Buddhist Ethics [2] 9789553118233

Table of contents :
1. Thinking of Foundations and Justification of Buddhist Ethics.1
2. Skill in Means (Upāya Kauśalya) in Early and Later
Buddhist Thought.................................................................... 23
3. Using Physical Force/Power and Inflicting Pain as
Problems in Buddhist Ethics.................................................... 43
4. Buddhism on Slavery................................................................ 50
5. Dissent in Buddhism: Its Doctrinal (Dhamma) and
Monastic Disciplinary (Vinaya) Perspectives.......................... 63
6. Monastic Sexual Behaviour: A Study of the First Pārājikā
and Related Rules of the Theravada Vinaya............................ 79
7. Environmental Philosophy and Buddhism............................. 93
8. Buddhist Views on Nature and Environment....................... 104
9. Justice, Kamma and Dhamma: Does Kamma in
Buddhism Make Justice Redundant?.................................... 121
10. Insights from Tripitaka on Justice ......................................... 135
11. Equality and Justice from a Buddhist Perspective................. 155
12. A Buddhist Approach to Development ................................ 175
13. Buddhist Perspectives on Balanced Living, Right Use of
Wealth and Equal Opportunities in Economy...................... 183
14. Globalization: Buddhist Perspective to Economics .............. 200
15. Buddhist Ethics of Consumption.......................................... 213
16. Political Metaphor in the Life of the Buddha........................ 232
17. The Buddha’s Teachings for Good Governance ................... 243
18. Religious Ethics and the New World Order: a Buddhist
Critique and Reconstruction................................................. 257
19. A Buddhist Approach to Conflict Resolution...................... 269
20. Mental Health and Gender from a Buddhist Perspective..... 308
21. The Light of Zen in the West Incorporating the Supreme
Doctrine and the Realization of the Self (Foreword)............ 338

Citation preview

Collected Papers : Asanga Tilakaratne Volume II

Buddhist Ethics

No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing from the publisher, except by a reviewer, who may quote brief passages in a review Sarasavi Publishers (Pvt) Ltd: [email protected] Collected Papers : Asanga Tilakaratne, Vol II - Buddhist Ethics First Print 2020 © Asanga Tilakaratne ISBN: 978-955-31-1823-3 Introduction Damien Keown Editor Wimal Hewamanage Book and Cover Design by Bertram G. Liyanage Printed by Sarasavi Publishers (Pvt) Ltd No - 601, Athurugiriya Road, Malabe Published by Sarasavi Publishers (Pvt) Ltd No - 23, Ekanayaka Mawatha, Nugegoda www.sarasavi.lk and Sri Lanka Association of Buddhist Studies

COLLECTED PAPERS : ASANGA TILAKARATNE Volume II

Buddhist Ethics

Introduction Damien Keown

Editor Wimal Hewamanage Editorial Assistant Sewwandi Marasinghe

2020

SRI LANKA ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES

COLLECTED PAPERS : ASANGA TILAKARATNE Volume I - Buddhist Philosophy Volume II - Buddhist Ethics Volume III - Theravada Studies Volume IV - Buddhism and Modernity Volume V - Inter-Religious Understanding Editorial Board Prof. Raluwe Padmasiri Thera, MA. Prof. Miriswaththe Wimalagnana Thera, MPhil. Wimal Hewamanage, PhD. D. Denzil Senadheera, PhD. Ashoka Welitota, PhD. Bertram G. Liyanage, MA. Sheila Fernando, PhD. Editorial Assistants Thich Nu Khanh Nang Bhikṣuṇi, PhD. Sewwandi Marasinghe, MA. Nuwanthika Ariyadasa, MA.

Contents Editorial Note ................................................................................. vii Ackonwledgements .......................................................................... x Introduction .................................................................................... xi 1. Thinking of Foundations and Justification of Buddhist Ethics.1 2. Skill in Means (Upāya Kauśalya) in Early and Later Buddhist Thought.................................................................... 23 3. Using Physical Force/Power and Inflicting Pain as Problems in Buddhist Ethics.................................................... 43 4. Buddhism on Slavery................................................................ 50 5. Dissent in Buddhism: Its Doctrinal (Dhamma) and Monastic Disciplinary (Vinaya) Perspectives.......................... 63 6. Monastic Sexual Behaviour: A Study of the First Pārājikā and Related Rules of the Theravada Vinaya............................ 79 7. Environmental Philosophy and Buddhism............................. 93 8. Buddhist Views on Nature and Environment....................... 104 9. Justice, Kamma and Dhamma: Does Kamma in Buddhism Make Justice Redundant?.................................... 121 10. Insights from Tripitaka on Justice ......................................... 135 11. Equality and Justice from a Buddhist Perspective................. 155 12. A Buddhist Approach to Development ................................ 175 13. Buddhist Perspectives on Balanced Living, Right Use of Wealth and Equal Opportunities in Economy...................... 183 14. Globalization: Buddhist Perspective to Economics .............. 200 15. Buddhist Ethics of Consumption.......................................... 213

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16. Political Metaphor in the Life of the Buddha........................ 232 17. The Buddha’s Teachings for Good Governance ................... 243 18. Religious Ethics and the New World Order: a Buddhist Critique and Reconstruction................................................. 257 19. A Buddhist Approach to Conflict Resolution...................... 269 20. Mental Health and Gender from a Buddhist Perspective..... 308 21. The Light of Zen in the West Incorporating the Supreme Doctrine and the Realization of the Self (Foreword)............ 338 Primary Sources and Abbreviations............................................. 344 Secondary Sources and Translations............................................ 348 Index of Subjects .......................................................................... 354 Index of Proper Names ................................................................ 369 Asanga Tilakaratne....................................................................... 374 Editorial Board.............................................................................. 376

Editorial Note

Professor Asanga Tilakaratne, who has followed the footprints of such eminent modern interpreters of Buddhism as KN Jayatilleke and David J Kalupahana, has played a prominent role in the field of Buddhist studies in Sri Lanka. The idea about this whole project of compiling the academic papers of Professor Tilakaratne emerged at a casual discussion among a group of us at the occasion of his retirement in 2018 from the university service as the senior chair professor of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Colombo. As a tribute to his services to the field of Buddhist Studies, we decided to edit and compile his papers scattered in various journals and books. At first, we presumed that the collection would run into a few volumes only. But to the amazement of us and the author himself it far exceeded our initial calculations, now the whole series running into eight volumes altogether, three in Sinhala and five in English. The five volumes in English are Buddhist Philosophy, Buddhist Ethics, Theravada Studies, Buddhism and Modernity and Inter-Religious Understanding. Turning to the scholarship represented by Professor Tilakaratne, he rightly marks a transition from the traditional to the modern Buddhist studies, exhibiting in the course of his academic career expertise in both aspects. On the one hand, there are the traditional Buddhist studies continuing more than two millennia in this country celebrating the expertise in the Pali textual tradition, which Professor Tilakaratne mastered at Buddhashravaka Dharamapethaya, Anuradhapura. On the other hand, there is the modern Buddhist academic tradition pioneered by such eminent savants as GP Malalasekera and continued by numerous scholars such as Jayatilleke and Kalupahana who interpreted the teaching of the Buddha in the light of western analytical and empirical philosophical thought, which Professor Tilakaratne inherited first at

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University of Peradeniya and subsequently at University of Hawaii. Although Prof. Tilakaratne has his professional academic training in the Buddhist philosophy of language and philosophy of religion his wideranging interests and the needs of the Buddhist academic field in the country have made him venture into many aspects of Buddhist studies as this multi-volume collection would testify. This has indeed made the task of the editors pretty challenging. We sincerely thank, therefore, Professor Tilakaratne for trusting us to handle this task and supporting us all the way through. Our editorial function was mainly confined to three aspects of these collected articles. With the consent of the author, first, we updated some facts where they were necessary. In most cases, following our suggestions, the author himself came up with innovative ideas to revise them with new materials. Secondly, we highlighted instances that we felt needed clarifying which, again the author was kind to comply with us. Lastly, in order to fit the individual papers to a collected whole, we removed from some papers particulars unique to specific contexts (excepting book reviews). Since the articles appearing in any particular volume are not written in regular order, we did not see a point in arranging them chronologically. Since overlapping of some information is unavoidable in a collection of this nature, we have only managed to remove some such repetitions with the least possible damage to the order and the content. We must, nevertheless, confess that we opted to leave some such recurrences untouched due to the structure of the given article. At the beginning of each article, we have mentioned the original publication in a footnote, which refers only to the first version of the corresponding article. Almost all papers in these collections are revised versions of these originals. Where there is not any remark about the first publication, the paper is either a fresh one written especially for the collection or a revision of an earlier article with a good amount of new materials. A marginal note is due here on the usage of diacritical marks and the citation style. Some of the Buddhist terms such as nirvana, karma, samsara are familiar to all English readers and hence we have treated them as ordinary English words. When it comes to proper nouns, particularly personal names, the author’s preference was to leave well-known names like Ananda, Sariputta, Mahakassapa without diacritical marks, expecting that the reader would find no difficulty of pronouncing them. If the given name sounds unfamiliar to the English tongue, we have inserted the diacritics (e.g. Vaṭṭagāminī, Koṇḍañña). For the secondary sources, we followed the Chicago style in citing references. For the primary

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sources, we have developed a consistent method catering to the actual editorial requirements. Moreover, we have to concede that we ignored spelling variations, British or American, insofar as they did not interfere with the comprehension of the content. Whenever spelling variation of a word appears critical to its meaning, we have rightly corrected it. In the course of this work, we have incurred many intellectual and emotional debts paying back for which our words will never be adequate. In addition to those kind-hearted individuals mentioned in the acknowledgement note of each volume, we must acknowledge sincerely and gratefully some individuals for their guidance, support, and assistance to the overall project. Of course, first comes Professor Asanga Tillakaratne, who entrusted this task on us without any hesitation. We are grateful to all editors and publishers of all original articles. We, nevertheless, regret our inability to take permission from individual editors and publishers. Since each volume represents a specific area of Buddhist studies, we invited five scholars to write introductory essays for the five volumes. We sincerely thank those distinguished scholars, Damien Keown, Rupert Gethin, Anne Blackburn, Abraham Velez and Ven. Soorakkulame Pemaratana, for their valuable contribution to the project. Our sincere thanks are due to Mr HD Premasiri, Chairman of Sarasavi Bookshop [Pvt] Ltd, Mr Chandu Haputhanthri, its Managing Director, and Mr Sripali Perera, its Publishing Manager, who undertook the substantial task of producing and publishing this series of volumes. In this context, we cannot fail to mention the Most Venerable Bellanwila Dhammaratana Mahathera, the chief incumbent of Bellanwila Rajamaha Viharaya from whose magnanimity this project has gained much. A bulk of the editorial work was done at Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya. We owe a great debt of appreciation to its academic and non-academic members, for their kind cooperation and understanding. Madihe Sugatasiri Thera of the academic staff of the University of Colombo deserves our thanks for his initiative to collecting and making copies of the papers to be edited. Finally, in his retirement, we wish Professor Asanga Tilakaratne, who has devoted more than 40 years of his academic carrier for the field of Buddhist studies, longevity, good health and happiness! Editors 2020

Acknowledgements

Asanga Tilakaratne, the founder Head of the Department of Buddhist Studies, University of Colombo, is a well-known scholar in the field of Buddhist Studies locally and internationally. He worked at Colombo as the Chair Professor of Pali and Buddhist Studies from 2009 to 2018. During this period he devoted his time, efforts and resources to establish the Department of Buddhist Studies at University of Colombo. During this period I had the good opportunity to work with him closely as a member of the academic staff of Buddhist Studies. Before joining Colombo, Professor Tilakaratne taught at Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, and during 2004-2007 he functioned as the Director of that institute. It is at his retirement in early 2018 as the Senior Chair Professor of Buddhist Studies at University of Colombo that we, his collegues, friends and students formed an Editorial Committee and decided, by way of conveying our gratitude to him for his outstanding services to the field of Buddhist Studies, to compile, edit and publish his academic writings in one series. Buddhist Ethics is the second volume of the English medium series. At the outset I would like to extend my heartiest thanks to Dr. Asanga Tilakaratne for giving us his consent for editing and publishing his writings which now form eight volumes, three in Sinhala and five in English. The review Introduction for this volume was written by Dr. Damien Keown, renowned Buddhist bioethicist and Emeritus Professor of Buddhist Ethics, Goldsmiths College, University of London. I express my sincere appreciation of him for his comprehensive introductory essay which certainly has added to the value of the collection. My special thanks go to the Venerable Professor Kotapitiye Rahula Anunayaka Thera, Director of Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies,

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the University of Kelaniya, where bulk of the editorial work was executed. The editorial team headed by Venerable Professor Raluwe Padmasiri supported me throughout this meaningful journey and I thank them sincerely. I would like to record my appreciation of Ms. Sewwandi Marasinghe, the editorial assistant, from whose dedication this volume benefitted much. Finally, I would like thank Lakpathi Lankage and the non-academic staff of the Department of Buddhist Studies, University of Colombo, and their counterparts at Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya for their kind support and cooperation in this work.

Wimal Hewamanage

Introduction Damien Keown Emeritus Professor of Buddhist Ethics Goldsmiths College, University of London

The publication of this collection of papers by Asanga Tilakaratne marks another memorable contribution to the study of Buddhist ethics by Sri Lankan scholars. If we review this distinguished history, we can trace its origins to the publication of the Venerable Saddhatissa’s classic volume Buddhist Ethics in 1970. This work has remained in print now for almost half a century and has been a leading resource to which many have turned for information on the Buddha’s ethical teachings. While this work was primarily descriptive in nature, other Sri Lankan scholars asked a variety of more probing theoretical questions. In a series of articles in The Mahabodhi, KN Jayatilleke enquired among other things as to how Buddhist ethics should be classified. ‘Is it’ he asked, ‘egotistic or altruistic? Is it relativist or absolutistic? Is it objective or subjective? Is it deontological or teleological? Is it naturalistic or nonnaturalistic? (1970, 194). Similar metaethical questions were posed by PD Premasiri a few years later, such as ‘Are moral judgements subjective or objective?’ ‘Is “good” definable in terms of some natural property or it is a non-natural property to be appreciated by intuition?’ ‘What is the logical relation between statements of fact and statements of value?’ (1975, 31). As we learn from the first chapter in this collection – “Thinking of Foundations and Justifications for Buddhist Ethics” -questions of this kind framed the agenda for much subsequent enquiry by scholars in Sri Lanka and elsewhere. AsangaTilakaratne has been in the forefront of those leading the search for answers to these questions. The present volume reveals how he not only pursued the agenda set by his compatriots but also broadened it in innovative ways, and it is particularly gratifying to see in this volume

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a strong interest in the applied dimension of Buddhist ethics. Here the reader will find papers touching on a broad range of contemporary social, political and ethical themes. The Buddha, as we are often told, was a pragmatist, and focused his teachings on practical questions, paradigmatically the problem of suffering. He demonstrated that while some suffering is unavoidable, such as that associated with birth, old age, sickness and death, a good deal can be avoided or mitigated by wise choices and prudent conduct. As this volume illustrates, he gave a considerable amount of practical advice on how to avoid suffering in the field of social relations. As noted herein, in the Sigālovāda Sutta he refers to “the four ways of treating others well, namely giving (dāna), pleasant speech (peyyavajja), working for the upliftment of others (attha-cariya) and even-handed treatment (samānattatā) and concludes by pointing out that ‘these things make the world go round like the chariot’s axle-pin’.” Unfortunately, the principles the Buddha adumbrated for the creation and maintenance of harmonious social relationships have not always been refined by the tradition with the attention they deserve. Many Theravāda commentators seem to have adopted the working assumption that since the problem of suffering has its source in the mind, the solution lies in an ever-deeper and more specialized analysis of mental phenomena. The Abhidhamma provides perhaps the best example of this subjective turn. However, it is in the intersubjective spaces dominated by social, political, and economic forces that the much human suffering arises. These powerful forces precede and shape individual minds and attitudes, and it is by understanding and controlling them that a good deal of suffering can be eliminated. Thus, while greed, hatred, and delusion are formidable psychological obstacles, their negative influence can be mitigated through sound political structures and viable economic models. These vices are less likely to flourish in a society that promotes values like justice, rights, and liberty, and more likely to flourish in one that does not. Whether injustice arises from hatred, or hatred arises from injustice, is a question that can be debated at length, but it seems clear there is a chicken-and-egg relationship between the two, and for the practical purpose of reducing suffering it makes sense to tackle the problem at both ends. What I find most impressive about this volume is the way in which the contributions remain faithful to the sources while seeking to apply Buddhist teachings in a contemporary context. Today, many writers choose the easier path of rejecting those parts of the tradition that seem

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incongruent or incompatible with modern modes of thought. For example, when karma and rebirth seem in conflict with science, they are often brushed aside and ignored.The chapters in this volume, however, take the ancient sources seriously and grapple with the challenge of reconciling old and new through original and creative interpretations. While thoroughly grounded in textual sources, specifically the Pali Canon and its commentaries, what is provided here is more than just a summary or repetition of canonical teachings of the kind we find in many popular works. Instead, the teachings are interrogated and challenged to produce new insights and answers to problems which while not entirely new, manifest themselves in a different form in today’s globalized world. While people have always lived in societies, the manner in which those societies are governed, and the political institutions which support them, are different today from those of the Buddha’s time. It is insufficient, then, simply to report canonical teachings about the Cakkavatti and assume this provides a solution to modern problems. There is a need to reassess the traditional teachings, reformulate them as appropriate, abstract appropriate principles from them, and apply these principles creatively in a manner relevant to modern times. This is what this volume sets out to do. We might describe it as an exercise in “engaged Buddhism” from a Theravāda perspective, in contrast to the bulk of contemporary discussions of this nature which draw primarily on Mahayana teachings. Given this orientation, socio-economic and political themes loom large in the collection. A number of chapters specifically explore political questions, and one specific dilemma concerns the question posed in the Samyutta-nikāya (I, 116f) as to whether it is possible for a king to rule solely by Dhamma without resorting to the use of force. This tantalising question receives no clear answer in the text, but is one that must have exercised the minds of Buddhist kings down the centuries. A number of questions arise here. Does a king have the authority to punish, and if so will he incur bad karma through his acts of violence? At a deeper level, what is the purpose of punishment, is it retribution, reform, or deterrence? Hovering in the background to these questions is the concept of justice, a term that features in the title of two chapters and in the content of several more. As noted at various points, although the concept of justice is not well developed in Buddhist literature, the sources have a number of ways of expressing its requirements. In the Jātakas we are often told that the essence of good governance is when a king exercises

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authority ‘rightly and fairly’ (dhammena samena) an expression which clearly expresses endorsement of the principle of just rulership. We glean further insights on justice from the principles of jurisprudence that underpin the Vinaya. We see there that punishments of various kinds are imposed on offenders, and note that these were always of a humane nature, and were imposed in escalating degrees, ranging from confession, warnings, probation, and finally exclusion from the Order. The aim here was primarily to reform the offender, and secondarily to deter others from committing similar offences. There is little evidence of the use of force in resolving Vinaya disputes, but not all problems can be resolved peacefully, especially not in secular society. Violent criminals must be restrained by force if necessary, and the same is true when the problem is scaled up to the level of terrorism, or invasion by an enemy force. While no definitive guidelines for dealing with these situations are set out in the Pali Canon, we can perhaps infer from the fact that the Cakkavatti retains a fourfold army that the king should stand ready to defend his kingdom when required. It may be, of course, that the Cakkavatti’s army serves a purely ceremonial function, but it seems excessive to retain a “fourfold army” simply for the purpose of display. I think, rather, we see here a note of realism, and an acknowledgement that even with the best will in the world a policy of total pacifism is impractical. At the same time, some degree of political opposition is to be expected and indeed is a sign of a healthy society. Dissent must be handled skilfully, and the challenges in dealing with it are explored in chapter five, and extent to which the use of physical force is justified as a response is considered in chapter three. Turning from politics to socio-economic themes, a common misunderstanding is that Buddhism is a world-renouncing tradition with little interest in the day-to-day welfare of ordinary people. That this was not the case can be seen from the fact that sociologically early Buddhism understood itself as an integratedmovementcomposed of four groups, namely monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen. While the monastic and lay communities have their different vocations, the relationship between them is symbiotic in nature. There could be no Sangha without lay support, and while the Buddha was first and foremost a religious teacher, he repeatedly interacted with the laity and gave countless sermons addressing issues of concern to householders. We can see from numerous discourses that the distinction between the two vocations is more a question of emphasis than the pursuit of antithetical objectives.

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The purpose of all the Buddha’s sermons was to encourage people to lead a good life. If we enquireas to the nature of the “good life” in Buddhism, we can see that it consists of two components, which might be described as virtue and happiness. Roughly speaking, these correspond to internal and external development. It may be thought that the former is pursued by monastics, and the latter by the laity, but this would be incorrect. Virtue is pursued by both, as we see from the Buddha’s advice to the laity to keep the precepts and to pursue wealth and material goods through blameless means. “Happiness” for the layperson (gīhi-sukha) is thus not understood simply as a life of pleasure but as one in which virtue and prosperity are pursued simultaneously. It is in this sense that the Buddha speaks of the ‘two-eyed’ person who strives for both inner and outer development consisting of worldly success and the development of moral character. We see the same theme in the Dīghajānu-sutta where the Buddha was asked to preach the Dhamma in a way that would lead to the happiness and welfare of laypeople. The Buddha replied that four things would have this result in the present life, namely initiative, protection, good friendship, and balanced living. He added that four other things would lead to happiness in future lives, namely faith, virtuous behaviour, generosity, and wisdom. The Buddha also speaks of four kinds of happiness, the happiness of possessions (atthi-sukha), the happiness of consumption or enjoyment (bhoga-sukha), the happiness of being free of debt (anaṇa-sukha), and the happiness of being free from blame (anavajja-sukha). Virtue and happiness therefore cannot be disentangled. When pursued rightly wealth becomes a genuine good and enhances the well-being of the householder, his extended family, and the wider community, including, of course, the Sangha itself. Socio-economic themes receive sustained consideration in a cluster of chapters in the middle of the collection concerned with equality, economic development, the right use of wealth, globalization, and consumption. We learn that the Buddha saw no virtue in poverty (dāḷiddiya), describing it as a condition of misery (dukkha) (A III, 351). He believed in a prosperous society, and described the city of Nāḷandā approvingly as ‘rich and prosperous’ (iddhaphīta) (D I, 211). The Buddha gives a lot of practical advice about balanced living and the management of financial resources. ‘And what is balanced living?’ he asks. The answer he gives is ‘Here, a clansman knows his income and expenditures and leads a balanced life, neither too extravagant or too frugal’ (A IV, 284).

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In the same place, hespeaks of four practices that lead to the dissipation of wealth, namely womanizing, drunkenness, gambling, and keeping company with bad friends, elsewhere adding loitering and frequenting carnivals to the list. Rather than squander one’s wealth in this way he recommended proper financial planning, saving, and investment. In the manner of a modern bank manager or financial advisor, he recommended dividing one’s wealth into four and spending one part on personal consumption, two parts on the development of one’s business, and one part as a bulwark against unforeseen events. This is prudent advice and taken in conjunction with the extensive remarks on social values provides the foundation for a Buddhist theory of economics. While the Buddha clearly believed in personal responsibility and individual enterprise, he also saw a role for the state in providing the facilities and opportunities for people to increase their income. In this mixed economy, agriculturalists should be supported with seeds and irrigation, entrepreneurs with loans and finance, and, professional people with employment as civil servants. In other words, people from different walks of life should be supported to develop their individual talents and skills.Thus the Buddha’s vision was of a partnership between the individual and government in which both mobilized their respective resources to enhance the well-being of all. Themes of the kind just mentioned, like social justice, economic prosperity, and good governance, must also be seen against the broader background of the ecological conditions affecting life on the planet more generally. Two papers specifically consider environmental questions and the subject is echoed in various others. These discuss the Buddhist attitude to nature in general, which is revealed as inclusive in form, taking into consideration animal and plant life but without excluding the importance of human beings. While for many ecologists human beings are part (if not the whole) of the problem, here they are shown to be also part of the solution. Nature is described as “an all-compassing phenomenon.” It is thus not only the attitude of humans toward nature that is important but the attitude of humans towards other humans. Until all the various permutations of the human-animal-plant relationships are rectified through the proper application of wisdom and compassion it is unlikely that a solution to the ecological crisis will be forthcoming. Above I have simply sketched in broad brush strokes some of the themes considered in this volume to give a flavour of its breadth and

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depth. There is too much to describe in detail. Suffice it to say much more will be found in the following pages on a range of challenging issues such as slavery (sadly still a problem in the modern world), the use of “skill in means,” conflict resolution, peace, mental health, sexual behaviour, and the ‘new world order.’ These are just some of the themes that have been addressed over the years by AsangaTilakaratne. All of this is, of course, is on top of his many other interests as revealed in his extensive list of publications in the field of Theravada doctrine and practice. I hope it will give him immense satisfaction to see the extent to which his labours over the years, as reflected in this fine collection of papers, have built on and advanced the work of his colleagues and shaped the development of Buddhist ethics and Buddhist Studies more broadly.

Bibliography Jayatilleke, KN, 1970. “The Ethical Theory of Buddhism”. The Mahabodhi 78, 192–197. Premasiri, PD, 1975. “Moral Evaluation in Early Buddhism”. Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities 1, 31–45. Saddhatissa, H, 1970. Buddhist Ethics : Essence of Buddhism. Braziller, New York, NY

1. Thinking of Foundations and Justification of Buddhist Ethics*

Introduction Studies in Buddhist ethics is growing in popularity among Buddhist scholars. A survey in more recent literature shows some new trends in the field. Traditionally studies in Buddhist ethics has been focused on the Pali canon. An early instance of using the term ‘ethics’ in relation to the Pali canon is the translation of Dhammasaṅgaṇi in 1900 by Mrs CAF Rhys Davids into English as A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics. Among those who pioneered studies in Buddhist ethics as a full-fledged subject are scholars such as S.Tachibana, OH de A Wijesekera, KN Jayatilleke, and H Saddhatissa Thera. While Tachibana and Saddhatissa were more interested in developing the basic principles and categories of Buddhist ethics, the other two scholars, in particular, Jayatilleke, was interested in clarifying the meta-ethical issues. More recently DJ Kalupahana, Winston L King and PD Premasiri have continued with the Pali tradition as their focus. GSP Misra, Gunapala Dharmasiri, Damien Keown, Peter Harvey, Charles Prebish, Mark Tatz and several others have gone beyond the limits of Theravada tradition and incorporated Mahayana Buddhist ethics and have tried to see the field as a comprehensive whole. Moving somewhat away from the descriptive approach to the subject, these scholars during the last two decades have combined their meta-ethical interests with normative approaches to social, political and bio-ethical issues. Although reviewing this rich store of literature is a rewarding exercise I am not proposing to do that in this context. What I would * Initially presented as the keynote speech at International Association of Buddhist Universities International Seminar on Buddhism and Ethics, Thailand, 2008.

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be looking at is some specific issues connected to the foundations of Buddhist ethics and the nature of justification of ethics in Buddhism. The two areas themselves are not totally new for almost all scholars who have dealt with Buddhist ethics also have discussed the basic assumptions and philosophical bases of it. In spite of such efforts by scholars still there are some issues needing more reflection. For example, the relation between puñña/kusala on the one hand and sīla on the other seem to require more sharply defined. With the sīla itself there is lack of clarity regarding the nature of monastic sīla and lay sīla. The paper begins with an exercise in conceptual clarification and will be concluded with some observations on foundation and justification of Buddhist ethics.

Buddhist ethics or Buddhism as (a system of ) ethics? A primary matter to be clarified is a problem connected to determining the proper location of ethics in the field of Buddhist studies. In Western philosophy ethics is studied on its own, as an independent and dissociated subject. Discussions on Buddhist ethics as a separate area of study are clearly owing to this adherence to Western philosophical categories. Consequently, studies in ethics in Buddhism too appear to be done as a separate subject. While such a study within limits may be justifiable, this fragmentary approach can pose difficulties in understanding the overall nature of the teaching of the Buddha. There is a wealth of material in the teaching of the Buddha dealing with what we consider today meta-ethical issues. It would, however, be a serious misrepresentation if we consider Buddhism solely as a meta-ethical system. The primary emphasis of the teaching is the practice. The analysis is there only in so far it facilitates practice. Once we place the whole soteriological enterprise of the Buddha in its proper context this matter becomes clearer. The fundamental problematique, which the Buddha set upon finding a solution for was human suffering understood in a very deep sense. In a traditional Theravada story we are told that the Prince Siddhartha saw an old man, a sick man and deceased body in three consecutive trips to his pleasure garden before he finally saw a religious person which suggested to him the way out of the human suffering he witnessed in its very concrete form. A more philosophical representation of what he witnessed is described in the following words by the Buddha: Bhikkhus, before my enlightenment, while I was still a bodhisattva, not yet fully enlightened, it occurred to me: Alas, this world has fallen into trouble, in that it is born, ages, and

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dies, it passes away and is reborn, yet it does not understand the escape from this suffering [headed by] ageing and death. When now will an escape be discerned from this suffering [headed by] ageing and death? (S II, 104; Bodhi 2000, 601). It is by seeing this deep rooted suffering that Prince Siddhartha decided to search for a solution for it. An understanding of human situation as characterized by unsatisfactoriness is behind this soteriological quest. In the Ariyapariyesana-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya the Buddha describes the purpose of his renunciation of worldly pleasures as “kiṃkusalagavesῑ anuttaraṃ santivarapadaṁ pariyesamānō” (M I, 163) (“in search of what is wholesome, seeking the supreme state of sublime peace”). The emphasis is on what is wholesome and what is peaceful as goals. The term ‘kusala’ as we will see in the subsequent discussion is a key term in the teaching of the Buddha. It is given as both a means and an end. “The supreme state of sublime peace” referred to here articulates the ultimate goal in value-laden terms. The life in kusala is prescribed as leading to the highest state of peace which is better known as nirvana, or the termination of suffering. This nirvana-orientedness of the entire teaching is often highlighted by the Buddha in the following words: Bhikkhus, before and even now I teach only suffering and its cessation (S IV, 384; M I, 140). Furthermore, the entire teaching has been described as having only one taste, namely the taste of liberation (vimutti-rasa), which is the cessation of suffering. The following statement occurring in the Dhammapada is meant to capture the essence of the teaching of the Buddha: Not doing any pāpa, practice of kusala, and purification of one’s mind - this is the message of the Buddhas. (Dhp 183) All three aspects of behaviour mentioned here are the domain of ethics. They constitute the normative ethics taught in Buddhism. The meta-ethical discussions available in the discourses are to elucidate the theoretical issues involving normative ethics. Simple elucidations and descriptions of ethics constitute a significant segment of the discourses of the Buddha. This explains why it is not altogether right to discuss ethics as standing out on its own independently of the system. In fact the entire system can more accurately be described as a system of ethics.

Understanding the key concepts With this broad context in mind we may now turn to what is usually being discussed as Buddhist ethics. Two key concepts pāpa or evil (deeds)

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and kusala or wholesome deeds were referred to in the Dhammapada stanza quoted above. The pair of puñña (puṇya: Sanskrit) and pāpa are pre-Buddhist concepts that basically refer to religious activities believed to produce good results in the life after death. These ideas have been absorbed to Buddhism, and lay people, in particular, were encouraged to abstain from pāpa and engage in ‘meritorious’ activities, and such behaviour was expected to make the samsaric journey smooth. The concept of kusala and its opposite akusala do not seem to have been known before the Buddha. The concepts of kusala and akusala seem to be the unique contribution of Buddhism to the ethical discourse. What is meant by the concept is wholesome behaviour which is devoid of attachment, aversion and delusion (lobha/rāga, dosa and moha). The distinction between the two sets of concepts, puñña /pāpa and kusala/akusala has been comprehensively studied initially by PD Premasiri (1976 and 1990) and subsequently by scholars like Damien Keown (1992), and hence I am not going to discuss this matter in detail here except for making a few comments. What may have been clearly defined at the early stage of Buddhism seems to have got intermingled with other cognate concepts subsequently. Gradually, the distinction seems to have got blurred. Consequently the two pairs of concepts were sometimes used interchangeably. Initially at least while puñña / pāpa seems to have represented the samsaric dimension kusala/akusala may have represented the nirvanic dimension. Initially, there seems to have been a clear distinction between sīla (ethical/moral behaviour) and puñña. Subsequently, however, the former was included within the latter as the second aspect along with dāna and bhāvanā in ‘three meritorious deeds’. The significance of this inclusion is that sīla was primarily seen as a kind of puñña-kamma (meritorious act). The three-fold meritorious action in the Theravada tradition includes dāna, sīla and bhāvanā. When sīla was included within puñña the emphasis is on observing sīla as a means of acquiring merits. It is the same with bhāvanā. Both these aspects were originally meant to constitute the ‘three tarinings’ (tisso sikkha), namely, sīla, samādhi, and paññā. The last two are to be achieved by means of bhāvanā which is divided into two as samatha-bhāvanā (calm-meditation) and vipassanābhāvanā (insight-meditation) producing respectively samadhi (serenity) and paññā (understanding). Under the puñña category, however, both sīla and bhāvanā were taken out of their original soteriological context and were made puñña - generating activities which have direct relevance for one’s samsaric existence. The much discussed distinction of kammic

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and nirvanic Buddhism, I believe, is not irrelevant. At least in the early form of Buddhism the practice characterized by the three meritorious deeds was meant for the householders whose main function was to provide the Sangha with requisites (dāna).1 Their sīla constituted in addition to the five basic precepts, observing higher sīla on uposatha days. Bhāvanā for them also seems to have meant something done occasionally. In the Kandaraka-sutta (M I, 339-349) we have Pessa’s evidence that they too were engaged in higher religious activities from time to time (kalena kalam...). Thus practicing dāna, sīla and bhāvanā as puñña was basically meant for the householders. The opposite category of pāpa too was applicable for the laity. Technically, this cannot have been applicable to monks and nuns who were supposed to be away from pāpa behaviour by the very nature of their life. According to the Sigālovada-sutta (D III, 180-193), it was one of the functions of the religious people to keep laity away from pāpa (pāpā nivārenti). Sikkhā is a broad term which includes the entire process of training in the Path leading to nirvana. In the concept of ‘tisso sikkhā’ we know that all three aspects of the Path, sīla, samadhi and paññā are included, thus allowing a very broad spectrum for the concept. In the discourses, sikkhā has been given as synonymous with kiriya and paṭipadā (anupubba-sikkhā, anupubba-kiriyā, anupubba-paṭipadā ...(A IV, 201), terms indicative of ways of behaviour and action. The term ‘sikkhā-pada’ refers to the specific articles of behavior understood as rules regulating the ethical behaviour. The five precepts (pañca-sīla) of the lay people and the rules of the Pātimokkha are examples for sikkhāpadas. Thus sīla is subsumed under sikkhā and understood as specific ways of physical and verbal behaviour characterized by abstinence from evil acts and practice of virtues.2 The sīla as the basis or the beginning point of the Path refers primarily to the behaviour that is conducive to the final goal. It is the basic rationality that one behaves in such a way that it would promote his final goal and will not be detrimental to it. In this sense we can talk about validity of sīla without referring much its ethical value. What I am talking here is very similar to the validity we know in the context of an argument. We say that an argument is valid only in so far as it follows logical rules and the conclusion is derived from its premises. In the same manner we can talk 1 In the later Buddhist tradition we have inscriptional evidence of monks at times serving as dayakas (donors). (Ref. Schopen 1997 ch. XI) . 2 An excellent discussion of sīla, sikkhā and sikkhā-pada is available in JD Dhirasekera (1982) which unfortunately does not seem to have got its due attention.

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about the validity of sīla if it is conducive for the attainment of the final goal, and the nature of the final goal may be deduced from the overall character of the sīla. We know that a logically valid argument does not necessarily mean that it is also a sound argument. The soundness of an argument depends on extra logical factors, and if the premises are true the conclusion drawn too has to be true and we take such an argument to be sound. The truth value of a premiss is a very complex issue involving theories of truth and the very definition of what it means to be true. Those who hold that ethical statements are mere expressions of emotions of the speaker (emotivists) would not even grant meaningfulness to such statements, let along truth-value. Although there may be an emotive element in ethical statements, the type of hard-core emotivism being not fashionable any longer, we need not worry about it. Nevertheless, the question still remains: are there any true grounds for ethical statements? When we examine, for instance, statements of the nature “it is good/ bad ...”, or “thou shalt not...” or “I undertake to observe...” it is obvious that inquiring about their truth­value is out of place. Nevertheless, we need some kind of justification for these statements. Is this justification with reference to some true state of affairs? Or is the justification coming only from some internal consistency of the system? What I mean here is coherence of a particular statement with the totality of statements within the system. But the problem is that coherence does not say much about a state of affairs as truly existing out there. The sīla appears to be in need of some objective basis for its justification. We will come to this issue toward the end of this discussion. Going back to sīla as the basis of the Path (in tisso sikkhā) what is meant by sīla in this context is what has been described as culla-sīla, majjhima-sīla and mahā-sīla (minor, medium and great morality) in the key discourses such as Brahmajāla, Sāmaññaphala etc. of the Dīghanikāya and many other discourses. The focus of this sīla is the monastic life. In the context of the monastic life the sīla has been organized into the four divisions known as ‘the four purificatory virtue’ (catu-pārisuddhisīla). The four kinds of sīla included under this category are: i. Sīla of restraining according to the Pātimokkha rules (patimokkha-saṃvara -sīla); ii. Sīla of restraining faculties (indriya-samvara-sīla); iii. Sīla of purification of livelihood (ajīvapārisuddhi-sīla); and iv. Sīla associated with acquisition and use of requisites (paccaya-sannissita-sīla). The first contains the basic set of rules to be observed by a fully-admitted (upasampanna) monk or a nun, 220 for the former and 304 for the

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latter (excluding 7 adhikaraṇa-samathas or ways of resolving conflicts). This provides the basic system of rules (ādi-brahmacariyaka-sīla) to be observed, starting from the most serious category of defeats (pārājikā) to sekhiyās involving minor matters of behaviour. Violation of these rules involves punishment. The rest of the three sīlas do not have rules the violation of which involves punishment in the organizational or legal sense, but are directly related to the proper way of living a goal-oriented monastic life. Why should one follow these rules or observe this sīla? The answer is provided in the discourses. For example, the story of Raṭṭhapāla (occurring in the Raṭṭhapāla-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya), says that when the young and rich householder listened to the Buddha’s teaching highlighting that life is characterized by suffering caused by craving for pleasures and that one must get rid of this craving in order to achieve a life of happiness and freedom from suffering he becomes convinced; and decides that in order to realize this goal, the monastic life is the most conducive. This is how he becomes a bhikkhu who by the very act of becoming a bhikkhu is committed to observing the sīla discussed above. The question one can raise on this sīla is whether or not this particular behaviour is consistent with the goal of freedom from suffering through freedom from craving, or whether or not it leads to such a goal?. If the answer is ‘yes’ then it is rational for one to adopt a way of life characterized by the fourfold sīla mentioned above. The criterion against which one has to test this sīla is the ultimate goal. By analysing the content of the Pātimokkha-saṃvara-sīla this point may be made clearer. The most serious category of violations called ‘defeat’ comprises sexual intercourse, killing a human being, stealing, and pretending nonexistent spiritual attainments. Of these four rules we can understand without much reflection why killing a human being has been counted among the most serious violations. Causing death is the most serious offence one can commit against another human being for the whole point of life is nothing other than living itself. To deprive a fellow human being of this basic possession is surely abominable. Stealing too can be understood in a manner similar to the above. But what about having sex? How can it be such a serious offence as causing loss of one’s membership with the Sangha (the community of monks/ nuns)? If we look at the act of having sex from a neutral point of view we can see that there is nothing right or wrong about it. Only how one does it could make it socially acceptable or not or a crime or otherwise.

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In the Buddhist monastic discipline the sexual act has been taken as one of the most serious offences. The seriousness has been determined with reference to its stake on the final goal. When getting rid of all the desires is a crucial aspect of the means of achieving the goal one can understand why sexual behaviour forms one of the most serious offences. The rule has to be understood with reference to consistency to and coherence with the goal. It is useful to examine the relationship between violation of a monastic vinaya rule and pāpa/akusala. Of the four pārājikās, killing any living being which forms the first of the physical pāpa acts is clearly a pāpa. Killing a human being is both a pāpa and a vinaya violation of the highest degree. Killing anyone other than a human being is a lesser vinaya offence for a fully admitted monk. Stealing and pretending, which in itself is a form of lying, are pāpa. The case with the first pārājikā is different. Although having sex is an offence of the highest degree it has not been described as a pāpa. Having violated the first rule if a monk or a nun were to continue to pretend to be a monk or a nun they can be guilty of pāpa behaviours of different sort. But having committed the first pārājikā if the particular person were to vacate the Sangha he is only guilty of being week and inefficient but he is not guilty of committing a pāpa. One could say that although having sex is not a pāpa it could be an akusala for any act done with lobha, dosa and moha is akusala. While this is true we have also to remember that almost all forms of behaviour of ordinary unenlightened people come under this category of akusala. The tradition, however, makes a distinction between lobha and abhijjhā and dosa and vyāpāda. What is considered to be pāpa is acts motivated by abhijjhā and vyāpāda, severe forms of lobha and dosa. Having lobha and dosa accompanied by moha is considered to be the ordinary human nature. The samsaric behaviour in general is taken as motivated by these three factors. Although they are akusala in the broad sense the ordinary life driven by these characteristics is not considered a life of pāpa although as a whole such a life is samsaric and not nirvanic; and does not lead to nirvana. In other words, all akusala is not pāpa although all pāpa invariably qualifies to be akusala for both categories are driven by lobha, dosa and moha. A puñña act performed with desire to be born in a divine abode is one basically driven by lobha and moha, and hence it cannot be a kusala. On the other hand, although driven by lobha and moha the act itself requires even temporarily a state devoid of lobha, dosa, and moha, thus making the particular act to be qualified as

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a kusala act. Vipassanā meditation is a candidate for a kusala act which is not a puñña in the sense of being relevant to samsaric existence. With this admixture of both kusala and akusala elements a puñña act at best is a mixed act. Thus we are led to conclude that although all kusala acts are not puñña acts all puñña acts have an element of kusala in them. Going back to our discussion on the vinaya rules we can see that certain offences considered most severe are not really pāpa. Such rules need to be understood only within the soteriological goal of the monastic life. In this context it is useful to introduce a broad distinction available in the Theravada tradition. According to this distinction offences or forms of wrong behaviour are classified as wrong by their very nature (pakativajja) and wrong because the Buddha has established so (paññatti-vajja). The first category of behaviour is also called ‘loka-vajja’ or behaviour so considered in the world. Under the first category acts such as killing, stealing etc. are included. It is under the second category that most of the monastic vinaya offences come. Discussing this distinction in the context of ten precepts (dasa-sīla) (usually observed by samaṇeras), the commentary to the Khuddaka-pāṭha describes the first five as ‘arisen from definite akusala thoughts’ (ekanta-akusalacitta-samuṭṭhanattā ...), and thereby allow us to have some idea as to why certain forms of behaviour were considered ‘wrong by nature’. Killing, stealing etc. are treated under this category for they originate from lobha, dosa and moha. The last five of the ten precepts such as using high and valuable seats, taking meals at improper time etc. have been described as paññatti-vajja for they are considered wrong because the Buddha has established them as so (KhpA 24). Discussing this division in connection with Vinaya rules the same commentator calls them ‘loka-vajja’ and says that it is these rules that the Buddha meant when he said that his disciples would not violate them even if they were to lose their life. Then he refers to rules involving sharing the same bed by two monks, and building monasteries etc., calls them paññatti-vajja and indicates that the violation of such rules is less serious (KhpA 190). In the Samantapasadika, the commentary to the Vinaya-pitaka, Budhaghosa describes the loka-vajja offences as ‘harmful’ (antarāyika) for both heaven and nibbāna, and paññatti-vajja violation as not harmful in either manner (anantarāyika = na+antarāyika) (VinA VII, 1319). The above commentarial analysis in general goes along the lines of pāpa and akusala discussed above. There is, however, some difference. In the above-analysis the Khuddaka-pāṭha commentator seems to include

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sexual behaviour and taking intoxicating liquor among the pakativajja offences. Even if we set aside the dubious case of taking liquor the inclusion of sexual behaviour (not sexual misbehaviour as in the case of the usual five precepts -panca-sīla- meant for lay people) within this category is problematic. If this is correct then layman’s life amounts to something ‘definitely motivated by akusala’. This goes against the social values articulated by the Buddha in clear terms in discourses such as Sigālovāda. Therefore I tend to differ from the commentator in maintaining that sexual behaviour, involving violation of a defeat, should be included among the paññatti-vajja and not among pakativajja (The commentator in fact does not specify the kind of vajja involved in the first pārājikā). Violation of such rules is not considered as pāpa per se. But they could amount to pāpa depending on one’s subsequent attitude and bahaviour toward them. But the pakati (loka)vajja offences are considered to be pāpa without any doubt. The most familiar classification of such behaviour outside monastic vinaya is the ‘ten akusala acts’ comprising killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, telling lies, engaging in malicious gossip, harsh words, and empty talk, severe craving, severe anger and wrong views. The distinction between pakati-vajja (or loka-vajja) and paññattivajja offences looks similar to the distinction we make between morality as virtuous conduct and ethics as specified conduct. The concept of professional ethics has been there in many societies for a longtime.3 Certain ‘do’s and ‘don’t’s count only in so far as one is within a certain professional group. Once he is out of that profession one is not bound by such ethics. This concept of professional ethics is quite similar to the concept of paññatti-vajja as discussed above. A good number of vinaya rules come within the purview of ethics simply because they have been prescribed by the Buddha for those who enter the Sangha. When one makes the choice to enter the Organization one becomes bound by these rules. They make sense basically within the system, not barring the fact that some of these rules may become valid even in more general social contexts too. Thus the paññatti-vajja aspect of the Vinaya can be described as monastic ‘professional’ ethics. The other category, namely, pakati (loka)-vajja, is considered as valid in general, thus providing an example for universally valid moral behaviour. 3 The Kurudhamma-Jātaka (# 275) refers to a prostitute who won the praise of others for her keenness on observing ethics of her profession despite the fact that the moral status of the profession itself was questionable.

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Foundations of Buddhist ethics If we think along the lines of pakati (loka)-vajja and paññatti-vajja, we can see that the latter classification finds it meaning and significance within the Buddhist monasticism. The specific mode of conduct exemplified by paññatti-vajja category is conducive to the nirvanic goal. Once one justifies the desirability of the goal, the relevant behavior in so far it is consistent with the goal, does not require any further justification. What one needs to justify is the goal. Once it is done only matter to be settled about behaviour is whether or not it is consistent with the goal. But there are some preliminary matters to be settled. For instance, in order to accept the Buddhist soteriology one has to be convinced that the world /reality is such that to adopt this way of life is the most rational thing to do. How does one get convinced of this-is it simply a matter of accepting what the Buddha says, or does it require anything further? It is clear that one needs to have accepted certain basic propositions for him to opt to follow the Buddha. For example if one is not convinced about the basic unsatisfactory character of human existence, or in other words, if one does not see the point of the first two noble truths, namely, suffering and how it arises, one is not likely to become a follower of the Buddha. This has to be seen by oneself and it cannot be forced on anyone. Except for a very small number of people who entered the Sangha at a very early age of their life or for some exceptional cases such as Nanda who could not say ‘no’ to the Buddha, all the others can be reasonably judged to have entered the Sangha preceded by this understanding. However, once they became the followers of the Buddha it seems that at least some of them had a tendency to develop a mentality of dependence on the Buddha characterizing unconditional willingness to accept what he said. For instance, the following occurs in a number of suttas: when the Buddha inquires from his disciples on certain matter they would respond to him with these words: Venerable Sir, we have the Fortunate One as the root of the dhammas, (we are) to be be guided by the Fortunate One, we have the Fortunate One as the refuge; therefore let the Fortunate One himself comprehend this; having heard from the Fortunate One the bhikkhus will learn. (A IV, 158)4 The instances of this nature betray a mentality of total dependence on the 4 Bhagavaṃmūlakā no bhante dhammā bhagavaṃnettikā, bhagavaṃpaṭisaraṇā. Sādhu vata bhante bhagavantaṃ yeva paṭibhātu etassa bhāsitassa attho. Bhagavato sutvā bhikkhū dhāressantīti.

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Buddha. But, on the other hand, as the Kīṭāgiri-sutta of the Majjhimanikāya reveals, the following attitude, namely, “The Fortunate One is the guide, and I am the follower; the Fortunate One knows and I don’t” (M I, 480) 5 marks a salutary state of mind which has to be passed on the way to realization. Based on such expressions as this one can claim that this dependence is only for providing guidance for the Path and not for the basic conviction that samsara is suffering and that one must follow the Path in order to overcome this suffering. In the well-known Kālāma-sutta, the Buddha advises Kalamas who were some sort of skeptics, to not accept anything unless they are convinced that it is morally good, or that what is said does not generate lobha, dosa or moha. But the Kalamas were clearly not an immediate group of disciples. The Vīmaṃsaka-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M I 317-320) provides us with a different example. In this sutta addressed to his immediate monastic disciples the Buddha says that anyone who cannot read other’s mind (M I, 318) 6 must investigate the Buddha to make sure whether or not the Buddha is fully enlightened. In the like manner the Cūḷahatthipadopama-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (MI, 175- 184) emphasizes that one must not rest assured till one has direct personal experience on what one tries to establish. These instances should show that acceptance of the Path and the resultant goal is not a matter of course. Such understanding /conviction has to be based on evidence. However, once one is convinced about the Path and the goal, that provides sufficient basis and justification for accepting and following the vinaya rules relevant to paññatti-vajja. The concept of pakati-vajja seems to pose some interesting questions regarding the overall nature of Buddhist ethics. If some act is wrong by its very nature, or if some behaviour is ‘intrinsically’ wrong then one does not need any extra justification to accept it as so. The term pakati, the Sanskrit form of which is ‘prakrti’, is well known in Indian philosophy, and in the Samkya system, means the fundamental universal reality from which ‘puruṣa’ or individual ātma originates. Although the commentator uses this metaphysically laden term he gives a psychological interpretation to it. As we saw in the above discussion why certain offences were called pakati-vajja is because they originate from 5 Satthā bhagavā, sāvako‘haṃ-asmi; jānāti bhagavā, nāhaṃ jānāmῑti. 6 I translate “parassa cetopariyaṃ ājānatena” (M I 318) as “by one who cannot read other’s mind” which contradicts the usual translation as referring to one who can read other’s mind. Although the long ‘ā’ in ‘ājānantena’ does not support my translation the opposite is not supported by the context.

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unmistakable akusala (ekanta-akusala-samuṭṭhāna). This connection of pakati to familiar akusala-mula makes it unnecessary for us to go into search for metaphysical nuances of it. The very term ‘loka-vajja’ highlights the fact that what is considered as immoral or unethical is what is accepted to be so in the world, i.e. in the society in general. This weight put on the world /society poses the problem of relativity of ethics versus some kind of absolute set of ethics. If the criterion of good and bad is the world or the society this effectively means that it is the people in a particular society, their history and their tradition and conventions that serves as the basis for ethics. Societies differ in their ways of thinking and ‘world making’, thus making a case for multiplicity of ethics in which it is quite possible that there are two mutually contradictory systems of ethics simultaneously at two different places. But then the use of such a strong term as ‘pakati­-vajja’ seems to indicate quite the opposite. The commentators do not seem to have analysed these usages thoroughly. It seems that they held a view to the effect that what is wrong by its very nature is so accepted by the world, and hence their equation of the two terms pakati and loka. The division of pakati and paññatti-vajja, nevertheless, is a useful one. It is also useful in understanding the Buddha’s attitude to his own vinaya rules. Was the Buddha uncompromising about his own vinaya rules? The Vinaya literature makes it very clear that the Buddha was not hesitant to change and modify certain vinaya rules depending on the context. But rules revised by the Buddha exclusively belong to the category of paññatti-vajja. Even in this category it is clear that he did not make modifications in what was considered to be the most serious. All the currently available Vinaya traditions belonging to eight different schools testify to the fact that the four pārājikās and thirteen Sanghādisesas remain unchanged.7 This, to all probability, is valid across all the Buddhist traditions, known and unknown. But the fact that some rules were revised is significant. It is recorded in the Mahāparinibbānasutta (of the Digha-nikāya) that the Buddha on his death-bed gave permission to the Sangha to change minor rules. This suggests that the Master was not absolutist regarding the proper monastic behaviour. But when we examine the actual instances of revision made by the Buddha for the vinaya rules what we really see is that he was concerned about the practicality of what he prescribed. When what is related to paññatti-vajja 7 Mahisasaka, Mahasanghika, Dharmaguptika, Sarvastivada, Mulasarvastivada, Kashayapiya, Sammitiya, and Theravada - all these traditions are similar in having 4 pārājikās and 13 saṅghādisesas for the bhikkhus.

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does not involve any akusala per se what the Buddha had to consider was the issues of practicality. When he found, for instance, that not wearing foot-ware was not convenient in remote areas he was not hesitant to revise the rule barring wearing foot-ware. To present this as an issue of relativism versus absolutism is to misconstrue it. The real issue was whether any rule was practical or not. It is relevant in this context to remember that the Buddha while appreciating sīla rejected irrational adherence to such rules and practices (sīlabbata­parāmāsa). What we need to keep in mind is that these modifications were done with regard to paññatti-vajja offences and not with regard to pakati (loka)-vajja offences. It is clear that the Vinaya rules involving latter kind of offences that amount to pāpa have been treated differently: there was no bargaining on the basis of practicality. Coming out from the context of vinaya rules and positioning ourselves on the larger territory of morality with puñña-pāpa dimension we see the same attitude of the Buddha. Pakati-vajja originating from akusalamūla has to be wrong under any circumstance. Now pakati-vajja is based on the familiar psychological explanation which is quite well known. Looking at the Buddhist ethics as a broad system, not merely as a set of vinaya rules, we need to inquire whether there is any broader ‘universal’ basis for its ethics assumed in the teaching of the Buddha. A prominent candidate for such a basis is viññū­purisa. When determining what is good and bad the Buddha very often put considerable weight on ‘[the view of] wise people’- viññū­purisā. The well-known Metta-sutta says that one should not do even a small thing censured by the wise (na ca khuddaṃ samācare kiñci yena viññū pare upvadeyyuṃ). Acts are judged on whether they are censured (viññūgarahita) or praised (viññū-pasattha) by the wise. His teaching is to be understood by such people individually (paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi). Viññū seem to refer to knowledgeable, intelligent and wise people noted for their integrity among their fellow members of society. On who viññū is KN Jayatilleke says the following: The viññū represented for the Buddha the impartial critic at the level of intelligent common sense and the Buddha and his disciples sometimes introduce the ‘viññū puriso’ or the hypothetical rational critic when it seems necessary to make an impartial and intelligent assessment of relative worth of conflicting theories. (v. [see] M 430-ff., 515ff, Jayatilleke (1963/2004) pp.229-230) But at the same time it is clear that there is no exact objective criterion to

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determine whether or not one is counted as viññū-purisa. There can also be differences of opinion among different viññū-purisas. In particular when we think of various religious teachers lived during the time of the Buddha and also about the presence of various sramana and brahmana groups with divergent views determining who the viññū -purisa could have been a pretty complex issue. Nevertheless, the fact that viññū purisa is referred to often as the basis of determining right and wrong conduct suggests that there was a general consensus among the learned and the intelligent during the time of the Buddha on social morality in spite of their ideological differences. The reference to viññū-purisa mentioned above is certainly not given as the sole criterion. Since application and utility of morality assumes a society of people, the Buddhist morality seems to derive its justification mainly from certain fundamental commonalities shared by all living beings, not merely human beings. These commonalities are established based on certain considerations which are empirical in character. For example, the first precept in the pañca-sīla, namely, refraining from killing, is justified on the love all beings have for their life. This universal nature is described in the Dhammapada in the following manner: Sabbe tasanti daṇdassa – sabbe bhāyanti maccuno Attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā – na haneyya na ghātaye Sabbe tasanti daṇdassa–sabbesaṃ jīvitaṃ piyaṃ Attānaṃ upaṃam katvā – na haneyya na ghātaye (Dhp v. 129-130) All fear punishment; all fear death. Comparing with oneself, one should neither harm nor kill. All fear punishment; life is dear to all. Comparing with... The first couplets of the two stanzas articulate the premise, namely the self-protective tendency that all beings have for their life. The conclusion we derive from this premises is that we should neither harm nor kill any being. The same argument has been presented by the Buddha in commenting on a conversation King Kosala had with his queen, Mallika. The king asked the queen whether she had anyone whom she would love more than she would love herself. To this question the queen answered in the negative. On being asked by the queen the king too gave the same answer. Later when the King reported this conversation to the Buddha he said the following: Even if one were to survey all directions by mind one would not discover anyone dearer than oneself. In this manner for

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each person, oneself is dearer. Therefore one who loves oneself should not harm others. (S I, 75) The conclusion drawn from self-love (atta-kāma) is that one should not harm another who has a similar self-love (tasmā na himse param att- akāmo). Similarly that beings love happiness (sukha-kāmāni bhūtāni ...) (Dhp v. 131) and that they love happiness and despise pain (sukha-kāmā dukkha-paṭikkūlā ...) (M I, 341) have been mentioned as a common characteristic of all beings. This too may be understood as supporting the same universal tendency. Although it is due to the very same self-love in the form of selfishness that people do harmful things to others, Buddhism makes use of this universal character to draw the opposite moral conclusion. In addition to this self-love existing in all beings, the discourses of the Buddha refer to some other characteristics of human nature which could be interpreted as proving the commonality of all beings. For instance, intimately connected with the self-protective tendency of all beings is their need for food or nutriment (āhāra). The Buddha says that “all beings subsist on nutriment” (sabbe sattā āhāraṭṭhitikā) (Khp 1) and makes a comprehensive analysis of nutriment on which beings subsist. According to the Buddha there are four kinds of nutriment, namely, edible food (kabaliṅkāra-āharā), contact (phassa-āhara), mental volition (mano-sañcetanā-āhāra) and consciousness (viññāṇ­ āhāra) (S II, 101). A glance at this classification shows that beings do not live by ‘bread’ alone. They need contacts for their senses, namely, for eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind they need forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects and mental phenomena (concepts). Mental volition is what lies behind human action for without volition (cetanā) there is no action. The last is consciousness which again arises based on the five sensory faculties plus mind as the mental faculty. While we consume edible foods for the sustenance of our physical body we never stop consuming food for our emotional and intellectual satisfaction. Going further deep the Buddha explains: Monks, these four kinds of nutriment have what as their source, what is their origin, from what are they born and produced? These four kinds of nutriment have craving as their source, craving as their origin, they are born and produced by craving. (S II, 11-12; Bodhi 2000, 540) In this analysis beings consume food because they are driven by craving which, in turn, is the main cause of suffering. All (unenlightened) beings

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are one in undergoing suffering. And in their desire to end suffering and attain happiness too ultimately all beings and all human beings in particular share an identical emotional universe, confirming thereby the universally shared nature of all beings. Based on these universal characteristics of all beings in general and human beings in particular we can derive the five precepts (pañca-sīla), the most basic and fundamental of moral life. Refraining from taking life (and any other lesser harm) can be directly derived from the emotion of selflove present in all beings. Stealing always involves something that belongs to someone other than oneself. Sexual misconduct has been defined as illicit relationship with someone else’s husband or wife or a woman who is under protection. Lying is to cheat someone else. In this manner all the vices associated with the first four precepts can be established as so on the assumed universal commonalities of all beings including their self-love. The fifth precept, one involving taking intoxicating drinks, is considered unacceptable presumably not because it is wrong in itself but because it plays a crucial role in causing the rest of the four vices. These five precepts are given as mandatory sīla for anyone becoming a follower of the Buddha. One moves to higher sīlas only subsequently. The Raṭṭhapāla-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (82) lists four observations on reality and human nature understanding of which is said to have caused young Raṭṭapāla’s renunciation. When young and wealthy Raṭṭhapāla leaves behind all his wealth and opts to become a monastic follower of the Buddha the ruler of the area becomes puzzled. Questioned by him Raṭṭhapāla says that he made his decision having seen four things taught by the Buddha about the world. They are: The world is unstable, it is swept away (upanῑyati loko addhuvo), the world is without protection, and without Over Lord (attāno loko anabhissaro), the world has nothing of its own, everything has to be left behind (assako loko sabbaṃ pahāya gamanῑyaṃ), and the world is incomplete, insatiate, and slave to craving (ūṇo loko atitto taṇhā-dāsō). The first statement asserts that nothing in human life is certain or permanent. This is to affirm impermanence, the first characteristic of reality in the teaching of three signata (ti-lakkhaṇa). The second asserts that there is no God to protect anyone in the world and that in this sense no beings have any real protection (from outside). The third is a corollary of the first, and says that one has to leave behind everything and has to depart from this life finally. The last most importantly asserts the incompleteness of all human beings which is the direct result of craving or ‘thirst’

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(taṇhā). When further questioned by the King, Raṭṭhapāla establishes the validity of these claims with reference to King’s own life. He gets the King to see that each of these assertions is true and valid with reference to his own life. Therefore the assertions are not meant to be accepted as dogmatic truths. The verification of these assertions is one’s life itself which, in other words, means one’s own personal experience. What the King sees as valid for his own life is presented in the discourse not as individual-based truths but as truths to be applicable to all living beings. What is applicable to one person, or what seems to be applicable to all the known living beings at any given moment is considered to be applicable to all. In this sense we may take these assertions as inductive generalizations confirmed by experience. For Raṭṭhapāla seeing these four realities was behind his decision to renounce his worldly life and assume a life of a mendicant working for freedom from samsaric suffering. Whether everyone who listened to the Buddha would have made the same decision is not a matter of logical necessity. The conclusion does not derive from the premises as a logical necessity. In fact one could even draw a conclusion totally opposite to that of Raṭṭhapāla from these premises. But the premises have been presented as universally available. The rationality of the choice depends on the overall attitude to life one has developed. Speaking from a Buddhist point of view we may say that such a decision as that of Raṭṭhapāla comes from the maturity in spiritual preparation in the samsara and it seems natural, given the raw character of ordinary puthujjanas, that only Raṭṭhapāla made this choice at this particular occasion. Raṭṭhapāla’s decision was quite radical in terms of things he had to sacrifice and the changes he had to make in his own life as well as disruption it caused in the lives of others who associated with him. There may have been many others who were equally convinced of the truthfulness of this state of affairs of the samsaric life but were not able to make a similar decision. Yet, consequent to this understanding, they must have made adjustments of lesser degree in their ways of thinking and modes of life. Whether or not one were to follow the Path as a bhikkhu or as a householder, or not follow the Path at all, seems to have depended not necessarily on understanding but also on factors such as social circumstances, level of their own spiritual maturity and the like. Whatever these peripheral states of affairs the morality itself, as revealed in the above discussion, seems to be based on certain shared characteristics of reality. Such characteristics are understood as subsumed in the ‘three universal characteristics of reality’, namely, impermanence, unsatisfactoriness,

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and no­soulness. Although the Buddhist morality may not be absolutist in theistic sense it is clear that within the conceptual universe governed by the understanding of three characteristics (ti-lakkhaṇa) Raṭṭhapāla’s decision has been given as undoubtedly correct. The foundations of morality were thus expected to be seen by oneself in relation to one’s own life and the nature of life in general. It is clear that the ethics/morality advocated by the Buddha did not come as inviolable injunctions similar to those in a theistic religious system. The general attitude of Buddhism to authority, personal or non-personal, and the attitude of the disciples toward the Buddha himself have been discussed in detail by scholars.8 What has been discussed mainly in the context of epistemology seems relevant in ethics. Thus one who follows the Path is expected to do so not because one has special obligation for the Buddha, or because one is scared of violating a rule prescribed by the Buddha. The function of karma as taught by the Buddha has nothing to do with the Buddha or any other person for that matter.9 It works subject to the law of dependent co-origination (pāṭicca-samuppāda). Following the Path as a bhikkhu by observing the Patimokka rules or living the life of a householder observing the five precepts is understood as a voluntary act. The Buddha does not come to the picture either as inflictor of punishment or a dispenser of rewards. In other words, there is no such a thing as ‘sinning against the Buddha’ in the Buddhist tradition. By violating a moral precept of the nature of the pañca-sīla one is only violating a promise given to oneself, and it is a moral act the consequence of which one has to bear by oneself alone. Violation of vinaya rules by bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs is dealt with by the Sangha as a matter of Vinaya. The function of karma has no connection to this ‘legal’ procedure. Does this seemingly ultra-rational attitude prevail all the time? Does Buddhism reject the need for an authority altogether in one’s moral life? The answer does not seem to be a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’. The emotion of fear (ottappa or bhaya) is known to play a role in religious life. It does not seem to be different in Buddhism too. The idea of ‘fear for the samsara’ 8 KN Jayatilleke (1963): see chapters iv and viii. 9 The concept of Yama as the king of the hell responsible for punishing the wrongdoers has been accommodated in the discourses with some unease although the presence of someone over and above the karma causation does not go well with the Buddhist karma theory. The Devaduta-sutta (Majjhima-nikāya: 130) makes a good compromise by maintaining that Yama, by being himself condemned to condemn others, is undergoing the result of a bad karma committed by himself. See Tilakaratne (2003) for a detailed discussion.

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(saṃsāra-bhaya) is an emotion valued in the tradition. Samsara includes various types of dangers one will have to undergo in the samsaric journey including being born in where there is no happiness (apāya/niraya =hell [apa+aya/nir+aya = place without income]). The discourses refer to four kinds of fear relevant to this context (A II, 121-123) They are the fear of being censured by oneself (attānuvāda-bhaya), the fear of being censured by others (parānuvāda-bhaya), fear of punishment (daṇḍabhaya) and the fear of bad destiny (duggati-bhaya). All these four fears are described as sentiments that help one to stay focused in one’s spiritual life. It is interesting to note that the commentarial tradition defines the term ‘bhikkhu’ with reference to the fear for the samsara (Vism 3).10 It is this fear that motivates one to follow the path properly as a bhikkhu/ bhikkhunī, or live a simple religious life as a householder. The difference between this emotion of fear and that of God or any other supernatural being is whereas the former has no reference to a person, the latter is centred on a person. Along with fear is mentioned moral scruple (hiri or lajja =sense of shame), and the two have been described as ‘divine qualities ‘(deva-dhamma) for their crucial role is one’s moral life. The concept of superiority (adhipateyya) plays a similar role in the field of morality. In a way this concept answers the question: why should one lead a moral life? The moral life in this context is not exclusively that of a bhikkhu, but the moral life in general. The Dhamma gives three reasons, namely, the superiority of oneself (atta-adhipateyya), the superiority of the world (loka-adhipateyya), and the superiority of the Dhamma (dhamma-adhipateyya) (A I, 147-150) In the absence of any superior divine power from where laws originate one is at one’s own initiative to lead a moral life. But there are forces to be recognized as providing supports and safeguards for one’s moral life. The first is to reflect on one’s own status as one who has dedicated one’s life for the practice of the path and make a resolution to stay focused on the path. One’s own conscience which blames one when one behaves wrongly too has been mentioned in the discourses as a moral safeguard. The second is the religious people with developed faculties and powerful divine beings who are capable of penetrating one’s mind. In a broad sense this refers to the external world which observes one’s behaviour. For example, for a bhikkhu this could be one’s own community of fellow bhikkhus or the lay society that supports him. The viññū-purisas of the society too may be included in this category. Of the fears mentioned above the first and 10 Saṃsāre bhayaṃ ikkhatīti bhikkhu (Visuddhimagga 3): A bhikkhu is one who perceives fear in the samsara.

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the second, namely, fear of being censured by oneself and others seem to correspond to these two kinds of superiority. The last is the Dhamma taught by the Buddha. This could also mean what is right and good in a universal sense. When taken from this broad sense, it has been said that one should rather lose one’s life than violating the Dhamma (Vism 47).11 This last seems to provide the ultimate basis for the moral life. The former two also seem to rest on the last for the basis on which one’s own self or the world blames someone is the Dhamma. The significance of this classification is that it shows that Buddhism does not reject the idea of superiority or the need to have a sense of being subordinate to some higher authority in one’s moral life. According to this analysis one needs to obey some authority as providing check on one’s moral life. But this authority is not any particular person, nor is it a god capable of inflicting punishment on those who violate such rules.

Conclusion In a theistic system the sense of fear toward the creator God and his possible punishment work as a deterrent against violating rules. At the same time possibility of reward from the same source works as an incentive for good behaviour. It is clear that these concepts do not operate in the same manner in Buddhism. But the concepts of superiority and fear mentioned above appear to be playing a similar role in the moral life of one who follows the Path. For example, being born in a duggati is the ‘punishment’ one receives for being immoral. The karmic causation however is a natural process for which personal intervention is not needed. This way of understanding shows that for the Buddha mere observance of morality without right view (sammādiṭṭhi) is of not much use. As our preceding discussion should have showed sīla as ethics is an integral aspect of the path leading to nirvana. When one moves higher in the path one takes it along and does not leave it behind. The completion of the Path is the culmination of kusala by shedding all akusala. Any form of existence or bhava, be it the bhava of pleasure, fine materiality or immateriality, it is a result of lobha which is a root of akusala. The ultimate goal is to be free from all forms of existence. During the time of the Buddha it seems that all or majority of those entered the Sangha 11 Dhanaṃ caje yo pana aṅgahetu – aṅgaṃ caje jivitaṃ rakkhamāno aṅgaṃ dhanaṃ jivitaṃ cāpi sabbaṃ – caje naro dhammamanussaranto (Let one leave wealth for the sake of physical limbs. Let one leave physical limbs for the sake of life. Let one leave everything, wealth, physical limbs and life, for the sake of Dhamma.)

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strived to achieve the final goal in their very life itself. Consequently to be born in a pleasant destiny (sugati) was not an option for them. Hence they were not interested in practicing meritorious deeds such as dāna, sīla and bhāvanā or to put it more accurately, they did not practice these three as meritorious deeds. There is evidence in the discourses to the effect that those who lived the holy life for the sake of worldly pleasures were laughed at by their fellow practitioners. The case of the householders was different. For them the goal was to live a good life here in this world and hope for a better destiny after death (According to the well known Sigālovāda-sutta, one of the ‘duties’ of the religious people toward the householders, who supply them with requisites, is to teach them the way to heaven). The distinction of puñña/pāpa was more meaningful with this way of life. The co-existence between nirvana as the immediate goal and the lay life were not considered to be an easy task. The best form of life for one who is intent on nirvana was to leave home and move into homelessness. In the story of Raṭṭhapāla discussed above his parents remind him that he can both live a good life (life of pleasures) and engage in meritorious deeds with his vast fortune. His wives inquire about the divine damsels for the sake whom, they presumed, Raṭṭhapāla was to leave them behind. The attitude of parents and wives represent the samsaric dimension of observing morality. But for Raṭṭhapāla pleasurable samsara was not an option. Hence he was not interested in puñña; nor was he interested in divine damsels he was to get in return for his puñña. Nevertheless, a person who is devoted to a life of puñña is undoubtedly an ethical/moral person. Likewise a person who observes the basic five precepts also is an ethical/moral person. But kusala captures a different dimension. This is purely the nirvanic dimension, and if our present ethical discourse cannot adequately capture it, the problem is not with this radically different ethical category. It is true that the path of the Buddha in its proper sense is one leading directly to nirvana. But the practical reality starting from the time of the Buddha himself was that there grew up a group of lay people who, while ideally participated in the ideal of nirvana, had to strive to have it both ways. What we find mostly in the traditional Buddhist societies today, among both the lay people and the monks and nuns, is the practice of puñña with the wish that it will bring about the final goal nirvana, of course as the very final thing after enjoying all the imaginable pleasures both human and divine!

2. Skill in Means (Upāya Kauśalya) in Early and Later Buddhist Thought

Introduction Skill in means or Upāya Kauśalya (UK) is a leading doctrinal concept in Mahayana Buddhist tradition. The fundamental historical meaning of the term has been that the Buddha and Bodhisatvas were endowed with this special skillfulness which made them to do things which they thought appropriate for the generation of the desired results. The problem for those of us today who are, in particular, guided by some kind of deontology is that how can we acquiesce in the apparent belief that we really do not have to worry too much about means so long as they produce the result we like. In the present paper I will examine this ethical problem taking into consideration some of the ethical principles and attitudes expressed in the early discourses of the Buddha and the subsequent Theravada tradition. In addition to being an ethical concept, UK also has been used in Mahayana as a hermeneutic device and a way of justifying a form of transcendentalism associated with the life of the Buddha. I will begin with a brief discussion on the concept in early discourses and then move to discuss the two aspects mentioned before focusing on the ethical problem that underlie the concept.

Skill in means in the early Buddhism and Theravada As has been shown by the scholars who have discussed the subject earlier, the key concept, ‘upāya’, occurs in the Pali discourses, and signifies a method or a means. The Pali equivalent ‘upāyakosalla’ occurs in the Dīgha-nikāya along with two other terms ‘āyakosalla’ and ‘apāyakosalla’. According to the commentator Buddhaghosa, the first refers to the knowledge in knowing how the wholesome phenomena that are not arisen are arisen and those that are arisen are multiplied; and

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the second to how the unwholesome phenomena that are not arisen are not arisen and those that are arisen are destroyed. The ‘upāyakosalla’ has been described as the wisdom of means (‘upāyapaññā’) with regard to the above-mentioned matters. The commentary describes it further as knowledge of the cause and the remedy of an urgent matter or a fear that is arisen (DA).1 The Vibhaṅga, belonging to the Pali Abhidhamma canon, refers to the same classification and describes the concept in almost identical terms as ‘the wisdom of means’ applicable in implementing the other two kosallas (Vbh 325-6).2 What is underscored seems to be knowledge in action or the practical aspect of knowledge which came to be emphasized with the development of the concept of perfecting virtues leading to the Buddhahood namely, the ‘Buddha-making virtues’ (‘Buddha-kāraka dhamma’) or ‘perfections’ (‘pāramitā’). An interpretation of UK and its associated virtue ‘karuṇā’ (compassion) occurs in the Commentary to the Cariyāpiṭaka: “His great compassion and skill in means are like (his) resolution. There the skill in means is the wisdom which makes charity etc. the factors producing enlightenment. It is by virtue of their skill in means and great compassion that the Bodhisatvas become indifferent to their own happiness, engage constantly in (acts of) compassion that causes happiness to others, become dexterous in great Bodhisatva acts which are hard to accomplish, and become the cause of wellbeing and happiness of beings even when they pleased their mind towards the Buddha by means of understanding, seeing, listening or recollection. (CpA 289) 3 Clearly this passage gives a different and also a more detailed account of UK. This may well be due to the influence of the Mahayana interpretation of the concept. The Dīgha-nikāya reference of UK, referred to above, occurs in the Saṅgīti-sutta which bears characteristics of later compilation4, and the Abhidhamma works too are considered 1  Sabbāpi tatrūpāyā paññā upāyakosallan’ti īdaṃ pana accāyikakicce vā bhaye vā uppanne tassa tassa tikicchanatthaṃ ṭhānuppattiyā kāraṇajānana vaseneva veditabbaṃ. 2 Tatrūpaya pāññā upāyakosallaṃ’. 3 Yathā ca abhinīhāro evaṃ mahākarunā upāyakosallañ ca. Tattha upāyakosallaṃ nāma dānadīnaṃ bodhisambhārabhāvassa nimittabhūtapaññā. Yāhi mahakaruṇūpāyakosallatāhi mahapurisānaṃ attasukhanirapekkhatā, nirantaraṃ parahitakarunāpasutatā, sudukkarāhipi mahābodhisattacaritehi visadabhāvo, pasādasambuddhidassanasvanānussaraṇakālesu pi sattānaṃ hitasukhapatilābhahetubhāvo ca sampajjati. 4 33rd Sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya, a sutta believed to belong to a later period.

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to be subsequent to discourses. There is no doubt about the posterior character of the commentaries. This could mean that the concept actually came to the Pali tradition later under the influence of other Nikayins, in particular the Mahayanists. The need to describe pañña which is quite familiar in the Pali tradition by this new term, namely, UK has to be understood in the context of later developments in the Buddhist tradition. It is quite possible that the Theravadins were forced to recognize the concept when it was developed by the other Buddhists. However, it is interesting to note that the concept was never developed in the Pali tradition as a hermeneutic device or as an ethical criterion as it was in the later Mahayana. In this sense the usage of UK in the Pali tradition does not contain any significant ethical or philosophical connotation. A situation that can be compared with skill in means is the mode of teaching the Dhamma supposed to have adopted by the Buddha, namely, the ‘ānupubbī-kathā’ or gradual (way of) explanation. The Pali commentarial tradition often refers to this in the following manner: The Teacher, in explaining the teaching, would do so referring to the account of giving, morality, heaven, the disadvantages, low-ness and defilement of pleasures and the advantages of renunciation (DhpA 6).5 It is said that the Buddha adopts this way of teaching taking into consideration the listener’s potentiality for realization (‘upanissaya’) and the state of his faculties. The Theravada tradition believes that this is an ability unique to the Buddha and not to any of his disciples. In the Vibhaṅga this knowledge of the Buddha is described in the following manner (Vbh 340)6: Herein what is the Tathagata’s knowledge as it really is of the improvement, of the deterioration of the controlling faculty of other beings, of other persons’? Herein the Tathagata comprehends the inclination of beings; he comprehends the latent tendency; he comprehends characteristic action; he comprehends disposition; he comprehends beings with little dust in their eyes, he comprehends beings with much dust in 5 Satthā tassa upanissayaṃ oloketvā dhammaṃ desento ānupubbīkatham kathesi: dāna -kathaṃ, sīla ­kathaṃ, sagga-kathaṃ, kāmānaṃ ādīnavaṃ, okaraṃ, sankilesaṃ, nekkhamme ca ānisamsaṃ pakasesi. 6 Tattha katamaṃ tathāgatassa parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ indriyaparopariyatteñañāṃ? Idha tathāgato sattānaṃ āsayaṃ pajānāti, anusayaṃ pajanati, caritam pajānati, adhimuttiṃ pajānati, apparajakkhe mahārajakkhe tikkhiṇindriye mudundriye svākāre dvākāre suviññāpaye duviññāpaye babbhābabbhe satte pajānāti. The Vibhanga. The Book of Analysis, tr. Ashin Thittila. PTS 1969. p. 445.

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their eyes, with sharp controlling faculties, with weak controlling faculties; of good qualities; of bad qualities, easy to instruct, hard to instruct, fit or not fit. (Thittila 1969, 445) Equipped with this knowledge, the Buddha would begin with the most preliminary state of one’s spirituality characterized by the desire to be born in the heaven after the death. However, the explanation does not stop at that, it continues till it culminates in the attainment of niravana by giving up all forms of desire. This may have worked in two ways: among the listeners of the Buddha there may have been a large number of people who stopped at the very preliminary level. For them to be born in the heaven may have been the destination. There may have equally been at least a few others who went further and reached higher levels of development culminating in nirvana itself. Referring to the Buddha’s practice of adjusting his sermons to suit the level of spiritual development of his listeners KN Jayatilleke says: It is this character of the Buddha in adjusting his sermons to suit the predilections and the temperament of his listeners that comes to be known as the upāya-kauśalya or ‘the skill in (devising) means (to convert people). Jayatilleke further adds to his statement: The content of these different methods of preaching is however self-consistent as far as the nikayas are concerned (Jayatilleke 1963, 406). Jayatilleke seems to have had a somewhat simplistic idea about skill in means in the Mahayana tradition. Nevertheless, his remark that the application of it was not contradictory to the teachings in the Nikayas is significant. This is significant, in particular, for there is a question how far the Mahayana use of the concept is in conformity with, or a continuation of, the ethical principles of the early teachings of the Buddha.

Skill in means as a hermeneutic device A very important use of the concept of UK in the Mahayana tradition is to harmonize all the different teachings of Nikayins to one whole which is presented as the ultimate teaching of the Buddha. This mode of use of the concept is quite clear in the Saddharmapuṇdarīka (Lotus) Sutra (SP). SP makes the claim that there is only one ‘yāna ‘and that is the Buddhayāna . All the other yānas, those of listeners (ṡāvaka [Pali] srāvaka [Sk.]) and the individual Buddhas (Pacceka-buddha [Pali] Pratyeka-buddha [Sk]) are provisional and presented by the Buddha to suit the mentality of his listeners. The well­known ‘house-in-fire’ parable of the SP has this as its main point. In the parable, the father promises his children what

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they long for in their childish mentality, namely, toy vehicles. This he does, because he knows that it is the best way to get them out of the burning house. However, in his higher understanding, the father knows that these toy vehicles are not what really one should long for but it must be a real vehicle which is much higher in value. In other words, the parable indicates the need for transcending the ‘childish’ or immature mentality in order to attain something higher. According to the parable, the two yanas of ṡrāvaka and pratyeka-buddha are mere devices to attract people to the highest yāna. In themselves, they are not of any value apart from their being temporary and provisional goals. In this manner, a key point of the parable is to show that the so-called traditional hinayana Buddhist views have not been rejected but been incorporated within one system.

Skill in means as a mode of explanation In the SP and in many other Mahayana Sutras the concept of UK has been used to explain certain incidents in the life of the Buddha (Sakyamuni) which were found to be requiring explanation. A chapter in the SP entitled ‘The Life Span of Thus Come One’ says that the Buddha’s birth into the Sakya clan is an instance of UK. The Mahayana work called The Skill in Means Sutra (Tatz, 1994), a short treatise devoted to elaborate the concept UK as multi­purpose device, is also a case in point. It employs the concept as a mode of explanation, a means of justifying transcendentalism and an ethical criterion. In the Sutra, there is a section that tries to use UK as an explanatory device. For instance, ‘the Bodhisatva great hero Jnanottara’ questions the Buddha on the bahaviour of Bodhisatva as the youth Jyotimala during the time of the Kashyapa Buddha. Venerable Lord, The Lord has stated that a Bodhisatva will not speak a word that would wound himself or someone else. But Lord, why then during the promulgation of theThus-ComeOne, the worthy, the fully awakened Buddha Kashyapa, did the Bodhisatva,then a brahman youth named Jyotimala who was bound by one more rebirth, says: “To “see a sramana shavepate? What is that to me? Where is the awakening in a sramana’s shaven head? Awakening is very rare.” Lord, what was the purpose of saying this? The following answer given by the Buddha resorts to skill-in-means:

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Do not assess the Tathagatas and Bodhisatvas. Why so? Son of the family, The Bodhisatvas, the great heroes, are endowed with inconceivable skill in means, and so these holy personages live in whatever way will serve to bring sentient beings to maturity.” (Tatz, 1994, 51) According to the subsequent explanation, the Bodhisatva behaved in this seemingly unruly manner towards the Buddha in order to get his five companions to the right path. Along with this incident there are several other instances mentioned in the discourse as examples of the ‘inconceivable’ skill in means of the Buddhas and the Bodhisatvas. The incidents are connected particularly with the life of the Buddha Gotama both as the Bodhisatva and the Buddha. They are: why did the Bodhisatva continue to be reborn in spite of his ability to attain nirvana at any moment in any birth after he had obtained the conviction that phenomena are unarising, why did the Bodhisatva enter a womb, why was he born in the forest and not in town, why was the Bodhisatva educated in the arts, why did he take a wife (Yasodhara), why did the Bodhisatva leave home with his servant Channa and the horse Kanthaka, why did he put people to sleep before he departed, why did he give the horse and the ornaments to Channa, why did he cut his hair by himself with his sword, why did the Bodhisatva go to the Bodhi-tree after taking food and generating physical strength rather that going while his body was emaciated and impotent, why did he beg for grass, after sitting down at the Bodhi-tree why did the Bodhisatva not attained the Buddhahood till the Mara came, why did the Buddha having attained the Buddhahood gazed at the Bodhi-tree for seven days and why did not he teach the doctrine till the Brahman invited him. The discourse proposes explanations for all these incidents by means of the concept of UK. Since, according to the discourse, the UK of the Buddhas and the Bodhisatvas is clearly inconceivable by ordinary worldlings, any further question cannot be raised.

Skill in means as a means of defending transcendentalism The transcendental nature attributed to the Buddha is clearly supported by the explanation of some ten instances which are considered by the Theravada tradition to be the results the some unwholesome deeds done by the Buddha when he was a Bodhisatva. According to the Upāyakauśalya-sutra: The Thus-Come-One demonstrates ten karmic connections to sentient beings. These also should be regarded as the skill in

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means of the Bodhisatva and the Thus-Come-One: They also should be regarded as having a hidden meaning. If the Bodhisatva had the slightest fraction of a hair’s tip worth of unwholesomeness, he would have no opportunity to go before the Awakening Tree, the site of awakening, and there nirvanize to supreme, right and full awakening. There would be no occasion. It would be impossible. …the Thus-Come-One is endowed with all wholesome qualities; he has eliminated all unwholesome qualities that are to be eliminated.... Nevertheless, the Thus-Come-One demonstrates karmic connections in order to demonstrate the maturation of deeds to certain sentient beings who waste the fruition of deeds, and to sentient beings who do not believe in karmic fruition. By showing the mkarmic connections in himself, the Thus-ComeOne raises the question: “If deeds come to fruition for me, the master of doctrine, why should they not come to fruition for yourselves? (Tatz 1994, 71) The sutra compares the situation to a learned teacher who would recite the alphabet in order to educate others. The point is that, in actuality, the Buddha never undergoes any (bad) karma results, but the Buddha makes them happen in order to give a moral lesson to the others. Ultimately these happenings are nothing but examples of the skill in means of the Buddha. The Theravada tradition, the oldest extant form of Buddhism based on the Pali Tripitaka which is believed to contain the oldest extant form of Buddhist literature, has two views on the question whether or not the Buddha had to suffer due to his bad past karmas. The standard view of Theravada is that nobody, including even the Buddhas and the Bodhisatvas, is beyond the law of karma. Although the Buddha and the arahants will not receive, as a result of any particular karma, an effect that requires him to be reborn for they are not born again owing to the fact that they have eradicated the craving for existence (bhavataṇhā), they can be subject to the illnesses that are usual to a physical body and the effects of the karmas that can produce results while a person is still living. It is possible that an arahant or the Buddha might not undergo the results of his past bad karma as an ordinary person does. This is due to the fact that his present behaviour characterized by purity could have some influence on this. Nevertheless, the tradition shows that the arahants, the Bodhisatvas and the Buddha are not totally beyond the domain of

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kamma. The Theravada Buddhist literature is full of stories describing how the arahants received the results of both good and bad karmas they had performed in their samsaric past as ordinary worldlings (eg. The cases of Moggallana, Cakkhupala and Angulimala for bad results and Sivali for good results). The Theravada tradition does not make a distinction between the Buddha and the arahants in so far as their arahanthood is concerned. However, it does recognizes distinction in the Buddha in several other respects, namely, the kinds of knowledge and the physical and mental powers the Buddha come to possess, and in particular, the absence of the residues of past defilements (vāsanāguṇa). The absence of these ‘vāsanāguṇas’ , which is considered a key characteristic of the Buddha, means that he does not have even residue of past defilements which an arahant could still have (Endo 1997, 110-113). However this does not mean that the Buddha was not subject to occasional effects of the bad karmas he committed in the past. The commentary to the Apadāna, Visuddhajanavilāsinī, refers to twelve incidents in the life of the Buddha and explains them as results of the bad karmas committed by the Buddha in his previous lives. The incidents referred to are: hardships underwent for six years before the Buddhahood, reproach by Cincamanavika, reproach by Sundari, reproach caused by the allegation that the Buddha was responsible for Sundari’s murder, attempt on life by Devadatta by rolling a stone, injury caused by a slice of rock, attempt on life by Devadatta with Nalagiri, the intoxicated elephant, suffering caused by surgery, suffering caused by headache, scarcity of food suffered at Verañja, suffering caused by backache and purge of blood. The Apadāna makes it very clear that Buddha, as Bodhisatva, had to undergo suffering for a long time in all the four woeful existences (anekavassasahassāni caturopāye dukkhamanubhavitvā ..) (Ap.125) as a part of the result of those bad karmas committed before and had to suffer for the last time as the Fully Enlightened One. Furthermore, having explained the reason for the last illness responsible for the Buddha’s passing away, the Apadāna summarizes its account with the following emphatic words: kammapilotikamevarūpaṁ lokattayasmim pi navijahati: ‘an application of karma of this nature cannot be escaped in the entire threefold world’ (Ap, 127). The standard Theravada viewpoint is expressed also in the Lakkhanasutta of the Dīgha-nikāya which describes all the thirty two marks of a Great Man (mahāpurisalakkhaṇa) as distinct results of the past good karmas performed by the Buddha as Bodhisatva. The Theravada

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tradition classifies karma among the five natural phenomena (pañca niyāmadhamma) (DA I, 432) such as climatic conditions, biological laws etc. Although the Buddha was considered an extra-ordinary human being in so far as his spiritual qualities are concerned, he was not perceived as surpassing those natural laws. Owing to this naturalist attitude, in the early discourses, the question whether or not the Buddha underwent karmic effects does not even seem to have been raised. However the situation may have undergone changes subsequently, in particular, with the development of transcendentalism connected with the life of the Buddha. An example may be the Milindapañha which is a post-canonical but pre-commentarial work believed to have been originally compiled around the first century bce. The Milindapañha is quite in accordance with the early discourses with regard to the situation of the arahant. In responding to a question raised by the king Milinda on whether or not an arahnt feels painful feelings the Venerable Nāgasena says: It is from the non-termination of the cause and condition [body] for the uprising of apainful bodily feeling that he feels a painful bodily feeling; but it is from the termination of the cause and condition [aversion] for the uprising of a painful mental feeling that he feels no painful mental feeling. And this, sire, was said by the Blessed One: ‘He feels one feeling: the bodily, not the mental. (Mendis 1993, 43) The statement referred to (‘so ekaṃ vedanaṃ vediyati kāyikaṃ no cetasikaṃ’) comes in the Saṁyutta-nikāya (S IV, 209). The over-all thrust in the Theravada analysis of the situation of the arahant is characterized by a kind of naturalism, namely, that an arahant is not one who has transcended the physical laws of the universe. In responding to another question which is a follow-up of the previous one, Nāgasena says: These ten qualities, sire, accompanying the body, follow it and keep on going with it from existence to existence. What are the ten? Cold and heat, hunger and thirst, the necessity for voiding excreta and urine, fatigue and sleepiness, old-age, disease and death. The arahant is without authority, powerless and not able to exercise mastery in these respects. (Mendis 1993, 118) The control or lack of control of the matters pertaining to physical body has nothing to do with an arahant’s mastery over his mind. The early Buddhist and the Theravada position is that this is equally applicable to the Buddha who is also an arahant.

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The Milindapañha seems to differ or to be uncertain when it comes to the question whether or not the Buddha undergoes the results of past unwholesome deeds. The uncertainty is not whether or not the Buddha undergoes unpleasant physical feelings; on it, the Buddha too seems to have been treated like an arahant. The uncertainty is on whether or not those unpleasant feelings and events were the results bad past karmas. The question of the king assumes that all the feelings that are felt arise as results of karmas. To this Nāgasena responds: It is not the, sire, that all that is felt is rooted in kamma. Feelings arise, sire, through eight causes, and many beings experience feelings by reason of these eight causes. What are the eight? Some feelings arise here on account of wind, some on account of bile, some on account of phlegm, some through a combination of these three, some through a change in the weather, some through reckless conduct, some through external agency, and some feelings arise that are born as the result of kamma. Therein, those people who say ‘kamma oppresses beings’ excluding the (other) seven causes that statement of theirs is false. (Mendis 1993, 82) In discussing the incident of the Buddha’s foot being cut by a stone splint, the Milindapañha admits that it could have happened either as a result of a karma or from a mere action. However, immediately after this admission it asserts that the Buddha never experienced feelings born of karma; nor feelings caused by reckless conduct; the painful physical feelings of the Buddha could arise from the other six causes (‘api ca mahārajā natthi bhagavato kammavipākajā vedānā, natthi visamaparihārajā vedāna. Avasesehi samuṭṭhānehi bhagavato vedānāuppajjati,) (Miln 136). On the one hand, the book seems to admit that certain painful feelings of the Buddha can be caused by bad past karma. On the other hand, the book states quite directly that the Buddha was not affected by the bad past karmas. Commenting on this particular feature of the book, the Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi, a contemporary authority of Theravada, says that it is a discrepancy from the final systematized expression of Theravada thought as articulated in the commentaries of Acariya Buddhaghosa and that it seems to be contradicted even by texts found in the Pali canon itself.7 The over-all early Buddhist position on this matter is that there is no difference between the Buddha and the arahants in so far as their 7 The Questions of King Milinda. Introduction.p.12.

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being subject to laws of nature and the (moral) law of karma. The early discourses do not seem to have treated the Buddha in any different manner. The question whether or not the Buddha had to undergo the results of the past bad karma had not even been raised. However with the development of the inter-sectarian teachings and, in particular, the transcendentalism associated with the life of the Buddha, it seems that certain Buddhists found that the early Buddhist position to be annoying. The Upāyakauśalya Sutra, referred to above shows the Mahayana response to this problem through the idea of UK. The Milindapañha belonging to Theravada seems to represent this transcendentalist influence. Even the commentary to the Apadāna, elaborating and reaffirming the early Buddhist position that the Buddha had to undergo painful physical feelings, blames and attempts on his life etc., may be understood as responding to this inter-sectarian development.

Skill in means and problems of ethics The behaviour characterized by UK attributed to the Buddhas and the Bodhisatvas in the Mahayana literature very often leads one to question how far one can justify the obvious Mahayana position that the end, or the motive to achieve a good end, justifies the means. In the Lotussutra the well-known parable of burning house contains an element of this problematic situation. In the parable the father does not give his children what he promised; but he gives them something higher. When the father promised them that he will give them various kinds of toy carts he did so in order to attract his children out of the burning house; but he knew that that is not what he really wished to give. Like a truly well-wishing father he gives something higher and better to his children. Somewhat comparable story is found in the Theravada tradition. The story is not canonical but commentarial and occurs in the commentary to the Dhammapada. The Buddha gives monkhood to his cousin, Prince Nanda who was to get married on that very same day. Nanda agreed only reluctantly and, thinking about his future wife, was obviously not happy in the monastery. The story says that the Buddha took Nanda to a divine world and showed divine damsels to him. In this manner his desire was converted to divine damsels and Nanda agreed to live the life of monkhood in order win divine damsels. According to the story the Buddha seems to take responsibility of Nanda’s enlightenment personally upon himself. However, gradually the latter’s ideas improved and he ended up being an arahant. In this story, the Buddha’s promise of divine damsels to Nanda may be compared with the father’s promise

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of toy carts to his children in the Lotus story. The Buddha obviously knew that it is not divine damsels that he wanted Nanda to gain. But he persuaded Nanda to live a life of monkhood assuring him something that he never really intended. It seems that no other incident of this nature is found in the commentarial literature. There is no question about the absence of similar instances in the Canon itself. Nevertheless, the two incidents do not pose any serious ethical problem for, although what is promised is not intended to be final, in both cases they could have come true. For instance, in the Lotus parable, the father could give the children what he promised and in Nanda’s story he could achieve divine damsels if he really so desired. As in the case of ‘gradual way of teaching’, referred to earlier, in these two incidents too it is the Buddha’s knowledge as to how to adjust to the intellectual and emotional states of the listeners. The situation, however, is not this uncomplicated in the stories recorded in some other sutras. Again, a clear case in point is the Upāyakauśalya-sutra. The first section of the sutra is devoted to discuss two main issues: how a moral transgression affects the Bodhisatva and how a Bodhisatva can indulge in sex as an expression of skill in means. On the first issue, the sutra has the following explanation: The Bodhisatva who is skilled in means attenuates even a grave transgression with skill in means. How does he do so? Son of the family: the Bodhisatva great hero who is skilled in means, on the rare occasion upon which a transgression befalls him because he is under the influence of an unwholesome advisor or because he is confused, will consider the matter thus: Let me not enter nirvana with these aggregates, elements, and sense-fields in any case, lest I burn with anxiety. Instead, let me prepare myself to remain in samsara until its future end, in order to bring sentient beings to maturity. Let me not be discouraged, fearful or anxious: As long as I continue to samsarize as recompense for that transgression, I will bring sentient beings to maturity. Besides, I will be bound that it not recur. Moreover, I will teach doctrine to all sentient beings in order that they be extricated from transgression’. Suppose, son of the family that a Bodhisatva who is a monastic should fall into all four seminal transgressions. If he removed them with this skill in means, I would call it no transgression on the part of the Bodhisatva. (Tatz 1994 p. 29) Looking from an early Buddhist Vinaya point of view if one commits any one of the four main offences (‘defeats’ or pārājikā) he cannot regain normalcy as a member of the Sangha. However, what is attributed to the

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Bodhisatva in the sutra is some kind of very special ability through which he can retain his monkhood. The position seems to be that the ordinary vinaya rules are not applicable to such great beings as Bodhisatvas. In the early Buddhist tradition, an arahant or the Buddha is a moral being, meaning a being characterized by moral perfection. Such a person is incapable of doing anything with an unwholesome (akusala) mentality. Thus the question of his violating a vinaya rule which provides the moral foundation of monkhood (ādibrahmacariyaka-sikkhā) simply does not arise. With regard to the Bodhisatva, the Theravada characterization is different. Theravada admits that a Bodhisatva can involve in various kinds of transgressions and evil acts (Various Jātaka stories bear testimony to this.). In fact Theravada position is that, if a higher being commits even a minor offence it gets amplified because it goes against his customary moral character. Coming to the second issue of Bodhisatva’s engaging in sexual acts: there are several incidents in which the Bodhisatva does not really engage in any sex act, but he does not mind being seen as engaging in such acts so long as he does not violate his vow of celibacy. To Ananda who misperceived such a situation, the Buddha admonishes in this manner: Ananda, do not conceive of a holy person, someone practicing the Greater Vehicle correctly, as being faulty. Ananda, this is how you should understand it: A person of the vehicle of auditors, in order to be absolutely peerless in maintaining meditative calm, will seek uninterruptedly to exhaust the outflows. In the same way, Ananda, the Bodhisatva great hero who is skilled in means, who is endowed with the thought of omniscience, will seek uninterruptedly for omniscience, even to that point of abiding among a holy retinue of women and enjoying, playing with, and taking pleasure in it. Why so? Ananda, the Bodhisatva great hero who is skilled in means takes a retinue only to introduce it to the three jewels... and to supreme, right and full awakening. In the story the Bodhisatva does not really have sex with the women but enjoys their company to the extent that an onlooker will get a wrong impression. In actuality no damage to his morality has been done; instead a greater service to a group of people has been rendered. Similar examples are found in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sutra too (Thurman 1981, 21).8 Such situations may be justified on two counts: motive behind the action and the end result produced. 8 “To demonstrate the evils of desire, he even entered the brothels. To establish drunkards in mindfulness he entered all the cabarets”.

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The situation gets a little more complicated with the cases of the Bodhisatva actually engaging in activities which are damaging to the accepted norm of morality. The Upāyakauśalya-sutra records of an incident in which the Bodhisatva terminates his long practice of celibacy in order to fulfill the desire of a woman. The state of the mind of the Bodhisatva has been compared to a courtesan who engages in sex not out of desire but purely for money. It is said, in the like manner, the Bodhisatva engages in sex not out of desire on his part but purely out of kindness toward the woman concerned. The sutra explains: “The Bodhisatva who is skilled in means indulges himself in all manner of sensual pleasures and games without generating any craving for permanence for them”(Tatz 1994, 36-39). The sutra also discusses an incident in which the Bodhisatva, as a captain of a ship kills a man in order to save some five hundred sailors from being killed by him. The sutra says that the captain whose name was ‘Great Compassionate’ deliberated for seven days before he decided that the only way to save the lives of the sailors and also the potential murderer from the hell is to kill the man although this meant that the captain himself is going to suffer in the hell. The sutra explains: Son of the family: Accordingly the captain Great Compassionate protected those five hundred merchants and protected that person from going to the great hells by deliberately stabbing and slaying that person who was a robber with a spear, with great compassion and skill in means… At that time, in that life I was none other than the captain Great Compassionate. Have no second thoughts or doubt on this point. Son of family: For me, samsara was curtailed for one hundred thousand eons because of that skill in means and great compassion. And robber died to be reborn in a world of paradise. (Tatz 1994, 74) In this explanation one point is very clear: the rightness of the action has been decided on two factors, namely motive behind the act and the end result produced. The advantage of saving five hundred lives has been underscored, but nothing has been directly said on the loss of one life and possible moral damage to the doer in killing a human being. A possible explanation for the loss of one life is that it saved five hundred lives, and, furthermore the robber who was killed was to be born in a divine world. A possibility of moral damage for the doer has been ruled out by saying that he committed this act purely out of compassion. According to an Abhidhamma analysis of mind into subtle thought moments it is impossible for one to commit a murder with a compassionate thought.

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This means that at the moment of killing one must have a thought characterized by anger and not by compassion. But this does not rule out the possibility of having the compassion as the overarching rationale of committing the act. The key ethical problem that underlies these incidents of Bodhisatva deliberately committing unethical acts is the belief that it is alright to engage in acts which could cause moral damage to oneself so long as such acts produce agreeable results, particularly for others. The very genesis of a Bodhisatva, according to both Theravada and Mahayana traditions, is a result of sacrificing one’s opportunity of realizing nirvana for oneself for the sake of the world at large. However this does not mean that moral perfection aimed at, namely, the Buddhahood requires one to engage in morally questionable acts such as killing on the pretext that plunging into the ocean of samsara as a Bodhisatva only means acquiring more opportunities for moral perfection. Therefore, one can argue that morally unacceptable actions cannot lead to morally perfect state of Buddhahood. However, it is also clear that in the instances discussed above there was an overarching motive and an immediate motive behind the action, say, in this context, the murder of the robber. This leads us to consider the possibility of having motives of various levels behind an action and the degree of the involvement in what is painful and unpleasant in an action. In other words, how far are we permitted to use (physical and psychological) pain in an action? In this connection the following discussion by KN Jayatilleke, one of the leading contemporary early Buddhist thinkers, would be suggestive: If right action is a means to the attainment of an end which is the ultimate good, the question arises as to whether the means must not themselves be good. Buddhism does not seem to hold that ends are means or means are ends or that the means to be adopted to attain a good end must themselves be wholly good. There is a definite goal to be achieved, which is called “the end of unhappiness” (dukkhass’anta) or the “supreme state of happiness” (paramasukha). It may be argued that a good end can only be attained by means of wholly good. But the fact is that we are not wholly good (if we were there would be no necessity to attain the end) and not being wholly good and not having a clear conception of the goal we cannot perform actions, which are “perfectly

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right” (paramakusala). Our right actions are, therefore, only approximations to what is perfectly right. It is only gradually that we refine them and doing so acquire clearer conceptions of the goal. The desire for fame and happiness in this life or the desire to be born in a better state in the next life could provide the initial incentive for betterment. Even if we are developed enough to have our eyes on the goal we must have “the desire to attain the ineffable” (chandajāto anakkhāte, Dhp v. 218), “desire is to be given up depending on desire” (taṇhaṃ nissāya taṇhā pahātabbam) (A II, 146), namely, the desire to end our selfcentred desires. “Conceit is to be given up depending on the conceited wish (mānaṃ nissāya māno pahātabbo) (A II, 146) that I would attain the goal”. A minimum of imperfection is, therefore, involved in our initial and sustained efforts to reach the goal. As the Buddha points out in the Abhayarajakumara sutta, if a child has got something stuck in his throat, it may be necessary to cause a minimum of pain in order to get it out. Truth is not always pleasant and it is sometimes necessary to state unpleasant truths or remind ourselves of them in order to arouse others or emerge from our state of smug satisfaction. (Jayatilleke 1972, 54-55; 2010, 223-224) As Jayatilleke shows the early Buddhist tradition accepts that there can be some degree of pain involved in reaching satisfactory ends. However what has not made clear in the early discourses is whether or not the required pain can go as far as inflicting death. The problem has not been discussed, to my knowledge, in the discourses. Another interesting point that emerges from Jayatilleke’s discussion is the relation between means and ends as understood in the early Buddhist tradition. It is significant to note that the achievement of the ultimate goal of Buddhist religious life, namely, the attainment of nirvana by eliminating desire, can be motivated by a (kind of) desire itself. In this context the two forms of desire, desire to begin with and desire to be enlightened differ only by degree, although the gap between the two forms of desire can be tremendous. The Abhayarājakumāra-sutta makes it clear that physical pain can be inflicted on another with a good intention, say, with compassion. But can we kill someone out of compassion to that very person? In the story of the Upāyakauśalya-sutra the captain Great Compassionate

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has compassion for both his victim and the victims of the victim. The implication is that one cannot commit a murder with compassion only for the victims of the victim. In the sutra, the logic of killing the robber is partly supported by the number of people who were going to be saved by the act. But does the sheer number always outweigh the other considerations such as the qualitative value of the people involved? In other words, should we save five hundred wicked people by killing fifty good people or vice versa? Our difficulty in finding definite answers for this kind of questions partly arises from the underlying belief that there must be one definite way to find one definite and clear-cut answer. The rationale behind the urge to find such definite answers is some kind of deontological consideration. When we examine the Buddhist ethical practice (and the theory that underlie it) we see that it is quite different from its contemporary Brahmanic ethical system which was deontological. The Bhagavadgita which emphasizes observance of Dharma at any cost is a case in point. The Buddhist emphasis on Dhamma (the Pali equivalent of Dharma) is not motivated by a search after an absolute principle. In determining what is right or good (Dhamma) early discourses identify several criteria. One is the motive behind the action and it has been articulated in such statements as “I declare, O Bhikkhus, that volition (cetanā) is Kamma. Having willed one acts by body, speech and thought” (A III, 415) 9 and “Mind is the forerunner of (all evil) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, because of that, suffering follows one, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox. Mind is the forerunner of (all good) states.... If one speaks or acts with pure mind, because of that, happiness follows one, even as one’s shadow that never leaves (Dhp v. 1-2).10 The other is the result of the action or how it can affect both the agent and the patient. This has been articulated in the well­known statement: “not for the harm of oneself, not for the harm of the other, and not for the harm of both” 9 Cetanāhaṃ bhikkahve kammaṃ vadāmi, ceatyitvā kammaṃ karoti kāyena vācāya manasā. 10 Manopubbaṅgamā dhammā –manoseṭṭhā manomayā Manasā ce paduṭṭhena – bhāsati vā karoti vā Tato naṃ dukhamanveti – cakkaṃva vahato padaṃ Manopubbaṅgamā dhammā – manoseṭṭhā manomayā Manasā ce pasannena- bhāsati vā karoti vā Tato naṃ sukhamanveti – chāyāva anapāyinῑ .

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(M I, 416).11 The Dhammapada articulates it in the following manner: That deed is not well done when, after having done it, one repents, and when weeping, with tearful face one reaps the fruit there of. That deed is well done when, after having done it, one repents not, and when, with joy and pleasure, one reaps the fruit there of (Dhp v. 67-68).12 For an action to be acceptable it has to have a good intention behind it and it has to be capable of producing good results. The Dhamma or what in right/good is not viewed in isolation of these facts. The emphasis on what is Dhamma in various contexts is quite evident in the Buddhist thought. For instance, in earning money, or ruling a country, or solving a disciplinary problem in the Buddhist monastic life, or in our life in general it is always emphasized that we must not violate Dhamma. However what is meant by Dhamma in each context is not the same. It has to be decided taking into consideration the factors present in each situation. In a sense, one may be tempted to construct Dhamma as the Buddhist counterpart for deontological theory. But in deciding what is Dhamma or otherwise we have to see whether or not the intention of the action is good and whether or not it causes harm for both oneself and the other. In doing so we are going back to some sort of teleology and a form of utilitarianism. In commenting on the nature of Buddhist ethics a modern commentator makes the following observation: ...the Buddhist theory of ethics maintains that morality has a hypothetical nature, because if the reality or the circumstances were to change, the ethical values would necessarily change too. This shows that Buddhist ethics is utilitarian. It is an ideal utilitarianism rather than a hedonistic one because the ultimate end of the ethical endeavour goes beyond the pleasure-pain principle. Also, what is emphasized is the utility of the act, rather than the utility of the rule. In performing an act, the whole context of the act, motive, and the act, has to be taken into consideration. (Dharmasiri 1986, 34-35) It is clear that the Buddhist ethics cannot be fitted comfortably 11 Neva attabyābādhāya saṃvatteyya, na parabyābādhāya saṃvatteyya, na ubhayabyābādhāya saṃvatteyya kusalaṃ idaṃ kāyakammaṃ sukudrayaṃ sukhavipākanti. 12 na taṃ kammaṃ kataṃ sādhu-yaṃ katvā anutappati Yassa assumukho rodaṃ – vipākaṃ paṭisevati Tañ ca kammaṃ kataṃ sādhu- yaṃ katvā nānutappati Yassa patῑto sumano- vipākaṃ paṭisevati.

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into any one category of contemporary Western ethical theory. In laying emphasis on a desirable end-result Buddhist ethics is clearly utilitarian. But in underscoring the qualities of goodness and desirability of action it is teleological. Although the Dhamma has not been understood as a kind of rigid deontological principle the emphasis on Dhamma can be interpreted as containing some degree of deontology too in Buddhist ethics. What is significant, however, in all this in the context of the present discussion of UK is that, like UK, the overall Buddhist ethical theory too is not governed by any one absolute consideration. The significance of UK is that it allows the Buddha, or a Bodhisatva (or anyone else for that matter) to take into consideration the contextual factors of a given situation and determine the appropriate act accordingly. UK basically is concerned with the end-result. If the end is desirable it does not hesitate to engage in an activity which is not sanctioned either by the Buddhist doctrine and discipline or by the secular law of a given location. This is something not found in the Theravada tradition; nor such a possibility has been discussed in the early discourses. From an early Buddhist point of view one could well say that even though the captain Great Compassionate could save five hundred people by killing one person, taking someone’s life is not permissible under any circumstance. If at all, one must try to prevent it by other means. Taking another’s life intentionally has not been justified under any circumstance in the early or Theravada Buddhist tradition. Although the above conclusion may be justified in the light of the ethical discussions available in the discourses and their interpretation in the Theravada tradition, characterizing the Buddhist ethical theory in that manner makes it a rigid deontology. As we saw earlier, in the Abhayarājakumāra-sutta the Buddha admits the necessity of causing physical or mental pain in certain circumstances. However the actual question discussed in the discourse is not really physical pain but mental pain for the question of the prince is whether the Buddha has uttered any unpleasant word. The Buddha’s answer is that the question cannot be answered categorically (‘na kho’ttha rājakumāra ekaṁsenāti’) (M I, 393). This answer shows that the Buddha admits the importance of the context and special circumstances in deciding what is to be done. But it is clear that the discussion does not consider physical pain. The commentary of the Buddhaghosa too is not helpful here. Therefore, although according to the existing early Buddhist explanation we may be able say that physical pain amounting to killing cannot be justified under any circumstance, the same may not be said about physical or mental pain in lesser degree.

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Concluding remarks A deontological theory holds that duty is logically independent of concept of good. This makes it unnecessary that moral behaviour ultimately has to produce what is good. The idea is that one must do the right thing, what is in accordance with an absolute moral principle, without any consideration of the context or the result. The belief in an absolute moral order has lying under it a sharp distinction between facts and values or ‘is’ and’ ‘ought’. The second distinction is based on the first. According DJ Kalupahana early Buddhist ethical theory does not presuppose either of these distinctions in a rigid sense. On his view, there are no facts in Buddhism totally dissociated from human interests. The Buddha rejects both ‘is-ness’ (atthitā) and ‘is-not-ness’ (natthitā) as absolute categories of existence, but does accept the arising and the ceasing of the world. This leads the Buddha to claim that existence with the characteristic of impermanence is unsatisfactory (or suffering) (Kalupahana 1995, chap. iii). The realization of this nature of reality enables one to do what is needed to do, first to alleviate and finally to end one’s own suffering and that of others. In this manner the motivation for action in the Buddhist ethical theory arises from this particular context, namely, the eradication of suffering of all sentient beings. In such an ethical theory it is only natural that there are no context-independent absolute moral principles. Ultimately what this means in the context of Upāyakauśalya is that, although there may be difficulties of justification in individual cases, the overall applicability of the concept is quite in accordance with the salient features of early Buddhist thought.

3. Using Physical Force/Power and Inflicting Pain as Problems in Buddhist Ethics*

Introduction The basic issue that will be discussed in this paper is the Buddhist attitude to use of power or physical force or pain as a means to an end, perceived as desirable. Traditionally, in political science, a government is described as an institute empowered to use violence in a legitimate manner. Violence is an act involving using power. Punishment in the form of subjecting one to physical pain has been there as an essential aspect in kingship or government from time immemorial.1 This is a clear case in using force (‘violence’) in a legitimate manner although from a point of view of ethics, this concept of ‘legitimate use of violence’ has been questioned. The very word ‘violence’ has a negative connotation and it is generally accepted that to be violent is not good. Therefore it would be better to frame the question in a less value ­added manner and hence my choice of the term ‘force’ or physical power understanding the term ‘physical’ in a broad sense to include any kind of external force used on others. There are several areas in which the problem of using force is applicable. One is the sphere of government where the so-called ‘legitimate use of violence’ is accepted without much fuss. It is normally believed that the king or the sovereign has authority to use power on his subjects. This traditional picture has been transferred to the modern governments only with some modifications. Another area is any legal 1  In the Aggañña-sutta (of the Dīgha-nikāya) story of the origin of kingship by popular choice it is clear that the major reason for choosing a king was to punish those who misbehaved. * Published in the proceedings of the seminar on ‘Exchange of Buddhist Thought and Culture between Sri Lanka and Korea,’ Colombo, 2003.

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system in which punishment in some form or other is accepted as necessary. The third is a more general case of persuading, maintaining order, disciplining and the like. For instance, in this third context we can include the religion which aims at persuading people to follow a certain way of life deemed desirable. Here we could discuss whether or not the Buddha himself used force in dealing with his (would be) disciples. In what follows we will discuss these three aspects of using power/force from a Buddhist point of view.

The legitimate use of violence by the sovereign It is an important issue in the Buddhist political thought whether or not the Buddha approved of various uses of force, in the form of aggression or physical violence, by the rulers. The general flavour of the Buddhist thinking is necessarily one bending to non use of violence. It is affirmed by such remarks as ‘adaṇḍena asatthena dhammena abhivijiya’ (D I, 89) (‘having conquered without stick, without weapon but by righteousness’) given in descriptions of Wheel-rolling monarchs (rājā cakkavatti). But beyond this general flavour the things don’t seem to be that dear-cut. In an interesting short discourse in the Samyutta-nikāya the Buddha is described as pondering on the question: Is it possible to rule without killing and causing killing, without conquering and without causing conquer, without repenting and without causing to repent but by Dhamma (S I, 116-117)?2 Interestingly enough the sutta does not draw a definite conclusion. It concludes: If there were a mountain made of gold Made entirely of solid gold Not double this would suffice for one Having known this, fare evenly How could a person incline to sensual pleasures Who has seen the source whence suffering springs Having known acquisition as a tie in the world A person should train for its removal. (Bodhi 2000, 210) These concluding remarks hint at giving up the idea of political action in favour of more sublime purposes of life. Being himself a one-time politician it is quite understandable that the Buddha now and then pondered over the questions of this nature. The commentary says that this occurred to the Buddha when he saw people suffering under unrighteous rulers (SA I, 180). Although the expression ‘iti vidvā samaṃ 2 Sakkā nu kho rajjaṃ karetuṃ ahanaṃ aghātayaṃ ajinaṃ ajāpayaṃ asocaṃ asocayaṃ dhammenā ti

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care’ (fare evenly) is suggestive the commentary does not elaborate on it. The word ‘sama’ seems to have a more important political sense, namely, equality. The even behaviour is ultimately the just behaviour. In later Jātaka literature we find the good governance of rulers described as ‘dhammena samena’ always. The concept of justice available in the Buddhist tradition needs to be developed. The Buddhist literature bears ample evidence to the fact that the Buddha had several leading kings among his supporters. Judging by the overall peaceful character of the Buddha we may assume that he may have advised these rulers against violence and aggression. Nevertheless, we do not find instances of the Buddha actively interfering with this aspect (or, for that matter, with any other aspect) of political life. The attitude seems to be one of accepting such practices as the way things are.

Crime and punishment Any system of law has as its necessary entailment that violation of that law results in punishment. Punishment is unpleasant, difficult and bad and involves pain. It is the case in particular in deterrent and retributive forms of punishment. In so far as the Buddhist Vinaya is a system of law it too entails punishment. The Buddhist Vinaya accepts the necessity of punishment although what is meant by the term may not mean exactly the same as in the other religious or legal traditions. The Buddhist punishment is basically reformative and secondarily deterrent. Since the primary function of punishment is to reform the offender it is used in so far as it serves the purpose. Commenting on the nature of punishment advocated in Buddhism KN Jayatilleke observes: The punishments are humane and consist of confession, gating, asking for forgiveness even from a layman, placing on probation, deprivation of rights, privileges and property, banishment to another Sangha (compulsory change of residence), public proclamation, social boycott (brahmadaṇda) and expulsion. (Jayatilleke 1967, 522) The above account shows that the kinds of punishment advocated in the Buddhist Vinaya tradition have basically to do with one’s mind. They are more psychological than physical. In particular, in the Buddhist tradition there were no corporal punishments such as beating, mutilation of limbs or capital punishment. We may question at this juncture why Buddhism prefers psychological to physical punishment. In a sense the kinds of punishments described

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above do have a physical aspect. But they are basically not meant to inflict pain on one’s body. This disbelief in physical punishment is not because Buddhism subscribes to the view that human body is sacred or inviolable and cannot interfere with by anyone other than its owner. This very way of articulation of the issue is alien to Buddhism. The reason why it prefers psychological punishment is connected with its envisaged purpose, namely, to reform the offender. Reform has to come about by understanding. Hence the punishment must make the person think and understand and not arouse mere fear. There is no doubt that pain is pain whether it is physical or psychological. The psychological pain serves the purpose more effectively. The physical pain can only arouse fear. The Buddha says: All fear physical beating up and death; hence comparing with oneself one must not harm nor kill (Dhp v. 129),3 not even as a form of punishment. On the other hand, in accepting psychological punishment Buddhism seems to accept that pain is an effective and inevitable means for reforming offenders. This poses a problem for Buddhist ethics which upholds compassion as a virtue of very high caliber. In using punishment there is no doubt that Buddhism accepts pain as permissible. The question is how it justifies its use of pain as a means. I think the answer lies in the following direction: although Buddhism uses (psychological) pain in reforming people its main aim is not inflicting pain. The methods followed may not be taken as painful in the negative sense by those who are quite honest and serious about their religious practice. What matters here is not the pain in itself but how the two parties, namely, the Buddha, who would pass the judgment originally and the individual members of the Sangha, who become subject to it, take it. It is clear that the former does not take the punishment as a mere infliction of pain for its own sake. If the latter takes it in a negative manner, which he is not supposed to, it is his problem. This suggests that pain with good intention is not altogether bad or undesirable. But, in the Buddhist view, it cannot go beyond certain limits. The picture gets somewhat blurred when it comes to the punishment as practiced by the rulers. As we saw above, the wheel-rolling king wins the world by Dhamma and rules it by the same means. The Kūṭadantasutta of the Dīgha-nikāya explains how punishment can be not only ineffective but also positively harmful when not attended to the causes of the crime. These are discussions of the ideal. In actual practice we do not 3 Sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa – sabbe bhāyanti maccuno Attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā- na haneyya na ghātaye

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see the Buddha interfering with the judiciary system of his contemporary rulers. Buddhist texts refer to various kinds of physical pain inflicted on wrong-doers by such rulers (Ñanamoli & Bodhi 1995, 182).4 These are of gruesome nature and many of them, in the present belief, will be counted as torture at its extreme degree. Discourses just refer to these accounts as things that those who behave wrongly have to undergo, without any note of approval or disapproval. It is clear, however, that once Buddhism starts influencing kings the situation improved. Commenting on the Mahayana sutra called Suvarṇaprabhāsa KN Jayatilleke says: ...punishments mentioned are humane and confined to reproving, warning and banishment, with no mention of corporal or capital punishment on the part of the king, despite the fact that mutilation, torture and capital punishment were rife at the time. This is due to the Buddhist ethics of punishment. Punishment has to be in the best interests of the community but based on love and understanding of the criminal. (Jayatilleke 1967, 514) Relevant examples may be found in the history of the Buddhist countries. In Sri Lanka there are records of some Buddhist kings who imposed the rule of no-killing (‘māghāta’) prohibiting killing of animals and birds. There is no reason to believe that they did not extend the same kindness to human beings! The Great Emperor Asoka has recorded in his edicts how he has been influenced in this regard by the practice of Dhamma.5 Examples of this sort show that Buddhism has had a salutary effect on the judiciary systems of the countries that came under its 4  …when they [criminals) are caught, kings have many kinds of torture inflicted on them. The kings have them flogged with whips, beaten with canes, beaten with clubs, they have their hands cut off, their feet cut off, their hands and feet cut off, their ears cut off, their noses cut off, they have them subjected to the- ‘porridge pot’, to the ‘polished-shell-shave’, to the ‘Rahu’s mouth’, to the ‘fiery wreath’, to the ‘flaming hand’, to the ‘blades of grass’, to the ‘bark dress’, to the ‘envelop’, to the ‘meat hooks’, to the ‘coins’, to the ‘lye-pickling’, to the ‘pivoting pin’, to the ‘rolled-up pallisse’, and they have them splashed with oiling oil, and they have them thrown to be devoured by dogs, and they have them impaled alive on stakes, and they have their heads cut off with swords- whereby they incur death or deadly suffering. The Middle Length Sayings of the Buddha. 5 In his sixth Dharma Lipi (Ananda WP Guruge 1993 Asoka: A Definitive Biography, Colombo: The Central Cultural Fund, pp.574-575) Asoka mentions how he mitigated the suffering of those who were sentenced to jail and their any dependents. However, as Vincent A. Smith says (Asoka: The Buddhist Emperor of lndia, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1991, p.59), he did not abolish capital punishment but he gave those who were to be executed a respite of three days.

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influence. This does not, however, mean that even corporal punishment was totally given up by these kings. Buddhism, with its own system of monastic law and punishment, has never advocated such a position. Buddhism does not seem to have had any difficulty in accepting punishment as involving mental and physical pain in so far it is for the best interests of the community and the offender.

The Buddha and use of force/pain In the preceding discussion we looked at the nature of punishment practiced in the Vinaya. Although it is an essential part of the teaching of the Buddha still it is a domain which is meant to regulate the overt behaviour of the monastic disciples. It is still important to study how the Buddha as a religious teacher viewed using force in his work as a teacher. In the Buddhist tradition the Buddha is described as “incomparable trainer of men to be disciplined’ (anuttaro purisadammasārathi). What is meant by this epithet is that he follows methods of discipline to suit the temperaments of his prospective followers. In a discussion with Kesi, the horse-trainer, who says that he uses both soft and harsh methods, individually or together, in training horses the Buddha admits that he would do the same in training his disciples. The difference was that, whereas Kesi would kill those horses that will not be trained by any of the methods mentioned, the Buddha would let such people leave the Order by not instructing them any more (A II, 112-113). In the Abhayarājakumāra-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya where the question whether or not the Buddha would use harsh words on disciples is posed by Prince Abaya and discussed, the Buddha, pointing to his infant son who was on Abhaya’s lap, gives the following illustration: What do you think Prince? If, while you or your nurses were not attending to him, this child were to put a stick or a pebble in his mouth, what would you do to him? Venerable Sir, I would take it out. If I could not take it out at once, I would take his head in my left hand and crooking a finger of my right hand, I would take it out even if it meant drawing blood. Why is that? Because I have compassion for the child. (Nanamoli and Bodhi 1995, 499) The Buddha subsequently says that in the like manner he would also use harsh language provided it is true and serves a good purpose. Here the Buddha admits that he deals with his disciples both softly and harshly. The simile used in the discourse indicates that, for the Buddha, the process of reform or correction could involve some pain and unpleasantness although it would not amount to drawing blood with vengence.

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Conclusion General applicability of the issue under consideration goes far beyond the matters discussed. It is a well-known fact that the Buddha used only what is called ‘ādesanā pāṭihāriya’, the miracle of explanation, in order to convince people. When this did not work satisfactorily the Buddha opted to wait. However, this was not applicable equally with regard to the disciples who behaved ill. The Vinaya (V II, 236-237) mentions an instance when the Buddha refused to perform uposatha-kamma until an unfit person left the assembly. When the person concerned did not leave voluntarily he had to be removed forcibly, and the Buddha accepted this action by Moggallana Thera, one of his chief disciples, as proper. Surely this is a minor incident of using physical power. It, nevertheless, indicates that even in the nirvana-oriented sublime religious life of the Buddha there can be occasions when other means of persuasion fail. Applying this to wider situations we may question what, for instance, a country, which is totally innocent, can do when it is invaded by a foreign aggressor. It is clear that a Buddhist cannot be an initiator of an aggression. This does not, however, mean that he has to respond to aggression, always and at any cost, by non-aggression. Even the much discussed Cakra-vartin does not dissolve his army. The paradox is that his army is so powerful nobody dares to challenge him. The symbolic armed vehicle returns unhurt (A small country does not have too much of options when a huge aircraft carrier from a Super Power arrives in its harbour for a ‘friendly visit’). The presence of physical power is very much an integral aspect of Rājā-Cakkavatti who is equally ‘dhammiko dhammarājā’: a righteous king. Mahāsīlava Jātaka depicts a Bodhisatva king who allowed an aggressor to come and take over his country. In his case, of course, he had the kindness of the divine beings to regain his kingdom. This extra-ordinary assistance, however, is very unlikely today. So the example of Mahasīlava cannot serve as the proper Buddhist ideal for the modern world. In sum, what this elementary survey shows is that we need to do more work in determining the Buddhist position on these crucial issues.

4. Buddhism on Slavery*

The existence of the institution of slavery in ancient India is evident from both Buddhist and non-Buddhist sources. The standard Brahmanic attitude to this institution was marked by strong approval of it as a legitimate division of social life. According to the dharma-sastra literature and the subsequent Manu’s Code of Law (Manusmṛti) the slaves or dāsas were an essential part of the society. Many of them may have come from the fourth ‘varṇa’ or caste which was religiously legitimized as a creation of Brahma along with the other castes. According to Manu there are seven kinds of slaves, namely, “... he who is made a captive under a standard, he who serves for his daily food, he who is born in the house, he who is bought and he who is given, he who is inherited from ancestors, and he who is enslaved by way of punishment” (Manusmṛti cp VIII-415). People that come under these categories need not belong to any one particular social class. It has been specifically mentioned that a member of any social category may become a slave under different circumstances. For example, among the four kinds of slaves enumerated in the Buddhist texts, one is a person who has voluntarily become a slave (samaṃ dāsavyāmupagata1) (DA I, 168). The story of Raṭṭhapāla refers to a ‘female slave who is a relative ‘(ñāti-dāsi) (MA II, 62) In this manner, in a dire economic situation one may voluntarily become a slave for the sake of one’s existence. This suggests that not all dāsas were necessarily ‘vasalas’ who were considered by the society as most deplorable for they belonged to the lowest social class. Nevertheless, the close connection between slavery and the lowest caste (Śudra), or in other words, the co­ 1  The other three kinds of slaves referred to are: ‘in-born, purchased and taken by force’ (antojāta, dhanakkita, karamarānīta). * Initially published in Dialogue vol. XXIII. Ed. Aloysius Peiris S.J. Colombo: Ecumenical Centre for Study and Dialogue, 1996, pp.1-12.

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extensiveness of slavery and low-casteness seems to be the norm. The Hindu dharma-śāstra tradition is quite clear on the co-extensiveness of dāsatva (slavery) and śudratva (low-casteness). Malalasekera and Jayatilleke refer to the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (vii-29) which says that a Śudra is always born to be a servant of another (Malalasekera & Jayatilleke 1958, 26). Servitude was taken as the in-born nature of the śudras. The same tradition is subsequently crystalized in Manu: But a Śudra, whether bought or unbought, he may compel to do servile work; for he was created by the Self-existent (svayambhū) to be the slave of a Brahmana. A Śudra though emancipated by his master, is not released from servitude; since that is innate in him, who can set him free from it? (Manusmṛti VII, 413-414) This shows that the Śudras were by definition slaves. Of them, the bought śudras may have been a particular person’s property whereas the unbought śudras were availabl to high caste society as slaves in general who could be employed in menial work. In this manner, low-casteness and slavery were two inseparable phenomena which, as have been wellrecorded by Malalasekera and Jayatilleke, were characterized by denial of social, religious and legal rights (Malalasekera & Jayatilleke 1958, 26-28). The same denial of rights may have applied to the slaves originating from other castes whatever may be the reason for their becoming slaves. The only difference may have been that such slaves as those who did not belong to the Śudra caste were not stigmatized by low-casteness. Nevertheless; for all practical reasons all slaves may have been treated alike. A slave from another caste may buy his freedom and cease to be a slave and return to his original caste status; but a Śudra buying his freedom from bondage to a particular person is still a slave, at least in theory. The practice of slavery was an essential aspect of the economy, for at the bottom of the caste system was the preservation of an economic system which provided privileges to certain sections of society. The Hindu tradition justified the practice on religious grounds through the concepts of ‘varṇa dharma’ (four castes created by Brahma) and ‘sva-dharma’ (the duty of each caste as assigned by the Creator). According to Manu: One occupation only the lord prescribed to the Śudra, to serve meekly even those (other) three castes. (Manusmṛti I, 91) The faithful adherence to this decree within this life was the only way open for a Śudra to better his miserable lot in the next birth (Ibid IX, 335).

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Slavery in ancient India, like anywhere else in the world, was marked by lack of personal freedom and being a property of another (D I, 72).2 Nevertheless, it is believed that the Indian version of this institution was characterized by many elements of humaneness. Basham ends his discussion on the subject with the following remarks: There are numerous references in literature to slaves being badly treated by their masters and the slave’s lot must have been often a very unhappy one; but he was probably better off in India than in most parts of the ancient world. Indeed in many contexts it would seem that the word dasa implies rather a bondsman or serf than a chattel slave. (Basham 1990, 154) Although the Indian version of slavery may have been less harsh compared with instances elsewhere, the ideological underpinnings of the practice fortified by religious arguments developed in the dharmaśastra literature exercised an immense influence on the people. Both the oppressor and the oppressed were the victims of this ideology. The emergence of heterodox religious traditions known as ‘śramaṇa’ movements by the time of the 6th century bce needs to be understood in this context. Although the emerging śramaṇa movements were guided by various ‘soteriologies’ they were one in their opposition to and rejection of the Brahmanic social system which was characterized by the caste division of which slavery was a key aspect. The Buddha’s criticism of the Brahmanic caste system is too well -known to be discussed in detail.3 The focus of the Buddhist critique is two-fold: one is to dismantle the concept of superiority or inferiority based on birth. The other is to reconstruct the two concepts on new grounds. The first is done through historical arguments in the discourses such as Ambaṭṭha-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya and through ethical, biological and social arguments in the discourses such as Vāseṭṭha-sutta of the Suttanipāta. As for the second, the concepts of ‘brahmana’ and ‘vasala’ were given an ethical criterion: it is not one’s birth but one’s moral behaviour or lack of it that makes one either a brahmana or a vasala. The idea is expressed in the following well-known words: Na jaccā vasalo hoti- na jaccā hoti brāhmaṇo Kammanā vasalo hoti - kammanā hoti brāhmaṇo (Sn v. 23) 2 The stock-phrase used in the Buddhist discourses is: anattādhīno, parādhīno nayenakamamgamo’ (‘not independen,dependent, not free to move at one’s will’). 3 See Malalasekera and Jayatilleke (1958) for a comprehensive discussion of this aspect of Buddhist social teaching.

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One does not become either a vasala or a brahmana by birth; one becomes so by behaviour. The locus classicus for the moral interpretation of ‘vasala’ is the Vasala-sutta of the Suttanipāta where all types of socially and individually harmful behaviour have been enumerated. The ‘brahmana-vagga’ (chapter on brāhmaṇa) of the Dhammapada (The identical account also occurs in the Vaseṭṭha-sutta of the Suttanipāta.) does the same thing regarding the concept of brahmana. The new characterization is that a brahmana is the one who has purified himself of all his defilements and one who is freed from all bonds (Dhp v. 405, 417). Thus the emphasis is on the character and the behaviour of the person. According to this new interpretation although the brahmin is still the highest, he is so because of his spiritual advancement. Once the myth of the superiority by birth is exploded, the rationale behind caste division cannot exist any longer. This effectively eliminates the ideological justification of slavery and associated evils. Compared with the eloquence with which Buddhism reacts to the caste division one may wonder why the same emphasis has not been given to denouncing slavery. To the extent that slavery is derivative of the caste division the Buddhist critique of the latter is equally applicable to the former. Moreover, that the Buddha, in principle, did not approve of slavery that existed in the society he lived in is very clear from many instances. He forbade his monastic disciples to accept persons as slaves. In enumerating different aspects of morality such as basic, middle and high (culla-sīla, majjhima-­sīla, mahā-sīla) the practice of not accepting males or females as slaves (Bhikkhu ...dāsi-dāsa-paṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato hoti, D I, 64). has been included within the basic4 morality of a pabbajita. Trafficking in slaves (This has been specifically interpreted in the commentaries as ‘trading human beings’ (‘sattavanijjāti manussa vikkayo.) (AA III, 303) has been included among the five harmful and hence prohibited forms of trade. Refraining from such activity has been included in sammā ājīva or right livelihood which is an aspect of the eightfold path. The Buddha further observes that there are only a few people who do not accept slaves and that the majority is in the habit of accepting them, the implication of which is that, though popular, the practice was still wrong (S V, 472). Although the designations ‘culla, majjhima and mahā’ (minor, middle and high) seem to indicate an ascending order, an analysis of the content of the three kinds of sīla shows that middle and great sīlas are only an expansion of the so-called minor sīla. Therefore in this context ‘cula’ may more appropriately be translated as ‘basic’ or ‘primary’.

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The Eightfold path of which sammā-ājīva is an aspect is common to both bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs and upāsakas and upāsikās (clergy and laity). For the bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs, we already know that non-employment of slaves is mentioned as an aspect of their basic sīla, although there is no specific ‘sikkhāpada’ to that effect in the Pātimokkha. This absence is more conspicuous with regard to the sīla of the laity. Sammā-ājīva prohibits trafficking in slaves, but does not refer to receiving the service of slaves. If Buddhism considers slavery as a social evil the Buddha should have requested his lay disciples as well not to employ slaves. Instead what we find in the well-known discourses such as the Sigalovada-sutta (‘Advice to Sigala’) is the Buddha advising his lay disciples to treat slaves well and not to ill-treat them. The Sigālovādasutta identifies six pairs of groups who are mutually bound by a set of duties. The relationship between master and slaves and labourers (dāsakammakāra) is one among those pairs. The Buddha enumerates the duties of the slaves/labourers to their master and vice versa. There the issue is not the validity or otherwise of slavery but how to treat them. This, no doubt, amounts to accepting slavery as a social institution. The significance of the Sigālovāda-sutta is that it places slaves on par with labourers who worked for wages. By doing so Buddhism seems to highlight the actual economic factor behind the practice. In the case of the caste system, on the other hand, rather than saying how the higher castes should treat the lowest caste, what the Buddha did was to challenge the very foundation of this historical institution. The behaviour of the Buddha towards slavery seems to be different. There are two issues to be settled: one is why the Buddha did not prohibit his lay disciples from accepting and patronizing the institution of slavery as he did for his monastic disciples; the other is why did the Buddha not denounce the institution of slavery openly as he did with caste. To deal with the second issue first: Although slavery in India is closely associated with the caste system, in actual practice, a person may have not become a slave automatically due to one’s birth. For instance a brahmin with lesser fortune may not have been able to enlist the service of the lowest caste as his slaves solely on account of his ‘higher’ birth. The decisive factor here may have been the wealth rather than the caste. In other words, although all the Śudras were slaves by definition, in actual practice this may have not been the case. A revealing statement has been attributed to the Venerable Mahakaccana, who himself came from the Brahmana caste. According to it, in the area called ‘Yona-Kamboja’ there

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existed only two ‘castes’, namely, masters and slaves, and the status of these groups was not fixed, for from time to time, masters would become slaves and slaves the masters (Yona-kambojesu aññesu ca paccantimesu janapadesu dveva vaṇñā, ayyo c’eva dāso ca; ayyo hutvā dāso hoti, dāso hutvā ayyo hoti, M II, 149). That the deciding factor in social relations was not the caste but the wealth is specifically mentioned in another instance where the Buddha shows that a Śudra with lot of wealth can employ even a Brahmin or a Ksatriya for his service (M II, 88). The slavery was in this manner, first and foremost, an economic institution. The fact that a member of any caste could become a slave in economic distress etc. shows that slavery and caste were not co-extensive in actual practice. Furthermore, it also shows that slavery is more an aspect of poverty or a result of poverty. Unless the conditions which necessitate slavery are eradicated slavery itself will not be done away with. With the rejection of the ideological foundation of the caste system what is rejected is the ideological justification of slavery. Nevertheless, it does not do away with the real cause of slavery, namely, poverty. The fact that the slaves could buy their freedom shows that the crux of the problem is not social status but economic condition. The basic philosophical insight of Buddhism, namely, that one needs to do away with the cause in order to do away with the effect makes it understandable why the Buddha did not want to launch a campaign against slavery which results from poverty. That poverty is a root cause of social evils is recognized in the discourses of the Buddha. In the Cakkavattisīhanāda-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya the Buddha attributes the genesis of all kinds of antisocial behaviour among people to poverty. In another Dīgha-nikāya discourse, namely the Kūṭadanta-sutta’, the Buddha suggests that it is the duty of the government to provide the means for people to earn their livehood. The Buddha’s views on economics have been discussed in great detail and need not be repeated here. What is more important in the present context is to understand the nature of the social action of the Buddha. The Buddha’s disapproval of the caste system and its associated evils becomes quite clear in his discussions which are well­ known and in his behaviour within the Sangha organization he initiated. He disregarded the caste distinctions when he admitted members into the Sangha order. The Buddha makes the following statement which illustrates this attitude: Just as great rivers: the Ganga, the Yamuna, the Aciravati, the Sarabhu and the Mahi, entering the mighty ocean, lose their

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former names and identities and are termed simply ocean; even so these four castes: ksatriyas, brahmans, vaisyas, and sudras, going forth from the world into the homeless life, into the discipline of Dharnma proclaimed by the tathagata, lose their former names and lineages and are reckoned simply recluses, sons of the Sakya...(Hare 1978, 139) What is to be noted, however, is that the full-fledged social action of the Buddha was confined to the society of the Sangha. In other words, the Buddha did not interfere with the caste practices of his lay disciples. It does not mean that either he approved it or that he did not explain the futility of the practice to the laity. The case is quite the contrary. Nevertheless, the Buddha did not interfere with the social life of the laity who came under the jurisprudence of the king. The Buddha’s role as a social reformer or social worker needs to be understood in the context of his being a religious teacher whose fundamental function was ‘soteriological’. The Buddha seems to have avoided the element of social reforming which entailed intensive involvement with society which could be a deviation from his main objective. The dilemma that lay before the Buddha may have been the following: without creating a suitable social environment the practice of the path leading to the cessation of suffering was impossible; on the other hand, to create such an environment within the society at large was something that requires tremendous changes of the system which is no easy task. There is a revealing story in the Samyutta-nikāya according to which, once the Buddha was wondering whether it is possible to rule a country ‘without killing, without causing others to kill, without conquering, without causing others to conquer and without grieving, without causing others to grieve’. It is said that, at that moment, the Mara, the Evil One, came to the Buddha and tried to persuade him to try it saying that the Buddha could even transform an ordinary mountain to gold. However, the Buddha rejected Mara’s proposal saying that since the man’s thirst for pleasure is endless the intelligent person must behave in an even manner (iti vidvā samaṃ care) (S I, 116-117). As is evident from this episode too the Buddha has distanced himself from fully involved political action. In the face of this difficulty the path chosen by the Buddha was to have his own organization of a group of selected people who accepted the rule of his teaching, namely, the organization of the Sangha. Within this organization, the Buddha could put into practice what he wanted to see in the society at large. The Buddha created a society not only where the equality of members was recognized but also where there was neither

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poverty nor riches. Since poverty is basically a psychological trait, it is impossible for poverty to exist in a society where people are content with what they have (santuṭṭhitā) and have few wants (appicchatā). For the same reason and due to the ‘sāṅghika’ system (community ownership) practised among the Sangha, nor can there be a sense of material affluence. In such a society there cannot be slaves (or masters for that matter). The prominent moral qualities such as loving-kindness (mettā), wisdom (paññā) cannot allow for a slave mentality or a master mentality. We know that within the community of the Sangha the Buddha prohibited employing slaves. If one violated this or any other law there was a method within the Vinaya to deal with such violations. The members had the choice either to obey the laws or to return to the lay society if they chose not to do so. If they chose to remain within the order, in case of a violation, there is an elaborate system of punishment characterised by reformation of the character of the offender. In cases of violations such as the four ‘defeats’ (pārājikā) the solution was to let the offender leave the order. The biggest punishment according to the Buddhist monastic discipline was to expel a member from the membership of brotherhood. This was considered equivalent to the capital punishment in the civilian jurisdiction. This point is made clear in the Abhayarājakumāra-sutta where the prince called Abhaya inquired about the Buddha’s manner of disciplining his followers (M I, 392-396). Within the monastic order, the Buddha seems to have had complete control. However, once a member leaves the order he or she cannot be within the jurisdiction of the order. Being fundamentally a religious teacher the Buddha may have kept himself within certain limits in his social action. If he were a passionate religious or social reformer he could have demanded certain forms of behaviour from the society at large and taken punitive measures in instances of violation or failure to comply with them. But it does not seem that the Buddha chose that path. The path chosen by him was that of a guide. The Buddha said: The work must be done by you; the Tathagatas are the pointers (of the path) (Tumhehi kiccaṃ ātappaṃ - akkhātāro tathāgatā, Dhp v. 276). This means that the Buddha did not think that it was his responsibility to get, by any means, the people to follow the path he showed. By establishing the monastic order the Buddha provided the necessary environment for those who wished to follow the path completely. However, his involvement with the ordinary civilian society seems to be much more limited. The case with slavery is a

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case in point. Definitely the Buddha would have wished a society where all people enjoyed equal rights and no one was a slave of another. However, the reality of the society was different. Certain groups of people had to relinquish their freedom for the sake of their survival. The Buddha seems to have accepted this reality. He asked his disciple not to ordain a slave for a slave has to take permission from his or her owner. The Buddha did not want to get into conflict with the society by disregarding these social conventions. Nor did he wish his organization to be misused by those who were running from slavery. He was not a rebellious social reformer to choose that type of course of action. He was first and foremost a religious teacher whose primary goal was ‘soteriological’. In addition to slavery being an economic condition, this should explain the Buddha’s twofold attitude to slavery, namely tacit acceptance within the society at large and clear rejection within the monastic order. The Buddhist attitude towards this important social institution may have definitely had a positive effect on its actual practice in society. As we noted earlier, the ‘Advice to Sigala’ envisages a society where slavery was a social contract guided by mutual responsibilities and where slaves were kindly and humanely treated. This enables us to assume that the already less harsh version of Indian slavery was still less harsh within the Buddhist lay society. It is known that the influence of Buddhism gradually dwindled within India after Asoka. However, we find unmistakable evidence of the Buddhist influence in Asoka’s rock edicts. His attitude towards his subjects is characterized by his well-known statement: ‘save munisā mama pajā’ - ‘all human beings are my children’ (Malalasekera and Jayatilleke 1958, 63ff). The positive influence of this attitude on the communities who received Buddhism subsequently seems to be varied. Sri Lanka provides us with a case where both caste system and slavery existed as social and economic institutions respectively, though, again in much less harsh from than their Indian counterparts. Within the monastic order the norm was to disregard any division based on social or economic or ideological considerations and to be guided by the principle of equality (samānattatā). During the time of the Buddha there were no slaves employed for the services of the monasteries although there seems to have developed some large scale monasteries. There is an instance in the Vinaya when King Bimbisara offered five hundred ‘ārāmikas ‘(workers belonging to, living in or associated with an ārāma, ­monastery) to the venerable Pilindivaccha for the completion of a new monastery. Since the vinaya does not record any disagreement

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either from the Buddha or from the public it is possible to think that the ārāmikas were not a kind of slaves. There seems to have developed a tradition of having ārāmikas in the monasteries from the time of the Buddha. This could have become gradually established subsequently, both within India and outside, when the monasteries grew in size. Sri Lanka, however, provides an interesting example of having slaves as a part of the monastic labour force. Buddhaghosa reaffirms the basic vinaya rule when he says that one must not employ slaves. However, as Professor RALH Gunawardena too has noticed, Buddhaghosa immediately says that it is acceptable if they are given as ārāmikas, veyyāvaccakaras (doer of monastic chores) or kappiyakārakas (those who assist monks to live properly) since it has been the tradition of the monasteries to have such helpers. It is difficult to say whether this is to find a convenient way to accept slaves under a euphemism. However, immediately after this statement Buddhaghosa adds that if the āramika given in that manner works full-time (before and after the mid-day meal) for the monastery he must be treated in the manner a samanera (a monk without higher ordination) is treated by ‘providing him with even medicine’. Nevertheless, Professor Gunawardena adduces evidence from inscriptions for the existence of slaves in the monasteries: Some inscriptions of the seventh and eighth centuries which were found in monastic precincts refer to people releasing themselves or others from slavery by paying a fee which amounted at times to a figure as high as one hundred kahapanas. Some scholars have cast doubt on the significance of the evidence from these inscriptions. They deny that the vaharala which occurs in these records, meant ‘slavery’. But even if this evidence is disregarded, the prevalence of slavery at monasteries is beyond doubt. According to the Culavamsa Silāmegha­vanna (A.D. 619628) granted captives taken in battles as slaves to monasteries, and Aggabodhi IV (667-683), Potthakuttha and Sena I (83 -853) provided slaves for the various religious establishments which they founded. The Galpata-vihara inscription is even more specific. It mentions two types of slaves - “hereditary slaves (anvayagata) and “bought slaves” (ranvahalin). In fact, it records an actual instance in which slaves were purchased with gold belonging to a monastery. It also lists eighty-three slaves in groups of families, having been granted to serve the monastery in various capacities as cowherds, potters and tailors. (Gunawardena 1979, 120-121)

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There is no doubt about the fact that the kings and other donors had supplied the monasteries with slaves. However, if the monks treated them in the manner prescribed by Buddhaghosa one might wonder whether ‘slavery’ is the proper term to describe them. On the other hand, Professor Gunawardena has noticed “the paucity of evidence concerning the organization of the Mahavihara and the Jetavananikayas”. “Almost all the records”, he further says, “belong to the Abhayagiriy monastery and the Cetiyagiri monastery at Mihintle” (Gunawardena 1979, 100) which belonged to the Abhayagiriya sect. Given the Mahāvihārins’ professed strict allegiance to the Vinaya it is possible that there may have been a significant difference in the manner they handled ‘slaves’ if they had any. The Galpata-vihāra inscription referred to by Professor Gunawardena belongs to the Polonnaruwa period. Professor Paranavitana thinks that the ‘Parakramabhuja’ referred to in this inscription is, most probably, Parakramabahu (Epigraphia Zelanica IV, 201) who succeeded in uniting the three nikayas existing in the country and subsequently assisted the monasteries in the regions outside the capital, and this vihara belonged to ‘Śailantarāyatana’ (or ‘Selantara-samūha’) of whose sectarian affiliation ‘there is no evidence at all’(Gunawardena 1979, 302). Therefore we are not in a position to determine whether or not the monastery belonged to the Mahavihara tradition. Even if it is possible to determine the affiliation there is not much point in doing so because the Sangha may have become one unitary body and adhered to one disciplinary code by this time. Nevertheless, it is possible that the monastic behaviour and the attitudes towards slavery may well have taken a different shape by this period of intense social and political change. We are not in a position, however, to say anything conclusively due to the lack of evidence. But it is clear that the historical developments peculiar to particular geographical locations ‘necessitated the disciples of the Buddha to revise the original stance of not accepting slaves. The specific Buddhist influence could still be seen in the manner these later disciples treated their ‘slaves’. Besides the slavery that existed within society due to ideological, social and economic factors to which Buddhism as a teaching and an institution has responded in the manner outlined above, there was another form of slavery about which the Buddha was more concerned. It is the psychological slavery due to which people are inextricably bound with samsara. Perhaps this could be the real slavery the teaching of the Buddha was aiming at. According to the Buddha the behaviour of an ordinary worldling is marked by his slavery to the world he grasps from his senses. In the well ­known Madhupiṇḍika-sutta the process of

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sense perception which ultimately leads one to the subjection of sensory objects has been clearly described. It says: Because of eye and material objects, O brethren, arises visual consciousness; the meeting of the three is sensory impingement, because of sensory impingement arises feeling. What one feels one perceives; what one perceives one reason about; what one reasons about one proliferates conceptually. What one proliferates conceptually, due to that, concepts characterized by the prolific tendency assail him in regard to material shapes cognizable by the eye, belonging to the past, the future and the present... Commenting on this, a recent authority characterizes this situation in the following words: The deliberate activity implied by the third person verb is seen to stop at ‘papañceti’ (‘proliferates conceptually’). Now comes the most interesting stage of the process of cognition. Apparently it is no longer a mere contingent process, nor is it an activity deliberately directed, but an inexorable sub jection to an ob jective order of things. At this final stage of sense-perception, he who has hitherto been the subject now becomes the hapless object (Italiciged by the original author). (Nanananda 1986, 6) The sole emphasis of the teaching of the Buddha is to liberate people from this subjugation. In addition to the concept of ‘mokṣa’ which is popular in the Indian religious context, the Buddha introduced the term ‘vimutti’ or release which has the same etymological origin, and this latter term brings into sharp relief the liberative aspect of the ultimate Buddhist religious experience. The concepts corresponding to ‘vimutti’ are ‘saṃyojana’ (entanglement), ‘bandhana’ (bond), and ‘yoga’ (bondage). All these concepts indicate a situation in which beings are stuck to self-centred existence. This state has been figuratively described in the statement: ūṇo loko atitto taṇhā dāsoti- ‘the world lacks and is unsatisfied and slave to craving’ (M II, 68). The liberation or nirvana signifies the ultimate release from this psychological slavery the eradication of which is the primary purpose of the teaching of the Buddha. In fact, it is significant to note that the elimination of the five ‘hindrances’ (nīvaraṇa), so named for they obstruct the attainment of nirvana, has been compared to several different senses of freedom. Freedom from slavery is one among them: Just as a man might be a slave, not his own master, dependent on another, unable to go where he liked, and after some time

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he might be freed from slavery, also to go where he liked, might think: Before this I was a slave...And he would rejoice and be glad about it. (Walshe 1987, 102) The above-outlined stage in the process of purification and freedom (visuddhi and vimutti) seems to be most decisive for it provides the basis for the entire subsequent attainments. To identify this stage with freedom from slavery suggests that the teaching of the Buddha deals with a more fundamental kind of inner slavery. This shows the significance of the term ‘yogakkhema’ (freedom from bondage) as another expression for nirvana which is the emancipation from all forms of suffering.

5. Dissent in Buddhism: Its Doctrinal (Dhamma) and Monastic Disciplinary (Vinaya) Perspectives*

Introduction In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary five different but related meanings of ‘dissent’ are identified. The third among them is to “differ in religious doctrine or practice especially from a prevailing or established Church.” It appears that this particular meaning comes closest to what we are proposing to discuss in this chapter, namely, how dissent is understood in the teaching and the monastic discipline of Buddhism. When we claim to discuss dissent in Buddhism it is assumed that there is a corresponding concept in the Buddhist literature. It is not easy to find a specific concept to the phenomenon of dissent in the Buddhist tradition. In discussing ‘nonconformity’ Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics identifies three concepts in it. While ‘heresy’ stands for opposition to ecclesiastically settled orthodoxy, ‘schism’ for separation from the communion of the society claiming to be the one true church, and ‘dissent’ for divergence from the beliefs and doctrines maintained by the national settlement.1 The three concepts, heresy, schism and dissent, are usually understood in the context of Christianity. The discussion that will follow will make clear that these concepts may be used in the context of Buddhism only in a limited manner. Strictly speaking in Buddhism one is hard pressed to find ‘ecclesiastically settled orthodoxy’ which is prerequisite for 1  Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, edited by James Hastings, Edinburgh, 1917. (See under ‘nonconformity’). * Initially published in Kalana: GSB Senanayaka Felicitation, ed. WS Karunatilake et al. Kelaniya: Sri Lanka, 1996, pp.168-176.

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heresy. What comes close to the category of heresy is the denial of the Buddhist view of no-self (anatta/anatma) with which some followers of the Buddha had difficulties. This, however, has to be distinguished from what is called ‘wrong view’ (micchā-diṭṭhi) in Buddhism which is considered to be morally and ethically undesirable and harmful. In the course of the discussion we will find that instances of ‘schism’ in the sense of ‘split of the community’ (saṅgha-bheda) and ‘dissent’ in the sense of misinterpretations or wrong views of the doctrine may more comfortably be located within Buddhism. Wrong-view (micchā-diṭṭhi) will be discussed briefly to highlight how it differs from the other two categories, and how it does not constitute dissent in either of the other two senses. Looking from a historical perspective we see that Buddhism is a result of dissenting from the Brahmanic religion which the Buddha as the Prince Siddhartha may have initially followed and also a result of dissenting from his two teachers to whom Siddhartha went immediately after his renunciation. Looking from the point of view of these early events, we may say that Buddhism was a result of dissent in the sense of rejecting the orthodox Brahmanic and Sramana views and walking away from them signifying both theoretical and practical phases of dissent. True to this dissenting spirit, the Buddha, once he attained enlightenment, showed a remarkable openness for inquiry and questioning of his followers. The most well known example is much discussed Kālāma-sutta (A I, 188-193) in which the Buddha instructed Kalamas to not to accept any claim on the grounds of reasoning, authority, orthodoxy or personal biases. He insisted that they should accept only when they know for themselves that a particular assertion is morally blameless and conducive for wellbeing when practiced. A less well known instance is the Vīmaṃsaka-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M I, 317-320), which he taught his immediate monastic disciples, unlike Kalamas who were a group of free thinkers with no particular religious affiliation. In this discourse the Buddha allowed his monastic followers (who were not able to read his thoughts) to investigate on his physical and verbal (external) behavior to make sure whether or not the Buddha was the person whom he claimed himself to be. An interesting question that emerges from these instances is that whether or not any situation of some of the followers dissenting and leaving had they found any evidence of the Buddha’s immoral or unacceptable behavior was anticipated, or whether or not any such situations actually happened and have been recorded in the history of the tradition. We will come to these concerns again toward end of this discussion.

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Dissent: wrong views and misinterpretations of the doctrine Like in any religious view, the Buddha was quite serious about disciples understanding his teaching correctly and accurately. The following excerpts from discourses reveal that the correct understanding of what he taught was considered crucial by the Buddha. Bhikkhus, those bhikkhus who explain non-Dhamma as Dhamma, … those bhikkhus who explain Dhamma as nonDhamma … non-discipline as discipline … discipline as nondiscipline… what has not been stated and uttered by the Tathagata as having been stated and uttered by him…what has been stated and uttered by the Tathagata as not having been stated and uttered by the Tathagata…what has not been practiced by the Tathagata as having been practiced by him… what has been practiced by the Tathagata as not having been practiced by the Tathagata…what has not been prescribed by the Tathagata as having been prescribed by the Tathagata… what has been prescribed by the Tathagata as not having been prescribed by him are acting for the harm of many people, for the unhappiness of many people, for the ruin, harm and suffering of many people, of devas and human beings. These bhikkhus generate much demerit and cause good Dhamma to disappear. (emphasis added) (Bodhi 2012, 105) Having described in these emphatic words the damage could be caused by the wrong understanding of what he taught, the Buddha articulates how the opposite right understanding would lead to ‘sustain the good Dhamma.’ In a similar vein, the Buddha referred to discourses with explicit meaning (nītattha) and with meaning requiring interpretation (neyattha), and stressed the crucial importance of observing this distinction when interpreting and understanding the discourses given by him: Bhikkhus, these two misrepresent the Tathagata. Which two? One who explains a discourse whose meaning requires interpretation as a discourse whose meaning is explicit, and one who explains a discourse whose meaning is explicit as a discourse whose meaning requires interpretation. These two misrepresent the Tathāgata. (Bodhi 2012, 151) Other similar categories are categorical (ekaṃsika) and non-categorical

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(unekaṃsika) statements which need to be distinguished properly lest distortion will result (D I, 191). The classification of questions into four types based on the manner in which they should be answered too is relevant in this context: a question to be answered categorically (ekaṃsavyākaranīya), a question to be answered after making a distinction (vibhajja-vyākaraṇīya), a question to be answered with a counterquestion (paṭipucchā-vyākaaṇīya), and a question to be set aside (ṭhapanīya) (Bodhi 2012, 432-433). The idea of this classification is that a particular question requires a particular method for it to be answered correctly, and confusing the methods will lead to misunderstanding. In order to get a clearer idea as to how the Buddha behaved on the face of dissent we could examine a few instances from the discourses. One such is the case of a bhikkhu named Ariṭṭha who had the “pernicious view” that “as I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, those things called obstructions (antarāyika dhamma) by the Blessed One are not able to obstruct one who engages in them.” (Nanamoli & Bodhi 1995/2001, 224: Alagaddūpama-sutta). The sutta mentions that his fellow bhikkhus tried to dissuade Ariṭṭha from this view, but failing to do so they informed the matter to the Buddha. The Buddha reprimanded him saying: “Misguided man, to whom have you ever known me to teach the Dhamma in that way?” and gave a comprehensive exposition of his entire teaching and concluded by reminding his listeners that the Dhamma well proclaimed by him was ‘clear, open, evident and free from patchwork’ and that his teaching without fail leads to the desired emancipating destination. A similar pernicious view is reported in another discourse in the Majjhima-nikāya (M I, 256- 271), Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta (Greater Discourse on the Destruction of Craving). It is the wrong view, arisen in the bhikku named Sāti, namely, “As I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is this same consciousness that runs and wanders through the round of rebirths, not another.” As in the earlier instance, the fellow monks failing to convince him of the error in his view, informed the matter to the Buddha who reprimanded him in the following words: Misguided man, to whom have you ever known me to teach the Dhamma in that way? Misguided man, have I not stated in many ways consciousness to be dependently arisen, since without a condition there is no origination of consciousness? But you, misguided man, have misrepresented us by your wrong

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grasp and injured yourself and stored up much demerit, for this will lead to your harm and suffering for a long time. (Nanamoli & Bodhi 1995/2001, 350) This reprimand was followed by an exposition of the Dhamma, and, in conclusion, the Buddha referred to Bhikkhu Sati again and said that he is ‘caught up in a vast net of craving, in a trammel of craving’. Both these instances have certain similarities which seem to be relevant to our discussion. Interestingly, the names of both these bhikkhus in question have been added with some extra information: Ariṭṭha, referred to earlier, was described as ‘formerly of the vulture killers’ (gaddhabādhipubba), and the latter as a ‘son of a fisherman’ (kevaṭṭaputta). It does not appear to be an accident that two of the known cases of dissent occurring in the discourses have been associated with persons who are from despicable professions (In either case, however, Buddhghosa, the commentator, does not seem to attribute any particular significance to these remarks). The term ‘moghapurisa’ (misguided man) is perhaps the strongest term that the Buddha seems to have used to refer to people with unacceptable behavior (Interestingly, we do not hear about ‘mogha-itthi’ – misguided women in the Buddhist literature!). According to Buddhaghosa, the Buddha would use this term to refer to either one who does not have potential for higher realization in this life or one who does not have higher realization at that moment even if he does have potential (MA II, 23). Furthermore, in both instances, the Buddha’s exposition of the Dhamma was addressed to the bhikkhus in general and not to the actual individuals concerned, and the both discourses are concluded with the usual statement that the listeners [bhikkhus] were satisfied, but no specific mention of the ‘misguided’ interlocutors is found. The reason, according to Buddhaghosa, is that both these bhikkhus, and Sunakkhatta who will be referred to shortly, had lost their opportunities of higher realization in this sāsana owing to their wrong views or misguided behavior (MA II, 104, 306). The bhikkhu named Sunakkhatta was one who left the Sangha in order to join another religious group, and, according to evidence found in the discourses, went around speaking ill of the Buddha. He is not so much associated with any particular wrong view as a malicious mind toward the Buddha. According to the Greater Discourse on the Lion’s Roar (I, 68-83) his remarks on the Buddha were the following: The recluse Gotama does not have any superhuman states, any distinction in knowledge and vision worthy of the noble ones.

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The recluse Gotama teaches a Dhamma [merely] hammered out by reasoning, following his own line of inquiry as it occurs to him, and when he teaches the Dhamma to anyone, it leads him when he practices it to the complete destruction of suffering. (Nanamoli & Bodhi 1995/2001, 164) Referring to these remarks the Buddha said that the misguided man Sunakkhatta was angry and his words were spoken out of anger, and thinking that he is discrediting the Buddha, he was in fact praising him! Sunakkhatta was simply identified as ‘son of Licchavis’ which does not carry any negativity about him, but in fact, once the Buddha had pralsed Licchavis in quite positive terms (In the Mahāparinibbāna-sutta, the Buddha compares their appearance with that of gods of the Tavatimsa heaven, D II, 96-97). The discourse was addressed to Sariputta and not to Sunakkhatta who had already left. It is the ‘lion’s roar’ of the Buddha about his unparalleled wisdom with the implication that none can challenge him with good reasons. Based on the above examination of the few instances of the wrong views on the Dhamma held by some disciples we may conclude that the tradition is quite clear that those who held divergent views were wrong, and further that they could not have a meaningful existence within the tradition while still holding such views. Looking at the subsequent history of Buddhism in India we come across Pudgalavadins (personalists) who held that although there is no soul there is a ‘person’ who transmigrates from one birth to the next. The view held by Bhikkhu Sati, referred to above, seems to be the precursor of this view. But unlike Sati who was just one person here we have a whole group of Vatsiputriya bhikkhus (those who were the pupils of Vātsīputra) who held this view and systematically defended it. The Theravada response to this view is found in the Kathāvatthu, one of the seven texts of the Theravada Abhidhamma. Buddhaghosa identifies Vajjiputtakas and Sammitiyas and many who belonged to other religious persuasions (aññatitthīya) as holders of this view2 (KvuA 9). It is interesting to see that Buddhaghosa groups those who held pudgalavada with the followers of other religions external to the sāsana. In this sense, we have here in Buddhism a category that comes very close to ‘heretics’ although how the Buddhists treated these so-called heretics is not the same as it was in the western religions. 2  Ke pana puggalavadinoti. Sāsane vajjiputtaka c’eva sammitīyā ca bahiddhā ca bahu aññatitthiyā.

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Dissent: schism of the Sangha One has to understand the gravity of causing schism of the Sangha in the context of the frequent remarks made by the Buddha on the value of the unity of the Sangha. The unity of the Sangha is happiness (sukhā saṅghassa sāmaggī), the Dhammapada (194) says. Such a happy life of the Sangha has been described in the following words: ‘living in concord, with mutual appreciation, without disputing, blending like milk and water.’3 A key characteristic of the Sangha in unity is the recital of the Pātimokkha together which is described in the Vinaya as ‘… the Sangha being in concord and in agreement and without dispute, holds undivided recitation (of the Pātimokkha) and lives in comfort’ (Patimokkha: 10th Saṅghadisesa rule). Later in this discussion we will see that schism of the Sangha essentially involves disrupting this practice of undivided recitation (eka-uddesa).4 Schism of the Sangha (saṅgha-bheda) is considered as one of the most heinous acts in the Buddhist tradition. It is ranked with killing mother, father or an arahant or causing with mind of hatred the Buddha to bleed, and classified among the five incurable lesions5 (A III, 146; Bodhi 2012, 743- 744). The classic (and only) case of saṅgha-bheda during the time of the Buddha is associated with bhikkhu Devadatta who became the arch enemy of the Buddha. His act of saṅgha-bheda is described in the Vinaya (V II, 180-206: Section on Saṅghabheda). According to this account, Devadatta makes five demands from the Buddha (V II, 197), and the latter refuses to accept them. Subsequently, he makes several unsuccessful attempts at the life of the Buddha, and manages to wound the Buddha by throwing a slab of stone at him. He secures the support of young Magadha Prince Ajatasattu and established his own order with the help of a group of bhikkhus some of whom were equally evil minded 3  The Buddha heard these words when he visited some of his disciples who were staying at a grove named Gosinga at the outbreak of strife among the bhikkhus of Kosambi. Culagosinga-sutta, Majjima-nikāya 31; Nanamoli and Bodhi (1995/2001) p.302. Also in Vinaya I pp.337-360. 4  I have elsewhere discussed the connection between the recital of the Dhamma and the Vinaya together (saṅgīti) and the unity of the Sangha. See: “Saṅgīti and Sāmaggi: Communal recitation and the unity of the Sangha,” Buddhist Studies Review, Vol. 17, No.2. 2000. 5  These actions are more popularly known as ‘ānantarika-kamma,’ karmas entailing immediate effects’ (Vinaya II p.193 refers to Devadatta’s act of bleeding the Buddha with a mind of hatred. Majjhimanikaya Atthakatha II, 102 refers to five ānantariya acts).

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and some new and inexperienced. The mark of the establishment such a break-away group is to perform the recital of Patimokkha (uposatha) and other group related acts (saṅgha-kamma) independently, away from the main group of the Sangha which Devadatta managed to do. According to the Vinaya account, the Buddha does not accept this development with disinterested equanimity. He persuades Sariputta and Moggallana to visit and meet the group that went away with Devadatta and convince them of the error of their decision and bring them back which the two chief disciples did successfully. Devadatta’s act has been described in the Vinaya as an act of saṅghabheda which makes the doer ‘incurable and suffer in misery and hell for an uncountable number of years’ (kappa/kalpa). In this account, the Buddha is seen making this prediction about the future destiny of Devadatta (V II, 202). The Buddha’s statement about Devadatta’s future is not presented as a wicked wish of the Buddha or his curse on Devadatta. It may be understood as a statement based on the natural working of the principle of action (kamma-niyāma). Five niyāmas including kamma-niyāma (the rest being utu, bīja, dhamma and cittaniyāma) are mentioned in the commentarial literature (DA I, 432) which is operative independent of any agent. In the Visuddhimagga (Vism 177; Nanamoli 1956, 184) Buddhaghosa mentions five conditions under which a practitioner of meditation is bound to be unsuccessful however much he tries. One such condition is ‘hindrance of karma’ (kamma-āvaraṇa) which refers to the five ānantariya kammas upon the commission of which one will not be successful generating any meditative attainment such as absorption (jhāna), path (magga) or fruit (phala). It is understandable how a person with a grave karma entailing immediate effect cannot be successful in his meditation the result of which is always good. Thus, the result of karma in Buddhism is impersonal, natural and cosmic. Notwithstanding all such considerations, however, it is undeniable that the tradition views saṅgha-bheda as disastrous and that it would do everything at its disposal to avert such an eventuality. It is interesting to note that, even though the saṅgha-bheda is a crime of the highest severity, and it can be done only by a bhikkhu who is a member of the Sangha, i.e. by one who has received the higher admission (upasampadā), this offence has not been considered a ‘defeat’ (pārājikā), the highest Vinaya offence at the commission of which one loses irrevocably one’s claim to the membership among the Sangha. Instead, it is one of the saṅghādisesa offences, an offence next to defeat

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in its severity, from which one may be reinstated by the Sangha. The relevant rule is the following: Should any bhikkhu attempt to cause a schism of the Sangha when it is in concord and should he undertake and endeavour in and persist in a legal process conducive to schism of the Sangha, that bhikkhu should be admonished by bhikkhus thus: Let the venerable one not attempt to cause a schism of the Sangha when it is in concord, let him not undertake and endeavour in and persist in a legal process conducive to schism of the Sangha. Let the venerable one be at peace with the Sangha; for when the Sangha being in concord and in agreement and without dispute, holds undivided recitations (of the Patimokkha etc.) then it lives in comfort. Should that bhikkhu, being admonished by the bhikkhus thus, endeavour as before, then that bhikkhu should be remonstrated by the bhikkhus, (that is, the announcement in the Sangha to stop a bhikkhu from such action) up to the third time so that he may relinquish (his endeavour). If on being remonstrated with up to the third time he relinquishes (his endeavour), that is good; if he should not relinquish it, this entails initial and subsequent meeting of the Sangha.6 Apart from this tenth rule directly dealing with the offence of saṅgha-bheda, the eleventh rule is also connected to the same offence and deals with those bhikkhus who support acts of schism by any other bhikkhu. In this manner, not only commission of the saṅgha-bheda offence but also those who support and encourage such act are guilty of this category of violation, the remedial measure of which requires the concurrence of the Sangha both at the beginning and conclusion of the process of rehabilitation. The two types of treatment, most severe and irreparable from the karma point of view, and less severe and reparable from the Vinaya point of view, have to be understood as trying to achieve two purposes simultaneously, namely, deterring the prospective violators from doing the act of saṅgha-bheda and keeping at the same time the doors open for the violators to later return so that the unity of the Sangha is ultimately safeguarded. From the Vinaya traditions we can gather that the organization was always ready to accept those who were guilty of 6  Translation from: Somdetch Vajrananavarorasa Sangharaja (1992), The Entrance to the Vinaya (Bangkok: Mahamakutarajavidyalaya). Vol I p.72.

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this violation provided that they were ready to reform themselves. An example discussed in detailed in the Vinaya (V I, 337-360) is the split that happened between two groups of bhikkhus from Kosambi. When the two rival groups finally agreed to settle down and reestablish the unity, the Buddha advised them to perform uposatha and recite the Patimokkaha. His advice to these bhikkhus was to perform uposatha and recite the patimokkha at that very moment (tāvadeva) of reestablishing the unity of the Sangha (Tāvadeva uposatho kātabbo pātimokkhaṃ uddisitabbaṃ V I, 367) (emphasis added).This category of uposatha is called ‘sāmaggi uposatha’ (uposatha of unity) which is in addition to the regular acts of uposatha at the fourteenth (cātuddasī) or the fifteenth (paṇṇarasī) instant of the month. The symbolic significance of this act of group recitation of the Patimokkha (code of Vinaya rules) has to be understood, as referred to above, as affirming the unity of the Sangha by publicly expressing their allegiance to a common set of rules. Although the unity of the Sangha has been a very sensitive issue in the Theravada monastic organization, the historical practice associated with it has always been characterized by some degree of vagueness. The interesting reference found in the Vinaya (V II, 289-290) to an elder called Purāṇa [‘the ancient’] raises a few questions. When Purana arrives in Rajagaha the elders headed by Mahakassapa had completed the historic meeting of what we know today as the first council (saṅgīti). The leaders approach him and ask him to accept their act of recitation of the Dhamma and the Vinaya. The answer they receive is not encouraging. He says that the elders may have executed the recitation well; but he would rather go by what he had heard directly from the Master himself Susaṃgῑt’āvuso therehi dhammo ca vinayo ca, api ca yath’eva mayā bhagavato sammukhā sutaṃ sammukhā paṭiggahitaṃ tath’evāhaṃ dhārayissāmῑti (V II, 290). Notwithstanding the historically important issue as to the identity of this hitherto unheard of elder Purāṇa with a large gathering of five hundred followers and the strangeness of the name attributed to him, one could question whether or not the elder is guilty of saṅgha-bheda for clearly he is going to have his uposatha recitation separately with his own group. The question has not been raised and the issue has not been discussed. On the other hand, it is clear from the beginning that the Buddhist Sangha has been composed of many different local/regional groups who performed their uposatha separately within their own designated limits – sīmā. And because this practice was the norm, it is imaginable that saṅgha-bheda may have always been understood as happening only within a particular group and not in

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the Sangha as a whole. Devadatta’s case discussed above may have been at a stage when the Sangha was limited to a fairly small area. With the subsequent spread of the Sangha outside ‘the middle land’ (majjhimadesa) a universal split of the Sangha seems out of the question. History of the Sangha during the first five centuries after the Buddha is full of beginnings of new chapters (nikāya) most of which no longer exist except Mahayana and the traditions that arose from it including Vajrayana. Although any new nikāya can be considered as a split of the Sangha, every new beginning may not have been caused by any Dhamma or Vinaya related disagreements. A clearer case of saṅghabheda, however, is the split of the Mahavihara Sangha in Sri Lanka and the emergence of Abhayagiri-nikāya. The Mahavihara bhikkhus decided to suspend one bhikkhu named Mahatissa on the ground that he got involved too closely with the affairs of the king, Vaṭṭagāmiṇi Abhaya (29-17 bce). The proper procedure would have been for the guilty bhikkhu to accept the verdict of the Sangha and present himself for rehabilitation. Instead what happened was that his group started functioning as a separate independent group (Mhv 33: 96-99), an act which is tantamount to performing uposatha separately amounting to saṅgha-bheda. Although the initial reason behind the split is related to Vinaya it may have had additional reasons related to power and the personality of the people involved. Subsequently, the Jetavana-nikāya started from Abhayagiri, and the three nikāyas existed in the country till Maha Parakramabahu (1153-1186 ce) initiated unification.7 Interestingly in the Sri Lanka Mahavihara tradition these developments are hardly discussed as instances of saṅgha-bheda, and consequently not identified as ānantariya karmas. More recent developments in Sri Lanka during the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries seem to have been motivated by quite different reasons and consequently have not been identified as instances of saṅgha-bheda or ānantariya kamma.8

Wrong view Wrong view (miccha-ditthi) is usually given as a mental act (manokamma) and occurs in the analysis of actions into three categories as 7  A reader interested in details may refer to Adikaram (1946/1994 Ch. Six pp.88100) and Rahula (1956/1993: Ch. 6 pp.78-91)who discuss in detail instances relevant to how the Mahvihara tradition during the Anuradhapura period dealt with the Buddhist views different to those of Theravada, particularly Vaitulya-vada or Mahayana. 8  I will not discuss the issue of the emergence of the current three main nikāyas and their sub-divisions among the Sri Lanka Sangha, though interesting, due to lack of space.

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physical, verbal and mental. What we discussed above as wrong views and misinterpretations are in fact described as pernicious or evil views (pāpakaṃ diṭṭhigataṃ) and are connected to the wrong grasp of the teaching of the Buddha. What we have here under ‘wrong view’ is not misunderstandings but misguided mental behaviour characterized by distorted vision (viparīta dassana) (M I, 287; A I, 33) which causes harm to the doer by generating unwholesome states (akusala). The following excerpts from the discourses articulate the characteristics of wrong view: Bhikkhus, I do not see even a single thing on account which unarisen unwholesome qualities arise and arisen unwholesome qualities increase and expand so much as wrong view. For one of wrong view, unarisen unwholesome qualities arise and arisen unwholesome qualities increase and expand. Bhikhus, I do not see even a single thing on account of which, with the breakup of the body, after death, beings are reborn in the plane of misery, in a bad destination, in the lower world, in hell, so much as wrong view. Possessing wrong view, with the breakup of the body, after death, beings are reborn in the plane of misery, in a bad destination, in the lower world, in hell. (Bodhi 2012, 117) Bhikkhus, for a person of wrong view, whatever bodily kamma, verbal kamma, and mental kamma he instigates and undertakes in accordance with that view, and whatever his volition, yearning, inclination, and volitional activities, all lead to what is unwished for, undesired, and disagreeable, to harm and suffering. For what reason? Because the view is bad. Suppose, bhikkhus, a seed of nee, bitter cucumber, or bitter gourd, were planted in moist soil. Whatever nutriments it takes up from the soil and from the water would all lead to its bitter, pungent, and disagreeable flavor. For what reason? Because the seed is bad. So too, for a person of wrong view …all lead to what is unwished for, undesired, and disagreeable, to harm and suffering. For what reason? Because the view bad. (A I, 30- 32; Bodhi 2012, 117-118) The wrong view characterized in this manner is given as tenfold: There is nothing given; nothing offered; nothing sacrificed; no fruit or result of good and bad actions; no this world; no other world; no mother; no father; no beings who are reborn spontaneously; no good and virtuous recluses and Brahmins in the world who have themselves realized by direct knowledge and declare this world and the other world (Bodhi

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2012, 381). These views are basically related to morality, efficacy of moral action, and its result particularly in the life after death. In the Buddhist tradition what is considered as wrong view is mainly the denial of karma and its result (vipāka) which Buddhism seems to have taken as that which causes the total breakdown of morality in individual and society. To hold the views opposite to this wrong vision is understood as the right vision, and it is considered the most desirable characteristic in any individual. The passages quoted above in relation to wrong vision have their counterparts for right vision. It is interesting to see that this type of right vision has not been considered in the tradition as a monopoly of the followers of the Buddha. It can be shared even by those who have some wrong views such as self-view (atta-vāda). According to the commentary to the Majjhima-nikāya (MA I, 196) the right vision is twofold as worldly (lokiya) and world transcending (lokuttara). The worldly right vision is to have the knowledge of one’s ownership of karma (kammassakatā-ñāṇa) and knowledge in conformity with truth (saccānulomika-ñāṇa). The world transcending right vision is the knowledge of noble paths and fruits. There are three persons who have right vision, worldling (puthujjana), trainee (sekha) and non-trainee (asekha). Of these, the worldling is twofold as, one who is external to the sāsana (bāhiraka) and one who is internal to the sāsana (sāsanika). The former may belong to another religious persuasion, but still such a person may have right vision in so far as he accepts karma and believes that he has to bear the responsibility of his actions. Such a person, however, may not be able to have knowledge in conformity with truth for he believes in the existence of self (Tattha bāhirako kammavādī kammassakatā diṭṭhiyā sammadiṭṭhi hoti, no saccānulomikāya attadiṭṭhiparāmāsakattā. MA I, 196). What is significant in this commentarial analysis is that the tradition is not hesitant to attribute some degree of right vision to all those who accept the validity of moral action whether or not they are the followers of the Buddha.

Discussion and conclusion In this discussion we identified three different but related aspects of dissent. The first is to have wrong understanding about the Dhamma. In bhikkhu Sati’s example his view about consciousness was a view of self, the denial of which can be considered the hallmark of the teaching of the Buddha. This wrong understanding was described as a pernicious view for such a view would cause much suffering to the world. This is a matter related to understanding of the Dhamma, and hence it is

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epistemological and Dhamma related. The second aspect was the schism of the Sangha, and it is organizational and Sangha related. We noticed that how saṅgha-bheda is treated in two different ways in the Dhamma and the Vinaya has important moral and ‘legal’ implications. The third is a moral category and hence ethical and Kamma related. At a cursory glance, this category may appear to qualify to be understood as referring to set of heresies. But a closer look will reveal that these beliefs are not views in propositional sense and hence epistemological sense, but are different ways of denying the efficacy of ethical action. For example, the view that ‘there is no mother’ is not an assertion of absence of mother but an ethical assertion denying the validity of any reverential treatment of one’s mother. Dissent usually being an internal affair of any religion or an organization, how Buddhism treated the followers of other religions (añña-titthiya), though an interesting matter, does not come within the purview of the present discussion. The Buddha says that disputes that could arise among his followers on the Patimokkha rules (the Vinaya) are relatively less serious than any disputes on the path or the way (the Dhamma) (M II, 243-251; Bodhi 1995/2001, 854). The history of the Sangha, however, shows that they did not have much disagreement, at least, on the most important matters of the Vinaya. In fact all the traditions (according to the versions of the Pratimoksa found so far) accept the most important categories of Vinaya, namely, pārājikā and saṅghādisesa rules. The differences are only on less serious rules. But contrary to Buddha’s expectations, the history of the Sangha after his parinirvana reveals that there were many disputes among his disciples on the Dhamma. The Kathāvatthu-pakaraṇa records 217 such views held by different sects, and it is interesting to note that none of these views is related to the Vinaya. The Kathāvatthu is the Theravada response to the views held by those who broke away from the original Sangha which came to be known as ‘theravada’ in the subsequent history. Although the Theravadins represented the orthodoxy in this debate, the manner of the debate shows clearly that the encounter between two groups was very cordial and professional. In the process of the debate ultimately both proponent and the opponent resort to the textual evidence in support of their views, making the resolution of the issue a matter of proper interpretation of the word of the Buddha. No verdict of the right or the wrong view is given at the conclusion of the debate, and it is left to the reader to decide.

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This leads us to the issue of how dissent was handled in Buddhism. In the course of this discussion we saw that the Buddha was open for questioning and inquiry. Most of the major discourses of the Buddha were not monologues but dialogues or conversations with groups of listeners (It is interesting to note that, at an early stage in Buddhist studies in the west (1899), Rhys Davids translated the Dīgha-nikāya into English as “Dialogues of the Buddha”). Asking questions and answering them was the preferred method of the Buddha. Although this does not mean that he conceded defeat in a conversation on a controversial matter or that he changed his view in favour of the view held by his interlocutor,9 the Buddha was merely content with making his point. It appears that it did not matter to him whether or not his listeners accepted his views (although almost always discourses ended with the expression that his listeners were satisfied with what he said). Neither Ariṭṭha nor Sati was excommunicated for holding their views. Nevertheless, their views were recognized as clearly wrong, ultimately to be corrected. The tolerant attitude characteristic of the Buddha has continued throughout the history of Indian Buddhism. Although Buddhists were persecuted and physically harmed by others (i.e. Hindu and Islamic rulers) it does not seem that Buddhists harmed or persecuted adherents of other religious traditions or their own brethren for holding wrong or heretical views. One event in the history of Indian Buddhism requiring our attention is the purification of the sāsana done during the reign of Asoka recorded in Sri Lanka chronicles (Mahāvaṃsa Chap. V). According to this account, the Sangha had not performed uposatha for seven years on the ground that the sāsana had been infiltrated for personal gain by those who belonged to other religious traditions. The intervention of the minister sent by the king in order to look into that matter turned out to be a disaster. Finally, the king had to get involved personally. It is said that all those among the Sangha who were wanting in their morality were made to revert to household life. The fake bhikkhus who had infiltrated were identified by testing their knowledge about the Dhamma. It is said that all those who failed to respond correctly, i.e. that the Buddha was an analyst (vibhajjavādi) were ousted from the sāsana. 9  Richard Robinson’s following observation seems pertinent in this context: Throughout the suttas and vinaya, though the inquirer may be at liberty to doubt or challenge Gotama’s statements, it is taken for granted that Gotama is right and the inquirer is wrong so long as he persists in disagreement. Gotama never once concedes that his opponent is right and he himself is wrong: “Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge” (book review), Asian Studies, 1969. p.80.

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Although in this account the reason that necessitated a purification of the Sangha was the morally deteriorated state of the Sangha, since it also refers to testing of the knowledge of the people involved we can see that all the other views excepting one were considered heresies. The important thing, however, that the punishment, if at all, given to those who were considered wrong was only discontinuation of their membership in the Sangha, a punishment way too mild contrasted with how the heretics were dealt with in the medieval Christian tradition. Asoka’s example of purification of the sāsana seems to have been subsequently followed by the Buddhist rulers of ancient Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. A good example is Maha-Parakramabahu (1153-1186 ce) of Sri Lanka who has gone into history as one who unified the three nikāyas, i.e. Mahavihara, Abhayagiri and Jetavana, by amalgamating the latter two with the former. Since in the final analysis both split and unification are the sole responsibility of the Sangha, the king’s role may be understood as that of a facilitator (even though we could imagine that he was a very powerful facilitator!). The Mahavaṃsa does not fail to mention that the king gave ‘lucrative positions’ to those who were ousted in the process (Mhv78:2710). However, this type of treatment does not seem to have happened always. The Mahavaṃsa reports an earlier instance of some sixty bhikkhus living in Abhayagiriya “who had turned to Vetulya-doctrine” (Mhv 36: 111) being banished beyond the sea by king Goṭhābhaya (302-315 ce). It may be imagined that the king did this at the counsel of the Mahavihara Sangha. But they do not seem to have gone beyond this step. In this manner, the overall Theravada history appears to be largely preserving the tolerance toward dissenting views, a characteristic of early Buddhism.

10  Wilhelm Geiger (1929/2000) Cūlavaṃsa being the more recent part of the Mahāvaṃsa, New Delhi: Asian Education Services).

6. Monastic Sexual Behaviour: A Study of the First Pārājikā and Related Rules of the Theravada Vinaya*

Introduction Celibacy has been a key aspect of the Buddhist monastic life from the beginning. In fact it has been prescribed for both householders and monks though at two different levels. For the former, celibacy has been prescribed as a part of their more intensive religious behaviour associated with the observance of uposatha1 day during which householders are expected to undertake to observe several more precepts than their regular five precepts. In the regular five precepts what comes as refraining from sexual misconduct (kāmesu micchācārā veramaṇi) becomes, under this special observance, equal to what is observed by the monks and nuns, namely, refraining from non-noble behaviour (abrahma-cariyā veramaṇi). Whereas total abstinence from sex is only optional for householders, for the monks and nuns it has been mandatory from the beginning of the Saṇgha organization. This paper focuses basically on the practice of celibacy within the monastic community for it is in the context of monastic life that the full import of the practice becomes clearly evident. In the monastic 1  Uposatha (Sanskrit: upavashatha) observance pre-dates Buddhism. lt seems that the practice was already there as a part of Indian religious life and the Buddhists in fact adopted it partly on popular demand [See Vinaya: Uposatha -khandhaka for details]. With the gradual development of monasticism in Buddhism it seems that specific modes of religious observance were evolved for the laity, an important aspect of which was for them to spend a day in a monastery undertaking to observe eight (aṭṭhangasīla) or ten precepts (dasa-sīla). * Initially published in Buddhist and Pali Studies in Honour of the Venerable Kakkapalliye Anuruddha, Hong Kong: Centre for Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong, pp.651-663.

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discipline, Vinaya, rules and traditions related to sexual behaviour become very important and hence one aspect of the paper will be to study the mechanism of the Vinaya rules associated with monastic sexual behaviour. Since Vinaya receives its justification in the broader context of the Buddhist religious practice aimed at attaining the purification/ liberation (visuddhi/vimutti) it is crucial for us to understand the doctrinal justification of celibacy within the broader context. The paper will be organized in the following manner: the first part will discuss the Vianya or the disciplinary rules related to monastic celibacy. The second part will discuss the doctrinal foundations of this practice. For the first section my main sources will be the Theravada Pali Vinaya literature, namely, the Vinaya-pitaka and its commentary by Buddhaghosa. More recent secondary literature will be cited for further clarification. For the second, the main sources will be in addition to the Vinaya-pitaka, the Sutta-pitaka or the discourses in the Pali canon. Although a good part of the paper focuses on the first pārājikā relevant to the bhikkhu (male) Sangha, the similar rules relevant to the bhikkhunī (female) Sangha and the other subsidiary rules having to do with sexual relations between bhikkhu and bhikkhunī Sangha will also be discussed.

The Theravada Vinaya stand on celibacy It is important to note at the beginning that the Vinaya rule connected with celibacy is the very first of the rules counting among the most severe in the degree of violation, and it is common for both bhikkhu and bhikkhunī Sangha. The four rules included in the first category, namely, pārājika, are so called for the particular violations amount to the ‘defeat’ of the offending member. What this term exactly means is given in the Vinaya: Like a person, whose head is cut off, is unable to live with that mutilated body, a bhikkhu having associated with sex becomes a nonsamana and non-sakyan-son (V III, 28).2; (i.e., loses his monkhood and the membership among the Buddha’s Sangha). This shows that the sense of ‘defeat’, amounting to losing one’s monkhood, has much stronger connotation than it would usually believed to contain. By violating this rule one becomes ‘un-associable’ (asaṃvāsa) by the Sangha, which technically means that the Sangha cannot execute Vinaya acts having him/her as a member, cannot recite the Vinaya together and does not share the same mode of training with the particular person any 2 Pārājiko hotῑ’ti seyyathāpi nāma puriso sῑsacchinno ababbho tena sarῑrabandhanena jῑvituṃ, evam eva bhikkhu methunaṃ dhammaṃ paṭisevitvā assamaṇo hoti asakyaputtiyo, tena vuccati pārājiko hotῑti

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more: Asaṃvāso’ti saṃvāso nāma ekakammaṃ ekuddeso samasikkhātā, eso saṃvāso nāma. so tena saddhiṃ n’atthi, tena vuccati asaṃvāso’ ti (V III, 28). The first pārājika rule has the main prohibition with two specifications. The main rule goes as: whoever bhikkhu engages in sexual act becomes defeated and un-associable [yo pana bhikkhu methunaṃ dhammaṃ patiseveyya pārājiko hoti asaṃvāso]. This original rule was enacted due to sexual intercourse by the monk named Sudinna with his former wife. It is known that the Buddha did not enact Vinaya rules until the conditions that necessitated doing so were there, and a tradition going back to the early period has that during the first twenty years of the Sangha there were no any regulated Vinaya rules, but, instead the disciples were guided by the Dhamma itself. The Sudinna’s case is considered to be first serious matter that arose within the Sangha. The conditions under which Sudinna had to have sex with his former wife are quite clear; he was the only son of a rich family; not wanting to lose their son and also not wanting see their vast property perished in the absence of a heir, they first tried their best to avert him from his decision to join the Sangha. When it failed and when he visited his parents at their house for the first time after his becoming a bhikkhu again they tried to lure him back, and having failed in both efforts the mother made a plea that at least he should produce a heir lo their family to which Sudinna had to agree. Consequently, he had sex with his wife with the intention of impregnating her [an act which actually caused pregnancy]. By this time there was no rule prohibiting the act of this nature. The Vinaya says that he did so not seeing the disadvantages of the act (anādīnavadasso... V III, 18). But his subsequent behaviour characterized by remorse shows that he was not ‘innocent’ in his mind. I will come to this point later. When the Buddha came to know the incident he enacted the rule prohibiting sexual intercourse. Two clauses, “at least with a female animal” (antamaso tiracchānagatāyapi) and “having made commitment to the training of bhikkhus, without giving up the training and without admitting the weakness” [bhikkhūnaṃ sikkhāsājivasamāpanno sikkhaṃ apaccakkhāya dubbalyaṃ anāvikatvā] were added due to subsequent developments. The first had to be added when a monk had sex with a female monkey thinking that what is prohibited is only sex with humans, and the next was added when some monks who got deprived by having sex wanted to return to the Sangha confessing their subsequent admittance of wrong-doing. The second specification allows that if a monk who had sex did so having distanced himself from

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the training and having admitted his inability to conform to the rule, he could return later to the Sangha. The case is clear for in fact by doing as indicated in the second specification a monk gives back his monkhood to the Sangha and thereby becomes an ordinary householder, who is beyond the jurisdiction of the Vinaya and whose behaviour consequently would not amount to violating the rule. Such a person may return to the Sangha provided that he or she were to display the proper attitude toward the Vinaya. One who did not fulfill this requirement should not be accepted if he or she were to return. The Buddha clearly says that a person who fulfilled the requirement should be accepted and granted upasampadā on return and one who did not conform to it must not be given upasampadā (V III, 23).3 With the addition of two specifications the complete rule on the first pārājikā reads as: whoever monk, without giving up the training, and without revealing his weakness, were to have sex even with a female animal becomes defeated and un-associable (Yo pana bhikkhu bhikkhūnaṃ sikkhāsājῑvasamāpanno sikkhaṃ apaccakkhāya dubbalyaṃ anāvikatvā methunaṃ dhammaṃ patiseveyya antamaso tiracchānagatāya pi, pārājiko hoti asaṃvāso’ ti V III, 23). In the specific context of the rule what is meant by the sexual activity [methuna­dhamma] is sex between man and woman. However, the rule was meant to be understood more broadly and more precisely. The phrase “engages in sex” [methunaṃ dhammaṃ paṭisevati] has been described defining what sex means and what engaging in sex means. Sex is defined as “that which is improper phenomenon, uncultured phenomenon, lowly phenomenon, lewd, requiring cleansing by water, covert, requiring the engagement between two [people] (Methunadhammo nāma: yo so asaddhammo gāmadhammo vasaladhammo duṭṭhullaṃ odakantikaṃ rahassaṃ dvayaṃ dvayasamāpatti, eso methunadhammo nāma. V III, 28).The engagement in such act has been described as “inserting of the mark with the mark or sex organ with the sex organ at least to the amount of mustard seed” (Paṭisevati nāma: yo nimittena nimittaṃ angajātena angajātaṃ antamaso tilaphalamattaṃ pi paveseti, eso paṭisevati nāma. V III, 28). In the definition of sex, the fact that the association of two people has been given as a requirement is important for us to understand the nature of sex referred to here. In the subsequent description of engaging in sex, although involvement of two sexual organs and penetration are mentioned, giving thereby an impression of 3  The Pali word used here is “na upasampādetabbo” meaning, ‘should not be given upasampadā [full membership], and not “na pabbājetabbo” meaning “should not be given pabbajjā” [initial leaving of household life], which seems to imply that such a person still may be accepted as a sāmaṇera [novice].

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heterosexual sex, in its technical analysis what the rule specifies is not mere vaginal sex but sex in any one of the three modes, namely, vaginal, anal and oral, the three modes being referred to as “three paths” (tayo maggā). This broadens the definition of the partner of sex, not confining to heterosexual act but sexual act between any two partners, whether or not belonging to the same sex. What really matters is whether or not sex act involves any of the ‘three paths’ and not sex of those who are engaged in it. In the technical analysis, following this convention, three females are identified as human, non-human and animal females and three males are identified as human, non-human and animal males (Although the category of non-human may be taken as including all non human members including animals, in the Pali usage ‘a-manussa’ is usually taken to mean only non-human counterparts in sub-divine, demon or hungry-ghost spheres, and not even those who belong to the divine sphere). Although the involvement of two people has been mentioned in the definition of the sex act [as we saw above], an incident, mentioned in the ‘case studies’ (vinīta-vatthu), of a monk who took his own member by his own mouth and who inserted his own member in his own anus have been judged to have violated the rule and guilty of pārājikā offence (V III, 35). Series of incidents involving dead bodies show that the rule applies equally even if the ‘partner’ is not alive. The next category of offences, which is called “saṅghādisesa” for the recovery process from the violation requires the participation of the Sangha at the beginning and at the end (i.e., “formal meeting of the Sangha”), begins with sex that does not involve ‘the three paths’ mentioned above. It is important to note that this act is not described as methuna-dhamma or sexual act, and consequently the violators are not considered as ‘defeated’. The relevant rule goes as: intentional emission of semen, unless in a dream, involves the saṅghādisesa offence” (Sañcetanikā sukkavisaṭṭhi aññatra supinantā saṃghādiseso’ ti. V III, 112). This rule covers any sexual act not involving any of the paths, executed within oneself or between two or more] people. The origin of the rule is a group of monks who engaged in masturbation. The case studies, however, refer to incidents between two monks but not involving paths. The two conditions, having intention and emission of semen both have to be fulfilled in order one to be considered guilty. This means that if emission happens even in a sexually provocative act or in an act motivated by sexual desire but emission is not intended or in an act meant for emission but emission does not happen, the monk concerned has been considered not guilty technically.

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In addition to this rule involving ‘second degree’ sex, there are four other rules belonging to the same category related to sexual desire, namely, touching a woman’s body with a perverted mind (saṅghādisesa rule # 2), speaking lewd words to a woman with a perverted mind (rule # 3), speaking with a perverted mind, in the presence of woman, in praise of administering to one’s sexual needs (rule # 4) and functioning as a gobetween carrying man’s sexual intentions to a woman or vice versa (rule # 5). Although these rules do not involve any direct sexual act in themselves such behaviour has been considered serious violations due to their obvious unhealthy impact on celibate life. It is interesting to note that the pārājikā field for the bhikkhunīs is much broader than that of bhikkhus. In addition to their being bound by the almost identical first rule related to having sex with a male partner4 (human, non-human or animal), they have two additional pārājikā offences not involving direct sexual intercourse but physical touch with a man, which are as follows: whatever bhikkhunī overflowing with desire, should consent to the rubbing or rubbing up against or taking hold of or touching or pressing against, below the collarbone, above the circle of the knees, of a male person who is overflowing with desire, she too becomes defeated, not in communion (rule # 5); whatever bhikkhunī overflowing with desire for the sake of following what is verily not the rule, should consent to the holding of the hand by a male person who is overflowing with desire or should consent to the holding of the edge of (her) outer cloak or should stand or should talk or should go to a rendezvous or should consent to a man’s approaching (her) or should enter into a covered place or should dispose the body for such a purpose, she too becomes defeated, not in communion. (rule #8: Norman 2001, 119-121) What is covered by these additional two pārājikā rules (NB. bhikkhunīs have altogether eight pārājikā rules.) seems to have been included within the category of the saṃghādisesa in the case of bhikkhus. What is interesting to note is that there is no saṅghādisesa rule for the bhikkhunīs corresponding to the first of that category of rules for the bhikkhus involving sex other than three paths. For the bhikkhunīs sexual 4 Yā pana bhikkhunῑ chandaso methunaṃ dhammaṃ patiseveyya antamaso tiracchānagatenapi pārājikā hoti asamvāsā. The rule is not completely identical for it does not have the clause concerning giving up the training and revealing weakness, which is a concession for those former bhikkhus who wished to come back.

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intercourse has been conceived solely as heterosexual act involving a male partner. Although there is no evidence in the Vinaya to suggest that it was aware of lesbianism involving two women, precaution has been taken against bhikkhunīs engaging in activities generating self-stimulation. In addition to the rules concerning sexual acts or sexually oriented behaviour there are good number of rules for both bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs that make sense only in the context of sexual behaviour. For instance, in the case of bhikkhus, in addition to the pārājikā and saṅghādisesa offences discussed above, there are following rules of varying degrees of gravity: i. Indefinite [aniyata]: two offences, one involving sitting with a woman privately in a screened seat convenient enough for sexual intercourse, and the other sitting in a place convenient enough not for having sex but for addressing her with lewd words. These two are called indefinite because the wrong-doing has to be determined on the word of a female follower (upāsikā) who is trustworthy and who brings forth the charge and the admittance by the person involved; accordingly the person may be charged either with pārājikā or with saṅghādisesa. ii. Offence entailing expiation with forfeiture [nissaggiya pācittiya]: the fifth rule in this category prohibits a monk from accepting a robe from bhikkhunī who is not related. He may do so only when it is an exchange of robe. Offences involving expiation [pācittiya]: the following offences involving expiation seem to be relevant for the present discussion: sharing the same bed together with a woman (rule # 6); teaching Dhamma to a woman exceeding five or six sentences in the absence of a knowledgeable man (rule # 7); exhorting bhikkhunīs without approval of the Sangha (rule # 21); even approved by the Sangha, exhorting after the Sun has set (rule # 22); exhorting a bhikkhunī having gone to her quarters except when a bhikkhunī is not well (rule # 23); giving robe material to a nonrelated bhikkhunī, except exchange (rule # 25); sewing a robe for or have a robe sewn by a bhikkhunī who is not related (rule # 26); setting out on the same journey, by arrangement, with a bhikkhunī even to the next village except at the proper time (rule # 27); embark with a bhikkhunī, by arrangement, on a boat journey other than crossing over (rule # 28); eating knowingly food prepared by a bhikkhunī, other than by a prior arrangement with the householder (rule # 29); taking a seat with a bhikkhunī privately, one man with one woman (rule # 30 ); taking a seat

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with a woman on a screened seat (rule # 44); taking a seat with a woman privately, one man with one woman (rule # 45); setting out on the same journey, by arrangement, with a woman, even to the next village (rule # 67). The purpose of the rules seems to prevent any situation that could be conducive for any mutual intimacy causing damage to one’s celibate life. In the case of bhikkhunīs, in addition to the pārājikā rules, there are subsidiary rules of varying degrees of gravity that can be made sense only in the context of celibate life. They are as follows: i. Offences entailing the formal meeting of the Sangha [Saṅghādisesa]: herself overflowing with desire, accepting with her own hand food from the hands of a man overflowing with desire and partaking of it (rule # 5) and instructing a bhikkhunī to ignore whether or not the man offering food is overflowing with desire, but accept with her own hands such food and partake of it since she herself is not overflowing with desire (rule # 6); acting as a go­between conveying man’s sexual desire to woman or vice versa (rule # 7). [NB. There are no indefinite [aniyata] offences for bhikkhunīs, and none of the thirty offences of expiation involving forfeiture [nisaggiyapācittiya] seem to be relevant for the present discussion] ii. Offences entailing expiation [pācittiya]: Slapping [genital] with the palms or the hand [rule# 3 1]; using a wax -stick (for stimulation) (rule # 4); washing genital inserting the fingers more than two finger-joints (rule # 5); standing together or talking together, one woman with one man , in the dark of the night when there is no light (rule # 11); standing together or talking with a man, one woman with one man, in a screened place (rule # 12); standing together or talking with a man, one woman with one man, in an open place (rule # 13); standing together with or talking with a man, one woman with one man, in a carriage or in a cul-de-sac or at crossroads or should whisper in his ear or should dismiss the bhikkhunī who is her companion [rule # 14]; not giving up keeping company with a householder or a householder’s son even when she is advised against it by the other bhikkhunīs [rule # 36]; entering into park with bhikkhus knowingly and without permission (rule # 51); without having obtained permission from the Sangha or from the group should sit together with a man, one woman

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with one man, make a boil or a scab that has formed on the lower part of her body burst or break or have it be washed or smeared or bound up or unbound (rule # 60 ); ordaining a trainee who keeps company with men, youths, who is a dwelling place for grief (rule # 79); making one’s bed with a man (rule # 102); teaching Dhamma to man more than five or six sentences (rule # 103); taking a seat with a man privately on a screened seat (rule # 125); and taking seat with a man privately, one woman with one man (rule # 126). This study of the rules involving peripheral offences other than pārājikā or saṅghādisesa directly involving sexual intercourse or behaviour shows how the tradition has strived to keep its monastic members right on its focus. The discussion of this section may be summarized by highlighting the emphasis put on limiting the heterosexual relations of bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs into non-sexual spheres.

II. Celibacy as an essential aspect of the practice/ soteriological significance of celibacy We need to understand the rationale behind the first pārājikā: why having sex by hhikkhus and bhikkhunīs has been considered to be so grave that it was made the first of the most serious of offences. In a way, this is not hard to explain viewing the phenomenon from the point of view of the crux of the Buddha’s realization, namely, the four noble truths. The first two aspects of the teaching say that the people in the world are suffering and that they undergo various forms of suffering due to the thirst (taṇhā) they have for the pleasurable (A I, 1, 2) objects (kāma-taṇhā), for becoming (bhava-taṇhā) and for non-becoming (vibhava-tanhā). The last two say that cessation of this thirst is the end of suffering and the path to be followed is the noble eighttfold path. The root of the problem according to this diagnosis being the thirst for pleasurable things, the other two aspects of thirst being dependent on the first, the need to get rid of the thirst for pleasures is obvious. The pleasures in question are the ones associated with the five faculties, forms, sounds, smells, tastes and contacts associated respectively with eye, ear, nose, tongue and body. The mental phenomena associated with mind too are included in this category. It is believed that all the basic five forms of pleasures are obtained in sexual relations. This is emphatically stated by the Buddha when he said that he cannot see any other form, sound, smell, taste or touch more attractive to a man than

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those belonging to a woman and vice versa (This, of course, assumes a universe where homosexuality or lesbianism was not fully identified). The gratification of senses, kāma-sukhāllika-anuyoga, as the very first discourse of the Buddha puts it, has been described as ‘low, vulgar and belonging to the ordinary”(hῑno, gammo, pothujjanῑko S V, 421) The discourses are plentiful with calamities and the multifarious sufferings associated with search for pleasures. For example, the Mahā­ dukkhakkhandha-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya details many forms of suffering people undergo due to pleasures. The Buddha says: With sensual pleasures as the cause, sensual pleasures as the source, sensual pleasures as the basis, the cause being simply sensual pleasures, kings quarrel with kings, nobles with nobles, Brahmins with Brahmins, householders with householders, mother quarrels with the son, son with mother, father with son, son with father, brother quarrels with brother, brother with sister, sister with brother, friend with friend. And here in their quarrels, brawls, and disputes they attack each other with fists, clods, sticks, or knives, whereby they incur death or deadly suffering. (Nanamoli & Bodhi 1995/2001, 181) Raṭṭhapāla, one among many young householders who left life full of pleasures for monkhood , explains to King Koravya the reasons behind his renunciation in the following words: Sensual pleasures, varied, sweet, delightful In many different ways disturb the mind Seeing the danger in these sensual ties I chose to lead the homeless life, O King (M II, 74; Nanamoli & Bodhi 1995/2001, 691) One could go on and on quoting texts to support this position. But how the early Buddhist tradition identifies the cause of the problem is beyond doubt. It is only rational for those who perceived the problem in this manner to adopt a life distanced from sensual pleasures, and naturally the monastic life was considered ideal for the purpose. Putting it in the words of very Raṭṭhapāla referred to above: Venerable sir, as I understand the Dhamma taught by the Blessed One, it is not easy while living in a home to lead the holy life, utterly perfect and pure as a polished shell. Venerable sir, l wish to shave off my hair and beard, put on the yellow robe, and

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go forth from the home life into homelessness. I would receive the going forth under the Blessed One, I would receive the full admission. (M II, 55-56; Nanamoli & Bodhi 1995/2001, 678) When the monastic life is defined in this manner vis-a-vis the household life characterized by gratification of senses it is natural to understand the monkhood as defined by celibacy. It is in this context that the Vinaya remark about Sudinna that he did not know the repercussions of his action when he did so becomes unacceptable, as Dhirasekera, a distinguished scholar of Theravada Vinaya, has pointed out.5 The admission of Sudinna to the Sangha, as described in the Vinaya, is quite similar to that of Raṭṭhapāla, both being young and wealthy householders who had to strive to persuade their households to get permission for admission. It is difficult to believe that Sudinna did not know about the implications of his act. This point becomes further clear when we examine the remarks by his fellow celibates on hearing the act committed by Sudinna: Isn’t it the case that the Buddha has taught the Dhamma in many ways for detachment and not for attachment; for disengagement and not for engagement; for non-grasp and not for grasp? ... Isn’t it the case that the Buddha has taught the Dhamma in many ways for detachment of attachment, for non-intoxication of intoxication, for the control of thirst, for the destruction of longing, for the cutting of circle, for the extinction of craving, for detachment, for cessation, for Nibbāna. (V III, 19-20) These remarks testify to the fact that celibacy was understood in the tradition as an essential aspect of monastic life which follows from the very logic of renunciation, i.e., ending suffering by eradicating the thirst for pleasures. 5 “It is difficult to maintain here that anadinavadasso means that Sudinna did not know that his act was an offence against the spirit of Buddhist monasticism. Two things preclude us from accepting this position. Sometime after the commission of the act Sudinna is stricken with remorse that he had not been able to live to perfection of his monastic life... He knows and feels that he has erred and brought ruin upon himself. For he says that he has committed a sinful deed…Perhaps it would also have occurred to him that his act was in violation of the item of sīla which refers to the practice of celibacy ... Therefore we cannot take anadinavadasso to mean that Sudinna did not know that methunadhamma was an offence against monastic life.Nor does he claim such ignorance anywhere during the inquiries held by his fellow celibates or the Buddha. Secondly, even in the absence of any restrictive regulations it seems to have been very clear to all members of the Buddhist Sangha that according to what the Buddha had declared in his Dhamma, the offence of methunadhamma contradicts the spirit of true renunciation...” (Dhirasekare 1981, 46-47).

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This intimate connection between monastic life and practice of celibacy makes clear why a person found guilty of violation of the rule had to be removed forthwith from the Sangha. The term used to indicate removal from the Sangha is “should be killed” [nāsetabba]. The origin of the metaphorical usage can be seen in the Buddha’s discussion with the horse-trainer who classifies his methods of training horses as mild and rough and failing in both, killing. The Buddha responds to him by saying that he would follow the identical methods in training his disciples. To the bewildered Horse-trainer as to how the kind-hearted Buddha could kill any disciple the Buddha explains that killing in his training is totally giving up and letting him/her go from the Sangha. Thus ‘killing’ in the context of training is a metaphor for removing a person from the Sangha. The strong language, however, indicates how the tradition viewed the situation. It also strongly suggests that the guilty person, who did not conform to the condition stipulated by (by such expression as) sikkhaṃ apaccakkhāya, dubbalyaṃ anāvikatvā, referred to above, cannot be reinstated.6 Looking from a broader ethical point of view adopted in the Dhamma one could argue that violation of pārājikā offence is not strictly an evil action [pāpa-kamma], and hence what one loses is only the membership of the Sangha, which does not mean that he cannot attain magga-phala. In that sense it is quite different from ānantariyapāpa [an evil action producing effect in the next birth itself without fail], which, for example, is believed to have committed by King Ajatasatthu by killing his father. In the Sāmaññaphala-sutta (Dīgha-nikāya 2) the Buddha refers to this action and says that if it was not for this reason, the King would have generated ‘the eye of Dhamma’ then and there at his encounter with the Buddha, but it did not happen for this grave action committed by him (Walsh 1987, 109).7 Furthermore, nowhere has it been said that one will be born in an 6  Once removed from the Sangha how many people wanted to reenter and how many succeeded remains a matter of history. Unless the particular group of the Sangha knew about the person there does not seem to have had any other method of knowing the situation of such a person as a new candidate. It is interesting to note that among the questions that are asked from a prospective candidates to judge his/her eligibility this particular question [whether he/she was guilty of committing pārājikā offence as a former member of the Sangha] is not included. 7 “As soon as the King had gone, the Lord said: The King is done for, his fate is sealed, monks! But if the King had not deprived his father, that good man and just king, of his life, then as he sat here the pure and spotless Dhamma-eye would have arisen in him.”

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unpleasant birth owing to this offence. It could happen if the offender pretends to be a real bhikkhu/bhikkhunī and continues as one, which involves lying and hypocrisy. But such a question would not arise for one who forthwith leaves voluntarily or is removed by the Sangha. Unlike in the case of an ānantariya-kamma, with violation of pārājikā offence one is technically not barred from attaining the goal as taught in the Dhamma. The pārājikā offence has to be understood more in the organizational sense and the punishment for the offence being loss of the membership of the Sangha. This, however, leads to some other questions, for example, on the significance of being a member [bhikkhu/bhikkhunī] among the Sangha. If it does not make any difference then one must easily be able to continue as a sāmaṇera or householder and still pursue the path. Although it is not technically impossible for a non-member of the Sangha to attain the final goal such a possibility is not borne by the evidence we discussed above. While householder with his spouse and children is bound by the worldly requirements, a sāmaṇera is not taken as a member of the Sangha for it is only a preparatory stage for monkhood. Since being a member of the Sangha is regarded as the form of life most conducive for the path of liberation, looking from this point of view, losing monkhood cannot be regarded as a simple matter of losing the membership of organization for having membership makes such a big difference in the pursuit of the ultimate goal. Finally, there is somewhat a general question to be addressed: does the account of gratification of senses, articulated in the context of the monastic Vinaya and represented by the first pārājikā offence, represent the overall Buddhist attitude to it? If it does then every time an ordinary non-monastic person engages in sex, or gratification of senses, s/he must be engaged in something “lowly, uncivilized and out-castely [hīnadhammo, gāma-dhammo, vasala-dhammo]. I need not produce all the wealth of material contained in such discourses of the Buddha as Sigālovada, Vyagghapajja, Vasala, Maṅgala, Parābhava, and many other discourses in order to prove that the Buddha accepted the validity of the life of householder with its householder-happiness [gihi-sukha] derived by matrimony, children, wealth, property; working, doing business, investing, earning and spending. What needs to be highlighted, however, is the often not clearly articulated distinction between goals and purposes of monastic and householder modes of living. As I mentioned at the

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very outset of this discussion one is characterized by total abstinence of kāma [brahmacariya] whereas the other is characterized by proper behaviour toward kāma. It is important to understand that there are two goals for the two groups, sagga or heaven for the householders and nibbāna for those who have renounced household life, and there are two paths for the realization of these goals. This does not mean that one has necessarily to become a member of the Sangha to attain nibbāna, and there are examples to the contrary recorded in the early literature. But what it shows is that those who attained higher states of the path as householders had done their renunciation while being in the context of household although then they cannot be considered as full fledged householders, which again proves the point that there are two paths for the two modes of life.

Conclusion The first part of the paper tried to understand the ‘legal’ mechanism of the process of celibacy whereas the second part examined the philosophy behind it. In a conceptual universe which identifies the physical sexual attraction of men and women toward each other to be the hardest binding factor it is quite natural and rational for it to uphold celibacy as an essential aspect of its religious practice meant to unbind it. In that sense both theory and practice in the teaching of the Buddha is internally coherent and consistent.

7. Environmental Philosophy and Buddhism

The idea behind this paper is to discuss certain issues of environmental philosophy from a Buddhist perspective. While welcoming the recently emerged philosophical awareness of the ecological crisis, the paper suggests that unless philosophy makes some fundamental changes in its approach it cannot be of much help for the crisis. The paper outlines certain areas where Buddhism can help philosophy and Western thinking in general, to make a difference in environmental attitudes popularly held today. To put our discussion in perspective, a brief survey of the beginnings and the major problem areas of environmental philosophy is in order. What is called “Environmental Philosophy” is not an old phenomenon. It came into being during the latter part of the last century as philosophers responded to a world-wide growing awareness of the environmental crisis. Before philosophers began their analysis of the problem, discussions were well under way from other perspectives. One such important discussion which is believed to have given the impetus to much of the subsequent philosophical involvement is Lynn White Jr.’s paper, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis” published in Science, 1967. White describes the world-wide ecological crisis as a problem created by modern science and technology which is Western in origin. Then he goes on to explain how the development of science and technology in the West was guided by the thinking in the Judeo-Christian tradition. He specifically refers to the Western religious image of man as superior to nature and nature as something created for man’s use. He says: What people do about their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them. Human

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ecology is deeply conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny-that is, by religion. White thinks that the Judeo-Cristian tradition is at the heart of the modern ecological crisis. He concludes: Since the roots of our trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be essentially religious, whether we call it that or not. We must rethink and refeel our nature and destiny. As possible solutions to the problem, White considers two options, to adopt a new religion or to reinterpret the existing Christian religion. He discusses the first option from the background of the 60’s when Zen was becoming popular in America, but does not think it is the right option because “Zen, however, is as deeply conditioned by Asian history as Christianity is by the experience of the West.” His option is to rethink the Christian tradition and, reform it following the thinking of Saint Francis of Assisi whom he considers to be the patron saint of ecologists. White’s diagnosis and prognosis shaped the subsequent discussion and debate over the issue. As far as the philosophical involvement of the issue is concerned, two theses of White’s paper have been most influential: (i) White’s diagnosis of the crisis as resulting from the Judea­Christian way of thinking; (ii) White’s suggestion that Zen (by implication, any other non-Western religion) would not be the solution. On the first thesis, there have been many discussions both for and against. The philosophically interesting result that emerged from this line of thinking is not whether or not any specific tradition is guilty, but the need for re-examining and questioning the roots. There is no doubt about the fact that re-examination results in some kind of judgment, favourable or otherwise, about what is examined. The ultimate result of the examination is the agreement that historical roots are crucial for understanding and solving the problem. How this awareness is reflected in environmental philosophy is described by Roger T Ames and J Biard J Callicott (Ames & Callicott 1989, 1). The real-world problems which taken together constitute the so called “Environmental Crisis” appear to be of such ubiquity, magnitude, recalcitrance and synergistic complexity, that they force on philosophy the task not of applying familiar ethical theories, long in place, but of rethinking the underlying moral and metaphysical assumptions that seem to have had a significant role in bringing on the crisis. Environmental philosophy in other

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words, begins with the idea that traditional metaphysics and moral theory are more at the root of environmental problems than tools for their solutions. As this statement shows, the critique of existing ideas is a fundamental characteristic of environmental philosophy. Such critical activity could result either in reforming existing ideas or in introducing some new ideas by rejecting old ones wholly or partially. Now, this point leads us to White’s second thesis. White suggested that the West cannot accept Zen as a possible solution because the latter is conditioned by the history of its setting. What White means by this is that Zen is a way of thinking that came into being as a response to certain developments which are unique to Japanese society. The nature of Zen is shaped by these specific social and historical circumstances. Therefore it cannot be applicable to a problem which is Western in its origin. The implications of this belief affect the foundations of any cross-cultural activity. This objection has been put more categorically by Holmes Rolston III. He takes such Eastern ideas as karma, reincarnation, yin-yang, nirvana, emptiness and extinction, and asks how any of the ideas can help solve specific environmental problems in the West. He says: A metaphysics can hardly be expected to provide a blue­print for action, but if a metaphysics cannot orient action in some meaningful way, then it is of no help where the West needs help valuing the environment that humans inhabit. (Rolston 1987, 172-190) Ralston brings out some specific environmental problems and wonders: Can a Mahayana Bodhisattva after meditating on lndra’s net, say anything that needs to be weighed seriously by decision makers? (Rolston 1987, 172-190) The skepticism and criticism emerging from such examples have certain assumptions that need to be highlighted and questioned. The claim that Eastern thought cannot help the West comes from a strong cultural relativism which enjoys significant sympathy in such disciplines as anthropology, linguistics and philosophy. This view holds that each culture is unique due to its unique language and thinking patterns. Linguists who are persuaded by this view hold that each language is a unique system which cannot be translated into any other. Kuhn’s thesis of incommensurability of rival paradigms and Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of translation are examples from philosophy.

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The resulting picture is that human societies are segregated from each other so sharply that there cannot be any meaningful interaction among them. In popularly known words, this is to say that, ‘East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.’ The debate over relativism and pluralism is alive in many areas of human thinking. We do not have to go deep into the debate to discover the obvious. The picture relativism draws on the human situation cannot be realistic. This is not to deny that there are differences between cultures and their patterns of thinking. Granted that, we can still see that interaction can take place at many levels. One good example from philosophy is the enterprise of comparative philosophy which assumes that intercultural understanding is possible and meaningful. However, if cultural relativism has the last word on the matter, the enterprise of comparative philosophy would be ill-conceived at its roots. But the fact that it has been a fruitful exercise proves that, despite its problems, intercultural ‘translation’ is possible. The next assumption to be singled out in the above type of discussions is that they operate from the misunderstanding that there is one unitary set of beliefs which can be called Eastern thought (Eastern Wisdom). There is no doubt about the fact that there are certain shared assumptions among different branches of Indian religion and philosophy. However, it is not sure to what extent Chinese and Japanese philosophy and religion share these Indian attitudes or vice versa. There may or may not be such similarities; but sweeping generalizations are certainly misleading. Ames and Callicott make the following comments about this situation: This presumption that there is some identifiable and, on some basis, unified “Eastern Wisdom” (if not philosophy) - a counterpart to the Western philosophic dialectic - is one signal of the absence of sophistication that has attended much of popular comparative environmental discussion. (Ames & Callicott 1989, 13) Therefore it is reasonable to assume that each religious and philosophical tradition has to be studied and be evaluated on its own. Although the progress of environmental philosophy up to this point is encouraging, it still remains to be seen how much mainstream Western philosophy is willing to accept this way of doing philosophy. In what follows, I will argue that environmental philosophy forces the mainstream philosophy to rethink its methodology and its aims. And

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then I will show how early Buddhism can help the former in these regards. The emergence of environmental philosophy as a branch of traditional philosophy is mainly due to the seriousness of the ecological crisis human being is faced with today. The Western hemisphere feels the problem more acutely for two reasons: it is the Western world that is threatened most by the crisis, and the problem itself is a production of Western science, technology and religion. It is a good thing that philosophers think that they can contribute to the solution of the problem. However, the problem is whether they can do so without making some radical changes in their system. Let me explain this point. Mainstream Western philosophy thinks that analysis is its major function. The analytical mind is revered as the cornerstone of advanced thinking. The cardinal function of the philosopher is to analyse philosophical problems. The method adopted by logical positivism crystalizes this attitude. The whole enterprise of philosophy was perceived as an effort to analyse away the so-called philosophical problems. The underlying idea was that philosophical questions arise due to misunderstanding of language. By analyzing questions correctly, it was believed, one can show that they are based on linguistic misunderstandings. Once the analysis is done the problem disappears. The job of the philosopher is over. It is curious to note that, although it is said that logical positivism is dead, most mainstream Western philosophers are still adhering to this attitude in varying degrees. We do not have any doubts about the value of analysis as a tool for elucidating philosophical problems. However, if the philosopher thinks that he can go to bed peacefully once the analysis is done this suggests that his idea of the “problem” is quite narrow. If all philosophical problems have their origin in misunderstandings of language, analysis may be the only method needed. However, if philosophers wish to broaden their field of vision and allow problems related to human life as worthy of their attention they will have to adopt different tools. When we move from narrow linguistic concerns to broader human concerns, we can still say that analysis of problems is very important. However, the latter questions do not disappear with right analysis alone. This can be explained by a simple example. Suppose there is a physician addicted to smoking. It is very probable that the person knows enough

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facts to understand that smoking is bad for health. In sober moments, he/she must be capable of analysing the situation realistically and convincing him/herself that something has got to be done. Nevertheless, in spite of all the factual knowledge, he/she continues to smoke. In the ecological crisis we see a similar situation. The fact that the crisis continues to exist despite the vast amount of knowledge generated by science and technology themselves (who bear the main responsibility for the crisis) on the crisis and the measures suggested, shows that mere analysis of the problem is not sufficient. Not knowing facts or not knowing what to do is not the real issue in this particular problem, it is rather not wanting to change and not doing what is necessary to effect change. Philosophy as it is today cannot meet this challenge. In an insightful discussion Gerald James Larson says that “we have not understood the environmental crisis until we realize that there is no philosophical answer to it”(Ames & Callicott 1989, 271). What he means by this “zen like” statement (as he calls it) is that philosophy does not have an answer in so far as it is only an activity which analyzes, scrutinizes and compartmentalizes. Faced with this challenge, it seems that philosophy has no alternative but to get down from its ivory tower and deal with human problems directly. My next step is to suggest that Buddhism can be an inspiration for philosophy in this respect. One must be forewarned, however, that this suggestion is not motivated by the narrow view that Buddhism has answers to all modern problems or that the Buddhist analytical method is supeior to that of contemporary philosophy. Rather the motivation derives from the fact that certain important aspects, insights and attitudes of Buddhism have yet to be articulated in the context of environmental philosophy. When discussing Buddhism, I will be focusing only on the kind of Buddhism represented in the Pali canon which is also known as early Buddhism. The reason for this is that certain later developments of Buddhism marked either by leaning toward popular devotional religion or towards transcendentalism, essentialism and substantialism cannot be true alternatives for the West which already has that kind of thinking. We will identify three broad areas in early Buddhist thinking which will be helpful in developing healthy attitudes toward man-nature relation. I will call the first among them in somewhat misleading terms, ‘the positivist and rational outlook’ in Buddhism. Although Buddhism

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is neither positivist nor rational in every sense of the term, in certain important respects which will be clear later, it has these characteristics. First and foremost, Buddhism is the only non-theistic religion among the major religions of the world. By being non-theistic, Buddhism rejects all such ideas as creation, the existence of God, theistic determinism and salvation and damnation as actions of God. As a result of this, Buddhism accepts a naturalistic explanation of the world and human being. Religiously speaking, the rejection of the idea of God puts Buddhism in a position where it has to justify and make meaningful the idea of religion without God- a task unimaginable and impossible for many theistically oriented people. Buddhism does this by giving a different interpretation to religious experience and by redefining man’s involvement in the process. The religious experience according to Buddhism is the realization of nirvana which results from removing all defilements from one’s mind. The problem of suffering is basically an internal problem which has its origin primarily in negative human characteristics. Therefore the answer lies in human being himself. Buddhism gives an analysis of the problem and also a solution. It is up one to see the problem and then to decide what to do about it. The Buddha is only a teacher and a guide. He is not responsible for one’s salvation or damnation. For that matter there is no one else who is responsible for one’s destiny except oneself: “one is one’s own Lord” Attāhi attano nātho (Dhp v. 160). This attitude of Buddhism gives a huge responsibility to oneself over one’s ultimate liberation. One has to be strong, intelligent and responsible. Buddhism emphasizes that one has to practice “origin-wise reflection” (yoniso-manasikāra) in order to see things as they are. This understanding is a prerequisite in the Buddhist practice. Analysis of concepts and reflection on them (vibhaṅga and dhammānupassanā) are important aspects of the practice. Why a follower has to do all these things is because the religious life at this stage is an action of understanding and not of faith. The ultimate realization does not come as a result of the Buddha’s grace, but purely as a result of one’s own effort, moral and ‘rational’. By placing this much trust on human ability, Buddhism undoubtedly assigns a privileged position to human being. However, this privilege has to be distinguished from his privilege in a theistic tradition according to which he towers over the entire creation which was created for his use. Buddhism actually draws a different conclusion from man’s apparent superiority: being such he has to be humble and generous to the rest of nature.

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By virtue of being such an intelligent and responsible creature human being’s actions are of utmost importance. Buddhism gives a several criteria as to how one should act. Usually, an action is determined by the motive (whether the motive is good or bad) or by the outcome. However, there is a more comprehensive criterion for action. The Buddha explains it in the following words. If you are desirous of doing a deed with the body, you should reflect on that deed of your body thus: That deed which I am desirous of doing with my body is a deed of my body that might conduce to the harm of self and that might conduce to the harm of others and that might conduce to the harm of both: this deed of body is unskilled, its yield is anguish, its result is anguish; If you reflecting thus should find.... (as above) a deed of body like this is certainly not to be done by you. (Horner 1959, 89) Then the Buddha goes on to say that if a deed is not harmful for oneself, others or both, that is the kind of deed that should be done. The significance of this advice is that it includes both one­self and others as deserving equal consideration. The importance of this attitude must be seen in the context of the debate among certain environmental groups on the place of man in ecological decision making. Whether the Earth or the human being is first has to be resolved by considering both sides (See Baird Callicott in Environmental Ethics, Summer 1990 for a relevent discussion). The Buddhist naturalistic explanation is primarily meant to explain the process of human suffering and the way to end it. Buddhism does this by using the well-known method of causal origin (paṭiccasamuppāda) which explains situations as arising due to many causes and many conditions. Thus, for example, suffering according to Buddhism has psychological, social and economic causes. Buddhism addresses the question from each perspective. The psychological aspect of the problem has been given more prominence because it was the Buddha’s ‘expertise’ so to speak. Nevertheless, other aspects too have been dealt with by the Buddha. What is more important in the present context is not the answers the Buddha gave for those social and economic aspects of the problems of Indians twenty five centuries ago, but the fact that Buddhism treats problems holistically. The rational and naturalist approach Buddhism adopts toward problems is equally valid today as it was in India in the 6th century bce. The next perspective we are going to outline is the emphasis Buddhism lays on the practical aspect of life. It is very important to note

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that Buddhism does not stop at analysis. The analysis and the resulting understanding is geared to practice, without which one cannot achieve the goal. The two aspects are mutually supportive and have to go hand -in-hand. Theory with­out practice is empty and practice without theory is blind. The practical aspect emphasized by Buddhism operates at two levels. One is the level called sīla or moral behaviour. This behaviour is determined according to the criteria mentioned above. When an individual or a group of individuals are faced with a problematic situation the proper behaviour has to be determined following a broad criterion which takes all involved parties into account. The next level, in a way is more important because it supplies the necessary impetus for proper behaviour. It is the development of healthy attitudes in one’s mind. Buddhism lays a great emphasis on this second stage because it believes that most of the human problems can be solved at this level. Buddhism would analyse a problem like the ecological crisis basically (but not exclusively) in terms of human attitudes or human defilements. According to Buddhism, all problems, first and foremost, are human problems. Therefore, the remedy has to begin from there. Whether or not one is able to act as one’s religious or general rationality requires largely depends on one’s inner attitudes. Buddhism would say that so many understanding people fail to act as their understanding requires them to because they have not developed the necessary moral characteristics. Buddhism holds that knowledge has to be controlled by one’s moral behaviour. Knowledge unrestrained by such means may do more harm than good. When we apply this piece of wisdom to the present ecological crisis, we can see that knowledge undisciplined and unguided by love for humanity or love for nature in general, is responsible for much of the damage so far done. One good example is how the knowledge of human psychology is being used to produce and sell new products. The fact that human beings have an insatiable appetite for new goods is being used by marketing specialists to help corporations make more money. Buddhism which is much aware of the same fact would use that knowledge to get people out of the resulting frustration. What makes the difference is which system loves humanity more. Buddhism would not forget the deep human psychological roots that lie at the bottom of the ecological crisis.

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Finally, Buddhism supplies us with examples of proper attitudes and behaviour towards nature. Buddhism starts with being kind to oneself and to one’s fellow human beings. Then the kindness is extended to animal life and to nature in general. The meditation of friendliness (mettābhāvanā) is one of the fundamental meditational practices in Buddhism. The famous statement “sabbe sattā bhavantu sukhitattā” (Sn v. 147) “may all beings be happy” does not make any distinction between humans and animals. A similar type of friendly nature is extended to nature in general. The way of life of the Buddha and his disciples is a good example in this regard. As for the Buddha’s own practice he had an intimate relation with nature. As a wandering sramana, he spent most of his time in open spaces such as woods, river banks and parks. The disciples of the Buddha did the same. As Psalms of Brethren and Sisters (Thera-Therī gāthā) reveal they derived an innocent joy by observing and living close to nature. This way of life certainly results from their spiritual development. The Buddha says: “Charming are the forests which do not attract the multitudes. But the arahants (holy ones), free from attachments, find delight in them for they are not seekers after the allurements of the senses” (Dhp v. 99; Kaviratne 1980, 41). It may strike one as odd if one were told to be grateful to a tree under the shade of which one rested, but that is exactly what Buddhism tells us. It is said that one is an evil traitor if one were to destroy the tree under which one rested (Bhuridatta-jātaka-J 452). This is not a figurative statement. On the other hand, it does not say that one cannot cut trees for reasonable use. What it rather says is that one must not be unkind to nature. Buddhism does not go to an extreme to maintain that either nature is for man or man is for nature. It does not make a sharp distinction between man and nature. For Buddhism, nature includes man too. If one harms other human beings or any aspect of nature he harms both himself and others. Ecological crimes are crimes against humankind. I believe these and many other insights Buddhism contain are helpful to develop better attitudes to the environment. The implications of this discussion for philosophy are general and broad. To repeat, if philosophy wishes to be helpful in the present crisis it has to broaden its vision, its methodology and its approach to problems. Buddhism, in its early form is one possible source of inspiration. There may well be other schools of Buddhism and schools of thinking that could prove equally helpful.

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Finally, there is a philosophical question to be raised and answered: given the nature of the Buddhist attitude to nature, why does Buddhism hold such an attitude? The answer is that Buddhism holds that no one likes to harm oneself or to be harmed by others. To harm nature is to harm oneself; therefore, “taking oneself as the standard, do not harm, do not kill” (attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā na haneyya na ghātaye) (Dhp v. 129).

8. Buddhist Views on Nature and Environment*

Introduction ‘Environment’ is a broad term which refers to the surroundings where human beings, animals and plant life exist interacting with one another. An environment needs to be understood in a particular context in which human being plays an important role. However, the concept of nature often referred to in this type of discussions has to be understood as having a broader connotation to include not only human beings, animals and plant life but also the globe as a whole including its rivers, forests, mountains, valleys, plains, deserts and oceans; the Sun, Moon and stars; and tsunamis, hurricanes, volcanoes, and floods. Some of these phenomena may not be a part of human being’s immediate environment. Although human being is a part of the nature in its broad sense, and at times, a helpless victim of the workings of the lager elements of nature referred to above, still he occupies a very special place in it owing to the power of his mind with which he can determine to a large extent the matters relating to his own life and the rest of the nature. While this state of affairs places the human being in an advantageous position vis-àvis the rest of the nature, it poses an ethical and moral challenge for him: he has to determine the right balance between his own existence and that of the nature. In this study I propose to discuss first the nature as a broad phenomenon encompassing the entire globe and the place and the role of human being in it as understood in Buddhism. Next, I will narrow down * A version of this paper was first presented at Interfaith Dialogue for Peace, Harmony, Security – A Global Initiative for Conflict Avoidance and Environment Consciousness, Myanmar, 2017.

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the discussion to environment and discuss human beings, animals and plant life as constituting the environment experienced by human beings.

Human being and nature The nature in its broad sense includes the world with its all conscious and non-conscious phenomena. In the early discourses of the Buddha the nature in this comprehensive sense is called ‘loka’, a term which has been used in several related senses. It has been used to refer to (i) physical world; (ii) world as extending much beyond the world we live in (universe) (S I, 62);1 (iii) (mainly but not exclusively) all human beings who live in the world (S III, 138);2 (iv) human being with his physical body, perceptual and cognitive aspects (S I, 62; Bodhi 2000, 158).3 The first two refer to the spatial dimension of the world whereas the third refers, in a figurative sense, mainly to human beings who live in it. The fourth is the philosophical use of the term. These meanings are interwoven and hard to distinguish one from another and often overlap. One has to depend heavily on the context to determine which is which. In this discussion I will not elaborate on these different meanings which have been already studied by many Buddhist scholars. I would examine instances of loka as referring to beings occupying the different plains of the universe with the aim of determining the status of the human being among such beings. In the Buddhist discourses there is a broad concept of loka extending much beyond the human world and human beings. It is said that the message of the Buddha’s first sermon went as far as the highest point of the universe, Akaniṭṭhaka Brahama world. It is further said that when the Buddha completed his preaching the ‘system of ten thousand worlds’ (dasa-sahassī-loka-dhātu) (S V, 420-424; Bodhi 2000, 1846) shook, quaked, and trembled. Included in this account is the idea that there is an infinite number of beings occupying these worlds. 1 Saṃyutta-nikaya I p.62 has a reference to a disciple of the Buddha who traveled at a great speed to reach the end of the ‘world’. The Buddha called him back saying that one can never reach the end of the ‘world’ by traveling (gamanena na pattabbo lokassanto kudācanaṃ). 2  Instances such as ‘the world is incomplete, insatiate, slave to desire” (ūno loko atitto taṇhādāso… Raṭṭhapāla-sutta, Majjhima-nikāya 82) and “I do not quarrel with the world; but the world quarrels with me” (nāham bhikkhave lokena vivadāmi, loko ca mayā vivadati… ) 3  It is in this fathom-high carcass endowed with perception and mind that I make known the world, the origin of the world, the cessation of the world, and the way leading to the cessation of the world.

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In the much known threefold analysis of the world as the world of sensual pleasures (kāma-loka), fine-material world (rūpa-loka) and nonmaterial world (arūpa loka), the human world comes within the sensual world and where it is one among the other four realms, namely, those of animals, and hungry ghosts, and hells and heavens. In these worlds there are so many beings with differing material conditions. Those who are born in the animal realm, the realm of hungry ghosts and hells all live lives full of misery. The latter two groups have long spans of life to suffer. The world of divine beings has a long span of life to enjoy the fruits of their past good karmas. The picture about human life is a little more complex. The discourses unanimously say that to be born as a human being is an extremely rare occurrence in one’s long samsaric existence. According to the well known simile of the tortoise blind in one eye, the chances of one being born as a human being is even rarer than the chances of meeting together of a hole of an axel floating in the vast ocean and the single eye of the tortoise which is equally roaming aimlessly in the vast ocean and being able to see the sky through that hole. Even if one gets such a rare opportunity to be born as a human being the span of his life is relatively shorter and the existence is mixed with pleasures and pains. There are two ways to perceive this state. On the one hand, to be born as a human being with a relatively shorter span of life is considered to be conducive for the realization of the Dhamma because to be born in hells with all-pervading long lasting suffering would not allow people to have any possibility of thinking anything higher or better, and being born in heavens full of pleasures the divine beings do not have any need to think of higher realization. Even to be born in the realm of Brahmas as a result of attaining worldly jhānas is considered to be not conducive for the progress in the path. While this is a positive way of perceiving human existence, there is a sense in which human life with its shorter life span and accompanied miseries is highlighted as not worthy of being cherished: bhikkhus, this life span of human beings is short. … One who lives long, bhikkhus, lives a hundred years or a little longer. Short is the life span of human beings-The good man should disdain it. (Bodhi 2000, 201) This seemingly contradictory position has to be understood as resulting from the soteriological urgency found in the teachings of the Buddha. Only the human being is capable of fully realizing the Dhamma. Heavens are with too much pleasure and hells are with too

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much pain; only the human existence has both. In that sense his life is relatively more valuable than that of divine beings not to mention the inhabitants of hells. From this perspective, the human life needs to be placed higher. But if a human being starts cherishing his life exclusively as a source of pleasures then he will not likely to follow the path. In order to motivate the human being to follow the path while laying stress on the value of his life as a human being the shortness of the span of life with its potential miseries has to be emphasized. The purpose is to create a sense of urgency in him so that he will follow the path ‘as if his head is aflame’ (Bodhi 2000, 201). According to Buddhism the world as a natural phenomenon is independent of human beings. It exists whether there were human beings or not. In discussing causally conditioned nature of reality the Buddha emphasized this aspect of reality in the following words: Whether there is an arising of Tathagatas or not arising of Tathagatas, that element still persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality. A Tathagata awakens to this and breaks through it. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. And he says: See! (S II, 25; Bodhi 2000, 551) In the subsequent Buddhist literature (DA I, 432) this conditionality has been described with reference to five areas covering physical, psychological and moral phenomena, namely the occurrence seasons (utu-niyāma), plants (bīja-niyāma), moral actions (kamma-niyāma), phenomena (dhamma-niyāma) and working of the mind (cittaniyāma). What is highlighted is that these aspects of the nature function without any agent, human or divine. The account of the Aggañña-sutta (D III, 80-98) (Discourse on the knowledge of beginning) confirms this way of understanding. According to the Sutta, human beings come to this world which was already there. The world evolves through four stages, the stage of continuing expansion (vivaṭṭamāna), the expanded stage (vivaṭṭa), the stage of (continuing contraction (saṃvaṭṭamāna), and the contracted stage (saṃvaṭṭa). They come to this world at the beginning of the expanding stage. The four stages have nothing to do with human beings. In this sense human beings are mere visitors to this world which has its own way of evolution. The sutta, however, records how the human beings started gradually interacting with the world, by way of feeding on the earth, demarcating

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limits of the earth and owning what they demarcated and so on. This suggests that they ‘created’ their own world from this world, and to that extent we can say that the world and the human beings depend on each other. The story of the Aggañña is not one on the beginning of the world or the evolution of human beings in it. It is meant to be a moral lesson: it tells a story of gradual degeneration of human society and proposes ways to regenerate it. But the world goes through its cycle whether or not human beings exist in it or do whatever they do. The world as matter (rūpa) is independent of human beings. It keeps on changing endlessly as a result of which it produces, among others, irruption of volcanoes and tsunamis as due to disturbances at the bottom of the earth. Finally, when the four stages of the cycle are over the world gets destroyed. According to the Sattasuriyuggamana-sutta [Discourse on rising of seven suns], (A IV, 100-106; Bodhi 2012, 1071-1075) at the conclusion of the contracted stage, there arises seven Suns one after the other, and at the rising of the seventh the entire world including its human inhabitants is reduced to ashes. The human being is helpless before these natural phenomena. It is this human helplessness that is articulated in the Raṭṭhapāla-sutta, as ‘the world is devoid of protection, it does not have an overlord (to protect it) - attāṇo loko anabhissaro (M II, 70). In the Buddhist understanding the world is not a creation by an allpowerful God. Neither is human being such a creation. While the world is subject to natural and physical laws the human being is subject to his own actions. In the absence of a creator and a purpose the world is neither moral nor immoral. Although helpless at times, human being is not a totally helpless victim before the nature. It can play a creative role creating his own ‘world’ within the nature. The vastness of the nature reminds the human being of his physical limitations. But at the same time the power of mind which he can develop makes him greater than the nature itself. These remarks may be substantiated with reference to the Buddha’s words (referred to earlier) to a disciple of him who traveled at great speed in search of the end of the universe. Seeing the disciple engaged in this unending mission the Buddha called him back and said the following: One can never reach the end of the universe by travelling. Without reaching the end of the universe there will not be a release from suffering. (S I, 62) The first part of this statement refers to the end of the physical universe which is endless, and hence lies beyond human physical limitations. The second part seems to refer to ‘universe’ in a figurative sense according

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to which it is one’s own inner universe which has to be penetrated by wisdom in order to attain the end of suffering. This particular discourse of the Buddha reveals both human limitations and human potential visà-vis nature. In sum, in the Buddhist view, human being should neither be arrogant nor be servile but be realistic about his position in nature. Before proceeding further, taking into consideration the above discussion it is necessary to clarify the position of human being visà-vis nature according to Buddhism. In theistic religions the superior position of human being is asserted owing to his being created by God who created human being in his own image. This has been understood as a human-centred world view in which the world (=nature) created by God is left at the disposal of the human being for him to do as he deems fit. This has been understood as leading to human beings’ exploitation of nature leading to its destruction and pollution of environment. One early analysis is by Lynn White (in his paper “The Historical roots of our ecological crisis”, published in Science, 1967) who describes the world-wide ecological crisis as a problem created by modern science and technology which is western in origin, guided by the Judeo-Christian tradition of religion. He specifically refers to the western religious image of man as superior to nature and nature as created by God for the use of man. He says: What people do about their ecology depends on what they think about themselves in relation to things around them. Human ecology is deeply conditioned by beliefs about our nature and destiny - that is, by religion. Although human being’s own image about himself may not be only reason why he exploits the nature relentlessly, it nonetheless, functions as a powerful rationale for his behaviour. One’s attitude toward nature is shaped by one’s attitude to oneself. If one’s self-image is that of the master naturally the nature becomes the slave. A slave is a mere object at one’s hand, a mere means to one’s personal ends, not a human being proper. Usually moral reasoning is not considered applicable to anything other than human agents. In the West it is only recently that they started thinking of animals as deserving moral consideration. Renee Descartes, of the 16th century France, father of modern philosophy, considered animals as ‘automata’ – some type of machines that are programmed to function – and hence as not coming within the purview of moral considerations. Nature in its wider sense including the natural environment was seen as something to be exploited, to be made use of and to be conquered. It

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is only very recently that this way of thinking has started changing for better. The self-centred attitude of oneself, coupled with human beings’ endless desire for wealth to be used for sensual gratification, paves the way for exploitation of nature’s resources to the possible maximum. The Buddhist position arising from a non-theistic world view is understood as conducive for the protection of nature and environment.4 Beyond this contrast between theistic religions and non-theistic Buddhism and the subsequent judgment for the relative desirability of Buddhism there is still a question to be discussed relevant to the Buddhist standpoint on the place of the human being in the nature. Does the Buddhist love for nature and harmonious existence with nature mean that at a crucial point the human being should be subordinated to nature? Or to put the same question differently, at a crucial point which should be given preference - human being or nature? Some advocates of deep ecology seem to think that our ecological thinking has to be completely devoid of any concern for human interests.5 The question is whether we can think of nature or environment as totally outside of us. Is there any meaning of nature or any discussion on nature [After all in the absence of human beings there will not be any discussion whatsoever!] in the absence of human beings? Any discussion of environment will be irrelevant and impossible without reference to human beings. If the human being is indispensable in this whole process, what would be the Buddhist outlook toward the interaction between nature and human being? There is no doubt about the Buddhist attitude to individualism which ultimately is a manifestation of craving which Buddhism considers to be the source of suffering. But can an ordinary human being do away with his own sense of individualism in his existence in the world. The Buddhist answer is ‘no’. But at the same time Buddhism says that we have to get rid of our craving, the root cause of individualism. Given the self-centred nature of the human being, this is no easy task. It has to be done gradually like a sailor who has to repair 4  Consequently, the writers on the Buddhist view or attitude to nature describe Buddhism as holding a very admirable view of nature. An early example is: Dharma Gaia: A Harvest of Essays in Buddhism and Ecology ( ed. Allan Hunt Berdiner, Parallax Press, Berkeley, California, 1990). 5  Ken Jones (1993 Beyond Optimism: A Buddhist Political Ecology, Oxford) seems to subscribe to a similar view when he complains that even the deeper ecological views are based on subtle forms of individualism. He advocates return to community. But since the community is the community of human beings I do not think that we can overcome the issue of self-interest of human beings.

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his boat while floating in the sea. This means that so long as the human being is in the world he has to survive making use of the resources belonging to the world. He has to cut trees to build his houses; build bridges across rivers, build dams for irrigation and generate power, and make tunnels through mountains. Human being interferes with nature, but Buddhism is not opposed to such activities to certain extent. If the human being devastates nature in so doing then Buddhism would show him that he is endangering his own survival (which is common sense!). But the inescapable fact is that ultimately this environmental love has individualistic roots as well as limits! In this situation, the Buddhist approach will be to adopt a nonextremist middle position toward nature. It is clear that insects that threaten human life have to be eliminated. But Buddhism would say that we should endeavour to not to make provisions for such harmful insects to grow so that the issue of terminating them will not arise or will be minimized. Eating meat is another issue which I discuss briefly below. A life on earth without any pain to oneself or the others appears an impossibility. What could be expected according to Buddhism is a life with minimum pain to oneself and the others. In the Buddhist thinking, two pillars of good human behaviour are compassion (karuṇa) and wisdom (paññā) which have to be balanced by each other. In the world with human beings, animals and plants and other things such as rivers, mountains, etc. only human being is capable of moral reasoning. In this sense he is superior to the rest of the nature. This allows the human being to make a balanced decision and above all to transcend oneself individually or collectively. But there is a limit: human being cannot opt for self-destruction at a crucial event.

Environment: human being toward other human beings In the concept of environment as outlined above, the relation between human beings among themselves is of utmost importance. In human being’s environment consciousness, how he behaves toward the rest of the human society ought to occupy a central place. In most cases environment constitutes his immediate surroundings with which he has emotional and cultural ties. In addition, with its potential for emotional, intellectual and inner development, human life is worthy of being preserved and cherished. Buddhism removes obstacles that stand on the way to happiness, and provides guidance for peaceful and rewarding human relations.

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A major factor that prevents human beings from interacting with each other compassionately and rewardingly is the assumed differences owing to which some are considered high and the others low. In the Indian context, this was called ‘colour phenomenon’ (varṇa-dharma) and the society was divided into four groups and on the top of the hierarchy was Brahmins (priests) and sudra (slaves) occupying the bottom. The Buddha rejected this hierarchy as baseless and demonstrated through rational arguments6 that there are no marks that separate one human group from another. In discussing this matter with two Brahmin youths, Vāseṭṭha and Bhāradvāja, who were of the opinion that they were the highest among the ‘colours’, the Buddha showed to them that there are no different types among human beings as such types are found among animals, birds, reptiles and plants. Human beings have no marks in their hairs, heads, ears, noses, eyes, lips, brows, shoulders, necks etc. which distinguish one from another human being, the Buddha pointed out (Vāseṭṭa-sutta). Having established this fact the Buddha concluded his argument in the following words: In human bodies in themselves nothing distinctive can be found. Distinction among human beings Is purely verbal designation (Nanamoli & Bodhi 1995/ 2001, 801) What is meant by ‘verbal designation’ (paññatti) in this context is that assumed differences among human beings is only a popularly agreed upon convention which does not refer to anything real. In the Buddhist monastic practice only the seniority in the monastic life is recognized as the criterion of recognition. Although inner attainments are valued and those with such attainments are revered, among the Sangha what matters most is the seniority in one’s monastic practice. Thus in Buddhism one is considered higher than others only on the ground of one’s virtues. It is on this same ground that bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs are considered higher than upasakas and upasikas. The Sangha in this broad sense consists of a community of the followers of the path leading to nirvana, the extinction of suffering. Their inter-relation is characterized by ‘mutual advice and mutual up-lifting’ (aññamañña vacanena aññamañña vuṭṭhāpanena7). The role of karma in determining differences among human beings 6  Refer to Malalasekera and Jayatilleke (1958) for an eloquent discussion on the Buddhist arguments for the oneness human race. 7  Pātimokkha (being the collection of the monastic Vinaya rules).

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is accepted in the teaching of the Buddha. In ‘the Discourse on the shorter exposition of action’ the following conversation occurs between the Buddha and the young Brahmin Subha: Master Gotama, what is the cause and condition why human beings are seen to be inferior and superior? For people are seen to be short-lived and long-lived, sickly and healthy, ugly and beautiful, uninfluential and influential, poor and wealthy, lowborn and high-born, stupid and wise. What is the cause and condition, Master Gotama, why human beings are seen to be inferior and superior? Student, beings are owners of their actions, heirs of their actions; they originate from their actions, are bound to their actions, have their actions as their refuge. It is action that distinguishes beings as inferior and superior. (Nanamoli & Bodhi 1995, 1053) In this discussion the Buddha lays much emphasis on karma as the cause and condition of differences among human beings. But depending on what is understood by action in this context the role attributed to karma may vary greatly. The popular reading is to interpret karma in this context to mean karma as the accumulated force behind one’s samsaric existence. In this interpretation karma becomes the inescapable for to which one has to succumb oneself. If we understand karma in this context as human action then the reading can convey a very different emphasis. Karma in this sense is what is done (and not done) by oneself. According to Buddhism any conscious action produces results in accordance its moral character. As the two beginning Dhammapada stanzas articulate (Dhp v. 1-2),8 what is said or done with polluted mind produces misery and what is said or done by purified mind produces happiness. Buddhism does not understand this process as something done by someone, but as a natural process in which the nature of the action determines the nature of its outcome. This has been described as ‘the principle of action’ (kamma-niyāma) which is one among five such phenomena which take place depending on causes and conditions (DA I, 432). The idea of human action as one’s responsibility, when coupled with the idea of oneness of the humanity, provides a sound basis for a system 8  Mano pubbaṅgamā dhammā – mano seṭṭhā manomayā Manasā ce paduṭṭhena – bhāsatῑ vā karoti vā Tato naṃ dukkhamanveti – cakkaṃva vahato padaṃ … Manasā ce pasannena – bhāsatῑ vā karoti vā Tato naṃ sukhamanveti – chāyāva anapāyinῑ .

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of social ethics. Sīla or the virtue as the beginning of the path becomes meaningful only in a social context. The five precepts (pañca-sīla), abstaining from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, lying and taking intoxicants are basically social virtues. The first four specifically require an outside society as a precondition for those actions to exist. Abstaining from those misdeeds is tantamount to assuring security to the society. In this manner, sīla is basically how one should behave toward others. In addition to this somewhat negative presentation of social morality, there is substantial discussion in Buddhism on how one should behave toward the rest of the society. The sīla has been described positively as protection of life as opposed to killing, safeguarding others’ property as opposed to stealing, being happy and content with one’s spouse as against sexual misconduct and telling what is true, pleasant and meaningful as opposed to telling lies, harsh words and meaningless things. The well-known Sigālovāda-sutta (D III, 180-193) lists six types of social relations, namely, parents and children, teachers and students, husbands and wives, friends and friends, masters and servants, and religious people and their lay supporters. It is noteworthy that this classification contains such vulnerable groups as children, women and the elderly in it and provides adequate provisions for nurturing and protecting them. Although this account does not specifically refer to the disabled they are naturally provided for when these social groups are protected. Given its naturalistic understanding of human action (karma) and absence of a concept of creator God Buddhism does not consider disability to be a challenge to account for. In this same context the Sigālovāda-sutta refers to the four ways of treating others well, namely, giving (dāna), pleasant speech (peyya vajja), working for the upliftment of others (attha-cariyā) and even-handed treatment (samanattatā) and concludes by pointing out that “these things make the world go round like the chariot’s axle-pin”. In addition to the inclusion of good friends as an important aspect in one’s network of social relations, Buddhism considers the phenomenon of good friend (kalyāna-mitta) as an indispensable factor in the success of anyone’s life. Usually the Buddha is described as the good friend of all for he guides all those who come to him in the path to cessation of suffering. For the same reason one’s teachers are one’s good friends, and the entire society can be a community of good friends for one another. When Ananda said that a half of the improvement in the religious life is owing to good friends the Buddha corrected him saying that it was

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not half but the entirety of the improvement in religious life is owing to good friends (S V, 2). The ideal Buddhist social life is characterized by the four states of mind manifested in one’s behaviour toward others, loving kindness (mettā), compassion (karuṇā), altruistic joy (muditā) and equanimity (upekkhā) which are described as ‘unlimitables’ (appamañña) in the texts. It is said that the Great Brahma has these virtues toward all beings, and parents have them toward their own children. The Karaṇīya-metta sutta (Sn v. 8) exemplifies the highest degree of these virtues when it says that one should practice loving kindness toward all beings ‘as if a mother would protect her only child at the risk of her life.’ Whether a person has these virtues or not is mainly revealed in one’s attitudes and bahviour toward others. How carefully and considerately one drives one’s vehicle, how one disposes one’s garbage, how one mis/ uses common properties such as water and air – all these and many other similar instances reveal whether or not one has above-mentioned qualities in oneself. The pollution of air, water and atmosphere is mainly due to the selfishness of people. Being insensitive to nature is not only a wrong way of treating nature but also being insensitive to others, fellow human beings. We will discuss our behaviour toward nature shortly, and hence we will refer to nature here only in so far as it affects the others. In this context we can see that how one treats one’s fellow human beings and nature is inter-dependent. At this point one may question as to why one should treat other human beings and nature in this manner. Several answers may be provided for this question from a Buddhist point of view. One response derives from the human nature shared by all human beings. Earlier in our discussion with reference to the Vāseṭṭha-sutta we found that Buddhism lays emphasis on the oneness of all human beings. It goes without saying that all human beings share similar mental and physical feelings and sensations. Supplementing this way of thinking, the Buddha says that all beings like happiness and dislike unhappiness (sukhakāmā dukkhapaṭikkūlā) (M I, 341). If this is a nature common to all beings, including human beings, then one should apply this insight to oneself and avoid inflicting pain to others. “All tremble at the rod. All fear death. Comparing others with oneself, one should neither strike nor cause to strike” –the Buddha says (Dhp v. 129). Besides, according to the Buddhist analysis, hatred is a root of unskillful (akusala) actions (A I, 201) which are good neither for oneself nor for others. Its opposite,

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friendliness, is therefore good for oneself and others, including, in this context, nature as a whole. As we saw in the foregoing Buddhism considers all living beings, human beings and animals, as constituting one whole particularly when it refers to the universally shared psychological, emotional and karmic traits. Certain aspects of the Buddhist ethical behavior, such as nonviolence, spreading the sentiment of friendliness (mettā) is applicable to all living beings. At the same time, however, Buddhism places human being above other living beings. We need to take into consideration several aspects of the Buddhist teaching and practice in order to understand the Buddhist position accurately. In the foregoing we noticed that Buddhism has two seemingly contradictory views of human life: on the one hand, it places human being on a higher position and values it as a rare opportunity, and on the other hand, it says that human life itself is short lived and hence should not be taken as overly valuable. The reason for these two attitudes is the soteriological opportunity and potential for both worldly and inner development Buddhism sees in human beings. In other words, the Buddha wished human being to be well aware of his relatively advantages intellectual position over the animal world, and at the same time, not to waste his life without making proper use of it for outer as well as inner development which culminates in ending one’s samsaric suffering.

Human being toward animals According to Buddhism, the world of animals is a ‘hell’, and beings are born as animals as a result of their bad actions. The human life, on the contrary, is a result of good actions. So this makes human beings naturally higher than animals. So how should the animals be treated is an interesting question in the Buddhist context. The Buddhist thinking on the status of animals may be illustrated with reference to the Buddhist monastic law code (Vinaya). In it the highest offence for the Buddhist bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs is called ‘defeat’ (pārājikā) upon violation of which they lose the membership in the Sangha, the highest loss according to the Vinaya. One among these grave and irreparable offences is killing a human being intentionally. Interestingly, killing a non-human (animal) is not included among these offences, and it is included among minor offences (pācittiya) from which the offender may recover him/herself by an act of confession.

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The Buddhist attitude to animals is one of loving kindness (mettā). The well known Karaṇīyametta-sutta, referred to above, articulates the scope this sentiment in the following words: Whatsoever living things there are whether they be feeble or strong, without exception, whether long or large, middling, short, minute or massive; Whether seen or unseen, or whether they live far or near, whether already come into being or still seeking birth, may all beings be happy at heart. This very sentiment has been even more elaborated in the Ahi-sutta of the Aṅguttara-nikāya (A II, 72): My metta is for those who have no legs, for those who have two legs, four legs, and those who have many legs. … All beings, all those who have life, all those who are born, may all of them see what is good; may not any evil befall them. A reason for this way of treatment, as we saw above, is the fact that all fear death and life is dear to all (sabbesaṃ jῑvitaṃ piyaṃ) (Dhp v. 130). Furthermore, it is said by the Buddha that in one’s long samsaric journey it is not easy to find a being who was not one’s mother, father, brother, sister, son or daughter (S II, 189-190). This provides an added reason why one should not harm any being including animals. A view resembling this has been attributed to Pythagoras (Russell 1946, 59). Before concluding this part of the discussion, it is necessary to address the issue of meat eating: whether or not it is permissible to eat meat according to the teaching of the Buddha? There is no doubt that the Buddhist position is against killing (human beings or animals). It is also prohibited for the house holders to trade in meat. It is one of the five prohibited trades. Although the Buddhist position on killing has been unambiguous the same cannot be said about the issue of meat eating. In the Vinaya the Buddha instructs his monastic disciples to eat meat only if they know that it was not killed for them, that nobody told them that it was killed for them and that they did not have any doubt that it was not killed for them (V II, 197; M I 368-371). This is described as ‘meat purified at three ends’. The Āmagandha-sutta (Discourse on Carrion Smell) of the Sutta nipāta (239-252) is an indirect defence of the practice of meat easing in which the Buddha says that what is more important is not eating meat but the overall virtuous behavior. What he says, in other words, is an otherwise immoral person does not become moral by mere practice of not eating meat. Vinaya further records that

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when Devadatta requested from the Buddha to make abstaining from partaking of meat a compulsory rule for the bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs the latter kept it at individual discretion. It should also be mentioned that the Vinaya refers to proper and improper varieties of meat (V I, 216220). These instances make clear that the Buddha did not prohibit his disciples from eating meat provided that they were not directly involved in killing. The question one tends to ask is: can you eat animals if you practice metta on them, the Theravada answer to which seems to be: one cannot practice metta on dead carcasses, and hence nothing wrong in eating dead carcasses. The problem of indirect responsibility for the death of the animal does not seem to have been raised or answered in the Pali discourses. Mahayana tradition which observes strict vegetarianism is a notable exception to this Theravada standpoint. This discussion could continue and I would like to direct the reader to one of my earlier studies on this issue for a detailed discussion.9

Human being toward plant life The following statement occurs in the Jātaka: One should not break a branch of a tree under which one sat or rested. (If one did so) he is a villainous traitor (J 452). yassa rukkhassa chāyāya – nisῑdeyya sayeyya vā na tassa sākhaṃ bhiñjeyya – mittadubbho hi pāpako. The Vinaya records that the newly enlightened Buddha kept on looking in gratitude for seven days at the Bodhi tree under which he attained enlightenment. This is a very fascinating sentiment which suggests that trees, and plant life by extension, were regarded by Buddhists as if they were a part of their moral universe. Usually, one does not talk about trees and plants, or nature in general, as if they were beings like any other living beings who should be treated as partners of our moral discourse. Jains in ancient India went a step further when they said that plants have a form of life due to which any harm or destruction to plant life was considered morally reprehensible. Although the Buddha too asked his monastic followers to respect this popular sensitivity, cutting a tree was not considered a moral lapse. Avolding it was only a part of good monastic behaviour. In the Theravada Buddhist tradition we see the Buddha himself and his disciples as well adoring nature including trees, plants, rivers and mountains. The early monasteries were housed in gardens (ārāma) full 9  Refer to Chapter 13 of Volume III: Theravada Studies of this Series.

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of trees and plants. This tradition continues even up to today and the Buddhist monasteries (in Sri Lanka) are usually called ‘arama’. There is much in the Vinaya on the orderliness and cleanliness of the Buddhist monasteries and the safe keeping of the properties of those monasteries which were meant to be used by all members of the community who came from four directions (cātuddisa saṅgha) (V II, 207-235). Those who have purified themselves of defilements are said to delight in natural beauty. The Dhammapada says thus: Delightful are the forests where worldlings delight not; the passionless will rejoice (therein), (for) they seek no sensual pleasures. (Dhp v. 99; Narada 1963/1993, 94) The Theragāthā and Therīgāthā (two works in the fifth collection of the Basket of Discourses) wherein the joyous memories of both male and female arahants are recorded bear witness to these enlightened persons’ love for nature. This is one aspect of the early Buddhist attitude to nature and environment. The other is the pragmatic aspect in which the enlightened avail themselves of the aspects of nature and environment without any attachment or aversion. Doctrinally, this attitude has been articulated as “having abandoned severe attachment (abhijjhā) and resentment (domanassa) with regard to the world” (Vineyya loke abhijjhā-domanassaṃ D II, 290). Even though the context is different, the well known ‘simile of the raft’ (kullūpama) (Alagaddūpama-sutta, M I, 130-142) exemplifies this attitude: out of a sense of gratefulness, one does not carry on one’s back the raft which was useful for one to cross a river. The right behavior toward the raft is to leave it behind on the shore (to be used by others). One makes use of natural resources with least harm to those things till one lives and then exit gracefully leaving nature and environment as intact as possible for the sake of others. Here again what is at play are compassion and wisdom, two pillars upon which human behavior should be based according to Buddhism.

Concluding remarks In this study, we examined the Buddhist attitude to nature and environment mainly as found in the Theravada Pali discourses. We understood nature as an all-encompassing phenomenon whereas environment as referring to specific contexts such as human beings, animals and plant life. In the first part of the discussion we examined how Buddhism defines the relation between human being and nature and the role and the status of human being vis-à-vis nature. In particular,

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we argued that the Buddhist attitude to nature or environment cannot be considered without locating human being within it. In the rest of the discussion, we studied human being’s attitude to human beings, animals and plant life, and found that one’s overall attitude and behavior toward nature and environment should be guided by compassion and wisdom.

9. Justice, Kamma and Dhamma: Does Kamma in Buddhism Make Justice Redundant?*

Introduction Writing on the Buddhist view on human rights Damien Keown observed: Buddhism is a latecomer to the course of human rights, and for most of its history has been preoccupied with other concerns. It might be suggested, in defense of Buddhism that concern for human rights is a post religious phenomenon which has more to do with secular ideologies and power-politics than religion. And it is therefore unreasonable to accuse Buddhism of neglect in this area.... there is no doubt that Buddhism lags far behind religions such as Christianity and Islam in developing the framework for a social gospel within which questions of this kind can be addressed. For such an intellectually dynamic tradition Buddhism is a-lightweight in moral and political philosophy. (Keown 1995, 1) If what Keown says in the context of human rights is correct, it must equally be applicable to the concept of justice Juxtaposed with such traditions as Christianity and Islam in which God is always spoken of as just. It is true that Buddhism seems even not to have a clear concept to denote justice. Is this because the Buddhists were simply not concerned about the whole issue of justice or is it because they had a perspective different from the theistic western tradition and articulated their concerns in a different manner not necessarily as involving issues of justice? * Initially published in Buddhism in Global Perspective, vol. I, ed. Kalpakam Sankaranarayan, Ravindra Panth and Ichigo Ogawa, Mumbai & New Delhi: 2003, pp.202217.

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A concept of justice? In discussing a Buddhist theory of justice one is faced with considerable difficulties from the very beginning. The apparent absence of a term denoting justice is a key problem. In such a situation it is easy to conclude that there is no concept of justice in Buddhism. I think this would be a hasty conclusion for the absence of a clear conceptualization does not necessarily mean that the underlying concern and the appropriate behavior were not there. One way to see whether or not the Buddhist tradition had a concept of justice is to examine situations in which discourse of justice can naturally be invoked from them according to our present-day understanding of justice.1 For instance in rejecting the caste system which was religiously ordained by Brahmins one would expect Buddha to refer to the injustices suffered by those who were considered low. In the Hindu view, the caste system and its associated social roles, denoted by the terms varṇa-dharma and sva-dharma respectively, were a part of Creation. As some critics have shown the four varṇa concept, appearing first in the Puruṣa Sūkta, belongs to a more recent period in Vedic literature. At the early stage of the Ṛgveda, references are always only to three varṇas, namely, Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, and Vaiṣya. The evolution of this concept into one referring to a hierarchical order takes place subsequently and is shown in works such as Manusmṛti. As a modern commentator has shown: Later the myth presented in the Puruṣa Sūkta was used for marking off the four varnas from each other, and lending sanction to an explicitly hierarchical conception of caturvarnya. Thus Manusmrti states that the Creator, in order to secure prosperity of the people, created respectively out of his mouth, arms, thighs and feet, Brahmana, Ksatriya, Vaisya and Sudra. (Rege 1985, 5) The division and the hierarchy of the caste system are justified on the ground that they are meant for the prosperity of the people. It is not easy to raise any question on justice in such a situation. Buddhism being a non-creationist religion, does not have a belief in a creator God. Consequently it rejects the caste system and its associated 1 What I mean by this is the concept of justice, which has its origins in the Judeo­ Christian religious tradition. Commenting on it Winston L King observes: “There is no mystery as to the cultural origins of the much invoked concept “justice” in the western world: it came directly out of the Judeo-Christian biblical tradition and teaching” (Journal of Buddhist Ethics, vol. II, 1995. p.67).

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social stratification as unfounded. In rejecting the caste system Buddhism produces various arguments to establish the oneness of humanity (Rege 1985, 3).2 In the well-known Vāseṭṭha-sutta (M 98; Sn v. 115-123)3 the Buddha produces arguments from history, biology, psychology and ethics in support of the fact that all human beings belong to one group. The underlying assumption is that as human beings, all human beings must be treated alike. In this context one would expect Buddhism to resort to the discourse of justice and talk about injustices caused by the system to those who were at the bottom of the social scale. But nothing of the sort is found in the texts. A curious fact is that in rejecting the Hindu view of inherent inequality of human beings Buddhism upholds a view of human equality which is usually a necessary precondition for upholding a view of justice. In other words, equality is taken as providing justification for treating the relevant cases justly. The Buddhist view, so it seems, does not resort to the concept of justice. Instead, it seems to follow a different route, namely, deriving an ethical implication from the fact that all human beings are equal as human beings. This requires one to treat all others as similar to oneself. The implication is that one must not do anything that one does not like others to do to oneself: attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā na haneyya na ghātaye (Comparing with oneself, one should neither strike nor cause to strike: Dhp v. 129). What this means is that, treating human beings unequally is not a matter of injustice but a matter of being unkind to them and ill-treating them and a matter of being misguided by a wrong way of perceiving human reality. The Buddhist monastic Vinaya (the code of the disciplinary rules of the monks and the nuns) is another obvious instance where one would expect considerations of justice to become highlighted. Such a concept, however, is not at all visible in this literature. In giving reasons for the promulgation of disciplinary rules (sikkhā-pada) the Vinaya (V III, 29) refers, among others, to the following two considerations: dummankūnaṃ puggalānaṃ niggahāya: ‘for the censure of those who are not disciplined’ and pesalānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ phāsuvihārāya: ‘for the wellbeing of those who are disciplined’. This suggests that the system 2 In the overwhelming presence in Buddhism of a view of equality of human beings as human beings (although there can be mental and physical differences among them) M.P. Rege’s following remarks seem enigmatic: “One must particularly note that human equality is peculiarly modern concept. It has been remarked that ancient societies were profoundly inegalitarian not only in their actual constitution but also in their philosophical outlook.” 3  For a modern discussion of these arguments see, G Malalasekera and KN Jayatilleke: Buddhism and Race Question, UNESCO Publication, 1958.

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was meant to deal with those who are ill-behaved and by doing so, to make the life of those who are well­behaved easy. Censure of the illbehaved basically refers to punishment. A well-established theory holds that the purpose of the punishment is retribution. From a closer look we may see that the Buddhist theory of punishment is not retributive but reformative. In such a theory the underlying concept of justice has to be different from one operative in a retributive system of punishment. This does not, nevertheless, indicate that there is no concept of justice operating here. Even for reformative purposes punishment has to be in accordance with the degree of the gravity of the offence. The nature of the punishment is determined in accordance with the nature of the violation. It is clear that there is a sense of justice underlying this process. The concern for justice is further seen in seven procedures of conflict resolution (satta adhikaraṇa samathā) adopted in the Vinaya (V II, 72). In none of these instances, however, do we find the issues of justice articulated in a manner one would do today. The Buddhist views on social issues are, again, not articulated in terms of social justice. The well known Sigālovāda-sutta is the locus classics of the Buddha’s discussion on social relations. Six kinds of social relations have been enumerated there. They are the relation between parents and children, teachers and pupils, husband and wife, friends and friends; employers and employees and religious people and their supporters. Among these relations one could expect issues of justice emerging in the relations between parents and children, teachers and pupils and employees and employers in particular. In more recent times the concerns of justice have been brought into the sphere of family life (Moller 1989 ) and hence one may think on the matters relating to family life too in terms of justice. The Sigālovāda talks about sets of mutual duties and responsibilities applicable to each of the six groups identified as representing six regions or directions (east, west, north, south, above and below). The word used is ‘sangaha’ meaning to minister or treat well or to take care which is further described as ‘honouring’ or ‘paying respect’ (namasseyya). What is significant in this discussion is that a discourse of justice is conspicuously absent. The employer and employee relation, which may be conceived as involving various issues of justice, has been dealt with sufficiently without presenting the things to be done as matters of justice or even matters of rights.4 The account goes in the 4 One is faced with a similar difficulty in discussing the possibility of a concept of right in Buddhism. Ultimately, the whole issue of rights in Buddhism, like that of justice, becomes an issue of having a different world-view and consequently a different perspective.

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following manner: There are five ways in which a master should minister to his servants and workpeople as the nadir: by arranging their work according to their strength, by supplying them with food and wages, by looking after them when they are ill, by sharing special delicacies with them, and by letting them off work at the right time. And there are five ways in which servants and workpeople thus ministered to by their master as the nadir, will reciprocate: they will get up before him, go to bed after him, take only what they are given; do their work properly, and be bearers of his praise and good repute. In this way the nadir is covered, making it at peace and free from fear. (Walshe 1987, 468) The language used here is not legal implying directly or indirectly rights or matters of justice. The entire relationship has been viewed as one of reciprocity. Earlier, we noticed how Buddhism responds to the Hindu view of social stratification. A key characteristic in this hierarchical society was economic inequality, particularly the poverty prevalent in society. Buddhism deals with the problem of poverty and understands it basically as a problem which requires the attention of rulers. In discourses such as Kūṭadanta-sutta it is clearly mentioned that it is the responsibility of the king to provide people with capital and infra-structure necessary for conducting business and agriculture. Furthermore Buddhism disapproves of hoarding money and amassing it without making use of it for oneself or for others. In spite of all this, it does not talk about these considerations as involving issues of justice or rights. The important question therefore to be asked is how we should understand the way Buddhism deals with the issues of what is called social justice without employing a concept of justice. The Jātaka literature (stories containing the accounts of the past births of the Buddha) has a lot to say about good and bad rulers, and, again it is clear that there is a strong notion of justice and injustice underlying these stories. Although it is obvious that Buddhism does not have a clearly articulated theory of justice, at a closer look we see that issues of justice have been articulated through the broad concept of Dhamma. Describing the good governance of kings, the Jātaka always uses the phrase “dhammena samena”, ‘righteously and equally’. The term ‘sama’ in this context is not difficult to interpret as a sense of equality which is nothing more than the literal meaning of the term. The broad term Dhamma in this context may be interpreted as justice for Dhamma in

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state-craft is basically justice as the term is understood today. One needs to have a far more comprehensive discussion to determine the right term if at all the concept exists in Buddhism. We do not propose to do that here.

Buddhist theory of karma5 In this manner, a key problem any student of Buddhist social, political or legal philosophy faces is to explain this obvious lack of a concept denoting justice and an absence of an explanation of human or social situations exhibiting a concept of justice. When thinking in these lines one is inevitably forced to examine the Buddhist view of karma (kamma) which seems to provide a theoretical framework for explaining human actions and their results. In the heart of the karma theory is the belief that human actions produce results proportionate to their nature and the intensity. The following metaphorical statement articulates this notion. Whatever sort of seed is sown - That is the sort of fruit. one reaps The doer of good reaps good - The doer of evil reaps evil By you, dear, the seed been sown - Thus you will experience the fruit (S I, 227; Bodhi 2000, 328) As we will be seeing in detail later, the workings of karma have been understood in Buddhism as one not involving any human or divine agency but acting on its own. The general Indian concept of karma has been understood by many to involve a serious sense of fatalism, which cannot be altered by human intervention. If the popular interpretation is correct, what one gets is one’s due for which no one else is to be blamed or praised. This means that there is not much room for any discussion of social justice in particular. Discussing the absence of a concept of justice in Buddhism, Winston L. King observes that the Buddha’s teaching ‘represents a fine-tuning of the existing social order with no question asked about whether the order itself is fair or just such as are today raised in the ‘justice-conscious West’. He observes further that there are two general reasons for this situation: one is that Buddhism is ‘a gospel of personal salvation; according to which escape from and not the transformation of samsara (wheel of existence) is the case. The second is that for Buddhists the western concept of justice; is ‘too much of an unending revengeful tit for tat”. 5  For a fairly comprehensive account of the Buddhist view of karma refer to the entry on ‘kamma’ in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism (Vol.VI Fascicle 1), (Government of Sri Lanka), by David J Kalupahana and Asanga Tilakaratne.

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Coming to the most crucial reason for the lack of concept of justice in Buddhism, King refers to the karma theory: While these two factors are important in explaining the general lack of concern for justice in the Buddhist world of past and present, there is a more basic and fundamental reason for this disposition. Its name is Karma. In the scheme of time-space structured existence embodied in sentient existence at all levels and in all forms (human, sub-human, super-human) the karmic principle of justice rules without exception or hindrance. There is no such thing as unexplained, causeless suffering,...Every state of existence, good or bad, animal, ghostly, hellish or heavenly, is caused by ethically good or evil deeds. Karmic justice, like the mills of the Greek gods, may grind very slowly but grinds exceedingly fine. (King 1995, 75) King rightly identifies the importance of the karma theory in this context. We need to examine the Buddhist theory of karma in order to see whether in Buddhism karma has been understood as providing the basis for understanding social situations, relations and conditions. In other words, we need to examine whether the karma theory of karma is the reason for Buddhism’s apparent lack of a concept of justice. King’s articulation of the Buddhist concept of karma is too rigid, too fatalistic and too deterministic. It is true that in the Indian religious tradition such theories of karma are not unknown. But the same does not hold for the Buddhist theory of karma articulated in various discourses in the Pali canon. We have to admit that there can be a gap between the ‘ideal’ theory and the less-than ideal practice of karma theory. Accordingly the popular understanding of karma across Buddhist societies may be close to what King articulates. But in so far as textual evidence is concerned the following discussion of ours will show that the Buddhist theory of karma is not exactly what King articulates. Karma is a pan-Indian religious concept. All Indian philosophies and religions have their own position regarding karma: mostly they accept it or sometimes reject, either way all have their pro or anti stance on it. The history of the concept goes back to the early Vedic literature. By the time of the Buddha Vedic religion had reached the stage of the Upaniṣads (early period). The sramana systems which had sprung as reactions to dominant Brahmanism were numerous and they too had their own theories of karma.

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Buddhism defines karma basically as intention (cetanā). The Buddha says: “Monks, I say that intention is karma. Having intended one performs karma by body, speech and mind.’ (A III, 415). What is said is that the nature of a karma, which is done physically, verbally or mentally, is determined by the intention behind it. The teaching of karma is closely linked to the idea of the result produced by it. The nature of the result is determined by the nature of the action. As the Dhammapada says: Things done with evil intention bring about unhappiness whereas things done with good intention bring about happiness (Dhp v. 1, 2). The Buddha rejected the contemporary theories of karma and its result as belonging to two extreme positions. The texts classify these views into two broad categories: one is the view that one and the same person does and undergoes results (so karoti so paṭisaṃvedetῑti); the other is the view that the doer and the experiencer are two different persons (añño karoti añño paṭisaṃvedetῑti) (S II, 20). The first view is represented by those who believed in an everlasting soul (ātman). The prime candidates for this view were brahmins. All the sramanas who believed in such a soul also can be believed to have contributed to this view. The second view is attributed to the materialists who did not believe in the existence of soul. Buddhism naturally rejected both these views. The reason for rejecting them is not so much how they have been described as the underlying assumptions of eternalism and annihilationism of the soul. In explaining the existence of human suffering Buddhism rejects some four positions held by various religious groups: i. suffering is selfwrought (sayaṃ kataṃ dukkhaṃ); ii. suffering is other wrought (paraṃ­ kataṃ dukkhaṃ); iii. Suffering is wrought by both oneself and other (sayaṃ kataṃ paraṃ kataṃ ca dukkhaṃ) and iv. Suffering is due to accident (adhicca samuppannaṃ dukkhaṃ) (S II, 19-20). The first two positions are rejected for the same reasons as the ones due to which the earlier two positions were rejected. The third is rejected for the reason that the combination of two wrong positions does not make a correct position. The fourth is rejected for the obvious reason explained in the teaching of dependant origination (paṭicca samuppāda), that there are causes and conditions for any situation to take place and that without them nothing would happen. In addition to these broad categories of karma theories, there is another version of karma rejected by the Buddha which has very important implications for the present discussion. It is the view that all happiness and unhappiness experienced by people are due to their past karma which is

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called sabbaṃ pubbekatahetu-vāda, ‘the view that everything is due to past karma’. This view is attributed to Jains, and in several instances the Buddha has rejected this view in unequivocal terms. In the following remarks the Buddha describes what is wrong with this view: There are certain recluses and Brahmins who teach thus, who hold this view: Whatsoever weal or woe or neutral feeling is experienced, all that is due to some previous action…Then I. say to them: “So then, owing to a previous action, men will become murderers, thieves, unchaste, liars, slanderers, abusive, babblers, covetous, malicious; and perverse in view. Thus for those who fall back on the former deed as the essential reason there is neither desire to do, no effort to do, nor necessity to do this deed or abstain from that deed. So then, the necessity for action or inaction not being found to exist in truth and verily, the term ‘recluse’ cannot reasonably be applied to yourselves. (A I, 173-4) In saying that everything is not due to one’s past karma, the Buddha is asserting that only certain things are due to such karma. The most important aspect of this assertion is that it safeguards the meaningfulness of human action. What is meant by past karma in this context can be problematic. What is popularly understood is that it is not the action done in the past but some sort of ‘karmic force’ produced by it. But how does that force work? Does it have an existence independent of the doer but works on him/her from outside? Or does it exist in the doer’s mind and condition his behaviour? The former seems unable to explain karmic effects according to Buddhism and hence it cannot be the Buddhist position (We will discuss some aspects of this question later). The latter seems to be more plausible according to Buddhism. But in a universe in which not everything happens according to one’s own will what it amounts to is that not everything is a result of one’s past karma. That this indeed is the position held by the Buddha is clear from the above discussion. In so far as a concept of justice is concerned the question one can raise is: Can one speak meaningfully about justice if everything happens due to one’s past karma? The answer is obviously in the negative. The only way to talk about justice will be to hold that karma itself is just. But this makes human agents irrelevant in the process. This cannot be a good ground for developing a theory and practice of justice.

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An implication of rejecting the view that everything is due to past karma is that things can be due to one’s present karma. This is an aspect not given its due emphasis at all in the present-day Buddhist discussions of karma. There is a strong sense of karma in the teaching of the Buddha that it is one’s present behaviour that can determine one’s present status. A good example of this possibility is the Buddha’s interpretation of ‘outcaste’ (vasala) and ‘high-caste’ (brāhmaṇa). In this analysis the Buddha says very clearly that it is not by a specific birth that one becomes either a vasala or a brāhmana but by one’s action (behaviour) (Sn v. 136). The action or karma referred to here is nothing more than what one does at the present moment. The teaching cannot be interpreted as saying that it is due to one’s past karma that one becomes either a vasala or a brāhmaṇa. A similar observation can be made on the practice of the path of purification taught by the Buddha. In following the path it is expected that one gets rid of one’s defilements gradually by developing one-pointed-ness of mind (samādhi) and liberative knowledge (paññā). In this process one’s past actions or their results, meaning karma committed in the samsaric past, play virtually no role. What really matters is one’s present practice (karma). This is not to deny that one’s mental condition and dispositions would not matter. It is said that in the course of surveying the world for potential listeners of the Dhamma the Buddha realized that there were people “with less duties their eyes and much dust in their eyes, those who have subtle faculties and mild faculties, with favourable dispositions and not favourable dispositions, easily instructed and not easily instructed” (M I, 169) and so on. These variations in abilities and dipositions have to be explained as resulting not only from one’s past karma but also as resulting from one’s continuing karma represented by a cluster of factors such as upbringing, education, environment and behaviour. What this means is that one is a result of one’s past karma, meaning basically one’s past karma in the present birth. The Buddhist belief in rebirth and the possibility of influence from the previous existences is an extension of the same which can only be explained as it is explained with regard to one’s immediate past existence in this very life. The overall theory understood in this manner, instead of being detrimental, seems to have salutary implications for developing a theory of justice. In addition, there are many instances in which the Buddha tried to demystify and rationalize the idea of karma and its result. For instance responding to a statement made by someone to the effect that one gets results for every action one does, the Buddha says:

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Monks, if anyone should say: “Just as this man does a deed, so does he experience it,”...this being so there is no living of the holy life, there is no opportunity manifested for the utter destruction of ill..But if one should say: “Just as this man does a deed that is to be experienced, so does he experience its fulfillment”- this being so, monks, there is a living of the holy life, there is an opportunity manifested for the utter ending of ill. (A I, 249; Hare 227, 1978) Here the Buddha makes a distinction between deeds that have the potential of producing experiences and those that do not. What determines this potential is the moral or immoral nature of the doer. Elaborating on this point further the Buddha says that the moral implications of the results of an action can be either enhanced or mitigated by the moral or immoral nature of the doer. In other words, apart from the nature of the act itself the character of the doer is also a factor that determines the nature of its result and the way it affects him. The Buddha also rejected the view that one’s life is dominated by things one does often. In responding to a statement made by a follower of Jainism to the effect that one is karmically led by the things such as killing, stealing etc., that one does often, the Buddha rejects the view and it is revealed in the following dialogue: If headman, it were the case that one is led on [to rebirth] by the manner in which one usually dwells, then according to Nigantha Nataputta’s word, no one at all would be bound for a state of misery, bound for hell. What do you think; headman? In the case of a person who destroys life, if one compares one occasion with another, whether by day or by night, which is more frequent: the occasions when he is destroying life or those when he is not doing so? In the case of a person who destroys life, venerable sir, if one compares one occasion with another whether by day or by night, the occasions when he is destroying life are infrequent while those when he is not doing so are frequent. So, headman, if it were the case that one is led on [to rebirth] by the manner in which one usually dwells, then according to Nigantha Nataputta’s word no one would be bound for a state of misery, bound for hell. (S IV, 316-317; Bodhi 2000, 1341) These instances suggest that although any volitional act is karma what is taken as important is only those with moral implications. Human

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life is full of activities and all of them do not have moral implications. Nor do all of them have a lasting effect on their doers. The canonical stand of karma and its result as non-deterministic and non-rigid has not only been upheld but also been elaborated on by the subsequent exegetical tradition. For example, the commentary to the Aṅguttara-nikāya lists four factors,(AA II, 218ff) namely, birth (gati), physical appearance (upadhi), time of the birth (kāla) and behaviour (payoga) that may affect in good manner or in adverse manner the results of one’s karma. What is said is that if the four factors are favourable then the bad results will be superseded by good ones and vice versa. What this really indicates is that irrespective of one’s past karma empirically verifiable non-ethical factors ultimately determine one’s present status. Although this classification is not available in the canon we can see that it is a faithful elaboration of the canonical standpoint. The clear message contained in this classification is that karma and its result are not totally determined and rigid. They change depending on situations that have nothing to do with the particular karma. A problem inherently associated with the belief that one is affected by one’s karma belonging to past lives is one’s inability to know which of the present situations are due to such karma and which are not. Buddhism believes that with the development of higher meditative states one can develop such abilities as the knowledge of seeing one’s own past life (pubbe-nivāsānussati ñāṇa) and the knowledge of how other beings are born according to their karma (cutūpapāta ñāṇa). But it is clear that these higher forms of cognition are beyond the reach of the ordinary people who are affected by day-to-day situations which require correction. In such a situation the belief in karma is nothing more than a reminder that one is governed by forces created by oneself and that some of them are not totally within one’s control. If it is taken as a reminder to be humble it is understandable. Apart from that, any notion that advances the impression that one is not one’s own maker cannot go together with early Buddhist attitude characteristically expressed by such statements as “attāhi attano nātho” (Dhp v. 160): one is one’s own saviour.

Karma as a universal moral Principle? The general understanding of karma seems to be characterized by the belief that it is a universal phenomenon that exists as a part of Nature. The question to be raised is: Does Buddhism believe that there is a universal moral principle according to which the righteous are rewarded

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and the unrighteous are punished? If such a principle exists then is it the same as the principle of Karma? Although it may not be justifiable philosophically, it seems that ‘folk’ Buddhism has accepted the existence of such a universal nature or a universal principle. In the Jātaka stories there are frequent references to Sakka’s stony seat which would get heated when something drastically goes wrong below in the world. Sakka being an individual god this ‘universal’ role attributed to him is difficult to understand. This particular happening associated with his life attributes to him a function similar to one traditionally attributed to God.6 Another thing that points out to this direction is the ‘act of truth’ (Satya­ kriyā), again, frequently, mentioned in the Jātaka. Now this act which is characterized by invoking the power of truth and virtue seems to assume that these powers exist as universal principles. When understood in this manner these virtues are not associated with any particular god or a creator God. Therefore the indication is that they exist as a part of the workings of Nature. When all the means fail it is believed that one may appeal to this force. Given some basic assumptions in Buddhism it is difficult to justify the possibility of a universal moral principle. For instance, in the absence of a belief in a creator God Buddhism cannot be holding this belief in association with such an omnipotent god with whom the ultimate responsibility of everything lies. With the belief that the world is founded on suffering (dukkhe loko patiṭṭhito) (S I, 40) and that one’s samsaric existence is sorrowful the universe cannot be a moral universe, inherently good and where goodness triumphs ultimately. Further the Buddhist teaching of karma bars us from believing in any activation of it without one’s volitional interference for karma ultimately is one’s volition. If this is the case, it is difficult to believe that karma functions as an agentless universal phenomenon which is a part of Nature.

Conclusion The above discussion of the Buddhist view of karma surely does not explain everything about it. But it does make clear the Buddhist position regarding certain key issues involving the karma theory: i. By karma Buddhism does not talk about a universal force existing independently of particular doers. ii. Buddhism takes karma as basically a psychological 6  I discuss this aspect in my paper ‘Buddhist Non-theism’ in Approaching the Dhamma: Buddhist Texts and Practices in South and Southeast Asia, eds. Ann M. Blackburn and Jeffery Samuels, Seattle: BPS Pariyatti Editions, 2002. pp.125-149.

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phenomenon which is determined by the nature of one’s volition. iii. According to Buddhism everything that happens to human beings is not due to their past actions. iv. The present karma or present human actions are of vital importance in determining the present condition of an individual or a group of individuals. v. Karma is not a kind of determinism or fatalism. Winston L King to whom we referred earlier characterizes Buddhism as not endorsing the change of the present situation but as ‘ducking one’s head’ and trying to escape from it by attaining nirvana. Whether or not a kind of fatalistic attitude similar to this was developed among the peoples where Buddhism spread is a matter to be investigated by sociologists. But in so far as the basic teaching of the Buddha and its subsequent exegetical tradition are concerned King’s reading remains unsupported. It is an interesting fact to observe that most of the Buddha’s discussions on karma are devoted to dispelling wrong views and distinguishing the right view from what the Buddha considered to be erroneous. There are many instances in the discourses that show that the Buddha really tried to give a kind of naturalist interpretation to the traditional and mostly misunderstood view of karma. It seems that the Buddha was trying to accommodate the contemporary karma theory as much as possible without sacrificing the empirical outlook ingrained in the teaching. The implication of all these is that it is not due to the theory of karma that there is not apparently a concept of justice in Buddhism. The larger question whether or not there is a concept ‘of justice in Buddhism remains open. It is not wise to conclude that there is such a concept simply on the popular assumption that everything that is modern is there in Buddhism. It is quite possible that Buddhism viewed human situations and relations in a manner different from the modern western perspective. This does not mean that Buddhism was not caring enough or that it did not have a social awareness and sense of fairness. It could simply mean that it operates on different assumptions with a different world-view.

10. Insights from Tripitaka on Justice*

Introduction A Buddhist view of justice is still in the making. For the last several decades scholars have tried to articulate what they consider to be the Buddhist view of justice. Still there is nothing of the sort that can be called ‘Buddhist theory of justice’. The scholars who have discussed this issue in particular and the Buddhist social philosophers in general have voiced their concern over the apparent absence of concepts such as justice and rights in the Buddhist discourse. The concept of rights, particularly the Buddhist view on human rights, has been discussed by a number of scholars. In the course of these discussions something very interesting has emerged, namely, whether we should proceed with the assumption that there is a clear Buddhist stand on (human) rights and elaborate on what we consider to be such rights or whether we should proceed from accepting that there is no such a concept in Buddhism and then proceed by asking why. Damien Keown’s paper (1995) on human rights in Buddhism titled as “Are there “Human Rights” in Buddhism?” highlights this dilemma. While admitting the western origins of the concept of rights and human rights Keown nonetheless shows how it is justifiable to discuss rights from a Buddhist perspective. I think a similar situation is obtained with the concept of justice. One way to study justice will be to assume that there is a concept of justice and proceed to articulate it. The other is to inquire about apparent absence of the concept in Buddhism and look for reasons behind the absence. In this discussion we will follow the second approach and begin with asking why there is no concept, or to be more precise, a separate concept, denoting * First published in Dialogue, New Series XXXV – XXXVI, ed. Aloysius Peiris SJ 2008/2009, pp.94-118.

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justice in Buddhism, and proceed subsequently to construe what can be called a Buddhist concept of justice.

Justice as the highest social virtue At the beginning of his celebrated work, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls wrote: Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. Continuing further he wrote: A Theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override (emphasis added). (Rawls 1971/1999, 1) This well-known statement by John Rawls, articulates, in addition to liberal individualist basis of his theory of justice, the place concept of justice occupies in the modern society. This further shows that, if one were to list social virtues, justice should be mentioned as the first. Now looking from a Buddhist point of view, in a similar exercise of listing virtues according to Buddhism, it is not very likely that one will place justice on the top. It is not sure even one will include justice at all in the list. It is important to see the reasons for this state of affairs. The contemporary thinking on social ethics of Buddhism owes its origin to Max Weber whose writings on Asian religion in general and Hinduism and Buddhism in particular have influenced greatly the thinking on the subject ever since. According to Weber the ‘ancient Buddhism’ is a system devoted for the search of salvation by an individual whose sole means is contemplation dissociated from any social action. Weber highlights this absence of any kind of action whatsoever in the path to salvation which according to him is sought “in a psychic state remote from activity.” Salvation is an absolutely personal performance of the self-reliant individual. No one, and particularly no social community can help him. The specific asocial character of all genuine mysticism is here carried to its maximum. Actually it appears even as a contradiction that the Buddha, who was quite aloof from forming a “church” or even a “parish” and who expressly rejected the possibility and pretension of being able to “lead” an order, has founded an order after all. The contradiction remains unless the institution here, in contrast to Christendom, was rather the

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mere creation of his students. (Weber 1958/1960, 213-214) In Weber’s view the laity is there only to provide material subsistence for these individual salvation seekers, and they did not have any role within the system. This exclusion of society at large and consequent characterization of Buddhism as a system consisting of ‘windowless monads’ seem to have provided the basis for subsequent theorization on the subject. Discussing justice in Buddhism Winston L. King (1995) says that “justice” is a rare, almost non-existent word in the Buddhist canonical literature.’ But this absence is not because there was no injustice in the Buddhist societies which necessitated people to be concerned about justice. King goes on to describe how the Asian Buddhist countries had their full share of ‘cruel oppressive rulers in whose realms there was much of what the West today calls injustice’. There was, nonetheless, no justice discourse developed in these societies because “the social order was accepted much like the natural order simply as the way life was. One ducked one’s head and hunched one’s shoulders, accepting everything passively and continually, hoping that the present storm of oppression and misfortune could be waited out (King 1995, 5). Discussing this issue further King adduces some possible reasons why there has not developed a discourse of justice in Buddhism. One is the fact that the teaching of the Buddha is a ‘gospel of personal salvation’ from time-space reality not meaning to transform it. Another has to do with the revengeful ‘tit for tat’ character of the popular western concept of justice which is not consonant with the Buddhist dislike of taking revenge. The most important reason, according to King, for this lack of interest in justice is the idea of karma. We will examine these claims in the course of this study. What is very interesting in King’s paper is that he elaborates in detail the Judeo-Christian origins of the concept. In the Judo-Christian monotheistic tradition God who is the ultimate judge has invariably been depicted as just. As King shows being just is a key characteristic of God. In the non-theistic Buddhist tradition it is clear that there is no similar god attributed with the quality of justice. The Buddha himself was never considered a God or a saviour, and hence there has never been a need to describe the Buddha as just. Does this, however, mean that Buddhism was never concerned about matters of justice? As we saw above, for the reasons already mentioned, Winston L King gives an affirmative answer to this question. King may be right in assuming that the Buddhist tradition was temperamentally not ready to develop a concept of justice characterized by doing ‘tit for

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tat’. But is he correct when he says that Buddhism encouraged people to accept the social order as similar to the natural order which would result in passivity and inaction? It is true that Buddhism started as a movement focused on ending individual samsaric suffering was never concerned about matters of the worldly life? It may be true that at least for those who went forth from home to homelessness the worldly affairs were not of much relevance. But at the same time we must not forget the fact that these so-called individual salvation seekers belonged in the organization called Sangha which was founded on broad democratic principles. It is a gross mistake to ignore the fact that there were lay men and women, upāsaka and upāsikā, constituting two important aspects of the ‘four groups’ of the disciples of the Buddha, whose style of life and social requirements were different from those of monks and nuns. Portraying Buddhism as a mere monastic system is historically incorrect. This however does not necessarily mean that the Buddha developed social concepts such as justice and rights for this group of people. But there is no doubt about the fact that the Buddha addressed issues related to their worldly life which were different from the requirements of the monastic disciples and would have come under justice discourse if the Buddha were to address them today. Scholars such as Uma Chakravarti who studied the ancient Indian social structure have convincingly shown that social background in which Buddhism arose was urban and commercial. The householders (gahapati) frequently mentioned in the Buddhist discourses, according to Chakravarti represented land-owner class of people who had direct hand in production. In such a society, it is quite natural that people had concerns about their rights and matters of justice. In the general Hindu Brahmanic context these issues were dealt with in such sciences as arthaśāstra, dharma­ śāstra and daṇda-nīti. It is true that even in these fields, issues involving rights, justice and the like have not been articulated in equivalent terms. The mere absence of equivalent terms or concepts does not mean that the issues were non-existent or that people were not interested in such issues. It could well be that they conceptualized things differently and provided different answers. The belief in karma is almost universal in Indian culture. It has been there from the very early Vedic period. In the teaching of the Buddha too karma features prominently. But the Buddha seems to have tried to present as naturalistic a concept of karma as possible. He clearly rejected the determinism associated with karma belief, namely, that all that happen to people are due to their past karma (A I, 173-177; Bodhi 2012,

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266-270). He showed that karma is only one among many factors. By presenting karma within dependent co-origination the Buddha showed that it is not a metaphysical belief beyond one’s experience but a natural phenomenon like growth of plants (bīja-niyāma), and evolution of seasons (utu-niyāma). In the Saṃyutta-nikāya (S I, 227), this idea has been articulated in the following manner: Whatever sort of seed is sown That is the sort of fruit one reaps The doer of good reaps good The door of evil reaps evil (Bodhi 2000, 328) For the Buddha karma or human action is subject to conditions. By behaving in a certain manner one creates conditions for good or bad returns. It is not some kind inexorable force that no one can stop. In so far as the Buddhist theory of karma is concerned it is clear that the Buddha did not want to contribute to the already existing wrong attitudes about it. It was presented as a moral theory. The aim was to teach the society how to develop their physical, verbal and mental behaviour in a harmless manner for the welfare of both the agent and the patient. But how this teaching was internalized by the ordinary followers remains a question. Clearly there is a gap between the precept and the practice here. But this does not explain if the Buddha was not interested in justice. Therefore, if one cannot find an idea of justice in the teaching of the Buddha one has to look elsewhere for reasons. In the remainder of this discussion I will make an attempt to show how the Buddha has addressed issues related to what is called social justice and legal justice within which come many other strands of justice.

Distributive justice A very important aspect of social justice is what is called ‘distributive justice’ or justice in the distribution of resources, opportunities and the wealth of a society. In a capitalist mode of production one tends to lay emphasis on freedom- freedom of the individual to engage in activities perceived as promoting one’s self­interest. Underlying this view is the theory of rationality which holds that it is the characteristic of a rational individual to promote one’s self-interest. If one were to act in a manner that hinders one’s own interests he is not considered rational. Society is seen as comprising such rational people. The broader theory behind this characterization is liberal individualism. The well-known articulation of this view is found in the John Rawls’ statement quoted above (Each

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person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override). In presenting his view in this manner Rawls is rejecting the utilitarian theory which holds that actions that produce maximum happiness to the largest number of people are the most desirable. According to this view, the happiness or the interest of any particular individual is subordinate to the interest of the society at large. In rejecting this view, Rawls is drawing near to Kant who held that a human being cannot be taken as a means to an end and that he should be treated as an end in itself. Individualism characterized in these views is the basis of the theory of justice accepted in capitalist society. Against this view is the idea of social justice or distributive justice that has been traditionally advocated by socialist groups. This view emphasizes the need for just distribution of resources among the members of any given society. Where does Buddhism stand in this debate? As we found earlier, Buddhism arose in an urban setting and was patronized mainly by the newly emerging social group called ‘householders (gahapati) and business people. Buddhism accepts trade and business as good ways of livelihood and has listed various types of unacceptable trades and practices. In the analysis of sīla found in the discourses such as Sāmaññaphala-sutta (D I, 47- 86), malpractices associated with weights and measures have been enumerated. What is implied is that entrepreneurship is good in so far as it is done honestly. Earning money/wealth with shedding of sweat and physical labour has been lauded but with the proviso that such earning should not violate the Dhamma. So far this seems quite close to laissez faire economy in which individual initiative is valued. But we have to remember that the Buddha did not approve of individualism characterized by selfishness of promoting one’s own ends exclusively. At the same time, the Buddha did not approve of the idea of rationality or rational individual as one is concerned only about his own welfare. Although the Buddha would say that ordinary unenlightened human beings are selfish by nature that would not be given as the hallmark of a rational human being. In fact the rational human being [paṇdita] in the worldly sense has been described as one who secures wealth/progress [artha/attha] in both this worldly and other worldly sense (Diṭṭheva dhamme ca yo attho – yo cáttho samparāyiko attābhisamayā dhῑro – paṇdito ti pavuccatῑti. S I, 89). In another instance, a righteous person has been described as one who makes oneself as well as one’s wife and children, in-laws, friends, religious people and others happy with what he has earned (A II, 65-69; Bodhi 2012, 449-452). Here, it is interesting to see that while oneself is

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included as the first the rest of the society, both immediate and peripheral, too has been included in the list. Thus the rational person according to the Buddha is not one who is concerned about oneself alone (A II, 46) In fact, in the Buddhist view, there can be occasions when one would put one’s own interest after the interests of others and still be counted as rational. The general Buddhist ethical position is to put both oneself and the other on a similar footing as advocated in such instances as the Ambalaṭṭhikā Rāhulovāda­-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya. This clearly is not individualism. The Kūṭadanta-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya (D I, 127- 149) contains some very important ideas relevant to distributive justice. It recognizes the close connection between poverty and crimes. The root cause of increasing trend of crimes in society is diagnosed by the Buddha as having to do with economic deprivation. Subsequently, the Buddha states that it is up to the ruler (government) to provide job opportunities for those who wished to serve the government, capital for those who wished to engage in business and seeds and other facilities for those who wished to cultivate. These are not specified as donations. The understanding is that the government can recover what it gave away once business and agriculture are successful. The role attributed to the ruler in this discourse is somewhat akin to the role of a planned economy in the modem sense. The insight of the discourse is that a ruler cannot take tax from people without first providing for them for the betterment of their economy. Although the discourse does not invoke the concept of justice in this context what underlies the whole discussion is none other than justice in distribution. The Cakkavatti-sīhanāda-sutta (D III, 58-79) of the Dīgha-nikāya too confirms the close connection between economic de-stability and social disorder. The discourse articulates the concept of Universal Monarch (rajā cakkavatti) in Buddhism. According to the story once the father-king leaves handing over the kingdom to his son the ‘wheeljewel’ suddenly disappears. When the son consulted his father his first remark was that the wheel-jewel is not his paternal heritage (na hi te tāta dibbaṃ cakka-ratanaṃ pettikaṃ dāyajjaṃ D III, 60). He has to behave in such a way that he deserves it. The father goes on elaborating the behaviour that would bring back for him his lost authority: It is, my son, yourself depending on Dhamma, honouring it, revering it, cherishing it, doing homage to it, and venerating it, having the Dhamma as your badge and banner, acknowledging

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the Dhamma as your master you should establish guard, ward and protection according to Dhamma for your (i) own household, (ii) your troops, (iii) your nobles and vassals, (iv) for Brahmins and householders, (v) town and country folk, (vi) ascetics and Brahmins, (vii) for beasts and birds. Let no crime prevail in your kingdom, and to those who are in need give property, and listen to those ascetics and brahmins who have renounced their worldly life,…and do accordingly. (Walshe 2012, 396, 397) In this account, the repeated emphasis laid on the Dhamma is noteworthy. Although what Dhamma means in this context is not elaborated it is understood that it refers to the ‘duty’ of the ruler. Dhamma is a common overarching criterion applicable to all situations. In the political arena it covers all the good qualities of a ruler including his sense of justice. According to the discourse the Dhamma in this context includes providing ‘guard, ward and protection’, to all segments of society including birds and beasts. What is meant here is not the physical security of these people against enemies. It includes a broader sense in which economic and social welfare of the people are incorporated as the king’s duty. The direct relationship of these ideas and practices to distributive justice is clear. The history of Buddhist countries testify to the fact that the kings took as their duty to safeguard economic interests of the people. The vast irrigation schemes, for example, found in ancient Sri Lanka may be understood at least as partly motivated by this kind of welfare attitude of the rulers. In the Jātaka stories we find quite often good rulers described as providing food for people at four outlets of the city. Obviously, the practice finds its justification in this royal duty although it does not bode well for a ruler who has his subjects gathering for alms at four entrances of the city! Perhaps these alms were meant for religious people and those who came from afar to visit the capital city. In the Buddhist view, it is clear that ruler has been perceived as responsible for the social and economic welfare of his people. It is true that this concept has not been described in terms of justice. But it is not difficult to recognize the underlying notion. That the Buddhists were quite conscious of the intimate connection between the ruler’s righteousness and economic and social stability of society is amply shown by the following stanza uttered by them virtually at the conclusion of every religious activity: Devo vassatu kālena – sassasampatti hotu ca Phīto bhavatu loko ca - rājā bhavatu dhammiko

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Let rains fall on time! Let there be abundance in harvest! Let the world be prosperous! Let the king be righteous!

Social justice A prime example for the Buddha’s concern for ‘social justice’ is how he treated the lowest of the social strata, namely, those who belonged to Śudra class. The caste hierarchy among Brahmins was religiously ordained and hence considered inviolable and unchangeable. The Buddha completely rejected this hereditary social division which lacked any empirical justification, and stressed that the only criterion to classify people is their behavior or what they do and do not. It is true that the main purpose of the Buddha’s interest in the issue was that he wished to establish that suffering is a universal problem and that all human beings had the potentiality to make an end to it irrespective of their social status. One of the key accusations leveled against the Buddha by his contemporary Brahmins was that he proclaimed purification for all four castes (samaṇo gotamo cātuvaṇṇiṁ suddhiṁ paññāpeti: M II, 147). Although the main focus was soteriological the applicability of the Buddha’s arguments for the one-ness of humanity (articulated in the Vasettha-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya and the Sutta-nipata), has far reaching significance of social justice. The very creation of the Sangha organization by the Buddha as one founded on equality and human dignity is a remarkable achievement in the history of religion. The democratic traditions adopted in the practice of the Vinaya deserve a much elaborated discussion which we are not allowed to do here. The hallmark of this organization was its decentralized administration without power centred on any one individual. The concept of sῑmā (boundary) or the idea of a specific location as demarcating the boundary of diverse units of the Sangha who functioned as local groups capable of attending to their own affairs and making their own decisions is another remarkable experiment in this direction. The organization of the Sangha comprising members who recognized only seniority and spiritual advancement as distinguishing factors was an embodiment of social justice. There is quite a substantial discussion in the discourses on matters related to what we would call social justice today. In the well-known Sigālovāda-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya (D III, 180-193) the Buddha discusses how one should ‘protect’ six directions. What is said in the figurative language is the mutual ‘duties’ of social groups- parents and children, teachers and pupils, husband and wife, friends and friends,

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masters and slaves and labourers, and religious people and lay people. Although these are described as ‘duties’ in contemporary discussions we have to remember that in the discourse itself they have not been articulated in that language. Perhaps closest that come to duty may be ‘vatta’ that occurs in the Buddhist monastic Vinaya. But no such term is used in the account of the Sigālovāda-sutta. The term used is ‘paccupaṭṭhātabba’ -’should be attended on’. The discourse would first describe how one should ‘attend on’ to each of these groups. Upon doing so the other group will reciprocate by being kind (anukampanti). What one gives or receives in such mutual relationships is described as ‘treatment’ (saṅgaha). The language is clearly not one of rights or duties. But what is dealt in the discourse is very much what we would describe today in terms of rights and duties. In the Sigālovāda-sutta and in many other instances the Buddha has discussed matters related to family life, namely, relation between parents and children and husband and wife. In discussing the relationship between parents and children the Buddha starts with what children should do to their parents; what parents do in return has been described as reciprocation on their part. On the part of the children they should, among other things, look after their parents when they grow old. Children’s education, physical safety and well-being have been mentioned as parents’ responsibility. In a society where these aspects of mutual relationship are fulfilled there will not be a need to talk about rights; nor will there be a necessity to invoke justice. It is the same with the relationship between husband and wife. Here the Buddha starts with what the husband should do to his wife. What wife does has been given as reciprocation on her part. Being faithful to one’s spouse has been mentioned for both. In today’s language one can say that being faithful is a right of a husband or a wife. But the Buddha includes this very crucial aspect of family life without calling it a right. It is what each owes to the other at the violation of which the family relationship is certain to break down. A significant aspect of the contemporary theory of justice is occupied by matters related to family life. There is a growing school of theorists who believe that justice should be the basis of family life. One prominent example is Susan Moller Okin. The opening statement of her Justice, Gender and the Family (1989) is as follows: The injustice that results from the division of labour between the sexes affects virtually all women in our society, though not

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in all the same ways. A pervasive social problem, it is inflicting increasingly serious damage on children as well as women, and it is also destroying the family’s potential to be the crucial first school where children develop a sense of fairness. This book is about that injustice and its detrimental repercussions. In this book Okin claims that all philosophers up to this point are guilty of neglecting this very important aspect of justice. One of her main concerns is the unfair division of labour at home. She argues that what a woman would do at home is unacknowledged and unpaid for. In addition, she details sacrifices a woman has to make, opportunities she misses and disadvantages she is bound to suffer due to unfair division of labour in family life. She sees gender which is socially constructed as mainly responsible for this prevailing injustice. Her proposal is to move beyond gender and create gender-less just society in which both man and woman share all the responsibilities of raising a family once the woman gives birth to children. Okin is just one example of a powerful school of thought that argue that justice should be at the centre of family life. The Buddha lived in a society in which men usually worked hard for making a living and women stayed home, attended to day-to-day chores and raised children. The Buddha, as revealed in the Sigālovāda-sutta and many other discourses, envisaged a family life where this type of division of labour was accepted as fair and reasonable. Earning money was man’s domain; it was up to the woman to spend it judiciously. In the ancient world, neither man nor women seem to have perceived themselves as existing independently except in cases when they rejected household life to become renouncers. Once one got into family life the usual division of labour followed without much exception. The world however has changed tremendously for the last several centuries. Age-old gender divisions have been brought under scrutiny and challenged and rejected in many instances. Individualism, we discussed earlier has become the defining factor in human life, and consequently, to be rational is to be safeguarding one’s own interests. This philosophy is common to both men and women. With changes of patterns of life and individualism as the ideological basis it is understandable that justice plays a crucial role in the contemporary life. If men and women are equal in all respects, if the philosophy is individualism it is nothing but just that society provides for all individuals to flourish irrespective of their joint social and biological functions. This underlying view of life is not for a society in which men and women perceive themselves as cooperating

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in joint ventures in which love, not justice, is the key virtue. Most of the contemporary social philosophy is devoted to find ways and means, often unsuccessfully, to bridge the gap between these two incompatible values. When two people love each other, or, in the Buddhist language, if the defining character of a relationship between two people is mettā, there will not be a need for justice. But true love is impossible with hardcore individualism. The same holds true for other social relations such as that between parents and children, teachers and students, family elders and youngsters etc. in which one may well devote one’s whole life for the protection or attending to sickness etc. of the other, inflicting considerable ‘injustice’ to one’s own interests (V I, 50 & 53). In fact the Buddha says that in the teacher -pupil relationship, it is one’s duty (vatta) to look after the other who is sick as long as he lives. Therefore it is not likely that the Buddha would have invoked justice if he were called for proposing remedy. Closely linked with the applicability of justice for gender and the family is justice for women in general. It is clear that Buddhism was quite different from Brahmanism in its attitude to women. The Buddha not only accepted in theory that intellectually and spiritually there was no difference between men and women but also he manifested it in practice by allowing women to be ordained in the sāsana. But this general picture is not without its hiccups. Although the Buddha allowed women to enter the sāsana as bhikkhunīs it is said that he did it reluctantly, not wholeheartedly. The real champion of women in Buddhism is not really the Buddha but his close attendant, Ananda, who successfully argued the women’s case with the Buddha. It is clear that the Sangha headed by the Venerable Mahakassapa did not think that this was a good idea at all. The elders (thera) headed by Mahakassapa accused Ananda Thera at the conclusion of the first council for persuading the Buddha to establish the bhikkhunī order (V II, 289). But all the available textual evidence shows that the Buddha did his possible best for restoring the dignity of women within the constraints of his society. This overall positive attitude is articulated by one of the female disciples of the Buddha: Itthibhāvo kiṃ kairā – cittamhi susamāhite ñāṇamhi vattamānamhi – sammā dhammaṃ vipassato (S I, 129; Bodhi 2000, 222-223) Why does our women-ness matter if the mind is concentrated, and knowledge for the discernment of phenomena is present?

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Legal justice A very important area in which justice is applicable is law and its implementation. In Buddhism something that comes closest to law is Vinaya or the monastic discipline. There have been discussions among scholars on the exact nature of the Buddhist Vinaya. Andrew Huxley, an expert on the subject has described the Buddhist law as a religious system. His basic position is that we must be careful when we attribute characteristics of western law to systems of law such as Buddhist that have originated from religious systems.1 This observation points to an important character of the Buddhist law, namely, that it is solely meant for the monastic community. Some times this characteristic has been ignored by scholars. For instance, Nandasena Ratnapala (Ratnapala 1993, 40) takes aspects of sīla such as the five precepts applicable to lay people as aspects of Buddhist law. It is very clear that the Buddha never had a legal system encompassing the entire society. In the Buddhist tradition, from the time of the Buddha itself, the lay society was considered as coming under the jurisdiction of the king. The lay Buddhists were always under the secular civil law. This has been so everywhere in the Buddhist world except perhaps in Tibet where the both the head of the State and the Head of the religion was the same. Therefore, the five precepts or any other advice given by the Buddha to lay society does not come within the Buddhist law. In the later commentarial literature, the Sigālovāda-sutta has been described a ‘gihi-vinaya’ (discipline of the householder) giving the impression that it is the counterpart of the Vinaya for the lay society. But this later description has to be taken as one meant to highlight the importance of the particular discourse in the life of lay people. All the evidence suggests that the Buddha always considered lay people as coming under the rule of king’s law. Even in the case of his monastic disciples the Buddha asked them to go along with the king’s rule where applicable. This has been the practice everywhere in Buddhist societies. It is important to make a distinction between sīla and vinaya at the beginning of this discussion. Sīla is the basic aspect of ‘training’ (sikkhā), which is the basis of spiritual life in Buddhism. It is applicable to both the monastic community and the lay society, although the degree of involvement is not the same. But Vinaya is basically the system of monastic law promulgated by the Buddha. While the sīla was there 1 See his “Buddhist Law as a Religious System” unpublished paper for IALS. London 2000. and “The Buddha and the Social Contract” in Journal of Indian Philosophy , 24: pp.407-420, 1996.

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as an essential aspect of the Path from the very beginning Vinaya came only later. The basic difference between sīla and vinaya is that the latter entails punishment. Sīla is a matter of one’s own commitment. If one violates it one does not have to account for it to anyone. There is no idea of ‘sinning against the Buddha’ in the Buddhist tradition, something equivalent to ‘sinning against God’ in theistic traditions. One is not obligated to the Buddha for behaving or misbehaving. The Buddha is not there to punish any follower whose moral behaviour is faulty. Due to one’s bad moral behaviour one will be undergoing karmic effects to the degree of his/her immorality and other factors associated. The karmic effect however is not a punishment as we already know. Its effect has to be understood as a manifestation of the principle of dependent coorigination. But the case with the Vinaya is different. Once one becomes a member of the Buddhist monastic community one is bound by the Vinaya rules the violation of which entails punishment depending on the severity of the violation. According to the traditional belief mentioned in the commentary to the Vinaya Pitaka the Buddha promulgated Vinaya rules only after 20 years of the Buddhahood (VA I, 213). This should not be understood as that the Buddhist monastic tradition was without discipline till that point of time. In fact, the story says, the behaviour of the monastic disciples was so exemplary there was no need of rules and regulations. In the Kakacūpama-sutta (M I, 122-129) the Buddha reminiscences the past when he did not need to instruct his disciples specifically on good behaviour but mere arousing of mindfulness on the particular matter was enough. The Bhaddāli-sutta (M I, 437-447) contains an important discussion relevant to the origin of Vinaya, the monastic law. The following question has been raised: Venerable sir, what is the cause, what is the reason why there were previously fewer training rules and more bhikkhus became established in final knowledge? What is the cause, what is the reason, why there are now more training rules and fewer become established in final knowledge?. (Bodhi 1995/2001, 548) This very story says something important about the nature of Vinaya rules. Their presence basically indicates that something has gone wrong. In fact, there are references to the effect that the leaders of the Sangha were lamenting the lapse of monastic behaviour as contrasted with the exemplary behaviour that was seen earlier.2 The very fact the Sangha 2 Saṃyutta-nikāya II p.208 (Bhikkhu Bodhi 2000: p.670) records how Mahakassapa

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organization needed a Vinaya was understood as a mark of degeneration. In that perspective Vinaya or law may be described as a ‘necessary evil’ from a Buddhist perspective. In the Bhaddāli-sutta, the Buddha refers to five situations as contributing to the degeneration of the monastic order. They are: that the Sangha has reached greatness, that the Sangha has reached the acme of worldly gain,... the acme of fame,... the came of great learning,... the acme of long-standing renown. These developments, though described as ‘basis for taint’, are natural states of the evolution of any social institute, and the Buddha in this discourse explains that he would promulgate training rules when these characteristics appear among the Sangha. The purpose of the Vinaya according to the discourse is to ward off the unhealthy situations that arise due to these conditions. In the Vinaya Piṭaka itself the Buddha gives the following ten reasons for the promulgation of the Vinaya rules: well-being of the Sangha, convenience of the Sangha , restraint of the evil-minded persons, ease of well-behaved monks, restraint against the defilements of this life, eradication of the defilements of the life after, conversion of new adherents, enhancement of the faith of those already converted, stability and continuance of the Dhamma, and furtherance of the good discipline (V III, 21). It is important to note that justice (or any term clearly indicative of justice) has not been referred to in the list, which one would have expected in this context. Although punislment is not mentioned in the list openly, we could interpret the third reason, i.e., restraint of the evil-minded persons, as implying some sort of punishment for the violators. Equally the fourth reason can be considered as providing for rewarding the good behaviour. The two reasons jointly imply that the idea of just deserts was in operation. The term for punishment widely known in the Indian tradition, ‘daṇḍa’ is not mentioned in the early Vinaya. Nevertheless, the concept and the practice of punishment has been there from the very beginning. The term ‘āpatti’ meaning violation or transgression in the technical ‘legal’ sense is there in the Vinaya. But āpatti has been seen more as a deprived or a fallen state than as a crime. Hence the punishment is perceived as a restoration. The Pātimokkha, the collection of the Vinaya rules, refers to the disciplinary process as ‘mutual advice and mutual raising (support)’ (aññamaññavacana, aññamaññavuṭṭhapana). It is found the monks were not easily advised as they were before. S II p. 224 [Bhikku Bodhi 2000: p.680] records Mahakassapa inquiring on the deterioration of the Sangha even with the presence of more Vinaya rules, the same issue raised in the Bhaddali­sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya.

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appropriate to quote KN Jayatilleke, who did a pioneering study on this aspect of Vinaya: The punishments are humane and consist of confession, gating, asking for forgiveness even from a layman, placing on probation, deprivation of rights, privileges or property, banishment to another Sangha, (compulsory change of residence), public proclamation, social boycott (brahmadaṇḍa) and expulsion. (Jayatilleke 1967, 522) Nevertheless, the fact that there is punishment is important for our discussion. In Jayatilleke’s own words, ‘the Sangha was a juristic person having a legal personality of its own, ((Jayatilleke 1967, 522) which meant that it could own property and that one could commit offences against it. Within such a system, there is all the reasons to believe that there was a strong sense of justice characterizing its operations. What follows are a few examples. The Buddhist Vinaya has upheld the tradition of not establishing laws with retrospective effect. The first ‘offender’ has been considered as being not guilty of offence (anāpatti ādikammikassa: V III 33) and accordingly has been exempted from punishment. This however does not mean that his offence has not been identified as going against the spirit of the Dhamma. In Dhirasekera’s words (discussing Sudinna’s grave offence), “his offence, at the time, is against an item of sīla and not sikkhāpada and he could not therefore be legally prosecuted for a presikkhāpada offence’ (Dhirasekere 1982, 46). It is only that the person is considered not guilty for a violation that did not exist before. Among the seven methods of resolving legal issues (adhikaraṇasamatha), adopted in the Vinaya, some clearly betray a sense of justice (V II, 73-104). One is to exempt the accused from the things he has committed while in a deranged state of mind (ummattaka). The rationale behind is that one must be in a fully stable psychological condition in order to be held responsible for any violation. This practice is called amūḷha-vinaya -verdict of past insanity. In addition, some were given ‘reckoning as deranged’ (ummattaka-sammuti) for the sake of Vinaya practices (V I, l23). Such people and, always those who were sick were exempted from the Vinaya obligations. The other of the same character is what is called sati-vinaya -verdict of innocence which is to rule out the possibility of an arahant being found guilty of any offence motivated by defilements. This is based on a specific Buddhist view that arahants are incapable of committing offences involving defilements.

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The Buddhist tradition considers it necessary that one is found guilty only in his presence and not in his absence. This is called sammukhāvinaya or the verdict in the presence. Another specific Buddhist practice is that in addition to establishing the guilt, the wrong doer is required to accept his guilt in order for the process to be complete. This is called paṭiññāta-karaṇa or the act of acknowledgement. The Buddhist vinaya tradition leaves room for the accused to appeal against a verdict given. In such cases a committee of arbitration or a select committee (appeal board) (ubbāhika) is appointed with senior and capable monks who are known for their impartiality (V II, 96). In all Vinaya proceedings it is emphasized that one must not be motivated by the desire to find the accused guilty. The proper attitude is to carry out the legal procedure with the intention of finding the accused not guilty. This idea has been summarized in the Samantapāsādikā (VA II, 392), the Commentary to the Vinaya Pitaka, in the following manner: Āpattidassanussāho- na kātabbo kudācanaṃ Passissāmī anāpatti – iti kayirātha mānasaṃ. One must not at any time endeavour to find the offence of the accused. One must have the intention of finding the innocence of the accused. It is also noteworthy that in the Buddhist tradition the accused is treated as innocent till he is proved guilty. Traditions and practices adopted in this manner show that the Buddhist Vinaya is guided by a very strong sense of justice. Referring to the idea of justice operative in the Buddhist Vinaya KN Jayatilleke says that “every individual is given a fair trial and the principles of natural or moral justice, as conceived in Buddhism, are scrupulously observed” (Jayatilleke 1967, 522). All the procedures mentioned above may be considered as ways of safeguarding the requirements of natural justice as conceived by the Buddhists. Punishment has been an important aspect of the Buddhist legal system as one would expect to find in any such system. As we saw earlier and as noted by scholars like Jayatilleke who have studied this subject, the punishment was humane. We do not hear bout corporeal punishment in the Buddhist tradition. Punishment or daṇḍa has a long history in the Indian tradition. The nature of punishment in the Indian Brahmanic tradition has been studied by many scholars. The Buddhist practice of punishment contrasts with this mainstream practice mainly in not

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being legalistic or retributive. In the Buddhist discourses themselves there are frequent references to severe and even horrendous corporeal punishments practiced by rulers. The Buddha does neither approve nor disapprove these punishments but simply mentions them as misfortunes one will have to undergo upon committing some offences. But in the Buddhist monastic tradition itself the Buddha has clearly shunned any form of physical punishment. We get an interesting case study of the nature of Buddhist practice of punishment from the ancient history of Sri Lanka. Although the Mahāvaṃsa is known for its heroic representation of King Dutugemunu, who defeated Elara, the South Indian Hindu king and reestablished the Sinhala Buddhist kingship, its portrayal of Elara as a righteous or just ruler is a splendid proof for the author’s capacity for objectivity. Interestingly, the Chronicle records two incidents that betray the acute sense of justice the Hindu ruler had. It is said that the king had installed a bell with a very long rope attached to it by his bedside so that anyone wronged could sound it to attract his attention. According to one story once a cow sounded this bell to report to the King that his son’s vehicle had overrun and killed its young calf. The King had his son’s head severed in the same manner by way of punishment (Mhv 21: 16-18). Now, this sounds very much like ‘tit for tat’ type approach to punishment, which is not in accordance with the Buddhist view. The second incident is with regard to the King himself. When the King was riding his chariot it damaged a part of a dagoba, and the dismayed king ordered the ministers to cut his head by the wheel of the same vehicle. The ministers explained to him that their teacher (the Buddha) did not like harm to others, and the King would compensate by repairing the damage caused (Mhv 21: 22-5). By disapproving physical harm as a form of punishment the Buddhist ministers of the King obviously echo the original Buddhist position of reformative justice and the rejection of retributive justice at the same time. The Buddhist Vinaya mentions five specific forms of punishment, namely, the act of censure (tajjaniya -kamma), the act of subordination (nissaya-kamma), the act of banishment (pabbājanīya-kamma), the act of reconciliation (pāṭisārānīya­ kamma) and the act of suspension (ukkhepanīya-kamma). To this list also may be added ‘the act of condemnation for specific depravity’ (tassapapiyyasika) included among the seven modes resolving legal matters (Dhirasekere 1982,

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123).3 It is interesting to note that these five acts have not been described as punishments (daṇda-kamma) per se, but simply described as ‘acts’. The idea of punishment, however, has been mentioned in some other contexts. For example the Buddha has approved punishment for misbehaving novices (V I. 84), and monks and nuns. What is meant by punishment in these contexts has been clarified as confining the offenders within the premises of the monastery, making an offender unworthy of accepting respect from others and the like (V II, 262263). Even if the above-mentioned five acts have not been specifically described as punishment it is clear that those acts have been meant to be such. That there is a correlation between the nature of the punishment and the degree of the offence indicates that there is a concept of justice behind the whole process. The purpose of punishment is basically to reform the offender and reinstate him or her to the normalcy. Accordingly we can easily conclude that the Buddhist Vinaya tradition does not recognize the retributive aspect of punishment and hence does not recognize retributive justice. The only exception seems to be the four pārājikā (defeat) offences in which case the guilty person is removed from the membership of the Sangha. Such a person cannot regain his membership although he or she may receive initial ‘going forth’ (pabbajjā) or novice ordination at a later stage. Additionally, we may also say that the ten objectives of promulgating Vinaya rules, as mentioned earlier, can be taken as the purposes of the punishment as well.

Conclusion In this discussion we saw that in Buddhism there is a sense of justice operating in the spheres of social life, economy and monastic law although one is hard pressed to locate a specific concept denoting justice. The idea of righteousness, dhamma, is the closest we have in the Buddhist tradition. From the contexts it is clear that imparting and inculcating justice has been subsumed under the observance of dhamma. It is true that the Buddhist society is not preoccupied with justice as the society informed by Judeo­Christian tradition. But should this be construed as the Buddhist society being less just or more unjust? Even the brief study we made amply shows that Buddhism, like the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, has been concerned about issues involving justice in 3 Dhirasekera (1982: 122) notices that this particular adhikaraṇa-samatha ‘has a great deal more in common with’ the daṇdakamma as a means of maintaining order of the community.

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social, distributive and legal spheres. The very lack of a specific concept suggests that what we have here is an example of a different world view entailing a different language. Incommensurability of language has to be understood with reference to the specific mode of perceiving reality. Which is better is hard to determine. The ultimate question perhaps is which kind of world­view would lead those who abide by that to a more satisfactory living.

11. Equality and Justice from a Buddhist Perspective*

Introduction Equality and justice are closely connected concepts. Equality is taken as the basis on which justice is to be administered. Although from a very broad perspective equality may be viewed as a universal virtue applicable to all human beings, or even to all beings according to Buddhism, it becomes a thorny issue when it comes to application. What is attempted below is an analysis of the Buddhist concept of equality as a concept, and, on the basis of its practice in the history of the Sangha, some issues associated with its application. My main focus in this essay will be equality. Although the concept of justice is closely connected with equality in a legal sense, I will discuss it only peripherally for the application of equality in the Buddhist tradition seems to go far beyond its usual legal sphere. Besides I have dealt with it previously (Tilakaratne 2009, 94-118). I will, however, make a few general remarks on justice in my concluding section.

Equality in Buddhism The Pali term for equality is ‘sama’ which is used both as a noun and an adjective. In the Jātaka stories we come across frequent references to kings who ruled their localities ‘with righteousness and equality’ - dhammena samena. In this discussion it is used as a noun to denote equality. As we will see shortlly, when discussing the status among human beings the Buddha clearly says that the four ‘colours’ (social groups) are equal (M II, * First published in Dialogue, New Series XLI, ed. Aloysius Peiris SJ 2013-2014, pp.39-65.

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85).1 In such contexts ‘sama’ is used as an adjective. Connected to ‘sama’ is ‘samāna’, used as an adjective, meaning equal. Most familier use of this term in the Buddhist context is ‘samānattatā’, usually understood as denoting equality, the literal rendering of which is: treating (others) as equal to oneself. This occurs in the “Advise to Sigāla’ where it is described as the last of the four ways of treating others well, the other three being generosity, sweet speech and working for the progress of others. These four virtues are meant to be practised in one’s social life. They are equally applicable to political sphere, and rulers are expected to adhere to these virtues. In the discourse on ‘the Lion’s Roar of the Turning of the Wheel (D 26), the Buddha says that a good king ‘should establish guard, ward ad protection’ for his own household, for his troops, for his nobles ad vassals, for brahmins and householders, for town and country folk, ascetics and brahmins, and for birds and beasts. Although this does not say that all these groups were treated with equality, it is clear that there must be some kind of concept of equality that runs across all these groups for them to be provided protection. It is of interest to note that equality is specified as ‘equality to things as case demands’ (D III, 118).2 This suggests that equality the Buddha advocated was not one uniform way of treating all. Equality to be applied had to be determined on case by case basis. Furthermore, in this very same discourse, the Buddha refers to four causes of biased behaviour, namely, attachment, ill-will, fear and folly, from which one needs to refrain. Although equality is not directly mentioned in the analysis what is implied is the behaviour characterized by equality and impartiality. A notion of equality lies at its basis. Therefore it is important to study the nature of the concept of equality that Buddhism operates with. Thinking on equality from a Buddhist perspective it is hard to begin merely with human beings as is usually done. This is because Buddhism seems to assume, in certain respects, equality of all beings, not merely of human beings. Although there is no instance where the Buddha expressly says that all beings are equal, there are many instances which encourage us to think so. Although Buddhism does not talk about ‘equality of all beings’ it does talk about things that are shared by and common to all beings. For instance, there are many instances where the Buddha refers to all beings (sabbe sattā). The well known statement that occurs in the equally well known Karaṇīyametta-sutta (Discourse 1 Ime cattāro vaṇṇā samasamā honti: these four groups are equal. 2 Samānattatā ca dhammesu-tattha tattha yathā’ rahaṃ (Sigālovāda-sutta).

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on Loving Kindness), ‘may all beings be with happy minds’ (sabbe sattā bhavantu sukhitattā) is a case in point. What is meant by ‘all beings’ is detailed in the discourse in the following manner: Whatever living beings there may be feeble or strong, long (or tall) or stout, or medium, short, small or large, seen or unseen, those dwelling far or near, those who are born and those who are yet to be born- may all beings, without exception, be happyminded. (Sn v. 146) Continuing a similar line of thinking Buddhism refers to certain characteristics shared by all beings. One such is that ‘all beings exist on food’ (sabbe sattā aharaṭṭhitikā) (Khp 1). In a similar manner the Dhammapada (Dhp v. 129-130) says that all fear harm (‘stick’), all fear death and that all love their life. This way of characterizing of beings is confirmed when the Buddha refers to (human) beings as ‘wanting to live and not wanting to die, desiring happiness and averse to suffering.(A IV, 179, 188; Bodhi 2000, 1237). It is true that none of these statements asserts that all beings are equal. Nevertheless, such statements indicate that all living beings share certain needs, emotions and sentiments, and consequetly they are equal in some respects. Although all living beings may be considered equal in such respects as mentioned above that does not mean that Buddhism ignores differences among beings which necessitate them to be treated differently. Usually in Buddhism animals are understood as belonging to ‘animal birth’ (tiracchāna-gati) which is considered as an unfortunate existence (niraya). On the contrary, being born as a human being is described as a rare opportunity which is to be cherished. An example from the monastic Vinaya may illustrate the relative higher value attributed to human life. To kill a human being is one of the highest offences that can be committed by a bhikkhu with higher admission (upasampadā). This is the fourth of the four ‘defeats’ (pārājikā) offences . Upon committing an offence of this type a bhikkhu loses his monkhood irrevocably. But if the same person kills an animal he is guilty of expiation (pācittiya) which is a much lesser offence (Whoever bhikkhu kills a living being intentionally is guilty of an expiatory offence: Pātimokkha: pācittiya rule 61). Here living being is understood as animal. This shows that notwithstanding some commonalities between human beings and animals Buddhism considers the former to be relatively more valuable. There is, however, no such differential treatment when it comes to human beings. Human beings are considered to be equal irrespective

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of any natural differences such as sex, level of intelligence etc. or any imposed differences such as ethnicity, caste, religion or geographical or ideological differences. The Buddha has adduced many powerful and convincing arguments in support of the one-ness of the humanity. Malalasekera and Jayatilleke (1958) have studied these arguments and have listed them as comprising the following categories: (i) the arguments from the biological unity of the humanity; (ii) arguments from dynamic evolutionary concept of society (iii) ethical and religious arguments. Of these arguments the key biological argument occurs in the ‘Discourse to Vāseṭṭha’ (Vāseṭṭha-sutta, M 98; Sn v. 239-255). In this analysis the Buddha points out to distinctive physical characteristics of various species of plants, animals, birds, reptiles and fish, and shows that there are marks of distinctive species among these categories, and highlights that there are not such species among human beings who constitute only a single species: Know you the grasses and trees, (know that) they too do not acknowledge it, their distinctive sign pertaining to species, for mutually discrete are the species. Next know the insects, moths, even as far as ants, their distinctive sign pertaining to species, for mutually discrete are species. Know even the four footed, both small and large, their distinctive sign pertaining to species, for mutually discrete are the species. Know the long-backed snakes, those that crawl on their bellies, their distinctive sign pertaining to species, for mutually discrete are the species. Next know the fishes, the aquatic creatures with their habitat in the water, their distinctive sign pertaining to species, for mutually discrete are the species. Next know the birds carried aloft on their wings, roaming in the sky, their distinctive sign pertaining to species, for mutually discrete are the species. (Translation adapted from Jayawickrama 2001) Having established that there are distinctive features exclusive to particular species among trees and plants, birds and beasts, reptiles and fish, the Buddha goes on to show that such distinctive features are absent in human beings : Unlike among these species with separate distinctive signs pertaining to species there is no separate distnctive signs among men. Not in their hair, head, ears, eyes, mouth, nose, lips or eye-

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brows. Not in their neck, shoulders, belly, back, or buttocks, chest and male and female sexual organs. Not in hands and feet, fingers, nails, calf muscles, thighs, colour or voice- there is no distinctive sign pertaining to species as in the case of other species. This is not seen among men individually on their bodies; and difference among men is said to be in their designation, (Translation adapted from Jayawickrama 2001) Having detailed the absence of any distinctive signs in human beings, the Buddha proposes what may be described as naturalist and functional analysis of what a human being is. This analysis is founded on the idea of human action or specifically what one does for living. Whosoever among men subsists on cattle-keeping, know thus ...that he is farmer and not a brahamin. Whosoever among men lives by varied crafts know thus ...that he is an artisan and not a brahamin. Whosoever among men subsists on trade know thus ...that he is a trader and not a brahamin. (Translation was adapted from Jayawickrama 2001) In this manner the Buddha describes those who live by serving others as slaves, those who live on thieving as thiefs, those who live on archery as archers, those who live by serving religious needs of people as priests and those who enjoy revenue of village and kingdom as kings. In a discussion between Mahākaccāna Thera, one of the leading disciples of the Buddha, and king Avantiputta, the ruler of Madhura, aswering a question posed by the king as to what he thinks about the claim made by brahmins on their superiority over the other castes the former adduces several arguments to demonstrate that the claim made by brahmins is nothing but a mere saying. The first argument is based on the economic status achieved by a person: if anyone, irrespective of his birth status by caste, earns substantial amount of money and becomes wealthy he will be served by those belonging to other three castes. The argument is meant to show that one’s acquired social status as one with substantial means supercedes one’s status by birth. This further suggests that, when it comes to social conventions, what ultimately matters is not the caste into which one is born but the power and status he has acquired by wealth. The next argument of Mahākaccāna is of moral nature: If one were to engage in immoral behaviour characterized by such acts as killing living beings, taking what is not given, misconducting in sensual pleasures, speaking falsely, speaking maliciously, speaking harshly, speaking gossip,

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having a mind full of anger and lust one will be born is a woeful state after one’s death irrespective of the fact that one is born into a higher or a lower caste. In the like manner, one who practises good behaviour characterized by the negation of what is mentioned above, one will be born in a happy destination irrespetive of the fact that one is born into a higher or a lower caste. The next argument of the Thera is based on how breakers of law are treated by the king. The Thera asks from the king whether he would treat those who violate the rules of the state by killing, stealing etc. differently taking into consideration the caste into which the culprits are born or would he punish them without any such consideration. The king agrees with the Thera that when it comes to dealing with criminals there will not be any preference given to them based on their birth. The final argument of the Thera again is of moral nature: What do you think great king? Suppose a menial worker, having shaved off his hair and beard, put on the yellow robe, and gone forth from the home life into homelessness, were to abstain from killing living beings, from taking what is not given, and from fasle speech, refraining from eating at night, he would eat only in one part of the day, and would be celibate, virtuous, of good character. How would you treat him? We would pay homage to him, Master Kaccāna, or we would rise up for him, or invite him to be seated; or we would invite him to accept robes, almsfood, resting place, and medical requisites; or we would arrange for him lawful guarding, defence and protection . Why is that? It is because he has lost his former status of a menial worker, and is simply reckoned as a recluse. (Bodhi 2001, 702) This argument points to the possibility that when it comes to one’s moral behaviour soicial conventions become secondary. The conclusion of all these arguments is that the claim made by brahmins on their alleged superiority is mere words and that all are equal and that there is no real difference among them. In a discussion with a brahmin youth named Assalāyana (Assalāyana-sutta, M 93) the Buddha adduces several arguments against the brahmins’ belief of their alleged superiority. The context in this particular discussion is the Buddha’s assertion that not only brahmins but all those belong to the all four castes are capable of achieving

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purification.3 It is understandable how the concept of equality of all beings was crucial to the Buddha who wished to establish the idea of universality of inner purification. As in the discussion with Vāseṭṭha, the Buddha adduces an argument from biology, but this time on some different grounds. Pointing to the fact that brahmin women, like any other women, have their periods, become pregnant, give birth and give suck to their children the Buddha asks how brahmin women alone are considered unique. Next the Buddha refers to the regions called Yona and Kamboja and similar outland countries where there are only two castes, namely, masters and slaves, who lose positions to the other depending on their strength or weakness, showing thereby that the caste is only a convention with mere limited applicability. In addition to the ethical and moral arguments similar to those mentioned above (in the discussion with Mahākaccāna Thera and king Avantiputta), the Buddha refers to the psychological equality of all human beings. According to this argument such noble states of mind as loving kindness may be developed by anyone irrespective of his/her caste into which one is born (Although this could be applicable with regard to negative mental traits equally the Buddha seems to refer only to positive mental traits in this context). This is taken as indicative of the fact that all human beings are equal from a very important perspective. It is important to note that the Buddha adduces some simplelooking empirical arguments in order to support one-ness of all human beings. One such argument is that anyone, irrespective his caste, is capable of washing and cleaning one’s body with soap. Although this argument appears simple, for the Buddha this could amount to an outright rejection of the brahmins’ claim on exclusive monopoly over physical and psychological purification. Similarly, another significant argument is one on lighting a fire by those who belong to different castes by using different kinds of firewood. Again the substance of the arguments is that the fire will not have any difference in its glow whether it was lit by one who is of alleged high caste or of low caste. Like water, fire too is closely connected with brahmins’ ritual life and involves rights and rituals regarding lighting it. Here the Buddha brings this ritual laden 3  Physical pollution and purification are two most important concerns of the daily life of the brahmins. In particular, brahmins believed that they become impure due to contact with those who belonged to alleged law castes, or with women on certain dates etc. and adhered to various forms of purificatory rituals. The Buddha rejected this concept of physical purity and proposed in its place a concept of inner purity (visuddhi).

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act down to earth and makes use of it to demonstrate the equality of all human beings. It is well known that the Buddha rejected the theistically ordained caste system of the Brahmanic society. The concept used to refer to caste is ‘vaṇṇa’ or colour. It may be presumed that the physical complexion was a factor behind the original division of the castes. Although the physical colour may not have been a factor by the time of the Buddha the original terminology must have continued. In the Vāseṭṭha-sutta discussion, the term used to refer to species is ‘jāti’ the literal meaning of which is birth. Although Bhikkhu Bodhi translates the term as birth consistently, Jayawickama’s translation (in Jayawickrama 2001) as species seems to make better sense for it is used even to describe the plant life. As Malalasekera and Jayatilleke (1958) have discussed in detail the instances of discrimination referred to in the discourses of the Buddha in the context of Indian brahmanic caste discrimination is not different from the situation of the contemporary world where people are discriminated against and denied of equal opportunities based on such phenomena as their physical colour, nationality, ethnicity and religion. Summing up these arguments Malalasekera and Jayatilleke conclude: Thus, according to Buddhism all men, irespective of their caste or race, had equal rights and deserved equal opportunity for developement as members of a single social order which embraced a common humanity. It was a man’s social status as determined by the wealth that he possessed, and not his birth in a particular caste or racial group which made it possible for him to command the services of others whatever their pedigree might be. All men, likewise, irespective of race or caste, should be equal before the law. The aptitudes of people do not depend on their birth in a partucular caste or a race. The moral worth of a person should receive social recognition. Regardless of the caste to which he belonged and all men should receive equal opportunity for moral and spiritual development since all men were capable of it. (Malalasekera & Jayatilleke 1958, 49) It is important to know as to why the Buddha took a keen interest to establish equality of all human beings. Although I have not found a place where the Buddha offers an explanation on this, the reason behind the Buddha’s move is not hard to imagine. A clue may be found in brahmins’ accusation to the Buddha (as we found in the above discussion

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of the Buddha with Assalāyana) that he advocated purity for all four catses (samaṇo gotamo cātuvaṇṇim suddhim paññapeti), which was unimaginable for brahmins who held that purity is a monopoly of the elite. As we saw earlier in the discussion, Buddhism holds that all beings like pleasure/happiness and dislike pain/unhappiness. It goes without saying that human beings desire happiness. The religions, including Buddhism, are supposed to teach people the highest happiness. In Buddhism the highest happiness is nirvana (nibbānaparamaṃ sukhaṃ: Dhp v. 204). Based on these premisses it is possible to conclude that all human beings, irrespective of their social hierarchies, desire the ultimate happiness. The Buddha lived a life dedicated for teaching the path leading to cessation of suffering, the highest happiness, to all those who showed interest in it. For the Buddha, who belonged in the Sramana tradition that rejected the brahmanic world view of creation of the universe including its caste system, it was crucial that all people, irespective of their birth status, had liberty to follow the path he taught and realize the final goal. This should explain why the Buddha advocated equality of four ‘colours’ and one-ness of humanity. It was very important for the Buddha for this reason to establish quality of all human beings as one species and that any other division such as those imposed by brahmins was artificial, arbitrary and baseless.4 Jayatilleke articulates this Buddhist position in the following words: Buddhism, therefore, upholds the equality of man in the sense that man’s essential nature is the same whatever the individual differences due to heredity, environment or karmic factors may be. His basic needs, material, psychological and spiritual are also fundamentally the same although men may differ in their interests and capacities due to their divergent historical evolution, and could contribute in their own way by developing their talents to enrich the life of mankind. He therefore needs 4 This, however, should not be taken as denying that the Buddha had any social concerns or any feeling for the poor and the helpless who suffered due to the caste system. Nor does it mean that the Buddha would not be interested in establishing the equality of all human beings unless it was a prerequisite for universal purification. In fact the Buddha’s concern for the ultimate purity of all beings is due to his great compassion (mahākaruṇā) toward all beings. But it is one thing for the Buddha to have great compassion toward all beings and it is another whether or not all beings are in fact equal in some very important sense. What is clear from the above quoted discussion of the Vāseṭṭha-sutta is that the Buddha established the equality of all human beings as a fact. This shows that his great compassion was based on a rational basis.

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to be treated equally and afforded equal opportunities for developing his potentialities and serving mankind. (Jayatilleke 2000, 74)

Equality in practice: the Sangha Having discussed the theory of equality in Buddhism it is now important to examine its practice within the Buddhist tradition and society. What we can gather from the foregone discussion is that the Buddha did not approve of but worked actively to undermine the caste distinction existed in the Indian society of his time, which was the main obstacle of the practice of equality. In his own life we do not have any evidence to suggest that the Buddha behaved in any manner that encouraged caste distinction. To the contrary, what we find is that he practiced what he taught particularly in the formation and the functioning of the Sangha society. A unique character of the Sangha society was that it totally rejected the caste hierarchy characteristic of the society of ordinary men and women. The Sangha organization of both bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs (monks and nuns) was open to all from all caste divisions. In this respect the Buddha compared his Sangha organization to the ocean which receives water from all rivers and where that water simply gets transformed to salty sea water shedding the former identities of individual rivers. The Buddha says: Just as, when the great rivers- the Ganges, the Yamuna, the Aciravati, the Sarabhu, and the Mahi- reach the great ocean, they give up their former names and designations and are simply called the great ocean, so too, when members of the four social classes­khattiyas, brahmins, vessas and suddas-go forth from the household life into homelessness in the Dhamma and discipline proclaimed by the Tathagata, they give up their former names and clans and are simply called ascetics following the Sakyan son. (Bodhi 2012, 1144) It is important to note that there is not any one single incident recorded in the canonical Buddhist literature that the Sangha violated this spirit of equality of its members. This, however, does not mean that the Sangha attributed an unconditional equality to all its members. Although all the members of the Sangha were equal to one naother as the members of the Sangha, within the Sangha itself there were several measures adopted to recognize unequals among these equals. Seniority was recognized as the basic

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criterion of respect­worthiness in the Sangha. The seniority counted in this context is not based on one’s chronological age. It was counted from the date one entered the Sangha. Koṇdañña thera who was the foremost among the first five monastic followers of the Buddha was also recognized as the highest among those ‘who knew nights of long time’ (cira-rattaññū). After the parinirvana of the Buddha, two chief disciples, Sariputta and Moggallāna had predeceased him, Mahakassapa thera assumed the leadership of the Sangha although he was not necessarily the senior most member of the organization. There is evidence to think that Mahakassapa was perceived by the Sangha as the leader after the Buddha (Tilakaratne 2005). This brings to light another feature of the practice of recognizing the elderly, namely, although one is respected for one’s seniority that does not qualify one to be the leader in a group. For this purpose not necessarily the eldest in the group but the most capable in the group was selected. For example, in the execution of Buddhist monstic discipline the senior most bhikkhu (or bhikkhunī) was given the ‘elder’s seat’ (ther­āsana)5; however, the most learned and capable (vyatta, paṭibala) one was assigned with execution of the Sangha activities. As recorded in the Aṅguttara-nikāya (Bodhi 2012, 109-113), the Buddha placed some bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs (male and female monastic members) and upāsakas and upāsikās (male and female household followers) in positions of excellence based on their particular merits. Accordingly, Sariputta thera was placed highest among those who are wise, Moggallana among those who performed psychic feats, Mahakassapa thera among those who practiced austerities, and Upali thera, who was a barber before he entered the Sangha, highest among those who were well versed in the Vinaya etc. In the like manner, the members of the other three groups also were accorded with similar positions. This means that the recipients were considered to be outstanding in the community. Relevant in this context is the states of inner development which have a gradually ascending order. In this scale the lowest are those who have attained the ‘formal’ absorptions (rūpajhāna). Ascending order from there are those who have attained ‘formless absorptions (arūpajhāna), 5 Although seniority by age is recognized as a ground for respect, the mere old-age is not considered respectworthy. The following statement occurs in the Dhammapada: He is not thereby an elder merely because his head is grey. Ripe is he in age; ‘old-in-vain’ is he called (260). In whom are truth, virtue, harmlessness, restraint and control, that wise man who is purged of impurities, is, indeed, called an elder (261) (Translation from Narada Thera (1963/1993).

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the state of cessation of perception and feelings (saññāvedayita nirodha), and the three ‘sciences’(vijjā), namely, the knowledge to recollect one’s past births, knowledge to see how others depart from here and born again, and the knowledge on the extinction of defilements. It is understood that one who has reached the level of formal absorptions is higher than ordinary worldlings (puthujjana). This ascending order culminates in the last of the three knowledges mentioned above, and such person is only next to the Buddha who was fully enlightened. Even though the inner development is taken as the determining factor of identifying those who have progressed in the path it is interesting to note that any of these people with higher inner attainments are below their own monastic teachers who may or may not have achieved absorptions, path or fruit (jhāna, magga, phala).The tradition seems to make clear distinction between seniority and advancement in the path. This high regard for seniority and teacher is a characteristic of Indian religious tradition. Buddhism shares this with the rest of religious traditions. It is said that the Buddha, after attaining enlightenment, looked for a teacher for himself to whom he could pay respect, and finding none, he decided to keep the Dhamma in teacher’s place and treated his own Dhamma as his teacher (A II, 20; Bodhi 2012, 406-407). The Vinaya Piṭaka gives detailed description on how a student should behave toward his teacher. It includes doing everything throughout the day, from the time the teacher gets up in the morning till he goes to bed at night, to make one’s teacher’s life comfortable. Student’s duty to teacher does not end there. He has to look after his teacher when he is indisposed. If this situation continues the student will have to look after him till he recovers or passes away. What is interesting is, the student has to be his teacher’s counselor if he becomes disinterested in his monastic practice or intends leaving behind the monkhood. This last suggests that the relationship is not necessarily one of inferiority on the part of the student. The Vinaya does assert that the teacher himself is bound to treat his own student in the manner described above if he becomes indisposed. While the teacher-student relation remains a well established fact within the monastic life, at another level, all bhikkhus (or bhikkhunīs) irrespective of their seniority or any other positions, are equal to one another as fellow travelers on the path. This is established by the fact that there is not a separate Vinaya for teachers or seniors in the system. All have to follow the same Vinaya and

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none is higher or lower in this respect. Punishment and penalties applicable upon breaking the rules are shared equally by all. Even if one is an arahant, meaning that such a person has completed his practice in the path and achieved the highest fruit, one has to follow the rulese stablished for the Sangha. An instructive case in point is Mahākappina thera’s hesitation as to whether or not he should take part in uposatha practice presecribed by the Buddha to all bhikkhus. Being an arahant Mahākappina felt that it is not necessary for him to attend this group activity which he thought was relevant only to those who are still undergoing training in the path. The Buddha corrected this view and said: “If people like you do not respect and abide by the uposatha act who else would do so? Do attend uposatha act; do attend the acts of the community” (V I, 105). The penalties and punishments are usually not applicable to arahants for they are incapable of committing any morally wrong actions.6 The applicability of Vinaya rules even to arahants suggests one of the cardinal principles of law recognized even by the modern traditions of law, namely, that all are equal before the law. The case of the arahant who is beyond moral offences is not given as a priviledge of an elite minority who can violate rules with immunity. It is merely a part of the very nature of being an arahant, a fully purified and liberated person. This discussion should show that although the Sangha is a community consisting of members who are equal to one another, within the Sangha there are those who are higher and lower not in any social sense but in a moral sense. It is natural to consider those who have attained absorptions, path and fruits as higher than ordinary individuals (puthujjana), and those in the second stage of arahanthood (‘once-returners) as higher than those who are in the first stage (stream-entrants), and finally, an arahant as higher than all those who are still in the path.This gradation, however, is based on the need for further development in the path and hence as a pedagogical requirement in the system, and as a monastic social convention for the requirements of proper behavior toward ‘fellow 6 In the Vinaya this is established by one of the seven methods of resolving conflicts (adhikaraṇa-samatha) within the Sangha, namely, ‘verdict of innocence’ (sati-vinaya). [Horner 1949-52 V pp. 96-140] This means that the Vinaya accepts the doctrinal position that an arahant who has eradicated all defilements is incapable of committing any immoral acts.

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travelers on the celibate path’ (sabrahmacārī) or collegues. Although due recognition was given to inner advancement, yet there is another level where all are equal: it is the adoption of a first-come-first-serve basis in using facilities for physical convenience. In this context one’s standing in the path or any other matter was not taken into consideration.

The Buddha The Buddha himself was considered basically an arahant, and as such, the Theravada tradition has been very clear on this point, namely, the Buddha was not different from other arahants on that particular attainment.7 This however does not mean that the Buddha was considered to be equal with his disciples even after they realized the same arahanthood as the Buddha did himself. The disciples intially place their trust in the Buddha as their teacher. This trust is fully confirmed only when they realize what the teacher had promised. What was trust (or faith) up to this point becomes knowledge once one attains arahanthood (Hence the saying that an arahant is ‘lacking in saddhā’ (assaddhā (Dhp v. 97) which is a virtue in others’ case). The difference between the Buddha and his followers is described by using a metaphor of pioneer who discovers an ancient city lost to people for a long time. The Buddha is one who discovers it first and the disciples are those who follow the road map given by the pioneer and who discover the city for themselves (Bodhi 2000, 601ff.). Although the accounts of this nature tend to give a reasonably humanist picture of the status of the Buddha, within Theravada itself which preserves the least transcendental form of the Buddha he is never considered an equal to any other disciple. The general attitude of the disciples toward the Buddha was the following: “the Buddha is the teacher and I am a follower; the Buddha knows, and I do not” (Kītāgiri-sutta, M I, 480). But it is to this tradition’s credit that it did not ever consider (at least in its early stage) its master to be radically different from its followers; the difference between the Buddha and any other arahant was always a metter of degree and not of kind. Therevada tradition which held the most naturalist attitude towatd the Buddha subsequently, developed an attitude characterized by a very high degree of devotion going to the extent of attrubuting omniscience to the Buddha which practice became the norm among the subsequent, particularly, Mahayana, Buddhsit traditions. 7 “Indeed there is equality of the Buddhas with disciples and individual Buddhas. There is essential oneness among them on this point. Hence the saying: there is no difference in release”. Cariyāpiṭaka-aṭṭhakathā (1939/1979) p. 328.

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The Buddha’s position as the promulgator of vinaya rules clearly placed him above his disciples. Also it is understood that these rules were not applicable to him. Nor did the Buddha take part in bi-weekly gatherings where monks and nuns recited the code of vinaya rules. This, however, does not mean that the Buddha was allowed to do whatever his disciples were forbidden to do. The vinaya rules were a relatively later introduction to the Sangha, necessitated due to developments violating the spirit of sīla. For those who had their sīla, vinaya rules were not required for the latter were automatically preserved when the former was there. Since the Buddha was the embodiment of sīla, samādhi and paññā, it goes without saying that he did not require rules. It also indicates that he did not violate them either. There is, however, one instance when the Buddha promulgated a rule which was not applicable to himself. This is the one on prohibiting performance of miracles. It is clearly shown that this prohibition was not meant for the Buddha although the disciples had to take persmission from the Buddha should they wished to do so. The reason for this exception was that, on occasions, the Buddha himself performed miracles when he felt that doing so was needed by the circumstances. Performing miracles itself was not considered bad. Nevertheless, he prohited disciples from doing it for some performed miracles for worldly gains. Except for this one exception (which is understandable), which could mean that the Buddha was above vinaya rules, there is no instance that the Buddha or any fully accomplished disciple was understood to be above sīla. Ultimately the entire path and its fruits come within the Dhamma under which the Buddha himself, including his disciples, is placed.

Women It is important to examine, at least briefly, how Buddhism views the issue of equality between man and woman. In the earlier discussion we saw how Buddhism affirms the fundamental unity and equality of all human beings irrespective of whether they are men or women. But this general attitude cannot be taken as correctly describing the Buddhist attitude toward women, given, particularly, the severe genderbased discrimination that was prevalent in the society of the Buddha. In accepting that all women like men have the need and the capacity for attaining nirvana Buddhism shows a remarkable improvement over its contemporary Brahmanism. An instance when this freedom finds loud and clear articulation is what Soma Theri said to Mara who voiced the traditional brahmanic view that women with meagre intelelctual

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capacity cannot reach the sublime heights achievable only by great sages: What does womanhood matter at all When the mind is concentrated well When knowledge flows on steadily As one sees corerctly into Dhamma (Bodhi 2000, 222-223) The Buddhist tradition shares this attitude with some other sramana traditions which rejected the brahmanic world view and social system characterized by sharp distinction between men and women. Unlike other sramana traditions, however, the Buddha envisaged his community (Sangha ) comprising four groups with women as one part sharing equal standing with men. This is further supported by what the Buddha said in the well known ‘Advice to Sigāla’ (Sigālovāda-sutta, D III, 180-193) on the relation between husband and wife as one with equal partners neither higher nor lower. But this seemingly unproblematic situation becomes blurred when it comes to the establishment of the organization of bhikkhunīs. According to the account given in the Vinaya-piṭaka, the Buddha rejected three times the proposal made by Ananda thera, his personal attendant, to allow women to enter monastic setting (namely, to receive initial and higher admission, pabbajja and upasampadā). The Buddha does not give any specific reason for this rejection, but simply refuses Aananda’s proposal. Finally, Ananda asks a crucial question from the Buddha: can a woman attain the highest inner purity in the sāsana of the Buddha? To this the Buddha says (or had to say) yes, and the argument is taken as conclusive. Then the Buddha announces eight conditions, which are described in the tradition as ‘eight weighty conditions’ (aṭṭhagaru-dhamma), to be accepted by Mahāpajapatī Gotamī, the former stepmother of the Buddha on whose behalf Ananda intervened. The latter accepts the conditions and thus begins the sāsana of the bhikkhunīs (nuns’ order in Buddhism). The organization started in this manner seems to have florished during the time of the Buddha producing such great theris as Khemā, Uppalavaṇṇā, Dhammadinnā, the last being the one who was praised by the Buddha for her eloquent exposition of the Dhamma. The end result, in this manner, was not bad at all; nevertheless there are questions lingering. Although Mahāpajapatī Gotamī accepted the eight conditions without complaint, it did not take long for her to realize that others did not like them. She had to take it back to the Buddha and ask for revision, particularly for the condition which required a bhikkhunī to pay respect to the youngest bhikkhu who had

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just been given higher admission even if the bhikkhunī had hundred years behind her higher admission. The text reports that the Buddha refused this request saying that he would not do something which is not done even by other religious groups. Although paying respect to seniority is the norm in the Buddhsit monastic tradition this condition nullifies this noble practice as far as bhikkhunīs are concerned. In other words, bhikkhunīs are clearly lower than their male counterparts. All eight conditions, and in particular the condition under undicussion, are absolute and final in their flavour, and seems to sit not very comfortably with the overall tolerant attitude of the Buddha. I do not plan to do a full fledged discussion on this issue in this context. Such a discussion will require us to make a textual critique in addition to examining historical, social and organizational reasons carefully. Without going into such a detailed analysis what looks clear is that the Buddha, while allowing intellectual freedom to women enabling them to live their religious life, was hesitant to allow equality between the two monastic communities. This, however, was not the case with householder males and females (upāsaka and upāsikā). Accordingly, the historical evidence from the societies that adopted the Buddhist way of life shows that it has managed to create societies with the least amount agression on women by men. But this is not to say that under Buddhism women enjoyed equality with men in all respects.

Religion The Indian society of the Buddha was marked by the presence of many religious views and traditions. The Brahmajāla-sutta of the Dīghanikāya, which details sixty two religious views, allows us to get some idea about its complex situation. In the same collection of discourses, the Sāmaññaphala-sutta describes six religious teachers who lived during this time. Thus the presence of many religious traditions was not a new phenomenon to Buddhism. In the same Sāmaññaphala-sutta it is recorded that when Ajatasatthu, the king of Magadha visited these religious teachers and inquired on the fruits of religious life to be realized in this very life, the king was not happy with their answers. But the kind did not show his displeasure lest he would offend a religious teacher living in his kingdom. This suggests that multiplicity of religion was a part of the life not only of the religious teachers but also of people, and that the politicians valued this presence. The Buddhist literature also records many debates and arguments the religious people had among themselves, (Suttanipāta) although Buddhist literature does not say that the Buddha

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had any debates with any of these six teachers. The Buddha clearly says that he did not debate with the world, but that the world debated with him (nāhaṃ bhikkhave lokena vivadāmi; loko ca mayā vivadati, S III, 138). Even though the Buddha did not debate with anyone he often visited other religious people for friendly discussions. In these meetings and other instances the Buddha presented his own critique of the religious views professed by his contemporary religious teachers. Thus he rejected as false and unsatisfactory eternalist and annihilationist views on ātma (sassata and uccheda vāda), determinist karma theory of Jains, creationist view, skepticism of various forms, views that denied causality (ahetu-appaccaya vāda) and many other views of syncretic character. From this behaviour of the Buddha we may be able to get some idea about how the Buddha perceived multiplicity of religion. It appears that the Buddha accepted the fact that there were many religious views in society, and that not all those views were right, or good or conducive for people to gain release from suffering. The Buddha was not hesitant to establish this position in the presence of many contending religious views. Although the Buddha did not denounce any religious view as outright false or harmful8 he was very clear in maintaining that the path to nirvana was available only within his teaching. Accordingly he is seen making the following bold statement: The first sramana (stream winner) in only in here (i.e. only in this sāsana); the second sramana (once returner) is only in here; the third sramana (non-returner) is only in here; the fourth sramana (the arahant) is only in here. The other teachings are empty of (true) sramanas. (M I, 63-64) This is a clear and outright rejection of all other traditions on the ground that they do not lead to the termination of suffering. This shows that the Buddha did not wish to compromise on the crucial question of termination of suffering, which is the purpose of the very enlightenment of the Buddha and his subsequent teaching till the end of his life at the age of eighty. This attitude of the Buddha should not be taken as denying the ‘right’ for other religious systems to exist. Although there are records that the Buddha and his disciples had threats for their existence from the followers of some other religions there are no records of the Buddha or his disciples doing the same to others. The best example of the Buddha’s 8  A possible exception could be the Buddha’s reference to Makkhali Gosala (Aṅguttara-nikāya I p.33) : Bodhi 2012 p.l19) as causing harm to people although his teaching is not specifically mentioned here. The Buddha may be referring to his determinism as was outlined in the Sāmaññaphala-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya.

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religious tolerance comes into light in his advice to Upali, the wealthy follower of Jains, who decided to follow the teaching of the Buddha. First, the Buddha tried to discourage him from this act; failing in that, the Buddha asked him to continue with his support to the Jain community (Upāli-sutta, M I, 371-387). What is discouraged in Buddhism is not so much holding a truth claim as dogmatism on one’s own religion and consequent aggression and harm on other religions. In the Buddha’s view, only his teaching will lead people to the termination of suffering in nirvana. But religions as religions should be allowed to exist without interference from rival religions. In other words, in the Buddhist view, religions are both equal and not equal to one another.

Conclusion In the Buddhist view, while the entire universe with its all animate and inanimate objects is subject to imperamnence, suffering and soullessness, the entire sentient world constitutes one equal phenomenon in the sense that all beings love happiness and dislike unhappiness. All sentient beings love their life more than anything else. While equality is maintained at this universal level, human beings are treated as higher than or unequal to the animal world while human beings are equal among themselves as human beings. Even among human beings, there are certain qualities that make some of them unequal to some others. In our discussion we found that Buddhism takes seniority by age as an important factor that makes certain human beings more respectworthy than others. Being a teacher also was found to be an instance making one respectworthy over one’s students or followers. The degree of one’s inner development characterized by attainments of absorptions, path and fruits is considered most important in this regard. In this manner, according to Buddhism the concept of equality of human beings, or the idea of equality, has to be understood as universally applicable at some level and as conditional and context-dependent at some other occasions. The Buddha’s interest in the theory and practice of equality was not motivated by any narrowly definable political reasons. Although he seems to have preferred community-based decentralized type of administration, it is clear that the Buddha accepted the then prevailing system of administration by a hereditary king under whose whims the considerations on equality and justice were largely compromised. But in the Sangha, over which the Buddha had his jurisdiction, equality among the members was a cardinal feature. Although there can be a problem with

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regard to equality between bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs, there cannot be a doubt about the fact that there was equality in practice within each group. Any practice of justice among the Sangha could be expected to have been informed by the concept of equality operative within the Sangha. We see a Buddhist concept of justice being operative among the Sangha in such areas as the distribution of requisites among the members and determining punishments and penalties involving the violation of vinaya rules. The best examples of such a practice of equality and justice are seen with regard to imposing probation on guilty monks and nuns and rectifying violations involving forfeit of wrongly acquired things. But it is not totally correct to understand the Buddhist monastic jurisprudence as solely guided by the matters of equality and justice in abstract legalistic sense. Although the Vinaya has a clear legal aspect, it is not wholly correct to understand the Buddhsit monastic Vinaya purely in terms of justice as understood in its popular legal sense. The Buddhist Vinaya is basically motivated by compassion and corrective sentiment toward the offender than punishing him to satisfy any retributive requirement of law. The picture of equality and justice that emerges from this discussion is not one of static and absolute nature but one needing to take into consideration the individual and social circumstances and conditions surrounding it. Human problems which we try to settle by means of these concepts are not absolute realities without any relation to particular spaces and times. Both the concepts of equality and justice as well as the situations which we try to settle by these concepts are dependently arisen (paṭicca-samuppanna) and hence contextual. If we accept this conclusion it also implies that Buddhism does not provide ‘over-the counter’ variety of solutions to the problems to which we seek answers through such concepts as equality and justice.

12. A Buddhist Approach to Development*

Introduction Economic development is the main aim of individuals, societies and nations. It has become so important that everything else in human life has become secondary. The universal need for economic development is understandable for none can live without fulfilling the basic needs of life. When nations have not achieved economic development there are problems originating from this fundamental deficiency. Malnutrition, hunger, diseases, crimes and lack of education are typical of such problems common in developing world. Where this has been achieved, at varying degrees, there are problems originating from other causes and conditions and from the very prosperity created by economic development. Over-consumption, exploitation of nature and natural resources, discrimination against those who do not have are a few such problems that can be found in developed nations. It appears that, the degree of our economic development plays a crucial role in determining our state of mind, attitudes, ideas and emotions in shaping the condition of the world we live in. In this brief essay, the Buddhist teachings and practices that are conducive to evolve a society where people enjoy a good life safeguarding the welfare of oneself and the others will be discussed. This discussion will indirectly show that the widely believed view that the teaching of the Buddha is not interested in the welfare of the ordinary men and women, and that it does not have anything positive to help human development is incorrect. * First published in Economic Review, Colombo: People’s Bank, 2012.

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Development and Buddhist society The Buddhist society comprises four groups, namely, monks and nuns (bhikkhu, bhikkhunī) and male and female household followers (upāsaka, upāsikā). Although all follow the Buddha believing in his basic insight about (human) existence that it is marked by sorrowfulness (dukkha) and that they should strive to make an end to this bad state of affairs by realizing nirvana, there is a very important distinction between the monastic and householder groups. Whereas the monastic group is following a direct path to achieve its goal, the householder group follows a long and round-about path to achieve the same goal. This basic difference makes them to adopt two types of living, for monks and nuns, one characterized by renunciation, absence of wealth, home, family and complicated web of social relations, characteristic of householder life, and for householders, a life with all that the monastic group has left behind. According to the Buddha’s view, the householders have to have wealth and property and with their wealth they have to enjoy themselves, look after their families and children, parents, in-laws, friends and finally, the religious people (‘sramanas and brahmins’) who do not earn their own income. The presence of this last group provides an additional but important reason why the householder followers of the Buddha should not only be self-sufficient economic-wise but also they should have some extra to feed this ‘unproductive’ group of men and women whose role in a Buddhist society is to help people to improve in virtues and morals. It is important that we do not confuse two ways of living of the two groups. It is by taking wrongly the way of life prescribed for the monastic follower as comprising the sole path meant for all followers that some have adopted the view that Buddhism is only for those who have left household life. It is not necessary to dwelve on this issue any longer for the teaching of the Buddha has provided guidance for millions of householders where Buddhism has continued to be the local religion for centuries. People have lived happy and contended lives guided by the teachings of the Buddha. It is important today for us to reexamine the teachings of the Buddha that provide insights on how one should live a good life.

Good life vs. happy life Many contemporary ethicists debate on the nature of ‘good life’. Many tend to equate good life with happy life which is nothing other than ‘having fun’. What is meant by happiness in general parlance is life full

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of excitements and pleasures. This view takes pleasure as the ultimately desirable objective of our life. The consequent way of life people often choose does not have anything to do with morals. It is this way of life that gives prominence and undue emphasis on material development or growth exclusively. The way of life prescribed by the Buddha to his householder followers was always a combination of both external (material growth) and internal (moral) development. Once, the Buddha said that people can be classified into three groups in so far as their outlook of life is concerned. They are, blind, one­eyed and one who has both eyes (A I,128-130). The Buddha explained the blind as one who lacks an eye for this­worldly development as well as an eye for internal (‘other-worldly’) development. The one-eyed person is one who has an eye only for this worldly development. The person with both eyes is one who strives for both types of development, inner and outer. The ideal householder follower of the Buddha is one who is successful in his worldly life and one who lives a moral life characterized by observing the five precepts (pañcasīla), earning wealth by righteous, harmless and innocent means. According to the Buddhist understanding of human psychology, all (human) beings ‘like happiness and dislike unhappiness’ (sukhakāmā dukkhapaṭikkūlā) (Kandaraka-sutta, M I, 341). That happiness is the most desirable goal of life is uncontested. But going beyond the ‘ordinary concept of material and ‘worldly, happiness, Buddhism talks about happiness as encompassing both material and inner aspects of human life. The Buddha says that there are four types of happiness to be enjoyed by householders (A II, 69). They are, namely, happiness of having things (atthi­ sukha), happiness of consuming (bhoga-sukha), happiness of being debt-less (aṇaṇa-sukha) and the happiness of being blameless (anavajja-sukha). The first two forms of happiness recognize the importance of having things, or owning material wealth. It is true in the ultimate nirvanic sense the material wealth increases desire and causes suffering. But clearly the focus in this context is the householder who has much to do with wealth. The second forms of happiness arises from using or consuming one’s wealth for one’s own sake and for the sake of others including one’s extended family, in­laws and relatives, friends and companions, religious people and the like. This particular happiness reminds us that one should not hoard one’s wealth without consuming and sharing it with others. The third underscores the importance of being free from debts. The fourth and most important is the happiness deriving from being blameless in one’s modes of earning wealth. It is at this point

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that Buddhism departs from mere pleasure- seeking- type development models without much care for the moral values of life. When one were to look back and review one‘s business practices one must be able to see for oneself that he has not violated the moral principles valued by oneself. In other words, one must not feel that one’s consciousness is blaming oneself for one’s unethical business practices. The balance between these two aspects of life is the hallmark of the Buddhist philosophy of development. A classic example occurs in the Vyagghapajja-sutta of the Aṅguttara-nikāya (A IV, 281-285). The context of the discourse is a young man named Dīghajānu asking the Buddha to teach him in such a way that it suits people like him who are householders with families enjoying sense pleasures and busy with wealth generating measures. To him the Buddha says that there are four factors conducive for the welfare of this life and four factors conducive for happiness of ‘life after’ (inner development). The factors relevant to the welfare of this life are the good fortune of initiative energy (uṭṭhāna­ sampadā), protection (of what is earned through energy) (ārakkha­ sampadā), good friends (kalyāṇa­ mittatā) and balanced life (samajīvikatā). Of these four factors, the first two, initiative energy and protection of what is earned need not further elaboration for they are the essential qualities behind material success. The last two, however, are usually not found among the factors behind development as it is practiced today. The Buddha laid substantial emphasis on having good friends and avoiding bad company not only in one’s material development but also in matters of internal development. Once when Ananda thera, the attendant to the Buddha, suggested to him that a half of the internal development is owing to good friends the latter corrected him saying that the whole development is owing to good friends (S V, 2). In this particular context the Buddha was stressing on the importance of good friends in economic development. This may be understood as operating on two different levels: personal and social. As a person may need good friends in developing one’s business, a country too may need support and cooperation of similarly good countries for its development. This also means that one should be a good friend to others and a country to other countries. The last factor, maintaining a balanced life, organizing one’s expenses according to one’s income, is common sense on the one hand, but a forgotten or disregarded factor on the other. Individuals and families ruin their lives by not being able to maintain this balance, and,

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in like manner, societies and countries ruin themselves by disregarding this simple factor. This indicates that those who plan the economy of a country need to be realistic about one’s capacity and be sensible enough to identify the priorities of the particular country. The teaching of the Buddha identifies four things that are necessary for our survival. They are namely, food, clothing, dwellings and medicine. These four constitute the bare minimum people require for their existence. From a Buddhist point of view, we may say that the rulers of any country have as their obligation to provide their people with these four basic needs. A society may have the richest people in it, thus making the average per head income of that society displaying a very high value. But this does not mean that in actual fact all people in that society have these four basic requirements. The desirable development according to Buddhism is one in which not some people are extremely rich while some others are extremely poor, but a society in which all have their minimum needs fulfilled. It is only when the basic needs are fulfilled a society may think about luxuries. In practical terms this will require, for example, a country to spend more on medicine or medical machinery that is useful to a larger majority than spending on expensive machinery which will be useful only for a few. To complete the story of Dīghajānu in conversation with Buddha, the latter also described four factors that are conducive for internal development, namely, conviction (saddhā-sampadā), morality (sīlasampadā), generosity (cāga-sampadā) and understanding (paññāsampadā). The Buddha says that these virtues need to be practiced by a person who is living a social life working for his economic development. How these virtues are applicable to a society has to be carefully thought out by the leaders of such society. The point to be stressed in this context is that the Buddha always envisaged successful development as constituting two interconnected aspects of internal and external well- being. The central conception that combines both these aspects to form a harmonious whole is ‘dhamma’ which is generally but not fully accurately rendered as ‘righteousness’. In addressing Dīghajānu (in the above discussed example), the Buddha says that what one earns with one’s labour has to be earned righteously by righteous means (dhammikena dhamma-laddhena). To repeat, the concept of dhamma mentioned here is the central conception in Buddhist social philosophy. Be it economic development, political power at local, regional or even universal level (rājā-cakkavatti, universal monarch) or social well-being, all these

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have to be within the limits of the dhamma. What really constitutes dhamma in each context has to be decided taking into consideration specific conditions unique to situations. A very broad guideline for dhamma applicable to any of the above­mentioned contexts is to abide by the five precepts (pañcasīla, namely, abstaining from killing and safeguarding, protecting and loving life instead, abstaining from taking anything that is ‘not given’ (meaning anything that is not lawfully and righteously owned) and protecting others’ property instead, abstaining from sexual misbehavior and honouring matrimonial values instead, not telling lies and deceiving others and being honest and truthful in one’s behaviour instead, and abstaining from things that cause intoxication and heedlessness and maintaining one’s sobriety at all times instead. One could argue that a society cannot be developed by adhering to virtues such as the five precepts. In particular one may say that without killing a country may not be able to produce fish or meat. One could even argue that business ventures are nearly impossible by being honest. It is quite clear that sale of alcohol is always a means of substantial income for a state. In the face of the arguments of this sort the Buddhist position is to minimize evil if it is impossible to do away with it totally. A Buddhist economy will not rely on income generated by the sale of alcohol or tobacco. It will not try to develop economy by developing industries such as production of alcohol and cigarettes. Instead, a state honouring Buddhist principle will focus on many other harmless or less harmful products. So, it is clear that in a Buddhist economy one may assess the desirability of the business ventures one is going to promote. The criterion behind the Buddhist economic behaviour is what the Buddha taught to Rahula, his own son in his lay life: When you reflect if you know that the action that you wish to do (with your body, word or mind) would lead to your own harm, to the harm of others and to the harm of both that is an unwholesome action with painful consequences, and you must refrain from doing it; when you reflect if you know that the action that you wish to do (with your body, word or mind) would not lead to your own harm, not to harm others and not to harm both that is a wholesome action with pleasant consequences, and you must do such an action. (Ambalaṭṭhika Rāhulovāda-sutta, M I, 414-420) This is a broad concept which needs to be adjusted to specific situations. The ethics applicable to society or to a country is not ultimately

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different from that is applicable to an individual. As we have discussed so far, the Buddhist philosophy of development takes into consideration both economic and moral aspects of human life. It does not uphold one at the expense of the other. The Buddhist concept of development does not advocate mere profit or growth. What really matters is not the mere quantity but quantity supported by quality.

Concluding remarks It is not customary for economists or planners of economy in our country to refer to Buddhist teachings as a possible source of inspiration and guidance. Interestingly enough, it is a Western writer, E.F. Schumacher, who wrote now well-known work Small is Beautiful in 1960s who started talking about Buddha’s teachings in the context of economy and development. In his book he devoted one whole chapter to ‘Buddhist Economics’ and showed to the world that there is something called Buddhist economics which deserves our serious attention. Against the popular belief that bigger is better Schumacher asserted that small can in fact be beautiful, healthy and harmless to people and to the environment. The situation today is not the same as it was before Schumacher. After about four decades, today we are living in a world where Buddhists are active in global economic, social and environmental issues. The movement called ‘Engaged Buddhism’ is active in many parts of the world providing alternative approaches to problems. ‘Green Buddhism’ is striving to promote environmentally healthy insights and practices. Following the Buddhist insights the world no longer is man-centred in its approach to nature. Deriving inspiration from the teachings of the Buddha, nature is defined as encompassing all living beings including animals, birds, reptiles, trees and creepers. This is none other than the Karaṇīya-metta­ sutta ideal, namely, ‘may all beingsbe well and happy’: sabbe sattā bhavantu sukhitattā. The logical implication of this universalist outlook is that not merely one species should live in this planet earth but all beings should live and live happily in it. To use a modern concept, it is development which is ‘sustainable’ and not mere growth of material things. In a world where 20% of people use 80% of the resources, in order to accept and behave according to the philosophy of sustainable development one needs lot of understanding, discipline and compassion, qualities which are taught in the teaching of the Buddha.

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It appears that traditional Buddhist countries like ours are still somewhat slow to grasp this valuable aspect of Buddhism for we are more interested in the popular and cultural aspects of Buddhism than in its doctrinal and philosophical insights. It is high time that we look at the teaching of the Buddha not as a mere religious practice but as a philosophy providing guidance to the burning problems in our society including the problem of achieving a balanced development.

13. Buddhist Perspectives on Balanced Living, Right Use of Wealth and Equal Opportunities in Economy*

Introduction This essay is on Buddhist economics, if it is possible to talk about such a subject at all, or, rather, it is about some very important economy related matters in individual and society from a Buddhist perspective. The main source for these perspectives for us in this study are the Buddhist literary sources. This does not mean that the virtues and good practices we discuss are not found in Buddhist societies at all. But we have to admit that even the so-called traditional Buddhist societies are not quite traditional any more. If we take the situation of Sri Lanka, for example, we see that the country was under direct colonial rule for four and half centuries and that Sri Lanka society evolved to modernity through colonialism which was western and Christian. The five centuries preceding colonialism was marked by greater influence of South Indian cultures and their direct domination at some instances. This shows that it is impossible in the context of Sri Lanka to talk about absolute influence of Buddhism on people after Anuradhapura period (3rd century bce to 10 century ce). Except for Thailand which was not colonized but came under heavy American influence from the 19thcentury, Western colonial influence was there for the rest of the Theravada Buddhist societies in South and Southeast Asia in varying degrees. If at present the Buddhist influence is not seen in these societies as a formidable force there is nothing to be amazed. The presence of some Buddhist influence at all is the thing to be amazed. In what follows I make comments basically from the Buddhist doctrinal sources on the three themes identified in the title of the paper. * First published in Dialogue, New Series XLII-XLIII, ed. Aloysius Peiris s.j. 20152016, pp. 257-278.

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Although the three themes have been discussed separately, in the course of the discussion it becomes clear that these issues cannot be treated independently of one another. It is so not simply because the Buddha did not discuss these issues separately but also because the three issues are inter-related. It is good to keep in mind at the outset that the focus of the discussion is not the monastic life but the life of the ordinary householders who are described in the Buddha’s discourses as “laymen enjoying sensual pleasures, living at home, in a house full of children, ...use sandalwood from Kasi, wear garlands, scents, and unguents, ... receive gold and silver” (Bodhi 2012, 1194). Nevertheless, the monastic life will be referred to often for the purpose of contrast. I will conclude the discussion with some general remarks on Buddhist perspectives on economy.

Balanced living It is well known that the Buddha asked his monastic followers to avoid two extremes, namely, inflicting excessive pain to one’s body or selfmortification and excessive indulgence in pleasures. Being an advice meant for those who have renounced their household life, the context here is limited. The Buddha’s own life as ascetic Siddhartha provides an example. After spending six long years of difficult practices, which the Buddha described later as ‘painful, ignoble, and unproductive’, he decided to leave that practice to resume a ‘balanced life’ which was to take a regular meal and attend to basic needs of physical cleanliness. The balanced life meant in this context should not be confused with what is being discussed here, namely, balanced living of ordinary householder. Sometimes it is erroneously assumed that the middle path referred to in the context of monastic life is a compromise between the two extremes. In fact such an understanding is better suited to householders. For the monastic community, the two extremes refer to two forms of life to be avoided and the middleness of the middle path is something different. The idea of balanced living relevant here can be understood in two different senses both found in the Buddhist teachings yet forming a part of the common understanding of the concept not exclusive to Buddhism. The first is to understand balanced living as maintaining a balance between one’s income and expenditure, and the second is to live a life without getting into extremes related to consumption. The first idea of balanced living is described in the teachings of the Buddha as ‘sama-jīvikatā’ the direct English rendering of which

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Pali term is balanced living. In the course of teaching virtues/ practices conducive for the welfare of this worldly life of the householder, the Buddha listed four, namely, initiative (or the energy to initiate new economic ventures), protection (of what is earned through initiatives), good friends and balanced living. He describes this last aspect in the following words: And what is balanced living? Here, a clansman knows his income and expenditures and leads a balanced life, neither too extravagant nor too frugal, [aware]: ‘In this way my income will exceed my expenditures rather than the reverse.’ Just as an appraiser or his apprentice, holding up a scale, knows: ‘By so much it has dipped down, by so much it has gone up,’ so a clansman knows his income and expenditures and leads a balanced life.... If this clansman has a small income but lives luxuriously, others would say of him: ‘This clansman eats his wealth just like an eater of figs.’1 But if he has a large income but lives sparingly, others would say of him: ‘This clansman may even starve himself.’ But it is called balanced living when a clansman knows his income and expenditures and leads a balanced life, neither too extravagant nor too frugal. (Bodhi 2012, 1195) In this same discourse, the Buddha further lists four practices that cause dissipation of wealth, namely, womanizing, drunkenness, gambling and bad friends (Bodhi 2012, 1195). When one has these practices one’s wealth will be dissipated and it will adversely affect one’s ability for balanced living. It is interesting to note in this analysis that the Buddha, although advocating balanced living, does not define the limits of balanced living in any fixed terms. We know that not all people earn exactly the same, and that there are substantial differences in people’s earnings. This shows that balanced living can differ from person to person depending on one’s income. What is intended is not that all live alike in quality or quantity of their consumption but that all live within their limits. Thus ‘neither too extravagant nor too frugal’ does not have fixed boundaries but is context dependent. Does this mean that one who has a very great income is allowed to live in such a way that his luxury life knows no bounds? The answer clearly is ‘no’ and it will be clear in the discussion to follow. The second aspect of balanced living is also indicated in the above 1 According to the commentary to the Aṅguttara-nikāya, this refers to one who shakes the whole fig tree and cause many fruits to fall and only eats a few letting the rest to go waste. See Bhikkhu Bodhi 2012 p.1806 note # 1751.

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analysis, namely, that one should avoid both extravagance and excessive forms of frugality. But what needs to be stressed in this context is that one should avoid extravagant life. One would adhere to extremely frugal life basically under religious influence or out of miserliness. If it is the latter, that should be treated as a symptom of a serious mental condition needing to be addressed systematically. It is possible that there are people who enjoy just having wealth but see spending such wealth as detrimental to their happiness, hardly realizing that they do not really enjoy their wealth but are in fact miserable. There is a story of a person of this character during the time of the Buddha who did neither spent his wealth for his own enjoyment nor did he spend his wealth to cure his own son who was dying for want of medical treatment (Illīsa­-jātaka). In another instance, when the owner of a huge fortune died without ever making use of his wealth, the wealth went to king’s treasury for he did not have progeny to inherit it (S I, 89-90). The Buddha refers to four types of happiness one should possess (A II, 69). They are: happiness of having wealth, enjoying wealth, not being in debt and being blameless. The first of the four allows ownership of wealth as a form of happiness. Buddhism is not insensitive to this aspect of human desire which is gratified by ownership of wealth. But Buddhism holds that people must enjoy wealth they own. In other words, wealth is not for people to hoard and leave unutilized. Balanced living, in this manner, entails enjoying one’s wealth. The important question is how one should enjoy one’s wealth, or the manner in which one should enjoy one’s wealth. In the world today we see two extreme situations, namely, overly use of wealth which is called over-consumption, and its opposite, underconsumption or poverty resulting from the lack of sufficient wealth. The excessive use of wealth or use of luxuries abundantly is harmful to oneself, others and the environment. We know much about the adverse effects of overconsumption, personal health hazards and environmental devastation.2 While a large segment of world population suffer from malnutrition, disease and lack of education, a substantially small number of people both in the so-called developed and underdeveloped worlds seem to have all luxuries around them. But the picture is bad not only 2 It is useful in this context to refer to the excellent work by Annie Leonard’s (2010) The Story of Stuff (New York: The Free Press) which is sub-titled ‘The impact of overconsumption on the planet, our communities, and our health-and how we can make it better.’ A key point in this work is that it illustrates how everything including what we consume is connected to everything else.

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for those who suffer due to poverty, but also to those in the developed countries who suffer due to their overconsumption. There is another sense in which all people, whether living in developed or underdeveloped contexts, should feel alarmed. It is the fact that the world we inhabit is ‘dependently arisen’, to use a Buddhist term, or inter-connected and cannot have sharp boundary lines separating one part of it from another. The forests, rivers, oceans, cities we live in and food we eat are all inter-connected. Although the pollution of environment may not be felt in some parts of the world in the same intensity as in some other parts, it is only a matter of time. Overconsumption causes degradation of environment and depletion of natural resources. According to the teachings of the Buddha, the root causes of this problem are greed, hatred and delusion. In particular, it is the excessive greed for pleasures, or greed for sensual gratification, that lies at the heart of the problem. Buddhism recognizes that, while all beings require food for their survival, human beings require four requisites, food, clothing, shelter and medicine. For the monastic life referred to earlier, these four requisites are to be had to the extent one’s basic needs are satisfied. Monastics who are motivated by the goal of termination of suffering are expected to practice a form of reflection (which is called ‘paccavekkhana’ meaning reflection) every time they make use of these requisites. This ‘reflection’ makes sure that they consume these things with the right attitude, solely for the purpose of survival, not for physical build-up, decoration, enjoyment or entertainment. In other words, consumption for the monastics is basically a means and not an end in itself. The ‘philosophy of consumption’ for the ordinary householder is not the same. Buddhism does not down-play the importance of consumption as an end in itself when it comes to the ordinary people. The first two types of happiness referred to above testify to this. The Buddha talks about happiness associated with things (sāmisa-sukha) and that not associated with things (nirāmisa­ sukha) (S IV, 236; Bodhi 2000, 1283- 1284). The former which is for the householder is usually associated with having material things and pleasures, and it is also called ‘happiness of the householder’ (gihi-sukha). The latter is for the renounced and it is called ‘the happiness of the renounced (pabbajjasukha) for it arises from the absence of things, or more accurately, from the absence of craving for material things.

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While Buddhism accepts the reality of the ordinary human life as driven by the desire for things or material pleasures, it, at the same time, asserts that our suffering increases proportionately with the increase of desire. On the one hand, the ordinary human being dislikes unhappiness (dukkha-paṭikkūlā), and does not wish to die (amaritu-kāmā) and he likes happiness so much (sukha­kāmā) and likes to live (jīvitu-kāmā) (S IV, 173), on the other, he is in the unenviable situation of wanting to eat his cake and keep it simultaneously, which is impossible. It is clear that we have to set limits to our cravings. A practical solution to the problem is to adopt a way of simple living. But ‘simple’ is a very vague term. How simple is simple? The Buddha has never set any fixed limit. But he has given some guidance. Buddhism expects a society to be ‘accomplished and prosperous’ (iddha-phīta) (DI, 211). A well-known stanza with the chanting of which Buddhists conclude their daily worship has the wish: ‘let the world be prosperous’ (phito bhavatu loko ca). These instances refer to people who are rich and prosperous. There are several ways to explain this emphasis on abundance of wealth. One simple reason is that a society with a substantial group of religious people who did not contribute to economic production anticipates a society with some extra to feed them. Although there is nothing Buddhist about tax, the Kūṭadanta-sutta (D I, 127- 149; Walshe 2012, 133- 142) clearly shows that Buddhism approved the institution of taxation. What the discourse highlights is that a ruler cannot obtain tax from people for whom he has not provided means of income. But it is alright to obtain tax if and when the ruler has provided ‘infra-structure facilities’ for his people. This tax is not merely for the king to meet the cost of his administration, but also to spend for social welfare activities which was considered to be the duty of the ruler. There could be another reason, perhaps very important from a Buddhist soteriological point of view, but I have not found explicitly stated anywhere in the discourses. The ultimate Buddhist soteriology is to terminate one’s suffering by eradicating one’s desire mainly for material things. It is highly unlikely for a person who has been deprived of any kind of material wealth and resultant happiness to be dispassionate of such enjoyments. If at all, it will be relatively easier for a person who has enjoyed pleasures in life to be wary of them. When the Buddha was addressing the issue of giving up pleasures, he always referred to three interconnected aspects, namely, satisfaction, disadvantages, and giving up (assāda, adīnava, nissaraṇa) (M I, 85 and many other places),

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indicating thereby that seeing disadvantages and subsequent giving up will be hard without having experienced the satisfaction. For this reason, it is reasonable to think that the Buddha anticipated a prosperous society, even from a soteriological point of view, rather than a society in which people did not have enough to eat and dress. According to the teachings of the Buddha, a poverty-stricken life without necessary requisites is not simple living. Poverty is considered a sorrowful state which needs to be overcome by energy and hard work. A person may be born into a family with poverty. But this does not mean, according to the Buddha, that such a person has to continue with that undesirable state. With sufficient intelligence and effort a person is capable of changing his state to a better one. In no place one finds the Buddha praising poverty as desirable. Bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs who do not have their own wealth are not considered poor in the Buddhist tradition. They have voluntarily given up their material comforts and opted for a life of no possession. Therefore, they are neither poor nor rich in economic sense. But they are rich with sevenfold noble wealth (ariya-dhana), faith, virtue, moral shame, moral dread, erudition, generosity and wisdom (D III, 163). Being possession-less they naturally depend on others for their survival. But this dependence is not a form of begging out of a painful sense of poverty. Even of a bhikkhu or a bhikkhunī who depends on others for his/ her survival there is a possibility that their life may turn out to be not necessarily simple for they receive more than they need from their donors. In such a situation, the Buddhist monastic Vinaya makes it very clear that a bhikkhu or bhikkhunī must not accept more than what is needed. Whatever one receives one must share it with one’s fellow brethren/ sisterhood. One must be satisfied with what is needed for one’s bare existence. At the same time, one must not waste what one receives and one must make maximum use of what one receives (V II, 291-292), This is clear from Ananda’s explanation to King Udena on how bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs made maximum use of the robes they received (Chullavagga). Although the Buddha does not seem to have given a definition of or limit to simplicity we can get a clue from what he taught to his monastic followers. In addressing a village leader the Buddha classifies people who enjoy sensual pleasures based on whether they seek wealth lawfully

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(dhammena) or unlawfully (adhammena), by violence (sāhasena) or non-violence (asāhasena), whether or not they make themselves happy, whether or not they share it with others, and perform meritorious deeds with that wealth. The Buddha points out how some people earn wealth lawfully, whereas some others do so unlawfully or by both means, how some people earn by non-violence, whereas some others do so violence or by both means. The Buddha says that all these people become blameworthy for what they have done wrongly and for what right things they have not done, and they become praiseworthy for what they have done rightly and for what right things they have done. Finally the Buddha identifies the following category as praiseworthy in four counts: Then, headman, someone here who enjoys sensual pleasures seeks wealth lawfully, without violence. Having done so, he makes himself happy and pleased, and he shares it and does meritorious deeds. And he uses his wealth without being tied to it, uninfatuated with it, not blindly absorbed in it, seeing the danger in it, understanding the escape. (emphasis added) (Bodhi 2000, 1352) In this analysis what is most relevant to the present discussion on balanced living is the last and fourth point, namely that one should use one’s wealth without getting infatuated by it. Although this is not given as a limit, such an attitude toward consumption makes oneself dear to oneself, others and both. What is most important according to this analysis is not that people enjoy wealth but how (with what attitude) people do so. Although it is true that one can consume at one’s will what one has earned within lawful limits, one cannot do so by neglecting one’s obligations to one’s immediate family, one’s in-laws, servants and labourers, and friends and religious people who depend on alms from others (See below for more on this point.). One may tend to think that one is permitted to enjoy as much as one can provid one has fulfilled these obligations. It is in such contexts as this that the Buddha has introduced the concept of ‘viññū-purisa’ or intelligent people who have the right perspective on whatever they do including consuming. The intelligent people referred to here are not necessarily the followers of the Buddha. They constitute all sensible people in a society who make rational choices in their life. The concept of rationality in Buddhism is one shaped by the concept of dhamma or righteousness which is a broad moral principle to be understood following the Buddha’s admonition to the village headman mentioned above.

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Right use of wealth The right use of wealth anticipates its wrong or unacceptable ways of using. In the Advice to Sigāla (D III, 180-193) the Buddha describes some six practices and characteristics which cause dissipation of wealth which are described as “doors to the destruction of wealth’ (bhogaapāya-mukha). These are: consumption of liquor, gambling, loitering, frequenting carnivals etc., association of evil friends and laziness. Except the last which can be an indirect cause of dissipation of wealth, the rest is more direct ways of wasting one’s wealth. In the same discourse, the Buddha refers to being addicted to women, liquor and gambling as ways of wasting one’s wealth. Addressing Sigāla, the Buddha explained the organized and planned use of one’s wealth when he said that one should divide one’s wealth into four, and spend one for one’s consumption, two for development of industries, and the last to be deposited for any future disaster. Even if one may not agree with the Buddha on exact division of wealth, one cannot deny the fact that the Buddha was keen on proper planning of wealth, investment and saving, which are key aspects of any successful economy. Directly addressing the issue of the right use of wealth, the Buddha first details how one should earn wealth (discussed in more details in the last section). According to the Buddha, one has to acquire wealth “by energetic striving, by the strength of one’s arms, earned by the sweat of one’s brow”, and most importantly, “righteous wealth righteously gained” (A II 66-69). This account, although there is no need to ask why one should not waste one’s wealth, seems to explain the reasons for not wasting one’s wealth. Then the Buddha goes on describing four proper things one should do with regard to one’s wealth With wealth acquired (as described above), the noble disciple makes himself happy and please and properly maintains himself in happiness;... his parents ..., his wife and children, his slaves, workers, and servants ..., he makes his friends and companions happy and pleased and properly maintains them in happiness. This is the first case of wealth that has gone to good use, that has been properly utilized and used for a worthy cause. The noble disciple makes provisions against the losses that might arise from fire, floods, kings, thieves, or displeasing heirs, he makes himself secure against them. This is the second ... used for a worthy cause.

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The noble disciple makes five oblations: to relatives, guests, ancestors, the king, and the deities, This is the third case of wealth... used for a worthy cause. The noble disciple establishes an uplifting offering of alms...to those ascetics and Brahmins who refrain from intoxication and heedlessness,... This is the fourth case of wealth... used for a worthy cause. (Bodhi 2012, 450-451; Pattakamma-sutta, A II, 66-69) In this classification of proper ways of spending one’s wealth, the Buddha combines the happiness of society at large including religious obligations with happiness of oneself and one’s immediate family. On the one hand, the Buddhist position is not one of the denial of one’s own pleasure or that of one’s immediate family, but on the other, it goes beyond one’s own happiness to that of others. This is in keeping with the well-known criterion the Buddha articulated to Rahula, his own son in his early life, namely, that the right action is that which is not conducive for the harm of oneself, the other or both (AmbalaṭṭhikāRāhulovāda-sutta, M I, 414-420; Bodhi 1995, 523-526). This position clearly suggests that-Buddhism does not ever advocate any asceticism to the lay society, let alone to the monastic community. Another important feature that emerges from the Buddhist discussion on the right use of wealth is its emphasis on sharing one’s wealth, first with one’s immediate family and surroundings including in-laws, friends and religious people, and secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, with the society at large. The reason to share with this last group is simply that they are in need of such generosity. Giving occupies the foremost place in almost all lists of good deeds mentioned in the teaching of the Buddha such as ten perfection, ten meritorious deeds, three meritorious deeds, ten royal virtues, and four ways of treating others well. This wide-spread emphasis on sharing in Buddhism can be explained with reference to the ultimate goal of ending suffering by eradicating defilements headed by desire for things, the opposite of which is sharing. But it appears that the Buddhist tradition advocated this practice so strongly also for the reason that all human beings live in a dependently arisen universe in which poverty or lack of material comforts of one person cannot be separated from the existence of all others among whom are those who have much more than they need.

Equal opportunities in economics At a casual look, one may tend to assume that the Buddha did not have anything to do with such issues as equal opportunities in economic

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production, which have political ideological overturns. One may even argue that an idea of an all equal society goes counter to the Buddhist view of karma. In a closer look, however, it is clear that this issue can be discussed from a Buddhist perspective, and that the Buddha did have some useful ideas relevant to the issue. Perhaps, what comes closest to the Buddha’ thoughts on equal opportunities in economic production is the discussion in the Kūṭadantasutta of the Dīgha-nikāya (D I, 127-149). The context of the discussion is that the legendary king Mahāvijita was planning a large sacrifice for the sake of which the king had to burden his subjects with extra taxes. The chief advisor of the king points out the undesirability of the plan and the resultant prospect of increasing taxes without increasing the income of the people. By way of solution the chief advisor proposes the following procedure: To those in the kingdom who are engaged in cultivating crops and raising cattle, let Your Majesty distribute grain and fodder; to those in trade, give capital; to those in government service assign proper living wages. (Walshe 2012, 135) In this statement, it is clear that the ruler will have to provide people with facilities and opportunities that enable them to increase their income. Some of these people are agricultural farmers who need such support for their work as seeds, water etc; some others are business people who need capital and other facilities for their work; still some others are those who are willing to work for the administration, and they need opportunities of employment provided by the king. We have to assume that these people belong to various social groups with divergent social status. It is clear that the support given by the ruler is equal to all groups although the kind of support given is naturally different. Equal opportunities in economy is a matter of social justice which, during the time of the Buddha, was believed to be a part of the role of the king. Not only the Kūṭadanta analysis, but also such concepts as ten royal virtues (dasarāja-dhamma) (J V, 378) 3 ten noble practices of the universal monarch (ariya dasa cakkavatti vatta),4 and four ways treating 3 Generosity, virtue, giving up, honesty, mildness, austerity, absence of hatred, nonviolence, forbearance, non-aggression (dānaṃ sīlaṃ, pariccāgaṃ, ajjavaṃ maddavaṃ tapaṃ; akkodho avihiṃsā ca khantī ca avirodhatā) Jātaka V 378. 4 (1-7) Establish guard, ward and protection according to Dhamma for one’s own household, troops, nobles and vassals, Brahmins and householders, town and country folk, ascetics and Brahmins, and beasts and birds; (8) prevention of crimes in the

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people well (satara sangraha vastu5). All these teachings underscore the role of the king in delivering social justice (distributive justice). In the Cakkavatti-Sīhanāda-sutta in which the noble practices of the universal monarch are discussed, it is said that the king must give wealth to those who do not have. In the subsequent unfolding of the story, we find that the kingdom becomes plagued by robbers because the king failed to give wealth to those who did not have and that stealing became rampant in the kingdom consequently. At this point the robber is produced before the king and the king was told by the robber that he stole others’ property because he did not have means to live whereupon the king gave him wealth. This sends a wrong message to other potential robbers, and they start stealing thinking that the king will give wealth to them. Realizing that his policy has backfired, the king decides to resort to severe punishment which, in tum, results in robbers themselves getting armed to meet the royal atrocities. The story of the sutta continues to detail how that society which enjoyed high longevity and happiness gradually deteriorated to a society with a very short life span and poor quality of life, and how some small group of sober people reversed this behavior and gradually restored the good old society. A strange thing in the story is that it does not say exactly what the king did after his policy of aggression aggravated the problem. Both giving wealth to individual robbers and the adherence to severe punishment are given in the sutta as wrong approaches to the problem of poverty. But the sutta says (in the list of ten noble virtues of the king) that wealth should be given to those who are in need. Either the sutta contradicts itself, or we have to understand this idea of giving wealth to those who are poor as an effort to remedy the maldistribution of wealth which is a major reason behind social unrest and crimes. The Kūṭadanta analysis is very clear in this regard: what the king needs to do is not simply giving money to those who are in need, but to provide facilities for them to generate their own sources of income. If we are to be guided by the principles of coherence and consistency (which the Buddha himself advocated in the four great criteria (mahāpadesa) (Mahāparinibbāna-sutta, D II, 72- 168) we will have to give a broader interpretation, following the line of the Kūṭadanta to this particular royal practice. Although there can be many kingdom, (9) giving property to those who are in need, and (10) consult virtuous religious people on what is good and follow their instructions (Walshe 2012 pp.396397; Cakkavattisīhanāda-sutta, Dīgha-nikāya 26). 5 Generosity, pleasant speech, working for others ‘good and even­handed treatment of others (Sigālovāda-sutta, Dīgha-nikāya, 31; Walshe 2012 p.469).

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instances in which simple welfare-oriented giving is needed, it cannot be taken as constituting the total Buddhist answer to the problem. Providing equal opportunities for economic activities does not mean that all become equal in their economic condition. According to the Buddhist analysis, society is composed of unequal people. These inequalities extend from differences in physical appearance, strength etc. to economic and social conditions. Once the Buddha was asked the following question: Master Gotama, what is the cause and condition why human beings are seen to be inferior and superior? For people are seen to be short-lived and long-lived, sickly and healthy, ugly and beautiful, uninfluential and influential, poor and wealthy, low­ born and high-born, stupid and wise. What is the cause and condition, Master Gotama, why human beings are seen to be inferior and superior? The explanation made by the Buddha underscores the crucial importance of karma in this process: Beings are owners of their actions, heirs of their actions,; they originate from their actions, are bound to their actions, have their actions as their refuge. It is action that distinguishes beings as inferior and superior. (Bodhi 1995, 1053) This statement is usually understood as referring to one’s moral or immoral actions belonging to one’s past life as a result of which people are born into the states described in the question. It is true that the Buddha says that people are born into different types of existence such as human world, divine abodes, forms of unpleasant existence (apāya) basically as a result of their good or bad past actions. The fact that they are born into these realms does not mean that they are bound by such states. This is in particular true to the human existence. On the one hand, the Buddha denies the popular belief that everything happens due to one’s past actions (sabbaṃ pubbekatahetu-vāda) (Mahā-titthāyatanasutta, A I, 173; Bodhi 2012, 266-270). Past actions, on the other hand, constitute merely one, yet a determining factor of the whole process of the continued existence in the wheel of life. More importantly, however, for human beings in particular, the Buddha always stressed the need for hard work in the sense of hard physical labour, and energy and initiative to achieve prosperity in the present life. To Dīghajānu Koliyaputta, referred to above, who wished to know how to be successful in this life the Buddha described initiative as the first factor:

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And what is the accomplishment in initiative? Here, whatever may be the means by which a clansman earns his living -whether by farming, trade, raising cattle, archery, government service, or some other craft - he is skillful and diligent; he possesssound judgment about it in order to carry out and arrange it properly. This is called accomplishment in initiative. (A IV, 281-285; Bodhi 2012, 1194) If everything is determined by one’s past actions, there is no point of talking about initiative and associated good qualities to be cultivated for economic prosperity. Further, the Buddha describes to the same person about the hard work needed for success. One should acquire wealth by “initiative and energy,...by the strength of [his] arms, earned by the sweat of [his] brow....” (A IV, 281-285; Bodhi 2012, 1194). In the well-known ‘Advice to Sigāla’ (D III, 180-193; Walshe 2012, 463), the opposite of hard-work, the idleness (alassānuyoga) due to which one always postpones ones work, is listed as a factor causing waste of one’s wealth. These discussions suggest clearly that, according to the Buddha, success depends not on one’s past actions (alone) but on present hard work, skills and diligence. How could one then understand the Buddha’s response to the questioner on the differences found in society? Taking into account that the Buddha does not see the past actions as the sole determining factor, the action that he refers to in this explanation has to be understood as actions of the present life. It is one’s actions, or what one does (or does not do) or one’s behavior that shapes one’s life. The initiative, skill and hard work discussed above, all involve one’s free and willful actions. Hence the Buddha’s statement needs to be understood not only as undermining absolutism and determinism linked to the allegedly inviolable results of one’s past actions but also as motivating people for action. Ultimately, all human beings are the outcomes of their actions, actions determine what one is, what one is not, what one will or will not be. This ‘philosophy of action’ has been articulated by the Buddha in many instances. One well known instance is the Vasala­sutta where the Buddha says that: One does not become a high­caste or a low-caste by birth; one becomes high caste by actions; one becomes low caste by actions (na jaccā vasalo hoti - na jaccā hoti brāhmaṇo; kammanā vasalo hoti - kammanā hoti brāhmaṇo, Sn v. 142). Combining the moral causation with the causation of biological order, the Buddha further says: One reaps according to what one has sown; the doer of good

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receives good and the doer of bad receives bad (S I, 227).6 The Buddha explains this idea further in the Vāseṭṭha-sutta: He who makes his living among men By agriculture, you should know Is called a farmer, Vasettha; He is not a brahmin [The same is repeated for merchants, servants, soldiers, priests and rulers.] He who makes his living among men By stealing, you should know Is called a robber, Vasettha; He is not a Brahmin (M 98: Bodhi 1995, 801-802) This is nothing other than a demystified notion of karma, understood in the sense of what one does, not necessarily moral / immoral actions. This concept of the Buddha leaves open the possibility for anyone to change one’s destiny for better (or for worse). Providing equal opportunities for the people is a duty of the ruler, according to the Kutadanta-sutta referred to above. But much depends on individual initiative, effort and intelligence for one’s success or lack of it. The historical example of the Sangha (‘community’) suggests that the Buddha believed that a society with equality can be created. In the formation of this society the Buddha rejected all types of social conventions including the caste hierarchy which plagued the society of his time. The Buddha compared his Sangha to the ocean to which the waters of all great rivers, with their distinctive colours, flow and lose their individual identities and become one ocean A. V II, 239). The members of this society shed their all former identities and became simply the sons and the daughters of the Buddha (sakya­-putta, sakya-dhītā). In the Sangha society, the private ownership was limited to a very few personal things. Whatever the members received went to a common store and was distributed from there according to one’s needs. This means that one may receive much and another may receive less, but all get according to their needs (and not according to their wants/desires). To this extent, the Sangha society was communist (advocated community ownership). This is a society without the rich or the poor, and the closest that Buddhism came to an equal society. But even in this society all were not 6 yādisaṃ vapate bījaṃ- tādisaṃ harate phalaṃ; kalyāṇkārī kalyāṇaṃ- pāpakārī ca pāpakaṃ.

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equal in many respects, such as intellectual and emotional capacities, and even in how much they received. This shows that even in the Sangha society, which is the Buddhist ideal of classless society, not all were equal in every respect. There is no evidence to believe that the Buddha prescribed this system to the ordinary society. The equal opportunities in economic production did not necessarily mean equal success in the production or equality of capacity for enjoyment of what is so produced. As the discussion above shows, much depended on individual’s initiative, energy and intelligence. The Buddhist karma theory, as we noted earlier, holds that people are born into different states owing to their good and bad past actions. This, however, does not mean that they were bound to continue in those states they were found when they were born. One may come down from a higher state or go up from a lower state, much depending on many internal and external factors.

Concluding remarks The preceding discussion must have shown that the teaching of the Buddha has many interesting and useful ideas pertaining to balanced living, the right use of wealth and equal opportunities in economy. The community of the disciples of the Buddha was constituted by four groups, namely, male and female monastic communities and the male and female ordinary householders. The Buddha never set limits for a balanced life. For the former two groups whose goal of life was to realize cessation of suffering by eliminating their all desires, matters such as balanced living did not matter very much. They depended on others for their survival, and theirs was a life characterized by simplicity in consumption. For the latter group, however, the Buddha allowed material comforts and pleasures within the limits of righteousness (dhamma). Although the Buddha did not set limits to balanced life, one was expected to fall within the limits of dhamma in the manner one acquired wealth and also in the manner one spent one’s wealth. Dhamma as far as its scope and the content are concerned is perhaps the broadest concept in the teaching of the Buddha. Its connotation differs from one context to another. What is dhamma in the present context has to be decided upon a more detailed scrutiny of the relevant discourses of the Buddha, a task to be kept aside at the moment for want of space. In a broader sense, what Dhamma is, following the line of thinking detailed in the Ambalaṭṭhikā Rāhulovādasutta (M I, 414-420; Bodhi 1995, 523-526) (referred to above), what

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is not harmful to oneself (agent), the other (patient) and to both, and what is beneficial for oneself, the other and to both.

14. Globalization: Buddhist Perspective to Economics*

Introduction The objective of this paper is twofold: to develop a critique of the economic aspect of the globalization process from a Buddhist point of view and to explore the nature of the role Buddhism, as a system of thought, can play by proposing measures to give globalization a human face. By identifying these two objectives, the present paper assumes that religion in general and Buddhism in particular has an important role to play in understanding and thereby changing the character of this very important trend of the contemporary world.

Globalization Globalization is a vast and complex process. It has been defined as “the process of economic and social unification of the world through voluntary and involuntary adoption by all countries of economic and social systems developed and practiced by the industrial Countries ...”1 In addition to being economic and social it is also cultural and ideological. The economic factor particularly is more significant than the rest for ultimately is has a direct bearing on the very existence of any society. For instance, in a priority list of human needs, food comes first. Such other basic requirements as clothing, residence and medicine come next. The cultural and aesthetic requirements find their place only subsequently. Therefore it is understandable that both individuals and societies aim at achieving their economic goals as soon and as best as they can. 1  ‘Globalization and the Free Market’. The Convocation Speech at Sri Jayawardenepura University on 9th October 1995 by J.B. Kalegama * First published in Dialogue, New Series XXIV, ed. Aloysius Peiris s.j. 1997, pp.53-65.

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The advances in transport and information technologies are playing very decisive role in the process of globalization. They have brought the peoples of the world closer to one another in an unprecedented manner. Trade and cultural relations between countries are not at all a new phenomenon. The advances of science and technology have made them so easy and so frequent that the entire world has become one unit of inter-twining relations. The effects of such links are immediately felt and clearly visible in cultural and social spheres. Far more significant are, however, economic links. The idea of globalization has in it, as one of its key characters, a tendency for homogenisation. Ultimately, the idea is that the entire world will assume, more or less, a uniform character which is nothing other than the character of the West for it represents a society which is economically most powerful. This, in other words, is to say that globalization is very much westernization. Whether or not westernization is good is a question that has to be viewed on an empirical basis and not on any preconceived notion of desirability or otherwise of the west. The clearly undesirable characteristic of the globalization in the field of economics is its coercive character. In the present situation there is not much choice left for the economically weaker other than accepting the conditions laid by the more powerful. If a society has no other alternative but to accept such a mode of thinking and behaviour, there involves a violation of a basic (human) right of being able to act freely according to what a particular society thinks best for its people. The fall of the socialist system in Russia and Europe has convinced many that the only viable economic policy is the market economy. With the break of the major alternative economic policy, the argument for the market economy has been taken as conclusively established. Therefore, it is believed that the movement towards market economy is unchangeable and inevitable. Some would argue that the fall of the socialist system is due to its inability to provide the required economic growth and therefore something inevitable. Some others would argue that the fall was designed and not natural. It is really too early for anyone to predict what the future would be. Even in the former Soviet Union and the European nations, the socialist parties are not dead; instead, in some places either they are the ruling power or the major opposition group. The People’s Republic of China has had the highest economic growth in the world - 13 percent in 1992 and 1993 and 11 percent in 1994 while operating under a ‘regulated or socialist market economy’ and not giving

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way to all the aspects of globalization. What all this indicates is that we are not at all in a position ‘to issue the death certificate’ for the socialist system of economy and governance. The Buddhist argument I am going to develop in this paper does not depend on the existence or the nonexistence of the socialist economic system. The purpose of pointing out to the fact that the socialist system is still not dead is to show that we cannot talk about the triumph of market economy as inevitable or as something that is bound to happen.

Is globalization itself undesirable? Globalization as a general process of unification, homogenisation and integration of all peoples is a phenomenon that is being increasingly experienced in the modern world. Those who do not approve of globalization in this sense are often of the view that the unique features of cultures which need to be preserved are in danger. Nevertheless, it is almost a fact that cultural absolutism is hard to maintain in the face of the modern technological developments for wide-spread knowledge results in wide-spread interaction and influence. Such interactions, among other things, help people to understand that they are only a part of one species called human beings. This is not at all a bad understanding. Conflicts among us result basically from the lack of such a holistic understanding. Buddhism is not meant to be addressing a problem limited to only one section of human society. It addresses a common human problem or, more accurately, a problem common to all living beings. In this sense Buddhism is not Indian or Asian but universal. On the other hand, the historical evolution of Buddhism in specific geographical and cultural settings show quite clearly that it is capable of adjusting itself to the particular situations and that it identifies and respects unique characteristics of cultures in which it found its home. However, these differences have never affected the inner core of the teaching which remained, both in Hinayana and Mahayana traditions, intact. The Buddhist attitude has been to recognize and respect differences but not to attach any inviolable sanctity to them. This attitude is revealed in the following statement of the Buddha which he made in the context of the proper behavior towards regional dialects: Do not cling to regional dialect; do not violate the convention (janapadaniruttiṃ nābhiniveseyya, sāmaññaṃ nātidhaveyyāti) (M III, 230). Humanity as a whole is essentially one. Buddhism supports this claim through both physical and psychological evidence. The Buddhist

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argument for the one-ness of humanity based on physical evidence occur the Vāseṭṭha-sutta (M II, 194; Sn v. 35) where the argument has been summarized in thefollowing manner: Behold the grass and trees They reason not, yet they possess the mark After their kind, for kinds indeed divide. Consider then the beetles, moths and ants: They after their kind too possess the mark... And so four-footed creatures, great and small... The reptiles, snakes, the long-backed animals... Fish and fond-feeders, water-denizens ... Birds and winged creatures, fouls o’ their, They after their kind all possess the mark; For kinds divide. Each after his kind bears his mark; in man there is not manifold. Not in the hair or head or ears or eyes, Not in the mouth or nose or lips or brows, Not in the throat, lips, belly or the back, Not in the rump, sex organs or the breasts, Not in the band or feet, fingers or nails, Not in the legs or thighs, colour or voice, ls mark that form his kind as in all else., Nothing unique is in men’s bodies found: The difference in men is nominal. (Horner 1957, 381-382) The psychological evidence is very much a basic assumption of the teaching of the Buddha. For example, the concept of suffering on which the entire doctrine of the fourfold noble truth is centred is given as a universal truth. All beings, both human and non-human, who have not done away their ‘thirst’ (taṇhā) are subject to dukkha. To be free from suffering is the common human goal. Although there can be cultural and physical differences among human groups ultimately they are all same in this fundamental psychological sense. This universal characteristic of human being allows us to imagine that there is a deeper inner affinity among human beings transcending the cultural and other differences which makes sharing of a common culture possible. In the face of the advances of the information technology if the world is gradually moving towards a common culture, such a globalization is quite understandable from a Buddhist point of view. There is nothing inherently undesirable in it. What is undesirable, however, is the

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physical and mental coercion involved in the process. In other words, inflicting suffering on others in the process of one’s effort to be free from suffering is what is questionable. If globalization takes place naturally and voluntarily obviously there are no victims.What is happening today, however, is different. Even the culture and ideology of the affluent and the powerful have to be accepted by the poor and the powerless merely for the sake of survival. This state of affairs indicate that there is something gravely wrong in the globalization process characterized particularly by the forced imposition of economic practices of the powerful countries on the less powerful.

Psychology and philosophy of market economy The strength of the open economy left to be determined by the behaviour of the market is mainly due to the fact that it is backed by the Western industrialism. The Western industrial system, it should be noted, has an inherent tendency to enlarge the scale of its operations or to globalize. This arises from the rapid advance of technology, mass production and surplus savings which need ever increasing markets. The motive force behind Western industrialism is the Transnational Corporations, whose size is so large that it has more resources at its command than many a government in developing countries... The continuing tendency of Transnational Corporations to enlarge the ultimate minimum effective unit appears to be nothing less than the entire world and all mankind. 2 An unlimited amount of production and the unending process of sale are the hallmarks of this economy. In order to sell, an artificial demand has to be created. Competition, rivalry and bitter efforts at destruction of the opponent are quite rampant. There is no doubt that any meaningful human action has to have a philosophy behind it. The system of market economy likewise has a view of reality and a view of the human being behind it. According to the economistic approach behind the capitalist system, the human being is conceived basically as homo economicus. According to this view, human beings ‘seek solely to maximise satisfaction of their preferences’. They are considered to be rational agents in so far as they make decisions capable of meeting this end. This view is backed by a strong subjectivist theory 2 JB Kalegama (1995) (see note # 1).

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of value which holds that individuals are the sole adjudicators of their values. This means that one cannot be mistaken in ends one pursues and one is singularly capable of determining as to what constitutes one’s own well-being. Therefore, preferences cannot be irrational; and individual’s behaviour motivated by his desire to maximise satisfaction cannot be irrational either. The view of reality behind market economy is that the world is a place to be exploited and the people in it are to be maneuvered and manipulated to maximise profits. In this system the success or the failure of economic activities is counted on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. Efficiency is a fundamental criterion and the customer satisfaction is the aim. These three concepts, cost-benefit analysis, efficiency and satisfaction taken by themselves are good indicators of successful human action and nothing intrinsically wrong in them. However, when they are taken as absolute and sole measures they can lead to an utter neglect of human values and ethical ends. Economists themselves and philosophers have been raising questions about these procedures lately. The utilitarian philosophy behind the modern market economy has proved itself to be dehumanising. The market does not have a heart-so to say. As Keynes noted long time back, ‘‘capitalism is absolutely irreligious, without internal union, without much public spirit, often though not always, a mere congeries of possessors all pursuers”. The sole motivation behind it is the accumulation of wealth virtually by any means. In this process all else become mere means. Now this is a general problem of capitalism and market economy. Particularly when human beings become mere means such a system cannot have respect for human life or human interests. The emphasis on satisfaction, one may argue, is a clear indication of regard for human interests for, after all, it is human satisfaction. The value placed on satisfaction by the market economy is not based on any altruistic motive but a selfish manipulation of the nature of human psyche. Capitalism knows very .well that the capacity of people for consumption is unlimited. The market in fact represents this boundless desire. What capitalism does is the exploitation of this natural tendency of human beings to its own benefit. Globalization enables the few powerful societies to maximise their own satisfaction at the expense of the unfulfilled desires of the rest of the world. The psychology behind is the unlimited desire. Both the victimisers and the victimised play the same game following the same rules. What prevails is the law of the jungle.

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The forefathers of capitalism such as Adam Smith did really see a vital role to be played by the government of safeguarding what is considered to be ‘the public good’. According to Smith there are three basic public goods - basic law and order, the right to property and the enforcement of contracts, and it is the function of the government to make sure that the above is happening properly for they constitute the very basis on which a successful and socially just system of capitalism can operate. It seems that more recent interpreters of Smith have not given due emphasis to this aspect of capitalism, and as a result, the role of the government has been pushed to a corner as something undesirable. It is this ‘neoliberal paradigm’ of capitalism that is more to be blamed.3 The globalization of the market economy is completely motivated by self-interest on the part of its main players. There is no doubt that economic policy of any country is motivated by self-interest. However, when self-­interest goes to the extent of violating the similar interests of others making them mere helpless victims it becomes questionable. What is happening today in the name of globalization, by and large, is this. In order to keep the market economy functioning there must be unlimited production. The rate and the amount of the consumption is taken as an indication of the success of the system. In order to sell, the producer has to create a desire to buy even when what is bought is not really necessary for one to live comfortably. Thus the demand, very often, is artificial and unrealistic. Ethically, it is questionable because it exploits a human weakness. Environmentally, it is dangerous for it depletes the resources of the world. To what extent the world can go on feeding this huge process of manufacturing is a question. The process of production is selfish for it robs the future generations of their share of the natural resources. The socialist mode of economy, whether or not it was able to deliver the goods, came into being as an effort to remedy the shortcomings of capitalism. The understanding was that everyone in society should get an equal share of social benefits. What this system tried to assure was economic security and social justice. In an economic system motivated purely by desire for satisfaction there cannot be room for such goals. On the contrary, centrally governed system with a sense of welfare can accommodate such goals as its main features. Under such a system one 3  “The State, the Market and Economic Development: A Second Look at Adam Smith in Theory and Practice” Arthur A. Glodsmith in Development and Change, Vol. 26 (1995), Institute of Social Studies UK pp. 633- 650.

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cannot produce whatever one wishes to for there are priorities to be given. Particularly, it is a responsibility of a government to ensure that all the citizens enjoy the basic requirements of life such as food, clothing, shelter, medicine and education. The market economy fails to recognize the economic security and social justice characterized by the universal availability of these basic requirements for all people. It is worth summarising the fundamental deficiencies of globalization of market economy: (i) Economistic view of human being fails to recognize that human beings are not mere maximizers of satisfaction but they are capable of assessing their preferences ethically and changing them if necessary. (ii) It is unethical in so far as it exploits a basic human psychological trait namely, desire, and it is environmentally harmful, for the resources of the world cannot endure the process of unlimited production in the long run. (iii) It is selfish in so far it neglects the plight of the poor and robs the future generations of their share of resources. (iv) It is coercive in so far as it violates a basic (human) right of a society, namely, of being able to determine its own economic policy.

The Buddhist perspective on economics The original teachings of the Buddha on economics are to be understood as applicable to two different groups of society, namely, monks and the ordinary laymen. For the monks who have dedicated their life to liberate themselves from all kinds of bondage and desire the economic aspect of life is a mere means of living the most simple life possible till one realises the goal. The monks need to have four requisites, namely, clothes, food, lodgings and medicine merely to fulfill the minimum requirements of life. It has been described as “with food barely sufficient to touch the stomach, clothes barely capable of covering one’s body...” This society does not have private ownership. The system of ownership practised among the Sangha is known as ‘sāṅghika’. The very term ‘sāṅghika’ means ‘belonging to the Sangha’ (or community). Everything that was received by the individual members of the society goes to a common pool from where they are distributed. The distribution takes place not according to one’s wants (desires) or not depending on how much one

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received but according to one’s requirements. The private ownership was limited to a very few personal belongings. Everything else was common property. Happiness associated with this mode of living has been described as nirāmisa sukha; ‘happiness of not-having’. It is clear, therefore, that no economic development or anything close to it occurs in the monastic context. The situation, however, is different in the context of the lay society. Buddhism tries to see a balance between material and ‘spiritual’ development in the case of the lay society. In the Buddhist language, the ideal lay person is one who has two eyes; one eye for the material development and another for internal development (A IV, 281-285). The nature of this material development and the means of achieving it have been described in the following words; sedāvakkhittena bāhabālaparicitena dhammikena dhammaladdhena; got by the sweat of one’s brow, accumulated by physical effort and righteous means. The most significant concept that occurs here is the concept of dhamma. The emphasis is always to function within the limits of the dhamma. In fact Buddhism does not set any other limits or restrictions on the development aspect of human life. It is in this context that we have to see the significance of the concept of dhamma. In enumerating the kinds of happiness attained by the lay society, the Buddha identifies the following four: (i) happiness of having (atthisukha) (ii) happiness of consumption (bhogasukha) (iii) happiness of being debtless (aṇanasukha) and (iv) happiness of being guiltless (anavajjasukha). What is meant by the happiness of being guiltless is directly related to preservation of dhamma in the process of material development. Another significant aspect worthy of note is that these four kinds of happiness are not mentioned with regard to the monks. The reason is clear; the four become meaningful only in a context of earning and spending. The philosophy behind the Buddha’s teachings of economics can be summarised in the concept of ‘dhamma’. In the Cakkavattisīhanādasutta where the Buddha articulates his views on political power and its responsibility in looking after the economic well-being of the people the idea of dhamma has been emphasised. The concept of the ‘wheel-turning king’ (rajā cakkavatti) in the Buddha’s teaching is characterised by righteousness. In the following advice to a new king the sutta articulates the duties of a ‘cakkavatti’ king essentially in terms of dhamma. ...depending on the Dhamma, honouring it, revering it, cherishing it, doing homage to it and venerating it and having

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the dhamma as your badge and banner, acknowledging the Dhamma as your master you should establish guard, ward and protection according to Dhamma for your own household, your troops, your nobles and vassals, for Brahmins and householders, town and country folk, ascetics and Brahmins, beasts and birds. (Walshe 1987, 396- 397) Although the sutta does not define what the ‘dhamma’ in this context means it describes what is proper and improper in a cakkavatti king’s behaviour. Poverty among people has been identified as the root cause of all evils. The elimination of poverty has been considered the duty of the king, but it has been pointed out that by mere donation of wealth poverty cannot be eliminated and that by punishment alone the crimes resulting from poverty cannot be stopped either. The Kūṭadanta-sutta is more specific on this matter. The ruler’s role in establishing economic security and social justice is described in the following advice by thechaplain to the king: To those in the kingdom who are engaged in cultivating crops and raising cattle, let Your Majesty, distribute grain and fodder, to those in trade give capital, to those in government service assign proper living wages. (Walshe 1978, 135) The ruler in general, or the cakkavatti ruler in particular, according to these ideas of the Buddha is essentially a righteous king who has the wellbeing of the people as his main task. The cakkavatti concept with a strong sense of social well-being embodies the Buddhist concept of a universal monarch who rules the entire land bordering on the ocean. Although the Indian sense of the globe may have been more limited than that of ours still the cakkavatti king was understood as a global ruler. This suggests that thinking in global terms is not alien to the Buddhist tradition. Much more significant in the present context of the globalization of economics motivated by extreme selfishness is that the global ruler in the Buddhist concept is always motivated by the urge to ensure the well-being of all beings.

Conclusion Capitalist market economy and the selfish and inhuman trends in globalization are not two different things. The latter is the logical conclusion of the former, or, perhaps more accurately, the logical conclusion of the underlying assumptions of the former. The market economy exploits both the ‘physical’ and psychological weakness of the

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people. Through its globalizing trends, market economy puts pressure on the weaker and violates their fundamental rights. It rightly assumes that the desire of human beings is endless, but makes use of that insight to exploit them ruthlessly. It is the psychological rationale behind unlimited production. The interesting fact is that Buddhism too takes into account this selfsame human weakness. According to Buddhism the world is unfulfilled, unsatisfied and slave to thirst (ūṇo loko atitto taṇhādaso) (Raṭṭhapāla-sutta, M II, 54-73). The whole point of ‘taṇhā’ (thirst) as the cause of the suffering is that. Nevertheless, the radical difference between market economy and Buddhism lies in the latter’s using that insight not to maximise one’s profits but to make an end to the resultant suffering. As we noted already the Buddha accepted his contemporary economic system characterised by agriculture, animal husbandry and commerce. Rather than trying to change the system, he tried to introduce dhamma or righteousness to it. In actual application, for example, with regard to commerce, dhamma meant that one must avoid trading in meat, animals, human beings, weapons and poisons and refrain from various modes of deception. The dhamma in the other contexts too was understood in a similar manner. However, this attitude to economy of the ordinary society does not exhaust the Buddha’s ideas on the subject. For example, what the Buddha prescribed for the community of the Sangha, namely, the sāṅghika system of ownership, was quite different and based on different principles. It was truly ‘communist’ for it practiced common ownership. It is easy to explain why the Buddha prescribed this system for the Sangha. A group of people who has the eradication of desire as their main goal cannot find a better way to deal with property. All the requisites were used only to fulfill the basic requirements and there was no concern for the fulfillment of ‘aesthetic’ requirements. The voluntary acceptance of the common ownership conduces to reduce desire and minimises the conflicts arising from private ownership. It seems that the Buddha approved two different systems of economics for the lay society and the monastic community. It is clear that what was prescribed for the laity was not meant for the Sangha. Nevertheless, the problem is whether what was prescribed for the Sangha is not at all suitable for the ordinary society. It does not seem that a straight forward answer is easy to be given. According to the Aggañña-sutta (of the Dīgha-nikāya), in the original human society, there was no private ownership, and people lived a long time happily

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owing to this situation. However, the problems started once the private ownership was gradually introduced. This legend, whether historical or not indicates two things: the common ownership is less prone to generate misbehaviour, and Buddism is in favour of such an economic system which is not selfishly motivated and tends to decrease desire: In such a situation it is difficult to conclude that the sāṅghika system was meant only for the Sangha. Therefore why the Buddha did not openly prescribed the sāṅghika system for society at large will have to be explained on different grounds. A salient characteristic of the Buddhist perspective to economics is that it does not exploit the common psychological traits of human beings for the maximisation of profits leading to disproportionate accumulation of wealth. Neither does it approve of the tendency to maximise the satisfaction at any cost. In the Buddhist view, the cost­ benefit analysis is not complete or salutary unless it takes into account broader human values. What it simply says is that common human tendencies must not let lose undisciplined. Although the human being is ordinarily driven to satisfy his wants he has the moral capacity to change himself for the better. This is a must in any society with a sense of responsibility and a care for social justice. Look at the following critique of the economistic concept of human being by two modern writers: I can admit that my preference is wrong even while also admitting that it is truly my preference. Indeed I may berate myself for continuing to have this preference. I may seek to establish constraints upon my conduct which will make it impossible or difficult for me to act upon it. I may even make efforts to rid myself of the repugnant preference altogether. If I am successful in expunging the preference, and possession of this sort of capacity seems to be one of the ways that human beings are fundamentally different from other creatures, then the economistic perspective would be shown to be incorrect in holding that what one values is entirely a matter of what one prefers. Quite the contrary, in an instance of this sort, what one prefers will be determined by one’s antecedent and independent values. In reducing us to creatures of our preferences, the economistic perspective simply ignores an extremely important human capacity, the capacity to stand apart from what we want, to ask whether what we want is what we should want, to ask whether what we want is what we should get, and to ask whether

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we should try to eliminate certain wants that we in fact do have. (Gillroy & Wade 1992, 244) This clearly underscores the need for ethical restraint and mind­ culture. Elaborating further on the same theme what the authors say can easily be translated into the Buddhist language of restraint of sense (indriyasaṃvara) and the development of mind (bhāvanā): Indeed one of the tasks that we wish education to perform for us, especially for children, is to establish this capacity, if it is not innate, and to nurture and enhance it. Among the most important and distinguishing features of maturity is the ability to stand apart from one’s preferences and gain some measure of control over them and their influence on one’s conduct. (Gillroy & Wade 1992, 249) What should be opposed in globalization, from a Buddhist perspective, is not the process itself but its underlying philosophy and the psychology and the coercive and selfish manner in which it is being implemented.

15. Buddhist Ethics of Consumption*

Introduction The context of this paper is the phenomenon called ‘mindful journalism’ initiated by a group of morally conscious journalists and scholars in journalism. Principle No. 6 of mindful journalism says: Discourage conspicuous consumption by all beings because it encourages the causes of suffering, taṇhā (desire) and upādāna (clinging) pinpointed in the second truth, and violates the ethical conduct dimension of the fourth truth. “Since consumption is merely a means to human wellbeing,” and our “aim should be to obtain the maximum of well-being with the minimum of consumption” (Schumacher 1973, 47-48) the promotion of this idea should be a major goal of mindful journalism. The mindful economics approach of Joel Magnuson (2008), who advocates institutional reform based on the core values of environmental sustainability, social justice and stability might become fertile grounds for journalistic exploration. This chapter examines the approach that journalists should ideally adopt toward consumption. Mindful journalism signifies a perspective consonant with the teaching of the Buddha. Adapting the adjective ‘right’ (sammā) used in the noble eightfold path, we introduce the concept of Right (or Mindful) consumption to explicate a Buddhist “theory” and practice of consumption and related insights. This is an effort at reconstructing a humane, eco-friendly and just way of consumption that mindful journalism could support and promote. * . A version of this paper was published under the title of “No Conspicuous Consumption” in Mindful Journalism and New Ethics in the Digital Era, ed. Shelton A. Gunaratne, Mark Pearson and Sugath Senerath, New York & London: Routeledge, 2015, pp.108-129.

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Journalism and right consumption This section substantiates the interaction, interdependence, and interconnection between mainstream (West-centric) journalism and conspicuous consumption. It provides food for thought for the kalyāṇamitta (wise advisers) to explore a pathway to escape from the vicious production-advertising loop and create a mindful journalism free of commoditization. The very need for a mindful journalism indicates that the plight of the existing mainstream journalism is unsatisfactory. Scholars have documented the enormous power media have in shaping people’s perceptions, attitudes and behavior. For they tell people what, where and how to buy, eat, and dress: what to drive and how and where to live. In short, media have become the purveyors of profit-oriented propaganda and advertising encompassing all aspects of human consumption. Advertising is ingrained in a capitalist market economy, which thrives on buying and selling multitude of goods and services - a sign of prosperity wrought by technology and know how. Although we have to gratefully concede all the material benefits we have accrued from the digital revolution, yet we must mull over the psychology behind this proliferation of goods and services. The market mechanism of capitalism, motivated by endless profit-making has relentlessly targeted all human beings to buy commodities well beyond their basic needs through the non-linear interaction of a set of underlying links (nidānas) sparked from the co-arising of what communication scholars call globalization and mediatization. Production, motivated by profits, requires selling, which requires advertising. Globalization and mediatization co-arose to accelerate the process of buying and selling thereby extenuating the state of dukkha in the samsara. In Buddhist parlance, capitalism, or its concomitant conspicuous consumption, illustrates the undesirable case of the five aggregates (capitalists) exploiting the five aggregates (consumers) because of taṇhā (desire) and upādāna (clinging) among other reasons. A “being” has some degree of control over the five aggregates through its mind consciousness (viññāṇa). This is where the kalyāṇa-mitta could step in to effect a change in commoditized journalism. Their “aim should be to obtain the maximum of well-being with the minimum of consumption” (Schumacher, 1773, 47-48). Selling needs buyers. The process, which necessitates a constant line of production results in an abundance of things, much more than required for the meaningful consumption of all in the world. Here, we

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encounter a weak point in human mind: its inexhaustible desire (taṇhā) for pleasurable things. The literal meaning of taṇhā is thirst, a temporary physical urge that one has to quench repeatedly. The concept of thirst provides the clue: if a system is available to kindle sufficient desire for goods and services, all that is produced could be sold . It is precisely the exploitation of this state of human mind that constitutes the cornerstone of modern classical economics. Since the desire of people is limitless the opportunities for production and sale should also be limitless. The media all over the world has been put to serve this purpose. The goods produced limitlessly will not be sold unless an artificial demand for such goods is created. The media in all forms is being used to create this artificial demand by means advertisements which, very often, can be deceiving eyes and ears, based on inaccurate and misleading information. An advertisement with a picture of a popular personality is an example of the fallacious argument of misplaced authority. Nevertheless, it works. The relation between media and things contributes to create a vicious circle for the media themselves cannot exist without income created through advertisements, which, in turn cannot reach the world without the media. Thus production of goods, advertisements and media become links of an interconnected chain wherein the stronger victimizes the weaker. The following is an extract from a study on advertisement in the USA: The average American spends a total of one year of his/her life watching advertisements, while the regular American child sees 110 TV commercials a day. By the time she is twenty, the average American has exposed to nearly a million advertising messages. According to the Center for a New American Dream, brand loyalties are established in children as early age as two, and by the time they get to school, they can identify literally hundreds of logos. Two-thirds of our newspaper space and 40 percent of our mail is unsolicited advertising. In 2002, global spending on advertising reached $446 billion, an almost nine-fold increase since 1950. In 2005, in the United States alone, $227 billion was spent on ads. China, meanwhile, $12 billion in 2006 and is projected to reach $18 billion by 2011, which will make it the third-largest advertising market in the world. (Leonard 2010, 163-4)

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The advertising of this magnitude is needed in order to persuade the possible buyers to buy a particular product among many other products which are virtually the same. There are serious problems about how these products are produced (issues related to adequate worker compensation, hazard-free working environment and living conditions away from harmful chemicals, etc.). Once produced and sold, the end result is overconsumption in the so-called developed or industrialized countries. Relative to such over-consumption is under-consumption and resultant malnutrition in the so-called less developed or less industrialized countries. Both over-consumption and under-consumption exacerbate dukkha in samsara. Environmental destruction occurs because of the depletion of natural resources caused by over-consumption, which, in turn, creates huge amounts of waste material and garbage. Mindful journalists could become advocates of institutional reform based on the core values of environmental sustainability, social justice and stability (Magnuson 2007). The root cause of this predicament that human being is defined with reference to what he consumes. It has become ‘religious duty’ of people to consume without stopping which is a requirement of the economic system. This, undoubtedly, is not a good situation for human society. Nor is it good for the environment they share with other hundred thousands of species of animals, birds and plants. It is common knowledge that the speed and magnitude of consumption has caused havoc to environment, forests and limited natural resources. Perhaps, most problematic of all is the erosion of human values that are basic to dukkha-reduction in any society. When a person sees meaning in himself as constituting purely of consumption, and other human beings, animals and nature as mere objects to be exploited in that pursuit, [meaning, consumerism], such a society will be very unhealthy for one to live in. This leads us to reflect on an alternative approach to meaning of life not centered on consumption. We have to recognize that media have enormous influence on people in contemporary society. The question is whether the media accept this consumerism and overconsumption uncritically. What follows is an effort to articulate an alternative vision of nature, human being and consumption as the Buddha envisioned and the subsequent practice of his philosophy.

Buddhist criteria of right human action Any effort to determine what is good and bad action according to Buddhism has to be based on its understanding of reality, a salient

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characteristic, or, more correctly, the philosophical basis, of which is the idea of dependent arising or conditioned genesis. This teaching is called paṭiccasamuppāda (Pali) or pratītyasamutpāda (Sanskrit) which explains everything in the universe, including how suffering arises and ceases, as dependently arisen phenomena. ‘Dependent arising’ is the literal rendering of this basic Buddhist concept. The most prominent application of this understanding in the teaching of the Buddha is to explain how human suffering begins and ends. Nevertheless, it is true to say that Buddhism explains everything or all phenomena in the universe according to this understanding which is articulated in the following abstract formula: When this is, this is. When this is not, this is not. With the arising of this, this arises. With the cessation of this, this ceases. imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti imassa uppādā idaṃ uppajjati imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirijjhati (S II, 70; Bodhi 2000, 579). Buddhism identifies five phenomena or “[aspects of] universal nature” (niyāma) in which the principle of dependent origination is operative, namely, seasonal changes, plant life, human action, natural happenings and functioning of the mind. These five areas cover all the major areas of reality. In the noble eightfold path, the last of the four noble truths, the Buddha elucidated the right (sammā) way of life. This path (magga) is included in the ‘threefold training’ scheme, virtue in behaviour, serenity in mind and wisdom in vision. The Buddha wanted people to practice right action, right speech and right living for the sake of their own life; that of all beings including birds, beasts, insects and reptiles; and the environment because all are ‘dependently arisen’ and inter-connected. The Buddhist dictum: May all beings be happy (sabbe sattā bhavantu sukhitattā) clearly reflects the very same understanding of reality. Rightness in action, speech and living, or the right life in general, is understood in the teaching of the Buddha as fulfilling the following three criteria: (i) not causing harm to oneself; (ii) not causing harm to the other,

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(iii) not causing harm to both oneself and the other. (M 61; Bodhi 1995/2001, 507- 523)1 Whatever that causes harm to the doer, the recipient and both is to be avoided for such action is ‘unwholesome, with painful consequences and with painful results.’ Put in positive terms, the criteria assert that one should do acts that are conducive for happiness and welfare of oneself, the other and both. The third criterion in this analysis is not redundant in the presence of the first two because it illustrates the Buddhist practice of taking both oneself and the other, or both subject and object, on equal terms. Some ethical standpoints may give primacy to oneself or to subject and determine rightness or otherwise of an action from the perspective of oneself. This is only looking at one side of the question and hence incomplete. On the other hand, there can be ethical systems that disregard totally one’s own perspective and conceive right action in terms of altruistic act in which oneself is sacrificed for the sake of the other. Buddhism considers both these as extreme positions to be avoided. Discussing this important ethical dilemma, once the Buddha narrated a story of two acrobats, a master and apprentice, who risked their life on a bamboo pole. Immediately before embarking on their display, the teacher told his student: “you protect me and I will protect you- that way guarded by one another and protected by one another both of us will be safe and display our skills”. The student responded: “Master, that is not the way to do it. I will protect myself and you protect yourself, and thus each self-guarded and self-protected both of us will be safe and display our skills”. Narrating this story to his listeners the Buddha said that the right approach was that of the apprentice and not of the master. Explaining why it is so, the Buddha added: protecting oneself, bhikkhus, one protects others; protecting others, one protects oneself (Bodhi 2000, 1648). Very often religious actions or religiously sanctioned actions are understood as self-negating and promoting the interests of the other at the expense of one’s own welfare and happiness. In this scheme, the first and second lay emphasis on two requirements to be taken into consideration in doing something, and the third lays emphasis on the need to consider both together. The Buddhist emphasis on oneself 1  This was explained by the Buddha to his son in his household life, Rahula, and occurs in the Ambalaṭṭhikā Rāhulovāda-sutta (Advice to Rahula at Amabalaṭṭhikā) of the Majjima-nikāya.

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should not be understood as taking room away from any altruistic and self-sacrificing actions. What this criterion underscores is the need to maintain balance in one’s actions, steering clear between selfcenteredness of subjectivism and the self-negation and sentimentalism in objectivism. Another Buddhist criterion, to supplement what we have already said, is to be clear about the motive behind action. As the very first statements of the Dhammapada says: Mind is the forerunner of (all) states. Mind is chief and they are mind-made. If one speaks or acts with wicked mind suffering follows one, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox. Mind is the forerunner... If one speaks or acts with pure mind happiness follows one, even as one’s shadow that never leaves. (Dhp v. 1-2) Buddhism identifies three unwholesome mental states: desire, anger and delusion (lobha, dosa, moha) which are at the root of human actions. It is the presence of these states that make one’s actions impure, unwholesome and bad. The absence of these states or the presence of the opposites of these states, liberality, loving kindness and wisdom, make human actions pure, beneficial and wholesome. Combining these two sets of criteria, one can say that good action is: (i) one that does not involve harm to all involved in it; (ii) one that is done with pure intentions (liberality, loving kindness, and wisdom) . (iii) one that positively promotes happiness and wellbeing of all beings, not merely of human beings. (iv) one that takes into consideration the fact that we live in a universe in which all beings and all things (nature, environment) are inter-connected and inter-dependent. In this inter-connected, causally conditioned and dependently arisen universe one cannot do harm to another without harming oneself in some manner or other. One does good to oneself when one does good to others. This also implies that when one does good to oneself with right understanding and right attitudes one in fact does good to others. This inter-connectedness and its impact on oneself and others should serve as guiding principles of the practitioners of mindful journalism. It is very important for a journalist to reflect on possible outcome of what one reports. This could mean that one needs to be careful about even

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telling what is true. It is the Buddhist understanding that one should tell the truth at the appropriate time, and that one should know the amount of truth that one should tell. In an enlightening discussion with Prince Abhaya (Abhayarājakumāra-sutta) on what words one should utter, the Buddha gives the following three criteria on which to judge words: true or untrue beneficial or unbeneficial welcome and agreeable or unwelcome and disagreeable The discourse identifies the following possibilities: One should utter at appropriate time a speech with all three positive qualities, and one should not utter at any time a speech with all three negative qualities. A true speech which is unbeneficial and disagreeable and unwelcome, one should not utter. One should utter at appropriate time a speech which is true, beneficial but disagreeable and unwelcome. One should not utter an untrue, unbeneficial but agreeable and welcome speech. True and agreeable and welcome word which is not beneficial, one should not utter. (M 56. Bodhi 1995, 500.) What is noteworthy is that one should consider appropriate time to utter even a speech with all three positive qualities; and that one should not utter even what is true and agreeable and welcome if it is not beneficial. The mindful journalist must heed this emphasis for benefit in what he reports, and be mindful at the same time, that one should not say what is untrue even if it is beneficial and agreeable. KN Jayatilleke sums up his discussion on the relation between truth and usefulness in the following words: (We may conclude from this) that the truths of Buddhism were also considered to be useful (atthasamhitaṃ) for each person until one attains salvation. This is confirmed by what is stated in the passage quoted above (discourse to Prince Abhaya) where it was said that the Buddha speaks only what is true and useful, whether pleasant or unpleasant. We may sum up by saying that the truths of Buddhism were considered to be pragmatic in the Buddhist sense of the term, but it does not mean that Early Buddhism believes in a pragmatic theory of truth. (Jayatilleke 1963, 358) It is clear that any effort at formulating a work ethics for journalists cannot by-pass what the Buddha has said to Prince Abhaya.2 2  See Jayatilleke (1963) p. 351 for a longer discussion.

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Right consumption A. Buddhism does not reject the basic need that all living beings have for consumption. It concedes that all beings depend on food/nutriment (āhāra) as a factor of foremost importance3 (Khp 2). However, the Buddhist definition of “food” is not confined to material food. It also includes the following: (i) the food of contact, which signifies the coming together of internal sensory organ, the external object and the resultant consciousness; (ii) the food of consciousness (viññāṇa), which is conditioned by the six sensory objects, viz. form, sound etc. and (iii) the food of mental volitions (saṇkhāra) without which mind cannot exist. The inclusion of these three types of food, in addition to edible food, shows that Buddhism acknowledges the need for ‘food’ not merely physically, but also psychologically and emotionally. This, in other words, means that Buddhism concedes that man does not live by bread alone! This broad concept of food also indicates that Buddhism operates with an equally broad concept of human being transcending both materialism and idealism. The popularly held position is that human beings comprise two substances or duality of Cartesian type having something called soul (atta) over and above the two independent substances. Buddhism analyses human being as a composite of the five aggregates: material form, feeling, perception, mental constructions and consciousness, and shows that there is nothing over and above these five constituents. The closest candidate in this analysis for a soul is consciousness; but the Buddha has clearly shown that consciousness is dependently arisen4 and changes from moment to moment in that what passes off is not what is arisen. In denying the existence of an unchanging consciousness, Buddhism avoids the extreme of idealism. In accepting a dependently arisen consciousness that connects beings from this life to the next, Buddhism avoids materialism, which does not allow room for rebirth, efficacy of good and bad actions, cycle of birth and death (samsara) and deliverance from this cycle, viz., nibbāna. This line of thinking allows Buddhism to 3 The Khuddaka-pāṭha, one of the texts belonging to the Khuddaka-nikāya, begins with a set of 10 questions and answers given to them. To the first question: ‘what is one’, the answer given is: ‘all beings subsist on food’, affirming in this manner the crucial significance of food for the existence of human beings 4 The view held by a bhikkhu named Sāti that consciousness runs through without changing is an example of this wrong view, and to him the Buddha asserted that consciousness is not equivalent to alleged unchanging ātma (See Mahatanhasankhayasutta, Majjhima-nikāya , Bodhi (1995/2001) pp. 349-361. for details).

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talk about “meaning, well-being and happiness” of this existence and the next. Meaning is spoken of in the teaching of the Buddha as attha the literal meaning of which is the meaning of a word. The term also means wealth, purpose and meaning in its figurative sense. As we will see in our discussion shortly, the Buddha refers to ‘meaning’ pertaining to this life and the next. The concept of human being that emerges from these insights is naturalist and broad. It rejects the belief in a permanent substance or ātma in human beings, at the same time without precipitating to the materialist view, which reduces the human being to mere matter. Consequently, the concept of food finds a broader expression in the teaching of the Buddha. He requires ‘food’ for thought, a sizable chunk of which is supplied by journalists. The mindful journalist informed by the Buddhist concept of food will take extra care to supply not what is merely sellable but what is healthy for his client’s comprehensive wellbeing. The journalist, like any other service provider, operates with a concept of human being at the back of his mind. The Buddhist concept of human being will serve as the basis for the mindful journalist to construct a true and beneficial picture of whom he minds to serve. B. Happiness is covered by the concept of sukha in Buddhism, and it is described in such various ways as, householder’s happiness and renouncer’s happiness (gihī­-sukha, pabbajita-sukha), happiness associated with things and happiness not associated with things (sāmisasukha, nirāmisa-sukha) etc. While the happiness not associated with things is emphasized in connection with monastic life, householder’s life is characterized by the presence of happiness associated with things although there are limits to such happiness. The three concepts, ‘meaning, progress and happiness’ (attha, hita, sukha), occur in the discourses as one combined set and together exemplify the overall positive attitude of Buddhism toward human life. Despite the generally popularized belief (in the west) that Buddhism is pessimistic, it is important and instructive to note that Buddhism takes happiness as the goal of life. The ordinary human life, in fact not merely human beings but all beings in general, is described as characterized by ‘desire for living and aversion to dying, desire for happiness and aversion to suffering’ (jīvitu-kāmā, amaritu-kāmā, sukha-kāmā, dukkha-paṭikkūlā, S IV, 172-188; Bodhi 2000, 1237), and Buddhism accepts this as a basic fact in human life. Pursuit of happiness is accepted as a legitimate human function, and it is not wrong to say that Buddhism views human life as an

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endeavor to achieve this goal.5 Happiness spoken of here is not merely the happiness derived from consumption, which is pleasure, but happiness as a satisfied, content, serene and positive state of mind. The ultimate goal of Buddhist religious life, namely, nirvana, is described as happiness, and it is said that ‘happiness has nirvana as its highest (nibbānaparamaṃ sukhaṃ: Dhp v. 204). Happiness in nirvana or the nirvanic happiness is not described as something to be achieved after this life, although it is the popular view today. Nirvana is the goal for this life for those who are ready to follow in complete dedication the path leading to it. Those men and women who have given up their household life for the sake of attaining this ultimate goal, which is the extinction of suffering, by making an end to one’s craving, are directed to live a life conducive to that goal. A Buddhist monk or nun is one who has practiced voluntary banishment from society, which is the literal meaning of the term ‘pabbajita’ used to refer to the state of being a bhikkhu or bhikkhunī in the Buddhist tradition. Since the ultimate goal of this life is to gradually reduce and finally eradicate craving to all material and non­material phenomena, it is rational that they live a life of simplicity and community ownership. To be content with what one has, to have minimum needs and being able to be maintained easily are considered to be virtues of very high standing in monastic life. The bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs are to live on what they gather from their daily alms round, dress with what was discarded by other and live in very simple residences. They are not allowed to own anything except their very personal stuff such as robes, alms bowl and items of medicine, if any. Whatever individual members received would go to a common store, and each would receive not according to what one contributes to the common store but according to one’s needs. Although this way of life was not strictly meant for an ordinary householder, what the Buddha prescribed for his monastic followers was applicable in principle to his householder followers as well, for ultimately all those who follow the Buddha are those who shared his vision of life which culminated in attaining nirvana by eradicating craving of all forms. Unlike the monastic community, the ordinary society is viewed as 5 Hatthavanagalla-vihāravaṃsa, a Sri Lankan Pali work belonging to Vaṃsa (history) category, puts this idea very beautifully: Vyāpārā sabbabhūtānaṃ- sukhatthāya vidhīyare Sukhañca na vinā dhammā – tasmā dhammaparo bhava. (All human endeavors are executed for the purpose of happiness. happiness, however, is not without Dhamma; hence act in accordance with Dhamma.)

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comprising people who are unable to dedicate their entire life to achieve this goal. They have more pressing immediate needs in their life to be fulfilled. If these people cannot hope for nirvanic happiness as their immediate goal, what kind of happiness can they achieve? How could such a group of people internalize the path taught by the Buddha? It is precisely this question that embodies the request made by the young householder Dīghajānu from the Buddha: Sir, we are laymen enjoying sensual pleasures, living at home in a house full of children. We use sandalwood from Kasi; we wear garlands, scents, and unguents; we receive gold and silver. Let the Blessed One teach us the Dhamma in a way that will lead to our welfare and happiness in this present life and in future lives. (Bodhi 2012, 1194) To this, the Buddha responds by pointing out four things to be achieved for the ‘happiness in this present life’, namely, (1) accomplishment in initiative energy; (2) accomplishment in protection; (3) good friends; and (4) balanced living. The Buddha describes the first as possessing sound judgment in order to carry out and arrange properly whatever means such as farming, trade, raising cattle etc. one pursues for living. The wealth earned by such means has to be, in the Buddha’s words, “acquired by initiative and energy, amassed by strength of one’s arms, earned by the sweat of one’s brow, righteous wealth righteously gained”. The second is to protect what one has earned from natural disasters and enemies. The third accomplishment, good friends, is described as having friends young or old who are mature in such good qualities as faith, virtue, generosity and wisdom, and conversing with them, engaging in discussion with them, and “insofar as they are accomplished in those virtues”, emulating them. The fourth is described in the following manner: Here, one knows one’s income and expenditures and leads a balanced life, neither too extravagant nor too frugal,[aware]: ‘in this way my income will exceed my expenditures rather than the reverse.’ Just as an appraiser or his apprentice, holding up a scale, knows: ‘by so much it has dipped down, by so much it has gone up,’ so one knows one’s income and expenditures and leads a balanced life. (Bodhi 2012, 1195)

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In the ‘Advice to Sigāla’, which I will discuss shortly, the Buddha advises the young householder, Sigāla, to divide his wealth into four, and spend one portion for consumption, two for industries and the fourth to be kept aside for when a need arises. These ideas found in the Buddhist discourses introduce a rational approach to one’s economic life. At the same time, they lay emphasis on increasing one’s wealth by investing some share of it in ‘industries’. Of particular importance here is the idea of protection of wealth referred to above. What is meant in this context is protecting one’s wealth without wasting it. Buddhism always emphasizes the idea that goods have to be made use of to their maximum. This is clearly stated in the context of the monastic life in which one depends on the charity of others. In answering King Udena who was anxious to know as to what the monks do to so many new robes they received, Ananda Thera describes how the monks make the maximum use of the robes given to them by people: new robes are given to those whose robes are old; old robes, no longer fit to be worn, are used as bed-covers, worn out bed-covers are used as pillow cases, worn out pillow cases used as carpets, worn out carpets used as door mats, worn out door mats used as dusters, and when no longer used as dusters, these are mixed with clay and applied as wall plasters (V II, 291). The commentary to the Dhammapada records a story typical of Buddhist thrift: The young physician Jīvaka was summoned by the lady of the richest banker of Rajagaha city. In the course of administering of medicine, some ghee was spilt on the floor. The lady right away asked her servant to absorb it into a cotton ball. Jivaka was surprised by this act which he interpreted as an act of miserliness, and started worrying about his fee. At the conclusion of the treatment, however, the lady compensated the physician even more than he expected, and explained the perplexed physician the difference between thrift and miserliness. Having described these four accomplishments relevant for this life, the Buddha lists another four conditions conducive for the happiness after this life. They are: (i) accomplishment in trust (in the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha); (ii) accomplishment in virtue; (iii) accomplishment in generosity; and (iv) accomplishment in wisdom. These four deserve a detailed analysis. Nevertheless, it is sufficient at this juncture just to underscore the broad basis of Buddhist perspective of one’s worldly life in which consumption plays a crucial role. This very same philosophy of consumption is described in detail in the ‘Advice to Sigāla’ (D 31; Walshe 2012, 461-470) which is known as the

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‘householders’ discipline’ (gihi-vinaya). The Buddha begins his advice with four defiled actions to be avoided by one who aspires to achieve happiness in this life. These actions are killing, stealing, adultery and lying. Next the Buddha outlines four sources of bias behavior, namely, desire, hatred, fear and folly. It is due to these psychological. conditions that people make wrong and harmful decisions and behave unjustly in the matters of family and public life. Next the Buddha identifies six ways of wasting one’s wealth, namely, addiction to alcoholic drinks, haunting the streets at unfitting times, attending fairs, being addicted to gambling, keeping bad company and habitual idleness. Addiction to alcoholic drinks causes waste of money, increased quarrelling, liability to sickness, loss of good name, indecent exposure of one’s person and weakening of the intellect. When haunting streets at unfitting times one is defenseless and without protection, so are one’s wife and children, so is one’s property, one is suspected of crimes, false reports are pinned on one, and one encounters all sorts of unpleasantness. In frequenting fairs one would not want to miss any opportunity for amusement. In gambling, the winner makes enemies, the loser bewails his loss, one wastes one’s wealth, one’s word is not trusted in the assembly, one is despised by one’s friends and companions and one is not in demand for marriage for a gambler cannot afford to maintain a wife. When one keeps bad company, all types of undesirable people in society become one’s friends. In habitual idleness one finds all kinds of excuses to postpone one’s work. Friends are a big influence in one’s life. Once the Buddha corrected Ananda, who said that half of the progress in the path to nirvana is due to good friends, by saying that the entire progress is due to good friends. Displaying a similar line of thinking the Buddha underscores the crucial importance of friends in one’s material progress. In this context, he lists four foes in friendly guise and four good friends. In the first category are (i) the man who is all take, (ii) the great talker, (iii) the flatterer and (iv) the fellow - spendthrift. How to identify these foes in friendly guise has been detailed by the Buddha: The man who is all take has the following characteristics: he takes everything; he wants a lot for very little, what he must do he does out of fear, and he seeks his own ends. The great talker talks of favours in the past, and in the future, he mouths empty phrases of goodwill, and when something needs to be done in the present he pleads inability owing to some disaster. The flatterer assents to bad actions, he dissents from good actions, he praises

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you to your face, and he disparages you behind your back. The fellow-spendthrift is a companion in drinking alcoholic drinks, in haunting streets at unfitting times, in frequenting fairs, and in gambling. (D III, 185) There are true friends, four in number: (i) the friend who is a helper, (ii) who is the same in happy and unhappy times, (iii) who points out what is good for his friend and (iv) who is sympathetic. The helpful friend looks after his friend when he is inattentive, he looks after his possession when his friend is inattentive, he is a refuge to his friend, and when there is a need he gives his friend twice what he asks for. The friend who is the same in happy and unhappy times tells his secrets to his friend, he guards his friend’s secrets, he does not let down his friend in a misfortune, and he would even sacrifice his life for the friend. The friend who points out what is good for his friend keeps his friend away from wrongdoing, supports his friend in doing good, he informs his friend what he did not know, and points out the path to heaven. The sympathetic friend does not rejoice at his friend’s misfortune, rejoices at his fortune, stops others who speak ill of his friend, and commends those who speak well of his friend. Speaking on mutually rewarding social relations, the Buddha refers to six inter-connected groups which are part and parcel of one’s social life, namely, parents and children, teachers and pupils, husband and wife, friends and friends, employees and employers and religious people and lay people, and describes their mutual ‘duties and obligations’ (Walshe 2012, 466-468). The Buddha further says that it is the respect for these ‘duties’ that keeps society going, like ‘chariot’s axle-pin,’ without break. The Buddha concludes his admonition to the young householder by showing him four ways how to treat others well, namely, gifts, pleasant speech, working for the welfare of the others, and to behave impartially and equally as each case demands . What is given in this manner in the ‘Advice to Sigāla’, when coupled with the eight accomplishments, contain a comprehensive guide on how to earn and how to consume what is earned. The fact that it emphasizes having good friends, avoiding bad friends, refraining from defiled actions and similar considerations not directly connected to earning illustrate that what Buddhism is interested in is not mere growth of wealth but an all-encompassing philosophy of development. In this analysis, which encompasses both inner and outer development, there are several important features to be noted. One is

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the fact that not only one’s this worldly welfare is taken into account but also one’s welfare in the ‘next world’ is given equal consideration. What is given as ‘next worldly welfare’ is what is conducive for one’s inner development. This shows that Buddhism does not consider mere economic development of people without their inner qualities being developed. Relevant to this, the Buddha classifies people into three groups, namely, blind, one-eyed and two-eyed (Bodhi 2012, 224-225). The blind is one who does not see either this world or the next; the oneeyed is one who sees only this world, and the third is the one who sees accomplishment both here and hereafter. Another feature emerging from this analysis is that the economic development has been seen not merely in terms of accumulating wealth but in terms of quality of life with properly managed wealth and enriched by the association of friends with higher human qualities . C. Earlier we noted that the Buddha refers to happiness as the goal of human life. The Buddha describes four types of happiness to be achieved by the ordinary householders. They are: (i) happiness of having (atthi-sukha); (ii) happiness of consumption (bhoga-sukha); (iii) happiness of being debt-less (anana-sukha); and (iv) happiness of being morally blameless (anavajja-sukha) (A II, 62; Bodhi 2012, 452). The first in this series is to have wealth as a means of achieving happiness. The Buddha explains how one should acquire wealth. In the list of eight good fortunes the Buddha refers to energy to initiate wealthproducing activities. It is described in the following words: by physical labor, by shedding sweat, gained by righteous means. In this account, two matters are highlighted: one is that wealth has to be acquired by working for it. Although physical work is emphasized here and although physical labor justifies one’s earnings without any doubt, the broader implication is that one must have worked for what one gets. The other and most important matter is that one must have earned one’s wealth without violating Dhamma. This very same matter comes again as the fourth in the list, the happiness of being blameless. The second is happiness deriving from consuming or making use of what one has earned. Although ‘happiness of having’ indicates that having wealth itself is happiness, in the Buddhist tradition, mere having wealth without making use of it is considered meaningless. Those who just hoard wealth without making good use of it are considered unfortunate who are unhappy in this life itself and bound to woeful states after their death. The lllīsa-Jātaka highlights the unfortunate end

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of lllīsa, the rich banker who just amassed a large amount of wealth, and was too miserly even to spend for his own son’s illness. The son who died for want of medicine, the story says, was born in a divine world, and seeing his former father’s unused wealth, descends to human world and gives away the wealth without his father’s knowledge. Strictly speaking, it may be argued that his former son does not have a right to give away his former father’s wealth. But what is interesting is that the Buddhist tradition preserved this story in its sacred literature and approved this unusual gift. The Buddha very clearly says that one must enjoy and make oneself happy with the wealth one has acquired by righteous means. One must also make one’s parents, wife and children, workers and friends happy with that wealth, and make donations with that wealth to religious people, relatives, guests and the like (A II, 67; Bodhi 2012, 450451). Having wealth and enjoying it are, in this manner, closely linked. The third type of happiness is that of being debtless. Although one cannot imagine being active in economic enterprise without taking loans, and undoubtedly it was the case during the time of the Buddha, what seems to underscore is the value of paying back one’s loans. What is meant in this context may be the mental happiness and sense of relief one acquires from paying back one’s loans. The Buddha compares (Sāmaññaphala-sutta, D I, 47-86) the state of mind without the five hindrances6 to the sense of relief one gets upon finding that one has paid off one’s loans. This comparison, perhaps, gives us a hint of what is meant by this type of happiness. The last and unusual but betraying definitely the Buddhist perspective on economic activities is the happiness of being morally blameless. As we saw in the above discussion, the wealth has to be accumulated with righteousness and by righteous means. One who gets wealth by morally blameworthy means cannot enjoy the happiness spoken here. A merchant, for example, who engages in buying and selling of the following five items, weapons, (human or animal) beings, meat, alcohol and poison will not have this happiness. These five items are listed as violating the requirements of right livelihood (sammā-ājīva) applicable for the householders. In earning money one must make sure that one has not violated the Dhamma in the process. In other words, one must not only be eating well but also one must be sleeping well! The concept of Dhamma features prominently in Buddhist social 6  The following five psychological states, desire for pleasures, anger, inactiveness, confusedness and doubt have been described as ‘hindrances’ (nīvaraṇa) for they obstruct the calmness of mind.

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philosophy including its political and economic philosophies. It may even be described as the central Buddhist philosophical insight on society, economy and polity. The concept with its so many meanings, is perhaps the broadest concept in Indian philosophy in general and Buddhist philosophy in particular. In Buddhist economics Dhamma serves as the limit which should not be surpassed. It is not how much one should earn but how well one should earn that matters. One cannot have happiness in solid and meaningful sense without satisfying the need of Dhamma. In other words, one cannot have happiness of ownership and consumption of wealth without the happiness of being debtless and happiness of being blameless. The connection wealth has with happiness is well known. What Buddhism adds to this is the Dhamma or being blameless in one’s behavior. The mindful journalist will not ignore this specific Buddhist contribution to true human well-being which has two clear aspects, inner and outer. What is usually emphasized is the outer at the expense of the inner. It is the moral responsibility of the mindful journalist to strive to swim against the current of his trade. To a world which has search for pleasure as its sole aim, it is the noble duty of the journalist to show what constitutes true happiness which surpasses the narrow boundaries of material pleasures.

Discussion and concluding remarks The way of life characterized by simplicity, prescribed by the Buddha to his monastic followers, is understandable and rational given the nature of the ultimate goal they are striving for. Although the householder followers of the Buddha too aim to reach the same goal, it is understood that their way of life is more round about. While the goal and the mode of life remain the same for both groups what makes them different from each other is the speed in which each group follows the path. In one of the discourses the Buddha compares these two modes of life with the movement of the swan which is simple but fast and that of peacock which is picturesque but slow (Sn v. 221). It is a misunderstanding to think that in the teaching of the Buddha the reality of householder’s life is under-stressed or disregarded. The very fact that the concept of food is given a broader interpretation to include psychological and emotional inputs suggests that the Buddha identified the crucial significance of the objects of all sensory faculties as ‘food’ for life. Ordinary human beings are characterized by the desire for the pleasures of senses. Also it is acknowledged that they cannot

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give up easily these pleasures for the ultimate nirvanic happiness. What is needed is to introduce a gradual path with some kind of restraint in pleasures and simplicity. It is in this context that one needs to understand the value of generosity (dāna) which is the foremost of all social virtues taught in Buddhism. A society characterized by giving (or rather giving up) cannot be selfish or self-centered. In such a society all cooperate with all and none competes with none. What was outlined above is an alternative or mindful way of approaching consumption which is a part of the larger process of making money and spending it mindfully, which may well be called ‘Buddhist economics’, a term introduced by Schumacher in his bestselling book, Small is Beautiful, which showed to the modern world how a great satisfaction could be gained by small and simple means. This discussion must have cleared the misconception that Buddhism is against consumption and happiness in household life. What Buddhism is against is overconsumption and under-consumption, which, according to the teaching of dependent co-origination, cannot happen without any adverse impact on the rest of the world including journalists. The mindful journalist stands above the rest of his own kind with his right understanding of reality as a dependently arisen phenomenon. It is precisely in this context that Magnuson’s thrust to care for environment and to preserve social justice and stability, without which economic development is bound to be meaningless, becomes crucial. The unique feature of the Buddhist approach to consumption, or rather, of the entire social philosophy, is that it centers on the concept of Dhamma within the limits of which one has to acquire wealth and consume it. What the Dhamma means in this context is to safeguard the criteria of right conduct mentioned above. The instinctive urge to accumulate, acquire and consume as much as one can does not require any deep thinking or guidance. Where the mindful journalist could help is to guide people to think beyond what is the received view. Buddhism provides such a philosophy of consumption which is conducive for the welfare of all involved, oneself and others including nature, birds, beasts, rivers, oceans and atmosphere. In order to be able to guide all those who come within its sway, journalism as one of the most influential institutions in contemporary social life, needs to be guided by a philosophy which transcends narrowly self-centered human desires and wants.

16. Political Metaphor in the Life of the Buddha*

Introduction The legend says that the Brahmins who were called by Suddhodana, the father of Siddhartha, the future Buddha, to predict his new born child’s future said that either he will become a wheel-turner monarch if he were to remain in the worldly life or he will be a Fully Enlightened One if he were to renounce the worldly life. Although one of them was certain that the prince will renounce household life and become the Buddha, the point behind the legend is that the concept of wheel-turner monarch or the concept of kingship has been associated with the life of the Buddha in a very vivid manner from its very beginning. The Buddha has been described as the king of Dhamma (dhamma-rāja), and his mission has been described as ‘the turning of the wheel of Dhamma’ (dhamma-cakka-pavattana). It is interesting to see how the Buddha’s life and mission has been compared to that of an all powerful monarch. The purpose of this paper is to examine this very strong political metaphor in the life of the Buddha. In this paper, I propose that this metaphor is not a mere later development but has its roots in the very life of the Buddha who was brought up in a ‘political’ atmosphere, perhaps with his own political ambitions.

A methodological problem In order to study what we consider to be the political metaphor of the Buddha, we have to depend on information available in the canonical * First published in Ňāṇappabha: A Felicitation Volume in Honour of Venerable Dr. Pategama Gnanarama Maha Thera, ed. Ven. Dr. Rangama Chandawimala and Prof. Chandima Wijebandara, Singapore: Ti-sarana Buddhist Association, 2011, pp.145-154.

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texts. It is believed that not all the texts belong to the same period of time. While some texts are considered as belonging to a very early stage of canonical development, some others are taken as belonging to later periods. The question in the present context is whether or not the instances referring to ‘the political metaphor’ belong to the earliest period of canonical development, namely, the time of the Buddha. We do not propose to engage in an extensive textual analysis to sort this issue out here. We assume the current knowledge of the matter, namely that the discourses of the Buddha have early and later periods in them. For instance, whereas the long, middle-length and connected Discourses are generally considered to belong to a very early stage of the Buddhist canon, the gradual discourses and some works belonging to the Khuddaka-nikāya, comprising Short Anthologies, are believed to represent a later stage. The information on which we base our argument occurs in the canonical texts belonging to both these periods. Although it is possible that some of these later occurrence in the texts are later modifications resulting from the over-enthusiasm of the followers, it is quite possible that some of the references to the political metaphor belong to very early stage.

The discourse on governance (Rajja-sutta) In the ‘Discourse on Governance’ (Rajja Sutta) found in the Samyuttanikāya (S I, l6-17), one of the five collections of the early discourses belonging to the Pali canon of the Theravada tradition, it is said that the following thought occurred to the Buddha who was in seclusion: Is it possible to engage in governance righteously, without killing and without causing others to kill, and without conquering and without causing others to conquer? It is further said that Mara, the Evil One, noticed this thought occurring in the Buddha and that he came and tried to encourage the Buddha to undertake ruling, saying that the Buddha had the power to convert into gold even a mountain. The Buddha rejected the Mara’s suggestion by saying that there is no limit to the craving of people, and therefore, a wise person must follow an even path. The language of the discourse does not allow us to think that the Buddha was keen about good ruler-ship as an option for himself. It says that the Buddha had this thought on ruler-ship only as a need in society. It could well be that the Buddha had this thought when he reflected on the troubled political situation of his day. In fact, the commentary to the Saṃyutta-nikāya confirms this, and attributes the Buddha’s thought to

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the compassion he felt about beings who suffered under unrighteous rulers (SA I, l88). Nevertheless, Mara’s intervention suggests that the Buddha was pondering over the possibility of his own ruling. Judging by the overwhelmingly soteriological character of what the Buddha taught it is very unlikely that the Buddha was actively interested in politics. Nevertheless, the occurrence of this particular discourse with its clear political content is very interesting in studying the political metaphor often found in the discourses of the Buddha.

The concept of ‘cakkavattirāja’: ‘wheel-turner monarch’ In the discourses the wheel-turner monarch is referred to quite often. He is referred to with approval, and this approval looks so strong that the Buddhist scholars are of the view, I think rightly, that the concept of wheel-turner monarch represents the Buddha’s concept of ideal ruler. In the well-known Cakkavatti-sīhanāda-sutta, (D 26) the wheel-turner king, Daḷhanemi, has been described in the following manner : Once, monks, there was a wheel-turner monarch named Daḷhanemi, a righteous king who was a ruler of righteousness, conqueror of the four quarters, who had established the security of his kingdom, and was possessed of the seven treasures, He had more than a thousand sons who were heroes, of heroic stature, conquerors of the hostile armies. He dwelled having conquered this sea-girt land without stick or sword, but by good law. (Walshe 2012, 395) In this account the following features of a wheel-turner king have been mentioned: the wheel-turner monarch is righteous; he has conquered the four quarters of the earth; he has a stable kingdom; he has seven treasures; he has a thousand sons who are heroic and conquerors; he does not use violence, but uses only the good law to conquer the earth. These features with minor variations occur as regular features of a wheel -turner monarch. Among the highlights of this account are the vastness of the kingdom of the monarch, and the fact that he has conquered it exclusively by righteous means. When referring to the vastness of the kingdom, the discourses describe it as ‘earth with ocean as its border’ (paṭhavim sāgara­ pariyantaṃ) indicating thereby the domain of the wheel-turner monarch is not any defined stretch of earth but the earth in its entirety. One cannot miss the early Buddhist preference to describe the life of the Buddha in comparison with that of wheel-turner monarch. In the Sela Sutta of the Suttanipāta the following conversation, attributed to

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the Brahmin named Sela and to the Buddha, occurs: You deserve to be a wheel-turner monarch, a conqueror in chariot (of war). Vanquisher of the four quarters, the supreme lord of the Jambu Grove. The khattiyas, your feudatory kings will be in your service, You are the emperor among kings, overlord of men, do reign, O, Gotama. ‘I am a king, O, Sela’ said the Exalted One, ‘the unsurpassed king of righteousness, I turn the wheel with righteous teaching, the wheel that cannot be turned backwards.’ (Sn v. 552-554) In this exchange of views, the Buddha does not deny what is said by the Brahmin; instead he gives it a somewhat different interpretation according which the Buddha turns the wheel in accordance with the Dhamma. Discourses elaborate on similarities between the Buddha and the wheel-turner monarch. One such similarity mentioned quite often is that both the Buddha and the wheel-turner monarch have thirty two auspicious marks; one among which is the mark of a wheel, on the soles of their feet. It is said that one who has these marks will become a wheel-turner monarch if he were to live a household life, or he will become a Buddha if he were to leave the household life (D I, 88, 89; II, 16; III, 142; M II, 134). This belief is given in the discourses as occurring in the ancient Brahmanic tradition (āgatāni.. amhākaṃ mantesu dvattiṃsamahāpurisalakkhaṇāni...D III, 142-179). The similarities do not end here. Both the Buddha and the wheel-turner monarch are born in the world for the welfare and happiness of the world; both are extra-ordinary human beings (acchariya­manussa); the demise of both cause unhappiness for people; both deserve being respected by erecting monuments (thūpāraha) (A I, 76-77). The Dhamma is the hallmark of both the Buddha and the wheel-turner monarch. The former ‘is righteous, king of righteousness, he relies on the Dhamma, pays respect to the Dhamma, has the Dhamma as his banner and pinnacle, has the Dhamma as his master, and provides righteous protection to such different groups as those who are within his household, etc’. In like manner, the Buddha “is righteous, king of righteousness, etc., and provides righteous protection for physical acts, verbal acts, mental acts” (A I, 109-110). It is interesting to note here that the Dhammacentred-ness of both the Buddha and the wheel-turner monarch is

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described in identical terms (A I, 110).1 The difference being whereas the former provides physical protection for everyone in his kingdom the latter provides protection ‘for moral behavior. The essential difference between the two domains is that one is worldly and the other is moral. In these accounts, the wheel-turner monarch is described as one being blessed with seven gems, namely, the wheel gem, the elephant gem, the horse gem, the precious stone gem, woman gem, the householder gem and the advisor gem. These seven are said to arise owing to the arising of a wheel turner monarch. In like manner, seven gems are said to arise with the arising of the Buddha; the gems of the seven factors of enlightenment (S V, 99).2 The Mahāparinibbāna-sutta records that the Buddha instructed Ananda , who wished to know as to how one should treat the dead body of the Buddha, to treat his body as if one would treat the dead body of a wheel -turner monarch. The wheel- turner monarch has his eldest son continuing his father’s rule following his example. The Venerable Sāriputta, who was one of two chief disciples of the Buddha (aggasāvaka), is described as one who continues with the turning of the wheel of the Dhamma set in motion by the Buddha (S I, 191). Following the tradition that the eldest son of the wheel-turner monarch is also his chief of armies, Sāriputta has also been described as the Buddha’s ‘chief of army of the Dhamma’ (dhamma-senāpati). It is further said that two Buddhas or two wheel-turner monarchs do not appear within one world system simultaneously (M III, 65). It is impossible for a woman to be either a Buddha or a wheel-turner monarch. It is clear from the discussion up to this point that the Buddhist tradition identifies in many respects the Buddha with the wheel-turner monarch. It is interesting to note that during the time of the Buddha we do not encounter any wheel-turner monarchs. Therefore it is clear that when in the Buddhist texts the Buddha is compared with the wheel-turner monarch the compilers of these texts were not referring to any particular ruler during or before the time of the Buddha but they were referring to the concept of wheel-turner monarch. The Buddha, of course, was the historical Buddha. But, again, like the wheel-turner 1 …dhammiko dhammarājā, dhammaṃ yeva nissāya, dhammaṃ sakkaronto, dhammaṃ garukaronto, dhammaṃ apacāyamāno, dhammadhajo, dhammaketu, dhammādhipateyyo ... 2  tathāgatassa bhikkhave pātubhāvā arahato sammā sambuddhassa satṭannaṃ bojjhaṃgānaṃ pātubhavo hoti.

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monarch, the Buddha too has been made into a general category beyond the historical Buddha. So, the comparisons are not applicable exclusively to the Buddha Gotama but to all Buddhas of all times. The concept of wheel-turner monarch is quite ancient in the Indian tradition. Scholars have found that it goes to the early Vedic period. The early modern Buddhist scholars who studied this concept have believed that the idea of a wheel-turner monarch has its origin in the early Vedic characterization of such gods as Varuṇa, and Indra. Varuṇa, in particular, with his responsibility of safeguarding the proper functioning of ṛta, has been identified as precursor to the concept of wheel-turner monarch. The wheel (cakra) mentioned in the concept is understood as referring to the sun whose proper movement is Varuṇa’s responsibility. Although this identification of Varuṇa and his ṛta with the wheelturner monarch and his wheel may contain an element of truth it does not necessarily explain why the wheel turning monarch is so called. In particular, it does not justify the belief that wheel in this context refers to the sun. The numerous contexts of the occurrences of the concept of wheel-turner monarch seem to support a different interpretation of what the wheel could mean. The crucial role that has been played by the wheel in the development of human civilization is well known. The wheel associated with potters, viewers, carters and grinders say much about its crucial role in ordinary human life. The wheel in the context of wheelturner monarch could very likely be the wheel of his war-chariot. In the Cakkavatti sīhanāda-sutta where the Buddha articulates his own concept of wheel- turner monarch, interestingly, the wheel-turner monarch with whom the story begins has an appropriate name, Daḷhanemi ‘Solid rim’ which has a direct relevance to the wheel of a chariot. The wheel gem (cakka-ratana) of King Mahāsudassana has been described as ‘having a thousand spokes a hub and a rim and complete in all aspects’ (sahassāraṃ sanemikaṃ sanābhikaṃ sabbākāraparipuṇṇaṃ D II, 172). This description makes it very clear that the wheel is question here is the wheel of a chariot. That wheel refers to vehicle is further supported by the reference where the phrase ‘cakka-samārūḷha’ having alighted vehicles’ is used in order to describe a situation when people escape in vehicles from their villages when robbers attack them (A I, 178). In the ancient Indian state-craft, vehicles (ratha), along with elephants, horses and the infantry, constituted the fourfold force (caturaṃganī senā) of a king. Of the modern scholars who have discussed the significance of the concept of wheel Mrs. Rhys Davids has held that the wheel of the

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wheel-turner monarch is nothing other than his war chariot. Sanath Nanayakkara summarizes her view: The widely accepted view is that the cakravartin concept is based on a sun-god. Mrs. C.A.F. Rhys Davids does not seem to fully endorse this view. Writing on the origin of this concept she says; “we must by no means give all the credit to the sun as suggesting a wheel.’’ Further she adds that the cakra here implies “the progressive discus, rolling on, as well as round, symbols of the procession of cosmic force or the advance of an aggressive conqueror.’’ (Encyclopaedia of Buddhism vol. III see ‘cakravartin’) In discussing the concept of ‘setting in rolling’ (pavattana) of the wheel of doctrine (dhammacakka), Jotiya Dhirasekera says that it indicates ‘the forward or progressive revolving movement of the wheel’ and he further says: It is in this same sense that a Cakkavatti or a Universal monarch calls upon his wheel treasure to start rolling. This conquering wheel of the Universal Monarch which conquers territories for him in all directions is not to be confused with the peaceconferring dharma wheel of the Fully Enlightened One which is set rolling to proclaim to the world the Truth He had discovered. (Encyclopaedia of Buddhism vol. IV: see ‘dhammacakka’) Dhirasekera’s warning should, no doubt, be taken seriously. Nevertheless, it remains a fact that the Buddha’s act of teaching or his ministry has been identified in the discourses with the turning of the wheel. The Vinaya (1.8) records that the Buddha, on being questioned by an Ajivaka ( A sramana group) named Upaka met on his way to meet his five erstwhile companions, told him that he was going to the city of Kasi in order to set the wheel of the Dhamma in motion’ (dhammacakkaṃ pavattetuṃ). In this discussion, the Buddha says to Upaka that he was ‘beating the drum of deathlessness’ (āhañhi amata-dundubhiṃ) The drum in the ancient Indian society was usually associated with the kings who used it to spread their messages and to alert people on the arrival of armies. The first sermon of the Buddha is known as the ‘discourse on setting in motion the wheel of the Dhamma’ (Dhamma-cakkapavattana-sutta). At the conclusion of this discourse, it is said that this wheel of the Dhamma cannot be turned back (appativattiyaṃ) by anyone in the universe with its sramanas, Brahmins, divine beings, Mara, or any brahma (dhamma-cakkaṃ pavattitaṃ appattvattiyaṃ samaṇena vā brāhmā vaṇena devena vā mārena vā brahmunā vā kena

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ci vā lokasmiṃ). That the wheel cannot be turned back is a characteristic equally shared by the wheel of the wheel-turner monarch. It is said that when the wheel of the wheel-turner monarch started rolling it was not to be stopped by any ruler. Obstructing the movement of the wheel was to challenge it, the discourses say that nobody was able to challenge it, and everybody accepted its authority without question. The important question is: why this exactly the same metaphor of war chariot was used in the context of the Buddha’s ‘ministry of peace’? As we saw earlier, some scholars are of the view that all these instances of identifying the Buddha with the wheel-turner monarch are the results of enthusiasm of the later disciples who wished to elevate their master to a lofty position of universal monarch. But the pervasive and recurrent occurrences of reference to wheel-turner monarch in so many discourses and the powerful metaphor of the wheel cannot be explained with reference to religious emotions alone. I propose that this metaphor of wheel-turner monarch and his wheel represent a deeper meaning which is intimately connected with the very life of the Buddha as Prince Siddhartha. The real meaning behind this political metaphor could be the following. Let me narrate a story: The future Buddha, Siddhartha, was born into a royal family in the foothills of the Himalayas (Sn v. 423-424).3 Although the compilers of the Theravada Buddhist literature want us to believe that Siddhartha’s father was a big monarch who ruled a substantial kingdom, we know that it is not the case. Sakyan ‘kingdom’ was one among many small territories ruled by clan leaders one of whom was Suddhodana, Siddhartha’s father. On the other hand, however small the kingdom may have been, Siddhartha grew up to be a young and energetic prince skilled in state-craft and ready to rule. As an intelligent young prince Siddhartha was well aware of the limitations within which he had to function. The Sakyans came under the rule of great Kosala kingdom. If Siddhartha was to be satisfied with what he inherited from his father he would be a ruler of small kingdom far away from the centre. All the great ideas he had in him had to be confined only within a small territory. He may have needed to make a real change. He may have wished to rule, ‘without harming and causing to harm, without killing and without causing to kill’, as was mentioned in the Rajja Sutta, discussed above. Siddhartha 3  Ujum janapado rāja - himavantassa passato

dhanaviriyena sampanno- kosalesu niketino ādiccā nāma gotten-sākiyā nāma jātiyā tamhā kulā pabhajitomhi rāja -na kāme abhipatthayaṃ.

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may have seen people suffering owing to bad rulers. Consequently, he may have had developed a political vision for a better world where people will live happily “with joy in their hearts, will play with their children, and will dwell in open houses” (III, 127-149). But the simple fact was that Siddhartha did not have enough space to implement these lofty ideas. Given the extra-ordinary capacity Siddhartha had it is hard to believe that he would have been satisfied with this state of affairs. The path open for Siddhartha was to wage war against all the other kingdoms and establish himself as a wheel turner monarch who ruled over the entire earth. But was waging an all-out war a realistic option for him? Although owing to his very disposition Siddhartha was prone to think global, the reality was such that he was ‘physically’ too restricted to realize his goals. Besides, a large scale war with great destructive potential could not have been to the liking of Siddhartha who claimed that life belonged not to the hunter but to one who saved it. This has reference to the story of Devadatta who shot a bird and Siddhartha who saved its life. Siddhartha was faced with a dilemma: on the one hand he was not able to implement his lofty ideas in a small territory for such an effort would have been too limited and a waste of energy. On the other hand no one will give him a large enough kingdom on a platter: he had to wage war and win over such a kingdom. But this meant destruction of life and property. Siddhartha could accept neither. My story ends here. But if we think that it represents what could have happened in Siddhartha’s mind, it is not difficult to understand what happened subsequently. Monks, the following occurred to me before I was enlightened and still a bodhisattva: Alas! This world has fallen into trouble in that it is born, becomes decayed and dies; leaves this world and reappears. Whence could there be escape from this suffering of decay and death?. (S II, l04) The traditional story of the four fore-signs says that Siddhartha saw an elderly person, sick person, and a dead body in three consecutive days and learned that he too would be subject to those natures and seeing on the next day one who had renounced the worldly life, he decided to leave household life. The passage quoted above refers to the same story with a significant difference in its emphasis. It says that Siddhartha saw the people in the world whose inevitable destiny was to be subject to these natures, namely, birth, old-age and death. It is to find a solution to this global (loka) problem that Siddhartha renounced his household life.

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The problem he is concerned here is not his problem exclusively. Nor was it a problem faced by a limited group of people. It was a universal problem faced by all including Siddhartha himself. Siddhartha realized that he still had to wage a war. But this war was not against any outside enemy but against the evil forces (māra) in his own mind. In the popular Buddhist literature Siddhartha’ s battle with his own self is described as war with Mara (māra-yuddha), and his victory over his inner defilements is desc1ibed as ‘conquering of Mara’ (maravijaya). Siddhartha perceived his inner struggle essentially in terms of war, a war with the Mara and his army, and it is said that in the process he made a resolution that it was better for him to die in the battle than getting defeated (saṇgāme me mataṃ seyyo - yañce jīve parājito: Sn v. 442). The Padhana-sutta of the Suttanipāta (427-451) where is statement occurs is in fact given as a dialogue between the future Buddha and the Mara. The war metaphor emerges quite clearly in this discussion. Subsequently, having defeated the inner evil forces, and becoming fully enlightened, the Buddha said that it is much nobler to have won oneself than winning over thousands in the battle field (Yo sahassaṃ sahassena- saṇgāme mānuse jine ekañcā jeyya attānaṃ - save saṅgāmajuttamo, Dhp v. 103). He further said that to have attained the state of stream entry (sotapatti, only the first stage of arahant-hood) is much higher than being the sole ruler of the entire world [i.e. Wheel turner monarch], or going heaven, or being the lord of the entire world (Pathavyā ekarajjena -saggassa gamanena vā sabba lokādhipaccena - sotātipatti phalaṃ varaṃ Dhp v. 178). Although the teaching of the Buddha was primarily meant for human beings, the virtues advocated in the practice were meant for all beings (sabbe satta) excluding none. The well known Buddhist dictum ‘sabbe sattā bhavantu sukhitattā ‘(may all beings be happy!) articulates this broad outlook characterized by bound-less mind (mānasaṃ bhāvaye aparimānaṃ.’) (Sn v. 147, 149). This global thrust of Siddhartha’s outlook is revealing when it is contrasted with his earlier political concerns which were aimed at only “the earth with ocean as its border’’ (paṭhaviṃ sāgarapariyantaṃ). (DI, 88). The new role Siddhartha defined for himself was essentially ‘global’ and even beyond the globe known to us. Once he became the Buddha he was known as ‘the teacher of gods and human beings (satthā devamanussānaṃ). When He taught the first sermon it was heard, in addition to the five human listeners, by divine beings inhabiting the entire celestial world system mentioned in the Theravada literature. It is

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said that the sound of his first sermon reached the Akaniṭṭha, the highest Brahma world. When the Buddha concluded his first sermon it is said that the entire system of ten thousand worlds (dasasahassi lokadhātu) started trembling. The concept of buddha-khetta or the ‘buddha-field, which was developed later, seems to have inspired by this same political metaphor associated with the life of the Buddha. To sum up: The two concepts, ‘the fully enlightened, thus-gone and worthy Buddha’ (tathāgato arahaṃ sammāsambuddho) and the wheel -turner monarch (rājā cakkavatti) are given in the Buddhist literature as representing the highest positions in the world-transcending (lokuttara) and worldly (lokiya) spheres respectively. Whereas the wheel of the latter has as its domain ‘the earth with the ocean as its boundary’, the former’s wheel has the entire ten thousand system of world as its domain. Whereas the latter’s is the wheel of command (āṇā-cakka), the former’s is the wheel of the Dhamma (dhamma-cakka).

Conclusion The argument of this essay is that the often recurring political metaphor associated with the life of the Buddha is not a mere later development in the hands of his over-enthusiastic followers. Its origins may be found in the family background and the environs within which the future Buddha Siddhartha was born and brought up. In the later Buddhist history we come across Asoka who went on conquering regions (digvijaya) finally, to give up in favour of ‘conquering of Dharma (dharmavijaya). Siddhartha never went into dig-vijaya, but conquered the entire ten thousand world system by Dharma, which is none other than the ‘wheel of the Dhamma’. The concept of ‘welfare and happiness of the multitude’ (bahujanahita bahujana-sukha) which is essentially a political goal, is found from the very beginning of the ministry of the Buddha. The urgency he felt in propagating the message of ‘deathlessness’ (amata) is clear from the words he uttered to His first sixty fully emancipated disciples. He asked them to travel for the welfare and happiness of many which included not only human being but also divine and other beings. The mission, from the beginning was perceived as a global mission. The target group was much larger and wider than that of a wheel turner monarch. It is quite possible that the political metaphor found in the sayings of the Buddha so vividly has its origin in the political aspirations and ambitions of young Siddhārtha.

17. The Buddha’s Teachings for Good Governance*

Introduction According to a discourse in the Pali canon, once when the Buddha was staying in seclusion in a small forest hut in the Himalayan region the following occurred to him: Is it possible to exercise rulership righteously without killing and without instigating others to kill, without confiscating and without instigating others to confiscate, without sorrowing and without causing sorrow? (Bodhi 2000, 209). By way of explaining the reason behind the Buddha’s thought the commentary adds that the “the Buddha reflected thus with compassion, having seen people afflicted with punishments in realms ruled by unrighteous kings” (Bodhi 2000, 418). Although the discourse does not give a direct answer to the question it raises, it is interesting to note that the Buddha was concerned about the matters of good governance.1 As I have argued elsewhere (see chapter 16), the frequently occurring ‘political metaphor’ in the life of the Buddha is not something extraneous to his thought but intimately connected to the mission of his life. In the texts the Buddha is often compared with ‘wheel turning monarch’ understood as a ruler who rules with righteousness ‘the earth 1 In modern usage good governance is a set of principles to be followed by any organization involved in public administration usually a government but not limited to it. The Council of Europe website lists 12 principles of good governance. Buddhism does not seem to have a concept corresponding to those ideas exactly. However, the Buddhist characterization of good rulers having “ten guiding principles for those in government” (dasarājadhamma) may be interpreted as a standard that corresponds to many of the qualities and practices mentioned in good governance principles. * First published in Justice and Statecraft, ed. Mahinda Deegalle, Sri Lanka: Nagananda International Buddhist University, pp.165-182.

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with ocean as its limit’. It is quite possible that the Buddha as Prince Siddhartha, heir to a kingdom, even though a very small one, must have been concerned about the issues of good governance of his people. Being a person with high ideals and a universalist outlook (S II, 104)2 it is quite natural if he thought about good governance in a much larger scale. Ultimately he gave up his worldly project for a much broader one encompassing not merely his small hilly kingdom but the entire universe. Hence the motive behind his becoming the Buddha may well be seen as an extension of this initial concern for happiness and wellbeing of people through good governance. Therefore, unsurprisingly we find in the teaching of the Buddha many instances when he expressed views on the worldly aspects of human existence including economic prosperity. In what follows I will highlight how economic planning is the basis of economic wellbeing, which is a precondition of good governance according to the Buddha.

Good governance Except for the general concept of dhamma, which is usually rendered into English as righteousness and frequently attributed to good kings including “wheel turning monarch” (rajā cakkavatti) Buddhism does not seem to have a separate concept denoting good governance. Nevertheless there are good number of discourses in the ‘basket of discourses’ (Sutta Piṭaka) and discussions related to the Buddhist monastic discipline in the ‘basket of discipline (Vinaya Piṭaka) dealing with what we understand today as good governance, rule of law and justice. According to such instances good governance can be discussed in two contexts. One is the more limited context related to the organization of the male and female monastic community (bhikkhu and bhikkhunī sangha), one of the oldest organized monastic traditions in the world. The other is good governance of society at large in which rulers and their subjects are involved. Although good governance can be discussed in the context of Buddhist monasticism there is hardly any economic aspect associated with that form of life, which is totally dependent on the charity of the 2 The following words of the Buddha, referring to the thought behind his act of renouncing his royal life in search of the end of suffering, testify to the universalist outlook of him: “Monks, the following occurred to me before I was enlightened and still a bodhisatva: ‘Alas! This world has fallen into trouble, in that it is born, becomes decayed and dies; leaves this world and reappears. Whence could there be escape from this suffering of decay and death?’ (S II, 104).

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society at large.3 The beginning of the Buddhist monastic community goes to the time of the Buddha. The Pali Vinaya Piṭaka records how a monastic community evolved around the Buddha. Initially started with five members, the monastic community grew up rapidly enlisting members from all walks of life. As we find in the Vinaya Piṭaka there evolved an advanced system of governance within the Buddhist sangha. One important aspect of the Buddhist monastic life is how its members earned their living. Both the Vinaya and the Discourses have many references to this aspect of monastic life, in particular, on how they should not earn their living by resorting to all types of wrong ways of living (micchājīva).4 Although there is no doubt that what the Buddha taught to his monastic followers might well be applicable to the society in general there is hardly any economic planning in this form of life. Therefore the focus of this essay will be good governance of the latter type.

Conditioned nature of reality According to the Buddhist understanding of reality, not merely origin and cessation of one’s personal suffering but all phenomena are causally conditioned and inter-connected. This philosophy of inter-dependency and conditionality is equally applicable to phenomena of good governance, and the related issues of wellbeing of people and economic planning. In the present context this means that good governance cannot be discussed without reference to economic wellbeing, which, in turn, depends heavily on good economic planning. In the well­known discourse- The Lion’s Roar on the Turning of the Wheel (Walshe 2012, 399-400) - the Buddha discusses the gradual decay of human society and makes clear this inter-dependency in the following words: 3 Ancient Indian monastic communities in general and the Buddhist monastic community in particular were not ‘productive’ in economic sense (although this situation changed drastically later; see Gunawardena (1979) for a study of these later monastic economic developments). One of the ten things a member of the Buddhist monastic community should keep constantly in mind is that his existence ‘depended totally on others’ (‘parapaṭibaddha,’ A V, 87). Even in this simple form of ‘economics’ there were matters related to how one should earn one’ s basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter and medicine, how should the community distribute fairly what they received, and in what frame of mind the members of the community were to use their requisites, concerns valid in any economic system. 4 For instance, refer to the accounts of sīla in the discourses (such as Brahmajālasutta, Samaññaphala-sutta etc. in Dīgha-nikāya) in which such practices are detailed under ‘mahāsīla’ (great virtue) and the Vinaya rules in particular dealing with ‘nissaggiyapacittiya’ (expiation with forfeiture).

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Thus, from the not giving of property to the needy, poverty became rife, from the growth of poverty, the taking of what was not given increased, from the increase of theft, the use of weapons increased, from the increased use of weapons, the taking of life increased and from the increase in the taking of life, people’s life-span decreased. (D III, 3) The discourse highlights the close connection between poor economic conditions and origin of crimes. This causally conditioned process is nothing but a social manifestation of suffering, a concept, which is the central insight of the Buddha’s teaching of the four noble truths. In many instances the Buddha stressed that he always taught only suffering and its cessation (M. I, 140; S. IV, 384). One could interpret the teachings of the Buddha with suffering (dukkha) as its key teaching as embodying a denial of worldly life with the further implication that Buddhism does not have anything to do with more positive aspects of human life. It is not necessary to discuss in detail this misinterpretation of Buddhism. Since the Buddha refers to suffering only to repudiate it one does not need to fear any possibility of pessimism. Nevertheless, suffering at both individual and social levels being a part of one’s day-to­day reality one needs to endeavour to find solutions to human suffering, a major form of which is caused by poor economic conditions of society as well as of individual. Discourses refer to four essential needs without which human beings cannot exist, namely, food, clothing, housing and medicine. Although these are described as ‘the four requisites’ of monastic life, they are common needs of all human beings. Among these requisites food is without which no living being can survive. That all living beings subsist on food (sabbe sattā āharaṭṭhitikā) is given in the Buddhist literature as a very factor in existence of all forms (Khuddakapāṭha). According to the Dhammapada (203) hunger is the greatest disease (jigacchā paramā rogā). The commentary to the Dhammapada records that the Buddha made this assertion when he saw a man among his listeners who could not comprehend what he taught due to his excessive hunger. Buddhism recognizes poverty as a miserable state: dāliddiyaṃ bhikkhave dukkhaṃ lokasmiṃ kāmabhogino: Monks, poverty is miserable for one who enjoys pleasures in the world (A III, 351ff). Some discourses of the Buddha attribute to the past bad karmas the present state of being born to an economically deprived family (A III, 385). Nevertheless, the Buddhist answer to one’s continued poverty is not to explain it away with reference to one’s past bad karmas or to extol

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nirvana as the termination of all forms of suffering including poverty. Although I have not found any discourse of the Buddha asserting the following directly, what we can gather from the Buddha’s attitude to poverty is that one cannot renounce one’s worldly pleasures unless one has enjoyed them beforehand. It would be extremely hard for one to renounce something that one has never owned. Siddhartha, the future Buddha, left his life of royal comforts due to the reason that he knew what it was like. When discussing pleasures the Buddha refers to their satisfaction (assāda), disadvantages (ādīnava) and finally getting rid of them (nissaraṇa) (MI, 85-86). It is noteworthy that satisfaction deriving from pleasures has been acknowledged. Lack of sensual pleasures due to poverty is not recognized in Buddhism as a virtue or a desirable state. Therefore, poverty has to be dealt with by proper means. It is in this context that this discussion will explore the Buddha’s teachings on economic planning.

Environment or mind? Before proceeding further it seems appropriate to discuss a question emerging from the alleged priority attributed in Buddhism to the role of mind in human behavior. The question is: how can an analysis referring to social factors be appropriate for such a system as Buddhism, which gives priority to mind and inner training? It appears that there is a discrepancy here in the Buddhist position: on the one hand, it appears that the discourses such as the Kūṭadanta and Cakkavattisīhanāda (to be discussed later) give the impression that without fixing at the social level the problem of poverty cannot be solved; on the other hand, the prominence given to mind seems to indicate that, whatever the social conditions, a trained and cultivated mind will be able to withstand any pressure from external factors such as poverty. I have not found any place in the discourses where this apparent contradiction between the two positions addressed directly. Richard Gombrich highlights this problem in the following words: This text (Cakkavatti Sīhanāda-sutta) states that stealing and violence originate in poverty and that poverty is the king’s responsibility; punishment becomes necessary only because of the king’s earlier failure to prevent poverty. This humane theory, which ascribes the origin of crime to economic conditions rather than to vice, is not typical of Indian thinking on such matters, which tends to conspiracy theories. Buddhism tends to find its causes for human events in human psychology. This text, however, shows

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awareness of social developments as unintended consequences of human - omissions or commissions. (Gombrich 1988, 84) The key to solve this problem lies in understanding properly the causally conditioned nature of reality (paṭiccasamuppanna dhammā). While admitting as a fact of human existence that human being is an independent agent, the Buddha by means of his teaching of dependent co-origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) has shown that human being is a part of a larger social context. A good part of his suffering arises from his interactions with the rest of the society and the world outside of him. We have to admit that it is possible for certain forms of suffering to exist even if a human being were to occupy a world of his own without other beings to interact with. For instance, of the threefold desire of human beings which is identified as the cause of suffering, while the first, the desire for pleasures (kāma-tanha), anticipates an external world with objects of sense perception, the other two, the desire for existence (bhava-taṇhā), and the desire for non-existence (vibhava-taṇhā) do not require any such external world. Nevertheless, the bulk of suffering arises and persists owing to an external world full of sensory objects. A human being’s existence cannot be separated from the world he occupies. It is in conjunction with this world that he generates suffering. How one’s suffering arises owing to one’s interaction with the world perceived through senses is vividly described in the Madhupiṅḍdikasutta (Discourse on Honey-ball) of the Majjhima-nikāya: Dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition there is feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates. With what one has mentally proliferated as the source, perceptions and notions [born of] mental proliferation beset a man with respect to past, future and present forms cognizable through the eye (Bodhi 1995-2001, 03). [The same is repeated for the rest of the sense organs, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind.] As has been elaborated on by Katukurunde Ňāṇānanda (1979), the passage quoted identifies three interconnected stages of the process. Up to the arising of feeling, a near automatic process takes place. With feeling starts the process of perception, reasoning and proliferation for which one is directly responsible. The final stage is characterized by one’s being a helpless victim to the process for which one was initially responsible.

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What this discourse highlights is the fact that suffering is a causally conditioned phenomenon for which both one’s mind and the external world serve as causes. It is true that ultimately the enlightened person transcends this world of sensory perception. But that marks the highest state of mental purification in which one stands above the external reality one finds oneself in. However, like a lotus situated in the water but rises above it, the enlightened person too is located in the world to which he does not belong. This shows that even the enlightened person is not totally away from the vicissitudes of the physical realities of the world. To connect this analysis to the issue at hand: neither mind nor environment will be solely responsible for any situation because the two interact on each other. While Buddhism lays emphasis on the crucial role played by the human mind in generating or terminating human suffering, human being cannot be totally isolated from the environment in which he finds himself. A person seeking enlightenment may have to practice inner development in person. But he has to live in public, within a group. Even a monk meditating all by himself in a forest belongs to a particular community of saizgha to which he has certain obligations. For instance, if his teacher has fallen ill, he cannot excuse himself saying that he has to meditate in isolation. Instead he has to look after his monastic teacher either till he is cured or till he passes away. An enlightened mind may well be able to withstand the pressures of poverty. That does not, however, mean that the problem of poverty has been solved. It is one thing to be hungry, which is a natural physical phenomenon; but it is totally another to be not affected by hunger. The latter is the state of the enlightened person. The solution applicable to him will not be effective for the ordinary person whose psychological state is not as highly advanced and who needs structural changes of the society in order for him to solve his problems. It is to this nature of solution that discourses such as Kūṭadanta and Cakkavattisīhanāda seem to guide us. Although not stated in such modern political science terms as good governance, justice or rule of law the Buddha seems to address issues related to such phenomena in these discourses.

Economic planning In the teaching of the Buddha it is possible to discuss economic planning at state level and at the level of individual as well. Thinking of the state and its role in economy from a Buddhist perspective one cannot forget how economic activity is closely connected to the origin of state in the form

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of a ruler who looked after the welfare of a particular group of people. Although not meant to be an account of historical origin of kingship, the Aggañña-sutta (the Discourse on the Knowledge of Origin) of the Dīghanikāya contains a story with social, political and ethical significance. According to this story, at one of its gradually evolving cycles, those who come from the realm of the Ābhassara Brahmas (radiant divine beings) populate the world. At this stage of the world where there were no Sun and Moon and hence it was dark people had the light of their own bodies, and they did not feel hunger for they were happy (or they fed on happiness). This blissful state of affairs, however, did not last forever. When a being of covetous disposition tasted the earth which was smooth, fragrant and delicious, and when others followed him they all lost their radiance. With heavy bodies due to solid food they lost their ability to travel through air. Gradually the Sun and the Moon appeared, days and nights and seasons arose, the earth lost its taste but produced a variety of mushroom first and subsequently a variety of rice on which they survived. At first rice was not owned by anyone, all took only what they could consume at a time. But gradually storing began leading finally to individual ownership of pieces of land where the rice grew. With individual ownership of land and its product, vices such as telling lies, stealing, violence etc. started gradually in this once beautiful society. It is at this point that they got together and invited one among them, who was good looking and had imposing personality, to be their ruler with powers to punish and reward in appropriate manner. This ruler was known as ‘Great Elect’ (mahā-sammata) because the rest elected him. He was also known as ‘khattiya’ (Skt. kṣatriya) in the sense that he was the lord of rice fields. The specific function of the ruler even at this early stage was not very different from what we expect from a ruler (i.e., state) today: it is to maintain law and order in the society. This was necessitated mainly because of the economic activity of the people. Apart from this function of maintaining law and order the ruler was not directly involved in the economy of the people though he received a portion of the product for his sustenance. In the Aggañña-sutta the story is given as a narrative without any prescriptive implications. Subsequently, however, the role of the ruler undergoes change: in addition to maintaining law and order in society, the ruler becomes directly involved in the economic activities of the people. He actively supports his people to organize their economic activities, and this economic activity was given as a duty of the ruler.

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The Kūṭadanta-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya, another discourse often mentioned in the discussions of the Buddha’s views on economy of a society, describes this new development. The discourse clearly says that a king needs to provide the infrastructure necessary for the economic activity of his people. It says: To those in the kingdom who are engaged in cultivating crops and raising cattle, let Your Majesty distribute grain and fodder; to those in trade, give capital; to those in government service assign proper living wages. (D I, 135) Looking at this advice given to the king by his chaplain from a point of view of economic planning it is clear that the chaplain’s suggestion is for the king to get involved directly in economic planning of his country. In the discourse this advice occurs in the context of the king’s wish to perform an expensive religious ritual with the taxes collected from his subjects. At this point, the adviser to the king points to him the miserable economic state of the people due to which some of them have resorted to theft and violence, and shows him that it is not proper to extract taxes from such people afflicted with poverty. The king has to first make sure that his country is self-sufficient in material needs and then only should he obtain tax from people. This, in other words, is to say that the king must get involved in the planning of the economy of his people. As in the case of the Discourse on the Lion’s Roar on the Turning of the Wheel, mentioned above, this discourse too establishes a clear connection between economic depravity and origin and continuity of socially harmful behavior such as theft and violence. The proper answer according to both discourses is not any simple act of charity, which could send a wrong message to the people (namely, that the king gives money to those who steal!) causing not decrease but increase of stealing. The discourses also highlight the failure of the usual reaction of a ruler resorting to harsh punishment to counter increasing acts of stealing and violence. The message is that the king must plan and organize the economy of his people. Whether or not the involvement of the king in economic planning should be interpreted as Buddhism’s support for state sponsored economy remains an open question. But one thing is beyond doubt: the king cannot practice good governance in a society in which people suffer from economic depravity. The discourses refer approvingly to agriculture, trade, animal husbandry, various kinds of industries and state service as ways of earning one’s living or activities generating one’s income. We cannot, however, take

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this as a comprehensive list in a restrictive sense that Buddhism approves only these activities. Rather than giving a list of economic activities that people should engage in themselves, what the Buddha seems to have done is to give a set of ethical and moral guidelines to ensure proper behavior in such activities. For example, the Buddha prohibited five types of trade for his household followers, namely, trading in weapons, living beings, meat, intoxication and poisons. (Pañcime bhikkhave vanijjā upāsakena akaranīyā. Katame pañca? Satthavanijjā, sattavanijjā, mamsavanijjā, majjavanijjā, visavanijjā, A II, 208; Bodhi 2012, 790). Standard accounts of sīla (morality) refer to various kinds of wrong practices associated with trade such as using false measures and weights that should be abandoned. Right livelihood (sammā ājīva) of the noble eightfold path is understood as applicable not only for the monastic society but also for the society at large as a broad concept covering ethics and morality related to economic pursuits. Along these lines may be mentioned the criteria given in the advice to Rahula at Ambalaṭṭhikā Rahulovāda Sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya: After you have done an action with the body [by speech and by mind], you should reflect upon that same bodily action thus: Did this action that I did with the body lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both? Was it an unwholesome bodily action with painful consequences with painful results? When you reflect if you know: ‘This action that I am doing with the body leads to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both; it is an unwholesome bodily action with painful consequences, with painful results’, then you should suspend such a bodily action. But when you reflect, if you know: ‘This action that I am doing with the body does not lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both; it is a wholesome bodily action with pleasant consequences, with pleasant results’ then you may continue in such a bodily action. (Bodhi 1995-2001, 525) The general criterion given here is to judge an action on the basis of its result or how it affects both oneself and the other, and the wholesome or unwholesome character of the action. The concept of affliction mentioned here is open for interpretation. But the principle that it tries to articulate is not hard to understand. Wholesomeness or otherwise of an action is judged by the state of the mind behind the action: if the mind is with craving, hatred and delusion, three roots of unwholesomeness

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according to the Buddha, then such an action is unwholesome, and the mind without such traits is wholesome. According to Buddhism, like any other activities, economic activities too must be guided by these broad moral principles.

Work ethics and holistic approach to economic life How Buddhism views the relation between working and earning (labour and wealth) and how it locates the economic activity in a broader context of the totality of human life are two issues relevant to economic planning from a Buddhist perspective. Relevant to the first, the Buddha makes a clear connection between working hard and earning one’s wealth. The following is the standard account of this connection as found in the discourses: ...wealth acquired by energetic striving, amassed by the strength of his arms, earned by the sweat of his brow, righteous wealth righteously gained... (Bodhi 2012: 450; A II, 67). In this account one’s earnings are specified as earned by physical labour and gained by righteous means, indicating that physical labour alone will not make any earning morally acceptable. In a conversation with a ploughman called Bhāradvāja in the Kasībhāradvāja-sutta of the Suttanipāta, the Buddha appears to appreciate the latter when he claimed that he worked hard for his living by ploughing and sowing. The Buddha reciprocated Bhāradvāja by saying that he too worked hard by ploughing and sowing for his meals. When the latter said that he has never seen any plough or oxen owned by the former, the Buddha gave a figurative interpretation to what he intended to mean his acts of ploughing and sowing. This story may be read as a challenge by someone who believed in hard labour to someone who did not appear to work for his meals. Here the Buddha appears to accept the validity of Bhāradvāja’s claim when he attributed to himself hard work in a figurative sense even though in actual fact he did not do physical labour as the latter did. Protection of what is so earned has invariably been emphasized in the discourses. The Advice to Sigala lists six avenues of wasting one’s wealth: addiction to strong drinks, haunting the streets at unfitting times, attending fairs, being addicted to gambling, keeping bad company and habitual idleness. These practices are viewed in this context purely from an economic point of view notwithstanding the fact that some of these are morally undesirable in themselves. In discussing factors conducive for the economic advancement, the Buddha lists as a necessary condition

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the protection (ārakkhasampadā) of what one has earned from natural and man-made disasters such as water, fire, kings and thieves (A IV, 281282; Bodhi 2012, 1194-1197) (see also below). The holistic approach is the hallmark of the Buddha’s teachings on economic activity. It is hard to find an instance in which the Buddha would discuss economic activity alone without reference to associated social and moral aspects of life. A representative example is what the Buddha taught the young householder named Dīghajānu whose request to the Buddha was as follows: Venerable Sir; we are householders enjoying sensual pleasures and living at home with children. We use sandalwood from Kasi; we wear garlands, scents, and unguents; we receive gold and silver. Let the Blessed One teach us the Dhamma in a way that will lead to our welfare and happiness in this present life and in future lives. (A IV, 281-282; Bodhi 2012, 1194-1197) Upon this request the Buddha taught him four things that would lead to the happiness and welfare of his present life, namely, initiative, protection, good friendship, and balanced living, the last of which we referred to earlier. He next taught him faith, virtuous behavior, generosity and wisdom as things that will lead to welfare and happiness of his future lives. In a similar manner, in his well known advice to the young householder Sigāla in the Sigālovāda-sutta of the Dīgha-nikāya (Walshe 1987-2012), the Buddha taught him, in addition to the six social groups to be treated well, such morally relevant behaviours as refraining from the four defilements of action, namely, killing, stealing, sexual misconduct and lying, abandoning the four causes of evil behaviours, namely, desire, hatred, fear and folly, and distancing oneself from the six ways of wasting one’s wealth (mentioned above). The advice to Sigāla includes a longer classification of both good and bad friends to be associated with and dissociated from respectively. Inclusion of friends in this discussion suggests that the Buddha viewed one’s economic life not in isolation but as a part of one’s life as a whole.

Planning of consumption Planning of consumption of one’s wealth is an important aspect of one’s economy according to the Buddha. Having earned wealth in the manner discussed above, it is advised that one should protect one’s wealth from the possible avenues of destruction, and at the same time one should

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enjoy one’s wealth without keeping it unused. In the Advice to Sigāla the Buddha says that one should divide one’s wealth into four parts, one for one’s consumption, two for further economic activities and the last to be deposited to be used in case of a calamity. In this scheme one can find how the Buddha advocated the practice of investment and saving to his household followers. Balanced living (samajīvikatā) is the key word in the Buddha’s advice on how to spend one’s wealth. It is described in the following words: And what is balanced living? Here, a clansman knows his income and expenditure and leads a balanced life, neither too extravagant nor too frugal, [aware]: ‘In this way my income will exceed my expenditure rather than the reverse.’ Just as an appraiser or his apprentice, holding up a scale, knows: ‘By so much it has dipped down, by so much it has gone up, so a clansman knows his income and expenditures and leads a balanced life, neither too extravagant nor too frugal, [aware]: ‘In this way my income will exceed my expenditures rather than the reverse. (Bodhi 2012, 1195; A.IV, 282) The balanced living described by the Buddha requires careful planning and managing one’s wealth. The Buddha’s advice on how to use one’s wealth always has not only oneself but also others as beneficiaries. This is in accordance with the criterion of taking both oneself and the other as the equal field of ethical consideration articulated in the Discourse on Advice to Rahula (mentioned above). In discussing how one should use one’s wealth the Buddha has the following advice: The noble disciple makes himself happy and pleased and properly maintains himself in happiness; he makes his parents... wife and children... slaves, workers and servants friends and companions happy and pleased and properly maintains them in happiness. (Bodhi 2012, 451; A II, 67) In addition to this aspect of enjoying one’s wealth for the happiness of oneself and others associated with him, the Buddha points out another three areas in which one should spend one’s wealth: I. The noble disciple makes provisions against the losses that might arise from fire, floods, kings, thieves, or displeasing heirs; he makes himself secure against them. II. The noble disciple makes five oblations: to relatives, guests, ancestors, the king, and the deities.

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III. The noble disciple establishes an uplifting offering of alms-an offering that is heavenly, resulting in happiness, conducive to heaven-to those ascetics and Brahmins who refrain from intoxication and heedlessness, who are settled in patience and mildness, who tame themselves, calm themselves, and train themselves for nibbana. (Bodhi 2012, 451; A II, 68) The six directions mentioned in the advice to Sigāla (parents, teachers, wife and children, friends, servants and workers and ascetics and Brahmins) too have to be understood in the same manner as areas needing to be taken care of by one with one’s wealth notwithstanding that the particular teaching has an additional aspect of reciprocity into it. What emerges from this discussion is that, according to the Buddha, not only earning money but also spending it requires careful planning and organization.

Conclusion To summarize the Buddhist position: Good governance is not possible without good economic condition, which, in turn, is not possible without proper planning and organization at both levels of earning and spending. A Pali stanza used by the Buddhists in Sri Lanka to conclude their daily religious observances articulates their perennial aspirations combining economic prosperity with good governance: Devo vassatu kālena – sassasampatti hotu ca Phīto bhavatu loko ca-rājā bhavatu dammiko May rain fall in due season! May there be abundance of harvest! May the world become prosperous! May the ruler become just!

18. Religious Ethics and the New World Order: A Buddhist Critique and Reconstruction*

Introduction This is basically an essay in Buddhist ethics. It will highlight the universality of the system of ethics taught by the Buddha. The context of the discussion is the challenges posed by what is known as ‘new world order’ (NWO), which has recently gained currency as a political concept. I will begin with a short introduction to the idea of NWO. Next, by way of a critique and reconstruction of the concept of NWO, the Buddhist concept of the ‘wheel-turner monarch ‘ and the concept of the Buddha as representing two respective domains, the domain of the worldly wellbeing and that of inner purification will be elaborated. The paper will be concluded by showing how the Buddhist philosophy supports a universalist approach to ethics without subscribing to universal tyranny. In this paper I take the Pali discourses of the Theravada canon as the main source mate1ial. This specification is not to exclude any other Buddhist canon or a tradition, but to serve two purposes, namely, to preserve internal consistency and to transcend all ‘yāna’ divisions in order to be based on the most ancient version of the word of the Buddha available to us.

New World Order (NWO) and its ethical implications The origin of the concept of NWO is traced to the concept of world government which has a long history. Hugo Grotius’ On the Law of War and Peace (written in Latin and published in Paris in 1625) is considered to be an early work promoting this idea which has attracted a world­-wide * First published in Proceedings of the International Conference to Commemorate the 100th Birth Anniversary of the Great Patriarch Sangwol Wongak, Korea, 2011, pp.118-135.

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body of adherents by now. The concept was given a definitive political nuance when George Bush, the President of USA used it in his ‘victory’ speech on March 6, 1999 at the conclusion of the war with Iraq.1 It is this newly acquired meaning of the concept that Noam Chomsky, the American philosopher and activist, defined as: “an international regime of unrelenting pressure and intimidation by the most powerful states against the weakest” (WSWS.org accessed on 02/07/2011). As seen clearly in the definition of Chomsky the notion of NWO is not very welcome in all quarters of people who are keen on justice and equality in society. For the limited purpose of this essay there is no need to go into details of the concept of NWO. It suffices to point out that the idea of NWO as articulated by its contemporary adherents is something intimately linked to power and domination. It is natural that such a concept is not welcome by any nations or societies other than those few in whose hands power lies. Politically it could mean power centred around the powerful, and owing to the same reason, economically and culturally it could mean domination and subjugation. In this latter sense NWO is very similar to globalization under which the culture of the most powerful is imposed on the less powerful. Religion is a clear case of cultural subjugation of the weak by the powerful. The spread of Christianity during the last five centuries in Latin America, Africa and Asia is a case in point which is well known and hence not discussed in this paper. It should also be parenthetically mentioned here that this proselytization process by the economically more powerful religions to eliminate the religions of the economically less powerful has not stopped, but carried out with renewed vigour in less developed regions of the world. Interestingly, these very same globalizing tendencies have forced us to rethink this religious ideology and attitude characterized by efforts at elimination of all other religions except one’s own and come up with a universal ethical system shared across religions. Both ideas, NWO and globalization, have come under criticism mainly for the potential they carry to create authoritarian regimes or forces that keep people under physical and/or psychological domination. Interestingly, however, while Buddhism shares this critique and would undermine any efforts at keeping people under subjugation of any sort, holds at the same time that there can be a universal moral ‘authority’ based on the concept of ‘dhamma’ or righteousness. This becomes clear 1  New World Order (Politics) in Wikipedia accessed on 8th on July 2010.

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in the Buddhist articulation of the concept of ‘rājā cakkavatti’ or ‘wheelturner monarch’ found often in the early Buddhist literature. Scholars have discussed in detail as to what is meant by the wheel in this concept of ‘wheel-turner monarch’. In what follows I will argue that wheel in this context is representative of the wheel of the armed vehicle of king and hence represents his power. The idea of wheel-turner monarch in the Buddhist tradition is one that combines both power and goodness. I will also adduce evidence to show that in the Pali discourses the Buddha is often portrayed as the counterpart of the universal monarch, not in any political sense but in the sense of ‘the teacher of gods and human beings’ (satthādevamanussānaṃ). It will be further shown that the concept of the Buddha also could serve as the basis for a system of morality that transcends the limitations of time and space. The conclusion of this discussion is that an idea of universal moral leadership is quite close to the Buddhist way of thinking

The Buddhist concept of universal rule and the concept of ‘cakkavattirāja’: ‘wheel-turner monarch’ The concept of wheel-turner monarch is often found in the discourses. It is always referred to with approval, and this approval looks so strong that the Buddhist scholars are of the view, I think rightly, that the concept of wheel-turner monarch represents the Buddha’s concept of ideal ruler. In the well-known Cakkavattisīhanāda-sutta [‘the Discourse on the Lion’s Roar on the Turning of the Wheel’] (D III, 58-79) the wheel-turner monarch, Dalhanemi has been described in the following manner: Once, monks, there was a wheel-turner monarch named Dalhanemi, a righteous king who was a ruler of righteousness, conqueror of the four quarters, who had established the stability of the provinces, and was possessed of the seven treasures, namely, the wheel treasure, the elephant treasure, the horse treasure, the precious stone treasure, the woman treasure, the householder treasure, and a seventh, an advisor treasure. He had more than a thousand sons who were heroes, of heroic stature, conquerors of the hostile armies. He dwelled having conquered this sea-gird land without stick or sword, by righteousness (Dhamma). (D I, 59) In this account the following features of a wheel-turner monarch have been mentioned: the wheel-turner monarch is righteous; he has conquered the four quarters of the earth; he has a stable kingdom; he has

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seven treasures; he has a thousand sons who are heroic and conquerors; he does not use violence, but uses only the good law (Dhamma) to conquer the earth. These features with minor variations occur as regular features of a wheel-turner monarch. Among the highlights of this account are the vastness of the kingdom of the monarch, and the fact that he has conquered it exclusively by righteous means. When referring to the vastness of the kingdom, the discourses describe it as ‘earth with ocean as its border’ (paṭhaviṃ sāgara-pariyantaṃ) indicating thereby the domain of the wheel-turner monarch is not any defined stretch of earth but the earth in its entirety. It is important to note that in this account the idea of power and conquering the regions by means of that power are not missing, in fact they have been highlighted as we will see below. But the significant difference is that the wheel turner monarch achieves his authority not by physical power but by the power of righteousness. In the Buddhist tradition the metaphor of the wheel as representing power has been connected with the Buddha and the universal monarch equally.2 For the former it is the ‘wheel of righteousnees (dhammacakka) whereas for the latter it is the ‘wheel of command’ (āṇā-cakka). Also it is important here to know that neither of these concepts refers to any particular historical persons but to broad universal categories. During the time of the Buddha there did not exist any wheel-turner monarchs. Therefore it is clear that when, in the Buddhist texts, the Buddha is compared with the wheel-tumer monarch the compilers of these texts were not referring to any particular ruler during or before the time of the Buddha but they were referring to a concept of wheelturner monarch. In the like manner, the Buddha too has been made into a general category beyond the historical Buddha. So, the comparisons are not applicable exclusively to the historical Buddha Gotama but to all Buddhas of all times as a universal category. The significance of these two universalist concepts in the Buddhist tradition is that they represent the total fulfillment of human beings’ both external or material and inner or spiritual needs. While the wheelturner universal monarch represents the fulfillment of material needs the Buddha represents the other. The range of applicability of the both concepts is global. The hallmark of the wheel- turner monarch is that he has Dhamma or righteousness as his sole means of witming the 2  It is important in this context to establish that wheel represents power although powere with regard to two persons are different in nature. For this we refer the reader to the chapter ‘Poltical metaphor in the life of the Buddha’ where this matter is discussed in detail (Chapter 16).

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world. According to ‘the Discourse on the Lion’s Roar on the Turning of the Wheel’, mentioned above, when the wheel-turner monarch visits a country with his wheel treasure the incumbent king of that particular kingdom welcomes the arriving monarch with pleasure, and submits himself for his guidance; the latter does not really take over the rulership of that kingdom from its incumbent; he merely establishes the host king and his people on the Dhmnma. What is described as the Dhamma here is nothing other than the five basic virtues (pañca-sīla) which have been prescribed by the Buddha for the regular observance of his followers. The wheel-turner monarch admonished in the following manner: Do not kill; do not take what is not given; do not commit sexual misconduct; do not tell lies, and do not drink alcoholic drinks; ‘eat as you have eaten before’ (do the goveming as you have so far done3) Having admonished in this manner and having established the ruler and his administration on the Dhamma the wheel turner monarch will leave for the next destination. In this manner he will continue his journey till he established the entire world on this Dhamma. Now this is considered as conquering the entire world. But this way of conquering is not by punishment or by weapons (adaṇḍena astthena) but by the Dhamma (dhammena). It is this same Buddhist concept that was articulated and put into practice by the Indian Buddhist emperor Asoka (3rd century bce). The last piece of admonition, ‘eat as you have eaten before’ highlights the fact that the wheel-turner monarch is not really interested in occupation of a territory in a physical sense; but that he is interested only in the establishment of good governance in the world. We must not lose sight of this aspect of the Buddhist notion. The Buddhist concept of wheel turner monarch is ultimately to establish a global society which is governed in accordance with the Dhamma. What is envisaged is not a universal ruler in whose hands the destiny of the humankind rests, but a universal ruler and regional rulers all coming under the governance of the Dhamma, namely, observance of the five principles mentioned above. Whereas the wheel-turner monarch is busy with creating a world order guided by the concept of Dhamma, the Buddha, the former’s counterpart in the ‘religious’ domain, is busy with inner development 3 The expression ‘eat as you have eaten before’ is the literal rendering of the expression (in Pali) ‘yathābhūttañca bhuñjatha’ which is wrongly translated as ‘be moderate in eating’ by Maurice Walshe (1987: p. 398). To admonish in moderation in eating to incumbent rulers does not make much sense in this context. As Professor Dhammavihari Thera (formerly Jotiya Dhieasekera) (2006: p.l41) too has mentioned what is meant in this context is undisrupted continuation of the rule under the guidance of the Dhamma.

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of all beings. The Buddha’s teaching is summarized in the following statement: Sabbapapāssa akaraṇaṃ - kusalassa upasampadā Sacittapariyodapanaṃ - etaṃ buddhanasāsanaṃ (Dhp v. 183) Not to do any evil, to cultivate good, to purify one’s mind-this is the teaching of the Buddhas. The three matters mentioned in this well-known statement has nothing peculiar to Buddhism, it contains a message meant to all human beings. As in the case of the wheel-turner monarch who is not interested in the actual physical control of the world, the Buddha too is not interested in converting the entire world to his ‘religion’. What is importent in the Buddhist point of view is that all human beings follow a set of moral rules that is “not for the harm of oneself, not for harm of others and not for the harm of both oneself and others” (neva attabyābādhāya, na parabyābādhāya na ubhayabyābādhāya) (AmbalaṭṭhikāRāhulovāda-sutta, M I, 414-420). The ultimate meaning of the message of the Buddha is inner purification of all beings. Although the Buddhist tradition upholds the ideal of the wheel-turner monarch, in this ultimate sense, even such a high state is inferior even to the lowest state of the inner development, namely the fruit of streamentry (sotāpatti-phala). The Dhammapada says: Better than absolute sovereignty over the earth, better than going to heaven, better than even lordship over all the worlds is the fruit of stream-winner (Dhp v. 178).4 The inner purification discussed here is common to all those who see the need for it. It does not and cannot have any limitations associated with time and space. In this manner what is envisaged in the teaching of the Buddha is a philosophy/ way of life which is applicable universally.

A higher morality transcending religion As I suggested in the above discussion the concept of dhamma advocated in the teaching of the Buddha, in its broadest sense, is not confined to Buddhism as a religious system or to any other particular religious system. It refers to a universal system of morality transcending particular 4 Pathavyā ekarjjena-saggassa gamanena vā sabbalokādhipaccena – sotāpattiphalaṃ varaṃ The process of inner purification, according to the Theravada tradition consists of four stages culminating in the arahant-hood signifying the purification of one’s mind of all defiling factors. At the first stage only some basic impurities are gone, but the practitioner who has achieved this state is destined to reach the final state.

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religions. Interestingly enough, such a development has been in the making for some time now. In fact, this can be considered a challenge to religion in general, and such a challenge to religion is coming from a very important development associated with globalization, namely, the organizations like United Nations, which have the entire world as their scope. The fact that almost all the nations in the world have joined UN shows the willingness of people to submit themselves to a kind of global agreement and consensus. One of the most significant developments in this trend was to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by the General Assembly of United Nations in 1948. Subsequently, many other documents specifying civil and political rights, rights of children, convention against discrimination of women, and the convention against torture and other cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment of human beings have been adopted by this world-wide body. It is interesting to see that all the individuals and social organizations, including religious organizations in particular, are seeking the assistance and guidance from these commissions, particularly they seek protection under Human Rights when faced with difficulties. What this highlights, as far as religion is concerned, is that it comes under these global conventions which are basically secular and non-religious. The idea of secularism has to be understood in its proper context. Secularism was initially developed in the context of western society as a reaction to the western religion.5 The history of this development can be traced in the histories of the particular countries starting from late medieval through modern periods, in such documents as Magna Carta [1215: England], Bill of Rights [1689, England], Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen [1789, France] and United States Bill of Rights [1789/1791] and in the movements such as Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment. Although secularism implies rejection of religion in some sense, and hence some religions in particular distance themselves from secularist movements, it is interesting to see that all the major world religions have accepted and supported UDHR. This is, in a way, shows that the concept and the convention of human rights have been ingrained in the religious teachings, and from that perspective, that 5 Although secularism of the kind that was developed in the West was not developed and even not favoured in other parts of the world (the possible explanations for which are being debated among scholars), there have been conventions in other parts of the world clearly revealing universalist ethical tendencies, much earlier than conventions mentioned above. One good example is the rock edicts established by the Indian Buddhist emperor Asoka in the 3rd century bce.

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UDHR is not something new to religions. Granting this point, still we have to note that religions seem to lack the organizational structure of the UDHR and its legal power on the nations of the globe. Unlike a religious teaching or a belief, UDHR has a legal validity and a mechanism to deal with its violators. It is in this sense that secularist institutes under globalization have been able to bring out a global form of ethics that cut across religious affiliations. If what was done by religions in earlier times is now being done by organizations such as UN, and if religions themselves accept this new order, it is an indication that secularism has triumphed over religion in some very significant sense. When religions themselves are at war with one another it is secular institutes that sit on judgment and working as sobering influences on religions. If religion is reduced to a state in which it is told what to do and what not to do by a secular institute it clearly is not good for the age-old ethical self-image of the religions. This situation, on the other hand, is inevitable in view of the history of religions fraught, very often, with persecution of other religionists, non-believers and others like so-called witches who were considered to be undesirable for the particular religion. Nevertheless, the sublime teachings of all great religions, in spite of the misbehaviors of varying degrees and frequencies on the part of the followers, have to be recognized. The very secular institutes clearly have been influenced by, or at least have not gone against, the essence of such teachings. This shows that religions themselves have these resources within their own systems. What needs to be done is to develop truly a global ethics within each religious system. An indication to the recognition of this need by religions is the document called “Declaration toward a Global Ethic”, authored by Hans Kung and issued at the Parliament of Word Religions, Chicago, 1993, which marked the first centenary of the initial Parliament in 1883. The Declaration was approved by the followers of the all religions gathered, and was signed subsequently by more than one hundred religious dignitaries belonging to different religious denominations. The declaration begins with the following analysis of the human predicament: The world is in agony. The agony is so persuasive and urgent that we are compelled to name its manifestations so that the depth of this pain may be made clear. Peace eludes us- the planet is being destroyed- neighbors live in fear- women and men are estranged from each other- children die! This is abhorrent. We condemn

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the abuses of Earth’s eco-systems. We condemn the poverty that stifles life’s potential; the hunger that weakens the human body, the economic disparities that threaten so many families with ruin. We condemn the social disarray of the nations; the disregard for justice which pushes citizens to the margin; the anarchy overtaking our communities; and the insane death of children from violence. In particular we condemn aggression and hatred in the name of religion. (www.parliamentofreligions.org) The Declaration holds that these sad conditions need not exist on earth and that there is an ethic available within religions capable of solving these problems. It further says that Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948 on the level of rights are confirmed and deepened by the Declaration from the perspective of an ethic. In other words, the Declaration proposes to provide an alternative religious basis for human rights to be upheld and observed. The Document begins with an introduction which outlines the need for a global ethic and then goes to outline the principles of a global ethic under four headings, namely, (i) no new global order without a new global ethic; (ii) a fundamental demand: every human being must be treated humanely; (iii) irrevocable directives, under which four different aspects of ethical norms, namely, (1) commitment to a culture of nonviolence and respect for life; (2) commitment to a culture of solidarity and just economic order, (3) commitment to a culture of tolerance and life of truthfulness and (4) commitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men and women, are discussed; and (iv) transformation of consciousness. (Source: Foundation Global Ethic, Germany.) Although the document itself may be studied for its relative merits, its completeness and conceptual clarity and the like, I do not propose to do so here. What is important to highlight in the present context is that religions have shown awareness of the larger challenge facing themselves and the need for constructing a system of globally applicable ethics.

Conclusion Whether or not NWO or globalization can usher a world government remains to be seen. But what is undeniable is the fact that, with the new

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developments in communication and transport, the societies of the world have come much closer than they were a hundred years ago. This physical proximity has proved one phenomenon beyond doubt: that no one can ignore the presence of the other, and that everyone is living in an inter-dependent and inter-connected universe. This state of affairs highlights the fact that reality is dependently arisen and dependently ceased. All human beings are connected with all others through their words, deeds and thoughts; their environment is shared, and their sorrows and pleasures also are shared. This is why one cannot think local in order to act local. This new awakening to reality is what is highlighted by the Buddha’s teaching of ‘dependent arising’ (conditionality/ paṭiccasamuppāda). The globalized society with its all possible negative characteristics still seems to provide us with some hope. It is the hope that, with a system of ethics shared across religions, the prospects of the survival of humanity on this planet will be brighter. The purpose this paper was to show that the teaching of the Buddha has support for a global forum of ethics and also that it has much to contribute in developing a system of global ethics. The discussion on the concept of wheel-turner monarch and the Buddha was to show how Buddhism would provide for a global context, a context beyond any particular time or space. The brief discussion on the Dhamma of the wheel-turner monarch and that of the Buddha, which needs to be elaborated on further, was to outline some guidelines for such a universal system of ethics. What is essentially undesirable about one global authority [i.e. world government] is its potential to perpetuate tyranny both physical and psychological. However, as I demonstrated in the preceding discussion, the Buddhist concept of wheel-turner monarch is not without a concept of political power. What is affirmed by characterizing the wheel-turner monarch as being endowed with power is that power combined with righteousness is good. The Buddhist concept of the wheel-turner monarch is one who is based on the five moral virtues, not killing, not stealing, not misbehaving sexually, not telling lies and not taking alcoholic ‘drinks’. Positively put, these are nothing other than kindness to all living beings, safeguarding others properties and rights, honouring family/ marital relations, being honest in words and deeds and keeping one’s sanity and sobriety in social relations. When the Buddha asked his lay followers to observe these five principles regularly, he was merely asking them to adhere to the basic principles of good behavior without which

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a society cannot function. As broad ethical principles anyone anywhere in the world may adhere to these principles without contradicting one’s own particular religious beliefs. It is the need of the religions in the world today to be clear about their ethical standing vis-a-vis other religions. The religions will have to develop their own ethics of accommodating the other religions without resorting to exclusivist and absolutist claims that negate the existence of the others. Today the religion itself has become globalized. It is a matter of concern whether or not religion has inner capacity to withstand the negative forces of globalization. Let me wind up this discussion by quoting from my conclusion from a paper I wrote on ‘Globalization and Religion in Asia’ which is equally relevant to the present context: The early strides of Globalization several centuries ago brought the western religion to Asia. More recently new strides of globalization have taken the Asian religions back to the West. On the one hand, globalization has found new homes for traditional Asian religions as it found new homes for the western religions centuries ago. On the other hand, the economic and cultural forces that are generated by globalization seem to pose serious threats to Asian religion in particular and religion in general all over the world without much discrimination. The fundamental principle of globalized market economy seems to be to let the market to decide, and the market, in John Rawls words, “ignores the claims of need altogether” (Ryan 1993, 85). In this inhuman pursuit, it is believed that religion is the most plausible candidate to provide sanity while maintaining that of its own. The way the globalized religion tries to dominate over other religions alarmingly suggests that religion too has entered the race on equal terms. In other words, while the fate of the developing economies is decided by the market, the fate of the Asian religions which lack sufficient material resources is left to be decided by the same principle of ‘market’ dominated by more powerful and affluent religions. The race in the view of the runners has only one rational end- that is, extermination of all other religions except the most powerful, whatever it may be. So long as religion itself is a competitor in the game it does not have a moral right, nor does it have a capacity to provide guidance for the kind of maladies described in the preamble to the Declaration of Global Ethic we discussed above.

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Therefore, it is paramount for religions to have adopted their own pluralist ethic toward each other before aiming at anything more grandeur. If religion fails to do this, what is most likely to happen is that ordinary people, who do not wish to be bothered by religious disputes, will bypass it. (Tilakaratne 2007, 92-93)

19. A Buddhist Approach to Conflict Resolution

Introduction Although there is a vast amount of literature on the conflict resolution theory and Buddhism separately, there is hardly any serious scholarly attempt at combining the two subject matters. What is proposed in the present paper is to explore concepts and philosophical insights available in the teaching of the Buddha regarding conflict and resolution there of with a view to construct what can be called a Buddhist theory of conflict resolution.1 In proceeding in a project of this nature we are struck with the fact that there is no road-map available readily to be followed. The absence of road-map is applicable at the level of both primary and the secondary sources. In the discourses attributed to the Buddha one looks in vain for a fully worked out theory of conflict resolution. The secondary sources are scarce although not totally absent. It is obvious that in the present endeavor we take as our point of reference the various conflict situations prevalent in our society both locally and globally. Conflict resolution as a theory and practice has been developed substantially particularly in the western world as a result of prevalence of conflicts. Consequently, there are refined conceptual schemes and conceptual tools readily available for prospective scholars who enter the field. In initiating a study of conflict and resolution based on the teaching of the Buddha, there are two possible ways to proceed. One is to assume that the concepts available in conflict resolution are equally available in Buddhism and start developing Buddhist perspectives on them. The other is to assume that the two subject areas 1  ‘Resolution’ is used here to include also such other related aspects as management and transformation of conflict.

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have different conceptual schemes and categories, and accordingly start working independently with minimum amount of borrowing. The first approach is relatively easy for the conceptual scheme is already provided and categories have been pre-determined. One has just to fill the structure with new material. But the danger is that in the process one may be attributing to what is being studied what is not in there. This does not necessarily mean that people living in two different systems of societies at two different times under different social circumstances will never think alike or would have never built similar conceptual categories. But what this amounts to is that one cannot plainly assume such a semblance without a serious study of the systems in question. The second approach is more challenging. In it one does not assume any semblance between the systems in question. Rather one would work internally, within the system on the belief that the system in question is dealing with situations with possible implications on other similar systems, and finally try to establish possibilities of mutual implications. In the present paper we propose to adopt the second approach. Consequently, the present paper is basically a study in the teaching of the Buddha with a view to analyze how the Buddha approached conflicts. Even this type of exercise has to assume some states of affairs. For example, we have to assume that the Buddha dealt with conflicts and was interested in resolving them. Looking at the history of the world to assume that in the 6th century bce there were conflicts is rather unproblematic. That the Buddha dealt with conflicts is not as unproblematic; it has to be proved. It further requires proposing some new ways of reading/ understanding the teaching of the Buddha. We will have to work our way through the teachings of the Buddha in the course of this paper.

Some preliminary issues At the outset of this discussion we have to answer ‘why Buddhism?’ This question becomes even more pertinent when we review the conflict ridden histories of religions in the world. There has been a long-drawn debate among scholars whether or not Buddhism is a religion. According to some, even the term ‘Buddhism’ is an attribution of a western category which is not warranted. It is true that the term ‘Buddhism’ is relatively new, and was introduced when Westerners started studying what they found to be the ‘religion’ of the people they encountered as colonizers or

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visitors. Some reservations and criticisms, therefore, are valid and worthy of our serious attention. However, without getting into this debate which has been around for a long time what we simply can say in the present context is that Buddhism has been there in the traditional Buddhist countries operating at various levels. For example, in Sri Lanka itself we know that there were divisions among monks who were mediators and who were scholars. The definition of what each group considered ‘Buddhism’ would definitely have been not identical or even not similar. When the ‘initiates’ were following such different paths there were the larger majority of ordinary people for whom these monastic differences make little sense, yet were happy with what has come to be known as ‘karmic Buddhism’ with simple system of beliefs and practices. This last aspect may well be called the religion of Buddhism although it may have lacked some of the salient features of religion by definition such as the belief in a Creator God. The Buddha cannot be regarded as a founder of a religion in its popular sense. Religions are usually understood as having their reference to a transcendental Divine. The religious teachers are believed either reincarnations or prophets of the Divine. The Buddha did not claim any of these. In the Ariyapariyesana-sutta (the Discourse on the Noble Quest: M 6) the Buddha describes how, before his enlightenment, being himself subject to decay, disease and death, he went after things subject to the same predicaments. There are many similar instances where the Buddha identified himself to be a human being like anyone else subject to the natures of life. The Buddha realized the ultimate goal of cessation of suffering, and taught his followers how to achieve the same. Although the Buddhist tradition recognizes the Buddha as far above his followers, in so far as the realization of the ultimate goal is concerned any significance difference is not made. The Buddha is credited with discovering the path leading to the cessation of suffering. The disciples are the ones who follow the instructions given by the Buddha to reach the same destination. In one instance, the Buddha compares this situation to one who discovers a lost ancient path (purāṇaṃ anjasaṃ) leading to an ancient city (S II, 104-107). A man accidentally discovers an abandoned path while he was traveling in the jungle. He follows that path and reaches an ancient city. There he goes around and enjoys his visit and on coming back informs the king or a minister and ask them to rebuild this city. They bring the city back to its ancient glory. The Buddha compares his role as the

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teacher and the role of the disciples as followers to this pioneering man and those who acted on his instructions. The difference according to this story, between the Buddha and the disciples is: the former discovered the ancient road and the city on his own without any guidance from others and the latter discovered the same under the guidance of the former. There is another important clue we can get from this story. According to this story those who act on the instruction of the pioneer rebuild the city on their own. The comparable situation in the sāsana (the religious organization) of the Buddha is that whatever the ‘truths’ one discover by following the path are one’s own discoveries. They are not claims imposed on the followers by the teacher as dogmas to be accepted without any question. In the Buddhist practice, it is very important to ‘know and see’ for oneself what one accepts as true and valid. This non-dogmatic and free character of the Buddhist religious practice is amply demonstrated by what the Buddha said to Kalamas (A I, 188-193). Kalamas were a group of free people who were undecided about religious claims. They confessed to the Buddha that they were perplexed when different religious teachers put forth contradictory claims. To them the Buddha said that their doubt and perplexity was justifiable, and elaborated on ten grounds, based on religious and personal authority and logical reasoning, on which they should not decide whether something is good or not. Subsequently, the Buddha gave them the following criterion: When, Kalamas, you know by yourselves that these phenomena are unskillful, that these phenomena are faulty, that these phenomena are despised by the intelligent and that these phenomena, if adhered to, are conducive for unhappiness and pain, and then you reject them. The Buddha elaborated on this criterion further by questioning them on each of the three causes of unskillfulness, namely, attachment, aversion and delusion, and gets them to accept that they are conducive to unhappiness and pain. At the same time, the absence of these unskillful states and the resultant positive states are shown to them and they accept such states to be conducive for happiness. The Kalamas accept by seeing for themselves what the Buddha said. A significant feature of this particular discussion is the procedure followed by the Buddha in presenting the ideas of karma and rebirth to this group who was basically skeptical about such beliefs. They did not have difficulty in accepting the moral reasoning of the Buddha which was

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based on personal experience. The ides of karma and rebirth, however, being not a part of one’s immediate experience, were different. The Buddha did not try to impose these beliefs on skeptical Kalamas. Instead what the Buddha did was to adopt a pragmatic basis and demonstrate to them that argument for the moral behaviour does not necessarily rest on believing in these two phenomena. The Buddha says that one who behaves morally whether there is karma and rebirth or not gains four kinds of relief. They are: If there is karma and rebirth, doing good, I will be born in a good state after death; if there is no karma and rebirth, not doing bad, I will have the satisfaction of having peace in this very life; if evil happens to an evil-doer how can it happen to me who does not do evil; and if evil does not happen to evil­doer I will live a peaceful life in this very existence in both manners. Thinking in these four manners one who behaves morally will have relief of mind even if one does not commit oneself to the claims such as karma and rebirth lying beyond one’s ordinary experience. This argument based on pragmatism has been presented in a more systematic manner in the Apaṇṇaka-sutta (The Incontrovertible Teaching: M I, 400-414), in which the Buddha addressed the inhabitants of the village called Sala who confessed to the Buddha that they did not have any preferred religious teacher. The issue again is the relationship between believing in the after-world and behaving morally. The Buddha elaborates on four possible positions that could be adopted by a rational person. i. One who does not know whether there is after-world or not, but assumes that there is no after-world and behaves immorally: if there is actually no after world he will not have a problem after death but he will be censured by the wise for his immoral behaviors; ii. One who does not know whether there is after-world or not, but assumes that there is no after-world and behaves immorally: if there is an after-world actually, he is censured in this very life by the wise for his immoral behavior, and he will be born in a state of woefulness after death. iii. One who does not know whether there is after-world or not, but assumes that there is after-world and behaves morally: if there is actually no after-world still he will be praised by the wise for his good behaviour. iv. One who does not know whether there is after-world or not, but assumes that there is an after-world and behaves morally: If there is actually an after-world, he will be praised for his moral behavior in this very life and since there is after-world he will be reborn after death in a happy state. The most

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rational choice for any intelligent person to make is to assume that there is after­world and behave morally without letting skepticism to takes one’s destiny over (The early modern Western philosopher Pascal’s wager argument on the existence of God is not different from this.). What is discussed in both Kālāma-sutta and the Apaṇṇaka-sutta are instances involving claims beyond one’s immediate experience although strictly speaking they are not beyond the limits of all modes of experience for they can be verified by those who have developed their mind. Through the discussion it is clear that the Buddha held a quite a free attitude toward these claims. What really mattered according to the Buddha’s thought was securing moral behavior which pays in this very life itself. Morality in Buddhism does not depend on the possibility of the next birth. What really matters is this world and this existence. These conclusions have clear implications for any conflict resolution theory we may construct based on the principle of the teaching of the Buddha. Another objection against any religious enterprise on conflict resolution may come from the point of history of religions. Histories are fraught with difficulties. This is particularly so when it comes to histories of religions. Religions have fought with one another, and together they have fought with others. Although Buddhism does not have a history of being violent on other religions or others it has had its share of violence on its own people who belonged to different sects or groups. This is a part of the behaviour of Buddhism as a religion or a religious organization. It surely is of interest to examine how a particular religious organization has coped with situations marked with conflict. Our focus in the present context, however, is the teaching of the Buddha as a system of thought and not as an organization. This is not due to an assumption that the organized form of Buddhism was contradictory to its philosophy. Among religions of the world, which have their histories marred with atrocities and persecutions, Buddhism has managed to remain quite clean. The truth is that Buddhism has been a civilizing and pacifying force for the last twenty five centuries not only in India, its place of birth, but also in a very large part of Asia amidst various cultural settings among different ethnic groups. It has served as the major ideological force that shaped the lives of many millions of people in these regions. Buddhism has not ever fought wars. Nor has it supported wars except in a very few instances. With the possible exception of Jainism, Buddhism is the most peace-loving of all other religions. Therefore it is important to examine the Buddhist attitude to conflict and peace.

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Which Buddhism? It is useful at this juncture to be specific as to which Buddhism we are studying in the present context. This question may sound strange to those who assume Buddhism to be one homogenous phenomenon. This type of assumption could result from the naive view of religion uninformed by historical developments and evolutions. Also such an attitude could result from an absolutist attitude which makes the holders to not acknowledge any school/ tradition other than one’s own as legitimate. Candidates for both these attitudes can be the followers, who are considered to be good according to accepted norms, of particular tradition. But we have to concede that there are different traditions within one religion which hold somewhat different perspectives. In the context of Buddhism we identify three main traditions, namely Theravada, Mahayana and Vajrayana. The popular division of Hīnayāna as opposed to Mahayana is no longer in vogue. The Mahayanists coined the term ‘hīnayāna’ which means ‘low vehicle’ obviously as a derogatory nomenclature. Translation of it as ‘small vehicle’ is not warranted either etimologically or historically. More accurate term to describe those who opted to attain nirvana by following the path as disciples (śrāvaka=hearer) was ‘śrāvaka-yāna’ or the vehicle of the disciples. As Wader says, when the Mahayanists wished to be rude they would use ‘hinayana’ and when they wanted to be polite they would use ‘śrāvaka-yāna’ to refer to those very same groups (Warder 1970/2000, 338). Historically, Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas were identified as Hinayanists in the classical Indian context of four Buddhist traditions. The Theravada tradition that was transmitted to Sri Lanka in the 3rd century bce during the reign of Emperor Asoka had its development away from these four traditions. Although strictly speaking the Theravada too can be counted as a variety of Hinayana it was historically not actually identified so simply for the reason that it became established in the southern part of India and in Sri Lanka. By the turn of the Christian era when these divisions were in the formation Theravada was already established in Sri Lanka. Scholars who studied Buddhism at the end of the 19th century started using the term ‘ hīnayana’ to refer to Theravada for it was the only extant śrāvaka-yāna since Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntiaka were long gone from the Indian scene. Only their literature was preserved mainly in Chinese translations and to some extent in Tibetan translations but the monastic traditions had died away for the

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same reasons as those that were instrumental in destroying Buddhism from Indian soil. In India, classical Mahayana was represented by Madhyamaka and Yogacara traditions. Gradually these two traditions and other socalled Hīnayāna schools started moving toward north ending in China finally. In China gradually all the Indian schools faded making way for new schools to arise. These new schools were inspired mainly by the classical Indian traditions but were Chinese in origin and flavour. The Chinese Buddhism was spread to Korea and Japan where it had its own development mainly under the influence of Chinese Buddhism. Madhyamaka and Yogacara do not exist as separate schools in Mahayana proper today. But the schools evolved in China were influenced by the philosophical ideas of these two schools. As śrāvaka-yāna is the more accurate designation for the so-called Hīnayāna schools, the Mahayana schools were more accurately called ‘bodhisatva-yāna ‘ for they aspired to become Bodhisatvas whose path is to sacrifice one’s liberation for the sake of others. Within the fold of Mahayāna there are number of subschools with varying views and practices. The Vajrayana (vehicle of diamond) is the latest of the three traditions. It is also called tantrayāna (vehicle of tantras) and mantrayāna (vehicle of spells). Tantras are basically texts containing esoteric practices, rites and rituals. Since these practices occupy a main place the tradition is known as Tantrayāna. Using mantras for protective as well as destructive and creative purposes the tradition acquired the name ‘Mantrayāna’. The concept of emptiness is identified with a diamond. Due to the centrality of the concept of emptiness and the Madhayamaka philosophy the name ‘Vajrayana’ is popularly used to refer to the tradition that is preserved and developed in Tibet. Although Vajrayana got established in Tibet as a distinctive tradition it originated in India. By the 7th century and onwards the Indian Buddhists had gradually started moving to Tibet mainly to escape Islamic attacks. Tantric views were prevalent in Eastern and Northern India by this time. Vajrayana is basically a development of Mahayana. The two classical Indian Mahayana schools are represented here unlike in East Asian Mahayana. The Madhayamaka philosophy can be regarded as the main philosophical tradition although the Yogacara tradition too is influential. Tibetan Buddhism places a very high significance on the lineages of teachers and their particular interpretations. The practice

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is a mixture of gradual path of Mahayana and tantric practices. There are four stages of religious life represented by tantras relevant to these stages. They are action (kriyā), behaviour (caryā), meditative practice (yoga) and the highest meditative practice (anuttara-yoga). This is a gradually ascending path resulting in the ultimate eradication of desire and associated defilements. Although all the three Buddhist traditions ultimately have more commonalities than differences it is still useful to be precise about the conceptual scheme adopted in one’s analysis. In the present study we take the doctrinal framework and the concepts available in the Pali canon known as the Tri-piṭaka (three baskets). The Pali canon is sometimes referred to as ‘early Buddhism’ for it is taken as representing the earliest available version of the word of the Buddha. Presently particularly with the discovery of several versions of the canon including Chinese agamas, scholars are reluctant to use this term to refer to the Pali canon exclusively. Nevertheless, it remains a fact that the Pali canon contains, if not the earliest, one of earliest versions of the word of the Buddha. An added advantage is that the Pali tradition has had a continuous tradition of interpretation and practice behind it. The Pali canon comprises three baskets, namely discourses (Sutta), Discipline (Vinaya) and Higher Doctrine (Abhidhamma). The basket of discourses contains five compilations called ‘nikaya’ (group). They are: Dīgha-nikāya (Long Discourses), Majjhima-nikāya (Middle-length Discourses), Saṃyutta-nikāya (Connected Discourses), Aṅguttaranikāya (Gradual Discourses), and Khuddaka-nikāya (Small Discourses). The basket of discipline contains five compilations, namely, Parājikapāḷi and Pācittiyapāḷi (dealing with main Vinaya rules), Cullavaggapāḷi and Mahāvaggapāḷi (dealing with monastic traditions not amounting to rules) and Parivāra-pāḷi (dealing with analyses of the above four compilations). The basket of Abhidhamma contains seven treatises, namely, Dhammasaṅgaṇi, Vibhaṅga, Kathāvatthu, Puggalapaññatti, Dhātukathā, Yamaka and Paṭṭhāna, all dealing with analyses of the doctrinal matters presented in the discourses of the Basket of Discourses excepting the Kathāvatthu which was added around 3rd century bce, containing the Theravada responses to the various views developed by schools other than Theravada. What is most relevant for the present study is the Basket of Discourses containing all the doctrinal expositions and analyses made

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by the Buddha and his immediate disciples. The Vinaya Piṭaka is equally important as representing not only some relevant concepts but also actual practices followed by the members of the Sangha in living harmonious and peaceful lives among themselves as well as others. And the analyses developed in the Abhidhamma piṭaka may be used to shed further light on the basic doctrinal points mentioned in the Discourses. The canonical literature in the Theravada tradition is backed by a vast amount of post-canonical works such as the Milinda-pañha (Milinda’s Questions), and Peṭakopadesa and Nettipakaraṇa (dealing with the methods of exegesis) and the Visuddhimagga, a detailed treatise on the Buddhist path to purification by Buddhaghosa, and the commentaries written for all canonical works by Buddhaghosa and several other ancient teachers. The vast reservoir of information contained in these works furnishes the student of the Pali canon with tools to be used in understanding what the texts mean. There is no doubt that the commentaries in general represent one particular way of reading the texts, even though this way of reading is not the only way. Consequently some modern scholars tend to downplay the significance of commentaries. The attitude of the present writer for the commentarial literature is not dismissive but one with caution. In addition to the textual tradition containing the basic teachings of the Buddha, there is a long and rich historical tradition behind Buddhism. Buddhism was the main religious and philosophical tradition in India during the reign of Emperor Asoka who is known to have put Buddhist political philosophy into practice, In Sri Lanka Buddhism was the sole source of inspiration for the rulers and the population at large till the European invasion in the 16th century. Similar situations are witnessed in other Theravada Buddhist countries in particular. In this paper, however, we will not examine the historical applications of the teachings of the Buddha in conflict resolution. We will confine ourselves to the teachings of the Buddha as our resource.

Scope and limits of applicability of Buddhism In making use of the Buddhist insights on a ‘mundane’ matter like conflict resolution one could raise a question of the legitimacy of such an endeavor. One could argue that the teaching of the Buddha, being a stereological enterprise meant for attaining nirvana by severing all the worldly relationships, cannot be applied to worldly questions such as conflict resolution. The legitimacy of constructing a social

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philosophy from the early Buddhist teachings has been questioned by modern scholars. The presence of a large number of discourses given by the Buddha on worldly matters, such as good governance, economic stability, social relations and many related issues clearly fly on the face of this objection. One could easily answer such an objection by eliciting evidence from the texts. The problem, however, goes deeper. The classical objection of this nature was raised by Max Weber who was also the first to raise the question in the seriousness it deserves. Weber characterizes the Buddhist path to salvation as resulting from totally inwardly reflection and knowledge in the process of which there is neither room nor need for social action. Let me present his case in his own words: For characterization of the influence upon external behavior of the Buddhistic type of salvation the following is decisive. Assurance of one’s state of grace, that is, certain knowledge of one’s own salvation is not sought through proving one’s self by any inner-worldly or extra-worldly action, by “work” of any kind, but, in contrast to this, it is sought in psychic state remote from activity. This is decisive for the location of the arhat ideal with respect to the “world” of rational action. No bridge connects them. Nor is there any bridge to any activity conceptualized as “social” conduct. Salvation is an absolute personal performance of the self-reliant individual. No one, particularly no social community can help him. The specific asocial character of all genuine mysticism is here carried to its maximum. Actually, it appears even as a contradiction that the Buddha who was quite aloof from forming a “church” and who expressly rejected the possibility and pretension of being able to “lead” an order, had founded an order after all. The contradiction remains unless the institution here, in contrast to Christendom, was rather the mere creation of his students. (Weber 1960, 213-4) Weber’s reference to ‘work’ here has as a central component his analysis of protestant ethics as involving work. Weber is not off the mark when he says that the Buddhist salvation is not a result of any ‘work’ performed by the practitioner. But his characterization of Buddhist monastic life as carrying the “asocial character... to its maximum” is not borne by the communal character of the Sangha community the guiding principle of which was “mutual advice and mutual support” (aññam-

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aññavacanena aññam-aññavutthapanena: Bhikkhu Pātimokkha). Although ultimately the realization of nirvana is the responsibility of each individual, the path has to be trodden in a community in a caring and sharing atmosphere. The concept of ‘kalyānamitta’ (good friend) has been very much emphasized in this context. The Buddha corrected Ananda who held that a half of the development in the religious life was due to kalyānamitta by saying that the entire development, not a half, was due to kalyana-mitta (S V, 3). The relationship between the monk and the lay person too has been viewed as one of mutual support, not a one-way track in which the latter has no any place in the system. The following characterization of Weber again is not supported by what was the actual practice: In the parish doctrine the status group of “house­dwelling people” in a manner somewhat similar to the tolerated infidels in Islam, existed only for the purpose of sustaining by alms the Buddhist disciple who aspires to the state of grace until he has achieved it (S V, 214). The well-known Advice to Sigāla includes the relationship between religious people and householders as one of the six social relationships and lists mutual duties to be performed by the two parties. For the householders who look after monks by providing material needs monks were expected to return the favor by providing them with spiritual guidance. Even if Weber’s view that the teaching of the Buddha was exclusively for monks is correct that does not necessarily mean that by prescribing a separate path for the householders the Buddha was contradicting himself. Although the higher spiritual attainments were not considered out of reach for the householders the usual practice expected of them was to live a good life both morally and materially, and expect to be born in a good birth after death. This is in accordance with the gradual path prescribed by the Buddha. Weber could not appreciate the ‘this-worldly’ aspect of the teaching of the Buddha for he was erroneously convinced that the teaching of the Buddha was a mysticism of extreme form. If he knew about moral behavior expected from a monastic member, or from any follower for that matter, Weber would not rule out ‘work’ totally from the Buddhist practice. Although the final stage of the Path is characterized by inner understanding it is very clear that such a practice has to have moral behavior as its basis. Cumulative conclusion of these points is that Buddhism is not a system meant exclusively for those who have renounced their household life, but meant for all four groups, bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs and upāsakas and upāsikās (male and female monastic and householder followers). A further conclusion we may derive from

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this discussion is that a social philosophy is possible within the teaching of the Buddha.

The Buddhist conception of reality: the doctrine of Dependent Co­-origination Conflict resolution involves human beings and environment; how does Buddhism understand these phenomena? The answers we give to these questions have a direct relevance to what we say on the issue at hand. It is well known that Buddhism denies the idea of divine creation. In other words, Buddhism denies an agent either in macrocosmic sense or in microcosmic sense. The important question however is: how does Buddhism assure the orderliness of the world in the absence of all-powerful and all-knowing God? The Buddhist answer has to be understood from the doctrine of dependent co-origination.

Dependent Co-origination The idea of dependent co-origination is a variety of causal theory that articulates how causation is understood in Buddhism. It basically talks about causes and conditions depending on which reality exists and evolves and things happen. The basic abstract formula of the theory runs as follows: In the presence of this, this is. From the arising of this, this arises. In the absence of this, this is not. From the cessation of this, this ceases. Having given this abstract form, the discourses immediately give the concrete application of this abstract formula, namely, how suffering arises and ceases dependently. The concrete explanation makes use of twelve concepts to describe this process. It goes as follows: Conditioned by ignorance volitional constructions arise. Conditioned by volitional constructions consciousness arise. Conditioned by consciousness psycho-physical entity arises. Conditioned by psycho-physical entity six sense bases arise. Conditioned by six sense bases contact arises. Conditioned by contact arises feeling. Conditioned by feeling arises thirst. Conditioned by thirst arises clinging.

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Conditioned by clinging arises existence. Conditioned by existence occurs birth. Conditioned by birth arise decay and death. In this manner the entire mass of suffering arises. The cessation of suffering is described following the same sequence: From the complete cessation of ignorance, volitional constructions cease. [And the process goes on to its conclusion, namely,]… from the cessation of birth, decay and death cease. In this manner the entire mass of suffering ceases. The Buddha makes a distinction between dependent co-origination and dependently co-arisen phenomena. The doctrine that explains the dependently arisen character of reality, namely, the abstract theory given at the beginning of this discussion, is what is called dependent coorigination. Although the theory remains the same the application of it may differ depending on what aspect of reality is meant to be explained. Twelve factors mentioned in the above explanation are what is called ‘dependently co-arisen phenomena’, in so far as the origin and the cessation of suffering is concerned. Ignorance (avijjā): lack of knowledge in suffering, the origin, its cessation and the path leading to its cessation. Volitional constructions (saṅkhārā): physical, verbal and mental volitional formations. Consciousness: (viññāṇa) the six kinds of consciousness, namely, eye­ consciousness, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body- and mind-consciousness. Psycho-physical entity (nāma-rūpa): feeling, perception, volition, contact and attention are called name; the four great elements and forms derived from are called form. The two together are called psychophysical entity (or name-and­form). Six sense bases (salāyatana): the eye-base, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-, and mindbase. Contact (phassa): It is six-fold as the eye-contact, ear-, nose-, tongue-, body-, and mind-contact. Contact means the union of the sense organ, the relevant object and the associated consciousness. Feeling (vedānā): It is six-fold as the feeling born from eye-contact, earcontact, nose-contact, tongue-contact, body-contact, and mind-contact.

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Thirst (taṇhā): It is six-fold as the thirst for material forms, -sounds, odours, tastes, tactile objects, and mental phenomena . Clinging (upādāna): It is four-fold as the clinging for sensual pleasures, clinging to views, clinging to rules and rituals, and clinging to the doctrine of self. Existence (bhava): It is threefold as the sense-sphere existence, formsphere existence, and form-less-sphere existence. Birth (jāti): The birth of the various beings into the various orders of beings. Decay and Death: (jarā-maraṇa): the ageing of the various beings in the various orders of beings, and the passing away of the various beings from the various orders of beings. In the explanation of the process of suffering ignorance has been given as the starting point. This does not mean that ignorance is the very first beginning of suffering. In fact Buddhism does not recognize any first cause as such. All the twelve factors given here, including ignorance, are dependently arisen. About ignorance the Buddha says: Ignorance is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to destruction, vanishing, fading away, and cessation (S II, 26). The process of arising and cessation of suffering as explained in this formula may be understood as involving two different dimensions. One is to understand it as an explanation of origin and cessation of suffering in the present life of any being, as something taking place every moment in one’s life. This is true for the arising aspect of suffering which happens near spontaneous manner for all those who are not enlightened. The conditions for the cessation aspect have to be practiced and cultivated. The other dimension is to understand the process as involving the larger samsaric picture of one’s life starting from the past, going through the present and extending to the future. This way of understanding has been developed by Buddhaghosa in the Visuddhimagga and commentaries. According to this understanding, there are five causes pertaining to the past, and five fruits pertaining to the present; there are five causes pertaining to the present and there are five fruits pertaining to the future. These are respectively, ignorance, constructions, (craving, grasping and becoming); consciousness, name and form, six bases, contact and feeling; (ignorance, constructions), craving, grasping and becoming; and, birth and decay and death (of consciousness, name and form, six bases, contact and touch). In this analysis what is included in the brackets is

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what is subsumed by the main factors. This later interpretation is meant to capture the process of suffering in its samsaric dimension, and in this sense it is only an extension of the basic teaching given in the discourses. Although what is described here constitutes the most important application of the doctrine its range of application is not confined to the phenomenon of suffering alone. In the Buddhist understanding of reality not only [human] suffering but also everything else happens following similar processes. Usually Buddhist texts refer to five areas where one finds this process active. They are: Principle of seasons: seasonal changes in the world take place depending on causes and conditions. Principle of seeds: the process of seeds producing plants and their growth takes place dependent on causes and conditions. Principle of action: human actions, in particular moral actions, follow a similar process. Principle of nature: events such as the shaking of the ten-thousand world system at the birth of a Bodhisatva and the like take place following a causal process. Principle of mind: the working of human mind follows a similar process. These five principles seem to cover the workings of the natural world and the moral and psychological spheres. The Doctrine and its manifestations in different aspects of reality highlight that there is no ‘doer’ in a real sense and what there really is only a complex web of causes and conditions. The absence of doer is understood at both universal level, according to which, there is no creator God who is responsible for the world, and at individual level, according to which there is no soul or self-believed to be the essence of human being. The Buddhist denial of these two major views, namely, theism and substantialism, follows from the understanding of reality as dependently originated. It is this world view that provides the rationale for what is called Buddhist naturalism. The absence of doer at either macro or micro level does not mean that things happen haphazardly for no reason. Nor does it mean that there is no order or sense of stability to be found in the world. The process of dependent co­-origination has been described as having the following four characteristics: (i) Objectivity (tathatā): This means that dependent co-origination is real not a fabrication or a mere theory but actuality. The Buddha has said that the dependent nature of reality is there whether the Buddhas were to appear in the world or not, and what the Buddha would do is to reveal it to the world, asking people to see (what is already there).

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(ii) Necessity (avitathatā = non-falseness): This characteristic assures that there is stability in the process. (iii) Invariability (anaññathatā): This characteristic assures that there is constancy and uniformity between causes and effects. (iv) Conditionality (idappaccayatā): Being conditioned as a key characteristic of the process is highlighted by this. The emergent picture of reality is not chaos or ‘anything goes’ but one regulated, uniform and stable in so far as it is determined by causes and conditions. The doctrine of dependent co-origination, broadly speaking, is the Buddhist understanding of reality. Reality includes everything- natural world, environment, birds and beasts, human beings their thoughts and actions and, more than anything else, their suffering. The most crucial application of this doctrine, as we have already seen, is the origin and the cessation of suffering. Suffering is seen in Buddhism as similar to any other phenomena that come under the nature of dependent co-origination. Suffering has been explained without resorting to such extreme positions as eternalism (sassata-vāda) and annihilationism (uccheda-vāda) or existence and non-existence. The following conversation between the Buddha and the naked ascetic named Kassapa illustrates how the Buddha avoided the extremes of eternal existence and total destruction of soul by using the doctrine of dependent co-origination: Kassapa: Is suffering done by oneself? The Buddha: It is not so. K: Is suffering done by another? B: It is not so. K: Is suffering done by both oneself and another? B: It is not so. K: Is suffering, done neither by oneself nor by another, but arisen accidentally? B: It is not so. K: Is it the case that there is no suffering? B: No; suffering is. K: In that case, you do not see it? B: I do see it. (S II, 17)

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Without committing himself to any one of the four positions outlined in this dialogue the Buddha describes suffering as a dependently arisen phenomenon. The first position rejected in this conversation indicates to the belief in a soul as the agent who both commits acts and experiences their results. The second indicates to the position that things in one’s life are created by another agency and consequent denial of efficacy of moral behaviour. This is based on the view opposite to the first, namely, that doer and one who experience results are two different agents. The third is a combination of two wrong views, and the fourth indicates rejection of causation, which would amount to denial of moral responsibility. Rejecting these positions the Buddha explained (human) suffering, how it originates and ceases, ‘naturalistically’ through this doctrine. In the ultimate analysis, the doctrine of dependent co-origination represents the soul-less and god-less world view of the teaching of the Buddha.

The Buddhist criteria of good and bad: the need for formulating a set of Buddhist criteria In working for resolution of conflict it is very important that we know the nature of ethical judgments in Buddhism and how to judge what is good and bad and right and wrong according to the teaching of the Buddha. Following the above discussion on the Buddhist understanding of reality as dependently arisen it is clear that we can talk only very tentatively about everything including ethical judgments. In a dependently arisen reality there is no God and there cannot be any absolute positions to be held as ‘no matter what’. Reality is characterized by impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and no-soulness (anatta). Both ethical judgments and the situations that require making such judgments are dependently arisen and impermanent. The dependently arisen nature does not mean that there is no certainty or predictability at all. As we saw in the previous discussion the four characteristics of dependent co-origination make sure that dependently originated reality is not chaos. When it comes to ethics, this does not mean that we cannot make ethical generalizations or that we cannot arrive at some universal general ethical principles. For example, the five precepts (pañca-sīla) prescribed for people as their day-to-day morality come very close to universal ethical principles. These precepts are given not as ‘thou shall nots’, but as voluntary undertakings. They are not justified with reference to a Divine Being against whom one should not sin. When one who undertakes the five precepts break his

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promise it is not considered as sinning against the Buddha. The rules are not the Buddha’s in that sense. One does not have to account to the Buddha or to anyone else for one’s violations. If at all one has only to account to oneself. The morality in Buddhism receives its justification from certain considerations which are empirical in character. For example, the first precept, refraining from killing, is justified on the love everyone, all beings, have for their life. This universal nature is described in the Dhammapada in the following manner: Sabbe tasanti daṇdassa – sabbe bhāyanti maccuno Attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā- na haneyya na ghātaye Sabbe tasanti daṇdassa –sabbesaṃ jivitaṃ piyaṃ Attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā- na haneyya na ghātaye (Dhp v. 129-130) All fear punishment; all fear death. Comparing with oneself, one should neither harm nor kill. All fear punishment; life is dear to all. Comparing with… The first couplets of the two stanzas articulate the premise, namely the self­protective tendency all beings have for their life. The conclusion we derive from this premises is that we should neither harm nor kill any being. The same argument has been presented by the Buddha in commenting on a conversation King Kosala had with his queen, Mallika. The kings asks the queen whether she had anyone she would love more than she would love herself. To this question the queen answered in the negative. On being asked by the queen the king too gave the same answer. Later when the king reported this conversation to the Buddha he said the following: “Even if one were to survey all directions by mind one would not discover anyone dearer than oneself. In this manner for each person oneself is dearer. Therefore, one who loves oneself should not harm others” (S I, 75). The conclusion drawn from self-love (atta­kāma) is that one should not harm another who has a similar self-love (tasmā na hiṃse paraṃ atthakāmo). Similarly that beings love happiness (sukhakāmani bhūtāni... Dhp v. 131) and that they love happiness and despise pain (sukha-kāmā dukkha-paṭikkūlā... M I, 341) have been mentioned as common characteristics of all beings. This too may be understood as supporting the same universal tendency. In addition to this self-love existing in all beings, the discourses of the Buddha refer to some other characteristics of human nature which

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could be interpreted as proving the basis for a broad ethical outlook. For instance, intimately connected with the self-protective tendency of all beings is food or nutriment (āhāra). The Buddha says that “all beings subsist on nutriment” (sabbe sattā āharaṭṭhitikā), and makes a comprehensive analysis of nutriment on which being subsist. According to the Buddha there are four kinds of nutriment, namely, edible food (kabaliṅkāra-āhāra), contact (phassa), mental volition (manosañcetanā) and consciousness (viññāṇa). A glance at this classification shows that beings do not live by ‘bread’ alone. They need contacts for their senses, namely, for eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind they need forms, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects and mental phenomena (concepts). Mental volition is what lies behind human action for without volition (cetanā) there is no action. The last is consciousness which again arises based on the five sensory faculties plus mind as the mental faculty. While we consume edible food for the sustenance of our physical body we consume all the time without stop food for our emotional and intellectual satisfaction. Going further deep the Buddha explains: Monks, these four kinds of nutriment have what as their source, what is their origin, from what are they born and produced? These four kinds of nutriment have craving as their source, craving as their origin, they are born and produced by craving. (S II, 11-12; Bodhi 2000, 540) In the Buddhist understanding, or to be more specific, in the dependent co­-origination analysis, the process of generation of suffering from the point of craving is quite well articulated, and hence we do go into details here. (Pls. refer to Paṭicca Samuppāda analysis given above.) This analysis has dual significance for the present study. On the one hand, it explains a very important aspect of the nature of all beings in general and that of human beings in particular. On the other hand, it explains a crucial factor responsible for the generation of human suffering, suffering as a global phenomenon with wars, famines, floods, environmental degradation, natural resource depletion and the like. The Raṭṭhapāla-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M II, 54-74) lists four observations which broaden our understanding of reality and human nature. When the young and wealthy Raṭṭhapāla leaves behind all his wealth and opts to become a monastic follower of the Buddha the ruler of the area becomes puzzled. Questioned by him Raṭṭhapāla

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says that he made his decision having seen four things taught by the Buddha about the world. They are: The world is unstable, it is swept away (upanīyati loko addhuvo), the world is without protection, and without Over Lord (attāno loko anabhissaro), the world has nothing of its own, everything has to be left behind (assako loko sabbaṃ pahāya gamanīyaṃ), and the world is incomplete, insatiate, and slave to craving (ūṇo loko atitto taṇhā-dāso). The first statement asserts that nothing in human life is certain or permanent. This is to affirm impermanence, the first characteristic of reality in the teaching of three signata (tilakkhaṇa). The second asserts that there is no God to protect anyone in the world and that in this sense all beings do not have any real protection (from outside). The third is a corollary of the first, and says that one has to leave behind everything and depart from this life finally. The last most importantly asserts the incomplete-ness of all human beings which is the direct result of craving or ‘thirst’ (taṇhā). When further questioned by the king, Raṭṭhapāla establishes the validity of these claims with reference to king’s own life. Raṭṭhapāla gets the king to see that each of these assertions is true and valid with reference to his own life. Therefore, the assertions are not meant to be accepted as dogmatic truths. The verification of these assertions is one’s life itself which, in other words, means one’s own personal experience. In the case of Raṭṭhapāla seeing these characteristics was instrumental in his subsequent decision to leave the household life and live a life dedicated for spiritual development. In a more general manner we can conclude that the observations of this nature that the Buddha’s discourses contain provide the basis for any measures we develop for the solution of the problems of human life. Any Buddhist solution has to take into consideration the insights into human life and reality as discussed above. Furthermore, there are certain specific criteria developed in the Buddhist tradition in order to judge whether or not such solutions are good or right. A key factor that determines the nature of action is the intention behind it. In the Buddhist thought action is defined by its associated intention. In a well-known statement the Buddha identifies action with its intention (cetanāhaṃ bhikkhave kammaṃ vadāmi; Monks, I say that intention is action: A III, 415). The very first two stanzas of the Dhammapada articulate the same view when it says: all phenomena have mind as forerunner; they have mind as chief and they are mind-made (mano pubbaṅgamā dhammā - mano seṭṭhā manomayā). The intention can be either good

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or bad. Bad intentions are desire, hatred and delusion. Their opposites are good. These intentions are also described as ‘roots of unwholesome’ (akusala­mūla) and ‘roots of wholesome’ (kusala-mūla). Whether or not an action is good depends on what intentions or psychological roots are there behind that particular action. Another criterion adopted is the consequence of an action. One has to reflect on the possible consequences of an action before one does it. The Buddha articulates this view to Rahula who was his son in his life as Prince Siddhartha: Rahula, when you are doing an action with the body, you should reflect upon that same bodily action thus: ‘Does this action that I am doing with the body lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both? Is it an unwholesome bodily action with painful consequences, with painful results? When you reflect, if you know: ‘This action that I am doing with the body leads to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both; it is an unwholesome bodily action with painful consequences, with painful results’, then you should suspend such a bodily action. But when you reflect if you know: ‘This action that I am doing with my body does not lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both; it is a wholesome bodily action with pleasant consequences, with pleasant results,’ then you may continue in such a bodily action. (Bodhi 1995/2001, 525) What is significant in this analysis is that both agent and the patient have been put as deserving equal consideration. Thinking about oneself only is to be selfish. Not thinking about oneself is not being magnanimous always; it can also be being naive or foolish. The most acceptable action from the Buddhist point view is one that looks after the interests of the both parties. In this admonition the Buddha takes into consideration the nature of action as well as its outcome. An action must not cause affliction to any parties involved. Furthermore, an action must be wholesome and producing pleasant outcome. Although there is no guarantee that all wholesome actions always produce pleasant results or all unwholesome actions always produce unpleasant results the general theory in Buddhism is that wholesome actions produce pleasant results and unwholesome actions produce unpleasant results. The advice to Rahula has to be understood not as wholesomeness and

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unwholesomeness as having inseparable connection with pleasantness and unpleasantness but as underscoring two important aspects of any course of action. Thus, the most preferable action is one that is both wholesome and producing pleasant results. Two important outcomes of this discussion are, that the Buddhist ethics is justified on empirical observations that derive from one’s lifeexperience itself and that the nature of the intention and the possible result provide the criteria of good and bad and right and wrong actions. A Buddhist approach to conflict resolution has to be in line with these findings.

Buddhist analysis of conflict and its resolution Discussing the extent and the scope of his own teaching the Buddha often said that he taught only suffering and its cessation. This obviously refers to the four noble truths which constitute the essence of the Buddha’s realization. The word ‘buddha’ drives from ‘budh’ to understand or realize and means one who has understood. What did the Buddha realize? It is nothing other than the four noble truths. The four noble truths scheme has dual significance for the present discussion. On the one hand, as a concept it contains the central insight of the Buddha into human reality. On the other hand, as a scheme it provides us with an approach we may adopt in finding ways to resolve conflicts.

Scheme/structure of conflict resolution Reflecting on the scheme of the doctrine of four noble truths, we can see that it starts with an analysis of the problem. If we may substitute ‘suffering’ with ‘problem’ we may take this as understanding what the problem is. The Buddha says that the problem has to be known/ understood (pariññeyyaṃ). The second is to know the origin or the cause of the problem. In order to solve a problem completely one has to remove the cause/s of it. In this sense, the second noble truth involves removing the cause (pahātabbaṃ). In one instance the Buddha takes the metaphor of a tree and says that a tree cannot be destroyed when its roots are unhurt, and, in the like manner, suffering cannot be destroyed when the underlying roots of thirst are not destroyed (Dhp v. 338). The third is solution to the problem. It is to have a clear idea of what the solution is. The Buddha says that the solution has to be realized (sacchikātabbaṃ). The last is the means to achieve that solution. This is the practical aspect of the scheme. The path leading to the cessation of the problem has to

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be practiced (bhāvetabbaṃ). This scheme is ethical and psychological; theoretical and practical. In this manner, the four noble truths scheme may be used as a structure for conflict resolution endeavors. The four noble truth scheme has to be understood as something that operates within the doctrine of dependent co-origination. Taken away from its soteriological context dependent co-origination presents causality as an inter-connected process of events characteristic of any phenomenon in the world. The relationship between two events is not linear but can take many different modes such as mutual, simultaneous etc. Reality is not as simple as that can be captured within linear causality alone. It can be much more complex with intersecting causes and conditions. The dependent co-origination doctrine is likely to capture such situations more accurately. In the discourses it becomes quite clear that the Buddha used the doctrine of dependent co-origination as a way to avoid extreme positions. In our earlier discussion of dependent co-origination we discussed two instances where the Buddha used the doctrine in this manner. The Buddha described this as teaching the doctrine from the middle without approaching either of these two extremes (ete te ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti ... S II, 20). The Buddha is seen avoiding both practical and ideological extremes always. In the Dhammacakka-pavattana-sutta (discourse on the turning of the wheel of the Dhamma) the Buddha started by admonishing the five ascetics to avoid two extremes of self-mortification and sensual indulgence, and practice the Middle Path (majjhimā-paṭipadā) which is the Eightfold Path itself. This is an instance of the Buddha’s avoiding extremes in the practice. In many discourses the Buddha is seen as avoiding ideological extremes such as ‘is and is-not’ (atthitā-natthitā), self and other (atta-para), soul and no-soul (atta­-niratta), true and false (sacca-musā) etc. The Buddha thought that reality cannot be adequately captured through sharply contrasting categories as referred to above, and avoiding such simplistic categories the Buddha presented situations as dependently arisen. It is interesting to note that the idea of catuṣkoṭi (four-fold logical alternative) developed by later teachers such as Nagarjuna has this basic insight as its basis. Rejecting this dualistic world­view the Buddhists developed the idea of catuṣkoṭi as a tool to capture complex situations of reality. In addition to the basic dualistic scheme of ‘is’ and ‘is not’ the Buddhists added ‘both is and is not’ and ‘neither is and nor is not’ as the third and the fourth positions. The third is a combination of two

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mutually contradictory propositions for something can and cannot be the case simultaneously without being contradictory. The fourth refers to a state for which none of the above-mentioned positions are applicable. This could simply be for the reason that the particular concept used is not applicable to the particular case, or because the situation allegedly transcends the limits of language. Modern scholars such as KN Jayatilleke who studied this scheme have described it as ‘two- valued logic of four alternatives’ for at any given situation only one possibility is true and the rest is false. A closer analysis of instances of application of this scheme shows that this characterization is right only as a general rule. There are instances where more than one position is right depending on the situation or none of the four positions would apply. The well-known ten unanswered questions (avyākrta) is an example for propositions for which none of the four positions is applicable2 (which Jayatilleke has noticed). The upshot of this discussion is that any analysis of conflict according to Buddhism has to be in line with the philosophy of dependent co-origination.

Analysis of conflict A usual discussion of this nature would have started with providing a definition of what conflict is according to Buddhism. But we are not in a position to begin this discussion with such a clear-cut definition. While there is no concept in Buddhism that exactly corresponds to what we mean by conflict in conflict­resolution discourse the more important reason for this apparent inability to define has something to do with the non-substantialist world-view of Buddhism. It is claimed that one needs to capture what is considered to be the ‘unique characteristic’ (svalakṣaṇa) or the essence of that thing which is to be defined. Accordingly the Brahmanic tradition was in search of the unique characteristic or what is not shared by anything else as a precondition of defining process.3 2  See chapter VIII of my Nirvana and Ineffability: A Study of the Buddhist Theory of Reality and Language, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, Colombo, 1993. for a detailed study of this four­cornered logic. 3  Following the anātma tradition the later Buddhist logicians came up with what they called ‘anya-apoha’ (Apoha theory) or exclusion of the other as a way of defining. Consequently, while Hindu logicians were trying to identify the unique characteristic of cow in order to define it the Buddhists defined it as ‘not non­ cow’ the rationale of which is to separate cows from non-cows (what is not cow) and then define the cow as not ‘non-cow’ by taking out cow from the rest of the group of non-cows which covers everything other than cow. A large number of negative ‘definitions’ found in the discourses too have to be viewed in this light.

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With the no-soul view as its unique insight into reality the Buddhist cannot be looking for such an essence as the determining factor in the process of definition. This, however, does not mean that the Buddha did not give explanations looking like definitions or that he was not precise on what he was talking about. On the contrary, there are many definitionslike statements made by the Buddha in the course of his teaching. For example in describing nirvana the Buddha would say that ‘the extinction of rāga, dosa and moha is nirvana (yo kho āvuso rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo idaṃ vuccati nibbānaṃ: S IV, 250). But this is not taken as a hard and fast definitive definition. There are many other ‘definitions’ equally used in this context. For example, nirvana is also ‘defined’ as ‘the highest happiness’ (nibbānaparamaṃ sukhaṃ: Dhp v. 204), ‘the extinction of existence’ (bhava-nirodho nibbānaṃ) etc. Therefore, if we were to look for an exact definition of what conflict is in the Buddhist thought we would be looking in vain. At times, in the place of definition, usually one would find a whole series of synonyms given for a particular concept. For example in describing language the Buddha used three terms, loka-samaññā, lokanirutti, and loka-vohāra’ (‘traditions of the world, dialects of the world, conventions of the world’) (The discourses are full of similar examples. In particular later Abhidhamma tradition developed this to great lengths, at times giving synonyms amounting to a hundred!). These terms are not exact synonyms and they are not meant to be such either. But taken together they give different aspects or facets of the same phenomenon. The relationship between language and reality in Buddhism is not hard and fast or fixed but elastic, fluid and open-ended. With this background in mind when we look at the discourses we find concepts, referring to conflict situations, articulated by the Buddha. In describing ideological conflicts that were prevalent among various religious groups, three terms kalaha (contention), viggaha (dispute), and vivāda (debate) have been used quite often. These terms basically seem to refer to verbal disputes that these religious groups had among themselves, but not limited to verbal disputes. The Buddha dissociated himself from these happenings that were quite characteristic of the religious society he lived in. Once the Buddha said that he was not in dispute with the world, but the world was in dispute with him (nāhaṃ bhikkhave lokena vivadāmi, lokova mayā vivadati (S II, 138). These terms are usually not defined, but taken as understandable through the associated behaviour.

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In terms of description of these concepts three discourses in the Suttanipāta (Sn v. 862-914), namely, Kalahavivāda-sutta, Cūlaviyūhasutta and Mahāviyūha-sutta, are quite valuable. In the ‘Discourse on contentions and disputes’ (Kalahavivāda-sutta) the interlocutor asks the following question from the Buddha: Whence have arisen contentions and disputes, lamentations and grief together with avarice, and conceit and arrogance together with slander-whence have they arisen? The Buddha gives an explanation which is essentially based on the idea of dependent co-origination. According to him these disputes, lamentations, avarice, arrogance and conceit all arise owing to loved objects, which in turn arise due to desire (chanda), and desire has its roots in what is pleasant and unpleasant. The duality of pleasant and unpleasant causes falsehood and frequent doubting. The origin of the ideas of pleasant and unpleasant is due to contact (with such objects), which in turn arises due to nameand-form (psycho-physical personality). The Buddha finally locates the difficulty in the manner of one’s perception (saññā). It is the wrong manner of perception that causes the idea of pleasant and unpleasant on physical objects. It is perception that causes conceptual proliferation (papañca) such as pleasant and unpleasant. The remedial process begins with correcting the manner of perception, and the person with right perception does not engage in disputes (...na vivādameti: 876). What is analyzed is essentially how disputes (suffering) arise on account of attachment (thirst) for pleasurable objects. ‘The lesser discourse on the battle array’ (Cūlaviyūha-sutta) and ‘the Greater discourse of the battle array’ (Mahāviyūha-sutta) discuss disputes arising from ideological differences. One such issue is the dogmatic view of truth based on which different parties claim that they alone have true view and the others do not. The state of mind of such people has been described in the following manner: Possessed by a dogmatic view that oversteps the limit, maddened with conceit, deeming himself accomplished, he in his own mind has himself anointed (as perfect): and in such manner has that dogmatic view been grasped. (Sn v. 889; Jayawickrama 2001, 347) Such uncompromising judgments on the monopoly of truth lead to disputes. One needs to avoid uncompromising judgments on truth or falsehood or consequent validity or invalidity of ideological systems. The Greater discourse on the battle array is a further elaboration of the same theme which is summarized in the following words:

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The very teaching which some call supreme, others in turn call it defective: which dogma among them is true, for all of them claim themselves to be experts? (Sn v. 903; Jayawickrama 2001, 905) The answer provided is, again, non-dogmatism and non-grasping of views as true or false or right or wrong. In addition to these discourses in which disputes, contentions and debates are discussed there is a discourse in the Majjhima-nikāya collection in which the Buddha analyses peace. The name of the discourse is ‘Araṇa-vibhaṅga’ the literal rendering of which is analysis of non-war. In the Pali language ‘raṇa’ refers to war or conflict. When added negative prefix ‘a’ a+raṇa means non-war. Bhikkhu Ňanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi translate ‘araṇa’ as ‘non-conflict’. So this seems to be of direct relevance to the theme under discussion. Starting the discourse the Buddha sets forth the following propositions: i. One should not pursue sensual pleasure, which is low, vulgar, coarse, ignoble, and unbeneficial; and one should not pursue self-mortification, which is painful, ignoble and unbeneficial. The middle way discovered by the Tathagata avoids both extremes; giving vision, giving knowledge, it leads to peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to nibbāna. ii. One should know what it is to extol and what it is to disparage, and knowing both, one should neither extol nor disparage but should teach only the Dhamma. iii. One should know how to define pleasure, and knowing that, one should pursue pleasure within oneself. iv. One should not utter covert speech, and one should not utter overt sharp speech. v. One should speak unhurriedly, not hurriedly. vi. One should not insist on local language, and one should not override normal usage. In the subsequent analysis the Buddha explains that the two positions outlined in the first proposition tend to cause suffering, vexation, despair and fever. On the contrary, the middle path which avoids these extremes produces peace and happiness, and therefore one should practice it. With regard to the second, the Buddha says that if one were to disparage those who practice the above mentioned two extremes or extol those who have avoided them, that is not how to teach the Dhamma. The teaching of the Dhamma in the proper manner is

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neither to disparage nor to extol those who practice them but show the right and wrong of the practice itself. While ad hominem remarks are avoided, the preacher of Dhamma must target only the act itself. The third proposition stresses on defining pleasure not as lowly and ordinary but as involving more exquisite jhanic states. Having defined in that manner one should practice such higher forms of pleasure. On covert and overt speech the Buddha says that one should avoid covert speech which is untrue, incorrect and unbeneficial by all means. If such speech is true, correct and beneficial one should still try to not to utter it. If one really has to utter such true, correct and beneficial covert speech one should know the right time for it. The overt speech which is untrue, incorrect and unbeneficial should not be uttered on any ground. The harsh overt speech which is true and correct but unbeneficial, one should try to not to utter. But when overt harsh speech is true, correct and beneficial one should know proper time to utter it. This analysis highlights that speech has to be true, correct and beneficial and not otherwise. Harsh speech is allowed only when it is true, correct and beneficial. A speech which is true and correct still can be unbeneficial, and consequently, truthfulness and correctness alone are not criteria of acceptable speech, according to the Buddha. The next proposition on hurried and unhurried speech contains a practical advise to speak leisurely so that it is clear and not tiresome for the speaker. The last on not insisting on local language and not overriding the normal usage may have been given in the context of the presence of many local dialects in the Northern India during the time of the Buddha. But the deeper message contained in it is to avoid any tenacious attachment to one’s own language as better or higher. This advice would have made lot of sense in the context of linguistic purity advocated by Brahmins who took Vedic language to be sacred. Language being a bone of severe contention, many conflicts in the modern world have their origins and reason for continuation in language. The Buddha advocates a relaxed attitude toward language. In the Buddha’s view language is only an instrument to be used without getting attached to. Since all the situations described in the six propositions lead to conflict, the Buddha admonishes that in order to have non-conflict or peace one should behave appropriately with regard to each situation. Apart from the above concepts which seem directly to refer to conflicts, a general concept in which a broader conception of conflict can be articulated is suffering, the key concept in the four noble truth scheme

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referred to above. All the four truths in reality are different aspects of this key concept. The concept of suffering or dukkha is the Buddhist explanation of the nature of human existence. Some critics tend to think that this emphasis on suffering makes Buddhism a kind of pessimism. Since the Buddha talked about suffering with the ultimate aim of eradicating it one cannot call Buddhism a pessimism. Nevertheless one has to accept the centrality of the concept of dukkha in the teaching of the Buddha. Describing what prompted him to renounce his household life the Buddha said: Bhikkhus, before my enlightenment, while I was still a Bodhisatta, not yet fully enlightened, it occurred to me: Alas, this world has fallen into trouble, in that it is born, ages, and dies, it passes away and is reborn, yet it does not understand the escape from this suffering [headed by] aging and death. When now will an escape be discerned from this suffering [headed by] aging and death? (S II, 10; Bodhi 2000, 537) This shows that the Buddha started his noble quest from this very understanding. What is meant by dukkha in the teaching of the Buddha is not merely the suffering or pain to which we as ordinary human beings are accustomed in our daily life. The tradition identifies three different aspects of suffering. The ordinary human suffering is called ‘sufferingsuffering’ (dukkha-dukkha). This includes all physical and mental pains we undergo in the course of daily life. The suffering caused by the change of things, situations and individuals is called ‘suffering of change’ (vipariṇāma-dukkha). The third is called ‘suffering of constructed phenomena’ (saṅkhāra-dukkha). The term ‘saṅkhāra’ covers a very wide meaning in the teaching of the Buddha. In this context what is meant by saṅkhara is what comes under its most common meaning, namely, the conditioned or dependently arisen phenomena. When we talk about dependently arisen phenomena this covers both the individual person and the universe or the physical world which he inhabits. As dependently arisen phenomena both these things are subject to impermanence, suffering and no­soulness (anicca, dukkha, anatta). The Buddha emphasizes that all the constructed / or dependently arisen phenomena are impermanent and they arise and cease (aniccā vata saṅkhārā-uppādavayadhammino : D II, 157). The physical world around us is dependently arisen and hence it is subject to change all the time. According to the Buddhist understanding

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the things in the world decay and perish; the world itself is bound to perish. This happens not abruptly but as a result of an ageing process that happens at all times. Although Buddhism talks about this change at macro scale it pays more attention on the ‘world’ at micro scale, as individual. In a well-known statement the Buddha asserts that “the world, its origin, its cessation and the path leading to its cessation are found within this fathom-long body with perception and mind” (S I, 62). The individual referred to here is understood as ‘the five aggregates of clinging’ (pañca-upādāna-khandha). In the standard analysis of suffering in the Dhamma-cakka-pavattana-sutta (Discourse on the turning of the wheel of Dhamma: S V, 420-4) the Buddha sums up by saying that “in brief the five aggregates characterized by clinging are suffering”. This suggests that the suffering, Buddhism is interested in, is basically suffering associated with human being. Human being is a combination of five aggregates (khandha), namely, physical form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), mental constructions (saṅkhāra) and consciousness (viññāṇa). These are called ‘aggregates characterized by clinging’ for it is to these aspects that one develops attachment and clinging as one’s self. All these aspects, as we saw in our analysis of dependent co-origination, are dependently arisen, and hence do not have any independent existence. The physical body which appears in rather a solid form arises and ceases all the time; it is not a stable phenomenon. Feelings, perceptions, mental volitions, and consciousness - all are dependently arisen; they too arise and cease continuously. In the absence of belief in soul, some followers of the Buddha were of the view that it is consciousness that does the function of the soul. The Buddha rejected this view by saying: I have described consciousness as dependently arisen; there is no arising of consciousness without conditions (paticcasamuppannaṃ viññāṇaṃ vuttaṃ mayā; aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇassa sambhavo: M I, 258). By means of this analysis the Buddha takes away any notion of stable reality, traditionally known as soul or self, in human being. Suffering in its deepest sense arises by clinging (upādāna) to these five aggregates. As the dependent co-origination shows, conditioned by craving clinging arises (taṇhāpaccayā upadānaṃ), and from that point onwards process leads to the whole mass of suffering. Suffering spoken at this level is much deeper than ordinary physical and mental suffering. One’s attachment to the five aggregates is the basis of suffering at the individual level. It is the same with much

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larger dimensions of suffering existing in society, country and world. Although the main thrust of the teaching of the Buddha is suffering at the individual level, for it is at that level ultimately suffering has to be addressed, suffering at larger social level has not been neglected. Discussing the dangers of the attachment to sensual pleasures, the Buddha says: With sensual pleasures as the cause, sensual pleasures as the source, sensual pleasures as the basis, the cause being simply sensual pleasures, kings quarrel with kings, nobles with nobles, Brahmins with Brahmins, householders with householders,; mother quarrels with son, son with mother, father with son, son with father; brother quarrels with brother, brother with sister, sister with brother, friend with friend. And here in their quarrels, brawls, and disputes they attack each other with fists, clods, sticks, or knives, whereby they incur death or deadly suffering. (Mahā-dukkhakkhandha-sutta, M I, 83-90 [Nanamoli and Bodhi 1995/2001, 181]) The attachment to sensual pleasures (kāma-taṇhā) has been described as one of the three types of ‘thirst’ (taṇhā) which cause suffering. The other two types, thirst for existence, and thirst for non-existence are not as prominent in an ordinary individual as the thirst for pleasures. Pleasures are described usually as five, namely, pleasures deriving from material form, sound, smell, taste, and touch. These correspond to the five sensory faculties. What is even more important in this context is the pleasures that have been given as six-fold including the ‘dhammas’ or conceptual and ideological things as the object of the faculty of mind. Kāma or pleasure in this context is understood as covering everything one would get attached to, including even the concepts and ideologies. This last aspect of kāma is very important for ultimately it is this connection with the mind that produces real thirst for pleasures. Explaining this psychological state the Buddha says: kāma is not all these colourful things in the world; what constitutes man’s kāma is the conceptual-kāma (na te kāmā yāni citrāni loke - saṅkappa-rāgo purisassa kāmo: (S I, 22). It is a part of the world that there are things that people consider to be beautiful. It is people who generate desire on those things and create suffering for themselves and others. Ultimately, this means that thirst is within one’s mind. In the last analysis it is a creation of the mind.

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Resolution of conflict A certain deity asked the following question from the Buddha: A tangle inside, a tangle outside This generation is entangled in a tangle I ask you this, O Gotama, Who can disentangle this tangle? The Buddha gave the following answer: A man established on virtue, wise, Developing the mind and wisdom A bhikkhu ardent and discreet, He can disentangle this tangle. (S I, 13; Bodhi 2000,.101) Inside and outside tangles referred to here are forms of internal and external suffering people are prone to experience. Internal tangles are deep psychological conflicts people suffer from. External tangles are conflicts people develop with their environment. The answer given by the Buddha articulates the threefold training (tisso sikkhā), virtue, concentration and wisdom (sīla, samādhi, paññā). This path articulated by the Buddha in his numerous sermons is a gradual path. It has been described as “gradual training, gradual action, gradual practice” (anupubba-sikkhā, anupubbakiriyā, anupubba-paṭipadā: A IV, 201). The path begins with morality (sīla) upon which one builds one’s spiritual progress. Development of a stable mind is followed by development of wisdom which leads one to see things as they really are. Although the path, in its ultimate application, is meant to attain freedom from all suffering, it is the same path that one has to apply for whatever the problems one faces before achieving the final goal. The salient feature in the path is to provide remedy at the root cause of the problem. This in the last analysis means transforming one’s attitudes, views and perceptions. Real behavioral change will take place only when the psychological basis for behaviour is transformed. In the Noble Eightfold Path, the first two aspects, right view (sammā-diṭṭhi) and right thought (sammā-saṅkappa) constitute basis appropriate for proper behaviour. The right view is described as developing understanding of the four noble truths. Such an understanding is considered as the basis for right physical, verbal and mental behaviour. The right thought is to develop the thoughts of renunciation or giving up, non-hatred and non-violence. Development of these two aspects results in a radical change in one’s way of thinking and patterns of behaviour. This inner transformation is a must in any process meant to forge a lasting solution to any problem.

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Inner transformation involves getting rid of defiling factors from one’s mind. The ultimate aim is to get rid of all defiling factors for good. This, however, cannot happen all at once. Like the practice itself the transformation aspect too happens gradually. The tradition recognizes that defilements can be avoided at three levels, namely, temporary avoidance (tadaṅga-pahāṅa), avoidance by suppression (vikkhambhanapahāṇa), and avoidance by total destruction (samuccheda-pahāṇa). These three levels of avoidance are recognized as milestones in the path. At the initial level defilements will disappear temporarily, for instance, as when one is engaged in a particular practice. Once that particular engagement is over it is possible that the defilements are reemerged. Although this is a very short-lived situation it still is desirable. The second is a more durable state of stability and purity of mind resulting from suppression of defilements by means of meditation. For example, at the first Jhana level one’s five hindrances (desire, ill-will, sloth and torpor, confusion and perplexity, and doubt) disappear and mind becomes calm and quiet. This is relatively a more stable state; but not permanent. The last is the state in which all defilements are gone from the mind and one becomes totally purified and free. The Buddhist solution to conflicts, in this manner, can be applicable at different levels. Although the optimum state is the last, the path accommodates stages prior to it. In conflict resolution too we may accordingly visualize different stages of dealing with conflicts. Buddhism has developed a good number of conceptual tools that can be used in the process of inner transformation. The concept of mindfulness (sati) mentioned in the eightfold path, and developed in detail in the Discourses of Establishing Mindfulness (Satipaṭṭhānasutta available in both Long Discourses - Dīgha-nikāya (D II, 290315) and Middle Length Discourses – Majjhima-nikāya (M I, 55-63) can be regarded as foremost among such tools. Sati is described as ‘the concentration in wholesome mind’, (kusala citta - ekaggatā) (Vism 84) and characterized by full and clear awareness of everything one does says and thinks. In the Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta four areas have been identified as fields to practice mindfulness. They are: behaviour and nature of physical body (kāya), feelings (vedāna), mind or thoughts (citta) and good and bad mental phenomena (dhamma). The practice plainly requires that one be mindful and aware of all the physical activities and the impermanent and filthy nature of physical body, various kinds of feeling one experiences both physically and mentally, various thoughts and emotional states of the mind and finally, both good and bad mental

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states and concepts found in the mind. When one is mindful and aware of these matters it is expected that they dissociate themselves from two extreme attitudes, namely, excessive attachment and aversion toward what one is mindful or aware of (vineyya loke abhijjhā domanassaṃ: Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta). This avoidance of emotional extremes is considered to be the most important requirement of this practice. Conflicts usually have their origin in either of these emotional extremes. In the satipaṭṭhāna practice one is trained to work, speak, and think without extreme attachment or aversion. The Buddha describes this practice as ‘the direct path for the purification of people, for overcoming grief and lamentation, for doing away with suffering and unhappiness, for the comprehension of knowledge and realization of nirvana’. Widely practiced today in many parts of the world, mindfulness can be used as an effective tool in conflict resolution processes. Inner transformation being the key aspect of the Buddhist practice we find many tools developed in the discourses. In the Discourse on all taints (Sabbāsava­-sutta, Majjhima-nikāya 2) the Buddha describes seven ways of dealing with what are called taints (āsava) or defiling conditions (kilesa). There are taints that should be abandoned by seeing (dassanā)....by restraining (saṃvarā) ,...by using (paṭisevanā),... by enduring (adhivāsanā),...by avoiding (parivajjanā),...by removing (vinodanā ), and the taints to be abandoned by developing (bhāvanā). The taints that should be abandoned by seeing are those views arising as a result of reflecting on what is unfit for reflection and not reflecting on what is fit for reflection. What is unfit for reflection are those views that are associated with one’s past, present and future existence. Such views tend to conflate one’s self-view and hence are not fit to be reflected on. Instead one should reflect on things, namely, the four noble truths, that are conducive for non-arising of the non-arisen taints and removal of taints that are already arisen. One needs to see these taints in order to abandon them. To be abandoned by restraining are the taints associated with unrestrained six sensory faculties. Taints associated with the four requisites, robe, alms-food, lodging and medicine, have to be abandoned by using those requisites wisely. Taints abandoned by enduring are such unwelcome conditions as heat, hunger, thirst, bite of insects, harsh words, unpleasant physical feelings and the like. Taints to be abandoned by avoiding are unfriendly animals, unsuitable places to walk, travel and live and bad friends and the like. Thoughts of sensual desire, ill­will and

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cruelty are taints to be abandoned by removing. By developing the seven factors of enlightenment (mindfulness, investigation-of-states, energy, rapture, tranquility, concentration, and equanimity) all the taints prevalent in oneself will be abandoned. As we can see, these seven conceptual tools have been explained in relation to the path leading to the final goal. But basically they have all to do with development of mind and attitudes conducive for mental development. These tools also shed light on attitudes one should develop in relation to situations in life. For example, whatever the taints that arise depending on the four requisites of life, food, clothing, lodging and medicine, have to be abandoned by using those requisites wisely, or in the course of using them in wise manner. One could argue that by simply avoiding using these requites (at the expense of one’s life!) one can avoid taints deriving from them. But this is obviously not practical although it might be appealing to some hard-core practitioners of religion. The attitude adopted in the discourse is that one needs to use these requisites although they could lead to taints. One has to be careful not to generate taints in the process. Certain situations in life, contrary to what is just discussed, plainly have to be avoided physically. Among such things are included bad friends of whom we will say more later. Physical hardships such as those caused by climatic conditions etc. have to be endured when working for a higher purpose. In this manner these seven conceptual tools are rooted in practice, and they provide us with a set of useful tools to be made use of in forging a Buddhist practice of conflict resolution.

Environment for conflict resolution The methods meant for promoting resolution of conflicts cannot be practiced in a vacuum. It is necessary that there is proper environment as a prerequisite. To live in a proper environment (patirūpa-desa-vāsa) has been described as one of the auspicious factors in the well-known Maṅgala-sutta. The later commentarial literature developed this concept further and list four factors that may affect adversely or in friendly manner. The four factors are (i) one’s particular birth as a human being or as an animal etc., (ii) one’s physical appearance, (iii) the particular time one does some action, and (iv) the particular manner one does some action. These factors can affect adversely (vipatti) in some situations, while in some other situations the very same factors may be helpful (sampatti). In the above discussion we noted that bad friends belong to a category that should be avoided. In many instances the Buddha has stressed on the

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importance of having good friends. The need for having good friends (kalyana-mittatā) has been stressed in the context of household life aiming at material development. In the ‘Advice to Sigāla’ (Sigālovādasutta: D 31) the Buddha described four types of good friends as well as another four types of bad friends (pāpa­mitta). In the same discourse the Buddha lists having bad friends as a door for the destruction of wealth. In the ‘Discourse to Vyagghapajja’ (A IV, 281-285) the Buddha lists having good friends as one of the four factors necessary for worldly advancement. The applicability of this matter in the monastic life dedicated for reaching the final goal has been emphasized even more. Once when Ananda said that a half of the development of monastic life is due to good friends the Buddha corrected him saying that the entire development in religious life, not a half, is due to good friends. The crucial importance of the role of friends in one’s both worldly life as well spiritual life has been clearly recognized in Buddhism.

Some more conceptual resources The teaching of the Buddha is rich with conceptual tools and categories that may be used in developing a theory and practice of conflict resolution. In particular such tools are abundant in the discourses addressed to the lay followers. The ‘Advice to Sigāla’ mentioned above, for example, refer to four biases (agati) that should be avoided in public enterprises, four defiled actions (karmakleśa) to be avoided, and four good ways of treating others (saṅgrahavastu). People become biased due to desire (chanda), anger (dosa), fear (bhayā) and delusion (moha), and such behaviours need to be avoided in one’s personal life as well as one’s public life. Conflicts of various dimensions arise due the biased behaviour. Such conflicts have to be resolved by not being biased. The four defiled actions are killing, stealing, sexual misconduct and lying. In ‘the Advice to Sigāla’ the Buddha refers to consuming alcoholic drinks (or intoxicating drugs) under the six ways of destruction of wealth. The five acts taken together constitute the five precepts the Buddha prescribed to the lay society. Both these categories include vices that cause conflict in society. Violating these basic social rules causes fear and enmity among people. Consequently, these have been described by the Buddha as five fears (pañca bhayāni) and five enmities (pañca verāni). In the heart of many conflicts are fears and enmities created by adverse social behaviour of some groups. Therefore, refraining from such behavior is quite clearly conducive for resolution of conflicts.

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Giving (dāna), pleasant speech (piyavacana), work for the welfare of the others (attha-criyā) and treating people as if they were oneself (samānattatā) are described as four good ways of treating others. These qualities are given as the bases of good social relations. They also contain seeds of building peace and goodwill among individuals and societies. Finally, there is what is called ‘ten royal virtues’ (dasa-rājadhamma), mentioned frequently in the Jātaka literature, constituting the practice of a good king. These virtues are: generosity (dāna), morality (sīla), sacrifice (pariccaga), straightness (ajjava), mildness (maddava), austerity (tapa), absence of anger (akkodha), harmless-ness (avihiṃsā), forbearance (khanti) and non-friction (avirodhana). Although these virtues are given as characteristics of an ideal ruler they are equally applicable to modern-day non-personal states in which ultimately it is people who make decisions.

Conclusion The teaching of the Buddha is first and foremost a practical path aimed at deliverance from suffering. The Buddha was basically a teacher who taught what he realized to people and showed that, like he did, they too can escape from suffering. He was a path-finder, a pointer of path and a guide, but not a saviour. The Dhamma he taught is timeless in its applicability. Human suffering has been a fact throughout the known history, and it is likely that it will continue to be so in the future. Conflicts are a form of human suffering, and the teaching of the Buddha should be applicable here without any doubt. What we discussed so far should have amply demonstrated that there is no dearth of material, concepts or conceptual tools relevant for conflict analysis and conflict resolution in the teaching of the Buddha. Over the time there has developed a ‘religion’ around the teaching of the Buddha in many geographical locations where it happened to find itself in. This religious aspect is not altogether bad for it has helped to develop some very rich cultural traditions throughout the regions of Asia. Although in the present analysis we did not study the possible contributions for conflict resolution from these cultures it is a fact that Buddhism has been, through centuries, a civilizing force in these locations. Today Buddhism is fast spreading to areas where it has not been before. New Buddhist cultures are being evolved as a result. People are making new experiments with this old religion and system of thought. Consequently, we find new forms of practice such as socially engaged

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Buddhism, green Buddhism and Buddhist feminism, all coming under applied Buddhism. Conflict in its varied form is only a manifestation of human vulnerability which Buddhism takes as its main burden. The task before us today is to re-present the teaching of the Buddha so that it can provide much needed guidance to our society.

20. Mental Health and Gender from a Buddhist Perspective*

Introduction The following matters will be discussed in the introduction: i. The aims of this study, ii. Definition of key terms, and iii. Methodology and structure of the paper. (i)The aim of the present study is to develop a conceptual framework, basically based on Buddhist philosophical insights that could be effectively used to promote mental health in a gender sensitive manner. The rationale of this understanding is derived from the acceptance of the current social reality that there is substantial gender based mental illhealth in our society, and that the teaching of the Buddha has some very useful insights to offer in providing answers and remedial measures to this crucial problem which, both overtly and covertly, is eating into the fabric of our society. The aim of the paper is to bring into highlight the Buddha’s insightful and practical solutions and guidelines concerning the promotion of mental health that is being adversely affected by gender-related issues. (ii) In this study there are three key terms, namely, (a) mental health (b) gender and (c) Buddhism. Though all three key terms refer to considerably broad areas that call for substantial discussion, the terms will be defined in a manner that would suffice the present purpose. * This chapter is a revised version of the paper [“How mental health can be addressed in a gender sensitive manner using Buddhist philosophy”] written by Asanga Tilakaratne for UNIFEM 2006. The following specialists headed by the author representing various fields took part in the initial discussions in developing the content of this paper: Oliver Abenayaka, Dilrukshi de Alwis, Padmal de Silva, DVJ Harishchandra, Agnes Mendis, Sanath Nanayakkara, Sriyani Perera, Sajeeva Samaranayaka, Laksman Senanayake, Yuki Sirimane, Samaneri [now, bhikkhunī] Suvimali, and Manjula Vithanapathirana.

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(a) Mental Health: Mental health is a phenomenon covering a wide area of mental well-being. Mental health as defined by the USA Surgeon Generals’ Report on Mental Health, “refers to successful performance of mental function, resulting in productive activities, fulfilling relationships with other people, and the ability to adapt, to change and cope with adversity.” According to the WHO (1981): Mental health is the capacity of the individuals, group and the environment to interact with one another in ways that promote subjective well-being. The optional development and use of mental abilities (cognitive, affective and rational), the achievement of individual and collective goals consistent with justice and the attainment and presentation of conditions of fundamental equality. Commenting on the above definition Jill Astbury says: This definition is significant because it goes beyond biological individualism... By adopting a positive, multi-level, transactional concept, this WHO definition acknowledges the complexity of inter-relationship that extends from the individual to the environment, the critical role of the social context and the importance of justice and equality in determining mental health. (Astbury 1999) These discussions highlight the complexity of the concept denoted by mental health. On one end of the continuum is mental illness meaning, ‘impaired mental functioning’ resulting in conflicts, despair and even morbidity; and on the other end is ‘successful mental functioning’ leading to productive activities, dynamic and beneficial relationships with others bringing about trust, understanding, cooperation, peace and joy. Thus, mental health is an essential element for success in all spheres of life. When viewed from the point of view of Buddhism, which is an out and out psychological teaching, mental health refers to a still more serenely elevated state of purity and freedom of mind resulting from total eradication, or at least, weaning out different defilements that make the mind sick (ātura citta). That this sickening of the mind by the influence of various defilements is such a common feature among human beings, irrespective of any gender affiliations, that the Buddha declares that though one may claim to be truly free from physical diseases

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for some period of time, it is hard to find people who could claim even a moment of real mental health; and the only exception to this is the liberated person (A II, 143). Nevertheless, in this research the level of mental health focused upon is the peaceful and balanced state of mind that enables one to lead a normal happy life conducive to the well-being of oneself as well as of others. (b) Gender: In its commonest and the broadest sense the term gender refers to the state of being male or female. However, this male female difference could be better and more appropriately referred to as ‘sex’ which connotes the biological difference as against ‘gender’, which has more a psychological connotation, suggesting the nuances of masculinity and femininity applicable mainly in cultural and social contexts. In this research the term gender is used in this latter connotation, though it is more concerned with the examination of the state of mental health of the females who are adversely affected by gender-based issues. This is because it is the women-folk who are more vulnerable and often fall victims to such issues, and are forced by number of circumstances to suffer silently. (c) Buddhism: This term derived from ‘Buddha’ refers to the teaching of Siddhartha Guatama, the Buddha [the Enlightened One]. Buddhism has a long history spanning a period of 2550 years within which period its thought blossomed and flourished, giving rise to a number of schools. Three of these schools namely, Theravada (Teaching of the Elders) prevalent mainly in South and South-East Asian countries (Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma etc.), Mahayana, flourishing mainly in FarEast Asian countries (China, Japan, Korea etc.), and Vajrayāna, existing in Tibet and surrounding areas, presently serve as the religion of, at least, one-fifth of the world population. In this research however, the designation ‘Buddhism’ is used to refer to the teachings of the Buddha that are presented in the canon of the Theravadins, maintained through the Pali Language. Though there is no total consensus on this, the generally accepted view is that this Theravada Pali canon, taken as a whole, is the most comprehensive, well preserved, perhaps oldest and the most dependable source regarding the Buddha’s teaching. Theravada Pali canon, called the Tipiṭaka (Pali) or Tripiṭaka (Sanskrit), consists of three ‘baskets’ (Piṭaka) or collections containing: i. Disciplinary rules to be followed by monks and nuns (Vinaya Piṭaka); ii. Doctrinal discourses (Sutta Piṭaka); iii. Analytical and explanatory presentation of the fundamental teachings of discourses and, hence,

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generally referred to as higher doctrine (Abhidhamma Piṭaka). These will be used as the primary sources for the basic teachings of the Buddha with regard to gender-based issues.

Philosophical and ethical basis of Buddhism This part of the discussion will be organized under the following themes: (i) Quest for ending suffering; (ii) Central philosophy of Buddhism; and (iii) The Four Noble Truths.

(i) Quest for ending suffering: Unlike most of the religious teachings

found across the globe, which are mainly theocentric, Buddhism is an anthropocentric teaching. Its primary concern is human being, his world of experience and the predicament he undergoes, vicissitudes he faces while living. These predicaments are referred to collectively by the Pali term, ‘dukkha’, a term often rendered into English, rather inaccurately, as suffering. (We will nevertheless use the term ‘suffering’ to denote this idea for want of a better English term) Suffering in the Buddhist use is a term pregnant with different nuances of meaning such as nonsatisfactoriness, discontentment, despair, unhappiness, mental agony etc, bringing out the sickened state of mind, a mental characteristic often experienced by human beings under various circumstances due to various causes and conditions. Preponderance of suffering in human experience made the Buddha declare that the world (loka) is established on it Dukkhe loko patiṭṭhito-ti. (S I, 40). In fact, it was this awareness of the preponderance of suffering that made the Buddha, yet a lay person as Prince Siddhartha, set out on the noble quest of finding a way out of it. The sentiment that motivated him has been articulated in the following words: This world, alas, is in a sorry state; in that it is born, ages, and it dies; it passes away and is reborn, yet it does not understand the way of escape from this suffering, namely, aging and death. When will deliverance be found from this suffering, namely, aging and death? (Mahāpadāna-sutta, D II, 1-54) According to this statement what Siddhartha perceived as suffering is the overall tragic nature of human life which could well be perceived by people as quite ordinary. He set himself on what is described as ‘noble quest’ in order to find a solution to this universal problem. The most lucid account of it is found in the discourse called the Ariyapariyesana-sutta (M I, 160-175). According to the Discourse, this

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noble quest was motivated by both the awareness of the prevalence of mental ill-health that makes life a misery and a drudgery as well as by the strong urge within to find ‘a sublime state of mental peace, (santivarapadaṃ) that is conducive to a smoother, cooler, conflict-free way of living. Therefore, any effort to make use of Buddhist insights to promote mental health, whether it is of men or women, it is important to understand the true significance of this noble quest. As highlighted in the above discourse and many others as well, falling victim to this mental ill-health, in general, is the overall unsatisfactory nature of human life. It is further evident that human beings become vulnerable to such mental sicknesses because of their wrong conception of reality, resulting from wrong perception. Our perception is usually distorted by our ‘likes’ and ‘dislikes’, and this makes us perceive everything, -ourselves and everything with which we come into contact and association- not as they are but as our wishes, which are regulated and motivated by our desires, (rāga/lobha) revulsions (dosa) and delusions (moha), want them to be. Thus, we see impermanent things as permanent, things generating unhappiness as bringing happiness, and things non-substantial as substantial. This is our common predicament, and this includes also numerous issues and conflicts that are genderbased, for these too are the outcome of our wrong perception of the nature of things. The noble quest of Prince Siddhartha for what is wholesome was aimed at seeing things in their true nature, thus putting an end to mental suffering caused by misdirected perceptions. Though Buddhism is also a religion replete with rites and rituals and a pantheon of gods, for this particular purpose of using it to obtain insights conducive to the promotion of mental health, its philosophical presuppositions should be correctly grasped. It is by such grasping of the fundamental teachings of the Buddha that one could really draw out the Buddhist insights that help promote mental health that is conducive to, successful performance of mental functions, resulting in productive activities, fulfilling relationships with other people, and the ability to adapt to change and cope with adversity. (ii) Central Philosophy of Buddhism: Dependent Origination All religions attempt to explain how things are caused. Generally this explanation is referred to as the doctrine or the theory of causation or causality. Among the many theories of causation present at the time Buddhism arose, at least, four theories stand prominent.

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a. External causation, i.e. everything including suffering is caused by an outside agent, usually God. b. Internal causation, i.e. it is caused by the individual self / soul which is the counterpart of the universal soul (Brahman), the matrix of everything. c. Combination of the above two theories, and d. No causation, i.e. everything happens without causes or conditions, by mere chance. Through examining reality, the Buddha, for the first time in the history of religions, came up with a revolutionary causal theory which he described as the ‘teaching by the middle’. The Kaccānagotta-sutta of the Saṃyutta-nikāya very succinctly puts this teaching as follows: This world, Kaccana, for the most part depends upon a duality -upon the notion of existence and the notion of non-existence. But for one who sees the origin of the world as it really is with correct wisdom there is no notion of non-existence in regard to the world. And for one who sees the causation of the world as it really is with correct wisdom there is no notion of existence in regard to the world .... ‘All exists’ : Kaccana, this is one extreme. ‘All does not exist’, this is the second extreme, the Tathagata teaches the Dhamma by the middle: ‘with ignorance as condition volitional formations comes to be; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness...’ (Bodhi 2000, 544) This causal law which the Buddha discovered as operating in nature is called ‘paṭicca-samuppāda’, the causal law of dependent co-origination. It is presented in the following succinct formula: When this is, this is (imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti) With the arising of this, this arises (imassauppādā idaṃ uppajjati) In the absence of this, this is not (imasmiṃ asati idaṃ nahoti) With the cessation of his, this ceases (imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirijjhati) (S II. 28) This idea as an underlying aspect of reality is not Buddha’s creation but what he discovered as a general principle valid in all spheres: spiritual, physical, social and so on. This realization enabled the Buddha

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to discard the belief in God, Atman / Brahman, and also the other then prevalent causal theories. The Buddha already saw the prevalence of the conditioned relations in everything, and he explained that things are caused as a result of this conditioned relations. This enabled him to explain causation without positing any independent, internal or external agency. It further enabled him to understand that nothing is static; that everything is a process, changing and continuing according to causes and conditions. It is this understanding of the general causal law that made him look at human being’s predicament in a new perspective. Applying this general causal law to the specific problem of suffering experienced by unenlightened beings, the Buddha himself evolved a particular twelvelinked theory of dependent co-origination: Ignorance> mental formations > consciousness> psycho-physical personality> gateways of sense-perception>contact> feeling> craving > grasping> becoming> birth> decay, death, sorrow etc. These conditions affect and influence each other. Though the list begins with ‘ignorance’, Buddhism speaks neither of a first cause nor of a single cause; nor does it accept any agent that operates these conditions. This is a natural law operating on its own, neither in a pre-determined or destined way nor in a chance manner. The simple rule is that, when these causes and conditions are present there arises the specific consequence, that is suffering (dukkha). The uniqueness of this theory is that it explain man’s predicament as something not caused or imposed by a superior external or internal agent, but as something arising dependent on a number of causes and conditions, and that the predicament ceases with the removal of these causes and conditions. It also shows that the individual has the ability to remove these causes and conditions and put an end to all suffering by himself. (iii) The four noble truths: The four noble truths contain the essence of the Buddha’s teaching. It is called the ‘totally elevating teaching’ for it helps elevate the individual from his ordinary ‘worldling’ state in which he lives quite unaware of his predicament and hence suffering, to that of a ‘noble’ state. In this state he is fully aware and awakened about his predicament and hence, capable of eradicating it with proper understanding.

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The four noble truths are: noble truth of suffering, noble truth of arising of suffering, noble truth of cessation of suffering, and noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of suffering. By this very structure of the four truths it should be clear that this is another way of applying the theory of dependent co-origination to the problem of suffering and its cessation. There is suffering and there is a cause for its origin; whatever that is arisen due to causes has to cease with the removal of those causes; if such removal is possible, then there should be a way for it. The first truth explains that all vicissitudes of life and life itself are characterized by suffering. The second suggests craving as the most palpable cause of this suffering. The Third shows the possibility of removal of this cause, and the fourth lays down a practice constituted of eight factors which, if developed properly, would lead to the total eradication of suffering. These eight factors are: right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. These eight factors are categorized under a threefold training namely, virtue (sῑla) (consisting of disciplining of mainly verbal and physical activities), concentration (samādhi) (that it is disciplining, cleansing and concentrating the mind), and wisdom (paññā) (leading such cultured mind to see things as they are). The total outcome expected of this threefold training is a complete inner revolution of the individual, bringing about a change of his views, attitudes, beliefs, outlooks, which are utterly self-centered and egoistic, into those which are absolutely unselfish, altruistic, compassionate and sympathetic to all alike. An individual with a character cultured through this threefold training (though not fully perfected) will not abuse his speech, bodily activities, or ways of thinking; would refrain from acting through craving, revulsion or delusion; would always thoroughly reflect before acting verbally, physically or mentally; would abstain from doing whatever is harmful to oneself and others, and instead would be prone to do what is beneficial to oneself and others; would give up all sorts of individualism, and identify oneself with others; would do his best to avoid doing to others what he would not like others do to him . It is this type of personality development complete with virtue, mental culture and wisdom that Buddhism advocates as the assured means of completely overcoming all predicaments of life, including

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gender-based discrimination, inequality, maltreatment and violence. Furthermore, Buddhism encourages, instead, developing an egalitarian view of gender in which all feeling of superiority-inferiority, privilegedunder-privileged will melt away, changing the traditional gender stereotypes, giving rise to a changed life style in which humanness comes to forefront above gender considerations.

The background to the Buddhist thought Since all types of gender issues are societal problems they are naturally closely related to the dominant social philosophy of a particular time and clime. When Buddhism arose in India in the 6th century B.C. it was Brahmanic social philosophy that was most influential and widely prevalent. This social philosophy was founded on certain philosophical assumptions, practices and beliefs amongst which are: (a) the existence of a creator God; (b) that the society is a divine creation, with a four-tiered class/ caste system (Brahmana, Kshatriya, Vaisya, Sudra), hierarchically stratified; (c) all rights, privileges and specific duties are linked to class/ caste system; (d) birth into a particular caste is the sole deciding factor of one’s social position; and (e) the whole system operates on the divine decree, and hence, fixed and unalterable. Inseparably associated with these assumptions was the belief that women are inferior to men both intellectually and physically. The Brahmanic literature shows that brahmins were obsessed with this belief. Buddhist canonical literature further affirms the existence of this obsession. In the eyes of the brahmins the woman is the epitome of evil, everything that is low, vulgar and corrupt in life. They were considered to be fickle, immoral, unchaste, impure and dependent on men for their happiness and well-being in this life as well as in the next. As women were considered to be of no real worth as independent beings and are full of inborn weaknesses, both mental and physical, they were considered unfit for holding any responsibility or high social position, and consequently, treated almost on par with the sudras, the menials among the four-tired class division. Just as these menials, women, too, were deprived of all basic human rights with no freedom in any sphere of activity: religious, educational, economic, or social. Then widely prevalent view was that women, at any stage of their life, should not be given freedom to live as they wish, but should be under ward, care and supervision of men. This standard Brahmanic view is given in Manuṣmṛti (IX: 2 & 3) in the following words:

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Day and night women must be kept in dependence by the males (of) their (families), and if they attach themselves to sensual enjoyments, they must be kept under one’s control. Her father protects (her) in childhood, her husband protects (her) in youth, and her sons protect (her) in old age; the woman is never fit for independence. Though it is not unusual to find the woman playing second fiddle to man in patriarchal society as the one that existed in India in the 6th century BC, it is hard to fathom why the brahmins subjected her to such discrimination, degradation and ill-treatment. This was not so at the beginning of Vedic culture. Undoubtedly, this was consequent to the development and stabilization of Brahmanism, and perhaps, reflects the external projection of some psychological aberrations the traditional brahmins, who strictly followed the doctrine of four stages of life (āśrama-dharma), were subjected to. As a result, their perception of womanhood was a complete distortion. Suspicion toward women was rampant, and their public behaviour was marked by the desire to enslave them and keep them under domination and supervision. For this they adopted various ruses such as citing certain biological conditions of women as disqualification and shortcomings in them. Thus, such natural phenomena as menstruation, conception, child bearing, and giving birth were made to appear as woes of womanhood. They failed to see these as biological functions. The brahmins indoctrinated the masses with these ideas so much that such ideas greatly contributed to mould the thinking not only of males but also of females themselves regarding womanhood. Buddhist texts also depict women giving vent to such sentiments about themselves. On the other hand, even Brahmins had to admit that the society could not go on without women. So they fixed stereotyped roles to be played by woman in the society. The main role assigned to her was that of the wife with all kinds of restrictions imposed and duties assigned, subjugating her to male domination. A husband expected from his wife not only sexual pleasure but also all services as from a slave-maid: she had to provide sons to the husband to help him continue his lineage. Failing to satisfy the husband the wife faced the risk of being discarded or even being relegated to the position of a co-wife which made life miserable. A childless woman was severely ill-treated, even though the cause of barrenness happens to lay with the husband. The wife was held responsible for any untimely death of the husband, and often the

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helpless wife was forced to commit suicide (sati pūjā) by jumping into the funeral pyre of the husband (a practice now legally banned). Thus it is clear that the Buddha was born to a society that was rampant with gender issues: males being discriminated against males on the basis of class/caste, and women being harassed and looked down upon on the mere fact of their being women. Gender egalitarianism was out and out anathema in this society. Low class males were considered as decreed by the Creator himself for menial work, sans all basic human rights not to speak of privileges. This was considered the fixed, sacred, infallible divine decree unalterable by any human agent. Women were forced to humbly accept their lot with the solace that being slavishly faithful to the husband would make the doors of heaven open to her. The Manuṣmṛti (V:155) says the following: No sacrifice, no vow, no fast must be performed by women apart (from their husbands); if a wife obeys her husband, she will for that (reason alone) be exalted in heaven. The Brahmanic social philosophy made a concerted effort to maintain the status quo of the brahmins, along with male superiority (of the higher classes), and the inferiority as well as the inborn weaknesses of women. To indoctrinate the gullible masses regarding this social philosophy of theirs the brahmins adopted some clever ruses. They strongly maintained that this social philosophy is divinely decreed and revealed; it is, therefore, infallible, unquestionable and to be accepted with utmost faith. Failure to do so would merely incur divine wrath. In the same vein they discouraged freedom of thought and inquiry and encouraged blind faith.

Buddhism on gender-based issues The following issues will be discussed under this theme: i. ii. iii.

Freedom of inquiry and Buddha’s rejection of the baseless traditions Gender issues as an aspect of suffering Remedial measures suggested in Buddhism

i. Freedom of inquiry and Buddha’s rejection of baseless traditions Buddhism like any other religious teaching is a product of society of the time. Yet, it differs from other religions in a number of ways. As

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the Buddha himself proclaimed his central teaching, the doctrine of dependent co-origination, is a teaching that was not heard of before. It is on this doctrine that other Buddhist teachings as well as the Buddhist world-view are founded. As already pointed out this is the Buddha’s ‘teaching by the middle’, which means the discarding of the two traditional philosophies of eternalism and annihilationism of soul (ātma). The Buddha’s daring to break away from the long-cherished, blindly followed traditional approach to human problems enabled him to look at human predicament from a different perspective. He looked at man’s problem not from a theocentric position but from an anthropocentric angle, and saw for himself these problems as they were faced and experienced by himself. Using his own experiences, and properly reflecting and analyzing these problems he found that all these are generated within oneself due to one’s inability to see clearly how these numerous problems have come to be. The Buddha encouraged his disciples to see and understand for themselves. This involved allowing them to inquire freely about himself and his teaching. Freedom of thought is closely linked with the freedom of the individual and the operation of his free will. Both Brahmanism and a majority of the Sramana teachings did not consider the individual to be free. According to Brahmanism the individual is a creature created by the Creator. Hence, he is more or less a puppet in the hands of his creator. Brahmanism is a revealed teaching and hence, considered infallible and unquestionable. Devotees have to accept the teachings blindly. The Creator is the one who orders and plans an individual’s life, with all its happiness and unhappiness predetermined and put in place. All that an individual has to do is to faithfully, adhere to the revealed teaching and lead the life prescribed in the sacred texts. In such a situation the question of free will does not arise. Many of the Sramana teachings too were deterministic and fatalistic. Some of them denied the efficacy of moral life, human action and human effort. While some maintained that the whole life is pre­programmed, and the individual action and effort to steer it to any other direction is futile. Some others maintained that the present happiness and unhappiness are predetermined by one’s past deeds, and that it is unalterable. Those who denied the efficacy of moral life advocated indiscriminate enjoyment of sensual pleasures.

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In these religions and philosophies there was no room for freedom of thought and investigation. All these religions and philosophies advocated the living of a life laid down according to a stereotyped format in which all events, from the beginning to end, according to some not only up to death but up to final liberation, are predetermined and fixed. Buddhism stands unique in this religious milieu, Buddhism considered the individual to be independent, endowed with free will, capable of thinking freely, choosing freely between alternatives, taking initiative, putting forth effort, and striving. The Buddha emphasized that one is one’s own master (Dhp v. 160); that one is responsible for one’s purity and impurity (Dhp v. 161, 165); and one’s predicament is one’s own creation. Hence, an individual has to use his discriminative knowledge, avoid evil, do good, take the initiative and strive hard to attain liberation. The Buddha presented himself merely as a torch-bearer (ukkādhāra: Sn v. 335), a guide (maggassa akkhāta: M III, 6). Each individual has to do his part to liberate himself. The Dhamma has to be individually understood by the wise. All these are features unique to Buddhism, and they call for investigation and discriminative thinking. Buddhism rejects blind faith, which it refers to as ‘amūlikā saddhā’ (lit. rootless or baseless faith), and encourages ‘ākāravati saddhā’ (reasoned faith) (see Caṇki-sutta, M II, 164-177). Buddhism is not a revealed teaching to be accepted on blind faith; hence, it extends an invitation to those interested to ‘come and see’ (ehipassika). Not only the Dhamma, even the Buddha offered himself for scrutiny and investigation, a feature unparalleled in the history of religions (Vīmaṃsaka-sutta, M I, 317-320). The Kālāma-sutta of the Aṅguttara-nikāya (A I, 188-193) can be called a sort of ‘charter of free inquiry’. This Sutta takes up the then accepted ten criteria of truth and examines their validity as means of obtaining true knowledge. These ten are: (i) Vedic textual tradition (anussava), (ii) unbroken tradition maintained by successive generations of teachers (paramparā), (iii) hearsay (itkirā), (iv) approved textual tradition (pitaka-sampadā), (v) logic (takka-hetu), (vi) reasoning (naya-hetu), (vii) validity of reason contained in the teaching (akāraparivitakka), (viii) agreement between the teaching and the views held by the individual (diṭṭhi-nijjhana-khanti), (ix) competence of the teacher (bhabbarupatā), (x) respectability and reputation of the teacher

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(samano-no-garu). These ten can be broadly divided into two groups: Nos. 1,2,3,4,9 and 10 as means depending on some kind of authority and Nos. 5,6,7,8 as depending on reason. The Buddha was neither a traditionalist nor a logician nor a mere inquirer but an experientialist (Saṅgārava-sutta, M II, 209-213). Hence, he adopted a cautious attitude to these. He did not reject any of these outright. His advice was not to blindly accept any of them merely because they are approved criteria. In the course of ths discourse the Buddha presented a new criterion. This is the use of one’s own experience and understanding in deciding between what is right and wrong, good and bad. The Buddha says that anyone if he finds, through his experience and understanding, that the adoption of some view or a course of action is unprofitable, blameworthy, censured by the wise, leading to loss and sorrow, or in other words, leading to the growth of greed, hatred and delusion, he should reject such a view or course of action and adopt whatever view and course of action leading to opposite results. This shows that freedom of thought allowed in the Kālāma-sutta has as its ambit of operation the moral issues involved in one’s day to day life. This is understandable for the main focus of the Buddhist practice is to develop a moral life. This new criterion has much practical relevance to the attitude one should adopt in deciding issues affecting one’s day to day life, and it is seen that most of our day-to-day activities are of moral nature. The Buddhist life is a life of abstention from evil or what is harmful, and cultivation of what is good and beneficial. The Buddha suggests numerous other methods, besides the one given in the Kālāma-sutta that could be used to guide one’s thinking when deciding between good and bad. One is to consider the effect of one’s action on oneself as well as on others. One is advised to give up all views and actions harmful to oneself and others (See Ambalaṭṭhikā Rāhulovāda-sutta, M I, 414-420). Similarly, one could analyze one’s motives and abstain from all actions motivated by greed, hatred and delusion. The Veludvara-sutta (Saṃyutta-nikāya) and Dhammapada (129) give another very practical aid to guide one’s behaviour. It says that one should take oneself as the example and avoid doing anything to others that one would not wish others do to oneself. Besides, the Buddha says that one could adopt the three ‘authorities’ (adhipateyya) to help one decide and choose particular views or causes of

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actions. These are the authority of one’s own conscience (attādhipateyya) public opinion (lokādhipateyya), and morality (dhammādhipateyya). Even with regard to customs and traditions Buddhism holds that one should not blindly hang on to them, merely because they are dear and long cherished. One should be ready to abandon traditions that are hindrances, and adopt beneficial and progressive ones (See Pāyāsi-sutta, D II, 316-358). ii. Gender issues as an aspect of suffering Gender Based Violence is defined as “any act of gender based violence that results in or likely to result in physical, sexual, or psychological or economical suffering to women including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty in public or private” (United Nation’s Declaration on the elimination of violence against women 1993). This definition is very broad and covers many acts of violence, some very minor like a husband insisting on wife doing a domestic task and others more significant like assault on her or killing her. It also spreads through different ages of the woman. New born girl may be killed because she is a girl or she may be used later on in her life in commercial sex. Common kinds of violence practiced in different parts of the world on women are sex selective abortion, infanticide of female infants, female genital mutilation, child prostitution, incest, forced prostitution, rape and domestic violence. The last being the commonest one, being seen in many homes, poor and rich educated and the not so educated. Instances of gender based violence in Buddhist literature During the time of the Buddha, it is very unlikely that the term gender based violence would have meant the same as today. Most of the accepted norms of that society are likely to be considered as criminal from today’s context. Some acts like sex selection and abortion of female foetesus may not have existed at that time. However, curiosity and attempt to get the information of the baby to be born existed even at that time, as seen by the incident of King Suddhodhana calling the Brahmans when Queen Maha Maya had a dream when she conceived. The stories of Theri Muttā, and Theri Sumaṅgalamātā show the pitiable lot to which a woman, as a wife in household, was subjected. Theri Muttā exclaims: Truly released I am, Relieved I am of three humps of motar, pestle and the hump-tracked husband (Thīg v.11)

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Theri Sumaṅgalamātā expresses her relief saying: O woman well set free! How free I am, How thoroughly free from kitchen drudgery! Me stained and squalid mong my cooking-pots My brutal husband ranked as even less Than the sunshades he sits and weaves always (Thīg v. 23) The story of Theri Isidāsi reveals a very complex situation which can be considered under this type of violence. She, in spite of being beautiful, virtuous, and slavishly caring and serving, was rejected by three husbands. And the reason given by a husband is: “I am tired of her”. Therigāthā (Psalms of Sisters in Psalms of Early Buddhists) contains numerous other utterances expressing sense of relief and joy once women knew that they, by joining the Order, found freedom from such forced domestic drudgery. The verses of theri Uppalavaṇṇā clearly suggest the mental agony experienced by a mother and a daughter who were forced to lead incestuous lives. She says: In enmity we lived, bound to one man Mother and daughter, both as rival wives What a woeful plight? found was ours Unnatural offence! My hair stood up Horror fell on me. Fie upon this life of sensual desire, impure and foul. A jungle thick with thorny brake, wherein We hapless pair, my girl and I had strayed” (Thīg v. 224 -25) Though less miserable than living in incest, the life of a co-wife, which was not uncommon at that time, must have caused severe mental strain on women. Rape: An instance of attempted rape is mentioned in the Vinaya Piṭaka as the reason to lay down the sixtieth rule (sikkhāpada), according to which a bhikkhunī has asked a man to open an abscess in the region between the navel and the knee. The man instead attempted to rape her. The story of the nun Uppalavanna shows how a women suffers because she was a woman and not due to any deed done by her as defined earlier. She was a beautiful woman like the lotus hence called ‘uapplavaṇṇā’, whose father was harassed by many men who wanted to marry her. She was ordained in the sāsana (Order of the monastic community) as a solution for his problem. Later on while living in the forest she was

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taken by surprise and raped by her kinsmen Nanda. In this story the perpetrator suffers in this world itself and is swallowed by the earth instantaneously. This is one of the instances where the evil effects of rape is given in no uncertain terms. Incest: In the story of bhikkhunī Uppalavaṇṇā in Theri-gāthā (referred to above) there is mention of incest. My daughter and I were wives to the same man a hair raising discovery it was. In the Mātāputta-sutta (A III, 67-69) an unusual instance of relationship of a mother and the son who was ordained is described. The sutta describes how strong the attraction of a woman to the man. Child labour and harassment of girl child: The story of a woman, who had a girl as a domestic servant, describes two aspects of this problem. The husband had a sexual relationship with the girl who was a domestic servant at his house. A very common fate the maids suffer at the present time too. She discovers the affair, beats the girl, ties her up and cuts off her ears and the nose and paradoxically goes to the Jetavana monastery to listen to the Dhamma (again a common phenomenon at the present time). The girl is discovered by the relations and brought to Jetavana before the Buddha. He asks the girl to stand up so that others could see and expressed his disapproval. Abortion: The phenomenon of induced abortion is mentioned in the Vinayapiṭaka: (gabbha-pātanaṃ) implying the use of orally administered drugs. other external means like crushing and heating had been mentioned. Both Buddhism and Brahmanism categorically condemn the practice of abortion. In view of forms of violence as just mentioned, setting up of the bhikkhunī (nun) order certainly must have provided them the opportunity of escaping from falling victims to mental derangement. But it has to be understood clearly that the Buddha’s answer to domestic violence is not the seeking of asylum in the Order. The objective of the bhikkunī Order, just as that of the bhikkhu Order, was to train entrants to realize final emancipation from all forms of suffering in the samsaric existence. By enunciating the bhikkhunī Order the Buddha made it very clear that a woman does not necessarily need to get married and live a household life in order to live a fulfilling life. Like man, woman too was

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free to choose a way of life that she desired to, and that was the message of freedom and relief given out by the existence of bhikkhunī Order. Suffering, in the final analysis, is unpleasant and acutely agonizing mental or psychological reaction to events, situations, circumstances etc. faced by an individual. Sometimes it may be purely of mental origin; but it also could be of societal origin. Gender-based suffering is more of societal origin, for it results from social institutions that function in a rather biased, discriminative and oppressive manner against certain segment of the society. The Buddha found that such social institutions lead to displeasure, despair, disharmony, mental unrest and conflict forming grave obstacles to individual’s material as well as spiritual well-being. This is what made the Buddha focus his attention on such adverse social institutions and call for drastic changes in them. He found that it is very necessary to secure a good social environment for individuals to make them incline towards morality that gradually leads to mental culture and development of insight wisdom. It is by considering the society as the habituating ground for higher training in morality, concentration and wisdom that the Buddha advocated change to some institutions that he felt were affecting the mental health of certain sections of the society. iii. Remedial measures suggested in Buddhism Sex equality: Buddhism’s view on sex equality is seen in the Aggaññasutta of the Dīgha-nikāya (D III, 80-98), the Vāseṭṭha-sutta (M II, 194), the Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta (M I, 256-271) and the Madhupiṇḍikasutta (M I, 108-114) of the Majjhima-nikāya to mention a few. What is reflected in these core doctrines is oneness of human nature in the ultimate analysis. Sex differentiation is considered a superficial or a nominal difference. In other words, sameness of human nature is taken as a fact, and gender is a ‘paññatti’, a social convention or social arrangement. The Aggañña-sutta which is a Buddhist story of genesis is an imaginative account of the origin of society and the state with some Buddhist thinking introduced into it, a case of old wine bags into which new wine has been poured. The important statement made in the story is that men and women came into being on earth simultaneously. Defilements were common to both. It is only when the radiant bodies of these divine beings became gross by feeding on the tasty earth and its fine mosses and creepers that they developed defilements and sexual characteristics. When corruptions grew in society, after private property came into existence, it was found

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necessary to elect a leader to maintain law and order. A male was elected to be the leader and presumably it is at this point that gender was socially constructed. We must remember that the story originated in the minds of men. But why does the Buddhist adaptation of it retain the androcentric strand of male leadership when it is accepted that men and women have the same nature? Is it merely a historic event, true only with reference to that point of time? One thing is clear and that is the fact that the Buddhist texts roundly condemn exploitation and is therefore opposed to that element in patriarchy. The Saleyyaka-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M I, 285-290) points out that a woman should be regarded as always protected by either a father, mother, brother, sister, relatives, clan or even by the fact of a garland of flowers worn round her neck or a stick held in her hand. It is seen from this statement that the Buddha was recognizing that the woman was the weaker of the two sexes and was appealing to the protective and chivalrous qualities in males towards women not the exploitative. Through the spirit of the central doctrines, the ground was made clear for the liberation of the mind from all views originating from wrong perception and the philosophy looks forward to the mind’s evolutiontherefore, the society’s evolution- based on truly egalitarian principles. The fact that sexual identity is socially constructed is humorously presented in the Garahita-Jātaka. In this Jātaka, the monkey protagonist, after observing the world of men, tells his companions in the forest. ‘In the world of men, they cry ‘Mine! Mine!’ all the time’ and added ‘There are two masters in the house, one has no beard to wear but has long breasts, ears pierced with holes and goes with plaited hair.’ (J II, 184) The monkey is seen to have missed the point of sexual identity which is socially constructed. It is certainly a view that comes of regarding his own species as a homogenous one. The actual reason for highlighting sexual differentiation is of course derived from a desire to focus on the female as a sex object and points to kāma (sexual or sensual desire) which exists in both sexes. The egocentrism seen in the constant cry of ‘Mine! ‘Mine!’ which is criticism derived from the Buddhist philosophic point of view of ‘etaṃ mama’, ‘this is mine’ is also alien to the communal life style of the monkeys. It refers to the attachment to one’s sexuality also. In this jataka tale, the monkey community is humorously presented as

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one that is of a higher order than human society. Sex equality is reflected in the Buddhist canon in other ways too. For instance, both dukkha as physical pain and psychological distress are presented in the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta (S V, 420-424; Bodhi 2000, 1843-1847) in its discussion of dukkha. It is common to both sexes. Psychological dukkha is caused by defilements known as kilesas. The way to eradicate defilements is through the practice of the noble eightfold path under the threefold training (tisso sikkhā). The eradication of defilements leads to perfect mental health. It is synonymous with dukkha-nirodha or cessation of dukkha, in other words nibbāna. This is attainable by both sexes in this life itself. Biological issues and particular gender roles the women had to play in their day to day life did not create problems for the Buddha, for he clearly understood that being male in gender also entails many problems and difficulties in day to day life. Just as women were burdened with household chores, men too were often straddled with heavy load of work in the paddy fields, in the battle field and in other places of work. The Buddha considered all these as part and parcel of the general predicament of life, and more so in lay life. So what he did was to make people realize the cumbersome nature of life in general, and educate them regarding how to understand it and adapt themselves accordingly. So most of these shortcomings, difficulties, hardships he explained as obstacle in household life, and at times encouraged those who are prepared to enter houseless life (anagārika), which he compared to ‘open air’ As the Buddha had a very clear view of life he, for all practical purposes, accepted sex (biological) differences and gender (cultural and social) differences pertaining to humans. Thus, he had views regarding the role that males and females could play, task they could accomplish, norms and rules they should observe in performing their different roles and accomplishing different tasks. Visākhā in the Buddhist literature could be easily singled out as the ideal lay-woman: generous, efficient, clever lady-like in her behaviour. Perhaps, Anāthapiṇḍika could be cited as the possible counterpart, not only because of generosity but because of virtue, entrepreneurship, commitment to his undertaking etc. Visākhā’s younger sister Sujātā, symbolizes the naughty daughterin-law. Nakulapitā and Nakulamātā, who could claim that they had never exchanged a resentful look or a word toward each other during their entire married life, epitomize the ideal Buddhist couple. There are many such males and females referred to in Buddhist texts showing that

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the Buddha as well as Buddhism was concerned about sex and gender, the roles males and females should play and the modes in which they should behave. It is, however, very clearly seen that Buddhism never employs sex or gender as a means of discrimination. It has already been shown that in India, even during the time of the Buddha, womanhood per se was stigma, a disqualification, a burden and a cause for misery. The birth of even princes was considered a cause for lamentation and despair, and the Buddha had to admonish King Pasenadi over such an issue. Naturally, a king would have better preferred a son to succeed him and carry on further his expansionist exploits. So the Buddha had to reason out and provide an explanation by citing the benefits a girl-child would finally bring. As it was natural for such a society, as the one that prevailed in N.E. India during the time of the Buddha, women’s role was mainly confined to the household, and in this, too, it was as the wife that she played a role of some significance. Under the Brahmanic social system even as wives they were not given their due. Being confined to the household, women were often subject to various kinds of domestic violence: verbal, physical and mental. To solve the problem of domestic violence and violence against women in general Buddha offered other remedies. Buddhism is against violence of any sort inflicted on anyone, whether men or women, human or animal. The Buddha puts this idea very emphatically when he said: All tremble at the rod. All fear death. Comparing others with oneself, one should neither strike nor cause to strike. (Dhp v. 129) It has in particular noted that women were subjected to various forms of violence, domestic and social. Among such violence there are instances of rape referred to in Buddhist texts. The incidents connected with the two bhikkhunīs Uppalavaṇṇā and Subha are glaring examples for this. Uppalavaṇṇā had been raped by her own cousin. The contempt and detestation with which such heinous acts are looked at by Buddhism is clearly seen when the text says that the rapist was swallowed up by the tires of Avīci hell. The case of Subha shows how she humbled her potential rapist, who was particularly enamored of the beauty of her eyes, by pulling out one eye and offering it to him. Buddhism provided a social ethic characterized by the five precepts (pañca-sῑla) meant to create a society without aggression or violence

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perpetrated against one another. In fact when taken in its broader sense the third precept, abstention from sexual misconduct, could be seen as a blanket cover presented to shield women from forceful molestation and rape. This is evident when one considers the political conditions of that time. That was a time of constant wars between states. As usual with marauding armies there was ruthless killing, despoiling of private property and ruination of families. It was the womenfolk, the children, specially the female children that fell victim to sex hungry army-men. These conditions suggest that the third precept is also a firm injunction against such violence against the womenfolk. The seven norms leading to the progress of good governance (sattaaparihaniya dhamma), which were taught by the Buddha to the Vajjins, also support such a position. One of these seven norms says that a good, efficient government should take steps to prevent abduction of women from their families See Mahāparinibbāna-sutta (D II, 72-168) of the Dīgha-nikāya).

Mental health As pointed out before Buddhism holds that there are two major kinds of disease namely, physical diseases (kāyika roga) and mental diseases (cetasika roga) (Roga- sutta, A II, 143; Bodhi 2012, 552) and of these the latter predominates giving rise to the belief that all ordinary people are, in one way or another, mentally imbalanced. This is further confirmed by the well-known statement found in the Buddhist literature that all ordinary worldly individuals are mentally ill (sabbe puthujjanā ummattakā). In the case of domestic violence this mental illness gets further aggravated and make women succumb more easily to various forms of mental disturbances. The constant prevalence of stressful circumstances in the domestic front itself is enough cause for mental stress leading to severe forms of not only mental sicknesses but also grave physical sicknesses. The Buddhist explanation is that there is close mutual dependence of mind and body, and, hence, mental illnesses affect the body and vice versa. This shows that Buddhism has an awareness of psychological conditions that give rise to physical diseases (A IV, 108112; Bodhi 2012,1411-1415). According to the Buddhist analysis greed (lobha), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha) are the primary causes of mental disorders. The Buddhist position is that these mental defiling forces affect both males and females making their minds sick. However, the added cause of

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domestic violence tends to accelerate the proneness of women to fall victims to mental disorders and aggravate such conditions leading also to physical sickness. The Buddha’s advice is to get rid of these primary causes, which if got rid of by men also would consequently immensely help to eradicate domestic violence. The best way for this is to begin the practice of the noble eightfold path constituted of training in virtue (sῑla), mental culture (samādhi) and wisdom (paññā). The Visuddhimagga clearly explains how this threefold training helps eradicate these defiling forces at three different levels namely, latent or dormant level, arising level, and vocal and physical manifestation level. The practice of the noble eight-fold path, specially by those who perpetrate domestic violence, with some degree of commitment would certainly help to get rid of or, at least, to reduce to a considerable extent domestic violence. This is obvious because the initial training is on virtue which aims at bringing about a behavioral change in speech and bodily actions which mostly cause domestic violence. Thus, the male, who is generally the perpetrator of domestic violence, is strongly advised to train himself in the noble eightfold path. The Buddha adopted another specific remedy, and that is individual counseling especially to women who are victims of such domestic violence. The Buddha very correctly understood that counseling intervention programs targeting women subject to violence and maltreatment could greatly help to save them from being subject to such violent treatment causing mental stress. Buddhist texts show that this was done with the objective of imbibing in such women a sense of self-esteem, self-confidence, self-reliance, self-respect, self­empowerment self-sufficiency etc. It is, in fact, by preventing women from cultivating these personality characteristics that the brahmins succeeded in keeping them humble and meek and treating them as slaves. The Buddha adopted a completely different attitude. He showed women their worth; urged them to develop their will power and personality; encouraged them to think and act positively. Therigāthā contains many declarations made by women who had benefited from such counseling. Through such counseling the Buddha educated women about their potential and the need for self-esteem. In the Mātugāma Saṃyutta [division on women] of the Saṃyutta-nikāya the Buddha made women aware of the powers they are endowed with, especially emphasizing the power of their virtue which could be effectively used as a means of generating self-esteem and winning regard, respect and honour of men.

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The Buddha encouraged women to educate themselves, about themselves, about their gender roles and the real worth of those roles in maintaining quality family life. He upheld certain women from amongst both the lay and in renounced life as models to be fallowed. He did not hesitate to come out in open with weakness of women that, perhaps, contribute to men turning into perpetrators of domestic violence. His counsel to Sujātā, the quarrelsome daughter-in-law of Anāthapiṇḍika, in which he enunciated different categories of wives allowing her to select and adopt for herself any of the seven type enunciated, he made her clearly see the domestic problems she caused and encouraged her to bring about a change in her behaviour.

Self-esteem of self confidence Amongst the women who are victims of gender based discrimination, violence, and marginalization, the lack of self-esteem and self-confidence to fight the odds seems to be a major hurdle to help them out of their predicament. Self-esteem is ‘good opinion’ of oneself. It also entails or results in self-confidence (having confidence in one’s own ability), selfregard (regard for oneself), self-reliance, self-respect, self-improvement (improvement of one’s own position or disposition by one’s own efforts), self-sufficiency (the ability to supply one’s own needs without relying on the outside world) and lack of self-pity. Lack of self-esteem could be a personal or a social construction. Whilst the ultimate goal of the Buddhist Philosophy is to transcend the notion of ‘self by eradicating lobha, dosa, moha or transcending ‘conceiving as superior, inferior or as equal to ‘self’. The very nature of an ‘arhant’-mind could be used as a tool for generating self-confidence and self-esteem. In that, the very potential in an individual to rise to such heights, and its constituents such as freedom from fear, sorrow, lamentation, in general its unshaken nature, above all the wisdom embodied therein, can be used to generate self-esteem. bhikkhunī Saṃyutta (division on bhikkhunīs) of the Saṃyutta-nikāya and Therigāthā (Psalms of Sisters) contain numerous declarations made by arahant bhikkhunīs, similar to what is set out below (a bhikkhunī in conversation with Mara) embodying the nature of their mind . Having gone to a sal tree with flowering top, You stand at this foot a all alone, bhikkhunī There is none whose beauty rivals yours Foolish girl aren’t you afraid of rogues?

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Though a hundred thousand rouges Just like you might come here I stir not a hair, O feel no terror Even along Mara I don’t fear you I can make myself disappear Or I can enter inside your belly I can stand between your eye brows Yet you won’t catch a glimpse of me I am the master of my mind The bases of power are well developed I am free from all bandages Therefore I do not fear you friend (Bodhi 2000, 225-226) The above conversation reported in the bhikkhunī Saṃyutta and also in the Theri-gāthā is attributed to Uppalavaṇṇā arahant bhikkhunī. Irrespective of whether Mara is taken to be a force internal or external, it is an epithet of self-worth and self-confidence of the highest order ever articulated by a man or a woman.

Women thinking positively on their potential In counseling women to think positively the Buddha made them think in terms beyond gender. This he could do because to him it is humanness that mattered most, for it is the common denominator of all human beings. Sex and gender are designations imposed by either through biological factors or in cultural and social contexts. Such thinking was not encouraged in other contemporary religions that restricted women to a particular stereotype. Somā Theri’s stunning reply to Mara (perhaps in this instance symbolizing traditional attitude of male domination) who had the audacity to taunt her referring to her womanhood (itthibhāva) and trying to intimidate her by saying that she, who is dull witted is engaged in a vain attempt to achieve a state that is the prerogative of the male. She was trained to think in terms beyond gender and make herself bold enough to retort: “What does womanhood matter at all When the mind is concentrated well When knowledge flows steadily As one sees correctly into Dhamma One to whom it might occur “I am a woman” or “I am a man”

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Or “I am anything at all” Is fit for Mara to address. (Bodhi 2000, 222-223) The final point of her reply to Mara questions not merely the gender role and the attitude of woman or that of man but the entire concept of gender of being a man or a woman. The usual attitude in this type of context would be to pit woman’s gender role against that of man and to uphold one against the other. This is, for instance, what is usual in the present-day gender debate. Buddhism transcends such one sided gender discourse and questions any gender role at all. The ultimate solution is to go beyond all forms of gender categories by overcoming the idea of ‘self’ as a man or a woman. This sort of counseling could be used very effectively even in modern times, in making women realize that their plight of getting subject to domestic violence is partly, at least, due to their nonawareness of their potential, strength and also due to their misconceived notion of gender role as one which requires them always to be meek and submissive, even in the face of violence perpetrated against them. Such realization of their potential and capabilities help to produce bhikkhunīs of Dhammadinnā’s calibre, who were capable of explaining the doctrine exactly in the manner the Master himself would have done. The Cullavedalla-sutta of the Majjhima-nikāya (M I, 299-305) records how Dhammadinnā answered abstruse questions on the doctrine posed by Visākha, her former husband. Although impressed by the confidence and knowledge of his former wife, Visākha sort to reassure her answers from the Buddha. It is on this occasion that the Buddha praised Dhamamdinnā on her knowledge and said that he could not improve upon her answer. The event itself is unique in the history of any religion, namely, that a woman disciple teaching the doctrine on behalf of the Master and being praised for her role. This is one example of how gender-stereotypes were overcome in the Buddhist tradition. In this regard the Buddha not only counseled women but counseled also men often pointing out that women are capable, wise and deserve a hearing. This he did to king Pasenadi by praising his queen Mallikāa wise but a low-caste woman whom the king began to admire and listen to. Nakulamātā’s advice to her gravely ill husband was praised by the Buddha as a ‘gain’ by the husband. Visākhā who at one stage was despised by her father-in-law, Migāra, subsequently earned the respectful designation ‘Migāra Mātā’ (mother of Migāra) through her wise and virtuous behaviour.

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Besides, the Buddha very often gave counseling to the whole family with the objective of developing mutual trust, confidence, understanding, respect and cooperation among its different members. Such counseling is given in a very general form presenting various norms and injunctions to be observed by the respective members. The Sigālovāda-sutta of the Dighanikaya is the best example for such general collective counseling. In this the Buddha enunciated how a girl child should be treated by parents, how siblings should treat them, how a husband should treat a woman as the wife and so on. In such counseling greater focus is directed on the woman as the wife, for it is the most important role the woman had to fulfill in that society, and in which role she was not given her due by Brahmanic social philosophy. The Buddha was very particular in advising the husband to treat his wife as the partner, the best friend, the trusted confidante, the best of those who are to be trusted (S I, 37; A I, 26, 457). He strongly admonished the husband to treat her with utmost respect, never to abuse her, to hand over to her authority in household affairs, to provide her with presents and ornaments. And what is more remarkable is that the Buddha, with equal emphasis, told the husband to be faithful to the wife, an aspect that was blatantly overlooked in Brahmanic tradition which considered that the male had the liberty and the license to engage in extramarital sex. In Buddhist social philosophy, being faithful to one’s partner was a mutual obligation of both husband and wife. Such counseling, though not directly addressed to domestic violence, would have certainly served as a strong preventive measure against possible violence. In addition to advising the husbands to be content and happy with their own wives, they are advised against indulging in gambling, in drinking and having extra-marital sexual relations that disrupt happy family life, causing conflicts between husband and wife, leading to wifebeating and other forms of domestic violence. From such counseling it is clear that the Buddha’s objective was certainly not to advise the women to mend their ways to suit the behaviour of men, but to empower them by showing that both man and woman are equal in a marital relationship. It is interesting to note that in the Advice to Sigāla (referred to above) the Buddha starts by enumerating how the husband should treat his wife and only subsequently he elaborates on wife’s obligations toward husband. When it comes to serious crises of more personal nature the Buddha used various psychotherapeutic devices to save victims of mental stress and sicknesses. The case of Kisāgotamī is an apt one. She was married

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to a rich family but, at first disdainfully treated by her in-laws because she was childless. But after giving birth to a son she was treated well. However, the boy died very young. With all her hopes shattered she was devastated with grief and became almost insane. Realizing her traumatic condition the Buddha applied a very effective therapeutic measure. When she came for advice to revive the dead child the Buddha asked her to bring him a mustard seed from a house where no one had yet died. After making a futile search for such a house, she grasped the truth and got rid of her traumatic condition. Similar is the case of Paṭācārā who, too, was subjected to a severe traumatic condition because of the death of her husband and the two children. The Buddha consoled her making her realize that she was not alone in such experiences and that what she was subjected to common to everybody (Malalasekera 1976). The texts reveal that there are still other philosophical insights that could be effectively used to address the issues of mental health in a gender sensitive manner. One is to encourage both males and females to develop freedom of thought and develop their ability to look at situations with a mind free from prejudices and impurities. Two key concepts to be noted in this context are freedom (vimutti) and purification (visuddhi). The first refers to all kinds of bondages, ties and prejudices that delimit one’s freedom of mind. The second refers to all kinds of defiling characteristics of mind due to which one’s vision is shrouded. Freedom from bonds and purification of impurities naturally have different levels, and in their ultimate degree they refer to the highest state of purity and freedom. What an ordinary person could achieve in their daily life may not be this perfect state; even such state, no doubt, will help one achieve balance in one’s behaviour. The practice of mental culture, especially meditative practices, would certainly help to see these issues in a clearer perspective, and gradually get rid of mental stress and the resulting physical sicknesses. Practice of mental culture by males would certainly help them to see their own lapses and mend their ways, enabling them to bring about a personality change in them for the better. As revealed in many discourses of the Buddha, the reflection of ‘seven aspects of enlightenment’ (satta bojjhaṅga) and the ‘ten notions’ (dasa saññā) has been often prescribed for the purpose of alleviating mental distress and physical sickness. Of the vast amount of Buddhist literary resources, the aspect called ‘Jātaka’, ‘birth stories’ associated with the past lives of the Buddha as the aspirant of Buddha-hood (bodhisatta), provide a wealth of insights on

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mental health. This has been widely acknowledged among psychiatrists and an increasing number of modern practitioners are using Jātaka stories for therapeutic purposes. They use Jātaka stories to address mental health in two major ways. One of these is called bibliotherapy - a verbal method. This is the guided use of reading, always with a therapeutic outcome in mind. These Jātaka stories contain a wide range of settings, characters and events which have parallels to those experienced in modern times. When a reader is made to read these she/ he feels that the problem is shared and not unique to them alone. Seeing one’s problem described in print, itself brings some relief to the reader. The other method is psychodrama. This is an action method of therapy as opposed to verbal methods. In this method a group of people meet and enact dramatic scenes of emotional significance under the direction of the therapist who chooses the particular scene from a Jātaka story which suits the mental problem involved (Harischandra 1998).

Conclusion Although Buddhism is concerned about mental and physical wellbeing of women, and gives specific guidance in that direction, its perception in general is much wider. It views, first and foremost, all beings, without any discrimination, as beings, irrespective of whether they are human or non-human. The well-known dictum in the Karaṇīyametta-sutta (Suttanipāta) is: May all beings be well and happy (sabbe sattā bhavantu sukhitattā). The same discourse further admonishes us to ‘develop a boundless mind’ (mānasaṃ bhāvaye aparimāṇaṃ) to all beings. In the earlier discussion, we witnessed this same attitude in Somā Theri’s response to the Mara. This attitude is very important and instructive in understanding the ultimate Buddhist answer to the gender­related problems, namely, that we need to transcend gender-based mentality in order to avoid gender-based illnesses and achieve health. This is not only for women but for both men and women. The Buddhist solution, as we saw in the foregoing, has much more guidance to offer to achieve mental health before reaching the ultimate level just mentioned. In addition to developing one’s virtue and morality one must develop one’s right attitudes and right understanding as prerequisites for further improvement. Developing one’s mind, bhāvanā or meditation, on specific lines such as mindfulness (sati), loving kindness (mettā), notion of impermanence (anicca-saññā) etc. was found to be quite useful.

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Buddhism being a teaching not given to blindly following traditions on the mere ground of their being long­cherished traditions, looked at human predicament in a more realistic, practical and anthropocentric perspective. This perspective along with its in-depth understanding of the true nature of the human mind and its influence on individual well-being or ill-being and made it conclude that mind plays a vital role generating all sorts of human predicaments which in turn sickens the individual’s mind itself. This approach made Buddhism hold that the assured remedy for all human predicaments, which have mind as their spring, is to free the mind from all defiling forces. In its wider perspective of human predicament Buddhism identifies that sex and gender based issues also heavily contribute to aggravate human predicament by adversely affecting the health of individual’s mind. So, in presenting solution to such issues Buddhism’s special focus is on ways and means of weaning out those harmful and ill-founded mind-defiling notions of sex and gender discrimination. In evolving such ways and means Buddhism uses its philosophical insights into the diverse origins of suffering to make aware, and educate the individuals affected by such problems, and counsel them as to how they should work their way out of such issues by understanding the true nature of their predicament and regaining, improving and preserving their mental health that is so vital for their own happiness and well-being as well as for the happiness and well-being of others. Buddhist philosophical insights clearly show that such a state of mental health is achievable by women in particular provided that they have will to do so. The message of the Buddha in nutshell is: Being a woman does not and should not become a hurdle on the way to peace and happiness.

21. The Light of Zen in the West Incorporating the Supreme Doctrine and the Realization of the Self Foreword Author: Herburt Benoit, Trans.: Graham Rooth; Sussex Academic Press, Uk. 2004. The idea of publishing a fresh translation of Hubert Benoit’s two works on Zen - The Supreme Doctrine and the Realization of the self - from a psychoanalytic point of view, is good news for those who take human freedom seriously. While all religions are interested in this matter, the seriousness with which Buddhism has addressed this issue has been widely acknowledged. The Buddhist concept of suffering as the human predicament and its cessation in nirvanic freedom, and the Freudian concepts of illness and health, have been found to have something in common before and after Benoit. The unique characteristic of Benoit’s presentation of Zen is that he articulates it in a language and metaphor intelligible of the contemporary mind informed of psychology, philosophy and science. In this foreword, I shall first try to locate Benoit’s discussion in the larger soteriological context of Buddhism, and subsequently, highlight some of its theoretical and practical implications. The beginning point for Benoit is the human condition and its problems. He underscores the need for radical change in what he calls “our natural condition”. This, undoubtedly, is quite near to Buddhism. In one of his early discourses the Buddha, at the beginning of his quest for enlightenment, is reported to have thought in the following manner: Alas, this world has fallen into trouble, in that it is born, ages, and dies, it passes away and is reborn, yet it does not understand the escape be discerned from this suffering [of] aging-and-death. When now will an escape be discerned from this suffering [of] aging-and-death? (Bodhi 2000, 537)

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In attaining Buddhahood by “conquering the evil ones” (to use a traditional metaphor) in his own mind the Buddha found a solution to the problem. This involved a total transformation of his vision and outlook, and resulted from the purification of mind. Understandably, Buddhism is rich in analyses of the human mind. Perhaps Buddhism is the most psychological of all religious traditions for it attributes a very important place for purification (visuddhi in Pali ) of one’s mind in the process of achieving liberation (vimutti). According to the analysis found in the early discourses of the Buddha the defiled character of one’s mind is what is ultimately responsible for one’s suffering (dukkha) in the samsara (wheel of existence). This requires anyone interested in getting rid of suffering to analyze, understand and purify one’s mind as a priority. A unique characteristic of Buddhism is that it rejects the concept of everlasting soul, a key element in the concept of the human being across religions belonging to both theistic and non-theistic traditions. The biggest theoretical challenge for the Buddha was to articulate his teaching without allowing the concept of ātma to creep in. In the context of the ancient Indian religiosity the challenge for the Buddha was to steer clear of the two extreme positions: namely, eternalism, that ātma is eternal; and annihilationism, that human life is discontinued at death. The ‘middle position’ of the Buddha was to explain reality without reference to an agent characterized in either eternalist or annihilationist terms. It is clear that the Buddha accepted such concepts as saṁsāra and karma, which were very much part and parcel of the brahmanic and nonbrahmanic Indian tradition. In those traditions, however, these concepts were articulated through the concept of ātma believed to the agent behind these phenomena. The challenge for the Buddha was to articulate these concepts without referring to a doer or an experiencer understood as constituted by an everlasting ātma.There were misunderstandings regarding the Buddha’s position already during the time of the Buddha. Brahmins accused him saving that he was an annihilationist. The disciples grappled with the idea and at times went perilously close to the view rejected by the Buddha. In one such case, a monastic disciple called Sāti thought it is consciousness that runs through without undergoing change. The Buddha corrected him, saying that consciousness as taught by him is causally conditioned (Bodhi 1995, 349-361). In the history of Buddhism, it is clear that the biggest challenge faced by the followers of the Buddha was to be faithful to the anātma (no-soul)

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stand of the Master while, at the same time, accepting the validity of such concepts as samsara and karma. The personalist view (pudgala-vāda), the idea of karma-seed (karma-bῑja), and store-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) are some historical efforts by various schools of Buddhism to overcome this challenge. None of these theories, however, seems to have been able to do successfully what is required of them for all of them have as their point of reference a concept of substratum or an underlying essence. Coming to the later stages of Buddhism a doctrinally significant factor in the emergence of Mahayana is the need to apply the concept of anātma to the religious life itself which was meant to eradicate the ātma view. The perception was that the early Buddhists in their practice geared to achieve personal liberation were motivated by the ātma view itself. The paradox was sought to be resolved by applying the view that everything - including the path, the person who practices the path and the defilements that he is determined to eradicate - are all in actual fact devoid of any self-nature and hence are empty. This is the key point made in such well - known Mahayana sutras as the Diamond-sūtra, the Heart-sūtra and the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra. It is in this light that we have to make sense of the statements of the type quoted below, which occur frequently in these sutras: There is no such thing as myself realizing enlightenment. Why? Because Bodhi (or enlightenment) is not an object which can be realized…… all Buddhas and great bodhisattvas achieved their goals because they were free from the idea of winning supreme enlightenment. (The Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra, ch. 7) Zen Buddhism as articulated by early Chinese masters is the culmination of this way of thinking. According to an episode well known in Zen, Hui-neng (638-713) a mere kitchen help at that time but later the sixth patriarch of Zen, responded to his senior colleague, who asserted that one must guard one’s mind diligently so that dust may not accumulate on it, by asking where is the mind that dust settles on and hence requiring purification. This response is believed to be the origin of the Southern school of Zen, which held that enlightenment is sudden and not something to be achieved by prior planning and exertion. In presenting Zen to the modern reader, Benoit does not particularly lay emphasis on this methodological issue. In fact he directly mentions it only once, towards the end of his work (p.334). This shows that he is not interested in the intricacies of theoretical debates that went on for centuries between the two sections. He, nevertheless, makes clear,

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throughout his entire work, that he advocates the sudden approach to realization. He further makes clear that he does not believe in ‘progress’ in religious life, which is indicative of the gradual approach to realization, but in ‘evolution’ (339). What Benoit is interested in is the solution to the human predicament. It is his conviction that Zen has something substantial to offer. The fact that he sees striking similarities between Zen and psychoanalysis makes him present the two systems as complementary to each other. But there are differences between the two and the comparison has limits. Can Zen be taken away from its soteriological context? Benoit refers to the advice by a Zen master to his student that he should eat when he feels hungry and sleep when he feels sleepy. The deeper meaning is that one must engage in such day-to-day activities with ‘right attitude’, one of being free of any ‘I-making’ or ‘mine -making’. The camouflaged advice is not a plea for carrying on one’s usual activities and still being ‘religious’. It is good to note in this context that in the early discourses the Buddha gives the identical advice to person called Bāhiya who insisted that he wanted guidance in summary form. The Buddha said: Baahiya, thus must you train yourself: In the seen there will be just the seen; in the heard just the heard; in the sensed just the sensed; in the cognized just the cognized. Thus you will not be [carried by that lust]. (Woodward 1948, 10) The advice is not as simple as it sounds at the practical level. It is also interesting to note that the Buddha gave this advice to one who was far advanced in his path purity. Today, some five decades after Benoit’s original writing, the knowledge in Buddhism of traditionally non-Buddhist countries is no longer in its infancy. After an initial infatuation with Zen, people have discovered many other forms of Buddhism. Notable among such are the insight (vipassanā) meditation as taught in the Theravada, traditionally found in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand; and the Tibetan tradition, found in almost all western countries as a result of the Tibetan diaspora with the annexation of Tibet by China. While it is important to have works tying to articulate Buddhist wisdom through a kind ‘nonreligious’ language there are many who feel that they need to see these traditions in their deeper religious perspective. The key virtue of Benoit’s presentation of Zen is that it is addressed to those open-minded people who do not have a special commitment to

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any particular religion. Even if the reader belongs to a particular religion he does not need to forsake his religious views for Zen, when ‘purified’ of any sectarian elements, is universally applicable. As Benoit says, one does not need to burn the Gospels in order to read Hui-neng (p.6). There are, however, limits to this viewpoint. Benoit is quite right in so far as most readers do not plan to go beyond the level of intellectual appreciation of the system and perhaps piecemeal application. Nevertheless, any further involvement would require keeping one or the other text aside. I do not think that one can be faithful to both simultaneously without contradicting oneself. This should not mean that a comparison within a limited space is unacceptable. But it does mean that one must be conscious of the limits of such exercises. The sudden realization upheld by the Southern school of Zen is obviously not the received view of Zen. Furthermore, the Southern Zen school itself was not quite unanimous about the nature and the extent of practice required for enlightenment. For example, teachers such as Tsung-mi (780-841) in china and Chinul (1158-1210) in Korea, who identified themselves with this particular school, held that sudden realization is only the initial awakening; real enlightenment would only come with gradual practice. These teachers often warned their students against misuse of system, for there were many who faked enlightenment. Benoit’s presentation is clearly based on one school of Zen, although that particular Zen happens to be more influential of the two. Not only Zen but also any religious system has the danger of being misused and misinterpreted. This particular type of Zen seems to be more vulnerable. If this is a problem at all, it is obvious that Benoit is not responsible for it. The iconoclastic character found in Zen admonitions is certainly attractive and ultimate realization seems to be so easy. Nevertheless we must not forget the fact that many Zen masters spent much of their times in wall-gazing meditation. Legendary Bodhidharma is believed to have spent seven long years ‘gazing at the wall’ and Satori does not need to be made easier than it actually is. In understanding the Western analysis of the human mind, knowledge of psychoanalysis is of great significance. Likewise Zen can never be ignored by those who take Buddhism as a viable solution for the ills of contemporary society. Zen has played a crucial role in making the Buddhist way of thinking familiar to the West. Both have come a long way to achieve professional status in their respective fields. As systems of thought seriously concerned about human predicament and aiming at

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human well-being, the two systems have ample room for cooperation. Benoit’s work is a commendable contribution to exploring the possible areas of such interaction. It needs to be taken more as an inspirational and instructive volume than a factual presentation of two towering movements in the making of contemporary man. It is clear that both the author and the translator have been motivated by far loftier goals transcending the narrow limits of academia. This volume deserves the attention of all those who take the collective well-being of humanity seriously.

344

Primary Sources and Abbreviations A.

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AA.

Manorathapūraṇī – Vol. I. Eka-Nipatā-Vaṇṇanā, ed. M. Walleser, Pali Text Society, London, 1973. Vol. II. Eka-DukaTika-Nipāta-Vaṇṇanā, eds. M. Walleser and H. Kopp, 1967. Vol. III. Catukka-Pañcaka-Chakka-Nipāta-Vaṇṇanā, ed. H. Kopp, 1966. Vol. IV. Sattaka-Aṭṭhaka-Navaka-NipātaVaṇṇanā, 1979. Vol. V. Dasaka-Ekādasaka-Nipāta-Vaṇṇanā, 1977.

Ap.

The Apadāna – Part I., ed. M.E. Lilley, Pali Text Society, London, 1925.

ApA.

Visuddhajanavilāsinī nāma Apadānaṭṭhakathā, ed. C.E. Godakumbura, Pali Text Society, London, 1954.

Buv/Cp.

Buddhavaṃsa and Cariyāpiṭaka, ed. N.A. Jayawickrama, Pali Text Society, London, 1974.

BuvA.

The Clarifier of the Sweet Meaning (Madhuratthavilāsinī), ed. I.B. Horner, Pali Text Society, London, 1978.

CpA.

Achariya Dhammapāla’s Paramatthadīpanī, ed. D.L. Barua, Pali Text Society, London, 1979.

D.

The Dīgha Nikāya – Vol. I, ed. T.W.R. Davids, Pali Text Society, London, 1949. Vol. II, 1966. Vol. III, ed. J.E. Carpenter, 1976.

DA.

Sumaṅgala-vilāsīnī – Part II, and III ed. W. Stede, Pali Text Society, London, 1971.

Dhk.

Dhātu-Kathā Pakaraṇa, ed. E.R. Gooneratne, Pali Text Society, London, 1963.

Dhp/DhpA. Dhammapada, eds. O Von Hinüber and K.R. Norman, Pali Text Society, London, 1994. The Commentary on the Dhammapada – Vol. I, II, III and IV ed. H.C. Norman, Pali Text Society, London, 1970. Dhs.

The Dhammasaṅgaṇi, ed. E. Muller, Pali Text Society, London, 1978.

345 DhsA.

The Atthasālinī, ed. E. Müller, Pali Text Society, London, 1979.

Dukap.

Dukapaṭṭhāna – Vol. I, ed. R. Davids, Pali Text Society, Oxford, 1996.

It.

Iti-Vuttaka, ed. E. Windisch, Pali Text Society, London, 1975.

ItA.

Paramattha-Dīpanī Iti-Vuttakaṭṭhakathā of Dhammapālācariya – Vols. I ed. M.M. Bose, Pali Text Society, London, 1977. Vol. II ed. H. Kopp, 1980.

J.

The Jātaka – Vol. I, ed. V. Faus Boll, Pali Text Society, London, 1962. Vol. II, III, IV, and V, 1963. Vol. VI, and VII 1964.

Khp.

The Khuddaka-Pāṭha – Paramatthajotikā I., ed. H. Smith, Pali Text Society, London, 1978.

KhpA.

The Khuddaka-Pāṭha – Paramatthajotikā I, ed. H. Smith, Pali Text Society, London, 1978.

Kvit.

Kaṅkhāvitaraṇi, eds. K.R. Norman and Pruitt, W., Pali Text Society, Oxford, 2003.

Kvu.

Kathāvatthu – Vols. I, II, ed. A.C. Taylor, Pali Text Society, London, 1979.

KvuA.

Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā, ed. N.A. Jayawickrama, Pali Text Society, London, 1979.

M.

Majjhima Nikāya – Vol. I, ed. V. Trenckner, Pali Text Society, London, 1979. Vol. II and III ed. R. Chalmers, 1960, 1977. Vol. IV, ed. R. Davids, 1974.

MA.

Papañcasūdanī Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā of Buddhaghosācariya – Part I, eds. J.H. Woods and Kosambi, D., Pali Text Society, London, 1977. Part II, 1979. Part III, ed. I.B. Horner, 1976. Part IV. Part V, 1977.

Nd.I.

Mahāniddesa – Parts I and II, eds. L. De La V. Poussin and E.J. Thomes, Pali Text Society, London, 1978.

NdA.I/II.

Saddhamma-Pajjotikā – Vols. I, II, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta, Pali Text Society, London, 1980.

Ps.

Paṭisambhidāmagga – Vols. I, II, ed. A.C. Taylor, Pali Text Society, London, 1979.

PsA.

Saddammappakāsinī –Vol. I, II, and III ed. C.V. Joshi, Pali Text Society, London, 1979.

Pug.

Puggala-Paññatti and Puggala-Paññatti-Aṭṭhakathā, eds. G. Landsberg and Davids, R., Pali Text Society, London, 1972.

346 PugA.

Puggala-Paññatti-Aṭṭhakathā, eds. G. Landaberg and R. Davids, Pali Text Society, London, 1972.

S.

Saṃyutta Nikāya – Part I. Sagātha-vagga, ed. M.L. Feer, Pali Text Society, London, 1973. Part II. Nidāna-vagga, 1970. Part III. Khandha-vagga, 1975. Part IV. Saḷāyatana-vagga, 1973. Part V. Mahā-vagga, 1976. Volume VI. ed. R. Davids, 1980.

SA.

Sārattha-ppakāsinī – Vol. I. Sagāthā-Vagga, Vol. II. NidānaVagga, Khandha-Vagga, Saḷāyatana-Vagga (First Part), Vol. III. Saḷāyatana-Vagga (Second Part), Mahā-Vagga, Pali Text Society, London, 1977.

Sn.

Sutta-Nipāta, eds. D. Andersen and H. Smith, Pali Text Society, London, 1965.

SnA.

Sutta-Nipāta Commentary being Paramatthajotikā II, Vol. I and II Uragavagga Cūḷavagga, ed. H. Smith, Pali Text Society, London, 1966. Vol. III, 1972.

Thag/Thīg.

Thera- and Therī-gāthā, eds. H. Oldenberg and R. Pischel, Pali Text Society, London, 1966.

ThagA.

Paramattha-Dīpanī Theragāthā-Aṭṭhakathā the Commentary of Dhamapālācariya – Vol. I, ed. F.L. Woodwerd, Pali Text Society, London, 1971. Vol. II, 1977. Vol. III, 1984.

Tikap.

Tikapaṭṭhāna – Part I. Paccayavibhangavāra, ed. R. Davids, Pali Text Society, London, 1988.

Ud.

Udāna, ed. P. Steinthal, Pali Text Society, London, 1948.

UdA.

Paramattha-Dīpanī Udānaṭṭhakathā of Dhammapālācariya, ed. F.L. Woodward, Pali Text Society, London, 1977.

Vbh.

The Vibhaṅga, ed. R. Davids, Pali Text Society, London, 1978.

VbhA.

Sammoha-Vinodanī Abhidhamma-Piṭake Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā, ed. A.P. Buddhadatta Thero, Pali Text Society, London, 1980.

Vin.

Vinaya Piṭaka – Vol. I, ed. H. Oldernberg, Pali Text Society, London, 1969. Vol. II, 1977. Vol. III, IV, and V 1964.

VinA.

Samantapāsādikā – Vol. I, eds. J. Takakusu and Nagai, M., Pali Text Society, London, 1975. Vol. II, 1969. Vol. III, 1968. Vol. IV, 1966. Vol. V, 1967. Vol. VI, 1947. Vol. VIII, ed. H. Kopp, 1977.

Vism.

The Visuddhi-magga of Buddhagosa, ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Pali Text Society, London, 1975.

347 Vvu/Pvu.

Vimānavatthu and Petavatthu, ed. N.A. Jayawickrama, Pali Text Society, London, 1977.

Yam.

The Yamaka – Vol. I and II, ed. C.R. Davids, Pali Text Society, London, 1987.

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Speeches “Globalization and the Free Market”. The Convocation Speech at Sri Jayawardenepura University on 09th October 1995 by J.B. Kalegama.

Index of Subjects

A A Buddhist Manual of Psychology 1 Abhayarājakumāra-sutta 40, 43, 50, 60, 220 Abhidhamma piṭaka (higher doctrine) 277, 278, 310 Abortion (gabbha-pātanaṃ) 323 absolutism 14, 196 cultural - 202 - moral principle 42 action 129, 277, 290 result of the - 39 right human - 216 Bodily - 252 acts: physical -235 verbal - 235 mental - 235 ādesanā pāṭihāriya 49 adhikaraṇa samatha 7, 158 ādibrahmacariyaka-sikkhā 36 advertisement 214, 215 after world 273 Aggañña-sutta 111, 112, 210, 250, 324 Ahi-sutta 121 akusala 4, 8, 9, 14, 22, 36, 74, 115

unmistakable - 13 Alagaddūpama-sutta 69 alcoholic drinks 226 altruistic 219, 314 - act 218 - joy (muditā) 119 Āmagandha-sutta 122 a-manussa 83 Ambalaṭṭhikā Rāhulovāda-sutta 141, 185, 197, 199, 218, 252, 320 Ambaṭṭa-sutta 55 American influence 183 anagārika (houseless life) 229 anger (dosa) 305 anekaṃsika (non-categorical) 69 Aṅguttara-nikāya 121, 170, 183, 277, 319 animals 84, 109, 116, 124, 186 - birth (tiracchāna-gati) 157 - husbandry 215 world of - 116 annihilationism (ucchedavāda) 285, 318, 338 anthropology 95 ānupubbῑ-kathā 25 Apadāna 30, 33 Apaṇṇka-sutta 273, 274

355 apāya /niraya 20 apāyakosalla 23, 24 apāyapaññā 24 appamaññā (unlimitables) 115 appicchatā 57 arahants 31, 34, 102, 123, 164, 168 -hood 31, 167 - mind 330 ārakkha-sampadā 178, 254 ārāma 119 Araṇavibhaṅga-sutta 296 Ariyapariyesana-sutta 271, 310 āsava (taints) 303 asceticism 192 a-social 279 Assalāyana-sutta 165 atta 221, 222 attādhipateyya 320 aṭṭha-garu dhamma 175 atthitā (is) 292 authorities 320 āyakosalla 23

B bad 291 - friends (pāpamitta) 304 balanced living (samajῑvikatā) 183, 185-204, 224, 255 behavior (caryā) 277 Bhaddāli-sutta 153, 154 Bhagavadgita 40 bhāvanā 4, 303, 335 metta - 106 bhavataṇhā 29 bhaya 20 attānuvāda - 20 duggati - 20, 270 parānuvāda - 20 Bhikkhunīs 57, 84, 86, 116, 169, 170, 171, 176, 179 Bhikkunῑ saṃyutta 331

sāsana of - 175, 181, 194, 223, 244, 280, 225 - order 323 Bhikkhus 57, 70, 83 fake - 77, 116, 169, 170, 172, 179, 181, 194, 223, 244, 280 - order 323 Bill of rights Bodhisatva 24, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 37, 42, 240, 284, 334 - engaging in sexual acts 35 - yāna 276 brāhmana 52, 53 Brahmajāla-sutta 176 Brahmanic literature 315 Brahmanism 316, 318 Brahmins 113, 126, 148 Buddha 28, 32, 34, 99, 126, 168, 225, 271, 272, 291, 306, 319 Buddhahood 24, 31, 38, 153 dead body of the - 236 - Gotama 28 - khetta 242 life of the - 32, 232-242 - making virtues (Buddha-kāraka dhamma) 24 - own practice 102 - two-fold attitude 61 Buddhism 99, 111, 141, 270, 274, 309 central philosophy of - 310, 311 early - 220, 277 engaged - 181, 306 evolution of - 202 Green - 181, 306 kammic and nirvanic - 5 karmic - 271 - opportunity 120 - significance of celibacy 90 Soteriological 59, 61 Buddhist: early - tradition 92

356 - economy 180, 183 - ethical behavior - feminism 306 - kamma theory 198 - law 147 lay - 147 - lay society 61 - love 110 - political thought 46 - monastic life 82, 279 - monastic practice 116 - morality 19, 274 - naturalism 284 - philosophy 230 - social life 115, 120 -soteriology 11, 188 - vinaya 147

C Cakkavattisīhanāda-sutta 58, 141, 194, 208, 234, 237, 247, 249, 259 cakravartin 238 rājā - 234, 259 Canki-sutta 319 canonical: - development 233 post - work 278 Capitalism 205, 206, 214 forefathers of - 206 - system 204 Caste 55, 158, 159, 161, 197, 317 division 52, 164 four - 143 high - (brahmana) 130 low - (śudratva) 51 out - (vasala) 130 - practices 56 - system 55, 61, 122, 123, 168, 315 causality 311 external - 312

internal - 312 - theory 312 celibacy 79, 80, 87, 89, 92 - life 89 monastic - 83 practice of - 90 cetanā (intention) 40, 128, 289, 289 Chinese agamas 277 Christianity 63, 94, 258 - era 275 - religion 94 - tradition 94 Chronicle records 157 colonialism 183 commentary 47 - analysis 78 commerce 215 community ownership 57, 223 compassion 115, 119, 120 Great - 36, 42,187 concentration 314 concept: - of superiority 20 Freudian - 337 conditionality (idappaccayatā) 245, 285 conflict 293, 294, 306 non - 296 - resolution 269-306 conscience 21 own - 320 consciousness 66, 299, 338 store - 339 consumption 213, 231 amount of - 206 Buddhist ethics of - 213-231 minimum of - 214 over - 186, 216, 231 planning of - 254 practice of - 213

357 rate of - 206 right - 214, 221 under -186, 216, 231 counseling 329, 331 craving 65 - for existence 31 creator 108, 318 crime 45, 46 Cūlahatthipadopama-sutta 12 Culavamsa 62 Cūlaviyūha-sutta 294-295 Cullavaggapāli 277 Cullavedalla-sutta 332 cutūpapāta ñāṇa 136

D dammhādhipateyya 321 damnation 99 dāna (giving) 4, 118, 305 death 121 -lessness 242 Declaration of the Rights of (man and of the citizen) 263 Declaration on the eliminating of violence against women 321 Declaration toward a Global Ethics 264, 267 Deeds: - evil 4 ten meritorious - 197 three meritorious - 197 deontology 23, 41 dependent co-origination 19, 133, 179, 217, 231, 248, 266, 280, 282, 285, 286, 288, 292, 293, 295, 299, 311, 312, 318 desire (chanda) 305 determinism 134, 196 Development 175-187, 228 economic - 175, 208, 228

spiritual - 208 material - 208 divine damsels 33 Dhamma 40, 125-139, 145, 147, 171, 196, 198, 209, 225, 235 concept of - 208, 261 conquering of - (dharma vijaya) 242 king of - 232 Dhamma-cakka-pavattana-sutta 238, 292, 326 Dhammapada 41, 72, 117, 123, 132, 162, 219, 225, 246, 262, 289, 320 Dhammasaṅgaṇi 277 Dharma Gaia 110 Dhātukathā 277 dig-vijaya 242 Dīgha-nikāya 149, 176, 183, 198, 210, 250, 251, 254, 277, 302, 324, 328, 333 Discourse of Honey- ball 248 diseases: mental - 328 physical - 328 Dissent in Buddhism 66-81 distorted vision (viparῑta dassana) 74 divine qualities 20 dosa (hatred) 12, 294, 328, 330 dukkha 181, 203, 214, 216, 297, 310, 326 dukkha-dukkha 205, 298 saṅkhāra- 298 Duties 144, 227 - of social group 149

E Ecology 93, 109 - crime 102 - crisis 93, 97, 98, 101, 109 eco system 264

358 ecologist 98 Economics 200-217 Buddhist teachings of - 208, 231 equal opportunities in - 193, 195 global -181 - life 253 -planning 25, 244, 245, 249 - policy 207 - production 193 - wellbeing 244, 245 Economy 251: Market - 205-210, 214 psychology of market - 204 philosophy of market - 204 - security 206 Socialist mode of - 206 Eightfold path 57, 91, 213, 217, 252, 301, 329 ekaṃsika (categorical) 69 emotivists 6 emptiness 95, 276, 339 Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics 66 enlightenment 339, 341 fully – one 232 - persons 123, 249 Environment 104 -120, 216, 304 -crisis 93, 94 - issues 181 - love 115 natural - 114 - Philosophy 93-107 - sustainability 216 equality 155- 174 - between men and woman 169 equally 125 - in practice 164, 173 - of all beings 161, 162 - opportunity 188- 204 - society 198 equanimity (upekkhā) 119 essentialism 102

eternalism (sassata-vāda) 285, 318, 338 ethics 3, 19, 127, 252 Buddhist - 3, 40, 43, 257 global form of - 264, 266 normative - 3 Mahayana Buddhist - 1 meta - 1 meta - issues 2 - principals 24 religious - 257-267 social - 118 - values 42 Western - theory 41 Western philosophy - 2 work - 253 European invasion 278 evil forces (māra) 241

F faith 224 blind - 319 reasoned - 319 fear (bhaya) 20, 21, 305 five - 305 First Council 75 five: - aggregates 214, 221, 299 - enmities 305 - hindrance 65, 229 foundation of global ethics 265 four: - biases (agati) 305 - fold force (caturaṃganῑ cenā) 237 - fold logical alternatives (catuṣkoṭi) 292 - kinds of nutriment 16 - requisites 246 Free will 319 fruit (phala) 73, 171

359

G gambling 190, 226, 227 Garahita Jāthaka 325 gender 145, 307-336 - based discrimination 315 - based issues 309, 317, 321 - based violence 321 - egalitarianism 317 General Assembly of United nation 263 generosity 179, 231 globalization 200-212, 214, 258, 263, 264, 265, 267 God 18, 103, 108, 109, 137, 313 all knowing - 280 all powerful - 280 creator - 137, 271, 315 Greek - 131 -less 286 sinning against - 153 good (Dhamma) 40 good 286, 291 - friends (kalyāṇa mittatā) 114, 178, 214, 226, 227, 280, 304 - governance 243-256 the public - 206 government 141

H happiness 176, 177, 199, 208, 218, 222, 223, 225, 228, 242, 244, 254, 336 highest - 168 - in this present life 224 - life 181 maximum - 145 - of having 228 - of the world 235 heaven 106 hell 106, 116, 131 heresy 63

heretics 68 - views 77 higher admission (upasampadā) 70, 85, 162, 175, 176 Hinayana 28, 202, 275 Hindu view 122, 129 Hinduism 141 horse trainer 50, 93 house in fire parable 26 houseless life (anagārika) 326 householder 91, 92, 140, 181, 182, 189 - happiness 91 -life 169, 181, 185, 222, 230 human : 84 - action 117, 118 - being 105, 116, 123, 157, 161, 162 economic concept of - being 211 - equality 123 - existence 110 - interests 114 - kind 102 - life 106, 107, 111, 116, 116 - physical limitation 113 - rights 121, 135, 263, 265 - satisfaction 205 - suffering 128 two pillars of good - behavior 115 - weakness 206 humanity 158

I idealism 221 ideology - foundation 58 - justification 58 ignorance 283 ill will 161 Illisa jātaka 191, 237 impermanence (anicca) 286, 298 notion of - 335

360 indefinite (aniyata) 85, 86 individualism 110, 140, 145, 146 indulgence: - of pleasure 184 sensual - 292 inner transformation 301 inter-dependency 245 invariability (anaññathatā) 285 Islamic attack 276

J Jainism 135, 274 Jātaka 137 - literature 129, 306 - stories 147, 160 jhāna 73, 171 arūpa - (formless absorption) 171 rūpa - (formal absorption ) 171 Journalism 214 ethics for journalist 220 West centric - 214 Judeo-Christian tradition 93, 98, 113, 137, 153 - monotheistic tradition 137 jurisprudence 59 Buddhist monastic - 179 justice 45, 121-139, 140-159, 155174, 244, 265 Buddhist theory of - 135 - conscious West 131 distributive - 144 injustice 127, 137 legal - 139 sense of - 151 social - 124, 125, 126, 139, 143, 193, 194, 206, 209, 211, 216 theory of - 130, 136 Justice, Gender and the Family 144

K Kaccānagotta-sutta 312 Kakacūpama-sutta 153 kalaha (contention) 294 Kalahavivāda-sutta 294, 295 Kālāma-sutta 12, 64, 274, 319, 320 kāma-sukhallikānuyoga 91 Kamma 78, 95, 113, 121-139, 198, 272 ānantariya- 73, 77, 91 bad - 30, 31, 34, 246 bodily - 77 verbal - 77 Buddhist view of - 126, 133 - connections 29 function of - 19 good - 32 grave - 73 hindrance of - 73 - justice 127 low of - 29, 33 past - 29, 32, 34, 128, 129, 196 mental - 77 nissaya - (act of subordination) 152 - niyāma (the principle of action ) 70, 118 pabbājanῑya - (act of banishment) 152 papa - 90 paṭisāranῑya - (act of reconciliation) 152 present - 130 - results 30, 33, 73, 136 - seed 339 tajjaniya - (act of censure) 152 ukkhepanῑya - (act of suspension) 152 kamma niyāma (principle of action) 73 kappiyakārakas 59 Karaṇῑya-metta-sutta 119, 121, 156, 186, 335

361 Kasῑbhāradvāja-sutta 253 Kathāvatthu 71, 79, 80, 277 Khattiya 250 Khuddakanikaya 221, 233, 277 Kilesa (defiling condition) 303, 326 Killing 8, 39, 41, 90, 118, 122, 135, 226, 254 - a human being 36, 116 abstaining from - 185, 287 causing killing 46 no - 47 involved in - 122 - living beings 165 - non human being 116 rule without - 46 King: responsibility of - 125 good governance of - 125 Kūṭadanta-sutta 49, 58, 125, 141, 193, 198, 199, 194, 202, 247, 249, 251 Kῑtāgiri-sutta 12, 173

L labour: - at home 145 child - 323 Lakkhana-sutta 32 law 244 breakers of - 160 civil -147 causal - 312, 313 natural - 313 lesbianism 88 Life: political - 47 basic requirements of - 212 extravagant - 191 family - 145 good - 176 linguistics 95 Living beings 162 lobha (greed) 12, 328, 330

local language 297 logical positivism 97, 103 loka 109, 240, 310 -nirutti 294 - sāmañña 294 - vohāra 294 lokādhipateyya 321 Loka-vajja 9,10, 13 Lotus sutra 34 loving kindness (mettā) 57, 115, 116, 120, 117, 122, 146, 335

M Madhupiṇḍika-sutta 64, 248, 324 Madhyamaka 276 - philosophy 276 Magna carta 263 Mahā sammata (great elect) 250 Mahādukkhakkhandha-sutta 91 Mahāpadāna-sutta 310 Mahāparinibbāna-sutta 200, 236, 328 Mahasῑlava jātaka 51, 52 Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta 69, 324 Mahātitthāyatana-sutta 201 Mahāvaggapāli 277 Mahāvaṃsa 81, 157 Mahāviyūha-sutta 295 Mahayana 25, 27, 34, 76, 202, 275, 309, 339 - bodhisattva 95 East Asian - 276 later - 26 - literature 34 - sutra 28, 29 - tradition 26, 38 Majjhimanikaya 146, 148, 248, 252, 277, 289, 296, 302, 325, 332 Maṅgala sutta 95, 304 mantrayāna 276

362 Manu’s Code of Law (Manuṣmṛti) 50, 54, 126, 315, 317 masturbation 83 materialism 221 meat: eating - 111, 117 trade in - 117 mediatization 214 meditation 73, 335 - practice (yoga) 277 mental: - health 307-335 - ill health 311 - stress 333, 334 middle path (majjhimā-paṭipadā) 292, 296 Milindapañha 31, 32, 33, 278 Mind 39 human - 338 purification of – 338 mindful: human - 338 - journalism 213, 214, 216, 219, 220, 222, 230, 231 mindfulness 302, 335 misinterpretation 65 of Buddhism 246 moha (delusion) 12, 294, 328, 330 mokṣa 61 Monastic: low 48 Buddhist - life 245 - community 82, 244, 245 - disciples 57, 83 - labour force 59 - life 82, 222, 223 - order 61 - vinaya 95, 127 monk 271 - hood 162, 171 moral 35, 53, 108, 252 - action 78 - behavior 101, 236, 273

- causation 196 - interpretation 53 - life 21 - 112, 135 - nature 159, 160 - rules 262

N name and form (psycho-physical personality) 295 natthitā (is-not) 292 nature 102, 104-120 harm - 103 love for - 119 necessity (avitathatā) 284 Nettippakaraṇa 278 new global: - ethics 265 - order 265 New World Order 257-267 neyattha (indirect meaning) 65 niraya 157 nirvana 22, 26, 30, 38, 61, 95, 116, 226, 296 nissaggiya pācittiya 85 noble quest 311 non-extremist 111 nutriment (āhāra) 288 nῑtattha (direct meaning) 68

O objectivism 219 objectivity (tathatā) 284 obligations 227 one-ness of the humanity 158, 136, 203, 324 ordinary society 224 orthodoxy 63, 76 - Brahmanic and Sramana view 67 - debate 80

363

P pabbajjā (going forth) 153, 175, 223 paccavekkhana (reflection) 187 Pacceka-buddha 26 pācittiya (minor offence ) 85, 86, 121 Pācittiyapāli 277 pain: psychological - 46 mental - 48 physical - 48 Pakati-vajja 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 Pali: - canon 233, 243, 277 - tradition 1, 25, 277 - tripiṭaka 30 pañca-sῑla 177, 180, 261 paññā (wisdom) 4, 57, 115, 124, 134, 174, 224, 254, 329 paññatti (verbal designation) 112, 324 Paññatti-vajja 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 pāpa 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 14, 22 para (other) 292 Parābhava-sutta 95 pārājikā (defeat) 7, 10, 36, 60, 70, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 91, 116, 153 first - 82, 83, 85, 95 four - 8, 13, 158 violation of - 90 pāramitā 24 Parinirvāna 79,170 Parivārapāli 277 Parliament of World Religions 264 path finder 306 Pātimokkha 5, 57, 72, 79, 149 - rules 7 Paṭṭṭhāna 277 Pāyāsi sutta 321 Peace loving 274

penalties 172, 174 perfection 24 ten - 197 pessimism 298 Peṭakopadesa 278 philosophy 95, 96, 98, 337 Buddhist social - 179, 281 Father of modern - 114 Indian - 13, 132 - of sustainable development 186 utilitarian - 205 physical - force 43- 52 - sickness 334 political: - metaphor 232-242, 243 - right 263 poverty 55, 60, 189, 209, 246 problem of - 247 power 43-52 pragmatism 273 precepts: ten -9 five - 1474, 182, 185, 286, 305 Psalms of the Brethren and Sisters 106 psychodrama 335 pubbekatahetu-vāda 129, 195 pubbe-nivāsānussati-ñāṇa 136 Puggalapaññatti 277 Pudgalavāda 68, 339 punishments 44, 45, 47, 48, 57, 78, 124, 149, 151, 153, 167, 174, 199 biggest - 60 physical - 45 psychological - 46 puñña / kusala 2, 3, 4, 9, 22 purification (visuddhi) 62, 334, 338 inner - 262

364 mental - 249 puthujjanas (ordinary wordings) 18, 166, 167

R rāga 294 Rajja-sutta 233, 239 Rape 322, 323, 327, 328 Raṭṭṭapāla-sutta 17, 112, 210, 288 reality 292 realization 337-350 gradual approach to - 340 sudden - 341 rebirth 130, 272, 273 round of - 66 reincarnation 95 relativism 14, 96 religion 97, 173, 270 Asian -141 Religious experience 99 Report on mental health 308 Rgveda 126 right (Dhamma) 39, 286 right livelihood 229, 252 righteousness 130, 153, 179, 196, 198, 213, 243 king of - 235

S Sabbāsava-sutta 303 saddhā 319 ākāravati - 319 amūlikā - 319 saddhā sampadā 179 Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (Lotus) Sutra 26 Sāleyyaka-sutta 325 salvation 99, 136, 279 Buddhist path to - 279 personal - 131, 142

samādhi 4 , 134, 174, 314 sāmanera 62, 91 Sāmaññaphala-sutta 145, 176, 229 Samantapāsādikā 156 Samkya System samsara 22, 64 - existence 117 - journey 121 Saṃyutta-nikāya 233, 277, 312, 320, 329, 330 Saṅgārava-sutta 320 Sangha 21, 69, 94, 202, 225 -bheda 64, 69, 70, 71, 72, 76 history of the - 76 membership of - 91 - organization 55, 56, 82, 164 society of - 59 unity of the - 72 Saṅghādisesa 13, 83, 84, 86, 87 sāṅghika 207, 210, 211 - system (community ownership) 60 santuṭṭhitā 57 Sāsana 151: Purification of the - 78 sati pūjā (commit suicide) 317 Satipaṭṭhāna-sutta 302 Satta-aparihāniya dhamma 328 Sattasuriyuggamana-sutta 112 satya-kriyā (act of truth) 133 Sautrāntika 275 sāvaka 26 schism 63, 67, 69 Science 97, 113, 337 science and technology 201 secularism 263 Sela-sutta 234 self 292, 337-350 - confidence 330 - destruction 115 - esteem 330

365 - centeredness 219 - centred attitude 114 - centered human desire 231 - centred nature 115 -centred existence 65 -love 16, 287 - mortification 184, 292 - nature 339 - negation 218, 219 no-(anatta) 67 - protective tendency 287 -sacrifice 219 - view (atta-vāda) 75 sensual pleasure 300 sentimentalism 219 sex 81 Sexual 8, 35, 79, 81 82, 95, 309, 336 - act 83, 84 - between man and woman 85 commercial - 321 - desire 86 engage in - 85 - equality 324, 326 extra marital - 333 heterosexual act 83, 85 homosexuality 88 - identity 325 - intercourse 81, 87 - behavior 79, 185 - misconduct 17, 79, 118, 254, 261 monastic - behavior 82-96 - organ 83, 86 - relation 91 - with human 81 Sigālovāda-sutta 54, 95, 114, 128, 143, 150, 152, 175, 254, 333 sikkhā 5, 147 - pada 5, 54, 127 Sinhala Buddhist kinship 152 Six: religious teachers 176 - social groups 254 - directions 256

sῑla 2, 5, 6, 7, 21, 105, 114, 145, 148, 169, 252, 314 culla - 6, 56; four kinds of - 7 mahā - 6,56 majjhima - 56 Pātimokkha saṃvara - 7 panca- 10, 17, 118, 327 - sampadā 179 sῑmā 148 skepticism 95, 177, 274 skill in means 23 - 44 slavery 50-65; psychological - 60, 61 slaves (dāsatva) 50, 52, 54, 59, 60, 116 Small is beautiful 181, 231 small vehicle 275 social boycott (brahmadaṇḍa) 45, 155 social: - institution 58 - life 227 - relations 305 - virtue 136 - welfare 188 - well-being 209, 336 soul (ātma) 128, 221, 222, 292, 318, 338 -less 286, 292, 293, 338 speech 297 pleasant - (piyavacana) 306 śramana 52, 172 - teachings 318 - tradition 170 śrāvaka-yāna 275, 276 stealing 199, 226, 254 stream entrance 167 subjectivism 219 substantialism 102, 284 suffering 16, 100, 246, 248, 291, 299, 313, 338 cessation of - 282

366 gender based - 324 human - 306 individual samsaric - 143 - of change 298 - of constructed phenomena 205, 298 origin of - 282 quest for ending - 310 suffering-suffering 298 sukha 222 aṇana - 182, 208 anavajja - 182, 208 atthi - 182, 208 bhoga - 182, 208 gihi - 187, 222 nirāmisa - 187, 208, 222 pabbajita - 182, 222 parama - 37 sāmisa - 187, 222 Sutta pitaka 244, 277, 309 Suttanipāta 55, 56, 122, 148, 234, 253, 294, 335 Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sutra 49 sva dharma 51, 126

T tantrayāna 276 tax 188, 198, 251 temporary avoidance (tadaṅga-pahāna) 302 theism 284 theistic 338 non- 99, 338 non - Buddhist tradition 137 non- world view 114 - religion 109 Theravada 25, 78, 79, 309 - Buddhist society 183 - monastic organization 75 - Pali discourses 124 - tradition 29, 30, 38, 42, 43, 123, 233, 275

- vinaya 80 Therῑgāthā 322, 329, 330, 331 thirst (taṇhā) 91, 210, 213, 214, 215 bhava – 91, 248 kāma – 91, 248, 300 vibhava – 91, 248 thirty-two auspicious marks 235 threefold meritorious action 4 threefold trainings 4, 301, 314, 326, 329 three meritorious deeds 5, 22 three signata (ti-lakkhaṇa) 17, 289 time and space 262 tisso sikkhā 4, 6 trafficking in slaves (sattavaṇijja) 56, 57 transgression 34, 78, 102 - religion 262 Transnational corporations 204 traumatic condition 334 Tripitaka 140-159, 277, 309 truth 18, 220 four noble truth 217, 246, 291, 292, 310, 313-315 monopoly of – 295

U ultimate judge 142 ultra rational 19 Universal 113, 202 -characteristics of human being 203 - ethical system 258 - monarch 141, 209, 238 moral - 123 -moral principles 133 - nature 217 - rule 259, 261 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 263 unwholesome 252, 290 roots of - 289 Upadāna 213

367 Upaniṣads 132 upāsakas 57, 117, 138, 170, 176, 280 upāsikās 57, 117, 138, 170, 176, 280 upāya kausalya 23 - 42 uposatha 72, 77, 79, 172 - of unity 72 utilitarianism 40

V Vaibhasika 275 Vajrayana 275, 276, 309 varṇa-dharma (color phenomenon) 51, 112, 126 Vasala-sutta 95, 201 Vāseṭṭha-sutta 55, 116, 119, 127, 148, 163, 166, 167, 168, 202, 203, 324 Vedic: - language 297 - literature 132 - period 143 Veludvāra-sutta 320 vetulya doctrine 81 vibhajjavādi 77 Vibhaṅga 26, 277, 296 viggaha (dispute) 294 Vimalakῑrti-nirdeśa sutra 339 vimutti (freedom) 61, 62, 334, 338 human - 337 vinaya 50, 51, 62, 73, 75, 79, 121, 122, 128, 148, 149 amūḷha - 150 gihi - 152, 226 - pitaka 153, 154, 171, 175, 244, 245, 277, 278, 309, 322 - rules 148 sammukhā vinaya 156 sati - 150 -tradition 45 Vinīta-vatthu 83 viññāṇāhāra 16 viññūpurisa 14, 15, 190

violence 43, 251 act of - 321 being - 274 domestic - 321, 327, 328, 337, 330, 332, 333 legitimate use of - 43, 44 non - 120, 195 vipassanā meditation 9, 340 vision: wrong - 75 right - 75 Visuddhajanavilāsinῑ 30 Visuddhimagga 73, 278, 283, 329 vivāda (debate) 294 volition 16, 39, 138, 221 Vyagghapajja-sutta 95, 178, 305 Vῑmaṃsaka-sutta 67, 319

W wealth 186-204, 228, 253, 255 accumulation of - 205 destruction of - 191 earn - 190 material - 188 righteous - 191, 224 right use of - 191, 192 sevenfold noble - 189 Western - industrialism 204 - influence 183 - Philosophy 97 - religion 101 - science 97 Westerners 270 Westernization 201 wheel: - turner monarch 46, 232, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 242, 243, 244, 257, 259, 260, 261, 265 concept of - 237 - of the dhamma (dhamma-cakka) 242 wholesome 252, 290

368 - deeds 4 roots of - 297 wisdom 314 Eastern - 96 - of means 24 women 145, 169-176, 236, 315, 316, 317, 321-323, 327, 329, 335 - as the wife 333 brahmin - 166 discrimination of - 263 -hood 316, 331 intellectual freedom to - 171 wome-ness 147 world 108, 310 wrong 286, 291 - view (miccā-diṭṭi) 64, 65, 67, 73, 74

Y Yamaka 277 yin-yang 95 Yogacara 276 yoniso-manasikāra (origin wise reflection) 99

Z Zen 94, 95, 337-350 Southern school of - 341

Index of Proper Names

A Abhassara Brahma world 250 Abhaya (prince) 60, 220 Abhayagiri 60, 73, 78 Aciravati river 59, 169 Africa 258 Aggabodhi IV 62 Ajatasattu (Magadha Prince) 73, 176 Akaniṭṭhaka (Brahma world) 109, 242 America (USA) 215, 258 Ames, Roger T 94 Ananda Thera 36, 37, 119, 151, 175, 183, 225, 226, 236, 280 Anāthapiṇḍika 326, 330 Angulimala 30 Anuradhapura 188 Ariṭṭha Bhikkhu 69, 70, 80 ascetic Kassapa 285 Asia 202, 258 Southeast - 81, 188, 309 - Buddhist countries 142 Far East - 309 Ashoka (emperor) 47, 61, 77, 242, 275, 278 - rock edicts 58 Assalāyana 165, 168 Astbury, Jill 308

Avantiputta (King) 164 Avῑci hell 327

B Bāhiya 340 Benoit, Herburt 337 Bhāradvāja 116 Bimbisara (king) 58 Bodhi tree 118 Bodhi, Bhikkhu 34, 167, 296 Bodhidharma 341 Brahman 313 Buddhaghosa 34, 43, 59, 63, 70, 73, 83, 278, 283 Burma (Myanmar) 309, 340 Bush, George 258

C Cakkhupala 30 Callicott, J, Biard 94, 100 Cetiyagiri monastery 63 Channa 29 Chicago 264 Chinul 341 Chomsky, Noam 258 Cincamanavika 31

370

D

I

Daḷhanemi (king) 237, 259 Davids, CAF Rhys 1, 237 Devadatta 31, 70, 76, 122 Dhammadinnā (theri) 175, 332 Dharmasiri, Gunapala 1 Dhirasekera, Jotiya 89, 150, 238 Dutugemunu 152 Dῑghajānu Koliyaputta 178, 201, 224, 254

Illῑsa 229 India 55, 105, 202, 274,276, 315, 327 ancient - 123 ancient - social structure 143 - Buddhism 77 Eastern - 276 - literature 143 Northern - 276, 297 - philosophy 96, 230 - religion 96 - slavery 58 South - 188 southern part of - 275 - tradition 237 Indra (god) 237 Isidāsī (therī) 322

E Elara 152 England 263 Europe 201 European nations 201

F France 114, 263 Francis, Saint 94

G Galpota-vihara inscription 63 Ganga river 59, 169 Germany 265 Gombrich, Richard 247 Gotama Buddha 117, 200, 237, 260 Goṭhābhaya (king) 81 Great Brahma 119 Grotius, Hugo 257 Gunawardena, RALH 59, 63

H Hans Kung 264 Harvey, Peter 1 Himalaya 239, 243 Hui-neng 339, 341 Huxley, Andrew 147

J Jains 123, 133, 177, 178 Japan 276, 309 Jayatilleke, KN 1, 26, 37, 40, 47, 49, 54, 150, 151, 158, 162, 220, 293 Jayawardenepura University 205 Jayawickrama, NA 167 Jetavana 78 -nikaya 60, 73, 323 Jivaka 225 Jnanottara 28 Jones, Ken 110 Jyotimala 28, 29, 29

K Kalupahana, DJ 1, 42 Kant 145 Kanthaka 29 Kashyapa Buddha 28, 29 Kasῑbāradvāja 253 Kālāmas 67, 272, 273

371 Kasi (city) 189, 224, 238, 254 Keown, Damien 1, 4, 125, 135 Kesi 48 Khemā Their 175 King, Winston L 1, 126, 134, 137, 143 Kisāgotamῑ 333 Koṇḍañña 165 Koravya (King) 91 Korea 276, 309 Kosala kingdom 239 Kosambi 75

L Larson, Gerald James 98 Latin America 258 Licchavi 71

M Magadha 176 Magnuson, Joel 213, 231 Maha Parakramabahu 76, 81 Mahākaccāna (thera) 58, 164, 165, 166, 312 Mahākappina (thera) 167 Mahākassapa (thera) 75, 151, 165 Mahāpajāpatῑ Gotamῑ 170 Mahāsudassana (king) 237 Mahātissa Bhikkhu 76 Mahavihara 60, 78 - sangha 73 mahāvijita (king) 198 Mahāmāyā (queen) 321 Mahi River 59,169 majjhima-desa (the middle land) 76 Malalasekera, GP 51, 158, 162 Mallika (queen) 287, 332 Manu 50, 51 Mara 29, 59, 175, 233, 234, 238, 241, 330, 331, 332, 335

Migāra 332 Migāra Mātā 332 Mihintale 63 Misra, GSP 1 Moggallana (thera) 30, 51, 73, 170 Muttā (therī) 321

N Nagarjuna 292 Nāgasena (thera) 32 Nakulamātā 326, 332 Nakulapitā 326 Ñanamoli (bhikkhu) 296 Ñāṇānanda, Katukurunde 248 Nanayakkara, Sanath 238 Nanda (prince) 33 Nanda (thera) 11 Nandā (therī) 323 Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta 135, 136

O Okin, Susan Moller 144

P Parakramabahu (king) 60 Paranavitana 63 Pasenadi Kosala (king) 327, 332 Paṭācārā 334 Pilindivaccha 58 Polonnaruwa 63 Potthakuṭṭha 62 Prebish, Charles 1 Premasiri PD 1, 4 Puggalavadins 71, 72 Purāṇa (thera) 72

R Rahula (thera) 185, 197, 218, 252, 255, 290

372 Rājā Cakkavatti 49, 208, 209 Rajagaha (city) 75, 225 Ratnapala, Nandasena 147 Raṭṭhapāla 88, 89, 289 Rawls, John 136, 140, 267 Renee Descartes 109 Republic of China 201, 215, 276, 31, 340, 341 Rolston, Holmes 95 Rooth, Graham 337 Russia 201

S Saddahatissa, H 1 Sakka 137 Sala (village) 273 Sammitῑya bhikkhus 68 Sarabhu river 59, 169 Sariputta 71, 73, 170, 236 Sati Bhikkhu 66, 70, 68, 78, 80, 338 Schumacher, EF 181, 231 Sena I 62 Siddhartha (prince) 64, 232, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244, 247, 310, 311 Sigāla 57, 61, 161, 175, 196, 201, 225, 225, 227, 253, 254, 256, 280, 304, 305, 333 Sirimeghavaṇṇa 62 Smith, Adam 206 Somā (their) 175, 331, 335 Soviet Union 201 Sri Lanka 49, 61, 62, 76, 81, 123, 183, 271, 275, 278, 309, 340 Buddhist in - 256 history of - 157 Subha Brahmin 117 Subhā (therī) 327 Suddhodana (king) 232, 239 Sudinna 81, 89, 150

Sujātā 326, 330 Sumaṅgalamātā (theri) 321, 322 Sunakkhatta 67, 68 Sundari 31

T Tachibana, S 1 Tatz, Mark 1, 28 Thailand 188, 309, 340 Tibet 276, 309, 340 Tsung-mi 341

U Udena (king) 225 United Kingdom 25, 27, 28, 29, 42 United Nations 263, 264, 265, 321 United states (bill of rights) 263 Upaka Ajivaka 238 Upali Thera 170 Uppalavaṇṇā (theri) 175, 322, 323, 327, 331

V Vajjins 328 Varuna (god) 237 Vāseṭṭa 116, 202 Vātsiputhriya Bhikkhus 68 Vaṭṭagāmanῑ Abhaya 76 Verañja 31 Visākhā 326, 332

W Weber, Max 136, 279, 280 White, Lynn 93, 98, 99, 109 Wijesekera, OH de A 1 World Health Organization (WHO) 308

373

Y Yamuna river 59, 169 Yasodhara 29 Yona- Kamboja 54, 166

Asanga Tilakaratne

Born in Tissamaharamaya of Southern Sri Lanka in 1952 Asanga Tilakaratne received his primary education at Debarawewa Vidyalaya (now Debarawewa Central College), Tissamaharamaya. Subsequently, he received monastic education at Mallikaramaya, Ratmalana and Siri Vajiranana Dharmayatanaya, Maharagama. He received his first degree, Tripitakavedi, from Buddha Sravaka Dharma Pithaya (currently Sri Lanka Bhiksu University), Anuradhapura and also, he completed his Pracina Pandit examination of Oriental Studies Society, Sri Lanka. Next, he joined Peradeniya University, Sri Lanka, and received his bachelor’s degree specializing in Buddhist Philosophy and offering Pali and Sanskrit as his subsidiary subjects. Receiving East-West Center graduate fellowship he studied Western Philosophy at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa for his Masters. He completed his Doctorate at the same university in Comparative Philosophy writing his dissertation on the problem of the ineffability of religious experience. From 1992 to 2007 Prof. Tilakaratne taught at Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, and served as its Director from 2004 to 2007. He joined the University of Colombo as the Professor of Pali and Buddhist Studies in 2009 January and taught there till his retirement in 2018. Meantime, he became instrumental in establishing the Department of Buddhist Studies at Colombo where he became the founder Head. During 2010-2012 he served as the President of Arts Faculty Teachers Association (AFTA) of the University. Prof. Tilakaratne received the Colombo University award for the best researcher in Faculty of Arts in 2013 and in the next year he was awarded the Best Senior Researcher Award in Humanities and Social Sciences by Council of Vice-Chancellors and Directors (CVCD). Respected

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by his students for his undergraduate and postgraduate teaching Prof. Tilakaratne has guided more than twenty-five PhDs in various aspects of Buddhist studies. Prof. Tilakaratne was the recipient of Commonwealth Senior Fellowship 1999-2000. He spent one year at Oriental Institute, Oxford University working with Professor Richard Gombrich and was affiliated to Wolfson College as a fellow. Prof. Tilakaratne has served as visiting professor at Yonsei University, Korea (2007-2008), Otago University, New Zealand (2015), Savitribai Phule Pune University, India (2017) and more recently at Sitagu International Buddhist Academy, Sagaing and Mandalay, Myanmar (2018-2019). He has published, both in Sinhala and English, more than one hundred papers on Buddhist studies. He has authored and edited more than twenty books in both Sinhala and English. Of his more recent academic works, Theravada Buddhism: The View of the Elders (2012) was published by University of Hawai’i Press in the series of ‘Dimensions of Asian Spirituality’. He co-edited with Prof. Oliver Abenayaka 2600 Years of Sambuddhatva: Global Journey of Awakening (2012), a work covering the history and the current status of global Buddhism of all three traditions, published by Ministry of Buddha Sasana, Government of Sri Lanka. In addition to his academic work, in 2002, Prof. Tilakaratne founded Sri Lanka Association of Buddhist Studies (SLABS), an academic and professional organization of Buddhist scholars in Sri Lanka. Having served as its Joint Secretary from the beginning in 2017 he became its president. Also, in 2002, he founded, with a group of academics and professionals, Damrivi Foundation, a government registered not for profit organization for economic, social, educational and spiritual development and continues to function as its founder Chairman.

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Editorial Board Raluwe Padmasiri Thera BA (University of Peradeniya); MA (National University of Singapore); Professor and Head: Dept. of Buddhist Thought, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. Miriswaththe Wimalagnana Thera Royal Pandit (Sri Lanka); BA, MPhil (University of Peradeniya); Professor and Head: Dept. of Buddhist Culture, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. Wimal Hewamanage Royal Pandit (Sri Lanka); BA, MA, MPhil (University of Kelaniya); PhD (University of Wuhan); Senior Lecturer: Dept. of Buddhist Studies, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka. D. Denzil Senadeera BA (University of Sri Jayewardenepura); MA, MPhil, PhD (University of Kelaniya); Visiting Lecturer: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. Ashoka Welitota BA (University of Peradeniya); MA, PhD (The University of Hong Kong); Senior Lecturer and Head: Dept. of Buddhist Sources, Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka. Bertram G. Liyanage Royal Pandit (Sri Lanka); BA (University of Peradeniya); MA, PG Dip. (University of Pune); Deputy Editor: Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, Sri Lanka. Sheila Fernando BA, MA, MPhil, PhD (University of Kelaniya); Research Assistant: Tulana Research Centre, Sri Lanka.

Editorial Assistants Thich Nu Khanh Nang Bhikṣuṇī MA, PhD (University of Kelaniya); Tu Nguyen Pagoda, Thach Lam street, Tan Phu District, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. Sewwandi Marasinghe BA (University of Colombo); MA (University of Kelaniya); MPhil Candidate: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri lanka. Nuwanthika Ariyadasa BA (University of Colombo); MA (University of Kelaniya); MPhil Candidate: Postgraduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies, University of Kelaniya, Sri lanka.