Business, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: Contributions from the Private Sector to Address Violent Conflict 9780415484350

Table of contents :
Book Cover......Page 1
Title......Page 4
Contents......Page 8
Copyright......Page 5
Introduction......Page 10
Part I: Evaluating business-based peacebuilding......Page 16
1 Business-based peacebuilding and conflict resolution......Page 18
2 Relevant work......Page 27
3 Business-based peacebuilding in practice......Page 38
4 Analysis......Page 57
5 The future of business-based peacebuilding and conflict resolution......Page 69
Part II: Designing business-based peacebuilding programs......Page 74
6 Violent conflict and business......Page 76
7 The business case for peace......Page 84
8 Lessons from conflict resolution and peacebuilding......Page 91
9 Mapping the forms of business-based peacebuilding......Page 108
10 Actors in business-based peacebuilding......Page 125
11 Developing business-based peacebuilding......Page 136
12 Caveats and questions......Page 145
References......Page 151
Index......Page 159

Citation preview

Business, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding

Business, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding examines the actions currently being taken by businesses in areas of violent conflict around the world, and explores how they can make a significant contribution to the resolution of violent conflicts through business-based peacebuilding. This book combines two approaches to provide a comprehensive look at the current state and future of business-based peacebuilding. It marries a detailed study of documented peacebuilding activities with a map of the possibilities for future business-related conflict work and pragmatic suggestions for business leaders, conflict resolution practitioners, and peacebuilding organizations. The use of the label “business-based peacebuilding” is new and signifies actions business can take beyond simple legal compliance or making changes to avoid creating a conflict. Although business-based peacebuilding is new, examples are included from around the world to illustrate that, working together, businesses have a strong contribution to make to the creation of peaceful societies. The book advocates pragmatic peacebuilding, which is not overly concerned with cause-driven models of conflict. Instead, pragmatic peacebuilding encourages an examination of what is needed in the conflict and what can be provided. This approach is free of some of the ideological baggage of traditional peacebuilding and allows for a much wider range of participants in the peacebuilding project. This book will be of much interest to students of peace studies, conflict resolution, international security and business studies, as well as to practitioners and business leaders. Derek Sweetman is Dispute Resolution Director for the Better Business Bureau in Washington, DC and Instructor at New Century College, George Mason University, USA.

Routledge studies in peace and conflict resolution Series editors: Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham University of Bradford

Peace and Security in the Postmodern World The OSCE and conflict resolution Dennis J.D. Sandole Truth Recovery and Justice after Conflict Managing violent pasts Marie Breen Smyth Peace in International Relations Oliver P. Richmond Social Capital and Peace-Building Creating and resolving conflict with trust and social networks Edited by Michaelene Cox Business, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Contributions from the private sector to address violent conflict Derek Sweetman

Business, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Contributions from the private sector to address violent conflict

Derek Sweetman

First published 2009 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2009. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2009 Derek Sweetman All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-87570-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN10: 0-415-48435-9 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-87570-2 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-48435-0 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-87570-4 (ebk)

For Sarah and Sofia

Contents



Introduction

1

Part I

Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

7

  1 Business-based peacebuilding and conflict resolution

9

  2 Relevant work

18

  3 Business-based peacebuilding in practice

29

  4 Analysis

48

  5 The future of business-based peacebuilding and conflict resolution

60

Part II

Designing business-based peacebuilding programs

65

  6 Violent conflict and business

67

  7 The business case for peace

75

  8 Lessons from conflict resolution and peacebuilding

82

  9 Mapping the forms of business-based peacebuilding

99

10 Actors in business-based peacebuilding

116

11 Developing business-based peacebuilding

127

12 Caveats and questions

136

References Index

142 150

Introduction

The Olympics have never been the guarantors of peace envisioned by Pierre de Coubertin. Nevertheless it was shocking for many viewers to see open violence between Georgia and Russia in South Ossetia on their televisions the day before the opening of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing. Although the irony was almost too much for many commentators to bear, the two events remind us both of our dreams for a more peaceful world and the reality within which we pursue those dreams. This book makes the argument that one path toward making our dreams of peace into reality is to rely, at least in part, on the contributions that can be made by both international and local businesses through business-based peacebuilding. Over the past thirty years, globalization has had many effects, including the expansion of multinational businesses farther than ever before. At the same time, we have seen some of the world’s bloodiest civil wars. New approaches must be considered to assist an ailing international conflict resolution regime weakened by indecision in the international community, ideological differences between participants and, to some extent, outdated ideas about high-level diplomacy and mediation. To say that business in this context can be part of the solution is not to ignore the fact that businesses can contribute to the creation and perpetuation of conflict. While some of these are the so-called “merchants of death” profiting through the production of weapons and even of violence, many more contribute through ignorance of their company’s effects on the countries in which they operate or a misguided notion of firm interest. This is a very pregnant topic familiar to anyone with a passing acquaintance with the concept of blood diamonds (or the movie of the same name), but it is one that will largely be set aside in this discussion. There are excellent researchers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that analyze and publicize the links between business and conflict. Here, instead, the intent is to answer the question: How can businesses – both local and international – be utilized within peacebuilding to help create more peaceful societies and resolve violent conflicts? This book is somewhat unorthodox in structure and intent. It is comprised of two deeply related, but functionally independent parts and is also intended

2   Introduction

for a variety of readers. The concept of business-based peacebuilding is of particular importance to conflict resolution practitioners and other peaceworkers, since potential contributions from businesses have primarily been either ignored or even discouraged. Understanding, however, that interest in business-based peacebuilding extends beyond the practitioner community to representatives from NGOs, governments, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), and businesses themselves (both in the boardroom and the compliance office), the intent here has been to produce a text that while still rigorous, is also not so specific or jargon-laden that it cannot be understood by anyone with an interest in the peaceful resolution of conflict. The book itself is a two-part examination of the actions currently being taken by businesses in areas of violent conflict around the world, as well as how they can make a significant contribution to the practice of the resolution of violent conflicts through business-based peacebuilding. The first part is an exploratory study of current and past efforts of business-based peacebuilding while the second focuses on extending these efforts, though the contributions of conflict resolution theory, into tangible plans for action for the future. In Part I, special consideration is given to the instigating actor for peacebuilding efforts, whether a single business, a business association, or a non-profit conflict resolution group. One of the primary insights of the study is that business-based peacebuilding efforts vary consistently in relation to these instigating actors, limiting peacebuilding possibilities. This study is by necessity exploratory. To a large extent we are still gathering information about what is being done or has been done by businesses attempting to influence conflict outcomes. The research that fuels Part I was largely completed in 2006 while I was a student at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. If Part I is an exploratory study, then Part II may be best thought of as an exploratory handbook. Usually, when seeking out a handbook or how-to manual a reader will look for something created out of endless hours of expert experience where the authors can address all, or almost all, problems and conditions that could arise from a topic. However, the practice of business-based peacebuilding is new enough that even viewed collectively those in the field do not have enough experience or research to simply convert their knowledge into a how-to guide. Instead, information is being pieced together from many different projects and experiments around the world. It is my sincere hope that this volume is rapidly overtaken by more rigorous works based upon larger samples of practice, the contribution of growing proportions of the practitioner and business communities, and plenty of academic research and assessment projects. However, we cannot simply stand by and wait for such material to arise. The conflict-resolution perspective that suffuses this work requires that we engage the situation we currently face as best we can with the tools at our disposal. This book is an attempt to begin to fill in the knowledge we will need to refine our use of a new tool, but this tool will always be just one of many. Business-based peacebuilding is no

Introduction   3

more a panacea than any of the other peacebuilding or conflict resolution approaches developed to address violent conflict. Violent conflict, especially on the intra- or international scale, is far too complex for singular solutions. Frankly, if such solutions existed we likely would have found them already. What is needed is a well-rounded portfolio of options for the use of either third-party intervenors or indigenous groups seeking to mitigate the harms of violent conflict, resolve the conflicts they are facing, and build a more just and peaceful world.

Structure of the book Part I comprises the first five chapters of the book. Chapter 1 discusses the need to examine business-based peacebuilding, both from an academic and practice-based perspective. Additionally, it describes the outlines of the conflict resolution approach adopted in this book. This is seen as comprising a present-focused engagement with conflict that is the result of a normative bias toward resolution or mitigation. It is contrasted with present-focused approaches that do not include such a normative bias, such as historical documentation or conflict journalism as well as future-focused engagements. These future-focused engagements can also be seen as having either a normative bias toward resolving or reducing conflict, as seen in fields like peace studies, or no bias, as in defense forecasting. The conflict resolution paradigm described illuminates certain assumptions that are being made in this book. First, we have the ability to affect positive change in situations of violent conflict. Of course, this does not mean we can resolve each case without bloodshed or damage, but these are also not lost causes or just the result being damned by biology. Second, we see a moral obligation to address conflict in a manner that attempts to resolve it. This may interfere with certain views of local autonomy, although we should recognize that an obligation to intervene is not the same as the right to do so. In part, this tension is resolved by the third assumption: that the way to approach violent conflict is through engaging the world as it currently is. In contrast with Peace Studies and other revolutionary approaches, the conflict resolution paradigm is not concerned primarily with remaking society or human social relations. Instead, we focus on using what we can to serve the interests of the parties in conflict. This does not mean that we do not look to the future, but it is done through the lens of the real present and focused on achievable outcomes. Viewed from the conflict-resolution perspective, business-based peacebuilding seems surprisingly obvious. If we have an obligation to get involved and need to base our intervention on the resources in front of us, we should consider every option, especially one with the potential to use businesses to assist with peacebuilding efforts. Chapter 2 focuses on the early attempts to study and promote positive business action in conflict as well as related efforts such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the economic conditions of conflict. This chapter is

4   Introduction

skeptical that CSR in itself will be an effective tool of peacebuilding and, while the “creed versus greed” approach has made significant strides, it is not seen as central to business-based peacebuilding. This relates more to the points of entry into a conflict for practitioners than an argument with the economic methodology or conclusions. The economic approach (as opposed to the business-based approach described in this book) calls for economic growth as an inoculation against violent conflict and supports the notion that growth and conflict resolution can go hand-in-hand. The practitioner or peacebuilding organization, however, will seldom, if ever, be able to directly effect change in economic growth rates. The tools for such intervention are simply not within their reach. While recognizing that both local and international businesses can contribute to growth, business-based peacebuilding focuses on projects that are more immediate to the reduction or resolution of the conflict. This chapter also examines the early work on business contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. This literature largely promotes three options: compliance, risk minimization, and value creation. Compliance entails ensuring that the company is not in violation of any local laws or industry-related codes in addition to international regulatory efforts like the Kimberley Process for diamonds. From the perspective of assisting the conflict, it is truly the least a company can do. Risk minimization focuses on changing business practices in response to a more well-rounded understanding of the interaction of the business and the conflict. Business-based peacebuilding, which would include both compliance and risk minimization as preconditions for participation, nevertheless is a value creation strategy. When a company participates in business-based peacebuilding, it is intentionally taking action beyond its standard business operations, even if the end goal is to serve the interests of the company. Chapter 3 is the heart of Part I, but also the simplest to describe. It contains a lengthy survey of documented cases of business-based peacebuilding. While gathering the data for this survey it became evident that there are identifiable clusters of similar approaches and that these largely correlate with the type of organization that instigated the program being examined. Businesses creating their own programs followed one set of likely approaches while NGOs and business associations used others. While this was originally seen simply as a curious finding, it is more likely related to the early state and ad hoc nature of business-based peacebuilding. In Part II this distinction is not recommended when particular options are being considered. Chapters 4 and 5 conclude Part I. Chapter 4 compares the information from Chapter 3 with the theoretical approaches described in Chapter 2 and also addresses a possible explanation for the divergence between businesses, NGOs, and business associations as an example of the “two culture problem” in conflict resolution. Chapter 5 presents some possibilities about the future of business-based peacebuilding and makes an argument that it should not be ignored by the conflict resolution community.

Introduction   5

Part II, composed of Chapters 6 through 12, attempts to provide the information needed for a reader who would like to consider starting a business-based peacebuilding project, whether as a member of a firm, NGO, or government or as a practitioner. Chapter 6 provides an overview of contemporary violent conflict and its effects on business as well as a short discussion of the literature addressing the ways in which business can contribute to conflict. Chapter 7 examines the case for involving business in conflict, especially that which can be framed within a CSR argument. It also discusses two important contributions to the study of business contributions to peace that were published after 2006. Recognizing that we do not yet have enough empirical data on business-based peacebuilding to draw conclusions about what kinds of programs will work, Chapter 8 discusses contributions to this understanding that can be built out of the literature of peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and peace studies. Chapter 9 provides a comprehensive examination of the forms that business-based peacebuilding can take, seen as a map of practice. It is the heart of Part II as Chapter 3 was to Part I. Chapter 10 moves beyond specific practice to discuss the actors involved in businessbased peacebuilding: businesses themselves, both local and international; business and trade organizations; and peacebuilding and conflict resolution practitioners, NGOs/IGOs/governments, and activists. It also considers the creation of two new international NGOs to cultivate business-based peacebuilding and assist in the prevention of conflict. Chapter 11 presents some of the logistic issues that need to be considered in utilizing business-based peacebuilding, especially in selling the idea to business leaders and cynical activists and consumers. The conclusion, in Chapter 12, discusses one possibility for business-based peacebuilding, some caveats for anyone too willing to accept business-based peacebuilding as a cure-all, and a discussion of where the research community could go next to further our understanding of this developing practice.

Part I

Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

1 Business-based peacebuilding and conflict resolution

The current international conflict resolution regime has been in place at least since the founding of the United Nations (UN). A well-publicized recent study from the Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia (2005) argues that the number of violent conflicts has been decreasing along with the number of refugees, dollar value of arms transfers, number of genocides, at least since the late 1980s. It also traces other positive trends, such as the decrease in battle deaths, an increase in the amount of interrupted peace between major powers, and the reduction in the incidence of military coups back to the 1950s. This is an optimistic view of the contributions that have been made to peace as well as the confluence of historical factors, such as the end of colonialism that may make the period studied anomalous and not a representation of historical progress. Even presuming the best interpretation of the study’s conclusions, a look around the world makes it clear that more can be done. A world made up of people and groups, all interacting in an environment of positive peace, is an impossibility, but that does not mean such a goal cannot be used to measure our current success. It is clear that the contemporary world’s experience of inter- and intrastate violence need not be as significant as it is. In fact, the enterprise of conflict resolution itself is predicated on the idea that it is possible to improve our relationship to conflict, to resolve some conflicts and to mitigate the destruction that comes from others. Viewed from this perspective, no matter how successful the current system has been, it is clear that there is room for improvement. It is arguable whether more of the same is needed or if novel approaches are key to having a larger influence on the path of conflict. Writers examining conflict from a conflict-resolution perspective often carry a bias toward traditional third-party intervention, especially mediation, as the most appropriate remedy for long-term violent conflict. This should not be surprising as most of these authors themselves are seldom direct parties to the conflicts they consider. In describing a role for conflict resolution, they are often considering one they could, at least on principle, fill. However, if as noted above, the current conflict resolution regime is insufficient, it makes sense to look for alternatives outside of the usual suspects. It

10   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

would be unreasonable to expect that the tools available in the conflict resolution toolbox at this time are the only ones we will need in the future and that they are the best ones for the job. This study will address one alternative to the current conflict-handling regime: business-based peacebuilding. It is not expected that business-based peacebuilding could replace the current system or even that it is necessarily superior to any other option. It does appear, however, to be part of the solution – and one that does include a role for conflict resolution practitioners. It may not be surprising that little attention was placed on businesses aiding peacebuilding efforts until recently. Under the Westphalian state system, foreign relations was the province of states. State sovereignty has been challenged through the development of international organizations and there has been a warm acceptance of discussing issues of war and peace within the context of the United Nations or regional organizations. Likewise, the number and character of non-governmental efforts has increased greatly, also undermining the state-only claim to international relations. This has also shifted focus away from pure statemodels of peacemaking and peacebuilding and allowed the inclusion of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the peacebuilding sphere. Of course, there were always individuals and groups working for peace and the mitigation of destruction, however their influence both on the ground and in academic and media realms has grown recently. Largely in discussions unrelated to the specific concerns of peacebuilding, commentators have noted the rise of the multinational corporation (MNC) and globalization, the effects of which are hotly debated. It is generally agreed that this rise has included an additional assault on traditional state sovereignty in international relations. While these studies and debates argue strongly that there is another set of actors to consider when analyzing international events, the peace and conflict resolution community has been slow to embrace or even study the potential business-based peacebuilding. Although instances of business-led conflict resolution and peacebuilding appear to be increasing there are many unanswered questions about it. This study asks what insights can be found by examining a subcategory of business activities in conflict, business-based peacebuilding. Additionally, it asks what can be contributed by focusing on whether these efforts are initiated by the companies themselves, business associations, or other organizations. The goal of the work is to provide useful insight for conflict resolution practitioners and organizations attempting to engage businesses as part of their work.

What is business-based peacebuilding? At a UN meeting with business leaders, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said: Business itself has an enormous stake in the search for solutions. After all, companies require a stable environment in order to conduct their

Conflict resolution   11

operations and minimize their risks. Their reputations – not just with the public but with their own employees and shareholders – depend not just on what product or service is provided, but how it is provided. And their bottom lines can no longer be separated from some of the key goals of the United Nations: peace, development and equity. All these are compelling reasons why business should play an active role in tackling these issues, without waiting to be asked. (Annan 2004) Annan’s comments are representative of the growing support for business involvement in issues of social concern, including violent conflict. Although in recent years it was still possible to discuss the “untapped potential of the business sector” in conflict resolution (Wenger and Mockli 2003), there has been a large increase in the practice of what can be called “business-based peacebuilding.” This practice should be separated from other business activities in the midst of violent conflict. Businesses can respond to conflict in their operating environment by choosing not to engage the conflict, which could include increasing company security; to avoid the conflict entirely, by leaving the conflict area; or by taking action to address the conflict. There is more than one way to divide the actions a business can take to address the conflict (see Chapter 2), but for the purposes at hand the most useful is to separate simple compliance with existing laws and guidelines from taking active steps to reduce the negative effects a company might have on a conflict, and also from attempts by business to address and help resolve the conflict itself. This final option is business-based peacebuilding. It is business-based in that the action and programs are managed and implemented by business and commercial actors. “Peacebuilding” in this context is used generally to indicate actions that may extend beyond limited conflict resolution (mediation and negotiation) and could also include conflict prevention and post-conflict work. This study focuses on business-based peacebuilding instead of attempting to analyze all corporate behavior in conflict areas. There are good reasons for this approach. First, most existing studies look at least at the three forms of positive interaction – compliance, do-no-harm, and business-based peacebuilding – and by focusing simply on business-based peacebuilding it may be possible to find correlations and connections not evident when viewed as part of a larger whole. Second, focusing on business-based peacebuilding avoids complex concerns that deserve their own independent treatment, such as the potential expansion of private security firms, the negative effects of business on conflict, or regulatory efforts such as the Kimberley Process for “blood diamonds.” These topics have been better addressed elsewhere and are not germane to the analysis and development of “best practices” for those companies that choose to become positively involved in conflict. Of course, this is not to say that all, or even most, companies make a positive contribution to peacebuilding. The question at hand is what those that do make such a contribution do.

12   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

Prior to 1995, there was virtually no scholarly work on the role of businesses in peacebuilding, with the exception of trade-based theories of peace that focus on countries, not corporations, as the primary actors. Since 2000, however, more work has appeared. Since both the phenomenon and analysis of business-based peacebuilding is very new, current accounts are exploratory in nature, often combining descriptions of ongoing programs with normative guides for the future. Additionally, these analyses usually incorporate aspects of positive contributions to conflict resolution along with critiques of business activities that exacerbate or perpetuate conflict. This is, in part, driven by the added attention brought to companies acting in conflict areas by NGOs like Global Witness or Amnesty International in the 1990s. The data on business-based peacebuilding is still incomplete. There are a number of reasons for this. First, to the extent that companies are doing peacebuilding work on their own, there may be an incentive to play down their actions. This could happen if the programs produce competitive advantages that allow a company to be more efficient or effective than competitors. Additionally, whilst there is great scholarly value in examining failed cases, there is little incentive for a company to publicize these. Not surprising, the documented cases of business-based peacebuilding are almost all considered moderate to large successes. Second, some companies instigate programs without the collaboration of the conflict resolution or development communities. These programs are more difficult to track and evaluate, although recent trends toward conflict assessment by companies is making this easier. Third, quite simply these programs are undertaken in areas that make thorough, objective research difficult. By definition, business-based peacebuilding is happening in areas in need of peacebuilding. While some cases involve post-conflict assistance, many involve companies literally in the middle of civil war. With the exception of a few books produced by academic presses, the majority of the work on business-based peacebuilding is developed and published by organizations in the conflict resolution and development fields, both NGOs and international governmental organizations (IGOs). Much of this developed in conferences by conflict resolution practitioners, academics, development professionals, governmental and IGO representatives, and on some occasions company staff. This literature usually considers the problem from the conflict and company levels, meaning either looking at all business sector efforts in a particular conflict or at the actions of a particular company in one or more conflicts. A smaller amount focuses on the role of business within the conflict resolution regime as a whole. As will be noted in Chapter 4, there is little if any focus on individual-level experience of business-based peacebuilding in conflict. Since the study of business-based peacebuilding is still very new, most work is exploratory, although much of it contains a normative component aimed at modifying company behavior. The links between the empirical observation and the normative suggestions is not always clear. Many authors

Conflict resolution   13

bring their preferred approaches to conflict from their past experience and apply these to the business role as well.

Why is business-based peacebuilding significant? There is no current regime of incentives (economic and non-economic) to encourage investment in peacebuilding by companies, yet they are taking on this role (Gerson 2000: 144). Beyond that, the amount of business-based peacebuilding appears to be increasing along with interest in it from conflict resolution and international organizations. In part, this is due to the growth of MNCs that has been made possible through economic globalization. Business actors are more likely to have operations in areas farther from their home and increasingly these areas include those subject to violent conflict. There are over 60,000 MNCs active in seventy conflict regions (Bais and Huijser 2005: 15). There are also indications that businesses are moving to take a more active role in the countries they do business in, whether they are in conflict or not. Largely, this is in response to pressure from transnational advocacy groups that make up the corporate responsibility movement. The conflict component of the corporate responsibility movement has arisen out of its general concern for human rights, and peace is becoming a larger part of the message from these groups (Haufler 2001: 6). Additionally, the idea that peace and prosperity are linked is a strong component of the economic philosophy of the United States. Insofar as this is correct, peace should yield expanding markets to all for non-inflationary growth for American companies. From the point of view of the individual or group working for peace, there are strong practical reasons to pursue this research. First, it is an example of the integration of peace research with peace action and education, which Galtung (1996) calls for as the path to social change. More specifically, by identifying and documenting business-based peacebuilding efforts, activists could be more prepared to mount persuasive cases for business involvement. Second, since most efforts of businesses to promote peacebuilding outside their home country have gone unnoticed by the peace and conflict resolution community, it is quite likely there would be a benefit from the exchange of theoretical perspectives and specific experience. Both groups may have something to learn. Third, by having a clear method of analyzing potential positive business activities in conflict areas, activists would be able to encourage those companies doing good work and provide constructive suggestions to those that are not. Currently, businesses are largely either ignored or demonized by activists. In addition to the practical concerns noted above, there are a number of theoretical justifications for examining this problem. First, it is relevant to the study of our world as it becomes more globalized. As noted above, one part of globalization is the expansion of business into areas of conflict.

14   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

­ usiness behavior in these regions, especially to the extent that they are B doing “social good,” will be of greater interest as economic integration increases. In light of the generally negative perspective on globalization illustrated by the anti-IMF/World Bank protestors that were common in the early part of the decade, the study of positive contributions serves to flush out the idea of globalization and provides a more complete picture of the contemporary world. Additionally, there is a growing theoretical literature that argues the Westphalian model of state-based international relations is being supplanted by other, non-state forms. Vying for power among the organizations put forward as new loci of power are businesses, specifically MNCs. Along with this, trade and business activity have been proposed as a remedy for (inter-state) war at least since the beginning of the twentieth century. Although the hope that economic interdependence would lead to both peace and prosperity was undermined by World War I, recent advances in globalized information technologies, as well as the theoretical recognition that industrial democracies may be more peaceful, have led to a resurgence of this argument among proponents of free trade and globalized capitalism. Business-based peacebuilding provides a mechanism through which this may be true.

The study This study will examine a broad, but focused, collection of business activities in conflict areas, those that could be considered “business-based peacebuilding.” It is broad in that cases from many disparate conflicts and business sectors will be considered. It is focused in that only this one aspect of business behavior will be considered. Hopefully, this will allow for the isolation of business-based peacebuilding activities from other business actions and will provide greater insight. This approach will be structured within the existing work on business-based peacebuilding (see Chapter 2), but will break from this with a focus on the instigating organizations for the businessbased peacebuilding programs. These can be individual companies, business associations, or conflict resolution and international organizations and it is expected that this approach will uncover commonalities and differences not previously noted. One desire in doing this is to help inform conflict resolution practice, so lessons will be drawn for that perspective and not simply for businesses, as most of the literature does. At this point in the development of business-based peacebuilding, it is unlikely that any study of the phenomenon could be successful if not primarily exploratory. There will be some attempt to draw causal arguments about the relations between instigating organizations and types of business-based peacebuilding, but the primary conclusions will be descriptive and taxonomic. In the end, it is expected that this study will generate many more questions than it answers, and these will be reviewed in Chapter 5. Information on business-based peacebuilding operations will largely come

Conflict resolution   15

from observers of company activities, although to a much lesser extent company sources will be used as well. There has been criticism that social projects undertaken by corporations are more related to public relations than doing good, and information about these is usually disseminated by the marketing or PR departments of the corporations. There is not enough evidence to say that all company communication about social projects is compromised, but in this study independent assessments and descriptions will be privileged to avoid this concern.

Context for this study of business-based peacebuilding The field that in some contexts is referred to as “conflict analysis and resolution,” “conflict studies,” or “conflictology” is amazingly varied in approaches to its primary subject. While this is to some extent simply due to the multidisciplinary nature of the field, which focuses on a single problem (conflict), instead of a primary method of inquiry, it is also in part because there are fundamental differences in the ways writers approach the subject. Along with this, many individuals writing on war and peace are not necessarily trained in the study or resolution of conflict, although in some cases their contributions have been significant. It is more difficult to place these writings within a particular discipline. While it is important to recognize that any study of conflict and peace necessarily will draw from a number of existing disciplines, and it has been well-established that no completed understanding of conflict can come exclusively from one discipline, this does not mean we should not draw conceptual boundaries. These boundaries serve less to restrict research than to focus it, allowing individuals working within the various approaches to concentrate their efforts. As an alternative to a disciplinary division, or a simple catch-all that includes all work on conflict and peace, there is a relatively simple alternative. This will be briefly examined here and the current study will be placed within it. Two boundaries can be placed within the range of work on conflict and peace, producing four regions. The first of these boundaries separates works that focus on the world as it is from those looking at the world as it could be. The second boundary splits the two previous territories by separating those works that presume a normative requirement to intervene to resolve conflict and/or promote peace and those that take a more objective view (see Table 1). The first region includes works that focus on the world as it is without a normative push to address conflict. These will not necessarily be entirely value-neutral, but the focus of this region is on the accurate representation and explanation of conflict as it is currently experienced. Included here would be academic disciplines such as sociobiology and purely observational approaches to sociology and anthropology, as well as research focused on uncovering conflict as a functional phenomenon, but the primary practitioners of this approach are historians and journalists. This region is dominated

16   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding Table 1  Examples of the regions of conflict and peace literature

Normative bias toward resolving/ reducing conflict

No normative bias

Present-focused Conflict resolution ADR Peacekeeping

Conflict journalism History Sociobiology Documentary efforts

Future-focused Peace studies Revolutionary ideologies

Defense forecasting Risk assessment Actuarial analysis

by those who seek to document conflict. Again, this is not to say that individuals writing in this region do not care about the resolution of conflict, but that the focus of their work is descriptive, not proscriptive. The urge to document conflict may be motivated by a desire to change opinions about it, but the works here do not specifically advocate involvement in the conflicts they cover. The neighboring region that includes those without a normative desire to address conflict, but with a focus on the world as it could be are those who specialize in forecasting conflict. Primarily, this area is populated with risk specialists, actuaries, and the forecasting arms of military and diplomatic agencies. The goal in these analyses is primarily to accurately represent a future state in regard to conflict and not to promote alternatives that reduce the amount of conflict in general. They may be involved in reality-testing alternative approaches that would increase or decrease conflict, but have no inherent bias toward either outcome. Very little of the work in this region is used on those on the other side of the normative boundary, while evidence from the current-focused documentary region often appears in other approaches. Works that focus on improving the conditions of conflict through envisioning worlds-that-could-be is the region of what is often labeled “peace studies,” although most labels in the study of conflict are inconsistently applied, at best. These approaches intend to improve the world for the better in the context of conflict, but do so through promoting revolutionary changes to the world system. These include everything from replacing cultures of war with cultures of peace (system-wide), to replacing patriarchy with matriarchy, or even to the mass ideological projects of the twentieth century. Most totalitarians promised that after society was remade, conflict would not be a problem. The boundary between this and the final region is not black and white and most observers will disagree at which point a solution moves from being based on current resources to involving large-scale changes to the world system itself, but this distinction is clean in most cases. The final region is made up of works that focus on addressing conflict with the resources available within the current system and can be character-

Conflict resolution   17

ized as the “conflict resolution space.” This includes everything from legal and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) approaches to international mediator and conflict resolution training, in short, most of the actual tools that are used to address conflict. In fact, this provides a good explanation of the difference between the two normative regions. In the conflict resolution region, tools are applied to contemporary conflict. In the peace studies region, the entire system is encouraged to change (or forced to do so) to produce a world with less destructive conflict. It is important to realize there is much borrowing between these two territories. For example, the negative peace/positive peace distinction developed in peace studies has utility in conflict resolution discussions of when a conflict is truly resolved. There is no attempt here to privilege any region over the other. Likely, contributions from all four will be useful in addressing conflict. In the conflict resolution region, there is an ontological presumption that the goal of analysis is to further the possibility of resolution or at least mitigation of the ill effects of conflict. Within this region, there is much disagreement about the exact nature of “conflict resolution” vs. “conflict management,” “conflict transformation,” and so on, but all of these approaches are linked by a commitment to do something with the tools available. It is important to realize that although the boundary between conflict resolution and peace studies is drawn in the latter’s future-orientation, this does not mean that conflict resolution is concerned only with the present. The difference is in how the two approaches deal with the contemporary world system. While peace studies is based on the desire to change the current world system to promote peace, conflict resolution works within that system. However, many conflict resolution approaches make an explicit effort to focus on the future of participants in conflict. This current study fits within the conflict resolution region. This means that it self-consciously presumes that positive action in conflict is both possible and morally necessary whenever possible. It also privileges solutions that are based in resources within the current international system and not widespread revolutionary change. The purpose of focusing on businessbased peacebuilding is to see what can be done to improve the current practice of conflict resolution and not to create a new world wholly different from the current one. The purpose of situating the study within this space is to allow it to move beyond basic questions about the nature of resolution or the inevitability of conflict and focus instead on tools to address conflict.

2 Relevant work

The literature on business-based peacebuilding was virtually nonexistent ten years ago, but has flourished since the first attempts to analyze business action in conflict areas in the 1990s. This chapter will examine the current approaches to scholarship on business-based peacebuilding as well as relevant strains of work in related fields. It is useful to begin the investigation by discussing the discourse of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and economic conditions of conflict.

Corporate social responsibility Davis (2005) identifies two primary paradigms of thought about the role of business in society that are active in the West. The first, the “Anglo-Saxon model,” is the traditional approach, which argues that while businesses certainly exist within a society, their sole responsibility to that society is related to a narrow definition of business focusing on providing employment, goods and services. In this view, the only responsibility a business has is to its own health and wellbeing and to that of its owners, who may be private individuals or shareholders. This is not an entirely amoral approach, however. The Anglo-Saxon model is based on the belief that economic growth and competition are good for everyone and, therefore, businesses are doing good for society by doing good for themselves. From the perspective of the second approach, CSR, however, the AngloSaxon model appears hopelessly naïve. CSR began to develop in the early 1970s when it was widely recognized that the gains of business could be offset by the damage business could cause. Originally focused on the effects of business on the environment and labor, proponents of CSR argue that businesses have a responsibility to address the negative effects they have on society. In some cases, this has meant a focus on codes of conduct – voluntary or compulsory – that restrict harmful actions. In other cases, it was argued that corporations bear an affirmative responsibility to make the societies in which they operate better, beyond the jobs-and-growth approach of the Anglo-Saxon model. It is the latter approach that has been most associated with CSR over time and companies that maintain CSR departments

Relevant work   19

keep these separate from the compliance officers who are responsible for ensuring the companies comply with existing law and regulation. Although conflict behavior was not a component of CSR originally, it has become more important as the result of the efforts of NGOs in the 1990s to highlight companies that, in their opinions, are contributing to conflict. Additionally, Ballentine (2004) notes that external actors have also derived notions of conflict-related CSR from the fact that companies have many resources at their disposal and concluded that they should use these for the general good. In 2000, the United Nations joined the CSR movement through the Global Compact, which is a voluntary group made up of companies that have agreed to abide by ten core principles related to human rights, labor, the environment, and non-corrupt business. The Compact has published guidelines and acted as a network node for representatives of corporations interested in CSR. Participation, however, has not been as high as expected, especially with US companies. In spite of this, a McKinsey survey of international companies found 40 percent said joining the Global Compact was having a positive effect on business behavior (Blair, Bugg-Levine, and Rippin 2004). Proponents of CSR argue that business support of CSR initiatives is important, since participating in them often involves an outside review of company actions, usually by an NGO, and that CSR helps coordinate efforts between the private sector, governments, and NGOs, who are presumed to have similar perspectives (ECON Centre 2001). In practice, CSR is made up of many varied approaches, including sustainable development, triple bottom line, corporate philanthropy, corporate community investment, socially responsible investment, and corporate governance (International Alert 2005). The boundaries between these approaches are ill-defined and the terms are often applied to the same form of action. In part, this is because CSR is not only a guide for action, but also a discourse about it. Many of the terms were developed to appeal specifically to businesspeople and not to have operational significance. Luckily, when addressing conflict, CSR has been simplified. The options available to a company in conflict can be seen as a three-step pyramid, where the base is simple compliance with the law, the second step is actively taking steps to limit the negative effects of doing business in an area of conflict, and the third being proactive peacebuilding (Banfield et al. 2005). For Nelson, these options are compliance, risk minimization, and value creation (2000: 28). Commentators focusing on the first step often propose changes to the legal and ethical regimes involving business and the regulation of conflictpromoting activities (Guáqueta 2002). However, since legal compliance is supported even in the Anglo-Saxon model, the argument within CSR for how to address conflict is between supporting “do-no-harm” efforts (step two on the pyramid mentioned above) and “do-some-good” efforts (step three) (Campbell 2002) or between “reactive” and “proactive” strategies (Frankental and House 2000). Some authors go so far as to argue that peacebuilding is

20   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

“a particularly powerful and promising manifestation of CSR” (Wenger and Mockli 2003). Recent work on the “do-no-harm” approach has focused on elaborating and promoting “conflict-sensitive business practices,” which seek to avoid the costs of conflict through the integration of a conflict-oriented lens in business activities (Banfield et al. 2005). In large part, this involves the addition of conflict risk assessments in various stages of the business process. While agreeing in general that businesses could possibly be a positive actor in a conflict area, critics of CSR point to a number of concerns. Ballentine (2004) argues that CSR, by focusing on responsibility instead of practical ability, “has had little effect on the will or capacity of corporations to effectively deal with conflict issues, and is indicative of a misguided or illconceived agenda for development in conflict settings.” Additionally, there is concern that a CSR regime would be very susceptible to collective action problems. For example, if companies were calling for greater government transparency in a region in conflict, the government could have an incentive to reward companies that do not raise similar concerns and those companies may also be able to operate more efficiently if they are not applying the same standards as those following CSR (ECON Centre 2001). One multinational manager quoted in The Economist stated that CSR-related social programs add an overage of 5 percent to the cost of doing business for multinational companies (Economist 2000). In the short term, it is possible that businesses will perceive an economic incentive not to participate in CSR. The application of CSR within corporations is also subject to wide variations. The ECON Centre (2001) found that company policy changed drastically based on whether the CSR offices for the company were in the headquarters or in the affected countries. Also, it has been argued that when CSR and business operations are in conflict, decisions will be made from the business perspective. As a result, companies will only act so long as business and CSR are pushing in the same direction, which could result in a strong bias toward only producing stability, not justice or long-term resolution (Goulbourne 2003). NGO campaigns focused on shaming companies for violations of CSR may in some cases be counterproductive. While there are many cases where an NGO was able to change the actions of a business in a conflict area – the most wellknown recent example is probably the blood diamonds campaign focused on extractive companies involved in civil wars in Africa – the result has often been that the companies targeted abandon the country. The irony in this is that the companies most often accused of fueling conflict are those that often have expertise and resources others do not. For example, the most-criticized oil companies, Shell, Exxon, and BPAmoco, are the only ones capable of extracting deep-sea oil deposits. If these companies leave a conflict area, due to international pressure or increasing costs, it is likely that no company will be able to fill the void (Cilliers 2001). Such campaigns are also based on the idea that companies cannot be trusted and must be policed by NGOs. This may undermine a company’s positive efforts to assist in the conflict (Killick 2002).

Relevant work   21

Some critics of CSR argue that the push for consultation is much more likely to produce CSR-themed advertising instead of real change. For example, the group Global Witness examined the divergence of the rhetoric and actions of BPAmoco in Angola and argued that part of the problem is that it is easy for companies to document actions, but much more difficult to show long-term effects on the countries in which they are doing business (Global Witness 1999). Finally, CSR may just be supported when business is good. Hoyos and McNulty (2003) quote an unnamed “institutional sales broker” saying, “In a market where companies are watching their share prices sag every day, and investors are watching their retirement funds being washed away, come on. Social responsibility is a bull market issue!” While CSR in itself is not a solution to world conflict, it seems reasonable that it is a valid and useful rhetoric tool through which conflict resolution practitioners can promote positive peacebuilding to business. It is best seen as an entry point through which the ideas and skills of conflict resolution can be “mainstreamed,” or incorporated into the regular business decision making (Sherriff et al. 2004). It is also clear that, whenever possible, the case for business-based peacebuilding will be stronger where it can be tied into rational business decisions.

Economic consideration in conflict Also during the 1990s, there was a greater focus on the role of economic considerations in the onset and perpetuation of civil war. The World Bank’s “Economics of Civil War, Crime, and Violence” project uses econometrics and other economic tools (especially game theory) to examine the role of economic issues in war. As researchers outside the World Bank took up the same tools, they began to work with academics using more traditional approaches and there is now a large body of work on the relative importance of economic and situational factors (creed or greed, in the language of the researchers) in conflict (Humphreys 2003). The “creed or greed” crowd has generally concluded that country wealth reduces the instances of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). The most common explanation for this is that rebels are motivated to seize resources and, as state wealth grows, the state’s ability to protect these resources does as well (Humphreys 2003: 2). Alternatively, scholars such as Thomas Homer-Dixon (Homer-Dixon 1994) argue that poverty itself is often a cause of conflict. The empirical data suggest that economic growth and conflict resolution efforts are “mutually reinforcing” (Humphreys 2003: 3). They also suggest that funds for conflict prevention are best spent in the very poor states. Although researchers indicate that wealth and growth in general reduce war, they do not agree about what types of growth are important. The level of wealth equality is more important. The Collier-Hoeffler model has many critics (Nathan 2005), but for the purposes of business-based peacebuilding

22   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

its ultimate accuracy is less important than the fact that the debate on civil wars has turned to focus squarely on economic conditions. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) also looked specifically at the role of resource wealth in conflict and determined that greed is a more likely motivator in intrastate conflict than ideology. However, critics charge that the Collier and Hoeffler approach addresses only a correlation of resource wealth and conflict than providing an explained causal relationship. In contrast to the idea that rebel groups are motivated to seek and exploit available natural resources, at least eight other mechanisms have been proposed (Humphreys 2003: 4). Civil wars have had specific economic characteristics, like the focus on rent-seeking and extraction of resources instead of processes aimed at long-term growth and return. They also involve the use of violence for economic aims: gathering resources, influencing labor, and so forth. Also, fighting has changed so that, in some cases, it becomes largely focused on acquiring economic assets and resources that can be  economically, instead of militarily, exploited. This was noticeable ­especially in cases like Sierra Leone and Angola (Ballentine and Sherman 2003). Knowing countries that rely on the export of natural resources are more likely to have civil wars, Ross (2003) looks at differences between types of resources and concludes that drugs and diamonds are the most likely to contribute to conflict. This is because drugs and diamonds are “lootable,” meaning they can be extracted with unskilled labor and are easily portable. Lootable resources lead more often to “nonseperatist” conflicts, which are more difficult to resolve and do not involve grievances over the distribution of resources. Non-lootable resources are more likely to lead to separatist conflicts. Lamb (2000) cautions that it is useful to divide economic agendas that are related to the causes of war from those that contribute to the perpetuation of war. The first agendas usually result from the attempts of groups to improve their situation, for example, conflict with the goal of controlling a resourcerich area. The second agendas relate to individuals (and companies) that directly benefit economically from the war, such as arms suppliers or private military companies. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has also taken a strong interest in the role of economic factors in conflict, convening an international colloquium in Villars in November 2001 and has continued with projects since then. Participants supported the notion that economic development can affect conflict, although with a stronger look at development inequality (Baltes 2001).

Business-based peacebuilding The earliest serious consideration of businesses as an agent of peacebuilding from an analytical perspective comes from the Multi-Track approach cham-

Relevant work   23

pioned by Diamond and McDonald (1996). This approach recognizes that traditional diplomacy (Track One), even when supplemented by unofficial efforts by governments (Track Two), cannot adequately address long-rooted conflicts. Diamond and McDonald suggest that peacemakers take advantage of a series of other “tracks” made up of individuals and organizations. Track Three in this approach is business. For Diamond and McDonald, the role of business in conflict, “beyond making a profit, is to build relationships and create pathways for communications and joint action” (1996: 52). Additionally, businesses can support peace by helping improve economic conditions and through the diversity they naturally support when operating across cultures. Seeing that businesses often make contacts throughout the areas in which they operate, they can act as effective messengers, in effect becoming “the exchange mechanism of the system” (1996: 57). Additionally, businesses can provide useful information to outside actors during a crisis. In order for businesses to fulfill this role, however, Diamond and McDonald argue they must become much more aware of the role they can play (1996: 56). Working around the same time, scholars in the peace studies tradition have proposed the pursuit of “peace business,” which is a transformative approach to organizing not only businesses themselves, but entire economic systems (Galtung, Jacobsen, and Brand-Jacobsen 2002). Peace business is not about using contemporary business for peacebuilding, but for radically changing not only the way business is done, but also the relationship between individuals and economic exchange. While the peace business movement shares a starting point with CSR, its radical proposals have kept it from making a serious contribution to business-based peacebuilding practice. The first major analytical work on business-based peacebuilding was the report written by Nelson (2000) as the result of work done by International Alert, The Council on Economic Priorities, and the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum. This report will be addressed in detail since it has served as the foundation for almost all analysis that has followed. Most work on business-based peacebuilding after Nelson has served to clarify or extend the points raised in the report. Those contributions will be addressed within the context of the Nelson report. Motivating factors Nelson recognizes seven characteristics of the contemporary world that encourage companies to get involved in peacebuilding: • • •

privatization, since this gives companies more authority as state-run enterprises are sold to the private sector; liberalization, in the context of the spread of market-based economies; increasing investment in emerging markets, which put company operations closer to conflict;

24   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

• • • •

technological change, which has been both stabilizing and destabilizing as it has empowered both existing companies and new challengers; increased societal expectations, especially from supporters of CSR; global competitiveness, through which companies need advantages against a larger body of competitors; and changing “governance” structures that allow for conceptions of nongovernmental governance (2000: 16–17).

Nelson also notes that businesses have a number of costs associated with conflict: security, including material losses; opportunity costs related to the suspension of work, and so forth; capital losses/increased costs; personnel costs; litigation costs (associated with defending lawsuits about complicity in the conflict, as Texaco had in 1993); and reputation costs (2000: 22–23). Others go farther and argue that effective action can only happen after businesses recognize and internalize the reality of these costs (Killick and Gündüz 2005). While some authors argue that an intensification of costs is required (Rettberg 2004), others believe it is the company’s awareness of costs, their transparency, that is key (ECON Centre 2001). Not all companies are affected by conflict in the same way. Goulbourne (2003) identifies three risk factors related to a company’s susceptibility to costs in conflict: the sector they operate within, the company’s size (since size means more targets), and their location. Companies in sectors with deep footprints, such as the extractive industry, that are large enough to attract the attention of combatants and happen to be located in areas of conflict, are most likely to feel the effects of conflict. Additionally, Rettberg (2004) notes that rural-based companies are more likely affected by conflict than urban ones and that the ability of a collective program to maintain free riders helped the program continue. Companies, especially those acting globally, have become more vulnerable to pressure from what Keck and Sikkink (1998) call Transnational Advocacy Networks, which are networked actors coordinated around an idea and taking action in many locations. The primary function of these groups is to push for “norm implementation” and change behavior (1998: 3). These are communicative networks, not physical ones. Transnational Advocacy Networks had a role in many companies pulling out of conflict areas, like Talisman in Sudan and De Beers in Congo, but they have also promoted the adoption of beneficial approaches to conflict. Von Koerber (2002) sees a “cultural change” in the way companies deal with conflict as the result of NGOs’ actions, media coverage, and boycotts organized by transnational actors. Wenger and Mockli (2003: 2) take a different approach. They argue there are four reasons companies are getting more involved: first, inter-country wars are being replaced with intracountry conflict, which does more damage to business; second, notions of the scope of national security are expanding in ways that include businesses; third, conflict prevention is becoming an

Relevant work   25

issue of global governance, and finally, it is also becoming an issue of corporate governance. Another useful approach in examining when companies take action comes from the self-regulation literature. Haufler (2001: 3) looks at what motivates transnational companies to regulate their own behavior instead of relying on external (governmental) regulation. In the light of the push for regulated conflict-sensitive business practices, these same factors should apply: a high risk of government regulation, relatively low economic competition and high asset specificity, high probability of transnational activist pressure (reputation being a key asset of the company), and high levels of information exchange, learning, and consensus within the industry. How should companies intervene? There are five principles Nelson supports for companies working in areas of conflict: • • • • •

Strategic commitment from the CEO and Board levels. This could include public pledges or internal documents. Risk and impact analysis. Companies should evaluate the impacts of their actions on conflicts. Dialogue and consultation. Companies need to talk with stakeholders in the country regularly. Partnership and collective action. Companies should work with other companies, governments, and NGOs on conflict issues and these partnerships should be transparent. Evaluation and accountability. Companies should set measurable goals and monitor the progress toward them (2000: 30–34).

The specific intervention is determined by a number of factors, including the causes, stage, and location of the conflict; the role, power, capacity, and relationships among the actors; the type of industry, size, history, ownership, and spheres of influence for the company; and the causes of the conflict. Nelson proposes specific remedies for four types of conflict. Resource conflicts are best addressed through supporting just allocation of resources and sustainable development. Identity conflicts can be mitigated by company actions that support diversity and tolerance through employment practices and dialogue. Ideological disputes are more difficult, since often the company needs to justify the existence of a capitalist system. Governance conflicts are best addressed through supporting the creation of good institutions (2000: 38–41). Nelson produces recommendations for each variation of conflict type and stage, within the pyramid of local actors developed by Lederach (1997) and extended for the business community (primarily by adding a business component to each level) by Killick, Srikantha, and Gündüz (2006). They divide

26   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

the possible actions into three categories: core business activities, social investment, and policy dialogue. Core business activities are anything related to the provision of the good or service produced by the company. This can include employee decisions, marketing, or operations. Social investment includes non-core resource expenditures, including building infrastructure or providing health services. Dialogue can be discussions either with local residents affected by the company or larger bodies such as the national government. It can also involve individual or collective action on the part of a company (Nelson 2000: 64–67). Killick and Gündüz, based on research on the peace efforts in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines, argue that collective efforts are “central to a successful and sustainable private-sector intervention.” (2005: 312) Bais and Huijser (2005: 12) are more pessimistic about the possibility of dialogue options for business-based peacebuilding, since the role of corporations is in doing business, not mediating, as “that requires an expertise truly beyond the core business of a MNC.” They also note an option not covered by Nelson, witnessing. Companies can gather information and publicize problems to bring international attention to a conflict. Wenger and Mockli also caution businesses against taking over functions normally handled by governments, since the companies are likely to value stability over all other outcomes and this could perpetuate injustice (2003: 131). Zandvliet (2002) believes that macro-level peacebuilding is unlikely from companies and argues practical experience has shown companies will only act within their own operational space. When acting locally, companies usually don’t see what they are doing as political. They also can do quite a bit by simply modifying their local processes. The benefits from acting locally are easier to see and they are more likely to receive credit for what they do from the local population. Public–private partnerships are also gaining in popularity. They were discussed widely by the Villars group and are part of the World Bank’s postconflict strategy. In these partnerships, private actors, NGOs and IGOs work together on projects to reduce conflict. Gerson and Colletta (2002: 34) go even further and advocate “injecting the private sector in all UN and other multinational peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peacebuilding efforts.” This will provide, they argue, more clarity of mission, better use of performance objectives, and “the delineation of measures for judging results in an open, transparent and accountable framework.” Additionally, private firms have a stronger incentive to finish the job, since that is how they will get paid. This avoids the political danger that can result in a country pulling out its soldiers in the middle of an operation, as the US did in Somalia (2002: 90). What factors lead to success? While most authors writing about business-based peacebuilding talk about the factors that can lead to its success, it is interesting to note that none has

Relevant work   27

developed an adequate measure of what success would be. Nelson, as indicated above, argues companies need to set goals and measure progress toward these goals while many authors argue periodic conflict assessment is necessary. However, none has provided an analytical tool capable of determining the direct or indirect impact these efforts have on the conflict at large. A large part of the problem is the complexity of violent conflict. It is very unlikely that business-based peacebuilding is going to be the only effort at peacebuilding in a conflict area. If the conflict gets better, how much of that is attributable to the business actions? How much to other efforts? If the conflict gets worse, is it in spite of business-based peacebuilding? How much conflict was avoided? Similarly, there is a difficulty in establishing what exactly would be a success. Is it a formal peace agreement? Lessening of violence? True, positive peace? The lack of adequate analytical tools means that there can be no good answer at this time and this does urge caution in approaching the factors that are claimed to lead to success in business-based peacebuilding. Many of these extend from other peacebuilding or development work, but in those areas as well, cause is very difficult to establish. That being said, of course conflict resolution practitioners are going to make assumptions based on their past experiences and will be seeking the best outcomes possible. A number of different suggestions related to success have been made. Mehler (2002) sees five requirements for successful action: the company must understand the business case for peace, it must have a framework to use to determine its approach, it must be familiar with their role in the conflict prevention process, and it must follow existing guidelines. Killick and Gündüz (2005: 311) see four conditions that help business take useful action in a conflict. There should be a wide recognition on the part of businesses as to the benefits of peace. The private sector should be influential and diverse and needs to be viewed by actors in the conflict as relatively independent. There must also be individual champions willing to take the lead. Zandvliet (2006) sees only two important factors: the level of conflict (national or regional) and the timing of the intervention (the ability to affect macro conflict change decreases over time, while the ability to affect regional and local conflict increases). He argues that prior to investment, companies have the most power to influence macro peace – they can ask for conditions in their agreements with regimes, but they lose some of this after they agree to invest and more after they start operating. Concerns While the literature is very supportive of the idea of business-based peacebuilding, there are a number of concerns raised by the authors. Zandvliet (2006: 14) still sees a “relational gap” wherein the actors active in a conflict zone do not communicate effectively, if it all, and a “content gap,” related to companies that are non-strategic in their conflict analysis. Very few have an

28   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

early warning system or do comprehensive political analysis. Businesses often adopt simplistic conflict models that presume economic causes. Similarly, Switzer and Ward (2004) identify gaps in the current process: a knowledge gap, since the ultimate relationship between business and conflict is unclear; a consensus gap, since stakeholders disagree about the appropriate approach, and participation gap, since local stakeholders often have no voice in the process. Additionally, almost all work being done on providing skills and analysis of business-based peacebuilding is focused on transnational corporations, not local businesses (International Alert 2005). Very little effort is put into understanding business-based peacebuilding on an individual level, either, since most studies have looked at company- or national-level phenomena. Others recognize that individuals promoting business-based peacebuilding and conflict resolution often do not explain themselves well to business leaders. Businesspeople do not have ready access to the nuance in terminology used in the conflict field (Alpher and Borris 2004). There is a surprising amount of consistency in the analytic approach to business-based peacebuilding. This is likely due in part to the consistency in backgrounds from the individuals writing in the field. Most are either NGO employees or academics working on development and/or conflict resolution. There has been no definitive work on business-based peacebuilding written from the business perspective and, as mentioned above, businesses have been small players in the discussion of peacebuilding. As the next chapter will show, however, they are not silent when it comes to acting to resolve conflict.

3 Business-based peacebuilding in practice

Although formal discussion of business-based peacebuilding is a new phenomenon, some businesses and businesspeople have been participating in peace-related efforts for a long time. For example, when Laurence Scott, a Quaker leader from Chicago, organized a meeting with the intent of creating a committee to stop H-bomb tests in April 1957, business leaders were among those invited. While the group did not form a fully fledged organization, the effort eventually led to the creation of The National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE). In fact, the participation of business leaders in the 1963 Citizen’s Committee for a Nuclear Test Ban is credited with sparking President Kennedy’s support in a meeting in August of that year (Wittner 1997: 427). While early examples like this are heartening, organized business efforts for peacebuilding are, to some extent, a characteristic of the 1980s and to a much larger extent of the 1990s to the present. During the collection of these efforts, it became clear that it would be useful to separate the examples, based on the instigating actor. Sometimes, conflict resolution organizations or other international organizations engage local or transnational businesses to develop a peacebuilding program, in other cases individual businesses themselves take action or groups of businesses collectively act within business organizations. In a few cases, business-based peacebuilding appears to grow organically out of the conflict situation itself. Each of these four possibilities will be examined in turn.

Conflict resolution organizations, NGOs and IGOs As was true in the theoretical discussion, the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy was one of the first conflict resolution organizations actively seeking to resolve conflict with the assistance of business. The organization initially engaged businesspeople in East Asia, doing research on business perspectives on peacebuilding in Taiwan and Hong Kong and finding that, while business leaders were interested in peacebuilding, they were largely unaware of resources for peacebuilding that were available to them. Also, in 1995 the organization began focusing on developing a business-based approach to

30   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

conflict in India and Pakistan. With funding from foundations and the cooperation of the Lahore University of Management Sciences in Pakistan and the Management Development Institute in India, it launched the Business and Conflict Resolution Executive Seminars in 2000. These seminars have been supplemented with case study research materials from South Africa, Northern Ireland, Cyprus, and Israel-Palestine (IMTD 2005). Wenger and Mockli (2003: 110–111) note that IMTD has been concerned with involving businesspeople in mediation and peace negotiation efforts. International Alert is another organization that focuses on conflict, that has been active in business-based peacebuilding, especially in the South Caucasus and Sri Lanka. In 2004, International Alert completed an 18-month research project on the link between economics and conflict in the South Caucasus. Based on that research, it decided to start working with small and medium-sized companies and convened meetings in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia. At these meetings, the costs of conflict were discussed and businesspeople often remarked that the conflicts needed to stop. International Alert hopes to develop this into a larger program linking companies throughout the region (Killick, Srikantha, and Gündüz 2006: 9–10). However, the lack of political cooperation means that legitimate cross-border cooperation among businesses in Azerbaijan and Armenia is unlikely. Businesses must first create the political possibility for trade before they can engage in it (Champain 2005). The organization has also taken action in Azerbaijan itself. Along with a local business association and the International Business Leaders Forum, International Alert organized a meeting with local businesspeople, oil company representatives, government representatives, and representatives from international organizations, including the World Bank and IMF in order to address conflict-related concerns. This meeting led to the creation of the Enterprise Development Committee (EDC). The EDC now has fifteen to twenty regular participants and has been meeting since 2000. This process has not necessarily been smooth, but it has been steady (Killick 2002: 26–27). International Alert and the International Institute of Sustainable Development have also been developing a “Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice Toolbox.” The goal is to provide conflict assessments to go along with the social and environmental ones already done by most extractive companies (Goldwyn and Switzer 2004). International Alert’s efforts in Sri Lanka came after the early success of the business community there, so it will be addressed with the other examples of collective business initiatives below. The Business Council for Peace (Bpeace) focuses on assisting women in areas of conflict and after conflict to develop businesses. “Our belief is that when women are stronger economically, they have a stronger voice for peace in their local communities and societies” (Bpeace 2006). It provides distance training, mentoring, and networking, assisted by individuals from large companies like American Express, Goldman Sachs, and Reuters. In Rwanda,

Practice   31

they have linked a village to retailers in the US. The village produces baskets and each basket brings in enough income to feed a family of four for a month. After this success, they assisted sixteen knitting cooperatives in developing saleable goods. Catholic Relief Services has promoted the use of conflict resolution in business in Peru by providing educational materials and has tried to reduce ethnic tensions with multiethnic banking projects in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Neufeldt 2004: 13). In Israel, the Peres Center for Peace has undertaken a number of business initiatives. For the Palestinian-Israeli Young Businesspeople Forums, it partnered with DATA (Research Institute of Bethlehem), the Palestinian Information Technology Association, and the Palestinian Trade Center and received funding assistance from international donors including the public affairs section of the US Embassy. These forums are divided by sector and included meetings of young businesspeople in the telecommunications, shipping and transportation, IT, small business, and banking sectors. The meetings started in 2003 and are ongoing. The purpose is to address obstacles to economic cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian companies (Peres Center for Peace 2006). The Center also held colloquia relating to the economic aspects of the Palestinian–Israeli relationship and the need for private sector cooperation. Three meetings were held with industry representatives from Jordan and Israel between 2003 and 2005 in Wittenberg, Germany. These were organized by the Center and the Amman Center for Peace and Development and sponsored by DaimlerChrysler. DaimlerChrysler representatives also actively participated in the meetings. In February 2003, the Center, the Federation of Chambers of Commerce, and the Israeli and Palestinian Ministries of Industry and Trade held a joint Israeli–Palestinian businessperson conference in Istanbul. After this event, a joint Steering Committee to continue work on economic cooperation was established. In July 2005, the Center organized the first Israeli–Palestinian business-to-business meeting for the handicrafts industry. It allowed for presentations by Palestinian producers and prearranged time to discuss the creation of specific business deals (Peres Center for Peace 2006). Three consulting organizations have become involved in business-based peacebuilding: the International Peace Forum, Political and Economic Link Consulting, and Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) (Wenger and Mockli 2003: 102). CDA is representative of these efforts, which are “focused on gathering experience across many contexts and from many corporate types in order to identify the common patterns that show up repeatedly” and to funnel this understanding to businesses (Anderson 2002). The CDA’s Corporate Engagement Project performs conflict assessments and tries to figure out how well-meaning programs from businesses can contribute to negative effects in a conflict. At this point, the consultancies primarily promote engagement with local populations and changing core business practices in ways that reduce harms.

32   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

International organizations have been less directly involved in businessbased peacebuilding. The largest contribution from the United Nations proper has been the UN Global Compact, which is focused on standardsetting to discourage bad behavior, not encouraging innovative good behavior by companies in conflict areas. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has taken more direct steps. For example, the UNDP has been assisting the peace process in Sri Lanka since 2002 through the Invest-in-Peace Project, which provides technical assistance to businesses through advice, legislative analysis, and training (United Nations Development Programme 2006). The World Bank has also begun to incorporate business-based peacebuilding into its projects in countries in conflict. The best example so far is the Chad/Cameroon pipeline project, which is a partnership between private companies, the host governments, NGOs and the World Bank to build a pipeline for oil. The agreement funnels oil revenue to an audited, offshore account, which is administered according to specific allocations by a group with representatives from a Chadian NGO, a trade union, members of Parliament and the Supreme Court, and executive branch representatives (Sherman 2002: 7). This project has received a lot of attention as a model for future collaborative efforts; however in December 2005 the National Assembly of Chad changed the Petroleum Revenue Management Law, undermining the focus on poverty reduction. The World Bank treated this as a breach of contract, has stopped any new loans to the government of Chad, and froze eight ongoing operations (World Bank 2006). Additionally, the government of Chad used $4.5million of the $25million bonus it received from oil companies to strengthen its military to fight rebel movements (Sherman 2002). In November 2002, the US Agency for International Development, the UNDP and ChevronTexaco gave $50million to encourage business development in Angola. The Angola Partnership Initiative (API) includes two partnerships: the Enterprise Development Alliance and the Angola Enterprise Fund. The Alliance provides matching funds for small- and medium-sized businesses seeking technical or financial help while the Fund specifically targets post-conflict recovery (ChevronTexaco 2004: 45). Some early observations can be drawn from these examples of businessbased peacebuilding driven by outside organizations. These organizations are very likely to partner with other organizations, companies, or IGOs. Especially in the case of IMTD and International Alert, the actions taken by the organizations are driven by research and assessments. These are planned approaches based on existing knowledge more than improvised solutions to immediate problems.

Company-initiated business-based peacebuilding There is less consistency in the approaches used by businesses that are acting unilaterally to promote peace. While Nelson’s taxonomy of response options

Practice   33

is very thorough, it is not optimal for the analysis involving the isolation of peacebuilding activities from compliance or do-no-harm efforts. The groupings used here will collapse the distinctions Nelson made in relation related to conflict factors into four general approaches. Pure philanthropy and personal peacemaking In the Anglo-Saxon business approach described in Chapter 2, businesses are seen as having no moral obligation to the society at large outside of doing well in business and helping the economy. Even the most aggressive proponents of the Anglo-Saxon model recognize that as individuals or as citizens they had a responsibility to the society at large and individual philanthropy was the primary way large business owners “gave back.” In order to avoid the appearance of conflict, these donations were usually designed so that the organizations created were free to do what they pleased. For example, by the time of his death Andrew Carnegie was a diehard pacifist. He created the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Carnegie Corporation in New York to work to eliminate war, what he called the “foulest blot on our civilization.” In following the traditions of the day, he gave no specific strategy for the institutions to follow. As time passed, they drifted toward the political middle in a phenomenon widely noted by critics of philanthropic peace efforts. In the end, the organizations were arguably more concerned with furthering the foreign policy interests of the United States than promoting peace (Tirman 2000: 6–7). More recently, companies and their foundations have begun to fund specific projects and focus on some peace-related issues. For example, the Volkswagen Foundation funded a project by the Bonn International Center for Conversion in 2002 to examine the privatization of peace (BICC 2004). Some business leaders respond to conflict by acting as international mediators. The most famous recent cases are probably Ron Lauder, the president of Estée Lauder, who shuttled between Israel and Syria between 1997 and 2000 to reduce tensions, and Tiny Rowland who, as head of Lonrho in the 1980s, spent eight years trying to resolve the conflict in Mozambique (Wenger and Mockli 2003: 130–131). However, there is little consensus on the actual effectiveness of personal peacebuilding by businesspeople. Critics are concerned about the conflicts of interest posed when a representative of a company, with a large stake in a company, is that close to the negotiations for peace and that the mediator in these cases cannot separate their own interests from that of the company (Nelson 2000: 111). Although the spirit behind these efforts is commendable, it is unlikely that either will have a significant long-term impact on business-based peacebuilding. Corporate and individual philanthropy may support organizations that engage business in conflict areas, but simple funding is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for success. It is more likely that characteristics of the

34   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

individual organizations and projects funded will matter. Personal peacemaking is rare, in part because there is limited support for it and also because even if a businessperson is interested they will only be able to intervene if the circumstances are correct. From the perspective of a conflict intervenor, there also have to be concerns with having these complex negotiations and discussions handled by amateurs. Dialogue One of the most popular forms of business-based intervention is dialogue. This can take many forms. One early example of this is the business version of the Caux Round Table, founded by Ryuzaburo Kaku, who was near Nagasaki when it was bombed and was the chairman of Canon in 1985, and Frederik Philips, who spent part of World War II in a German prison camp and later ran Philips Electronics. In 1985, anti-Japan sentiment was high in the US as a result of perceived unfair trade practices. Philips was friends with Konosuke Matsushita, the head of Matsushita Electronics, and through him invited Japanese business leaders to an event co-hosted by Oliver Giscard d’Estaing, the head of the European Institute of Business Administration. Nine Japanese, seven American and twelve European business leaders agreed to come to the meeting. While it started tensely, the meeting ended productively and the group issued a communiqué explaining how the countries could overcome their differences. (Henderson 1996: 183–185). The group wanted to have a greater impact and formed the Caux Round Table as a forum for high-level discussions on trade, development, and other social issues among business leaders. Between 1985 and 1995, the group met twice a year, alternating between Caux and meetings hosted by participants. In that time, more than 250 business leaders participated. Over time, corporate social responsibility took a more prominent role and in 1994 the group issued the Caux Round Table Principles for Business (Henderson 1996: 188). Dialogue does not necessarily mean the businesses are discussing the conflict among themselves. They can also promote dialogue with the governments in the countries in which they operate. In Zambia, companies put pressure on the government to stay out of the conflict in Congo and, during the 1980s and 1990s, companies in South Africa pressured the government in secret to drop apartheid (Nelson 2000: 69, 112). Fort and Schipani argue the presence of businesses behind the scenes in 2001 helped reduce tensions in the dispute between the US and China over a spy plane that landed in China after a midair collision (2002). In Colombia, private sector actors are in direct contact with the Forces Armades Revolutionaire Colombia (FARC), because FARC claimed it could trust them when it could not trust the government (Gerson and Colletta 2002: 32). It is becoming common for businesses to start small-scale dialogue projects among the stakeholders within their areas of operation in order to

Practice   35

hear grievances and address concerns before violence occurs. However, companies tend to address these efforts to the groups causing the most trouble and can ignore the legitimate concerns of non-violent stakeholders. In the end, this can promote the idea that the only way to get a company’s attention is to commit violence against its employees or property (Zandvliet and Nwankpo 2004). Businesses can also have dialogue before they are doing business in a country. Zandvliet notes there is a rising instance of companies securing agreements related to the improvement of conflict conditions prior to investing or expanding an investment. He recognizes one oil company that has been negotiating with an African country and has made its investment conditioned on there being a signed, effective, and sustainable peace agreement, as well as a company in Colombia that was considering additional investment and made this conditional on security sector reform (Zandvliet 2006: 6–7). Dialogue can also occur between companies and their customers in ways that help support conflict resolution. For example, Body Shop has run advertising campaigns around peace issues, especially in Nigeria; some have promoted tolerance through their advertising campaigns, such as Benetton and Timberland; and Ben & Jerry’s “1% for peace campaign” attempted to open a debate about the US government reallocating 1 percent of its defense budget for peace work (Nelson 2000: 69, 116). In rare cases, dialogue with businesses is vital to peace negotiations. For example, in Sudan, Talisman provided geological data and information on revenues and existing contracts to political groups and think tanks as well as directly to the facilitators of the peace talks. This helped craft a revenuesharing settlement based on real information and this was included in the peace agreement signed on January 9th, 2005 (Zandvliet 2006: 8). Additionally, in South Africa, Consolidated Goldfields arranged and funded secret meetings between the ANC and important Afrikaners during the last few years of apartheid (Gerson and Colletta 2002: 137). While these discussions may not have had the impact of the efforts of the Consultative Business Movement (CBM) described below, they did serve to keep the ANC from becoming totally alienated from the process and probably made the final resolution easier. Not all dialogue efforts are successful, especially those undertaken without transparency. In 1998, Hyundai founder Chung Ju-yung organized an effort to herd 500 cows across the border into North Korea as a gift to help the fledgling “sunshine policy” of South Korean President Kim Daejung. In 2000, Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il met in a summit to discuss reducing tensions. It later was found that the summit was achieved only after the South Korean government paid North Korea $100 million. Additionally, Hyundai Group paid $350 million to be able to run businesses in the North. Hyundai’s payments were facilitated by the South Korean government. The scandal that erupted when a prosecutor indicted both Kim Dae-jung and

36   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

Chung Ju-yung threatened to undermine conflict resolution efforts. Critics in South Korea link the payments to the expansion of the North Korean nuclear program (Ward 2003). Social investment Social Investment is a broad category covering business-based projects that are not necessarily focused directly on conflict resolution (i.e. they are not formal mediation), but are intended to promote an environment in which peace can flourish. These are also the programs most likely to appear in corporate public relations materials. For example, ChevronTexaco promotes these types of efforts through its International Community Engagement Report (2003). One common form of social investment is the support of education or health services in an affected area. ChevronTexaco financed Ludoteco, which educates poor children in Manaure and co-sponsored Children’s Month (April), which includes building an educational and cultural center for over 6,000 children. Similarly CNL Nigeria, which is owned by ChevronTexaco, joined the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and the government of Delta State to produce a riverboat-based health care system to service the delta region of the country. In addition, CNL Nigeria rebuilt the Ugborodo Cottage Hospital, which had been damaged during the conflict and is electrifying twenty communities of about 100,000 people in the Niger delta. Another form of social investment is product donations. In Ireland, Oracle coordinated with the State of the World Forum to donate 100 computers to Catholic, Protestant, and nonsectarian schools as part of the Computers for Coexistence program in Belfast (Bennett 2001). Ericsson in April 2000 created Ericsson Response, an initiative aimed at providing early response to crises. Working with the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UNDP, and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, this program provides communication technology to refugee camps and relief organizations. For example, Ericcson provided mobile phone stations to the refugee camps serving individuals displaced during the conflict in Kosovo (Gerson and Colletta 2002: 107). A more involved approach to peacebuilding through social investment occurs when companies promote the development of business in an affected area. This can involve something as simple as information and management skills, as BP, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and McKinsey share with local NGOs in Azerbaijan, Vietnam, and India (Wenger and Mockli 2003: 143), to efforts to promote in-country purchasing by transnational companies. Supporting the development (or redevelopment) of a business sector is not only important under the theory that business development is good for peace, but it can also provide more direct assistance in conflict resolution and prevention.

Practice   37

In a postconflict situation, there will usually be a high number of ex-­ soldiers who need to be reintegrated into society. Employment is one of the best ways of addressing this concern, since it allows not only for reintegration but can also reduce demands on the government as well. In order to address this in Guatemala, local businesses funded and ran a training center and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Transition Initiative helped them offer retraining at reduced rates to ex-guerrillas (Nelson 2000: 69). CNL Nigeria and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation developed the Local Business Development/Global Procurement Unit, which promotes purchasing from local businesses. In 1997, 25 percent of corporate purchases came from Nigerian sources. That was up to 82 percent by 2001 (ChevronTexaco 2004: 41). Statoil promoted the development of local businesses in Azerbaijan as well (Lindbaek 2004). Siemens AG ran a joint software company with Israelis and Palestinians which was of such interest within the company that the CEO showed up for the opening. However, the project was abandoned as violence increased (Pierer 2004). Another example, the Industries for Peace Program was founded by Grupo Mega and IDC to promote foreign investment and encourage the development of export projects. For example, seven villages hard-hit by the conflict in Chiapas now produce snow peas for the European market (Nelson 2000: 68). Companies will occasionally combine different approaches. Lundin was producing oil and gas in Sudan between 1997 and 2003. Although it was initially welcomed by local communities, instances of violence in the area increased. In 1999 the company commissioned a study to determine if it was contributing to the conflict. The study concluded that while there was not a clear link between Lundin’s actions and the violence, there was a chance for more violence if the local communities began to feel they were not benefiting from Lundin’s presence (Batruch 2003: 25). From their entry in the area, Lundin met with community representatives, hired local staff, and performed infrastructure projects. These actions were formally wrapped into the company’s new Community Development and Humanitarian Assistance Programme. When operations had to be stopped as a result of violence in the course of 2001 and 2002, the staff of the Programme stayed in the communities. As violence increased and in response to the 1999 survey, Lundin sought a stronger peacebuilding role. It had found that national problems with the implementation of the Khartoum Peace Agreement were increasing tensions with the local communities. The company engaged one of its Directors, Carl Bildt, UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Balkans from 1999 to 2001, to conduct diplomacy of behalf of the company. Bildt met with representatives of the Sudanese government and the Nuer community as well as the governments acting as mediators in the conflict (Kenya, Norway, the US and the UK). He pushed the message that the conflict was bad for business and that Lundin was willing to do what it could to help (Batruch 2003: 31).

38   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

The company sold its interest in Sudan in 2003 for a profit (in part, due to the improved conflict conditions). Petronas Carigali Overseas Sdn Bhd, which is Lundin’s successor, agreed to continue the efforts Lundin pioneered and to expand the social programs. Company approaches to social investment can change over time, especially in response to the conflict situation. Indupalma, a palm oil producer, has initiated a program to create cooperatives in the Middle Magdalena River region of Colombia. As the palm oil market weakened, the company encouraged a large number of employees to take early retirement. As economic conditions became worse, they moved to have most of the palm oil production in cooperatives staffed by former employees. In exchange for agreeing to purchase palm oil beans from the company, Indupalma has been providing business and computer training. From 1995 to 1999, nineteen cooperatives were founded and by 2004: 980 individuals were working with them. Indupalma recently expanded this program to include assisting in the purchase of 3,500 hectares of land (“peace territories”) for the cooperatives to plant palm oil trees. If everything works out, after five years the land will be owned by the cooperatives (Rettberg 2004: 29). The company did not begin using the rhetoric of peacebuilding until the new program had started. This program was a canny business decision, since it both strengthened the company and supported the company’s peacebuilding model, which presumed that encouraging entrepreneurship among the people living in the area would decrease the influence of the guerillas. The company also funds conflict resolution programs not directly related to business, such as “Soccer for Peace” and interpersonal skill training, as well as providing services to the community like playgrounds and computer centers. Along with these more traditional efforts, Indupalma has tried to promote political change in favor of peace, including openly supporting candidates who promoted peace and worked against the paramilitaries that had moved in as guerilla influence has waned. Recent economic data seem to indicate that Indupalma’s approach has been at least partially successful, since the region has improved financially and violence has decreased (Rettberg 2004: 29–31). Another example is BPAmoco, which sponsored the Casanare 2000 program in Casanare, Colombia, where the company runs a wholly owned subsidiary, the British Petroleum Exploration Colombia (BPXC). The goal of the program is to reduce conflict in the area through expanding the company’s existing social investments in the region. The project was launched as a direct result of an increase in violence, especially attacks aimed at BPXC facilities (Campbell 2002: 17). BPXC originally funded community programs simply to get community support for the company’s programs, but over time this changed to a focus on strategic regional development and peacebuilding. BPXC’s change was not exclusively motivated by conflict-specific factors. Global criticism of BP’s actions in many areas also played a part, especially two television documentaries that aired in 1997 (Campbell 2002: 76).

Practice   39

Since 1999, BPXC has had ethics workshops for its contractors and employees and started a community peace initiative called “Time for Peace,” with the assistance of the Governor of Casanare, the Red Nacional de Iniciativas por la Paz y contra la Guerra (Redepaz), and the Casanare Ombudsman. This program consists of a series of workshops covering tolerance, human rights, communication, and conflict resolution (Gerson and Colletta 2002). BPXC uses a tri-sector partnership model, with business, government, and NGOs working together. This is common among extractive companies that are sensitive to unrest in their operational areas. A CDA assessment found this was true in the African context, where companies by policy only do projects if they involve the company (or its foundation), the local community, and the government and each party is contributing to the project. One advantage of the partnership model is that it does not place the company in competition with the government in providing necessary services. This keeps the company from needing to address awkward legitimacy questions while also keeping the government from relying on the companies to provide basic services and rerouting basic service funds into the conflict (Zandvliet, Ornosa, and Reyes 2004). Core business practices Peacebuilding through core business practices is a more varied category than it may seem at first glance. This category includes companies that attempt to promote peace simply by doing business in a conflict area, those who have modified their basic business practices such as employment or purchasing, some whose business is producing tools for peacemakers, and a few that have structured their entire business around peace. Some companies have argued they can improve a conflict situation simply by staying in a country in conflict. Heineken is one of the best examples of this. The company has operated in Africa for forty years and maintained operations in Rwanda, Congo and Burundi during their recent wars. One of the important roles it filled was by protecting its own workers and keeping people working (Bais and Huijser 2005: 41). Heineken has been asked to participate in specific peacebuilding activities in central Africa, but has always refused. Former CEO Jean-Louis Homé said, It is very hard to say no, but you have to. Being a direct actor in peace building is not the vocation of a company. It is so tricky, and I strongly recommend not doing it. If, as an enterprise, you act with decent rules, then you are part of the stabilization of the country. (Bais and Huijser 2005: 47–48) While it is arguable whether Homé’s position is based on the company’s experience or just ignorance of the more active roles companies have played in conflict, his perspective is one held by many business leaders.

40   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

Companies operating in Burma/Myanmar faced a dilemma while they were under activist pressure to pull out of the country. They could either stay and contribute to the wellbeing of the people in the country or protect their reputations by leaving. Many left. Total stayed and, as a result, can guarantee security for its employees. Triumph, which produced women’s underwear in a factory in Rangoon, left after activist pressure, leaving 2,000 employees, most young women, without work (Bais and Huijser 2005: 57, 59–60). A number of companies stayed in South Africa and were able to make contributions to the wellbeing of their employees and to work against apartheid at the same time. De Beers, and especially the Oppenheimer family that controlled it, was a very early critic of apartheid. While working conditions at its mines in South Africa could not be considered comfortable, they were better than other companies working in South Africa at the time. Wages were also higher than their competitors (Smille 2003: 7). Jürgen E. Schrempp headed Mercedes-Benz South Africa (and later the entire company). During apartheid, instead of leaving, the company remained and just ignored the apartheid rules such as unequal pay. Schrempp said, When I was in South Africa, I learned that I was there not only to make money. I was rather young then, but I learned that as the chief executive of a company you have a political responsibility; you have a responsibility to society. (Ryback 1998) Palabora, the South African subsidiary of Rio Tinto, is another company that took special effort during apartheid. If an employee was arrested, the employee’s manager was instructed to contact the police to find out where and why they were being held. This usually kept the employees from disappearing. It also paid workers’ salaries to their families if the worker was being held (Economist 2000). Companies that move in quickly after a conflict also have an opportunity to contribute positively. ABB, a Swiss-Swedish construction company, works in the post-conflict Balkans and specifically brings together Serbs, Bosnians, and Kosovars in joint construction projects. DHL moved quickly into Kosovo and was able to help relief and humanitarian organizations reestablish logistical communication quickly (Nelson 2000: 68). Coca-Cola pulled out of Angola at the beginning of the civil war in 1975, but the company opened a $33 million plant on the Cuanza River in 2001, working with the IMF on economic reform and operating under a strict CSR guideline that prohibits paying bribes and taking other actions that harm peace (Gerson and Colletta 2002). Some companies are organized around the goal of peace. PeaceWorks, which calls itself a “not-only-for-profit” company, sells gourmet food in the US that is produced by businesses run and staffed by former combatants in

Practice   41

conflict. Products have been produced in Israel with ingredients from only Arab countries, and in Chiapas, and include a chocolate bar jointly produced by Israelis and Palestinians (Nelson 2000: 117). The company has been successful enough to partner with the World Bank Post-Conflict Unit and the United Nations Office for Project Services in a project to create businesses in Guatemala (Bennett 2001). While Groove Networks is not specifically chartered to seek peace, the company’s focus on collaboration and cooperation made it a good fit for the Sri Lankan peace process. Groove produces virtual collaborative tools that are being used as online support for the peace negotiations by Info Share, a local non-profit organization. Since countries that have had long-term conflict cannot usually sustain the information infrastructure to handle the complexities of negotiations, Info Share and Groove developed an online repository for all kinds of data and documents that are needed (Hattotuwa 2004: 18). The Info Space workspace allows participants, whether they be governmental negotiators, NGOs with an advisory role, or local businesses to share, organize, and collect information on the conflict as well as supporting the development of a one-text settlement document. One large advantage of such an approach is that it allows parties with diverse perspectives on conflict resolution to interact, since there are a number of collaboration methods available (Hattotuwa 2006: 27).

Collective business peacebuilding While some businesses choose to take action themselves to seek peace, it is becoming more common for business coalitions or existing business organizations to handle peacebuilding roles. While these groups use the same approaches that individual companies do, they are more likely to use more than one. As a result, it is more clear to examine collective actions conflictby-conflict. Northern Ireland In 1994, the Northern Irish branch of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) published “Peace – A Challenging, New Era,” a paper that promoted the notion of a “peace dividend” and detailed the costs of the conflict and the economic benefits of peace. This rapidly became known as the “peace dividend paper.” This paper is credited with encouraging the media to adopt the peace dividend as a frame for describing possible resolution of the conflict and was supported when tourism increased and unemployment fell during the ceasefire in 1994 (Tongeren et al. 2005: 327–328). In 1996, CBI joined the Hospitality Association for Northern Ireland, the Institute of Directors, the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Northern Ireland Growth Challenge, the Northern Ireland Economic Council, and the Northern Ireland Committee of the Irish Congress of

42   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

Trade Unions to form the G7. The organization held meetings in Belfast where all political parties were welcomed. It also helped bring US business leaders and the Commerce Secretary to Northern Ireland to promote investment in June 1998 and published hiring and management guidelines, aimed at promoting diversity for reducing tensions. Some commentators argue the economic improvement brought about by the CBI’s actions was a large contributing factor to the eventual signing of the Good Friday Agreement (Tongeren et al. 2005). The CBI is no longer active in the peace process, but this is largely due to the growth of other organizations that can be more directly focused on the issues of importance. For example, the Northern Ireland Community Relations Council (CRC) was formed in 1990 and is funded by the British government and the European Union. It focuses on community relations efforts as peacebuilding from below. In 1997 the CRC joined with the Institute of Directors, the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Institute of Management, the Institute of Personnel and Development, the Chief Executives Forum, the Federation of Small Businesses, the Northern Ireland Quality Center, the Confederation of British Industry, and Business in the Community as part of the Doing Business in a Divided Society Initiative. The CRC convened meetings on the division issue, but let the business organizations lead on coming up with ideas. The result was four sets of guidelines for business to address social concerns, and these were published ten days after the Good Friday Accords were signed in 1998 (Mullan 2001). South Africa The Consultative Business Movement (CBM) was active in facilitating discussions between conflicting parties in South Africa, especially during the transition from apartheid. In the 1980s, the CBM opened discussions with banned liberation movements. There was a push for a national peace conference, but the ANC and the government could not agree to terms. The CBM organized discussions at the Barlow Rand, Ltd headquarters that were chaired by John Hall, the chair of the Chamber of Commerce, and Archbishop Desmond Tutu. While business leaders were not the only third party participants, they were effective in setting the stage for the development of a national peace accord in September 1991 (Fourie 2005: 323). The CBM had been trying its own efforts with little success in 1991, but when F. W. de Klerk tried to organize a summit in May it was able to help get the ANC to the table. The organization had been unwilling to step into a venue organized by the government, but was willing to accept a space convened by a third party. The CBM joined with the South African Council of Churches, which also had been unsuccessful on its own, and the meetings led to the creation of the National Peace Accord. In 1993, the CBM lent a staffer, Retief Olivier, to run the Peace Committee that was working to raise awareness of the peace efforts among South Africans (Marks 2000: 8, 30).

Practice   43

After the settlement, CBM stayed involved in facilitating forums with multinational companies and development agencies to help support the South African economy. Additionally, as the ANC and the de Klerk government settled into the difficult task of reworking the South African constitution, they asked the CBM to handle the administrative and organizational requirements of the process. After the new constitution was ratified, CBM merged with the Urban Foundation to become the National Business Initiative (NBI). The NBI originally focused on “the role of business in growth, development, and democracy,” and has moved to programs that support schools, micro­ finance, and capacity-building (Fourie 2005). Fourie reaches this conclusion: In view of the success of the ‘new’ South Africa, it can be safely claimed that the interventions and activities of CBM provide clear evidence that business not only can make important contributions to peacebuilding, but that in spite of the apparent risks, business can itself be an important beneficiary of such interventions. (2005: 326) Sri Lanka In Sri Lanka, there was a failed attempt by businesses in the 1990s to negotiate a peace deal between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). One reason this failed was that the businesspeople seemed to assume they could force a resolution through their economic power (Killick, Srikantha, and Gündüz 2006: 10). They were more successful, however, the second time around. On July 24, 2001, the LTTE attacked Bandaranaike International Airport near Colombo. This caused hardship to local businesses, especially tourism, apparel, and other high-grossing industries. This was the trigger for business involvement in the conflict. Neela Marikkar and the business organization Sri Lanka First began a campaign to push for peace by running advertisements on TV and radio and in magazines and newspapers. They also distributed pamphlets to small businesses. Like the CBI in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka First stressed the possibilities of a peace dividend (International Alert 2005: 14). Sri Lanka First organized a national event where citizens were invited to stand outside and hold hands for fifteen minutes at noon on September 19, 2001 in order to show their support for peace. Organizers claim more than one million people participated across the country out of a population of 18 million (Marikkar 2006). Shortly after the demonstration, the Sri Lankan parliament was dissolved as the government was facing a losing no-confidence vote. Sri Lanka First actively supported candidates running on a peace platform and they were elected. Within a week of the election, the LTTE offered a ceasefire. The government agreed and a final agreement was signed in February 2002. Permanent peace negotiations are still occurring.

44   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

In 2002, International Alert brought the head of the South African Business Trust to Sri Lanka to meet Sri Lanka First and ten business leaders. They discussed the South African case and how businesses can support the peace process. A Sri Lankan delegation continued this exchange during a visit to South Africa in 2004. The group is now seeking to act as a facilitator and convener for further talks (International Alert 2005). Sri Lanka First is not the only business organization working for peace in Sri Lanka. After the ceasefire, the Business Peace Alliance (BPA) was formed in the Hambantota District, where business was often interrupted by violence. Sinhalese and Tamil business owners in this area worked together and in some cases integrated their businesses. The group holds meetings and networking events as well as providing training in public speaking and business finance (Schreck 2005). The BPA includes representatives of the fifteen regional Chambers of Commerce and encourages cross-province economic activity through Chamber-to-Chamber exchanges. Its network is connected to both the grassroots and the national leadership and BPA leaders have purchased land for a proposed “peace hotel” in Jaffna, which will include both normal hotel space and a business center (International Alert 2005: 14). Its primary objectives are to generate peace dividends, strengthen provincial and inter-provincial economic activity, lobby national leaders on peace issues, and practice CSR in all of its activities (Thassim 2006). Additionally, the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce formed the Joint Business Forum of all Chambers of Commerce, Trade and Employer Associations specifically to support the peace process (de Zoysa 2002). Colombia Another country with strong collective business approaches is Colombia. Since the 1980s, businesspeople have been involved in peace negotiations as representatives of business associations. They took various roles, sometimes acting as part of government teams and sometimes as representatives of just the private sector. This participation was limited, however, and cannot be seen to represent a strong endorsement of peace by the private sector as a whole. Businesses became more interested in participating after the conflict intensified during the Ernesto Samper administration from 1994 to 1998. As the conflict increased the costs on business, businesses invested more time and effort into peacebuilding. They opened business congresses and workshops focusing on the need for peace efforts and the responsibility of business for peace (Rettberg 2004: 17–18). USAID, Javeriana University, and Confecámaras (the National Chamber of Commerce association) held a series of events on the private sector’s role in peacebuilding in Colombia in 2000 and 2001. However, when talks broke down in 2002 and Álvaro Uribe was elected, businesses endorsed his gettough approach to the guerillas, the peacebuilding rhetoric of the prior years disappeared, and many business-led projects were stopped.

Practice   45

One ongoing project is Vallenpaz (Corporación para el Desarrollo y la Paz del Valle y el Cauca), an organization founded by the private sector to assist with development projects in poor and conflict-prone towns in the Valle and Cauca regions of Colombia. Vallenpaz was a reaction to the kidnapping of worshippers at the La Maria church in Cali in 1999. Former mayor, Rodrigo Guerrero convinced several local business leaders to join together to rebuild local state institutions and promote economic development in nearby guerilla-controlled regions (Rettberg 2004: 20). There are over 700 organizations in Vallenpaz, mostly medium-sized companies along with some large, NGOs, educational institutions, and peasant groups. Vallenpaz endorses a structural approach to peace, focusing on fostering economic development to reduce conflict. It argues that by providing self-sufficiency for poor families in the area, these families will be able to resist the influence of the guerillas. Local businesses only donated 330 million Colombian pesos (about $125,000) as startup capital. International bodies such as the European Union, the US Organization for International Migrations, USAID, and Plan Colombia’s Peace Investments Fund donated $2 million. One of the reasons that Vallenpaz has been successful at fundraising is that its founder, Guerrero, was very well connected as the result of founding a large national foundation (Fundación Carvajal) and being the coordinator of the social component of Plan Colombia. The aid package from the US focused on fighting narcotics and reducing conflict. Guerrero’s political abilities have also helped the organization negotiate with guerilla leaders to gain their support for its programs. Results are inconclusive at this point. Some critics have indicated that the projects completed have been of low quality and ties to international donors have made the organization more vulnerable to funding whims (Rettberg 2004: 24). Another collective effort for peace is the Peace Group, President’s Forum Bogotá, which was formed by a group of company presidents from Bogotá in 1999. They were all already in the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce President’s Forum, which was a select group of 140 Chamber members. The Forum brought in experts to talk to its members and often split out individual groups to address a specific topic. In the mid-1990s, in response to increasing violence and economic decline, the Forum became more active in peacebuilding. Prior to this, their efforts were focused exclusively on peace through improved economic conditions. After the change, they began supporting more traditional conflict resolution efforts. Members pledge to spend at least four hours a month on the Group and most of them are presidents of companies. The group calls companies “territories of peace.” In 2001, the group proposed a detailed conflict resolution program for schools, but this was opposed by the Chamber of Commerce whose officials felt the new program would compete with the Chamber’s own. A splinter organization of the Group was formed, the Programme of Productive Coexistence, which was independent of the Chamber, but made up of the same

46   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

company representatives. In February 2004, the new group officially renounced the sponsorship of both the President’s Forum and the Chamber. By 2004, company financial support was starting to become more prevalent and the program had moved into five schools. Rettberg (2004: 47) argues that the ability to provide a free ride was key to success for Vallenpaz and the Peace Group in Colombia. When funding comes from outside and risk levels drop, companies are likely to restrict their peacebuilding efforts unless the costs are low. When companies can participate without significant resource investment, they are more likely to stick with a peacebuilding effort. Other examples While these cases have been examined in some detail, there are many other examples of interest. In 1998, British businesses joined together into the British Angola Forum to exchange information and suggestions for addressing conflict in Angola (Nelson 2000: 123). Later, it was successful in bringing together warring sides in the conflict (Killick and Gündüz 2005: 315). In examining petroleum companies in conflict areas, Simpson noted that they prefer to act in what he calls “New Partnerships.” These are coalitions of businesses, governmental, and non-governmental actors that focus on common problems. They include public-private partnerships, beyond business-borders partnerships (stretching business efforts outside their operating borders), open-stakeholder partnerships (recognizing the shared interests in private and public sectors along with civil society), and public partnerships, where businesses join with public groups to provide services traditionally reserved by governments, like protection, education, and providing clean drinking water and housing (Simpson 2004: 3–4). One example of these is the Angola Partnership Initiative. In the Philippines, the organization Philippines Business for Social Progress (PBSP) was founded thirty years ago by the leaders of fifty of the largest companies in the country. Many of its projects address social concerns and CSR. In October 2001, it created the Business and Peace program within the PBSP Centre for Corporate Citizenship. By 2003, there were 154 companies participating. This was also supported by the Prince of Wales International Business Leaders Forum, the British Embassy, and the British Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines. They have also established an internship program for business called Young Muslim Professionals for Peace. Additionally, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Business Council and Mindanao Business Council are working together to address culturally sensitive business practices targeted at the root causes of the conflict. They are working to reopen Islamic banks, provide employee training, and reviving the traditional barter system (Concepcion et al. 2003: 40). In Somalia, the Academy for Peace and Development, Somaliland (APD) was created in 1999 as a peacebuilding program. It involves local businesses,

Practice   47

especially in its focus on reforming the pastoral economy. Many of the local private sector actors identified by the program also function in other sectors, for example through their memberships in academic institutions, religion groups, or the government. Businesspeople seem pleased with the program and there are hopes that dialogue can be expanded based on the APD model through organizations like the Somaliland Chamber of Commerce (Weber 2002). In El Salvador, the business community partially funded the Movimiento Patriotico contra Delinceuncia, which allowed people to turn in guns for rewards (Nelson 2000: 69). The Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council (TABDC) was founded in May 1997. Its purpose was to promote cooperation between the private sectors in both countries and provide communication assistance. It also wants to remain connected to the governments to “enable them to forge global economic priorities.” It is the only joint Turkish-Armenian institution in the world and intentionally includes the Armenian Diaspora (TABDC 2006). TABDC now focuses on more than business. It also acts as a line of communication between the Turkish and Armenian governments. In 2005, it staged a meeting between business and political leaders from Kars, Turkey and Akhaltsike, Akhalkalaki, and Ninotsminda, Georgia to talk about improving relations on the border of Turkey and Georgia. These regions of Georgia are occupied primarily by ethnic Armenians. Participants focused on opening the border between the countries, developing regional tourism, and improving infrastructure in both areas (Gültekin and Hertoft 2005). Similarly, the Turkish-Greek Business Council has organized tours of Turkey by Greek businesspeople. From 1999 to 2002, sixty Greek companies invested in Turkey (Economist 2002). One of the most interesting cases is one involving collective action but no stable organization. The Sadakhlo Market, in Georgia, but on the border with Azerbaijan and Armenia, is an outdoor market active since the early 1990s. The market provides a “safe space” for Azeris and Armenians to meet and exchange, while avoiding politics (Killick, Srikantha, and Gündüz 2006: 16).

4 Analysis

In light of the examples in Chapter 3, it is useful to see how the approaches to business-based peacebuilding described in Chapter 2 hold up. Both CSR and economic causes of war literature have some relevance to businessbased peacebuilding, but they serve primarily as the foundation upon which the specific literature of business-based peacebuilding has developed. Their relevance outside of this is that they illustrate two different approaches adopted by companies faced with conflict. Some companies choose actions derived from the CSR model like local community engagement, mitigation of negative effects of the business, and most social investment programs. Others adopt the economic causes model and promote programs designed specifically to address development and economic growth, or the equitable distribution of resources. However, most combine aspects of both. It is more interesting to examine the business-based peacebuilding theory itself to see how well it addresses the cases presented in Chapter 3. In addressing motivations, Nelson (2000) saw seven characteristics of the contemporary business experience that encourage companies to get involved in peacebuilding. On reflection, many of these are not necessary to explain business-based peacebuilding. Nelson lists three components related to the expansion of companies: privatization, liberalization, and increased investment in emerging markets. The argument is that greater engagement with the world would encourage business-based peacebuilding efforts. However, the  majority of companies involved in business-based peacebuilding, with the exception of those providing donation support to humanitarian efforts and those who are building tools for peacebuilders, such as Groove, were only active in areas where they already had business operations. It is not necessary to explain why the businesses have such operations as much as why some companies with such operations choose business-based peacebuilding while others choose compliance, do-no-harm strategies, flight, or apathy – a question well suited to additional research. Nelson also considers technological change and global competitiveness to be motivating factors for business-based peacebuilding. From the cases examined, it is difficult to see how this could be the case. It is reasonable to

Analysis   49

believe technological change and global competitiveness have made MNCs less likely to just write off the costs of conflict or to leave an area when conflict starts, but this approach does not have much to say about the businessbased peacebuilding efforts themselves. Nelson’s other two motivations, increased societal expectations, and the changing nature of governance are the most appropriate for the business-based peacebuilding efforts described. These explanations are deficient, however, in that they are all external to the companies themselves. Nelson fails to realize there are internal changes in businesses that correspond to the external motivations. Not every company that receives societal pressure to assist in a conflict opts to do so. Talisman in Sudan was under pressure from both its home government, Canada, and international activists, yet did not engage in business-based peacebuilding. Likewise, it is inaccurate to presume that changing governance structures that allow for non-governmental governance would automatically pull in business actors. Many of the examples in Chapter 3 illustrate that corporations that practice business-based peacebuilding usually do so out of a recognition of “enlightened self interest” that incorporates the wellbeing of the society around them into their business decisions – the “cultural change” described by von Koerber (2002) as well as the “conflict mainstreaming” described by others. This, by and large, is the product of an internalization of CSR discourse and the weakening of the pure Anglo-Saxon model of business. This is especially evident in South Africa, where some companies were taking principled stands on apartheid that had to harm their business from a bookkeeping perspective. The shift to a CSR-influenced business philosophy opens up the possibility of businesses taking action outside their core business practices and virtually demands that they incorporate societal concerns into the practices themselves. This expansion of the range of options possible within normal business can then be coupled with a similar expansion in the venues in which businesses can act, to provide a tentative explanation for the growth of business-based peacebuilding. It is not just that governance space was created, but that internal forces pushed businesses to fill it. The cases in Chapter 3 endorse the idea that many companies will take action after an increase in costs attributable to the conflict. Especially in the Colombian and Sri Lankan experience, violence led to direct responses from companies and the business community. In South Africa, the costs were more likely imposed by sanctions than violence, but they affected companies nonetheless. Similarly, the costs could be reputational and related to activist pressure much more than the experience on the ground. Some perspectives argue it is important for conflict resolution organizations to promote a fuller understanding of the costs of conflict on business. The preceding examples, however, do not fully support this conclusion. It is patently evident that businesses do not have the ability to comprehensively understand their own role in the conflict as well as external, trained specialists, but that does not mean they are incapable of understanding the costs

50   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

associated to the way they do business. Corporations are organizations run on a cost-gain decision making structure. Actions are taken because they are believed to have gains that justify the costs. Risk, of course, is always a component of this and no one would expect every company to act the same way in the same situation. When activists and scholars of business-based peacebuilding discuss informing the business communities of the costs of a conflict, they are using the wrong approach. What they should be doing instead is taking action to make the effects of the conflict into costs for the company. This is already happening, but is not recognized as such. What is meant here is that it is much more difficult to break down engrained business decision-making processes to get business leaders to focus formally on items outside of their calculations. Instead, it is better to translate the conflict into costs the business can understand. This is not reframing, but a quite literal attempt to make conflict costly for business. The best recent examples of this might be the blood diamonds or dolphin-safe tuna campaigns. In both cases, industry compliance was gained by asking consumers to make behavioral changes which could cost companies directly. There is no reason that similar efforts could not be used to promote positive peacebuilding. In fact, PeaceWorks is subtly imposing these types of costs on its competitors by promoting purchasing its products as promoting peace. Arguably, this is the same process that has mainstreamed CSR over the  past thirty-five years. As more people discuss social responsibilities of corporations, the corporations are more willing to increase the costs of violating the CSR guides, whether through consumer boycotts, regulation, or even just a general distaste among consumers for the company and its products. This cost-making activity, which is primarily rhetorical, can be partnered with another framing strategy, the promotion of a “peace dividend.” While the concept may be terminologically difficult in some areas, the examples of Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka especially illustrate the use of envisioning positive possibilities. The literature mentioned in Chapter 2 treats this as businesses (or, more often, associations) making a business-based argument for peace. However, it likely has repercussions outside the raw calculation of likely GNP. Peace-dividend-style appeals from the business community, in many cases, may provide the first realistic alternative discourse to the outcomes promoted by the conflicting parties. Of course, this kind of intervention is not unique to business-based peacebuilding. In fact, interpersonal models often focus on allowing participants to see past their lived-in conflict and envision possible futures (Wilslade and Monk 2000). Businesses and business associations that ask individuals to look past the current conflict to reasonable, possible futures are helping in the resolution of the conflict. The range of possible actions described by analysts in Chapter 2 appears to be sufficient in capturing the possibilities of business-based peacebuilding

Analysis   51

described in Chapter 3. However, businesses do not seem committed to following peacebuilding approaches tailored to the conflict types (identity, economic, and so forth) as described by Nelson. Company efforts are much more likely to be based on an evaluation of what is needed within the current context than in addressing the believed causes of conflict. This is an example of what Sandole calls the “two-culture problem” (Sandole 1999: 131). This arises because there is a divergence between actors attempting to eliminate the causes of the conflict and those attempting to interrupt the process of conflict. Sandole found that what many conflict analysts refer to as the “causes” of the conflict, what Sandole calls the “startup conditions,” only fuel the conflict at the beginning. There is a point beyond which the conflict itself becomes the largest “cause” of further conflict. For Sandole, this is the difference between “conflict-as-startup conditions” and “conflict-asprocess.” The effective intervention in conflict requires an accurate assessment of whether the conflict is in startup conditions or as process. The conflicts in which businesses are actively pursuing business-based peacebuilding are almost always long-term and certainly have moved into conflictas-process. Therefore, the business approach of addressing current concerns instead of the perceived “causes” of the conflict is appropriate. Seen from this perspective, it is quite possible that the businesses involved in businessbased peacebuilding are taking a more effective approach to conflict than many conflict resolution organizations. Luckily, those organizations like IMTD and International Alert that are active in business-based peacebuilding appear similarly sophisticated. To an extent, this analysis implies that Zandvliet’s concern that companies take a simplistic view of conflict can be mitigated by the fact that they focus more pragmatically on addressing what they see, instead of applying such an analysis to devising a comprehensive peacebuilding scheme (2002). Concerns such as those of Bais and Hujiser (2005), who wrote that business could not be effective in dialogue, are not supported by the cases in Chapter 3. While businesses cannot participate in dialogue with other parties as if they are participating in business-to-business negotiations, there is no evidence to suggest they are attempting to do so. Businesses, especially large-scale and multinationals, regularly have to communicate with individuals outside the business community, whether regulators or lawmakers in government, local communities, or the media. They even have entire departments – marketing – dedicated to communicating with a group of people who have different opinions and worldviews. Of course, there is also a lot of movement by individuals between the foreign policy, trade agencies and corporations. In at least one case a company, Lundin, hired a diplomat to assist its business-based peacebuilding efforts. This is not to say that businesses are uniquely qualified to mediate – that is not the case – but to singularly rule them out is unjustified. Conflict resolution has long been an amateur vocation and although the professionalization of the field is helpful, this should not be done to exclude viable partners in peace.

52   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

Interestingly, for all the promise of partnerships described by many authors, these efforts are not widely represented in business-based peacebuilding practice at this time. It is possible, however, that this is more due to the time it takes to develop and implement such a program as opposed to one initiated by a single company or organization. It is possible that in five years partnerships will dominate business-based peacebuilding practice. At this point, it is difficult to predict. From the examples in Chapter 3, it appears most of the conditions for success outlined in Chapter 2 are being met. Those businesses that are taking action do appear to appreciate the business case for peace and seem to be acting following a framework, although this framework may be more pragmatic than Mehler (2002) anticipates. There is no evidence of companies stepping outside boundaries of current guidelines in the context of peacebuilding and no serious allegations were noted of companies not acting independently. In the end, however, it is still difficult to evaluate what positive effect, if any, these efforts are having. For a conflict resolution practitioner, it feels like these are the correct actions to take – they ring true – but a more detailed and testable approach to the assessment of peacebuilding actors in conflict areas is necessary before the actual contribution of businesses can be evaluated. Zandvliet’s concerns about a relational gap between peacebuilding actors are not allayed by the cases presented, although there are numerous examples of coordination (2006). In these cases, however, concerns about a content gap in which companies are non-strategic in their conflict analysis do not seem warranted. This is likely due to the design of the study, since those companies taking positive action to resolve conflicts are those with a strategic view of conflict. There is no evidence presented that would counter Zandvliet’s argument in the context of business at large. In spite of the utility of much of the analysis examined in Chapter 2, there are some clear limitations of the current scholarship on business-based peacebuilding. It does not consider the originator of the business-based peacebuilding effort, largely ignores the individual-level effects of business activity, and focuses more on what the writer believes business could provide than what is needed for conflict resolution.

Instigating actors One of the advantages of focusing on the instigating actors (the companies themselves, business organizations and associations, or organizations working in conflict resolution), is that it appears that different approaches are adopted depending on which type of organization begins the peacebuilding effort. These conclusions are not absolute, of course, as some organizations appear to be more willing to step outside their experience and be creative in addressing conflict. The cases presented in Chapter 3 show companies beginning businessbased peacebuilding on their own are more likely to rely on localized dia-

Analysis   53

logue and social investment programs. This supports Zandvliet’s belief that macro-level peacebuilding is unlikely (2002). Businesses do appear to focus on the area in which they operate, but this does not literally mean just the communities in which they do business. They often focus on regional (but intrastate) projects. The evidence in Chapter 3 supports the idea that the companies most likely to become invested in business-based peacebuilding are those experiencing the highest costs and without exit options. Most of the companies examined that instigated their own efforts were in the extractive or agricultural sectors and could not pull out of the affected areas. However, this rule does not hold true if small local businesses are considered. These are likely to bear an even greater portion of the costs of the conflict, since they risk outright destruction, and they also do not usually have the resources to exit. However, very little evidence exists of small-scale business-based peacebuilding efforts from these companies. This is not hard to understand, however. In violent conflict, the enterprise of local business itself may be untenable as supply routes are disrupted, and employees and customers become combatants or refugees. This does serve as a warning that much of the business-based peacebuilding literature is applicable to large-scale national industries and multinational companies, and a different approach may be needed with local actors. Separating business-instigated peacebuilding from business association-instigated business-based peacebuilding enables consideration of small and medium business participation in peacebuilding, since the associations are often made up of small- and mediumsized businesses. Businesses starting business-based peacebuilding themselves focus on different kinds of actions than business associations or other organizations. In many cases, like Colombia, businesses act as communication conduits between warring parties and are not participating in dialogue per se. When businesses are promoting their interests and these interests intersect with peace, the businesses are likely to attempt to directly persuade governments with words and threats (or a pullout, for example) instead of participating in what would normally be viewed as a conflict resolution-style dialogue. There was no evidence, for example, of a company participating simply as a stakeholder in peace negotiations. Instead, they serve a convening or persuading role. Most social investment activities in business-based peacebuilding come from business-initiated efforts. One noticeable characteristic of social investment programs focused on peace is that they look a lot like social investment programs focused on other social problems. Businesses provide donations of products or technical services to non-profit organizations working in many problem areas and that these approaches are extended to peacebuilding is not surprising. In fact, with a company like Lundin it is possible to see businessbased peacebuilding efforts evolve from traditional social investment to more specific dialogue, albeit of the persuasion mode.

54   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

Based on the evidence presented in Chapter 3, it is likely (but by no means settled) that companies are having their biggest impact on conflict through their core business practices. In part, this is obvious in that the businesses spend all their time doing core activities while other business-based peacebuilding is supplementary. But it is also because this is where most of the innovation in business-initiated, business-based peacebuilding is occurring. In large part, this is due to the integration of conflict awareness into normal operating procedures, as well as a conscious attempt by these companies to do good when possible. Companies are finding ways to support peace by how they do business and by changing what they do to help, often in small but significant ways. By promoting the collection and dissemination of such efforts, conflict resolution organizations can help the businesses help themselves. Collective business-based peacebuilding, usually organized through business associations, is different in scope and action from company-focused efforts. A number of authors considered in Chapter 2 argue businesses will be more successful in business-based peacebuilding in collectives, but they give different rationales. Fourie (2005), for example, when examining the South African case argues an individual company will not have the influence a group of businesses could have while Rettberg (2004), stresses the ability of business groups to allow free riders who participate without committing resources. The preceding analysis, however, argues for another conclusion. The question is not whether unilateral or multilateral business initiatives work better in general, but which type of approach is best suited to the circumstances at hand. One of the reasons Rettberg is correct to identify the acceptance of free riders as an advantage of business-based peacebuilding by business associations is that these efforts are often largely rhetorical. It is unclear from the evidence whether the CBI in Northern Ireland was more influential through its promotion of the idea of a peace dividend or its convening role as part of the G7. With a rhetorical campaign, symbolic support can be more important than actual commitment of personnel or funding. While businesses, as described above, usually act as communication conduits or by trying to persuade parties to adopt peace-friendly actions, collective business-based peacebuilding is much more likely to actually convene and facilitate meetings between the parties, as seen in the Northern Ireland and South African examples. This is a role that would be difficult for a single company to take on, although smaller scale meetings, such as those arranged by Consolidated Goldfields in South Africa, are a possibility. In addition to framing the problem and convening dialogue, collective efforts also focus on networking among business leaders, often to promote business development in areas of conflict or across tense borders. The Business Peace Alliance in Sri Lanka and the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council are examples here and it is interesting that both cases caught the attention of International Alert, which is working with the groups now.

Analysis   55

In the context of these examples, the Colombian experience is somewhat unique. Vallenpaz participated in social investment programs much like a business would. The Peace Group promotes conflict resolution training like a conflict-focused organization. In part, this might be explained by the absence of state or other actors in these areas, but this case deserves more direct and detailed analysis. One surprising finding from this study was that in many ways business associations in business-based peacebuilding were operating in a similar manner to Keck and Sikkink’s transnational advocacy networks (1998). Organizations such as Sri Lanka First were always primarily communicative networks promoting change through reframing the current situation. The British Angola Forum was largely concerned with the dissemination of information and ideas from participants (nodes, in the network analogy). Organizations like the CBI functioned this way while promoting ideas such as the peace dividend, but ultimately relied on a centralized structure that disqualifies them from being included as strictly defined advocacy networks. To the extent these associations function primarily as advocacy networks, there may be a benefit in applying the methods and theories of the study of social movements, however, this is not the place for such an analysis. Conflict resolution organizations, as exemplified by IMTD and International Alert, focus on building relationships between businesspeople through staged dialogue and exchanges, as well as providing their expertise to the companies in the form of conflict resolution training and promoting recognition of the costs of conflict. None of these approaches was developed specifically for the business community, but it is likely that small changes have been made to improve their efficacy in the business environment. They are extensions of the most successful efforts (excluding mediation) that groups have found useful in other conflict situations. One of the most interesting features of some of these efforts is the conscious attempts to build upon the success of other groups in other conflicts. Most directly, this is illustrated by the visits to Sri Lanka of veterans of the business-based peacebuilding campaign in South Africa, but also through the case study approach used by IMTD. Additionally, the dissemination of the conflict assessments produced by consulting firms such as CDA has been useful. International organizations too have expanded programs from other areas to incorporate business-based peacebuilding into what they do. The World Bank adopted the public–private partnership model prior to applying it to conflict areas and the UN Global Compact is an extension of CSR discourse, which only recently began considering conflict. One conclusion from this analysis is that organizations involved in business-based peacebuilding, whether companies themselves, business associations, conflict resolution organizations, or international organizations approach business-based peacebuilding in accordance with their experience in other areas. Companies apply the lessons of CSR and improve the way

56   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

they do business, business associations focus on networking and promoting a particular message (peace, in this case), conflict resolution organizations try to initiate dialogue and international organizations form large-scale partnerships for large-scale projects. This should not be surprising, but it reinforces that business-based peacebuilding is not a transformative response to conflict. Instead, it is an extension of doing business by other means. Trustbuilding The business-based peacebuilding literature primarily focuses on the direct success of intended programs, meaning peacebuilding actions that promote peace. Even when these are the result of core business practices, they involve the conscious modification of the standard operating procedure to take the conflict into account, such as in employment or procurement. To the extent the writers discussing economic conditions of conflict are concerned with business efforts to promote peace, they are looking at contributions to economic issues such as poverty and employment. However, there is another way of looking at the benefit of business, especially in a post-conflict situation. If the business-based peacebuilding approach is “doing good by doing good,” and the economic approach is “doing good by doing well,” this approach could be seen as “doing good by just doing.” The analysis by Colletta and Cullen (2000: 3) is especially useful here. While concern over social capital has become common in recent years, they were the first to apply the concept to post-conflict situations. They note intrastate war has a much more devastating effect on social cohesion. Not all conflict harms social capital. Especially in cases where a country is unified against an external enemy (as was the United States in World War II), the conflict can intensify social capital. However, intracountry conflict cuts through these kinds of bonds and reduces the capacity of the society to address problems. Social capital is also value-neutral. Although it is related to problem-solving by organizations, it has no influence over what is considered a problem and was a strong component of the organized and efficient genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia, where the existence of entire groups of people was classified as the “problem” (Colletta and Cullen 2000: 15). The definition of social capital is still being contended in its literature, but for the purposes here a general definition such as Putnam’s (1993) is sufficient: “the features of a social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” An organization (or country) with more social capital will be better able to address problems that arise. Fukuyama (1995) specifically addresses trust as the primary building block of social capital. Similarly, trustbuilding has long been a component of conflict resolution. Colletta and Cullen (2000) highlight what they call “bridging social capital,” which creates horizontal linkages between individuals in different groups. This form of social capital can act as a dampening agent on destructive conflict.

Analysis   57

Business activity is often tied in to community networks of trust and these are disrupted by conflict. For example, in Sierra Leone, rural villages have merchants that serve not only as businesspeople, but also provide short-term capital for individuals in the course of emergencies. Although these individuals charge high rates of interest, they seldom foreclose on residents, instead “arguing that his relationship with village clients is a long-term one. Debt is thus a social nexus, binding villagers into a complex web of longterm obligations” (Richards, Bah, and Vincent 2004: 12). The Revolutionary United Front encouraged rural villagers to target merchants, causing many to flee to Guinea. While some have returned, they do not have the access to capital that they used to and many villages are suffering from the lack of credit. Similarly, credit use has decreased in post-conflict Rwanda due in part to reduced levels of trust as a consequence of the conflict (Colletta and Cullen 2000: 40). Business itself cannot operate effectively outside an environment of trust and commercial interaction (as with most forms of interaction) serves an important trustbuilding function. This primarily happens through the predictable, regularized transactions that happen every day. It is important here to realize that consumer-focused business, as opposed to business-focused business, is going to have a large effect on trust in the community. Local business activities can have a large role in restoring some form of normalcy in a post-conflict setting and can help promote pockets of normalcy during conflict. Additionally, the relationships developed in the course of normal business often cut across the allegiances that can be mobilized by individuals seeking conflict. The best example of this from Chapter 3 is the Sadakhlo Market in Georgia, which was not consciously created by a business, NGO, or IGO. The other business-originated approaches involved structured business organizations (usually corporations) and intentional peace supporting actions, while the Sadakhlo Market is much more an attempt to solve a localized problem – the need for commerce in this area – that has the additional benefit of promoting peace. It would be useful for conflict resolution organizations and businesses to promote the creation of similar markets or local business operations in other areas as well. More research needs to be done on the role local business can play in creating trust through local interaction. A few organizations, more notably International Alert, are beginning to focus on local business, but more should be done outside the assistance for business associations and organizations.

What conflict resolution needs from business Lederach (1997: 99) has recognized that one of the biggest deficiencies in work in conflict is the fact no one does an inventory of the work being done and who is doing it. Similarly, Jones (2001) argues peace agreement implementation is becoming more complex and difficult. Business, with links

58   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

throughout society, is in a good position to help with this. Companies will already have systems in place to manage logistics and are used to coordinating various internal and external actors. Additionally, business are often able to keep communication open even during violence, which can make coordination after the fact much easier (Fourie 2005). In current practice, peace agreement implementation is often assisted by “friends groups” made up of interested countries. There is no reason to expect businesses could not fulfill a similar role. Currently, the Info Share project in Sri Lanka appears to be the only attempt to use the tools of business to assist in peace implementation, but it is an impressive project. One advantage Info-Share has is in addressing the problem of implementation as one of information, not political will. While it would not be possible to craft a peace agreement without considering political necessity, such consideration is better left up to the parties themselves and the third party assisting them. By focusing on information problems, Info Share is able to carve out a support role for itself, one that is uniquely suited to the resources and talents of business. There are some business-related activities vital to a successful peace implementation. If the company has outstanding relations with both parties, for example, it needs to renegotiate those contracts. For example, many extractive companies signed agreements to seek gold in Congo with both the government and rebels. The harmonization of these contracts is something that must be addressed to a complete peace settlement (Wallis 2003: 4). An area in which conflict resolution organizations need greater participation from businesses is in gathering information for early warning. For example, the Country Indicators in Foreign Policy database, an open source conflict early warning tool by businesses, has suffered from a lack of business input into the system, even though businesses use the database regularly (Goulbourne 2003: 12). Other attempts at developing early warning systems would also benefit from information that can be provided by businesses. On occasion, business operates in areas not reached by humanitarian organizations and well outside the operating area of international embassies. Additionally, local stakeholder dialogue, which is becoming ubiquitous in multinational operations (although not always focused on conflict resolution), along with the presence of country experts hired by the company can mean that on occasion businesses have access to indicators of conflict that, if recognized, could help international actors intervene earlier in a conflict. There are precedents for this, from contemporary human rights whistleblowers to the case of Edmund Morel, who as an employee of a Liverpool shipping company uncovered and publicized the Congolese genocide at the turn of the 20th century. Parts of the business community in Liverpool even helped fund the publication of Morel’s findings, the earliest example of business-based peacebuilding found in this survey (Hochschild 1998). It is unreasonable to expect, however, that businesses themselves would be able to synthesize the data they have and reach accurate conclusions. The

Analysis   59

expertise of conflict resolution and international organizations will be necessary to gain insights from the data, but as an information-gathering resource, local managers in business operations will be effective in many situations. Currently, however, there is no guidance for these managers about what to look for and how to report findings. In order for businesses to take a strong role in a new international conflict resolution regime, they will need to be brought into discussions about conflict more often. The UN and the OSCE have begun this process and many other organizations are likely to follow. The ability of these disparate organizations to maintain a fruitful and continual dialogue is vital to the success of a larger integration of business into peace efforts.

5 The future of business-based peacebuilding and conflict resolution

After examining business-based peacebuilding as it is currently practiced, it is important to look to its future. At this point, business-based peacebuilding is promising as a supplement to traditional peacebuilding and conflict options, but there are important analytical contributions that must be made before business-based peacebuilding can be a regular tool for conflict resolution practitioners. One of the most important needs is for a method of analysis that can accurately weigh the contribution of business-based peacebuilding to an overall peace effort and the extent to which business-based peacebuilding options increase or decrease the likelihood of resolution. As mentioned before, this is difficult largely because the peace and conflict literature has not developed these tools to a significant degree. Instead, it is largely made up of claims that one approach does or does not work. In most inter-state or intra-state violent conflict, there will be many attempts to resolve the conflict involving many actors on many levels. Until there is a way to evaluate the entirety of these efforts as well as the individual contributions (positive or negative) made by the actors engaging the conflict, it will be difficult to measure the true effectiveness of business-based peacebuilding and whether businessbased peacebuilding is preferable to other solutions in particular contexts. However, business-based peacebuilding practice is not going to wait until the conflict literature catches up. Businesses are engaging conflict on many levels and anyone approaching the problem from a conflict resolution perspective must acknowledge this reality. For practical purposes, all that can be said is that business-based peacebuilding seems to be helpful and that if businesses are going to try it, the outcomes are likely to be better with the assistance of people trained in the field. Faced with the world as it is, business-based peacebuilding must be engaged as a possibility. One outstanding question that can be addressed to some extent here is how a conflict resolution organization can choose companies that are likely to participate and be successful in business-based peacebuilding. In Chapter 3, most of the examples of business-based peacebuilding involve companies or business associations starting action themselves, without the assistance or encouragement of outside parties. As awareness increases, this will likely

The future   61

happen less often. The increased interaction of NGOs and IGOs with businesses in conflict areas, illustrated by the growing number of conferences and international education efforts suggests that, in the future, at least some conflict resolution organizations will enter a conflict area looking for business partners. At this point, it is possible to examine some criteria by which this search could be made. To some extent, the options will be limited by the conflict being addressed. Some conflicts will be more amenable to business-based peacebuilding efforts. Although writers on business-based peacebuilding such as Nelson stress the need to establish the type of conflict to formulate a business-based peacebuilding response, an understanding of Sandole’s conflictas-startup conditions and conflict-as-process would encourage the idea that this is less necessary over time. Once a conflict has become conflict-as-process, the tools used to stop or reduce it will likely be more related to conflict in general than the specific circumstances preceding that conflict. If a company is lucky enough to recognize and act on a conflict that is still in startup conditions, it will be well-served to consider Nelson’s recommendation, but otherwise it is likely a wider variety of potential business-based peacebuilding options will be available. For a conflict to be amenable to business-based peacebuilding, there must of course be some kind of commercial presence. As the Sadakhlo Market example shows, however, this need not be the presence of organized corporations. Additionally, there are some identifiable factors that would seem to encourage companies to participate. The most obvious from the prior discussion is the growing cost of conflict on the company, but there are other possible factors as well. In 1999, Political and Economic Consulting (PELC) studied managerial decision making by MNCs operating in conflict areas (Berman 2000). While the purpose of the study was to explain the conditions under which MNCs choose to do business in conflict areas, and not when they might perform a peacebuilding function, PELC’s conclusions provide a sound beginning to estimate which companies may be willing partners. Berman focuses on the criteria under which a company is willing to continue operating in a conflict areas as well as when a company will choose to invest in one. It is reasonable to expect that similar criteria will apply to companies being asked to participate in business-based peacebuilding. PELC found companies are more likely to invest or stay in areas of conflict when the conflict itself is limited geographically. Companies are willing to be involved most often if the conflict is terroristic, when governmental control exists and violence is limited; less often when there is incursional conflict, where the area is controlled by one group and another performs occasional incursions; and less likely for territorial conflict, where different areas within the operating footprint of the company are under control of different groups (Berman 2000: 29). The organization also found government transparency about the conflict encouraged companies to stay, but the presence of a party that is ideologically

62   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

motivated against corporate existence (as is the case in some Maoist or Marxist groups), strongly encouraged companies to leave (Berman 2000: 30). It also found industry-related factors. Companies producing basic goods are less likely to leave than those producing discretionary ones and if the resources available in the country are rare enough, there is a strong incentive to stay (Berman 2000: 31–32). While the PELC study did not correlate these factors with willingness to participate in business-based peacebuilding, until a better analysis is available, it provides a good guide to what could be expected. In addition to the PELC factors, other characteristics are likely to influence business-based peacebuilding participation and support. One of these is prior experience. Companies that have participated in peacebuilding in one area will have developed at least some of the institutional knowledge to do so in another. Also, companies that are implicated in exacerbating conflicts, even in other areas, should be avoided as this could cause observers to question the integrity of the business-based peacebuilding efforts. Along with the considerations described by Berman, it may be useful to target specific industries for assistance in business-based peacebuilding. While extractive companies are often those with the weakest exit options and the highest amount of capital invested, they are also often those criticized as contributing to the conflict through revenues and occasionally to use of private security forces. If extractives are the only option, it would be prudent to approach them, but if less-tarnished options are available, they may make better partners. One example of such an industry is mobile telecommunications. Companies providing mobile phone service are often the first to reenter a country that has recently had a reduction in violence. For example, in October 2003, more than 200 companies applied for mobile licenses in Iraq; there are two mobile companies active in Afghanistan and four in Liberia (Bray 2005: 14). There is also an advantage in that these companies are unlikely to be criticized for large-scale environmental problems and should be able to avoid labor difficulties with prudent management. Another industry that makes a good fit for business-based peacebuilding efforts is tourism. Bais and Huijser (2005: 14) argue the relationship between the tourist sector and peacebuilding is largely unique, since it is one of the few sectors whose clients are likely contributing to peace by using just their services, under the belief that travel and interaction limit conflict. This is in no way a complete list. Much more work needs to be done to validate these factors as well as developing other measurements to assist conflict resolution organizations in efficiently targeting partners that will be the most helpful.

Missed and current opportunities Viewed through this analysis, it is possible to note a few examples of conflicts where there was a potential for business-based peacebuilding that was

The future   63

not realized, as well as some well-suited to the ongoing business-based peacebuilding. Angola can be seen as one of the missed opportunities. While business-based peacebuilding efforts in Angola are active now, there was an opportunity for business to support peace in 2000 that could have brought an earlier end to the war there. It has been clear that in Angola companies have contributed to the conflict, especially through oil funds supporting the government and diamond revenues supporting UNITA (Anderson 2000: 46). In June 2000, thousands of Angolans joined a peace march in Luanda. In July, religious leaders organized a conference for peace and sought a ceasefire and negotiations. These failed when the government was unwilling to join at least partially. The government’s unwillingness to participate has been attributed to the US government’s public support of the Angolan government’s position in the civil war. The oil companies involved in Angola are largely American and the US position can be seen as being supported, if not coordinated by these companies (Anderson 2000: 57–58). Luckily for the people of Angola, an alternative process took hold later and, in spite of the tepid support for peace among the businesses in Angola, the ceasefire of 2002 is still holding and the country is currently setting up its first stock market. Post-conflict business-based peacebuilding is also taking hold. As was noted in Chapter 3, some credit is due to the business sector in limiting conflict between the US and China during the spy-plane incident in 2003. Similarly, business may be in the best position to prevent the escalation of conflict between China and Taiwan. Both countries have vibrant business sectors and economic exchange between them has increased. While visiting the Li River in Guangxi province in 2003, a tourist destination for both international and domestic travelers, the author observed signs denoting investment made to improve the river area that was funded by prominent Taiwanese companies. In discussions after noticing this, Chinese nationals often said the conflict would never escalate due to the economic ties between China and Taiwan and that the idea of future conflict was simply the concern of “a few generals in Beijing.” This is anecdotal, to be sure, but it does illustrate the potential for economic exchange and investment to reduce the risk of conflict. Another opportunity for business-based peacebuilding involves the disputes between São Tomé and Nigeria over oil rights in the ocean between them. São Tomé sits atop an estimated four billion barrels of oil and has very little legitimate military power (Anderson 2002: 74). The president of São Tomé, a former businessman named Fradique de Menezes, has been negotiating contracts with Nigeria to define the maritime border between the two states, but the potential for Nigerian military action still exists. Nigeria had been promoting a defense pact with São Tomé that would result in sending a 200-man force to the islands. That force would be the same size as the army of São Tomé (Anderson 2002: 79). In September of 2002, São Tomé broke a

64   Evaluating business-based peacebuilding

contract with the Environmental Remediation Holding Corporation, which was supposed to evaluate and publicize São Tomé’s oil reserves. The company had been owned by a firm in Houston, but was purchased by Chrome, a Nigerian company. The terms of the original contract were vague and by general consensus unfair to São Tomé. The expectation at the time was that Nigeria would either negotiate or litigate the dispute, but violence was an outside possibility (Anderson 2002: 83). Briefly in July 2003, de Menezes was overthrown in a coup, but this was reversed and oil companies were invited to bid on contracts to prospect for oil in blocks that would be tentatively co-owned by both countries (Peel 2003). There have been intermittent problems with the bidding and ownership, but blocks were assigned to companies in late 2005. ChevronTexaco has already found oil. However, São Tomé was not satisfied and very recently pulled out of the Production Sharing Contract between ST/Nigeria and the companies that won the bidding for block four (Ezigbo 2006). This is a conflict that appears to be well-suited to business involvement. The potential for profits for all parties is high and, as of yet, there has been no violence. There is a chance for companies to proactively address the concerns of both São Tomé and Nigeria and develop a sustainable relationship with both. However, no company has thus far been willing to engage the parties through business-based peacebuilding. The closest any has been to business-based peacebuilding was when ChevronTexaco met with de Menezes in 2002 and presented him with a copy of their CSR brochure (Anderson 2002). Wenger and Mockli (2003) have proposed going a step beyond companyand association-focused business-based peacebuilding in the creation of a “Collective Business Initiative,” which would represent the business sector in conflict, manage programs aimed at promoting local business capacity development, and offer advice to companies operating in conflict areas. They envision a professional organization staffed by conflict resolution practitioners and employees recruited or borrowed from member companies. The organization would be business-funded, but donor-independent and would be run more like a business than a development organization. This is a promising approach, however it is equally possible that such an organization would be subject to the same institutional drift seen in other organizations. It may be better to focus on the approach that has worked on the association level and promote a global organization dedicated simply to promoting peace rhetorically and in facilitating exchange and networking among business professionals interested in peace. It could be argued this approach has better evidence of success in the existing literature and that it could be managed with many fewer resources.

Part II

Designing business-based peacebuilding programs

6 Violent conflict and business

This chapter marks the transition from the study of what has been done by businesses to try and positively influence conflict situations to what could be done with and by the business community in the future. The shift is one from “what was done” to a preliminary “how-to.” The first step for this will be examining contemporary violent conflict and its implications for business. In order to provide context for business roles in violent conflict, this chapter provides a short overview of the general description of conflict within the conflict resolution perspective, considers inter- and intranational conflict over the past thirty years as well as discussing changes in business over that time, and finally examines the possibility that business can be a contributing factor in violent conflict. There are a number of realities of conflict that are repeated at the beginning of nearly every conflict resolution course or training session, but since it is hoped that some individuals reading this are from the business community and not used to the mantra, it is worth discussing these points. Like any good discipline, Conflict Analysis and Resolution is still arguing over basic definitions but, in general, from within the field conflict is seen as a social occurrence between two parties (individuals, groups or nations) that happens when two conditions are met. First, at least one of the parties has to perceive that its goals are incompatible with the other’s or that the parties’ methods of achieving a common goal are incompatible. Second, at least one party needs to take action to undermine the ability of the other to pursue its goals. In the simplest example, two toddlers perceive that they want to play with the same toy and one grabs it to prevent the other one from playing. Seen from this perspective, it becomes evident that in a world where not everyone agrees about goals, conflict will be inevitable. Two additional concepts can be drawn from this. First, while conflict is inevitable, it is not always dangerous or damaging. In common usage, we often associate “conflict” with harm, but instead we need to realize that the existence of conflict in itself cannot be seen as always negatively affecting a social relationship (between individuals, organizations or nations) any more than it would be accurate to say it is always beneficial. The business world provides the best example of this. The firms within a sector compete against each other over

68   Designing business-based peacebuilding

limited resources (capital or consumer purchases, for example). As such, they by design have incompatible goals. They also take action in the marketplace to undermine each other’s ability to meet goals. Economic competition is conflict. The result of this competition is seen as beneficial from a number of perspectives: from the invisible hand guiding the markets to the quasievolutionary idea of more worthwhile firms surviving while weak ones shut down. The second important concept is that while conflict is inevitable and not inherently good or bad, our reactions to it can differ greatly and it is these behaviors that cause the damage attributed to conflict. Not only can conflict be beneficial or harmful, but to a large extent the parties involved can control which outcome is likely. All of this explains why discussions about the normative function of the conflict resolution approach are careful to reference the obligation to resolve violent or harmful conflict, not just conflict itself. It is presumed that the practitioner has reflected on the conflict enough to make such an evaluation. As the costs of conflict rise, the obligation to intervene becomes more obvious and, for some practitioners, it is enough to know that human lives are being lost. Others may even be willing to overlook this if they believe the end of the conflict can justify the harm (by ending slavery or liberating a country, for example). At this point, conflict resolution and peacebuilding almost sound simple. If the behavior of the parties controls whether conflict is good or bad, all that needs to be done is to get the parties to deal with conflict constructively. Of course, it cannot be that easy. The primary question in conflict research has always been, “why do we fight?” After nearly 100 years of concentrated research and with other contributions going back at least as far as Herodotus, not only are we no closer to a single predictable cause of violence or destructive conflict, but it has become very clear that no single explanation can be found. Instead, the answer lies within a tangled web of influences from the biological through the social and cultural to the global. Navigating these influences, attempting to shape them to positive outcomes, or trying to limit their effectiveness altogether is what conflict resolution and peacebuilding practitioners and organizations do.

Contemporary violent conflict Discussions of conflict in the contemporary world inevitably, but correctly, note that the nature of violent conflict is changing. During the Cold War, two superpowers faced off around the globe, yet never directly fired a shot against each other. Instead, proxy wars were fought, primarily in the developing world. These wars were often driven more by geopolitical calculation than organization or grievance on the ground. The end of the Cold War brought about talk of peace dividends and confidence that since the oppressive threat of great power conflict was gone, at least for the time being, the world would become a less dangerous place. This optimism led many to

Violent conflict and business   69

agree with Fukuyama’s proclamation of the end of history (1989). The book that followed was a reasonably popular success, but if more people had read it carefully, the shocks of Bosnia and Rwanda might have been lessened. Fukuyama argued that the end of the Cold War, and particularly the events of 1989, could be seen as an indicator that large-scale ideological conflict was over. Some form of capitalism and representative democracy had won and its legitimacy would not be challenged seriously. Fukuyama did not, however, claim that nothing would happen after the end of history. Our definition of conflict above explains why. Even presuming the triumph of the Western approach was entirely complete and everyone, everywhere agreed that capitalism and democracy were their shared goals, there were still plenty of concerns over how to reach these goals. The most well-known conflicts of the 1990s, after the Gulf War, seemingly reinforced an alternate idea: that there were long-simmering disputes kept in check only by the authority of the US or the USSR. These examples were the “ethnic wars,” seen to be about fundamental identity and autonomy concerns. For example, media reports about the wars in the former Yugoslavia rarely missed an opportunity to remind viewers that Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks had fought at different times over hundreds of years or that Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda were adversaries until colonial rule. Whether this is an accurate accounting of the causes of these conflicts is a question for other books, but what is important is that such ideas rapidly became generally accepted. There is an alternative explanation for many of the conflicts in the 1990s and 2000s that does not presume the violence that occurred was inevitable. Theorists quickly recognized that conflicts after the Cold War were often fought, at least in part, in the media in a manner that may seem familiar to business leaders with marketing experience. Not only were parties fighting in the streets, but they were struggling on the televisions, radios, and computers of people around the world. Such an observation led Baudrillard (1995) to conclude, energetically but erroneously, that the Gulf War did not take place. The first of these was the Zapatista uprising in southern Mexico, which managed to tie together well-timed action (the first public notice about the uprising was coordinated with the day the North American Free Trade Agreement went into force), with a mysterious, charismatic leader to sway individuals outside Mexico. In light of these changes, Kaufman (2001) developed a theory of conflict instigation that made “symbolic politics” much more prominent. Recognizing that conflicts start as a result of choices and behavior, Kaufman argues that instead of choosing to fight through the well-reasoned consideration of goals and instruments for reaching these goals, “People choose by responding to the most emotionally potent symbol evoked” (2001: 28). Violent conflict in these cases occurred because leaders like Slobodan Miloševic´ in Yugoslavia pursued symbolic politics – actions aimed at changing emotions instead of interests.

70   Designing business-based peacebuilding

Kaufman argues that leaders cannot always rely on symbolic politics to incite violence. Three criteria are necessary: there must already be myths in place justifying ethnic hostility, there must be existential ethnic fear, and there must be an opportunity to mobilize and fight (2001: 30–32). The general process that leads to open, violent ethnic conflict starts with hostility and chauvinism, usually promoted by leaders. If the three criteria are in place, a triggering event is often enough to move a country into civil war. In Rwanda, the deaths of the Hutu presidents of Rwanda and Burundi provided the spark, but the symbolic groundwork was already taking place, in that case largely by radio. With the preconditions met and a triggering event, mass-led violence becomes likely. Kaufman also believes that elites can consciously manipulate symbols, like Miloševic´’s evocation of the Battle of Kosovo to rally Serb nationalism, and create an environment in which eliteled violence is possible. Symbolic politics reinforce an existing real grievance while the reality fueling the grievance reinforces the symbolic politics in a feedback loop (2001: 36). This approach is important for the discussion of business-based peacebuilding because it indicates there are many more entrance and leverage points for intervenors than suggested by theories that just presume violent conflict to be inevitable. Additionally, there have been times when businesses themselves have become symbols used by leaders to motivate violence, such as the case of Royal Dutch/Shell in Nigeria. In addition to having different causes, the conflicts after the Cold War were qualitatively different from those during it, as they were often intranational or secessionist. They took place within environments often flooded with small arms and involved irregular forces and less traditional approaches to warmaking. Lederach identified two conditions that supported the growth of intrastate conflicts in this time. First, the democracy movements of the post-communist countries made it easier for non-state armed actors such as guerilla groups to see their political aspirations as legitimate and possible (1997: 9). Second, while there was much optimism about changes after the Cold War, the international community continued to reinforce the notion that violence was a legitimate method for protecting the state from internal and external actors (1997: 12). Lederach also noted five ways in which the new intranational conflicts differed from prior conflicts. First, while they started within a single country, they had a tendency to internationalize so that money, arms, and other forms of support flow into the country (1997: 11). Second, for the participants of these conflicts, identity becomes defined much more narrowly so that fewer identify first with their country. While the idea of “ethnic conflicts” received the most attention in this time, it is important to note that the narrow identities often dealt with religious, clan, geographic and other differences (1997: 13). Third, the same forces that encouraged a narrowing of identity began to undermine statist models of power as authority devolved to other groups. Fourth, because the conflicts were seen as having age-old roots, they were often labeled as “protracted” or “intractable” (1997: 14). Finally, traditional

Violent conflict and business   71

diplomacy was less effective than before at addressing conflict, since it was based on the notion of state-to-state interaction and could not easily adapt to intranational negotiations (1997: 15). Though it seems, perhaps, that the response to the 9/11 attacks and the Bush administration’s “War on Terror” has included a return to international war, the vast majority of violent conflicts still meet the post-Cold War model. Iraq and Afghanistan are the exception, rather than the rule.

The global context of business The changes noted above were not the only ones happening after the end of the Cold War. They likely were not even the most important. That honor falls to globalization. Although often spoken of as if it was a single, identifiable concept, it is more accurate to speak of an increasing number of globalizations. During this time, ongoing trends led to greater integration of global financial systems and made it easier for multinational companies to do business around the world. Globalized supply chains allowed companies to reduce costs and expand while global consumer markets created a potential for greater profits. At the same time, a globalization of movement allowed individuals to leave their home countries to work elsewhere, or for companies to take jobs to lower-cost areas. Along with this was a globalization of activism through what Keck and Sikkink called “transnational advocacy networks” (see Chapter 2) and the rise of a globalized “anti-globalization” movement that focused on the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and multinational corporations. The street protests of the Battle in Seattle and other actions largely stopped when governments took such actions more seriously after 9/11. Many large NGOs are using the activist networks to examine business actions in developing countries, where appropriate, and using their improved access to media to issue reports on companies charged with bad behavior. For many, the globalization of business and finance is “globalization from above,” while networked activism promotes “globalization from below.” The reality of the world, however, is far more subtle. All of the forms of globalization interact, support and hamper each other. All of these globalizations are supported by the global revolution in communication technology, including mobile phones and the internet. Not only is it easier to communicate with far-flung friends and colleagues, but it has become more difficult for governments and companies to hide unpopular aspects of their operations. The same technology that improves worker productivity in business assists the activist in the field trying to report on some ethical violation. Some commentators have argued that the increasing integration of countries participating in globalizations will reduce the number of violent conflicts since the countries have more to lose than to gain by fighting.

72   Designing business-based peacebuilding

Additionally, those countries would have well-developed middle classes that would resist outright violence. Friedman expressed this, somewhat facetiously, as the “Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Resolution.” He forecast that no two countries that both had McDonald’s franchises would fight a war (2000). Unfortunately for the theory, it was disproved in August of 2008 when Georgia and Russia, both possessing McDonald’s franchises, fought. Even if in some ways globalizations can limit conflict, they can also contribute to conflict. The most notorious example is the Zapatista uprising, which consciously stated it was fighting globalization in the form of supranational integration. Additionally, finance sector reforms being made by countries to comply with international donor requests have, in some cases, reinforced existing divisions and increased inequality, making conflict more likely. The internet and global communication infrastructure allow conflicts that start to grow through international (often diasporic) private support. Recently, Canada attempted to close down the Tamils Rehabilitation Organization in Toronto, accusing the charity of taking donations and sending them to support the Tamil Tigers’ war in Sri Lanka (Bell, 2008). One other related trend is useful to examine. At the same time that globalizations have been occurring, the notions of security, especially national security, that fuel decisions about war and peace have been changing. It would not be accurate to describe this as a globalization of security thought, but it does include a greater awareness of threats outside the traditional national security approach. These concerns have included “health security,” which relates to the potential harm from cross-border disease as well as refugee flows and scarcity that can arise due to public health concerns (PriceSmith 2002) and “environmental security,” which focuses on threats that arise out of environmental degradation such as “constrained agricultural output, constrained economic production, migration, social segmentation, and disrupted institutions” which can all instigate or contribute to conflict (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998: 10). The Project on Environment, Population and Security at the University of Toronto identified environmental scarcity as a contributing factor to the conflicts in Chiapas, Gaza, South Africa, Pakistan and even the Rwandan Genocide (1998: 12). Coupling the spread of multinational business with the spread of violent intranational conflict and the growing scarcity of some natural resources, it is inevitable that businesses have become more likely to be involved in states and regions that are also involved in violent conflict. As noted in Chapter 1, as of 2005 there were more than 60,000 multinational companies operating in over seventy areas of conflict. Of course, this does not even consider the number of national or local businesses trying to operate in areas of conflict as well. Although many companies are affected by conflict, they are not affected in the same ways. For example, a multinational company with a small presence in a country experiencing violent conflict is not likely to be experienc-

Violent conflict and business   73

ing an existential threat. A small, single-location business, however, could be destroyed by a mortar shell.

Business as a cause of conflict This book consciously focuses on positive contributions that can be made by businesses in conflict areas and not on trying to explain the balance between business contributions to conflict and business contributions to resolution. However, this is not due to a belief that business has not been a source or exacerbator of conflict. It is worthwhile to briefly describe the contexts under which businesses can contribute to conflict. Shankleman (2006) provides an excellent overview of the problem while focusing on the oil industry. She notes that the “creed or greed” research discussed in Chapter 2 concluded that countries that export primary commodities are at a greater risk for violence (this has been called the “resource curse.”) Later research by Ross (2003) attempted to refine these findings by pinpointing which commodities were more likely to be correlated with violence. He found that lootable resources – those that are easily transported and extracted – as well as oil were linked to violence, while legal agricultural commodities were not. Shankleman argues that oil production is more likely to cause violence when it is located in an area interested in separation or otherwise at odds with the national government. Shankleman discusses two primary links between oil and conflict: (1) competition for and misuse of revenue produced by it, and (2) tension created when local individuals are not able to benefit from the revenue or protect themselves or their property against incursion (2006: 143–144). Heightening this effect is the fact that oil companies often have an “insulation effect” because the infrastructure of oil production is often not near the areas of violence. This is especially true in cases where oil production occurs offshore and can mean that the conflict-related impacts produced by the business are much less evident. Of course, the oil industry is not the only one implicated in conflict. NGOs have been effective at tying some industries to the conflicts in countries in which they operate, most famously in the case of the blood diamonds campaign (which also spawned a popular film). In 1998, the NGO Global Witness released a report documenting the contributions made by the diamond industry to the conflict in Angola. It argued that funds from diamond sales were being channeled directly to continue the war there. Later investigation faced similar conclusions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This group and others have expanded their focus to address “blood timber” and “blood cocoa” (Lambert 2007). While the original report was primarily documentary, the campaign against the diamond industry grew quickly once these diamonds were labeled “blood diamonds.” Activist groups were able, quite cannily, to connect consumer behavior in the developed world directly to deaths in these countries. Since

74   Designing business-based peacebuilding

then, an international certification regime, the Kimberley Process, has been created to provide assurance that consumer diamonds are not from conflict regions. In addition to these examples, there are a number of ways business can actively contribute to conflict, such as employment practices that reinforce unequal ethnic representation. To a large extent, these occur through standard business practices that are not informed by an understanding of the conflict. They also have corresponding peacebuilding practices which could be seen as standard business practice informed by such an understanding. At this point, it is impossible to provide a reasonable estimation of the amount of conflict or the amount of extra conflict that can be attributed to the action of businesses. The examples we have relate to specific conflicts and even in those known cases we are not able to assign reliable figures. Over time, as better research instruments are developed and reporting improves, it is hoped that more definite conclusions can be reached. At this point, however, we cannot deny that businesses can contribute to perpetuating and intensifying conflict. This chapter has concentrated on the real-world context for conflict in which business operates. The next will examine the reasons why we should be looking to business to contribute to peacebuilding.

7 The business case for peace

Chapter 6 provided the global context in which businesses are becoming more affected by conflict, but that is not in itself enough to explain why business-based peacebuilding should be utilized. To build the business case for peace, we must look at its appeal to two different groups: first, the practitioners and peacebuilding organizations that must be persuaded to work with businesses and second, businesses themselves.

Why should peacebuilders look to business? The case for conflict resolution practitioners and peacebuilders to engage with businesses is the easiest to make, largely because the purpose of these individuals and groups is to actively engage conflict. To add businesses to the actors they regularly deal with and to add business-based peacebuilding to the practitioner’s toolbox only requires a change in practice, not a change in focus. When considering what kinds of intervention and what actors to associate with, the primary question is simply, What will work? Part I has made a compelling argument that, when used, business-based peacebuilding can work. Of course, this does not mean it is guaranteed to succeed, and since we have a shorter body of practice to study, it is too early to draw empirical conclusions about what forms work best and when it is more effectively used. However, there are few, if any, empirical truths in conflict work. Even much more established forms of international conflict resolution, such as mediation, cannot be said to be successful in even a preponderance of cases. As the field of research matures, hopefully we will begin to speak of interventions with something like scientific accuracy. Until then, we must build what we can out of the experience of past peacebuilding work to guide which forms and programs are attempted. One good reason to consider business contributions to peacebuilding is simply that our current efforts are not working, at least not in all cases. There are a number of peacebuilding successes, but we still face both an unacceptable and unnecessary amount of violence, in spite of the best efforts of practitioners and peacebuilding organizations. One of the reasons for this could be that we are not always using the best tool to affect a particular conflict. It

76   Designing business-based peacebuilding

is also reasonable to argue that the issue here is not the lack of tools of peacebuilding, but instead a lack of resources to implement all of the peacebuilding programs that would be needed. This may be true, but even if so, having more partners in the business community could only improve the chances of further action being taken. Either way, it makes sense to evaluate the potential of business-based peacebuilding in the field instead of only relying on traditional approaches. Another reason to consider using business-based peacebuilding is that the businesses are already there. This is obvious in the case of local business, but in contrast with the oil companies discussed in Chapter 6, many multinational companies have a broad and deep presence in countries and may reach areas that NGOs cannot feasibly cover. The best example of this could be Coca-Cola, which claims to be the largest private employer in Africa. The Economist recently proposed seeing the expansion and retraction of the company and Cola-Cola consumption rates as an “Index of Happiness” for the continent and noted that due to the fact that Coca-Cola reaches broadly into the market, it interacts with many more individuals in these countries than either NGOs or the international community (July 3, 2008). A final reason for conflict resolution and peacebuilding organizations to consider business-based peacebuilding is that it allows for a more holistic view of the experiences of those in conflict. In media reports about conflict, people are usually divided into categories: combatant vs. noncombatant, soldier vs. innocent, victim vs. oppressor. To a large extent, existing methods of peacebuilding reinforce these categories, in part because the collapse of identity to such a category is a result of being caught in violent conflict. However, moving beyond the conflict requires a re-rounding of the individual, from singular identity to the breadth of their experience. In almost all societies, business activity is an important part of normal, pre-conflict life. That is true not only for those running businesses, but for those working as well. In the study of civil societies, researchers lament the fact that most social theorists treat societies as if they are bi-sectoral, focusing only on business and government, “market vs. state,” and ignoring everything else (Anheier 2004: 1). In conflict resolution and peacebuilding the error is to see the only two relevant sectors as civil society/NGOs and governments.

Why should businesses do peacebuilding? Where the goal of conflict resolution is to limit the destructiveness of conflict and resolve it when possible, ultimately the purpose of business is to create a profit. Divergent theories of business encourage different accountings of profit, some focusing on shareholder value and others incorporating a broader notion of both profit and cost, but businesses are fundamentally different than peacebuilding or conflict resolution organizations. As such, the burden to convince them to assist in peacebuilding is more difficult than convincing peacebuilders to work with companies.

The business case for peace   77

As a matter of principle, this book does not rely on the argument that businesses should help mitigate conflict because it is the right thing to do. This is not to say that such arguments are not personally compelling, but there are two reasons to be concerned about arguing from a position of obligation. First, we should not be surprised that conflict resolution practitioners are convinced by an argument that there is a normative obligation to help in a conflict if possible. As described in Chapter 1, that is one of the things that separates the conflict resolution paradigm from other work involving conflict (like objective journalism). There is no reason to presume that such values are shared by business leaders. Second, if our appeal is based on arguments about what ought to be done and we are trying to convince someone who holds a very different view of ethical obligation – a business leader who supports the Anglo-Saxon model described in Chapter 2, for example – we will be faced with trying to persuade them by arguing against their fundamentally held values. A persuasive approach that is framed around practical business-based reasons to do business-based peacebuilding is more likely to be effective in more cases. This does not mean that CSR appeals are useless, however, just that for the direct purpose of motivating specific behavior in a particular conflict the effort may be misplaced. It cannot be disputed, however, that a business environment permeated with the CSR approach will likely be more conducive to businessbased peacebuilding. As such, it is important to appreciate CSR and ethicsrelated arguments for business involvement in conflict. The best analysis of the ethical case for peace and business comes from Fort, Business, Integrity, and Peace: Beyond Geopolitical and Disciplinary Boundaries (2007) and builds off earlier work between Fort and Schipani (2004). Fort (2007) promotes the concept of “Peace through Commerce,” which argues that businesses participating in ethical commerce will also be supporting peace. This is clearly related to business-based peacebuilding, but the goal of promoting Peace through Commerce is to get companies to act in ways that have the additional benefit of promoting peace, while businessbased peacebuilding is about companies taking actions that are specifically intended to promote peace. Fort approaches the relationship of business and peace from a corporate governance and business ethics perspective, promoting the idea of “Total  Integrity Management,” which “pulls together legal, managerial, and aesthetic/spiritual approaches to business ethics” (2007: 5). Interestingly, Fort, who teaches at the George Washington University School of Business, makes a self-consciously moral argument, while this book, written by a conflict resolution practitioner working for a business ethics organization, is making a much more practical one. If nothing else, this illustrates the growing congruence of thought on social issues between the business and practitioner/activist communities. Fort is not representing the current mainstream of business, but he does speak for a growing minority.

78   Designing business-based peacebuilding

Peace through Commerce is specifically designed to counter “shareholder theory,” which in effect is the equivalent of the Anglo-Saxon model of business discussed in Chapter 2. Shareholder theory, Fort argues, encourages business leaders to work toward short-term benefits even if the results are likely long-term harms (2007: 15). As an alternative to shareholder theory, he proposes Total Integrity Management as a new form of business built around a new ethical culture. Fort recognizes three contributions that businesses can make to peace. First, they can generally support economic development, especially by avoiding base commodity extraction (and therefore the resource curse). “When businesses add value to the product, violence decreases” (Fort 2007: 19). Second, they can avoid corruption, which was shown by Fort and Schipani to have a strong correlation to violence in countries (2004: 18). Third, they can assist in building a sense of community in the areas in which they operate. In order to practice Total Integrity Management, companies need to pursue three kinds of trust. Good Trust involves “engaging the innate desire human beings possess to be good” (Fort 2007: 25) and is focused on emotional sentiments and the goodwill of community. These are the conditions under which individuals will feel the company is trustworthy. Hard Trust is enforced by compliance with societal expectations, such as the law, presuming the law is just. The third form is Real Trust, “managerial strategies that make good ethics good business” (2007: 25). These are the conditions under which a company can do what it says it will do and make sure that both it and its customers are well-served. Conveniently, the three forms of trust correspond with the three ways in which business can support peace. Real Trust addresses economic development, Hard Trust ensures compliance in the rule of law and therefore avoidance of corruption, and Good Trust allows for a focus on community-building. While this may be a compelling explanation, ultimately Fort’s intent is to encourage the adoption of Total Integrity Management to expand on and combine existing ethical frameworks to change how decisions are made within a company, not specifically to promote peacebuilding. Peace through Commerce is a complementary concept to business-based peacebuilding, and a welcome one. However, there are two important distinctions between the concepts. First, business-based peacebuilding looks at the external actions of companies, while Peace through Commerce is much more concerned with affecting the internal culture of business. Second, Fort clearly believes that companies should be practicing Total Integrity Management independently of the benefits to reducing violent conflict. This is not to challenge Fort’s commitment to peace, but peace itself is secondary to the goal of having businesses act ethically. It is clear that he is deeply committed to the outcome of a peaceful world, but his path is different. Fort’s approach is representative of the arguments made on the behalf of CSR in order to improve conflict behavior by businesses. Other CSR approaches to conflict focus on specific strategies for conflict, such as avoid-

The business case for peace   79

ing exacerbating actions, helping create environments conductive to peace, using employment to limit the attractiveness of alternatives such as crime or insurgency, and using existing social and community programs to support community-based nonviolent conflict resolution (Shankleman 2006: 155). All of these approaches seek a long-term change in the way companies do business and make business decisions. Conflict resolution practitioners and peacebuilders are often faced with immediate concerns about lives and property that may make getting a peacebuilding program off the ground a short-term need. They will of course be concerned with the long-term effects and will operate with the knowledge that their efforts may take a long time to be effective, but it is in the shortterm that a program either gets started or it does not. Over time, as more companies adopt a CSR or Total Integrity Management approach, practitioners should have an easier time persuading companies to get involved. Right now, however, they will need to rely on approaches that can get results more quickly. If we set aside appeals to what businesses ought to do from a moral or ethical perspective, what is left? The alternative is to make a pragmatic argument that appeals to business leaders. Why should businesses get involved? What do they stand to gain from peacebuilding? Cousens (2001), in a discussion about determining what types of peacebuilding are more appropriate in a particular conflict, notes that there are two approaches to the problem, the inductive and deductive options. Inductive approaches look at what is needed within a conflict situation while deductive ones focus on the available capability of the international community. This will appear again in Chapter 10, but for the purposes of this discussion it is possible to invert the approach and focus it on the businesses themselves, yielding two questions. From the inductive side: What do businesses need that business-based peacebuilding can provide? And from the deductive side: What can business uniquely provide to peacebuilding? There are four primary needs a business is likely to have when it is operating within an area of conflict: security, stability, freedom from interference, and opportunity to do business. These are generally self-explanatory. Companies need security so that employees and property are not physically threatened. They need stability so as to be more easily able to manage risk. Not knowing the likely economic condition of the country it is working in, much less who is likely to be in charge in the next year, makes it increasingly difficult for companies to forecast and efficiently allocate resources for continuing business operations. Freedom from interference is needed to prevent assets being seized, employees from being conscripted, or in the extreme, businesses being nationalized. The opportunity to do business requires there be a market in which the company can sell, whether physical or metaphorical. In other words, companies like Coca-Cola that do not just export resources from the country need to ensure there is a domestic market for their products.

80   Designing business-based peacebuilding

Another way to examine a business’ needs is to frame them as costs to avoid. International Alert has refined the discussion of costs from Nelson The Business of Peace (2000) and now presents a list as part of their series on conflict-sensitive business practices (see International Alert 2005 as an example). These are broken down into direct and indirect costs. Direct costs include payments to security firms or governments for physical security; insurance, mobility and transportation costs, and personnel training costs associated with risk management; the loss of property or infrastructure; an increased cost of raising capital; physical danger to employees, kidnapping, higher wages and other personnel costs; costs to reputation for being associated with conflict; and potential litigation costs. Indirect costs are more generalized and include human costs such as loss of life, health, and capability; social costs like the weakening of social capital; economic costs like lost markets; environmental costs like depletion of resources; and political costs like weakened political institutions and the rule of law (International Alert 2005: 2). These costs can be avoided and these needs met through improvement of the conflict situation independent of any business-based peacebuilding, but there are reasons why business action may be more likely to do so for the businesses involved. First, business-based peacebuilding action will, by necessity, occur in regions where the business is operating. This could produce local effects, like those seen in Colombia in Chapter 3, that can substantially improve the situation for the company. Second, by participating in business-based peacebuilding a company can more accurately manage the cost of doing business over time by directing such peacebuilding toward the areas most likely to make a lasting impact on business conditions. Without such participation, businesses may have a hard time getting a seat at the table to discuss what needs to be done when. Third, active participation in the resolution of the conflict can go beyond protecting the company from reputational harm from being associated with the conflict and, presuming the company received or took credit for their work, actually improve their reputation with consumers, NGOs, and other governments. We cannot simply look at the needs of business to settle the case for business-based peacebuilding, however. It is important for this discussion to also consider what business can uniquely provide to peacebuilding, not just what they could contribute. If one problem with peacebuilding is that programs are underfunded, it would be accurate to say that business can meet that need. However, so could some NGOs, governments, or IGOs. Meeting the need for funds is not, therefore, a compelling reason to approach business and, frankly, explanations of why a program needs funding do not differ much based on whether the donor is non-profit, for-profit, or governmental. Existing approaches can be effective there. These contributions that can be considered unique will be developed further in Chapter 9, but it is worthwhile to consider them as part of the justification for business-based peacebuilding as well. Business is vital to many

The business case for peace   81

process-based forms of trust in a community. The ability of citizens to know that they will be able to get what they need when they need it is an important part of the return to normalcy after conflict. Similarly, the extension of credit and trade reinforces bonds between community members. Another very important contribution that is more likely to come from business is employment itself. One of the largest challenges after a war is reintegrating a large portion of the soldier population into their communities. Employment is usually described as the appropriate solution to this concern, but it is seldom described as a business-driven project, although it clearly is one. Similarly, employment can address some of the strain being placed on relief and support organizations by refugees, who could be resettled by employers in instances where returning to their original home is impossible. Fort takes the notion of employment as a contribution even further, arguing that business can be a mediating institution through employment, since individuals will often change their behavior as the result of changes at work and in their work environment (2007: 23). A business that promotes tolerance at work can likely improve it at home as well. Ultimately, many efforts to encourage companies to participate in businessbased peacebuilding are likely to run into opinions like those encountered by Shankleman when she spoke with oil company CSR managers. These individuals reveal skepticism that explicit corporate commitments to peacebuilding would be viewed as legitimate or realistic, that their colleagues and shareholders could be persuaded that this is a valid activity to undertake, or that they have the skills needed to intervene successfully. (2006: 67) To respond to such concerns, practitioners need not only a good argument for businesses to get involved, but also the ability to support that argument with examples and evidence from other instances so it is clear that businessbased peacebuilding is both legitimate and realistic and that other companies have overcome internal problems with motivation and the idea that they could not competently intervene. The next four chapters take up this challenge, first, in the next chapter, by specifically incorporating the literature of conflict resolution and peacebuilding into the discussion.

8 Lessons from conflict resolution and peacebuilding

The business case for peacebuilding, elucidated in Chapter 7, would be much easier to make were there an established body of empirical research making clear the success of business-based peacebuilding and the exact benefits companies could expect from participating. Unfortunately, this form of peacebuilding is too new for such studies and the complexity of violent conflict and the large number of different resolution efforts underway in any particular conflict may make such certainty difficult, if not impossible. Similarly, in order to develop a comprehensive map of the peacebuilding activities business can undertake or assist with we cannot rely only on what is known to have come before (Part I of this book). Along with that, it is important to consider the significant contributions that can arise from the literature of conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and peace studies. This chapter examines the literature to prepare for the discussion of the forms of business-based peacebuilding in Chapter 9.

Peace studies Chapter 1 recognized that while both conflict resolution and peace studies share a common obligation to address the negative results of conflict, they differ in that conflict resolution focuses on the world as it is while peace studies seeks to change the world to produce a new environment in which destructive conflict is less likely. The distinction becomes clear when looking at the role of business in peace studies. As noted in Chapter 2, the peace studies approach leads to a call for the creation of “peace business” that is fundamentally different than the current system. Although this suggestion is being set aside here, that does not mean there are no contributions to be made from a peace studies perspective. In fact, there are a number of conceptual contributions to consider. Many of these have been incorporated into peacebuilding practice and were well summarized by Johan Galtung in his speech, “Conflict Resolution in the Age of Cholera: Ten Pointers to the Future of Peace Studies” (Galtung 1996). The first of these is the distinction between positive and negative peace. Galtung recognizes that most people define peace as a negation of

Lessons   83

war. Peace happens when war ends. Such a definition was not a satisfactory justification for peace work, so Galtung labeled the absence of violence “negative peace” and a condition where the future causes of violence have been eliminated “positive peace.” This distinction becomes practically useful when combined with Galtung’s three forms of violence. The most commonly recognized form of violence is what Galtung calls “direct violence.” It involves the literal infliction of harm by one person on another. This is violence that commonly appears on television reports and is easy to recognize. The cessation of direct violence is the mark of negative peace and is the primary goal of most armed interventions such as peacekeeping or pacification. Direct violence does not occur on its own, however. In most societies “structural violence” can also be found. Structural violence also causes harm, but instead of coming from one or more identifiable actors it is the result of the manner in which a society is structured. Poverty, for example, shortens life spans just as readily as direct violence, but it is more difficult to easily see the causal mechanisms through which this happens. Stopping structural violence requires either restructuring the society or otherwise ameliorating the effects of the structural problems so that they are not causing harm. Both direct and structural violence act upon people in a relatively straightforward way, albeit more easily seen with direct violence. The third form of violence, “cultural violence,” is the most abstract. This is because cultural violence is the system of cultural beliefs that allows direct and structural violence to occur. It is made up of hate, intolerance, superstition, and other cultural forms that support the idea that it is acceptable for violence to occur, or more likely in the case of structural violence, for it to continue. Although the link between cultural violence and direct violence is often obscured by the large number of factors affecting culture, there is a clear example from the Rwandan genocide. From July 8, 1993 until July 31, 1994, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Colline, a radio station in Rwanda, broadcast a steady stream of anti-Tutsi propaganda while also targeting moderate Hutus and external groups such as the UN. Tutsis were often referred to as “cockroaches” that needed to be exterminated and called for “total war” on the Tutsis. The causal connection between the broadcasts and the genocide was clear enough that three of its executives were convicted of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In fact, General Romeo Dallaire, who led the small UN force in Rwanda during the genocide, said that “Simply jamming [the] broadcasts and replacing them with messages of peace and reconciliation would have had a significant impact on the course of events” (Smith 2003). For the purposes of business-based peacebuilding, the concepts of negative and positive peace and direct, structural, and cultural violence are useful, even though they are initially alien to the lay understanding of conflict, because they are readily explained and understood. They can also be used to help explain the utility of business-based peacebuilding, as will be discussed further in Chapter 11.

84   Designing business-based peacebuilding

In order to produce positive peace, cultural, structural, and direct violence need to be eliminated. For Galtung, the activity of pursuing the end of structural or cultural violence is the central function of peacebuilding. We cannot simply classify actions as peacebuilding on the basis of their intent. Results do matter. Many wars are motivated by individuals convinced they are acting to preserve or achieve a greater peace. However, since it is very difficult to evaluate the results of singular peacebuilding actions as opposed to evaluating overall levels of violence, we must act carefully. In light of this, Galtung argues: I would not dispute the right of everybody to act out of compassion, according to their best knowledge, to reduce suffering and enhance life. But human beings are imperfect, and so is our compassion, and so is our knowledge. This principle of human fallibility should, in my view, lead us to draw one consequence: act so that the consequences of your action are reversible. Prefer the action that can be undone. Proceed carefully, you may be wrong. (Galtung 1996) This is one of the most important lessons of experimental forms such as business-based peacebuilding. Wherever possible, act in a manner that can be reversed. This leads to Galtung’s suggestion that peaceworkers operate with “Realism of the Brain, Idealism of the Heart.” Hopes for peace need to be maintained, but should be tempered with a rational appreciation of the pragmatic reality of the situation.

Preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping Chapter 6 described changes in violent conflict that arose after the Cold War. At the same time, the literature of peacebuilding flourished. One important early contribution was the United Nations’ An Agenda for Peace (1992), which was developed during the tenure of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as SecretaryGeneral and intended to provide guidance for international responses to conflict. The report calls for three kinds of action to address conflict: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. All three of these approaches are intended for either country-actors or regional or international governmental organizations. Preventative diplomacy involves actions to prevent conflicts from occurring, to keep those that have started from becoming destructive, or limiting the damage if all else fails. Boutros-Ghali (1992) suggests confidence-building measures, factfinding, and early warning systems, along with preventative deployment and the creation of demilitarized zones, both of which require military force. Peacemaking includes attempts to stop violence between at least two parties, including mediation or arbitration, use of the World Court to address grievances, ameliorating conditions that are contributing to conflict, and using

Lessons   85

sanctions or military force to compel parties to stop fighting. Peacekeeping is the form of intervention most commonly associated with the UN. It entails placing military forces loaned from member states in between fighting parties to reduce tensions and enforce negotiated agreements. While there are a number of successes to note both during the Cold War and in places like Macedonia in 1995, this is tempered by the violations of “safe zones” in the former Yugoslavia as well as the complete failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. The new mode of UN intervention in active conflicts started to end almost as soon as it began. After Somalia, the United States became much more reluctant to loan its troops for peacekeeping missions. As the 1990s continued, it became more and more difficult for the Security Council to agree on which interventions to undertake as Russia regained some of its authority and China became more assertive. In 1999, when Western leaders wanted to take action against Serbia in Kosovo, they chose to act under the umbrella of NATO, not the UN, since they felt that consensus on the Security Council was unlikely. Although the war in Iraq was in part sanctioned by UN action and was undertaken by a coalition of countries, it marked a return to a more unilateral form of foreign policy and peace operations. The very limited UN peacekeeping activities in Sudan are another example of the weakening of the peacekeeping regime. Unless there is a change in how member countries interact with the UN or in their acceptance of unilateral action, the hopes of An Agenda for Peace seem likely to go unfulfilled. Even so, Boutros-Ghali provides an excellent illustration of the spectrum of tools available to the UN and the international community. Many practitioners working on conflict issues recognize, however, that additional efforts were being undertaken that did not fall within these categories, however. These alternative efforts are properly categorized as peacebuilding.

Peacebuilding As a field that is relatively new, it is perhaps not surprising that so much of the literature is built from a small pool of contributions. For example, even though there are a small number of books addressing business activity in conflict areas there are no fewer than three versions of Lederach’s peacebuilding pyramid utilized in them. No author (including this one) has seen the need to make wholesale revision to existing peacebuilding methodology. While this could be seen as either the limitation of a new area of scholarship or even intellectual laziness on the part of researchers, the best explanation is neither of these. The literature of peacebuilding, both business-based and other forms, has grown out of the practice of peacebuilding, workshops, dialogues, reports, and other byproducts of individuals participating in the practice. The peacebuilding literature is often the result of practitioners attempting to organize and codify their own practices. It reflects a general consensus about what can or should be done to address violent conflict. This

86   Designing business-based peacebuilding

is not to say that the current work simply agrees with everything to be found in Lederach, but that large portions of it reflect the general consensus within the practice of peacebuilding – developed over years of trial and error, discussion and collaboration – and that these contributions should be given their due consideration for that experience. Even considering this, the existing literature is just a starting point and we should expect the field to grow substantially along with the practice of business-based peacebuilding itself. The question facing those working for business-based peacebuilding is: What are the important contributions from general peacebuilding theory that apply to business-based peacebuilding? The term “peacebuilding” is often used by the UN in the form of “postconflict peacebuilding,” focusing primarily on actions taken after negative peace has been secured, but more recent works have considered peacebuilding as including conflict prevention and attempts to build capacities to resolve or mitigate the conflict itself (Rotberg 1996). Definitions of peacebuilding have expanded to the point that it could be said to be easier to identify what peacebuilding is not, instead of what it is (Cutter 2005). This is not a flaw that is remedied in this discussion of business-based peacebuilding, which frankly also uses a “kitchen-sink” approach to definition. As stated before, business-based peacebuilding includes the affirmative actions taken by businesses to promote the resolution of violent conflicts, mitigate the effects of conflicts underway, and prevent new conflicts from starting. It can happen before, during, or after the violent conflict occurs. As described in Part I, the important component of this definition that allows it to delimit business-based peacebuilding from all actions taken by companies affected by violent conflict is that it does not include the bottom two levels of Nelson’s pyramid of action: compliance with existing laws and doing no harm. Both of these are important for companies who want to have positive impacts on conflict, but until a business takes some action beyond compliance or reflection they are not participating in business-based peacebuilding. It is also useful to realize that businesses are not the only actors involved. Peacebuilding practitioners and NGOs who engage businesses in peacebuilding are also practicing business-based peacebuilding. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 10. The most prominent writer on peacebuilding is John Paul Lederach, whose books have charted a theoretical rationale that backs up his own peacebuilding practice. It will be useful to discuss Lederach in some detail, since there are a number of important contributions that can inform businessbased peacebuilding. The first of these is the difference between prescriptive and elicitive approaches. Peacebuilding activities are often developed and maintained by developed Western countries and performed in less-developed areas prone to conflict, especially Africa and South America. They also very often include a training component intended to teach the parties in conflict how to begin to resolve their dispute. Under one approach to this, the intervention is often structured

Lessons   87

around a model of conflict behavior, or more accurately conflict-limiting behavior, that has been developed outside the country in conflict. Lederach calls this the “prescriptive approach” and it involves trying to convince the parties to the conflict to understand and agree to adopt the model. In this approach, innovation comes from outside the conflict. Additionally, the ideological assumptions of the model and program are rarely presented. Participants are just told that there is a way to solve their problems and that they should just agree (Lederach 1995: 48). The danger in using prescriptive approaches is they may not address the actual conditions of a particular conflict, it can be more difficult to gain compliance from a population that sees the peacebuilding program as being alien, and it can contain unacceptable ideological baggage in some cases. The alternative to the proscriptive approach is what Lederach calls the “elicitive approach,” which focuses on discovering already-existing resources within the society in conflict. These could be institutional, cultural, or even personal. Elicitive approaches avoid some of the problems of prescriptive ones, since they allow for innovation to arise from the society in which the peacebuilding occurs. Programs developed elicitively are more likely to reflect the reality on the ground, or at least the reality as seen by the participants. This means it can be easier to gain support for elicitive proposals (Lederach 1995: 55). There are two drawbacks to consider, however. First, if all the resources for resolution already existed within the society in conflict, the parties would have been able to resolve it themselves. There will always be a component of outside intervention in peacebuilding, whether in the form of ideas or more tangible resources. Second, from the perspective of businesses, the uncertainty of elicitive approaches, which cannot as easily be predicted or quantified, can cause concerns about predictability. Businessbased peacebuilding proposals that rely strongly on ideas to be developed during the peacebuilding process may never get started at all. It would be better for elicitive programs to use a pilot phase first, likely funded by NGOs or the practitioners themselves, in order to present a more definite plan to businesses. Lederach is quick to note that neither prescriptive nor elicitive approaches work well in the extreme. The key to effective peacebuilding is balancing the two. Effective peacebuilding must have some originating structure, likely developed from other conflicts, but must also recognize that individual conflicts present novel problems and that their participants likely have part of the solution. Business-based peacebuilding may lean closer to the prescriptive ideal, but cannot ignore the utility of elicitive approaches. A second important contribution is the centrality of identity to contemporary conflict. This was briefly mentioned in Chapter 6, but deserves a more thorough discussion here. In the current intranational wars, Lederach sees the narrowing of identities as an important process through which conflict occurs. Prior to the conflict, individuals simultaneously maintain a number of identities based on race, ethnic heritage, gender, occupation, family

88   Designing business-based peacebuilding

r­ elations, geographic location, and so forth. During violent conflict, however, these collapse such that individuals become primarily focused on a single marker of identity, such as Hutu or Tutsi ethnicity in Rwanda. These identities cut both vertically and horizontally through society, so people can be mobilized regardless of other identities that might normally separate them, such as class, age, or geographic origin. Not only are other identity relations broken down, but the boundaries of the remaining identity become rigid. Participants must be either one or the other. Nuance is not allowed. As identities narrow, trust breaks down as well as, sometimes, central authority and state infrastructure. This happens often in the context of longstanding mistrust and paranoia, which is reinforced by the direct violence at hand. This process is seen across the levels of conflict. This brings the conflict home in a manner that was less common in the past, meaning that the conflict is affecting a deeply held part of the individual. “The difference between contemporary internal conflicts and traditional conceptualization of international conflict is the immediacy of experience” (Lederach 1997: 13). This immediacy relates to proximity, shared histories, and severe stereotyping. In order to legitimately respond to these contemporary conflicts, “peacebuilding must be rooted in and responsive to the experiential and subjective realities shaping people’s perspectives and needs” (Lederach 1997: 24). This is where peacebuilding significantly differs from traditional diplomatic peacemaking. The third contribution is Lederach’s focus on the creation and sustainability of reconciliation as a peacebuilding approach. Reconciliation is a forwardfocused change in the relationship between parties in conflict. It allows them to “envision a future in a way that enhances interdependence” (Lederach 1997: 27). Reconciliation requires a relationship between the parties, an encounter. It cannot occur in a vacuum. This encounter occurs not just between representatives of the groups in conflict, by must involve “several different and highly interdependent streams of activity” (Lederach 1997: 26). It must also allow for the creation of space in which to discuss trauma and loss. This is important for business-based peacebuilding for two reasons. First, business can be one of these independent streams of activity. Second, no matter how well-funded and well-intentioned, reconciliation cannot occur as the result of activity associated with the business sector alone. The fourth contribution is the most important as a theoretical innovation. Lederach (1997: 33) recognizes that the key dilemma of peacebuilding is how to coordinate the different peacebuilding activities and programs occurring in a conflict so they collectively produce reconciliation and positive peace. In order to visualize how this is possible, Lederach relies on the metaphor of a pyramid representing the society. This is the peacebuilding pyramid that has been so widely adopted within the business-in-conflict literature. The pyramid is divided into three levels, each corresponding to a different type of leader in the society. At the top are found national leaders. They are

Lessons   89

very visible and can represent governmental, military, religious or political actors. There are very few individuals active in this level. Moving down to the middle section, Lederach recognizes leaders who do not represent nationlevel constituencies, but nonetheless have significant authority within particular sectors, such as lower-ranked religious leaders, ethnic or clan leaders, academics and intellectuals, NGO leaders, those running business and trade associations, and the leaders of large business enterprises, especially those recognized as being dominant in a particular sector. The bottom level is filled with grassroots leaders who have less influence individually over the course of the conflict, but directly represent in the aggregate many more people than those at the top of the pyramid. Traditional international conflict resolution has focused on top-level leaders, who are viewed as having the most authority and power to shape the conflict. However, these leaders are often the most constrained in their ability to negotiate and compromise (Lederach 1997: 40). This is largely because their political identity as leaders is often tied to particular positions on issues that are at the heart of the conflict. Not only do they need to change their minds to endorse a different path, but they must do so in public. The political risks of appearing to “give in” to the other side, especially unilaterally, significantly limit the range of possible options. Most choose only to endorse a plan after it has been negotiated in secret and procedures are in place to ensure compliance by both sides. It is useful to remember that while top-level leaders can make decisions affecting the largest number of people, they are also insulated from the effects of these decisions in many cases. These effects are felt farther down the pyramid. Lederach suggests that instead of focusing on the top-level, middle-level leaders might provide the best entry point for resolution and reconciliation. There are a number of places to look to identify viable middle-level leaders. They are often the leaders of particular sectors such as business, the nonprofit community, education, or health. If they are not formal leaders there, they are as likely to be prominent and widely-respected. Additionally, practitioners can focus on organizations that link individuals horizontally between those sectors or by focusing on less-prominent leaders from minority groups (1997: 41). The primary advantage of using the middle level is that these leaders often have strong connections to those at the top, but they also represent and interact with more people in the grassroots level as well. They are less bound by prior public positions, since their roles are not explicitly political and they are less likely to have taken public positions. Since their authority derives from sources other than political authority and military might, they are less likely to seek these as an outcome of the conflict (Lederach 1997: 41). They are also likely to have relationships with the members of other groups through participation in professional groups, the philanthropic sector, or civic organizations. This can help them can cut through the dominance of singular identities.

90   Designing business-based peacebuilding

There are reasons to engage grassroots leaders as well. First, they are those most closely linked to actually meeting the needs of individuals. In fact, this is the primary function for a large number of grassroots leaders on a day-to-day basis. By virtue of being connected to the largest number of people, they are also the leaders most likely to have personal experience with violence and the other destructive elements of the conflict. Killick and Gündüz, while examining peacebuilding among local businesses, argue that the vertical and horizontal linkages between business participants are so strong that they should be considered a new addition to Lederach’s pyramid (2005: 310). This is overly optimistic about the potential of business and pessimistic about the scope of Lederach’s model, but it is true that along with religious leaders, business leaders may have more ability to travel vertically and horizontally than others. Due to the narrowing effect described above, as a conflict intensifies the lines of identity tend to run vertically through this pyramid. This means that leaders at each level have at least one path of introduction to those higher on the pyramid. In effect, the identity-based behavior that is perpetuating the conflict can also be used against it. While Lederach feels the middle level may be the most effective for peacebuilders, he does not argue that only middle-level approaches are needed. Instead, there are different interventions that can be effective when tailored to the level on which they operate. Top-level approaches most often include the involvement of prominent peacemakers or mediators, such as the involvement of Jimmy Carter and Desmond Tutu in the conflict in Zimbabwe in the Summer and Fall of 2008. The goal of this intervention is to reach a negotiated settlement between top-level representatives of the parties in conflict. These negotiations are usually conducted without a lot of public scrutiny, often away from the conflict itself and usually the intent is to broker a ceasefire to provide enough space for other efforts to take hold (Lederach 1997: 44). The top-level approach assumes that appropriate representatives can be identified, that these representatives will accurately represent the positions and grievances of the groups they represent, and that they have the power or influence to enforce the agreements reached within their communities. This is a “trickle-down” approach. It assumes that agreement and policy reached at the top will be accepted throughout society and eventually make the situation better at the bottom. Top-level approaches also presume a particular sequence for peacebuilding. The cessation of all direct violence comes first, followed later by national transition that spreads change though other sectors, in effect remaking society. This is not to say that top-level approaches presume that any solution reached at the top will be acceptable to those in the grassroots. They do recognize that a peace agreement will be implemented locally and therefore it must be practical on the local level (Lederach 1997: 45). The top-down approach is best represented by the steps in Boutros-Ghali’s model for the UN described above. While top-level approaches focus on singular paths to peace, what Leder-

Lessons   91

ach calls the “middle-out” approach instead seeks to utilize a number of programs in order to locate enough middle-level leaders and provide them with the ability to form an infrastructure for peace. While new ideas are still being developed for this, problem-solving workshops, conflict-resolution training, and peace commissions are prominent examples. The middle-level work of the business communities in South Africa and Northern Ireland described in Chapter 3 show the middle-out approach working the way it was intended. Grassroots approaches are different from those in the top two levels for two reasons. First, it contains many more people. Interventions that are not significant or do not have a plan for spreading through the population risk being overrun simply by the number of people not reached. Second, in the middle of violent conflict the leaders of the grassroots are often primarily concerned with their survival and the survival of those they lead. Lederach is optimistic, however, that “bottom-up” approaches are possible. These will likely involve the grassroots putting pressure on higher-level leaders to take action to stop the violence either due to a desire for a transformation or just simple exhaustion (1997: 52). Other grassroots approaches seemingly ignore the larger conflict and focus on providing support for local solutions to conflicts. This can happen before and after a formal cessation of violence and often includes conflict resolution and post-conflict skill trainings as well as promoting indigenous forms of dispute resolution like the Gacaca system in Rwanda. These empower communities to address localized problems without needing to appeal to an overburdened government or international groups that may be present. Another contribution from Lederach uses the peacebuilding pyramid along with Dugan’s nested paradigm (1996) to create an overarching structure for peacebuilding efforts. Dugan recognized that any large conflict takes place within a series of levels nestled with each other. The most basic is the issue being fought over. The conflict, however, is not simply about an issue or grievance. It also happens within the context of a relationship. This relationship exists within a larger subsystem, which itself is contained within a larger system of relations. Dugan recognized that by looking at these different levels different conclusions about interventions would be drawn. At the issue level, interventions would focus on resolving a singular problem, such as where a border should be. Relationship-level explanations encourage interventions to repair or improve the relationship between the parties so they can address the current issue and other issues that arise later. Systemlevel explanations see the conflict as being rooted in the way the society is structured and lead to advocating for social change to fix problems like inequality or a lack of justice. Recognizing that traditional conflict resolution is strongly biased toward relationship-level solutions while peace researchers often focus on system-level causes and social change, Dugan proposes that instead interventions be contextualized with the “sub-system,” which allows for the consideration of relationships, but recognizes relationships occur within larger contexts and that some of these can be changed. Similar to

92   Designing business-based peacebuilding

­ ederach’s approach to the peacebuilding pyramid, Dugan’s suggestion is to L enter in the middle, the subsystem. Lederach uses Dugan’s concept to develop an image of peacebuilding as a process made up of a number of actors working across the levels of society and addressing issues, relationships, and to some extent systems. Peacebuilding is a process made up of roles and functions, not an individual act by a charismatic peacemaker (Lederach 1997: 66). This level of complexity is required to make a difference in the conflict, but it can be more easily managed by combining practical experience with theoretical research. For Lederach, the goal of peacebuilding is conflict transformation, the descriptive and proscriptive change across personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions (1997: 82). This can only occur through the creation of an indigenous peace constituency. This means, in part, helping the international community see people in the conflict as “resources, not recipients” (1997: 94). Identifying middle-range actors who see themselves as contributing to peace is key, but they need to be able to network with their colleagues across the lines of conflict. They must also be empowered as legitimate actors by the international community. To the extent that these actors are from business, the international community and international peacebuilding organizations must recognize the contributions they can make. Lederach is not the only person generating useful work in peacebuilding, although his influence is significant and justified. Cousens and Kumar (2001) provide a good overview of other important concepts within the peacebuilding literature that can be used within business-based peacebuilding. First, they recognize that “peacebuilding” is a term with many currently used definitions. In order to narrow the range of options, they propose examining peacebuilding through two axes, deductive and inductive. This approach was used in Chapter 7 to illuminate business-based peacebuilding and it is also useful when discussing peacebuilding as a whole. Deductive approaches look at the tools and capabilities available to the international community to foster peace while inductive approaches focus instead on the particular causes and conditions of the conflict in question. The UN’s An Agenda for Peace, described above, is an example of deductive analysis, since it concentrates on what the UN has the ability to do in conflict. While the deductive approach is relatively straightforward, it will be useful to unpack the inductive one. It is impossible to identify a single cause or set of causes for a particular conflict. They arise from a very complex interaction of sources. Each form of conflict intervention, however, seems to privilege some notions of cause over others. Cousens notes that traditional peacebuilding has tended to support “longstanding or structural factors, often found within social, economic, or cultural spheres, that are believed to have rendered a particular society vulnerable to armed conflict in the first place” (Cousens 2001: 8). Similarly, the international mediation approach privileges explanations of conflict that relate to political disagreement and the motivations of top-level

Lessons   93

leaders. The focus on cause leads to a second concern, that the path to reconciliation is not necessarily related to remedying the context under which the conflict has occurred. Instead, peacebuilding would be more effective when focused on the needs evident in the conflict. Instead of worrying about answering the question, “What caused this conflict?” peacebuilding should look to answer, “what is needed for the people affected by this conflict to move toward a better future?” This present- and forward-focused approach – closer to Lederach’s – does not predicate action on definitive models of causality, but instead on observable needs. It should be noted that this idea is different from the human needs approaches promoted separately by John Burton and Johan Galtung, which focus on the needs of people within the conflict individually (security, food, recognition), while what is being proposed here is to see what the society needs in order to transform the conflict. This argument will receive additional support in the discussion of conflict analysis approaches below. Ultimately, no peacebuilding program can be effective by using only the deductive or inductive approach. An absolute loyalty to the deductive approach would mean using only existing peacebuilding tools, regardless of the individual circumstances, while a purely inductive approach risks suggesting interventions that are entirely infeasible. Instead, a balance must be made between what can be done and what should be done. The normative aspect of the conflict-resolution approach impels us to do something, but what we do should be well-considered and based both on the availability of resources and what is needed to resolve the conflict. This may seem obvious, but across the levels of conflict there are many examples of disputes that are exacerbated through the use of inappropriate intervention strategies, or the inability to act based on a concern for total knowledge of the situation. For business-based peacebuilding, the best solution for maintaining this balance may be to consciously stage the two approaches. Businesses in conflict areas need to have plans in place about what they could do to address the conflict, if necessary. These plans will be produced deductively, based on what the company actually has the resources, skills, connections, and will to do. In the middle of a conflict, however, inductive analysis will be needed to determine which of these options is most needed. Cousens (2001: 11) also indentifies five primary objectives for peacebuilding found in the peacebuilding literature. These move from a selfenforcing ceasefire, where the parties do not resume violence even in the absence of international presence, to “self-enforcing peace,” where later armed conflicts do not occur; to democracy; justice; and finally, equity. Of these, Cousens believes self-enforcing peace is the best focus for peacebuilding. For Cousens, peacebuilding is about the creation of political institutions and processes that allow a society to manage the conflicts that inevitably arise without resorting to violence. This leads to the suggestion that the most important function of peacebuilding is in the “reinstitution of political life” and political participation (Cousens 2001: 12). Such a political focus is

94   Designing business-based peacebuilding

i­ll-suited for direct action by business-based peacebuilding, however. As discussed in the previous chapter, business can support the environment for political change through the restoration of “regular life” as well as trustbuilding and the creation of social capital. Viewed broadly, the goals of traditional peacebuilding and business-based peacebuilding are the same. Summarizing the case studies presented in their book, Kumar (2001: 183) notes that “the key to lasting peace within a society is an ability on the part of its members to manage tensions and disputes before the eruption of violent conflict.” Ultimately, that is the goal of business-based peacebuilding as well. In addition to helping define peacebuilding, these case studies provide useful suggestions for effective peacebuilding. Kumar (2001: 185) recognizes four steps likely to support peacebuilding success: maintaining a “substantive, nuanced knowledge of the political landscape of a society,” developing a clear strategy that is carefully considered, coordinating the efforts of all peacebuilding actors, and relying heavily on learning and feedback as programs are implemented. These in turn support three factors to help promote inter-group harmony: creating the capacity for dialogue and compromise, providing public security, and allowing for full participation (Kumar 2001: 186). On the basis of this experience, Cousens and Kumar conclude that peacebuilding is a useful tool, but in the end “perhaps the greatest challenge for the international community in trying to assist war-torn societies is to be ruthlessly modest about its ambitions” (Cousens 2001: 15). Peacebuilding cannot eliminate all conflict. Kumar (2001) makes three suggestions to improve peacebuilding. The first of these is that outside involvement should be structured around limited and understood goals. Second is the realization that no single actor can resolve the conflict or promote peace. Third, the international community can foster political institutions, but has not been effective in creating them wholesale. All of these need to be kept in mind when pursuing business-based peacebuilding.

Conflict analysis and resolution The literature of peacebuilding exists within a larger field often described as “conflict analysis and resolution” and this field also can provide useful insights to business-based peacebuilding. The first of these are basic notions about the nature of conflict as a human experience. While it can be meaningful in certain settings (the study of literature or psychological analysis) to speak of individuals in conflict with themselves, for the purpose of the conflict analysis and resolution community, conflict is inherently social. It is also an ongoing process involving a series of actions, interactions, and feedback. While much ink has been used attempting to explain why we have destructive conflict, it may be better to ask why we “do” conflict in ways that are destructive. It has been discussed before that conflict is inevitable, yet

Lessons   95

destruction is not. If there is one central truth to be distilled from the conflict literature, it is that the way humans do conflict is the result of no single cause. Instead, it is an interrelation of biology, ideology, culture, economic structure, history, political systems, and many more, including habit. Adding to the complexity is the fact that conflict theory is reflexive, in that new explanations of conflict get incorporated into cultures such that conflict behavior can change. For practitioners hoping to change how we pursue our goals in conflictual situations, this is good, but for those seeking to explain, it is not. Although that sounds like a recipe for analytical chaos, there are a surprising number of patterns that emerge from conflict independent of the scale at which it is occurring. This does not mean there are not issues surrounding the level of analysis in conflict. Two individuals squabbling over a barking dog are not the same as two million squabbling about a contested border. The actions of two million individuals will create aggregate differences that are important. However, the lived experience of each of the two million has much more in common with the lived experience of the two than it differs. The effects of war on individuals will obviously be much more severe than a simple neighborhood argument, but that does not mean the forces driving the process are not very similar. As a result, similar phenomena are viewed in conflict at every level, such as negative attributions, stereotyping, escalation, and more. Even the nation-specific idea of the security dilemma – where one country increases its military to feel safer in relation to a neighbor, that neighbor responds with increases to feel safer itself, and the original country has to increase again to feel safe – has quite a lot in common with the behavior seen in consumer-business disputes when lawyers are called. This concept of similarity can be taken too far, however. The complexity of large-scale violent conflict is greater than smaller conflicts and this can make definitive conclusions less feasible. However, that is simply a better reason to focus on the patterns and consistencies that can be observed, like a stockbroker seeking bits of order in the chaos of the market. This becomes even more necessary when the perspective being informed is that of an intervenor instead of a participant. Whereas disputes can have two or two million participants, the practitioners involved in various projects, whether business actors, diplomats, or private citizens, will work in smaller groups. They do not have the kind of tools that can allow action on an entire conflict. Even international mediators must be concerned that a peace agreement negotiated between leaders can actually be approved, supported, and implemented. All of this is to say that there will likely never be a “unified theory of conflict” in the sense of physicists seeking a theory of the universe. Instead we should focus on specific contributions that can assist our pursuit of businessbased peacebuilding. One of the most important in this sense is Sandole’s distinction between conflict-as-startup-conditions and conflict-as-process (1999). This was discussed briefly in Chapter 4.

96   Designing business-based peacebuilding

Sandole ran a simulation with college students to study a number of proposed causes of conflict. After a number of rounds of simulation, he was surprised to find that the largest contributing factor for a conflict continuing was simply that it had already been going on. Armed with this result, he found that a number of researchers had come to similar conclusions from different disciplines, sometimes without realizing the magnitude of what they had found. The implication of this view of conflict is that, after a certain point in the parties’ interactions, the conflict becomes self-perpetuating. If the most important factor causing a conflict to continue is the conflict behavior itself, interventions should focus more on changing that behavior than chasing the causes of the conflict in the first place. However, there is a large portion of the conflict resolution community that insists that causes are the place to intervene. This leads to what Sandole refers to as the “two-culture problem.” As described in Chapter 4, there is tension between those intervenors seeking “root causes” and ways to address them and others seeking to interrupt the forward impetus of the conflict itself through process-based actions. Business-based peacebuilding is much more suited to an interruption approach than root causes for a number of reasons. First, businesses are often limited in the geographic scope in which they can operate. Many causebased interventions require country-wide action to be effective. Second, the greatest benefits to business in the short term relate to stopping hostilities. It is in the longer term that benefits such as preventing a recurrence of violence are felt. Third, the factors identified as causing a conflict may not be the same ones that will cause a recurrence of that conflict. Violent social conflict is a transformative force on a society. The society after such conflict is not the same as it was before. This could mean that the causes of a conflict are simply not relevant anymore, even if social conditions have not improved. Finally, it needs to be considered that the businesses themselves can be contributing causes to conflict. If this happens, the company can be engaged to change its behavior, but it would be unwise to attempt positive businessbased peacebuilding operations at the same time. The result of this is that business-based peacebuilding should be a pragmatic, not dogmatic enterprise. This argument should not be interpreted to mean that business-based peacebuilding should only be concerned with stopping direct violence. It does mean that there is a strong bias towards using interrupting practices while violence is overt and only changing to address the causes in post-conflict situations. One interesting consequence of this approach is that it mimics the UN’s specific call for peacebuilding only in post-conflict situations. The difference in the business case is that peacebuilding is seen as the entire range of action as well as considering that there are non-military and nonviolent methods of encouraging violence to stop. It is important to realize that this is not quite the same as the debate in the conflict resolution literature over “ripeness.” One branch of conflict analysis stresses the appropriate time for intervention in conflicts. Every conflict is seen as following a similar trajectory and intervention will not work until the

Lessons   97

conflict itself is “ripe,” usually recognized as a condition in which the parties have reached a “hurting stalemate” (for example, see Schrodt, Gerner and Yilmaz 2003). This approach has spilled over into diplomatic rhetoric as well, sometimes providing intellectual cover for the unwillingness of international actors to address violent conflicts or the political impossibility of action. Theories of ripeness fly in the face of the normative component of the conflict resolution outlook as described in Chapter 1. To the extent that ripeness approaches argue that some conflicts should be left unengaged until they have reached a critical stage (an admittedly extreme reading), they are inadequate. Most importantly, these approaches are usually intended to improve the effectiveness of high-level international mediation and, quite understandably, do not consider the alleviation of suffering of those most affected by the conflict as their direct goal. A peacebuilding or conflict resolution practitioner, however, will likely be uneasy with waiting in the face of strife and will seek to do something to assist. This does not mean, however, that all methods of conflict resolution or peacebuilding are appropriate at all times. It may be entirely impossible to achieve even a negative peace resolution to the conflict at hand at the current time, but there are still efforts that can be made from the mitigation of harmful effects to the creation of zones of peace or the protection and maintenance of refugees. Timing will be important in crafting a plan for business-based peacebuilding, but cannot be an excuse to take no action. There is one other important contribution that comes from the conflict analysis literature. It is the importance of symbols and symbolic action in conflict, as described in the discussion of Kaufman in Chapter 6. Kaufman realizes the grievances that mobilize conflict are not always based on lived conditions for individuals. Instead, people are susceptible to emotional and symbolic manipulation by elites as well as cultural influence by those around them. Some of the peacebuilding literature described by Cousens and Kumar above seeks to have intervenors divine the “true causes of the conflict” in order to define the proper response. When these explanations are biased toward structural forces, both the cause and remedy for conflict can rapidly get divorced from the actual experience of those individuals most affected by the conflict. Incorporating the symbolic considerations into these discussions allows for the possibility that, on some basic level, conflicts are actually about exactly what the participants claim they are about. Engaging the people participating in conflict on their own terms requires an appreciation of the symbolic conditions of the conflict as well as those considered more substantive. Kaufman suggests peacebuilding efforts that respect the symbolic contributions should attempt to modify the myths and hostility that allow groups to undertake violent conflict. He believes it is difficult to get people to fight and even more difficult to get them to commit atrocities. As such, intervening to reshape these myths and beliefs is a valid approach to conflict resolution (2001: 43). This has two interesting consequences for business.

98   Designing business-based peacebuilding

First, businesses are more experienced in the manipulation of symbols and media messages through the use of advertising, branding, and public relations than are most NGOs working for peace. The surprising success of Global Witness’ blood diamonds campaign was built on a combination of symbolic and empirical work that has been copied often since, but original efforts are difficult to find. Second, the role of symbols in conflict also reminds us that, at least in some cases, the perception of business contributions to conflict can be more important than the actual, measurable contributions. This has already been seen in the discussion of the ability of business associations to provide symbolic cover for participants, as well as their ability to leverage additional symbolic meaning from members that may not be participating fully in peacebuilding efforts. This recognition can lower the barriers to companies to get involved in business-based peacebuilding since smaller investments in some cases may reap larger rewards. In addition to examining the contributions to business-based peacebuilding that can be made by the literature of other related forms of conflict work, this chapter has taken specific care to illuminate the difference between cause-focused, backwards-looking approaches to conflict resolution and peacebuilding from those that are present- and future-focused and concentrated more on solutions than removing causes. For the purposes of simplicity for the remaining chapters, as well as providing a useful label for discussing this concept with business leaders, it is useful to refer to actions focused on present conditions and needs as well as future possibilities instead of fixing past causes by “pragmatic peacebuilding.” This should not be seen as an attempt to indict cause-focused approaches, which may be appropriate in other settings. Pragmatic peacebuilding, however, is better suited to the kinds of programs that can be pursued by businesses as well as likely being more palatable to business leaders. Not all peacebuilding efforts that fall within pragmatic peacebuilding are business-based, but all businessbased peacebuilding, as described here, is pragmatic in this sense.

9 Mapping the forms of businessbased peacebuilding

The chapters in Part I of this book took care to try to create and analyze the existing body of business-based peacebuilding literature. The purpose of this chapter is different. Its goal is to create a map of the possible approaches to business-based peacebuilding, including those known to have been used and others that have not, at least not yet. While Chapter 3 divided the types of business-based peacebuilding efforts by the instigating actor, this chapter looks at a more thorough taxonomy of possible actions. The differentiation in forms that was attributable to the instigating actor was a surprising finding, but this was ultimately shaped by the haphazard development of business-based peacebuilding over the past twenty years or so and not fundamental requirements of the practice. If the goal now is to map the future of business-based peacebuilding efforts, a different approach is needed, one that is not tied to the existing biases of those who have come before. As mentioned before, Nelson’s (2000) work included a taxonomy of business-based actions that was built around the idea that interventions need to be tailored to the type of conflict in which a business is operating. This approach was shown in Chapter 3 to be insufficient as an analytical tool (a purpose for which it was most assuredly not intended in the first place), and also as one that presumes that the best interventions are those conceived around the idea of the initial causes of conflict. It was noted in Chapter 8 that a growing body of work indicates that focusing on “true causes” is appropriate only very early in conflict, if at all. Instead, a map of possible interventions is needed that is not tied to notions of causes, following the perspective of pragmatic peacebuilding. Even if a true root cause could be determined and the perfect intervention for that cause designed, the conflict resolution actor would still be faced with the need to mobilize resources and expertise in the real world, and these will result in compromises and improvisation. Presuming a normative obligation to intervene where possible, which is a foundational idea of the conflict resolution perspective as defined here, the question is not “What is the optimal possible intervention?” but “What is the best that can be done with the resources we have available?” Facing a conflict in the present, anyone hoping to intervene will be limited by a lack of

100   Designing business-based peacebuilding

total information about what is happening and why. What is needed at that moment is a map – some way to gain one’s bearings and chart a path ahead. It will be important to determine if opportunities were missed, or missteps taken, but that is the province of assessment, to be incorporated into refining the map for those who come later. Mapping is an adequate metaphor here. The intent of this chapter is to chart out the range of possible actions that would fall within the boundaries of business-based peacebuilding. Some of these will be well-known and well-traveled, while others will become evident only through their absence once this known territory is charted. In the end, we should be able to see not only the relationships between the forms discussed in Chapter 3, but also recognize where our current horizons lie and, possibly, what may be beyond them. This approach is influenced by Lang and Taylor’s (2000) call for conflict resolution practitioners to recognize their constellation of theories: a virtual map of the tools, experience, and theoretical baggage they carry into conflict work. The authors argue that understanding and appreciating this constellation of theories not only keeps a practitioner from forgetting resources he or she has available at the time of intervention, but also makes more clear what blind spots might be affecting their approach to conflict. This discussion will attempt to work from those forms of business-based peacebuilding most widely understood and utilized by and with businesses in conflict areas to those less familiar and even in some cases simply hypothetical. A thorough map should point us beyond what is known to what is possible. One primary conclusion of Chapter 8 was that the best method for selecting peacebuilding practice is not to look at the causes of the conflict, but instead to focus on what is needed by the participants in it to be able to move toward resolution and reconciliation. Following this suggestion, the map of business-based peacebuilding is divided into regions by the type of need that motivates the particular types of peacebuilding practice. This approach may seem like an alien taxonomy at first, but its utility should become evident in the discussion. In addition to providing clear lines between types of practice, it has the benefit of uncovering relationships that are not regularly noticed. Two peacebuilding projects may seem quite different in form and function, but if they share a common presumption of the practical needs in the conflict there is a chance for them to become collaborative and reinforcing. Similarly, if none of the practices utilized in a conflict share a single idea about what is needed, cooperation is going to be much more difficult.

Boundaries of the map It is important before beginning this task to note that business-based peacebuilding is not comprised of simply any action a company can take with the intent of positively affecting a conflict in the area in which it operates. As

Mapping   101

noted previously, only those actions that go beyond base compliance with laws or avoiding harmful effects from business activities fall within the bounds of business-based peacebuilding. While compliance and business practice mitigation are important contributions to peace, they primarily fall outside the scope of this research. That said, there are some peacebuilding practices that are closely related to these other efforts and these will be noted in the discussion that follows. Additionally, although previous chapters in Part II, especially Chapter 7, have discussed business-based peacebuilding from the perspective of businesses being the primary actors involved, this will not always be the case. Some examples from Chapter 3 illustrate actions taken by NGOs or peacebuilding practitioners in order to influence business or promote commerce without basing these programs on business action. This chapter incorporates peacebuilding activities performed by businesses and business leaders alongside those aimed at businesses. This is business-based peacebuilding, so it only considers approaches that are done either by business or with business in some direct form. While there is a growing body of literature, as described in Chapter 2, about peacebuilding through economic development, such efforts operate on an entirely different level and are not part of business-based peacebuilding itself, even though they are important considerations for peacebuilding and likely to make a positive contribution. Their exclusion from the discussion of business-based peacebuilding is, in part, a matter of analytical simplicity. In the case of economy-level intervention, the actors involved are best seen as the business sector as a whole along with international financial institutions, governments, and IGOs. To evaluate such programs would entail engaging the conflict and the proposed peacebuilding practices at an entirely different level of analysis, which would overly burden the concept and utility of business-based peacebuilding. Such efforts are probably better thought of as “economic peacebuilding” and addressed in a different venue.

Information-presumptive approaches The first area on the business-based peacebuilding map contains the approaches that presume information is needed to assist the conflict. Though, when compared to more active programs, information-gathering and dissemination can seem reactive, it turns out to be a fruitful division of businessrelated work. One initial group of approaches here focuses on providing information to businesses, and the most direct form is simply making companies aware of what they are doing in conflict areas. Businesses, both by design and experience, are able to rapidly absorb and process information about markets and finances, but are less able to address non-financial concerns not directly related to running the business. Outside actors can change business behavior in some cases simply by pointing out the negative consequences happening

102   Designing business-based peacebuilding

as the result of business actions. It is likely that such investigation and report-writing will be completed by activists and representatives from NGOs, but it would be reasonable to expect that some business associations could also perform this task. In some cases, businesses themselves, whether individually or in collaboration with others in the same industry or region, may hire consultants to do such assessments. This example is interesting, since it is one where the goal of business-based peacebuilding is primarily to induce lower-level peace work (compliance or do-no-harm). No companies need be involved in the production or dissemination of information at all. In fact, when companies do perform regular assessments of their own conflict impacts, such as those using International Alert and the International Institute for Sustainable Development’s Conflict Sensitive Business Practice Toolbox, are likely to not even reach to business-based peacebuilding under the definition discussed here. This does not mean this work is without value, just that it is a different response to conflict. A related project would be to collect information on the negative consequences of company action and publicize it to other organizations, governments, and especially consumers. The work by groups that gather and release information about blood diamonds, blood timber, and blood cocoa are the most clear examples of this form. The difference between this approach and the last one is that when the information is provided directly to companies, it is presumed they will have the will to act on their own. When a group goes beyond the company to the general public, it is presuming the company will not do what is right without outside pressure. Although there is a shaming aspect of programs such as the blood diamonds campaign that could produce internal change in the business, the real cost to companies comes when consumers internalize this information and opt to purchase from other companies or avoid an industry entirely, or when governments use it to promote additional regulation. Shaming and consumer-awareness campaigns can be supplemented through certification programs. While the blood diamonds campaign focused on information about the negative consequences of business action (or inaction), certification approaches seek to identify products that do not cause those same harms. The Kimberley Process that certifies diamonds as “conflict-free” is one example of this, but that is done by certifying entire shipments and not single stones, so the certification is a few steps removed from the consumer experience. Consumers need to rely on the good faith of intermediary companies to ensure their diamonds are not from conflict regions. It would seem that a consumer-focused, conflict-free certification program would be possible. Current efforts to produce “fair trade” certifications have shown early success and “dolphin-safe” tuna certification was widely successful, with over 90 percent of companies complying with dolphin-safe methods (Earth Island Institute 2008). Another information-based approach is to generate and disseminate information on the costs of the conflict as well as the benefits of peace. This

Mapping   103

could be aimed at the business sector in order to encourage businesses to get more involved either by quantifying their losses or realizing their potential gains. The more interesting programs, however, have been those organized and funded by the business community in order to promote information about the benefits of peace. The best example of this is work by the Confederation of British Industry Northern Ireland on the Peace Dividend Paper. Those approaches adopt business methodologies and apply them to the conflict at hand in order to make the costs and benefits easier to understand for the rest of society. This can be an especially powerful tool when generated from within the conflict. Two related approaches also involve information produced from businesses in conflict areas. In the first, businesses can actively support active peace negotiations through information gathering and sharing. Talisman did this in Sudan, providing resource assessments to assist the parties involved in determining the relative acceptability of different settlement options. The second approach is collecting, analyzing, and reporting for early warning systems. This appears to have significant potential but is not widely used, yet it is in line with The Economist’s suggestion that the spread and retraction of Coca-Cola can be seen as an active measure of changes in stability. Properly trained and provided the right tools for reporting, businesses could be an important component in early-warning systems, making those outside the country aware when problems are just starting, so they do not have to wait until circumstances are out of hand before responding. Businesses can also present information to consumers in a way that encourages the consumers to take action involving a particular conflict. For some, this is a matter of including conflict-related messages in their advertising, as Benetton and The Body Shop have. It could also involve sponsoring and/or promoting media events, conferences, speakers, or even report and book publication to help spread the word about what is happening in conflict areas. Ben & Jerry’s has been a leader in this regard. Their company website includes a list of fifty ways to promote peace along with encouraging its customers to get involved. Users can select different categories of action as well as choosing a “personal time investment level.” Making a selection presents only those activities that meet the criteria. The general push for increased transparency in business-government transactions that is prevalent in discussions of extractive industries and CSR is also an information-driven program. The logic behind this approach is twofold. First, fewer conflicts will arise due to confusion about distribution of resources. Second and more importantly, companies and governments will be less willing to participate in corruption if transactions are publicly recorded. The motivation for transparency is primarily to change behavior and not to simply provide information, so this will be addressed with other anti-corruption methods below. The final form of information-presumptive peacebuilding is, in some ways, the most direct: providing information to companies about what they

104   Designing business-based peacebuilding

can do to assist existing peacebuilding efforts or start their own. This also presumes that the reason more companies are not participating is a lack of knowledge of what to do, not a will to do so. The British Angola Forum has been successful in providing just such an informational exchange. Additionally, a well-developed resource explaining business-based peacebuilding will eventually be able to incorporate empirical studies and best-practices literature in order to help those companies participating do it more effectively. There are some pitfalls to avoid when attempting to utilize informationpresumptive approaches. First, many forms of conflict assessment and information gathering can bring an “outside expert” approach similar to Lederach’s proscriptive model. This approach may miss important information about the conflict while attempting to squeeze the information available into existing frameworks. Second, information-driven projects usually have few stakeholders. This is especially true when one organization is doing all of the work. That leaves many companies and organizations in the position of not being active participants, which means they not only need to do less, but also have much less of a stake in the success of the overall effort.

Interaction-presumptive approaches The second area on the business-based peacebuilding map collects approaches that presume what is needed is more interaction between parties or specific interaction between specific subsets of those parties. The first cluster of approaches here focuses on different forms of dialogue. In the most direct sense, dialogue can be arranged between business leaders to discuss conflict-related issues. This could include business leaders from opposing sides meeting during a conflict, getting together when tensions are rising, or forming a group to work on concerns arising in a post-conflict situation, as was seen with the Caux meetings described in Chapter 3. This first approach concentrates on gathering representatives from the business community to specifically work on conflict-related issues and possibly participate in negotiation. A second approach is also concerned with bringing together businesspeople, but the primary goal is to encourage them to work together professionally. These would be closer to networking or social business events like those run by the Peres Center for Peace. They do some work on cross-ethnic cooperation, but leave ample time for business deals to be made. Business exchange programs are another option. They take the notion of interaction farther to physically move managers between companies on either side of a conflict. While this may contribute to business collaboration, its primary goal is to normalize contact between the parties in the conflict as it is hoped that such contact will change the opinions of those who participate. While exchange programs and networking may lead to collaboration between businesses, peacebuilding programs can be devised specifically to

Mapping   105

foster such agreements. A good example of this would be International Alert’s work in Azerbaijan and Armenia, through the Caucasus Business & Development Network. These programs, which seek to encourage cross-­ border or inter-ethnic trade and business associations, not only presume that interaction is what is needed in the conflict, but that business interaction is a specific concern. A second group of approaches focus on the role of business as a facilitator of dialogue between parties in conflict. In some cases businesses are the only entities in contact with both sides in a violent conflict. These businesses can function as messengers, ensuring the lines of communication are open when official ties have been severed. This is one of the roles envisioned by the Track Three approach of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. Additionally, businesses can use their positions within society to connect peace actors from the top, middle, and grassroots level, as noted by Lederach (1997). Similarly, business actors can use horizontal connections that cross identity lines to engage the other side and bring people together. In its most developed form, this could include having businesses or business organizations actually host and facilitate the dialogues themselves, as has been seen in Colombia and by the Consultative Business Movement in South Africa. Another cluster of interaction-presumptive programs relate to the practice of business itself as a path to improving or increasing interaction between parties. One option here is to promote businesses to provide services to all parties involved in the conflict, like Catholic Relief Service’s multiethnic lending programs in Bosnia. Not only can this create a feeling of equality among those consuming these services, but the regularized interaction of the employees and different groups is presumed to help as well. Business-based peacebuilding programs can also focus on changing hiring, training, and promotion programs to further integrate a multiethnic workforce. This is especially useful in circumstances where class divisions have resulted in one group being vastly overrepresented in management. Again, the presumption is that as people interact with each other as colleagues they will have a reduced likelihood to participate in violence. Tourism-promotion is an interesting form of business-based peacebuilding. It can take two forms: promoting the country as a tourist destination through collaboration among businesses and civic organizations that reach across the lines of conflict or by promoting tourism between two areas that are experiencing or are likely to experience conflict. It may seem strange to think of sites of conflict and violence as tourist destinations, but Sturken disagrees. “Sites of collective trauma are seen as having a particular kind of authenticity and are often the focus of tourist activity” (2007: 11). In general, the actual sites of trauma and memory are owned and managed by governments or non-profits, but the support structure for tourism is built and maintained by business. Also, businesses can be persuasive in pushing for support of this type of tourism from governments. Perhaps the best example of this is the business community of Çanakkale, Turkey, which for the past twenty

106   Designing business-based peacebuilding

years has been hosting over 15,000 Australian tourists around ANZAC Day, on April 25, commemorating the landing of Australian troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula during World War I. Although at the point this began relations between Turkey and Australia were not contentious, the warm reception and joint commemoration events have improved their relations. A similar approach is to promote tourism between antagonists to diffuse tensions or speed up reconciliation. The timeliest example of this is the creation of nonstop cross-strait flights from China to Taiwan and the promotion of cross-border tourism starting in July 2008. The first flights were expected to carry 662 tourists and it is expected the number will expand to possibly 3,000 per day. Alexander Huang, a security researcher at Tamkang University in Taiwan, said “This will be the first time for ordinary Chinese people to see Taiwan for themselves. I think that over time, Taiwanese will feel more comfortable with their cousins on the other side” (Adams 2008). One consideration for tourism promotion is that the tourists who are likely to travel are either middle- or upper class. This is not a reason to avoid the approach, but it should be recognized that tourism is not a way of getting a large number of people from the bottom of Lederach’s pyramid to meet each other. The final option within the interaction-presumptive approaches is the most comprehensive for a business or businesses operating in a region of conflict. They can convene stakeholder dialogues among everyone affected by the conflict and business relations. This is especially useful when the company believes it may be contributing to the conflict in some way or has been accused of causing the problems, even if just in part. This type of program cannot end with just dialogue, however. The business and groups involved would need to identify next steps to be taken, which would likely mean adopting a new idea of what is needed in the conflict and launching a new program tailored to those conclusions. One large benefit of this kind of interaction is that it allows for the creation of elicitive projects, built from the preferences and needs of those affected, instead of borrowed from another experience.

Business-presumptive approaches The third area on the business-based peacebuilding map includes two related forms of peacebuilding. One focuses on projects that promote local business while the other focuses on promoting international business and investment. Of the projects that focus on local businesses, the most direct would be funding local businesses in conflict areas or post-conflict situations, like the UN Development Programme’s Invest-in-Peace program in Sri Lanka. Similar to the “conflict-free” certification project described above, it would also be possible to promote a certification project for products produced by local businesses in conflict areas that are using practices that help address the conflict or otherwise support peacebuilding. Some of this is covered by “fair

Mapping   107

trade” designations, especially when coupled with product presentations that recognize the origin of the product as being from a conflict zone, but a more specific seal is feasible. Independent of outside certification, many companies selling imports from countries in conflict promote the products this way, such as PeaceWorks. Presuming they are accurately representing these products, they are also participating in business-based peacebuilding. Another option is to promote the creation of local businesses, especially after the reduction of direct violence. Since there is often little commerce at first, funding is a large concern. Often this funding is made in the form of microloans, like those issued by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Borrowers take out small loans for projects that will eventually return revenue. This currently appears to be very effective in Rwanda. Funds have been available for survivors to start farms and other businesses, the economy is beginning to prosper, and there has not been a return to widespread violence. With so many men killed and disabled during the genocide, a large number of the new entrepreneurs are women. These women have proven to be more responsible than men at paying back the loans and creating profit-generating businesses, a result that has been observed around the world (Faiola 2008). Local business creation can also be encouraged by providing training and mentorship opportunities for prospective entrepreneurs. The Business Council for Peace participates in this kind of work. In post-conflict situations, one of the largest challenges for those attempting peacebuilding and reconciliation is to account for men who had served as soldiers but are no longer engaged. Additionally, there can be large numbers of people unemployed due to the destruction or failure of their original place of work. Encouraging employment growth on the local level can be helpful in this situation. Businesses can be specifically encouraged (or even given incentives by their international partners) to hire ex-soldiers and others at risk or provide training so those that cannot immediately work will be able to eventually. During a conflict, the ability to keep workers employed may keep them from needing to seek support from the army. A related approach could specifically tackle the problem of refugees. Long after conflicts end, refugees who are unable to return to their homes remain in camps or collection areas. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that as of January 1, 2005 there were more than nineteen million people making up the “population of concern” of refugees, recently returned refugees, the stateless, and internally displaced persons in the world. In 2004, 5.5 million of these people were in “protracted refugee situations” lasting more than five years (UNHCR 2006). While not a solution to the problem of refugees, businesses could promote employment which could help individuals generate some income as well as giving people something to do. This would clearly be an example of business-based peacebuilding, but perhaps an uncomfortable one. The right to choose to participate or not would need to be carefully protected, or refugee employment could slide toward slave labor. If such a program was developed for a particular conflict,

108   Designing business-based peacebuilding

it would be imperative to do so with total transparency and with the close collaboration of the UNHCR. It would not be appropriate to turn refugee settlements into company towns or to use these people to reduce labor costs. One of the most interesting examples in Chapter 3 was the Sadakhlo Market in Georgia, even though many of the participants were not what would usually be considered formal businesses. Encouraging the growth of local markets is an option for promoting local business. Since the scale of these markets is such that most people can participate, they have the benefit of involving a large portion of the population in a region in them. There are concerns with this approach, however. First, these markets can be co-opted by criminal forces and can become conduits for smuggling. Allegations have been made that Sadakhlo has been used in just that way. Additionally, markets are probably not a good idea in an area where physical security cannot be guaranteed since they encourage large gatherings of people at predictable times, so they are vulnerable to attack. As a post-conflict strategy or one to diffuse pre-violence tensions, they are viable. All of these approaches presume that increasing the amount and success of local businesses will reduce conflict. There are also projects that focus on the need to expand international business and investment as well. The first example is best considered a hybrid of local and international business approaches. It involves programs intended to promote the use of local suppliers to international companies with operations in the country already. This interaction not only supports local business, but also creates greater incentives for the international company to promote stability. If governments and local elites desire international investment, the companies looking to invest can choose to negotiate pro-peace behavior into their contracts. For example, revenues could be banned from being spent on arms. This has been done successfully in some cases, but this approach has two weaknesses: first, once the contracts have been signed and the company has begun significant capital expenditure, it loses much of its leverage over the government. The cost to the company of pulling out will be great. Additionally, such a negotiating position would likely be disadvantageous against other companies willing to work without such guarantees. Not only would the company supporting peacebuilding lose out entirely, but this failure could convince government negotiators that such issues need not be addressed. This can be avoided, however, if the companies in an industry collectively agree not to work without conflict-related conditions being met. It is tempting to include the option of a company threatening to stop investment in exchange for changes in conflict behavior, however this steps outside the bounds of peacebuilding. It is clearly a reasonable response to violence, but it is not a positive action taken by or for business. It is simply disengagement. Actively working to encourage international businesses to stay in areas of conflict would be a business-based peacebuilding project. The question facing a company dealing with an outbreak of violent conflict is often whether to stay or go. In some cases, like Mercedes-Benz’s experi-

Mapping   109

ence in South Africa, the company’s continued presence can help it influence governmental behavior, protect resources, maintain employment, and provide some cover for employees and their families. Additionally, a company that is still in the country is in a position to consider other forms of business-based peacebuilding.

Peacework-presumptive approaches The term “peacework” is being used here as a generic label for peacebuilding, conflict resolution, and related terms. These approaches share the presumption that what is needed in the conflict is simply to provide adequate peacebuilding or conflict resolution. This may appear self-serving at first, but in a very literal sense it is the failure of alternative methods of resolution that allows conflict to become violent – for a dispute to become a fight. It is reasonable to argue that more or better conflict resolution and peacebuilding mechanisms could stop a conflict from becoming violent, more quickly end one that has, or work to prevent one that has ended from beginning again. The first approach here might be better labeled “business-sponsored peacebuilding” instead of business-based peacebuilding. Businesses can fund efforts by practitioners and peacebuilding groups. While these could be strategically targeted to address areas in which the company needs assistance, businesses could fund the enterprise of peacebuilding and conflict resolution in general. In fact, a number do exactly this through donations to charitable foundations that fund peacebuilding and conflict resolution programs. It is also possible to form new groups, like the Angola Partnership Initiative, made up of companies involved in a particular country so they can pool resources and be more efficient. Another approach is for businesses to concentrate on creating tools for peacebuilding practitioners. This is especially needed in terms of new communications and collaboration technology. The Info Space effort described in Part I is a good example of a technology-driven peacebuilding effort. However, individual practitioner organizations seldom have the resources or access to the technology needed to refine and invent new technology to use in the field. Companies can often modify existing products or even simply repurpose them to be useful in the peacebuilding effort. These tools could specifically be designed to assist in collaboration between actors in the conflict area. Such collaboration is probably the most difficult aspect of maintaining a comprehensive peacebuilding program in a country. There are IGO actors, NGO actors, practitioners, local political actors, religious and business leaders, and many more groups and people working on different projects, often spread around a large geographic area. No one is formally in charge, and it is very likely that individual programs are at best redundant and at worst working against each other. On top of this, it is important to remember that these actions are taking place in a country

110   Designing business-based peacebuilding

that is either actively in the middle of violent conflict or recently passed that stage. Of all the approaches to business-based peacebuilding in this chapter, this is the one that could make the best business sense to the company that solves the problem of coordination. Since such a solution would also be useful in development work and disaster relief, the windfall could be significant. If a permanent solution to the coordination problem is not an option, business can still act by convening round table discussions with the parties involved in peacebuilding and otherwise ensuring there are adequate opportunities for collaboration where possible. To the extent that a company’s products are needed by peacebuilders, targeted product donations can be helpful. It is tempting to think of products that are directly related to peacebuilding, such as the technology just mentioned, but in practice these organizations can use anything from office paper to toilet paper. Anything that is donated is one less thing that needs to be purchased, increasing the resources that can be expended on program work. A final approach that addresses a need for peacework is for companies to provide conflict resolution training to their own employees. These programs are gaining in popularity as a tool for reducing harmful conflict in the workplace, but employees do not leave their skills at work when they leave.

Leadership-presumptive approaches This area on the map represents business-based peacebuilding approaches that focus on the need for more or better leadership in the conflict. Initially, some business leaders react to a perceived lack of leadership by jumping in and trying to mediate the conflict themselves. While there have been cases of this approach being effective, much of that effectiveness relies on individual characteristics of the person involved instead of their nominal role as a business leader. Additionally, those that have been successful mediators likely would have been successful had they been representing the NGO community or religious groups as well. Provided that the organization supporting the mediation effort had reason to believe that a particular leader would be effective, this approach could be used, but such certainty is difficult to imagine and a program designed around the work of a single person is one that also has a single point of failure. This is unlikely to be the first choice of any pragmatic peacebuilder. This does not mean, however, that it is a bad idea to include business leaders on mediation teams. Representation from the business sector, especially the individuals chosen to represent important companies or industries, can help ongoing mediation efforts. Even so, the individuals chosen would be part of a team and would need significant training and preparation to be likely to make a positive contribution. If a business leader is committed to addressing a conflict situation personally, one option is to encourage them to speak out publicly. When prominent individuals speak out, they can often draw more media attention to a problem

Mapping   111

than NGOs working in the area, in part because warnings from NGOs happen all the time, but it is rare for a CEO to stand up and speak about a political issue like a particular conflict. A plan to provide private statements supporting peace can also provide leadership. Chapter 3 mentions the case of US–China tensions after a US spyplane clashed with a Chinese fighter and landed on Chinese land. In that case, business leaders eschewed media platforms and instead carried their message privately to decision makers in the US and China. A similar process appears to be happening between Taiwan and China as well. While many businesses have policies preventing the company from overtly endorsing political candidates in elections, there are circumstances when campaigning or otherwise supporting a candidate or party is necessary. In some cases, this can be part of a larger peacebuilding effort. In the nonviolent revolution against Slobodan Miloševic´ in Serbia in 2000, led by the youth movement Otpor!, businesses and employee organizations originally tried to stay neutral, but eventually joined the movement against Miloševic´. A business that wants to stay out of the actual electoral process could instead identify promising leaders who can work for peace and help them connect with organizations that can train and prepare them for office. Similarly, businesses can foster improved leadership by helping identify and train NGO leaders, both within the country in conflict and in outside peacebuilding organizations. They can also “lend” managers and executives to these organizations to provide additional leadership and help develop leadership structures that can be continued. Another approach that focuses on building leadership capability is to concentrate on fostering female leaders and entrepreneurs. As discussed above, when local business support has been targeted at women, the result is an increased repayment rate on loans, increased investment in the family, and better economic returns, on average. While this kind of investment supports the creation of local business, it also helps elevate women who might otherwise not be in positions of leadership so that they can contribute to the peacebuilding effort and conflict resolution.

Support-presumptive approaches Some of the most common actions by businesses that contribute to peacebuilding, often without intending directly to do so, seek to address deficiencies in or the lack of social support institutions. Often this is done in order to promote community development as encouraged by CSR supporters. These projects include building schools, medical facilities, civic buildings, and other institutions needed by communities that either supply employees to the company or are affected by the operations of the company. Often, social investment choices are made specifically to address concerns about conflict. For example, Coca-Cola does not have a corporate presence in Sudan, but they do work with a franchise there. The company has chosen to donate all

112   Designing business-based peacebuilding

of its profits from their Sudanese business to support refugee care through Oxfam and the Red Cross (Isdell 2008). Another way of strengthening these support institutions is by helping civil society through donated or low-cost products. It is quite possible that more companies are indirectly supporting peacebuilding through donated and nonprofit-priced products than any other of these approaches. An American nonprofit called CompuMentor is just one example of this phenomenon. CompuMentor works with donor companies to arrange low-cost hardware and software for non-profits. The organization received direct funding from many companies, including Microsoft, AOL, and Cisco Systems in addition to having partnerships with more than 35 companies that provide the products distributed through their TechSoup website. The organization has now expanded globally and claims it serves organizations in more than 190 countries (TechSoup Snapshot 2008). In Fiscal Year 2008, the organization assisted in the delivery of over 900,000 individual products with a retail value of more than $300 million. This would not be possible without the active support of the partner companies. When civil society is able to function efficiently, it can serve more of the general population and positively influence conflict two ways. First, these non-profit or civil-society organizations can become a societal conflict resolution mechanism when functioning properly. Second, by mitigating the worst social conditions, they can prevent some grievances from forming. Shankleman makes an interesting argument about social investment projects that bridges this part of the map of approaches and the next. She suggests that companies can support peace by working with local governments to “recast” investments as development projects (2006: 157).

Symbolic-presumptive approaches The next collection of approaches on the map are those focused on meeting symbolic needs in the conflict. These can involve the promotion of symbols supporting peace as well as countering symbols of intolerance. Kaufman (2001) described conflict that occurred when elites consciously manipulated symbols to influence emotional responses. This can only occur within a background of myths justifying hostility and ethnic fears; basically, Galtung’s cultural violence. There are three approaches to business-based peacebuilding that rely on symbolic action. The first is the use of company advertising to promote peaceful ideals. This differs from the use of advertising to bring attention to a conflict in that it is more abstract and generalized. Instead, companies can focus their advertising on messages of cooperation and tolerance. The most well-known example of this is Benetton’s colorblind advertising, which consciously creates provocative images intended to change behavior. Another option is coordinated symbolic action. Since businesses form connections with other companies across a country, it is easier for them to

Mapping   113

coordinate events like the peace protest in Sri Lanka in 2001. Sri Lanka First was able to mobilize one million people for that event by working through affiliated businesses. The organization also generated commercials promoting peace. The third approach is only useful to one industry within the business community, the entertainment sector. These businesses have the freedom to produce movies, television shows, music and other forms of entertainment that, contain pro-peace messages or bring attention to conflicts around the world. Although these projects do include an informational component and are, therefore, related to information-presumptive approaches, it can be argued that their informational component is limited (and sometimes affected by the requirements of the form in which they are produced), so their symbolic value is more important. The most effective symbolic entertainment for this purpose is that which provides a model for future interaction that is closer to positive peace.

Security-presumptive approaches The final region of the business-based peacebuilding map is occupied by approaches that seek to fill a need for security in a conflict. The intent of using business-based peacebuilding, as described in this book, is to find ways that companies not usually in the business of resolving conflicts or dealing with peacebuilding can do so. This eliminates professional consultancies focuses on peace issues from the discussion (as business participants, at least) as well as other companies that focus on the use or threat of violence as part of their business, such as private military contractors (PMCs). A complete accounting of the role of PMCs in peace operations and conflict situations is important for the understanding of peacebuilding in general, but is beyond the scope of the discussion here. If PMCs are not included in the discussion, how can businesses contribute physical security in a conflict? There are actually two approaches that show how this is possible. The first is sanctuary. Somewhat embarrassingly, it is possible that the most famous example of business-based peacebuilding over the past twenty years is a use of sanctuary, but this was not recognized when the study for Part I was completed. In part this was likely because most business-based peacebuilding actions are about businesses reaching out into their communities in some way while sanctuary is about protecting individuals physically within the business from others in that community. When the Rwandan genocide started, Paul Rusesabagina, the manager of Sabena’s Hôtel des Diplomates, was able to shelter more than 1,000 people during the genocide in another hotel owned by Sabena, the Hôtel des Mille Collines in Kigali. The story, which was made into the movie Hotel Rwanda, incorporates other aspects of business-based peacebuilding as well. When faced with a roadblock that was placed in front of the hotel, Rusesabagina relied on the collection of business cards he had collected through interaction

114   Designing business-based peacebuilding

with people visiting the hotel. He systematically called through the phone numbers listed and eventually found General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, who was acting as the commander of the National Police. Ndindiliyimana had the roadblock removed. (Rusesabagina and Zoellner 2006: 99–100). This is a direct example of the kind of vertical mobility of businesspeople described by Lederach. It could be argued that Rusesabagina’s actions are more an act of individual heroism than business-based peacebuilding, but Rusesabagina’s actions were backed up by Sabena throughout the ordeal. He was in periodic contact with the company headquarters through a fax line that was not being monitored. The day after the genocide began the company notified him that it would do whatever it could to protect its employees. This involved working through the Belgian embassy and lobbying for protection of the people in the hotel. Additionally, Rusesabagina requested company support when his authority in the Hôtel des Mille Collines was challenged by other employees. Although he had been the assistant manager of Hôtel des Mille Collines, he had been made the manager at the Hôtel des Diplomates and some employees of the Mille Collines challenged his right to make decisions. Sabena quickly faxed a formal letter signed by Michel Houtard giving Rusesabagina authority over the Mille Collines. Both the initiative of Rusesabagina and the support of Sabena were required for success. Once sanctuary is recognized as part of business-based peacebuilding, many more examples can be found, such as Oskar Schindler’s sheltering of nearly 1,200 Jews as employees during World War II. Sanctuary is also the one approach to business-based peacebuilding for which any company operating in a conflict zone needs to be prepared. This does not mean these businesses need to have an open-door policy toward those who request sanctuary. Instead, a plan needs to be in place to guide employees should the request be made. What should happen if people fleeing violence show up at the door? What if soldiers attempt to occupy the facility? Who needs to be notified and how? What actions should be taken to protect those granted sanctuary? The other security-based approach is attempting to create “zones of peace.” These are areas that combatants in a conflict agree are off-limits for violence. They are usually single communities or a small group of communities. The impetus to attempt to create a zone of peace usually comes from within the community, not outside, but that does not mean businesses could not start the movement. In the best-case scenario, a zone of peace is declared and recognized by both sides in the conflict as well as NGOs that assist these zones in resisting invasion, like the Zones of Peace Foundation. A zone of peace is sanctuary writ large. The items on this list, taken as a whole, seem quite prescriptive, in Lederach’s sense. They are attempts to chart what could work or has worked elsewhere and not the innovative interaction of indigenous ideas about conflict resolution and peacebuilding. As more elicitive projects are undertaken those will need to be added to the general constellation of available options.

Mapping   115

This list is lengthy, but not complete. Original approaches to peacebuilding will still be developed in the field. But even this list could be overwhelming for a practitioner or business seeking to get involved in business-based peacebuilding. How would they determine what kind of project or projects to support? Where do they go from here? The next two chapters attempt to answer that question by looking first at the actors in business-based peacebuilding and then at suggestions for developing and selling a plan for business-based peacebuilding.

10 Actors in business-based peacebuilding

One of the surprising findings in Part I was how strong a determinant actor type was on the kinds of actions being done within the rubric of businessbased peacebuilding. This is especially interesting in that in most cases the particular interventions attempted did not require that they be managed by a single business, group of businesses, or NGO. In practice they are largely actor-neutral. The same holds true for the approaches mapped in Chapter 9. Most could be instigated by any actor within a conflict, although a few might lose their meaning as business-based actions if only NGOs or practitioners were involved. The primary function of this chapter is to describe the characteristics of businesses and business actors that could make them both particularly receptive to and successful with business-based peacebuilding. It will also include a brief discussion of the other actors involved in business-based peacebuilding, especially the practitioner community that will, in large part, be guiding actual peacebuilding programs. The easiest way to present this is by dividing the actors into three groups: those that support and influence it from outside, those that actively manage it, and the businesses and business organizations without which these efforts would just be simple peacebuilding. The chapter will end with a proposal to create two support organizations needed to help spread business-based peacebuilding and to leverage the business sector for early warning activities.

Supporting and influencing actors Supporting and influencing actors are those that provide some assistance to business-based peacebuilding, but are not actively involved with the projects themselves. These are likely to be either NGOs or IGOs, and while some may spend most of their time on conflict issues, they could also have a different primary focus like development or financial systems. Leadership from the UN, through the UN Global Compact, and other institutions, like the World Bank, will be important for the development and expansion of business-based peacebuilding. While NGOs will still be needed, the global influence and support that can be organized by the IGOs

Actors   117

could dwarf NGO efforts. Additionally, some of the NGOs described up to this point straddle the supporting and practicing divide, with some programs intended just to provide assistance while others are about enacting businessbased peacebuilding itself. Similarly, business associations can act as supporters of businesses’ efforts or undertake business-based peacebuilding on their own. One of the primary roles that can be fulfilled by supporting actors is in organizing peace efforts and business-based peacebuilding across an entire conflict area. Lederach suggests five approaches to help in the coordination of peace efforts, in general. These would also apply to coordinating business-based peacebuilding within a particular conflict. These approaches are: developing a Peace Inventory that documents all of the peacebuilding activity occurring in the conflict, helping create clearer channels of communication between the middle and top levels in the society so business actors seeking dialogue can be more effective, creating and hosting peace-donor conferences that gather together the businesses participating in peacebuilding with IGOs and NGOs supporting other approaches, creating strategic resources groups that can provide specific forms of assistance, and linking internal and external peacemakers (Lederach 1997: 99–102). Governments are seldom noted as supporters of business-based peacebuilding. There is the potential, here, for a much greater role. In conflicts that do not involve an entire country, host governments could engage with their local business communities or international businesses operating in their country. In cases where the host government is one of the belligerents, neighboring governments could work with multinationals to develop programs. This effort will likely be aided by the fact that companies often work in entire regions, so finding those with representation in both countries should not be difficult. More work needs to be done to encourage government-­ business collaboration in business-based peacebuilding. Peace and anti-corporate or anti-globalization activists make up an interesting subset of the support and influence organizations since, in many cases, their primary position is to counter business actions, not encourage them. As mentioned before, in order to promote changes in business behavior these activists primarily organize into transnational networks that allow the actions of member organizations to have their efforts multiplied in both strength and reach. While the anti-corporate movements have focused on international financial institutions, it was initially motivated by business actions in conflict. Klein calls the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa in Nigeria in 1995 “the most significant landmark in the growth of anti-corporate activism.” Saro-Wiwa was campaigning against Royal Dutch/Shell’s oil drilling on the Niger Delta, and his arrest and hanging occurred within the context of military action by Nigeria to stop the nonviolent movement against the drilling (2000: 331). While it could be said that the entire situation in the Niger Delta could have been better handled though the application of business-based peacebuilding,

118   Designing business-based peacebuilding

from the activists’ point of view it reinforced the need to use public exposure to shame companies into changing their behavior or withdrawing from the region. This has developed into the specific tactic of “outing” companies associated with bad behavior overseas that is central to campaigns like that working to stop blood diamonds. It is possible that outing and shaming activities can make companies that are reluctant to participate in business-based peacebuilding join the effort, but this is a dangerous approach. It is likely to be more effective to make arguments about the benefits of business-based peacebuilding instead of threatening companies that are not participating. If a company is receiving attention from activists or has been the subject of publicity actions, it would be wise to bring representatives from the activist community into the business-based peacebuilding process. Not only will this bring in new perspectives, it likely will also limit activist action against the company, presuming the representatives are real participants in the process.

Managing and practicing actors As business-based peacebuilding matures, one of the primary goals of all of the organizations involved needs to be increasing the professionalism of the practice. While some of the peacebuilding programs described in Part I were started by businesses without much consultation with either practitioners or related NGOs, the best chance to both formalize the practice of businessbased peacebuilding and improve the quality of future programs is for businesses to work closely with conflict resolution practitioners and peacebuilding organizations. The first suggestion that should be made to any company interested in business-based peacebuilding is either to add a practitioner to their staff or engage a consultancy that focuses on these issues. This practitioner (whether a full employee or consultant) can help businesses understand the conflict in which they are involved as well as the opportunities for peacebuilding and problems to avoid. While this could greatly expand the market for peacebuilding and conflict resolution practitioners, currently the field itself is probably not ready to provide enough qualified, willing individuals to help. This difficulty is related to an inherent weakness in the way the conflict resolution profession is structured, as explained by Mayer (2004). Mayer has noted that the vast majority of individuals working with conflict professionally consider themselves simply as neutral mediators. Mayer, originally a mediator himself who worked both on domestic conflict in the US and internationally on projects that are closer to peacebuilding, argues the field cannot grow until we expand the notion of conflict resolution practitioner to be, instead, a conflict specialist. Conflict specialists will receive much of the same training as mediators and other conflict resolution practitioners, but may focus more on conflict analysis. The largest difference is in the way a conflict specialist approaches

Actors   119

conflict as a practitioner. While the mediator or other neutral actively seeks only a third-party role, the conflict specialist is just as comfortable working primarily with just one party, providing conflict analysis, program design, training, and even coaching if necessary. The conflict specialist has not abandoned the obligation to address destructive conflict that is central to the conflict resolution approach, but recognizes that this obligation can be fulfilled from a number of positions in the conflict. Conflict specialists working with or for companies seeking to perform business-based peacebuilding will also need a good understanding of business and finance. Additionally, they need to take a pragmatic view of the situation they are within, in order to be as effective as possible. Working within a for-profit company is not the same as working in an NGO. The recognition of this simple fact will help reduce friction between practice and employer and also help the specialist understand how to best utilize the resources available. Until the field of conflict practitioners catches up with Mayer’s proposals, businesses will need to rely on more support from outside organizations and will need to spend more time educating their own employees. Additionally, there are circumstances under which partnering with a NGO makes more sense than just having one practitioner on staff, especially when the scope of the peacebuilding program is large or when coordination among a number of programs and businesses is necessary. It is likely, however, that NGOs are also staffed by people with the training and/or experience of conflict specialists, so in the end the distinction may be minor.

Business actors The most important actors in business-based peacebuilding are, not surprisingly, businesses. One of the primary challenges for NGOs and practitioners is identifying the businesses and business organizations that can be convinced to participate in business-based peacebuilding and those most likely to be successful. For Nelson, there are six characteristics of a business that need to be understood to evaluate its appropriateness for business-based peacebuilding. These are the industry type, company size, company history, ownership structure, the tradition of corporate collective action by the company, and the company’s sphere of influence (2000: 56–61). Industry type is important for three reasons. First, certain industries such as the extractive sector have higher levels of capital investment and a more difficult time abandoning a country due to these sunk costs. Coca-Cola, as a soft drink company, can be more reactive, entering quickly after a conflict and packing up and leaving when necessary. This is even more true when industries are structured around a corporate-franchise model, where the primary corporation, like Coca-Cola, is somewhat insulated from conflict, giving it both greater freedom and possibly less of an incentive to participate. Second, it gives some insight into the kinds of resources used by the

120   Designing business-based peacebuilding

company. Businesses that rely on easily lootable resources can more easily avoid the conflict altogether. The third reason is that some industries should not be included at all, since their main business comes from conflict. These would include weapons manufacturers and private military companies. Company size is simply a concern over the resources available from the company. It is presumed larger companies could put more toward a peacebuilding effort. Ownership structure is more important than it may seem at first glance, since it determines the stakeholders within the company that would need to be informed and convinced to undertake business-based peacebuilding. A private company with a small number of owners or partners can more quickly decide to participate than a public company with a large board of directors. Nelson is concerned about the tradition of collective action by the company as a way of getting at its organizational culture. For a company that is already active in social investment and community involvement, business-based peacebuilding is not much of a departure. A company with no experience will require more resources and time to get started. This allows us to bring CSR back into the discussion. While it has been argued here that CSR is not an effective path to encouraging companies to actually begin businessbased peacebuilding, CSR does set the stage for many of the discussions necessary to getting involved. Similarly, companies that participate in either do-no-harm approaches, like using conflict-sensitive business practices or at least conscientious compliance, will be better prepared to step up to businessbased peacebuilding. The final characteristic worth investigating according to Nelson is the company’s sphere of influence, by which she means the reach of its core business operations, the particular communities affected by it, and the area within which it is participating in dialogue or civil institutions. All of these seem reasonable, but the largest limitation of Nelson’s approach is that it is designed to identify international business actors and does not necessarily apply to local businesses and groups. The concern is not that the wrong questions are being asked, but that the answers for local businesses will often be incomplete or irrelevant. For local businesses in the middle of conflict, it is likely that willingness to participate could be the only important characteristic. Determining which businesses are appropriate for business-based peacebuilding is not the same as determining which are the most likely to be successful with it. As described in Chapter 2, Mehler (2002) recognizes four requirements of the company for successful business-based peacebuilding. The company must understand the business case for peace, must have a framework to determine which approach is appropriate, must have a clear understanding of its role in the process, and must follow existing guidelines. Mehler is discussing situations where the business is designing its own intervention, so some of these will be mitigated through the use of practitioners to assist and advise. In light of that, the most important of these is that the

Actors   121

company be clear about what it is doing and why. Business-based peacebuilding must be deliberate and considered. Some of the most interesting business-based peacebuilding projects described in Part I were the work of business associations or trade groups, not individual businesses or NGOs. While some of these organizations existed prior to the peacebuilding effort, others were formed by businesses specifically to give them a greater voice in the society to advocate for peace. Peacebuildling efforts can be organized by or through many different kinds of business organizations including sectoral or trade associations, tourism agencies, chambers of commerce, and also fraternal organizations populated by businesspeople. There are three primary advantages to businesses working collectively. First, collective action allows businesses to pool their resources and aggregate ability so the work of the group can be greater than anything that could be managed by a single firm. This is especially true with geographically dispersed groups that can coordinate regional or national action. Second, associative action spreads the risk from action throughout the group, while also making retaliatory action more difficult. The third advantage is the most interesting. As indicated in Chapter 4, Rettberg (2004) sees the ability of organizations to tolerate free riders as something that actually strengthens the peacebuilding effort. A large association can tolerate the presence of members who do not significantly contribute to the peacebuilding effort or even are not very convinced it is a good idea. The reason for this is that, from the outside, the organization or movement appears simply as the sum of its members. In effect, when the true contributions of members are unknown, everyone appears to be participating equally. This can make public statements more powerful and persuasive. Additionally, keeping the free riders within the organization retains the potential that they change their minds due to observation of the success of the group or simply their greater comfort with what is happening. These are compelling advantages for the collective approach. Whenever feasible, peacebuilding practitioners should seek to engage ­business organizations or even create them for the purpose of peace­ building. Up until now, this chapter has addressed businesses as if they were monolithic entities. The actual experience of working with businesses is much different. It will be useful to spend some time discussing the characteristics of individual employees or business leaders that may make them more interested in or useful for business-based peacebuilding. Killick and Gündüz believe business-based peacebuilding cannot occur without the intervention of “individual champions” willing to take the lead (2005: 311). These are the individuals who speak out, show up, and generally keep a peacebuilding process moving. Champions need to be selected and cultivated carefully since the peacebuilding practitioner does not want to be linked to an internal department simply by default.

122   Designing business-based peacebuilding

A business that is not experienced with peacebuilding that is approached about it is likely to send the prospective peacebuilder to one of two departments, risk management or CSR compliance. Neither is the best fit for business-based peacebuilding. In general, risk management personnel in international companies are the ones most aware of the conflict, since their primary goal is to predict what will be happening in the future and prepare the company for it. Risk management is often about increasing security, identifying threats, and making informed guesses about trends. As such, it can be a good ally for a practitioner. There is real danger, however, if the entire operation is managed within risk management. Partially this is because risk management is, by design, a restrained department focused more on keeping the company from making mistakes than promoting new approaches. It is possible a practitioner could meet representatives from risk management who would accept business-based peacebuilding as a risk-reduction strategy, but this would be unlikely to happen often, especially in the early years of the practice. CSR compliance poses similar limitations. In most companies, CSR guidelines are viewed as standards to be met and most of the individuals in CSR specialize in knowing the existing laws, regulations, and codes and ensuring the company is abiding by them. This makes sense from the perspective of the company, but peacebuilding practitioners are more likely interested in interacting with individuals empowered to be creative and to mobilize resources. A culture of CSR can be very helpful when selling the idea of peacebuilding to companies, but tying a peacebuilding approach to the existing organizational CSR infrastructure will likely be counterproductive. To avoid the default department referral, practitioners should attempt to meet and get to know employees for the company they wish to approach. This will allow them to encourage those people to become champions within the organization and also encourage a cross-department project that is not tied down in any one place. Employees need to be considered in another way as well. There may be times when the peacebuilding project calls for volunteers from the company or when the company is deciding which employees to send to where the project is underway. There is little mention of this in the current literature, but two perspectives from the NGO community can help start the conversation. Katarina Kruhoja is director of the Centre for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights in Osijek, Croatia. She was interviewed by Margareta Ingelstam for Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz Peacebuilding: A Field Guide (2001) about how she selects individuals for conflict work. Kruhoja looks for people who are committed and motivated. She cautions against those seeking to get involved to be “saved” or to avoid their own pasts. She also is careful to ensure that their behavior is consistent with the mission and vision of the project. They cannot be a destructive force within the organization or company and participate, even if that behavior does not appear to bleed over

Actors   123

to the project work. She is careful to select those who can see the people in the conflict zone as something other than victims and approach them with respect. Luis Enrique Eguren, from Peace Brigades International, added to this that participants be willing to accept the risk of violence and be able to deal with a violent situation. They need to be risk-conscious and adaptable (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 33). Putting all of this together is a tall order, whether for the practitioner trying to get a new project off the ground or a company considering which of its employees to send into a conflict area. What is important is that these individual differences need to be considered when approaching companies and when staffing projects. It matters greatly who is working within a peacebuilding program, no matter how well-designed it is.

A proposal: the collective business initiative and a businessbased early warning system While the actors described in this chapter provide a sufficient network of support for business-based peacebuilding to be successful, there are two opportunities for new organizations to address parts of an overarching business-based peacebuilding regime and add significant value to the practice. The first of these is the Collective Business Initiative proposed by Wenger and Mockli (2003) and briefly described in Chapter 5. The Initiative would be an international NGO chartered to support businesses in conflict by representing the business community in conflict areas, managing programs that promote the development of local business and business capacity development in conflict areas, and offering advice to businesses in conflict areas. This organization would be funded by the business community, primarily multinational businesses that have operations in conflict areas, but the actual programs managed by the Initiative would be donor-independent. Wenger and Mockli argue that the incorporation of traditional development and conflict resolution practitioners, along with employees with business experience recruited from or loaned by member companies, would allow this organization to function more like a business. Presumably, this is intended to be reassuring, but there are well-run NGOs and poorly run businesses. Mixing representatives from the business community with practitioners and experienced non-profit workers is beneficial on its own account. First, businessbased peacebuilding is not only a business activity and not only a peacebuilding one. Using employees from both worlds will ensure a wellrounded perspective on the Initiative’s activity. Additionally, the ultimate consumers of the information generated by the Initiative are businesses and it will be beneficial to have a business perspective to make sure these reports and case studies are understandable. It could be argued that an NGO like the Initiative is not necessary, since the spread of business-based peacebuilding will increase the number and availability of consultants to provide assistance. While this is likely true,

124   Designing business-based peacebuilding

there are advantages to the collective NGO approach. Most importantly, while consultants maintain their value by providing select information to their clients and withholding it from competitors, an NGO chartered to serve the entire community creates value through sharing information and creating networks between its members. This does not mean there is no role for the professional consultant. One important distinction between the work the Initiative will do and a consultant’s contribution is that the consultant will provide advice and information that is much more clearly targeted to the particular conflict in which the business is operating as well as to the characteristics of the business itself. In addition to representing the business community in conflict areas and promoting local business development, Wenger and Mockli suggest that the Initiative provide advice to businesses. This approach should include acting as a clearing house for new business-based peacebuilding ideas as well as developing a rich database of case studies for further study. This approach has been used successfully by the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, but that organization focuses on many different peacebuilding tracks, not just business, and does not have the resources to cover as many cases as the Initiative could. Additionally, the Initiative should place special focus on comparing and contrasting these case studies to produce a best-practices and worst-practices guide for its members. Any form of peacebuilding requires constant reflection and improvement. Peacebuilding is a learning process. Lessons learned must be collected, shared, debated, and incorporated into practice (Paffenholz 2001: 541). This process can be made more efficient and effective through an organization like Wenger and Mockli’s Collective Business Initiative. Right now, a number of NGOs are attempting to perform the functions of the Initiative, but these efforts are incorporated within larger peace-related programs and would be better served by an organization focused exclusively on it. The second organization could be funded by the business community, but could also be run by an existing NGO or IGO. Its intention would be to focus on the possibility of using businesses as an early-warning system for violent conflict. Early warning has long been a primary goal within the peacebuilding and peacekeeping communities, but success has been hit or miss. The best uses of early warning recently have probably been the interventions in Burundi during the Rwandan genocide and in Macedonia during the Yugoslav conflicts. In both cases, widespread violence was avoided (Leatherman, et al. 1999: 23). There are already some early warning databases, such as the Country Indicators in Foreign Policy, but while these incorporate some information from the business sector, they are primarily intended as products to promote to the sector. There is no organization dedicated to collecting data from businesses operating in conflict areas and making it available to wider early warning efforts. Leatherman et al. recognize four characteristics of a working early warning system. It must be able to take with a wide-vision perspective while

Actors   125

being usable day-to-day, have streamlined instruments contextualized to the situation, generate information that is useful for those who can make a difference and easy to process, and ensure that messages coming from the system are clear and consistent (1999: 36). Restated more simply, the purpose of an early warning system is to accurately gather information in the field, process it to uncover trends in conflict and violence, and distribute it to decision makers in a form they can use and understand. For an early warning system to have the best chance of detecting impending violence it must collect data from a large number of indicators and these will invariably include some beyond the scope of businesses. Therefore, a business-based early warning system should be seen as one component of a larger effort, not an end in itself. The purpose of this organization will be to encourage businesses to participate in detection, train employees who are participating, receive and process reports from the business participants, and provide this information in a format that can feed other early warning systems. While such an organization could also publish information to its members, relying only on business-gathered indicators would mean that information coming from the system is unlikely to be clear and consistent. As part of a larger system, this organization could disseminate the more accurate overall conclusions, but this function could also be fulfilled by the Initiative discussed above. There are two primary reasons a company may choose not to participate in an early warning system. First, it will involve the use of company resources. Some employees will be asked to perform observations and will need to be able to file the information they gather with the system. This, however, is likely to be a very small portion of the expenditures for a company in a conflict region, especially if having a functioning early warning system could reduce the uncertainty about being there in the first place. The second reason would be that the company is not necessarily in a position to disclose information it has gathered, because it could compromise relationships with local authorities or because it could compromise the company’s competitive advantage (by disclosing areas the company is studying for expansion, for example). These concerns can be avoided by structuring the system to provide anonymity to participants’ reports. This is one of the main advantages of having an intermediary organization processing reports from the companies instead of having the companies themselves submit directly to another body. The business-based system can vouch for the validity of the data without needing to disclose its source. It could also, in special circumstances, sanitize information in reports without compromising conclusions in order to protect its sources. Both of these organizations would make strong contributions to businessbased peacebuilding and conflict resolution. However, their presence is not required. As shown in Part I, business-based peacebuilding has been effective without them and would only be more so with them.

126   Designing business-based peacebuilding

These last four chapters have examined the business case for peace, the important contributions to business-based peacebuilding that come from the conflict resolution and peacebuilding literature, the possible forms of business-based peacebuilding, and the actors involved. At this point it is reasonable to ask: How can a business leader or peacebuilding/conflict resolution practitioner design and manage a business-based peacebuilding program? The next chapter provides an outline of this process.

11 Developing business-based peacebuilding

The preceding chapters in Part II have addressed business-based peacebuilding from a number of directions. The goal of this chapter is to bring everything together into a set of steps through which a plan for business-based peacebuilding can be produced and used effectively. As such, this chapter is the practical end of Part II. The final chapter will consider outstanding questions, some concerns about business-based peacebuilding, and directions for new research. The steps presented here are intended as an outline and a guide for action, but it is important to remember that peacebuilding is a process and that process is often uneven. It will involve moves backward, jumps forward, and sometimes staying in the same place. These steps will bring analytical clarity, but they should not be made to try and control the process. These steps and the questions that develop from them should be molded to fit the circumstances in which particular instances of business-based peacebuilding occur, not the other way round.

Step one: the conflict The process of creating a business-based peacebuilding program begins with a conflict. For actors living or working within the conflict, their choice of it is already decided. However, there may be some organizations that are more concerned with promoting business approaches to peace in general than in addressing a specific conflict. In that case, the best place to start is with two questions that compare various potential sites of peacebuilding. These could apply to different conflicts entirely, or simply different regions within the same one. • •

Which option has the best chance of being successful? Which option allows the greatest benefit for the scope of resources available?

Throughout this book it has been stressed that predicting the outcomes of individual peacebuilding programs is very difficult with the tools currently at

128   Designing business-based peacebuilding

our disposal. However, some common indicators of success have been noted. Most importantly, Killick and Gündüz argue that there are four preconditions for successful business-based peacebuilding. The business sector must recognize its interest in peace, it should be diverse and influential, the sector should be perceived positively by citizens and be reasonably independent of government interference, and it must contain individuals willing to lead (2005: 311). These preconditions provide an early measure about the sector’s ripeness to participate in business-based peacebuilding. It should be noted that Killick and Gündüz are primarily referring to peacebuilding efforts that seek to engage large portions of the business community. It would still be true, however, that an individual company practicing business-based peacebuilding would be better served by doing so in a similar context. Determining which of multiple options would produce the greatest benefit is more difficult, but is still an exercise that will strengthen the proposal in the end. On one hand, this question makes clear that the ultimate goal of business-based peacebuilding needs to be improving the lives of those in the conflict. There are plenty of other reasons to get involved, such as company prestige or security, but in the end the purpose of peacebuilding is literally to build peace. On the other hand, the question pushes the idea that outcomes are going to be related to resources available and that matching those two will be best. It is much better to succeed with a modest program than to fail with a large one. Whether the conflict in which to intervene was settled by the actors promoting business-based peacebuilding or selected as the best option among many, the next questions to be addressed relate to the conflict itself. The first of these is: •

What is the scope of the conflict being addressed?

Answering this is more complex than it seems. To an extent, we have a tendency to label conflicts according to the largest space they could conceivably occupy. When we say a country is in the middle of a civil war, we do not necessarily mean that every community within the country is actively fighting all the time any more than we intend “World War” to be taken literally. Within any conflict there are pockets of violence and pockets of peace, at least temporarily. Additionally, there is no reason to presume that a peacebuilding project needs to address the most expansive understanding of the scope of the conflict. In fact, many of the examples in Chapter 3 are actions focused on improving conditions in a particular region, valley, or even just village. In such cases, although the actors probably think it is possible for the good effects of their world to spill over, they are specifically choosing to address a smaller scale version of the larger conflict. This becomes especially important when approaches are chosen, since they need to be matched carefully with the portion of the conflict being engaged. From there, we move to:

Developing business-based peacebuilding   129

•

What do we know about the conflict and what can we find out?

It is at this point that it would be helpful to have access to a conflict specialist or consultant who can provide detailed information and serious analysis. At this stage it is important to examine the conflict in a very detailed and thorough way, but also to start looking for metaphors or simplified explanations that will help provided the necessary background to persuade companies and other actors to participate. One important piece of information will be whether the conflict is new (conflict-as-startup-conditions) or at the point where it has become partially self-perpetuating (conflict-as-process). From the serious analysis, hopefully we are ready to ask the final question in Step One: •

What is needed in order to change the circumstances of the conflict so those involved can work toward resolution or reconciliation?

Notice this is specifically constructed to take advantage of the map from Chapter 9. Once we have identified what is needed in the conflict, it is time to move on to Step Two.

Step two: locate partners The common approach to problem solving would encourage a jump from identifying the problem to crafting the solution, but in order to pursue a pragmatic peacebuilding approach, it is important first to locate potential partners for the project. This is because it is a waste of time to develop solutions and interventions that cannot be implemented. Those working for business-based peacebuilding are constrained by the willing (and sometimes less willing) partners that can be found. The first question to pursue in Step Two is: •

What peacebuilding, peacekeeping, peacemaking, or conflict resolution efforts are currently underway?

This is answered by performing what Lederach called a Peace Inventory, a list of all known actors trying to promote peace or conflict resolution in the area as well as the programs being pursued. If the peacebuilding process is being instigated by a business, the Peace Inventory can become a directory of potential partners. For practitioners it can illuminate possible collaboration opportunities with other projects or redundancies. Additionally, it can encourage information sharing between the groups currently active in the field and those developing the new program. At the same time, additional business actors should be considered: •

Are there business associations or other business groups that can be approached?

130   Designing business-based peacebuilding

Chapter 10 discussed the reasons that collective action may be more effective than projects run by single companies and Chapter 3 showed a number of examples of this working. In every design process for a business-based peacebuilding project, associations and business groups should be considered. After that, the focus should turn to identifying businesses that can participate. •

What local or international businesses have a strong incentive to participate?

This is intentionally a different question than asking which businesses are willing to participate. A company that is eager to participate, but does not have a business interest to do so needs to be treated differently from one that is participating out of its own self-interests. This does not mean that the altruistic company cannot be as good a partner as one that is self-interested, but it is possible that their support could be less secure, especially if business conditions change and the company is looking to cut expenditures. After examining incentives, it is time to determine which companies to approach as partners: •

What businesses are likely to participate?

The companies likely to participate are made up of those with strong interests related to the results of peacebuilding and those with strong cultural or organizational reasons to participate. Additional consideration should be given to companies located with the scope of conflict identified in Step One. At this point, it is a good idea to stop and ask: •

What creative alternatives have not been considered?

The process of choosing a conflict and locating partners can seem deterministic. A practitioner seeking to make a difference in an oil producing region is likely to first consider oil companies as actors. That makes sense, but a pause to consider unorthodox alternatives is warranted. Few peacebuilding programs are hampered by an excess of support. An example may be useful to illustrate this point. In the Philippines during the reign of Ferdinand Marcos, most major media practiced self-censorship, unwilling to risk criticizing the regime. However one location of resistance arose in the pages of women’s magazines such as Mr. & Ms. These were not taken seriously enough to be censored and when the nonviolent “People Power” revolution was underway they were primary sources of information and coordination for protestors (Uy-Tioco 2007). A practitioner designing a peacebuilding program for the Marco-era Philippines would probably not have considered using women’s magazines as a partner, at least not upon original consideration. Once potential partners have been selected, they should be approached to

Developing business-based peacebuilding   131

discuss their interest. Of course, no company will wholeheartedly endorse a project like this without understanding the details involved, but it is important to have at least tacit approval to move ahead. Otherwise, there is a risk of developing projects around participants that would not agree under any circumstances. Additionally, one more question needs to be asked: •

What businesses have conflicts of interest and conflicts of practice that should disqualify them from participating?

Conflicts of interest in this sense are not necessarily legal conflicts, but reasonable reasons that their business could jeopardize the peacebuilding effort or where peacebuilding could unnecessarily risk damaging their business. The most direct example of such a conflict is when a company actively makes profits from the existence of the conflict. This is the reason that weapons manufacturers and private security companies should be ruled out of consideration early in the process. These conflicts of interest do not need to eliminate all possible participation, however. If the danger is to the company’s business, as opposed to the peacebuilding project, participating along with many other companies may make that risk manageable. Additionally, there are some approaches that can be suited to companies that, for example, profit from large contracts with the government. Those companies should not be used in projects that require the appearance of neutrality, but could be used to open lines of communication with the government or to pressure the government to change policies that are contributing to violence. Conflicts of practice relate to instances where the business in question is actively encouraging conflict through their business practices. These companies should not be approached for business-based peacebuilding until they have adopted conflict-sensitive or do-no-harm practices. •

What other decision makers at the partners need to be involved in a decision to join the peacebuilding effort?

The initial contacts that make up Step Two will seldom reach many of the ultimate decisionmakers in the companies approached. It will be important to know who has the authority to make a final decision and which stakeholders would be involved in this. Can the CEO decide on their own? Does someone need to make a presentation to the Board of Directors? Are there large shareholders to consider? Founders? Once partners have been identified and courted, it is time to focus on which approaches to use in the business-based peacebuilding project.

Step three: choose projects and approaches If enough effort has been put into the first two steps, this is much simpler. Earlier chapters have relied on the inductive and deductive approaches to

132   Designing business-based peacebuilding

identifying peacebuilding programs for a conflict. When choosing from the approaches in Chapter 9, it is best to work from inductive to deductive approaches. The first issue is to determine what is needed in the conflict in order to help it move toward peace. This has already been answered as the final question of Step One. The initial answer should be revisited in light of the information gathered in Step Two, especially the Peace Inventory. It is quite possible that other groups have identified the same needs and may already have adequate programs in place, leaving the possibility for new actors to focus on different needs. Once the needs in the conflict have been established, the deductive approach is used in asking: •

Of the approaches that meet the needs we have identified, which are within the ability of the group of identified partners?

It is important that the deductive question follow the inductive. If the first question is “What is available?” and the second “What can we do with what we have?” there is a danger of adopting ill-suited approaches just to make use of what is available. If there are not options available to address the identified needs through the group of partners, then the solution is to either expand the number of partners or to be more creative in creating a program. No matter what, a solution should not be forced upon a problem that it is illsuited to address. There are two additional questions that can assist in evaluating the potential options for programs: • •

Is the conflict in an initial stage (conflict-as-startup-conditions) or inertial (conflict-as-process)? Or is the conflict still latent? Which of the approaches that could be used are most feasible for businesses to use?

Determining the stage of the conflict provides assistance in selecting between tension-reducing options (for pre-violence situations), cause-focused options that attempt to remedy the specific problem that caused the conflict (for early, conflict-as-startup-conditions cases), or process-focused options that seek to interrupt the self-reinforcing conflict system (for conflict-as-process cases). Once the options available have been narrowed down, feasibility and the ease with which partners will agree become important. Shankleman noted two criteria that should be met for there to be a reasonable expectation that businesses would participate: first, the project must follow a “business logic” designed for it and, second, the program should be designed as to have a reasonable opportunity of success while producing an identifiable contribution (2006: 153). The former is important because the project will need to be explained and justified to business representatives, and the latter is important

Developing business-based peacebuilding   133

so the company can reasonably expect to receive some credit for the project if it works. Both of these will make it easier to gain support during Step Four. The final questions in this step attempt to forecast outcomes for the project: • • • •

What is the likeliest outcome of the project? What is the best-case outcome? What is the worst-case outcome? How does the approach or intervention expected to work?

Partners will want to understand the impacts that are possible from the project as well as have some understanding of the likely outcome and the range of possible outcomes. This applies equally for the project itself and the participants in it.

Step four: sell the plan to the partners With a formal plan in hand, the potential partners need to be converted into actual partners. A number of questions need to be addressed. The first of these is: •

What additional information is needed so that participants can make informed choices?

Since in Step Three a particular course of action was adopted, there will likely be new information that needs to be gathered related to that practice in order to help businesses decide whether or not to participate. Similarly: •

What aspects of the conflict or the peacebuilding program will need to be explained to decision makers at the business?

Galtung’s definitions are useful here. The concepts of negative and positive peace and types of violence are basic enough for business leaders to understand, although unfamiliar, and meaningful enough to act as a gateway to more detailed and specific analysis. Some care need be taken here to avoid patronizing the business leaders as well as burying them in technical analysis. One important thing to consider is that business leaders will be able to make decisions more quickly if the questions are presented in terms they can easily process. This may mean discussing concepts such as the costs of the action vs. the costs of inaction, external costs that may not regularly be considered, and return on investment. Additionally, special attention should be paid to the symbolic aspects of participation, which may otherwise get lost in reified cost/benefit discussions.

134   Designing business-based peacebuilding

•

Does the company participate in other community-focused or CSR activities?

This book has been consistent in arguing that responsibility is a weak argument to sell business-based peacebuilding to businesses, but if a company has already committed to CSR it will probably be easier to persuade to step further into proactive programs. When these arguments have leverage within the organizational culture of a business, they should be used. •

Who else needs to be convinced?

The participants in business-based peacebuilding are not the only ones who need to be comfortable with the program. Individuals in the target communities do as well. Care must be taken to manage expectations and diffuse any cynicism about business action so those who stand to benefit will assist, instead of resist, the program.

Step five: revise After presenting the business-based peacebuilding plan to the partners, revisions will likely need to be made. The important question here is: •

What accommodations need to be made to maintain the resources necessary to continue?

Some actors will not be swayed by the arguments that arise during Step Four, but may be willing to stay involved pending changes in the peacebuilding plan or with the involvement of additional actors. For some, the issue will be the need for additional security, which could come from group action or the option for some anonymity for participants. While the ability to brag about good deeds may motivate some businesses, others may only be interested if they can keep their company from being connected to the actions being taken, at least until the situation in the conflict changes. Once partners have agreed to move ahead, the next step is implementing the program.

Step six: implement The act of implementation does not generate questions to answer in itself. However, it is important to note that the implementation of the program is the result of the significant planning work that has occurred during the first five steps. If those have been completed carefully and conscientiously, implementation will be easier. However, there is no way to plan for all of the contingencies that will arise during the peacebuilding program. While this is the shortest step in this chapter, is it the most complex in practice.

Developing business-based peacebuilding   135

Step seven: assess and revise The questions that need to be addressed during the time in which the peacebuilding program is ongoing relate direct to how it is working and how it can be improved: • • • • • • •

Is the program meeting its goals? Can improvement in the conflict situation be seen? If there is improvement, what other factors may be causing it? If there is no improvement, is there anything that could explain the ineffectiveness of the project? Is the program still focused on its original mission? Are the participants in the program satisfied with it? What can be done differently to address problems that have arisen? Is the program worth continuing?

All of these are straightforward. Together they form an ongoing reflective practice where information about the project and changes in the conflict situation around it are fed back into the program through changes to either shift its focus to new concerns or refocus it on the original ones.

Step eight: assess and share A similar set of questions should be used after the project has finished in order to determine what lessons can be taken from the experience and to identify mistakes that were made. This information should be shared with other peacebuilding groups active in the conflict area and with other practitioners of business-based peacebuilding through case studies or lessonslearned documents. Since this chapter is about the process of designing and selling a businessbased peacebuilding project, it appears from a glance at the steps described that the difficult and complex work occurs early on in the process and later steps are simpler. While it is true that a program that is pragmatic and wellplanned will have a better opportunity for success, there is a limit to the contribution that good planning and good information can make. Ultimately, peacebuilding projects will thrive or wither in the field. Identifying experienced and qualified partners will be a very important component of success. So will utilizing reflective assessment and being willing to change what is being done in response to changes in circumstance.

12 Caveats and questions

After discussing the past practice of business-based peacebuilding in Part I and charting a path ahead in Part II this final chapter wraps up some loose ends by attempting to answer one nagging question, providing some caveats for the business-based peacebuilding enterprise, and examining some of the issues it is now clear will need to be addressed in future research.

The war in Iraq This book was written by an American in the second term of the Bush administration, but no single mention has been made of the possibility of business-based peacebuilding related to the war in Iraq. Truthfully, this absence is probably motivated in part by a distaste for the war itself and the methods through which it has been pursued with some level of embarrassment for those involved. This, however, is not a reasonable reason to ignore a conflict. To some extent, Iraq would provide a good test for business-based peacebuilding approaches. On first glance, the conflict would appear hostile to efforts by external business actors. How then would one go about designing a peacebuilding program with businesses to resolve current conflicts in Iraq? Was there any potential for having used a business-based approach before now to limit the destruction caused by the conflict? The answer to these questions might depend on how we define the conflict in Iraq. It is a conflict between the US-led coalition forces and insurgents? Or an internal conflict between ethnic and religious groups within the context of a significant American pullout? The prospects for business-based peacebuilding to address Iraqi-American conflict are slim. First, there are very few international companies to engage. The international companies that are present in the country are primarily there to either support the occupation or to participate in the oil industry. Those there supporting the military should be ruled out due to their conflict of interest. From an international business perspective, that would leave oil companies. Companies from the extractive industries have been successful in other contexts, but it would likely be difficult for these companies to be taken as credible and sincere. The animosity toward foreign forces seems to also apply to external companies as well. If

Caveats and questions   137

these companies were to work on improving their image with Iraqis, it would be for their own sake and not for the sake of peace. If they were to take conflict-related actions, these would probably relate to the do-no-harm approach more than true peacebuilding. Envisioning an Iraq without a large American presence, but still containing a non-trivial amount of violence, does appear to open some space for business-based peacebuilding. In this situation, foreign companies would still likely face credibility problems, but peacebuilding focused on the support and creation of local business would be a possibility. The approach with the most potential would be something like promoting entrepreneurship and exchange within communities to promote a return to normalcy. This approach would need to be carefully limited to areas where some stability and reasonable security has been established. It would be useless in neighborhoods where people are afraid to leave their homes. If there is one thing working in favor of this kind of approach, it is that many Iraqis can remember a time of relative commercial prosperity. Of course life under Saddam Hussein was not perfect and the economic condition of the country suffered greatly with the imposition of sanctions after Iraq’s invasion of and repulsion from Kuwait, but at least in this case the commercial and business system of Iraq at this point needs to be recreated, not created from whole cloth. This is a significant advantage. The existence of successful overseas Iraqis could also provide substantial assistance. The fact that business-based peacebuilding may not be appropriate in this particular conflict, at this particular time, should not be taken as an indictment on the approach itself as it represents only one option for conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

Caveats In a book about business, it is appropriate to include a list of caveats to consider. The largest of these is to make clear a presumption that underlies this discussion of business-based peacebuilding. This book presumes that corporations are participating in business-based peacebuilding in good faith, or at least for the reasons they claim. In reality, this is an unrealistic assumption for every case, albeit one that is necessary for the analytical exercise intended here. Presuming that companies are always pursuing actions that conflict resolution and peacebuilding actors feel are good, or are doing so for motives that would also be considered good is a mistake. Not only do peaceworkers and businesspeople define their approach to “good” differently, it must be acknowledged that some actions will be undertaken in bad faith. Provided that business-based peacebuilding is practiced as a comprehensive approach, including vibrant assessment, this issue can be reduced to a debate over the legitimacy of advertising claims when a company chooses to brag about its work. However there is a real danger that if one party participating in the program is not doing so for admirable reasons, it would also be willing

138   Designing business-based peacebuilding

to withdraw from the program at any time, possibly endangering other participants and risking making the conflict worse. This is one reason to avoid any companies that directly profit from the conflict. It is imperative to avoid situations where participants need to choose between their business and creating peace. The other primary caveat is to note that, in order to maintain the conflict resolution approach described in Chapter 1, this book has focused on how to promote peacebuilding within the existing structure of commerce. This differs from a peace studies approach like Galtung’s “Peace Business,” which envisions remaking the commercial system so that all externals costs of violence – direct, structural, and cultural – are included in business decisions. This revolutionary change is seen as either a necessary step toward creating true, positive peace or possibly as a consequence of it. Either way, business would be very different. If the peace business approach is, in the end, the correct one, there is a real danger that business-based peacebuilding could provide a distraction from realizing the truth about an oppressive system.

Future questions While this book has attempted to focus the discussion of business-based peacebuilding and provide some guidance for its practice, it also raises many more questions. Hopefully, as the body of practice and assessment grows and more researchers take up the topic the following questions will be satisfactorily addressed. The true scope of business-based peacebuilding is unclear. There may be many cases of behind-the-scenes activity or actions that companies are not promoting, but which have positive effects. How widespread is businessbased peacebuilding? What new categories of actions need to be considered? Why do some companies choose to engage conflict while others retreat or attempt to remain neutral? Is this behavior related to the characteristics of the business organization itself or the individuals leading it? What, therefore, are the best points of leverage for practitioners and activists attempting to encourage businesses to engage in business-based peacebuilding? Where are the failures of business-based peacebuilding? Currently, there is no incentive for companies to report projects that do not produce the intended results, especially if such programs worsen the conflict in which they are tried. At best right now we have cases like the sunshine negotiations between the Koreas, which appeared to be successful at the time they were publicized, but later failed. In order to grow as a field, however, it will be important for researchers to be able to study the failures as well as the successes. Similarly, tools for the assessment of business-based peacebuilding are critically needed. The lack of these is not surprising, however, since assessment has been a major problem in the field of conflict resolution in recent

Caveats and questions   139

years for interventions from the interpersonal to the international. The necessary assessment in the case of business-based peacebuilding is twofold. Not only is an understanding of whether the business-based peacebuilding program undertaken was beneficial in the context of the greater conflict itself, but we also need to understand whether such a program was beneficial to the company itself. While non-profit organizations can operate seemingly exclusively on positive outcomes, in the end the success of a business will be measured by shareholders and stakeholders and neither the goodwill of an international community nor the reconciled parties of a violent conflict can allow a company to continue operating on their own. Hopefully, successful business-based peacebuilding efforts correlate to a successful business, but at this point this is only a wish. There is no adequate method of evaluating the relationship between the two. If a company can be successful at peacebuilding but fail at business, it is imperative that practitioners understand those circumstances and work to develop programs that do not exacerbate the problems of business. Otherwise, the entire enterprise risks being marked as a bad idea by investors, CEOs, and boards of directors. Another question is whether it makes analytical or practical sense to include local business-building activities like the funding of small business, the creation and facilitation of physical markets and other forms of cultivation aimed at promoting healthy interaction, on one hand, and interventions by foreign multinational corporations attempting to do conflict resolution, on the other, as part of the same concept. In this book, business-based peacebuilding has been separated from higher-level programs of economic intervention for what appear to be reasonable reasons, but it is also possible that between the extremes of supporting local small business and outside companies the differences are so pronounced that they should be treated as two different types of peacebuilding. Another question is whether to include the notion and practice of business-based peacebuilding into the education of future business leaders. Viewed exclusively as a business proposition, the author of this book strongly encourages all business schools to not only create courses in business-based peacebuilding, but to make them part of core education for all students. Considering the matter realistically, business students must already cover many different topics. To what extent would mainstreaming businessbased peacebuilding in business education promote its use in conflict areas as opposed to simply burdening students with information they, individually, are likely to use? While the number of companies involved in zones of conflict is growing, many companies operate happily uninvolved. Would it be better to incorporate the discussion of positive interventions like businessbased peacebuilding into the discussion of Corporate Social Responsibility? Or to leave the majority of instruction to the conflict resolution practitioners and peaceworkers used to doing it on the job, as they need to do with other groups in conflict?

140   Designing business-based peacebuilding

The conflict resolution movement in the United States may provide some guidance here. After almost forty years of formal Alternative Dispute Resolution practice related to the business community, the percentage of practitioners who make a living exclusively from practicing is still small and limited usually to the most experienced and connected. Many more in the field are able to live by teaching conflict resolution approaches. If the goal of such instruction was simply to create more mediators and arbitrators, the volume of students would quickly absorb the demand for services, hurting everyone. However, in recent years many practitioners have moved from the goal of creating new practitioners to imparting conflict resolution skills to individuals who will use these skills to address conflict in their organizations. A similar approach could point the way for the incorporation of business-based peacebuilding into business education. While a thorough knowledge of business-based peacebuilding theory and practice would be wasted on a majority of students, the ability to recognize, analyze and qualify the negative effects of business (as in a business conflict assessment) and to consider how to collaborate across companies and communities and with governmental and non-governmental actors in order to engage an obstacle to business would be a boon to many business leaders of the next generation. The fact that exposure to business-based peacebuilding as a case might also make such leaders more willing to listen when approached by practitioners or to consider engaging them when faced with situations of violent conflict would be an added benefit. Finally, it is unclear whether widespread cooperation between the business sector and conflict resolution is likely to occur. There are two obstacles to this. First, viewed within Sandole’s two-culture analysis, the majority of conflict resolution education and discourse is concerned with startup-­ condition analysis – what in other venues has been called “root causes analysis.” At the same time, business can be criticized for sometimes being too stuck in the world, too pragmatic, but this pragmatic focus often makes businesses more likely to focus on conflict-as-process. The argument here has been that conflict resolution practitioners and peacebuilders should move away from cause-based models of intervention, but is that likely? Is it truly a large enough problem to scuttle the approach, or is it just likely to reinforce the phenomenon noted in Part I where particular approaches are associated more with business-originated or practitioner-originated programs? This book began with the statement that our global approach to the resolution of violent conflict has been inadequate. Business-based peacebuilding can be an important contribution to making our efforts more effective, reliable and efficient, but it cannot be the only change. The involvement of business is not a panacea and just as the market itself does not keep individuals from taking up arms against each other, businesses and business groups will not be able to contribute in every case and possibly not even in most cases. However, it is clear from the proceeding analysis that the conflict resolution and peacebuilding communities ignore business contributions to their work

Caveats and questions   141

to their own detriment and that businesses affected by violent conflict should realize they can contribute to making a positive change in the societies in which they operate. It is hoped that this book has hewed to Galtung’s call for peacebuilders to act with Realism of the Head and Idealism of the Heart, described in Chapter 8. The examples of business-based peacebuilding from Part I are very encouraging, as is the large menu of options available to those seeking to participate. However, we must keep focused on the past, the present, and the future. The future drives the peaceworker to have hope, the present provides a reminder to focus on the world that is in order to create the conditions for change and improvement, and the past provides a reminder of what can be done and what can happen when nothing is done.

References

Adams, J. (2008) “Flights Begin from China to Taiwan,” New York Times, July 4. Online, available at: www.nytimes.com/2008/07/04/world/asia/04taiwan.html?ref=world (accessed July 5, 2008). Alpher, D.G. and Borris, E.R. (2004) “Markets and Peace: Common Visions, Common Bridges,” in Occasional Papers, Arlington, VA: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. Anderson, J.L. (2000) “Oil and Blood,” The New Yorker, August 14, 46–59. —— (2002) “Our New Best Friend,” The New Yorker, October 7, 74–83. Anderson, M.B. (2002) “Developing Best Practice for Corporate Engagement in Conflict Zones: Lessons Learned from Experience.” Paper read at Public Bads – Economic Dimensions of Conflict Conference, November 26–27, Berlin. Online, available at: www.inwent.org/ef-texte/publicbads/anderson.htm (accessed January 12, 2006). Anheier, H. (2004) Civil Society: Measurement, Evaluation, Policy, London: Earthscan. Annan, K. (2004) “Role of Business in Armed Conflict Can Be Crucial – ‘For Good and For Ill’.” United Nations. Online, available at: www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/ sgsm9256.doc.htm (accessed March 24, 2006). Bais, K. and Hujiser, M.H. (2005) The Profit of Peace: Corporate Responsibility in Conflict Regions, Sheffield, UK: Greenleaf Press. Ballentine, K. (2004) “Natural Resources, Governance, Development and Conflict.” Paper read at DESA Expert Group Meeting on “Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Development,” November 15, New York. Ballentine, K. and Sherman, J. (2003) “Introduction,” in K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds.) The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Baltes, M. (2001) “Improving the OSCE Capacity to Alleviate Economic and Environmental Risks of Conflict.” Paper read at the OSCE and UNECE Villars Colloquium on “The Role of the Economic Dimension in Conflict Prevention in Europe,” November, Villars, Switzerland. Banfield, J., Barbolet, A., Goldwyn, R., and Killick, N. (2005) Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries, London: International Alert. Batruch, C. (2003) “Oil and Conflict: Lundin Petroleum’s Experience in Sudan,” in M. Dettling (ed.) Adding Fuel to the Fire: The Role of Petroleum in Violent Conflicts, Bern: Swisspeace. Baudrillard, J. (1995) The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Bell, S. (2008) “Charity Funding Terror” National Post, November 20. Online, available at: www.nationalpost.com/news/canada/story.html?id=974528 (accessed November 21, 2008).

References   143 Ben & Jerry’s (2008) “50 Ways to Promote Peace.” Online, available at: www.benjerrys. com/features/50_ways/50ways.cfm (accessed November 20, 2008). Bennett, J. (2001) “Business in Zones of Conflict – The Role of the Multinationals in Promoting Regional Stability.” Paper read at UN Global Company Policy Dialogues, March 21–22, New York. Online, available at: www.unglobalcompact.org/content/Dialogue/PolicyDialogues2002/ZonesOfConflict/Reg_Stability.htm (accessed March 20, 2006). Berman, J. (2000) “Boardrooms and Bombs: Strategies of Multinational Corporations in Conflict Areas,” Harvard International Review 22 (3): 28–32. BICC. (2004) BICC Bulletin, Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion. Blair, M.E., Bugg-Levine, A.J., and Rippin, T.M. (2004) “The UN’s Role in Corporate Social Responsibility,” The McKinsey Quarterly (4). Online, available at: www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article_page.aspx?ar=1499&L2=33&L3=117 (accessed February 22, 2006). Bpeace. (2006) Business Council for Peace 2006. Online, available at: www.bpeace.org (accessed March 24, 2006). Bray, J. (2005) “International Companies and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Cross-Sectoral Comparisons,” in Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, Washington, DC: World Bank. Boutros-Ghali (1992) “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping” Report of the Secretary General of the UN, June 17. Online, available at: www.un.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html (accessed October 10, 2008). Campbell, A. (2002) “Fueling Conflict of Financing Peace and Development?,” in Country Indicators in Foreign Policy, Ottawa: Carleton University. Champain, P. (2005) “The Cost of Stalemate: Economic Aspects of the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict,” Accord 17: unpaginated. ChevronTexaco. (2004) Case Studies in International Community Engagement 2003. Online, available at: www.chevron.com/social_responsibility/community/docs/intl_ case_studies.pdf (accessed November 1, 2004). Cilliers, J. (2001) “Business and War,” African Security Review 10 (3): unpaginated. Online, available at: www.iss.co.za/PUBS/ASR/10NO3/Cilliers.html (accessed March 29, 2006). Colletta, N.J. and Cullen, M.L. (2000) Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital, Washington, DC: The World Bank. Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2001) Greed and Grievance in Civil War, Washington, DC: World Bank. Concepcion, S., Digal, L., Guiam, R., de la Rosa, R., and Stankovitch, M. (2003) Breaking the Links Between Economics and Conflict in Mindanao, London: International Alert. Cousens, E.M. (2001) “Introduction,” in E.M. Cousens and C. Kumar (eds.), Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Cutter, A. (2005) “Peace Building: A Literature Review,” Development in Practice 15(6): 778–784. Davis, I. (2005) “What is the Business of Business?” The McKinsey Quarterly (3): unpaginated. Online, available at: www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article_page.aspx?ar=1638& L2=21&L3=37 (accessed February 22, 2006). Diamond, L. and McDonald, J. (1996) Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace, 3rd edn, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

144   References Dugan, M. (1996) “A Nested Theory of Conflict,” Women in Leadership 1(1): 9–19. ECON Centre. (2001) Economic Driving Forces of Conflict and War, Oslo: ECON Centre for Economic Analysis. Economist. (2000) “Risky Returns,” The Economist, May 20. Online, available at: www. economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_PPQPNJ (accessed March 20, 2006). —— (2002) “Let’s be Friends,” The Economist, April 11. Online, available at: www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TDRDQPD (accessed March 20, 2006). Earth Island Institute (2008) “Dolphin Safe Tuna.” Online, available at: www.earthisland. org/dolphinSafeTuna/consumer/ (accessed November 5, 2008). Ezigbo, O. (2006) “JDA: Nigeria Demands Apology From São Tomé,” This Day, February 27. Online, available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200602270721.html (accessed March 20, 2006). Faiola, A. (2008) “Women Rise in Rwanda’s Economic Revival,” Washington Post, May 16. Online, available at: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/05/15/ ST2008051504314.html (accessed October 20, 2008). Fort, T.L. (2007) Business, Integrity, and Peace: Beyond Geopolitical and Disciplinary Boundaries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fort, T.L. and Schipani, C.A. (2002) “The Role of the Corporation in Fostering Sustainable Peace,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 35: 389–436. —— (2004) The Role of Business in Fostering Peaceful Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fourie, A. (2005) “Brokering Peace and Building the Nation: The National Business Initiative in South Africa,” in P.v. Tongeren, M. Brenk, M. Hellema, and J. Verhoeven (eds.) People Building Peace: Successful Stories of Civil Society II, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Frankental, P. and House, F. (2000) Human Rights: Is It Any of Your Business?, London: Amnesty International UK and the Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum. Friedman, T.L. (2000) The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: Anchor Books. Fukuyama, F. (1989) “The End of History?”, The National Interest 16: 3–16. —— (1995) Trust: The Social Values and the Creation of Prosperity, New York: Free Press. Galtung, J. (1996) “Peace and Conflict Research in the Age of the Cholera: Ten Pointers to the Future of Peace Studies,” International Journal of Peace Studies 1(1). Online, available at: www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol1_1/Galtung.htm (accessed August 5, 2007). Galtung, J., Jacobsen, C.G., and Brand-Jacobsen, K-F. (2002) Searching for Peace: The Road to TRANSCEND, 2nd edn, Sterling, VA: Pluto Press. Gerson, A. (2000) “The Private Sector and Peace,” Brown Journal of World Affairs VII (2): 141–145. Gerson, A. and Colletta, N.J. (2002) Privatizing Peace: From Conflict to Security, Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers. Global Witness. (1999) A Crude Awakening: The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets, London: Global Witness. Goldwyn, R. and Switzer, J. (2004) “Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Towards the Integration of Conflict Assessment and Prevention in Extractive Industry Practice,” in Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence, Rijswijk, the Netherlands: OGEL. Goulbourne, T. (2003) “Corporate Social Responsibility: The Business Case,” in Country Indicators in Foreign Policy, Ottawa: Carleton University. Guáqueta, A. (2002) “Economic Agendas in Armed Conflict: Defining and Developing

References   145 the Role of the UN,” in Symposium, New York: International Peace Academy and Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science. Gültekin, B. and Hertoft, M. (2005) Turkish-Georgian Cross Border Interactions for Integrating South Caucasus, Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council and the European Centre for Minority Issues. Online, available at: www.tabdc.org/ pdf/K-A-english.pdf?id=324 (accessed March 10, 2006). Hattotuwa, S. (2004) Untying the Gordian Knot: ICT for Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding, Info-Share.org. Online, available at: www.info-share.org/files/ UntyingTheGordianKnot.zip (accessed March 10, 2006). —— (2006) Daring to Dream: CSCW for Peacebuilding, Info-Share.org. Online, available at: www.info-share.org/files/UntyingTheGordianKnot.zip (accessed March 10, 2006). Haufler, V. (2001) A Public Role for the Private Sector: Industry Self-Regulation in a Global Economy, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Henderson, M. (1996) The Forgiveness Factor: Stories of Hope in a World of Conflict, London: Grosvenor Books. Hochschild, A. (1998) King Leopold’s Ghost, New York: Mariner Books. Homer-Dixon, T. (1994) “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases,” International Security 19 (1): 5–40. Homer-Dixon, T.F. and Blitt, J. (1998) Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment, Population and Security, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Hoyos, C. and McNulty, S. (2003) “The Oil Company the Greens Love to Hate,” Financial Times, June 11: 8. Human Security Centre. (2005) The Human Security Report 2005, New York: Oxford University Press. Online, available at: www.humansecurityreport.info/index.php?option =content&task=view&id=28&Itemid=63 (accessed March 1, 2006). Humphreys, M. (2003) Economics and Violent Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research. IMTD. (2005) IMTD – Business and Peacebuilding, Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy 2006 Online, available at: www.imtd.org/initiatives-business.htm (accessed September 10, 2005). Ingelstam, M. (2001) in L. Reychler and T. Paffenholz (eds.), Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. International Alert. (2005) Peace Through Profit: Sri Lankan Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility, London: International Alert. Isdell, N. (2008) “Interview: Africa – Things Go Worse with Oppression, Says Coke,” Allafrica.com. Online, available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/200806050716.html (accessed October 19, 2008). Jones, B.D. (2001) “The Challenges of Strategic Coordination: Containing Opposition and Sustaining Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars,” in IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation, New York: International Peace Academy. Kaufman, S.J. (2001) Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Keck, M.E. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Killick, N. (2002) “Conflict Prevention in Azerbaijan,” in V. Haufler (ed.) Case Studies of Multistakeholder Partnership, New York: UN Global Compact. Killick, N. and Gündüz, C. (2005) “The Peacebuilding Potential of Local Businesses,” in P.v. Tongeren, M. Brenk, M. Hellema, and J. Verhoeven (eds.) People Building Peace: Successful Stories of Civil Society II, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

146   References Killick, N., Srikantha, V.S., and Gündüz, C. (2006) “The Role of Local Business in Peacebuilding,” in Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Berlin: The Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management. Klein, N. (2000) No Logo, New York: Picador USA. von Koerber, E. (2002) “How Can International Companies Contribute to Conflict Prevention in Areas of Conflict and Social Tensions.” Paper read at Public Bads – Economic Dimensions of Conflict, Berlin. Online, available at: www.inwent.org/ef-texte/ publicbads/koerber.htm (accessed January 10, 2006). Kumar, C. (2001) “Conclusion,” in E.M. Cousens and C. Kumar (eds.), Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Lamb, G. (2000) “A Literature Review on the Current Relationship between War and Economic Agendas in Africa,” in Staff Papers, Cape Town, South Africa: Centre for Conflict Resolution. Lambert, B. (2007) “Chocolate Now Fuels War in West Africa?”, The Christian Science Monitor, July 17. Online, available at: www.csmonitor.com/2007/0717/p04s01-woaf. html (accessed September 14, 2007). Lang, M. and Taylor, A. (2000) The Making of a Mediator: Developing Artistry in Practice, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Leatherman, J., DeMars, W., Gaffney, P. and Vayrynen, R. (1999) Breaking Cycles of Violence: Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises, Sterling, VA: Kumerian. Lederach, J.P. (1995) Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. —— (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Lindbaek, J. (2004) “Strengthening Conflict-Sensitive Business Practices in Vulnerable and Conflict-Affected States,” in UN Global Compact Symposium, New York: UN Global Compact. Marikkar, N. (2006) Empowering the Silent Majority: The Initiative for Inclusive Security. Online, available at: www.womenwagingpeace.net/content/articles/0222a.html (accessed March 29, 2006). Marks, S.C. (2000) Watching the Wind: Conflict Resolution During South Africa’s Transition to Democracy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Mayer, B.S. (2004) Beyond Neutrality: Confronting the Crisis in Conflict Resolution, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Mehler, A. (2002) “Results and Recommendations from the Experience of the EU Conflict Prevention Network,” in Public Bads – Economic Dimensions of Conflict, Berlin: Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung GmbH. Mullan, R. (2001) “The Role of the Business Community in Northern Ireland,” in L. Reychler and T. Paffenholz (eds.), Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Nathan, L. (2005) “ ‘The Frightful Inadequacy of Most of the Statistics’: A Critique of Collier and Hoeffler on Causes of Civil War,” Track Two 12 (5): 1–36. Nelson, J. (2000) The Business of Peace: The Private Sector as a Partner in Conflict Prevention and Resolution, London: The Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, International Alert, and the Council on Economic Priorities. Neufeldt, R. (2004) Catholic Relief Services Peacebuilding Activities, Baltimore, MD: Catholic Relief Services. Online, available at: www.crs.org/publications/pdf/Peb0405_e. pdf (accessed March 10, 2006).

References   147 Paffenholz, T. (2001) “Peacebuilding: A Comprehensive Learning Process,” in L. Reychler and T. Paffenholz (eds.), Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Peel, M. (2003). “São Tomé Coup Leader Calls for Fresh Elections,” Financial Times, July 18: 6. Peres Center for Peace. (2006) Online, available at: www.peres-center.org (accessed March 10, 2006). Pierer, H.V. (2004) “The Role of Business in Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping and PostConflict Peacebuilding,” AICGS Advisor, May 6. Online, available at: www.aicgs.org/ analysis/c/pierer050604.aspx (accessed March 10, 2006). Price-Smith, A. (2002) The Health of Nations: Infectious Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development, Cambridge: MIT Press. Putnam, R.D. (1993) “The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life,” American Prospect 13: 35–42. Rettberg, A. (2004) “Business-Led Peacebuilding in Colombia: Fad or Future of a Country in Crisis?,” in Working Paper Series, London: Crisis States Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science. Richards, P., Bah, K., and Vincent, J. (2004) “Social Capital and Survival: Prospects for Community-Driven Development in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone,” in Social Development Papers, Washington, DC: The World Bank. Ross, M.L. (2003) “Oil Drugs and Barons: The Varying Role of Natural Resources in Violent Conflict,” in K. Ballantine and J. Sherman (eds.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, London: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Rotberg, R.I. (ed.) (1996) Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Rusesabagina, P. and Zoellner, T. (2006) An Ordinary Man: An Autobiography, New York: Viking. Ryback, T. (1998) “The Man Who Swallowed Chrysler,” The New Yorker, November 16, 80–89. Sandole, D.J.D. (1999) Capturing the Complexity of Conflict, London: Pinter. Schreck, J. (2005) “Building Peace through Business in Sri Lanka,” People Building Peace Newsletter, July 20. Online, available at: www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/index.ph p?module=news&lg=en&showdate=2005–07 (accessed March 10, 2006). Schrodt, P.A., Yilmaz, O. and Gerner, D. (2003) “Evaluating ‘Ripeness’ and ‘Hurting Stalemate’ in Mediated International Conflicts: An Event Data Study of the Middle East, Balkans, and West Africa.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Portland, OR, February 2003. Online, available at: http:// web.ku.edu/keds/papers.dir/Schrodt.etal.ISA03.pdf (accessed October 25, 2008). Shankleman, J. (2006) Oil, Profits, and Peace: Does Business Have a Role in Peacemaking? Washington: USIP Press. Sherman, J. (2002) “Options for Promoting Corporate Responsibility in Conflict Zones: Perspectives from the Private Sector,” in IPA Meeting Report, New York: International Peace Academy. Sherriff, A., Lange, M., Alexander, L., and Banfield, J. (2004) “Development and Peacebuilding: Meeting Institutional Challenges,” in Issue Papers on Development and Peacebuilding, Utrecht: Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. Simpson, J. (2004) Breaking the “Curse” – Sharing the Wealth in Developing, Resourcerich Countries, Calgary: World Petroleum Council. Smille, I. (2003) “Motherhood, Apple Pie, and False Teeth: Corporate Social Respons-

148   References ibility in the Diamond Industry,” in Occasional Papers, Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada. Smith, R. (2003) “The Impact of Hate Media in Rwanda,” BBC News, December 3. Online, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3257748.stm? (accessed November 12, 2008). Sturken, M. (2007) Tourists of History: Memory, Kitsch, and Consumerism from Oklahoma City to Ground Zero, Durham: Duke University Press. Switzer, J., and Ward, H. (2004) Enabling Corporate Investment in Peace, Chatelaine, Switzerland: International Institute for Sustainable Development and International Institute for Environment and Development. TABDC. (2006) Online, available at: www.tabdc.org (accessed January 10, 2006). TechSoup (2008) “Snapshot 2008.” Online, available at: www.techsoup.org/about/ pressroom/files/screenshot2008.pdf (accessed November 22, 2008). Thassim, A. (2006) Investing in Peace: Private Sector Initiatives the Sri Lankan Experience. Online, available at: www.peoplebuildingpeace.org/upload/resources/Newyork_ Presentation2_-HDCC.ppt (accessed February 20, 2006). Tirman, J. (2000) Make the Money Sing: Private Wealth and Public Power in the Search for Peace, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Tongeren, P.v., Brenk, M., Hellema, M., and Verhoeven, J. (2005) “A Profitable Peace: The Confederation of British Industry in Northern Ireland,” in P.v. Tongeren, M. Brenk, M. Hellema and J. Verhoeven (eds.), People Building Peace: Successful Stories of Civil Society II, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers. UNHCR (2006) The State of the World’s Refugees: Human Displacement in the New Millennium. Online, available at: www.unhcr.org/static/publ/sowr2006/toceng.htm (accessed September 3, 2008). UNDP. (2006) Invest in Peace, New York: United Nations Development Programme. Uy-Tioco, C. (2007) Interview with author, November 19, 2007. George Mason University, VA, USA. Wallis, W. (2003) “Warlords and Adventurers Thrive in the Scramble for Congo’s Riches,” Financial Times, July 16, 4. Ward, A. (2003) “From Cows to Cash in Quest for Korean Peace,” Financial Times, June 26, 6. Weber, S. (2002) “Multi-stakeholder Initiatives in Zones of Conflict: The Academy for Peace and Development, Somaliland,” in V. Haufler (ed.), Case Studies of Multistakeholder Partnership, New York: UN Global Compact. Wenger, A., and Mockli, D. (2003) Conflict Prevention: The Untapped Potential of the Business Sector, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers. Wilslade, J. and Monk, G. (2000) Narrative Mediation: A New Approach to Conflict Resolution, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Wittner, L.S. (1997) Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement 1954–1970, Stanford: Stanford University Press. World Bank. (2006) Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project. Washington, DC: World Bank. Online, available at: http://web.worldbank.org (accessed March 10, 2006). Zandvliet, L. (2002) “How Companies Can Contribute to a Less Violent Working Environment.” Paper read at Public Bads – Economic Dimensions of Conflict, at Berlin. Online, available at: www.inwent.org/ef-texte/publicbads/zandvliet.htm (accessed January 10, 2006). —— (2006) “Opportunities for Synergy: Conflict Transformation and the Corporate Agenda,” in Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Berlin: The Berghof Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

References   149 Zandvliet, L. and Nwankpo, A. (2004) Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited Field Visit: June 30–July 13, 2004, Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action. Zandvliet, L., Campos Ornosa, Y., and Reyes, D. (2004) Efforts to Operate Constructively in a Context of Conflict: Best Corporate Practices in Colombia, Cambridge, MA: Collaborative for Development Action. de Zoysa, T. (2002) “The Role of the Private Sector in Conflict Resolution in Sri Lanka.” Paper read at Public Bads – Economic Dimensions of Conflict, Berlin. Online, available at: www.inwent.org/ef-texte/publicbads/zoysa.htm (accessed February 22, 2006).

Index

ABB 40 Abkhazia 30 American Express 30 Angola 21–2, 32, 40, 63, 73 Angola Partnership Initiative 46, 109 AOL 112 Armenia 30, 47, 105 Australia 106 Azerbaijan 30, 36–7, 47, 105 Balkans 40, 69, 124 Bangladesh 107 Ben & Jerry’s 35, 103 Benetton 35, 103, 112 Bildt, Carl 37 Body Shop, the 35, 103 Bosnia-Herzegovina 31, 69, 105 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 84–5 BP Amoco 20–1, 36, 38 British Angola Forum 45–6, 55, 104 Burma 40 Burundi 39, 70, 124 Business Council for Peace 30, 107 Business Peace Alliance 44, 54 Cambodia 56 Cameroon 32 Canada 49, 72 Carnegie, Andrew 33 Catholic Relief Services 31, 105 Caux Round Table 34, 104 Chad 32 Chevron/Texaco 32, 36, 64 Chiapas 37, 41, 69, 72 China 63, 85, 106, 111 Chrome 64 Chung Ju-yung 35–6 Cisco Systems 112 CNL Nigeria 36–7 Coca-Cola 40, 76, 79, 103, 111, 119 Collaborative for Development Action (CDA) 31

Collective Business Initiative 64, 123–4 Colombia 34–5, 38, 44–6, 49, 53, 55, 80, 105 CompuMentor 112 Confederation of British Industry 41–2, 54–5, 103 Congo 24, 34, 39, 58, 73 Consolidated Goldfields 35, 54 Consultative Business Movement 42–3, 105 Cyprus 30 DaimlerChrysler 31 De Beers 24 DHL 40 Ericsson 36 d’Estang, Oliver Giscard 34 Estée Lauder 33 Exxon 20 Georgia 30, 47, 57, 72 Global Witness 98 Goldman Sachs 30 Grameen Bank 107 Groove Networks 41 Grupo Mega 37 Guatemala 37, 41 Guerrero, Rodrigo 45 Heineken 39 Hong Kong 29 Hyundai 35–6 IDC 37 India 30, 36 Indupalma 38 Infoshare 41, 58 Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy 29, 51, 55, 105, 124 International Alert 30, 44, 51, 54–5, 80, 102, 105

Index   151 International Business Leaders Forum 30 International Institute of Sustainable Development 30, 102 Iraq 136–7 Israel 31, 33 Israel–Palestine conflict 30–1, 37, 41, 72 Jordan 31 Kaku, Ryuzaburo 34 Kim Dae-jung 35–6 Kosovo 36, 40, 70, 85 Lauder, Ron 33 Liberia 73 Lonrho 33 Lundin 37, 51, 53 McDonald’s 72 Macedonia 85, 124 McKinsey 36 Matsushita, Konasuke 34 Mercedes-Benz 40, 108–9 Mexico see Chiapas Microsoft 112 Morel, Edmund 58 Mozambique 33 Myanmar see Burma Nagorno-Karabakh 30 National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) 29 Nigeria 35–7, 63–4, 70, 117 North Korea 35–6 Northern Ireland 26, 30, 36, 41–2, 50, 54, 103 Oracle 36 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 22 Pakistan 30, 72 Palabora Rio Tinto 40 Palestine see Israel–Palestine conflict Peace Group, President’s Forum Bogotá 45, 55 PeaceWorks 40–1, 50, 107 Peres Center for Peace 31, 104 Peru 31 Petronas Carigali Overseas Sdn Bhd 38 Philippines 26, 46, 130 Philippines Business for Social Progress 46 Phillips, Frederik 34 PriceWaterhouseCoopers 36

Reuters 30 Rowland, Tiny 33 Royal Dutch/Shell see Shell Rusesabagina, Paul 113–14 Russia 72, 85 Rwanda 30–1, 39, 56–7, 69–70, 72, 83, 88, 91, 107, 113–14, 124 Sabena 113–14 Sadakhlo Market 47, 57, 61, 108 São Tomé 63–4 Saro-Wiwa, Ken 117 Schindler, Oskar 114 Schrempp, Jürgen E. 40 Scott, Laurence 29 Serbia 70, 85, 111 Shell 20, 70, 117 Siemans AG 37 Sierra Leone 22, 57, 73 Somalia 26, 46–7, 85 South Africa 26, 30, 34–5, 40, 42–4, 49, 54, 72, 105, 109 South Korea 35–6 South Ossetia 30 Sri Lanka 26, 30, 41, 43–4, 49–50, 54–5, 58, 72, 106, 113 Sri Lanka First 43–4, 55, 113 Statoil 37 Sudan 24, 35, 37–8, 49, 85, 103, 111–12 Syria 33 Taiwan 29, 63, 106 Talisman 24, 35, 49, 103 Timberland 35 Triumph 40 Turkey 47, 105–6 Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council 47, 54 Turkish-Greek Business Council 47 United Nations Development Programme 32, 36, 106 United Nations Global Compact 19, 32, 55, 116 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 32, 37, 44 Vallenpaz 44, 55 Vietnam 36 Volkswagen Foundation 33 World Bank 32, 116 Zambia 34 Zimbabwe 90