was Merkens, long the leading figure in the chamber, in city affairs, and also in the diet, where he was Cologne's representative. Mayor Steinberger intervened to try to prevent the mass resignation. He argued that since the new law had been proclaimed, it should be administered until changed through normal channels. The chamber met to consider the ar­ guments of Steinberger and the interior minister. It concluded that Berlin simply did not understand the true "purpose and vocation" of the institution of the chambers of commerce. The broadening of its electoral base was again rejected, for the follow­ ing reason: Since, moreover, [the chamber of commerce] is an investiga­ tory authority, [authorized] to render expert judgments and thereby, according to legislative procedures, to correspond with the ministries, and on the other hand, since it does not take part in the administration of justice or of the executive, the chamber is excluded completely from that cluster of institutions for whose constitutions popular elections are in some places in demand. The administrative norms referred to for popular elections for communal representatives and for city magistrates neither have been introduced in the Rhine province, nor does the popu16 RWWA:

1/3/6/39.

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lation here, which loves lawful freedom, appear to give its approval to participating in [such elections]. Moreover, the chamber of commerce in an important commercial center might well not agree to having its position and area of compe­ tence subordinated to those of a communal representative body.17 The old members also found it particularly unpleasant that Norrenberg had been elected to the chamber. To them, Norrenberg was the perfect example of the rising manufacturer in a new industry, with no experience and little interest in the broader concerns of commerce. Back in 1813 he had asked the French government to assign a role in public ceremonies to the labor ar­ bitration board (of which he was president) equal to that played by the chamber of commerce. His request was rejected, but nev­ ertheless it had been a challenge to the preeminence of the chamber.18 His personality clearly grated on the old members. Perhaps it also galled them that Norrenberg had taken to printing some of his political views in pamphlets. In 1826 he had urged Cologne's voters to exercise the "greatest care and caution" in selecting delegates to the diet and not choose men that might support measures harmful to industry. In December of 1832, dur­ ing the dispute over membership in the chamber of commerce, another pamphlet by Norrenberg urged "citizens of the lower and middle estates" to come out to vote in the election of those respon­ sible for assessing the business tax and also complained about the "monstrous barriers" that restricted access to the post of judge on the commercial court.19 Now Norrenberg entered the chamber 17

RWWA: 1/3/6/49. The chamber did in fact administer local ordinances, es­ pecially regarding the harbor. 18 HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/2167/Klespe to Conseil des prud'hommes, Jan. 15, 1813. 19 Wilhelm Anton Norrenberg, Eine angestellte ernsthafte Betrachtung iiber das Standewesen am Rheine (Cologne, 1826), pp. 9-10; and Dringender Zuruf an meine lieben gewerbtreibende Mitbiirger genngeren und mittleren Standes (Cologne, 1832), pp. 4-5, 8.

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itself and, concluding that the new regulations would fill the chamber with men of a similar kind, the old members stuck by their resignations. The resignations were accepted on April 22, 1833, and a few days later new chamber members were elected. The dispute and the resignations seemed at first to have ac­ complished nothing at all. Probably because their claims about the unique position of the chambers in the lawmaking process in bureaucratic Prussia were valid, many of the businessmen who resigned in April accepted reelection in September. Merkens reentered the chamber in 1835 and was promptly elected its president. Their dislike of Norrenberg did not keep the former members away from the politically influential chamber for long. Moreover, in early 1836 the government agreed to raise the minimum tax level for voting from twelve to twenty thalers. The number of eligible voters dropped to 482, approximately the number of businessmen now holding merchants' rights.20 But more important than this belated victory is the fact that the chamber had fought not only to defend its privileged position in the political system, but also to exclude lesser businessmen from sharing the chamber's political influence. The chamber was not opposed to manufacturers, in spite of its opposition to Norrenberg. Koch, for instance, vice-president of the chamber during much of the 1820s, was a merchant turned cloth manufacturer. Nor was it opposed to new wealth and success. Merkens himself had begun as an apprentice in an old commercial firm and later 20 Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 90. In June 1833, the chamber asked that mem­ bership be restricted to those who paid at least thirty thalers business tax. Norrenberg signed the petition, but appended the following comment: "I wish to repeat here in writing my solemn and concerned objection [to the petition] with the ac­ companying explanation. In this necessary case I am willing to support the peti­ tion for important and cogent reasons, only that any of my fellow citizens that my wise, lawmaking king finds good enough to trust with the possible (even if un­ likely) exercise of an honorary office is also good enough for me." See RWWA: 1/3/6/74.

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made his own fortune. The apparent elitism of the chamber was more political than economic or social. Cologne's chamber had for over thirty years been a dominant force in local affairs and had enjoyed the confidence of the most powerful French and Prussian officials. It had functioned almost as a political club, made up of a relatively small number of men who thought alike most of the time and worked well together. Its local political impact can be measured by the fact that two of the men that led the chamber after 1815—Merkens and Koch—were chosen as Cologne's two delegates to the diet of the Rhine prov­ ince. It is important that precisely these men, feared by the gov­ ernment as leaders of the Rhenish liberal "opposition party," resisted expansion of their political club for fear that its power and influence might be diluted. Cologne's businessmen knew that political influence in Prussia at this time was not exercised through open, public channels. Appeals to the public would be looked on with disfavor, and, as we shall see later in this chapter, such appeals were not necessary for successful dealings with the bureaucracy. Indeed, the government in the mid-1830s renewed the French prohibition on publication of memoranda prepared for the government.21 Except for the mass resignations in Cologne in 1833, changes in membership and leadership in the chambers of commerce were gradual and not dramatic. In Aachen the leaders of the French period (A. Wildenstein, N. Startz, G. C. Springsfeld) gave way to what in a sense was a second generation of public-minded manufacturers and merchants in the cloth and needle industries. The members and alternates elected to the reconstituted chamber in 1834 included several sons of families that had been active dur­ ing the French period, such as Ignaz van Houtem, Jr., Heinrich Nellessen, and Jacob Springsfeld. Several of the members were 21

Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 284n.

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also city councilmen, and one member, Christian Oeder, had been a mayoral adjunct and acting mayor during the 1820s. Jacob Springsfeld was Aachen's representative in the provincial diet.22 Under the French system, it will be recalled, the mayor was also the president of the chamber of commerce. Until his death in 1820, Mayor von Guaita was the dominant figure in the Aachen Chamber of Commerce. However, neither Oeder nor Daniels, who was also a mayoral adjunct, really led the chamber between 1820 and 1834, though they did preside over meetings. The most forceful personalities during that period were the cloth manufacturer Georg Wagner and the wool dealer David Hansemann. Wagner was president of the commercial court after 1825, and under the new chamber statutes he became its first elected president in 1834.23 Hansemann, elected secretary of the chamber in 1834, had been first elected a member in 1826. Hansemann's role in the chamber is best shown by a minor dis­ pute in November 1829. He had proposed the creation of a wool market in Aachen, and he was outraged to discover that Oeder, as president of the chamber, had deliberately failed to notify him of a chamber meeting called expressly to discuss the wool-market plan. He complained to the Aachen district government and an­ nounced his resignation from the chamber. Oeder defended him­ self by saying that he had wanted the chamber's unprejudiced opinions of the plan prior to the city council's discussion of it, rather than the one-sided opinions that would inevitably be ex­ pressed with Hansemann present, since he and his grandiose ideas already completely dominated the chamber. And he pointed out that as a member of the city council, Hansemann could pro­ mote his plan there.24 The wool-market plan was in fact endorsed 22

SaA: Oberbiirgermeisterakten/125/7/I/37; HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/I/ 7801/Schuckmann to Reg. Aachen, March 2, 1834; HSAD-K: Regierung Dusseldorf/Prasidialbiiro/1015"/249-51. 23 Huyskens, pp. 74-75. 24 HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/I/7800/Letters of Nov. 29, 1829, from Hansemann and Oeder.

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by both the chamber and the city council, and Hansemann with­ drew his resignation and stayed in the chamber. He was a mem­ ber for all but four of the years between 1826 and 1848, and its president from 1836 to 1839 and again from 1843 to 1848.25 In Crefeld too, most of the chamber members from the French period continued in office, and naturally those members were rep­ resentatives of the great textile firms of the city. As we noted ear­ lier, neither the chamber of commerce nor the city council of Crefeld was as important as the private associations of the leading businessmen. That the chamber would follow the lead of the silk manufacturers was in any case assured by the fact that, at the mayor's request, a von der Leyen served as president of the chamber (instead of the mayor himself), and Conrad Sohmann, a silk manufacturer and adjunct mayor, was also a chamber mem­ ber.26 Membership in the Cologne Chamber of Commerce shares with Aachen the characteristics of continuity and generational change. Several important members, such as Johann Philipp Heimann, Hermann Lohnis, and Isaak Moll, were sons of men who had nurtured the chamber in its infancy. Forty-three men served in the chamber between 1815 and 1833, at which time it was reformed on the basis of the Dusseldorf statutes. During those years members averaged nine years and four months of serv­ ice.27 If we exclude the seven men who failed to complete even 25 Erich Angermann, "David Justus Hansemann," Neue Deutsche Biographie·, Bergengriin, Hansemann, p. 222, points out that in 1839 Hansemann quit the chamber because he was disappointed at being defeated in election to the diet by Jacob Springsfeld and felt that he no longer could represent the city in the chamber of commerce. 26 Buschbell and Heinzelmann, p. 176; Friedrich and Paul Goldschmidt, Das Leben des Staatrats Kunth, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1881), pp. 267-69. Membership lists in Die Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Krefeld, 1804-1929 (Krefeld, 1929), pp. 247-49, show that only nineteen men, including six mayors/chairmen, were members of Crefeld's chamber between 1804 and 1834. 27 See tables in appendix of Kellenbenz and Eyll. Average length of mem­ bership includes terms that extended before 1815 and after 1833. All told,

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one normal term of three years, we find that the average duration of membership was nearly eleven years—almost four terms. Such continuity helped to make the chamber a tightly knit or­ ganization, and it was made even more so by the domination of four men: Bernard Boisseree, Johann Philipp Heimann, Georg Heinrich Koch, and Peter Heinrich Merkens. Boisseree spent thirty years in the chamber, beginning in 1802, in addition to serving on the city council and serving as adjunct mayor for many years. Heimann entered the chamber in 1812, when his father left it. He was its vice-president from 1814 to 1818 and from 1820 to 1821, and he remained a member until his death in 1832. Koch was active in the chamber for twenty-two years, beginning in 1813. He was vice-president in 1818 and 1819 and again from 1821 to 1829. Merkens spent twenty-six years in the chamber, eight of them as vice-president or president. He also sponsored Ludolf Camphausen's election to the chamber in 1831, and Camphausen was chamber president from 1839 to 1848. Some of the projects in which these men were involved will be discussed shortly, but we should recall that Merkens and Koch were Co­ logne's representatives to the diet and were considered the leaders of Rhenish liberalism. It is not surprising that the long years of leadership in the Cologne Chamber of Commerce made these men the natural representatives of the Cologne electorate, which was composed for the most part of the same businessmen who voted in the chamber of commerce elections. A final observation should be made about that membership of the Cologne Chamber. In 1822 the Jewish banker Salomon Oppenheim was elected to the chamber. Oppenheim was the first seventy-seven men were at some time members of the Cologne Chamber from its founding in 1797 through 1834. With some overlapping, twenty-three were in­ volved in the forwarding trade, ten in the wine trade, nine in the spice trade, seven in colonial trade, six in tobacco trading or processing, eleven in banking or money changing, sixteen in the manufacture or trade of textiles or dyestuffs, and eleven in other kinds of manufacturing.

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Jew to move to Cologne after the constitution of the old free city, which prohibited Jewish residents, had been abolished by the French, and his election to the chamber made him the first Jew to hold an office in Cologne. Later his son, Simon Oppenheim, was also elected to the chamber and, from April 1833 to February 1834, served as its president.28 Since the chamber's founding of course, many of its members had been Protestants. The election of Oppenheim is an indication of the further progress that tolera­ tion had made in Cologne, a city where religious conflict had led to riots as recently as 1789. The Commercial Courts

The question of whether or not to retain the French commer­ cial courts was raised early in Prussian rule as part of the broader debate on the retention of French law. The existing commercial courts and the chambers of commerce argued that the courts should be retained. The judges (all businessmen) on the Aachen Court wrote in April 1816 to the president of the district gov­ ernment, declaring that "it is essential for commerce that there is a mediating and manageable administration of justice." The commercial courts, the judges contended, hindered speculation by offering speedy decisions from men familiar with the problems of business. Both speed in deliberations and low administrative costs were possible, because the commercial courts could avoid unnecessary legal "subtleties and chicanery." The Aachen Chamber of Commerce echoed these sentiments and pointed out that because the judges were chosen from and by the most promi­ nent merchants and manufacturers, the business community as a whole had great trust in the decisions of the commercial courts.29 In 1818, the Cologne Chamber of Commerce also defended the 28

Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 433; Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 93. HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/I/1606/Schmallhausen and others to Reimann, April 19, 1816, and correspondence of May 1816. 29

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courts on the basis of opinions gathered from throughout the Rhineland in favor of their retention.30 The commercial courts did indeed continue to function, their existence guaranteed by the continued use of French law in the Rhineland. And, whenever Prussia made gestures suggesting that French law might be re­ placed by the Prussian General Code, Rhinelanders singled out the commercial courts to support and defend.31 While the Prussians had sought to modify the French system of local government and the system of chambers of commerce, the commercial courts themselves were responsible for attempts to change their structure. The president of the Cologne Commercial Court, then Jacob Reiff, proposed that at least the court president be a paid, permanent judge. Ideally, he should have legal train­ ing, but he should still be either a merchant or a lawyer working primarily for a commercial firm, and should still be elected, not appointed by the state. The chamber of commerce supported ReifiPs proposal, suggesting that the court president have estab­ lished legal credentials, serve a ten-year term, and be paid 1,500 thalers out of the business tax, and that the first president should be elected jointly by the current commercial court judges and the chamber.32 This proposal is interesting for several reasons. Election of a jurist as president would have added a professional character to the court, even though the remaining judges would have been businessmen and laymen. However, the commercial court had existed for the benefit of the litigants that came before it, and deci­ sions had been based on common practice and an intimate ac­ quaintance with concerned parties. This was quite different from the kind of training a lawyer would receive in a university, and to 30

RWWA: l/23d/30/253. See for example RWWA: 1/27/4/Memorial of the Cologne Chamber of Commerce to diet delegates Koch and Merkens, Nov. 28, 1836; also RWWA: 1/27/4/Merkens to the Chamber of Commerce, April 19, 1825, reporting on meetings in Berlin. 32 RWWA: l/23f/48/Correspondence of Jan. 10 to Jan. 29, 1825. 31

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get legal credentials one had to pass Prussian state examinations. Indeed, with a salaried jurist as president, the commercial court would have become more official than semiofficial, and Prussia might have been able to exert considerable influence on proceed­ ings. On the other hand, election of a professional, full-time judge would have set a precedent that Prussia might not have liked. As a matter of fact, the Prussian government first approved the plan and then changed its mind. With the permission of the jus­ tice minister, the chamber of commerce and commercial court elected Justizrat J. A. Heimsoeth as court president. Then Inte­ rior Minister Schuckmann disallowed the election on the ground that other chambers of commerce and commercial courts pre­ ferred to have all lay judges, and Cologne should not be allowed to be the single exception. When the Cologne institutions asked that Heimsoeth be allowed to serve until new elections were held, the interor minister emphatically declared Heimsoeth incompe­ tent to be a judge, much less a court president, and this in spite of recommendations from Daniels, president of the court of ap­ peals.33 The structure and legal status of the commercial courts thus remained unchanged throughout the period we are studying. Election to the court continued to be by a group of notable busi­ nessmen selected by the mayor of the town with the advice of the chamber of commerce. Election to a commercial court brought considerable prestige, perhaps as much as did election to a chamber of commerce. Many of the judges in Aachen, Crefeld, and Cologne were members of the chambers of commerce, city councils (though simultaneous membership in a court and a city council was prohibited after 1825), and even the diet. Johann Philipp Heimann, for example, was a member of the chamber of commerce and also served as president of the Cologne Court. In 33

RWWA: 1/27/4/Lettersof Nov. 13, Dec. 7 and 13,1825, and Jan. 18 and 31 and Feb. 10, 1826.

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Aachen, Hansemann, Wagner, and Jacob Springsfeld were among the leading businessmen to serve on the commercial court between 1815 and 1834. Crefeld Commercial Courtjustices in­ cluded Gerhard Hunzinger, Conrad Sohmann, and Franz von Rigal. In all, they were a distinguished group of businessmen that did honor to the institution of the commercial court. And, in securing the place of the court in the Prussian system, the lay judges secured their own position in that system.34

The Labor Arbitration Boards

Like the chambers of commerce and the commercial courts, the labor arbitration boards enjoyed continued support from Rhenish businessmen and received official approval from the government. In the debates of the first diet in 1827 the boards were explicitly mentioned among the French institutions that should be pre­ served and even extended in the Rhineland.35 Since business and government alike saw the boards as an important instrument for the control and supervision of the artisan and working classes, the question was not the existence of the boards but rather their composition and competence in relation to the chambers of com­ merce. The justice and trade ministers first made inquiries about the Aachen Labor Arbitration Board in 1821. They wished to know the administrative costs and the effectiveness of the institution. 34 HSAD-K: Oberprasidium Koln/1353/IX/3. Kellenbenz, "Heimann"; SaA: Oberbiirgermeisterakten/125/2/I and II; HSAD-K: Regierung Diisseldorf/I/ 2020/passim; RWWA: 1/4/5/8-20. It is interesting that in 1833, when eligibility for election to the chamber of commerce was broadened, Cologne's rising manu­ facturers (led by Norrenberg) demanded that their names be added to the list of notables that elected the justices of the commercial court. 35 Rumpf, p. 210; Bahr, p. 7, states that only the Aachen and Cologne Boards continued to function. I found no evidence about the Crefeld Board at all, and I think it better to assume that the board there did continue to function, given the very strong support it enjoyed late in the French period.

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The answers given by the board and the support it received from District President Reimann so reassured the ministers that Bulow authorized payment of the board's budget from state funds, thereby relieving the city of the burden.36 Eleven years later the government again asked for a report of the Aachen Board's ac­ tivities. The board explained in reply that it was a court of first instance for laws pertaining to masters and workers in the cloth and needle industries, and the commercial court served as the court of second instance. With the labor unrest of 1830 fresh in their memories, the board members now asked the government for additional powers. They said that because of the increasing need to regulate working conditions in factories and to provide a stable labor force, they should have the power to levy stiff fines and even impose jail terms. The government was evidently wary of putting such authority in the hands of laymen and declined to grant the request, but the composition of the Aachen Board was changed to include trades and industries other than cloth and needles. In addition, the board and the chamber of commerce agreed on rules for regulating wage changes to forestall future un­ rest.37 In Cologne the government made inquiries in 1822 about the local board. On behalf of local manufacturers the board had proposed to the mayor, the Oberprasident, and the ImmediatJustiz-Kommission that it be allowed to institute an ordinance to regulate the number and training of master artisans. This was necessary, the board felt, because the abolition of the guilds had led to a decline in skills and a breakdown of labor discipline. The Cologne District Government was inclined to give the board in­ creased authority to help it to get information on industrial condi­ tions and to supervise and regulate artisan affairs. But whereas in 36 HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/I/7901/Rat der Werksverstandigen/Correspondence of Oct. 23, Dec. 21, 1821, April 14 and May 29, 1822. 37 HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/I/7901/Rat der Gewerbverstandigen to Reg. President, Feb. 20, 1833, and Min. Decree of Dec. 18,1833; Gothein, pp. 408-9.

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Aachen the board and the chamber of commerce were both dom­ inated by manufacturers sharing common interests, in Cologne the chamber of commerce was made up of merchants who op­ posed reinstitution of anything that might resemble the "egotism of the old guild system." Moreover, the chamber was not about to give the labor arbitration board so much independent authority that it might rival the chamber. It opposed the plan put forward by the board, and it insisted that the board still be considered subsidiary to the chamber of commerce. It was, however, willing to see the board's competence extended to cover other trades and industries in addition to cloth manufacturing.38 And again in 1830, when the Oberprasident and the mayor urged the board and the chamber to follow Aachen's lead in jointly regulating local wages, the chamber rejected the idea as an unwarranted change, there being no need, as the chamber saw it, to give the labor ar­ bitration board power to regulate wages.39 In both 1822 and 1830 the chamber prevailed, and the board continued on the same basis as before. As we might expect, members of the Aachen Board had a more prominent place in Aachen, a manufacturing center, than did the members of the Cologne Board in that city's merchant-dominated business community. Several of the Aachen members—Startz, Nellessen, Pastor—had been or were members of the chamber of commerce.40 The best-known member of the Cologne Board was its president, Wilhelm Anton Norrenberg, the quarrelsome cloth manufacturer so disliked by the leaders of the chamber of com­ merce.41 On at least one occasion, when Norrenberg declared that 38 Relevant documents in RWWA: 1/52/2/Letters of November 18, 1822; May 15, June 20, July 4, 1823. 39 Gothein, pp. 408-9. 40 HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/I/7901/Protocol of Feb. 10, 1820, and Ratder Gewerbverstandigen to Reg. Prasident, Feb. 20, 1833. See also HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/7882/passim, for examples of work of the Aachen Board. 41 For membership of the Cologne Board see HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/2164/passim; and HASK: Bestand 400/II/1A/4.

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the board was unable to provide the government with all of the statistics requested on industrial production, the chamber of commerce (through which the statistics were to be channeled) threatened to call down the anger of the Oberprasident on the heads of the board if they did not comply with the request.42 The chamber could, of course, do no such thing, but the exchange in­ dicates the tension between the two institutions. Nevertheless, the labor arbitration board of Cologne, like that of Aachen, stead­ ily performed its duties of adjudicating labor disputes and provid­ ing information and suggestions for the regulation of artisan affairs.

Government, Business, and the Economy of the Rhineland

The first ten years after the annexation of the Rhineland by Prussia were marked by a pronounced recession, particularly in those industries that had sprung up under the protection of the Continental blockade. Between 1817 and 1830, as English tex­ tiles flooded the German market, thirty of the larger manufactur­ ing firms (mainly cotton) in Cologne declared bankruptcy. Aachen and Crefeld both suffered from the loss of French mar­ kets, now closed to them by French tariffs. The unemployment in industry was compounded by disastrous weather and resultant crop failures, and trade on the Rhine suffered from the imposition of Dutch tariffs.43 The government did little to help. Oberprasident SolmsLaubach in 1819 sought to encourage Cologne's merchants to create overseas trading companies, and he pledged that the gov42

RWWA: 1/52/2/Letters of May 13, July 15, 1822. pp. 24, 32-34; Treue, Wirtschaftszustande und Wirtschaftspolitik, pp. 87-107; Buschbell and Heinzelmann, p. 178; Goldschmidt, pp. 254ff. For a study of textile production in Bonn, see Martin Schumacher, "Wirtschafts- u. Sozialverhaltnisse der rheinischer Textilindustrie im friihen 19. Jahrhundert," Rheinisehe Viertdjahrsblatter 35 (1971). 43 Milz,

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ernment would assist in negotiations with foreign states. He had to admit, however, that the entire capital for such a venture would have to come from private investors. With Holland firmly block­ ing the Rhine, Cologne's merchants could see little to be gained from the project. Dutch tariffs were also a major obstacle to pro­ posed trade with the young United States.44 A national exhibi­ tion of manufactured goods was organized in 1822, and Rhenish business entered and won prizes, but this effort was far short of the concerted drive Napoleon had made to sponsor innovation and industrial development.45 One problem was that Hardenberg and his closest economic advisors, Biilow, Kunth, and Maassen, were all influenced by the writings of Adam Smith and were all advocates of free trade. This led them to rule out protective tariffs, since they believed that the competition of English goods in the long run would stimulate in­ dustrial progress and weed out weaker firms.46 A second problem was the government's fiscal needs. Tariff and tax rates were set at a level intended to provide Prussia with an income sufficient to pay expenses and to get out from under the debts left over from the Napoleonic wars. Prussia's leaders were unwilling to invest scarce state funds in the economy. The burden of helping the populace through the economic slump fell to local authorities—the city governments and the semiofficial institutions. For example, in the fall of 1816 the Co­ logne city council, the mayor, and the chamber of commerce col­ laborated on plans to lower the prices and speed the distribution of basic food and clothing. And in 1822 the labor arbitration board of that city was helping to provide health examinations for sick and poor workers.47 44

RWWA: 1/23^/31/72-83; 1/23^/30/224, 231, 249. RWWA: 1/52/2/Report by Beuth on exhibition, Oct. 27, 1822. 46Treue, Wirtschaftszustande und Wirtschaftspolitik, p. 131; Goldschmidt, pp. 86ff. 47 RWWA: l/23d/30/57-92; HASK: Bestand 400/11/1=/7. 45

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The most famous plan to aid the poor that dates from this pe­ riod is that of David Hansemann. In 1824, with the support of the chamber of commerce of Aachen and of all the important officials of the town, district, and province, Hansemann founded the Aachen Fire Insurance Company. A unique provision in its char­ ter was that once the profits of the company reached 30,000 thaIers (which happened in 1834), one-half of all future profits would be turned over to a "Society for the Promotion of Dili­ gence." This was to be a self-help organization for workers that would provide them with a savings bank, educational programs, and a children's nursery. Hansemann strongly believed that such a society could help the poor learn skills, discipline, and thrift, and that these in turn would lead to employment and advance­ ment.48 All of these measures of course did some good, but obviously the real solution to the post-Napoleonic recession was renewed growth of the economies of the Rhine province and especially of the cities, where poverty and unemployment were most in evi­ dence. For the most part, initiative for such growth had to come from individual businessmen. The needle and cloth industries of Aachen, the tobacco processing and even the small textile indus­ tries of Cologne, and the silk industry of Crefeld were all expand­ ing by 1830.49 Some of this growth was the result of private in­ vestment in machinery, including steam engines built by the busy firms of Cockerill in Aachen or Dobbs in Eschweiler. Crefeld's 48 HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/I/17119/4-10. Bergengriin, Hansemann, pp. 54ff.; Rohr, pp. 92-93; Koster, pp. 24-25. Rohr, Kdster, and Puppke have analyzed in depth the attitudes of Rhenish businessmen, especially in the 1830s and 1840s, toward the "social question." See also Gerhard Adelmann and Wolfgang Zorn, "David Hansemann als Sozialpolitiker," and Lothar Briickner, "David Hansemann als Versicherungsunternehmer," both in David Hansemann, 1790,1864,1964, ed., Bernard Poll (Aachen, 1964). 49 Milz, p. 54. In Aachen, fourteen of fifty-one textile factories by 1829 were relatively modern, with mechanized production and an average of twenty-one workers. See Volkmann, p. 559. For Cologne's tobacco industry, see Boerner.

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Conrad Sohmann installed a steam engine in his silk-stocking fac­ tory in 1819. Nellessen and Kelleter of Aachen installed steam engines and were later able to impress Prussian officials with the high quality of the woolen cloth produced in their factories. By 1833, fifteen Aachen cloth manufacturers had steam engines, and the technological modernization of that industry was well ad­ vanced. Norrenberg introduced new spinning machinery in his Cologne cotton factory in the early 1830s.50 The investment in these innovations suggests that by 1834 the Rhenish economy had shaken off the earlier slump, and by this time too the Customs Union between Prussia, Hesse, Bavaria, Saxony, Wiirttemberg, and Thuringia was beginning to stimu­ late trade. We should not, however, overestimate the progress that had taken place. Most industrial production was still not cen­ tralized in factories but remained on a putting-out basis. We have already discussed the labor unrest in Crefeld in 1828 and in Aachen in 1830. In 1829, State Councilor Kunth reported that Crefeld's silk industry was doing well, but he overlooked some serious problems. The number of silk firms was increasing, but at the expense of the old firms, so the number of artisans in the in­ dustry remained almost unchanged. The old firms, suffering from competition and from the bad management that resulted from having their ownership repeatedly divided by death and in­ heritance, had begun to decline. The firm of Friedrich Heinrich von der Leyen closed its doors in 1845; his brother's firm did so ten years later.51 The decline of the great silk firms of Crefeld is mirrored in the lessened activity of the Crefeld Chamber of Commerce and in the subordinate political role played by Crefeld's businessmen in pro­ vincial affairs. Under the French, Crefeld had provided economic 50 Goldschmidt, pp. 267, 317; Bruckner, pp. 159,200; and Joachim Kermann, Die Manufakturen im Rheinland, 1750-1833 (Bonn, 1972), pp. 176, 632-43. 51 Goldschmidt, pp. 312-13; Buschbell and Heinzelmann, p. 188-89; Horst, p. 83.

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and political leadership to the Roer department. Ironically, once it was reunited with Prussia, Crefeld followed the lead of Aachen and Cologne, at least until the late 1830s, when Hermann von Beckerath became Crefeld's leading figure. The greatest eco­ nomic advances of this period—in insurance, steamships, rail­ roads, and banking—began in Cologne and Aachen. All of these economic endeavors were dependent upon the chambers of com­ merce of these cities, all were tied up with Prussian trade and tariff policies, and all brought businessmen into frequent and close contact with the Prussian bureaucracy and the process of political decision making. On May 26, 1818, Prussia promulgated an important new tariff law. It abolished all internal trade barriers, and ad valorem import and consumption duties were established for the whole kingdom. Most raw materials for manufacturing could be im­ ported duty-free, but goods being transported through Prussia paid a duty based on the weight of the cargo. Finally, by equaliz­ ing duties for both parts of the kingdom, Prussia created a na­ tional market.52 The Cologne Chamber of Commerce first learned that a new tariff law was imminent in October 1817. The chamber promptly wrote to Finance Minister Biilow, asking that he allow them to submit opinions on the tariff issue. The chamber noted that "under the French constitution, no tariff law or any other measure affecting trade was instituted unless the government had first heard the opinions and utilized the experiences of the chambers of commerce of the Empire. That was also the case with the comple­ tion of the Commercial Code." Consequently, it was hoped that Biilow would give serious attention to the wishes not only of Co­ logne "but also of the other chambers of commerce, which are to be considered as the representatives of the entire merchant com­ munity."53 52 W. 53

O. Henderson, The Zollveretn, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1959), pp. 39-41. RWWA: 1/54/2/Chamber of Commerce to Biilow, Oct. 18, 1817.

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Bulow replied that since the tariff had already been given its definitive form, there was no point in the chamber's submitting new memoranda on the subject. In any case, the tariff was low and had been developed from a fiscal point of view.54 About this lack of consultation on the new tariff, Merkens later commented: "we cannot conceal our astonishment that the consultative preroga­ tive, which in such cases is allotted to the chambers of commerce, remains so completely ignored." In order to understand what was involved in the tariff battles being waged by the neighboring states against Prussia, "not just general, but above all local, in­ formation is necessary."55 There is no question that Rhineland merchants were unhappy about the way in which the tariff was formulated. Their advice had not been sought, and they feared that the provisions of the tariff would be harmful to the local economy. Most historians have agreed that the 1818 tariff was the result of plans first pro­ posed during the reform era and only slowly brought to fruition. Therefore the tariff was not a response to economic conditions currently existing in the Rhineland, which was annexed long after the tariff provisions were first conceived. Moreover, it is true that the officials who drew up the tariff were influenced by laissez faire theories.56 It does not follow, however, that the tariff's authors were con­ cerned only with the fiscal needs of the state and ignored local economic needs. Kunth, Maassen, and Biilow all wanted the tariff to stimulate, not hurt, the economy, and that idea was prominent in their official reports.57 Moreover, as Biilow pointed out to the 54

RWWA: 1/54/2/Biilow to Chamber of Commerce, Oct. 28, 1817. in Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 402. 56 Goldschmidt, pp. 86ff.; Treue, Wirtschaflszustande und Wirtschaflspolitik, p. 131; Hermann Freymark, Die Reform der preussischen Handels- und Zollpolitik von 1800-1821 und ihre Bedeutung (Jena, 1898), p. 97. 57 Treue, Wirtschaftszustande und Wirtschaftspolitik, p. 150; Lindner, p. 364; Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 125, all make much of the lack of consultation and stress the fiscal basis of the tariff. See also Goldschmidt, p. 344; Carl Dieterici, Zur Ge55 Quoted

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Cologne Chamber in his letter of October 28, he was already in possession of the opinions that the chamber of commerce and the Rhineland merchant communities submitted to Jacobi while he was special commissioner charged with proposing a new tariff for Sack's governorship in 1815-16.58 Thus, even though the Rhineland chambers of commerce were not consulted specifically on the 1818 tariff, it cannot be concluded that the needs of the Rhineland were not known in Berlin. This means that complaints made at the time about the lack of consultation should be viewed from a political as well as a purely economic point of view. What particu­ larly galled the Cologne Chamber of Commerce was the violation of what it felt was its right to participate in the decision-making process. After meeting to discuss the tariff in September 1818, the Co­ logne Chamber sent letters to Hardenberg and to the king declar­ ing that the tariff would completely destroy Rhenish trade and prosperity. To get around it, the chamber argued, merchants would become smugglers, thus "spoiling the morality of the people."59 Finance Minister Klewitz, to whom the letters were re­ ferred, wrote back to say that Cologne's fears for its forwarding trade were unwarranted. The staple right was still in force, and the government would deal with Cologne's forwarding trade when, and if, the staple right were abolished.60 An assembly of "deputies" of the merchants of the Rhineland that met in Dusseldorf in October 1819 had no better luck with Klewitz than had the Cologne Chamber. The nineteen deputies came from twelve cities on both sides of the Rhine (Heimann and Dumont, both from the Cologne Chamber, represented Cologne; schichte der Steuerreform in Preussen von 1816-1820 (Berlin, 1875), p. 77; and Wilfried von Eisenhart-Rothe and A. Ritthaler, Vorgeschichte und Begrundung des deutschen Zollvereins, 1815-1834, 3 vols. (Berlin, 1934), 1:78-82. 58 See above, chap. 7, text at. nn. 40ff. 59 RWWA: 1/54/2/Meeting of Chamber, Aug. 25, 1818, Chamber to Hardenberg, Sept. 5, 1818, and to the King, Sept. 20, 1818. 60 RWWA: 1/54/2/Klewitz to Chamber, Dec. 18, 1818.

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Aachen and Crefeld were not represented). They complained about smuggling caused by the new tariff, about the damage to the forwarding trade, and about the harm to local retailers.61 Klewitz rejected the claims about smuggling, declined to lower the tariff rates on the ground that manufacturers needed some protection, and pointed out that a full year's experience with the tariff had shown that the forwarding trade had not in fact been really hurt. He concluded by reporting that Hardenberg, after "careful consideration of the matter, found the rejection of [the] petition completely justified by the circumstances."62 Between 1818 and 1828, the year Prussia formed a customs union with Hesse-Darmstadt, Rhenish businessmen and Prussian officials occasionally consulted on changes in tariff rates or proce­ dures, and the complaining merchants often received some satis­ faction.63 Also, the government asked Rhenish businessmen to assess the impact of the tariffs instituted by other German states on the Prussian economy. In 1823 the Cologne Chamber of Commerce wrote to leading businessmen in Aachen, Crefeld, Remscheid, and Elberfeld asking for information, and soon there­ after reported to the government that the tariffs of neighboring 61

RWWA: 1/54/3/Address to the King, Oct. 20, 1819. RWWA: 1/54/4/Klewitz to Chamber of Commerce, Dec. 6, 1819. How cor­ rect was Klewitz's assessment of the impact of the tariff? When Cologne's Mayor Mylius in 1819 invited the chamber of commerce and the labor arbitration board to submit reports on the tariff's impact, he received complaints about the decline of trade and the harm to tobacco manufacturers, but textile producers were evidendy receiving some small benefits from the tariff. On the other hand, a recession con­ tinued for another seven to eight years, and it would seem that the new tariff did not really do much to help the Rhenish economy. RWWA: 1/54/1/Norrenberg to Chamber of Commerce, Feb. 8, 1819; 1/54/4/Chamber to Mylius, March 29, 1819. See also Boerner, pp. 18Iff.; Lindner, pp. 387-407; Leopold von Ranke, "Zur Geschichte der deutschen, insbesondere der preussischen Handelspolitik von 1818 bis 1828," HxstoHsch-politische Zeitschnft 2 (1833-36):98, found the re­ sults of the tariff positive. 63 See, for example, RWWA: l/54v'3/Chamber of Commerce to Bulow, Jan. 22 and April 29, 1821, and Billow to Chamber of Commerce, Dec. 13, 1820, and June 12, 1821. 62

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states had had little impact on Rhenish trade and manufactur­ ing.64 Yet in spite of this consultation on day-to-day tariff problems, there seems once again to have been little or no consultation be­ tween Prussia and the Rhineland on the formation of the customs union with Hesse-Darmstadt. Hesse seems to have taken the ini­ tiative, not Prussia, but a customs union obviously fitted in nicely with the plans of Finance Minister Motz and his confidant Maassen. The 1818 tariff drawn up by Prussia was developed out of longstanding plans to solve internal Prussian problems and was not conceived as a step toward some kind of national tariff union or national polity. But by 1828, such ideas were definitely in the minds of Prussia's tariff directors, and Prussia was willing to offer Hesse and other states highly advantageous terms to join a cus­ toms union.65 Rhenish businessmen were aware of Prussia's in­ tentions and gave their approval, even if it was not asked for. Merkens observed that "Prussia, with its striving for a customs union, seeks to unify Germany into a great whole." The efforts of smaller German states to form competing trade associations, on the other hand, threatened to split Germany into two pieces, which Merkens felt was "obviously a great evil."66 Once the tariff union with Hesse was in force, the government consulted with the business community on minor changes and modifications.67 In one interesting case in 1832, Oberprasident 64 RWWA: 1/54/5/Chamber of Commerce to Bettendorff, von der Leyen, Hasenclever, and Briining, Jan. 13, 1823, and Chamber to Reg. Koblenz, Feb. 26, 1823. 65Treue, Wirtschaftszustande und Wirtschaftspolitik, p. 149; Freymark, pp. 100-101; Christian Eckert, "Zur Vorgeschichte des deutschen Zollvereins. Die preussische-hessische Zollunion vom 14. Februar 1828," Schmollers Jahrbuehfiir Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung, und Volkswirtschaft 26 (1902):70-82. For a brief summary of the negotiations leading to the customs union, see W. O. Henderson, The State and the Industrial Revolution in Prussia, pp. 92ff. Otherwise see Hender­ son's longer monograph on the Zollverein. 66 RWWA; 1/52/2/Merkens to Holterhoff, n.d. 67HSAD-K; Regierung Dusseldorf/Prasidialburo/205-31; RWWA: 1/55/1/

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Pestel asked the Cologne Chamber of Commerce to assist him in deciding upon the proper tariff policy for the cotton industry. He asked the chamber to study the question of how best to reconcile the interests of the spinners, the manufacturers and dyers, the merchants, and the nation. The chamber was to advise him through one of its members, who was to be appointed to a special investigatory commission.68 The busy Merkens, a staunch free­ trader, represented the Cologne Chamber on the commission. Only four years after the agreement between Prussia and Hesse, the German Customs Union came into existence. It began operations on January 1, 1834, and included all of the major German states except Austria; in the next few years it was joined by the rest of the small German states. Rhenish businessmen had nothing but praise for Prussia and the new national market created under her leadership. The Aachen Chamber of Com­ merce began its first annual report by extending its "most grateful recognition" to the Prussian government for the creation of the Customs Union. The chamber "recognizes the great benefits which already have appeared in all of Germany and especially in [its] industrially rich homeland." The Customs Union, the Aachen merchants felt, was "a magnificent undertaking under the existing conditions in Germany."69 The government on its part worked closely with Rhenish businessmen on adjustments in the tariff situation. For example, Finance Minister Maassen, Interior Minister Schuckmann, and Foreign Minister Ancillon promised the Aachen Chamber that they would try to meet Aachen's Dumont to Chamber, May 19, 1829; Correspondence between the Chamber of Commerce, Delius, SchuJz, and the Mainz Chamber of Commerce, May-July 1828; also HSAD-K: Provinzialsteuerdirektion Koln/292/95. 68 RWWA: 1/52/2/Pestel to Chamber, Nov. 30, 1832; HSAD: Abteilung 403/3345/1 and II. 69HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/I/1540/86. For Cologne see RWWA: 1/ 15/5/Monatsbericht for Dec., 1833. Also Droz, LiberaJisme rhenan, p. 172; Her­ mann von der Dunk, Der deutsche Vormarz und Belgien, 1830/48 (Wiesbaden, 1966), p. 148.

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wishes by negotiating with Belgium and Holland to free trade on the Scheldt River.70 Just as Prussia found a successful solution to the tariff issue, so she successfully resolved the long dispute over Cologne's staple right (in practice, the transshipment right). During the whole pe­ riod in which Prussia was constructing the Customs Union, the city of Cologne, the Rheinschijfahrtskommission, and the Prussian and Dutch governments continued to spar over the Cologne staple right and the regulation of Rhine trade. The Dutch con­ tinued to interpret the 1815 peace treaties as allowing her the right to levy import and export duties and other fees on all goods shipped through Holland on the Rhine. Since most of Holland's income came from these tariffs, she clung stubbornly to her tariff law of October 3, 1816.71 On their part, the Cologne Chamber of Commerce and the city of Cologne argued that as long as Holland continued to levy duties on Rhine trade, Cologne's staple right should be retained as a countermeasure. Otherwise, Cologne would be forced to bear alone the entire cost of the Vienna settlement, and Prussian monies would enrich the Dutch. The maintenance of the staple right, however, went against the basic premise underlying Prus­ sian trade policy, namely, that there should be as few trade re­ strictions as possible. The Cologne Chamber of Commerce set out to persuade the Prussian authorities to support the staple right in spite of Prussia's general policies. We do not need to fol­ low this campaign in every detail, since the same arguments were repeated many times. Rather, we should direct our attention to Cologne's tactics. As usual, the spokesman for the Cologne Chamber was Mer70 HSAD-K: Regierang Aachen/I/1540/85. Beuth, the administrator for the division for trade, industry, and construction, worked with the Cologne Chamber in 1835 to try to obtain modifications in Belgium's new tariff laws. See RWWA: 1/55/2/58, 67, 69. 71 Eckert, "Rheinschiffart," p. 105; Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 379.

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kens, with his flair for political negotiation. In 1816 he composed a memorandum defending the staple right against Holland, and the memorandum was sent to Chancellor Hardenberg, Hum­ boldt, and to Jacobi, now Prussia's delegate on the Rheinsehifffahrtskommission in Mainz (Jacobi had suggested composition of the memorandum in the first place), and to Oberprasident Solms-Laubach.72 Chamber President Heimann personally de­ livered the memorandum to Jacobi in Mainz. Jacobi was won to the Cologne position, as was Solms-Laubach. In the commission Jacobi pursued the tactic of delaying full implementation of the provisions of the Vienna Convention until Holland had complied with them. He also urged the Prussian finance minister to negotiate with Holland on the issue.73 Hardenberg visited Koblenz in January and February 1818. The chamber of commerce was urged by Daniels, the Cologne jurist who had often aided the chamber and who was with Hardenberg's party, to send a delegation to confer with the chancel­ lor. The chamber immediately dispatched its secretary, Hages, to Koblenz, along with a new memorial to Hardenberg on the staple right. It had planned to send Merkens and Koch as well, when Hages wrote that would not be necessary. Prussia had decided to back Cologne's position, and informed the Rheinschiffahrtskommission that the staple right would remain in force until the Dutch tariffs were removed. Jacobi and Delius, who later re­ placed him as Prussia's delegate, continued to argue before the commission the advisability of maintaining the staple right against Holland. This went on until the mid-1820s, when both sides began to move toward a compromise.74 With Motz, the new finance minister, directing the Prussian side of the negotiations, an agreement was finally worked out 72 RWWA: l/23b/19/77, 86, 88, 102; Grupe, p. 18; Gothein, p. 276; Klaus Schwank,Peter Heinrich Merkens (Cologne, 1973). 73 RWWA: l/23"/6/31; Eckert, "Rheinschiffart," pp. 100-104. 74RWWA: 1/23b/19/108, 112, 116; Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 380-81; Gothein, pp. 162, 270.

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with the Dutch. Holland allowed free passage of goods on the Rhine, though she retained the right to charge ship fees and other fees that gave her some income, and Prussia finally abolished the Cologne staple right. Negotiations were actually completed in 1830, but the outbreak of revolution in the Low Countries post­ poned the signing of the agreement until the spring of 1831. Co­ logne's thirty-seven-year battle to protect the ancient staple right had finally ended.75 Cologne, of course, had known that the end was near. In May 1828, the chamber of commerce had composed a memorial dis­ cussing possible compensation Tor the impending loss of the staple right. The memorial declared: "Cologne, ruled by Prussia's protective sceptor and trusting in a king that surpasses all the monarchs of the world in his generosity and justice, Cologne, we say, need not fear that she must make sacrifices without seeking compensation."76 It then proposed improving the harbor and lowering harbor fees to make the port more competitive. The chamber also asked Prussia to abolish her other tariff-control sta­ tions and to make Cologne the main customs port on the Rhine. This would force all foreign trade and forwarding trade to stop in Cologne, but it would leave internal trade free of tariff's. In the fall of 1828, Merkens went to Berlin to discuss the end of the staple right with Motz. From Motz and from other officials he won promises of compensation, and when the privilege was finally abolished in 1831, he wrote to Berlin to remind the goverment of these promises. Some compensation was urgently needed, since the city lost one-third of its income with the fall of the staple right. The Prussians proved true to their word; be­ tween 1831 and 1838, 232,000 thalers were paid to the city of Cologne, though she did not become the sole customs port as the chamber had hoped.77 75

Schwann, Handelskammer, p. 386; Eckert, "Rheinschiffart," pp. 221-31. 1/23V19/133. 77 RWWA: 1/2/7/6; l/23b/19/169, 173; Grupe, p. 18; Gothein, pp. 242, 276; 76RWWA:

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Through the period between 1816 and 1834, then, busi­ nessmen had a productive relationship with the Prussian gov­ ernment when it came to tariff matters. Certainly there were times when the businessmen were not consulted, but the success of Prussia's policies obviously made up for her having occasionally ignored the right of the chambers of commerce to give advice on economic legislation. Though not as often as they might have liked, businessmen were frequently consulted on tariff policy, and they met or corresponded with Prussia's highest officials. Prus­ sian leadership had resulted in a German national market, and businessmen could not help but respect and admire the Prussian government for its achievement. At the same time, because of their dealings as lay bureaucrats in the chambers of commerce, Rhenish businessmen could feel that they too had participated in the creation of the most forward-looking institutions in postNapoleonic Prussia. Expansion of internal markets through the Customs Union, in­ creasing freedom of trade on the Rhine, renewed economic growth, and the importation of new technology were a fertile mixture in the Rhineland. During the first two decades of Prus­ sian rule, Rhenish businessmen introduced many new ideas and founded new firms that have survived to the present day. In steamboat and railroad companies and financial institutions, businessmen and government officials worked together to obtain sanction for the formation of joint-stock companies, and they were partners in investment. One new financial institution has already been mentioned: the Aachen Fire Insurance Company. According to the Commercial Code, the government had to approve the founding statutes of joint-stock companies. To help him obtain approval of his brain­ child, David Hansemann won the support of Ingersleben and Helmut Bieger, Das Finanzwesen der Stadt Koln unter preussischer Herrsehaft bis zur Reichsgrundung 1871 (Diss. Cologne, 1968), pp. 98ff.

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Vincke, the Rhenish and Westphalian Oberprasidenten, and began a correspondence with State Councilors Kunth and Beuth in Berlin. Finally, in the spring of 1825, Hansemann traveled to Berlin, discussed his project with the leading officials in the finance and interior ministries, and returned to Aachen having won the required governmental approval. (For Hansemann, this was also the beginning of a long career of negotiations with the Prussian government.) Furthermore, Hansemann not only per­ suaded most of Aachen's greatest merchants and manufacturers to put up capital, he also got the Aachen district government presi­ dent to invest in the company.78 In Cologne, Merkens provided the leadership which made that city a major insurance center. In 1817 the Cologne Chamber of Commerce endorsed Merkens's proposed statutes for a Rhine Shipping Insurance Company, and by 1822 the new firm had had its statutes approved and most of its capital subscribed to. In 1845, the firm was transformed by Gustav Mevissen, a protege of Merkens, into the Agrippina Insurance Company, an institution still prominent in the Rhineland. In 1839 Merkens was instru­ mental in founding the Colonia Fire Insurance Company, and in 1852 he founded the first reinsurance company. In all of the en­ terprises, Cologne's leading bankers and leading merchants were the major investors.79 It was also during the first two decades of Prussian rule that the Rhineland's bankers increasingly directed their attention away "from the financing of state credit to the financing of the West German economy."80 Bankers were major investors in the insur­ ance companies, in the steamship and railroad ventures, and in 78HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/I/17119/4-10; Bergengrun, Hansemann, pp. 54ff.; RWWA: 1/55/2/69. 79 Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 78; Grupe, pp. 13-14, 23-25; Gothein, pp. 440-41. 80 Kriiger, pp. 14-15, 138-48; and for Herstatt, pp. 44-49; for Schaaffhausen, pp. 40-57; for Stein, pp. 57-64; for Oppenheim, pp. 64-72. The Herstatt bank just closed its doors in 1974, the result of currency speculation.

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the growing iron, steel, and coal industries of the Ruhr Valley. The four great Cologne banks of this period—Herstatt, Schaaffhausen, Stein, and Oppenheim—had profited enormously from land, grain, and currency speculation during the French period, and the founders or managers of all four sat at various times in the chamber of commerce and the city council. In this way they were always well informed about both government policy and changes in the local economy. All of the Cologne and Aachen banks were private banks that had grown out of some kind of mercantile activity (except for the bank of the Oppenheims, who had long been court bankers). But after 1827, when the economy was feeling the effects of a shortage of specie and a rapidly growing demand for capital, Hansemann, Merkens, and later Camphausen all urged Prussia to sanction local banks of issue, to create central exchange banks, and to per­ mit the formation of joint-stock banks.81 The government, how­ ever, was afraid of banks of these kinds and of paper money, so the Rhineland had to do without these modern banking techniques till mid-century. We should also note that the bankers and merchants were not always in agreement. A case in point is the dispute in 1820 and 1821 over the use of Prussian money in the Rhineland. Fees and duties on the Rhine at this time were supposed to be paid in French money, but since that was becoming scarce, the Cologne Chamber of Commerce asked the Prussian government to inter­ cede with the Rhine commission in Mainz to get approval for the use of Prussian money instead. The chamber then decided that the Prussian thaler should be the main currency in the Rhineland, and it tried to introduce a fixed exchange rate in the Cologne har­ bor based on the thaler. Cologne's bankers, who profited from flexible exchange rates, and all the local officials were opposed to the chamber of commerce on this issue, and both sides appealed 81 Kriiger, pp. 35-36; Tilly, Financial Institutions, p. 50; Bergengrun, Hansemann, pp. 91-92; Gothein, pp. 418-21.

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to the finance and trade ministers. Eventually, the chamber of commerce emerged victorious, and the Prussian thaler became the basic currency of Rhine trade and eventually of German trade.82 Probably the two most important innovations in the Rhineland economy at this time were the introduction of steamships and railroads, facilitated by the working relationships between indi­ vidual entrepreneurs, the chambers of commerce, and the gov­ ernment. Already in 1816 a steamship had made its first appear­ ance on the Rhine, and immediately there was discussion of the possible advantages to be gained from a steamship company. The Cologne Chamber of Commerce began considering the matter in 1822, and in February 1823, Merkens wrote to the minister of trade suggesting that steamships be used as tugs for the sailboats moving upriver. Later that same year a company was founded in Rotterdam, and in 1824 the Cologne Chamber of Commerce sub­ scribed to some stock in the company, in spite of some reserva­ tions expressed by Merkens and Boisseree about the company's statutes. In Berlin in 1825, Merkens discussed steamships with the government, and by 1826, Merkens and the chamber had re­ ceived a concession from the Prussian government for the forma­ tion of the joint-stock Prussian-Rhenish Steamship Company. Quickly Cologne worked out an arrangement with Rotterdam and Mainz, whereby the Dutch steamships would ply the Rhine from Holland to Cologne, the Cologne ships from that city to Mainz, and the ships of a proposed Mainz company from there on upriver. This agreement worked well and benefited all partners until it fell into disuse after 1839.83 82 RWWA: l/23c/23/l-68; 1/53/15/70-125; 1/54/3/Chamber of Commerce to Biilow, Sept. 25, 1821, and Biilow to Chamber, Oct. 11, 1821; also Schwann, Handelskammer, pp. 423-25, 429; Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 112; Gothein, pp. 415-16. 83 Jiirgen Heinz Schawacht, Schiffahrt und Giiterverkehr zwischen den Hafen des deutschen Niederrheins (insbesondere Koln) und Rotterdam von Ende des 18. bis zur Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts (Cologne, 1973), pp. 133-41, 155; Grupe, p. 15; RWWA; 1/27/4/Report from Merkens to Chamber of Commerce, April 19, 1825.

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The Prussian-Rhenish Steamship Company boasted that dur­ ing its first ten years it carried one million passengers and two million centners of freight, but the real breakthrough did not come until 1841, when the Cologne Steam Tugboat Company began to function under Ludolf Camphausen's leadership. Till then the steamships (in addition to carrying some freight on board) had mainly served as tugs for the traditional Rhine sail­ boats that had always carried cargo. Camphausen solved various organizational and technical difficulties to make possible the tow­ ing of large barges. This became the standard means of transport­ ing large and bulky goods on the Rhine.84 The initiative for the construction of railroads on the Left Bank of the Rhine also came from Camphausen, who had joined Co­ logne's chamber of commerce and city council in 1831. In an essay entitled "Concerning a Railroad from Cologne to Antwerp," Camphausen proposed that private enterprise and the Prussian state become partners in the construction of a railroad which would bypass Holland and free Rhenish trade and industry of Dutch obstructionism on the Rhine. He also pointed out that railroads held great military potential for Prussia and would bind together parts of the monarchy for greater national strength.85 A railroad committee was formed under the chairmanship of Mayor Steinberger. It included, in addition to Camphausen, HolterhofiF (the president of the commercial court), Koch, and others, and it submitted for government approval a plan for a joint-stock com­ pany.86 Learning of Camphausen's proposal, businessmen in Aachen met to discuss it with the Aachen mayor and District GovernIbid., pp. 1·83-84; Kellenbenz and Eyll, p. 139. Schwann, Camphausen, 1:292-97; 2:121-22; 3:6. The idea of a railroad to bypass the Dutch bottleneck on the Rhine of course in part grew out of the 1830 revolution that divided the Low Countries. See also Dunk, pp. 145-51. 86 Schwann ,Camphausen, 1:454-58. Int. Min. Schuckmann stated reservations about Steinberger's participation but did not forbid it. See RWWA: 1/3/6/94. 84

85

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ment President Reimann. Their concern was whether the pro­ posed line would go through Aachen as they wished, or would bypass the city, as some engineers felt it would have to do because the terrain around Aachen presented too many difficulties. Lead­ ership of the Aachen businessmen fell to Hansemann, supported by Wagner (president of the Aachen Chamber of Commerce), the machine manufacturer Cockerill, the cloth manufacturer van Giilpen, and the needle manufacturer from nearby Burtscheid, P. H. Pastor.87 Countering the Cologne proposal, the Aacheners then proposed to seek official approval for a railroad company of their own. Camphausen and Hansemann each led a delegation to Berlin in 1835 and 1836 to lobby with government officials. While there, Camphausen also had a long conversation with the crown prince and was invited to social functions at the royal court.88 Han­ semann, however, proved the more successful lobbyist, winning the support of Interior Minister von Rochow and Rother, the offi­ cial most directly concerned with railroad policy. In early 1837, the Cologne company was awarded the concession for the line, but it was to be built through Aachen, and the Aachen railroad committee was to be absorbed into the Cologne committee. The merger took place in June 1837 at a meeting chaired by Oberprasident Bodelschwingh. Both Hansemann and Camphausen were elected as directors, but Camphausen, angered by Hansemann's brash manner and his success in stalling the Cologne plan, de­ clined to serve. Hansemann thus led the railroad company until 1844, when the presidency went to Gustav Mevissen, while Camphausen turned to his project for the steam tugboats on the Rhine.89 87

Bruckner, p. 20; Bergengrun,Hansemann, pp. 168ff. Caspary, pp. 36-39; Schwann, Camphausen, 1:73. 89 For other accounts of the beginnings of the Cologne-Antwerp Railroad see Gothein, pp. 299-317; Eichholtz, pp. 19-22; Klara van Eyll, "Camphausen und Hansemann—ZweirheinischeEisenbahnunternehmer 1833-1844," Tradition 11 88

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The negotiations over the railroad company had several charac­ teristics that are by now quite familiar. Businessmen and officials both conceived the enterprise in "public" rather than purely private terms. Local officials came to the support of local busi­ nessmen, and lobbying delegations carried the issue to Berlin for resolution. The leading figures in the chambers of commerce, commercial courts, and city councils were involved with the rail­ road committees in both cities. This was the common pattern of business-government relations, and it owed nothing to the fact that both Hansemann and Camphausen felt that the state should help finance the construction of railroads. It does, however, indi­ cate the spirit of good-will and cooperation that infused the rela­ tions between government and the Rhenish business community. Business Institutions and Business Politics

We can see at this point that many characteristics of the busi­ ness institutions which developed under the French continued and were reinforced under Prussia. First, while all of the business institutions were in some way instruments through which mer­ chants and manufacturers could realize their goals, at the same time they were supposed to reconcile public and private interests. A chamber of commerce, for example, always claimed to speak for the public, for a city, and for the province, as well as for com­ merce. This was not hypocrisy; businessmen believed in the iden­ tity of all of these interests. And it was very important to be able to fulfill public needs in a Prussia that, after the abolition of guilds during the reform era, was officially hostile toward self-interested societies. Second, participants in the commercial courts, the labor arbi­ tration boards, and the chambers of commerce were what I have called lay bureaucrats. Though unpaid, they assisted the govern(1966); Erich Angermann1 "Ludolf Camphausen (1803-1870)," Rheinische Lebensbilder, vol. 2 (Diisseldorf, 1966), 198ff.

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ment in the administration of certain laws, and they provided expert information and judgments to assist the government in lawmaking. These institutions, in other words, enjoyed the im­ mediate access to government (Staatsunmittelbarkeit) that other­ wise only the bureaucracy had. Third, the character of the institutions (their duties and rights), the character of bureaucratic rule, the issues that drew most attention, and the habits of French rule all combined to fos­ ter a political style in which lengthy memoranda, dispatched to authorities on all levels, and lobbying by delegations from the in­ stitutions were the means by which influence was exerted, needs expressed, and complaints filed. As long as this style was fol­ lowed, politics remained sheltered from the public eye. Finally, we should recall that Rhenish businessmen, though primarily concerned with economic problems, saw themselves as a political elite. The threats to the structure of the chamber of commerce, the attempts to broaden the previously exclusive membership of the chambers, the periodic failure to consult the chambers on tariff policy, were all met by the chambers of com­ merce with protests couched in political, not economic, terms. And though Merkens, Koch, Hansemann, Camphausen, and others were considered potentially dangerous leaders of Rhenish liberalism, they themselves saw little difference between their work in the business institutions and their activities as public figures. In his railroad essay of 1833, Camphausen declared: "We find ourselves in a time of transistion to a new phase [of history]. Neither religious nor political ideas will stand in the forefront in this new age, and if one were to dare to speculate what [idea] might be designated to take over this empty place, it would be the striving of all peoples after material well-being."90 No wonder, then, that the politics of the chambers of commerce were consid­ ered fully as important as the politics of the city councils and diet. 90

Schwann, Camphausen, 1:288.

10. Conclusion: The Integration of the Rhenish Business Community into Prussia

AS we saw earlier, when the French annexed the Left Bank of the Rhine, they used a variety of methods to break down Rhenish particularism and develop loyalties to France. Oaths of allegiance, participation in patriotic ceremonies and societies, plebiscites and petition campaigns, and the possibility of acquiring prestigious offices and titles all combined to give Rhinelanders a sense of be­ longing to a regional and national polity. Political horizons and political opportunities expanded until they were nationwide—an enormous change from the narrow ways of the small Rhenish states of the old regime. When the Rhineland was turned over to Prussia in 1815, the new rulers had no concerted plan for transforming French loyal­ ties into Prussian loyalties. The Prussians assumed that Germans would prefer to be ruled by Germans as long as the new adminis­ tration was competent and fair. But actually, Prussia did a great deal to win the loyalty of the Rhineland, and what she refrained from doing also helped to win that loyalty. For the most part Prussia did not force her institutions and law on the Rhineland, allowing most of the French institutions and reforms to remain. Administrative posts, to be sure, were gradually filled with pro­ fessionally trained bureaucrats, but Prussia did not go out of her way to make reprisals against individuals who had served the French. Aachen's von Guaita and Jacobi, and Crefeld's von der Leyen, for example, continued to hold official posts under the Prussians.

CONCLUSION

335

On the whole, the transition from French to Prussian rule was smooth. Both France and Prussia had centralized bureaucracies and local self-administration supervised by the central govern­ ment. Both censored the press and tried to manipulate public opinion, and both, after initial years of economic hardship, suc­ ceeded in bringing prosperity to the Rhineland. Consequently the transferral of loyalty from a French ruler to a Prussian ruler, the type of rule and degree of prosperity enjoyed being to all intents and purposes the same, did not prove difficult. Moreover, Prussia did make rewards of social prestige to some Rhinelanders, though this was not in a deliberate effort to win support. During the period wfe are studying, several outstanding Left Bank businessmen were awarded titles by the Prussian king. Koch, Herstatt, Schaaffhausen, and J. P. Heimann of Cologne became commercial counselors, as did Cornelius Floh and Abra­ ham Sohmann of Crefeld, and Crefeld's Peter von Lowenich was named a privy commercial counselor and a counselor of the ex­ chequer.1 Georg Wagner, president of the Aachen Commercial Court, received the ennobling "Order of the Red Stag," as did two members of the von der Leyen family and Aachen's Mayor von Guaita.2 Friedrich Heinrich von Friedrich von der Leyen, Bernard Scheibler of Eupen, and Franz Rigal of Crefeld were en­ nobled and raised to the rank of Freiherr, or baron.3 Several man1 HASK: Franzosische Verwaltung/4430/80; RWWA: 1/56/4/Letter of Dec. 24, 1819; RWWA: 1/56/5/Letter of May 14, 1822; RWWA: 1/26/5/140; Wolfferts, "Floh," p. 137; Buschbell and Heinzelmann, see genealogies in Index, pp. 433-79. 2 Huyskens, p. 133; Kurschat, pp. 34, 38; HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/ Prasidialbiiro/54/140. 3 Barkhausen, "Die sieben bedeutendsten Fabrikanten," pp. 104, 108n; Kurschat, p. 37. Scheibler, the reader may recall, had unsuccessfully sought membership in the French Legion of Honor. Friedrich Heinrich von Conrad von der Leyen sought a rank equal to that awarded his brother. He was unsuccessful, and this led to a quarrel with his brother that helped weaken the famous silk firm. See HSAK: 403/5796/1; and Kurschat, pp. 92-95. Carl Martin Nellessen, an ad­ junct mayor oftAachen in the 1820s, was ennobled in 1856 and made a count in 1862. Fiirth, 2:78-9.

336

CONCLUSION

ufacturers received citations of honor during the 1820s for the high quality of their products.4 Two cases involving titles are particularly interesting. Aachen's von Guaita, in addition to receiving a Prussian title, was honored with appointment to the French Legion of Honor. Not only did Prussia not object, she ordered her ambassador in Paris to pick up the certificate for von Guaita. And in the 1840s Co­ logne's Peter Heinrich Merkens held the titles of Knight of the Order of the Red Stag, Knight of the French Legion of Honor, and privy commercial counselor.5 Both cases indicate that Prussia was confident of the loyalty of her Rhenish subjects and was not afraid of their harboring a latent Francophilia. That leading businessmen were acknowledged as notables is apparent too in the membership of the social clubs that were found in nearly every city. In casinos, billiard clubs, reading societies, and garden societies, prominent businessmen shared a cultured social life with officials and ranking noblemen, just as they had in Masonic lodges during the French period. The mem­ bership rolls of the Aachen Casino, founded in 1805, are broken down by occupation in table 16.6 During the French period few officials who were not of local origin belonged to the Aachen Casino, which was supported overwhelmingly by young busi­ nessmen, particularly those also active in the city council, chamber of commerce, commercial court, and labor arbitration board. However, during the first two decades of Prussian rule, the number of members who were professional men and Prussian officials rose markedly, especially after the mid-1820s. By 1834 4

HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/Prasidialbiiro/54/94, 109, 121. HSAD-K: Regierung Aachen/Prasidialburo/124/16; Grupe, pp. 25-26; and Schwank. 6 Arens and Janssen, pp. 9-12. The membership lists, along with available genealogical materials, show that the leading families continued to intermarry, just as they had prior to 1789. The Nellessens, Scheiblers, Lowenichs (of Crefeld), Molls (of Cologne), Pastors, Peltzers, and the newcomers the Cockerills were all related by marriage. See Macco on the Peltzer and Pastor families; also Furth, vol. 2. 5

337

CONCLUSION

TABLE 16 New Memberships in the Club Aachener Casino by Occupation 1805-1814 Businessmen1' Professionals1' Lesser businessmen1' Officials Unknown Total 1814-1834 Businessmen·' Professionals'1 Lesser businessmen'' Officials Rentiers Unknown Total

71 5 5 3 24

(65.7%) ( 4.6%) ( 4.6%) ( 2.8%) (22.2%)

(businessmen holding public office: 17) (members of chamber of commerce, commercial court, labor arbitration board: 18)

108 (99.9%) 96 17 9 25 6 8

(59.6%) (10.6%) ( 5.6%) (15.5%) ( 3.7%) ( 4.9%)

(businessmen holding public office: 24) (members of chamber of commerce, commercial court, labor arbitration board: 14)

161 (99.9%)

SOURCE: Arens and Janssen, pp. 109-44. •' Manufacturer, wholesale merchant, banker, dye-works owner. 11 Lawyer, notary, clergyman, doctor, professor. c Brewer, druggist, innkeeper.

both the district government president and vice-president had joined. A minor incident shows that political questions were aired at the club. The casino had a large collection of newspapers and periodicals, including many that were French or Belgian. After the 1830 revolts in those countries, the local censor raised objec­ tions to the collection, but it was defended by other local officials who were club members, including Mayor Daniels.7 By bringing together notables of different origins, such clubs acted as a liberalizing influence and furthered the integration of the business community with Prussia. Just as had been the case under the French, leading busi7 Nipperdey, pp. 31, 34, 42-44; Gerth, p. 40; Eckart Pankoke, "Soziale Selbstverwaltung: Zur Problemgeschichte sozial-liberale Gesellschaftspolitik," Archiv fur Sozialgeschichte 12 (1972):186. Arens, pp. 90-95, lists nine clubs founded in the territory of the Rhine province prior to 1792, eleven founded be­ tween 1792 and 1815, and eleven between 1815 and 1834.

338

CONCLUSION

nessmen could hope to be rewarded with prestigious titles and honors and enjoy social contacts that would enable them to move further up the social ladder. Also, as happened under the French, businessmen could demonstrate their political loyalty by par­ ticipating in public ceremonies, such as the celebration of the king's birthday in Cologne's cathedral, always attended by the members of the chamber of commerce.8 Businessmen put their greatest efforts, however, into playing host to royalty whenever the opportunity presented itself, since this was one of the most effective ways of showing loyalty and acquiring status. Here the special object of attention was the crown prince, who was very fond of the Rhineland. When he visited Cologne in 1817, the chamber of commerce hosted a festival in his honor, to which it invited members of the district government and the Oberprasident, Solms-Laubach.9 Two years later, on a visit to Crefeld, the crown prince lodged with the von der Leyens, and in 1821 he lodged in the house of the Aachen factory owner Nellessen. In Aachen in 1833, he was greeted by an honor guard mostly made up of the town's leading businessmen. He met with the members of the chamber of commerce to hear their wishes and visited several factories and an exhibition of industrial products.10 The king was a less frequent visitor. His most famous visit, of course, was to the Congress of Aix-Ia-Chapelle (Aachen) in 1818. The city council, the mayor, and the chamber of commerce com­ bined forces to provide the visiting dignitaries, including the Russian tsar, the Austrian emperor, and Europe's leading diplo­ mats, with lavish entertainment. Three years later, the king stopped overnight in Crefeld and stayed in the home of Peter von Lowenich. And, on another visit in 1836, the royal family sailed on the Rhine on a steamship personally piloted by Merkens, now 8

RWWA: l/23d/30/140; 1/8/11/225. RWWA: l/23d/30/138-48. 10Buschbell and Heinzelmann, p. 321; SaA: Oberbiirgermeisterakten/2/l/Ia/ 80, 91, 107, 125, 136; Poll, Geschichte Aachens, p. 124. 9

CONCLUSION

339

the president of the Prussian-Rhenish Steamship Company.11 These visits enabled leading Rhenish businessmen to become personally acquainted with Prussia's rulers, to earn their confi­ dence, and to assure them of the loyalty and well-wishes of the business community. Furthermore, a businessman who received the king or crown prince in his home or factory enjoyed a boost in prestige comparable to that which came from receiving a title. After two decades of Prussian rule, businessmen in the Rhineland found themselves in a very strong position. They dominated local government, even though local officials were usually career bureaucrats. The leaders of the third estate of the diet were busi­ nessmen, and these men were often the leaders of the entire diet. The key business institutions—the chambers of commerce, the commercial courts, and the labor arbitration boards—continued to exist, and through them businessmen had access to the highest councils of decision making in Prussia. Through these institu­ tions, personal contacts, and official forums businessmen achieved a great deal. The Commercial Code was retained, and with it the semiofficial institutions through which businessmen worked. Governmental sanction was obtained for innovations in shipping, insurance, and railroads, and government assistance was secured in many smaller matters. Even where Rhenish businessmen and the Prussian government were most at odds—over tariffs and the staple right—the eventual success of the Customs Union and the growing prosperity after 1825 seemed to vindicate the judgment of officialdom and testify to the government's wisdom. Certainly Prussian rule was not Utopian. Especially after 1830, as the "reform" generation of Prussian bureaucrats was gradually replaced by more conservative, more rigid, more formal men, the Prussian administration became less responsive to some needs of the changing Rhenish economy.12 Moreover, the energetic Iead11 See SaA: Oberburgermeisterakten/2/ l/Ia/24-33; Buschbell and Heinzelmann, p. 32; Grupe, p. 16. 12 See Gillis; Friedrich Zunkel, "Die Rolle der Bergbaubiirokratie beim indu-

340

CONCLUSION

ership of Cologne's Merkens and Koch in the diet was criticized in some government circles. The Landrat and police spy Schnabel went so far as to circulate a story that Merkens and Koch were leading a separatist movement, whereby the Rhine Province and Westphalia would be under the rule of the crown prince and would have their own systems of taxation, policy, law, and political institutions. The story was false, and Merkens reacted vigorously by urging publication of diet debates and ad­ vocating removal of what he called "secret police" (namely, Schnabel).13 Incidents such as this, however, did not lead to any sort of revolutionary opposition. On the contrary, while busi­ nessmen were ambivalent about the bureaucracy, they were polit­ ically loyal Prussian state.14 This is not surprising; businessmen had learned from forty tur­ bulent years to be flexible. Consider the career of the cloth manu­ facturer Fuerth of Aachen. Having held a number of important offices under the French, including that of commander of the town honor guard for imperial visits, he was awarded the Legion of Honor, 100 louis d'or and a diamond pin from the empress, and he was among the guests at the baptism of the King of Rome. Yet when Napoleon's star fell, he became a lieutenant in the Landwehr and led a battalion against his former sovereign at Water­ loo.15 Merkens himself declared in the first diet: "The honorable striellen Ausbau des Ruhrgebiets 1815-1848," in Sozialgeschichte Heute, ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Gottingen, 1974). 13 Hansen, RBA, 1:107-10, 116-17, 123-27. Schnabel had been appointed as a police commissioner in Aachen after the unrest there in 1830. After 1832 he was a "special" official for internal security and continued to send secret reports to the interior minister. Droz, Liberalisme rhenan, p. 180, evidently accepts Schnabel's reports as true, in contrast to Hansen. More recently, Friedrich Keinemann has rejected Schnabel's reports as unsubstantiated. See his Das kolner Ereignis, sein Widerhall in der Rheinprovinz und in Westfalen1 pt. 1, Darstellung (Miinster, 1974), p. 24. 14 James J. Sheehan, "Partei, Volk, and Staat," p. 169; Keinemann, pt. 1, pp. 20-21, 33-36. 15 Arens, p. 22.

CONCLUSION

341

representative of the noble estate asks if, while in 1814 we so ju­ bilantly welcomed our liberators and with fighting spirit joined them against the common enemy, if we at that time expected and wanted the retention of the [French] legal system. Who can doubt the affirmative answer to this question?"16 Fuerth, Merkens, and many others were able to adapt to the new situation after 1815, become Prussians, and still hold firm to the concrete benefits of French rule. Thus the business community's complaints about such things as censorship or excessively bureaucratic government must be taken with a grain of salt. Through the semiofficial institutions, businessmen were themselves lay bureaucrats, and they had learned to use bureaucratic channels to their advantage. For the privilege of having immediate access to the ministries, for exam­ ple, they were willing to abide by the prohibition on publication of the chamber-of-commerce memoranda. And at the same time that they were demanding greater representation for themselves in the diet, they were jealously striving to prevent a broadening of the franchise and eligibility requirements for membership in the chambers of commerce. As for the businessmen's "jubilantly welcoming their liber­ ators" while at the same time having every intention of holding on to French legal and political institutions, and their making every use of the Prussian bureaucracy while criticizing and complaining about it, behavior such as this may appear to some degree selfcontradictory. I believe, though, that it does not, once we take into account the businessmen's loyalty to the Prussian state and their thorough integration with it. When Rhenish businessmen opposed specific policies or sought reforms, they did so almost as a loyal opposition, seeking improvements in a system that they basically approved of. It is with this in mind that I think we 16 Quoted in Droz, Liberalisme rhenan, p. 120n. It is rather doubtful that Mer­ kens really jubilantly welcomed the Russian and Prussian troops in 1814.

342

CONCLUSION

should approach the two political essays of David Hansemann, written in the early 1830s. The first, entided "Concerning Prussia's Situation and Politics at the End of 1830," was sent in manuscript form to the king on December 31, 1830. The French historian Jacques Droz has called it "the only positive document of Rhenish origin which sets out to prove that the defense of liberal institutions can and must be pursued within the framework of the Prussian state."17 It was not, as a matter of fact, the only document to express such ideas, since many similar ideas also appear in Hansemann's second es­ say, Prussia and France, published in 1833 in book form. To­ gether the two essays are extremely important. They are the first essays written by a Rhenish businessman that thoroughly analyze the general constitutional problems confronting Prussia. More­ over, they contain ideas central to Hansemann's political views. This is evidenced by the fact that he published the 1830 manu­ script with only minor modifications in 1845 and again in 1850.18 Of the two essays, the earlier is more directly political, while most of Prussia and France is devoted to a detailed comparison of taxation in the two states and taxation in the Rhineland under French rule and under Prussian rule. It can be argued, however, that the analysis of taxation was an attempt to lend weight to the political ideas at the end of the book. There is no need to discuss Hansemann's essays exhaustively, since this has been done al­ ready by many historians concerned with German liberalism.19 We should, however, take note of the central political ideas in both essays in order to see to what extent they are the product of 17

Droz, Liberalisme rhenan, p. 166. The essay is printed in Hansen, RBA,

1:11-81. 18

Rohr, p. 95. See Droz, Liberalisme rhenan, pp. 166-71; Hansen, RBA, l:32*-44"; Han­ sen, Preussen und Rheinland, pp. 66-69; Bergengriin, Hansemann, pp. 108-18, 122ff. 19

343

CONCLUSION

the successful integration of Rhenish businessmen with the Prus­ sian political system. At the heart of both of Hansemann's essays is an argument ad­ vocating the realignment of political forces in Prussia. Tradi­ tionally, Hansemann noted, Prussia's strength had been her no­ bility and her aristocrat-led army, but that was no longer really the case. In its most recent triumphs over Napoleon, the army had relied on a militia. Moreover, the nobility was constantly being weakened as it lost or sold its land to members of the middle class.20 The state had tried to substitute a bureaucracy for the no­ bility, but a bureaucracy, Hansemann argued, could never really become the bulwark of state power.21 Consequently, if Prussia were to remain strong, as Hansemann thought it must, the state should begin to rely upon what he called the "true majority of the people." But, he went on to explain, majority is never to be understood as that of a number of per­ sons. Rather it is the true strength of the nation, which should also have no other interest than that of the majority of the popu­ lation, but which is essentially distinguished from that popular majority insofar as it has greater insight through education and greater interest because of its property in maintaining the exist­ ence of a firm, mighty, and good state government.22 Where is this true majority to be found? He finds the real bulwark of the nation at this time in businessmen: "No state power is con­ ceivable without trade and industry."23 Because the income of the nobility was derived from land and was comparatively unaffected by war or civil unrest, that class had less interest than business­ men in preventing such disturbances. "Consequently the middle class, because the most distinguished merchants and manufac20 22

Hansemann, p. 293. Ibid., 1:16-17.

21 23

Hansen, RBA, 1:17-22. Ibid., 1:39; Hansemann, pp. 263-66.

344

CONCLUSION

turers belong to it, offers the throne more elements of stability and order than does the class of landowners." In fact, Hansemann ar­ gued, it was because of the influence necessarily exercised by businessmen in political affairs that no "general European war grew out of the extraordinary events of 1830"—the revolutions in France and Belgium.24 The Prussian crown would be strengthened, therefore, by drawing the business community more fully into politics, and it could make sure that only the most talented members of the busi­ ness community would become politically active by restructuring the electoral and legislative process. Hansemann proposed a twostep process in which only a small group of high taxpayers would exercise a direct vote for the members of national and provincial assemblies. The election procedure would be carried on under the scrutiny of a free press, thus ensuring that men of talent would be elected. The assemblies so elected would then debate and enact all kinds of legislation, especially taxation. The ministers, ap­ pointed by the king at his discretion, would be responsible to the national assembly.25 Hansemann's proposal, of course, meant the introduction of a constitutional monarchy in Prussia, and in view of the king's promises of 1815, Hansemann felt that Prussia was in a period of transition to such a monarchy. And it is important to note that, while he wanted to increase the power of the business community at the expense of the bureaucracy and nobility, he had no desire to increase the power of the general populace. He expressly rejected popular sovereignty, calling it a "pernicious theory," and stated that "the idea of forming a great and powerful republic in Europe is a piece of nonsense."26 "Political rights," he declared, "are 24 Hansen, RBA, 1:51. Thus Hansemann's views did not develop out of any fear of social revolution. Rather he used the example of the revolution of 1830 to support his arguments for greater political participation for businessmen and for moral and political education for the poor. See Adelmann and Zorn, "David Hansemann," pp. 32-33. 25 Hansen, RBA, 1:53-60. 26 Ibid., 1:78; Hansemann, p. 287.

CONCLUSION

345

necessarily privileges of a part of a nation, especially in a great monarchical state."27 Mass participation in politics, he felt, was no better than mob disorder, and he criticized the revolution in Belgium for having relied for success on popular unrest. Indeed, Hansemann repeatedly pointed out that his suggested reforms should be viewed as improvements in the political system of a state for which he had great affection. He pointed out that a monarchy which included such constitutional or democratic in­ stitutions as a militia and elections had to rely for its stability upon great love for the king, and he noted that the great affection for the monarch in the Rhineland was remarkable, since that prov­ ince had belonged to Prussia for only half a generation. Moreover, Hansemann went out of his way in both essays to praise the Prus­ sian bureaucracy, stating that "many branches of administration are excellently cared for in Prussia, and the numerous bureau­ cracy distinguishes itself generally by its humanity and good will. This is a result of the facts that: [in Prussia] more is administered than governed; the government gives great attention to the scien­ tific education of its officials; and humanity and a sense of order flows from the throne throughout the bureaucracy."28 The monarchy, however, needed more than the bureaucracy and nobility: it needed the strength and vitality of the business com­ munity. Hansemann felt that Prussia needed to be strong because she was certain to be the core to which the small German states would gravitate. He was confident that "because it is better able to understand the spirit of the times than Austria (as was also the case during the Reformation), the Prussian dynasty seems des­ tined to become the preponderant power in Germany, while Aus­ tria renounces that destiny by ruling over non-German people."29 27

Hansen, RBA, 1:53. Hansemann, pp. 303, 306; also Hansen1RB/!, 1:17, 21. 29 Hansen, RBA, 1:39, 71; Hansemann, p. 261.

28

346

CONCLUSION

Prussia alone could breathe life into the feeble German Confeder­ ation. To play her proper role in Germany, Prussia had to be power­ ful and dynamic and could not rely on the political heritage of a feudal age now past. "The Rhine province, this genuinely Ger­ man territory," Hansemann contended, was not turned over to Prussia in order to determine by exper­ iment just how far the remnants of the feudal age could be rec­ onciled with new cultural conditions, but rather to show what would happen in the eastern provinces when the freeing of the trades and the emancipation of the peasantry had taken root firmly, and to prove that one could govern very well with the introduction of formal justice, conducted in public and orally, and with equality before the law and before the courts.30 Because the Rhineland should serve as an example for the rest of Prussia, it was a mistake to overtax it in comparison with the other provinces; such unfair treatment could undermine its sup­ port for the regime. Rhenish businessmen, together with other Rhinelanders, should stand alongside the monarchy, the nobility, and the bureaucracy as Prussia's and Germany's leaders, rather than being relegated to the role of collaborators working only in­ directly through the bureaucracy as was currently the case. This was the purpose of Hansemann's proposals, to strengthen the Prussian state, not to threaten it. He tried to assure the king that in spite of inequalities in taxation and the existence of greater political freedom in neighboring states, Rhinelanders preferred to belong to a strong "noble German dynasty." It would be a great error to think "that in the Rhineland anyone longingly wishes to become French once again."31 Neither of Hansemann's essays was successful in persuading the government to begin reform. King Frederick William III sent 30 31

Hansen, RBA, 1:76. Hansemann, pp. 285, 376-77.

CONCLUSION

347

polite thanks to Hansemann for the first essay and referred it to the interior minister, who did nothing with it. Nor was any offi­ cial notice given to the book Prussia and France, though the gov­ ernment did consider censoring it for being too French-minded.32 Nevertheless, the two essays are central documents in the history of Prussian liberalism. They established Hansemann's credentials as a leader of the liberal movement, though his political aspira­ tions remained for the time being frustrated. In 1839 he wrote: "I speak and write freely about the deficiencies of the bureaucracy here on up—very high up—and one can cast no aspersions at me, must listen to me willy-nilly, and do either something stupid or reasonable, in spite of the inclination to the contrary. That I am not a paid official but rather am a merchant and never seek my own advantage in public affairs—that is what establishes my posi­ tion and ennobles my action."33 Of equal importance, Hansemann was expressing ideas that could have come from any of the Rhine businessmen that were actively exploiting the political opportuni­ ties available to them.34 These businessmen were loyal Prussians, experienced in the political school of local and provincial affairs. They were participants in the Prussian political process, and they could see no reason not to expand their political activities to the national level and eventually to all of Germany. Like Hansemann, they saw themselves as experienced and especially qualified to provide the leadership that would be needed in the immediate future.

State Councilor Kunth, after traveling through the Rhineland in 1816, reported that "through the experience of a twenty-five32

Hansen, RBA, 1:87-88, 117ff.; Bergengriin, Hansemann, p. 154. in Dieter Schafer, "Die politische Personlichkeit David Hansemanns," in David Hansemann, 1790, 1864, 1964, ed. Bernhard Poll (Aachen, 1964), p. 9. 34 See Julius Heyderhoff, Johann Friedrieh Benzenberg (Diisseldorf, 1909), pp. 36-37; and Droz, Liberalisme rhenan, pp. 163, 279ff. 33 Quoted

348

CONCLUSION

year revolution which they endured, through the process of law­ making in which they participated, if often in appearance only, through the laws which they had to learn to understand and ap­ ply, the residents of the Rhine provinces have been pushed to a level of political awareness which the eastern German lands don't yet know."35 We have examined the impact of that twenty-fiveyear revolution on the business communities of the cities of Aachen, Cologne, and Crefeld. We have seen that the French brought to the Left Bank of the Rhine political institutions and a style of politics that particularly benefited businessmen, and that most of the key institutions and major characteristics of political life under the French survived Prussia's annexation of the Left Bank. During the forty years between the French occupation of the Left Bank and the formation of the Customs Union, businessmen in Aachen, Cologne, and Crefeld received a political education that laid the groundwork for their political behavior during the next several decades. Their political horizons had expanded from the boundaries of their native cities to encompass their province and the nation-state. Through officeholding, through the semi­ official self-administrative institutions set up for businessmen, through lobbying and personal contacts with royalty and the highest officials of the state, they had had the opportunity to par­ ticipate in political decision making on all levels. In the chambers of commerce, commercial courts, and labor arbitration boards businessmen had articulated the concerns of the Rhenish business community, had helped to select local administrative personnel, and had advised on new legislation. At times they had initiated new legislation, had helped to administer the law, and had ad­ judicated disputes involving merchants, manufacturers, and arti­ sans. As members of these institutions, businessmen were lay bureaucrats and enjoyed the respect, consideration, and coopera35

Goldschmidt, p. 294.

CONCLUSION

349

tion of the official bureaucrats of the central government. For the most part this cooperative relationship was productive. However, the privilege of working with the government, through the gov­ ernment, and within the government deprived businessmen of the right to oppose the government by appealing to public opin­ ion, while at the same time they were obliged to assume some public responsibility. In any case, at least until the mid-1830s, the French/Prussian system of bureaucratic government was effective enough to offset whatever irritation and resentment Rhenish businessmen may have felt towaVd the stiff-mannered and some­ times haughty Prussian bureaucrats. The participation of businessmen in this complex political process on the Left Bank of the Rhine naturally induced some of them to emerge as leaders. It is possible to identify a general path of political advancement. A businessman might first be elected by his peers to the chamber of commerce or commercial court and then be appointed to the city council. In all of these local institu­ tions he was required to represent not only business interests but also the interests of the entire community. From the city council he was in line to go to the provincial or national capital as a dele­ gate of the city or as president of the chamber of commerce. In either capital city he would become acquainted with powerful officials while learning the skills of negotiating with the bureau­ cracy. The next step might be appointment (under French rule) or election (under Prussian rule) to a provincial assembly and, finally, to a national assembly. Or he might be appointed to an administrative post, such as mayor or mayoral aide. A businessman who climbed the political ladder in this way was, of course, exceptional. Not all businessmen were so ambi­ tious or had the time and ability necessary for a political career. But those who did—such as Merkens, Koch, Camphausen, Hansemann, Jacobi, von Guaita, von der Leyen, and others— emerged as the leaders and representatives of their communities. Their political and economic achievements brought them titles

350

CONCLUSION

and great prestige in the Rhineland. Their political activities were based on years of political experience, and they had firm support at home. During the period we have been discussing, the cities of Co­ logne, Aachen, and Crefeld were exceptional. They were the largest, most important business centers on the Left Bank, and few other towns on either side of the Rhine had the full range of business institutions and full range of political opportunities that they had. However, businessmen elsewhere in the Rhineland and the government as well recognized the great value of the cham­ bers of commerce, commercial courts, and labor arbitration boards. As we have seen, in the 1830s Prussia authorized the cre­ ation of similar business institutions in other cities that did not have them. The political education received by businessmen in the major Left Bank cities then became available to businessmen in other important economic centers. By the mid-1830s the business communities of Cologne, Aachen, and Crefeld had been politically and economically inte­ grated with Prussia. This was brought about through the increas­ ing opportunities for political participation and the successful use of those opportunities to further the interests of businessmen pri­ marily, but also the more general interests of the community and the Rhine province. That this French/Prussian system worked so well for Left Bank businessmen had important implications for the subsequent course of Prussian liberalism and for the place of businessmen in the liberal movement. For forty years Rhenish businessmen had enjoyed success in realizing their interests without having had the benefit of genuine parliamentary institutions. As long as the individual members of the official hierarchy, from the king on down to businessmen act­ ing as lay bureaucrats, behaved responsibly, there seemed no ur­ gent reason to replace a functional, productive nonparliamentary system with one based on parliamentary institutions. It did not follow that liberal, parliamentary institutions were not perhaps desirable. As we have seen, Hansemann wanted such institutions

CONCLUSION

351

as a means of increasing the political participation of businessmen on the national level. But like other businessmen, Hansemann wanted to improve, to strengthen the system of Prussian politics, not to abolish it in favor of something else. Businessmen re­ spected the bureaucracy and honored the dynasty. They consid­ ered themselves partners, albeit junior partners, in the manage­ ment of Prussian affairs. In 1845 Ludolf Camphausen remindied the Oberprasident that the chambers of commerce enjoyed an "un­ restricted" and "unmediated" relationship with authorities on all levels of government, while they remained independent and thus able to advise those authorities.36 Businessmen certainly felt no obligation to share this special relationship with the masses, who lacked both education and property, considered to be the prereq­ uisites for sound political judgment. In short, what early Rhenish liberals wanted was a fair share in directing the state, not complete control or sovereignty over it. They wanted to join the crown and bureaucracy as leaders, not to replace them. This does not mean that Rhenish businessmen did not develop their own political style and distinctive conscious­ ness. The forty years of transition from the old regime to integra­ tion with Prussia produced a style that combined assertive, business-oriented politics with an awareness and acceptance of public responsibilities. It was a style neither hostile to aristocratic, bureaucratic rule, nor docilely obeisant, nor derived from a fear of the artisans or working classes. Rhenish businessmen/politicians had a sure sense of their place as notables. Their behavior re­ flected the confidence gained from years of experience, from dis­ cussion of both political principles and political realities, and from the knowledge that the urban business community rested on a firm social and economic foundation. And if businessmen made the most of available opportunities, they were still far from being mere opportunists. To be sure, we cannot assume that the political behavior of 36

Schwann, Camphausen, 2:233-35.

352

CONCLUSION

Rhenish businessmen was typical of businessmen in all parts of Germany. More work needs to be done on other German states and other Prussian provinces in the nineteenth century. Never­ theless, it seems necessary to reevaluate the role ascribed to Prus­ sian businessmen in the political history of the mid-nineteenth century. A remarkable number of the most important liberal leaders of the 1840s, including key leaders during the Revolution of 1848, were businessmen from Aachen, Crefeld, and Cologne. Camphausen, Hansemann, Merkens and his protege Gustav Mevissen, and Hermann von Beckerath (a member of an old Cre­ feld textile-manufacturing family) were liberal spokesmen in the United Diet of 1847, the Prussian National Assembly, and the Frankfurt National Assembly. All of these men had had similar po­ litical careers in their local chambers of commerce, commercial courts, city councils, and the diet of the Rhine province. All thus entered into the conflicts of the 1840s secure in their political strength at home and guided by long experience within the Prus­ sian political system. The same, we might note, was true of at least two other businessmen/politicians from the Right Bank, August von der Heydt of Elberfeld and Friedrich Harkort of Hagen.37 The political education of all of these men had been similar. Moreover, all had in one way or another been involved in the issue of railroad building. This was the issue that most concerned businessmen during the 1840s and the one that led to the calling of the United Diet. During the 1830s it had been possible for businessmen and government to reach agreements on railroad construction through normal channels like the chambers of com­ merce. But after 1840 the new king, Frederick William IV, contributed to a paralysis of the existing political process by his own arbitrary decisions and by his appointment of increasingly 37 See Bergengrun, von der Heydt, pp. 35-37; Berger, p. 219; Boberach, "Beckerath," p. 181; and Konrad Repgen, Marzbewegung und Mahvahlen des Revolutionsjahres 1848 im Rheinland (Bonn, 1955), pp. 61-67.

CONCLUSION

353

conservative officials to the top levels of the bureaucracy. The men he appointed were unwilling to listen to the opinions of pro­ vincial officials, diet representatives, or businessmen. The ensu­ ing bureaucratic deadlock over railroad financing naturally drew Rhenish entrepreneurs into the conflict, and their inability to break the deadlock resulted in their joining in the movement for constitutional reform.38 The Revolution of 1848 was touched off by popular demonstra­ tions, and these politically experienced Rhenish businessmen quickly came to the fore. Turning to men he had met long ago when he was crown prince, the Prussian king appointed Camphausen minister-president to lead the reform cabinet, and when Camphausen resigned from that office he became Prussia's am­ bassador to the Frankfurt Assembly. Hansemann was appointed finance minister under Camphausen and continued in the follow­ ing Auerswald cabinet, of which he was the actual leader. In 1848, the king appointed August von der Heydt minister of trade and tried without success to persuade Hermann von Beckerath to lead a new cabinet. Beckerath had been serving as the finance minister of the government set up by the Frankfurt National As­ sembly and had been acting as the intermediary between Berlin and Frankfurt in the effort to persuade Frederick William IV to accept the German crown offered him by the Frankfurt Assem­ bly. The Frankfurt Assembly, of course, collapsed without having unified Germany or having provided it with liberal institutions. The revolution in Prussia, however, was somewhat more success­ ful. A Prussian national legislature was created, the members to be elected by a three-class electorate, the voting weighted in favor of the propertied classes, and the rule of law and the independ­ ence of the judiciary were established. Remaining feudal privi­ leges were abolished, and censorship was ended. Many of these 38 Eichholtz, pp. 92ff.; Koselleck, pp. 319-24, 346, 583, 618-19; Walker, Ger­ man Home Towns, p. 356. See also Gillis.

354

CONCLUSION

reforms resemble the proposals made by Hansemann in 1830; in fact, he served on the commission that modeled the new national franchise on the Rhenish three-class franchise of 1845.39 Cer­ tainly the Rhenish business leaders were basically satisfied with the results of the revolution in Prussia. All the businessmen active during the revolution strongly endorsed the constitution promul­ gated by the king on December 5, 1848, and Gustav Mevissen declared that it offered more "than pre-March Rhenish liberalism had hoped for."40 As important for Rhenish businessmen as the constitutional re­ forms was the fact that the old, prerevolutionary political process which had benefited them and had provided them with their political education was revitalized. Von der Heydt continued as trade minister throughout the 1850s and most of the 1860s, and in this position he helped to solve the railroad finance problem and other problems of economic policy. Changes in banking laws and in regulations affecting joint-stock companies, begun while Hansemann was finance minister, were brought to completion. The chambers of commerce and other nonparliamentary institu­ tions gained added importance and influence in the decision­ making process.41 These institutions, together with responsible, responsive officials, made it possible for businessmen to return to the political style and methods that had been developed during the first four decades of the century. Their confidence in a familiar system in which they had been privileged participants was re­ stored, once that system was put back in working order.42 39

Boberach, Wahlrechtsfragen, pp. 140-41. 1AiermCTJ, 1:608-11; Caspary, pp. 343ff., 360, 387; Bergengriin, Hansemann, pp. 586, 591. See also Beutin, p. 296; Krieger, pp. 310-11; and Theodore S. Hamerow, The Social Foundations of German Unification, 18581871 (Princeton, 1969), p. 154. 41 Zunkel, -Der rheinisch-westfalische Unternehmer, pp. 188-92; Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, p. 234. Faber, "Strukturprobleme des deutschen Liberalismus," p. 215, points out that early Rhenish liberals saw Napoleonic institutions as a substitute for a constitution. 42 The Camphausens, Mevissen, and von der Heydt were eventually ennobled. 40Hansen

CONCLUSION

355

This in turn suggests that the very success of the political style of Rhenish businessmen in the first half of the nineteenth century may well help explain the ultimate failure of parliamentary gov­ ernment in Germany. This style—one that was formed while in­ dustrialization was just beginning—must be seen to have been as "normal" as the style of nineteenth-century English or French liberalism, and it was quite similar to the latter. The problem with the role businessmen played in the liberal movement was not that they failed to provide leadership, but that the kind of leader­ ship they offered was not the kind we have come to expect— because of the English model—of a socially strong and experi­ enced middle class. Thoroughly integrated with Prussia, busi­ nessmen from the Rhineland, the industrial heartland of Prussia and Germany, had perfected the political system in which they had grown up. It had worked well for them most of the time, and they saw no real need to alter it radically. The political style of liberal Rhenish businessmen was the re­ sult of a long, practical political education that had seen them sucLudolf Camphausen left the political arena for scientific studies in 1851, and he also retired from business. Through his brother Otto, however, he still retained political influence. Otto Camphausen sat in the lower and then upper houses of the Prussian Diet; between 1869 and 1878 he was the Prussian minister of finance, and in 1873 he became vice-president of the Staatsministerium. Hansemann left active politics after suffering a defeat of his ambition to remain in the lower house, but he was later president of the Deutsche Handelstag. He turned down election to the upper house. Mevissen most fulfills the image of the abandonment of poli­ tics for business, having preferred to manage the Schaafihausen Bankverein, the first modern corporate bank in Prussia, rather than accept election to the diet. However, he did accept election in the 1860s and sat in the upper house for many years. See Hansen,Mevissen, 1:608-16, 841; Bergengrun, von der Heydt, pp. 139, 279ff., 322; Bergengriin, Hansemann, p. 701; Caspary, pp. 404-7; Boberach, "Beckerath," pp. 191-92. In a recent study of Berlin entrepreneurs, Hartmut Kaeble concluded that after 1848, businessmen in that city were so successful in realizing their interests through institutions like the Berlin Merchants' Corpora­ tion that parliamentary tendencies were decisively weakened. Zunkel reached similar conclusions regarding Ruhr entrepreneurs. See Kaeble, pp. 9,277-78; and Friedrich Zunkel, "Beamtenschaft und Unternehmer beim Aufbau der Ruhrindustrie 1848-1880."

356

CONCLUSION

cessfully through a difficult period of dramatic change. Moreover, the carefully cultivated relationship between the business com­ munity and the Prussian bureaucracy remained a basic part of middle-class politics in subsequent German history. Unfortu­ nately, the very success of this political education prevented busi­ nessmen from clearly recognizing the great flaws in the political system, and this contributed to the failure of parliamentary de­ mocracy in Germany. Businessmen confused self-administration with true self-government; they confused practical participation in lawmaking and administration (Staatsunmittelbarkeit) with in­ stitutional guarantees against abuses of sovereignty by the crown or bureaucracy. Good will and a spirit of cooperation on all sides were needed for the Prussian system to work smoothly. If the monarch and his bureaucracy withdrew that cooperation and be­ came arbitrary, if the potential power of bureaucratic absolutism was brought into play, the only recourse was revolution. The crisis of 1848 was therefore destined to be repeated.

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Gottin gen, 1974.

Index

Aachen, 15, 204-205, 257, 348, 350, 352; administrative capital, 86, 94, 217, 263-64,285; arrondissement of, 94; canton assembly, 125; Catholicism in, 24, 24n, 30n; city government under old regime, 24-25,24n, 36-39; cloth manufac­ turers, 148-49, 234, 311, 315; Club Casino, 336-37; constitutional cir­ cle, 189, 192n; constitutional con­ flict, 37-39; contributions and req­ uisitions in, 61, 91; economic life in, 25-27, 156-57, 313, 315, 317, 330-31; Freemasonry, 34n, 71, 89, 195-96; guilds in, 24, 24n, 26-27, 37, 39; honor guard, 197-98, 201, 338, 340; labor unrest, 37, 164-65, 274-76, 311; lists of most taxed, 126-28; mayors, 106, 218, 270-71; militia, 238, 276; needle manufac­ turers, 26, 148-49, 311, 315; "New Party," 34n, 38, 51, 54, 56, 60-61, 71, 79; oaths of allegiance, 186; "Old Party," 38, 71; petitions for union with France, 188-91; Protes­ tantism and Protestants, 26, 38, 56, 160; Prussian officials in, 266, 26971; reforms in city government, 50-51, 56, 60-61, 70, 88-90; repre­ sentation in the diet, 279-81, 283; representation in electoral colleges, 123; representation in the Roer de­ partment, 127-28; royal visits, 197, 338; subprefect of, 105; tariff de­ mands, 228,234,320; town council, 123, 259, 273, 304-305, 336-38;

wool market, 304. See also Central Administration of A.; Chamber of Commerce of A.; Commercial Court of A.; Committee of Commerce of A.; Consultative Chamber for Man­ ufacturing of A.; Council of Com­ merce of A.; District Government of A.; Labor Arbitration Board of A. Aachen Fire Insurance Company, 315, 326-27 Aachener Zuschauer, 61 Agrippina Insurance Company, 327 Alexander I (Tsar of Russia), 213,338 Altenstein, Karl von, 4n, 251, 275 Amsterdam, 173 Ancillon, Friedrich von, 322 Andreas family, 27 arrondissements, 95-96 Auerswald, Rudolf von, 353 Augereau, Pierre Frangois Charles, 84, 87, 186 Austria, 23, 345 banking, 327-28 Bannerherm, see Cologne, guilds in Barmen, 279, 281, 297-98 Basel, Treaty of, 58-59, 214 Bas-Rhin, Department of the, 216 Batavian Republic, 177. Seealso Hol­ land Beckerath, Friedrich von, 277 Beckerath, Gerhard von, 34n, 189 Beckerath, Heinrich von, 34n, 106, 189 Beckerath, Hermann von, 15, 317, 352-53

388 Beckerath, von, family, 46-47, 57, 60, 198,218η Beissel, Stephan, 51, 53 Belderbusch, Charles Leopold, 112, 114 Belgium, 228-30, 235, 323 Bemberg, Kaspar Heinrich, 40 Bemberg, Peter, 45n, 76 Berg, Duchy of, 158-59, 159n, 167, 173, 179, 214, 227, 229; former Duchy of, 234, 241, 274 Berlin, Merchants' Corporation of, 355n Bettendorf, Theodor, 61 Beuth, Christian Peter, 323n, 327 Beyme, Karl Friedrich von, 250 Birckenstock, J. E., 45n Birkenstock, Heinrich, 43, 67 Bodelschwingh, Ernst Karl Ludwig von, 264, 331 Boelling (Commissioner for Roer de­ partment and Lower Rhine), 220, 224, 227-28, 230 Boisseree, Bernard, 67, 108, 109, 139, 144-45, 145n, 171, 176, 196, 306, 329 Boisseree, Carl, 198 Boisseree family, 28 Bonaparte, Jerome, 262 Bonaparte, Joseph, 195 Bonaparte, Louis, 195 Bonn, see District Administration of B.; Middle Commission of B. Borcette, 165, 196 Bouget, Jakob Johann, 57n, 86, 88, 105, 112, 114, 121, 153 bourgeoisie: definitions of, 7, 13, 19-20; German, 8-10 Boyen, Hermann von, 245, 249 Bruck, Engelbert vom, 189 Brussels, 256 Biilow, Ludwig Friedrich Victor Hans von, 227-28, 230, 235-36,239, 262-63, 294, 311, 314, 317-18

INDEX

Burger, definition of, 19-20 Biirgerliche Deputatschaft, see Cologne,

guilds in Biirgertum, definition of, 19

Burgundy, 216 Burtscheid, 189, 331 business institutions, significance of, 181-84, 332-33,348-52 businessmen, 33-34, 154, 196-98, 224-25; definition of, 18-19; enno­ blement of, 33; as officeholders, 54-55, 68-69, 73, 88-90, 102-132, 279-81, 283; political education of, 4-5, 17, 78, 184, 207, 348-50, 352, 354-56; and politics under France, 205-209; and the Prussian bureau­ cracy, 224-25. See also France, Prussia; awards of titles and enno­ blement Cambaceres, Jean-Jacques, 101, 195 Camphausen, Ludolf, 13, 274, 306, 328, 330-33, 349, 351-53, 354-55n Camphausen, Otto, 354-55n Campo Formio, Treaty of, 83, 186, 189 canton assemblies, 101, 125 cantons, 94 Cappe, Karl, 270, 277 Carstanjans, Wilhelm, 229 Caselli, L. P., 87, 87n Cassinone, Franz, 198 Cassinone, Maximilian H., 44, 45n, 67, 171, 178 Cassinone family, 28 Catholicism and Catholics, 24, 206. See also Aachen, Cologne, Crefeld: Catholicism in Central Administration, territory be­ tween Maas and Roer, 54-55, 55n, 62-63, 67, 70, 105 Central Administration of Aachen, see Central Administration, territory be­ tween Maas and Roer; Roer, De-

389

INDEX

partment of the: Central Administra­ tion ceremonies, public political, 137, 191, 193-94, 204-205,218,338 Chamber of Commerce of Aachen, 226, 228, 238, 274-76, 303-305, 307,312, 315, 322, 331,336, 338 Chamber of Commerce of Cologne, 135, 163, 237, 289,291,307-309, 312, 314; activities to encourage trade and industry, 146-47, 153-55, 158, 179-80, 327-30; defense of staple and transshipment rights, 167, 174-78, 232-33, 323-25; "first" or "old," 140-44,149; leader­ ship of, 45n, 144-45, 260, 303, 305-307, 305-306n; modifications in composition of, 298-302; and politics, 181-83, 198-99,203, 208, 338; and Prussian officialdom, 224-25,271-72,271n, 278,295-96; and Prussian tariff policy, 226, 228-29, 231,23 In, 317-20, 320n, 322-23; and Prussian taxation, 220, 291-95 Chamber of Commerce of Crefeld, 228, 278,305,305η, 316 Chamber of Commerce of Dusseldorf, 296-98 Chamber of Commerce of Elberfeld/ Barmen, 296-98 Chamber of Commerce of Liege, 228 Chamber of Commerce of Mainz, 174n, 175 Chamber of Commerce of Monschau,

228 Chamber of Commerce of Strasbourg, 175 Chamber of Commerce of Verviers,

228 chambers of commerce, 119,134,194, 205,218,219n, 231,284,289-310, 326, 332-33, 339, 341, 348-52, 354; continued existence under

Prussia, 221-23, 241, 262, 289-90; creation of, 144; prohibition on pub­ lication of memoranda, 183, 208, 303, 340

Champagny, Jean-Baptiste Nompere de, 182-83 Chaptal, Jean, 104, 139, 141, 144, 150, 175 Cisrhenane Republic, 73-74, 186, 188 citizenship, nature of, 101, 258, 260,

286 Clermont, Johann Arnold von, 38, 54 Clermont, von, family, 26 Cleve: arrondissement of, 94, 109, 116; Duchy of, 30; town of, 123. See also District Government of C. Cochon de Lapparent, Charles, 66 Cockerill, James, 273, 276, 331 Cockerill family, 273, 336n Coels, von (police director), 270 Cogels, H. J., 87-88 Colard (French customs inspector), 171-72 Colin (Collin) de Sussy, Jean-Baptiste, 172, 179 Cologne, 15, 52, 63, 116, 204-205, 251, 266-67, 275, 278, 285, 348, 350, 352; as administrative center, 86,239,263-64; all-weather harbor, 171-72, 176-77; arrondissement of, 94, 114; bourse, 146-47, 262; busi­ nessmen in city government, 68-69, 73; canton assembly, 125; Catholi­ cism in, 24, 24n, 30, 30n, 40; con­ flict over business tax, 292-95; con­ stitutional circle, 192n; contribu­ tions and requisitions, 54, 61, 63, 67-68, 91, 136, 220-21; delegation to Paris, 63-68; economic life, 27-30, 156, 158-59, 313-15, 32731; forwarding trade, 27, 136, 319-20; free harbor, 142-43, 149, 152, 170, 179; Freemasonry, 3435n, 42, 138, 195-96; freight-scale

390 Cologne (cont.) dispute, 44-45, 68; government and politics of old regime, 24-25, 24n, 39-46; guilds in, 24, 40-43, 72; honor guards, 198-99; lists of most taxed, 126-28; mayors, 106-109, 218, 271-72; oaths of allegiance, 186-87; organizing efforts of mer­ chants, 44-45; petitions for union with France, 187-88, 190-91; police administration, 269-70; Protes­ tantism and Protestants, 27-29,35n, 38, 40-41, 56, 69-70, 75, 138, 307; and Prussian tariff policy, 228, 234-35, 317, 319, 325; reforms of city government, 68, 70, 72-73, 88; representation in electoral colleges, 123; representation in provincial diet, 279-83; representation in Roer department, 127-30; resistance to French, 61-69, 72-73; royal visits, 338; staple right, 28-29, 65n, 77n, 145, 149, 166-68, 171-72, 174-76, 178, 231-33, 256, 278, 319, 32325, 339; subprefects, 105; town council, 123, 273, 314; transship­ ment right, 28-29, 152, 166-68, 170-78, 180, 231-33, 256. See also Chamber of Commerce of C.; Com­ mercial Court of C.; Council of Commerce of C.; District Govern­ ment of C.; Labor Arbitration Board of C.; Merchants' Committee of C.; Napoleon I, in C.; Rhine and Harbor Commission Cologne-Dusseldorf Steamship Com­ pany, 145n Cologne Steam Tugboat Company, 330 Colonia Fire Insurance Company, 327 Commercial Code, 141-42, 160-61, 223, 284, 290, 295, 326, 339 Commercial Court of Aachen, 159-61,

INDEX

223, 238, 272, 307, 309-311, 335-36 Commercial Court of Cologne, 160, 272, 308-309 Commercial Court of Crefeld, 160-61, 309-310 commercial courts, 95, 119, 134, 159-61, 205, 223-24, 289, 307-310, 332, 339, 348-52 Committee of Commerce of Aachen, 38 Committee of Public Safety, 55, 606In, 64-65, 67 "communal notables," 101 communes, 94 Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 338 Congress of Vienna, 15, 213-14, 23132, 256 Conseil des fabriques et manufactures, 153, 156, 158, 222 Conseil des prud'hommes, see Labor Arbitration Board Conseil Gene'ral of Roer department, 98-100, 103-104, 119, 121, 152, 181, 216, 222, 229, 279-80; and businessmen, 114-15, 149; urban representatives on, 127-28 Conseils Generaux: in France, 115n; in Rhineland, 251 Constitution of the Year III, 190 Constitution of the Year VIII, 101 constitutional circles, 189, 191-92. See also Aachen; Cologne; Crefeld constitutionalism, 249-52, 288, 344-45 Consulate, 91-92 Consultative Chamber for Manufactur­ ing of Aachen, 150,152-55,162-63, 181, 197, 199, 217-18, 223, 28991,298 Consultative Chamber for Manufactur­ ing of Crefeld, 152-55, 163, 181, 223,289-91,298

INDEX

consultative chambers for manufactur­ ing, factories, arts, and trades, 134, 151-55,231,292, 299 Continental blockade, 156, 159, 179, 201,229,313 Corps Legislatif, 96-97,101-102,104, 153, 287 Cotzhausen, Louis, 120 Council of Commerce of Aachen, 141, 149-50 Council of Commerce of Cologne, 139-45, 149, 174, 181, 193 Council of Commerce of Mainz, 143 Council of State, 93, 98, 104, 193 Council on Factories and Manufac­ tories, 153, 156, 158, 222 councils of commerce, 134, 139 county diet, 269 county government, 268-70 courts of law, 95 Crefeld, 15,204-205,266,270, 285, 348, 350, 352; arrondissement of, 94; canton assembly, 125; Catholi­ cism in, 31; constitutional circle, 189; contributions and requisitions, 57, 59-60; economic life, 156-57, 313,315-17; Freemasonry, 34n, 58, 195-96; and French occupation, 51-52, 56-60, 150-51; honor guards, 198; labor relations in, 164-65,276-77; lists of most taxed, 126-28; mayors, 106, 218, 270; Mennonites in, 31, 46, 56-57, 59-60, 79-80, 90, 132, 198, 270, 277; merchants' societies, 278, 291; oaths of allegiance, 189-90; petitions for union with France, 188-91; Protestantism and Protestants, 31; and Prussia, 30-31, 189,214; and Prussian tariff policy, 234, 320; rep­ resentation in electoral colleges, 123; representation in provincial diet, 279-81,283; representation in Roer

391 department, 127-30; royal visits, 338; security force, 276-77; silk manufacturers, 30-33, 117, 142, 148-49, 168, 229, 270, 305, 31516; subprefects, 105; town council, 123, 272-73, 278; town govern­ ment, 46-48, 89-90. See also Chamber of Commerce of C.; Com­ mercial Court of C.; Consultative Chamber for Manufacturing of C.; Labor Arbitration Board of C. Cretet, Emmanuel, 174-77, 179 Cromm, Nikolaus, 51,54-55, 57n, 60, 6On, 87-88, 189 Croon, Helmut, 272

Dampierre, August Henri Marie Picot, 50-51 Daniels, Franz Wilhelm, 271, 275, 304, 337 Daniels, Heinrich Gottfried Wilhelm, 143, 174, 177, 179, 232, 256, 309, 324 Dautzenberg, Franz, 61 Dautzenberg, Gerhard, 34n, 61 Dauven, Stephen Dominikus, 37-38 Delius, David Heinrich, 266, 272, 278, 296, 324 Desforest, General, 50 Deusner, Christian Friedrich, 163, 196, 199, 221 diet, see Rhine province, diet of Directory, 66, 68, 84 District Administration of Bonn, 62, 67-68 District Government of Aachen, 263,. 266, 282, 304 District Government of Cleve, 263-64 District Government of Cologne, 263-64,266, 282, 294-96, 311 District Government of Dusseldorf, 263-64,266, 282

392 District Government of Koblenz, 263,

280, 282 District Government of Trier, 263,

280, 282 district presidents, 259 Dohm, Christian von, 34-35, 38 Dorsch, Anton Josef, 34n, 87-88, 155 Droz, Jacques, 342 Dubois-Dubais, L. T., 91 Ducos, Roger, 97, 101 Diiren, 123, 165 Dusseldorf, 167, 172-74, 179, 181, 234-35, 279, 281, 319; chamber of commerce, 296-98; tariff conference, 229-31. See also District Govern­ ment of D. Duisburg, 57, 167, 173 Dumont, Heinrich Josef, 34n, 45n, 319 Dumont, Johann Marie Nicolas, 34n, 55n, 63-69, 69-70n, 71, 79, 105, 108-109, 133, 186, 194, 196 Dumont, Michael, 198 Dumont family, 28 Dumouriez, Charles Frangois, 52 East India Company, 141 Effertz, J., 45n Eichoff, Johann Joseph, 35n, 67, 180, 232-33 Eichoff, J. P., 35n Elberfeld, 57, 279, 281, 296-98, 320 electoral colleges, 101-102, 127-28 Electorate of Cologne, 25, 64, 65n, 114,287 Elskes, Heinrich, 277 Emundts, Edmund, 271 Engel, G. A., 136 Engels, Friedrich, 6 Engels, Hermann Joseph, 198 England: as model for Prussia, 247; trade with Rhineland, 170, 177, 179, 229,313-14

INDEX

Enlightenment, the, 35, 58, 64, 207 Estienne, Antoine, 71-72, 88-89, 186, 189 exhibitions, industrial, 155, 196, 314 Farina, Johann Baptist, 136n Farina, Johann Maria, 45n, 198 Farina family, 28 feudalism, 86 Floh, Cornelius, 32 Floh, Gottschalk, 105-106, 120, 133, 148, 163, 189, 202,218 Floh, Johannes, 32 Floh family, 34, 52, 57 Forster, Georg, 30 Foveaux, F., 45n Foveaux, Heinrich Josef, 174 Foveaux family, 28 Frangais de Nantes, Antoine, 143 France; annexation of Left Bank, 15, 65-66, 83, 186; awards of titles and ennoblement by, 199-201, 206; bu­ reaucratic government in, 5n, 207209; contributions and requisitions by, 55, 70-73, 87, 91; encourage­ ment of industry, 154-59; evacua­ tion of Rhineland, 202; exploitation of Rhineland, 50-54, 57n; govern­ ment of, as model for Prussia, 247; Napoleonic plebiscites, 192-205; policy of integration of Rhineland, 83-84, 86, 90-92; political loyalty to, 190n, 192, 202-204, 209; structure of Napoleonic government, 92-102; tariff policy in Rhineland, 142, 145, 166-72, 175-76, 178-80; taxation, 98, 98-99n. See also Aachen, Co­ logne, Crefeld; contributions and requisitions; Commercial Code; Consulate; Continental blockade; Directory; Napoleonic Codes; Rhine River, as tariff border Francis I (Emperor of Austria), 338

INDEX

Francis I (Holy Roman Emperor), 33 Frangois de Neufchateau, Nicolas Louis, 148 Frankfurt am Main, 29, 31, 33, 167, 179 Frankfurt National Assembly, 352-53 Frecine, Augustin Lucie de, 54, 63 Frederick William II (King of Prus­ sia), 38 Frederick William III (King of Prus­ sia), 148, 214, 244, 249-51, 287, 338, 344, 346-47; constitutional promises, 239-40, 249-51, 344 Frederick William IV (King of Prus­ sia), 287, 338, 352-53 Freemasonry, 34, 74, 78,195-96,206. See also Aachen; Cologne; Crefeld: Freemasonry Fuchs, Johann Baptist, 34n, 44, 67, 73-74, 88, 88n, 108, 108n, 272, 278 Fuchs, Johann Peter, 272 Fuerth, Joseph von, 197, 340-41 Gaudin, Martin Michel Charles, 142 General Maximum, 57, 59 German Confederation, 346 German Customs Union, 16, 316, 322-23,326, 333 German question, the, 6-7, 14 Geuljans, Joseph, 199 Gewerbegericht,see labor arbitration boards Gillet, Pierre Maturin, 55, 60, 60-61n, 62 Gladbach, 165 Gneisenau, August Wilhelm Neidhardt, 245 Goerres, Joseph, 240, 290 Goethe, J. W. v., 35 Gothein, Eberhard, 272 governors general, 215 Greiff, Anton de, 89

393 Greiff, Cornelius de, 196 Greiff, de, family, 34, 60, 218n,'278 Greiff, Isaac de, 33, 89, 106, 148-49, 270 Greiff, Peter de, 283 Greiff, Wilhelm de, 276-77 Griiner, Justus, 217 Guaita, Cornelius von, 106, 106n, 120, 133, 150, 161, 196, 198, 202, 217-19,221, 226, 270, 274, 304, 334-35, 349 Guaita, Martin von, 33 guilds, 134, 311, 332. See also Aachen, Cologne: guilds in Hagen, Ludwig von, 266 Hages, Ferdinand Franz, 139, 295, 324 Hahn, Nicolaus Joseph, 75-76 Hansemann, David, 273-75, 283, 304-305, 305n, 310, 315, 326-28, 331-32, 350-51; as liberal political leader, 13, 333, 347, 349, 352-54, 355n; political writings, 259, 280, 342-46. See also Preussen und Frankreich Hardenberg, Karl August von, 274·75,290,294,319-20; economic pol­ icy, 226-27, 232-33, 314-24; politi­ cal ideas, 214,220,248-51; political policy toward Rhineland, 239-41, 255-56,267 Hardung (Cologne tax supervisor), 224-25 Harkort, Friedrich, 352 Hasenclever, Josua, 229 Haut-Rhin, Department of the, 216 Heimann, Friedrich Carl, 44, 45n, 143, 146, 196, 198-200, 219; as founder and leader of Merchants' Committee and Chamber of Com­ merce, 75-76, 138-39, 144-45, 145n, 171, 177, 199; resistance to

394 Heimann, Friedrich Carl (cont.) French, 62, 67, 69, 73 Heimann, Johann Philipp, 145, 145n, 198, 305-306, 309, 319, 324, 335 Heimsoeth, J. A., 309 Heinitz, Friedrich Anton, 148 Heister (police director), 270 Herstatt, F., 67 Herstatt, Johann David, 40, 43, 107109, 150, 176, 198, 271,335 Herstatt bank, 328 Herstatt family, 34, 34n Herwegh, F., 108 Hesse-Darmstadt, 320-23 Heydt, August von der, 352-54, 354n Heydweiller, Franz Heinrich, 32 Heydweiller, Friedrich, 89, 148 Heydweiller, Friedrich Jakob, 270 Heydweiller, J. B., 218, 270 Heydweiller, Johann Georg, 198 Heydweiller family, 34, 57, 270, 278 Hilgers, Philipp Joseph von, 34n Hinsberg, G. von, 232-33 Him, Johann Baptist, 44, 45n Hoche, Louis Lazare, 70-71, 73-74, 84 Holterhoff, Mathias, 330 Hoffmann, J. C., 4n Holland, 142, 146, 168, 173, 180, 235, 239, 313-14, 323-25, 329-30 Holy Roman Empire, 83, 204-205, 218

Hompesch, Ludwig von, 120 honor guards, 197-98. Seealso Aachen, Cologne, Crefeld: honor guards Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 34-35, 215, 237, 245, 249-50, 324 Hunzinger, Gerhard, 89, 218, 283, 310 Hunzinger, Johann, 34n Hunzinger, Peter, 277

INDEX

Immediat-Justh-Kommission, 241, 255-56,265, 311 industrial exhibitions, 155, 196, 314 industrialization, German, 8, 10 Ingersleben, Karl von, 263, 268, 326 Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 35, 39n Jacobi, Georg Arnold, 217n Jacobi, Johann Friedrich, 35,38, 39n, 54, 89, 126, 149, 161, 200, 266, 324, 334, 349; as acting prefect, 104, 139, 140, 153, 272; as legis­ lator, 112, 132-33, 153, 182 Jewish rights, 284, 306-307, 324 Jollivet, Jean-Baptiste, 92, 108 Jordans, Franz Joseph, 105, 163, 218n

Joseph II (Holy Roman Emperor), 40-41, 43 Josephine de Beauharnais (Empress of France), 197 Joubert (government commissioner), 68, 108-109n Jourdan, Jean-Baptiste, 57-58, 60, 60-61n, 62 Jiilich-Cleve-Berg, province of, 263 Jungblut, Κ. A., 270, 277 Kaldenberg, Wilhelm de, 199 Kaldenkirchen, 165 Karl Theodor (Duke Elector of Pfalzbayern), 33, 39 Keil, Antoine, 220 Kelleter, EMmund Joseph, 106 Kelleter, Johann Tilmann, 316 Kircheisen, Friedrich Leopold von, 223, 241, 255 Klespe, Reiner von, 34n, 105, 107, 147, 163, 193, 196 Klewitz, Wilhelm Anton von, 263, 268,319-20 Koblenz, 86, 170, 263-64, 279, 290,

395

INDEX

324. See also District Government of K. Koch, Georg Heinrich, 2 2 9 , 2 3 1 , 2 8 3 , 287, 302-303, 306, 324, 330, 333, 335, 340, 349 Korfgen, J., 34n, 175 Kolb, Jacob Friedrich, 61, 89, 105106, 149, 189, 197 Koselleck, Reinhard, 250 Kramer, Johann Peter, 108-109, 108-109n, 139-40, 196 Kreitz, J. M., 50-51, 53 Kiigelgen, Georg, 76 Kunth, Gottlob Johann Christian, 3 1 4 , 3 1 8 , 327, 347 Labor Arbitration Board of Aachen, 162-65,228, 276, 310-12, 336 Labor Arbitration Board of Cologne, 163-64, 193-94, 272, 301, 311-14, 320n Labor Arbitration Board of Crefeld, 163-65 Labor Arbitration Board of Lyons, 162 labor arbitration boards, 95, 119, 134, 162-65,165-66n, 284,289,310-13, 332, 339, 348, 350 labor unrest, 275-77. See also Aachen; Crefeld Ladoucette, Jean-Charles Frangois, 103, 196, 200-202 Lakanal, Joseph, 91 Lamarliere, Antoine Nicolas Collier, 51-52 Lambrecht, Joos, 86-87, 89n, 187 Lameth, Alexandre Theodore Victor, 103, 106, 162-63

Landesdepuiation, 216, 219 Landrate, 269-70 Langen, Caspar, 271, 278, 292 Laumond, Jean Charles Joseph, 103 Lebrun, Charles Francois, 101

Left Bank of the Rhine, 14, 83, 86,92, 186, 206-207,214-16, 226-27, 228-30, 246, 2 5 6 , 2 6 9 , 2 8 3 , 2 8 5 86, 330, 349-51 Legion of Honor, 199-201,335n, 336, 340 Le Grand, Joseph, 120 Leipzig, Battle of, 215 Leipzig Convention, 215 Lenzmann, Carl, 229 Leven, Johann Alois, 45n Leydel, Martin, 89 liberalism, 11, l l - 1 2 n , 355; German, 6-9,13-14,355; Prussian, 347,350; Rhenish, 13-14, 274, 287-88, 303, 306, 333, 342, 351-52, 354-56 Liege, 229, 273 Lingen, G., Company, 148 List, Friedrich, 4n local government: mayoralty system, 9 4 , 1 0 7 , 2 7 8 - 7 9 , 2 8 3 - 8 4 , 2 8 9 ; Stein system of, 2 7 8 - 7 9 , 2 8 9 Loe, Edmond de, 112, 200 Lohnis, Hermann Heinrich, 75-76, 138-39, 149, 168-69, 171, 305 Lowenich, Peter von, 33-34, 34n, 52, 58, 189, 196, 2 8 3 , 3 3 5 , 3 3 8 Lowenich, von, family, 27, 34n, 60, 336n Lommessem, Gerhard Franz Gottfried Anton Maria von, 105106, 109, 197,219 Lonneux, M.F.J, von, 37 Louis XVIII (King of France), 220 Lower Rhine: governorship of, 21617,227; province of, 263 Luneville, Treaty of, 92 Maassen, Karl Georg, 262, 314, 318, 321-22 Maguieu (French customs administrator), 143 Mainz, 28, 65n, 86, 143, 170-72,

396 Mainz (cont.) 174-75, 178, 231-33, 329. See also Chamber of Commerce of M.; Council of Commerce of M.; Mer­ chants' Committee of M. manufacturer, definition of, 18 Marie-Louise (Empress of France), 197, 199 Marquis, J. J., 90-91, 148, 173 Martini, Johann Theodor, 136n Marx, Karl, 6 Max Franz (Elector and Archbishop of Cologne), 35n, 40-41, 43-44 mayoralty system, 94, 107, 278-79, 283-84, 289 Mechin, Alexandre, 99, 103-104, 109, 152, 174-76, 196 Melsbach, Konrad, 276-77 Mennonites, see Crefeld, Mennonites in merchant, definition of, 18-19 Merchants' Committee of Cologne, 74-78, 88, 107-109, 135-40, 144, 149, 166-74, 181, 191, 193 Merchants' Committee of Mainz, 168, 174 Merchants' Corporation of Berlin, 355n merchants'corporations, 290-91, 293n Merkens, Peter Heinrich, 145n, 279, 318, 327-29, 333, 336, 338-39, 340-41, 349, 352; in diet, 260-61, 283-84, 287-88, 303; as leader of Cologne Chamber of Commerce, 144-45, 292-93, 295n, 298-300, 302, 306, 321-25 metric system, 142, 147, 205 Metternich, Clemens Lothar von, 213, 232, 252 Meuse-Inferieure, Department of the,

216 Mevissen, Gustav von, 13, 327, 331, 352, 354, 354-55n

INDEX

Meynard (representative on mission), 67-68 middle class, definition of, 18-20 Middle Commission of Bonn, 70-72, 70n, 84, 91, 105, 186 Middle Rhine, governorship of, 21617, 227 military conscription, 202, 202n Mill, John Stuart, 4, 6 modernization, models of, 6-10 Mors, Earldom of, 30 Mole, Louis Mathieu, 146 Molinari family, 28 Moll, G., 45n Moll, Isaak, 305 Moll1Johann Jakob, 146,219,224-25 Moll family, 336n Monschau, 165, 196, 228, 234 Monschaw, Franz Rudolf von, 271, 292 Mont Tonnerre, Department of, 86, 130, 216 Motz, Friedrich Christian von, 262, 321, 324-25 Miillensieffen, Peter Eberhard, 229 Miiller, Josef, 274 Miinster, Duchy of, 227, 229 Mumm, Georg, 198 Murat, Joachim, 179 Mylius, CarlJoseph von, 218-19, 271, 278, 320n Napoleon I (Emperor of France), 15, 71,91-93, 129-32, 146, 178-79, 181, 192-94,202-203,240, 244-45, 287, 314, 343; in Aachen, 154, 197; appointments by, 96-97, 101-102, 199-201; in Cologne, 146-47, 15859, 176-77, 198; in Crefeld, 198 Napoleonic Codes, 141-42, 160-61, 192, 216, 223, 241, 243, 255-56, 283-84,289-90,295, 307-308,326, 339

INDEX

National Convention, 60-61n, 63-65 Nellessen, Franz Charles, 154, 189, 219,221 Nellessen, Heinrich, 303, 312, 316, 338 Nellessen family, 336n Neuss, 123, 165 Norrenberg, Wilhelm Anton, 298, 301-302,302n, 310n, 312, 316 notables and notability, 119, 125-33, 161, 195, 205-206, 218, 247, 25255,257,261,276, 285, 297, 336, 351 Nouvelles Politiques, 65 oaths of allegiance: to France, 186-87, 189-90; to Napoleon, 194; to Prus­ sia, 218 Oberprasidenten, 217, 250-51, 263-65 Oberwinter ship seizure, 137-39, 142-43 Oeder, Christian, 271, 275n, 304 Oestges, Dominicus, 34n Oppenheim, Salomon, 306-307 Oppenheim, Simon, 307 Oppenheim bank, 328 Osnabriick, Peace of, 41 Ourthe, Department of the, 216 Paris, Treaty of, 232-33 Pastor, Johann, 34n Pastor, P. H., 273, 312, 331 Pastor family, 336n Peletier, Friedrich Karl, 35n, 40 Peltzer, Johann, 274 Peltzer, Mathias, 113, 149, 153, 161, 163, 182, 197,272 Peltzer family, 189, 336n Pelzer, Franz, 61 Pelzer, Hermann, 54 Peres de Lagesse, Emmanuel, 55 Pestel, Philipp von, 259, 264-66, 268, 277, 322

397 petitions for union of Rhineland with France, 187-91 Peuchen, Friedrich, 198 Peuchen, Johann Jakob, 45n, 76, 88, 139n, 177 police administration, 259, 269-70 popular sovereignty, 66, 79, 101, 131, 187, 344 prefecture system, 83, 91-95, 131, 204, 216, 286; advisory and legisla­ tive bodies, 101-102; arrondissement councils, 98, 101-102, 216; Conseil General, 98, 101-102; pre­ fecture council, 93-94, 216; munici­ pal councils, 98, 101 Preussen und Frankreich (Hansemann), 280,342, 347 Protestantism and Protestants, 78, 132,205-206, 284.Seealso Aachen, Cologne, Crefeld: Protestantism and Protestants Prussia: annexation of Rhineland, 218; awards of titles and ennoblement, 47, 335-36; bureaucratic govern­ ment in, 5n, 247-49, 261-68, 285-87, 343, 345, 34950, 356; and Crefeld, 47-48, 189,204; encouragement of trade and industry, 221, 225-27, 313-14,317-18, 321-23; and England, 6n; General Code, 223, 241, 243, 255-56, 308; interim administration in Rhineland, 21314; National Assembly, 352; policy toward Rhineland, 48, 148, 173, 334; political loyalty to, 241, 33435, 339-41, 345-47, 351; political representation in, 239-40, 243, 249-55, 261, 267, 279-83, 288; re­ form movement, 3-4, 243-49, 262, 339; Rhenish possessions in 1815, 15; tariff policy, 226-38, 314, 31622, 320n, 325-26, 339; three-class

398 Prussia: annexation of Rhineland (cont.) franchise, 353-54; War and Do­ mains Boards of Cleve, 30, 46-47 Prussia and France, see Pruessen und Frankreich Prussian-Rhenish Steamship Com­ pany, 145n, 329-30, 339 railroads, construction of, 326-27, 330-32, 352-54 Rastatt, 174 Rat der Gewerbeverstandigen, see labor arbitration boards reading societies, 34, 34-35n, 42, 74, 78 Reiff, Jacob, 308 Reimann, D. W. von, 266, 268, 311, 331 Remscheid, 320 representatives on mission, 54-55, 60, 62-63, 67-68 republicanism in Rhineland, 71, 73-74, 79, 186. See also Cisrhenane Republic; popular sovereignty requisitions and taxes: by allies, 21921, by France, 56. Seealso Aachen, Cologne, Crefeld: contributions and requisitions Rethel, Johann, 67-68, 71-72, 75, 88, 88n, 104-105, 107, 135-37, 161, 167, 171, 173, 186 Revolution of 1848, 8, 252, 352-54 Revolutions of 1830, 344-45 Rheinbund (Rhenish Confederation), 215 Rheinischer Merkur, 240 Rheinschiffahrtskommission, 237, 266, 323-24, 328 Rhine and Harbor Commission of Cologne, 136 Rhine and Moselle, Department of the, 86, 130,216 Rhine-Meuse Canal, project for, 142, 146, 177, 180

INDEX

Rhine Octroi agreements, 175-76, 178-80, 232 Rhine province, 217,346,350; diet of, 251-55, 260-61, 279-84, 287-88, 296, 303-304, 306, 310, 339-40, 352; district governments, 263-67; proposed three-class franchise, 260; town councils in, 272-74. See also Oberprdsidenten; Prussia, three-class franchise Rhine River: shipping, 44, 137, 16669, 172-75, 178-80; as tariff border, 91, 148, 158, 166-71, 178, 188; trade, 28-29, 234, 313, 323-26, 329-30. See also Cologne: staple right, transshipment right Rhine Shipping Insurance Company, 327 Rhineland: economic conditions in, 26-33,155-59, 313-32; government commissioners of, 84, 90-94, 96, 181; integration with France, 129, 183, 185, 204; integration with Prussia, 16, 246, 285; invasion and occupation by France, 50-53; occu­ pation by Austria and Russia, 201202; under the old regime, 23-25; particularism in, 14, 23-24, 26n, 102, 235; political clubs, 51, 89, 189, 191-92; political life under France, 205-209 Rhineland Gazette, 223 Riegeler, Philipp Joseph, 271 Riesbeck, J. C., 29 Rigal, Franz von, 106, 270, 310, 335 Rigal, Ludwig Maximilian von, 32, 89,98, 111, 113, 126, 132-33, 148-49, 153, 182, 200 Rigal family, 57-60, 218n, 278 Right Bank of the Rhine, 15,227,268, 296. See also Berg; Diisseldorf; Westphalia Rittmann, Friedrich, 277 Robespierre, Maximilien, 60n

399

INDEX

Rochow, Gustav Adolf von, 331 Roederer, Pierre Louis, 143 Roer, Department of the, 16, 86, 216, 272, 317; central administration, 86-87, 91; councilors general, 111, 114-15; electoral college members, 111, 121-23; electoral college presidents, 111, 116-21; government, 86-92, 94-95, 98-100, 103-104; legislators, 111-14; municipal councilors, 111, 123, 128; notables, 119-21; prefects, 103; prefecture council, 219; representation of businessmen, 126-29; senators, 111-14; taxation, 98-99n. See also Conseil General Rother, Christian, 331 Rotterdam, 173, 329 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 66 Rudler, Anton Franz, 138 Rudler, Franz Joseph, 84, 84n, 86-91, 88-89n, 104, 136, 148, 160 Rudolf II (Holy Roman Emperor), 26 Sack, Johann August, 214-15, 21732, 237-43, 255, 262-63, 266, 289 Saint-Andre, Jeanbon, 92, 140, 14243, 174n, 179 Salm-Dyck, Joseph, 113-14, 121, 200, 287-88 Sarre, Department of the, 86, 130,216 Saxony, 215, 236 Schaaffhausen, Abraham, 45n, 62, 107-108, 108n, 125, 133, 137n, 198,219, 222, 335 Schaaffhausen Bankverein, 328, 355n Scharnhorst, Gerhard Johann Davidson, 245 Scheibler, Bernard von, 33, 201, 219, 229, 335 Scheibler, Johann Heinrich, 270 Scheibler family, 27, 3 7 , 2 7 8 , 336n Scheldt River, 323 Scheuten, A . W., 89

Schleicher, Adolf, 54 Schleicher family, 189 Schmalhausen, Gustav, 277 Schmalhausen, Heinrich, 189, 196 Schnabel (Landrat), 340, 340n Schon, Theodor von, 227 Schrotter, Friedrich Leopold, 227 Schuckmann, Friedrich von, 263,275, 309, 322 Schiilgen, Johann, 34n • Schiill, Everhard Caspar, 45n, 88n, 136, 145 Schiill, Wilhelm, 45n, 75-76, 88, 88n, 138, 198 self-administration, 5n, 78, 131, 13 In, 184n, 207, 207-208n, 258, 286, 288-89, 335, 348, 356 self-government, 247, 258, 278, 356 Senate, 96-98, 101-102 Send, Josef Anton, 4 4 , 4 5 n Shee, Henri, 91-92, 95n, 143 Sheehan, James J., 19 Sieyes, Emmanuel Joseph, 97, 101 silk manufacturers, see Crefeld, silk manufacturers Simon, Sebastian, 103, 108 Simons, E., 88n Smith, Adam, 6n, 227, 314 Social Contract (Rousseau), 66 Sohmann, Abraham, 34n Sohmann, Abraham (commercial counselor), 335 Sohmann, Conrad, 89n, 106, 270, 276,305,310,316 Sohmann family, 60, 218n Solms-Laubach, Friedrich Ludwig Christian zu, 241, 264, 267-68, 293-94,313-14,324,338 Speymann, Christian Heinrich, 45n Springsfeld, G. Charles, 34n, 189, 197n, 219, 303 Springsfeld, Jacob, 283, 303-304, 305n, 310 Staatsrat, 250-51, 262

400 Staatsunmittelbarkeit, 182, 209, 287, 333,356 staple right, see Cologne, staple right Startz, Franz Heinrich, 61 Startz, Leonard, 199, 221, 312 Startz, Nicolas, 303 Startz family, 189 steam engines, 315-16 steamships, 29n, 326-27, 329-31, 338 Steffens, Wilhelm, 275 Stein, J. H., bank, 328 Stein, Karl vom, 3-4, 148, 215-17, 219-20, 227, 232, 244-49, 257, 267, 286 Steinberger, Adolf, 161, 271, 278, 292, 295-96, 298, 300, 330 Stohr, Johann, 45n, 63-65, 64n, 75, 108-109, 108n, 140 Stolberg, 165, 189, 196, 234 Struensee, Karl Georg Philipp von, 270-72, 271n, 278 Sybertz, Augustin, 105, 108, 140 Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, 175 tariff unions, 227 ter Meer, Adam, 277 tobacco, processing of, 149, 153, 156-57, 166,216 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 4 toleration, religious, 86. See also Aachen; Cologne; Crefeld: Catholi­ cism, Protestantism; Jewish rights Toscani, Johann Friedrich, 89-90, 189 town government: mayoral system, 243, 257-61, 269; Stein system, 247-48, 255-60 transshipment right, see Cologne, transshipment right Tribunate, 96, 101 Trier, 86, 279. See also District Gov­ ernment of T. Uelpenich, J. J., 34n United Diet, 352

INDEX

Upper Rhine, governorship of, 216 van Giilpen, Christian Nikolaus Joseph, 331 van Houtem, Alois, 34n van Houtem, Ignaz, 105, 160, 189, 196 van Houtem, Ignaz (Jr.), 303 van Houtem, Servais, 61 Venedy, M., 187-88 Vincke, Ludwig von, 250, 262, 327 von den Westen family, 60 von der Leyen, Conrad Isaak, 52 von der Leyen, Friedrich, 47 von der Leyen, Friedrich Heinrich von Conrad, 57-58, 189, 305, 335n von der Leyen, Friedrich Heinrich von Friedrich, 58-59, 89, 121, 132-33, 189, 198, 200, 240, 252, 316, 334-35,349; as Freemason, 34n, 58, 196; as legislator, 113, 153, 182; as mayor of Crefeld, 89n, 106, 150-51, 153 von der Leyen, Heinrich, 47 von der Leyen, Johann, 32 von der Leyen, Johann Heinrich, 273, 283 von der Leyen family, 31-35, 46-48, 52, 57-60, 132, 148, 190n, 218n, 270, 278, 335, 338 Vossen, Joseph, 51, 55, 57n, 60, 60n Wagner, Georg, 304, 310, 331, 335 War and Domains Boards of Cleve, 30, 46-47 Wasserfall, P., 86 Waterloo, Battle of, 233 Wesel, 165 Westphalia, Kingdom of, 15, 214, 262, 264, 268 Westphalia, province of, 250, 296 Weyer, Franz Joseph, 34n, 45n, 76, 138 Weyer, Heinrich Joseph, 198

401

INDEX Wiedenfeld, W . E., 54, 189

Joseph von, 35n, 6 7 , 1 2 5 , 1 3 3 , 1 8 6 ,

Wildenstein, Johann Adam, 221, 303

198; as mayor of Cologne, 68, 69n,

Wildt, Hermann Joseph, 2 1 9

107-109, 108-109n, 144-46, 163,

Witte, Philipp Vincez Maria von, 34n, 37 Wittgenstein, Heinrich Joseph von,

176-78, 199-200, 218, 2 2 4 , 271 women's auxiliary, 238-39 Wyck, M . v., 89

43, 45n, 125 Wittgenstein, Johann Jakob Hermann

Zunkel, Friedrich, 17

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Diefendorf, Jeffry M 1945Businessmen and politics in the Rhineland, 1789-1834. Originally presented as the author's thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1975. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Business and politics—Germany, West—North RhineWestphalia—History. 2. Businessmen—Germany, West— North Rhine-Westphalia—History. 3. Germany—Politics and government—1789-1900. I. Title. HC287.N6D53 1980 330.943'4306 79-3200 ISBN 0 - 6 9 1 - 0 5 2 9 8 - 0