Bureaucracy and bureaucrats in Mexico City, 1742-1835 9780816510689

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
List of Figures and Tables (page ix)
Acknowledgments (page xi)
1. Politics and Bureaucracy (page 1)
2. The Empire, the Republic, and the Bureaucracy (page 12)
3. The Mexico City Secretariats: Professionalization, Reform, Crisis, and Reorganization (page 24)
4. From Audiencia to Supreme Court: The Cádiz Contribution (page 56)
5. The Fiscal Bureaucracy: Decision Making, Challenges from Within, and Independence (page 81)
6. Bureaucrats: Job Security, Income, and Family (page 98)
7. Bureaucrats: Career Opportunities, Personnel Policies, and Politics (page 112)
8. The Colonial Legacy (page 127)
Appendix A. Salaries of Positions in Fiscal Departments, 1754-1835 (page 131)
Appendix B. Salaries of Positions in Congressional Offices, 1825-1835 (page 151)
Notes to the Chapters (page 153)
Bibliography (page 183)
Index (page 197)

Citation preview

Bureaucracy and Bureaucrats 1n Mexico City

- Blank Page | |

Bureaucracy and

Bureaucrats 1n Mexico City

174.2—1835 Linda Arnold

The University of Arizona Press, Tucson

THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA PRESS 7

All Rights Reserved , : Manufactured in the U.S.A. 7 | Copyright © 1988

The Arizona Board of Regents ,

This book set in 10/13 Linotron 202 Galliard. ,

p.cm. , Bibliography: Includes index. p. | ,,, JL 1246.A476 1988 , } CIP . Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Arnold, Linda. ,

Bureaucracy and bureaucrats in Mexico City, 1742-1835 / Linda , Arnold. ,, ISBN 0-8165-1068-7 (alk. paper) , ,

1. Bureaucracy—Mexico—History—18th century. 2. Bureaucracy—

Mexico—History—roth century. 3. Crvil service—Mexico— History—18th century. 4. Civil service—Mexico—History—1oth | century. $5. Mexico—Politics and government—1540—1810. 6. Mexico— Politics and government—1810—1821._ 7. Mexico—Politics and

government—1821-1861. I. Title. , 354.7201 09—dcI9 88-17226

British Library Cataloguing in Publication data are available. ,

This book is printed on acid-free, archival-quality paper. ,

Dedicated to Nettie Lee Benson

Blank Page |

Contents

List of Figures and Tables 1x

Acknowledgments XI 1. Politics and Bureaucracy I

2. The Empire, the Republic, and the Bureaucracy 12 | 3. The Mexico City Secretariats: Professionalization, Reform,

Crisis, and Reorganization 24. |

Contribution 56

4. From Audiencia to Supreme Court: The Cadiz

5. The Fiscal Bureaucracy: Decision Making, Challenges from

Within, and Independence 81

Politics 112 8. The Colonial Legacy 127

6. Bureaucrats: Job Security, Income, and Family 98 7. Bureaucrats: Career Opportunities, Personnel Policies, and | Appendix A. Salaries of Positions in Fiscal Departments, 1754-1835 131 Appendix B. Salaries of Positions in Congresstonal Offices, 1825-1835 151

Notes to the Chapters 153

Bibliography 183 Index | 197

Vil |

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Figures and Tables

Figures

2.1 Employee Turnover, 1761-1832 19 2.2 Percentage of Employees With at Least Ten Years of

Experience in the Administrative Bureaucracy 20

Mexico City, 1811 104.

6.1 Location of Residences of Viceregal Employees in

Tables 2.1 Donations to the Peninsular Army by Government

Employees, 1811-1814 21 2.2 Donations to the Army of the Three Guarantees by

Government Employees, 1821 22

3.1 Organizational Structure of the Viceregal Secretariat, 1773 27

3.2 Salaries of Positions in the Viceregal Secretariat 33 3.3. Organizational Structure of the Viceregal Secretariat, 1788 36 3.4. Organizational Structure of the Viceregal Secretariat, 1790 38 3.5 Organizational Structure of the Viceregal Secretariat, 1797 44.

3.6 Salaries of Positions in the Executive Secretariats 52 3.7. Organizational Structure of the Secretariat for Interior and

Foreign Affairs, 1822—1823 53 1x

x Figures and Tables 3.8 Organizational Structure of the Secretariat for War and | Naval Affairs, 1822 , | $4.

Decree 62 ,

| 3.9 Organizational Structure of the Secretariat for Justice and

Ecclesiastical Affairs, 1822-1835 5 ,

4,1 Courts and Positions Abolished under the October 9, 1812,

4.2 Perquisites of Audiencia Ministers 64.

A.1 Salaries of Positions in the Real Aduana 131 A.2 Salaries of Positions in the Contaduria de Azogues 134

A.3 Salaries of Positions in the Casa de Moneda 134 -

Correos y Postas , 137

A.4. Salaries of Positions in the Administracio6n Principal de

A.s Salaries of Positions in the Direcci6n General de Rentas 138

, A.6 Salaries of Positions in the Loteria 38

A.7_ Salaries of Positions in the Contaduria de Media Anata 139 |

A.8 Salaries of Positions in Temporalidades 140

A.g Salaries of Positions in the Renta de Pélvora y Naipes 141 | A.10 Salaries of Positions in the Contaduria de Propios y Arbitrios 142 A.11 Salaries of Positions in the Tribunal y Contaduria de Cuentas 142

- A.I2 Salaries of Positions in the Comisaria Subdelegada de la a

-Bulas de la Santa Cruzada 144

A.13 Salaries of Positions in the Renta de Tabaco 144

A.14 Salaries of Positions in the Tesoreria General 146 ,

(Retasas) | 149 ,

A.15 Salaries of Positions in the Contaduria General de Tributos

, Publico , 152

B.1 Salaries of Positions in Congressional Secretariats Isl 7

, B.2 Salaries of Positions in the Contadurfa de Hacienda y Crédito

Acknowledgments

This study is the culmination of a research project that 1 began during my | first semester in graduate school at the University of Texas at Austin. It is not possible to acknowledge the contributions of all of the people who assisted me during the years I have spent researching and writing. Still, there are a number of historians and friends who merit special mention. Nettie Lee Benson with her incomparable knowledge of sources, enthusiastic curiosity, and unceasing encouragement guided me through a Master’s thesis and Ph.D. dissertation. Lawrence S. Graham and Karl M. Schmitt also provided guidance and support during my years in Austin.

Hours of discussions with Doris M. Ladd, Brian R. Hamnett, Jay Kins- | bruner, John E. Kicza, Takako Sudo Shimamura, Mark A. Burkholder, Colin MacLachlan, and S. Lief Adleson brought insights during many enjoyable lunches, suppers, and soirees. My fellow graduate students in Austin and fellow researchers at libraries and archives in United States, Mexico, and Spain exchanged and compared ideas and approaches and offered grand camaraderie during the years of scanning dusty documents. I thank the staffs of the Benson Latin American Collection, the Archivo

General de la Nacidn in Mexico City, and the Biblioteca Nacional de México for their help. I am particularly indebted to Alejandra Moreno Toscano for granting me access to thousands of uncatalogued documents at the AGN. Also, Roberto Beristain at the AGN spent many hours idenxl

xii , Acknowledgments | tifying uncatalogued volumes that he thought might contribute to my

research and which did. Lyman De Platt of the Genealogical Department : of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints made heretofore unused

_and uncatalogued census material on microfilm available. | | Jack Dabbs shared his research with me. I am most appreciative for his

| permitting me to review his manuscript guide to Real Hacienda in the Archivo General de la Nacién and for giving me copies of salary lists he oo compiled from that source. The Secretaria of the Oficialia Mayor of the Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico gave me a reprint edition of

_ Fabian de Fonseca and Carlos de Urrutia’s monumental Historia general , | de real hactenda, an invaluable reference guide for the late colonial fiscal

| bureaucracy. José Marfa Mariluz Urquijo provided a copy of his work on , the late colonial viceregal bureaucracy in Buenos Aires. The Escuela de

| Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla generously offered copies of many

of the works published by that exceptional research center. Maria Dolores | Morales gave me a copy of the 1813 Mexico City property census, which | is not catalogued in any library in a manner that makes its contents evident | to a researcher. Jay Kinsbruner, John E. Kicza, and Adan Benavides gra- a _ ciously passed me archival references.

Research for this study included seven trips to Mexico, four to the , | Bancroft Library at the University of California at Berkeley, one to Spain, © | and one to Salt Lake City. Financial support for such extensive travel was made possible by grants from the Institute of Latin America Studies, the

_ Department of History, the Graduate School, and the School of General , , ~ and Comparative Studies at the University of Texas; a Fulbright scholar- 7 ship from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1977—

1978; a fellowship from the Organization of American States in 1978—1979; _

a and grants from the Department of History and the Humanities Program | at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. I have little doubt | | that my patience for organizing an untold quantity of data on 2,733 long - forgotten Mexican bureaucrats and countless notes from regulations, cor-

respondence, files, and a variety of record books would have given out , long before now had it not been for such generous support. The assistance

| - of so many has contributed immeasurably to the final product. While

pretation. ,

| appreciative of all, I alone am responsible for any errors in fact or inter- :

;_ |support. | | | | | LINDA ARNOLD , Finally, to Georgia B. Ragsdale, my grandmother, and Jeannette R.

Webb, my aunt, I extend my heartfelt appreciation for their love and |

Bureaucrats in Bureaucracy and

Mexico City

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CHAPTER I

Politics and Bureaucracy

The origins of modern nations in Latin America are found in the Bourbon reforms, the Napoleonic Wars, and the wars of independence. These eighteenth- and carly nineteenth-century developments gave rise to new eco-

nomic and political groups throughout the hemisphere. During the nineteenth century those groups struggled to create new political systems and new domestic and international policies. Political instability in the new nations stood in contrast to three centuries of stable imperial rule. Confronting the paradox that instability had its roots in stability, historians

have sought to identify and trace the concerns and dynamics of late colonial | interest groups. Still, historians have yet to research the core element of the colonial political system, the viceregal bureaucracy. This study fills that gap in the literature. By focusing on the impact of Bourbon admunistrative

and personnel reforms and constitutional and political changes in the viceregal bureaucracy in Mexico City, it shows that Bourbon reforms, justified on the basis of enhancing the prosperity of the people, strengthened the imperial state by professionalizing the bureaucracy of empire. It also shows that political revolution during the 1820s, justified on the same basis, displaced the bureaucracy and in so doing eliminated it as the intermediary between state and society. With their ideological roots in the Enlightenment, national politicians replaced royal bureaucrats as guardians of the state. I

2 Politics and Bureaucracy For Mexico the event that led to political independence was Napoleon - Bonaparte’s capture of the Spanish kings in 1808. By holding Charles IV

and Ferdinand VII captive between 1808 and 1814, Napoleon decapitated | the imperial political system. The response in Spain to the absence of the

| king was the return of the sovereignty of the state to the people. That | response led to a parliamentary constituent congress to which Mexico sent deputies. The congress framed the 1812 constitution, promulgated in Mexico the following year. After Ferdinand VII returned to power in 1814 and

abrogated the constitution, neither he nor his close advisors responded , astutely to the interests of the new political and economic groups through-

out the empire, and its dissolution was the result. | Independence alone did not accomplish a political revolution or establish | a modern political system in Mexico; these resulted from Mexico’s exper- | iment with republican federalism during the 1820s and early 1830s. During

the first federal republic, politicians successfully displaced the old bureauc- | racy of empire from its powerful position in the political system. Removing |

| the bureaucracy and bureaucrats from their traditional position and re- : placing them with political institutions and politicians was the essence of the political revolution.

| Appreciating the significance of the early national political revolution | requires an understanding of the colonial viceregal bureaucracy. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Hapsburgs of Spain created that bureaucracy in order to exercise sovereignty and maximize access to colonial resources.’ As the intermediary between society and the state, the

colonial viceregal bureaucracy was the institutional core of the colonial

| political system. Clearly, bureaucrats were key actors; they helped shape | and implement imperial policies. Their political position permitted them

groups in colonial society. 7

| to balance the goals of the Crown and the goals of the diverse interest

The fact that studies have not analyzed the relationship of the bureauc_ racy to the political system before and after independence is principally a

, — result of traditional concepts of periodization.* Mexican historians have long distinguished between the colonial period (1521-1810) and the early national period (1821—1854.) and have identified the years between 1810 and | 821 as the independence period. This periodization, along with the distinct

themes explored and questions raised by researchers, has led to three

distinct bodies of literature. The historiography of the late colonial era on |

the institutions, economy, and society of Mexico approaches but does not 7 broach analysis of continuity and change during the independence period.

Politics and Bureaucracy 3 Historians of the independence era have tended to focus on rebel leaders

and military history. And historians of the carly national period have principally described and analyzed the political actors and rhetoric of the era. A small but growing body of literature that crosses the boundaries of

traditional periodization and Eric Van Young’s call for reconceptualizing | periodization have drawn attention to the need for studies that examine continuity and change during the “Age of Revolution,” the 1750-1850 era.

Adopting the concept of the Age of Revolution as a period of study encourages historians to ask new questions about state and society in Latin

America. What became of the great bureaucracy of empire is one of those | questions.

Traditional periodization has also inhibited a broad understanding of the evolution of the loss of faith in the monarchy to solve the problems of the empire. That loss of faith did not stem from the Napoleonic Wars or the inability of Ferdinand VII to solve the problems of the empire; it had its roots in the policies and programs of the eighteenth-century Bourbon imperialists. It grew out of the recognition of the contradiction in enlightened despotism with, on the one hand, its commitment to enhancing

the power of the state to the point of burdening imperial subjects with , new taxes and of engaging in costly incessant warfare and, on the other hand, its commitment to improving the material prosperity of royal subjects.* Political revolution was the response of the Mexicans to that contradiction; they preferred the goal of material prosperity of the people to a powerful, costly state. For their revolution to succeed, they had to change

the political system; they had to destroy the means whereby the imperialists | enhanced the power of the state, that is, its administrative bureaucracy. Even though traditional periodization has limited the analysis of con-

tinuity and change during the Age of Revolution, an ample body of literature exists upon which to draw for discussion of the viceregal bureaucracy. From the early studies of Berkeley-trained scholars such as Donald Smith, Lillian E. Fischer, and Herbert I. Priestley to more recent works of the historians at Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos in Seville, researchers have sought to identify the policies, organization, institutions, and major figures of the bureaucracy of empire.* Numerous historians also have grappled with the relationship between royal policy,

bureaucrats, and local society; the nature of careers and career tracks; and , the significance of the Bourbon reforms.° The historiography on the colonial system falls into five major categories: studies of viceroys and viceregencies; studies of oidores and audiencias; analyses of fiscal policies and

4 Politics and Bureaucracy programs; works on regional administration; and examinations of mu- | nicipal governance. The literature pertinent to this study is that body of _ material concerned with the first three categories: viceroys, audiencias, and

fiscal affairs.

| Our understanding of viceregal administration in Mexico began with

, Donald Smith’s 1910, still-seminal study The Viceroy in New Spain. In | straightforward and readable style Smith outlined the administrative duties

of the viceroys in civil, military, and ecclesiastical affairs. As the senior | representatives of the king in the New World, they were responsible for | overseeing civil governance, including the collection of taxes, the expen- | diture of revenues, the regulation of commerce, law enforcement, the administration of justice, and municipal government. Viceroys also issued | titles of appointment for lower-level staff in the fiscal and judicial sectors

of the colonial bureaucracy and for local officials in the least prosperous | provincial districts (alcaldias mayores, then subdelegaciones). As captains general, viceroys were the superior commanders of military, naval, and

~ militia forces. As vice-patrons of the Church, viceroys ensured compliance | with the prerogatives of royal patronage in the areas of tithing, the con-

| - $truction and repair of ecclesiastical buildings, the mission programs of the regular orders, and disputes within and between ecclesiastical corpo- | |

| | rations.

Biographical studies of individual viceroys have elaborated on the role

of these king’s men in Mexico City. Arthur S. Aiton noted in his study | of Antonio de Mendoza, the first Mexican viceroy (1535—1550), that viceroys

used their prestige, financial resources, and power to cultivate “proper awe

| and authority” of royal governance.® Submissiveness to royal authority | was a necessary component of the ideology of empire and colonial imperial |

rule. Building on the foundation Mendoza laid, later viceroys promoted | _ respect for a hierarchical social and economic system and facilitated the a development of the administrative and political infrastructure of empire.

That viceroys proved to be successful royal delegates is demonstrated by _ three centuries of imperial domination of the Americas. | During the Hapsburg era (1492—1700) the Crown relied on the Church

| as its chief ally and partner throughout its empire. The Church converted , native Americans, regulated the personal behavior and attitudes of all the

Crown’s subjects, and reinforced awe and authority of the Crown, teaching _ that a hierarchical social, political, and economic system was the natural — | _ and proper God-given order of life on earth. This partnership served both

Politics and Bureaucracy 5 the Crown and the Church in their separate as well as mutual interests in the Americas. With the succession of the House of Bourbon to the throne in Madrid in 1700, the secular notion of the sovereignty of the state in temporal affairs

became a dominant component of the official Spanish ideology, and with | it came policies and programs to enhance the power of the state and strengthen the imperial bureaucracy. During the eighteenth century the Crown justified new imperial policies and the expansion of the role of the

state by claiming that 1t wanted to promote the material prosperity and well-being of all of its subjects.” Bourbon imperialists, intent on improving

the global power and prestige of their empire, reformed old institutions | and developed new policies, programs, and institutions in order to increase the financial resources of the Crown. And to ensure metropolitan control

over these reforms, the Crown sought to professionalize the traditional bureaucracy of empire. Before the end of the century the Crown successfully

subordinated ecclesiastical authority. However, the Bourbon Crown inits __ competitive zeal also engaged incessantly in costly wars that required greater

and greater amounts of capital. The extraordinary effort of the historians at the Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos under the direction of José Antonio Calderén Quijano has opened up new vistas and added greater depth to our appreciation of the scope of imperial reform during the reigns of Charles HI (1759— 1787) and Charles IV (1787-1808). Los virreyes de Nueva Espana illustrates the dynamism and intent of metropolitan and viceregal officials to augment

royal control without upsetting the delicate balance between the interests of the Crown and the interests of its subjects. In extending royal authority, viceroys had to be ever conscious of powerful entrenched interests in the colonial bureaucracy and local society. Most viceroys successfully balanced

those sometimes contradictory interests. Submissive acceptance of royal | authority and a hierarchical world view contributed to their success. However, when loyal subjects opted to fill the power vacuum created by Napoleon with written constitutions and new political institutions, popular sovereignty and the legitimacy of public participation in policy formation

eroded this submissive acceptance of a restricted monarchical political system. After the Napoleonic Wars, Ferdinand VII in particular and peninsulars in general proved unwilling to adjust to ideological change in the Americas and as a result lost control of the empire.®

The next chapter of this study probes into the relationship between

6 Politics and Bureaucracy politics and the bureaucracy during the late colonial and early national | eras. The following three chapters focus on major components of the bureaucracy: the viceregal and executive secretariats, the courts, and the

fiscal sector. Because the viceregal secretariat became the base institution | from which the first four national secretariats of state emerged, that sec-

retariat, rather than the viceregency itself, is the initial topic of discussion | in Chapter 3. Few historians have delved into the history of the viceregal secretariats in the Americas; the major exception is José Marid Mariluz

Urquijo. In his Origenes de la burocracia rioplatense Mariluz Urquijo ex- , amined the origins, organization, and work of the viceregal secretariat in

Buenos Aires.? He pointed out the differences between the responsibilities | and duties of viceroys, their secretaries, and the senior notaries of gov-

ernment and war; he detailed the contribution of the viceregal secretariat : to the administrative achievements of the viceroys in the newly established

viceroyalty of the Rio de La Plata region. Elsewhere for more than two | centuries, viceregal secretaries had been the personal employees and confidants of viceroys. During the mid-eighteenth century, though, the Crown

decided to appoint professional viceregal secretaries, responsible to the |

viceroys but appointed by and loyal to the king. , In the case of New Spain the Crown’s decision in 1742 to appoint a

royal viceregal secretary marked the beginning of the professionalization | of the traditional Hapsburg administrative system. The establishment of

a secretariat staff the following decade initiated the creation of a system | of record keeping that enhanced uniform policy implementation in New Spain. Unlike the secretariat in Buenos Aires, which organized its files on

the basis of region of origin, or geopolitics, the viceregal secretariat in Mexico City organized its work and its files on the basis of thematic content: |

military affairs, ecclesiastical affairs, tobacco, sales taxes, and the like.’

This emphasis on issues rather than regions enhanced uniform policy | implementation during the era of the Bourbon reforms and permitted the | easy division of the responsibilities and portfolios in the executive branch ,

of government after independence. | The viceregal secretariat was but one component of the bureaucracy of empire in Mexico City. A second important institution was the audiencia. , As a colonial institution the audiencia preceded the viceregency and orig-

inally exercised royal sovereignty. The brief experiment with rule by au- , diencia in the late 1520s and early 1530s imbued the audiencia with a status

and prestige that the Crown chose not to undermine when it appointed © its first viceroy. As a result, audiencia magistrates shared administrative

Politics and Bureaucracy 7 decision-making responsibilities with viceroys. Unlike their colleagues in

the peninsula, the American high court magistrates had duties and responsibilities that went far beyond the adjudication of civil and criminal law. Enrique Ruiz Guinazu and Charles E. Cunningham, who published major studies on the audiencia early in this century, both recognized the unique role of the royal justices in the New World.'' So different from peninsular legal and judicial institutions were the American institutions that within the study of the history of law the laws and institutions of the Indies—derecho indiano—are recognized as a separate and distinct field. Its students have produced a significant body of literature that may generally be divided into three categories: works that focus on the evolution of the institution of the audiencia, such as Pilar Arregui Zamorano’s La

1973). |

Audiencia de México segun los visitadores, siglos XVI y XVII (Mexico City:

Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de México, 1981); works that analyze juridical developments, such as Beatriz Bernal de Bugeda’s Notas a la Recopilaciin de Indias (Mexico City: UNAM, 1979); and works that evaluate

the relationship between colonial institutions and groups in colonial so- : ciety, such as Silvio Zavala’s La encomienda indiana (Mexico City: UNAM,

In addition to derecho indiano, a second body of literature, written by

historians not trained by Spanish and Latin American law faculties, has focused on the organization, administration, politics, and personnel of the audiencias. From John Leddy Phelan’s analysis of the audiencia in the Kingdom of Quito to Mark A. Burkholder’s study of the career of José Baquiano, this body of literature has probed into the training, ambitions, and politics of magistrates and their ability and inability to influence decision making on different issues and at different times.'* Additionally, Burkholder and D. S. Chandler’s efforts have produced substantial contributions to the study of this sector of the colonial bureaucracy. Their analysis of the colonial audiencias and ministers, From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687-1808 (Colum-

bia: University of Missouri Press, 1977), has shown that by the mideighteenth century the Crown’s desire to exert greater control over the

traditional Hapsburg system led to the appointment of professionals out- | side “the traditional service elite.” Their study also suggested that a system

of advancement and promotion had developed in the early decades of empire. By the era of the Bourbon reforms that system provided predictable career tracks for average magistrates and special rewards, such as an ap-

pointment to a council or court in Spain or to a “home” audiencia, for

8 Politics and Bureaucracy persons of special merit, ability, or favor. These two historians also have | provided us with their Biographical Dictionary of Audiencia Ministers in the

Americas, 1687-1821 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), a work that | substantially increases our awareness of those individuals whose life works contributed to the maintenance of a vast and complex European empire

in America. ,

| Though studies of audiencias and audiencia magistrates have enhanced

our appreciation of the imperial system, historians have not evaluated the

impact of the Spanish constitution of 1812 and independence on the au- | diencia. Because the 1812 constitution mandated the separation of powers,

it replaced the monarchy and its traditional unity of authority with the modern division of executive, judicial, and legislative powers. Moreover, ,

, because that change took place in Mexico prior to independence, early national magistrates were not directly involved in defining the role and

| responsibilities of the Mexican judiciary. Magisterial authority was not to |

be exercised in republican Mexico. - ) ‘The serendipitous discovery of the minutes of the meetings of the

Mexico City audiencia between 1785 and 1823 permitted this author to | evaluate this most significant aspect of the transition from colony to nation

in Mexico. Parallel research into the debates of the Spanish Cortes and the early national legislatures in Mexico corroborates the view expressed

here that popular legislatures subordinated powerful colonial institutions, |

| virtually eliminating jurisprudential considerations in government and | administration. This change is explored in Chapter 4. The third major component of the colonial bureaucracy in Mexico City

was the fiscal sector, the principal focus of discussion in Chapter 5. Studies |

, of the colonial fiscal sector have emphasized institutional development, : policy changes, and revenue collection. To be sure, archival documentation |

| | on the political economy of empire is overwhelming. Decades before the | dissolution of the empire, royal officials and outsiders had begun research

into this aspect of colonial rule. In the early 1790s Fabian de Fonseca and | Carlos de Urrutia compiled their impressive “Historia general de las rentas

de la Nueva Espafia,” a twenty-nine-volume manuscript that details the _ history of the colonial budget system.!* Baron Alexander von Humboldt, | who received metropolitan permission to inquire into the complexities of a the empire and the imperial system, offered his analysis of the imperial | political economy shortly after the turn of the century. Since that time an , untold number of historians have delved into the printed and manuscript | sources on the colonial fiscal and economic system, as exhibited by Enrique

Politics and Bureaucracy 9 Florescano’s 1972 fifty-three-page “selective” bibliography on colonial economic history in La historia econdmica en América Latina, Vol. I, Desarrollo, perspectivas y bibliografia (Mexico City: SEP/SETENTAS, 1972), which remains a starting point for research.

Certainly, the abundance of archival and documentary resources on fiscal and economic policies and programs will continue to lure historians into those areas of inquiry, overshadowing mundane aspects of fiscal and administrative decision making. The decision-making process in the fiscal bureaucracy, however, was at the very heart of policy development and

thus deserves serious attention. The nature of decision making in the colonial bureaucracy has long remained a vague and unexplored topic. The literature usually refers to a hierarchical system, one dominated by viceroys. John L. Phelan challenged this notion in his posthumously published The People and the King: The “Comunero” Revolution in Colombia, 1781. Phelan referred to a consultative system that during the eighteenth century was dominated by incipient technocrats. The historical evidence from the Mexican case supports Phelan’s view and describes a collegial system as well. From Isabella’s decision in 1492 to appoint Juan Rodriguez de Fonseca as royal advisor to accompany Columbus to Charles I'V’s decision in 1804 to name a committee to administer the consolidacién de vales reales, both

Hapsburgs and Bourbons relied on the informed advice and counsel of royal officials, most of whom sat on the administrative committees of the imperial bureaucracy. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that the viceroy made decisions, no single individual or institution held autonomous

power and authority in the Spanish empire. Administrative decision mak- | ing required input from all pertinent supervisors, managers, counselors, | and committees. And administrative committees, as evidenced by the min- | utes of the veal junta superior de hacienda, the junta de union de ventas, the juntas de montepios, and the real junta superior de consolidacién de vales reales,

ensured collegial supervision of decision making. That that system limited the autonomous authority of individual royal officials is further shown by challenges to the established system of decision making during the latter decades of empire. After independence the national congress and secretaries of state replaced collegial administrative committees, and rhetoric replaced administrative counsel in policy formation and program implementation.

Chapter 5 examines challenges to the established decision-making process during the reform cra and changes in that process after independence within the context of the fiscal bureaucracy. |

In addition to examining major components and procedures, this study |

IO a Politics and Bureaucracy also discusses the bureaucrats and the influence of imperial personnel — policies and revolutionary politics on their lives and careers. During the | late colonial era proprietary titles gave employees a lifetime right to work, prescribed salaries permitted modest economic security, pension programs | provided for widows and orphaned children, and implicit promotion and

advancement opportunities contributed to the professionalization of the | bureaucracy of empire. The principal sources of information on the men who worked as scribes, clerks, accountants, managers, magistrates, notaries, and secretaries in Mexico City were the guias de forasteros, published annually between 1761 and 1822, then occasionally under varying titles until __- 832. These handbooks include the positions and officeholders in the co-

lonial and national bureaucracies. According to those handbooks, 2,733 , individuals worked for the royal and national governments between 1761 and 1832. Gaps in the series have meant that some departmental personnel are not included in this figure. Nevertheless, supporting evidence from

| payroll and pension records and career history sheets (boas de servicios) , compiled during the late colonial era do not suggest that the analysis of personnel patterns and trends discussed in this study would be altered by |

the inclusion of missing cases. _ | Unfortunately, the lack of comparable information on the careers of

persons employed in the early national bureaucracy inhibited a full analysis | of personnel policies and career trends after independence. Briefly, because early national politicians restructured the bureaucracy, the committees and _

senior managers, once responsible for regulating personnel policies and -

compiling career history data, no longer existed during the federal republic. | ~ No source consulted during the research for this study suggested that any 7 | early national officials were charged with parallel responsibilities. Rather, the historical documentation, as discussed in Chapter 7, suggests that

politics rather than professional criteria emerged as the significant factor : iN appointment and promotion matters during the first federal republic. An alphabetical compilation of the 2,733 individuals listed in the 1761— 1832 guias permitted research in other sources for information on bureaucrats.'* Details on the private lives of individuals who lived in Mexico City

one hundred fifty to two hundred twenty-five years ago are not readily , available; as a result census, property, and notarial records only begin to shed light on the social history of bureaucrats. As with personnel records,

comparable census and property records after independence are wanting. |

The last major extant parish censuses were taken in 1825. | | The author would have preferred the documentation after independence

Politics and Bureaucracy II to be as complete, comparable, and accessible as those archival sources generated by colonial bureaucrats. Unfortunately, but to the point, the early national Mexican bureaucracy was not charged with nor did it generate the kind of bureaucratic paperwork as had its colonial predecessor. Politicians, not bureaucrats, ran the republic. Finally, much work remains to be done in the Mexican national archives to organize and catalog early national correspondence and files. From 1977 to 1979, during the author’s two years of research-in-residence, the staff at the Archivo General de la Nacioén in Mexico City was just beginning the awesome task of identifying

the documents in that no-longer-extant vamo euphemistically entitled zdiferente general. That section contained twenty thousand oversized moving

boxes of unorganized and unidentified documentation, much of which pertained to nineteenth-century administrative affairs. As those documents

become available to future generations, new studies will reevaluate the impact and significance of the Mexican political revolution.

: | CHAPTER 2

The Empire, the Republic, and the Bureaucracy

| When the Conde de Aranda, minister to Charles III, secretly proposed an | imperial commonwealth in 1783, few in New Spain could have appreciated

the sagacity of his vision. The Crown appeared securely in control of its | | empire, and the ambitious program of economic and administrative re- | forms of the previous two decades had created the image of a powerful,

| enlightened, and dynamic imperial system. Indeed, the reform program, which paralleled a silver boom in New Spain, contributed to a significant

| improvement in royal revenues that in turn financed a substantial increase |

in Spain’s military presence in the Americas. But the Conde de Aranda | looked beyond current Bourbon policies and programs and recognized _ the potential of the newly independent Anglo-American republic along the North Atlantic seaboard. He wrote that men will go where they believe | they can improve their fortunes and that the Anglo-American republic with its freedom of religion, its vast territory, and the advantages offered

by its government would lure people to it. The Conde de Aranda thought | that those people would create a grand colossus, a colossus that would

| take Florida, interrupt the Mexican trade, and aspire to conquer Spain’s

most wealthy American colony.! a

| In his futurist scenario the Conde de Aranda perceived Spain’s inability — | to defend its vast and intricate imperial coastlines and Mexico against a , formidable, established power in the western hemisphere. He therefore recommended the creation of three independent and sovereign American

| : 12 | ,

Empire, Republic, Bureaucracy 3 kingdoms that would be linked to the Bourbon monarchy in Madrid

through marriage, commercial reciprocity, and military alliance. Americans | could pay for the advantages of commonwealth with their vast bullion reserves, while Spain could continue to gain access to American products without the dangers and costs of trying to defend its farflung empire. In

turn, the Spanish merchant marine could expand and Madrid could assert | its military dominance on geopolitically strategic islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific. The Conde de Aranda’s assessment of Spain’s future in the Americas contrasted with José Campillo y Cosio’s 1743 analysis, a work revised, revamped, expanded, and published under Bernardo Ward’s name in 1762.” Campillo y Cosio and Ward viewed the American mainland colonies as

the source of Spain’s wealth and power. Unlike the Conde de Aranda, neither Campillo y Cosio nor Ward seriously considered the likelihood of new actors in the global power rivalries of the traditional European monarchies. Such lack of foresight can be credited to the political realities of a different age. Writing before the Anglo-American war of independence, only brilliant insight into the future might have permitted imagining the new international politics of later decades and centuries. Campillo y Cosio, Ward, and the overwhelming majority of their contemporaries had a tra-

ditional, not a modern, perspective that focused their attention on the problem of enhancing Spain’s global power vis-a-vis its European rivals. The prevailing consensus regarding the role and value of the Americas and the inertia of historical tradition inhibited political innovation along the lines proposed by the Conde de Aranda until Spanish Americans in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century rejected the legitimacy

of peninsular domination. | Imperial fiscal reforms rather than political innovations were the preferred topics of discussion among Bourbon counselors. Those men did not worry about the entrance of new actors in global power politics, and though concerned about competition from traditional rivals, they did not question that Americans would continue to recognize the value and wisdom of peninsular policies. In fact, so pervasive and entrenched were imperial

fiscal policies in New Spain that even after independence early national | politicans did not reconceptualize the fiscal basis of the nation.° Imperial counselors of the eighteenth century had sought to do more

than restructure the colonial fiscal system, however. They had also wanted | to reduce the power and authority of the viceregency, the audiencia, and the tribunal of audits, traditional Hapsburg institutions in the Americas.

, 14 Empire, Republic, Bureaucracy In large part the very nature of the consultative and collegial system of decision making in imperial and colonial governance inhibited such change. _ |

| And those institutions persisted as the dominant institutions in colonial

| administration until imperial politicians during the Napoleonic Wars ordered the separation of powers. Constituent congressmen in Spain and Mexico City between 1810 and

1824. carried the Bourbon reforms to their logical ends when they abolished | the viceregency, the audiencia, the tribunal of audits, and the collegial committees that had been responsible for policy implementation and over_ sight. Despite institutional changes, though, neither peninsular nor Amer-

ican politicians developed viable new policies to complement profound changes in the structure and organization of administration. That short-

coming in independent Mexico contributed to decades of insolvency and |

, 1830S and 1860s.

led to French, British, and Spanish interventionist adventures between the

| This interpretation of Bourbon and early national shortcomings inno way discredits the herculean efforts and accomplishments of the imperial

| counselors and administrators and early national politicians. Anyone who | a has studied the late colonial era must respect the thoroughness and profes- | sionalism of Spanish imperialists as they developed new policies and im-

plemented new programs. Similarly, students of the early national era 7 cannot fail to recognize the extraordinary challenges faced by early national politicians in their efforts to express and direct consensus political views

when consensus remained wanting. For those who study both the late | colonial and early national eras it is evident that imperialists succeeded where nationalists failed principally because of the widespread consensus

regarding the legitimacy, sovereignty, and prerogatives of the Spanish | _ Crown and the vibrancy of the eighteenth-century silver boom. Despite

their charisma, sagacity, or astuteness, early national politicians, partici- | __ pating in a substantially distinct political and economic environment, could - not match or even approach the success of their imperial forefathers until

| their politically aware and active fellow countrymen reached a modicum | of consensus on a variety of issues.

The Napoleonic Interlude | To no little degree the cause behind the disintegration of political consensus may be attributed to the leadership vacuum created in Spain

Empire, Republic, Bureaucracy 15 and America when in the spring of 1808 Napoleon Bonaparte captured Charles IV and Ferdinand VII. Had the peoples of Spain and its empire simply accepted the legitimacy of Napoleonic rule, Joseph Bonaparte might

have exercised imperial sovereignty in the absence of a Bourbon king. Peninsular and American loyalists, though, would not accept the French usurper as their legitimate sovereign. And contemporary Spanish political theory permitted recourse to the argument that in the absence of the king

sovereignty reverted to the people. Within two years “the people” had established a regency to rule in the absence of Ferdinand VII and had called for a convening of a Cortes, a Spanish parliament, to advise the regency.

The Cortes that convened in Seville and fled to Cadiz in 1810 was not a traditional one nor did it limit itself to advising the regency. This new Cortes was an elected body, a modern political body, that declared itself a constituent congress on the opening day. The deputies expressed their

intent to write a constitution and create a tripartite monarchical political | system. It was the purpose of those imperial politicians to establish new | institutions and to participate in policy formation and decision making, that is, to limit the sovereignty of their monarch. Certainly, the intent of the politicians in Seville and Cadiz was not a novel development in western political culture. The English had acted to limit their monarch’s sovereignty centuries earlier. Just two decades earlier the French people had expressed their desire to limit the power and authority of their monarch, to say nothing of the Anglo-Americans’ outright

rejection of their monarch in 1776. Unlike the Anglo-Americans at the 1776 | Philadelphia convention, neither Spanish nor American representatives at the Cortes in Cadiz between 1810 and 1812 wished to sever their bonds with their king. Rather, both wanted to ensure more responsive adherence

to the “common good” and the “popular will.” The emergence of the constitutional alternative, however, did not successfully fill the vacuum created by Napoleon’s machinations as civil conflict emerged throughout the Americas. The defeat of Napoleon and the return of Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne in the spring of 1814. did not bring an end to the years of civil wars in the colonies. Ferdinand VII, a monarch with little practical experience

| in or temperament for the exigencies of imperial rule, rejected the advice of his formal counselors. He preferred a less institutionalized and less compromising approach to imperial rule. He surrounded himself with his personal camarilla, or kitchen cabinet.* As a result, loyal peninsular subjects

16 , . Empire, Republic, Bureaucracy | who for six years had sustained his empire and for six more patiently submitted to the imperial will rebelled in the spring of 1820 when he ordered thousands of troops into cantonment to prepare for the reconquest of rebel areas in the Americas. His majesty’s subjects insisted on a second

promulgation of the 1812 constitution, and Ferdinand VII gave in to their |

demand, _ a

Had peninsular politicians in the reconvened Spanish Cortes been fully | committed to American participation in policy formation and decision making and permitted their fellow citizens overseas an equal voice in

legislation, the idea of an imperial commonwealth, an idea discussed by | imperial counselors between 1814 and 1820, might still have emerged from

| the ravages of the Napoleonic interlude. Peninsular Spaniards, however, had not significantly altered their perception of the relationship between — oe | _ the peninsula and the Americas. They refused legislation that would have --- permitted Americans a greater voice in policies affecting the Americas.°

In so doing, peninsulars, as had their king, left little choice for the in-

creasingly politically alert Americans. ,

_ Adventures in Self-Rule | _ Mexicans in the spring and summer of 1821 who supported the coalition that rallied around rebel military commander Agustin Iturbide, the Plan

of Iguala, and the banner of the Army of the Three Guarantees—Inde- | pendence, Religion, and Unity—wanted a commonwealth arrangement

| with Spain and a Bourbon prince to head their new state. This preference, |

reiterated in the Treaty of Cérdova signed in August 1821, did not meet | with peninsular approval. Peninsulars in the Spanish Cortes, adamant in

| their view of the Americas as subordinate to the peninsula, rejected the legitimacy of the Treaty of Cordova and of Mexico’s demand for political | autonomy. In the spring of 1822 Mexicans permanently severed their ties

with Spain and embarked on an experiment in national self-government. |

| The loose political coalition that had formed to support political autonomy and successfully engineered Mexico’s separation from Spain, like

so many political coalitions that gather support to oppose the status quo, , was unprepared for the intense and sometimes bitter political feuds that

, follow successful rebellions and revolutions. Occasionally unruly mobs in _ ,

Mexico City and not infrequent recourse to pronunciamentos in the prov- | inces indicated intense and bitter rivalries during the first five decades of

Empire, Republic, Bureaucracy : 17 independence. During those decades popular elections revealed the Mexican preference for a federal republic. Indeed, even before a constituent congress had authored a constitution for a federal republic in 1824, provincial legislatures had begun to declare their provinces sovereign states.° The initial form of government that Mexican politicians organized was the empire of Agustin Iturbide, the figurehead of the Army of the Three Guarantees that lured so many into the independence coalition. Iturbide, the son of a wealthy peninsular immigrant, lacked the political skill necessary to stay in power. Within months of his “coronation” in the spring of 1822, he became autocratic. And because of widespread opposition to autocratic rule in the spring of 1823, the first national Mexican emperor abdicated his throne. The second experiment in self-government led to the writing of the 1824. federal constitution. The triumverate, or junta, that ruled after Iturbide’s abdication provided transitional leadership until the promulgation of that constitution. National politicians agreed to a minimum ten-year commitment to this experimental form of government. Ideally, during those ten years sound policies, peaceful transitions of power, and thoughtfully conceived programs should have settled concerns over the legitimacy

and viability of constitutional federalism as the popularly preferred form , of government. Neither popular preference nor a written constitution are sufficient to maintain a federal republic, however. In such a system, national and state political leaders need to develop consensus-based policies, programs, and institutions that will sustain the government. In the absence. of consensus among the politically active that a federal republic was appropriate and

viable, in the absence of a political culture that espoused the inherent legitimacy of popular preferences over elite management, and in the absence of fiscal policies that could sustain a federal republic, this second experiment also failed. In 1835 Mexicans abandoned the federal system and embarked

on a third experiment in self-government; this time they tried to create a | central republic, an experiment that proved even more damaging to the territorial integrity of the nation than had the federal republic. During the ten years of the first federal republic, between 1824. and 1835,

many Mexicans became critical of the unforeseen and unappreciated turmoil of early national politics. One such critic, himself a participant in many of the political battles of the 1820s and early 1830s, was José Maria Luis Mora. Mora was especially perturbed by the competition for jobs in

the new state and national bureaucracies. He implicitly compared the well- |

8 Empire, Republic, Bureaucracy _ _ organized, professional bureaucracy of the late colonial era with the po-

jobs.

— liticized bureaucracy of the first federal republic. In his “Discurso sobre | los perniciosos efectos de la empleo-mania” Mora concluded that public | employment mania indicated decay in the moral fiber of the Mexican people, a decay that threatened to infest all segments of public life.” Political | jockeying for jobs and patronage, though, was not a moral problem; it was a political problem. In the absence of consensus solutions to political _

and economic issues, early national leaders could not develop sound policies | or organize effective programs to control competition for patronage and Intense political debate and serious financial difficulties, along with the ambitions of any number of aspiring politicians, exacerbated and over-

_ shadowed the inability of early national politicians to develop consensus | , - policies. The experiment in federalism was accompanied by conflict be| tween the federal executive and the federal legislature, between the federal

- legislature and the federal judiciary, and between the federal government | and state governments. In the face of profound institutional changes and | dynamic political competition, the once-powerful colonial bureaucracy was

‘ment. | ,

transformed into a weak and ineffective component of national govern-

Policy and Politics: Personnel Patterns a In subsequent chapters the impact of institutional change and political competition on the bureaucracy in Mexico City will be discussed in detail.

| Before analyzing that impact sector by sector, a basic overview of personnel | patterns and trends will serve to illustrate the quantitative impact of the , Bourbon reforms, constitutionalism, and independence on the bureauc- __

racy. The quantitative data corroborate the view that Bourbon policies led , ~ to professionalization and that political change reversed that trend.

New policies and programs that nurtured a professional administrative | system under Charles III contributed to an increase in the number and

persistency rates of the colonial bureaucrats in Mexico City. Data from | os the 1761—1832 guias de forasteros indicate limited turnover, rarely averaging __ | more than ro percent per year, and increasing numbers of employees (see Fig. 2.1). When royal officials implemented the structural changes neces-

sitated by the separation of powers under the 1812 constitution in 1813 and | 1814, the elimination of special jurisdictions and courts in the judiciary led

Empire, Republic, Bureaucracy 19

r] Ry :© //f/ 600 -

500 {Vf \ TeV 1x) IN / y A 4 Number of Employees

Oo 400+ pf ~~

a, 300 YN -~— Ae Employees — fiscal affairs secretariat in 1821. Instead, he became a clerk on the secretariat of Iturbide’s council of state. The government pensioned Benito and Ignacio in late 1824 under legislation that abolished both of their jobs. Benito, sixty-eight in late 1824, did not receive another appointment; under current legislation, though, he was entitled to a 4,000-peso annual pension, less _

deductions. Ignacio, on the other hand, received a temporary appointment | as an auxiliary on the secretariat for foreign and domestic affairs; in that position he collected his 1,200-peso pension from the council of state.

Because the government abolished Benito’s job, the family had to move | out of the apartment in the customs house. Ignacio, a bachelor, moved _ into an apartment on the Calle de las Rejas de Balvanera a block south of

the national palace. He probably took care of his parents through their oe elderly years as Benito’s age and infirmities were such that the congress

granted him an exemption from the 1827 expulsion laws.*? | That Ignacio Cuellar had not married by his mid-thirties was unusual | among government employees. Census data from 1793 and 1811 indicated |

| that between 30 and 34 percent of government employees remained bach- |

Job Security, Income, and Family 109 clors. Most of those who did not marry lived with their parents, siblings, or other relatives. A very few, such as clerk José Cuevas y Picazo and surveyor Mariano Bustamente, shared apartments.°? Census information also suggested that some bureaucrats whose first wives died remarried and had second families. For example, Manuel Reyes Manzano, the notary for the customs house between 1791 and 1819, remarried after his first wife had died and their three children had grown. According to the 1792 census, Manuel lived with his three children— Manuel (21), Maria Josefa (19), and José Ignacio (17)—and two domestics. Nineteen years later Manuel had married Dofia Maria Antonia Ladrén de Guevara and had fathered two more children: Manuel (13) and Felipa (9). The household did not include any domestics in 1811, but Reyes Manzano did rent one of his rooms in his apartment on the Puente de San Francisco to an eighteen-year-old widow, Dofia Maria Ignacia Fernandez of Nuevo Santander.*? Like Reyes Manzano, José Maria Leal y Gamboa, a staff notary on the audiencia between 1777 and 1812, lived in an apartment on Calle de

Indiotriste in 1793 with his first wife, Doha Maria Josefa Camarena, and their three children—Marfa de la Luz (19), Maria Soledad (15), and José

Maria (9)—-and employed five live-in domestics. Sometime during the next | decade his wife died; by 1811 he was married to Maria Villalobos, eighteen | years his junior. Living with the couple were twenty-seven-year-old, now a bachiller, José Maria, seven-year-old Mariano, and two domestics.**

Independence and the Loss of Economic Security A lack of comparable census information after independence has in-

hibited a full evaluation of the social impact of political change. Household | censuses taken by parish officials indicated that the breakdown in relations between the Vatican and Mexico over the issue of independence contributed to incomplete records. On the west side of the traza in 1823, 2,145 individuals and families refused entrance to parish census enumerators.*° Less comprehensive evidence did suggest that bureaucrats and their families did not continue to receive salaries and pensions regularly. Pension-fund documents reported that, despite continued salary deductions for the fund, widows and orphans in the provinces did not receive benefits.*° And receipts from Mexico City beneficiaries indicated that by the late 1820s be-

tween one hundred twenty and one hundred forty widows or orphans received only partial allotments from the treasury.°’

110 | Job Security, Income, and Family Although independence and federalism were accompanied by uncer- | tainties and job insecurity that reduced employees’ ability to provide for their families, those who continued on the job after independence and the

promulgation of the Mexican federal constitution of 1824 did gain new rights. Henceforth, they could own property and engage in commerce. Several employees who had accumulated a small amount of capital invested

in mining. Miguel Dominguez, president of the supreme court, obtained | interest in a mine in the Mineral de Santo Cristo.** Similarly, José Isidro Yafiez, an audiencia minister who became a supreme court magistrate,

bought shares in a mine in Real del Monte.* A small number of others, | like Juan Gomez de Navarrete, also a supreme court magistrate, invested , in business ventures. Gdmez de Navarrete owned the Imprenta del Aguila publishing house.*° Ildefonso Maniau y Torquemada, a senior accountant on the tribunal of audits who became head of the accounting department

under the secretary for fiscal affairs in late 1824, scraped together 2,500 | pesos in September 1825 as down payment on the purchase of part of a house on the Calle de Relox.*! All of these investors were highly paid

officials who obviously had discretionary income. | | | The historical evidence, however, does not suggest that a significant | number of government employees either before or after independence had capital to invest in property or business ventures. Like the overwhelming majority of their neighbors, government employees did not even bother

to leave last wills and testaments. Prior to independence only twenty-five | to thirty people a year died testate in the main Spanish parish in Mexico City; after independence between twenty and twenty-five people died

testate annually. Of the 2,733 individuals identified as bureaucrats who , worked in the viceregal and national bureaucracies, fewer than two hundred |

left wills.*” Of the few who did, such as José Maria Gutiérrez de Rosas y | Mufiive, who started his career as a substitute attorney on the audiencia in January 1799, worked for the Inquisition for fifteen years, and later became president of the audiencia in the State of Mexico in 1825, or Adrian

| Ximénez de Almendral, who worked in the treasury as senior clerk from | 1777 until his promotion to accountant in 1827, most wrote that their belongings included only their clothing and household furniture.** These ,

simple possessions were usually left to their heirs. , _ Although the characteristics and dynamics of the masses of people less | fortunate than bureaucrats remain to be understood, we can draw a few

conclusions about bureaucrats in Mexican society. First, bureaucrats were ' not a homogeneous group. Highly paid senior employees could afford

Job Security, Income, and Family tI better housing, more maids and servants, more and better food, clothing, medical care, and leisure-time pursuits for themselves and their children than could the lesser-paid clerical staff, who lived more humbly. Government employees, like their counterparts in agriculture, mining, and commerce, belonged to a highly stratified group.** Second, prior to independence, economic security characterized this group. Though a government job did not permit employees to accumulate capital reserves, regularly paid salaries permitted bureaucrats to provide adequate housing for their families. After independence, however, as a group, bureaucrats lost economic security. Even though many sought jobs with the government, the government could not afford to pay salaries regularly. Some employees lost their jobs when the congress restructured the government, others when it expelled peninsulars, and others still when it passed legislation that made employees in the ministries the personal confidants of the executive. The

right to invest in property and commerce did not offset those losses. Within | less than a decade after independence, bureaucrats joined the many Mexico City residents who never had experienced the luxury of economic security under imperial rule.

CHAPTER 7 | | Bureaucrats Career Opportunities, Personnel Policies, and Poltttcs oe

, When Mariano Perezcano wrote to President José Antonio Lépez de Santa , Anna on June 12, 1824, he begged the president for an appointment to a | bureaucratic post. Perezcano recounted his career in the tribunal of audits,

_ his service in the royal militia, his support for the Iturbide independence , coalition, his skill in uncovering an 80,000-peso fraudulent deficit in the

gunpowder monopoly, and his work for the secretary of fiscal affairs. He |

Ii2

recounted that the congress had abolished the department in which he worked in 1831; since then he had not worked. He was struggling to support

| his wife and children on a meager pension. Unfortunately, he had not Oo ~ received his full pension; of the 1,800 pesos due him over the previous three years, he had collected only 493 pesos 4 reales.’

Had Spanish imperial rule continued in Mexico City, Perezcano would

_ have been guaranteed a job or at least his full pension. Royal employees like Perezcano had special privileges in the imperial system. A proprietary | right to work had accompanied his royal appointment as an apprentice clerk on the tribunal of audits in 1809 after his seven years as an untitled,

oe unpaid apprentice clerk. With a royal title Perezcano stood in line for , | promotions and higher pay. He was promoted and started earning 500 a pesos a year in 1811. The Crown promoted him again ten years later; he

then earned 600 pesos annually as a first-class clerk of audits.7 | a a Following independence Perezcano, like other government employees,

Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics 113 expected the new government to honor his proprietary right to work; initially, it did. Independence also broadened his career opportunities. He applied in October 1821 for a position on the newly created fiscal affairs

secretariat. Though he did not get that job, the Iturbide government a year later commissioned him general administrator of the gunpowder mo-

nopoly, a position outside the realm of possibility for a lowly auditing clerk prior to independence.’ With his auditing skills and a zealous spirit for proving his worthiness, he audited monopoly accounts for the previous decade and found an 80,000-peso discrepancy between reported and actual accounts. His work provided the basis for a case against former employees. The 1824. federal reorganization of the fiscal bureaucracy displaced Perezcano, however. The new regulations abolished his position in the gunpowder monopoly.* Those regulations also abolished the tribunal of audits, thus eliminating Perezcano’s proprietary position as a clerk of audits. The

congress made up for this move when the chamber of deputies elected him to serve as a clerk in the congressional auditing office in 1825. He was dissatisfied with that job, though, because it paid only 600 pesos. In hopes of improving his lot, he applied for and received an appointment as a clerk in the fiscal secretariat’s provisional department for backlogged audits. In

that position, unfortunately, he received only his 600-peso pension from the tribunal of audits instead of the 1,500-peso salary legislatively authorized

for his position. Nevertheless, within a year he was promoted to the | position of accountant. Due to the financial problems of the federal gov-

ernment, a raise did not accompany his promotion. In search of a better- | paying job, he applied for a transfer into the secretariat’s accounting de-

partment. He received the transfer and a 400-peso salary increase, effective , April 16, 1828. Then the congress abolished that department and reclassified

Perezcano as a pensioned clerk from the tribunal of audits rather than as

a pensioned accountant from the fiscal affairs secretariat. With that decision, he lost the salary increase he had gained with his 1828 transfer. Perezcano, like many of his fellow bureaucrats, had worked diligently for the imperial and national governments. He had letters of recommendation from his superiors. He had proven his ability and served loyally.

Under the king his stressful situation would not have been ignored if for | no other reason than his proprietary right to work. Mexican politicians, though, did not want to guarantee that right. Perezcano did receive a new appointment in 1834. Under the imperial political system, appointments and promotions, remunerations and benefits, and career routes and tracks depended on formal and predictably informal policies and procedures

114 - Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics regulated by bureaucrats on imperial and local collegial committees. As keepers of their own gate and with a royal mandate to standardize pro-

_ cedures, colonial bureaucrats promoted professionalism and consistent policy application. Under the federal republican system, bureaucrats were no longer guardians of the state; politicians had replaced them.

| Colonial Career Opportunities , | The aspiring colonial bureaucrat had implicit career opportunities based

| on his preparation, background, entry level, and sector affiliation. Within | | the judicial sector, because most of the support staff held saleable and _ renounceable titles, few advancement opportunities existed for clerks, staff

| lawyers, notaries, or business agents. For audiencia ministers and em- | _ ployees in other sectors who held proprietary titles, advancement depended

on seniority. For ministerial level officials and those who aspired to a | ministerial position in the treasury or the audiencia, advancement and salary increases involved geographic relocation. In the fiscal sector low-

, and middle-level employees could advance internally within a department. | In all departments work performance more so than patronage could lead |

| to advancement from a departmental position to a superior title position (a position filled by someone who had a title issued by the viceroy guaranteeing the title holder to a lifetime right to work in the viceregal bu-

, reaucracy), and from a superior to a royal title position (a position filled |

by someone who had a title issued by the Crown guaranteeing the title | holder a lifetime right to work in the imperial bureaucracy).

Individual careers illustrate the exigencies of colonial career opportun- | ities and local, viceregal, and imperial career tracks. Individuals who began, , , — continued, and ended their careers in the same locale followed a local career | track. Those who served in different communities and provinces within a

single viceroyalty followed a viceregal career track. Those who held po- 7 _ sitions in one or more viceroyalties or received promotions to high po-

| sitions in the peninsula followed an imperial career track. Most clerical _ employees pursued the local career track; most managerial and ministerial _ officials pursued a viceregal track. Every year or two a high Mexico City _

| Official, usually an audiencia minister, received a promotion to a high | position in Spain, exemplifying the imperial career track. The careers discussed below were exceptional because of their duration and because very

Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics 115 few other employees were as successful as these men. Still, though it is essential to keep in mind that a career might pause or stop at a particular level or locale and that job performance had a decided impact on future career opportunities, the careers of Juan and Juan Ignacio de la Fuente,

Agustin Pérez de Quyano, and Fernando José Mangino reflected these | basic career tracks. The Local Career Track: The de la Fuente family

The ideal local career began, continued, and ended in Mexico City, and was cut short or extended depending upon the longevity of the individual. Through family merit, honorable service, and longevity, the de la Fuentes

exhibited the typical local career pursued by native son and immigrant | bureaucrats who worked for the Crown in Mexico City. Like many who had long careers, they began at the lower levels and advanced through the ranks. Their professional careers were upwardly mobile without their having to move away from their homes, families, and friends. The senior de la Fuente received his first appointment to the staff of the tribunal of audits in January 1741. He earned seniority promotions through the ranks of clerk and accountant to the position of senior auditor and tribunal judge. His 1793 promotion to senior auditor after fifty-two

years of royal service came as a final reward for a lifetime of auditing viceregal accounts. Juan, seventy-four years old in 1793, continued to work until his death in 1798.°

Juan Ignacio followed in his father’s footsteps, acquiring a superior title | as an interim junior accountant from Viceroy Croix in 1768 after working

without a title at his father’s side for just over a year. The junior de la Fuente rose to the position of senior accountant by 1785. For his and his father’s dedicated services and duc to a shortage of senior auditors, the

Crown rewarded him with the title of honorary senior auditor in the fall | of 1792, a title that permitted him to fill in on the tribunal when needed. Juan Ignacio did not receive a proprietary appointment as senior auditor

in his own right; in his 1798 personnel evaluation his superiors wrote that | because of incurable epilepsy, Juan Ignacio could not continue at his job. The Crown responded to this comment and the recommendation by vice-

regal authorities that he be retired with a royal retirement order and a pension equivalent to two-thirds of his salary. He collected that pension until his death in 1809.°

116 : Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics , - The Viceregal Career Track: Agustin Pérez de Quijano , The second type of career track was a viceregal one. The viceroyalty of

New Spain was vast, stretching from the eastern Caribbean to the Phil- | | ippine Islands. An individual who was willing to move away from his | home town in Spain, New Spain, or elsewhere could advance to important,

| high-paying positions in various locations around the viceroyalty. The | ~ Crown never defined promotion routes for provincial officials; for a competent and recognized few, though, provincial jobs could lead to important | positions in Mexico City. The career of Agustin Pérez de Quyano illustrated a track that led to

high-level opportunities in Mexico City. Pérez de Quyano began his career , in his home province of Asturias as a cadet in the royal army in 1763 when

a _ he was eleven years old. He stayed in Asturias with his infantry regiment | through the 1760s. When his father, Bartolomé Pérez Quyano, received |

a an appointment as governor of Comayagua in Guatemala, Agustin accompanied him, sailing from Cadiz in late October 1770. In Guatemala ,

: Agustin kept his commission in the royal army, advancing in rank though | never receiving any pay. On his deathbed in 1775 Bartolome named his son to the positions of interim governor and lieutenant captain general

| for the province of Comayagua. Three and a half years later, after proving , his loyalty and devotion to service by subduing several indigenous communities that had resisted royal authority, Agustin received a royal title to the position of corregidor of Realejo in Nicaragua.

| While in Nicaragua, he continued to serve his king with fervor. He

| received credit for pacifying some communities that had been abused by : a a local Spanish official, organizing militia troops in his province, and | directing the construction of several ships needed for defensive action in Pacific coastal waters and in the inland lake in Nicaragua. In these endeavors Pérez de Quyano followed the orders of imperial and superior officials. _ Those officials rewarded him for his exceptional services in 1785 by appointing him to the position of accountant general of customs and sales

| taxes in Mexico City. | | Pérez de Quyano continued to make extraordinary contributions. Re| portedly, on May 19, 1799, he apprehended over 100,000 pesos’ worth of contraband destined for Mexico City. More than a decade later he received

| a promotion to the position of director general for sales and pulque taxes. | Pérez de Quijano served in Mexico City until his death in January 1816 at the age of sixty-eight. His service in the southern provinces combined with

Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics 117 his years in Mexico City as a junior and then senior administrator typified the viceregal career track. Most employces with similar career patterns were

not as successful as Agustin because there just were not that many top

jobs. Nevertheless, the pattern of territorial or provincial service followed | by junior then senior administrative or management jobs in Mexico City was a recognizable career track for immigrants and creoles.” The Imperial Career Track: Fernando José Mangino

Promotion through the hierarchy of one or more departments in America followed by an assignment to a still higher-level peninsular position characterized the imperial career track of audiencia ministers and exceptional administrators. The career of Fernando José Mangino, mentioned in Chapter 3, exemplified this pattern. Mangino, born in Spain to Italian

immigrant parents, attended the university in Alcala de Henares during a the 1740s and graduated with a degree in canon law. He worked as a lawyer for thirteen years before obtaining an appointment from the Council of the Indies (a consulta appointment) in 1762 as corregidor for Zacatlan

de las Manzanas in New Spain. The investigator who wrote his 1769 residencia praised him, mentioning that he had collected over 8,000 pesos

for the new royal tobacco monopoly. José de Galvez, visitor general in Mexico City, was suitably impressed with Mangino, even before the end of his tenure as corregidor, and named him to the position of high sheriff (alguactl mayor) on the visitor’s staff. During the crises that accompanied the expulsion of the Jesuits, Galvez sent Mangino to Valladolid and Patzcuaro to quiet public unrest. Mangino handled that assignment firmly and forcefully, pleasing his superior. Shortly after his return to Mexico City, Mangino received a viceregal appointment as interim director general of the expropriated Jesuit estates. Mangino successfully rose through a hierarchy of senior administrative positions during the ensuing two decades. Loyalty, ability, broad expe-

rience, longevity, and patronage from Galvez led to his appointments as | accountant general for tribute, judge superintendent for the half-annates tax, honorary judge on the tribunal of audits, substitute superintendent of the mint and the mercury monopoly, and finally, subdelegate superintendent for royal fiscal affairs in New Spain. Following the extinction of that position within a year of its 1786 creation, Mangino received a promotion to the Council of the Indies. Mangino’s rise to the very top of the colonial bureaucracy, in spite of controversy in New Spain over the

118 - Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics Jesuit problem and the death of his patron in 1787, was spectacular. His

| career as a provincial official, a senior administrator in Mexico City, and | , a member of the Council of the Indies followed the imperial career track.®

Employee Rights and Privileges Seniority and merit influenced promotions and transfers because local bureaucrats participated in the application of personnel policies. In Mexico City the fiscal affairs committee oversaw the procedures for appointing

men to both proprietary and saleable positions. The pension-fund com- | oe mittees and the fiscal aftairs committee reviewed the credentials of pro, spective royal servants. Furthermore, audiencia ministers, senior auditors,

| and departmental directors and administrators supervised the staffs of the , - courts and offices in Mexico City. Finally, the staff, individually and col- | lectively, used the consultative and collegial system to file grievances against

perceived usurpations of their rights. |

, Within departmental clerical offices seniority ranked above merit as the leading criterion for promotion.’ In defense of this right, the clerks in the : accounting office for the royal mint protested through official channels in 1787 when the mint’s superintendent and the viceroy authorized an interim

promotion to the superior position of senior clerk for Manuel Velazquez : , _ de Leén. Velazquez de Leon, a scribe in that accounting department since — 1784, had the least seniority of any employee. The mint’s superintendent

_ chose to disregard seniority because Velazquez de Leén had exhibited more ability, diligence, and intelligence than his co-workers. The clerks objected to merit as the sole criterion for promotion. Less than a year after : Velazquez de Leén’s interim promotion, the imperial government ordered

his demotion to the position of scribe." It also ordered the viceroy to

respect seniority rights over merit for promotion within departments. , Although internally within a department employees could not be promoted above more senior functionaries, the government did consider merit

to be a legitimate priority criterion for transfer promotions. To wit, as | noted in Chapter 3, Velazquez de Le6n received a transfer promotion into

| the viceregal secretariat in May 1791.'! In that same month the imperial government ordered the viceroy to devise a merit-promotion track for , transfer promotions in the fiscal sector.”

| The use of merit transfers to promote able and experienced employees offended those who anticipated advancement on the basis of seniority. |

Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics 119 After independence some career bureaucrats expressed their resentment. José Joaquin Beltran, in an unsuccessful bid for a position on the secretariat for fiscal affairs in 1821, wrote that unfair royal policies had retarded his career. He complained that the Crown had transferred more than twelve people into positions above him during his loyal years of service on the tribunal of audits. Beltran did not mention that he had less than exemplary

evaluations from his superiors or that he had a chronic problem with

alcohol. Beltran had not suffered under royal rule; royal personnel policies , had guaranteed him a job in spite of his slipshod work and alcoholism.** The merit-transfer policy benefited the Crown and capable young em-

ployees. Manuel Velazquez de Ledn, for example, advanced to become | the senior clerk on the viceregal secretariat within a decade of his transfer into that office. He managed viceregal affairs in Mexico City when Viceroy Marqués de Branciforte moved half of his staff to Jalapa in 1797 and 1798. Velazquez de Leén became acting secretary to the viceroy in 1806, managing the secretariat through the turbulent summer and fall of 1808. The

imperial regency issued a proprietary title in his name in 1810, and until | Viceroy Calleja became suspicious of all native Americans on the viceregal secretariat in 1813, Velazquez de Ledén received the highest praise for his work.**

The role of merit in a career went beyond the ability of a young man to attract patronage. Standard operating procedures required prospective employees to enter a competitive application process. To enter the com-

petition for a superior government position, an individual had to receive | the recommendation of the superior committee in Mexico City in charge

of nominating job candidates.'* Superior committees usually recommended |

three candidates in rank order, justifying the ranking on the basis of | experience, ability, and merit. Senior bureaucrats in the superior government also regulated the competition for saleable offices. Most positions sold under the auspices of the auction committee (junta de almonedas) required that purchasers be professionally qualified for those jobs. Assayers’ positions in the mint and the

royal treasury could be held only by individuals who had passed qualifying | examinations administered by other royal assayers; notarial and attorney | positions in the audiencia and in the fiscal sector could be held only by

those who had passed examinations administered by the audiencia; and | land surveyor positions had to be filled by licensed surveyors." Personalism and favoritism also played a role in late colonial personnel affairs. Imperial figures used their authority and power on behalf of friends

, 20 | Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics and favorites. However, as was evident in Pedro Antonio Cosio’s brief i career as viceregal secretary, favoritism alone did not guarantee permanent

employment. Even a court favorite had to show that he could perform his | duties well and not disrupt the system. Viceroys could appoint, promote,

| ployees. | i

a and transfer favorites. Still, viceroys had to honor established principles — and routines; they did not exercise autonomous authority over royal em- a

The Exercise of Unwritten Prerogatives | Employees used written and unwritten rules to protect their rights as royal servants, and they used established administrative procedures in attempts to expand their collective prerogatives. Members of the royal college

of notaries, for instance, filed a collective grievance against Manuel Galindo | after he purchased a position as court clerk (receptor) on the audiencia in

1809.'” They argued that Galindo had no right to hold such an office because he was not a member of their organization. Furthermore, they stated that he could not become a member of their organization because

he was the illegitimate son of a military officer. Despite this and previous | attempts by the members of the college of notaries to expand their influence

in personnel affairs, the superior government decided against them, citing ,

, the college’s regulations and previous government decisions that excluded | Galindo’s position from the jurisdiction of the college. Employees used the consultative and collegial system individually and collectively to protect their incomes. As mentioned previously, proprietary employees received prescribed salaries, and employees with saleable and

| renounceable titles received incomes from service fees. Those salaries and | fees, however, had to be used to pay for title registration fees, half-annate taxes, pension deductions, and not infrequently, forced donations to the

treasury for imperial war efforts. Employees regularly sought exemptions | and delays in the payment of half-annate fees. The volume of these requests |

, ultimately led to the development of a policy that permitted new appointees four years to pay the s0 percent appointment tax and two years to pay the | IO percent promotion tax.'8 _ Employees also used standard procedures to complain about affronts

| _ to their honor and status. Senior auditors complained about Pedro Antonio ~ | -Cosio’s insulting comments about them.’’ Clerks on the viceregal secre-

-——- tariat complained when the lay brotherhood of coachmen adopted em-

| Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics 121 bellished uniform buttons identical to those the clerks wore on their uniforms.”? Luis Gutiérrez y Paez, interim royal treasurer in 1783, complained when Antonio Rodriguez de Velasco, who leased the management rights to the bullfight arena for that year, refused to assign him a seat in the shade, a traditional privilege of royal treasury ministers. To preempt the possibility of a such an insult again, fifteen years later as permanent treasurer Gutiérrez y Paez filed another administrative grievance against Rodriguez de Velasco after he leased the management of the bullfight for

a second time. The treasurer wanted the government to order Rodriguez | de Velasco to assign him a seat in the shade even though no seats had as yet been assigned to anyone. The treasurer won his case.*! In addition to protecting and trying to expand their rights and privileges, bureaucrats participated in policing themselves. They acted as informants

and investigators in rooting out nepotism and corruption. Theft, embezzlement, and malversation of funds obviously required that there be goods

or specie to which an employee had access. There was no such access for the vast majority of Mexico City bureaucrats. Investigations, therefore, principally focused on the problem of nepotism. On occasion close relatives acquired positions in the same department, and occasionally, employees prohibited from owning property and en-

| gaging in trade owned property and retail establishments. The Crown

ordered general and special reviews (visitas) to investigate any tendencies | a toward collusion and familial conspiracy. José de Galvez investigated the Mexico City customs office and uncovered numerous violations of laws based on the testimony of employees. Joaquin Xavier Uria, the accountant for sales taxes on perishables in 1766, when queried about his colleagues in the customs office, for instance, accused Mateo de Arcipreste, senior sales tax accountant, of owning several estates and small ranches, two inns, and one or two bakeries. Uria also thought that Arcipreste had a financial

interest in the Mexico City sanitation contract.”* Galvez removed Arcipreste , from his job. Uria accused five other employees of owning or partly owning | retail shops in Mexico City. Unmentioned by Uria, but acknowledged by the head of the customs guard Ignacio Cubas, was the fact that Uria was

Cubas’s father-in-law. Cubas also stated that Andrés de Canti, the Mex- , icalzingo gate guard, was his own compadre. Cubas, like Uria, implicated | Arcipreste in various illegal activities. Cubas’s accusations concerned orders

from Arcipreste to let particular shipments pass through the city gates uninspected and to let baggage and packages for the viceroy pass freely. The government initiated another investigation into nepotism the fol-

‘122 Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics lowing decade and uncovered seeming violations in numerous departments. Customs-house employees reported that thirteen of their fellow

workers were violating antinepotism laws. Other employees reported vi- |

_ Olations in the general treasury, the tobacco monopoly, the tribunal of | audits, and the playing-card monopoly. Employees in the mint alone re- | ported that twenty of their co-workers potentially violated the law. Because | of the exigencies of appointment, employment in distinct departments of the mint, and lack of opportunity for collusion, not one of the twenty had

to transfer or separate from his job.?* After the investigations were com- | pleted only seven individuals in Mexico City received orders to change jobs or leave royal service.

When Revillagigedo took office in late 1789 he initiated a general review oo

| of all government offices in Mexico City. This review produced fewer | apparent violations of the law. Juan José Echeveste and José Domingo

Echeveste, second cousins, worked together in the treasury for the tobacco | monopoly. Martin de Alegria and his son José Alejo worked in the tribunal

of audits along with the former’s nephew Juan José de Lezaun, as did José , Ignacio Soto Carrillo and Pedro Marfa Monterde, nephew and uncle. Luis Medina and his brother Juan de Dios both held jobs in the tribunal also.

, In some cases relatives in the same department did not violate the law , because their distinct jobs provided no opportunity for collusion. In other | instances, though, such as that involving Martin and José Alejo de Alegria, _ the superior government transferred the senior, more experienced relative

- to another position.* |

Rarely, individual employees made unsolicited denunciations. Francisco

Eguia in 1807 complained about Pedro Maria Monterde and his nephew | José Ignacio Soto Carrillo working in the same department. They had , already been absolved of any opportunity for collusion in the early 1790s.

Egufa also accused a number of other employees of serious crimes. He | | said that audit clerks Francisco de Paula Zavaleta and Manuel Tenorio de la Vanda were swindlers, drug traffickers, and gamblers and that de la Vanda was involved in some illegal business ventures with one of his uncles. There was no indication that Eguia’s charges led to another in-

, vestigation; all of the individuals he accused of wrongdoing remained in |

Office for at least another five years.” |

Collectively, employees policed themselves through enforcement of pen-

sion-fund regulations. Applications for membership, required of all clerical | | and ministerial level employees who earned over 400 pesos annually, had | to include certification of one’s “espafiol” lineage. Committee-approved |

Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics 123 marriage licenses ensured that employees did not marry below their social status. And children’s baptismal certificates were required to ensure that only legitimate offspring recerved an employce’s pension. Exceptions to the established rules had to be approved by metropolitan officials.”° For example, when Luis del Camino, a clerk in the sales tax accounting office, married without royal license on March 28, 1785, several months after the establishment of the clerical employees’ pension fund, he had to petition

the Crown for inclusion in that program. First in late 1788 and again in late 1789 Camino pressed his case. In its December 15, 1789, meeting, the committee decided to send his request to the secretary accountant of the

fund for a comprehensive review. The committee deliberated on his case | the following December. It accepted the secretary accountant’s opinion that Camino’s case would have to be reviewed by the Crown. The com-

mittee forwarded the documentation overseas, where imperial officials , benevolently decided in Camino’s favor. Camino presented a royal cédula dated March 17, 1791, to the committee, a cédula that authorized his retroactive membership in the insurance fund.’” This decision in Camino’s favor did not alter the regulatory role of the Mexico City committees or

change their rules; it merely made him an exception to one of them. |

The Exercise of Illegal Prerogatives | The government also investigated and punished officials and subjects involved in smuggling, fraud, and malversation of funds. Accounts of major

attempts to defraud the customs house in Veracruz have been well documented.”8 Fraud and malversation of funds in the customs offices continued in spite of royal prosecution of previous offenders. ‘The government

arrested Diego Cadaval, the senior warden of the Mexico City customs warehouse, on July 24, 1786, for suspected malversation of funds. Following

his arrest, Cadaval was asked why he had no account books. He replied | that no one had ever given him one nor had he received a notebook for

that purpose. He was also asked why he used the fee money he collected | from merchants and muleteers for personal expenses. In his defense Cadaval

stated that he had not intended to defraud the Crown. He saw nothing

wrong with his informal personal loans from royal funds. In a judgment a dated September 14, 1787, Fernando José Mangino, superintendent subdelegate for fiscal affairs, declared that Cadaval acted in violation of departmental regulations and was unworthy of royal employment. However,

124. Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics | the viceroy’s legal advisor and the royal attorney for fiscal affairs, not | ~ convinced that criminal intentions had motivated Cadaval, ultimately recommended to the fiscal affairs committee that the government return the

warden to his job and pay him his back salary. The fiscal affairs committee a

, on October 29, 1789, decided in Cadaval’s favor.?° | The investigation of the Cadaval case was not dissimilar to other Mexico | | City fraud cases. The government arrested suspects, confiscated papers in their offices and homes, suspended or cut their pay in half, and investigated

the charges against them.*® The imperial government consistently perceived | errors in judgment without intent to defraud as minor offenses. It was ,

interested in catching the criminal, not persecuting the ignorant. | More common than the immediate discovery of fraud was the delayed _ | discovery that accompanied the auditing of accounts. The backlog in audits | prevented rapid detection of illegal transactions and theft of funds. For instance, the tribunal did not audit the 1748 accounts belonging to Manuel , Angel Villegas Puente, the royal factor in the treasury in Mexico City during the 1740s, until 1774, a decade after his death.*! The judgment in

this case required Villegas Puente’s bondsman to pay a 10,000-peso fine Oo levied against the accused’s estate. Final payments on the fine were not | made until 1790, and then the payments came from the estates of his

bondsman, as might be suspected, because forty years after the fact all | immediately concerned parties had died. Litigation, therefore, did not

result in the immediate restoration of royal funds. Rather, it signaled the |

beginning of a process. _ | |

Independence: Opportunity and Uncertainty | In the late colonial bureaucracy, the majority of bureaucrats adhered to | government rules and regulations, policing themselves while promoting the development of a professional administrative system. They saw an advantage in adhering to the rules: their careers could develop predictably _ with standard policies and procedures. Importantly, because they con-

trolled most aspects of their working environment, late colonial bureaucrats | had a high level of morale. Even though the financial rewards of royal | service were much less than those in mining, commerce, and agriculture, —

bureaucrats had job security and a place in government and society that |

made up for low pay and years of routine work. | | After independence a handful of individual public servants fused bu- ,

Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics 125 reaucratic and political careers or bureaucratic and business careers. The

majority of public servants, though, became isolated functionaries within , the ambiguous and amorphous sociopolitical reality of early national Mexico. As we have seen, Mariano Perezcano did not get a job in 1834. The job he wanted went to Fernando Mangino. Mangino, the paternal nephew of the well-known, late-eighteenth-century official Fernando José Mangino and brother of Rafael Mangino, secretary for fiscal affairs under Anastasio

Bustamante, had not applied or been recommended for the position sought | by Perezcano.*? Moreover, Mangino had no experience or training as an accountant. He had been an aide in the viceregal secretariat for eight years before independence, had worked for several years in the secretariat for justice and ecclesiastical affairs, and had served in the Mexican legations in Rome, London, and Paris under the secretary for foreign affairs.** Even after recerving the appointment, Mangino did not keep the accounting

job. Within two months of his return to Mexico City in the summer of 1834, the government reappointed him to the Mexican legation in Paris, where he remained for many years.** Perezcano continued to seck permanent employment. Perezcano was not the only government employee to lose his job and

privileges after independence. A number of senior officials lost their po- | sitions when the congress reorganized the fiscal sector in 1824. Peninsular Spaniards, even those who had immigrated decades prior to independence and had served the independent government loyally, lost their jobs 1n 1827 when the congress prohibited the government from employing peninsulars

until Spain recognized Mexico’s independence. And as mentioned previ- | ously, employees no longer received their pay on a regular and predictable basis.* In late September 1821 employees in every department collectively swore allegiance to the Plan of Iguala and the Treaty of Cordova. Individually, employees attested to their loyalty as well.*° Neither professional nor aspiring bureaucrats imagined that independence would alter the basic procedures and policies of a job with the government. They had not understood

the full implications and potential ramifications of the exclusion of au- 7 diencia ministers from participation in administrative decision making. It was only a matter of time before politicians in Mexico City would exclude senior auditors, treasurers, and accountants from participation in decision making also. The refusal of political leaders in Mexico City to appoint, even on a provisional basis, judges to the territorial audiencia between 1821 and 1823

126 Careers, Personnel Policies, and Politics | a indicated that bureaucrats had lost control over the application of personnel policies and procedures, over their working environment. The 1821 legis-

| lative order prohibiting all but the most urgent appointments in the fiscal sector further illustrated the encroachment of politics into administration. | The 1824 elimination of consultative and collegial committees and the

transfer of their responsibilities to the congress and the federal executive | ended any illusion bureaucrats still may have had about the preservation | of worker autonomy in the government bureaucracy. The extinction of the formal participation of administrative employees

‘in personnel affairs and the failure of the federal congress to legislate | enforceable and viable alternatives left the door open to the intrusion of

rampant personalism and corruption. As those practices became disruptive, | , congressional politicians passed laws and regulations defining procedures for salary and pension payments, for hiring pensioners, and for filling

vacancies.*” None of that legislation specified enforcement mechanisms, | and politics continued to undermine standardized personnel policies. Bu- |

reaucrats as a group did not benefit from independence. | | Within a decade of the establishment of the first federal republic, civil | employees had become dependent on politicians for their jobs. The May | 1833 personnel law that made employees in the secretariats of state personal , | confidants of presidents legalized that dependency. The extralegal expatriation of two supreme court justices in 1833 showed that the congress

would ignore jurisprudential considerations in legislation.2* The country | | had changed; the bureaucracy had changed; the whole idea of what gov| ernment was and what it was supposed to do and not supposed to do had changed. Politicians altered traditional lines of communication and au- | thority, restructured administration, and politicized the bureaucracy. Be- | | fore the end of the first federal republic in 1835 the professional bureaucrat

| system. | OO | |

of empire had become an isolated functionary in a revolutionary political ,

CHAPTER 8

The Colonial Legacy

With uneasiness the Conde de Aranda in 1783 wrote that men will go where they think they can better their fortunes. He was wrong in one sense: the loyal subjects of the Spanish Crown in New Spain did not leave; they accomplished a political revolution instead. In the most basic sense the Mexican federal system did not maintain a connection with the Bourbon system. The 1824 constitution made new and radical changes in the structure

of power. By segregating power in three branches of government, displacing the bureaucracy, and abolishing corporate privilege, early national politicians accomplished a political revolution. Recognizing the inherent contradiction in enlightened despotism, that the Crown could enhance its power only by draining the economy of the capital necessary for the material progress of the people, Mexican political

revolutionaries during the 1820s created a liberal state based on the pro- os tection of individual liberties and the promotion of a laissez-faire economic | system. The revolution of the 1820s was not an ideological one, though.

The Bourbon imperialists of the 1700s had already succeeded in replacing | the spiritual ideology of earlier centuries with the material ideology of the Enlightenment. And Mexican political revolutionaries embraced that material ideology and its basic suppositions: the nation must be juridically uniform and fiscally strong.’ The federal system and the Bourbon system

127

128 | The Colonial Legacy lacked political connection, but ideological continuity linked the federal | republic to the Bourbon past.

| That federalism, like enlightened despotism, failed to achieve material

prosperity fueled the intense political battles of the nineteenth century. | Experiments with centralism, federalism, dictatorship, and monarchy followed the demise of the first federal republic in 1835. Nevertheless, when

given the opportunity to express their choice at the ballot box, the Mexican |

| people persistently voiced their preference for a liberal federal republic. They perceived that such a system would best permit them to better their

fortunes, to achieve material and cultural prosperity and progress. | The failure of imperialists and federalists to bridge the gap between the

ideological rhetoric and reality should not detract from our recognition

of their remarkable achievements. In Mexico City both successfully estab- | lished the systems they endeavored to create. The professionalization of the bureaucracy of empire at the viceregal level, as this study has shown,

| served the interests of the Crown. Additionally, the secondary goal of that | process, the participatory self-regulation of the bureaucracy, successfully tied the interests of viceregal bureaucrats to those of the Crown. In essence, | - within the bureaucracy of empire the state became an end in itself. Similarly, the displacement and deprofessionalization of that bureaucracy served the

interests of the federal republic. The revolutionaries of the 1820s wanted : a liberal political state; they did not want their political choices and options | limited by the administrative procedures, mental attitudes, or institutions of empire. The separation of powers, the creation of new institutions and procedures, and the departmentalization of the collegial Bourbon bureaucracy had the secondary effect of politicizing the bureaucracy; as a result,

_ than to the state itself. ,

| the interest of bureaucrats became tied to the politics of the republic rather

The revolutionary fervor of the 1820s that contributed to nationalizing oe and mythologizing the Hidalgo rebellion and its panoply of heroes drew |

attention away from the revolutionary accomplishments of the early na-

tional politicians. Similarly, the politics of the 1828 presidential election, — | riots, racism, and xenophobia obscured profound changes, changes in- | tended to overcome the inherent contradictions between the ideology and

programs of enlightenened despotism. For example, neither active partici- pants nor historians until the 1960s and 1970s focused attention on the most serious contradiction and catalyst for political change, the 1804 consolidacion de vales reales program. That program of compulsory redemption | of mortgages belonging to chantries and pious works undermined the |

The Colonial Legacy 129 financial infrastructure of New Spain’s credit-based economy. Moreover, by requiring ecclesiastical lending institutions to call in loans, the collateral for which were real properties, the Crown threatened the economic security

of those who had effectively diversified investments to include real property | in order to guard against uncertainties in more speculative endeavors such

as mining and overseas commerce. How could rural estates be made more 7 profitable without access to capital at a stable and reasonable price? How could more speculative investments be made without access to capital?? How could the Crown possibly promote the material progress and prosperity of its subjects when its tax and loan policies and programs absorbed the capital necessary for economic development? It could not. To the same

extent that the 1808 Napoleonic capture of the Spanish kings triggered | political change, the consolidactén de vales reales program set the stage for revolutionary political change in Mexico. That program called into question the Crown’s commitment to its ideological raison d’étre.

Material and cultural prosperity and progress are potent ideological concepts. They appeal to basic human emotions: greed, ambition, pride. Ultimately, in Mexico they became more significant than the established and time-honored values of Crown and empire. Yet, as a peripheral participant in the expanding global market economy of the nineteenth century,

Mexico and its people faced previously unimagined competition for access , to resources and markets. None of the political alternatives of the nine- | teenth century contributed to the fulfillment of the rhetorical ideology of | the republic. Faith in the value of the material ideology continued nevertheless. It continued through the Porfirian experiment of “much administration, little politics.” It continues in the late-twentieth-century experiment with technocracy. Inextricably, the modern Mexican nation is linked to its

colonial past, to its faith in the future and in the ideology of the Enlight-

enment. It shows no sign of abandoning that colonial legacy. a

a Blank Page |

Appendix A Salaries of Posttions in Fiscal Departments, 1754—1835

TABLE A.I

Salaries of Positions in the Real Aduana (In Pesos)

Position 1754 1787 1793 1802 La Superintendencia

Superintendente

(Administrador) 5,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 Asesor 1,000 1,000 1,0001,300 1,000 Abogado Fiscal » 1,300 Escribano 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000

Alcaide c c1,200 c Primer Alcaide1,000 a 1,200 1,200

Segundo Alcaide a 1,000 1,000 b Guarda Almacén b 650 650 b Visitador 1,500 3,000 3,000 3,000

Portero 150 c c ¢ Merino 300 500 500 500

Tesoveria | Tesorero 3,000600 3,500 3,500 Oficial Primero 800 800 8003,500 , Oficial b 350 b Contador Segundo de Moneda 400 600 650 600 600

131

132 , Appendix A TABLE A.1 (continued)

Position 1754 1787 1793 1802 |

, Contaduria Principal Contador Principal 3,000 4,200 3,000 b _ Oficial Oficial Mayor 1,200 2,000 1,400 Segundo 1,000 1,000 1,050 1,050

b, Oficial Tercero 800 800800 , Oficial Cuarto800 700800 700 700

Oficial Quinto | a 800 1,050 1,050 Oficial Sexto a 700 850 850 , Séptimo a 600 800 800 -Oficial Oficial Octavo a a 800 b Oficial Novenoa aa 2700 800 b| Oficial Décimo b , Escribiente 300 400 400 , b , Escribiente Segundo 300 400 400 350 350 Escribiente Tercero 4a ,300

, Contaduria del Viento

Contador del Viento 2,200 c c ¢ | Oficial Primero 1,000 1,000 1,100 1,100 Oficial 950 900 Oficial Segundo Tercero 800 | 700800 700 700 700 ,

Teniente a , Caballero 500 450 700 Resguardo | , Comandante 1,200 1,200 2,200 2,200 Comandante 700 1,000 1,500

, , Contaduria General de Rentas (Alcabalas) , | Contador , a , 1,200 b 1,200 | Oficial Mayor a 2,000 b 2,000

Oficial Segundo a 1,300 1,300 1,300 Oficial Tercero a 800 Oficial Cuarto ne b 800 b b ,|

Oficial Quinto| 7a 400 500 400 500 bo b Oficial Sexto

Salaries of Posttions in Fiscal Departments 133 TABLE A.1 (continued)

Position 1754 1787 1793 1802

Director a 6,000 6,000 Abogado Fiscal a 1,300 1,300 b Dureccién General de Rentas

Asesor a b 1,000 b Comisario a 3,500 3,865 b Visitador a 1,200 b 1,200 Escribano a450—500 b 1,000 bb Merino a a Oficial Mayor a 2,500 b , 2,500

Oficial Segundo : 1,300 p 1,300 Oficial Tercero a 1,100 1,200 1,200

Oficial Cuarto a 1,000 1,100 700 1,100700 , Oficial Quinto a 800 Oficial Sexto a 600 b b

Escribiente a 400 b Portero a 450 300 b450 Mesa de Pulgque

Guarda Mayor a a 1,100 Avaluador 550650b650 b

Oficial Unico a a 800 b Oficial Mayor aaa1,200 ‘‘, Oficial Primero a 600 Oficial Segundo a 750 900 450 650 b6 Oficial Tercero a Escribiente a 500 550 b SOURCES: Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia de real hactenda, 2: 96-102; BN, MS 439[1376], fs. 333-339r., “Serie de las dotaciones . . . ,” 1606-1780; BN, MS 4.65[14.02], fs. 266—270r., “Demonstracidn del ntimero de ministros y empleados . . . ,” 1793; BN, MS 468[1405], fs. 118—25sr., “Sobre la creacién de la agencia fiscal de real hacienda,” 1792; AGI, AM 1173, “Sobre la incorporacién de pulques,” 1779; AGN, Civil 2114,

“Primer visita general .. . Testimonio ... ,” 1766; AGN, Historia 159, exp. 2, fs. 48~83, [“Empleados de aduana” |, 1789-1790; AGN, Indiferente General [Media Anata, caja 10, folder 11], “Libro de la contaduria general ... Media Anata. 1777-1785”; AGN, Montepfos 18, exp. 9, fs. 154198, “Clases de empleados que deben reconocer al montepio de ministros y al de oficinas,” 1793~1806; AGN, RH 75, “Nota o relacién que expresa las plazas de dotacion . . . en la real aduana . . . 1794,” “Estado que . . . comprende todos los empleados en la real aduana . . . 1802,” and “Lista . . . de la direcci6n general de reales rentas de alcabalas

y pulques foraneos ... 1794”; and AGN, RH 107, “Estado . . . que comprende todos los empleados en la real aduana .. . 1802.”

‘No information available. , *Official position not established.

‘Position abolished or replaced.

134 Appendix A

TABLE A.2 |

, (In Pesos)

Salaries of Positions in the Contaduria de Azogues

Position 1753 1771 1787 1802 Contador 1,600 © 2,400 2,400 2,400 , Abogado Fiscal 300 ; 300 300 Almacénero 300 550 550 550

Almacénero y Ministro Executor 300 , 450 450 450 , Escribano 500 a 500 ~ 500 Oficial 800 1,200 1,200800 OficialMayor Segundo 500 1,200 800 800

,

SOURCES: Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia de real hacienda, 1: 199, 307, 330, and 387; Heredia Herrera, La renta de azogue, p. 25; BN, MS 450[1387], fs..26—58, “Relacién de los sueldos . . . 1788; AGN, RCO 99, exp. 23, fs. 133-135, “Real cédula de 18 de agosto de 1771”; AGN, Montepios 18, exp. 9, “Clases de

plazas . . . azogues, 1802.” | , | |

empleados ... ,” 1806; AGN, RH 75, “Lista de plazas . . . azogues, 1794”; and AGN, RH 107, “Lista de : 4No information available.

TABLE A.3 | ,

Salaries of Positions in the Casa de Moneda

(In Pesos) ,

Position 1776 1778 1794 1829 La Superintendencta

Asesor _ 600 300600 500 b600 c Amaneunse 500 Marcador de Baras — 500 700 5 b ,

Superintendente 6,000 7,000 6,000 3,000 ,

Merino 400 600 400be b |500 b | Oficial 600 Padre Capell4n 300 — 500 b b

Portero de ~ 500 Portero —Barras 400. 500 b -700 400b ,b ,

Juez 2,400 3,000 b b Primer Ayudante 800 1,200 p Segundo Ayudante 600 900 P p Oficina de Balanza

Tercer Ayudante b 600 b b

Salaries of Posttions in Fiscal Departments 135 | TABLE A.3 (continued)

Position 1776 1778 1794 1829 Contaduria

Contador 4,200 5,000 2,000 Oficial Mayor 1,500 2,000 b 1,000

Oficial Segundo 1,2001,000 1,500800 6 800 Oficial Tercero 1,000 Oficial Cuarto 800 800 700 bb

Oficial Quinto 700 700 b500 400 Amaneunse a a 400 Escribania

Escribano 1,200 1,200 b Amaneunse 500 5001,300 is 600 Afinador de Cobres b 700 800 Constructor de5,500 Pesos b bp3,000 3,000 b , Fiel Admuinistrador 6,000 Frelatura

Guardacufios 1,400 1,800 Teniente Guardacufios 800 900 bb

Guarda a aa 4a a600 Guarda Nocturno 1,095

b6,

Ensayador 3,000 °° Ensayador primero ° 3,300 °8 2,000 Oficina de Ensaye

Ensayador segundo 7 3,000 . 1,500

supernumerario , 1,500 1,800 supernumerario a 1,500 p 800 Apartador General 3,000 5,000 b 1,500 Ayudante Conclavero » 2,000 Primer Guardavista 1,200 bb 500 b , Ensayador primero

Ensayador segundo

Apartado

Segundo Guardavista900 1,000 b 400 b Tercer Guardavista b 800 b , Guardavista Cuarto b 600 500 b

Amaneunse b 600 b b

Libros b 400 b b Portero 500 b b b

Amaneunse Oficial de

Oficial de Libros b 500 600 b

136 7 Appendix A |

oe | TABLE A.3 (continued) | ,

| , Tesoreria . | : | Position «1776 1778 1794 1829 _Oficial Tesorero 5,500 b 2,000 — bb Mayor 1,600 b 1,000 Oficial Oficial Segundo Tercero. 1,200 ~900 bb 800 bb |b,

, Oficial Cuarto -| b600 b bb b, b , Amaneunse 400 Contador de Moneda 1,000 6 600 b Escribiente oa b 500 b , , , Fundaciones

Fundador Mayor 4,000 Guardamateriales -. 1,600 b b4,000 —- ,

Tercer Guarda 1,200 b bb 600 b b Quinto Guarda 1,100 Amaneunse 500 b 365 b Ayudante de Périto 900 . p 6

,Tallador : , | Oficina de Talla | 3,000 3,000 3,000 2,500 Grabador 1,000 c co c , Oficial Primero 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,000

Oficial Segundo 1,200 1,200 1,200 900 : Oficial Tercero 800 800 800 —534 a

| Oficial Cuarto 500 500 500 340

SOURCES: Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia de real hacienda, 1: 109-296; Guia de hacienda, 1825; Arrillaga,

Recopilacton, 1829, decree, “Nueva planta y administracidn de la casa de moneda de México,” September |

| 28, 1829; BN, MS 450[1387], fs. 26-58, “Relacién de los sueldos .. . 1788”; AHH 69, exp. 13, “Informe

| hecho por el contador del montepio . . . 1799”; AGN, Media Anata 202, “Titulo de ensayador,” June 15, | 1771; AGN, Montepios 1, exp. 1, “Real casa de moneda . . . ,” 1778-1820, and exp. 3, “Real casa de moneda

... 1804 hasta 1812”; AGN, RH 75, “Noticia ... las reales casas de moneda,” 1794; and AGN, RH 107,

, “Real casa de moneda... ,” 1802.

’No information available. | *Official position not established. |

| ‘Position abolished or replaced.

Salaries of Positions in Fiscal Departments 137 TABLE A.4.

Salaries of Positions in the Admunistraci6n Principal de Correos y Postas

Position 1790 1825 | Administrador Principal 4,000 4,000 (In Pesos)

Asesor 500 b Escribano Fees b Contador 2,500 b

Oficial Mayor . 2,000 2,000 Oficial Segundo 1,500 1,500 Oficial Tercero 1,200 1,200 Oficial 1,000 OficialCuarto Quinto 9001,000 900

Oficial Sexto 800 800 Oficial Séptimo 700 700 Oficial Octavo , 650 650 Oficial Noveno 600 600 Oficial Décimo a 600 Escribiente Primero 500 500

Escribiente Segundo 400 400 Escribiente Tercero 365 365 Maestro de Postas ’“, real per letter delivered

Archivero a 350 | Cartero a 12% of value Primer SegundoPortero Portero500 450 400 400

of postage

Tercer Portero a 600 SOURCES: Carrera Stampa, Historia del correo en México, Mexico City, Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transportes, 1970; Guia de hacienda, 1825, and AGN, RH 174, “Raz6n de las gratificaciones que tenfan los sefiores ministros de México por las comisiones,” 1814. *Official position not established. bPosition abolished or replaced.

138 Appendix A ,

, TABLE A.§

Salaries of Positions in the Direccién General de Rentas , (In Pesos)

Position 1831

-| || Contador Director _4,000 3,000

| Tesorero — 1,500 , Oo Guarda 1,000 , , Oficial Mayor 1,500 | , OficialArchivero Cuarto 600 , , 800 , Escribiente 500 a Tercenista 500 | , | Mozo 180 Oficial Segundo 1,000

| general de rentas,” January 26, 1831. | SOURCE: Arrillaga, Recopilactén, 1831, law, “Establecimiento de una direccién

| (In Pesos) , , Position 1771 1781 1794 1825 TABLE A.6

, | Salaries of Positions in the Loteria ,

, Colecturia | — Oficial Mayor a a ; 500 Colector, con casa 600 b 1,800 1,200.

| Oficial 400 OficialSegundo Terceroan a a° a° 300

, , 2 pesos per

Oficial Cuarto an ° 3 50 per year and drawing , Direcctén y Contaduria |

Director, con casa 2,000 2,500 2,500 3,000 ,

Contador, con casa 1,200 1,800 1,800 : Juez | b 1,000 700 c Escribano — 800 | 1,000 1,000 b |

Impresor , by contract , Oficial Mayor. 800 1,000 1,000 c

Oficial Primero a | a a 1,000 , Oficial Tercero Segundoa 3500 800500 800b b| | Oficial , Oficial Cuarto a: , ; 200 and 1% of value of

, : drawing | Portero - 200 Mozo a a200 a a200 b

Salaries of Positions in Fiscal Departments 139

TABLE A.6 (continued) , Position 1771 1781 1794 1825

Tesorero b 1,800 b bb Oficial Mayor ‘ 250 500 Tesoveria

Oficial Primero a a 400 aa Oficial Segundo a 250 Oficial OficialTercero Cuartoaa250 250300 b bb

Auxiliar a 250 p b

SOURCES: Cordoncillo Samado, Historia de la Real Loteria; Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia de real hacienda,

21131 and 151-88; Guia de hacienda, 1825; BN, MS 447[1384], fs. 340-390, “Relacién individual . . . 1784”; | BN, MS 450[1387], fs. 26-58, “Relacién de los sueldos . . . 1788”; BN, MS 465[14.02], fs. 263-265, “Dem-

onstracién del ntiimero de ministros y empleados ... 1793”; AGN, Montepios 18, exp. 9, “Clases de empleados . . . ,” 1793-1806; AGN, RH 75, “Real Loteria de Nueva Espafia .. . 1794”; AGN, RH 107, “Lista general de empleados . . . 1802”; and AGN, RCO 98, exp. 9, fs. 31-31r., royal order, [“Sobre la loteria”], January 10, 1771. *Official position not established.

bNo information available. ‘Position abolished or replaced.

TABLE A.7

Salaries of Positions in the Contaduria de Media Anata (In Pesos)

Position 1770 1787 Juez 5% for half-annate taxes

and 4% for taxes on noble

Asesor 200 Contador b200 800 and fees titles

Escribano 600 600 Escribiente a 200

Oficial Mayor 500 650 Oficial Segundo 400 450 Oficial Tercero 300 300

SOURCES: Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia de real hactenda, 2: 487-588; BN, MS 4471384], fs. 340-390, “Relacién individual . . . 1784”; BN, MS 450[1387], fs. 26—

58, “Relacién de sueldos . . . 1788”; AHH 601, exp. 2, “Reforma de la contaduria de media anata... ,” 1790; AHH 100s, “Reales érdenes y titulos,’ November 7, 1776; AGN, Media Anata 26, exp. 11, “Testimonio de expediente formado en virtud

de real orden sobre asignacién de sueldo al contador regulador de real derecho de media anata y oficiales del juzgado de ella,” 1779; and AGN, Media Anata 70, exp. 18, “Sobre el restablecimiento de la contaduria . . . 1807.” 4Official position not established. ‘No information available.

140 Appendix A |

(In Pesos) — Position 1768 1773 1794 1825 TABLE A.8

oo Salaries of Positions in Temporalidades

Archivo Archivero a 400 ‘

Oficial Escribiente a 300 c , _ , Contaduria Contador a a a 2,000 |

OficialSegundo Mayor 1,500 P600 6 1,000 | Oficial 800 900 | Oficial Tercero 700 b bb700

Escribiente 3 aa a| 200 300 , Portero a a Oo Oficina General Director , 3,000 2,400 2,400 ° ¢| Tesorero 3,000 b 500 Contador 2,000 6 c Administrador 2,000 3,000 . b c Agente Fiscal _? , 1,080 ‘

Archivero a a 400 ¢

| Oficial Mayor 1,500 1,500 1,000 Oficial Segundo 800 800 9001,000 900

Oficial Tercero 600 650 700 650 700 c700 , Oficial Cuarto 600 Oficial Quinto a a 600 c

Oficial Sexto a aa 496 -€ | s Escribiente a 300 | Portero 400 ~ 400 200 200 SOURCES: Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia de real hacienda, 5:110—11 and 242; Guia de hacienda, 1825; AGN, }

| | Jesuitas Cuentas 1, fs. 2-4r., “Nomina de los dependientes de direccién, contaduria, tesoreria y admina istraci6n general de bienes ocupados ... ,” 1771-1774; and AGN, RH 75, “Lista de todos los empleados

|

position not established._—| ‘No_ 4Official information available. ... temporalidades . . . 1794.”

] ~ €Position abolished or replaced. ,

Salaries of Positions in Fiscal Departments 141 TABLE A.9

Salaries of Positions in the Renta de Pdlvora y Naipes (In Pesos)

Position 1776 1788 1793 1807 1825 Factoria de Polvora

Administrador 1,800800 a 1,800 Su Teniente 1,800 800 800 8001,800 800

Asesor 300 a a a b Contador 2,000 b b b bb b b Escribano 400 b Oficial Mayor 1,000 b b b b Interventor 700700 a 700 b Oficial de Libros a a aa700 Oficina de Polvora y Naipes

Director 4,000 4,000 a 4,000 4,000 Contador 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 Tesorero 1,000 1,000 1,000 a bb

Visitador1,000 1,500 a1,500 1,500b a 1,500 | Asesor a 1,000 Escribano 400 a a a b Administrador 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200

Guarda General 300 a a 800 b Oficial Mayor 1,000 1,000 a 1,000 1,000

Oficial 700 600 700 aa 600 700 600 700 Oficial Segundo Tercero 600 Oficial de Naipes 600 600 a Tercenista a aa600 a 500 500 SOURCES: Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia de real hacienda, 2:189—231, Guia de hacienda, 1825; BN, MS 450[1387], fs. 26-58, “Relacidn de los sueldos . . . 1788”; BN, MS 465[14.02], fs. 251-257r., “Demonstracién

del niimero de ministros y empleados . . . 1793”; AHH 69, exp. 13, “Empleos incorporados en el monte de ministros .. . ,” 1799; AHH 614. “Nomina de los sugetos empleados en la renta de pdélvora.. . ,’ May 29, 1778; AGN, Historia 159, exp. 2, fs. 170~179r., [“Empleados de pdlvora”], 1791; AGN, Media Anata 19, exp. 3, “Dos relaciones que demuestran los sueldos y premios que gozan los empleados en la renta de pdlvora y en la de naipes ... ,” 1807; AGN, RH 64, “Real renta de naipes . . . 1805” and “Real renta de

polvora ... 1805"; AGN, RH 75, “Real renta de naipes ... 1794”; and AGN, RH 107, “Real renta de naipes .. . 1804.” and “Real renta de pdlvora .. . 1804.” 4No information available. bPosition abolished or replaced.

| 142 , Appendix A |

TABLE A.10 ,

Salaries of Positions in the Contaduria de Propios y Arbitrios -

Un Pesos) | | |

| Position 1771 | 1784 1793 1802 1828

Oficial Mayor | (or Oficial

| Contador 1,200 b b 1,500 3,000

Primero) 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 Oficial Segundo a 700 700 700 800500 : Oficial Tercero 38 600 600 600

Oficial Cuarto Portero a aa aa a, 350 300b

b

~ souRcEs: Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia de real hacienda, 5:243-349; AGN, Indiferente General [Propios y Arbitrios], “Lista individual de los dependientes de esta contaduria general de propios y arbitrios,” draft, October 4, 1784; AGN, Montepios 30, Receipt 8367, 1828; and AGN, RH 107, “Lista de los empleados

en esta contaduria general de propios y arbitrios . . . 1802.” | |

bNo information available. , |

‘Official position not established.

TABLE A.II | |

, a , oo (In Pesos)

Salaries of Positions in the Tribunal y Contaduria de Cuentas ,

Position a 1769 1784 1794 1805 a Tribunal

Regente — -§,000 Suppressed Contadores Mayores (3) 3,500 3,500 4,000 © 4,000 |

a Archivo , Oficial , a 400 500 600 | , Contaduria , | Contador _ 1,380 ¢ _ 6 c , Contador de Provincia 8 1,000 c co , | Alguacil Mayor , 2,000 2,797 ‘ c Archivero _ > 1,000a1,000 | Oficial Escribiente a 3001,000 300

Contador de Resultas 2,500 2,500 c c ,

Salaries of Positions in Fiscal Departments 143 TABLE A.11 (continued)

Position 1769 1784 1794 1805 Contaduria (continued)

Primera Clase a a 2,500 2,500 ,

Contador de Resultas de

Contador de Resultas de

Segunda Clase a a 2,200 2,200 Primera Clase a a 1,800 1,800 Segunda Clase ° 3 1,500 1,500

Contador Ordenador de

Contador Ordenador de

TerceraPrimero Clase aa a3 1,200 b Oficial 600 600 Oficial Segundo ° * 500 500 Oficial Tercero , , Apprentice without

— | pay

Contador Ordenador de

Oficial Ministro de Libros a 500 600 600 Portero Executor a 250 400 400 |

Portero b 250 400 400 Escribania

Escribano (and fees) 1,200 1,200 b (Valued at 3,000 in 1791; valued at 4,000

in 1813; purchased for

Oficial Mayor p bp 400 Oficial Segundo ° 365400 b 6000 in 1813)

Oficina Provisional de Rezagos | Contador Oficial aa aa1,200 600 1,200 600 sourcEs: BN, MS 439[1376], fs. 333~-339r., “Serie de las dotaciones . . . ,” 1606—1780; BN, MS 4.47[1384],

fs. 340-390, “Relacién individual . . . ,” 1784; BN, MS 450[1387], fs. 26—58, “Relacion de los sueldos. . . ,” 1788; BN, MS 457[1388], f. 85, royal order,[“Sobre el tribunal de cuentas”], September 15, 1786; BN, MS 455[1392], fs. 8—8r., “Sugetos provistos ... ,” 1791; BN, MS 460[1397], fs. 12—15r., royal order, [“Sobre el

tribunal de cuentas”|, April 16, 1792, and fs. 3-11, “Reglamento del tribunal de cuentas ... ,” 1791; BN, MS 46s[14.02], 269-270r., “Demonstraci6n del ntimero de ministros y empleados . .. ,” 1793; AHH 69, exp. 13, “Informe hecho por el contador del montepio . . . 1799”; AHH 647, exp. 4, “Testimonio de varios apuntes ... ,” 1805; AGI, AM 1989, regulation, “Reglamento. Duplicado,” July 10, 1782; AGN, Historia 159, exp. 3, “Noticia individual de los sugetos que se compone el tribunal de cuentas . . . ,” 1789; AGN, Media Anata 70, exp. 13, “Los titulos de los oficiales [del tribunal de cuentas],” 1794; AGN, Media Anata 172, f. 370, “Que se recibe la media anata del escribano del tribunal de cuentas . . . ,” 1791; AGN, Montepios

18, exp. 9 “Lista de ministros . . . ,” 1806; AGN, RH 64, “Lista de los ministros . . . ,” 1805; AGN, RH 75, “Lista de los ministros .. . ,” 1794; AGN, RH 107, “Lista de los ministros .. . ,” 1804; AGN, RH 136, receipt 287, February, 1806; AGN, RH 178, receipt 4395, September 1814; AGN, RCO 94, exp. 62, f. 87, royal order, “Sobre los sueldos de los contadores mayores del real tribunal de cuentas,” March 18, 1769; and AGN, RH 238, committee minutes, April 23, 1813, item: “Autos de la escribania del real tribunal de cuentas” and committee minutes, April 30, 1813, item: “Ocurso de don Felix Cardenas en los autos del oficio de escribano de camara del real tribunal de cuentas.”

4Official position not established. ,

bNo information available. ‘Position abolished or replaced.

144 , Appendix A

| : TABLE A.12

Salaries of Positions in the Comisaria Subdelegada de la |

, , , Bulas de la Santa Cruzada (In Pesos)

Position - 1784 1792 1802 1825 | Tesorero 4,000 4,000 4,000 (é Asesor 500 500 500 ba Comisario 1,500 1,500 1,500 Ministro Executor _ 250 350 — 350 b ,

| Oficial a a a 600 , Notario 300a — 200600 500a ,ab Su Oficial

| souRcES: Recopilacién de las leyes de Indias, \ey 1, titulo 20, Libro I; Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia de | real hacienda, 3:337; Ordenanza de Intendentes, articles 16s, 166, 167; Guia de hacienda, 1825; BN, MS 447[1384],

fs. 340—390, “Relacidn individual .. . Santa Cruzada. . 1784”; BN, MS 450[1387], fs. 26—s8, “Relacién de

sueldos ... Santa Cruzada. . .1788”; AHH 69, exp. 13, “Razon de los ministros ... ,” 1799; AHH m4, exp. 1, “Sobre la Santa Cruzada, 1813”; AGN, Indiferente General [Media Anata, caja 10, folder 10], “Libro

- de la Contadurfa General de Media Anata ... 1777-1785,” f. 154r.; AGN, RH 48, “Testimonio de lo : conducente sobre sueldo y gratificacién a don Antonio Fernandez de Cordova... ,” 1791; and AGN, RH | 107, “Lista de los individuos que disfruten sueldos ... 1802”; and AGN, RH 218, committee minutes,

| September 25, 1789, item: “Instancia de don Antonio [Fernandez] de Cordova, escribano interino. . . .”

4No information available. | >Position abolished or replaced.

, : , TABLE A.I3 oe

(In Pesos) , Position , 1768 1775 1788 1799 1825

ot Salaries of Positions in the Renta de Tabaco |

oo ,Director _ Dwreccton , 6,000 — 8 , a 5,000 6,000 Tesoreroob |ab 3,000 3,000 3,000 c| Asesor 1,500 1,500 c | Escribano b bb 500 500 ¢ | Proveedor , bo b b 1,600

Portero , b | b 600 b b Contaduria General

Contador y Director 6,000 b c¢ c c | Contador | 3,000 3,000 4,000 4,000 . Oficial Mayor 2,000 2,000 2,500 2,500 c Oficial 1,500 2,000 2,000 c |c | OficialSegundo Tercero a , 1,500 900 1,500 1,500

Salaries of Positions in Fiscal Departments 145 TABLE A.13 (continued)

Position 1768 1775 1788 1799 1825 Fabrica de Tabaco

Administrador b 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000

Contador b 1,500 1,500 1,500 Fiel de Almacénes b b 700 8001,500 800 Oficial b 1,000 1,000800 1,000800 1,000 OficialPrimero Segundo b 700 1]|

reales per

day Admiunistracién General del Arzobispado de México

Administrador Principal 3,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 Administrador de

Estanquillos b 2,200 2,200 2,200 c Fiel de Peso 1,0001,500 1,350 1,500 1,350 ¢c Contador b b1,500 Fiel Administrador b 1,200 1,600 1,600 c

Visitador b 1,000 Interventor 6001,000 b b 1,000 500 c¢

Tercenista 500 800 800bb¢‘ Escribano b b 400 Oficial de Libros 800 1,000 1,000 c ¢ Escribiente a 500 600 600 c SOURCES: Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia de real hacienda, 2:351-436; Guia de hacienda, 1825; BN, MS

450[1387], fs. s9—78, “Razon de los sueldos fixos. . . ,” 1786; BN, MS 465[14.02], fs. 242—250, “Demonstracién |

del ntimero de ministros y empleados . . . , 1793”; AHH 69, exp. 13, “Informe hecho por el contador del montepio . . . 1799”; AGN, Civil 1664, exp. 1, “Sobre que no hay parientes en oficinas de real hacienda,” 1775-1790; AGN, Montepios 18, exp. 4, “Lista de los empleados . . . fabrica de puros y cigaros,” 1803; and AGN, RH 7s, “Razén de las plazas . . . tabaco,” 1794. *Official position not established. bNo information available. ‘Position abolished or replaced.

146 | Appendix A (In Pesos) , Position 1765 1784 1788 1802 1825 TABLE A.I4

Salaries of Positions in the Tesoreria General

, Su, Teniente Almacén , 500 500

| Guarda Almacén b b 1,200 1,200 1,200

Oficial del Archivo. bb 600 ? > 600 Oficial Primero 700700 ,

, _Contaduria

Contador — 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 , a Oficial Mayor 400 600 600 2,500 2,500 (plus cost of

(plus cost of , Escribania ,

paper and ink)

Oficial Segundo a 1,000 600 2,100 2,000 , paper and ink)

pesos in 1799) , ,ss7Oficial Oficial a a a a 600 | Primero a a a 800 c Oficial Segundo : ° ; 400 ° Escribano (plus fees, b b 2,800 2,050 600 valued at 10,000

Escribiente Primero a | 2 a 400 365 Escribiente Segundo | a 2 : 365 360 Mesa de Media Anata

OficialSegundo Mayor 3; a; 500 1,000 1,000 Oficial 500 ‘ ‘,

Ensaye , | Su Teniente 1,000 1000 —_1,000 b

7ink)ink)

| Ensayador Mayor b 4,000 4,000 4,000 2,500

, Factoria FactorMayor 4,000 —_ a Oficial 700 7004,000 c‘c, | a for paper and © , , Oficial Segundo 900 900 °°° , (plus 1,100 pesos , (plus 1,400 pesos

, for paper and ,

Salaries of Positions in Fiscal Departments 147 TABLE A.14 (continued)

Position 1765 1784 1788 1802 1825 Tesoreria

Pagador ; ; °, °, :2,000 Su Ayudante ‘ 600

Ministros 4.000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000

(plus cost of , ,

Oficial Mayor b 400 650 2,000 1,500 paper and ink)

Oficial Segundo b 700 1,000 2,000 2,000

paper Tercero and ink)b 700 700 2,200 800 Oficial (plus cost of

Oficial Cuarto b 1,000 1,000 2,100 1,200

Oficial Quinto bb b 1,000 1,000 1,000 Oficial Sexto b 900 900 800 Oficial Séptimo b 400 450 700 1,000 Oficial Octavo b 600 600 600 600

Oficial b b450 550 Oficial deNoveno Libros a 400 400550 c 550 |

Oficial Décimo a 365 a a 500 500 Amaneunse a 365 400 500 Archivero a a a 600 800

Moneda 300 400 300 400 c Escribiente ‘ c c c 500 Escribiente Segundo ‘ ° ° ° 500 Contador de

Marcador Barras b 350 650 cc MinistrodeExecutor a a350 a 400

Executor b b 300 400 c

Portero Ministro

de Barras 350 350 650 700 ¢

Portero Marcador

148 , Appendix A TABLE A.14 (continued)

Position 1765 1784 1788 1802 1825 . Mesa de Bienes de Comunidad

— Oficial Primero a a a 600 800 Oficial Segundo a , a a 400 400 SOURCES: Guia de hacienda, 1825; BN, MS 439[1376], fs. 333-339r., “Serie de las dotaciones . . . ,” 1606— |

a 1780; BN, MS 447[1384], fs. 340-390, “Relacién individual de los empleados de real hacienda . : . ,” 1784.; BN, MS 450[1387], fs. 26-58, “Relacién de los sueldos ...,” 1788; BN, MS 465[1402], fs. 233—-2411.,

, “Demonstraci6n . . . de ministros y empleados . . . ,” 1793; AGN, Indiferente General [Media Anata, caja 9, folder 2, exp. 2, fs. 8—8r.], “Sobre las nuevas oficinas de la tesoreria general,” 1795~1817; AGN, Indiferente : General [Media Anata, caja 9, folder 5, exp. 3, f. 35], “Correspondencia a los oficiales reales,” 1783-1801;

AGN, Indiferente General [Media Anata, caja 9, folder 7, exp. 2], letter, José Quijano Zavala and José Maria Maestre de la Mota to the ministers of the royal treasury, Mexico City, November 5, 1816, draft; AGN, Media Anata 55, fs. 249—253r., “Relacidn jurada [del ensayador mayor del reino],” 1778-1779; AGN, Media Anata 202, fs. 258-287, “Sobre la media anata de José Antonio Lince Gonzalez,” 1778~1783; AGN, Montepios 18, exp. 9, “Clase de empleados . . . ,” 1802; AGN, Montepios 33, receipt 8215, 1828; AGN, RH 75, “Lista de los empleados . . . ,” 1794; AGN, RH 92, “Lista de salarios . . . ,” 1798; AGN, RH 107, “Lista de los empleados . . . ,” 1802; AGN, RH 122, receipt 2072, September, 1802; AGN, RH 155, receipt 2645,

July, 1816; AGN, RH 210, committee minutes, September 5, 1809, item: “Autos sobre remate de la escribania | de real hacienda... ”; AGN, RH 227, committee minutes, June 18, 1799, item: “Expediente sobre el remate del oficio de escribano mayor . . .”; and AGN, RCO 97, exp. 148, fs. 271-272, royal cédula, “Sobre }

- , *Official position not established. - 'No information available., |, . la contaduria de hacienda,” December 6, 1770.

‘Position abolished or replaced.

Salaries of Positions in Fiscal Departments 149

TABLE A.I§ Salaries of Positions in the Contaduria General de Tributos (Retasas) (In Pesos)

Contaduria | Asesor 400 400 400 400 b Position 1770 1784 1794 1804 1809

Contador 4,000 4.000 4,000 4,000 3,600

Comisario 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 b | Escribano 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 Fees Oficial Mayor 400 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,600 Oficial Segundo 300 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,300 Oficial Tercero 300 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,100 Oficial Cuarto 300 1,000 1,000 1,000 900

Oficial 500600 800 600 800 600 800 600 700 Oficial Quinto Sexto 500

Oficial Séptimoa7a500 500400 500 b6 Escribiente 400

Executor 400 400 400 400 400

Portero Ministro

SOURCES: Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia de real hacienda, 1:411-519; BN, MS 439[1376], f. 261, “Dem-

onstracién del nimero de ministros y empleados . . . 1793”; BN, MS 450[1387], fs. 26-58, “Relacién de los empleados . . . 1788”; BN, MS 465[1402], fs. 333—339r., “Serie de dotaciones . . . 1606-1780”; AGN, Historia 159, exp. 3, fs. 16r—4.0, [“Empleados de la tesoreria”], 1789; AGN, Media Anata 44, exp. 2, “Sobre la media anata de los tres amanuenses provisionales de la contadurfa de tributos,” 1783; AGN, Media Anata 44, exp. 9, “Sobre la media anata de Manuel de Rivas, 1788”; AGN, RH 75, “Lista de plazas de dotacién

... Retasas,” 1794 AGN, RH 107, “Relacidn de los empleados . . . Tributos,” 1804; and AGN, RH 210,

committee minutes, May 17, 1809, item: “Autos sobre el arreglo de la contaduria de tributos.” *Official position not established. ‘No information available.

Blank Page |

Appendix B Salaries of Positions in Congressional Offices, 1825-1835

(In Pesos) , Positions 1822 1828 , TABLE B.I

Salaries of Positions in Congressional Secretariats

Oficial Primero 3,000 2,912 Oficial Segundo 2,600 1,173

Oficial Tercero Oficial Cuarto 1,000 7761,300 776 , Oficial 900 678 678 Oficial Quinto Sexto 800

Oficial Séptimo a 631 631 Oficial Octavo a Oficial Noveno a 580

Archivero 800 970 Escribiente 600 580

Portero a 388

SOURCES: Gaceta del imperio, June u1, 1822, regulation, “Reglamento para el gobierno interior de su (el congreso constituyente) secretaria,” May 24. 1822; and AGN, Montepios 30, receipts 7875 and 7895, 1828.

’Official position not established.

151

| 152 , Appendix B ,

| TABLE B.2 Crédito Publico , Salaries of Positions in the Contaduria de Hacienda y

, (In Pesos) ,

, | Position 1828 , | Hacienda

| Contador Mayor 4,650 Contador Primero de Glosa 2,500

a Contador Segundo de Glosa 2,000 Oficial Primero de Glosa 800

Oficial SegundodedeLibros Glosa| 1,000 600 — Oficial Primero | ,

,| Portero 400 | Crédito Publico :

— , Oficial Segundo de , Escribiente 400Libros 800 Archivero580 970 | Su Portero. | Contador Mayor 4,000 |

| Oficial Primero 800 : Oficial Segundo > 600 , | Escribiente 500 | | Contador Primero de Glosa 2,500

souURCE: AGN, Montepios 30, receipt 7895, 1828. |

Notes to the Chapters

1. Politics and Bureaucracy

1. The creation of the colonial bureaucracy permitted the Hapsburg monarchs to exercise temporal authority in their global empire. The immensity and complexity

of that empire inhibited the imposition of absolutist control over its bureaucrats

and subjects; their pecuniary interests, therefore, could and did in many instances | supersede the interests of the Crown. Nevertheless, the strategical significance of the political position of the bureaucracy was not altered by the personal vices of either royal servants or royal subjects. See S. N. Eisenstadt, Political Systems of Empire (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). For a deeper analysis of the significance of the development of the absolutist state, see Marc Raeft, “The WellOrdered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Fighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach,” American Historical Review 80 (December 1975): 1221-43.

2. Eric Van Young, “Recent Anglophone Scholarship on Mexico and Central

America in the Age of Revolution (1750—-1850),” Hispanic American Historical Review

65 (November 1985): 725~43. (Hereafter HAHR.) |

3. Richard Herr in The Eighteenth-Century Revolution in Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958) pointed out the essential recognition of this contradiction by key metropolitan officials by the end of the eighteenth century; see especially pp. 435-44; also see Raeft, “The Well-Ordered Police State.” 4. Donald Smith, The Viceroy of New Spain (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1913); Lillian E. Fisher, Viceregal Administration in the Spanish American Colonies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1926); Herbert I. Priestley, José de Galvez, Visitor General of New Spain, 1765-1771 (Berkeley: University of California

1$3

, 154 , Notes to Pages 3—8 , Press, 1916); and José Antonio Calderén Quijano, Los virreyes de Nueva Espana, 4 , vols. (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1967-72). _ . Jacques Barbier, “Elites and Cadres in Bourbon Chile,” HAHR 52 (August , 1972): 416-35; David A. Brading, “Government and Elite in Late Colonial Mexico,” HAHR 53 (August 1973): 389-414, and Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico: : 1763-1810 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Mark A. Burkholder,

“From Creole to Peninsular: The Transformation of the Audiencia of Lima,” | HAHR 52 (August 1972): 395-415, Burkholder and D. S. Chandler, “Creole Ap--- pointments and the Sale of Audiencia Positions in the Spanish Empire under the Early Bourbons, 1701-1750,” Journal of Latin American Studies 4 (November 1972):

187-206; Manuel Carrera Stampa, “Fuentes para el estudio de stratificaci6én social , _ y las clases sociales en México,” reprint, Memorias de la Academia Mexicana de la Historia 24 (1965); J. R. Fisher, Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The

| _ _Intendant System, 1784-1814. (London: Athlone Press, 1970); John E. Kicza, Colomal _ , Entrepreneurs, Families and Business in Bourbon Mexico City (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1983); John L. Phelan, The People and the King: The

“Comunero” Revolution in Colombia, 1781 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); and Magali Sarfatti, Spanish Bureaucratic Patrimonialism in America (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1966).

, 6. Arthur S. Aiton, Antonio de Mendoza, First Viceroy of New Spain (New York:

Russell and Russell, 1967), p. 193. ,

7. Priestley, José de Galvez, pp. 37-45; Gisela Morazzani de Pérez Enciso, La intendencia en Espana y en América (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela,

1966), pp. 31-36; Luis Navarro Garcia, Intendencias en Indias (Seville: Escuela de , Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1959), pp. 7-15; Horst Pietschman, Die Einftihrung des Intendentensystems in Neu-Spanien im Rahmen der allegemeinen Verwaltungreform

der spanischen Monarchie im 18. Jahrhundert (Cologne: Latein-amerikanische For- |

, schungen, Bohlan Verlag, 1972), pp. 35-40; and L. Fisher, The Intendant System in Spanish America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1929), pp. 6~8.

- 8. Timothy E. Anna, Spain and the Loss of Empire (Lincoln: University of Ne-

braska Press, 1983), pp. 19-26, 143-47, and passim. , a | 9. José Maria Mariluz Urquyo, Origenes de la burocracia rioplatense: La secretarta

oe _ del virreinato (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Cabargon, 1974). 10. Linda Arnold, La secretaria de camara del virreinato en México (Mexico City:

Archivo General de la Nacidén, 1979). 7 u. Enrique Ruiz Guinazu, La magistratura indiana (Buenos Aires: Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1916), and Charles E. Cunningham, The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies as Illustrated by the Audiencia

| of Manila (1583-1800) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1919). | 12. John Leddy Phelan, The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century (Mad-

, | ison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), and Mark A. Burkholder, Politics of a

of New Mexico Press, 1980). : | 133. The Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico in 1978 reprinted a limited Colonial Career: José Baquiano and the Audiencia of Lima (Albuquerque: University

facsimile edition of the six printed volumes originally published between 1845 and

Notes to Pages 10-25 155 1853. I express my sincere thanks to the office of the Oficial Mayor of the Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico for the gift copy of the facsimile edition.

14. Linda Arnold, Directorio de burocratas en la ciudad de México: 1761-1832, Guias ,

y Catalogos (Mexico City: Archivo General de la Nacién, 1980). | 2. The Empire, the Republic, and the Bureaucracy 1. “Dictamen reservado que el excelentisimo sefior Conde de Aranda dio al rey

sobre la independencia de las colonias inglesas después de haber hecho el tratado , de paz ajustado en Paris el afio de 1783,” in José Maria Luis Mora, México y sus vevoluciones, 3 vols. (Paris: Libreria de Rosa, 1836), 3:275—83. The Spanish effort to build a strong military in New Spain is discussed thoroughly by Christon I. Archer in The Army in Bourbon Mexico, 1760-1810 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977). 2. José Campillo y Cosio, Nuevo sistema de gobierno econdémico (Madrid: Imprenta de B. Cano, 1789); Bernardo Ward, Proyecto econédmico (Madrid: J. Ibarra, 1779); Miguel Artola, “Campillo y las reformas de Carlos III,” Revista de Indias 12 (1952): 685—714; Geoffrey J. Walker, Spanish Politics and Imperial Trade, 1700—1789 (London:

Macmillan, 1979); and Phelan, The People and the King, pp. 4—17. 3. The most complete inventory of early national fiscal problems is in the 1870

Memoria of the Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Puiblico by Matias Romero. Romero catalogued and discussed relevant fiscal legislation and regulations of all of the preceding national congresses and executives. For a discussion of the fiscal politics of the early republic, see Barbara A. Tenenbaum in The Politics of Penury: Debts and Taxes in Mexico, 1821-1856 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986). 4. Anna, Spain and the Loss of Empire, pp. 151-220.

§. Ibid., pp. 174-75 and 258-64. 6. Nettie Lee Benson, La diputacion provincial y el federalismo mexicano (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1955). 7. José Maria Luis Mora, “Discurso sobre los perniciosos efectos de la empleo-

mania,” Obras sueltas, 2nd ed. (Mexico City: Editorial Porrtia, 1963), pp. 531-37. , 8. Plan of Iguala, paragraph 15; ‘Treaty of Cordova, paragraph 16; see Felipe Tena Ramirez, Leyes fundamentales de México, 1808—1967, 3rd ed. (Mexico City: Editorial Porrtia, 1967), pp. 15 and 118, respectively.

3. The Mexico City Secretariats | 1. Mariluz Urquio, Origenes de la burocracia rioplatense, pp. 24—25; Archivo General de Indias, Audiencia de México 1217, “Titulo del secretario del virreynato don Francisco Fernandez Molinillo,” April 23, 1742. (Hereafter AGI, AM.) I would

like to express my appreciation to José Maria Mariluz Urquijo, who on a brief trip to Mexico City in 1979 tracked me down in the uncatalogued section of the

156 | Notes to Pages 25-28 | Archivo General de la Nacién and for several hours discussed his work on the

development of the bureaucracy in Buenos Aires. | | , 2. Archivo General de la Nacién, Historia 580A, exp. 4, cuaderno 2, Marqués

| de Cruillas to His Majesty, Mexico City, October 17, 1756 (hereafter AGN); and , AGN, Reales Cédulas Originales 77, exp. 87, fs. 207—210. “Real cédula sobre la secretaria del virreynato,” Buenretiro, August 28, 1757 (hereafter RCO). Employees appointed by the Crown held royal titles that for all intents and purposes guaranteed

_ lifetime employment in the imperial bureaucracy. Employees appointed by viceroys had superior titles, which entitled them to secure although not guaranteed employment in the viceregal bureaucracy. Individuals appointed by department heads

held departmental titles; they held their jobs at the discretion of local management

royal titles. |

officials. This study is concerned primarily with employees who had superior and

3. Smith, The Viceroy of New Spain, pp. 186—91, briefly discussed the secretariat; AGI, AM 1217, “Titulos de los superintendentes subdelegados de real hacienda,” royal cédula, Aranjuez, June 30, 1751.

September 15, 1758. , , , October 16, 1772. , , 4. AGN, Historia 580A, Marqués de Amarillas to His Majesty, Mexico City,

5. AGN, Historia s80A, exp. 4, Marqués de Croix to His Majesty, Mexico City, |

February 26, 1771. Oo

, 6. AGN, Historia 580A, Antonio Maria de Bucareli to His Majesty, Mexico ,

| — City, January 27, 1772; AGI, AM 1962, José de Galvez to Julian de Arriaga, Madrid,

, 7. AGI, AM 1242, Antonio de O’Reilly to Bucareli, Madrid, November 25, 1772, | and O’Reilly to Bucareli, Madrid, December 26, 1772. — 8. AGN, Intendencias 25, fs. 62—64r., “Real cédula sobre el arreglo de la secretaria del virreynato,” Aranjuez, June 19, 1773, and fs. 6s—66, “Real orden sobre

la secretaria del virreynato,” Aranjuez, June 19, 1773. For a complete table of the , changes in the structure of the viceregal secretariat, see Arnold, La secretaria de camara, Cuadro 1, “Estructura de la Secretaria de Camara del Virreynato, 1773—

1797.” For the original 1773 plan see AGN, Historia 580A, exp. 4, fs. 1-23, “In-

Mexico City, May 4, 1773. _ | strucci6n para gobierno de la secretaria de este virreynato,” Melchor Peramas,

9. Peramas submitted a list of candidates to Bucareli on September 16, 1773, |

Bucareli forwarded the list to Madrid on September 26, and the Crown approved 7 Peramas’s recommendations by May 1774. AGN, Bandos 8, Peramas to Bucareli,

—32sr., Appointments. | | | Mexico City, September 16, 1773. AGN, Reales Cédulas Duplicados 126, fs. 322r.—

10. AGN, Media Anata 60, Junta de Hacienda, March 16, 1780, decree. Peramas

received permission from the viceregal fiscal committee first; then Viceroy Mayorga

, asked metropolitan officials to approve the committee’s recommendation to pay | Peramas back. AGI, AM 1240, “Sobre el arreglo de la secretaria, 1778-1783.” Ma-

, yorga to Galvez, Mexico City, May 26, 1780. Mayorga used Peramas’s experience to justify the secretary's proposal for expanding the secretariat to include eight | clerks, an archivist, two copyists, and a doorman, and for a budget that included 2,100 pesos annually for temporary copyists. Mayorga also requested an additional

Notes to Pages 28~32 157 400 pesos annually for office expenses. To justify that request he referred the , Crown to a controversy developing between the viceroy and fiscal officials who wanted Mayorga to pay the royal treasury for the 860 reams of paper the secretariat had received from the royal warehouse during the previous decade. At 2,580 sheets per ream, which the clerks folded and cut into varying sizes for scratch paper and official correspondence, the secretariat consumed the equivalent of 750 to 2,000 sheets of paper per day between January 24, 1771, and January 25, 1779. Each ream cost three pesos; the 400 pesos that Mayorga requested would also pay for ink, pens, and candles. u. AGI, AM 1240, “Real decreto de 19 de agosto de 1779,” draft; AGI, Indi-

ferente 1519, royal decree, August 19, 1779, and royal cédula, September 22, 1799; , José Gémez, Diario curtoso de México (Mexico City: Antigua Imprenta de la Voz de la Religidn de T. S. G., 1854), pp. 78, 85, and 302. The viceroy justified the

petition for retirement on the basis that Peramas was in poor health. He retired , at half pay and with the title of honorary oidor of the Mexico City audiencia. Peramas received word of the Crown’s approval on January 25, 1780; he took the oath of honorary oidor on May 9, 1780; he remained in Mexico City until his death on August 2, 1788. 12. The best discussion of the Cosio episode 1s by José Joaquin Real Diaz and Antonia Maria Heredia Herrera, “Martin de Mayorga (1779-1783),” in Los verreyes de Nueva Espana en el reinado de Carlos III, ed. José Antonio Calderén Quijano (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1967), 2:39~74. 13. AGI, AM is11, Cosio to Galvez, Mexico City, March 14 and 18, 1781. See discussion by Real Diaz and Heredia Herrera, “Martin de Mayorga,” pp. s6—57. 14. AGI, AM 1240, Pedro Antonio Cosio to Galvez, Mexico City, August 14, 1779.

15. Real Diaz and Heredia Herrera, “Martin de Mayorga,” pp. 60--64. 16. AGI, AM 1240, Cosio to Galvez, Mexico City, November 24, 1781. 17, AGI, AM 1240, Galvez to Mayorga, December 13, 1782, n.p., draft; this draft refers to the royal cédula of June 10, 1761, which distinguished the clerical duties

of the viceregal secretariat from the legal clerking responsibilities of the senior | notaries. 18. AGN, Correspondencia de los Virreyes 130, draft, Mayorga to Galvez, Mexico City, January 4, 1782.

19. AGI, AM 1240, Mayorga to Galvez, December 13, 1782. 20. AGN, Historia 580A, exp. 4, Matias de Galvez to His Majesty, Mexico City, May 30, 1783, and January 4, 1784. 21. AGN, Correspondencia de los Virreyes 140, Conde de Galvez to Marqués de Sonora, Mexico City, September 26, 1786.

22. Real ordenanza para el establecemiento de e instruccion de intendentes de exército , provincia en el veino de la Nueva Espana (Madrid, 1786). 23. Navarro Garcia, “El virrey Marqués de Croix (1766—1771),” in Los virreyes

... Carlos IIT, ed. Calderén Quyano, 1:262 and 301-3. Mangino, Galvez’s commissioner in Michoacan, summarily sentenced and hanged an alcalde mayor whose resistance to the expulsion orders contributed to riots in Apatzingan and Uruapan. Judicial authorities in Mexico City immediately objected to the unprecedented

158 | Notes to Pages 32-35 imposition and execution of capital punishment carried out without consulting _ the criminal court of the audiencia. Nevertheless, metropolitan officials approved Mangino’s decisive action. AGI, AM 1218, “Real titulo de Fernando José Mangino, | - intendente de exército superintendente subdelegado de real hacienda,” January 24, 1787, and AGI, AM 1161, “Relacién de mérito de Fernando José Mangino,” 1793. 24. AGN, Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreinato, minutes of the fiscal affairs committee, August 10, 1769, and October 9 and 1, 1770. 25. Biblioteca Nacional de México, MS 447(1384), f. 2, “Bando de 10 de mayo

de 1787,” announced Mangino’s assumption of the superintendency and his position |

, as directly subordinate to the minister of the Indies, José de Galvez. (Hereafter , BN.) See also AGN, Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreynato, Correspon-_

dencia de Mangino, 1787-1788. , oo

26. With Nuifiez de Haro and Ferndndez de Cordova’s approval, Mangino chose José Maria Beltran, a clerk with over ten years’ experience in the viceregal secretariat,

for his secretary. Mangino also adopted thematic content of letters, petitions, , complaints, and files as the basis for organization and distribution of work in the fiscal secretariat. AGN, Historia 580A, exp. 4, Viceroy to His Majesty, Mexico City, May 27, 1787. AGI, AM 1323, Hoja de servicio de José Maria Beltran, 1820.

1787. . 26, 1788. | ,

AGN, Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreynato, Coleccién de documentos , sobre la secretaria, “Varios métodos de distribuir los asuntos de la secretarfa en | sus respectivas mesas,” 1788.

27. AGN, Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreynato, Correspondencia de Mangino, 1787, Fernando José Mangino to His Majesty, Mexico City, June 28, , 28. AGN, Historia s80A, exp. 4, Mangino to His Majesty, Mexico City, January

29. Brading, Miners and Merchants, p. 66; AGN, Intendencias 25, “Sobre que se proponga lo conveniente acerca de los articulos de la ordenanza de intendentes

que exfjan declaracién.” , — , 30. AGN, Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreinato, Correspondencia de Espafia, royal order, San Lorenzo, November 6, 1787; AGI, AM 151s, Manuel ,

Antonio Florez to Antonio Valdés, Mexico City, February 25, 1788. 31. AGI, AM 1937, “Inventario de los expedientes, papeles, y correspondencias _

que de la secretaria de la superintendencia subdelegada de real hacienda se entre-

garon a la camara del virreynato ... ,” Mexico City, February 26, 1788. , , 32. AGN, Intendencias 25, f. 13, Florez to His Majesty, Mexico City, February 25, 1788, Bernardo Bonavia, a peninsular regular army officer, originally went to New Spain to review military affairs in Texas as a personal favor to the Conde de

| Galvez. When the Conde died Bonavia requested and received permission to remain |

25, 1788. | |

in Mexico City rather than journey into the wilds of Texas. Florez commissioned

, him before any orders from the peninsula assigned him new duties. See AGI, AM 1974, Antonio Bonavia to Valdés, Mexico City, October 27, 1787, and February 33. AGN, Intendencias 25, “Sobre que se proponga . . . ”; the concluding opin- ,

ion was written by the civil fiscal on October 31, 1803. 34. AGI, AM 1974, draft, royal decree, Aranjuez, June 19, 1788.

Notes to Pages 3s—41 159 35. AGN, Intendencias 25, Revillagigedo to Valdés, Mexico City, January 1s, 1790. Bonavia received 4,100 pesos as corregidor and 1,900 pesos as interim intendant. In addition, he earned 800 pesos a year as treasurer for the funds the city

collected from its rental properties, and about 300 pesos annually in fees for countersigning various fiscal documents pertaining to intendancy affairs.

36. Under half-annates regulations individuals appointed to newly created po- | sitions were exempt from that tax. 37. AGN, Intendencias 25, royal order, July 23, 1790. 38. AGN, Intendencias 25, Revillagigedo to Conde de Lerena, Mexico City, October 30, 1790; also see AGN, Historia s80A, exp. 4 and AGN, Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreynato, Cartas Reservadas del Virrey, 1789-1795, draft,

Revillagigedo to Conde de Lerena, Mexico City, October 30, 1790. |

39. AGN, Intendencias 25, royal order, March 27, 1791. ,

40. AGN, Intendencias 25, Revillagigedo to Valdés, Mexico City, July 27, 1797. ,

31, 1792. |

41. AGN, Intendencias 25, royal order, January 13, 1792. 42. AGI, AM 1974, Revillagigedo to Diego de Gardoqui, Mexico City, October

43. AGI, AM 1974, royal order, April 18, 1793.

44. AGN, Intendencias 26, exp. 1, decree, August 7, 1793, “Sobre la extincidn de la intendencia. . . .» Correspondence with Bonavia’s office was ordered to cease and was henceforth directed to the viceroy. See also AGI, Indiferente 183, “Breve

compendio del estado en que se halla la secretaria del virreinato de Nueva Espajfia,” | Bonilla, Mexico City, (1793), copy dated October 2, 1793. 45. AGN, Historia 159, regulation, March 31, 1790; AGN, Historia s80A, exp. 4, Revillagigedo to Valdés, Mexico City, January 11, 1790 (no. 15). See also AGN, Intendencias 25, fs. 1oo—110 for another copy. | 46. Mariluz Urquyo, Origenes de la burocracia riplatense, pp. 44-46 and 61— 62, and personal discussions with the author. 47. AGN, Intendencias 25, fs. 106—106r., “Estado que manifiesta el numero de - Oficiales y dependientes que deben existir por ahora en la secretaria de cAmara del virreinato y distribucién,” (1790); AGN, Historia 580A, exp. 4, fs. 27—38, “Instruc-

ci6n que debera observarse provisionalmente en la secretaria de camara del virreinato ...,” Revillagigedo, Mexico City, March 31, 1790. (Another copy is in AGN, Intendencias 25, fs. 1oo—110.)

48. AGN, Historia 44, f. o1r., “Nota de las representaciones que ha hecho a

S. M. el virrey de Nueva Espafia sobre la urgencia de arreglar la secretarfa del | virreynato,” October 29, 1791. According to the list of letters in this note, Revillagigedo between January 1790 and October 1791 had sent eight letters to senior officials in Spain regarding staffing deficiencies in the secretariat. 49. AGI, Indiferente 183, “Hoja de servicios de Manuel Velazquez de Ledn,”

p. 287. ,

Mexico City, 1794; Linda Arnold, Directorio de burécratas en le ciudad de Mexico, 1761-1832 (Mexico City: Guias y Catalogos 52, Archivo General de la Nacidn, 1980),

50. AGN, Historia 580A, f. 46, “Demonstracién del repartamiento de nego-

ciados de secretaria entre los individuos que se expresan,” February 20, 1791; AGN, Media Anata 36, exp. 2, fs. 6~7, “Decreto de varias prevenciones para continuar

160 , Notes to Pages 41-47

, rreynato,” February 17, 1791. | con progresos y orden metddico el arreglo del archivo de la secretaria del vi-

| s1. Despite this optimistic note, the viceroy continued to employ twenty-eight ,

persons in the secretariat. AGN, Historia 580A, fs. 43-46, “Nuevo arreglo y dis- ,

tribucién de negocios,” February 18, 1791. , 52. BN, MS 460(1397), f. 209—212r., Gardoqui to Viceroy, Aranjuez, April 18,

1793; AGI, AM 1974, “Documentos sobre la extincidn de la intendencia”; AGI, , Indiferente 183, “Breve compendio. . . ,” Bonilla, Mexico City, September 15, 1793,

and Revillagigedo to His Majesty, Mexico City, November 30, 1793 (no. 663);

Maria Lourdes Diaz-Trechuelo, Concepcidn Pajaron Parody, and Antonio Rubio . Gil, “El virrey don Juan Vicente de Giiemes Pacheco, segundo Conde de Revillagigedo,” in Los virreyes de Nueva Espana en el renado de Carlos IV, ed. José

Antonio Calderén Quijano, (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos,

1972), 1:141—45. | , |

53. AGI, Indiferente 183, “Nueva distribucidn de departamentos . . . ,” July 1796.

54. Navarro Garcia and Maria del Pépulo Antolin Espino, “El virrey Marqués

May 14, 1797.

_ de Branciforte,” in Los virreyes.. .Carlos IV, ed. Calderén Quyano, 1:558—60 and 576-80; AGI, AM 1312 and 1579, Branciforte to Gardoqui, Mexico City, February

, 26, 1797; AGN, Historia 580A, exp. 4, Principe de Paz to Branciforte, Aranjuez, , 55. AGN, Historia 580A, exp. 4, “Instruccién provisional para la secretaria del virreynato y providencias sobre agregacién de oficiales a la de México, con motivos de la subdivisién temporal,” Bonilla, Orizaba, August 18, 1797. Branciforte approved the plan the next day.

56. AGN, Historia 580A, exp. 4, “Instruccién ...,” Bonilla; AGN, Historia 580A, exp. 4, Manuel Velazquez de Leén to Branciforte, August 28, September 4. - , September 7, and September 11, 1797; and Real Tribunal de Cuentas to Branciforte, | Mexico City, August 27, 1797.

57. AGN, Historia 44, exp. 6, “Cartas escritas a la corte de Espafia sobre el

_ arreglo de. la secretaria del virreynato,” Miguel José de Azanza to His Majesty, — | Mexico City, September 14, 1798, draft.

_ §8. Maria del Carmen Gablis Diez, “El virrey don Miguel José de Azanza,” in Los virreyes. . . Carlos IV, ed. Calderén Quyano, 2:34—35; AGN, Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreinato, “Relaci6n de los documentos que deben remitirse a la secretaria de camara del virreinato en los tiempos y por los individuos que se

-_ expresan,” (1798), draft; AGN, Real Hacienda 13, “Manifiesto del plan de empleados,” Mexico City, April 1800, copy, June 5, 1808, and “Sobre pago de escribientes,”

, Mexico City, June 5, 1801 (hereafter AGN, RH). , , 59. Ordenanza general formada de orden de su magestad, y mandada imprimur y

_ publicar para el gobierno e instruccion de intendentes, subdelegados y demas empleados , , en Indias (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Ibarra, 1803); Navarro Garcia, Inten-

, dencias en Indias, pp. 128—38.

June 4, 1804. , , ,

| 60. AGN, Intendencias 29, Francisco Manuel de Arce to José de Iturrigaray, Veracruz, May 30, 1804; AGN, Intendencias 26, Iturrigaray to Arce, Mexico City,

61. AGN, Intendencias 26, Arce to Iturrigaray, Jalapa, June 14, 1804.

Notes to Pages 47~51 161 62. AGN, Intendencias 26, Arce to Iturrigaray, Jalapa, August 12, 1804, mentioned a superior order dated August 4, 1804; AGN, Historia 44, exp 6, f. 63, superior order, Mexico City, September 12, 1807. 63. Lucas Alaman, Historia de México, desde los primeros movimientos que preparon su independencia en el ano de 1808 hasta la época, 5 vols. (Mexico City: Imprenta de

J. M. Lara, 1849-1852; Editorial Jus, 1952), 1:147; Doris M. Ladd, The Mexican Nobility at Independence: 1780-1826 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976), p. 110; Anna, The Fall of Royal Government, pp. s0-—55; and Archivo Histérico de Notarias,

Juan Manuel Pozo, power of attorney from the merchant community (comin de , comerciantes), Mexico City, September 2, 1809. (Hereafter AHN.) 64. AGI, AM 1974. “Documentos sobre la extincién de la intendencia. .. .” 65. AGN, Civil 1581, exp. 10, Velazquez de Leédn to Viceroy, Mexico City, May 6, I8I0. 66. Anna, The Fall of Royal Government, pp. 59~—61. The audiencia appointed Merino as interim intendant in Valladolid, Michoacan: see AGN, Civil 1581, decree, May to, 1810; AGN, RH 221, superior order, October 1, 1810; and AGN, RH 221, fs. 18r—22, Real Junta Superior de Real Hacienda, minutes, January 1, 181, item: “El sefior don Pedro Maria Monterde encargado de la intendencia de México sobre abono de gastos.” (Hereafter RJS/RH.) 67. Gaceta de México, Mexico City, April 27 and May 4, 1813; Gaceta de México, October 12, 1813, reproduced a superior decree of October 1, 1813; Alaman, Historia de México, 3:407. Under the constitution of 1812, promulgated during Calleja’s administration, officially the position of viceroy ceased to exist; politicians in the peninsula intended to appoint civil governors (jefaturas politicas) throughout the empire; Calleja, trying to suppress the civil war, refused to abandon the use of the old title and the power that accompanied it; see Anna, The Fall of Royal Government, p. 128.

Garcia, Intendencias, pp. 211-16. | 68. AGI, Indiferente 1701, royal order, January 29, 1821; transcribed in Navarro

69. Anna, “Francisco Novella and the Last Stand of the Royal Army in New

Spain,” HAHR 51 (February 1971): 92-111; and The Fall of Royal Government, pp. 216-18. 70. Mexico, Congress, Coleccién de los decretos y ordenes que ha expedido la soberana

qunta provisional gubernativa del tmperio mexicano, desde su instalacton en 28 de septiembre de 1821 hasta 24. de febrero de 1822 (Mexico City: Valdés, 1822), September

25, 1821. Hereafter Coleccion, SJPG. — |

8, 1821. |

71. Mexico, Congress, Diario de las sestones de la soberana junta provisional gubernativa del imperto mexicano, instalada segun previenen el plan de Iguala y tratados

de la villa de Cordova (Mexico City: Valdés, 1821-1822), September 29, 1821. (Hereafter Diarw, SJPG.) 72. Mexico, Congress, Diario, SJ)PG, November 4., November 5, and November

73. Mexico, Congress, Diario, SJPG, October 24, 1821; and Mariano Galvan

Rivera, comp., Coleccion de drdenes y decretos de la soberana junta provisional gubernativa, y soberano congresos generales de la nactén mexicana (Mexico: Imprenta de Galvan, 1829—184.0), decree, October 24, 1821.

162 , Notes to Pages s1—s4. 74. AGN, Justicia (Archivo), vol. 25, “Polizas de los sueldos de empleados . . . ,” , March 1822; AGN, Justicia (Archivo), vol. 8, f. 107. Joaquin Iturbide to Secretary for Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, July 12, 1823, letter; AGN, Justicia (Archivo), , vol. 25, “Razén de las cantidades que por buenas cuentas de sus sueldos han recibido © , los oficiales de la secretaria de justicia y negocios eclesidsticos” (November 15, 1821,

to November 15, 1823); AGN, Justicia (Archivo), vol. 26, “Los oficiales de la secretaria de justicia y negocios eclesiasticos que suscribimos, nos obligamos a

responder de mancomiuin por la cantidad de ciento y cincuenta pesos que se le , anticipan por la tesoreria general,” Mexico City, August 27, 1827, letter; and voll. 69, Secretariat clerks to the Secretary for Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Mexico City, June 14, 1834, letter. In this letter the clerks complained not only about the government's failure to pay them but also about a promotion freeze. The secretary

salary problem. authorized the promotions and asked the secretary for fiscal affairs to resolve the ,

75. “Organizacion para el despacho ordinario y extraordinario de los negocios de gobierno ...,” November 8, 1821, in Arrillaga, Recopilacién, April-June 1833,

pp. 121-22; AGN, Justicia (Archivo), vol. 8, f. 145, letter, Secretary of Fiscal Affairs

to Secretary of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Mexico City, April 24, 1823; fs. | 141—44, letter, Secretary of Foreign and Interior Affairs to Secretary of Justice and , Ecclesiastical Affairs, Mexico City, August 13, 1823; and f. 140, letter, Secretary for

Fiscal Affairs to Secretary for Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Mexico City, November 26, 1823; vol. 10, “Correspondencia sobre juntas de ministros,” Mexico City, October 14, 1826, draft; and “Orden del 12 de enero del excelentisimo sefior

vice presidente sobre establecer el despacho de los negocios de las secretarias y , juntas de ministros que diariamente debe haver”; and vol. 69, “Sobre arreglo del despacho con el excelentisimo sefior presidente de la republica,” Mexico City, April

28, 1834, order, copy. |

, 76. Secretary for Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Mexico, Memoria (Mexico City: 1826). Material organized by the secretariat can be consulted in AGN, Justicia,

and Justicia (Archivo). - oe

77. Secretaria de Guerra y Marina, Memoria (Mexico City: 1827) and Memoria (Mexico City: 1834). I did not conduct any research in the military archives in

Mexico City. At the Bancroft Library at the University of California at Berkeley , I did review microfilm copies of personnel files from the archive of the Secretaria , de Defensa Nacional, files organized during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Those files are arranged in alphabetic and chronological order. From

conversations with researchers who have received permission to enter the Defensa |

| array of paperwork. oo | |

archive in Mexico City, I have concluded that military aides imposed order on an 78. Secretaria de Relacidnes Interiores y Exteriores, Memorias . . . , 1831-1835;

Robert A. Potash, Mexican Government and Industrial Development in the Early

1975). ae ,

Republic: The Banco de Avio, rev. English ed. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1983); and Michael P. Costeloe, La primera republica federal de México (1824—1835), trans. Manuel Fernandez Gasalla, (Mexico City: Fonda de Cultura Econémica,

Notes to Pages s6~s9 163 | 4. From Audiencia to Supreme Court 1. Juan de Solorzano y Pereira, Politica indiana(Madrid: 1647; Madrid and Buenos Aires: Compania Iberoamericana de Publicaciones, 1930), 2:137; for the philosophical foundations of Solorzano y Pereira, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,

Book V, Chapter 3, on justice and equality. 2. Alaman, Historia de México, 5:3:0-68; W. Woodrow Anderson, “Reform as a Means to Quell Rebellion,” in Nettie Lee Benson, Mexico and the Spanish Cortes, 1810~ 1822: Eight Essays (Austin: University of Texas Press), pp. 107—203; Jaime E. Rodriguez O., The Emergence of Spanish America: Vicente Rocafuerte and Spanish Amerwanism, 1808-1832 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), pp. 37-46; and Anna, Spain and the Loss of Empire.

3. For the development of the audiencia as a colonial institution, see Cunningham, The Audtencia in the Spanish Colonies; John Parry, The Audtencia of New Galicia in the Sixteenth Century(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948); Ricardo Zorraquin Becu, La organizacién judicial argentina en el periodo hispanico (Buenos Aires: Libreria del Plata, 1952); Phelan, The Kingdom of Quito; and Burkholder and Chandler, From Impotence to Authortty. 4. Lyle N. McAlister, The “Fuero Militar” in New Spain, 1764-1800 (Gainesville:

University of Florida Press, 1957); Alonso Toro, Historia de la suprema corte de justicia de la nacién (México: 1934), pp. 5-58; Joaquin Escriche y Martin, comp.,

2:450—61. , 5. The patrol duties of junior ministers complemented those of neighborhood |

Diccionario razonado de legislacién y jurisprudencia, 3rd ed., 3 vols. (Madrid: 1947),

alcaldes, the militias, the military, and the viceregal guard. Mexico City, like any big city, had an indefinite number of street criminals and its share of ordinary citizens who committed crimes of passion. Major crimes, such as the robbery and murder of Joaquin Dongo and ten members of his household in early October 1789, were rare. José Gdmez, a viceregal guard who kept a diary between 1776 and 1798, recorded only one markedly unusual incident involving a junior minister on patrol. Apparently, on the night of January 21, 1782, Minister Juan Antonio de Anda, along with a court deputy and notary, made their usual rounds and encountered two soldiers cavorting with several prostitutes in a bar. The minister ordered the women to leave the premises, and the infuriated soldiers beat up the minister and his aides. G6mez commented that such an incident had never before occurred anywhere in the kingdom. See José Gémez, Diario curioso, entry for January 21, 1782.

6. Charles Berry, “The Election of Deputies to the Spanish Cortes, 1810-1822,” Mexico and the Spanish Cortes, ed. Benson, pp. 11—14.

7. The motion was made by Agustin Argtielles, the substitute deputy from the principate of Asturias. Spain, Cortes, Diario de las discustones y actas de las cortes, January 29, 1811. (Hereafter Diario de las cortes.)

8. Diario de las cortes, March 30, 1811. , 9. Diario de las cortes, November 19, 1811. The only two aspects of the committee

recommendations that the deputies debated were the extent and limits of the

164 , | Notes to Pages 59-67 | ecclesiastical and military jurisprudence and the process of appeal, which they limited to three instances. 10. Constitucton politica de la monarquia espanola, in Leyes fundamentales de Méxt-

co, 1808-1967, ed. Felipe Tena Ramirez, 3rd ed. (Mexico City: Editorial Porrta, , 1967), Pp. 59-104.

u. Title V, articles 260, 271, 272, and 298, stipulated that other regulations sy concerning the precise organization and number of courts and the specific functions , | of justices of the peace, district judges, and magistrates be given proper form by the Cortes in future legislation. , 12, AGN, Real Acuerdo n, September 18, 1812. If not cited, minutes to the dates

of the meetings are indicated in the text. | , , 13. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, October 15 and 19, 1812.

14. The magistrates reversed this vote on March 22, 1813, after receipt of the October 9, 1812, decree that regulated the new courts. See “Decreto de las cortes generales y extraordinarias .. . ,” in Recopilacién de leyes, decretos y circulaves de los supremos poderes de los estados unidos mexicanos .. . comprende de enero de julio de 1833,

a ed. Basilio José Arrillaga (Mexico City: Imprenta de J. M. Fernandez, 1850), pp.

| 117-206. |

15. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, November 12, 1812. |

16. See, for example, Jefferson Rea Spell, The Life and Works of José Joaquin

Fernandez de Lizard: (Philadelphia: Series in Romantic Languages and Literature, University of Pennsylvania, 1931), pp. 92—93.

ernment, p. 113. | ,

17. Benson, Mexico and the Spanish Cortes, p. 8; Anna, The Fall of Royal Gov- ,

(Cadiz: 1812). , | 18. Proyecto de ley sobre el arreglo de las audtencias y juzgados de primera instancia, presentado a las cortes generales y extraordinarias por su comisién nombrado al objeto

9, 1820. |

| 19. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, April 14, 1813. |

20. AGN, Real Acuerdo n, March 17 and April 27, 1813. a

| 21. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, March 17, 1814.

22. The government refrained from making any changes until official verification of peninsular events reached Mexico City on June 9. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, June _ 23. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, June 15, 16, 17, and 20, 1820. On the organization of the judiciary, see June 22 and 26, July 13 and 18, August 7 and 11, and September

, 5 and 25, 1820; on the new role of attorneys, June 26, September 5, and October

, 9, 1820; and on the ministers’ salaries, July 10, 1820. : 24. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11; the magistrates finished the regulation between ,

February 22 and 26, 1821, and it was published on March 12, 1821. | 25. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, March 1, 1821. For a copy of the Plan of Iguala, see -

Tena Ramirez, ed., Leyes fundamentales, pp. 113-16. , 26. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, May 31, 1821.

27. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, August 31, 1821. | GS 28. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, September 8, 1821. 29. Alaman, Historia de México, 5:240.

Notes to Pages 67-71 165 30. AGN, Real Acuerdo 1, see minutes for meetings in August, September, and October 1821; and Arnold, comp., “Personnel Data Files: Mexico City Bu-

reaucrats, 1761-1832.” Of the magistrates sitting on the court during the summer | of 1821, American-born Manuel del Campo y Rivas became acting regent, and the court’s attorneys, José Ignacio Berazueta and José Hipdlito Odoardo, both Americans, remained on the court; American José Isidro Yafiez became a regent; American Manuel Martinez Mansilla left to sit on the sovereign provisional governing committee; Juan Antonio de la Riva, a peninsular, though ill, remained through the first week of October 1821 when his presence was vital for a quorum and until

substitutes were sworn in (he obtained a passport to emigrate to Spain on November 17, 1821); Regent Miguel Antonio Bataller y Ros, a peninsular who had served on the Mexico City audiencia since 1796, left the court despite pleas from the regency and his colleagues and received a passport on January 3, 1822; Manuel Mariano de Blaya y Blaya, a peninsular, also received a passport in early January 1822; peninsular magistrates Ildefonso José de Medina, Juan Ramon de Oses, Pedro Lopez de Segovia, and Ambrosio de Sagarzuricta also emigrated. 31. AGN, Real Acuerdo nm, October 5, 1821. Mexican Lic. Juan José Flores Alatorre, who had served as a lawyer for the poor, as legal advisor for the royal

mint, and as honorary magistrate of the Guadalajara audiencia; Lic. José Maria Rosas y Mufive, a local lawyer who had served as an assistant royal attorney for brief preparation and as a lawyer for the Inquisition and was at the time an honorary magistrate of the audiencia and a district first-instance judge in Mexico City; and Manuel de la Pefia y Pefia, a Mexican appointed to the audiencia in Quito. By October 23 Juan Manuel Elizalde, a Chilean appointed to the audiencia in Manila, had also sworn loyalty to the Plan of Iguala, the Treaty of Cordova, and national sovereignty and had taken the oath of substitute magistrate. 32. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, October 8, 1821, passim. 33. Juan Antonio Mateos, comp., Historia parlamentaria de los congresos mexicanos

de 1821 w 1857 (Mexico City: V. S. Reyes, 1877-1912), October 16, 1821, p. 84. 34. Mateos, Historia parlamentaria, October 17, 1821.

City, October 25, 1821. | 35. AGN, Real Acuerdo m, Manuel Campo y Rivas to the Regency, Mexico

36. AGN, Real Acuerdo t1, November 3, 1821. 37. Extract of a regency letter in AGN, Real Acuerdo t1, November 6, 1821; correspondence mentioned in Mateos, Historia parlamentaria, November 3, 1821, p. IOI. 38. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, November 13, 1821; Mateos, Historia parlamentaria, November 22, 1821, p. 123.

39. Mateos, Historia parlamentaria, December «1, 1821, p. 140.

40. Mateos, Historia parlamentaria, December 13, 1821, p. 145. 41. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, December 20, 1821. 42. Mateos, Historia parlamentaria, December 29, 1821, p. 161.

43. Mateos, Historia parlamentaria, January 8, 1822, pp. 179-80. . 44. Mateos, Historia parlamentaria, December 29, 1821, and January 22 and 23, 1822; and Galvan Rivera, Coleccién de ordenes, January 23, 1822.

166 , , Notes to Pages 72-77 , , 45. Galvan Rivera, Coleccién de érdenes, February 26, 1822; on the hiring freeze see Mateos, Historia parlamentaria: first reading of motion was on February 28,

| 1822, second reading and approval on March 1, 1822.

46. AGN, Real Acuerdo nm, March 1, 1822.

, 47. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, May 18, 1822. ,

48. After receiving clarification regarding the location of clerking offices and the archive, the magistrates moved out and the monarch moved in on June ro.

51. Ibid. , , :

AGN, Real Acuerdo 1, June 7, 8, and 10, 1822. , 49. AGN, Real Acuerdo u, June 20 and 26, July 5 and 19-24, 1822.

50. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, January 23, 1823. ,

52. Mateos, Historia parlamentaria, April 22, 1823; pp. 191-93; Galvan Rivera, Coleccién de ordenes, “Decreto de 22 de abril de 1823.”

$3. Mateos, Historia parlamentaria, June 20, 1823; and Galvan Rivera, Coleccién de ordenes, June 23, 1823, “Establecimiento provisional de un tribunal de justicia.” 54. AGN, Real Acuerdo 11, July 30, 1823.

55. Ladd, The Mexican Nobility at Independence, pp. 108-11; Anna, The Fall of ,

, Royal Government, p. 56. ,

; §6. Benson, La diputacion provincial, pp. 141-65. | 57. Proyecto de decreto orgdntico provisortio, para el arreglo del gobierno interior del

estado libre, independiente y soberana de México (Mexico City: Imprenta a cargo de |

| Rivera, 1824), p. I.

58. Memoria que el golierno del estado libre de México de los ramos de su administracién leida al congreso del mismo estado, a consequencia de su decreto de 16 de diciembre _ de 1825 (Mexico City: Imprenta a cargo de Rivera, 1825), Chart 14, indicated the

assumption of the responsibility of paying the magistrates’ salaries. The court

- remained a provisional court throughout the first federal republic. | — 59. Mateos, Historia parlamentaria, August 27, 1824. | 60. In accordance with the May 20, 1826, law that mandated the establishment of circuit and district courts, circuit courts would be located in Mérida, Puebla, , Mexico City, Guanajuato, Guadalajara, Rosario, Monterrey, and Parral; the circuit courts in Mexico City and Monterrey opened for business in February and April 1828; the next year the court in Mérida opened, followed by the Parral court in

1830; see AGN, Suprema Corte de Justicia, caja 5, legajo 2, arbitrio 103, “Informa , de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en que se proponen varias medidas para el arreglo de la administracion de justicia” (hereafter

AGN, SCJ). The shortage of qualified lawyers stemmed from the monopoly on | the adjudication of complex legal cases held by Mexico City and Guadalajara for

nearly three hundred years. Most practicing lawyers lived in or near those two | cities. With the establishment of a federal republic, the national government had , to compete with the states for the small pool of qualified lawyers. Lawyers in , _ Mexico City and Guadalajara who wanted to give up the practice of law for judgeships could opt for state circuit and supreme courts in México, Jalisco, Puebla, Michoacan, or Guanajuato; they did not have to move to the less desirable desert

- north or tropical south to be judges. 61. AGN, SCJ, caja 1, arbitrio 1, [Indice de arbitrios . . . 1826]; see, among many

Notes to Pages 77—78 167 others, item 87: “El licenciado don Ignacio Blanco solicita la promotoria [fiscal] del tercer circuito”; item 88: “El licenciado don Ignacio Conejares solicitando la

promotoria [fiscal] del juzgado de circuito de México”; and item 89: “El licenciado don Mariano Guerra de Manzares solicita la secretaria vacante en una de las salas , de la suprema corte de justicia.” 62. AGN, Justicia (Archivo), vol. 34, to Secretary for Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, Monterrey, Coahuila, December 1, 1826, letter, acknowledged receipt to the second call (convocatoria) for qualified applicants for federal positions; this letter also noted that magistracies in Coahuila-Texas, Sonora-Sinaloa, Tamaulipas,

Upper California, and New Mexico were vacant because of a lack of applicants and that other positions in the federal courts in Coahuila-Texas, Nueva Ledn, Tamaulipas, Michoacan, Tabasco, Chihuahua, and Yucatan were vacant because the appointees had resigned; vol. 38, Antonio Tomas Robles to Miguel Ramos Arispe, Capital de Chiapa, March 27, 1827, letter; in Chiapa the lack of a qualified notary who could record court testimony impeded judicial proceedings; AGN, SCJ, caja 1, arbitrio 1, [Indice de arbitrios .. . 1827], item 12: “El licenciado don Victor Marques sobre que no puede proceder a al instalaci6n del tribunal de circuito del Parral por falta del promotor fiscal del mismo.” 63. AGN, Justicia (Archivo), vol. 94, fs. 3—s, Juan de Elizalde to Secretary of

Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs, May 18, 1827, and SCJ, caja 1, arbitrio 1, [Indice , de arbitrios . . . 1828], item 139: “Representaci6n que hace la escribania del juzgado

de distrito de México sobre la imposibilidad de formar las listas semestres que se , deben presentar a la Suprema Corte de Justicia por conducto del tribunal de circuito ,

y necesidad de que se pongan y doten oficiales y escribientes que la sirvan.” | 64. AGN, Justicia (Archivo), vol. 43, “Sobre la falta de contestaciones de juez del distrito de Oaxaco a las leyes decretos, y 6rdenes que se le comunican por este ministerio,” 1830.

65. AGN, SCJ, caja 1, arbitrio 1, [Indice de arbitrios ... 1827], item 7: “El licenciado don José Ignacio Conejares sobre que se le pague su sueldo de abogado

de pobres”; [Indice de arbitrios . . . 1834], item 24: “El juez de distrito de Campeche | espone la falta de subalternos en su juzgado,” see full file in SCJ caja 8, legajo 1, arbitrio 12; due to the failure of the government to pay salaries the attorney, the notary, the interpreter, and the court’s bailiff all resigned; caja 1, arbitrio 1, [Indice de arbitrios .. . 1835], item 87: “El juez de circuito de Puebla hace presente las necesidades que padece por la falta de sus sueldos”; and item 97: “Sobre la esposicién

hecha por el juez de letras don Manuel Zosaya, acerca de los sueldos de los dependientes de los juzgados de letras y falta que hay de estos.” 66. AHN, Notary José Ignacio Montes de Oca, will of José Mariano Ruiz de Castafieda, May 30, 1830.

67. AGN, SCJ, caja 1, legajo 2, arbitrio 1, “Toca de la competencia suscitada entre el juzgado de letras del licenciado don Francisco Ruano, y la comandancia general sobre el conocimiento de la causa instruida contra don Domingo Abedul por extravio de unas cartas de su oficina de correos,” 1827; caja 5, legajo 1, arbitrio 2, “Toca a la competencia suscitada en el comandante general del estado de Zacatecas y el juzgado de primera nominacién de la ciudad del mismo sobre el conocimiento que quien tener el Ultimo de delitos cometidos por el desertor Anselmo Castillo,”

| 168 | Notes to Pages 78-81 | 1827; and arbitrio 10, “Toca a la competencia suscitada entre el alcalde tercero y el ,

- comandante general de Puebla sobre conocimiento de la causa instruida a dona | | Maria Josefa Rodiles, complice en una conspiracién ... ,” 1827. 68. AGN, SCJ, caja 1, arbitrio 23, “Sobre si el Tribunal de Guerra y Marina

, conocera en primera y segunda instancia, a falta de yueces de circuito y distrito en |

las presas de mar.” |

; 69. I arrived at a figure of 249 cases by examining the court case indices and , case records between 1826 and 1835. AGN, SCJ, caja 1, [Indices . . . 1826—1838]; for , case records see caja 1 for 1826, caja 2 for part of 1827 and for 1828 and 1829, caja 3 for 1830 and 1831, caja 4 for 1831, caja 5 for part of 1827 and 1831 and for 1832; caja 6 for 1833, caja 7 for 1834, caja 8 for 1834, and caja 9 for 1835. Pedro Vélez, Vindicacion de la primera sala de la suprema corte de justicia de los estados unidos mexicanos sobre Ia acusacion hecha contra ella ante la chmara de diputados del congreso general, por la — honorable legislatura del estado de México (Mexico City: Imprenta a cargo de Miguel

Gonzalez), 1835. } a | 70. Arrillaga, Recopilacién, 1834, “Reglas para proveer de suplentes a la suprema

, corte de justicia,” March 18, 1834; Michael P. Costeloe, trans. Manuel Fernandez

| Gasalla, La primera republica federal, pp. 414-16; and Charles W. Macune, Jr., trans. Julio Zapata, El estado de México y la federaciin mexicana, 1823-1835 (Mexico City:

, Fonda de Cultura Econdémica, 1978), p. 174. 7. Arrillaga, Recopilacién, 1834, “Separacion de suplentes, y reposici6n de min-

istros suspensos en la suprema corte de justicia,” August 8, 1834. | 72. AGN, SCJ, caja 5, legajo 2, arbitrio 103, “Informe de la Suprema Corte de

1833). |

Justicia de los Estado Unidos Mexicanos, en que se proponen varias medidas para 7 el arreglo de la administraci6dn de justicia” (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila, 73. AGN, SCJ, caja 5, legajo 1, arbitrio 26, “Sobre el fallecimiento del sefior

_ don José Yafiez, magistrado de esta supremo tribunal,” 1832; caja 6, legajo 1, arbitrio : , 55, “Sobre el fallecimiento del sefior doctor don Tomas Salgado, presidente de la -- gsuprema corte,” August 1833; arbitrio 56, “Sobre el fallecimiento del sefor don |

, Vélez, Vindicacton, 1835. |

, Jacobo de Villaurrutia, magistrado que fue de este tribunal,” August 1833; and , 74. AGN, SCJ, caja 8, legajo 2, arbitrio 54, “Sobre las providencias que deban

tomarse para que no se repitan los escandalosos robos, y acesinatos cometidosen estos tiltimos dias,” 1835; the judges edited and revised part of this file, and it was _ published as Exposiciones de la Suprema Corte de Justicia y de los jueces de letras de

, esta capital, sobre el estado en que se halla la administracion de justicia en lo criminal, __-y las verdaderas causas del atraso que se advierte en la aprehension y castigo de algunos

_ delicuentes (Mexico City: Imprenta del Aguila, 1836). | ,

, 5. [he Fiscal Bureaucracy | 1. AGI, AM 1217, “Declarando la superintendencia general de real hacienda, _ | con iguales facultades a las que ejerce en Espafia el superintendente general de ella,” royal cédula, June 30, 1751, Aranjuez; this cédula cites a June 20, 1746, royal

Notes to Pages 81-83 169 order and an August 26, 1747, royal cédula that granted viceroys absolute power over all branches of the fiscal bureaucracy exclusive of the mint and quicksilver monopoly; the 1751 cédula extended the authority of the viceroy over those two areas in addition to granting him the title of fiscal superintendent. Pietschmann in Die E1infiihrung des Intendantensystems, pp. 35-40, pointed out that viceroys had exercised substantial authority in the fiscal sector since the late sixteenth century; the decision to formalize this role accompanied the crown’s move to extract more revenue from the overseas kingdoms. 2. BN, MS 436(1372), fs. 125-151, “Ordenanza de la real aduana de México,” September 26, 1753, and “Real orden de 23 de junio de 1752”; Priestley, José de Galvez, pp. 73 and 80; Donald Smith, Viceroy, p. 60. The Mexico City consulado held the lease for aduana management and collection until its profits increased dramatically during the 1740s. The Crown opted to manage the Mexico City offices

in 1752; between 1752 and 1777 it extended its control over aduana and alcabala management and collection. See Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia de real hacienda, 2:1-118, and Archivo Histdérico de Hacienda 117, exp. 30, fs. 235-39, “Noticia del

establecimiento en el reyno del real derecho de alcabala. . . .” (Hereafter AHH.) 3. Priestley, José de Galvez, pp. 37-45; the Crown had not intended to wait that long, but two appointees died before Galvez was selected for the job.

4. Fonseca and Urrutia, Historia general de real hacienda, 2:189~231, 3:265—337, . and 5:351-4.02; Manuel Carrera Stampa, Historia del correo en México (Mexico City: Secretaria de Transportaciones y Comunicaciones, 1972), pp. 29—32. 5. AGN, RCO 88, exp. 2, “Sobre la nueva junta de tabaco,” Madrid, February 25, 1766; Harold B. Benedict, “The Distribution of the Expropriated Jesuit Properties in Mexico, with Special Reference to Chihuahua, 1767-1790,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1970; Chandler, “Pensions and the Bureaucracy

of New Spain in the Late Eighteenth Century,” Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1971; and Carrera Stampa, Historia del correo, pp. 29-30; Priestley, José de Gdlvez, pp. 14-16, 25-41, and passim; Navarro Garcia, Intendencias en Indias, pp.

8—11 and 79~82. Senior fiscal officials sat along with audiencia ministers on these committees, most of which also functioned as courts of first instance. 6. Bernard E. Bobb, The Viceregency of Antonio Maria Bucareli in New Spain, 1771-1779 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1962), pp. 214—19; Maria Lourdes DiazTrechuelo Spinola, “Don Antonio Maria Bucareli y Ursua, 1771-1779,” in Los virreyes

... Carlos IIT, ed. Calder6n Quyano, 1:4.93—s02.

7. Priestley, José de Galvez, pp. 172-209; AGI, AM 1249, José de Galvez to Arriaga, Mexico City, February 27, 1767; and AGI, AM 1249, Mexico City consulado to Arriaga, Mexico City, May 27, 1767. The consulado could not get other groups

to support it; the other base of wealth and power, the Mexican miners, were

skillfully coopted in 1765 when the Crown granted them the opportunity to form |

their own guild. They would not risk royal disfavor to support the merchants, | according to Priestley, José de Galvez, pp. 74-75. Galvez in 1765 initiated the legal process of establishing the mining guild. The Crown delayed formal incorporation until 1783, when regulations and a new mining code were published. 8. AGI, AM 1989, Pedro Antonio Cosio and Francisco Corres, “Reglamento,” Mexico City, July 10, 1782, duplicate copy; AM 1988, “Sobre el arreglo del Real

170 | Notes to Pages 83-87

4, 1792. ,

Tribunal de Cuentas,” 1792-1806; and AGN, Tributos 16, exp. 10, fs. 141-206, José ,

Manuel Ibargoyen, “Plan que se propone para un nuevo método o reforma del , manejo de la real hacienda en este reino de Nueva Espafia,” Guadalajara, October

9. Anna, Spain and the Loss of Empire, pp. 148-220. , |

, 10. BN, MS 439[1376], Cedulario tomo 4, fs. 333—-39r., “Serie de las dotaciones , que han tenido en México los empleos de virrey, y ministros que se expresaran, |

desde 6 de noviembre de 1606, que se erigi6 este tribunal y real audiencia de , , - cuentas, hasta hoy de igual mes de 1780. . . .” Tribunal auditors did receive a raise in 1769; previously they earned 2,000 ducados, or 2,757 pesos 2 reales 9 granos | annually; see AGN, RCO 94, exp. 62, f. 87, royal order, Madrid, March 18, 1769.

_ at. AGI, AM 1989, Ramon Posada y Soto to Galvez, Mexico City, August 14, . 1782 (no. 61). For over a decade imperial and viceregal officials had been taking , steps to improve the performance of the tribunal. Cosio was to find out just how much improvement had been made. See Bobb, Bucarelt, pp. 219-22. 12. AGI, AM 1989, Cosio and Corres, “Reglamento,” paragraphs 37 and 38.

Cosio commented that Galvez suggested this idea. To the extent that reformers

wanted to weaken the prestige and traditional authority of the viceroy and the | audiencia and to eliminate the jurisprudential qualities of other institutions and officials, this idea made sense. There was no consensus for such a plan, though. Cosio showed an astounding lack of common sense by tactlessly publicizing such

Cosio. ,

a notion and attacking one of the most powerful and important institutions in ,

New Spain. On Corres, see AGN, RCO 86, exp. 90, f. 165, “Relacidn de los sugetos

que han de pasar a Nueva Espafia con José Galvez para ayudarle en la visita general | -...,” March 26, 1765; he originally came to Mexico as one of several personal aides of José de Galvez; during the 1770s he was an alcalde mayor and later worked with

City, July 31, 1782. , , |

13. AGI, AM 1989, Real Tribunal y Audiencia de Cuentas to Galvez, Mexico 14. AGI, AM 1989, Posada y Soto to Galvez, Mexico City, August 14, 1782.

15. Real Diaz and Heredia y Herrera, “Martin de Mayorga,” pp. 72-74. oo 16. AGN, Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreinato, “Sobre la nueva in- ,

Mexico City, February 9, 1786. - 17. BN, MS 451(1388), f. 85, royal order, September 15, 1786. struccion de tribunal de cuentas,” 1784, and Real Tribunal de Cuentas to Viceroy,

18. BN, MS 450(1387), fs. 338-39, royal cédula, Madrid, July 4, 1788. This royal _ cédula reiterated previous royal cédulas dated August 10, 1748, October 10, 1756,

and September 28, 1778. , | | 19. BN, MS 460(1397), fs. 3-11, “Reglamento de la contaduria mayor de México,

resuelto en Junta de Real Hacienda de 29 de abril de 1791.”

20. BN, MS 455(1392), f. 8—8r., “Sugetos provistos en principios de julio de oe 1791 para el arreglo del real tribunal y audiencia de cuentas de México”; and AGN, a _ . Media Anata 70, exp. 5, “Lista de contadores y oficiales que se hallan destinados

en esta contaduria mayor para vencer el rezago de cuentas de aduanas.” , — 21. BN, MS 460(1397), fs. 12-14r., royal order, April 16, 1792. , 22. AGN, RH 219, RJS/RH, minutes, July 13, 1792, item: “Expediente formado

Notes to Pages 87—89 171 sobre el cumplimiento de la real orden de 16 de abril de 1792; con que se acompafio el nuevo plan formado para la contaduria mayor de esta capital.” The Crown issued titles for the new accountants immediately. Titles for the clerks were delayed for several years until metropolitan officials certified the documents required for employment. AGI, AM 1986, “Titulos de la contaduria mayor,” 1606-1821. One nominee, Pedro Mendoza y Benavides, was refused a royal title because of a falsified

baptismal document. See also AGN, RH 219, RJS/RH, minutes, December 22, 1792, item: “Expediente seguido por Pedro Mendoza y Benavides sobre que se le nombre en una de las plazas de oficial de glosa de tercer. .. .” 23. During the 1770s and 1780s, as mentioned above, expansion and management

consolidation characterized the reforms. Royal servants continued to recommend reforms along those same lines into the 1790s and 1800s. BN, MS 174[1339], “Apuntes para un plan de reforma, arreglo y economia de gastos en los ramos de real hacienda

que se expresaran del reino de Nueva Espafia,” 1789-1791; AGN, RH 233, RJS/ RH, minutes, February 6, 1793, item 2: “Expediente sobre aumento de oficiales para la direccién general de alcabalas y pulques”; RH 210, RJS/RH, minutes, April 28, 1808, item: “Expediente sobre auxilio de tres escribientes para las cajas generales

de México”; April 26, 1809, item: “Expediente sobre reuni6n de la contaduria general de aduanas foraneas a la administracién y creaci6n de la plaza de contador.” 24. AGN, Tributos 16, exp. 10, fs. 141-206, “Sobre cumplimiento de real orden

con que se acompafid un plan formado por don José Manuel Ibargoyen para el manejo de la real hacienda de estos dominios,” 1792—1798.

25. Phelan, in The People and the King, passim, emphasized that consultation, , conciliation, and compromise characterized conflict resolution. More importantly, consultation and collegiality were at the very heart of colonial administration. 26. AGI, AM 1988, “Sobre el arreglo del Real Tribunal de Cuentas,” 1792-1806, “Sobre que no se oiga a los ministros de real hacienda y tribunal de cuentas en asuntos de rentas, sino que se observe en ellos lo prevenido para la Casa de Moneda en real orden de 12 de julio de 1792.” 27. Viceroy Revillagigedo created the Junta de Union de Rentas to research how to consolidate local revenue offices. Under the intendancy ordinances subdelegates collected tribute; other officials collected sales taxes; still others distributed tobacco, gunpowder, playing cards, and lottery tickets. Officials in Mexico City wanted to unify all these diverse functions. However, the different revenue pro-

grams and their lines of communication and authority had evolved separately; some local tobacco reports were sent to Guadalajara while sales tax reports went to Mexico City. The committee worked on this problem until independence without ever fully resolving it. Nevertheless, the committee did take over some of the more menial oversight duties of the fiscal affairs committee, as they related to the revenue

departments. The Junta de Union de Rentas originated as a viceregal committee

subordinate to the fiscal affairs committee. The Crown never gave it the status of , a royal superior committee, though, and it had no authority to make binding decisions. For documentation on this committee, see AHH 643, “Reglamentos y consultas, sobre reunidn de admuinistraciones con otras noticias relativas,” 1790— 1792; AGN, Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreinato, Secretaria de Camara, cajas 12, Real Tribunal de Cuentas, Folder 3, “Sobre dificultades ocurridas para

172 , Notes to Pages 90—95 reunir las rentas,” 1791-1821; caja 14, Rentas (Junta de Unidn), “Expedientes sobre _ administraciones de rentas,” 1816—1820; Indiferente General, Real Hacienda, Ren-

, tas, “Correspondencia al virrey,” drafts, 1797-1798; and AGI, AM 1967, “Nombramiento del escribiente de la secretarfa de la junta de unidn de administraciones y resguardos de rentas,” January 1, 1795.

28. AGI, AM 1988, “Informe del fiscal del consejo de Indias,” July 31, 1806. 29. AHH 601, exp. 2, “Reforma de la contaduria de media anata,” 1790-1808. 30. AHH 603, exp. 3, “Arancel de media anata y lanzas .. . ,” 1804. 31. On Palacios’s career see AGN, Diezmos 20, f. 134-35, “Solicitude de Gabriel

Palacios para el empleo de contador de diezmos,” 1794-1795; Indiferente General, , oo ~ Real Hacienda, Media Anata, caja 12, folder 3, “Sobre la aptitud de Gabriel Palacios,” , Juan Navarro y Madrid, March 21, 1807; AHH 1567, “En seguro del exceso de — sueldo a los que se pagd a don Gabriel Palacios,” June 3, 1809; and Arnold,

~~ “Personnel Data Files, 1761-1832.” , 32. Anna, The Fall of Royal Government, pp. 140—61, thoroughly discussed the very real threat that economic problems posed during the last decade of the colonial -

period.

oe tember 25, 1813. Se , _ 33. AGN, RH 238, “Memoria de la comisidén de arbitrios,”’ Mexico City, Sep-

34. Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, pp. 112-14; Costeloe, “Spain and the | Latin American Wars of Independence: The Free Trade Controversy, 1810-1820,” |

HAHR 61 (May 1981):209—34; and John H. Hann, “The Role of the Mexican

: Deputies in the Proposal and Enactment of Measures of Economic Reform Ap- |

plicable to Mexico,” in Benson, Mexico and the Spanish Cortes, pp. 153-84. , 35. AGI, AM 1961, “Expediente General: Informe sobre arbitrios para aumentar

la real hacienda en Nueva Espafia,” Madrid, May u1, 1816, draft report, includes , “Planes sobre la deuda y arbitrios para su pago,” Antonio Miranda y Medina, Mexico City, 1815, and documentation from Mexico City officials.

, 36. Anna, Spain and the Loss of America, pp. 19-20 and passim. , | 37. Mexico, Congress, Diario, SJPG, October 22, 1821. | , 38. The junta unified the accounting offices for sales taxes, the pulque tax, and customs duties in January 1822; Galvan Rivera, Colecctén de érdenes, January 4, 1822. 39. Galvan Rivera, Colecciin de érdenes, February 28, 1822; the congress reinforced

this decision on March 9, 1822, when it declined to approve new appointments to , the tribunal of audits; Galvan Rivera, Coleccién de érdenes, March 9, 1822. A decree

a dated May 7, 1822, repeated the freeze policy: see Dublan and Lozano, Legislactén , 7 mexicana, May 7, 1822, “Reglas para la provisi6n de empleos civiles y militares.” | 40. Ramon Gutiérrez del Mazo in Mexico City remained on the job as com-

missary general. Dublan and Lozano, Legislacién mexicana, September 21, 1824; | , Arnold, Directorio, pp. 127-28; Archivo General de la Curia Metropolitana del Arzobispado, Mexico City, Libro de Testamentos, vol. 11, item 3, February 6, 1827: , ~ Ramén Gutiérrez del Mazo. , 41. Dublan and Lozano, Legislactén mexicana, November 16, 1824, “Arreglo de

la administracién de hacienda publica.” | 42. Dublan and Lozano, Legislactén mexicana, March 22, 1827, “Al fin de las

Notes to Pages 9s—99 173 memorias de los ministerios se podran en iniciativa medidas que crea conducentes al gobierno”; Mexico, Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico, Memoria, 1830. 43. El Sol, Mexico City, February 5, 1830. 44. Dublan and Lozano, Legislaciwin mexicana, January 26, 1831, “Establecimiento

de una direccién general rentas,” and May 21, 1831, “Arreglo de las comisarias.” 45. Mexico, Secretaria de Hacienda y Crédito Publico, Memoria, 1833. 46. El Sol, February 5, 1830. 47. Dublan and Lozano, Legislactén mexicana, May 27, 1833, “Contiene la circular

de la primera secretaria del estado, de 22 que inserta la ley del mismo dia.” 48. AGN, Colecciédn de documentos para la historia de la hacienda publica, 1:724.-38, “Remocion del sefior don Juan de Rodriguez del empleo de oficial mayor primero de esta secretaria y nombramiento del sefior don Juan José del Corral.” 49. Military personnel traditionally received double credits for each year of service. Corral, like all men who could verify their participation in the wars of independence, received double credits for his guerrilla actions in the Puebla-JalapaVeracruz region between 1811 and 1821. AGN, Coleccién de documentos para la historia de hacienda publica, 1:872—77, “Hoya de servicio de Juan José del Corral,” December 1833. The clerks also objected to the shoddy treatment Rodriguez received. Santa Anna did not appoint him to another position; rather, he recommended him for a lower-paying and less important position in the Mexico City

customs house. However, employment in that department still depended on a |

vacancy and the recommendation of the director, not the president. , 50. La Lima de Vulcano, Mexico City, October 23, 1834.

6. Bureaucrats: Job Security, Income, and Family 1. Mexico City had a tremendous population for a preindustrial city. AGN, RCO 87, exp. 7, f. 21, “Poplacidn del reino de México segtin se consideré el afio de 1745 ...,” estimated the population at 98,000; AGI, Indiferente 1527, “Estado general de la poblacién de México capital de esta Nueva Espafia: 1790 reported 103,181 residents; Gaceta de México, January 16, 1812, “Estado que manifiesta el numero de habitantes de esta capital, segtin los padrones por los caballeros tenientes

de policia,” cited 168,84.6 inhabitants during the Hidalgo revolt; Fernando Navarro | y Noriega, “Memoria sobre la poblacidn del reino de Nueva Espafia,” México, 1813, stated that 123,907 residents lived in the city; this figure represented those remaining following the suppression of the Hidalgo revolt but before the full impact of the 1813 epidemic that ravaged the city. 2. AGN, Historia 159, exp. 2, fs. 22—-2ar., “La Casa de Moneda,” 1790. 3. AGN, Historia 159, exp. 2, f. 217, “Contaduria de Temporalidades,” 1790. 4. AGN, Historia 159, exp. 2, f. 3, “Secretaria del Virreinato,” 1790; RH 223, RJS/RH, minutes, August 23, 1792, item 12: “Expediente formado a instancia de don Mariano Ignacio Quijano, oficial segundo de la direccién general de alcabalas sobre abono de los sueldos que le corresponden por este empleo.” 5. AGN, Historia 159, exp. 2, f. 3r., “Secretaria del Virreinato,” 1790.

174 Notes to Pages 99—102 6. AGN, Historia 159, exp. 2, f. 218, “Temporalidades,” 1790; Indiferente Gen-

eral, Real Hacienda, Montepios, “Sobre liquidacién de las cantidades contribuidas , por Manuel Diaz de Solorazano,” 1805.

_ 7, AGN, Historia 159, exp. 2, f. 2r., “Secretaria del Virreinato,” 1790; AGN, , | Mineria 142, José Villegas Puente to Viceroy Revillagigedo, March 25, 1791, Mexico City; Villegas Puente to Viceroy Marqués de Branciforte, June 1795; Silvestre Diaz de la Vega to Viceroy Marqués de Branciforte, July 10, 1795, Mexico City; Tribunal ,

, of Audits to Viceroy Marqués de Branciforte, July 24, 1795, Mexico City. 8. AGN, RH 53, “Sobre Manuel Carrillo, portero que fue de la tesoreria general

de exército y real hacienda,” 1790. | 9. AGN, RH 216, RJS/RH, minutes, December 2, 1788, item: “Expediente de

la pretensién del portero del real tribunal de cuentas don Miguel Ozacta sobre _ , aumento de sueldo”; vol. 217, minutes, September 28, 1790, item: “Expediente

formado por la contaduria de la renta de alcabalas sobre el nuevo reglamento de aumento de sueldos a varios dependientes de ella”; minutes, October 8, 1790, item: “Autos formados a representacion de los oficiales mayores y porteros de la tesoreria

general sobre aumentos de sueldos”; vol. 210, minutes, August 19, 1808, item: , “Expediente sobre aumento de sueldo de un mozo para la direccién de alcabalas”; _

, minutes, October 27, 1809, item: “Expediente del secretario del virreinato sobre agregacién de la intendencia que se le ha hecho y paga de sus sueldos”; AGI, AM 1270, “Expediente sobre el aumento de sueldos que solicitan de la real audiencia de México,” 1772, and “Expediente sobre la instancia de los oficiales y contadores de moneda de la aduana de México, de que se aumento los sueldos,” 1772.

10. The Crown and viceregal governments had used salary deductions to aug- | ment royal resources during previous wars. During the late 1790s those deductions

had not caused any outcry. AHH s11, exp. 2, “Nuevo donativo,” 1798; AGN, RH 96, “Nota de las cantidades recibidas en esta tesorerfa general de exército y real

hacienda por razon del nuevo donativo . . . ,” 1798.

I8IO. , a , } , City, December 11, 1812. - |

ir, AGN, RH 174, exp. 3, “Noticia comparativa del precio de los viveres y efectos de primera necesidad y general consumo en los afios de 1800, 1806, y el , presente (segtin el dia) para manifestar la alteracidn y el gravamen en ello... ,” —

2. AGN, RH 174, fs. 42-48, Mateo de Castillo to Viceroy Venegas, Mexico |

, 13. AGN, RH 174, fs. 49~s6r., Agustin Pérez de Quijano to Viceroy Venegas,

Mexico City, December 11, 1812. — , ,

, 14. AGN, RH 174, fs. 59-68, José de Rosas to the Junta de Unién, México,

, December 11, 1812. ,

15. AGN, Civil 106, “Expediente instruido sobre aumento de sueldo al sefior

regente y ministros de la real audiencia,” 1813-1820. | 16. Although viceroys and intendants did not have to pay for their residences, all other royal employees, whether in public or private dwellings, paid rent. In the

customs building, for instance, rents for apartments ranged from 250 pesos a year , , for a small apartment to 830 pesos paid by the superintendent for his family’s living quarters. AHH 117, exp. 54, f. 73-73r., “Lista de las viviendas que ocupan jefes y

subalternos en la aduana de México, debiendo exigirse el 5% por el (impuesto |

Notes to Pages 102-4. 175 sobre) el arrendamiento ... ,” Mexico City, 1812. During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the vast majority of employees resided all over the city in some of the 9,725 residential buildings. BN, MS 451 (1388), f. 157—16ar., “Plan que compendiosamente demuestra el numero de los edificios publicos y privados, tribunales y oficinas, fabricas de que se compone la ciudad de México... ,” 1788. 17. Richard S. Harris and Eric G. Moore, “An Historical Approach to Mobility Research,” The Professtonal Geographer 32 (February 1980): 22-29; A. Chevan, “Fam-

ily Growth, Household Density, and Moving,” Demography 8 (1971):451-58; and Arnold, “Before Crisis: Stratification Patterns in Mexico City Neighborhoods, 1793,” a paper delivered at the VII Congress of Mexican and United States His-

torians, October 23-26, 1985, Oaxaca, Mexico. , 18. Biblioteca Nacional de Espafia, Madrid, Seccién de Manuscritos de América,

MSS 8671-8676. These volumes record the width and type of each building in Mexico City. Illustrations of typical colonial Mexico City residences have been reproduced in Manuel Romero de Terreros, Restdencias coloniales de México (México, Secretaria de Hacienda, 1918); in Carlos Flores Marini, Casas virreinales en al ciudad

de México (Mexico City: Fonda de Cultura Econémica, 1970); and in Casas de

México, Artes de México 14, nos. 97/98 (1967). These sources, when combined with , extant maps and virtually any census of the late colonial era, give a picture of a complex mixture of dwelling units and their dimensions. Josefina Muriel presented a thorough and fascinating slide presentation, “Habitacion plurifamiliar en la ciudad de México, siglos XVI—XVIII,” at the VII Congress of Mexican and United States Historians, October 23—26, 1985, Oaxaca, Mexico. Also see Dennis N. Valdés, “The

Decline of the Sociedad de Castas in Mexico City” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1978). 19. The 1811 census, which listed occupation and race, offers the clearest view of the complex pattern of residence in late colonial Mexico City. See, for example, AGN, Padrones 53: in the tenement (casa de vecindad) at 29 Tacuba, thirteen families

lived in the building; they included the family of the high sheriff for the playingcards factory, a lieutenant of the audiencia, two tailors, a cigar maker, an iron worker, and a beggar. 20. AGN, Padrones 52 and Civil 1496 contain the 1753 census. This data has been published by Eduardo Baez Macias, “Planos y censos de la ciudad de México, 1753, segunda parte,” Boletin del Archivo General de la Nacién 8, nos. 3/4. (July— December 1967):485—1156; AGN, Padrones 53—77 and 107 contain most of the 1811 census. The 1777, 1793, and 1823 censuses, stored in the Archivo General de la Curia

Metropolitana del Arzobispado, Mexico City, and the Archivo General de la Parroquia del Sagrario Metropolitano, Mexico City, have been made available on microfilm by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS). The Salt

Lake City reel numbers for these censuses are 442,105 for the 1777 census; 442,110 | and 708,358 for the 1793 census, and 036,429 for the 1823 census. Hereafter this material will be referred to by LDS reel number. a1. Arnold, Directorio, p. 81; LDS 442,110 (1793), 9 Alcaiceria; AGN, RH 7s, “Lista de todos los empleados . . . Temporalidades,” 1794. 22. Arnold, Directorw, p. 89; LDS 442,110 (1793), Calle de la Alhondiguita no.

2; and Mexico, Secretaria de Justicia y Negocios Eclesidsticos, Memoria, 1823. ,

176 | | Notes to Pages tos—9 23. For information on the Torres-Catafio clan, see Arnold, Directorio, p. 271; , Magdalena, Titulos de Indias, p. 144; LDS 442,105 (1777), 15 Santa Teresa; LDS 442,110 (1793), 15 Santa Teresa; AGN, Padrones 60 (1811), f. 40, 15 Santa Teresa; LDS 036,429 (1823), 15 Santa Teresa; AGN, Civil 1798, exp. 1, “Informe,” 1792; vol.

1537, exp. 5, “Relacién de méritos de Lic. don José Maria de Torres y Catafio,” 1795; and exp. 10, “Autos formados para las oposiciones a la relatoria vacante . . . por muerte del Lic. don José Mariano Torres,” 1795; AHH 452, exp. 2, “Nom-

bramiento interinamente al Lic. don José Marfa Torres y Catafio . . . ,” 1795; Jay Kinsbruner generously sent me with a copy of AGN, Consulado 164, documents concerning the settlement of accounts of the grocery store owned by Lic. don José

Maria Torres y Catafio, 1801; AGN, Bienes Nacionales 72, exp. 105, “Diligencias | matrimoniales de don José Tames y dona Marfa Josefa Torres Catafio,” 1817; and Gaceta de México, January 30, 1821, announcement of election of Torres y Catafio

as rector of the college of lawyers.

24. See AHH 1555, Fianzas, 1760-1764, for a series of bonds guaranteeing pay-

ments to the presidios in Coahuila and Texas, and Guillermo Lohmann Villena, Los americanos en las 6rdenes nobilarias, 1529-1900 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de , Investigaciones Cientificas, 1948), 2:338. 25. AGN, Media Anata 31, f. 16: an entry dated July 9, 1789, recorded the 1,453

| pesos 4 reales in taxes that Miguel paid upon inheriting his father’s properties. For Tomas’s career see Burkholder and Chandler, From Impotence to Authority, pp. 200, 204, 206, 210, and 213; on Miguel, see Kicza, Colonial Entrepreneurs, p. 181. ,

December 9, 1801. | , 26. AHN, Juan Manuel Pozo, “Testamento de don Miguel Gonzalez Calderén,”

27. AHN, Juan Manuel Pozo, “Testamento de dofia Maria Josefa Gonzdlez

Guerra y Carrillo,” February 6, 1811. ,

28. AGN, Padrones 54, Segunda Calle de Relox, number 3; Comisié6n Monetaria, Datos sobre rentas de fincas urbanas en la ciudad de México (Mexico City, 1903), p. 108; Ladd, The Mexican Nobility at Independence, map, “A Plan of Central Mexico

City Showing the Residences of Principal Citizens, 1811,” p. 66.

29. José Gomez, Diario curioso de México (Mexico City: Antigua imprenta de , , la Voz de la Religion de T.S.G., 1854) pp. 257 and 261; AGI, Indiferente 179, “Hoja a de servicios de Benito de Cuellar,” 1795 and 1798; see also AGN, Indiferente General,

Secretaria del Virreinato, “Hoja... ,” 1814. | | 30. AGN, Coleccién de documentos para la historia de hacienda publica, vol.

I, €Xp. I, pp. 81-85, Benito Cuellar to the secretary for fiscal affairs, (October) 1821.

31. Mexico, Congress, Lista de los espanoles eceptuados de la ley de 20 de marzo de ,

1829, por impedimento fisico perpetuo. -

32. Cuevas y Picazo and Bustamante lived in an interior apartment in the Casa

de Santa Catarino at no. 3 Calle de Calvario, see AGN, Padones 72, f. 24. : 33. AGI, Indiferente 178, “Hoja de servicio de Manuel Reyes Manzano,” 1791; :

AGN, Padrones 66, f. 9, Puente de San Francisco 6; LDS 442,110 (1793), Calle de ,

Santo Domingo no. 4.0 ,

— 34. LDS 442,110 (1793), Calle de Indiotriste no. 6; AGN, Padrones 57, f. 87, , Calle de la Merced no. 12. , 35. LDS 036,429 (1823). The parish census enumerator for the west side of the

Notes to Pages 109-11 177 traza reported that 10,380 households were enumerated and 2,145 households declined to be enumerated. 36. AGN, Montepios 25, exp. 24, fs. 245-254, “Las viudas y huerfanos de los empleados de hacienda, residentes en el estado de Puebla, piden se declaren pertenecer al crédito publico las pensiones que se les adeuden y se les satisfagan integrar las que se venzen cn lo sucesivo,” 1826; vol. 29, exp. 42, fs. 278-283, “Sobre pago de pensiones a las viudas y huerfanos que residen en Orizaba,” 1831. 37. AGN, Montepios 30-40 contain receipts of payment of pensions for the years 1828, 1829, and 1830.

38. AHN, Ignacio José Montes de Oca, “Contrata de compania,” October 6, 1825.

39. AHN, José Ignacio Montes de Oca, “Compania celebrada entre el sefior don José Isidro Yaiiez, el general don Arturo Wavell, y don José Maria de Miner en la mina nombrada la Reuni6n, alias San Miguel,” April 2, 1825; and “Contrata,” August 16, 1825.

40. AHN, Francisco Madariaga, “Escritura de Indemnidad,” April 14, 1825, and “Deposito Irregular,” June 16, 1826. 41. AHN, José Ignacio Montes de Oca, “Venta de la cuarta parte de una casa,” September 14, 1825; the total cost was 4,500 pesos, and Maniau y Torquemada had } one year to pay the remaining 2,000 pesos and 5 percent interest. 42. Archivo de la Parroquia del Sagrario Metropolitano de México, Libros de Testamentos, vols. 9—11, 1783—1843. This source 1s available on microfilm through the Genealogical Department of the Church of Latter-Day Saints in Salt Lake City. 43. AHN, Francisco Calapiz, “Testamento,” José Maria Gutiérrez de Rosas y Muiftive, January 19, 1827, and “Testamento,” Adrian Ximénez, July 25, 1830.

44. Lyle McAlister in 1963 suggested looking beyond caste and into class as a , dominant feature of late colonial society in his “Social Structure and Social Change

in New Spain,” HAHR 43 (August 1963): 349-70. Manuel Carrera Stampa, in , “Fuentes para el estudio de stratificacion social y las clases sociales en México,” Subretivo, Memorias de la Academia Mexicana de la Historia 24. (1965), suggested

looking at class also. In Arnold, “Social, Economic, and Political Status in the Mexico City Central Bureaucracy,” I illustrated stratification at one point in time. Unfortunately, a lack of comparable quality data inhibited a time-series analysis of stratification within the bureaucracy. On miners, merchants, and agriculturalists, see Brading, Miners and Merchants; Ladd, The Mexican Nobility at Independence; and Kicza, Colonial Entrepreneurs.

7. Bureaucrats: Career Opportunities, Personnel Policies, and Politics 1. AGN, Ayuntamientos, vol. 17, fs. 62-64, Mariano Perezcano to Antonio Lédpez de Santa Anna, Mexico City, June 12, 1834. For further documentation on Perezcano’s career, see Arnold, Directorio, p. 213; AGN, Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreynato, “Hoja de servicios, Mariano Perezcano,” Mexico City, December 1814; AGN, Colecciédn de documentos para la historia de la hacienda publica, vol. 1, exp. 1, “Primera provisi6n de los empleos de la secretarfa de ha-

, 178 , Notes to Pages 112-15 — clenda,” p. 378; and AGN, Montepfos 33, receipt 8367. He received a pension _ because the government abolished his job. Dublan and Lozano, Legislacton mex-

, icana, January 26, 1831, “Establecimiento de una direccidn general de rentas,” 2:308— , | 10: article 10 abolished the accounting office under the secretary for fiscal affairs; | article 22 delayed the implementation of the law until the publication of the law

restructuring the treasury and commissary general system; that law, published on _~ | , May 31, 1831, went into effect on June 31, 1831; “Arreglo de comisarias,” 2:329—34. ,

In both laws the congress stated that employees in abolished offices would be

subject to congressional legislation relative to displaced personnel. , 2. Recopilactin de las leyes de Indias, Book I, title 15, law 174, and Book III, title 2, laws 52 and 69; and Joaquin Escriche y Martin, Diccionario de legislacion y jurisprudencia (Paris: Libreria de Rosa, Bouret y Cia., 1852), pp. 1392-93. AGN,

Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreinato, “Don Vicente Pereda, don Venancio ,

a Pereda y don Tomas Naveda empleados que fueron del extinguido tribunal de la | | inquisicién sobre premiso para trasladarse a la peninsula y que a cuenta de sus _ gueldos se les facilite alguna cantidad para gastos del viaje,” 1820. BN, MS 460 | (1397), “Nuevo plan formado para el tribunal mayor de cuentas de Nueva Espafia,” Oo and royal order, April 16, 1792; and AGN, RH 219, RJS/RH, minutes, July 13, — 1792, item: “Expediente formado sobre el cumplimiento de la real orden de 16 de

abril de 1792; con que se acompafie el nuevo plan formado para la contaduria

mayor de esta capital.” , , 3. Prior to independence the individuals who occupied that position rose into it from positions within the royal monopolies, not the clerical levels of the tribunal of audits. For instance, Francisco Olmedo served as an inspector for gunpowder

oe and playing cards prior to his 1805-1822 term as general administrator for gun-

, powder and playing cards. See Arnold, Directorio, p. 197.

4. The secretary for fiscal affairs became senior administrator of all of the

monopolies. Dubldn and Lozano, Legislacién mexicana, November 16, 1824, “Arre-

glo de la administracidn de la hacienda publica,” 1:740—43. : 5. For documentation on Juan de la Fuente see AGI, Indiferente 177, “Hoja de

, servicios, Juan de la Fuente,” Mexico City, December 1796; AGI, AM 1986, royal title, Juan de la Fuente, April 12, 1793; AGI, AM 1986, royal title, Juan Matias -. Lacunza, January 12, 1799, which mentions Juan de la Fuente’s death; Magdaleno, Titulos de Indias, pp. 190-92; AGN, Civil 1664, exp. 1, “Sobre que no hay parientes en oficinas de real hacienda, 1775~1790,” f. sr.—6; and Arnold, Directorio, p. 101.

, 6. For documentation on Juan Ignacio de la Fuente see AGN, Mineria 142, | “Hoja se servicios, Juan Ignacio de la Fuente,” Mexico City, December 1797; AGI,

Indiferente 177, “Hoja se servicios, Juan Ignacio de la Fuente,” Mexico City, , December 1798; AGN, RCO 96, exp. 36, royal cédula, February 21, 1770, “Sobre el nombramiento de don Juan Ignacio de la Fuente”; AGN, Montepios 9, exp. 6, fs. 51-87, “Sobre Juan de la Fuente,” Mexico City, 1790; AGN, Civil 1664, exp. 1,

“Sobre que no hay parientes .. . .”; and AGI, Indiferente 1519, royal cédula, January |

bureaucrats. , 18, 1799, “Sobre jubilaci6n de Juan Ignacio de la Fuente.” The Crown awarded

_ Juan Ignacio de la Fuente retirement in spite of its attempt to limit the drain of , retirement pay on the royal treasury and its decision to restrict the retiring of fiscal

Notes to Pages 116-19 179 , 7. AGN, Montepios 29, exp. 44, fs. 288—299, “Juana Alarcén, viuda de Agustin Pérez, Quyano, director que fue de alcabalas en esta capital, solicita la pensién que le corresponde, 1831”; AGI, Arribadas 421, entry of October 20, 1770, noted that Bartolome Pérez Quiyjano along with his son Agustin and two personal servants sailed from Cadiz to Honduras on that date; Arnold, Directorio, pp. 214—15. 8. AGI, AM i161, “Relacién de Méritos, Fernando Joseph Mangino,” 1793, and Arnold, Directorio, p. 160. 9. AGN, RH 70, “Real orden de 20 de junio de 1792,” refers to a royal cédula dated January 20, 1761, that specified seniority as the primary criterion for promotion within a department; Juan E. Hernandez y Davalos, Coleccién de documentos para la Instoria de laguerra de ndependencia de México de 1808 a 1821 (Mexico City: J. M.

Sandoval, 1877-1882), 5:915—16, royal order, October 18, 1792. , 1o. AGN, RH 70, “Real orden de 28 de junio de 1788.” u. AGI, Indiferente 183, “Hoja de servicios, Manuel Velazquez de Leon,” Mex-

ico City, December 1794. 12. BN, MS 455 (1302), f. 31-32, “Real orden comunicado al virrey Conde de ,

Revillagigedo para el establecimiento de una escala de acensos (escalafén) en dicha clase (oficiales reales) de empleos,” May 25, 1791. Viceroy Revillagigedo responded

to this order with a plan that authorized transfers for able junior employees to Ministerial positions in regional treasuries, qualified senior employees to ministerial positions in the Mexico City and Veracruz treasuries, and exceptional ministerial

officials to senior auditor positions on the tribunal of audits and to provincial intendant positions. BN, MS 455 (1392), f. 39, “En el dictamen general en virtud de real orden instruy6 el actual virrey sobre establecimiento de intendencias propus6 de paso lo siguiente escala por aptitud y sin atender a antigtiedades,” n.d. 13. AGN, Coleccién de documentos para la historia de la hacienda publica, vol. 1, exp. 1, letter, José Joaquin Beltran to Excelentisumo Sefior, Mexico City, October §, 1821, fs. 264-269; AGN, Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreynato, “Hoja de servicios, José Joaquin Beltran,” Mexico City, December 1814; AGN, Civil 110, exp. 6, Francisco de Eguia to the viceroy, Mexico City, March 1, 1808, fs. 1—s. 14. AGN, RCO 202, exp. 93, royal cédula, February 26, 1810; AGN, Civil 1581, decree, real acuerdo, May 10, 1810, “Sobre la solicitud de Manuel Velazquez de Leén de retirarse”; and AGN, Intendencias 76, exp. 4, “Sobre que el secretario de camara don Manuel Merino vuelva a encargarse del despacho de la intendencia de esta capital y don Manuel Velazquez de Leon de la secretaria del virreynato,” 1810. 15. AGN, Civil 1554. exp. 21, “Propuesta de oficial tercero de la contaduria de media anata hecha en don Juan Pérez,” Mexico City, March 1784; AGN, RH 59, “Propuesta que hacen los ministros de la tesoreria general de exército y real hacienda

de esta capital al exmo. sr. virrey, para que se sirva proveer al empleo de oficial del libro comun de Ia misma tesoreria,” Mexico City, October 1, 1793; and AGN, RH _ 70, “Nombramiento de don José Maria Martinez del Campo para oficial segundo de contaduria de las cajas generales propuesto ... por acenso de don Manuel de Santibafiez y Llaguno,” Mexico City, November 6, 1794. 16. AGN, Indiferente General, Real Hacienda, “Cobro de media anata por los

examenes de ensayadores,” 1795-1797; AHH, exp. 3, “Arancel de media anata y , lanzas, 1804. f. s—sr; AGN, Media Anata 13, “Examenes de abogados,” 1788; and

180 Notes to Pages 120~24.

3. a

Recopilaciin de las leyes de Indias, Book HU, title 24, law 1, and Book V, title 8, law

| 17. AGN, RH 230, RJS/RH, minutes, f. 1o9r.—112r., May 26, 1809, item: “Sobre

| remate del oficio de receptor que fincé en don Manuel Galindo.” 18. AHH 601, exp. 1, royal cédula, May 26, 1774, “Reglas para la exaccién de

16, 1696. , ,

media anata de empleados”; exp. 4, royal order, May 6, 1774, “Reglas para la

exacci6n de media anata de empleados.” Both of these documents reiterated and a extended general rules laid down in royal cédulas dated July 3, 1664, and February

19. AGI, AM 1989, Tribunal of Audits to Galvez, Mexico City, July 31, 1782. ,

| 20. The coachmen kept their new buttons; the clerks got new, specially designed — ones. AGN, Historia 580A, exp. 4, secretariat employees to Iturrigaray, Mexico

, City,a1.February 27, 1804. | AGN, Indiferente General, Secretaria del Virreynato, Luis Gutiérrez to |

October 30, 1798. ,

Viceroy, Mexico City, November 1783; and Gutiérrez to the viceroy, Mexico City,

22, AGN, Crvil 2114, exp. 1, “Sumaria secreta ...,” Mexico City, 1765—1770. 23. AGN, Civil 1664, exp. 1, “Sobre que no hay parientes en oficinas de real ,

, , hacienda,” 1775-1790; AGN, RCO tos, exp. 134, royal order, December 15, 1774, _ “Ordenando no esten parientes en una misma dependencia”; and AGN, RCO 106, : exp. 13, royal cédula, January 20, 1775, “Prohibiendo que trabajan en una sola oficina dos personas de la misma familia.”

| 24. AHH 614, “Sobre que no hay parientes in las oficinas,” Mexico City, September 23, 1790. This documentation includes copies of and reiterates orders of December 15, 1774, and January 20, 1775. Also see AGN, Historia 159, “Informes sobre el numero de empleados del reino, sus nombres, méritos, etc.,” Mexico City,

1791; and AGN, Civil 1664, “Nota de los empleados que deben colocarse en otras

March 1, 1808.

_ oficinas,” Mexico City, 1791.

25. AGN, Civil 110, exp. 6, Francisco de Eguia to the Viceroy, Mexico City,

_ 26. Chandler, “Pensions,” pp. 122-24; AHH 5092, exp. 8, Real Junta Superior de Montepios de Oficinas, minutes, October 9, 1788, item: “Instancia del portero

don Antonio de Rivas en solicitud de licencia para contraer matrimonio con dofia | Ignacia de Soto, aseguriando es igual en calidad y de arreglada conducta”; minutes, October 13, 1788, item: “Aprobacion de la instancia del portero . . .” (hereafter RJS/ MPO); AGN, Montepios 6, exp. 27, fs. 516—521, “El director de pdlvora y naipes,

Mendoza y Molina,” 1792. ,

, pide se le conceda licencia a don Francisco José de Olmedo, para casarsecon Marfa 27. AHH 592, exp. 8, RJS/MPO, minutes, November 14, 1788, item no. 14: “Sobre habilitaci6n de Luis del Camino”; December 15, 1789, item no. 3; and December 15, 1790, item 10; AGN, Montepios 13, exp. 8, fs. 308-314, “Don Luis del Camino, oficial de la contaduria del viento, presenta una real cédula en que se

manda se le incorpore en el montepio de oficinas,” 1791. , 28. Priestley, José de Galvez, pp. 109, 174-75, and 180-82; Diaz-Trechuelo, Pajaron Parody, and Rubio Gil, “Revillagigedo,” pp. 218-20.

29. AGN, RH 48, “Testimonio del expediente formado a instancia de don

Notes to Pages 124-27 181 Diego Cadaval, primer alcaide de la real aduana sobre que se le restituye, a este empleo y se le satisfaga los sueldos que tiene caidos,” 1789, and “Testimonio del expediente sobre percibos y enteros defectuosos o no executados en la tesoreria, hechos por don Diego Cadaval, primer alcaide de la real aduana de esta capital,” 1786-1789; AGN, RH 216, RJS/RH, minutes, October 19, 1789, item no. 1: “En el

expediente sobre suspension del empleo de alcaide primero de la real aduana de | esta capital a don Diego Cadaval.” 30. AGN, RH 216, RJS/RH, minutes, June 19, 1789, item: “Consulta del sefior intendente de esta capital, acompafado testimonio de la resolucién tomada en el expediente promovido por don Francisco Javier Sarria, sobre que se le paguen los medios sueldos que deja de percibir al tiempo que estubo suspenso de su empleo”; vol. 220, RJS/RH, minutes, February 12, 1796, item: “Autos formados sobre suspensi6n y aresto de don José Pelleramo y perjuicio que padese la real renta de tabaco”; and vol. 235, RJS/RH, minutes, June 17, 1803, item: “Expediente sobre el fraude cometido en la real loteria, por los empleados de ella.” 31. AGN, RH 217, RJS/RH, minutes, August 11, 1790, item no. 3: “Autos sobre la quiebra de don Manuel Angel de Villegas Puente, factor oficial real que fue de

esta caja matrix.” The tribunal audited the factor’s 1748 accounts in 1774. , 32. Perezcano complained that the federal executive violated an 1829 law when it appointed Mangino to a job for which he had not even applied. See Arrillaga, Recopilacin, 1829, p. 104, May 26, 1829, “Ninguno empleo de la federacié6n se provea

sin previa propuesta.” 33. Rafael Heliodero Valle, Un diplomatico mexicano en Paris (don Fernando Mangino, 1848—1851) (Mexico City: Publicaciones de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, 1948), pp. 10-13.

34. Valle, Un diplomatico mexicano, pp. 13-18. 35. See Chapters 3 and 4 for discussion of salary problems among administrative

and judicial employees in the late 1820s and early 1830s. , 36. Beltran, Oracion. . . . 37. Arrillaga, Recopilacién, July 28, 1829, “Por que oficina deben pagarse los sueldos de los cesantes, de los pensionistas y espafioles suspensos,” p. 1723; January 13, 1830, “Empleados cesantes que han de cobrar sus sueldos en la comisaria, y cuales en la tesoreria,” p. 43; August 17, 1829, “Descuento de sueldo a todos los de la federacién y préstamo forzoso,” in 1831, p. 24. 38. Arrillaga, Recopilacién, Junc—July 1833, p. 127-29, June 23, 1833, “Reglas que

deben observar en la expulsidn fuera del territorio de la reptiblica de los individuos que expresa y respecto de los que expelen los estados”; Francisco Parada Gay, Breve resena historica de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nacién (Mexico City: Antigua Imprenta de Murguia, 1929), pp. 1o—11; and Enrique Olivarria y Ferrari, México independiente, 1 México a traves de los syglos, gen. ed. Vicente Riva Palacio (Mexico City: Ballesca y Compafiia, 1888), 4:338.

8. The Colonial Legacy

1. Hale, Mexican Liberalism, p. 39; Potash, Mexican Government and Industrial Development, pp. 12-28; and Tenenbaum, The Politics of Penury, pp. 17-40.

, 182 Notes to Page 129 , 2. Flores Caballero, Counterrevolution, pp. 28—65; Lavrin, “The Execution of , , the Law of Consolidactén”, Ladd, The Mexican Nobility, pp. 98-104; Jan Bazant, A Conese History of Mexico from Hidalgo to Cardenas (Cambridge: Cambridge - _ University Press, 1977), pp. s—1o; Anna, The Fall of Royal Government, p. 36; Kicza,

Colonial Entrepreneurs, pp. 5s5—61; and Jay Kinsbruner, Petty Capitalism in Spanish |

| America: The Pulperos of Puebla, Mexico City, Caracas, and Buenos Azres (Boulder: __- Westview Press, 1987), pp. 37-39. Kinsbruner found minimal evidence to link small

, grocery-store owners to loans from ecclesiastical credit institutions; however, their

| inventories included items of international origin, items that linked those petty

capitalists to the larger, credit-based economy. |

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Index

Acta Constitutiva, 75-76 of, 7-8, 57—59, 61, 81; salaries of, 101-2;

Age of Revolution, 3 senior, 58, 61. See also magistrates

Aiton, Arthur S., 4 auditors. See tribunal of audits Alaman, Lucas, 67 Azanza, Miguel José de, 43, 45 Alegria, José Alejo de, 122

Alegria, Martin de, 122 Baquiano, José, 7 Amarillas, Marqués de, 25 Bataller y Ros, Miguel Antonio, 67, 16sn. ,

amnesty law, 70 30

Anda, Juan Antonio de, 163n. 5 Beltran, José Joaquin, 119 Aranda, Conde de, 12-13, 127 , Beltran, José Maria, 41, 158n. 26 Arce, Francisco Manuel de, 47, 48, 49 Berazueta, José Ignacio, 63, 67, 68, 165n. 30

Arcipreste, Mateo de, 121 Berenguer de Marquina, Félix, 43, 45 Argiielles, Agustin, 163n. 7 Bernal de Bugeda, Beatriz, 7

23, §O, 67 Bonaparte, Joseph, 15 |

Army of the Three Guarantees, 16,17, 22~ — Blaya y Blaya, Manuel, 67, 165n. 30

Arregui Ziamorano, Pilar, 7 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 2, 15, 101 | Aspiros, Martin de, 25 Bonavia, Bernardo, 35, 37-39, 158n. 32, audiencia, 6--8, 58; abolished, 14; positions 1§9n. 35

in, 119; role of, 56; weakening of, 13, Bonilla, Antonio, 35, 40—41, 42, 43-44

I70N. 12 Bourbons: and fiscal system, 9; goals of, 3, audiencia attorneys, role of, 58-59 5, 13; reforms of, 1, 5, 12, 18, I7IN. 23; reaudiencia ministers, 86; career tracks for, forms of, in fiscal bureaucracy, 81~82 7--8, 114, 117-18; after independence, 8, Branciforte, Marqués de, 42, 43, 45-46,

$7, 67—68, 125; junior, 58, 60, 61, 163N. 5; 99, 119 | perquisites of, 62, 63-64, 65; reaction of, | Bucareli, Antonio Maria, 26-27, 156n. 9 to constitution of 1812, 60-62, 63; role Buenos Aires, viceregal secretariat in, 6

197

198 Index bureaucracy: employee turnover in, 18-19; — consolidacién de vales reales, 9, 128-29 persistency rates in, 18-20; politicization constituent congress, national, 68, 71; disof, 10, 18, 83, 96, 126, 128; professionali- solved by Iturbide, 74; and fiscal system, zation of, 1, 5, 6, 10, 18, I9, 20, 25, 114, 94—96, 97; and judiciary, 72—73, 75-76

128; role of, 2, 81. See also bureaucrats; constitution of 1812, 2, 16, 18, 19, 49, 56, $7, , , fiscal bureaucracy; secretariat, viceregal 161n. 67; abrogated by Ferdinand VII, 2, _ | bureaucrats: career tracks of, 7-8, 113, 114— 49, 56, 6§; and appointment of judges, 18; contributions of, to military, 21-23; 69; audiencia ministers’ reaction to, 60—

dismissal of, 100; displaced, 23, 108, 111, 62, 63; impact of, on audiencia, 8; and ,

«112-13, 125, 178n. 1; grievances of, 118, judiciary, 59-60, 69, 164n. 11; and su, 120-21; housing of, 102-5, 174—75n. 16; preme tribunal, 70 job security of, 10, 98-100, 102, 124; life- constitution of 1824, 17, 24, 83, 127. See also | time right to work of, 98, 113, 114 (see Acta Constitutiva | also titles, proprietary); morale of, 20— consultative system, 9, 14, 58, 83, 86, 88, 89, : 23, 124; as presidential confidants, 23, 96, 90, 92, 100, 118, 120, 17In. 25; abolished,

Ill, 126; promotion of, 7, 10, 98—99, 113, 94. 126 , 114, 115, 118—20, 179nn. 9 and 12; self- Corral, Juan José del, 96—97, 173n. 49 |

policing of, 121-23, 124, 128. See also bu- —- Corres, Francisco, 84—86, 170n. 12 |

_ reaucracy correspondence, organization of. See files ,

Burkholder, Mark A., 7 corruption, 83, 87, 121, 122, 123-245 after in- , Bustamante, Anastasio, 95, 125 dependence, 126

Cortes, 8, 15, 48, 56, 57, 63, 65, 66, 83, 93;

Caballero y Rivas, Andrés de, 63 and judiciary, 59, 164n. 11; rejected

Cadaval, Diego, 123 Treaty of Cérdova, 16, 57, 72

~ Calderén Quyano, José Antonio, 5 , Cosio, Pedro Antonio, 28—30, 32, 84—87,

— Calleja, Felix Maria, 49, 62—63, 64—65, 119, 120, I70nn. 1 and 12

I6IN. 67 , Council of the Indies, 89-90, 93, 117, 118 , Camino, Luis del, 122 Croix, Marqués de, 26 |

Campillo y Cosio, José, 13 Crown and Church, 4—5. See also mon-

Campo y Rivas, Manual, 67, 68, 69, 70-71, archy | 7, Andrés 165. 30de,, _121 Cubas, Ignacio, , || , Cant, Cuellar, Benito,121 107-8 career tracks, 7—8, 113, 114—18 Cuellar, Ignacio, 108 ,

Carrillo, Manuel, 100 Cunningham, Charles E., 7 | |

ne 19D. S.,, 7 OF ! Chandler,

Castillo, Florencio, 73 customs house, 81, 82, 94, 121, 122, I69n. 2, , Castillo, Mateo de, 100-1 | 172N. 38; corruption in, 123; salaries in,

census, IO, 106, 109, 176-—77N. 35; of 18II, 13I—33 . : . | Charles ITI, 5, 12, 18 debt, government, 83, 92-94, 95

Charles IV, 2, 5, 9, 15, 47 _ decision making, process of, 9, 14, 58, 83,

Church and Crown, 4—s . | 88, 89, 90, 92, 94

, clerical staff, shortage of, 26, 28, 31, 32, 34, de la Fuente, Juan, 115

40, 42, 43, 49, 50, OI, 94 de la Fuente, Juan Ignacio, 115, 178n. 6 collegial system, 9, 14, 34, 82, 83, 86, 88, de la Vanda, Manuel Tenorio, 122 89, 92, 118, 120, 171n. 25; abolished, 14, derecho tndtano, 7

7 94, 126 ! Diaz de Solorazano, Manuel, 99

Colombia, Republic of, constitution of, 73. Dominguez, Miguel, 110 |

commonwealth, Spanish, proposed, 12-13, Dominguez de Riezu, Juan, 103

16, $7 donations to treasury, forced, 21, 63, 120

congressional auditing office, 95, 113 _ Dongo, Joaquin, 163n. 5 |

Index 199 Echeveste, José Domingo, 122 26, 31, 32, 81-82, II7, 121, 158. 25, 169N.

Echeveste, Juan José, 122 7; and Cosio, 28, 29, 30, 84—86, I70n. 12

Eguia, Francisco, 122 Galvez, Matias de, 30—31

Elizalde, Juan Manuel, 68, 70, 165n. 31 Garcia Parrilla, José, 90—91

enlightened despotism, 3, 127, 128 Garibay, Pedro, 48

Enlightenment, 1, 127, 129 General Indian Court, 58

3, 5 Gomez, José, 165n. 5 |

Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, Gomez, Blas, 99

Espinosa y Bermeo, Francisco, 103—4 Gomez de Navarrete, Juan, 110 , Estrada, Felipe, 105 Gomez Pedraza, Manuel, 52 examinations, competitive, 119 Gonzalez Calderén, Francisco José, 107

Gonzalez Calderén, Tomas, 64, 107 ,

FBagoaga, José Maria, 68, 70, 71 grievances, 118, 120—21 Rajardo Covarrubias, Bernardo, 98-99 Giiemes Pacheco, Juan Vicente de. See Refavoritism, 83, 96, 119-20. See also bureau- villagigedo, Conde de

cracy, politicization of guias de forasteros, 10 federalism, 2, 17, 128 guild: merchant, 82; mining, 86, 169n. 7 Ferdinand VII, 2, 3, 5, 15-16, 20, 47, 48, Gutiérrez del Mazo, Ramon, 49

4.9, 56, 65, 83, 93 Gutiérrez de Rosas y Mufive, José Maria, Fernandez de Cordova, Fernando, 31, 158n. 110

26 Gutiérrez y Paez, Luis, 121

Fernandez de Cordova, Francisco, 30-31

Fernandez Molinillo, Francisco, 25 Hapsburgs, 2, issn. 1; and Church, 4~5; files: geopolitical organization of, 6, 40, and fiscal system, 9 43; thematic organization of, 6, 24, 26— Herrera, José Joaquin de, 53

27, 4.0, 43, 158N. 26 Hidalgo revolt, 106, 128, 173n. 1 first-instance cases, 60, 62, 63, 66, 81, 92 Hierro, Felipe del, 89 fiscal bureaucracy: Bourbon reforms 1n, historiography, 2-4, 7—9 81—82; decision making in, 9, 14, 58, 83, history, Mexican, periodization of, 2-3 88, 89, 90, 92, 94; after independence, housing, 177nn. 18 and 19; of bureaucrats, 94-97; salaries in, 131-52; studies of, 8— 102-5, 174—75n. 16

9. See also tribunal of audits Humana, Patricio, 41, 49

fiscal superintendency, 29, 30, 31, 42, 49, $1. | Humboldt, Alexander von, 8 | See also secretariat, superintendency fiscal superintendent: viceregal secretary as, | Ibargoyen, José Manuel, 87—88, 93 28-30, 3I—35; viceroy as, 34—35, 81, ideology, material, 3, 5, 127-28, 129

169n. I independence, 2, 3, 16—18; and audiencia

Fischer, Lillian E., 3 ministers, 8, 57, 67—68, 125; corruption

Flores Alatorre, Juan José, 68-69, 73, 165n. after, 126; and employee morale, 20, 22—

31 23; and employee turnover and persis-

Florescano, Enrique, 9 tency, 19-20; and fiscal bureaucracy,

Flores Palacios, Francisco, 77 94-97; and personnel policies, 10, 96, | Florez, Manuel Antonio, 34—35, 158n. 32 126; and salaries, 51, 52; wars of, 1. See

Foncerrada, Melchor de, 60 also constituent congress, national; con-

Fonseca, Fabian de, 8 stitution of 1824; regency and judiciary; freedom of the press, 59, 61, 66 sovereign provisional governing junta inflation and salaries, 84, 100-2

Galindo, Manuel, 120 intendancy, Mexican, 35, 37, 38, 39-40, 41, Galvez, Bernardo de (Conde de Galvez), 45-47, 48, 49

31, 107, 158n. 32 intendancy system, 28~29, 31, 32, 35, 36-40, Galvez, José de (Marqués de Sonora), 25, 41, 82, 86, 90; abolished, 94

200 , — Index Isabella, 9 Mariluz Urquio, José Maria, 6 Iturbide, Agustin, 16, 17, 66, 72, 73, 74, 94 Martinez de Aragon, Felipe, 62

| — -- -Tturbide, Joaquin, 51 | a Martinez Mansilla, Manuel, 67—68, 73, | - Tturbide, Miguel Mariano de, 88 165N. 30

_ Iturrigaray, José de, 46-47, 48, 91 Mayorga, Martin de, 28, 31, 84, 156—57n. I0 media anata. See taxes, half-annate

Jesuits: expulsion of 26, 32, 82, 117, 157. Medina, Ildefonso José de, 165n. 30 , 23; sale of estates of, 26, 93 Medina, Juan de Dios, 1222 judges. See audiencia ministers; magistrates | Medina, Luis, 122

judiciary: and constitution of 1812, 8, 59— Mendoza, Antonio de, 4 , 60, 61; federal, weakness of, 77, 79, 80; Mendoza y Benavides, Pedro, 171n. 22 military, 71-72; national, lobbying for, Merino, Martin, 48, 161n. 66

| 68; and regency, 68, 69, 70-71; under =— merit, as criterion for promotion, 87, 118— | second constitutional era, 66; shortage 19 , of staff for, 67, 69—70, 74, 77, 80, 166n. Mesia y Caicedo, José de, 60 60, 167N. 62; sovereign provisional gov- Mexico: history of, periodization of, 2—3;

| } ering junta, 68—72; states, 76. See also intendancy of, 35, 38, 39-40, 41, 45-47, ,

Magistrates; supreme court; supreme tri- 48, 49 | bunal of justice , military justice, 71-72

juntas de montepios, 9 in, 134-36 jurisdiction: civil vs. military, 57, 78, 80; Modet, Ramon de, 60 , junta de union de rentas,9,17IN.27- mint, 26, 82, 117, 118, 119, 122, 171; salaries

, federal vs. state, 57, 78, 80; fiscal superin- | monarchy: as administrative state, 33, 48;

tendency vs. viceregency, 29—30, 31, 32— as jurisprudential, 29, 33, 56 | | |

34. - monopolies, 180nn. 3 and 4; gunpowder, | ee 26, 81, 82, 112, 113, 142, I7IN. 27, 178N. 35

lawyers, shortage of, 166n. 60. See also ju- lottery, 82, 95, 139, I7IN. 27; mercury, 26,

diciary, shortage of staff for 82, 117, 134, 169n. 1; playing-card, 81, 82,

Leal y Gamboa, José Maria, 109 © 122, I7IN. 27, 178n. 3; stamped-paper, 81,

Lezaun, Juan José de, 122 82; tobacco, 26, 82, 89, 93, 94, 99, 117, Lizani y Beaumont, Francisco Javier, 48 122, 146-47, I7IN. 27

Llave, Raphael de la, 60 | Monterde, Pedro Maria, 122 ;

loans: forced, 21, 93; foreign, 97 Mora, José Maria Luis, 17-18

, 112, 1730. 49 Napoleon, 2, 15, 101 | Lédpez de Santa Anna, José Antonio, 96,

Lopez de Segovia, Pedro, 165n. 30 Napoleonic Wars, 1, 3, 5, 14, 83

| , National Instituent Congress, 74

a _ - Magistrates: appointment of, procedure nepotism, 121-22

for, 73-74, 75, 76; role of, 7-8, 57, 61; New Galicia, 24, 32, 49, 50 | salaries of, 64—65, 166n. 58; shortage of, New Spain, 24, 29, 32, 49, 50, 66, 92, 129;

67, 69—70, 74, 167N. 62. See also audien- silver boom in, 12, 14 |

cia ministers; judiciary Novella, Francisco, 50, 66—67

mails, 26, 81, 137 Niifiez de Haro, Alonso, 31, 158n. 26 | Mangino, Fernando, 125, 181n. 32

Mangino, Fernando José, 32—34, 41, 5, Odoardo, José Hipdlito, 68, 69, 73, 16s5n.

1I7—18, 123, 125, 157—58n. 23, 158nn. 25 and 30 26 | , | O’Donoju, Juan, 49, 50, 57, 67, 72

Mangino, Rafael, 73, 95-96, 97, 125 oidores. See audiencia ministers, senior Maniau y Torquemada, Ildefonso, 110 Olmedo, Francisco, 178n. 3

177. 41 Oses, Juan Ramon, 65, 67, 165n. 30 :

Index 201 Otero, Maria Josefa, 107—8 Ruiz de Castafieda, José Mariano, 78 Ruiz Guinazu, Enrique, 7 Palacios, Gabriel, 91, 92

papal bulls, sale of, 81, 14-4 Sagarzurieta, Ambrosio de, 165n. 30 patronage, 18, 114, 119. See also bureaucracy, salaries, 32, 33, 84, 120; in congressional of-

politicization of fices, 151-52; deductions in, 21, 65, 100-1,

Pefia y Pefia, Manuel de la, 68, 70, 73, 176n. 10; in fiscal departments, 131-49;

16sn. 31 after independence, 51, 52; and inflation,

peninsulars: and Americans, 16; barred 100-2; of magistrates, 64—65, 166n. 58;

from government jobs, 23, 111, 125 in viceregal secretariat, 31, 32, 33 | |

pension funds, 10, 82, 109, 122-23 Santa Anna. See Lopez de Santa Anna, Peramas, Melchor de, 26-28, 31, 43, 1s6nn. José Antonio

9 and 10, 157n. II secretariat, superintendency, 32~34. See also Perezcano, Mariano, 112-13, 125, 178n. 1, fiscal superintendency

18In. 32 secretariat, viceregal, 6, 19, 24-26, 54—55; Pérez de Quyano, Agustin, 101, 115, 116-17, military department of, 29, 31, 4.2; muli- , 179Nn. 7 tary personnel in, 29, 31, 41, 42, 49; salaPérez Quyano, Bartolomé, 116, 179n. 7 ries in, 31, 32, 33; structure of, 26, 27, 36— personnel policies, 18-20; after indepen- 37, 38, 40-41, 42-43, 4.4 dence, 10, 96, 126; regulation of, 10 secretariats of state, 24, 50-1, 55; for army

Phelan, John Leddy, 7, 9 and naval affairs, 52-53, 54; for fiscal af-

Pious Fund of the Californias, 43 fairs, 50, 54; of internal and foreign relaPlan of Iguala, 16, 23, 50, 66, 125; and gov- tions, 50, 53-54 for justice and

ernment debt, 94. ecclesiastical affairs, 50, 52, 55

Posada y Soto, Rarndén de, 85, 86 secretary, viceregal, 6, 25; role of, 28-30

positions. See titles secretary for fiscal affairs, 51, 94, 95, 97

postal service, 26, 81, 137 secretary for justice and ecclesiastical af-

Priestley, Herbert I., 3 fairs, 69, 71 .

promotion and advancement, 7, 10, 98-99, seniority, as criterion for promotion, 118,

113, 114, IIs, 118-20, 179nn. 9 and 12 179N. 9 separation of powers, 8, 14, 18, 56, 77, 79,

Quyano, Mariano Ignacio, 99 127, 128

Quijano Zavala, José, 90, 91 Sequeiros, Pablo José, 98 smelting house, 26, 82, 98

Ramirez, Alejandro, 49 Smith, Donald, 3, 4

real junta supertor de consolidaciin de vales Soto Carrillo, José Ignacio, 122 ,

reales, 9 sovereign provisional governing junta, $0,

veal junta superior de hacienda, 9 68; and appointment of magistrates, 69—

regency and judiciary, 68, 69, 70-71 70, 71; and fiscal system, 94; and judiciRevillagigedo, Conde de, 35, 37-42, 43, 86, ary, 68-72; secretariats organized by,

99, 100, 105, 122, 1§9n. 48, I7IN. 27 50—SI

Reyes Manzano, Manuel, 109 sovereignty, 2, 5, 6, 14, 15, 73 Riva, Juan Antonio de la, 68, 165n. 30 states, role of, 76 :

Rodriguez, José Antonio, 99 states’ rights, 78-79, 94

Rodriguez, Juan de Dios, 96, 173n. 49 superintendency secretariat, 32-34. See also

Rodriguez de Fonseca, Juan, 9 fiscal superintendency Rodriguez de Velasco, Antonio, 121 supreme council of war, 72

Rosas, José de, 101 supreme court, 57; appointment of justices

Rosas y Mufiive, José Maria, 110, 165n. 31 to, 73-74, 75, 76; role of, 77, 78-80. See

Ruiz de Apodaca, Juan, 50, 65—67 also judiciary; supreme tribunal of justice ,

202 | Index ,

Supreme Court of Justice, 76 Uria, Joaquin Xavier, 121 :

supreme tribunal of justice, 59-60, 68, 702— —_ Uria, José Simedn de, 59 , 71; establishment of, 73, 75; and trium- Uribe, Juan de Dios, 47

virate, 74—75. See also judiciary; supreme — Urrutia, Carlos de, 8 court ~ Van Young, Eric, 3

taxes, 92, 93; alcabala, 86, 169n. 2; on ap- Velazquez de Leon, Manuel, 41, 43,44,

pointments and promotions, 120; con- 48—49, 118, I19 , sumer, 100-1; half-annate, 32, 35, 37-39, Venegas, Francisco Javier, 48, 60, 61

63, 9O—92, 102, 106, 120, 140, I59N. 36; viceregency, 13, 14, 33 , - pulque, 85, 86, 172n. 38; sales, 26, 82, 85, viceroy: advised. by audiencia attorneys, 58;

93, I7IN. 27, 172n. 38 | and Church, 4; duties of, 4, 26, 81; as

, titles: proprietary, 10, 68, 112-13, 114, 118, fiscal superintendent, 34-35, 81, 169n. 15 : 120; saleable, 114, 118, 119, 120; types of, role of, 5, 6; weakening of powers of, 13,

114, 156n. 2 28, I7ON. 12 .

Torres, José Mariano, 105 Victoria, Guadalupe, 95

_ Torres y Catafio, José Maria, 1os—7 , Vilchis, Anna Josefa, 105, 106 transfers. See promotion and advancement _ Villaurrutia, Jacobo, 75

Treaty of Cérdova, 23, 50, 67, 125; rejected Villegas Puente, José, 41, 99-100 ,

by Cortes, 16, 57, 72 Villegas Puente, Manuel Angel, 124 |

tribunal of audits, 30, 58, 91, 92, 93, II2, 115,

170nn. 10 and 11, 172n. 39, 179N. 12; abol- — Ward, Bernardo, 13 |

ished, 14, 94, 113; challenges £0, 83, 84— Ximénez de Almendral, Adrian, 110

bureaucracy 30 | 90; nepotism in, 122; salaries in, 84, 86,

142-43; weakening of, 13. See also fiscal Yafiez, José Isidro, 67, 69, 73, 79, 110, 165n. ,

Ugarte y Loyola, Jacobo, 87 | Zavala, Lorenzo, 73 | upward mobility. See promotion and ad- —Zavala, Silvio, 7 , vancement , Zavaleta, Francisco de Paula, 122 ,

LINDA ARNOLD received her M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Texas at , Austin. She has been an Assistant Professor of History at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University since 1982. Her research on the bureaucracy of late colonial and early national Mexico has been presented in numerous papers and articles. During her many trips to Mexico, she has compiled half a dozen guides to previously uncatalogued document sets. Her published and unpublished archival guides to documents in the Archivo General de la Naci6én and the Suprema Corte de Justicia have provided other researchers with greater access to information and materials. Her Directorio de Burocratas en la ciudad de Mexico, 1761-1832, a volume

that contains the names and Mexico City careers of the 2,733 bureaucrats who were ,

the prosopographical basis of this work, has given archivists and historians a basic | tool for identifying the provenance of late colonial and early national documents.

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