Buddhism, War and Nationalism: Chinese Monks in the Struggle Against Japanese Aggression, 1931-1945 0415975115, 9780415975117

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Chapter One Changing Buddhism in Modern China
Chapter Two Buddhism and National Defending
Chapter Three Propaganda against Japanese Aggressions
Chapter Four Buddhist Participation in the War
Chapter Five Buddhism in Japanese-Occupied Areas
Chapter Six Taixu and Buddhism after the War
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

EAST ASIA

HISTORY, POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY, CULTURE

Edited by

Edward Beauchamp University of Hawai’i

A ROUTLEDGE SERIES

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EAST ASIA HISTORY, POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY, CULTURE EDWARD BEAUCHAMP, General Editor NEW CULTURE IN A NEW WORLD The May Fourth Movement and the Chinese Diaspora in Singapore, 1919–1932 David L. Kenley ALLIANCE IN ANXIETY Détente and the Sino-American-Japanese Triangle Go Ito STATE AND SOCIETY IN CHINA’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION Confucianism, Leninism, and Economic Development Xiaoqin Guo

IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY The Politics of History as a School Subject in Hong Kong, 1960s–2002 Edward Vickers

PITFALL OR PANACEA The Irony of US Power in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952 Yoneyuki Sugita

THE RENAISSANCE OF TAKEFU How People and the Local Past Changed the Civic Life of a Regional Japanese Town Guven Peter Witteveen

MANAGING TRANSITIONS The Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, Corporatism, and Hegemony Gerry Groot THE PROSPECTS FOR A REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISM IN EAST ASIA Hidetoshi Hashimoto AMERICAN WOMEN MISSIONARIES AT KOBE COLLEGE, 1873–1909 New Dimensions in Gender Noriko Kawamura Ishii

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A PATH TOWARD GENDER EQUALITY State Feminism in Japan Yoshie Kobayashi

POSTSOCIALIST CINEMA IN POST-MAO CHINA The Cultural Revolution after the Cultural Revolution Chris Berry BUILDING CULTURAL NATIONALISM IN MALAYSIA Identity, Representation, and Citizenship Timothy P. Daniels LIBERAL RIGHTS AND POLITICAL CULTURE Envisioning Democracy in China Zhenghuan Zhou

THE ORIGINS OF LEFT-WING CINEMA IN CHINA, 193237 Vivian Shen

MAKING A MARKET ECONOMY The Institutional Transformation of a Freshwater Fishery in a Chinese Community Ning Wang GLOBAL MEDIA The Television Revolution in Asia James D. White

ACCOMMODATING THE CHINESE The American Hospital in China, 1880–1920 Michelle Renshaw

INDONESIAN EDUCATION Teachers, Schools, and Central Bureaucracy Christopher Bjork BUDDHISM, WAR, AND NATIONALISM Chinese Monks in the Struggle against Japanese Aggressions, 1931–1945 Xue Yu

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BUDDHISM, WAR, AND NATIONALISM CHINESE MONKS IN THE STRUGGLE

AGAINST JAPANESE AGGRESSIONS, 1931–1945

Xue Yu

Routledge New York & London

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Published in 2005 by Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 270 Madison Avenue New York, NY 10016

Published in Great Britain by Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 2 Park Square Milton Park, Abingdon Oxon, OX14 4RN

© 2005 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 International Standard Book Number-10: 0-415-97511-5 (Hardcover) International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-415-97511-7 (Hardcover) Library of Congress Card Number 2005009581 No part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Yu, Xue. Buddhism, war, and nationalism : Chinese monks in the struggle against Japanese aggressions, 1931–1945 / by Xue Yu. p. cm. -- (East Asia, history, politics, sociology, culture) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 0-415-97511-5 1. Buddhism--Social aspects--China. 2. War--Religious aspects. 3. Sino-Japanese Conflicts, 1937–1945. I. Title: Chinese monks in the struggle against Japanese aggressions, 1931–1945. II. Title. III. Series: East Asia (New York, N.Y.) BQ645.Y82 2005 294.3′37273′0951--dc22

2005009581

Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at http://www.taylorandfrancis.com Taylor & Francis Group is the Academic Division of T&F Informa plc.

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and the Routledge Web site at http://www.routledge-ny.com

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To My Parents

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Contents

Foreword by R. David Arkush

ix

Acknowledgments

xiii

Introduction

1

Chapter One Changing Buddhism in Modern China

15

Chapter Two Buddhism and National Defending

43

Chapter Three Propaganda against Japanese Aggressions

77

Chapter Four Buddhist Participation in the War

105

Chapter Five Buddhism in Japanese-Occupied Areas

151

Chapter Six Taixu and Buddhism after the War

177

Conclusion

197

Notes

213

Bibliography

257

Index

269 vii

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Foreword

It is startling to reflect on how infrequently Buddhist monks appear in historical writing on China of the first half of the twentieth century. We have hundreds and hundreds of books and articles on politics, on militarists, Nationalists, and Communists, on intellectuals, scholars, students, and modern literature and culture, on the economy and society, both urban and rural, on the lives of women and workers and even villagers, and on businesses, businessmen, and the modernizing cities with their new popular culture. But where in all this are the half million or more Buddhist monks and nuns? Apart from an occasional piece on a prominent cleric like Taixu, there are only Holmes Welch’s books from the 1960s and that his books are still useful now after forty years shows how little progress has been made since. Through all this scholarly writing on twentieth-century China, the theme of nationalism runs strong: how, around 1900, scholars and officials felt that foreign imperialism threatened China’s very existence, and how in the next decade centuries-old institutions were rapidly discarded. In the decade of the 1910s, young intellectuals became convinced that saving China required rejecting the culture of their fathers, Confucianism, classical writing, and old-fashioned family ethics, in favor of new ideas and new ways from abroad. By the 1920s, anti-foreign anger brought to power the Nationalist Party, whose state would demand that everything else be subordinated to the needs of the nation, and in the 1930s Japanese invasion spread nationalism even to portions of the rural population. That Buddhists also have a place in this narrative is the novel thesis of the book before you. In many ways, Dr. Xue Yu shows Buddhist institutions were marginalized by the fervid nationalism of modern China, itself almost a rival religion in its demands for total allegiance. Buddhist clergy were thought irrelevant to the supreme goal of strengthening the nation in its crisis, and Buddhist temples and their properties were at times expropriated. What this book shows is how

ix

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Foreword

some Buddhist monks responded to the threat of nationalism by embracing it. A national organization was formed to represent their interests to the government; modern Buddhist schools were founded, producing new monks who thought of themselves as citizens of the nation, with rights and duties like everyone else; a few cultivated ties with political leaders. Astonishingly, around 1936, as war with Japan loomed and with it military conscription, many monks were ready to say yes to involvement in war. This required a difficult rethinking of the requirements of their monastic vows of nonviolence. Indeed Xue Yu has uncovered a fascinating debate among the clergy about the morality of their participating in war, and whether it could be reconciled with the fundamental Buddhist prohibition on taking life. Might not Buddhist compassion for life require protecting fellow citizens by participating in the war of resistance against Japanese aggression, and perhaps even killing? Dozens and dozens of monks wrote essays to express their ideas on Buddhist participation in war that haunted most of Buddhists, especially monks and nuns at the time, and a good number argued that Buddhist doctrine sanctioned killing if it were in order to protect millions of fellow Chinese and the nation. This book makes a great contribution in showing the wide variety of ways in which Buddhists participated in the war in different parts of China, and how they were affected by this destructive conflict. Many monks underwent military training in various regions; others formed first-aid brigades, or engaged in relief work, anti-Japanese propaganda (to prove that the Japanese were not true Buddhists), and religious rituals for troops. All this, presumably, was to show themselves useful to the nation and so to valorize their place in society by the touchstone of nationalism. Xue Yu also examines the dilemmas and choices made by Buddhist monks and nuns in Japanese-occupied areas. Xue Yu has had rigorous Buddhist training, including several years in Sri Lanka. He has a passionate interest in Buddhism, and a deep and empathetic understanding of the people he is writing about and of the textual and doctrinal traditions and divisions which informed their outlook. He has also immersed himself in a broad scholarly literature, and learned to use his sources critically and approach his subject dispassionately. He thinks and writes as a scholar rather than a partisan, and he uses sources from both sides of the Taiwan straits as well as in Japanese and Indic languages. A final thought. The arguments discussed in this book about compassionate killing and skillful means may sometimes provoke the thought that clever minds with a sufficiently complex religious tradition can find justification for anything. But that misses the point. These were serious and concerned people faced with real moral dilemmas, in a society suffering from invaders who were at times capable

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xi

of terrible brutality. And, after all, these matters of what are the criteria for a just war and when should violence be sanctioned by those whose deepest convictions abhor it are, unfortunately, hardly altogether distant from the concerns of our present world. R. David Arkush The University of Iowa

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Acknowledgments

Nothing can arise without cause and condition; the completion of present work is largely due to the kind assistance of many persons. I am very grateful to all those who have extended their kindness and help to me throughout my academic pursuing in Mainland China, Sri Lank, Japan, America, and Hong Kong. To Dr. Wendy Adamek, Dr. Janine Sawada, and Dr. Robert Baird, I am indebted for their kindness and assistance showed to me during my stay at the University of Iowa. My special thanks should go to Dr. David Arkush, who inspired me to carry out the research on Buddhism and contemporary society in the first half of the twentieth century China. His generous assistance and capable guidance enabled me to have completed this work. Xue Yu The Chinese University of Hong Kong

xiii

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Introduction

RELIGION AND VIOLENCE Reason suggests that religion and violence should be mutually exclusive. After all, violence in absence of peace is the extreme form of suffering; the highest goal of religion is to eliminate suffering and to provide lasting peace and ultimate happiness; and in addition, human beings prefer living in peace to suffering or dying in violence. Logically, then, religion, the ideal way to achieve happiness and peace, should help overcome violence, and religion and violence should share little common ground. Unfortunately, however, world history demonstrates that religion and war often go hand in hand. Religion can be a major force behind violence and war is waged for the sake of religion. Religion and violence serve and sometimes reinforce each other, and humankind becomes accustomed to religious violence and somehow may not consider it as violence. In fact, religious violence is one of dominant phenomena in primitive religion where gods often use violence to demand human obedience and surrender. The anger of such supernatural beings, it is thought, can be pacified only by the blood of human sacrifice. People worship god not because god is full of love, but because it possesses “superior violence” against those who dare to defy him. The Vedas, the sacred texts of Hinduism,1 vividly depict both animal sacrifice and the glory of victory in war.2 The Bhagavad-gītā, one of the most important texts in Hinduism, strongly advocates war. Arjuna was morally dejected when he realized that he was going to slay his own kinsmen. However, Krishna, Avatara of God Vishnu, urged him to fulfill the duty of the warrior class even though to do so he had to kill his evil kinsmen, because “If slain, you shall go to heaven and if victorious you shall enjoy the earth.” (II.37). According to Krishna, a warrior who fulfills his royal duty of fighting and a contemplative seer who performs the duty of a recluse reach the same goal, and war was merely the instrument of God to manifest the divine duty of humanity. M. K Gandhi (1869–1948), a keen admirer of the Bhagavad-gītā, found it difficult to reconcile his conviction of ahimsa or nonviolence with the idea of 1

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the violence expressed in the text, and considered the text as not a historical work but the duel that perpetually goes on in the hearts of mankind.3 This allegorical interpretation, however, is rejected by scholars such as Kashi Nath Upadhyaya.4 Whether we should take the text literally or understand it allegorically, the Bhagavad-gītā has exerted tremendous impact on Hindu religion and culture; as a result, ordinary Hindus, especially the followers of Vaisnavism, may believe that they are the instruments of their personal God Vishnu and will do everything possible, even violence, to fulfill the will of God. Indian history is full incidents of violence associated with religion, and contemporary India continues to witness violent conflicts between Hindus and Muslims originated from dispute over the rebuilding of Rama’s temple on the site of Bahri Mosque at Ayodhaya. In the Hebrew Bible, the religious tradition of violence is more eminent. Yahweh, in order to save his chosen people, demonstrates his violence by murdering every firstborn in Egypt (Exodus 12:12) and commands his people, whom he has led out of Egypt, to decimate seven peoples in Palestine (Deut. 7.1–26). He also orders his followers to exact vengeance for Israel on the Midianites, and to destroy them without showing any mercy as an offering to Yahweh. Following the command of God, the Israelites killed every male, took the women and dependants captive, and set fire to the towns where Midianites lived. Early Christianity, especially manifested in the New Testament, emphasizes unconditional nonviolence and universal love, yet the New Testament cannot be read independent of the Old Testament, and violence tradition in the Hebrew Bible is not irrelevant to Christianity.5 Jesus is also recorded to have said, “If he has no sword, let him sell his cloak to buy one” (Luke, 22:36). The interdependence of the church and the Roman Empire at the time of Constantine (r. 306–337) inevitably caused a shift away from pacifism in the Christian church. The idea of a holy or just war emerged when Augustine declared that war is the instrument of divine judgment on wickedness.6 In 1093, Pope Urban II initiated the First Crusade, the “just war” against infidels, and promised that those who participated in the war would be blessed in heaven and be rewarded with booty in this world.7 Since then, the Christian concept of a “just war” developed and wars were waged even among Christians.8 Although Islamic conceptions of war can be traced back to pre-Islamic culture, to religious and political situations and apocalyptic tradition prevailing at the time of Muhammad,9 they became part of Islamic religion once Muslims adopted in their practices. The spirit of Jihad can be found in the Koran, the Islamic juridical tradition, and the life of Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam. Although Muslim pacifism is not unknown in Islam, especially among Sufis who claim that it is greater struggle to conquer the Self than to conquer external enemies, Jihad is often interpreted as a holy war against infidels in the way of

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God in order to establish a theocratic state of one God, one mankind, one law, and one ruler. The above brief analysis of violent traditions in world religions demonstrates that violence and religion co-exist in the holy texts of religions and reinforce each other in history.10 God, who is behind human actions and in control of human destiny, is de facto the primary source of the tradition of violence. Following their religious tradition and beliefs, people of different religions endorse their own religious violence and categorize it as “holy war” while condemning that of other religions as pure terrorism, which necessitates punishment. Numerous wars in history have been fought in the name of God, including the Christian Crusades and the Islamic Jihad. We may thus assume that, just as the concepts of love, compassion, or brotherhood are familiar to religions, so are the idea that God will punish infidels through violence and religious followers should pursue the path of God.11 Many people begin to see that monotheism in these religions plays a vital role in justifying violence, as the existence of one God demands the exclusion of the other, and religious exclusivism inevitably creates conflict and violence when two religions encounter each other.12 Meanwhile, political involvement of religion or marriage of politics and religion may have also contributed to the fact of religious violence. In contrast, Buddhism, unlike monotheisms, denies the existence of the absolute God and shows little interest in politics. Buddhists often claim that Buddhism advocates tolerance and compassion, and many non-Buddhists accept such claims too. In Vinaya, the idea of ahimsa (pānātipātā veramanī 不殺生) is much addressed as primary obligation that both cleric and lay communities must observe.13 Similarly, several Buddhist doctrines—on the equality of all living beings, no-self, dependent origination, and the law of cause and effect—urge people to investigate the nature and consequence of violence and the meaning of life so that they can refrain from killing each other.14 Then, the questions arise inevitably whether there is teaching of violence in Buddhism and how Buddhists justify their violent actions in the past. The present work sets out not to theorize or harmonize Buddhist ideas of nonviolence and violence, but to contextualize them in the social, political, and religious environment in early 20th century China, and to explore the nationalistic motivation behind Buddhist involvement in the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945). My study examines how young Chinese monks, inspired by the nationalism and patriotism prevailing in China at the time, passionately supported and participated in the war, and explores how they advocated war by selecting a few texts and past examples of Buddhist participation in violence to justify their “unconventional activities” despite the overwhelming majority of Buddhist texts that condemn violence. These young monks creatively reinterpreted Buddhist texts and elaborated on the relationships between Buddhism and the state, and the bodhisattva’s ideas

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of “compassionate killing.” They abandoned their commitment to Buddhism in order to fulfill their nationalistic duty of protecting the nation. By examining their arguments and their war activities, we may realize that Chinese clergy made use of Buddhism through skillful means for the war perhaps because they were forced by the supremacy of nationalism at the time or perhaps they truly believed that Buddhists were duty-bound to serve the nation first.

BUDDHISM AND VIOLENCE If Buddhist ethics in both Theravada15 and Mahayana highlight nonviolence and prohibit killing,16 the question inevitably arises of how Buddhists should deal with violence in society where they live. It is true in Buddhism that much is said about nonviolence and the way to achieve peace through moral and spiritual cultivation of individuals and complete liberation from this world. It is also true that Buddhism, as Buddhists may claim, can prevent violence because it provides the final way to entirely terminate conflict and violence through purifying the individual mind and through eliminating the source of violence. However, more effort is needed for them to convince others that Buddhist nonviolence can effectively overcome or eliminate violence, which is a human nature and world phenomenon, and that loving-kindness alone can deter war and bringing an end to conflict.17 It may be unreasonable to assert that every human being in the world will accept the value of Buddhist ethics; Buddhism may transform those who believe in its morality and doctrine, but it is doubtful that it can have much influence on those who disregard it. Does Buddhism provide a solution if its ethical persuasions fail to win over violence and evil? Ideally, the solution to war is to prevent it from happening in the first place, to erase all sources of violence in terms of craving, hatred, and ignorance, yet even the Buddha could not prevent the genocide of his own Sakyan clan by King Virudhaka and the destruction of Vajjis by King Ajatasātru.18 To understand Buddhist attitude toward violence and nonviolence, we should first differentiate ethics for the sangha from that of lay society. In the Theravada tradition, lay Buddhists, often represented by the king, are not restrained from exercising self-defense or from positively dealing with violence. In contrast to the discipline that clergy are absolutely prohibited to take any violent action and that they are even dissuaded from resisting violence against themselves, lay Buddhists have the right to combat violence and defend justice.19 The Aggańńa Sutta endorses the use of force to protect the social order and the property of people by punishing evil.20 The Cakravatin or the universal monarch is an ideal king of Buddhism, who conquers the world with the Dharma, yet the king maintains a powerful army as one of his seven treasures, to fight evil and crush violence wherever it occurs.21 Aśoka, who was one of the most important kings in the Theravada

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tradition and who manifested some characteristics of the universal monarch, did not completely abandon the use of force.22 It also should be emphasized that the Buddha advises his disciples to live in peace and harmony with the rest of the world and to comply with the law of the society where they live, accepting violence as reality of the world. He never requested his disciples, both lay and clerical, to change existence of social order, or to disobey political authority. Contrarily, he willingly changed monastic discipline to accommodate secular law, to avoid conflict between the sangha and the state. Upon a request by king Bimbisāra, the Buddha prescribed that soldiers who run away from military service or anyone who avoids military service should not be admitted into the sangha. Instead, it is said that he once gave blessings to a lay Buddhist, who was setting out for fighting in war.23 Contemporary scholarship, which shows interest in Buddhism and war, has discussed Buddhist attitudes toward violence either through hermeneutical analysis or historical examination. Some works have focused on how Buddhists, especially the members of the sangha in different countries such as in Japan and Sri Lanka, made use of Buddhist doctrines to justify their involvement in violence. All these studies demonstrate that a few Buddhist texts, particularly in the Mahayana tradition, do claim a Buddhist way of violence, and that the Buddha does show concern with the way in dealing with war. During the time of the Buddha, social, political, and religious revolution was taking place in India, as the Ksytriya class gradually ascended to the top of the social hierarchy and powerful monarchies continued to annex small kingdoms. The Buddha appears to have contented to such trend of change and preferred the warrior class to the Brahmans, for when many Buddhist texts mention the fourfold caste system they list the former before the latter. It is well-known that the duty and responsibility of the Ksytriya class was to engage in military operation and violence whenever necessary to defend a nation and protect the lives and property of people. Although the overwhelming majority of Buddhist texts reiterate the Buddhist commitment to nonviolence, a few texts indicate that the Buddha did not completely reject all forms of violence and that Buddhism is not pure pacifism throughout history. The Mahāsatyakanirgrantha-putra-vyākarana-sutra,24 translated by Bodhiruci (fl 508–527 CE) in 519, relates that Nirgrantha, the founder of Jainism, delivered a sermon on warfare to a king and that Buddha acknowledged such teaching as saddharma or right Dharma, which should be adopted as a Buddhist solution to violence. In this text, King Pradyotta is advised to first observe the precept of nonkilling and solve the problem of violence with peaceful means. However, when all means are exhausted, the king should prepare for war even though he has to kill other human beings.25 A similar situation and its solution can also be found in the Sūtra of the Humane King.26

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Narada once made the statement that Buddhism has always contributed to peace,27 he seems to have disregarded the incident in the history of his own country when King Duttagāmani (101–77 BCE), as recorded in Mahāvamsa, fought a war against a Tamil invasion with Buddha’s relic as his banner, and that thousands of monks joined his troops, fighting for the sake of reestablishing Buddhism in Sri Lanka.28 In its modern history, the voices of monks resonated in the struggle for national independence in the first half of the 20th century. A number of leading members of the sangha have directly or indirectly been involved in current campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam since 1983.29 These monks made use of canonical and post canonical texts to justify their claim that war on the Tamil was to protect the Dharma, which the Buddha had entrusted to the Sinhalese people. Tessa Bartholomeusz examines in detail the idea of nonviolence as prima facie obligation on the one hand, and acceptance and practice of violence on the other.30 In safeguarding the Dharma and defending the nation, which most Sinhalese Buddhists consider to be the promised Buddha-Land, Sinhalese Buddhists have developed the just war theory. They would use all means to fulfill their divine duties entrusted by the Buddha, including resorting to violence. In Mahayana Buddhism, although the discipline emphasizes the idea of ahimsa, asserting that all Buddhists must observe it, its Dharmic interpretation in accordance with social and political practice, varies from place to place and changes from time to time. With the development of new doctrine and the expansion of Buddhism in the world, the tradition of ahimsa transformed accordingly. Buddhists, including members of the sangha, often attempted to reconcile conflicts between Buddhist ethics of non-killing and the necessity of violence in dealing with violence in contemporary social and political contexts, or they just simply developed such new philosophical theory, interpreting the idea of non-killing in non-conventional ways, such as emptiness of all actions. Of many places in the Dazhidu lun 大智度論, Nagarjuna emphasizes the importance of observing the precept of non-killing, yet when elaborating on emptiness he gives the following statement: Therefore, living beings in fact are non-existence. There will be no sin of killing if there is non-existence of living beings; no one can be said to observe precept if there is no sin of killing . . . Just like that there will be no sin if one commits killing in dream and kills the image in mirror, so is one who kills empty form of five aggregates of [a living being].31

A sentient being is consisted of five aggregates (matter, sensation, perception, mental formation, and consciousness) that change momentarily without anything that can be called self or soul. In other words, nothing except five constantly changing aggregates can be killed or taken away if a person is killed. Emptiness

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7

of killing is also illustrated in the Nirvāna Sūtra. Prince Ajātaśatru had his father, king Bimbisāra, murdered in order to ascend throne. Later on he suffered both mental and physical pains as sharp remorse arose in his heart and sores covered his entire body. His ministers recommended that he consult the six great ascetics of the time, yet their advice brought no consolation and peace to him. Later on, Jīvaka, the royal physician, urged the young king to see the Buddha for advice. Reluctantly, the king paid a visit to the Buddha who first analyzed the nature of killing and the illusion of karmic consequence, saying that the action of killing is not performed independently, but has its cause and conditions. The Buddha suggested that the fact that King Bimbisāra was killed was resulted from the incident when he had once murdered an ascetic in his previous life. Then the Buddha stated: Great King, it is like a magician at the crossroad conjuring all varieties of men and women, elephants and horses, adornments and robes. The ignorant think them real, but the wise know that they are not. Killing is like this. Foolish men think it real, but the Buddhas, the world-honored ones, know it is not. Great King, it is like the echo of a voice in the mountain valleys. The ignorant think it a real voice, but the wise know it is not. Killing is like this. Foolish men think it real, but the Buddhas, the world-honored ones, know it is not.32

The Buddha’s explanation of emptiness and the uselessness of remorse consequently provided instant spiritual relief to Ajātaśatru, as if he was born again and as if his past full of evil suddenly disappeared. The king, after conversion, played a vital role in supporting and protecting the Buddha-sasana (Buddhism). This teaching and practice of the Buddha in his effort of converting evils through all ways and means may help us understand the theory and practice of “liberation through killing” (sgrol moksa) in Vajrayana Buddhism. It is said that Bodhisattva Vajrapāni transformed Maheśvara (i.e., Śiva) by killing and reviving him. In connection with this myth, a tantric ritual is performed in which one recites a mantra, visualizes kīlaya deities, and finally strikes an effigy where the evil is supposed to have resided.33 By this ritual, the evil can be transformed even though the physical body of evil-doer is destroyed. In this connection, the ideas of non-duality and non-attachment as highlighted in Zen Buddhism, which is often described as iconoclasm and anti-norminalism, also shed some light on the understanding of non-consequence of killing. Zen Buddhism urges practitioners to abandon attachment to or illusion of good and bad, killing and non-killing. Enlightened Zen masters sometimes encourage their students to transcend conventionality and not be bothered by worldly traditions, emphasizing that any dual thinking would prevent one from achieving non-duality of oneself and Buddha. Thus, Zen koans are full of incidents directly against conventional practices of Buddhism, such as non-killing. For instances,

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Nanquan (747–843) once killed a cat in order to awaken the monks who had been involved in the dispute over the cat. Linji (d. 867), the founder of Linji School ( Jan, Rinzai) once told his students: Followers of the Way, if you want insight into Dharma as it is, just do not be taken in by the deluded views of others. Whatever you encounter, either within or without, slay it at once: on meeting a Buddha slay the Buddha, on meeting a patriarch slay the patriarch, on meeting an arhat slay the arhat, on meeting your parents slay your parents, on meeting your kinsman slay your kinsman, and you attain emancipation.34

Although the above cases should not be understood literally, the implied idea that there is no “sin” in killing or that one should not attach to duality of killing and non-killing would certainly downplay the importance of the morality of non-killing. Such idea could provide opportunity or excuse for Buddhists to reinterpret violence and to adopt an alternative to nonviolence in dealing with violence. In fact, the above ideas as expressed in Buddhist texts may have created a context for some Buddhists, both clerical and lay, to justify their actual engagement in war throughout Buddhist history. It is, however, certain that Buddhist ethics of nonviolence did not prevent Japanese monks from involvement in violent struggle against each other, in defying the government military, as well as in the nationalistic effort of invading other countries. Militant monks in the early history of Japanese Buddhism, especially during the Heian period, were deeply engaged in fighting to invade other’s temples or to protect their own temples from invasion. They also vigorously resisted government forces, which were sent to disarm them. In modern history before the end of the Second World War, Japanese priests actively participated in supporting Japanese aggression against other Asian countries. The theory that war may be waged to spread the Dharma and to save more lives with compassion inspired many of them to replace their robes with military uniforms, and some of them participated in a war of killing people in other Asian countries.35 By understanding Buddhist discipline, doctrine, and history in both Mahayana and Theravada as a whole, we may realize that there are discrepancies and contradictions with regard to the traditional ethics of nonviolence and the idea of violence. Although a majority of Buddhist texts emphatically affirm the discipline that Buddhists should not commit killing and that monks and nuns should not be involved in military and war, a few texts do, directly or indirectly, convey the idea that killing is allowed. Under certain circumstances, killing is justified, such as when it is meant to defend oneself, to safeguard or spread the Dharma, or to enact compassion. Although general Buddhist “norms are not necessarily invalidated by

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the fact that they are occasionally or even constantly violated by certain individuals or groups,”36 such ideas and practices of violence should not be dismissed as nonBuddhist. Rather, they may be seen as a part of Buddhism and product of Buddhist development throughout history and in different nations. If we consider the doctrines of “emptiness” and “existence” in Buddhism as non-dual or as a whole, it is not difficult to realize that violence and nonviolence in Buddhism are just a design of skillful means because killing will be identical as non-killing in the ultimate sense. However, one cannot fully understand Buddhism by merely attaching to this transcendent truth of emptiness, the conventional truths of existence, moral law (such as cause and effect of killing), and justice should not be ignored. The comprehension of the twofold truth as a whole would enable us to understand the nature and phenomenon of Buddhist violence as they are. Therefore, it is important to be open-minded and rational with historical evidence and doctrinal insight when making value judgments or normative evaluation in understanding Buddhist violence both in texts and history, seeing not only the similarities of doctrinal justifications for violence in different countries at different times but also their differences. For instance, both Japanese priests and Chinese monks made use of Buddhism to justify their respective countries’ engagements in Japan-China conflicts between the 1880s and the 1940s. It is important to explore the similar doctrinal justifications the Buddhists in two countries employed, yet it is also vital to understand different motivations and circumstances that prompted them to articulate their advocacation and participation in violence.

TERMS EXPLAINED This book is based largely on primary sources in Chinese published in the early 1930s and 40s; it may, therefore, be useful to explain some terms and translations first. Charles Jones translated Zhongguo fojiao hui 中國佛教會 as Buddhist Association of the Republic of China, reasonable in the sense that the association existed and still exists in the Republic of China, Taiwan. But I prefer the more literal translation of “Chinese Buddhist Society,” which is differentiated from “Chinese Buddhist Association,” the official translation for Zhongguo fojiao xiehui 中國佛 教協會, established in the People’s Republic of China in 1953. The two translations preserve the distinction in Chinese between society (hui 會) and association (xiehui 協會). Several terms in Chinese indicate Buddhist clergy, such as sengzhong 僧 眾 (monks and nuns), chujiaren 出家人 (those who have left householder life), fashi 法師 (Dharma masters), and heshang 和尚 (those who value harmony). In general, all may indicate Buddhist monks, nuns, or both, who live in the monastic community, the sangha. In other words, they are interchangeable with each other.

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When it is clear that only monks and not nuns are meant in the original source, I have used the term “monks.” Otherwise, “clergy” is used. I use “priests” only for the married Japanese clergy living with families in temples, widely practiced after the Meiji Restoration. Fojiao 佛教 is normally translated as “Buddhism,” although the Chinese words imply more “the teaching of the Buddha,” and Buddhists more often use the term fofa 佛法 or Buddha-Dharma instead. As this work is mainly concerned with Buddhist organizations and institutions of clergy, I often use the term “institutional Buddhism,” and sometimes “Buddhism” to include Buddhist doctrine, practice, as well as organization. The war between China and Japan at the end of the first half of the 20th century, during what is known in the West as part of the Second World War or the Pacific War, is often called the “Sino-Japanese War” in English. Yet, Chinese call it the kanri zhanzheng 抗日戰爭, “the war of resistance against Japan.” Sometimes, it is also called the “eight years of resistance war (banian kanzhan) 八年抗 戰, referring to the years from 1937 to 1945. More recent Chinese texts also speak of “the resistance war of fifteen years,” considering that the conflict began in 1931 when Japan seized Manchuria. I will follow the Chinese usage, consistent and unanimous among both Nationalists and Communists, and write of “the AntiJapanese War” or the war of resistance to refer to the conflict from 1937 to 1945. In connection with this usage, I interpret the word “violence” in term of killing, injury, or causing harm that particularly is manifested in war. Modern nationalism (Minzu zhuyi 民族主義) emerged after the French Revolution; under this tenet, a nation state was established to form a unity of the whole people by a common race, language, religion, culture, territory, and history, as an imagined community to pursue the ultimate political rights and loyalty, and to exercise sovereignty over the statehood.37 Therefore, nationalism means a sentiment arising from the group consciousness of “what we are” and “what we are not.”38 Before the ideas of nation-state and nationalism were introduced to China at the turn of the twentieth century, the concepts of tianxia (天下 under heaven) and ethnical nationality in the sense of culture dominated Chinese people’s world view. Therefore, the understanding and the practice of nation-state and nationalism by Chinese would differ from those in Europe or other countries. As satisfactory definitions of nation and nationalism in the context of the modern China are still to be found, for the purpose of this work, I define nation (Minzu 民 族) to indicate the political and solitary community of all ethnical nationalities within the territory of China. State (Guojia 國家) refers to the political system and the form of government that represents the nation and demands loyalty from its citizens. In general, I will follow the definition of nationalism given by Ernest Gellner, who noted that “Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”39 Yet, keeping

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in mind the particular Chinese circumstances during the time that this work focuses on, I define nationalism as the sentiment of citizens toward the nation-state and the movement of discovering their national identity against what were not Chinese. Therefore, nationalism and patriotism are sometimes interchangeable in their use. Buddhist activities at the time of the war were not only nationalistically inspired, but also politically oriented. Under the banner of nationalism and patriotism, the Nationalists and Communists formed a united front under the leadership of the Nationalist government (Guomin zhengfu 國民政府), yet the struggle and conflict between the two parties even at the time of the war never disappeared. The politicization of Buddhist activities for or against either of the two is amply demonstrated in the records of those clergy. The available materials I have collected from mainland China and Taiwan are to some extent tinged with the political flavor of support for Communists or Nationalists. Some of these materials left by veteran monks in Taiwan cannot actually be brought into mainland China because of their anti-Communist propaganda. Meanwhile many monks in Taiwan accuse the monks who remained in mainland China after 1949 of betraying Buddhism by supporting Communists during or after the war.40 In order to eliminate or minimize the biased influence of these materials, I have endeavored to examine them by taking the political background of their providers into consideration, and I compare such materials with other sources, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, or government documents from Taiwan and mainland China.

THE STRUCTURE OF BOOK Chapter One outlines some new features in Chinese Buddhist history before the war within the context of contemporary social, political, and religious changes prevailing in China. In the second half of the 19th century, China was exposed to the outside world, and consistent defeats in resisting foreign powers shocked many Chinese intellectuals, who came to feel an urgent need for national awakening and reconstruction. A national awakening movement spread to enrich the nation and strengthen the military (fuguo qiangbing 富國強兵) through wide-ranging internal self-reforms. Educational reform and popularization of the Western style school system forced the Chinese government to find new financing. One means it found was to appropriate temple properties. Many temples were thus transformed into schools, and temple land was confiscated for financing these schools. Institutional Buddhism was also challenged by the coming of Western religion, particularly Christianity, which severely criticized Buddhist teaching and practice. As the result, leading Buddhists, especially young monks, influenced by the movement of national awakening, called for Buddhist reform by setting up schools in

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temples in order to resist the appropriation of temple properties, to dissolve the criticisms of social and political intellectuals, and to meet the challenges of Christian missionaries. I pay special attention to analyzing how these monks became actively involved in social and political revolution, and how they initiated revolution to reform Buddhist society as well. A number of Buddhist organizations were established and new Buddhist education and social charities found their way into Buddhist temples—all these were expected to show the usefulness of Buddhism to the nation and society. Guided by these first wakened Buddhist leaders, “new young monks” (xin qingnian seng 新青年僧) emerged and carried out Buddhist reform. They became a powerful force in institutional Buddhism and vigorously advocated Buddhist participation in war in the 1930s. Chapter Two mainly discusses the complicated relationship between institutional Buddhism and the state. I explore how the relations between the two changed from Buddhists protesting against state persecution before the war to the Buddhists supporting the state against the Japanese invasion as the war approached in the mid 1930s. With the national crisis of the Japanese invasion in the early 1930s, Chinese monks and nuns faced a dilemma about whether they should fulfill the constitutional duty of serving the nation by undertaking military training and preparing for war or continue to observe their religious commitment to non-killing and non-involvement in military activities. I examine in detail how young monks who had received a modern Buddhist education from Buddhist schools reconciled the dilemma by advocating the idea of killing with compassion based on the bodhisattva’s doctrine and prioritizing the importance of fulfilling the duty of citizenship over their religious obligations. Being aware of contemporary nationalism and patriotism, I analyze the arguments of the young monks about why and how Chinese clergy should serve the nation. In Chapter Three, I discuss Buddhist propaganda in condemning Japanese invasion and appealing for Chinese resistance. Some leading and active monks, such as Taixu and Leguan, committed themselves to spread Buddhist messages of resisting the invasion not only in China but also in neighboring countries; they justified such resistance as the way to repay the kindness of the nation and the Chinese people. I then examine the articles from Shi zi hao 獅子吼 (Roaring like a Lion), a Buddhist journal that appeared at the height of the war; it was so named in the hope that it could act as roaring lion to deter Japanese invasion and to awaken Chinese people for resistance. Chapter Four first provides a glimpse into the ongoing military training of the clergy starting at the end of 1936. It then presents Buddhist activities in the areas controlled by Nationalists and Communists during the Anti-Japanese War: ritual service in praying for the nation, donation campaign for Chinese soldiers, rescue work, first aid, and other unconventional activities, such as engagement in

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guerilla warfare. The chapter examines how monks prioritized the importance of fulfilling their duties as citizens, leaving their temples behind, and undertaking rescue missions in warfront or engaging in guerilla warfare in Japanese occupied areas. Chapter Five provides a general survey of Buddhist activities in the areas occupied by Japanese after the war broke out in 1937. I demonstrate how the war profoundly affected institutional Buddhism in so far as numerous temples were destroyed, scriptures and statues were burned, and monks and nuns in the warring areas had to leave their temples as refugees or be killed. I explore two major features of institutional Buddhism that emerged in these areas during occupation: the rapid development of charitable engagements and politicization of Buddhist activities. The war resulted in countless dead, wounded, and refugees; these emerging needs enabled Buddhists, especially monks and nuns, to carry out charitable work, although such activities might be inspired either by patriotism or by Buddhist compassion, or by both. After Japan failed to conquer China within a short period, Japanese authorities demanded the political cooperation of Chinese people. Buddhist clergy were thus required to serve in organizations sponsored by the Japanese and to perform rituals for Japanese soldiers. Buddhist activities, such as religious celebration and meetings, became politicized to show the unity of Chinese Buddhists in supporting the Japanese and prosperity under the Japanese rule. This chapter presents solid examples to demonstrate how the monks cooperated with Japanese and how others refused such cooperation through self-concealment. I analyze how those who collaborated with the Japanese became the victim of politics after the defeat of Japan in 1945. Chapter Six presents Taixu’s views on violence and peace by examining his advocacy on war and nationalism during the war, as well as on peace and internationalism before and after the end of the war. Taixu was one of the well-known monks in modern Chinese Buddhism in that he changed the course of Buddhist history. His active participation in the war and calls for all Chinese monks and nuns to do the same became part of his important legacy of Buddhist sociopolitical philosophy. In this chapter, I will also investigate activities of institutional Buddhism and Buddhist reform after the war, giving particular attention to how the Civil War (1945–1949) eventually terminated the course of the Buddhist awakening, as a large number of sangha were once again pushed into the war. In the Conclusion, I first review the impact of the war on Chinese Buddhism and then briefly summarize the important topics discussed in this work. In order to illustrate the relationship between Buddhism and nationalism, I specifically select the ideas of non-killing (ahimsa) and compassionate killing for further analysis. The discussion is based on Theravada Buddhism, which emphasizes the way of preventing violence by cultivating the compassionate mind and by

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eliminating craving, hatred, and ignorance individually, and on Mahayana Buddhism, which advocates killing with compassion to save more lives or to safeguard the Dharma. The questions of who could act as bodhisattva and how compassionate killing could be carried out are raised in order to highlight why Japanese priests and Chinese monks extensively and exclusively elaborated on this theory either for the sake of invading China or for the sake of resisting such invasion. Careful reexamination of Buddhist texts that advocate “compassionate killing” clearly shows that only highly spiritually developed bodhisattvas and Buddhas could kill others with compassion and wisdom. The motivation behind such indiscrimination of Buddhist justification for violence during the war could only be found in nationalism, which was supreme religion in both Japan and China at the time. In order to highlight Buddhist involvement in nationalism, I also carry out a general examination of Buddhist movement in connection with national struggle in the modern history of other Asian countries, such as Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma, and Korea.

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Chapter One

Changing Buddhism in Modern China

BUDDHIST AWAKENING In The Buddhist Revival in China, Holmes Welch follows early Christian missionaries and uses the term “revival” to describe institutional Buddhism in China during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, because, as he says, “it is the most convenient and customary way of referring to the varied development that took place in Chinese Buddhism.”1 At the end of the book, however, Welch is uncertain whether he has used the right term because of the vague implication of “revival.” Indeed, the picture presented by Holmes Welch hardly conveys an idea that Buddhism was reviving. The sangha was full of ignorant and disoriented monks and nuns who were considered by many intellectuals as “parasites of society,” living in dilapidated temples, lacking spiritual inspiration. Therefore, Welch worries that the idea of revival might be “trebly misleading.”2 Still, he maintains the term with the justification and hope that “Repeatedly, religious practices have seemed to fade away only to rise again, perhaps in new forms.”3 After all, following the destruction of the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), many large temples in Jiangsu and Zhejiang had soon been reconstructed. By 1885, Baohua Shan 寶華山, one of the most well-known sites for Buddhist ordination, had fully recovered and was active in operation. In 1911, the reconstruction of Lingyin Si 靈隱寺, the largest monastery in Hangzhou, was completed. Some temples were rebuilt on a larger and more lavish scale than before. Jinshan 金山, looted and burned down to the ground by the Taiping rebels, reemerged less than five years after the rebellion was crushed by Qing armies, a sizable temple complex in better condition impressing Buddhist devotees and tourists.4 The rebuilding of temples in large scale within a short period showed that institutional Buddhism was not dead, as some nineteenth-century missionaries claimed, but continued to attract Chinese. Even though the sangha was full of 15

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corrupted monks and malpractices, Buddhist institutions also produced numerous virtuous and learned monks who enjoyed high veneration from society. Monks, like Jichan (1851–1913), Yekai (1852–1922), Yingguang (1861–1940), and Xuyun (1840–1959), who were accomplished in religious practice or Buddhist learning and proficient in religious preaching, attracted tens and thousands of followers. Meanwhile, Buddhist philosophy fascinated a number of intellectuals, who began to study Buddhism in their quest for social, political, and intellectual reform in China. These phenomena convinced Holmes Welch that the early western missionaries had intentionally exaggerated the decline of the sangha.5 They portrayed the worst of what they saw about the sangha and then generalized the dark side of Buddhist situations to cover what they did not see, or to ignore the positive side of what they saw. The decline of Buddhist spiritual practice and the renovation of temples shaped and mirrored contemporary Chinese Buddhist history in which old and new, conservatives and reformers existed side by side. The gradual disappearance of the old and the birth of the new within institutional Buddhism made modern Buddhist history too complicated to be described simply in terms of “revival.” Therefore, for the sake of convenience and greater accuracy, I propose the term “awakening” for Buddhist developments in conjunction with the contemporary social, political, and intellectual movement of national awakening (minzu juexing 民族覺醒) in an effort for self-strengthening in China that started after the Opium War in 1842. Awakening or enlightenment—in Chinese jue 覺, juewu 覺悟, wu 悟, xing 醒, or juexing 覺醒—is in fact a Buddhist concept, literally meaning waking from dreamful sleep or illusion, and figuratively indicating seeing reality and realizing truth. According to Buddhist philosophy, all sentient beings full of ignorance are said to have fallen asleep and live in the world of illusion; and the teaching of the Buddha will awaken them and enable them to achieve enlightenment. Foreign invasions and humiliations of repeated defeat, beginning in the 1840s, and especially after the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), caused Chinese, especially intellectuals, to awaken their nationhood and national identity. Nationalism thus gradually replaced culturalism, which had dominated Chinese view of self identity for centuries. The idea of nation-state replete with sovereignty and territory in contrast to foreign states spread among Chinese people.6 With the social Darwinist concept of the survival of the fittest, many intellectuals and revolutionaries began to construct the ideas of the new Chinese nation and endeavored to enlighten others about “Chineseness.” The awaking of modern nationalism culminated in the overthrow of the Manchu Qing dynasty, which came to be regarded as alien to “Chineseness.”7 After the establishment of the Republic in 1912, the “Chinese people” was expanded to include five ethnic nationalities—

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Han, Tibetan, Mongolian, Muslim, and Manchu—in China as a whole, and to uphold its inherited empire together as a Chinese nation-state, and to unite all these peoples against foreign invasion and occupation. The Chinese nation was thus said to have finally begun to awaken.8 The spirit of nationalism further developed in the New Culture Movement in 1915 and the May Fourth Movement in 1919, and reached its peak during the time of the Anti-Japanese War. If the awakening of the Chinese nation was prompted internally by selfdeterioration and externally by foreign invasions, and if Chinese nationalism was closely associated with internationalism in the sense of learning foreign techniques for self-modernization, Buddhist awakening was also the result of the external challenges of Christianity, of Japanese Buddhist missionaries, in addition to the state appropriation of temple properties and by self-corruption within the sangha, with the sense of learning from Christian charity work and Japanese Buddhist reform. The dangers that Chinese Buddhism faced forced many Buddhists, both lay and clerical, to realize the importance of self-reform for Buddhist survival and revival, and thus they became actively engaged in Buddhist intellectual studies and social services. They believed that Buddhism would not survive in China if monks and nuns continued to remain inactive inside temples and isolated from society.

MODERN LAY BUDDHIST MOVEMENT The revival of intellectual Buddhism was initiated by lay Buddhists, such as Yang Renshan 楊仁山 (1837–1911) and Ouyang Jian 歐陽漸 (1871–1943), most of whom endeavored to revitalize Buddhism to meet contemporary social needs and political challenges by publishing Buddhist texts and inculcating Buddhist philosophy among intellectuals. This lay movement was succeeded and expanded by some well-known social elites and politicians, who attempted to make use of Buddhism to implement social and political reforms in China. In 1866,Yang Renshan (Yang Wenhui), who is regarded as the “father of modern Chinese Buddhism,” founded Jinling Buddhist Press (Jinling kejing chu 金陵刻經處), which printed millions of copies of Buddhist texts for free distribution in society.9 He was able to retrieve a large number of the scriptures of the Dharmalaksana School 法相宗 from Japan through his acquaintance with Nanjo Bunyu 南條文雄, a well-known Japanese Buddhist scholar. In 1908, Yang Renshan donated part of his residence in Nanjing for the establishment of a Buddhist college, namely Jetavana Hermitage (Qiyuan Jinshe 祇洹精舍), which produced some of the most eminent Buddhist scholars, such as Ouyang Jian, in the Republican period. The reintroduction of the texts of the Dharmalaksana School stimulated Buddhist studies in China. Intellectuals and politicians, like Tan Sitong (1866–1898), Liang Qichao (1873–1929), and Zhang Taiyan (1868–1936), found

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inspirations in such Buddhist philosophies such as no-self, impermanence, universal oneness, and the path of bodhisattva, and made use of them as an alternative ideology for China’s self-strengthening. These lay Buddhist intellectuals exercised considerable influence on modern Chinese Buddhist thought and provided the foundation for Buddhist reform movement. The Buddhist studies with their participation enhanced society’s interest in Buddhism, and many literati and politicians in the Republic era began to play active roles in Buddhist developments such as charity and relief works. Some of them became leading members of the Chinese Buddhist Society founded in 1929. Meanwhile, a number of lay Buddhist organizations emerged, such as Zhina neixue yuan 支那內學院 (China Metaphysical Institute) in Nanjing, Hankou fojiao hui 漢口佛教會 (Hankou Buddhist Society) in Wuhan, Sanshi xueshe 三時學社 (Sanshi Study Society) in Beijing, and Shanghai jushi lin 上海居士林 (Shanghai Lay Buddhist Society) in Shanghai.10 The rise of lay Buddhist activities at the turn of the century greatly impressed some scholars who now claim that modern Buddhist history was dominated by the lay Buddhist movement. Holmes Welch, being one of such scholars, attributed the Buddhist revival to the efforts of laymen,11 while Wing-tsit Chan even suggested that Mahayana Buddhism was dominated by lay-Buddhists who provided the leadership to Buddhist affairs. Chan concluded: The shift from the Buddhist clergy to the layman was inevitable. Long ago China transformed Hinayana Buddhism centering on the monastic order to Mahayana Buddhism centering on lay society . . . the weakness and degeneration of the Sangha encouraged the transition; modern Buddhist developments have made it complete.12

Chan’s claim that China transformed Hinayana Buddhism into Mahayana Buddhism centering on lay society is disputable. In Chinese Buddhist history, the monastic sangha, just as its counterparts in the Theravada tradition in other Asian countries, always dominated Buddhist affairs and temples were the centers of Buddhist activities. The rise of Mahayana Buddhism in India and its subsequent development in China were certainly not the result of the efforts of lay Buddhists, but internal evolution by Buddhist monks such as Nagarjuna, Asangha, and Vasubandhu. It could be regarded as an inner effort to expand Buddhism and make it more accessible to society. Although Mahayana Buddhism makes less differentiation between clergy and lay people and both of whom can be regarded as bodhisattvas, monks played the central role in Buddhist development in both India and China. It is uncertain how much will be left if we sweep aside the activities of the monks based on temples throughout history. The conclusion that modern Buddhism was a lay Buddhist movement may be right for the activities of intellectual Buddhism that, to some extent, ushered

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in changes of Buddhism in modern China. Nevertheless, intellectual Buddhism led by lay Buddhists never became widespread in Chinese society, but remained among a small group of intellectuals in cosmopolitan areas, such as Shanghai, Nanjing, and Beijing. These lay Buddhists, who were part of the larger intellectual awakening in China, and who promoted Buddhist studies and opened a way for Buddhism to reintegrate itself into society, had a limited impact on institutional Buddhism at large. Lay people’s role in leading Buddhist studies was gradually reduced and they were soon replaced by monks who quickly emerged to lead Buddhist reform. Even when these lay Buddhists were active in Buddhist studies, social work, and Buddhist education during the early Republican period, the clergy continued to be in charge of Buddhist activities centered on temples. Lay Buddhist intellectuals, such as Ouyang Jian in Nanjing, never exclusively dominated the affairs of the Dharmalakasana philosophical studies, nor did their Buddhist research extensively influence Chinese Buddhist society in general, especially the monastic community. A large number of monks, such as Taixu, Changxing, and Zhenhua, to name only a few, were also very active, and they made distinguished contributions to modern Buddhist studies and extended Buddhist impact in society. We must not be blind to the rejuvenated spirit of the Chinese sangha for Buddhist awakening and regaining Buddhist glory of the past, and many Buddhist organizations at national and provincial levels were established by the monks to reorganize Chinese Buddhism. Buddhist schools were opened in temples to educate monks and nuns, and numerous Buddhist journals were published: both were under the leadership of monks even though they were sometimes financially supported by lay Buddhists. Although there were many influential lay Buddhists working in such Buddhist organizations or acting as sponsors, most of them were well-known not because of their Buddhist activities but because of their social and political preeminence; although the Chinese sangha in general had deteriorated morally and spiritually, monks continued to dominate Buddhist affairs, and temples still played central roles in religious activities all over China. In 1906, the first modern Buddhist school was founded by monks at Tianning Si 天宁寺 in Yangzhou, one year earlier than Jetavana Seminary set up by Yang Renshan.13 In early 1912, some lay Buddhist intellectuals, including Ouyang Jian, Li Zhenggan, and Gui Bohua, organized the Buddhist Society in Nanjing and obtained an endorsement letter from Sun Yatsen, the first President of the Republic of China. They began to criticize monks and nuns and attempted to establish a new Buddhism in China dominated by lay Buddhists. Their attitudes and criticisms resulted in mounting counterattacks from other Buddhists, especially clergy, and within a few months they had to declare the cancellation of the society.14 Meanwhile, some eminent monks initiated their own efforts to reorganize Chinese Buddhism and to revitalize Buddhism’s social appeal, and in 1912 they

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founded the All China Buddhist Congress (Zhongguo fojiao zonghui 中華佛教 總會). During the next several decades, monks established dozens of national or regional Buddhist organizations, the most important of which being the Chinese Buddhist Society (Zhongguo fojiao hui 中國佛教會) established in 1929. Although some leading lay Buddhists were active in sponsorship, and disunity and mismanagement of the clergy prevented such organizations from playing efficient roles or from articulating a uniform voice in Buddhist reform, the establishment of these organizations showed the aspirations of monks to be more engaged in Buddhist social and political activities. To some extent, these organizations were powerful because they were legitimately registered and connected with Buddhist temples all over China. On many occasions, monks and nuns effectively organized protests under the auspices of these Buddhist organizations against the movement to appropriate temple properties. In 1936, some monks, most of whom were reformers, initiated a plan to exclude lay Buddhists from the Chinese Buddhist Society, and the plan was supported by the government.15 Meanwhile, many regional lay Buddhist organizations, such as the Wuhan Buddhist Right Faith Society (Wuhan Fojiao Zhengxin Hui 武漢佛教正信會), sought spiritual guidance from eminent monks, such as Taixu. Under their leadership, Chinese people again showed interest in Buddhist studies and practices and found comfort in Buddhism among the social and political turmoil. Wuhan Buddhist Right Faith Society, for instance, attracted thousands of well-educated people who “were apparently in dead earnest.”16 Among 30,000 lay disciples of Taixu in Wuhan, there were sixteen doctors who had been partly educated abroad.

CRITICISM AND EXPROPRIATION During the early Republican period, many monks were not only ignorant of social services, but they also lacked Buddhist learning and practice.17 Instead of struggling for spiritual attainment, most clergy were fully engaged in funeral services in exchange for their living, and they were thus called “business monks,” while some others even became addicted to drugs. Buddhist clergy in feudal society had been consistently accused by Confucian scholars for not making any material contribution to society, only exploiting people’s hard work. Now many Western-educated intellectuals added new voice in condemning Buddhist social practice. Criticism of Buddhism became more vociferous when Christian missionaries joined these critiques. The missionaries held Buddhism to be devoid of religious, social, or ethical value, to be nothing more than idol-worship and superstition. In the 1850s, English and French military power had extracted from China the right of Protestants and Catholics to organize Christian missions in China, and a large number of church properties confiscated during the earlier Qing dynasty began

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to be returned to the missionaries, and temples in some places were converted churches as compensation.18 By 1906, more than seventy independent Protestant mission societies were operating in China with nearly four thousand missionaries.19 Enjoying extraterritorial rights and supported by powerful and rich Christian societies at home, the proselytizers were aggressive in their attacks on Buddhism and of the Chinese monks and nuns. Ernst Johann Eitel, a Christian missionary who studied Buddhism,20 remarked that he could find nothing in Buddhism that Christianity did not offer in a better way and with superior validity. Of monks he said in 1884: They are mostly recruited from the lowest classes, and one finds among them frequently the most wretched specimens of humanity, more devoted to opium smoking than any other class in China. They have no intellectual tastes, they have centuries ago ceased to cultivate the study of Sanskrit, they know next to nothing about the history of their own religion, living together mostly in idleness and occasionally going out to earn some money by reading litanies for the dead or acting as exorcists and sorcerers or physicians. No community of interest, no ties of social life, no object of generous ambition, beyond the satisfying of those wants which bind them to the cloister, diversify the monotonous current of their daily life.21

One of the most devastating challenges Buddhist institutions faced was the Christian-inspired military movements. During about fourteen years of Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) and its occupation of southern China, the troops of Taiping rebels massacred Buddhist monks and nuns; almost all temples in the south were destroyed and Buddhist images and scriptures were burned.22 In the 1920s, Feng Yuxiang, a Christian general and warlord, ordered his troops in Henan to destroy all Buddhist temples and to confiscate Buddhist property for military usage. More than 300,000 monks and nuns were driven out of their temples, and Buddhism was almost entirely eliminated from the region.23 During the 1910s and 1920s, anti-religious movement spread over China and culminated in the May 4th Movement in 1919. In 1922, the Federation against Religion (Fei zongjiao da tongmeng 非宗教大同盟) was organized by intellectuals and students in Beijing. Although these movements were aimed mainly at attacking imperialism, Christianity, and Confucianism, Buddhism as a religion was also criticized as pure superstition.24 The criticism of Buddhism further strengthened the practice of appropriating temple properties for public education. In the 1890s, some officials, in order to pay for social and political reforms, petitioned the throne to confiscate Buddhist properties. According to them, institutional Buddhism, corrupt as it was, yet endowed with huge land holdings and spacious buildings, should be made useful for redressing the financial problems of the state. In early 1898,

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Kang Youwei 康有為 submitted to Emperor Guangxu, “A Memorial to Revere Confucianism as the State Religion, to Set up a Confucian Ministry, To Adopt the Confucian Calendar, and to Demolish Temples and Shrines.”25 He chastised religious practices in Buddhist temples and urged the court to take action to convert temples into public schools. Kang’s appeal was echoed by Zhang Zhidong 張之洞, the governor general in Hubei and Hunan, who provided a more detailed proposal for expropriating temple properties in his 1898’s Exhortation to Learning: Seven out of ten temples in every county should be converted to schools, and the other three be preserved for the accommodation of dislodged clergy and Taoist priests. Seventy percent of temple properties should be allocated to the funding of schools, while the other thirty percent be retained as resource for the livelihood of Buddhist clergy and Daoist priests.26

On July 10, 1898, as a response to Kang Youwei and Zhang Zhidong’s calls, the court issued an imperial edict titled the “Imperial Order to Transform Shu Yuan to Schools in Every Province, Magistrate, and County” which stated: “Local government officials should announce publicly that all shrines and temples in society not functioning as a place of worship and sacrifice should be converted to schools so that expenses can be saved and education can thrive.”27 One may think that the edict does not sound harmful to Buddhist institutions at all, for it only calls for the abolishment of disused or misused temples. However, because the edict did not specify the criterion for non-functioning temples, local government officials took on themselves the right of interpreting the imperial order and carrying it out without any discretion. In a village in Shanghai county, for example, dozens of Buddhist temples were transformed to schools, all Buddhist statues were destroyed or moved to other places, and monks and nuns were driven to a small temple and provided with barely sufficient provision and living space.28 Although the policy was suspended when the reform was rescinded after Empress Dowager Cixi regained the power in controlling court,29 expropriations of temple property continued. In 1904 when the civil service examination system was abolished, the government called for the establishment of public schools throughout the country. The financial problems and the shortages of facilities once again forced local governments to look covetously at the debilitated yet richly endowed Buddhist monasteries. All at once, numerous temples were confiscated and countless monks and nuns were turned out.30 The practice remained active and the destruction of institutional Buddhism continued up to the end of the Qing dynasty and into the Republican era. The inner spiritual degeneration of monks and nuns and their ignorance of social and political knowledge prevented them from taking any positive action in

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response to the outside attacks and persecutions. Nevertheless, a number of young revolutionary monks emerged and struggled to save Buddhism through self-reform. They became involved in social and political activities in order to change stereotyped image of the sangha and to recreate Buddhist tradition so that it could fit contemporary needs of people, society, and the state.

REVOLUTIONARY MONKS Buddhism as a social institution in some sense could not entirely be isolated from the social and political changes in the early twentieth century. The awakening of the nation and subsequent state appropriation of temple properties agitated the sangha. Monks, exposed to the rapidly changing world outside, realized that they should defend Buddhist institutions rather than depend on lay Buddhists or wait for the protection of government. Therefore, a number of “revolutionary monks” (gemingseng 革命僧) turned to sociopolitical activism through which they hoped to safeguard Buddhism. One was Zongyang 宗仰 (1865–1921), who had secretly joined anti-Manchu movement at the end of the Qing dynasty, frequently had his revolutionary articles and poems condemning Manchu rule appear in Supao, a newspaper full of revolutionary spirit.31 In 1903, after the newspaper was banned by the Qing court, Zongyang became wanted by the government. He managed to escape to Japan and befriended Sun Yet-san, becoming a member of the revolutionary movement and its financial supporter.32 Another monk, Yizhou 意周, the abbot of Baiyun An in Hangzhou, voluntarily contributed his temple to the revolutionary movement for use as a center where revolutionary members could secretly meet.33 Monks not only vigorously advocated and supported revolution, but also participated in military action to overthrow the Qing dynasty. On the eve of the Republic of China in 1911, monks in Shanghai and Zhejiang joined revolutionary troops, taking up weapons and attacking the cities controlled by the loyalists to the Qing dynasty. When the revolution erupted in Nanchang in 1911, Tieyan 鐵岩, the abbot of a temple in Hangzhou, responded immediately. He sold his temple property, used the money to purchase two hundred guns, raised an army of five hundred monks and lay followers, and prepared to take over Hangchou.34 When revolutionary troops attacked Shanghai at the end of 1911, Quefei 卻非, a monk from the Jade Buddha Temple, organized young monks of seven Buddhist temples into the “Monk Army of Shanghai” (Shanghai sengjun 上海僧軍), which was well-equipped and disciplined. These monk-troops, under the commander of Chen Qimei 陳其美, the military governor of Jiangsu, participated in the fight to liberate Shanghai. Later they marched to Nanjing and helped take over the city.35 Again, in 1927 more than a thousand monks in Hunan led by Xiaoguan

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曉觀 and Kaiwu 開悟 joined the Nationalist army. Under the slogans “Supporting Buddhism is supporting the revolution,” and “Undertake revolution in the spirit of saving the world through great compassion and kindness,” they participated in the North Expedition.36 It is quite possible that the spirit of revolution or rather nationalism prevailing in Chinese society prompted these monks to act in responding to the social and political changes. This spirit also inspired the sangha to wake up and launch Buddhist reforms in response to criticism and persecution; a number of eminent monks brought this spirit into the sangha and developed a new Buddhist social and political philosophy. Just as many political and social reformers at the time attempted to strengthen the Chinese nation and wake up Chinese people through adopting Western science and technology in conjunction with the essence of Chinese culture; these monks attempted to revitalize Buddhism by recreating Buddhist tradition to meet the intrusion of the Western religion and to resist the pressure from state persecution. Institutional Buddhism at the end of the Qing was disorganized and in disunities, and struggles between conservative and reformist clergy dominated internal Buddhist affairs throughout the Republican era. Nevertheless, the contemporary social, political, and religious circumstances forced them to fight together for Buddhist survival. All of them agreed that Buddhism must participate in social and charitable work in order to avoid being eliminated from China. As a result they initiated many programs to bridge Buddhism and society, and the most prominent measures they undertook were to sponsor Buddhist schools and carry out charitable work. At the very beginning, the primary aim of organizing Buddhist schools in temples was to prevent an attempt to appropriate temple property; providing education for young monks was considered secondary. Yang Renshan once urged Chinese Buddhists to organize Buddhist education in order to avoid losing their endowments: Reform is the vogue of the day! Those who proposed reform often attempt to appropriate temple property to finance public education. I am afraid that they did not understand the needs of the nation and the people. It would be better to use Buddhist property to revive Buddhist education, and for learning modern technology, just as Protestantism and Catholicism have done in opening schools to educate their followers. . . . Chinese Buddhism has been in decline for generations, and not only will it be ridiculed by neighboring countries, but also Buddhist property will be seized by the powerful if it is not reorganized soon. Later generations will be unable to benefit from the Dharma, which can save the world, if Buddhism, which has been respected for generations, is neglected and destroyed. Under these circumstances, we should petition the

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government to formulate a new policy that the half of Buddhist and Daoist property should be used for schools.37

In 1904, the Japanese monk Mizuno Baigyo 水野梅曉 of Hongaku Temple of the True Pure Land School arrived in Changsha. As Chinese monks and nuns there tried in dismay to avoid the state expropriation, Mizuno advised them to first register temples under the name of the True Pure Land School in Japan, and then to convert parts of temple premises into schools for Buddhist education.38 His advice was enthusiastically received and widely adopted by monks and nuns in the city. Overnight, a number of Buddhist temples changed their identities and schools were opened inside the temples. As Buddhist education in temples could be considered part of public education, the clergy intended to demonstrate that they too were responding to the government calls for supporting education, although in fact aiming at self-protection. The Japanese involvement, however, made the contemporary Buddhist situation more complicated. The danger was looming that institutional Buddhism in China would lose its identity by taking refuge under Japanese protection. One dramatic incident took place in Hangzhou in 1904 that brought the situation of converting Chinese temples into Japanese protection to the fore. Thirty-five temples, with the help of Japanese monk Itō Gentō 伊藤賢道, announced the change of their temples’ sectarian identity to the Japanese Pure Land School.39 The news of the incident immediately spread and provoked criticisms from the media and the public, accusing the Chinese monks of selling Chinese property to foreigners.40 The outcry from the Chinese public forced the Qing court to intervene. The governor of Zhejiang, Nie Zhongfang 聶仲芳, having realized the severity of the issue, personally reviewed the case and suggested to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Chinese monks and nuns be permitted to set up their own educational schools in hope that this would ultimately prevent any further foreign interference.41 After negotiating between the Chinese and Japanese government, an agreement was reached. “The True Pure Land School of Japan would first relinquish its ‘protection’ of Chinese temples, and the Qing government promised to issue the edict to safeguard Buddhism and recognize the schools founded by clergy.”42 The Ministry of Education then formally issued the Charter of Buddhist Education, which officially endorsed the legitimacy of schools in temples as a part of public education.43 Monks and nuns responded quickly to this hard-won opportunity for survival.44 Schools sponsored by institutional Buddhism, whether designed for monastic or public education, suddenly emerged in large numbers all over China, especially in the south. Jichan 寄禪 (1851–1913) first had a school set up in Tiantong Monastery 天童寺, one of the most influential Buddhist institutions in

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China, of which he was the abbot at the time. Meanwhile, he felt the urgent need to form a united front of all monks and nuns irrespective of their monastic lineage, because he believed that only when they were well educated and united could Buddhism survive more misfortunes. In 1908, he organized the Buddhist Education Society of Ningbo (Ningpo sengjiaoyu hui 宁波僧教育會).45 The society elected two chairmen, one monk and one local government official, while all facilities and expenditures of the society were shared by temples in Ningbo. Following his example, monastic education societies were gradually organized in many other cities; each of them sponsored a number of primary and secondary schools.46 By the end of 1908, Buddhist education societies were established in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Hunan, and Jiangxi, and later on were placed under the administration of the “General Society for Monastic Education” (Sengli jiaoyu zonghui 僧立教育總會), the forerunner of the All-China Buddhist Congress.47 Early in 1906, Wenxi 文希, a well-known monk in Yangzhou, opened the Common Sangha School (Pudong sengxue tang 普通僧學堂) in Tianning Si; more than 20 young monks were enrolled. The school was jointly financed by temples in Yangzhou. Besides Buddhist education, English and Japanese language courses were also included in the curriculum.48 Nevertheless, the school was closed after Wenxi was arrested on the false charge of associating with the members of the Revolutionary Party.49 In 1909, a Buddhist school under the sponsorship of Duanfang, the governor general of Jiangsu, Anhui, and Zhejiang, was established in Nanjing and Yuexia and Dixian, two of the most famous monks of the time, were invited to run the school. Soon after the founding of the Republic of China, additional schools for sangha education were opened in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and their focus gradually shifted from protecting temples from confiscation to educating monks and nuns. Sangha education developed and became an important part of modern Chinese Buddhism after the Wuchang Buddhist College was founded in Wuhan in 1922, the Minnan Buddhist College in 1925, and Chinese-Tibetan Buddhist College (Hanzan jiaoli yuan) in 1933.50 According to Welch, thirty-six Buddhist schools opened between 1912 and 1950, and more than 7,500 students graduated.51 Among these schools, four were devoted to nun’s education.52 Most of these monk-students vigorously resonated with Taixu’s call for Buddhist reform, and later became passionate supporters of Chinese nationalism and advocated Buddhist participation in the Anti-Japanese War. Monastic education produced many new monks. Having received modern education not only in Buddhism but also in politics and other social and philosophical subjects, these monk-students became the major force behind Buddhist reform movement, pushing forward Buddhist social integration and political involvement. Inspired by the ideas of Xinmin (新民 New People) advocated by Liang Qichao, of Xinqingnian (新青年 New Youth) expounded by Chen Duxiu,

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these young monks—who called themselves Xinseng (新僧 New Monks) or sengqingnian (僧青年 Young Monk)—began to discuss politics and the Buddhist role in nation-building while attacking conservative elements within the sangha. They began to publish Buddhist journals to articulate their views for reform and to promote Buddhist social service. Within a short period, about forty Buddhist periodicals gradually appeared.53 The first Buddhist journal in modern China was Fojiao yuebao 佛教月報 (Buddhist Monthly) published in 1913 with Taixu as its editor. According to the Chinese Year Book 1935–1936, Hai chao yin 海潮音, Fohua xin qingnian 佛化新青年, Xiandai fojiao 現代佛教, and Neixue 內學 were the most popular ones.54 In early 1937, the China Student-Monks Society (中國學僧會 Zhongguo xuesen hui) was established with the mission of uniting young monks to revive Buddhism and defend the nation. In the May, a special column called “Monk Youth” (僧青年 Senqingnian) appeared in Hai chao yin.55 The inauguration statement declares that young monks have the responsibility of revitalizing Buddhism and protecting the nation. The column then became an arena for young monks to articulate their ambitions and discuss their concerns for the sangha and the nation. In his article “Arise, Monk Youths,”56 Liaoru lamented that Buddhism had lost the noble ideal of service to the nation and people. He urged his “monk-comrades” to take up Taixu’s mission of reforming the sangha and serving the nation. Articles in the column also revealed tension and conflict between these young monks and “old monks.” Buddhists, clerical and lay, were then divided into conservatives led by Yuanying and reformers led by Taixu. The conservatives were “old monks” who, being afraid of rapid change, stressed the importance of maintaining traditional practice in temples over modern Buddhist education. Most were abbots of rich temples in the south and displeased with the call for Buddhist reform. This is not to say they completely ignored contemporary social and political development in China, for Yuanying and others were engaged in social charity by setting up orphanages.57 The reformers attempted to reintegrate Buddhism into social and political life with revolutionary spirit. They wanted sangha education to follow the modern college system in the hope that young monks could master both Buddhist doctrine and the secular knowledge necessary for them to serve the nation and society. They criticized indulgence in funerary ritual service and the undemocratic system of abbotship that dominated monastic life The young monks were largely graduates of Buddhist colleges, the most famous ones of which were run by reformers such as Taixu, and they were accused of transgressing monastic discipline, discarding tradition, disrespecting elders, and ignoring their religious practice. These old monks disbelieved modern Buddhist education for reducing religious enthusiasm and spiritual aspiration of the sangha. Although their temples were richly endowed they neither supported young monks

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nor sent their disciples to study in these colleges. Meanwhile, the young monks criticized the old ones for their conservative ideas. In his article, “On Sangha-Treasury,” Liaoru said he and his fellow young monks: Consider the old monks corrupt for thinking of nothing except becoming abbot, performing rituals of ordination, receiving disciples without discretion, seeking donations, and being addicted to funerary service. They are completely uninterested in the duty-bound cause of Buddhism. Such old elements must be removed for Buddhism to revive.58

Such criticism may have reflected some social opinions that monks and nuns were social parasites, and young monks echoed this social criticism and distanced themselves from such accused monks by calling for Buddhist reform. They joined intellectual society to censure the practices of old monks of self-interest and attempted to integrate Buddhism into society. Although conservatives and reformers could not agree how Buddhism should respond to the social and political changes outside, they all shared the common responsibility for defending Buddhism against persecutions. As the tension between Buddhist institutions and the state continued to develop after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, it enabled them to cooperate in protesting government’s policies on Buddhism by forming Buddhist organizations. In early 1912, Jichan, with the oral permission from the Nanjing government, prepared to organize the All-China Buddhist Congress in Shanghai. Representatives from seventeen provinces at the inauguration meeting adopted two resolutions, a call to the new government to protect Buddhist institutions, and a call to monks and nuns to donate generously to the government’s army.59 Nevertheless, no official recognition had been obtained one year after the charter of the organization was submitted to the government in Beijing. During this time, the military occupation of temples and the forcible conscription of monks increased, and monks and nuns in all parts of China repeatedly complained to the All-China Buddhist Congress. Jichan then decided to go to Beijing and petition the government.60 Accompanied by Xuyun and some of his disciples, he arrived in Beijing on November 1912, and stayed at the Fayuan Monastery 法源寺. During this time, the Interior Affairs Ministry was undertaking a survey and registration of temple property. It divided Buddhist properties into three categories, the state, public, and private,61 and planned to confiscate properties belonging to the state and the public. When Jichan met with Du Guan 杜關, the director of the Bureau of Propriety and Customs, the latter said the government’s policy was to regard properties which had been offered (bushi 布施) to institutional Buddhism as state or public properties, and those which had been solicited as donations (muhua 募化) by monks or nuns as private properties. Institutional

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Buddhism might keep the latter but should give up the former. Jichan countered that there was no difference between the two, because as he explained, from the perspective of lay Buddhists who give, it is called offering, while from the perspective of Buddhist clergy, it is called the seeking for donation. Therefore, even so-called state and public properties were donated to Buddhism and should be owned by Buddhist monks and nuns. At the end, Du lost his temper and shouted at Jichan. Old and highly respected, Jichan left the bureau in indignation.62 Early the next morning, he was found lying dead with peaceful look on his face in his room in Fayuan Monastery.63 The mysterious death of such a prominent monk immediately aroused a strong reaction from the literati and society in general. Seventy-three eminent people from all walks of life in Beijing formed the funeral committee and thousands of people turned out to participate in the memorial ceremony. For the next few days, the news of Jichan’s death quickly spread out by the media, which expressed sympathy for Buddhism while criticizing Du Guan’s behavior and the government policy.64 With the intervention of the literati, the press, and society, the government finally approved the charter of the All-China Buddhist Congress and promised to withdraw its controversial policy on Buddhism. On January 7, 1914, an order signed by Prime Minister Xiong Xilin65 was issued by the State Council, stating that all expropriation of temples and harassment of monks and nuns should be stopped immediately.66 The approval of the establishment of the All-China Buddhist Congress and the declaration of the government order, partly the result of the death of Jichan,67 exerted a great impact on society and on institutional Buddhism. On the one hand, the occupation and expropriation of temple properties was brought under control. On the other hand, monks and nuns began to speed up their cooperation for selfreform. The official establishment of the congress was announced in Shanghai during a memorial service dedicated to Jichan on February 17, 1914. The nationwide organization, consisting of twenty provincial branches and more than four hundred county branches,68 was the first of its kind in China. As the organization was legally registered and recognized by the government, it played an important role in resisting the expropriation of temple properties in the years to come. In 1929, another nationwide organization, the Chinese Buddhist Society (Zhongguo fojiaohui 中國佛教會), was founded in Shanghai. At the beginning, the society played an active role in safeguarding Buddhist institutions and mediating conflict between the sangha and the state. However, the inner struggles between the conservatives and reformers, represented by Yuanying and Taixu, the two disciples of Jichan, emerged and prevented the society from effectively serving the needs of institutional Buddhism. Later on, the Nationalist government became more concerned with Buddhist affairs and gradually favored Buddhist

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reform. In 1936, the Civil Training Department of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party issued “A Draft for Revising the Charter of the Chinese Buddhist Society,” which was welcomed by reformers and resisted by conservatives. However, after a short period of debate, the implementation of the draft was aborted largely due to the strong protest of the conservatives and sudden eruption of war in 1937.69

INSTITUTIONAL BUDDHISM AND THE REPUBLICAN STATE Institutional Buddhism in China was never completely independent of politics; it had always been subjected to state intervention and supervision and exposed to numerous state censures and persecutions. Buddhism could not have survived if it had completely disregarded the authority of the state or had not received sponsorship from kings and nobles. Buddhist legend holds that the official introduction of Buddhism to China was facilitated by Emperor Ming of the Eastern Han dynasty (25–220 CE), who sent a mission to the West in search of the Dharma. Although this claim may not be historically verifiable, it indicates that Chinese Buddhist tradition values close relationship between its establishment and the state. Dao’an (312–385), one of the most eminent monks of early Chinese Buddhism, advised his monk-disciples that the protection from the state was essential for the survival of the sangha in times of turmoil. At various times, institutional Buddhism received protection and patronage from the imperial court, although which supported Buddhism sometimes for political reasons.70 By the end of the Qing dynasty, however, royal protection of Buddhism had weakened, and eventually vanished after the founding of Republic China that made Buddhism, facing mounting criticisms, vulnerable to appropriation. During the early period of the Republic of China, successive governments in Beijing and Nanjing declared constitutional and legal guarantees of religious freedom to all Chinese citizens. The seventh clause of article 6 in the “Provisional Contract of the Republic China” of 1912, states that “people have the right of religious freedom.”71 This article became the blueprint for several constitutions and laws promulgated later. The “Constitution of the Republic of China” passed on October 10, 1923, says that the freedom of religion is protected even though Confucianism would enjoy certain privileges.72 Although in the “Program of Political Tutelage” adopted in 1928 by the Standing Committee of the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist government, nothing is mentioned about religious freedom,73 both article 11 of the “Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage” (promulgated in 1931) and article 15 of the “Final Draft of the

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Constitution of the Republic of China” (published in 1936), announced that the right of religious freedom for all citizens are protected by the state.74 Despite these guarantees, successive governments also issued regulations that by and large contradicted the right of freedom of religion. Threatened or actual expropriation of temple properties would be followed by Buddhist protests, then some government concession and relaxation, while new regulation would set off another cycle. This pattern would continue for a couple of decades. In June 1913, the Ministry of Internal Affairs issued the “Provisional Regulations for Temple Management.” The regulations recognized that the abbot of a temple was in charge of temple property, yet the government reserved the right to take away temples and temple properties that had been offered to Buddhist institutions by the public and the state.75 Consequently, a large number of temples were transformed into public buildings for education or charity and numerous monks and nuns were forcibly defrocked on threat of arrest if they resisted.76 The regulations provoked a storm of protest from the Buddhist society and clergy launched an emotional petition urging the government to repeal them and return the confiscated properties.77 On October 29, 1915, by presidential order, the government issued the “Regulations for Temple Management” in thirty-one articles, one of which disenfranchised the legal status of the All-China Buddhist Congress established in 1913.78 The regulations also prohibited monks and nuns from transferring their temple properties and granted the power of temple management to local government officials, who could request abbots to resign. Buddhist leaders, such as Lama Zhangjia 章嘉, petitioned the Parliament, but it was fruitless because the Parliament was soon dissolved by Yuan Shikai. Although the political situation in China at the time changed rapidly as one government was replaced by another, policies towards Buddhist institutions remained essentially the same. On May 20, 1921, the “Revised Regulations for Temple Management” were issued to replace the previous ones, compacting the former 31 articles into 24.79 Although the new regulations repeated the promise to protect temples and monastic properties, they reemphasized that all temples should be registered in the government office and pay property tax.80 The abbots were declared the legal managers of the temples, yet government officials at different levels maintained the right of final decision on how temples should be administered. The regulations also demanded that monks or nuns inculcate lay Buddhists with patriotism so that they would develop their usefulness to the nation and society. Following the establishment of the Nationalist government in Nanjing in 1928, “Regulations for Temple Management” were issued on January 25, 1929,81 based on previous ones with a new emphasis on such Buddhist activities as fundraising for public education, disaster relief, and orphanage homes. Most strikingly,

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the Nationalist party was given charge of managing Buddhist temples. Article 6 indicated that the study of the doctrine of the Nationalist party (the Three People’s Principles) was a compulsory part of the curriculum for Buddhist clergy. Instead of allowing monks and nuns to deal with temple management and organize Buddhist charities independently, a committee of trustees was to be formed to collectively manage the affairs of temples. Monks and nuns could not be more than half of the committee, and government officials at city and county levels might admonish and replace “monks or nuns who disobey the regulations.” The duty of monks and nuns to educate people with patriotic ideas was reiterated so as to “inspire the idea of saving the nation through revolution among the masses.” However, even some officials in the central government found it difficult to implement these regulations.82 The Legislative Yuan, after a series of debates, issued another code, the “Regulations for Supervising Temples” on January 11, 1930.83 Compared with the previous ones, it appears that the government moderated its policy on Buddhist institutions and entrusted administrative power over temples to clergy. Instead of imposing direct leadership over temple managements, the state now would exercise the right and duty of supervision as it was indicated in the title of the regulations. Nevertheless, the abbots were asked to report temple management twice a year to government authorities, who maintained the power of dismissing abbots when they considered it appropriate. The regulations also discriminated between Buddhist institutions in ethnically Han areas and those in Tibet and Mongolia by exempting taxes for temples in these minority areas. Inevitably, the new regulations again provoked nationwide Buddhist protest.84 All these regulations, once promulgated in public, were protested by Buddhists who exercised their constitutional rights to defend themselves. Yet, some political and intellectual leaders were reluctant to give up an attempt because the resources that could be extracted from Buddhist temples for nation building were so attractive. The government repeatedly justified its actions by claiming that it was acting in accordance with the law, even though the regulations were frequently amended. Article 18 in the 1931’s Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage states, “where public interest necessitates, the property of the people may be expropriated in accordance with law.”85 It was argued that the action of taking away temple properties for the national interest did not violate the constitution. In the one-party system of the time, regulations issued by the government were the law, as the Nationalist government was endowed with legislative and administrative powers. Buddhists would fight harder in order to change and modify such law and regulations. Although this series of regulations was declared in the name of protecting Buddhist institutions, they did not curb but rather encouraged temple appropriation, and a large number of incidents of the indiscriminate occupation and seizure

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of temple properties occurred everyday and everywhere. Spacious temples became suitable military camps, schools, government offices, or comfortable resorts for local elite.86 The government’s example and policies also prompted some antiBuddhist intellectuals to stage campaigns against Buddhism. In March of 1928, the news media reported that Xue Dubi 薛篤弼, the Minister of Internal Affairs, had planned to transform all temples in China into schools. The proposal was said to have been submitted to the First National Conference on Education by Tai Shuangqiu 邰爽秋, a professor at Zhejiang University, and to have been adopted by the conference.87 Buddhist society became tremendously agitated. From all over China, monks, nuns, lay Buddhists, and sympathizers sent petitions or dispatched delegations to Nanjing, urging politicians to reject the proposal. The protest was so overwhelming that Xue Dubi had to announce on April 18, 1928 that the rumor of converting temples into schools for education was entirely unfounded.88 Unsatisfied by Xue Dubi’s denunciation of rumors, Tixian 諦閑, Yingguang 印光, and other Buddhist monks from Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces submitted a joint letter to the Nationalist government on May 7, 1928.89 The letter warned that the party principles and government policies would be gravely damaged and the future of the Nationalist revolution would be less appealing if the state carried out the resolution.90 On July 3, 1928, Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培, the Minister of Higher Education, after meeting with Buddhist delegations, wrote a letter to the Central Committee of the Nationalist government, suggesting that freedom of religion should be dealt with carefully in accordance with the principles of the party.91 In March 1929, monks and nuns from 19,758 temples in Sichuan jointly appealed to all Chinese clergy to unite and denounce the government. Meanwhile, protests against the forcible occupation of temples were carried out in many parts of China. In April 1929, thousands of clergy in Beijing took to the street, demonstrating against the occupation of a temple by the tram-drivers union.92 Faced with a united protest, the government delayed the debate over the issue of temple appropriation in the National Conference on Education in 1929. The conflict between Buddhism and the state thus subsided again, although it did not completely disappear. On November 1, 1930, Tai Shuangqiu, now a professor at the Central University, and some other intellectuals organized the Committee for Promoting the Expropriation of Buddhist Temples for Education in the Republic of China. The aim of the committee, as publicly announced, was to “crush monk-lords (sengfa 僧閥), disintegrate the sangha, reallocate temple properties, and revive education.”93 On December 23, 1930, they drafted the Declaration of the Committee for Accelerating the Movement of Appropriating Temple Properties for Education. It was sent to the Nationalist government,94 and reviewed by the Education Committee of the Fourth Plenum of the Third

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Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, which duly endorsed the proposal and sent it to the Education Ministry and the Internal Affairs Ministry for implementation. The news about the government plan, however, was leaked out by a Buddhist journal, Modern Sangha (xiandai sengjie 現代僧伽), before it was publicly announced.95 The waves of protest mounted higher than previously, as nearly all Buddhist publications carried the news and passionately called upon clergy and lay people to wake up and fight back as if the doomsday of Buddhist institutions (mofa 末法) was finally approaching. Appealing to their constitutional rights and supported by some politicians and social leaders, including many representatives of the National Assembly, Buddhists made the case that Chinese citizens had freedom of religion and the right to inherit property, and that according to the constitution no one could seize or confiscate their property.96 In a letter to all Buddhists in China, Xingxiu, the abbot of Daweishan in Hunan, appealed to monks and nuns to fight to the death against the Committee for Promoting the Expropriation of Buddhist Temples for Education.97 Meanwhile, he also urged monks and nuns to accelerate Buddhist reform by contributing to society and showing their usefulness to the nation so that their action would silence criticisms and stop the practice of temple appropriation. Taixu, who was in charge of the Chinese Buddhist Society following new elections in its third meeting in April 1931, sent a long letter of petition calling for the abandonment of the plan to the National Assembly in session in May 1931.98 The assembly discussed Taixu’s petition and proposal by the Panchan Lama and others, and passed a resolution that confiscated properties be returned, and the government to prevent similar incidents in the future. On August 1, 1931, Jiang Jieshi signed an executive order that prohibited the seizure of Buddhist properties.99 The order also said, however, that the return of already confiscated properties would not be possible; meanwhile it did not specify who was authorized to deal with such incidents if they occurred again. Government departments in charge of education at different levels continued to handle complaints from Buddhist clergy, and they consistently decided in favor of appropriation. On May 5, 1932, another order from the Executive Yuan required that all cases concerning temple properties should be submitted to the courts and that no government department had a right to pass decision on them.100 While promising to protect Buddhist institutions, the government also requested monks and nuns to allocate a certain amount of money from their temple income for charitable work so as to reduce the government’s economic burden and budget deficit. On January 14, 1935, the Executive Yuan issued “Regulations for Public Charitable Activities by Buddhist Temples.” Its fifth clause provides that “Temples whose income is less than hundred Yuan per year will pay one percent

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[of total income for charity]; over one hundred but less than three hundred Yuan pay two percent . . . all temples earning more than one thousand Yuan pay five percent.”101 The regulations can be better understood in light of the contemporary social and political situation in China. During that time, a number of natural disasters made millions of Chinese homeless. The conflict with Japanese in the northeast and fighting between the Nationalists and Communists forced millions of people to leave their homes and depend on charity. Before the regulations on charities were issued, Buddhist organizations had already begun disaster relief work, and several Buddhist relief teams were dispatched to the disaster areas, bringing with them relief materials collected from temples, individual monks and nuns, and lay Buddhists. The movement of appropriating temple property for education and charity was not the only one destroying institutional Buddhism in China; worse was the military occupation of temples. During the Nationalists’ unification from 1926 to 1928, such practice was widespread. In October 1926, after the Revolutionary Army took over Wuchang, the buildings of the Wuchang Buddhist College (Wuchang foxueyuan 武昌佛學院) were confiscated and made part of the School of Military Officers.102 A similar phenomenon could be seen throughout the country, as Dongchu remarks, “After the Northern Expedition, without exception all ancient monasteries at militarily strategic areas in all provinces and counties were occupied by soldiers. Temples became military camps.”103 There were perhaps several million soldiers in China and the government could not afford to provide proper living facilities for all of them. Temples therefore became convenient places for the soldiers to reside. Occupied temples were devastated, buildings were damaged and statues were burned. Monks were usually driven out or confined in a corner. The temples were also used to store military equipment and ammunition, which was dangerous for the ancient buildings. In 1933, a huge fire broke out in Kaiyuan Si in Quanzhou where the military equipment of the 61st Division of the Nationalist Army was stored.104 After several such incidents, the Internal Affairs Ministry in November 1933 prohibited soldiers and police from occupying ancient temples.105 Again in 1936, the Ministry of the Army ordered explosive materials removed away from temples of historic significance.106 These repeated orders indicate that the military occupation of temples was continuously prevalent and consistently protested by the Buddhist clergy. As often reported in Buddhist journals, Buddhists, both cleric and lay, urged the government to abandon the military occupation of temples completely. Taixu and many other Buddhist leaders made great efforts to take back the Wuchang Buddhist College since 1928. They were unable to have the occupants moved out until some high military officers were invited to be committee members on the college board in 1932.107

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The Buddhist protests against the government were in striking contrast with what happened as the war between China and Japan approached. When military tension between the two nations increased at the end of 1936, Chinese monks and nuns began to change their attitude and increased their support for the state, even though the appropriation of temple property and forcible taxation continued. They gradually reduced their critics against the government; fewer complaints and protests against the government’s policy on Buddhist institutions can be found in Buddhist journals like Hai chao yin,108 while more articles on nationalism appeared, pledging Buddhist commitments to the nation. When the government called upon Chinese clergy to undertake military training and prepare for national defense as the national crisis deteriorated in 1936, monks, especially young ones, felt that although Buddhist institutions had suffered severely under the regime, Buddhists should respond positively to the government’s call for national defense. They believed that this would not only fulfill their duty to the nation, but also show the usefulness of Buddhism and dispel the public misunderstanding of the relationship between institutional Buddhism and the state,109 and many of them prepared themselves to defend the nation.

TAIXU AND BUDDHIST REFORM As early as 1923, when Taixu was thirty-three years old, Frank R. Millican, a Christian missionary in China, remarked, “Tai Hsü and modern Buddhism are inseparable. You can no more write intelligently about modern Buddhism and ignore Tai Hsü than you could about the Reformation and leave Luther out.”110 Taixu, regarded as “the Martin Luther of modern Chinese Buddhism”111 and “the Saint Paul of Chinese Buddhism,”112 was one of a few eminent monks in modern China. His written legacy totals seven million words on various subjects, and his ideas of “aspiring to reorganize the sangha while observing bodhisattva’s precepts” enabled institutional Buddhism in modern China to readjust itself of awakening for survival and revival. Taixu was born into a poor family at Chang’an Town of Haining County in Zhejiang province on January 8, 1890. His mother remarried after his father died when he was only one year old, and he was raised by his maternal grandmother, a devoted and traditional lay Buddhist. As a child, Taixu often accompanied his grandmother on pilgrimages to famous Buddhist sites. He spent most of his childhood in a temple where his grandmother lived, and studied classical Chinese under his uncle. In 1904 at the age of 14, without telling anyone, Taixu left his hometown and set out in search of supernatural power (shentong 神通) and immortality (xian 仙). He arrived in Suzhou and stayed in Xiao Jiuhua Si 小九華寺, a Buddhist temple he and his grandmother had visited several years before. Without quite

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understanding the meaning of tonsure, he became a monk under master Shida 士達 and received full ordination under Jichan, who was also known as Ascetic of Eight Fingers (八指頭陀 Bazhi douduo)113 in 1904. Taixu spent the next two years reading and studying Buddhist scriptures; within a short period, he reportedly had memorized many Buddhist texts and grasped the essence of Buddhist philosophy. In 1906, Taixu and Yuanying 圓瑛, another promising young monk and later the leader of the conservatives and the rival of Taixu’s reformists, pledged in a ritual ceremony to become brothers in Dharma.114 In 1908, Taixu met Huashan 華山, who would become responsible for bringing revolutionary ideas into the sangha, and the two soon became intimate friends. Huashan opened a new horizon for Taixu by introducing to him provocative books on modern social and philosophic ideas, such as Kang Youwei’s Tatong shu 大同書 (Book of the Great Unity), Tan Sitong’s Renxue 仁學 (An Exposition on Benevolence), Zhang Taiyan’s Gao fozi shu 告佛子書 (A Letter to Buddhists), and Yan Fu’s Tianyanlun 天演論 (On Evolution). Later on, Taixu extensively read the Chinese translations of works written by Peter Kropotkin, Mikhail Bakunin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and Karl Marx. These books aroused his interests in revolutionary ideas and laid down a sound foundation for his career in Buddhist reform. Meanwhile, Taixu became an active member of the Revolutionary Alliance (Tongmenghui 同盟會) founded by Sun Yatsen in 1905 and often took part in secret meetings in Guangzhou.115 In early 1911, the Guangzhou Uprising organized by the Revolutionary Alliance was suppressed by the Qing army, and seventy-two revolutionaries were executed in Huanghuagang 黃花崗, some of whom were Taixu’s close friends. In memory of his martyred friends, Taixu composed a poem,116 full of revolutionary fervor against Qing rule. The poem was later discovered by local government officials and in March of 1911, Qing troops surrounded Taixu’s temple in order to arrest him. With the help of his friends, he was allowed to leave Guangzhou. Soon after the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, Taixu set up an office to prepare for the establishment of the Association for Buddhist Advancement (Fojiao jiejinhui 佛教協進會) at Piru Si in Nanjing, briefly the new capital of China. At this time, Renshan, Taixu’s erstwhile fellow student at the Jetavana Hermitage,117 was also in Nanjing seeking government permission to convert Jiangtian Si in Jinshan, a well-known monastery for the vigorous practice of Buddhist meditation, into a Buddhist school. Commonly inspired by the ideas of revolution, the two returned to Jinshan and started to implement Buddhist reforms. Their radical ideas and actions were, however, violently resisted by some conservative monks in the temple, and a bloody incident, later popularly known as “The Storming of Jinshan” (danao Jinshan 大鬧金山), eventually forced them to leave the temple.118 Shortly afterwards, Taixu was persuaded by Jichan

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to merge the Association for Buddhist Advancement into the All China Buddhist Congress established in April 1912. At the memorial service for the death of Jichan in 1914, Taixu, then 23 years old, presented his views on a threefold reform of Buddhist organization, property, and doctrine. He called on Buddhists to shift from funeral services for the dead to serving the living. Based on the five precepts and ten wholesome deeds, all Buddhists should make efforts to improve politics and economy in society in which they live. Taixu suggested that temples and temple property in China should belong to all monks and nuns collectively, and that private temples should be transformed into public property of the sangha by eliminating the practice of lineage-inheritance. The most important element of his reform was the reorganization of the sangha.119 However, his reform plan was severely criticized by the conservatives who were afraid that they would lose the control of their temples if Taixu’s plan were carried out. After a short period of doubt and disappointment owing to the resistance met by his reform and to the stagnation of political revolution in China,120 Taixu in 1914 strengthened his religious resolute and decided to meditate in confinement (biguan 閉關)121 at Putuo Mountain in Zhejiang. During the next three years, he practiced intense meditation and studied the Buddhist Pitakas systematically.122 Yet he never neglected current social and political developments; he allocated a certain period of time every day to read newspapers and magazines. Experienced in Buddhist practice, equipped with Buddhist doctrines as well as other philosophies, and well informed about the current sociopolitical situation, Taixu decided to leave his confinement in 1917 and re-embark on Buddhist reform. In 1917, Taixu visited Japan and gave lectures in Taiwan. On his return, together with some social and political leaders, including Zhang Taiyan, Wang Yiting, and Jiang Zuoping, he founded the Jueshe 覺社 (Enlightenment Society) in Shanghai, and began publishing the quarterly journal Jueshe cong shu. In 1920, the journal was renamed Hai chao yin (海潮音 The Voice of the Tide), and became the first monthly journal of Buddhism in China. In the inaugural issue, Taixu declared that the aim of the journal was to enhance the truth of Mahayana and to guide the aspirations of modern humanity. During this period, he was often invited to give lectures in various parts of China and his fame quickly spread. A number of gentry and intellectuals, who were inspired by his eloquent, new style preaching, and his spirit of revolution, eagerly sought his guidance. Nevertheless, he was criticized for his liberal ideas on Buddhist reform so much that many old monks would even not allow their disciples to be associated with him. In 1922, Taixu revolutionized the traditional Buddhist education system by adopting the modern college system of the Western style in his newly founded Wuchang Buddhist College in Wuhan.123 This college, together with Minnan Buddhist College (Minnan foxueyuan 閩南佛學院) co-founded by Taixu and Chinese-Tibetan

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Buddhist College (Hanzang jiaoli yuan) became the center of modern Buddhist education in China and produced many fine students who later became leading members of Buddhist institutions across China. Taixu also founded the Chinese Buddhist Study Society (Zhongguo foxue hui 中國佛學會) in 1928, and was elected a member of the standing committee of the Chinese Buddhist Society 中國佛教會 founded in 1929. Taixu also demonstrated interest in forming international organizations to unite all Buddhists in the world for peace, and in 1924, he organized the East Asia Buddhist Conference at Lushan. The Asian Buddhist Conference, initiated by Taixu and held in Japan in 1925, became a landmark in the history of Buddhist exchange between China and Japan. Taixu’s knowledge and religious charisma profoundly impressed many well-known Japanese Buddhist scholars, who later called him the pivot of the exchanges between the Buddhists of the two countries.124 In late 1928 and early 1929, Taixu toured Europe and America, meeting religious leaders and well-known philosophers. The six-month trip further broadened his vision for Buddhist reform in an international context. Taixu often impressed people with skillful means by his talent and Buddhist knowledge. Politicians, intellectuals, and social leaders became his associates and supporters. He was good at elaborating Buddhist doctrine to a variety of audiences at different levels. His religious sermons and exhortation were well received by military officers, whose profession was not easily reconciled with the teaching of the Buddha.125 By his early thirties, his fame was widespread in the upper political circles of China. In April 1927, when Taixu arrived in Fuzhou, municipal and provincial government officials and military officers gave a banquet in his honor. At the end of the party, Taixu was asked by some military officers how they could reconcile their military profession with Buddhist idea of non-killing if they were required to fight battles for the sake of the Nationalist party and the welfare of Chinese people. Taixu explained that a bodhisattva would do everything possible to save people from suffering by heroically destroying evil ones. Taixu then summarized his advice to soldiers under three rubrics: wisdom, compassion, and skillful means. According to Taixu, all actions, if guided by wisdom and compassion, were right, including killing. When Taixu was asked again whether they could regard enemies as evil and hate them, Taixu replied, “The man of great benevolence has no enemy. The one who is the enemy of compassion is evil. The Buddha will never lose the mind of compassion. All evil will be subdued if one’s mind eliminates evil.”126 Killing may be performed in order to fulfill the duty of the soldier when his mind is pure, full of compassion and without hatred. Such advice would certainly satisfy the unsettled minds of military officers. That may be why Taixu had many military friends and why numerous soldiers took the Three Refuges

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under him.127 In August 1929, the military officer Wang Shen called on Taixu in Putuoshan, expressing his regret for not being prudent in choosing his profession. Taixu quickly pointed out that he should not be obsessed by such thought because Weituo 韦陀 Bodhisattva, the guardian of the temple, also manifested himself in military uniform and helmet. Taixu even suggested that the military profession could be valuable and important to the nation at a time of disorder if they could be compassionate.128 In November 1929, Taixu was invited to the Institute for the Training of Military Officers in Changsha and gave a lecture on “How to be a Military Officer.”129 He instructed the future military officers to make use of Buddhist doctrines such as compassion, wisdom, courage, discipline, and loyalty to the nation and people, and practice them in their careers with skillful means. Taixu once gave a twofold reply to the question of whether Buddhists could freely exercise the soldiers’ duty of killing in war. First, according to the Theravada tradition, those who have received the five precepts shall not perform killing. Therefore, in order to be a Buddhist and soldier simultaneously, Taixu recommended, one should only take the Three Refuges130 without committing oneself to the Five Precepts131 so that one would be free to kill enemies as a soldier without any sense of religious guilt. The second reply was that in Mahayana Buddhism a bodhisattva is one who rids himself of the idea of self and regards all living beings equally. Soldiers who receive the bodhisattva precepts should consider themselves citizens of the nation first. It is not a violation of Buddhist precepts if they kill the enemies of the nation for the sake of protecting the nation and saving people. This was the path of the bodhisattva: killing with skillful means, based on compassion, was encouraged.132 Nevertheless, Taixu explained that those who killed others for the sake of invasion or out of craving, as Japanese did in China, had lost the bodhisattva’s mind; they violated the precepts and would suffer the consequences accordingly. During this time, many Chinese considered Japan as the enemy of Chinese nation, yet Taixu was friendly with many Japanese Buddhist leaders before the war in 1937. Nevertheless, he was critical of Japanese policy toward China and urged Japanese Buddhists to prevent the Japanese invasion of China. At the beginning of the war, Taixu called upon all Buddhists to rally behind the Nationalist government and take actions to defend the nation. During the next eight years, he energetically launched Buddhist propaganda supporting the Anti-Japanese War, organizing sangha rescue teams in Hankou, Yunnan, and Hunan,133 and leading Buddhist delegations to Burma, India, and Sri Lanka. In January 1941, Taixu set up the Office for Preparing Sangha Reorganization in Chongqing, hoping to bring all Buddhists together to serve the nation. Nevertheless, due to lack of support from the government and enthusiasm of his colleagues, he had to abandon

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his efforts in November 1941. His plan to reorganize institutional Buddhism was not implemented until after the war.

CONCLUSION The governments in the Republic era were in desperate needs of finance and would exhaust all means to strengthen its military and economic power. Frequent wars between warlords wrecked the Chinese social structure and made millions of people refugees. Under these circumstances, the sangha, decline in spiritual yet rich in material endowment, became the target of state appropriation. In order to legitimate such practices, the governments won the support of intellectuals and promulgated a series of regulations. Nevertheless, monks and nuns exercised their institutional rights and protested governments’ policies. Although their protests could not completely change the nature of government’s practice, it slowed down its process as governments’ regulations repeatedly modified. If the government’s efforts to build a new nation can be considered as a part of nationalism, the members of the sangha, who would not sacrifice their religious property for the nation, did not yet enthusiastically respond to such nationalistic idea at this time. The relationship between institutional Buddhism and the state was not changed until the sangha urgently felt national crisis caused by foreign invasion in the middle of the 1930s. Buddhism was constantly criticized by Confucians, Christian missionaries, and new intellectuals, and persecuted by the state when Chinese nation was undertaking the movement of self-strengthening. The outside attacks challenged the very existence of the sangha that the changes within became inevitable. To some extent, modern Buddhist reform was a inner response to the pressures and attacks of outsiders, whose aims were to eliminate the sangha although with different motivations. Many Buddhist clergy, especially those leading members of the sangha and young monk-intellectuals, waked up to this reality and accepted the challenges by opening schools in temples, reorganizing Buddhist society, and performing charitable activities. During this period, the ideas of social and political revolution penetrated into the sangha and a number of monks took part in overthrowing the Qing dynasty and made contributions to the founding of the Republic of China. Their revolutionary ideas and actions further inspired monks to undertake Buddhist reforms. The modern Buddhist education as the result of such reforms produced a large number of talented and young revolutionary monks, who became active forces to engage Buddhism in social and political affairs. They played an active role in resisting state appropriation of temple properties, and most importantly, they prepared themselves to participate in war in 1937.

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The Buddhist reform movement led by Taixu, however, had a limited impact on contemporary Buddhist institutions for a variety of reasons, such as the stubbornness of conservatives, powerful state persecutions, the continuation of war, anti-religious movements in society, and lack of government support. Some scholars believe that modern Buddhist reform in China failed and attribute the failure to the personal shortcomings of reformers and the incompleteness of reform itself.134 They argued that the Buddhist reform could have been successful if the reformers had completely abolished differentiation between clergy and laypeople just as Martin Luther did to Christianity. It should be pointed out, however, that unlike in Christianity, the twofold system of monastic life and lay life was laid down by the Buddha, the founder of Buddhism, and has been emphasized in Buddhist tradition throughout history. The contemporary conservatives were so powerful that even minor reforms were vigorously resisted. It can be imagined how much harder resistance would be if more radical reform had taken place. Although it might be said that the reforms failed, it created a sound environment for Buddhism to reintegrate itself into society and prepared many young monks to serve the nation when nationalism became the supreme religion towards the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War in 1937.

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Chapter Two

Buddhism and National Defending

After Japan occupied Manchuria on September 18, 1931, military confrontation between China and Japan gradually increased. Fighting in Shanghai in January 1932 and in Rehe in February 1933 indicated that full scale war between the two countries was probably coming soon. The Nationalist government sought to delay war in order first to gain power over warlord and communist forces and to strengthen national military capabilities, to which most of its resources were devoted in the following years. Politically, the regime urged all Chinese to unite under the Nationalist party and intensified nationalistic and patriotic education in society, including the New Life Movement. By 1935, Communists, having barely escaped encirclement by Nationalist troops and their year-long Long March, were calling for a united front of all Chinese against Japanese aggression. The national crises of foreign invasion and civil war agitated many Chinese intellectuals, especially students, who petitioned the Nationalist government to unite with all forces, including the communists, and to take stronger military action against Japan. Large scale anti-Japanese demonstrations and boycotts of Japanese goods became common in many parts of China. All these contributed to the Xi’an Incident in December 19361 that eventually led to the nationalists and communists promising to cease hostilities and fight the Japanese—the common enemy of the Chinese nation. In July 1936, the Nationalist government, as part of its mobilization for war, ordered young Buddhist clergy to undertake military training and to prepare themselves for defending the nation in accordance with their constitutional duty. Again in October, another order was issued that all young monks and nuns be militarized just like other Chinese citizens.2 Within a short period, a number of military training centers were founded in temples in different places, especially in big cities. In this chapter, I first outline the nationalism that prevailed in China and examine how young monks creatively reconceptualized relations between

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Buddhism and the state in arguing that Chinese clergy should fulfill their civic duties first even if they must temporarily abandon their religious commitment.

CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY AND BUDDHIST OBLIGATION The duty of the Chinese clergy as citizens of China to serve in the army and to protect the nation had been repeated in the constitutions formulated after the founding of the Republic of China in 1912. Article 14 of the “Provisional Contract of the Republic of China” (Zhonghua minguo linshi yuefa 中華民國臨時約法) promulgated in March 1912, states, “People have the duty of serving in the army according to the law.”3 The 1931 “Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage” adopted by the National Assembly, in article 26, announces, “All persons shall have the duty of performing military service and compulsory labor (for the State) in accordance with law.”4 Again on May 5, 1936, the “Final Draft Constitution of the Republic of China” was declared, in which article 22 proclaims, “Every citizen shall, in accordance with law, be amenable to the duty of performing military service and labor service.”5 Although neither the provisional nor the draft constitutions specifically mentioned that monks and nuns had to join the army, it was clear that every citizen of China was duty-bound to provide military service to the nation when her sovereignty was in danger. Traditionally, Buddhist clergy were advised not to attach to or be involved in worldly affairs while they are not clearly bound by secular law; they were considered to have left family (chujia 出家) and sought the way beyond this world (chushi 出世). However, after the establishment of the Republic of China, the Buddhist clergy were considered as members of the Chinese nation. Article 2 of the Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage states, “All persons who, according to the law, enjoy the nationality of the Republic of China shall be citizens of the Republic of China.” Article 6 adds, “All citizens of the Republic of China shall be equal before the Law, irrespective of sex, race, religion or caste.” Thus, the clergy were the citizens of the Chinese nation and enjoyed equal rights and shared the same duties with the rest of the Chinese people to serve the nation, including military service. Although the duty and responsibility of the clergy for the nation was indicated in the various constitutions, many monks and nuns were not aware of it at the time, and in practice it was terrifyingly difficult for them to change their long standing tradition and adapt to the new political environment. The government’s order requiring the military training of clergy provoked diverse reactions from the sangha. On the one hand, some traditional monks and nuns expressed grave concerns that involvement in military was itself transgression of precept, and that after the training they would be forced to violate Buddhist discipline of non-killing if

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they were drawn into military service for war, in which killing was unavoidable. On the other hand, the movement of national awakening had reduced the gap between the monastic community and general society through modern education, and young monks were heavily affected by the social, political, and even military activities of the nation, and felt duty-bound to share social and national responsibilities. Many young monks who had studied in Buddhist colleges, influenced by the nationalistic sentiment prevailing in China, responded positively to the government’s call. These young monks or “new monks,” as they preferred to call themselves, had long been associated with and contributed to Buddhist reform. They were concerned with the future of the nation and connected it with Buddhist destiny in China. The question they often asked was how they could render service to the nation so that they could win social and political recognition. The government’s order of demanding military training of clergy provided them with an opportunity to demonstrate Buddhist patriotism and prove the usefulness of Buddhism. Nevertheless, these new monks were also aware of their commitment to Buddhist teachings and disciplines, in which nonviolence (ahimsa) and disassociation with military were always emphasized.6 Both Vinaya and Dharma in the Theravada and Mahayana traditions emphasize that both clergy and laity should refrain from killing, and that monks and nuns are further advised to distance themselves from the military—an instrument of violence. Although Mahayana canon occasionally speaks of the possibility of disregarding the idea of ahimsa under circumstances, overwhelming majority of texts stress nonviolence and the evil consequences of killing, and common monks and nuns in China were probably unaware of Buddhist texts permitting violence. Therefore, young monks who wanted to bring military training into their temples and support possible participation in war had to convince others that their actions would not contradict or violate Buddhist doctrine and discipline. In other words, they somehow had to reconcile their constitutional duty of preparing for killing with their religious commitment of non-killing. One day in December 1936, a notice was posted inside Nanputuo Si in Xiamen, where the Minnan Buddhist College was located. It was from Dingyong, the editor of Fo hai deng 佛海燈 (The Illuminator of the Buddha’s Realms),7 a monthly Buddhist journal published first in Changsha by the Buddhist Studies Society in December 1935. Dingyong asked monks and nuns to contribute articles for a special edition of the journal on the topic of Buddhist protecting the nation, as he stated, “We members of the sangha are also the citizens of the nation. At this time when the mission of defending the nation against foreign invasion has been thrust upon us, we cannot refuse to fulfill our sacred (shensheng 神聖) duty to protect our country.”8 The notice was sent to other temples and Buddhist colleges, and

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attracted great attention and responses from “new young monks.” Unexpectedly, more articles were received than could be contained in one issue, and within next three months, three full special issues on “Sangha and National Protection” (Sengjie huguo 僧伽謢國) were published and widely circulated among the Buddhist community. In the editorial comment of the first issue, Yueyao briefly reviewed the military and political situation in China, repeating how China’s sovereignty had been trampled upon and its territory divided by the Japanese invasion. He praised Chinese soldiers, who had heroically defended the nation under the banner of nationalism, and expressed hope for the national survival by the efforts of all Chinese. Yueyao informed Buddhists that the Chinese forces led by General Fu Zuoyi 傅作義 had then successfully repulsed the joint attacks of the Mongolian, Japanese, and Manchurian troops, and recovered some territory in the north. He felt that the victory had raised Chinese military morale, and pushed nationalistic zeal to a new level in society; Chinese citizens were now ready to support the government and provide material assistance to the soldiers. Yueyao believed that Buddhist monks and nuns, as members of the nation, could not remain idle inside their temples disregarding the national crisis of foreign invasion. Thus the aim of the special issues of the journal, Yueyao claimed, was to “awaken the monks and nuns from their deep sleep so that all may unite to protect the nation.”9 The three issues of the journal contained more than fifty articles, largely contributed by “new monks” who were studying at the Minnan Buddhist College and the Wuchang Buddhist College, the cradles of modern Buddhist education. In the articles, these monk students enthusiastically expressed their views on how to reconcile the Buddhist rule of non-killing with the constitutional duty of defending the nation against the enemies, who intended to invade China and kill the Chinese. They came to the startling yet expected conclusion that monks and nuns must show support for the government by undertaking military training so that they could be better prepared for participation in war. Many of them vowed that they were ready to sacrifice their lives and their commitment to their religion for the sake of saving the nation. In the political and military circumstances of 1936 when nationalism reigned supreme in China, these young monks thought that it was impossible for them to remain uninvolved in the national affairs and to keep silent in their temples. They were convinced that they should not compromise their duty to the nation even though they had left the secular world, but instead should fulfill it to the utmost of their abilities as citizens. Since they could neither change the reality of the invasion nor disregard the prevailing atmosphere of nationalism, nor would they neglect their civil duty, they could only redefine their religious obligation. The monks turned to Buddhist scriptures in search of justification for their involvement in national defending and came to believe that Buddhist doctrine and discipline were not rigid and dogmatic,

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arguing that Buddhist ahimsa did not mean either non-action or inaction, or even pacifism. The Buddha, as recorded in Mahayana and Theravada texts, did not always denounce killing nor did he entirely reject the necessity of defensive violence. In fact, Buddhist discipline consists of two aspects: non-doing of what is evil and doing of what is good. Besides non-killing,10 Buddhists are told to carry out the positive action of promoting peace by preventing killing through skillful means. Although killing should be avoided, Buddhists are requested to protect lives from injury, extending loving kindness to living beings and relieving them from suffering through compassion. The young monks thus came to the conclusion that it was possible for Chinese clergy to prepare themselves for war in accordance with the spirit of Mahayana Buddhism. For the sake of saving the nation and serving the people, they argued, the clergy could temporarily renounce their vows of nonkilling in order to join the rest of the Chinese people in the battle against Japanese invaders. Monks who temporarily abandoned the vow of non-killing could resume monkhood after war was over. To the objection that monks were prohibited from being associated with the military, some young monks replied that Buddhism emphasized the spirit rather than the letter of the monastic rules. Buddhist precepts were prescribed by the Buddha in accordance with the arising of occasions. The precept of not watching military parades, for instance, was introduced only after people complained that certain monks had neglected their religious practice. Buddhist precepts were not arbitrary or dogmatic but prescribed by the Buddha according to the spirit of religious practice and the social environment. Buddhist discipline was pragmatic and flexible, these young new monks argued, and should be observed in accordance with contemporary social needs. Furthermore, the Buddha prescribed the precept of non-association with army under certain circumstances for the goodness of the sangha; similarly, as young monks maintained, monks could make adjustments in their discipline to associate with the army for the benefit of contemporary sangha and society. They should not attach importance to the formality of the precepts, but always follow the path of bodhisattva intuitively, actively cultivating loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and equanimity. By learning from the example of bodhisattva and following the spirit of discipline, monks and nuns could even abandon the precept of non-killing in order to perform their duty of defending the nation. In asserting that the precept of non-killing could be abandoned, some of these young monks just declared their proposal without providing any doctrinal basis, because they felt it could be and should be so. But many others did seek textual support and argued that the whole of Mahayana Buddhism can be epitomized in one phrase: “compassion as the basis and skillful means as the door” (cibei weiben, fangbian weimen 慈悲為本, 方便為門). Monks and nuns, after becoming

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fully ordained, vow to pursue the path of the bodhisattva based on the Mahayana texts, one of which is the “Text of Bodhisattva Disciplines” in the Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra.11 The text outlines the practice of the bodhisattva, and summarizes the precepts in three categories: not doing what is evil (discipline), doing what is good (loving kindness and compassion), and constantly benefiting others by all means. The most important of them was benefiting all living beings through compassion and skillful means.12 Instead of directly confronting the idea of non-killing, some young monks asked such questions: Would Buddhist compassion and skillful means supersede ahimsa? Which was more important: compassion to save people or observance of non-killing? Did Buddhist scriptures suggest any idea of the justice of resisting injustice? Were monks and nuns authorized to fight against demons (mo 魔) in order to rescue their victims? The answers they found in the texts confirmed that responding to violence with violence was not completely precluded in Buddhism and that getting rid of evil by force might be justifiable as a necessary means to achieve what is good. One of the passages quoted most often is that of “killing one with compassion in order to save many” (yisha duosheng 一殺多生). Juexian recalled a story in the Āgamas in which a bodhisattva killed dozens of pirates in order to save five hundred merchants.13 The legend is retold in various Buddhist texts and is differently explained by Buddhist commentators, yet the spirit of the story is straightforward: a bodhisattva never hesitates to resort to violence to kill a small number so that a large number of people can survive. Yicheng, while discussing the controversy over killing and emphasizing the significance of compassion,14 quoted a similar passage from the “Text of Bodhisattva Disciplines” (pusa jieben 菩薩戒本) in the Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra: Having seen a bandit who is about to kill many living beings, or to murder Śrāvakas,15 Pratyekabuddhas,16 and Bodhisattvas, or to commit numerous other vicious karmas due to his covetousness, a bodhisattva thinks thus: “I shall now terminate the life of that evil one even though [it will cause me to] fall into hell.” The bodhisattva knows that one who kills human beings will suffer in hell consequently. Nevertheless, “If the life of the evil one is not brought to an end, he will kill and that will incur great suffering to him as well. I would rather fall into hell than allow him to suffer endless suffering.” Having thus contentedly thought, the bodhisattva extends good or neutral will towards the evil one. Having felt pity for the living beings now and in the future, the bodhisattva kills the evil one out of compassion. By doing so, the bodhisattva not only does not violate the precept, but even produces merit.17

Killing a few in order to save many not only is justified in the Buddhist doctrine and vinaya that highlights the bodhisattva’s compassion, but also is the meritorious action that gives rise to wholesome fruit. In citing this passage to

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justify killing, young monks unanimously took no notice of the details of the story and the circumstances in which this compassionate killing was performed. Monks also searched Buddhist history to find the precedent of killing by Buddhist clergy. Zhenhua 震華, a well-known young intellectual monk and abbot of Yufo Si 玉佛寺 in Shanghai, discovered many texts that exemplified the idea of combating evil and injustice. In History of State-Protection by the Sangha18 first published in 1933, Zhenhua cites a large number of cases, both historical and legendary, in which Chinese monks advocated and participated in violence. Emperor Wen (r. 424–453) once asked Gunavarman, an Indian monk who arrived in Nanjing in 431 CE, what he should do if the country were invaded, explaining that as a Buddhist he intended to observe the precept of non-killing even though he had duty of protecting the country. The Indian monk told him that it was the duty of the emperor to defend the kingdom, although when fighting the enemy he should entertain a compassionate mind, not have a mind full of hatred. Killing without hatred or a harmful mind was the right response to deal with enemies and invasion, the monk said, and the action based on right understanding and inspired by compassion was blameless by its own nature. Zhenhua writes that all kinds of skillful means, as many as “eighty-four thousand” in Buddhist parlance, can be justified in order to achieve the goal of serving and saving life. The Dharma door of skillful means (fangbian famen 方便法門) is so important in the bodhisattva’s path that it may be considered ultimate itself at the end (fangbian wei jiujing 方便為究竟).19 Zhenhua thus comes to the conclusion that under some special circumstances killing may be performed for the sake of greater course and compassion can inspire one to perform the act of killing. Ordinary people do not see their dialectic harmony and interrelatedness, instead, they dichotomize the two, thinking that the action of killing violates the principle of compassion. In fact, Zhenhua insisted, killing can be compassionate and Buddhists should pay attention to the intention and consequences, not to the act itself: It is contradictory to the spirit of great compassion (da cibei zhuyi 大慈悲主義) if one is a stickler for the formalities of worldly humanity and righteousness when one sees enemies blandish their swords to kill our compatriots. Instead, why shouldn’t one cherish the bodhisattva’s heart within and show Vajra’s face without, and kill a few enemies to save more lives? [By so doing], one commits bad karma yet simultaneously produces the good so that demerit and merit cancel out one another.20

Different from the “Text of Bodhisattva Disciplines” Yicheng quoted above that there would be no bad karma resulted from such compassionate killing, here the evil karma of killing and the good karma of saving lives are produced in one action

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of killing with compassion. According to Zhenhua, the action of killing human beings, severe as it is, will give rise to evil effects; yet if carried out with compassion, it becomes the act of producing merit. It is not clear from the above statement, however, whether the merit of compassion can compensate for the evil karma of killing, or whether the act of killing and the act of compassion, two parts of one action, will produce bad and good results sequentially at different times. Under any circumstance, bodhisattvas are aware of evil of killing human beings, yet deliberately disregard its consequence and perform such killing because their mission is to save others before saving themselves, as expressed in the slogan “Who else will go to hell if not me” (wu buru diyu shui ru diyu 我不入地獄誰入地獄). Zhenhua thus suggests that Chinese clergy emulate these acts of compassionate killing in repelling Japanese invasion. The stories and comments of Zhenhua in his book were often quoted by other young monks to highlight their own arguments. Having referred to evidence that Chinese clergy in the past had been involved in violence and having reminded Buddhists of the contemporary national crisis, Yicheng boldly urged Chinese clergy to put compassionate killing immediately into practice: If sixty or seventy million [ Japanese] pirates were about to attack 450 million innocent [Chinese] people, all genuine bodhisattvas will certainly kill these pirates so that such a great number of people can be saved and the pirates will be kept from making unwholesome karma, which may bring unbearable suffering to them as well.21

Many also emphasized that killing might not be aimed at taking the lives of the Japanese out of hatred, but was to be performed out of great compassion with the object of saving the Japanese from being punished for their own evil actions. Bodhisattvas have no “enemy,” just as loving kindness and compassion face no opposition; they regard all living beings equally without discrimination. Nonetheless, they will not tolerate any injustice and are prepared to kill potential killers in order to release all living beings from suffering. Doctrines of non-discrimination and emptiness were also employed to convey the ultimate non-duality of killing and non-killing, or the killed and the killer, which we have briefly discussed in the introduction. Although young monks did rely on sources of earlier Buddhist texts, such as that of Nagrajuna and the Nirvana Sūtra, they, such as Zhenhua, cited the similar passage from the work of Lianchi 蓮池 (1535–1615), one of the four most famous monks of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644): “The act of killing may turn out to be compassion; killing is not different from non-killing. Yet Dharma cannot be meaningless, as kindness and compassion will not be wasted. The administration of the state and the mind of Buddha therefore do not contradict one another.”22 From a transcendental point

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of view, the doctrine of wisdom, as revealed in the Prajňāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom) literature, illustrates that all that exists is empty and that emptiness (sūnyatā in Sanskrit or kong in Chinese) is none other than existence.23 The dual view of bad and good, killing and non-killing, are just illusions without any real substance in the ultimate sense because emptiness, being empty of an eternal self, is the shared characteristic of all phenomena. A bodhisattva does not attach himself to anything, good or bad, nor does he or she worry about the consequences of the actions, because s/he perceives no “I,” “mine,” as opposed to “others.” Having abandoned all these wrong views and misleading conceptual discriminations, and detached themselves from all attachments, bodhisattva acts naturally and spontaneously with perfect skillful means. The doctrine of emptiness can be inspiring and useful in allowing monks a free hand to act as “bodhisattvas” in serving the nation, yet it can also be dangerous. Zhenhua did not further elaborate whether that this idealized doctrine could be applied to and practiced by all Buddhists, and many young monks directly quoted this passage in their article without scrutiny. The idea that killing is non-killing can be an excuse for random killing if not understood properly or if adopted indiscriminately.24 It is evident that Zhenhua and many other young monks were concerned not with Buddhist doctrine or discipline or proper practices of them, but with how to inspire monks and nuns to defend the nation. They focused on a limited number of highly selective passages in Buddhist literature as a basis for their argument that clergy could participate in war by first undertaking military training, reluctant to explain them as a whole why and how action of compassionate killing can be performed. Meanwhile, it might be precisely because of the scarcity of such passages in Buddhist texts that these monks were able to develop creative interpretations and elaborate on them according to the necessity of the contemporary political and military situation in China.

BUDDHIST NATIONALISM Above arguments for Buddhist participation in the national defense cannot be understood as resulting from Buddhist appreciation for government policies towards institutional Buddhism during the Republican era. To the contrary, as discussed in the last chapter, monks and nuns had been engaged in a long battle with the state’s policies of appropriating temple property, high taxation, and military occupation of temples. Indeed, relations between the state and Buddhist institutions were further estranged during the period in which young monks advocated their support for the government as appropriation and occupation of temples continued and accelerated just before the war erupted in 1937. These phenomena became a norm in the Nationalist-controlled areas during the war.

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When Chongqin became the new capital of China soon after the beginning of the war, many government and military departments entered temples and took them as office-buildings. For instance, the Finance Ministry occupied Huayan Si 華岩寺. Ciyun Si 慈雲寺, the largest monastery in the city, was shared by both military and civilian organizations. The monks in these monasteries were confined in a small backyard.25 They would be driven away from temple premises if they were considered useless or obstacles to the resistance war.26 The Tianning Buddhist School 天寗佛學院 in Changzhou had to be closed and student-monks were dispersed because the buildings had been designated for wounded solders at the beginning of the war.27 In the available government documents and Buddhist journals published at the time, however, no reports of Buddhist protests against the military occupation can be found. When news did inform such occupation, it would normally blame the monks and nuns of those temples for their unwillingness of making contribution to the resistance war and would urge them to consider the nation and war first. It seems that monks and nuns accepted the reality and offered their service to the state. In January 1942, Taixu wrote a letter to the Executive Yuan, suggesting that twenty percent of Buddhist properties could be used for war charity, and another twenty percent for Buddhist education.28 Three considerations explain this change of Buddhist attitudes. First, before the war clergy considered temples and temple lands as their own property or as belonging to institutional Buddhism. They would be guilty of mismanagement if the temple property, which they received from their predecessors, was taken away by the government, just as a spendthrift who lost the property inherited from his ancestors would be blamed for ruining the family (baijiazi 敗家子). Temples were considered a home for clergy, who regarded themselves as members of one Buddhist family, and just as the family had to be protected before one could serve the state, so too Buddhist institutions appeared more important than the state or nation before the national crisis of foreign invasion was urgently felt. Second, the intellectual and democratic awakening movements in modern China enabled many intellectual monks to defend institutional Buddhism by appeal to the rights guaranteed in the constitution of the Republic of China. Monks voiced their protest against the government because they wanted Buddhism to be treated equally with other religions, and their properties protected. Third, just before and during the war, nationalistic sentiment was so powerful that it swept away the conflicts between the sangha and the state, and nationalism penetrated the sangha, forcing monks and nuns, or rather inspiring them, to abandon their feud with the government.29 As Japanese invasion grew imminent and the war intensified, the sentiment of clergy that Buddhist institutions needed their protection more than the nation gradually gave way to a feeling that the nation in crisis should be protected first. Even though the seizure of Buddhist property and

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the military occupation of the temples increased, the importance of safeguarding Buddhist institutions surrendered to the more urgent necessity of protecting the nation. In order to maintain Buddhist dispensation and safeguard the sangha in China, they had to first protect the nation. Having thus been convinced of the supremacy of the nation, the clergy readily rallied behind the government in the resistance war. Buddhism had spread beyond the borders of India and became an international religion when Aśoka allegedly dispatched the first Buddhist missions to the world. When Buddhism was introduced to China in the first century CE, Buddhist practice of renunciation clashed with Confucianism, which cherished family values and the importance of the state. On the one hand, the idea of renunciation practiced by monks and nuns could destabilize the traditional Confucian family system, which was considered the foundation of a strong nation and a healthy society. On the other hand, monks and nuns who renounce family life are less involved in society, and are therefore not be expected to have strong ties with the ruler and the state. The idea of the nation is secondary to these worldly renunciates because those who enter into the sangha abandon their worldly status and identity and become members of one Buddha’s family, just as water of different rivers flowing into sea lose their own flavor. Those who renounced the world are given new names with the last name of Shi, the family name of Sakyamuni Buddha; any previous identity of family, clan, and nation is dissolved into the family of Buddha. Monks and nuns can live under any ruler in any society as long as they enjoy basic freedom and need of religious practice. Thus, Buddhism is constantly criticized by Confucians for disregarding the value of the family and state. In response to such criticisms, Chinese monks throughout history recreated Buddhist tradition that the sangha should neither depend entirely on society nor completely isolated from it. In the middle of the first half of the twentieth century, Buddhist reforms could be regarded as an attempt to recreate Buddhist tradition and to reestablish a bridge between the sangha and society that had lost in the past centuries. In the 1930s, young monks, who were products of such reforms, looked into Buddhist scriptures and discussed among themselves whether monks and nuns should participate in national protection. In chapter 26 of the Ekottarāgama,30 an episode goes like this: Virudhaka, the prince of the powerful kingdom of Vaisana, was once insulted by the people of the Śakya clan into which the Buddha was born. When he ascended the throne, Virudhaka immediately decided to take revenge and set out with a fourfold army (i.e. elephants, horses, carts, and infantry) to wage war against the Śakyans. When the Buddha heard the news he rushed to the direction toward which the king’s army was approaching, and sat cross-legged beside the road under a leafless and branchless tree. Seeing the Buddha sitting without anything to protect him from

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the unbearable heat of the sun, the king descended from his cart and inquired why the Buddha sat uncovered under the burning sun. The Buddha replied that he did not feel hot because he was shielded by the leaves and branches of the Śakya clan, which could give him coolness and comfort surpassing anything else. Realizing that the Buddha had acted in that way in order to stop him from attacking the Śakya clan and to prevent people from being killed, the king ordered his troops to retreat.31 Long before this incident, on one occasion when the Buddha returned to his hometown for the first time after his enlightenment, he refused to admit that he was still a member of Śakya clan, of which all other members were proud. The Buddha told his father that he was part of the Buddha lineage, which was different from that of Mahasammata, the founder of the Śakya state.32 It became a tradition later on that one who had renounced the world became the son of Buddha, thereby breaking all national or tribal allegiances, cutting ties with the secular family.33 When these two episodes are examined together, one may find that although the Buddha cut his ties with the Śakya lineage after he renounced the world, his sentiment towards his people and nation, to whom he owed their kindness, prompted him to take action to protect them. It is also said that when the Śakya clan was finally destroyed by King Virudhaka who had all Śakya people killed except those who had followed the Buddha to renounce the world, the Buddha felt sorrowful and had a headache for three days.34 The incident that the Buddha, although declined to be the member of Śakya clan, attempted to protect his nation and kinsmen demonstrates that monks and nuns, who have renounced the world, should continue to be concerned with the welfare of their nation and people. After Buddhism was introduced into China, Buddhist doctrines and practices, though criticized by Confucians, were influenced by Confucian ideas of family and the state. Although Buddhist institutions generally remained aloof from society, the practice of serving the state was never absent in the activities of monks and nuns. Throughout Chinese Buddhist history, rituals and prayers for the nation were daily performed. The Sūtra of the Humane King Who Protects the Nation (Renwang huguo jing 仁王護國經) was regularly recited in temples to invoke the blessing of the Buddha on the nation whenever there was foreign invasion or natural disaster.35 In various parts of China, numerous temples named Huguo Si 護國寺 (Temple of Protecting Nation) were constructed to show the Buddhist attitude toward the nation. In religious services, monks and nuns recited the passages to pray for the peace and order of the state, for instance, “Peace in the country and harmony among people” (guotai minan 國泰民安); and “Strengthening the national foundation (guoji gonggu 國基鞏固).36 In this connection of serving the nation, many well-known monks in Chinese history also acted as statesmen, national masters (guoshi 國師), or were respected as national heroes. Daoyan, a Buddhist monk, acted as a military advisor

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to Emperor Yongle (r. 1403–1425) and as the teacher of the prince in the early Ming dynasty (1368–1644).37 Fahe, an eremitic monk at the time of Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty (502–549), organized an army of thousands of disciples and attacked the troops of Houjing, a general who rebelled against the Liang court.38 During the middle of sixteen century, Hangzhou was frequently plundered by Japanese pirates. In 1553, when a gang of pirates attacked Hangzhou again, the Ming court, according to a legend, appointed Tianzheng and Tianchi as generals, two monks from the Shaolin Temple 少林寺. They together with forty other Shaolin monks launched attacks on the Japanese, killing many of them and forcing the others back to sea. Subsequently, another group of monks from the Shaolin Temple also marched to Shanghai; the two groups then encircled the Japanese and killed all of them.39 The above accounts from Buddhist literature were frequently cited by young monks of the 1930s as precedents for monks using military force to protect the nation. Although the incidents that monks in the past had participated in violence for a variety of reasons are not in a large number, the young monks eagerly repeated them. In the middle of the 1930s, the preparation for war to defend the nation grew to be national campaign and dominated the lives Chinese people. Parents sent their children to join the army; even prostitutes were said to have donated their income to fund military charities.40 Young monks were also agitated, and in comparing themselves with other Chinese youths who were fighting against the foreign invasion in battles, proclaimed that if Chinese youths were defenders of the nation, they shouldered the double duty of protecting both the nation and Buddhism, and that the two were in fact the same.41 In September 1936, a long article on “Buddhism and the Revival of Our Race”42 appeared in Hai chao yin. The author Fushan 福善, a former abbot of the Jade Buddha Temple in Shanghai, analyses the close relationship between Buddhism and the state, emphasizing Buddhist contributions to Chinese culture and spiritual life, and to the ending of earlier foreign occupations. But due to the decline of Buddhism and the nation, Fushan laments: Our land has been trodden by the horses of foreign soldiers, our ports are full of foreign fleets of war ships, our tariffs on imported goods are collected by foreigners, our judiciary is interfered with by foreigners, the system of our communication is managed by foreigners, and our trades and commercial goods are manipulated by foreigners. In short, our lives are almost completely in the hand of foreigners.43

In order to change this sorrowful situation, all Chinese, including Buddhist monks and nuns, should unite to regenerate national spirit through self-reliance and cultivation of Chinese traditional virtues. Fushan calls upon all Chinese, especially

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followers of religions, to rise up against the former foreign powers of the West, to reject the new imperialism of Japan, and to seek international equality. Religion can contribute to the revival of the nation and to the resistance to the invasion, Fushan emphasizes. Nationalism sanctified by religion will be powerful and overcome material poverty and limitations. Buddhism in particular can strengthen nationalism and unite all Chinese, as four out of five major ethnic groups in China have adopted and practiced Buddhism (Han, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Manchuria). Buddhist doctrines, such as no-self, dependent origination, and universal compassion can cure the Chinese symptom of the self-centeredness and disunity. Buddhism is the religion of compassion and universal love that aims at saving the world, rejecting all sorts of egoism and adopting the cause of altruism. It is sure that the Chinese nation will be on the healthy and broad track to revival if all [Nationalist] party members and citizens aspire to save the nation through the great compassion, wisdom, heroism and the idea of merit in Buddhism.44

Nationalism also inspired monks to view the world and the Chinese nation from a broader perspective than that of the Buddhist institution. The feeling of being Chinese and the eagerness of serving the nation were vividly exhibited by these young monks even though the idea of a Chinese nation was still vague to most people at the time. In May 1937, an article, “A Young Monk as National Hero,” appeared in Hai chao yin. Yituo 伊陀, a monk student in Wuchang Buddhist College, relates how in the fourteenth century Zhu Yuanzhang abandoned monastic life in order to join the military campaign against the Mongol occupation. Zhu Yuanzhang used to be a monk in a monastery, and at the age of 24, he, encouraged by his master, left the monastery and joined the rebel army. He devoted himself to resisting the Mongol occupation (1271–1368) and eventually succeeded in establishing a new and powerful dynasty. Yituo then calls upon his fellow young monks likewise to act as national heroes to save the nation and Buddhism, “It is the perfect time now. The nation faces disaster and Buddhism is in danger. Under these circumstances, (we shall) love our country even though we must love Buddhism; we shall love Buddhism yet love the nation more.”45 There is conformity between loving one’s nation and loving Buddhism, and patriotism is the best way for monks to love Buddhism. Yituo recommends that when the nation is in crisis, Chinese clergy should not be “lifelessly” lagging behind the rest of Chinese people, but positively respond to the call of the nation. Evidently these young monks now completely abandoned the idea that monks and nuns must first protect their religion and kept aside that they should observe Buddhist nonviolence; instead, they suggested that clergy must first protect the nation in order to safeguard Buddhism in China.

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At this time, the prevailing opinion in society towards Buddhist institutions and clergy was rather negative, if not contemptuous. Due to the degeneration of the sangha and the debilitation of the religious vitality of clergy, Buddhist institutions had long been regarded as a burden of the state, and the clergy were accused of being parasites of society. Even thinkers like Tan Sitong, Liang Qichao, and Zhang Binglin, who favored Buddhism and tried to use Buddhist philosophy to deal with social and political problems and thus to render Buddhism relevant to people’s lives, still severely criticized the practice of the sangha. Many intellectuals charged that Buddhism was not only useless but harmful to the nation. In India, they assumed, Buddhism had contributed to decline and collapse of the country and brought it under British rule. Against these criticisms, young intellectual monks made various counter-arguments to explain Buddhism and the sangha in positive terms. Zhenhua insisted that Buddhism could make great contributions to the nation. He alleged that the colonization of India was not because of Buddhism, but on the contrary, because its abandonment of Buddhism, which had made India lose its national identity and spirit. Zhenhua also argued that Buddhism in fact had strengthened the power of the Japanese nation.46 Although Zhenhua’s arguments were not very convincing and apparently one-sided, we can see that some monks looked hard for reasons why institutional Buddhism could help the country prosper. In the early 1930s, Taixu was asked if Buddhism could aid the development of the nation and help save the country, he replied that the nation was powerful during the periods of Chinese history in which Buddhism was thriving. Buddhism thrived at the beginning of the Tang, Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties, but declined when each of those dynasties degenerated and came to an end. At the end of the Qing, the Chinese nation deteriorated and Buddhism experienced its worst degeneration in history. Although Taixu did not go further to explain whether Buddhism contributed to the prosperity of the nation or visa versa, he attempted to explain that the destiny of the nation was closely connected with the fate of Buddhism.47 He demonstrated that Buddhist doctrines, such as the equality of liberation and compassion for saving the world, were all useful for expelling foreign invasions and for national building. The young monks also attributed the contemporary public dislike of clergy to the traditional isolation of the sangha from social and political affairs. They claimed that the sangha in the past had ignored the importance of keeping in touch with the world and associating with ordinary people. As a result, Buddhism was misunderstood, monks and nuns were abused, and the religious vitality of Buddhism diminished. Therefore it was the members of the sangha who were responsible for this situation and should be blamed, and it was the time for them to change it by serving the nation and bringing the sangha back into society now.

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Although most of the articles written by the young monks were full of nationalistic spirit and enthusiasm for national defense, they also criticized some monks and nuns, who expressed their doubt on the issues of Buddhist participation in war. From their criticisms, we come to know that there were some clergy who attempted to disassociate themselves from military training and rejected war participation in order to observe Buddhist discipline, although direct information of such attempts is not available from existing records. Those who upheld these views defended the traditional practice of Buddhist institutions by stating that they should not be enmeshed in worldly business, much less entangled in violence and war. As monks and nuns, their priority was to follow the Buddhist tradition, practice meditation, perform rituals, and recite sutras, assuming that those who involved themselves in social and political activities would certainly neglect their spiritual cultivation. And in fact, when the order for military training of the clergy was issued by the government in 1936,48 some monks fled from their temples. One such monk was quoted as saying: Having lived for several dozen years and witnessed more than a dozen emperors and presidents, I have never seen such abnormal and undisciplined action. Now, the emperor is no more, yet monks have to undergo military training. I never heard of this before and I will never follow it. I’m scared to death that I will violate the precepts if I’m sent to the warfront. I would rather recite the name of Buddha (nianfo 念佛) and perform ritual service to pray for (chaodu 超度) those who are killed in war.49

Buddhist engagement in military affairs was not unanimously welcomed by all clergy, especially by the older members, whom were regarded as conservatives by young monks. Some such elders even committed suicide when they heard of military training, lest they should be forced to violate the precept,50 because they would rather die in honor and keep their religious commitment. Some of them expressed doubts and pessimism about usefulness of their fighting, saying that they might not oppose military training but China would not be able to win a war, and the result would be the same whether clergy took part or not. One such a monk thus remarked, “Even if we break the Buddhist precepts, change our robe for military uniforms and take up guns . . . we will only be wasting our lives.”51 These clergy believed that they could not make any contribution to war not only because they were spiritually dedicated to the precept of nonviolence, but also because they were physically unfit. Another voice opposed the military training and participation in war on the grounds that Buddhism transcended national boundaries and proclaimed peace to all people, irrespective of nation. Monks and nuns were to detach themselves from discrimination between self and others, native and

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foreigner; they were to regard relatives and enemies equally and to treat all with the same compassion and loving kindness. Young monks charged these elders with being uninterested in the welfare of Chinese nation and the happiness of Chinese people and criticized them as ziliaohan 自了漢 (one who seeks only for his own benefit) and chanhezi 禪和子 (one who is addicted to meditation) in derogatory sense.52 These elders were accused of being attached to private virtue and self-benefit like Hinayana monks,53 and thus violating the Mahayana spirit of compassion and benefit to others. The young monks called on their elders to wake up from illusion, to open their eyes quickly to the stark reality of the national crisis, because they would be responsible for committing treason and the Chinese race would become extinct (miezhong 滅種) if all other Chinese followed their example.54 Wude, in an article on the “Survival of the Sangha and the Citizen’s Attitude,”55 distinguishes between private virtue (side 私德) and public virtue (gongde 公德). Working for one’s own benefit is private virtue; for the benefit of others is public virtue. Although the two should be cultivated simultaneously, public virtue is always more important because it unites people to achieve a common goal of community and nation. Wude believed that the nation is the collective unity of all individuals; it provides an arena for one to work for others, as well as for others to work for one. The idea that all Buddhists and Buddhist institutions owed kindness to the nation that they should repay its kindness was always highlighted as powerful argument for participation in national defense. As monastic life is dependent on material provided by society, Buddhist ethics maintains that monks and nuns should first understand and then repay the kindness of people and society (zhi’en bao’en 知恩報恩). According to the Buddhist theory of dependent origination, everyone is related to everyone else and therefore everyone has received benefits from others both individually and from the country in which one lives. The Sūtra on Insight of Mind-State of Mahayana Jataka56 specifies four kinds of kindness one is obliged to repay: the kindness of parents, fellow-human beings, king, and the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma and Sangha). The kindness of a king (guowang 國王) was redefined in the Republic of China as the common welfare and protection that Buddhism and Buddhists received from the state. Early in 1922, Taixu explained that guo means country or nation in the sense of territory while wang indicates sovereignty or administration. Therefore, guowang or “king” is another name for the territory and sovereignty of the nation.57 It was argued that the clergy, who did not produce material goods, would not survive without the support of other fellow human beings and the protection of the state. Clothing and food, and even the temple buildings, the homes of clergy, were donated by people or provided by the state. In “How shall the Sangha Protect the Nation,”58 Xudan explains why monks must repay the kindness of the

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nation, and asserts that, like the members of all other organizations, they cannot survive without depending on the state, because they “eat without farming and wear clothing without weaving.” It was commonly suggested that because the nation and people had been kind to institutional Buddhism it was the duty of monks and nuns to repay this kindness when the nation was under attack and people were exposed to danger. In May 1933, Taixu delivered a radio speech, titled “Buddhism and Protecting the Nation,”59 in which he reiterated the significance of the Buddhist “protection of the nation”: We are indebted to the state for the great kindness of protection that it has extended [to us], and we ought to sacrifice ourselves to repay it. Human beings are born out of the conditions of their parents, yet are sustained with the assistance of society. We cannot survive when society is in disorder and turmoil; there must be the system of the state to protect citizens so that society will be organized and we can live peacefully. Whether one believes in Buddhism or not, everyone is closely connected with the nation. Therefore, there is not inner or outer with regard to patriotism.60

Taixu also insisted that in a broad sense protecting the nation also means safeguarding peace and showing great compassion to peoples in all nations so that the world will be peaceful and peoples will enjoy happiness. Zhikai, in the article “To Arouse Young Monks to Save the Nation Together,” states: “We save the nation in order to save the lives of people, and this is the way to save the world. In reverse order, we seek unity and peace in the world in order to save human beings, and struggle for the equality and happiness of human beings in order to save the nation.”61 Precisely because Buddhism regards all nations equally and all people in the world as members of one human family, protecting the nation and saving people from being killed are actually the same as saving the world. Mingshan 茗山, a young monk student in the Wuchang Buddhist College, suggested that the nation must be first saved in order to save the world (jiushi 救世), and only then a pure land in human society (renjian jingdu 人間淨土) could be established.62 During this period in China, nationalism was the same as patriotism because it was supposed that those who loved their country should defend it under the banner of nationalism, and concrete manifestation of patriotism was to contribute to national unity. Yuanying regarded patriotism as the sacred duty of every citizen that should be fulfilled unconditionally. In 1935, when he was invited to give a lecture to a battalion of Chinese soldiers, he delivered a speech entitled, “The Sacred Duty that Citizens Must Fulfill,” asserting that it was a natural instinct for one who lived in the territory of China to protect the nation. The citizens of the country are duty-bound to love their nation, and they must perform this duty everyday. . . . One cannot be qualified as the citizen

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of a nation unless one loves the nation; otherwise, one loses one’s citizenship. Although I am a member of the sangha and a follower of the Buddha, I am always a citizen of China. The love of country and concern for people’s welfare are constantly cherished in my heart.63

Yuanying reiterated that monks and nuns were citizens of China, and only after they performed the duty of a citizen could they be free to exercise their religious right. Only those who protected the interest of the nation and extended love to other people could regard themselves as the citizens of the nation and enjoy such religious right. This was Buddhist patriotism that could be understood as Buddhist nationalism to protect one’s nation when its unity and sovereignty were threatened by foreign invasion. Early in 1933, Zhenhua explained why Buddhist monks and nuns were duty-bound to defend the nation by defining the relation between the nation, the people, and the sangha: The basic elements of a nation-state consist of people and land. The land is the place where people can live and enjoy life. People, sustained by the land and provided with food by nature [of the land], should dutifully love and protect the land. In other words, there is commonality between the fortune and misfortune of the people and the land [of the nation]. When the land is invaded, people can no longer live in peace. When conflicts occur between one’s own nation and others. . . . all people [of the land] must aspire to the spirit of defending the nation . . . safeguarding the fate of the nation . . . Monks and nuns are citizens, protected by the nation-state. Their duty to love and protect the nation is the same as that of others.64

It is interesting to note that Chinese monks made their argument that they were the citizens of China and enjoyed the same rights when they protested the state’s policies on appropriating temple properties earlier, and no one had said that the clergy should also consider the national interests. Now, these same monks who had claimed that they were the citizens of China were now embracing a duty to serve the nation first. It is quite obvious that nationalism resulting from foreign invasion made them to change their attitude toward the state. In “Protecting Buddhism, Family, and the Nation,”65 Yuguan, a monk journalist of Fo hai deng, recalls vigorous protest of Buddhists against state appropriation of temple properties several years before. He claims that it is the duty of the members of the sangha to take good care of Buddhist institutions, yet it is also the duty of the sangha to protect the nation now because Buddhism cannot exist if the nation is destroyed. In articulating the Buddhist responsibility of protecting the nation, young monks made extensive use of appealing slogans, such as “Each person has responsibility for the rise and fall of the nation” (guojia xingwang pifu youze

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國家興亡 匹夫有責) and “Where can hair stand if the skin is gone,” (pi zhi bucun maojiang yanfu 皮之不存毛將焉附). Jingguang 淨光 in the article on “Some Attitudes that Young Buddhists in China Should Have,”66 argues that although Chinese clergy will eventually give up the idea of the nation, they must first depend on the system of the state to serve the nation and people, and then extend these services to other peoples and nations of the world. He points out that the efforts of clergy to protect the nation are not limited to China; all Buddhists, including Japanese, will do the same for their own countries. Japanese Buddhists love their own country, although they are now misled by their military government to invade other nations. It is therefore not surprising, Jingguang suggests, to read the reports and to see pictures in newspapers that Japanese priests, with machine guns in hands, undertake military training. Jingguang says that he is not criticizing Japanese nationalism demonstrated by Japanese priests, but is only concerned about whether the priests will come to invade China and kill Chinese people. If so, Chinese clergy must catch on to the similar nationalistic spirit, and prepare to defeat Japanese invasion. Yicheng admitted the theoretic difficulty in the sangha taking part in the cause of national protection, because there seemed no concept of nation in Buddhism. Whenever the concept of space is mentioned in Buddhist texts, it usually indicates the universe, transcending the notion of nation-state.67 Nevertheless, he explained that the idea of nationalism and patriotism was implanted deeply in the human mind and it was simply the reality of the world that people tended to demarcate the territory of the nation and to sacrifice their lives to defend it. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for Buddhists to disregard the mentality of common people and the common practice of the world. Although monks and nuns were told that the world is full of corruption and distortion as truth is often falsified and evil prevails during the period of the Dharma Degeneration,68 they must accept this reality and act accordingly by unifying the ideal and reality through skillful means to serve the nation first. Yicheng employed the metaphor of a “small self ” and a “great self ” to demonstrate the co-existence of individual people and the nation. Numerous individuals as “small selves” are organized to form the nation of the “great self.” The former will not survive if the latter is destroyed. Just as each cell within a human body must function properly and in unity if one is to live a healthy life, so must each “small self ” perform its duty aptly so that the nation or the “great self ” can survive. Yicheng thus continued, “Young and energetic monks! We have already left behind our small families, cutting off worldly love, and renounced the secular world. Having abandoned the most cherished pleasure in the world, should we yet be afraid of death [in protecting the nation]?”69 Monks and nuns have given up every worldly thing so that they were not afraid of anything. They renounced

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the world in order to transcend death, one of the grave sufferings encountering humans. Yet for the sake of the nation, death was nothing but an opportunity to serve the people. Yicheng claimed, “Don’t be afraid of death, it will only manifest our monks’ sincere patriotism!”70 The idea of fighting enemies to death can hardly be found in Buddhist texts, which highlight the ideas of tolerance and compassion with regard even to one’s opponents. Tolerance was the one of the most important virtues in Buddhist ethics. How then did these young monks rationalize their call of not tolerating and even killing the enemy? When this question was put to them, three answers were generally given. First, the clergy had no personal enemy, but only enemies of righteousness and justice. Therefore, when they said that they would not tolerate Japanese aggression, it meant that they would fight the enemies of Dharma against injustice with great resolution. Second, the practice of tolerance should be conducted under the guidance of wisdom. To tolerate those who would cause great harm to the human world was equally to commit a crime against humanity. One who turned a blind eye to evil shared the responsibility of the consequences of evil. One who connived with killing of innocent people was to encourage the killing, and from the vinaya point of view, it was the same as if one were directly committing the evil. Third, monks tolerated suffering and injustice only if they were inflicted upon themselves; they would not keep silent if such things befell on others. Compassion would rather force them to release those who suffered by removing the cause of suffering, as Zhenhua argued: Therefore, if true tolerance is misinterpreted as to be passively allowing fellow citizens to be trampled upon and the country to be invaded . . . surrendering our beautiful land and offering people’s lives and property to the enemy, this is [simply] subservience. A bodhisattva acts expediently with regard to tolerance, without being such simple and dull.71

Tolerance was not without condition and limitation nor could it be extended indiscriminately to everyone. Otherwise it would be abused by those who took advantage of others’ tolerance and looked at it as a sign of weakness. Guided by wisdom, monks should punish those who inflict suffering on others and deter them from fostering more intolerance. In “Sangha and the Disaster of the Nation,”72 Lengguang 冷光 recapitulated a series of Japanese violations against China: annexing Taiwan in 1895, seizing three provinces in the Manchuria in 1931, and attacking Shanghai in 1932. He believed that tolerance would only allow Japanese to terminate the existence of the Chinese nation and increase Japanese greediness. China had again and again restrained itself from confrontation with Japan, yet Japan had step by step become insatiable in its desire to colonize China. Lengguang insisted that Chinese nation

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had been driven to the limit of destruction and collapse; Chinese people had suffered unspeakable pain and tolerated the intolerable. Just because of the tolerance of Chinese people, China had been repeatedly invaded and its sovereignty insulted more quickly in the past hundred years. Such situation could no longer continue because the more Chinese people tolerated incurably evil ones the more the latter took advantage. Lengguang was convinced that the only way left for the Chinese, who did not want to be the slaves without nation, was to “put up the bayonet into the rifle, charge into the enemies, break open their trenches, and expel them from Chinese territory.”73 Longyao was once arrested and imprisoned for six months by the Japanese authorities in Taiwan when he was there on a preaching tour in 1935. After being released, he returned to the mainland, and wrote a booklet, “Pro-Japan or ProChina.”74 Based on his personal experience, Longyao described pain and suffering that had been inflicted upon people in Taiwan, who had been treated as slaves. He maintained that Buddhist clergy would be discriminated against particularly as they faced not only national but also religious mistreatment once they became such slaves. Therefore, he warned that anyone in the mainland China who did not want to undergo the tragedy of the people in Taiwan must stand up and defend the nation. As there was no middle way between treason and patriotism, Longyao suggested, one who did not want to be a traitor must be prepared to make sacrifice for the nation. These emotional calls to not become slaves or traitors moved the rankand-fire Chinese clergy to give up their own interests and to join others in saving the motherland. The term wangguo nu 亡國奴, slaves who lost their country, was powerful enough to rouse Chinese morale against foreign invasion. It was said that those who had lost their nation would be treated as young children who lost their mothers, and their future was full of misery as certainly they would be mistreated and bullied by others. Therefore, all Chinese, who wanted to maintain their national identity and all Buddhists who wanted to reject the fate of religious discrimination should join together and fight the war to defend the nation against Japanese invaders.

HOW SHOULD CLERGY SERVE THE NATION? Having passionately argued that monks and nuns should serve the nation, young monks put forward and discussed a variety of proposals to how they could make contributions to the nation in war. Although they criticized conservative views that monks and nuns should follow the tradition for national protection and articulated their intentions of being directly involved in warfare, some young monks still felt ambivalent and misgiving about killing and were not quite sure whether

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they could actualize what they had passionately advocated. Their mixed feelings of anxiety agitated by current nationalism to serve the nation and of phobia about killing can be easily detected in their suggestions of how to prepare for war. Paradoxical or even contradictory statements can be seen in their writings. The following is one example proposed by Juexian in an article “On the Militarization of Monks to Protect the Nation”: The seven hundred thirty thousand clergy75 should be militarized. Monks and nuns may not actually be able to participate in fighting, the most suitable work for them is to take care of the wounded. The members of the sangha are endowed with great heroism, energy and compassion. They can be armed (wuzhuang qilai 武裝起來),76 and having marched into the battlefield, kill enemies (shazei 殺賊).77

On the one hand, Juexian admitted monks and nuns should not be directly involved in fighting. On the other hand, he urged members of the sangha to kill the enemies, the thieves of the nation. The contradictory ideas demonstrate the uncertainty of the monks about what they should do in the prospective war. It is unclear whether Juexian preferred rescue work to military involvement or vice versa. The ambiguity or confusion, however, also indicates that although the monks preferred direct involvement in war and theoretically approved of the legitimacy of “killing with compassion,” they still could not easily put aside the Buddhist tradition and completely ignore precepts. Their hesitation became more evident later on, for only minority monks and nuns actually engaged in battle during the war. Long tradition and the monastic environment had forged mental habits that were quite different from what was required for the battlefield. To change from non-killing to killing was easier to say than do. Some young monks then suggested that clergy could first give up their robes, the symbol of their religious commitment, and replace them with military uniforms. Living in a military environment for a while, they would be more amenable to fighting and would create a new mental and physical environment suitable to war and free from religious complexity. Yicheng, in an article on “The Right Way for the Sangha to Defend the Nation”,78 acknowledges the importance of the first four precepts,79 one of which is non-killing, but at a time of a national crisis, monks and nuns may not be able to resist public pressure to forsake the precept: At this turbulent period of the End of the Dharma (mofa 末法), it is extremely challenging to be a monk or a nun. Fellow citizens will accuse us of disregarding national interest [if we abide by the precepts]. In order to avoid criticism from fellow citizens, we must go with them to kill enemies in battle by taking up guns to protect the nation. Although this may enable us to fulfill our duty

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Buddhism, War, and Nationalism of protecting the nation, we will be disqualified from being the members of the sangha.80

Yicheng therefore calls upon monks and nuns to first relinquish the precepts so that they may return to lay life, free of religious restrictions on fighting and killing. The alternative of going to war as monks and nuns, Yicheng warns, risks the danger of harming the nation, because it was believed that transgression of the monastic rules by clergy would bring disaster to the nation as well as evil karma to individuals. The question however remained unresolved of who could continue to transmit the seed of the Buddha (shaolong fozhong 紹隆佛種) if all monks and nuns left their temples and became engaged in preparation for war. The sangha had been regarded as main force to maintain the Buddha-Dharma, the disappearance of the sangha meant extinction of the Dharma, and one who was responsible for destroying the Dharma committed one of the five grave sins. Nevertheless, some other young monks did not think it necessary to give up the precepts at all, but argued simply that it was absolutely necessary to destroy all evil first as emphasized extensively in Buddhist texts. Monks and nuns must resist the invasion and get rid of the invaders, because the invasion and the invaders were evil and would bring suffering to the invaded nation and people, and therefore, there was no wrong doing for monks and nuns to fight the evil. Juexian passionately asserts that monks and nuns may destroy evil invaders without giving up their religious vow of non-killing because destroying evil is legitimate in Buddhism and it is not in violation of non-killing, as the Buddha had to subdue Mara, the evil one, in order to attain enlightenment. Compassion guided by wisdom enables one to differentiate righteousness from evil and to perform the right action.81 Juexian believes that at this time of national crisis, monks and nuns should not consider their personal welfare and karma to be more important than the nation. Serving the nation and saving the lives of people are themselves the manifestation of loving-kindness and compassion (cibei 慈悲). They should, therefore, follow the example of their colleagues in the Shaolin Temple by learning martial arts and prepare themselves to protect the motherland. Juexian declares, “Let us use our red blood to wash away the evil of our enemies. . . . Insofar one more enemy is killed, one more merit will be produced.”82 Many new monks responded positively to Juexian’s suggestion and challenged the monastic saying that “even at the cost of losing life one should not violate the precept.” To them, killing did not violate the precept of non-killing at all if it was done for the good of others. It was not necessary to give up one’s commitment to the precept of non-killing as long as the action of killing could be proved meritorious and beneficial. Lengguang asked how monks, who have vowed to be followers of the bodhisattva path, which aims to provide happiness to all

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living beings and release them from suffering, could hesitate to protect their fellow citizens from being murdered by Japanese invaders? If Chinese monks and nuns at this time of a national crisis refused to serve the nation in the name of observing Buddhist obligations, they would be guilty of disregarding the path of Bodhisattva and bear responsibility for the consequence of losing the nation. How could the clergy “look on with folded arms” (xiushou pangguan 袖手旁觀) without compassion while murderers were going to kill thousands of people?” Lengguan asked. Other young monks agreed that they should replace Buddhist robes with military uniforms and confessed that it was not because that their faith in religion had waned, but because they were convinced that they should first save the nation from being invaded and the people from being killed. They explained that it was not that they had become less concerned with their religion, but that they loved their nation more; they would be able more efficiently to exercise Buddhist compassion. They also promised that they would return to the sangha once the war was over. By leaving the sangha temporarily,83 monks and nuns would neither violate Buddhist discipline nor would they be kept from serving the nation. Nevertheless, the proposal was questioned by many others who worried that it would be very difficult to resettle these laicized monks and nuns in temples afterwards and that the damage to Buddhist institutions would be unredeemable. Yicheng, while suggesting that monks and nuns should first renounce their precepts before fighting the war, believed that the very existence of the sangha would help bring fortune and security to the nation. The nation where the Three Jewels were respected would be protected by deities and supernatural beings; the nation that lacked the blessings of the Triple Jewels would be under the spell of evil and ultimately destroyed.84 If all monks gave up their robes for the sake of military service, Yicheng worried, the sangha would discontinue and Dharma would disappear that would cause the destruction of the nation too. Therefore, virtuous monks and nuns should remain inside temples and devote themselves to religious practice as a way of protecting the nation. In order to prove his point, Yicheng quoted a passage from a speech that Taixu had delivered to the students of the Minnan Buddhist College several years before. In that speech, Taixu speculated that if one member of the entire sangha could attain arhathood or the advanced state of bodhisattva, and display supernatural powers to destroy the invaders, it would be sufficient to prove the great value of Buddhism for national protection.85 Besides attempts to show this supernatural power through religious cultivation, clergy could also provide spiritual guidance to ordinary Chinese, who would understand their individual as well as collective karma and make a united effort to change the consequences of the past and create a new future. According to Yuanying, to save the nation was to change the declining course of the nation resulted from the collected karma of Chinese people in the past.86

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A more acceptable and less controversial proposal then was put forward that each monk and nun should conscientiously decide what was individually possible and suitable. Those who had money were asked to make donations, while those who were physically strong were requested to contribute labor. In March 1936, a group of the leading monks in Shanghai met Fafang, the editor of Hai chao yin.87 The topic of how the members of the sangha should react if war was forced upon them dominated their conversation. Most agreed that the Buddhist clergy could not do much because they were monks—heshang 和尚 in Chinese—, which means ones who values peace and harmony; the most appropriate service they could offer was to provide first aid to soldiers. Several days later, Fafang happened to meet some friends who served in the army and discussed the same issue. When he was asked how monks should serve if war broke out, he replied spontaneously: “The majority of the monks and nuns are useless [for a national crisis]. We are only able to share the responsibility of taking care of the wounded if war occurs.”88 Later on, Fafang regretted what he had said. He asked himself why he had not given a more positive answer to the question and affirmed that monks and nuns could do more than first aid work. Thereafter he urged Buddhists to do whatever they could or whatever was needed for the nation. The conversations on these two occasions revealed what common clergy may have thought of their religion and their service to the nation, as they could not transcend themselves and disregard Buddhist traditions. In self-criticism, Fafang attributed his spontaneous reply to the customary and prevailing attitude of monks towards the nation and violence. Ordinary monks and nuns had traditionally unheard of patriotism and nationalism, neglecting the social and national obligations thrust upon them. In contrast, as Fafang pointed out, Japanese priests always openly and strongly expressed their nationalistic ideas, many of them in the True Pure Land School served as politicians, and some priests in the Zen sect served as military chaplains.89 According to Fafang, in comparison to Japanese priests, Chinese monks should be ashamed of their lack of interest in serving the nation. He therefore pressed the members of the Chinese sangha to be self-reflective and to follow the bodhisattva’s path, upholding their national responsibility. In the spirit that the clergy should do their best to serve the nation, these young monks speculated on about what action would accord with both the Buddhist spirit and the needs of the contemporary situation. Mingshan outlined three actions: military training, political participation, and supporting the welfare of soldiers through material donations.90 He anticipated that military training, which had already begun in a number of temples, would provide an opportunity for clergy to actualize the Buddhist ideas of working for the benefit and happiness of the human world. By taking part in political activities such as elections, the clergy

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would better contribute their service to the nation as well as people. By donating materials to soldiers, the clergy would not only perform meritorious deeds, they would also change the “consumer-only” image of the sangha and improve their relation with the rest of Chinese people. Liaoru 了如, another young monk-student in the Wuchang Buddhist College, in an article on “Necessary Attitudes towards the Protection of the Nation by the Sangha,” suggests that monks and nuns, besides military training, should organize themselves into three societies: the Society of Buddhist Charity, the Society of Buddhist Propaganda, and the Society of Buddhist Economic Enterprise.91 The clergy could render their service to the nation by providing care to the families of Chinese soldiers who were fighting on the front. They could also collect donations or prepare food and clothes for the soldiers, and transport military equipment and supplies to battlefields. In his second suggestion, Liaoru calls on intellectual monks who have mastered Buddhist doctrine to preach in villages in order to unify ordinary Chinese people to fight against Japanese. In order to silence the accusation that monks and nuns are merely material consumers who do not produce, Liaoru suggests that clergy organize themselves to cultivate land and to work in factories. Big monasteries with large numbers of monks usually were endowed with large parcels of land yet the material life of the sangha was supported by the rents from tenant farmers, who cultivated temple lands. If the monks could work on some of the lands owned by the temples, Liaoru believed, they would reduce their dependency on the state and become contributors to society instead. Material donations to Chinese soldiers were one popular service that the monks and nuns could render to the nation. Early in 1932, several days after Japanese troops attacked Shanghai on January 28, the monk students at the Minnan Buddhist College in Xiamen gathered together to show their support for the mobilization of Chinese troops against Japanese. They organized demonstrations on the street, shouting anti-Japanese slogans and distributing patriotic pamphlets. Some of them were even prepared to go to Shanghai to join Chinese troops. A Committee for the Donation of Medical Materials was founded inside the temple, and solicited contributions from Buddhist community. The students voluntarily reduced their daily meal consumption for ten days and donated the savings to the fund for the Chinese soldiers. Within a short period, they were able to collect more than thirty Yuan and they used the money to purchase medical materials to send to Shanghai.92 Many young monks felt regretful because they were too poor to contribute more.93 Yanran who witnessed the events said that the actions of these young monk students should inspire other clergy all over China to do the same, and that Buddhist contributions to the nation would be greater if all monks and nuns did as the student monks in Minnan. Yanran thus challenged his fellow

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clergy: “Members of the sangha! Wake up! Make the ultimate contribution to the protection of our nation. Wake up! Members of the sangha, stand up, the time has come.”94 Traditionally, the material welfare of monks and nuns depend on society as they are not material producers because clergy are advised to keep away from agricultural work.95 But now, Chinese clergy were urged by their young colleagues to be involved in agricultural and industrial production not only for their own material independence but also for their contributions to the nation. By emphasizing the importance of producing material product as other ordinary Chinese, these young monks mentioned nothing that the clergy should first fulfill their commitment to their religious practice. A thought never occurred to them that the clergy would have no much time left for religious practices and that there would be no difference between clergy and ordinary people if the former are wholeheartedly engaged in material production, and the meaning of being a monk or nun, whose primary aim was spirit attainment through religious practice, would be lost. This may again show how seriousness and eagerness of young monks were about the supremacy of Buddhist sacrifice to the nation. Many young monks also considered Buddhist propaganda in supporting the government as crucial in prompting Chinese to face the stark reality of the national crisis. When ordinary Chinese saw that the monks and nuns, who had traditionally remained within temples, engaged in the struggle for national independence and salvation, they would consider how much more they themselves should do for the nation. Monks and nuns were thus asked to promote publicly the just course for Chinese to take against the invasion, to expose Japanese military ambitions, to elucidate the imminent danger of the nation, and to inculcate in Chinese people nationalistic and patriotic ideas.96 They suggested that monks and nuns use Buddhist sermons to encourage soldiers to fight and to enhance the general public morale, bringing those who might have committed treason to justice. In “The Way of National Protection by the Sangha,” Xifeng 西峰 states: For clergy to render service to the nation, it is not necessary solely to take up arms and fight on the battlefield. They can, by wearing the armor of seminal effort (jingjin 精進), taking in hand the sword of wisdom (zhihui 智慧), and steering the “boat of the compassionate vow” (beiyuan 悲願), go to cities and remote villages to disseminate the Dharma and to teach the Three People’s Principles. They should also explain the sad Chinese history of foreign invasions, in which many compatriots were ruthlessly killed. Hopefully all these efforts will inspire people to strengthen themselves and be self-reliant. Consoled by the teaching of Buddha, Chinese people will neither be pessimistic nor commit meaningless suicides. They should be warned of the potential suffering and shame of becoming an enslaved people in a conquered nation so that no one will become a traitor to the nation.97

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Boycotting Japanese products was also proposed. Peiluo maintained that every year Japan exported millions of tons of goods to China and earned billions of Yuan, which were then used to produce new weapons for invading China. Clergy could have a great impact on Chinese efforts to defeat the invaders if seven hundred thousand of them in contemporary China refused to purchase or use any Japanese product and thus led an example for other people to follow.98 In an article on “The Necessary Attitudes of the Sangha toward National Protection,” Liansheng summarized traditional services of Buddhism to the nation and urged monks and nuns to make a twofold contribution through body and mind.99 The contribution through one’s body would be to sacrifice one’s life for one’s nation; the contribution through the mind would be to organize religious rituals, to recite scriptures and to practice the Dharma, and to transfer merit for the sake of peace and unity of the nation. The practice of protecting the nation by reciting the name of the Buddha or the scriptures, for instance, The Sūtra of the Humane King Who Protects Nation, had been customary in China for more than thousand years. However, debates about whether serving the nation through rituals was proper and effective during this time when China faced imminent invasion took place throughout the sangha. While some monks insisted that serving the nation through rituals was relevant and legitimate, many others doubted its immediate efficacy. Longyao depicted these two attitudes by describing a talk among three monks about how they should render service to the nation.100 One day in 1936, three monks met and discussed how China had lost five hundred million square kilometers of territory in Manchuria to Japan after 1931; and how thirty million Chinese people there had not seen the national flag of White Sun in Blue Sky for more than five years. However, since Chinese people and government were now determined to recover the northeast, and Japan was also preparing to take over all of China, a war seemed inevitable. When monk A asked what clergy should do if a war broke out, monk B replied that virtuous monks should be invited to give a lecture on The Sūtra of the Humane King Who Protects the Nation and to transfer merit for peace efforts so that war tensions could be dissolved. He reiterated that preaching the sutra was the traditional and the best way for monks to protect the nation. However, monk A expressed doubt about the efficacy of reciting and preaching sutras and questioned whether the merit of such practices could be powerful enough to counter Japanese warplanes and cannons. Monk C suddenly interrupted and asserted that it was too late to serve the nation by lecturing on sutras. It would be much more effective to undertake military training and preparing to fight in war. Monk B was thus offended, angrily accusing monk C’s view of distorting the Buddhist teaching of compassion and violating the discipline of non-killing. The heated argument went on and neither side could convince the other. Finally, monk A reconciled the two opinions through a

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compromise: he recommended that monk B perform religious services and preach sutras, and that monk C receive military training and prepare for war. Longyao thus continued with preference to military involvement: There are a variety of ways to serve the nation . . . any action, if only it is useful for protecting the nation, will be good. However it is much better if one can take part in military training with a great spirit of heroism, strength, and compassion. Preaching the sutra should be done before the emergence of a national crisis, while the participation in the military training is the most appropriate when the national crisis has already arisen.101

Some monks, however, continued to express their doubt abut the immediate efficacy of sutra-preaching and recitation of dharāni in protecting the nation. Juexian cited an example of Emperor Wu (r. 502–548) of the Liang dynasty to testify to the inefficacy of Buddhist rituals for saving the nation and reminded monks to be realistic. When the capital was attacked by rebels, Emperor Wu, instead of organizing military resistance, assembled monks to recite Buddhist sutras in order to expel enemies. Consequently he lost his kingdom. Juexian then questioned, “Recently, among the sounds of warplanes and of the cannons of enemies, the voice that ‘ritual services should be performed to protect the nation’ can also be increasingly heard of. Is this to save the nation or to play a game?”102 Nevertheless, Juexian did not completely reject the value of Buddhist rituals in serving the nation, but insisted that only virtuous clergy who had achieved a high spiritual level could accumulate sufficient merit to be transferred to and to transform effectively the warring world. He maintained that Buddhist rituals and ceremonies organized or attended by the masses to invoke blessings from the Buddha and bodhisattva should only be regarded as an expression of sincere wishes in response to nationalism and patriotism that would, however, hardly impose any impact on the military situation.103 At the end, Juexian preferred the way of protecting the nation through strength and power (shili jiuguo 實力救國), suggesting that Bodhidharma,104 if he were alive, would not ask monks and nuns to do meditation, but would urge them to fight the invaders.105 In order to better serve the nation, Juexian recommended, an army of seven hundred thousand members of the sangha should be organized under the leadership of Taixu, who could act as commander-in-chief of clergy-soldiers and lead them to war.106 Monks and nuns had performed rituals for the country’s safety for more than a thousand years in the past, but now even members of the sangha doubted the efficacy of such practice. Their doubts manifested their impatience at the sangha’s reaction toward national service. They downplayed Buddhist rituals at the time of crisis, because they believed that the attention of clergy would be diverted from participating in military training and preparing for war; they were eager to adopt

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more direct and immediate ways to serve the nation. In other words, their doubts show their passion for the nation even at the expense of discrediting Buddhist tradition and practice that some other monks and nuns were proud of. Nevertheless, many eminent monks, such as Taixu, stressed the religious significance of saving the nation manifested in such rituals. They provided historical as well as legendary evidence from Buddhist literature that rituals performed by monks in the past were effective in protecting the nation from invasion.107 In 1932, after Japan occupied northeast China, some elite lay Buddhists, such as Dai Jitao and Li Jishen, proposed that a state-sponsored ritual be organized at Yonghegong 雍和宮 in Beijing in order to invoke Buddhist protection for the nation. The event was reported in the newspaper Shishi xinbao and was ridiculed by the reporter. Taixu, in his “Comments on Saving the Nation through Reciting Sūtras and Dharānis as Reported in Shishi xinbao,” responded to the sarcastic remarks about the value of Buddhist ritual services.108 Prayers for peace and victory in war, he said, were practiced in almost all religions and were authentically endorsed in Buddhism as well. The effectiveness of reciting sutras should not be overlooked; history had proved its efficacy, although modern human beings, beset by doubt and ignorance, could not fully understand it. A proposal that Buddhists should collaborate with other religious groups was articulated long before 1937, and drew more attention as war approached. Reasoning that a large population in Japanese occupied Manchuria were Buddhists and Muslims, Sun Weide, a member of the Shanghai Society for Research on Manchuria, proposed that Buddhists and Muslims should unite to bring out their strengths and overcome each other’s weaknesses to expel Japanese from China.109 The idea was strongly endorsed by Buddhists in Shanghai. Fafang, in response, suggested that the goal of saving people and the world was the same in both religions although there were also some differences. At this time when the nation is in trouble, the tension at the border is intensified, people are suffering, human and natural disasters occur one after another, and internal and external conflicts increase, we Buddhists and Muslims shoulder the responsibility for saving the world, the nation, and the people. Under the leadership of the government, we should unite and collaborate with goodwill, enhancing mutual respect and exchanging knowledge. Based on the spirit of the Three People’s Principles, Buddhists and Muslims should follow the ancient path of co-existence in peace and sincerely unite to revive the Chinese nation.110

In the article “After Reading ‘The Unity of the Nation Should Begin with Collaboration between Buddhism and Islam,” Zhizang reiterated that Buddhists and Muslims must join together to recover the Chinese territory of the northeast.

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He urged Buddhists to learn from Muslims and suggested that the combination of the Buddhist method of peace and the Islamic approach to military defense would enable China to be invincible.111 Enthusiasm of the clergy to protect the nation sometimes became politicized as support for the Nationalist government in its struggle against the Communists.112 Some monks consented with the government that an external invasion could not be repelled unless the internal unity was achieved first. These monks called the Communists “bandits” (gongfei 共匪), accusing them for not cooperating with the government to establish a united front against Japanese.113 Unlike many contemporary university students who pressured the Nationalists to collaborate with the Communists, these monks urged the Communists to give up their struggle with the Nationalists, arguing that the Nationalist government was the unique legitimate authority, and that only Jiang Jieshi could lead Chinese to form a new and strong nation. Taixu called Buddhists to join the Nationalist army and not that of warlords. In December 1936 at the news of Jiang Jieshi’s arrest in the Xi’an Incident, temples all over China held rituals to pray for his safe release. Monks and nuns were alarmed about the future of the nation; they believed the internal conflict, which had debilitated the strength and vitality of the nation, would invite more serious foreign invasion. A young monk named Pengseng from the Minnan Buddhist College sent a telegram to Xi’an, remonstrating against Zhang Xueliang’s arrest of Jiang Jieshi,114 and urging Jiang’s immediate release so that the nation could reunite against Japanese aggression. No one argued that clergy should not serve the nation; even the “old monks” expressed willingness to do so. The debate in the middle of the 1930s was one following the traditional ways, such as transferring merit to soldiers and the nation through reciting and preaching sutras, or putting aside the commitment to their religion so as to be able wholeheartedly to serve the nation. However, even young monks were uncertain whether their proposals could be put into practice without great effort of self-transformation, both physically and mentally. They realized that it was difficulty and not necessary for all Chinese clergy to do the same. Each should follow his or her conscience and do what seemed best for the nation depending on individual physical and spiritual capacity. In conclusion, their difference may not have been on whether monks and nuns should observe monastic discipline, but how they should serve the nation.

CONCLUSION We have analyzed the dilemma of Chinese clergy whether they should fulfill their civic duty of serving the nation or observe monastic discipline of nonviolence, and examined how young monks passionately explained why and how monks and nuns

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should prepare for defending the nation. From protesting against the state appropriation of temple properties and the military occupation of temples to extending support to the government and preparing themselves to defend the nation, these young monks prioritized their constitutional duties over their religious commitments. In order to prove the usefulness of Buddhism to the nation, they justified the government call for military training by appealing to the Buddhist concept of compassionate killing. Some of them openly advocated the abandonment of the precept of non-killing and criticized those who would rather die than violate such precept. They were not bothered by the questions such as what would happen to the sangha if all monks and nuns followed their call, but only interested in how Buddhists should serve the nation. The phenomenon of young monks willingly transforming themselves and abandoning their religious commitments, however, can only be understood within the context of the contemporary nationalism and patriotism in China. It would be unthinkable for them to challenge so blatantly the precept of ahimsa and to propose the idea of compassionate killing at a time other than the national crisis. Most Chinese monks and nuns had probably never thought or heard of such ideas before. The call for abandoning monastic discipline would have outraged the Buddhist community under normal circumstances, and been criticized as treason to Buddhism. In the name of serving the nation at this time of national crisis, however, young monks could boldly articulate such radical or rather “anti-Buddhism’s” views in Buddhist journals, not because they were tired of Buddhist discipline or attempting to reform the sangha per se, but because they were deeply influenced by nationalism, agitated by foreign invasion, and desperately searching a new and effective way to serve the nation. To some extent, they spoke more as patriotic citizens rather than as members of the sangha. The conservative clergy’s concerns about religious commitment, although we hear of them only indirectly through their opponents’ criticism, were legitimate. Their outrage against young monks, who proposed to sacrifice Buddhist commitment for the sake of nation, would be considered as defending the Dharma if viewed from a normal Buddhist perspective at normal times. To them these young monks were calling for destruction of monastic discipline and were thus the traitors of Buddhism. We do not know whether ordinary Chinese clergy at large accepted the advocacy of young monks or whether they shared the view of “old monks.” The available information is limited and largely from young monks. It is understandable that the “unpatriotic” or rather “anti-nationalistic” views of these “old monks” would not appear in journals run by reformers at this time. The remaining Buddhist narratives of the war history are written under the premise of nationalism. There is too little information about the views of common monks and nuns and

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their reactions to military training and participation in war. Nevertheless, it is evident that even some young monks could not completely ignore their religious status or disregard their religious commitment; they were uncertain among themselves about how to abandon their religious obligation and carry out compassionate killing. It is quite reasonable, therefore, to suggest that such ambivalence might have prevailed throughout the monastic community at the time.

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Chapter Three

Propaganda Against Japanese Aggressions

In Chapter Two, we examined how young monks argued that it was important to prepare themselves to defend the nation by undertaking military training and how they articulated that they could subordinate their religious commitment to the fulfillment of national duty by replacing the precept of non-killing with that of compassionate killing. Their arguments, however, can be understood only in light of the contemporary social, political, and military contexts in which nationalism and patriotism reigned supreme. As war loomed during the 1930s, Buddhist propaganda criticizing Japanese aggression intensified. Articles in such propaganda described Japanese as “devils” (guizi 鬼子) and Japan as imperialistic; Buddhist support for the nation against the Japanese invasion continued throughout the eight years of the war. This chapter explores the role of Buddhist propaganda in criticism of Japanese aggression in China and calling for Chinese resistance.

TAIXU LOSES HOPE IN JAPANESE BUDDHISTS AGAINST JAPANESE AGGRESSIONS Taixu had long been a strong advocate of cooperation between Chinese and Japanese Buddhists for reforming Chinese Buddhism and for Buddhist missions in the West. He emphasized the importance of Buddhist relations between the two countries for promoting Eastern culture and world peace. He maintained a friendly relationship with Japanese Buddhist scholars and activists from long before the war. In 1917, Taixu visited Japan and its modern Buddhist education greatly impressed and encouraged his efforts to reform the sangha in China.1 In 1925, he led a Chinese Buddhist delegation to the East Asian Buddhist Conference and toured many Buddhist sites in Japan. Nevertheless, he was critical of Japanese priests for their disciplinary laxity. In any case, Taixu would become in the 1930s one of the 77

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staunchest Buddhist campaigners against Japanese aggression in China. He did not compromise his commitment to the Chinese nation for the sake of preserving his Japanese relationships. His association with Japanese Buddhists began to wane when Japan intensified its belligerence against China in 1928. Gradually, Taixu became more critical of Japanese militarism and blamed Japanese Buddhists for tolerating the Japanese violation of Chinese sovereignty. On May 3, 1928, when the Nationalists were attempting to reunify China, Chinese and Japanese troops clashed savagely in Jinan; the hostilities immediately provoked anti-Japanese protests in China.2 Taixu, doubtlessly influenced by onesided inflammatory accounts published in the Chinese press, sent a telegram3 to the Japanese Buddhist Union 日本佛教聯合會, urging that China and Japan, brother nations nurtured by the common spirit of the Buddha’s teaching, cooperate for the benefit of the people of both countries. He noted, however, that Japan had sent troops to seize Chinese territory, and “they [ Japanese soldiers] have engaged in killing, stealing, and raping without principle. There is not a single crime, of which the Japanese soldiers are not guilty.”4 Claiming to speak on behalf of three hundred million Buddhists in China,5 Taixu requested thirty million Buddhists in Japan to persuade Japanese military authorities to withdraw their troops from Chinese soil.6 He also demanded an apology from all of the Japanese. When Japan suddenly occupied Manchuria in northeast China on September 18, 1931, the aggression further inflamed Chinese nationalism; people protested the invasion by launching armed attacks, striking at Japanese factories in China, conducting street demonstrations, and boycotting of Japanese goods. Taixu, while condemning Japanese militarism and imperialism, appealed to Japanese Buddhists to wake up immediately and to topple their militant government. In his article, “A Letter to Forty Million Buddhists in Taiwan, Korea, and Japan Concerning the Incident in Mukden,”7 dated in October 1931, Taixu urged Japanese Buddhists to exercise their wisdom and compassion in order to end the escalation of the conflict. He reminded the Japanese that China, Japan, as well as India, had been all nurtured by Buddhist culture and should play leading roles in Asian developments and world peace, yet, Japan, although more than a half of its population is Buddhist, is unable to restrain its greed and hatred, and is bewildered about the law of causality. The Japanese have capriciously started a war and committed crimes of terror forcibly seizing Chinese provinces in the northeast. . . . They have performed the Ten Immoralities and Five Deadly Sins8 in an attempt to destroy the Chinese nation of the five united ethnics.9

Taixu declared that the cruelty of the Japanese would not frighten Chinese away from resisting, and Japanese militarists could not and would not conquer

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China, which possessed vast size, huge population, and long history of advanced culture. Chinese people, nurtured by such culture, were endowed with the characters of perseverance, non-submissiveness, and resistance to injustice. On January 28, 1932, a few months after the Incident in Manchuria, Japanese troops attacked Shanghai. The fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops lasted for a month, and thousands of soldiers on each side lost their lives before the two governments agreed to negotiate. The incident once again prompted Taixu to appeal for peace instead of war between two countries. In his article “Calming the Crisis between China and Japan after the Liaoning and Shanghai Incidents,” dated March 18, 1932, Taixu once again denounced Japanese military actions and criticized America and Britain for complicity with the Japanese aggression. China had justice on her side, Taixu concluded, and its people would never submit. America and Russia, which had showed great interest in China, would not tolerate further the expansion of Japanese power, and would end up taking over both Japan and China. Even at the risk of provoking the antagonism of people in my country, I would like to make an appeal: I have put forward to Japanese authorities that Japan, which initially caused these conflicts, should solve the problems (jieling xiling 解鈴繫鈴) [by returning Chinese territory taken since September 18, 1931]; and I have presented the citizens of China and Japan with the conflict solution of the late Sun Yatsen’s [the idea of Pan-Asianism] . . . Otherwise, [ Japan and China] will be the colonies of America and Russia respectively, and the Chinese and Japanese will no longer be the masters of Asia.10

Meanwhile, Taixu received a letter, dated from February 1, 1932, three days after Japan attacked Shanghai, from the Japanese Buddhist Union. The letter did not mention anything about the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and attacks on Shanghai. Instead, it admonished Chinese clergy to exercise great restraint for the sake of peace in East Asia, and to “advise anti-Japanese groups to stop any violent actions [against the Japanese], and to instruct the unrighteous army to cease its bombardment of Japanese troops.”11 Rather upset by the letter, Taixu immediately responded in another letter, “To the Japanese Buddhist Union,”12 in which he alleged that the Japanese Buddhists had not understood the cause of the conflict between China and Japan. It was the Japanese who had invaded and occupied China, forcing China to respond in self-defense. It would be impossible to solve the problem if Japanese Buddhists blamed the Chinese rather than examining their own behavior and that of their military government. Taixu, therefore, demanded that the Japanese Buddhists see into the cause of the conflict and push their government to withdraw its troops from China.

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Simultaneously, Taixu requested that Chinese Buddhists prepare to resist invasion. When Japan attempted to occupy Yuguang and Rehe in 1933, heavy fighting occurred between Chinese and Japanese troops. In order to have Buddhists, especially monks and nuns, prepared for a possible war, in May 1933 Taixu advised young clergy and laity to organize a League of Buddhist Youths for Protecting the Nation (Fojiao qingnian huguo tuan 佛教青年護國團). For the first time, a detailed plan for a Buddhist organization that would prepare monks and nuns to participate in war was established. According to the plan, Buddhists should be trained to join the army, to conduct prayers, to do transport work, and to form rescue teams. Taixu urged all physically fit monks and nuns—except those he called “virtuous monks” (deseng 德僧) who devoted themselves to religious practice, student monks (xueseng 學僧) who studied in Buddhist colleges, and working monks (zheseng 職僧) who served in temples—to be fully engaged in protecting nation. At the inauguration ceremony of the establishment of the league, Taixu delivered an address, “Appeal to Buddhist Youths of the Whole Nation to Form a League in Protecting the Nation.”13 He warned that at a time when the nation faced peril all Chinese Buddhists should take up their responsibility to protect it. Buddhist youths should join the national army (guojun 國軍) under the Nationalist government, which, according to Taixu, was uniquely capable of protecting the nation: Now, there are several hundred thousands monks in China. Apart from those who are determined to be student-monks, those who are committed to serving in temples, and those who are sincerely devoted themselves to religious practice, as well as monks who are too old or too young, sick or handicapped, all other physically strong monks should join the army and resist the evil invaders. The monks who cannot practice the Dharma should go into society and make their contributions to the nation, rather than drifting alone aimlessly within the sangha and tarnishing Buddhist institutions. This course of action will bring a double blessing for the nation and for Buddhism.14

According to Taixu, unqualified monks should leave the monastic order and join the army. Those who remained within the sangha, in addition to fulfilling their religious duty and studies, should also contribute their services to the national defense by, for example, performing first aid and organizing propaganda. Taixu drafted a charter for the League of Buddhist Youths for Protecting the Nation, which later became the blueprint of the sangha military training program and the model for sangha rescue teams during the war. Taixu’s anti-Japanese activity provoked Japanese critical responses. In October 1936, an article, “A Chinese Monk against Japan” appeared in several Japanese

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newspapers in Shanghai,15 claiming to represent the view of all Buddhists in Japan, asserted that it was absolutely wrong for a Buddhist monk to incite nationalistic sentiments against Japan among Chinese people even if Japan had done harm to China.16 From then on, Taixu distanced himself from Japan, although he did not completely abandon his Japanese friends. In 1934, he turned down the invitation of serving as the first president of newly established China-Japan Buddhist Studies Society (Zhongri fojia xuehui 中日佛教學會).17 Again, when invited to participate in the Pan-Pacific Buddhist Youth Conference scheduled to be held in Japan in July of 1934, he refused on the grounds that the conference had also invited a delegation from Manchuguo. However, Shenbao in May 1934 reported that Taixu had agreed to lead a Buddhist delegation to Japan.18 Taixu had to publicly announce that he would not go to Japan and that China and Japan would never be friends unless all the Japanese troops left from China, including Manchuria.19 Nevertheless, he never abandoned hopes and his efforts that Japanese Buddhists might contribute to peaceful solution for the conflict between two nations. In March 1937, Taixu had a meeting with a number of Japanese priests from a sub-temple of the Higashi Honganji in Shanghai to discuss the possibility of organizing a Buddhist international conference on peace so that Buddhists in both countries could work together for peace instead of war.20 The Pan-Pacific Buddhist Youth Conference was the center of the controversy. Taixu was criticized by his fellow-Buddhist in China for cooperating with Japanese. The first meeting of the conference organized by Buddhists from Japan and America was held in Hawaii in 1920. China did not send a delegation, because it had no Buddhist youth organization at the time. The second meeting was to be held in Japan in July 1934. A Chinese delegation could have attended but the inclusion of a Buddhist delegation from Manchuguo meant that Chinese participation might be considered to constitute Chinese recognition of Manchuguo as an independent state. In June 1934, Taixu, in his article, “On the Second Conference of the Pan-Pacific Buddhist Youth Society,”21 questioned the motivation of the Japanese who were organizing the second meeting. Japanese Buddhists never questioned the status of Manchuguo, which was created by the Japanese military government, but Chinese Buddhists regarded it as a part of China. As Taixu noted, “There will be no harmony and reciprocity between the peoples of China and Japan if the ‘ghostly name’ (guiming 鬼名) of Manchuguo is not removed.” Despite Taixu’s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the China-Japanese conflict, full scale war of Japanese invasion broke out on July 7, 1937. Like many other Chinese, Taixu was deeply disturbed by the news of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident; a poem he wrote when he heard the news vividly expressed his dismay.

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Buddhism, War, and Nationalism The sea of mind stormed against the waves of the past; Tempest rain forced down on a lonely lamp; Knowing and worrying about the world for thirty years, Attempting to save the sangha for twenty years; Finally I see the bravery of devils, Yet cannot bear to admit the incapacity of the Buddha; I throw down my pen and sigh three times, Stroking my breast while looking up to heaven.22

CALL FOR RESISTING THE INVASION AND DEFENDING THE NATION At the beginning of the war, Taixu worried about the fate of the Chinese nation and the future of Buddhism; it seemed that all his efforts had been wasted. Nevertheless, he soon reinvigorated his efforts to persuade the Japanese Buddhists against their government. Taixu forwarded “A Cable to All Japanese Buddhist Believers”23 to the Japanese Buddhist Union again, pleading that Japanese Buddhists should immediately stand up in unison and fight to stop Japanese military offense in China so that it could pave the way to solving the crisis through diplomatic methods based on equality and understanding. He warned that the Japanese invasion would bring about a disaster of massive mutual killing between the two countries for dozens of years.24 Meanwhile, Taixu dispatched another telegram, “To Buddhists in China,”25 appealing Chinese Buddhists to take up three urgent tasks. First, he called for the enhancement of religious practices and prayers for the cessation of the cruel invasion and for the preservation of peace in the world. Second, he asked that preparations be made to defend the nation at all costs under the leadership of the Nationalist government. Lastly, he encouraged monks and nuns to become more involved in defense efforts, such as rescuing the wounded, accommodating refugees, burying the dead, and instructing people how to prepare for air raids and gas attacks. Under the leadership of Taixu, a Buddhist Rescue Team, consisting of members of the Right Faith Association in Hankou was organized in September 1937. In December, Taixu encouraged the students of the Chinese-Tibetan Buddhist College (Hanzang jiaoliyuan 漢藏教理院) to undertake military training.26 In his speech, “The Members of the Sangha Should Receive Military Training for the Sake of Buddhist Revival,” delivered to the students, Taixu connected the resistance war to the Buddhist revival in China, emphasizing that the clergy should undertake military training for the benefit of Buddhism. Healthy and physically fit members of the sangha would be indispensable to the revitalization of Buddhism. The military training of monks and nuns would rectify the decadence,

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indolence, and sluggishness that had characterized the public image of the clergy for centuries.27 In order to effectively practice Buddhism in this violent world, Taixu believed that Buddhists must grasp both skillful means and wisdom and act in accordance with the needs of society. Those who were guided by wisdom and aspired to fulfill their duties through skillful means would be able to accomplish all their endeavors, religious or non-religious. In the previous year when the government ordered that all monks and nuns to undertake military training, as mentioned earlier and will be discussed in detail in next chapter, Taixu had requested that the clergy conduct only rescue missions so that they could avoid killing. Though, he had encouraged lay Buddhists to follow the government orders and to fight the enemy on the battlefield. Once the war broke out, however, Taixu, no longer differentiated between lay Buddhists and clergy, but urged all to defend the nation without any reservation. He reiterated the dialectic “harmony” between observing Buddhist precept and serving the nation: Compassion does not necessarily mean non-killing and skillful means can always find a solution. When evil ones attempt to murder many people and there is no other way to stop them, the bodhisattva should act with compassion to kill them so that more people can be saved and the retribution of the evil prevented. Today, a small group of evil ones, in defying world peace, goad their own people to fight the peoples of other nations. It seems that mutual killing is inevitable. In order to stop their lunatic action, it is right and expedient to take part in the Anti-Japanese War.28

After the fall of Nanjing in December 1937, the Nationalist government moved its capital west to Wuhan and then a year later to Chongqing in Sichuan. Taixu went to Chengdu shortly after the war began and then moved to Chongqing, and for the next eight years his activities were centered in Sichuan and Yunnan, the two most important provinces controlled by the Nationalists and their allies. Acting as a mediator between Buddhists and the government, he was always prepared to promote war efforts of Chinese Buddhists. In support of the government policy on the Anti-Japanese War outlined in “Principles for the Resistance and Nation-Building,”29 Taixu urged the Japanese authorities and the leaders of the puppet governments in China to wake up from their delusion of conquering China. In his article entitled “Have Japan and the Puppet Government Awakened?” Taixu accused the Japanese militarists of disregarding human justice and imposing an unjust war on the Chinese nation.30 Meanwhile, he praised the resistance war led by the Nationalist government under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi and condemned those who had betrayed the nation by serving in the puppet governments.

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In denouncing Japan, Taixu accused its people of ingratitude because they had profoundly benefited from Chinese culture, especially Chinese Buddhism.31 Instead of repaying the kindness of the Chinese nation, Japan invaded China and Japanese were now committing crimes against Chinese people. Taixu’s attack also echoed the ideas of East Asian cooperation against Western imperialism as advocated by Sun Yatsen: . . . China and Japan had enjoyed a friendship based on a shared culture and race in Asia. . . . Within a dozen years, the two nations would have been able to confront the storms of Europe and America (Oufeng meiyu 歐風美雨), . . . [China and Japan] should have stood side by side and transformed the world of the power-thirsty by propagating their native culture of peacefulness and harmony so that the friendliness and brotherhood of East Asia could have been maintained and so that world unity could have been achieved. However, China has erred by abandoning its essence [Chinese own culture] in order to superficially follow a smattering [of the West] and as a result has been torn by civil war, while Japan has single-mindedly pursued the expansionist imperialism and is interested only in devouring China.32

In 1938, Taixu and other leading members of the Chinese Buddhist Society in western China decided to set up a temporary office of the society in Chongqing.33 In a telegram to all Chinese Buddhists, Taixu requested them to sever their connection with Buddhist societies in Nanjing, Beijing, and Shanghai.34 In the middle of 1938, it was rumored that the clergy in Japanese-occupied areas had either voluntarily or unwillingly collaborated with the Japanese under the name of the Chinese Buddhist Society in Shanghai. In June 1938, a group of eminent Buddhists in the Nationalist controlled areas, in response to Taixu’s call, sent a letter to all Buddhists in China. The letter criticized some leading members of the Chinese Buddhist Society in Shanghai for their remaining in Japanese occupied territories, forgetting the shame of national tragedy and bringing the disgrace to Buddhism by willingly living under foreign rule.35 Meanwhile, the Nationalist government also worried that the cooperation of leading Chinese monks with Japanese would undermine the efforts to form a united front against Japan. In response to the government’s concern and with the support of Buddhists in Sichuan, Yunnan, Shanxi, and Hunan, Taixu declared the end of the Chinese Buddhist Society in Shanghai and urged the leaders of the society in Shanghai to transfer the documents to Chongqing.36 In reply to Taixu’s request, Changxing 常惺, the general secretary of the society and a friend of Taixu in Shanghai, promised that he was ready to hand over the seal of the Chinese Buddhist Society to the temporary office in Chongqing. However, he explained, “All Buddhists in fallen areas know self-respect. This is truly a good sign for the state. After August 13 [1937], the Chinese Buddhist

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Society narrowed its size yet never stopped functioning. The reports in the newspapers should not be believed. Some charity work is still going on.37 Taixu was also aware of the dilemma of clergy in the occupied areas, who could be tortured or even killed if they refused to cooperate with the Japanese. Yet he insisted that they would do much more harm to Chinese Buddhism and the nation if they collaborated with the Japanese and the puppet governments.38 He appealed to them either to avoid involvement in political activities or to escape to Nationalist-controlled areas.39 Taixu’s devotion to the nation, condemnation of Japanese invasion, and steadfast support for the government were closely watched and duly appreciated by the Nationalist leaders. In 1939, the government invited Taixu to be a member of the Committee of National General Mobilization.”40 On June 31 1940, he was elected the honorary chairman of the China Branch of the International AntiInvasion Conference (Guoji fanqinlüe dahui Zhongguo fenhui 國際反侵略大會中 國分會).41 His fame surpassed that of all other monks in China and his name became widely circulated in the press. During the war, the geographic location of Sichuan (including Chongqing, the military and political center of Nationalist-controlled China at the time) enhanced the strategic importance of its neighboring provinces, especially Yunnan, which was still under the Nationalist government’s influence. After Japanese troops advanced and took over coastal areas in the south, they cut off the Chinese government’s connections with the outside world and blockaded international supplies to Chongqing. The Burma-China highway, which ran through Yunnan, became for a while the unique conduit of military supplies and gasoline from abroad to the Nationalist government. One of the government’s priorities was to maintain the alliance of the people and the local governments of Yunnan (which had been virtually independent since the end of the Qing dynasty) in order to keep the road open. As Buddhism was a major religion in this region and widely accepted by both the upper and lower classes, Buddhist institutions played an important role in helping to maintain sound relations between the Nationalist government and Yunnan province. Taixu, having realized the political importance of Yunnan, attempted to reaffirm Buddhist support for the government and uphold a close association with Yunnan Buddhists by frequently traveling to Kunming, the capital of the province. In April 1939, Taixu carried out his plan for reorganizing the Yunnan Buddhist Society and was unanimously elected as its chairman by Buddhist delegates from all parts of the province. He was meanwhile requested by Lu Jieqing 祿介卿, a military commander in Yunnan, to rebuild Buddhist temples in Jizu Shan 雞足山, one of the most famous ancient Buddhist sites in China. Under the leadership of Taixu, Buddhism in Yunnan began to show signs of revival and local

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Buddhists became actively engaged in resisting the Japanese invasion. In August 1939, the Yunnan Sangha Rescue Team was founded and monks and nuns were organized to work collectively for military and humanitarian operations. In the inaugural ceremony, Taixu delivered a speech entitled “Serving the Nation and Propagating Buddhism.”42 He first demonstrated the interrelatedness of serving the nation and spreading the teaching of Buddhism and encouraged monks and nuns to do their utmost for the country. He then summarized the idea behind the formation of the Sangha Rescue Team by creatively relating dialectic consensus between serving the nation and propagating Buddhism: The true motivation for founding the Yunnan Sangha Rescue Team in fact is to encourage Buddhists to serve their country just as the other citizens of the nation are doing. It is also intended to make the monks, who are the major force within Buddhism, responsible for spreading, reviving, and promoting Buddhist doctrines. It is the duty of our monks to manifest and enhance Buddhist ethics and to serve as spirits of great compassion, social service, and fearlessness. We will lose our qualification as monks if we do not spread the message of serving the world.43

The military situation became more serious when the war had nearly exhausted Chinese national resources; the closure of the China-Burma highway because of the Japanese occupation of Burma in 1941 further devastated Chinese economy. The Nationalist government was now in desperate need of financial and material replenishment. Chinese citizens were asked to donate whatever they had to the military so that the resistance war could be sustained. In response to the government’s call, Taixu endorsed the idea that the Chinese troops must be well equipped and well cared for in order to disarm the invaders.44 He felt that it was the duty of all Chinese people to provide material support to the soldiers. In order to encourage Buddhists to save everything useful and donate it to the government, Taixu personally donated 300 yuan for the welfare of soldiers in September 1937.45 In his radio speech, “Money Donation to Soldiers and Buddhist Generosity,” delivered on February 15, 1941, Taixu argued that providing gifts to the army was not only to fulfill Buddhist duty as citizens of the nation but also sanctioned by Buddhism as one of the Six Perfections. Donations to the soldiers should be understood as encompassed in the three kinds of offerings in Buddhism: the offering of materials, of Dharma, and of fearlessness: At this moment of resisting the Japanese and building the nation, [one who] propagates the idea of national supremacy [is making] the highest Dharma offering; [one who] participates in resisting the invasion and in repelling the evil enemy in order to secure military victory [is making] the foremost offering

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of fearlessness; [one who] unites the will and power [of all the people] for the sake of the victory of the nation in the war [is making] material offering.46

By identifying the donation to the soldiers with the religious activity of generosity, Taixu provided a Buddhist theory to his proposition that serving the soldiers and equipping them with advanced weapons were tantamount to serving the nation, and serving the nation was to serve Buddhism. Although Taixu creatively connected Buddhist practice of generosity with donations to the soldiers, he did not go further to explain whether such kind of connection could be suspected of supporting violence and of thus violating moral discipline of non-association with army and non-dealing with weapons, because all these were immaterial in comparison with the national defense. During the early period of the war, a large number of clergy, especially young monks, engaged in Buddhist propaganda to strengthen the determination of the Chinese people and to expose the crimes of the Japanese soldiers, articulating how Buddhists could serve the nation and resist the invasion. During this period, Buddhists endeavored to provide all necessary service in defending the nation. Zhengping 正平, in his article, “Buddhist Education and National Defense,”47 proposed the establishment of a special Buddhist school to train clergy in preparation for participation in war. Fafang suggested that Chinese monks learn the nationalistic spirit of Japanese priests in order to defend the Chinese nation, although Japan had carried out an imperialistic policy of military aggression while portraying itself as a Buddhist nation of goodwill and friendliness: “All Japanese love Japan, and all Japanese Buddhists are fond of patriotism. It is certain that all Chinese love China. Therefore, Chinese Buddhists, both clergy and laypeople, are patriots of the Chinese nation.”48 Nevertheless, as Fafang explained, Japanese patriotism was quite different from that of the Chinese, because the Chinese Buddhists used their nationalistic and militaristic spirit in order to defend the sovereignty and integrity of the Chinese nation while the Japanese abused theirs as a tool of invasion. Soon after the outbreak of war in China proper on July 7, 1937, Yuanying, then the chairperson of the Chinese Buddhist Society, sent a letter to the Japanese Buddhist Union,49 calling upon Japanese Buddhists to denounce the militarism and imperialism of their government.50 He suggested that Japanese people, who had claimed that their country was a Buddhist country, should practice bodhisattva’s compassion and egalitarianism to save the human world from the suffering of violence and war. He maintained that only a few Japanese militarists in power, full of covetousness and ambition, had launched the war of invasion against China. The majority of Japanese would love peace. However, Yuanying did not exclusively blame the Japanese for the war; he partially attributed the Japanese invasion to Chinese national decline resulted from the negative karma of Chinese people.

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In other words, the contemporary national crisis was actually created by Chinese people. In order to change the course of national decline to development, Chinese people must collectively make efforts first by producing wholesome karma through mind and body for national defending and rebuilding. He also believed that it was unfortunate that in the name of nationalism a handful of people in both countries put their selfish interests over those of the human race.51 The call of the Chinese Buddhist Society for Japanese to rise against Japanese invasion never impressed Japanese Buddhist leaders. Instead, the Japanese Buddhist Union issued a statement to justify Japanese military action in China on July 28 1937, saying that Japan, inculcated by great love and compassion of Buddhism, was exercising its benevolent forcefulness of “killing one so that many may live” (issatsu tashō): We believe it is time to effect a major change in the course of human history, which has been centered on Caucasians and inequality among humanity. To realize the true happiness of a peaceful humanity and construct a new civilization, it is necessary to redirect the path of world history’s advance from this false path to the true path. Rooted in this sublime view of history, the mission and responsibility of Mahayana Buddhists is to bring into being true friendship between Japan and China.52

This harsh response of Japanese Buddhists made Chinese Buddhists realize that it was futile to persuade Japanese Buddhists against war, and confirmed that Chinese people must give up any this illusory hope and themselves repel Japanese invaders. As the war intensified, Buddhist propaganda changed from persuasion to condemnation. Chinese monks adopted the rhetoric of the Chinese news media of the time to describe the destruction of war and cruelty of Japanese. Renxin 仁心, in an article, “To Japanese Buddhists,” accused the Japanese of brazen military invasion.53 China, nurtured by the Buddhist messages of equality and compassion, had endured humiliation repeatedly for the sake of maintaining peace and order in the world. But the Chinese people, now driven beyond the limits of their forbearance, would fight the Japanese aggression with determined will and fearsome strength. Renxin maintained that, because Japan had thrust war upon China, Chinese Buddhists had no alternative but to kill the invaders by violent means. Ardent calls for killing enemies were not new to Chinese monks—such calls had appeared in Buddhist journals before the war as we have discussed in previous chapter. Yet the passion had intensified after the eruption of the war, and some clergy were now involved in encouraging Chinese soldiers to fight against Japanese. Zongyue 宗月, a well-known monk in Beiping, told Chinese soldiers to kill the Japanese with mercy but without hesitation. When war broke out outside

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Beiping, a battalion commander (a lay-disciple of Zongyue) and his soldiers visited the monk before marching to the battlefield. Zongyue warmly received them and conducted Buddhist rituals to invoke blessings for their victory. In his sermon, Zongyue advised them, “Killing one in order to warn a hundred (shayijingbai 殺一警百) is not a violation of the precept of non-killing. It is a meritorious action to save the lives of human beings. For the sake of the nation, don’t be frightened. Be brave and the Buddha will bless you.”54 It is said that such the ritual and sermon, full of religious sentiment and inspiration, reassured the Chinese soldiers that their fighting was righteous so that they could put aside their spiritual anxiety and wholeheartedly go to war. In October of 1937, the army commander of the twenty-third corps, Pan Zhongsan 潘仲三, marched out of Sichuan at the head of his troops to participate in the war. Pan was on the board of trustees of the Chinese-Tibetan Buddhist College in Chengdu, the teachers and students of the college sent a cable to General Pan, congratulating him beforehand on his sure victory under the blessing of the Buddha and the protection of Vajra Bodhisattva.55 In response, General Pan promised that he would not let them down, and that he and his troops would fight to death to destroy the enemies. While encouraging Chinese soldiers to kill invaders, monks also promised that they would actively work for the national defense and the protection of the Chinese people. In “Buddhists among the Shouting Sound of Resisting Enemies,”56 Renxin specified two kinds of work that monks and nuns should undertake: intense military training and Buddhist religious services on behalf of the nation. He recommended that a training center for monks and nuns be set up in every province. At each center, one hundred clergy should be trained for threemonth period. Meanwhile, a hospital of five hundred beds for wounded soldiers should be founded in every large temple, and 30% of the total income of all temples in every province should be allocated to pay the expenses of such hospitals. After the fall of Nanjing at the end of 1937, Wuhan became war front and fighting between Chinese and Japanese was deadly brutal in early 1938. Wuhan was one of the centers of modern Buddhist revival movement and Buddhists had been active in social and charitable activities. However, because of rapid advancement of Japanese troops, Buddhist community there was in disarray. Fafang called upon all Buddhists to quickly organize their services in defending Wuhan. In his article “Clergy in Wuhan being Organized,” he urged monks and nuns to leave their temples either to serve in rescue teams or to take part in fighting, and thus theorized his calling: We ought to know that “war is tragedy yet fighting is practice of endurance.” Although Buddhism opposes to war, [we] will readily make self-sacrifices in

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Buddhism, War, and Nationalism order to save millions of people. Even if we shall suffer greater pain we would rather kill the evil ones who are imposing harm on Chinese people. Not only is this killing harmless but also meritorious.57

War was merciless yet fighting war in defending the nation could be humane and merciful, it would be same as religious practice of compassion and enduring suffering. Many monks were convinced that China was fighting the righteous war against evil so that it would receive blessings from Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Buddhists had no choice but join the “force of righteousness” (有道之軍 youdao zhi jun) so that less Chinese would lose their lives. They came to realize that what is good could not prevail if evil is not stopped, and non-resistance of evil invaders would inevitably bring the destruction of nation and suffering of people.58 Since the resistance was justifiable, monks suggested that China should not fight alone, but seek support and sympathy from Buddhists outside China.59 Fafang called upon the five hundred million Buddhists worldwide, especially those in the neighboring Buddhist countries, to condemn Japan and to support China. He believed that Japan had now become the common enemy of all Buddhists because it had betrayed humanity and Japanese Buddhists had become defected from community of Sakyamuni Buddha.

MISSIONS TO BURMA AND OTHER BUDDHIST REGIONS By the middle of 1940, Japan had occupied a large part of China. The Japanese military government proclaimed that their goal was to create a “New Order of Greater East Asia.” It was later changed to the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” encompassing eastern Siberia, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, China, Southeast Asia, India, and Oceania. Many Japanese, some of them Buddhist priests, were dispatched as missionaries to carry out political and religious propaganda in India, Burma, and Thailand. The major task of these Japanese was to broadcast accusations that China had become a Christian government,60 and that Buddhist institutions had been destroyed and temple properties confiscated. According to this propaganda, Japan then, as the leading Buddhist nation, had declared war on China to provide protection to Chinese Buddhists as well as to Buddhists across the world.61 The activities of these Japanese alarmed the Chinese government, which made several efforts to send Buddhist delegations to visit these regions in order to counter-attack Japan. One possible–though long and difficult–route for international supplies to Chinese resistance forces was the road to Chongqing from India through Qinghai and Tibet,62 which were minority areas mainly influenced by Buddhism, especially Lamaism. In 1939 the Nationalist government realized the importance of keeping

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close ties with these minorities in order to sustain the struggle against the Japanese. It was decided that eminent lamas should be sent to these regions to propagate the message of resisting the Japanese through Buddhist means, distributing The Small Collection of Anti-Japanese War Material. In order to win the support of people, most of whom were Buddhists, the government also agreed that lamas in Tibet and Mongolia be allowed to postpone their military service although monks and nuns of the Han nationality must obey the law and join the army without delay.63 In 1939 Zhangjia 章嘉 (1889–1957),64 one of the most politically prominent lamas in the Republic of China, was asked by the government to organize the Tibet-Mongolia Buddhist College in Qinghai and was appointed its president.65 In April 1938, Japan sent one hundred and fifty Buddhist priests to China, and some of them went to as far as to Inner Mongolia.66 These priests visited lama temples and persuaded lamas to form friendly relationship with Japanese government. In order to counterattack Japanese effort, In May 1939, Shirob Jaltso 喜饒嘉措 (1884–1986), who joined the Nationalist party in 1937 and was another eminent lama who actively supported the Chinese national effort of resisting the Japanese, toured areas in Qinghai, Gangsu, and Inner Mongolia as a special government envoy, spreading the Three People’s Principles and the message of saving the country.67 He organized a “Propaganda Team for the Resistance,” and published booklets in Tibetan and Mongolian, such as To the Mongol and Tibetan Compatriots for the Sake of Resisting the Japanese. He aimed to promote the unity of all nationalities in China, reassuring the minorities of the government policy of protecting Buddhist institutions, exposing the cruelty of the Japanese, and exalting the cause of the resistance war. Shirob Jaltso told his people that, although Japan had declared itself a Buddhist nation, the actions of Japanese soldiers were not different from those of Aśuras, Buddhist semi-gods full of hatred and violence. He described the situation of northern China, which had been occupied by Japan, as a living hell for Chinese residents. During the tour, Shirob Jaltso organized rituals of national protection in various temples, and gave lectures to different people, in which he advocated the ten vows of saving the nation. He urged his people not to be misguided by Japanese propaganda, or intimidated by their military power so that they slavishly became traitors to the nation, but to join the rest of people in China in resisting the Japanese. His work and contribution were rewarded by the government when he was awarded the title of Chan Master of Facilitating the Teachings and Providing Universal Benefit (Pujiao xuanji chanshi 輔教宣濟禪師) in 1939.68 In 1939, Japan occupied Hainan Island in south of China. The occupation not only reinforced the isolation of the Nationalist government, but also threatened other Asian countries and American interests in the Philippines. The military situation became increasingly serious for resistance forces, and the Nationalist

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government realized the urgent needs of seeking international support, especially from neighboring countries. Taixu, who was closely monitoring this military and political development, called for a united front of Asian Buddhists against Japanese aggression. In his article, “The Threat of [ Japanese] Occupation of Hainan and Luring of Buddhist Countries,”69 Taixu suggested that it was the time for China to form a united front with neighboring countries to fight against Japan. Because large populations in these countries were Buddhists, Buddhism could play an active role in stimulating the sympathy of their peoples toward China’s war efforts, and thus enhancing the goodwill of these countries toward China. Taixu also pointed out that Japanese Buddhist missions had already launched propaganda campaigns in these countries that Japan, for the sake of protecting Buddhism and Asian culture, was waging a “holy war” (Shengzhan 聖戰) against China.70 Consequently, Buddhists in these countries, under the influence of the Japanese propaganda, had become hostile to China and reluctant to support Chinese people. The unfriendliness of these neighboring countries was detrimental to China and had to be changed soon. Emphasizing the importance of the political and ethical support of the peoples in neighboring countries, Taixu advised the government to protect Buddhist temples in China lest the sentiments of Buddhists in these countries be further hurt. He then suggested that China should expose the crimes that Japanese had committed against Buddhism in China. It was Japanese Buddhists who had betrayed Buddhism, who were wantonly massacring Chinese monks and nuns and indiscriminately bombing temples. In 1939, Taixu proposed a Buddhist delegation to visit Burma, India, and other Southeast Asian countries, and his proposal received immediate endorsement from top government officials.71 On June 21, 1939, Zhu Jiahua, an official in the Social Affairs Ministry, sent a letter to Chen Lifu 陳立夫, the Education Minister, reporting that the Japanese had been very active in Burma to spread propaganda harmful to China.72 When Jiang Jieshi was informed of this, he laid down three countermeasures to deal with the situation, the most important of which was to organize a Buddhist delegation to visit Burma. Jiang Jieshi then ordered the Education Ministry and the Internal Affairs Ministry to actualize the formation of the Buddhist delegation and to provide necessary financial support and diplomatic convenience.73 In November 1939, after the several months of preparation, the Chinese Buddhist delegation headed by Taixu and including four of his disciples74 was ready to leave Chongqing. Although it was publicly announced as a voluntary Buddhist pilgrimage, the delegation was financed by the government, and its political importance was obvious as Jiang Jieshi and Lin Sen 林森 honored the delegation with inscriptions. Before setting off, Taixu called upon the government and political leaders, including Jiang Jieshi, Kong Xiangxi, Chen Lifu, and the leaders

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of non-government and religious organizations, to discuss how the delegation could stimulate international Buddhist support for the resistance war. Before leaving Yunnan, Taixu sent a communiqué about the delegation to the press without openly politicizing its mission: Taixu, inspired by people in the culture circle and supported by Buddhist followers, has organized a Buddhist delegation, which will visit various Buddhist sacred sites in Burma, Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand. We will pay visits to Buddhist leaders in order to enhance the friendships between Buddhists in China and in these regions and to spread the message of the Buddha. The delegation also aims to announce the efforts and struggles of the Chinese people, including Buddhists, for the independence and survival of the Chinese nation, and for the cause of equality and justice. Buddhism in China has now been broadly accepted by Chinese people and a new Buddhism will certainly thrive alongside with the founding of a new China. This shall surely console the true and faithful Buddhists of the world. . . . 75

On December 4, 1939, when Taixu arrived at a Burmese city near the Chinese border, two thousand monks and ten thousand lay Buddhists came to welcome the delegation.76 On December 10, the delegation reached Rangoon, where more than thirty thousand people received Taixu at the train station. In the afternoon, the prime minister, and minister of the Forests, mayor of Rangoon, and four hundred other politicians, businessmen, and cultural elites attended a reception to welcome the delegation. For almost one month in Burma, Taixu held extensive talks with several government ministers, Buddhist leaders, overseas Chinese, and other Burmese people. On January 12, 1940, when Taixu arrived at Buddhagaya in India, where the Buddha had attained enlightenment about 2500 years earlier, more than two hundred intellectual and political celebrities from China, India, Sri Lanka, and British participated in a reception held by the Maha Bodhi Society. Taixu presented the society with a gold-and-silver gilded pagoda-shaped casket, a gift from Jiang Jieshi. On January 30, the president of People’s Congress Party in Benares hosted a reception in honor of Taixu. On this occasion, Taixu met Nehru, and the two discussed religion and the war in China. The next day, one hundred thousand people turned out in the streets for a parade to welcome the visit of the delegation. Before leaving India for Sri Lanka, Taixu also paid a visit to Gandhi, who was then on a hunger strike against British rule in India. When the delegation arrived in Colombo on February 24, 1940, the prime minister of Sri Lanka, the mayor of Colombo, and other social and political leaders came to the port to receive Taixu. During his stay, Taixu discussed world Buddhism and the China-Sri Lanka relationship extensively with G. P. Malalasekera. When he visited Kandy and paid respect to the Buddha’s Tooth Relic, a Sangharaja (king

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of monks) entrusted Taixu with a golden pagoda-shaped reliquary to be presented to Jiang Jieshi, hoping that China would be blessed by the Buddha and soon win freedom. Before leaving Colombo, Taixu gave a speech, entitled “The Dream that Should be Broken and the Enlightenment that Should Be Aroused,” on the national radio of Ceylon.77 In the speech, he emphasized that, in order to change the world of war to the world of peace, two dreams must be crushed: the dream of those who attempt to trample the peoples of other nations by using advanced weapons and the dream of those who invade other nations for the sake of their selfish interests. The political mission of Taixu’s delegation to invoke Buddhist support of China from Asian countries was achieved, and became an important part of Buddhist participation in the war. Taixu met the leaders of these countries and discussed political and military situation in China. When Taixu and his delegation returned to Chongqing after a six month visit,78 a number of ceremonies were organized to receive them. In May 1940, more than fifty organizations and government departments, joined by many social and political leaders, held a grand reception party in honor of Taixu. On this occasion, Taixu told the audience that he had delivered two messages to the world during the visit: first, that Buddhism was still active in China; and second, that Chinese Buddhists, including monks and nuns, supported the government and joined with the rest of Chinese people in the Anti-Japanese War.79 After his successful visit of Buddhist countries, Taixu became more convinced that Buddhists in Asia could form a united front against Japan. In the next few months, he published a number of articles, calling Buddhist monks to serve the nation abroad. In one of them entitled, “Buddhism and International Anti-Invasion,”80 Taixu alleged that more Chinese Buddhist delegations to these countries would inform the world that the resistance war of China aimed not only for the independence and freedom of the Chinese nation but also for the common interests of Buddhist nations. In one speech, “Buddhists and Diplomacy of Citizens,”81 Taixu said that individual citizens could have better connections with people from other countries than government agencies and that Chinese Buddhists were in a unique position to play a diplomatic role in arousing the sympathy of Buddhists in other countries. In Burma, which had a population of more than ten million, about 80% were Buddhists. Buddhism was virtually a national religion and clergy enjoyed respect from society. Before the eruption of the war in 1937, the Burmese thought poorly of China because the Chinese government was reported to have persecuted Buddhist institutions. During the early stages of the war, Burma became a crucial gateway for international military and economic supplies after China’s sea ports were seized by the Japanese. The Chinese government was anxious to maintain

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good relations with Burma and win the support of Burmese for Chinese war efforts. In 1940, China signed an agreement with Burma to exchange scholars and students and strengthen cultural ties between the two countries. Daju 達居, a Chinese monk who had studied in Burma for several years, suggested that exchanges of Buddhist monks would be more productive and beneficial in maintaining the relationship between two countries.82 In September 1940, three monks led by Fafang received scholarships from the Education Ministry and made a study-tour to Burma.83 There, they became acquainted with leading monks and launched Buddhist propaganda against Japan among Burmese Buddhists, soliciting support for the Chinese government. They claimed that they convinced Burmese monks and lay Buddhists that Japan was not a true Buddhist country or it would never have attempted to destroy human lives and the sangha in China. The success of these Buddhist delegations to southern Asia inspired Leguan 樂觀 to send a letter to the Social Affairs Ministry on October 13, 1940, pledging that he would organize “A Chinese Buddhist International Propaganda Walking Team” (Zhongguo fojiao guoji xuanquandui 中國佛教國際宣傳步行隊)84 to tour Burma, India and Thailand. Within a week, the ministry endorsed Leguan’s proposal and four young monks, Manlin 曼林, Guoneng 果能, Nengren 能仁, and Juehua 覺華 were recruited after undergoing careful political background checks. As all of them volunteered to serve the nation through Buddhism abroad, they did not ask for government’s help; in preparing for their journey, they sold several sets of their robes, pawned suitcases and sheets, and borrowed money from friends in order to finance their trip. Before departure, the communiqué of the walking team appeared in many newspapers in Chongqing, including Dagong Bao 大公報, Xinhua Daily News 新華日報, Shishi Xinbao 時事新報. It declared that the team aimed to counter Japanese accusations by exposing to the world Japanese crimes against Chinese Buddhist institutions. We are young monks who have been tempered by the enemy’s warplanes and cannons. We have witnessed with our very eyes the savage nature and inhuman actions of the Japanese, and have personally born the insults and ravages of our nation by the enemy. Our blood is boiling and the flames of our indignation and rage rise high. We do not want to remain within a chamber of meditation in a deep mountain, or to be self-interested monks with carefree leisure. We have stood up. Following the examples of Buddhist masters in the past who made contributions to the happiness of people and who sacrificed their lives for the nation, we are determined to take revenge on behalf of Buddhism.85

The original plan had been to travel on foot from Chongqing all the way to Burma, in order that they could arrive in Burma earlier, however, the Propaganda Ministry had the department of transportation in the southwest region given them

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a ride to Burma. On November 11, 1940, the four members86 started their journey, carrying with them a number of pictures of temples and Buddha icons destroyed by Japanese air raids, as well as various propaganda pamphlets. One day before their departure from Chongqing, Buddhist institutions in Chongqing hosted a farewell banquet on the grounds of the ruined Luohan Si 羅漢寺,87 an ancient temple that had just been devastated by Japanese bombs. Members of the team took the pictures of the ruined site as the evidence for propaganda in Burma. In January 1941, the team arrived in Rangoon and the members changed to Theravada robes. Once they had settled in, Leguan and the others paid visits to Burmese government officials, eminent monks, and the leaders of overseas Chinese, explaining why Chinese monks and nuns were participating in the resistance war. They distributed a large number of booklets in English, Chinese, and Burmese that contained photos and articles depicting how the Japanese had bombarded Chinese temples and killed clergy. On January 5, 1941, Leguan delivered a speech, “Reviving the Nation at the Time of Disasters,” to a conference of the overseas Chinese, denouncing the Japanese, “From the beginning of the war, the warplanes of the enemy frequently bombarded Buddhist temples, while Japanese soldiers murdered monks and raped nuns . . . for more than three years, not a single Japanese priest has come out to condemn these inhuman actions.”88 In an interview with the Burmese New Star News,89 Leguan insisted that China was still a Buddhist country, and that the heads of four of the five branches of the Nationalist government were Buddhists.90 The team members tried hard to convince Burmese Buddhists that Japanese invasion of China violated the general humanity and principle of Buddhism. On April 20, 1941, a leading member of the sangha in Burma, U Thusin Ta, wrote an article entitled, “Japan is a Counterfeit Buddhist Country,”91 and published it in Juemin Ribao 覺民日報 in Rangoon.92 Buddhism had played an important role in relationships between China and India, Burma, and Sri Lanka in the past. During the war, however, these Buddhist relationships were made to unite Buddhists in these countries to form a front against Japan. Although Buddhism was a religion of peace, Buddhist monks could be the messengers of war. They conveyed political messages of the Chinese government for the resistance war, just as some Japanese Buddhist missionaries were there to deliver the messages of the Japanese government why Japan invaded China. Both insisted that their governments, either in invasion or resistance, were engaged in protecting Buddhism.

ROARING LIKE A LION—SHI ZI HAO As the war dragged on, resource shortages as well as the rigid war environment made it extremely difficult for Chinese monks to continue their propaganda

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campaign against the Japanese invasion. Fewer articles appeared in less frequently published journals, and the skyrocketing price of paper and the deterioration of communications forced a number of Buddhist journals to shut down. According to the Chinese Year Book, 1935–1936, forty-four Chinese Buddhist periodicals were published in 1934. However, the Chinese Year Book, 1942–1943 reported only five, one of them Hai chao yin, left, and they published with much reduced size and frequency.93 The Buddhist voice in the public domain, therefore, gradually diminished during the war. In spite of these difficulties, one Buddhist monthly journal, Shi zi hao (獅子吼 Roaring Like a Lion), emerged in Guilin at the end of 1940. “Roaring like a lion” is a Buddhist phrase indicating that the preaching of the Dharma, like a lion’s roar, will eventually silence all other voices. Shi zi hao was a monthly magazine,94 run by young intellectual monks, such as Dao’an 道安, Mujia 暮笳, and Juzan 巨贊, all of them had been actively involved in the resistance war. With more than forty pages in each issue, the journal contained Buddhist news, articles about Buddhist war-attitudes and activities in the war, and discussions of Buddhist doctrines. The articles were written largely by well-known Buddhists, including monks and lay people, as well eminent Chinese such as Tian Han 田漢 and Xia Yan 夏衍 (both were communists). The purpose of the journal was to wake up the Chinese nation, which had been sleeping like a lion for a thousand years, and cause her to roar like a fully awakened lion. The journal also aimed to stir up ordinary Chinese people and have them realize the danger facing the nation, and to decry Japanese criminal actions in China. Yet the major function of the journal was to galvanize Buddhists, especially monks and nuns, so that they would leave their temples and directly participate in the resistance war. Because of its high literary quality and full some spirit of resistance, Shi zi hao attained wide circulation among Buddhists and in society in general; it was especially welcomed by Chinese intellectuals in the Nationalist-controlled areas. In its inaugural statement of the first issue entitled “Carrying Two Heavy Swastikas,” Mujia appealed to young Chinese Buddhists to shoulder two missions: transmitting the Dharma and saving the motherland from the disaster of foreign invasion. Mujia announced that the journal was aimed at “exposing the false propaganda of the enemies, bringing out Buddhist ideas against the invasion, solidifying a united front of anti-Japanese forces, and supporting the stratagem of the resistance over the long term.”95 The war, he wrote, mandated that monks and nuns at least leave their temples and forests temporarily, and go to serve in villages, factories, and military stations. Acting as true bodhisattvas, they should be concerned about the difficulties of the Chinese people and release them from suffering by launching a cultural and propaganda war against the invasion. Mujia proposed that the monks and nuns make efforts to unite all Buddhist institutions nationwide, establish a “Buddhist Wartime Service Team,” support the

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government, carry out propaganda, and facilitate monastic participation in the resistance war. In the areas after Japanese occupation, many Japanese Buddhist missionaries served in the propaganda and pacification team, spreading political messages of Japanese government and consoling Chinese with Buddhist doctrine in supporting Japanese occupation. Consequently, these missionaries were severely criticized by Chinese intellectuals and Buddhists, who were convinced of Chinese nationalism. “Roar like a Lion at the Japanese” is the title of an article by Xia Yan, who held that modern China’s national crises had always been caused by foreign missionaries, first from the West, then from Japan: “Since the founding of the Republic of China, imperialistic Japan has dispatched numerous priest-spies to China, opening the way for the Japanese invasion. The traces of these spies can be found from Mongolia in the north to Hainan Island in the south. There is no place they are not found, no advantage they have not taken.”96 Xia Yan reminded Chinese people that the Shanghai Incident of January 28, 1932 was sparked by Japanese priests.97 He anathematized Japanese priests, predicting that they would go to hell because they were the running dogs of Japanese imperialists. These priests were responsible for the deaths of countless Chinese and Japanese, the destruction of thousands of families, and the separation of numerous wives, husbands, and children. Xia Yan urged Chinese people to be vigilant and to recognize the true face of the Japanese priests, who were actually spies. To a large extent, Buddhist propaganda throughout the war reflected the general emotions of Chinese and echoed the Nationalist government’s military and political campaigns. In April of 1939, the Nationalist government issued the “Program for National Spiritual Mobilization” (Guomin jingshen zongdongyuan gangling 國民精神總動員綱領),98 which emphasized the importance of strong spirit for winning the war and called upon all Chinese to focus their minds and energy on the cause of resistance. Chinese of all walks of life should single-mindedly encourage each other, and adjust their lives to the war environment so that they could achieve the common goal of defeating Japan. The program stated that the combined mental power of all Chinese people would effectively alter the national morale and improve military situation. In response to the government’s policy, Tan Puzhi elaborated a Buddhist view of mind to emphasize the importance of spiritual mobilization for victory. In his article “Spiritual Mobilization and the Theory of Consciousness-Only,”99 he discussed the Buddhist notions that mind and matter cannot entirely be separated. Mind may exert influence and cause reactions in matter so that the latter can be transformed and its function improved. According to Tan Puzhi, the strength of a nation-state is the cumulative result of the mental activities of all its people. Mind can change matter only when it is focused; accordingly, the course of the

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Anti-Japanese War would be enhanced if the minds of all Chinese people concentrated on the single object of expelling the Japanese. Tan Puzhi also indicated that the collective karma of all Chinese in the past had incurred the disaster in current China; thus, in order to change the situation, they had to work together to eliminate their past negative karma and build up good karma by destroying the Japanese. It is evident that Tan’s article was not aimed at explaining Buddhist doctrine. Although Tan emphasized the effect of mind on the physical world, he paid no attention to the most important aspect of “consciousness-only” in the Dharmalaksna School that nothing but consciousness is real and that no one should attach to any worldly phenomena. Cai Shu in “Saving the Nation Must Begin with Observing the Five Precepts” argued that killing in order to stop the war did not fall into the category of killing at all. Therefore, observing the precept of non-killing means to kill those who attempted to kill more Chinese. He compared this situation to a tumor that must be removed in order to maintain good health of a patient. In this case, a doctor should not be blamed but praised for eliminating it in order to save the patient’s life. Therefore, one who observes the precept of non-killing should kill enemies in order to stop further killing. Cai Shu reminded Buddhists and other Chinese that this kind of killing must be done without showing hatred and must be constantly guided by wisdom and truly motivated by compassion.100 Although some of these Buddhists attempted to find justification in Buddhism for Buddhists participation in the resistance war, others openly said that Buddhist doctrines were outdated, invalid for Buddhists at this time to wholeheartedly engage in the war. The teachings preached by Śakyamuni Buddha, though relevant at the time of the Buddha or later, had become irrelevant 2500 years now. They asserted that a new Buddhism should be established completely based on the needs of the current war. They even claimed that the Buddha, if he were alive, would teach Buddhists, especially monks and nuns, how to answer the war of invasion with justifiable violence. Zhang Zhirang challenged the validity of Buddha-Dharma, especially the concept of loving kindness and the discipline of non-killing, which he believed could not transform the malicious and brutal nature of Japanese people.101 Even the Buddha would not be able to change the incorrigible Japanese, who were fated to believe that their destiny was to kill other human beings, how could others? He asked. In addition, Buddhist morality and doctrine should not be used to indoctrinate Chinese people, because these teachings might reduce their spirit of fighting to resist evil. To implement Buddhist teachings among Chinese people, Zhang continued, was exactly what Japanese invaders wanted. It is striking that Shi zi hao, a Buddhist journal, would publish such an article overtly calling for complete abandonment of Buddhist teachings. Zhang’s doubts about the validity and usefulness of Buddhism may have resulted from his

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frustration about the inefficacy of Buddhist efforts in the war. It may reflect the situation that some Buddhists continued to oppose Buddhist participation in the war based on Buddhist teachings. Zhang’s position also expresses the eagerness of some Buddhists to serve the nation, and the belief that the resistance war was supreme and anything that stood in its way should be swept aside. Yingshun, at the time a young scholar monk and now one of the most learned in Taiwan, however, insisted that Buddhist doctrines could deal with the reality of the violent world and provide a solution to the problems of humanity. In his article, “Buddhist Views on War,”102 published in Shi zi hao in December 1941, Yingshun, based on the texts in the Āgmas, held that war and conflict, rather than peace and harmony, are the reality of the world, even though people may refuse to believe so. War is inevitable because it is generated by the three poisons of craving, hatred, and ignorance, which prevail as long as the human world exists, while peace is an idealized hope of humanity and a goal humans struggle to achieve. Only those who have cut off these three poisons can break the net of conflict and live in peace.103 Referring to the views that if there is no “I” or “mine” there cannot be the consequence of violence so that people who uphold these ideas will adopt pessimistic attitude or engage in heartless killing, Yingshun wrote, the doctrine of no-self does not endorse random killing because it does not deny the law of cause and effect, which is manifested in continuation of human activities. Buddhism promotes humanity and encourages people to achieve nirvana here and now, which is the complete absence of conflict. Yingshun continued, “Whether unity, happiness, and peaceful co-existence are possible or not, they always remain the common hope of human beings, the right path of human progress. Similarly, whether conflict and war are sinful or not, they are reality, and can be completely eliminated only when human existence comes to an end.”104 Yingshun encouraged Chinese people to accept the reality of the war without falling into pessimism, and to try to deal with it realistically. He emphasized that although Buddhism condemns wars of invasion, Buddhists are allowed to take part in war against invasion, as a last resort to restore peace and justice. He quoted a story from the Jātaka Sūtra 本生經,105 in which the Buddha gave his blessing to a Buddhist soldier who came to bid farewell before he marched to war. After peaceful means fail, Yingshun said, “all Buddhists” should fight without hatred so that they may mollify the cruelty of the invaders. It is interesting to notice that throughout the article, he did not differentiate between clergy and lay Buddhists, but used the general term fojiaotu 佛教徒, “followers of Buddhism.” Having thus analyzed Buddhist attitudes on war, he concluded: This war [the Anti-Japanese War] is aimed at destroying the lunatic Japanese militarists, not at showing hatred against ordinary Japanese people. It will end

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only when Japanese military power collapses so that we, together with those Japanese who love peace, can establish the friendship of unity, happiness, and co-existence. . . . We do so not for revenge, but with great compassion, for the sake of justice and freedom. For the sake of compassion, we need fight the war, and we must sacrifice ourselves to realize it. [Only then] can the world materialize the idea that “the man with great humanity has no enemy” and achieve the victory of freedom and happiness for all people.106

Unlike other young monks, Yingshun did not directly call for “compassionate killing,” but urged Chinese Buddhists to unite, accepting reality and fighting enemies with the ultimate hope of eliminating conflict and violence caused by Japanese invasion. Buddhist propaganda emphasized the unity and cooperation among Chinese Buddhists, who had been disunited for long time. Shortly after war broke out in 1937, the headquarters of the Chinese Buddhist Society in Shanghai failed functioning properly; there was no national organization to unite Buddhists in the Nationalist-controlled areas. Some intellectual monks, in criticizing Buddhist inefficiency, urged Buddhists to learn from Muslims and Christians and to set up a nationwide Buddhist organization so that they could effectively participate in the war. Juzan went further and suggested that the government intervene in Buddhist affairs to provide direct leadership for Buddhists in the war by reorganizing the Chinese Buddhist Society.107 In criticizing the disorganization, inefficiency, and obstinacy within the monastic community, Juzan made sharp comments about contemporary leading monks who he claimed were abandoning their duties in the resistance war. He praised Taixu for having unambiguously called on Buddhists to act against the Japanese invasion, for his efforts to reorganize the Chinese Buddhist Society,108 and for his missions to Burma, India, and Sri Lanka. But, according to Juzan, Taixu, full of enthusiasm and new ideas, was not prudent enough in training his disciples,109 and he failed to unite the Buddhist masses because he was always surrounded by a small group of Buddhist bureaucrats from the middle class. Taixu was an excellent propagandist, yet his efforts to bring Buddhists into the resistance war were not fruitful because he ignored the support of capable monk activists. In contrast, Juzan was unreserved in his criticism of Yuanying for both his lack of ability in organizing the Chinese Buddhist Society and his role in the resistance war. Yuanying’s knowledge and integrity, Juzan asserted, could not be compared with that of Taixu, yet Taixu was unable to replace him because Yuanying was supported by powerful conservative monks and by corrupt yet politically influential lay Buddhists in Shanghai and Zhejiang.110 Juzan’s comments on Taixu and Yuanying may have revealed common opinions of Buddhist reformers on these two most famous monks. Taixu went to

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Chongqing and became actively engaged in the resistance war, while Yuanying remained in Shanghai under the occupation of the Japanese. The war showed that reformist monks were more concerned with the nation than were the conservatives, and that the government and society should support the former in the future.111 According to Juzan, more rapid and effective reform within Buddhism, however, was needed to bring Buddhists, especially monks and nuns, into the war. He then went on to suggest a nationwide Buddhist framework because more than one million clergy with enormous wealth in temple properties could make important contributions to the war. In attempts to launch a new Buddhist reform movement, Juzan called on all monks and nuns to become either intellectuals or economically self-sufficient, or else to leave the sangha.

CONCLUSION In the early twentieth century, Japan was regarded by many Chinese intellectuals and politicians as a model for the modernization of the nation; so too, Japanese Buddhism, which after the Meiji Restoration became more engaged in social and political affairs, impressed many Chinese monks, who either studied in or visited Japan. Taixu, who toured Japan three times in 1917, 1925, and 1929, formulated modern monastic education based on what he observed in Japan and opened the Wuchang Buddhist College in Wuhan. He was engaged in Buddhist exchanges between two countries and believed that Buddhism, the common faith of Chinese and Japanese, could further strengthen the cooperation between the two nations, which would lead Asia to encounter the West. His Buddhist reform, aimed at bringing monks and nuns into social and political life, reveals certain influence of modern Japanese Buddhism. However, after the military conflict between Chinese and Japanese troops in Jinan in 1928, Taixu became a critic of Japanese Buddhists who, according to him, had detracted from the true Buddhist path by conniving with and supporting Japanese aggression against China, yet he spared no effort to persuade them against Japanese imperialistic policy. Meanwhile he urged Chinese Buddhists to prepare themselves for and participate in resisting Japanese invasion, and justified his call as the way to revive Buddhism. Although, such justification may be regarded as rhetoric excuse for his strong nationalism, the reader should also keep in mind that he may have truly believed that monks and nuns, by involving in the resistance war, could bring a new opportunity for Buddhism in China. In fact, after the war ended, he did receive a mandate from the government for carrying out Buddhist reform with the expectation of Buddhist revival. Although a great number of Buddhist journals disappeared soon after the beginning of the war, the remaining ones and new ones such as Shi zi hao doubled their propaganda efforts to condemn the Japanese invasion and to encourage the

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fighting spirit of Chinese people; they became dominant Buddhist intellectual activities in the areas controlled by anti-Japanese forces. In order to win broad support from Buddhists, Buddhist propaganda was conducted in minority regions and neighboring countries. While criticizing Japanese Buddhists for supporting the Japanese and puppet governments, some Chinese monks politicized their own activities and offered their services to their own government. All these efforts may indicate that these monks tried everything possible for the resistance war. Nevertheless, there were some Buddhists who still believed that Buddhist moral teachings diametrically reject violence and can not be used to justify Buddhist participation in the war; some revisions, such as “killing one for the sake of saving many” and “justified self-defense,” had to be recreated to defuse the apparent violation of the precept of non-killing. Some others, realizing Buddhist morality might be detrimental to the war effort, advocated the complete abandonment of “old” Buddhism in order to create a new tradition that would unequivocally provide strong and effective ways for Chinese Buddhists to resist the Japanese invasion. It would be unthinkable at normal time that such proposal could appear in Buddhist journal, but at this time of national crisis, all Buddhists are legitimately urged to give their priorities to the resistance war. Such proposal, although extreme, may have manifested actual situation Buddhism faced at the time that monks and nuns had to fight the war and fight for the survival of Buddhism simultaneously.

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Chapter Four

Buddhist Participation in the War

Buddhist participation in the war took many forms, including preparation for monks’ and nuns’ involvements in warfare. The previous chapter examined how Chinese monks and especially Taixu, who was regarded as “a friend of Japanese Buddhists,” called on Japanese Buddhists to resist the war and how they urged Chinese Buddhists to fight Japanese invaders. While Buddhist propaganda continued during the resistance war, Chinese monks became more directly involved in war affairs. This chapter focuses on these forms of more direct Buddhist engagements, beginning with military training of clergy that prepared monks and nuns for the war activities.

MILITARY TRAINING OF THE CLERGY At the beginning of 1936, a massive campaign for the military training of Chinese youths was carried out nationwide in preparing for war. In the middle of 1936, the magistrate of Wuxi County sent a letter to the Department of General Supervision for Military Training, suggesting a class to train clergy-soldiers. The branch of the Chinese Buddhist Society in Wuxi supported the idea and helped the magistrate draft regulations and an outline of the training.1 The central government immediately endorsed the proposal and ordered that the training of monks and nuns should be implemented nationwide. Within a few days, the Executive Yuan issued an edict that all young and physically fit monks and nuns should undertake military training. The government’s order received enthusiastic response from young monks of Buddhist colleges, who believed that by undertaking military training Buddhists could respond positively to the prevailing spirit of nationalism and show Buddhist services to the nation. The order was opposed, however, by conservative monks who were afraid that military training would eventually force them to violate Buddhist discipline. Many clergy in Sichuan petitioned the Chinese Buddhist 105

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Society in Shanghai to persuade the government that monks and nuns should be exempted from military service.2 They claimed that it was morally wrong and unacceptable under any circumstance for monks and nuns to be involved in war, the field of killing and violence.3 To resolve the dispute, Taixu, who supported the government’s decision to militarize the clergy yet would not openly challenge the monastic tradition of non-involvement in violence, sent a letter to Tang Shengzhi 唐生智,4 the Minister of the Department of General Supervision for Military Training. In the letter, Taixu said he welcomed military training for monks and nuns, but he held that they should not be drafted into regular military forces after the training; instead they could be allowed to perform less controversial work, such as rescue work and first aid. Taixu explained that social work and medical care for wounded soldiers were also important parts of supporting the national war effort. By performing rescue work, the clergy would be able to observe the precept of non-killing as they wished. Nevertheless, Taixu implied that those who preferred could take part in combat along with regular troops. In reply, Tu Xingru, the director of the Education Bureau promised that the clergy would not be conscripted into the regular army after training. Tu elaborated: According to the constitution, all citizens have both the right of religious freedom and the duty of serving in the army. All Buddhist and Daoist monks and nuns have defended their temples in the past, and they should now follow this spirit in defense of our nation. The national crisis deteriorates everyday . . . For the clergy to undergo training, however, is different from becoming soldiers, although the clergy had to share the duty of protecting the nation.5

This statement clearly indicates that because they enjoyed the freedom of religion, all monks and nuns should in return render military service to the nation. Taking into consideration their special religious profession and status, the government specified four guidelines for the training: (1) the training of the clergy would be conducted independently; (2) the monastic short sleeved robe would be used as the uniform of clergy;6 (3) the above two may be changed if the monks and nuns prefer to train along with other military trainees; and (4) after training the clergy would not be recruited to engage in combat. In response to the government’s order, the Chinese Buddhist Society issued a notice to all provincial branches, calling on them to follow it and actively organize military training. Over the next few months a number of training centers that focused on rescue work were opened in big monasteries. Buddhist societies in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shanghai, gradually sponsored sangha rescue team seminars, and numerous monks and nuns in reformed robes took part in the training. On October 17, 1936, the monks and nuns in Wuxi began their training, and completed it two months later. The Ministry of General Supervision for Military Training

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provided a special instructor for military and rescue training. During these two months, the trainees were inculcated with the idea that they were members of the nation and, therefore, were obliged to protect it. In one of their reports, which recapitulated the purpose and the results of the training, the trainees contended that the training for rescue work was in complete agreement with the Buddhist spirit of loving kindness and compassion, and of benefiting oneself and others.7 At the end of graduation ceremony, all signed their names in the pledge-register, promising that they would always love the nation and work tirelessly for its protection and the welfare of people. The military training in Wuxi thus opened the way for monks and nuns in China to prepare for war. The training program differed from place to place yet generally covered stretcher-carrying, first aid, basic medical knowledge, and drills on how to handle guns. Political studies, including the Three People’s Principles and the duties and rights of citizens, were also compulsory in many training centers. The training usually took place inside a big temple and it normally lasted one and one-half months; the sessions were run continuously one after another. Individual trainees in some areas had to pay five Yuan on food or lodging expenses, the other casts were subsided by large and rich temples in the area. The instructors were usually provided by the county administration free of charge. Young monks and nuns thus turned their temples into military training centers that dramatically transformed the life of the sangha. Even conservative monks and nuns, pushed by the government and young monks, had to change their attitudes and accept the reality of training. In December 1936, the abbots of temples in Zhenjiang 鎮江 gathered to discuss the issues of the military training of clergy; they chose Jinshan (Golden Mountain), where Jiangtian Si is located, to be the site of training. The leading monks from Jinshan, which was known for its meditation praxis and for preserving traditional Buddhism against modern reform, accepted the selection and prepared for hosting the training. On January 1, 1937, about one hundred and fifty young monks from the county started training.8 Representatives from the provincial government, the Nationalist party of Jiangsu province, the National Security Bureau in Nanjing, and the Jiangsu Buddhist Association attended the inauguration ceremony. The mayor of Zhenjiang presided over the ceremony and delivered the opening speech. The president of the Jiangsu Buddhist Society, Renshan, the hero of the Incident of Storming Jinshan in 1912, presented a major speech. He elaborated on the relations between Buddhism, society, and the nation, highlighting the Buddhist spirit of saving the world and called upon all trainees to fulfill their missions and prepare themselves for war. The curriculum of the training program consisted of the study of the Nationalist party’s ideology, politics, medicine, personal hygiene care, martial arts, first aid, and military performance. The study was intense and the training rigorous,

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four lectures and two military drills every day. Four military officers were invited to instruct the training; the mayor personally served as the general director of the training program and gave lectures on political studies. The monks were divided into nine groups of sixteen people each. The first training class was scheduled to be completed within two months, and the next batch would begin as soon as the first one ended. There was no difference in training between members of the sangha in temples and ordinary Chinese people in society, as if the former had truly become regarded as the members of Chinese nation. Eight weeks later, the commencement ceremony for all the military trainees in Zhenjiang was held in the city gymnastics stadium, and monks took part in the ceremony together with the other Chinese, who had undertaken military training. More than two thousand people, including officials from different levels of the Nationalist government, were present. The mayor gave a general report on the training and specifically praised the members of the sangha for their hard work and their nationalistic enthusiasm. Dai Jitao, Minister of the Examination Yuan, Wang Boling, a member of the Central Committee of the Nationalist party, and others delivered speeches; all of them particularly encouraged the clergy to make use of what they had learned to serve the national defense in future. At the end of commencement, an inauguration ceremony for the second session of the training took place, and a group of more than one hundred new monks were officially enrolled. Guanyuan, one of the new trainees, sent the following report to the Buddhist News 佛教新聞, describing the excitement of the monks, who participated in the ceremony.9 They got up at five-thirty that morning instead of six, the usual time. After breakfast, they assembled in front of the Great Hall and the instructor reminded them of what they had learned the day before, such as marching forward and backward, and marching left and right turns. When they arrived in the stadium, a large number of young trainees from all walks of life were already assembled there. Guanyuan was moved by their enthusiasm and discipline; all of them looked energetic and strong, ready to sacrifice their lives for the nation. He told himself that he should learn from other Chinese and prepare to serve the nation. At the end of ceremony, the mayor delivered a speech in which he made three points with regard to the military training of the monks: (1) the training reconnected institutional Buddhism with society; (2) it changed monks from material consumers to producers so that people’s attitudes toward them would also change accordingly; and (3) it improved the health of monks who had been emaciated and feeble before the training but now looked strong and energetic. The mayor mentioned nothing about how the training could benefit the nation, but only highlighted the positive results of the training for Buddhist institution and monks. This may be because the training of monks and nuns was unprecedented

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and no one would know the effect or contribution they could make to the nation after the training. The military training also included Buddhist nuns. In some cities monks and nuns were trained separately while in other places they were trained together, yet all of them were trained in similar skills. In some places, monks and nuns were dressed in military uniforms as soldiers while in others they kept reformed Buddhist robes during training. Monks and nuns in Nanjing received training in Guling Si and Jieying Si respectively.10 The Ministry of General Supervision for Military Training dispatched one officer and two assistants to conduct the training of both the monks and the nuns. All trainees wore grey military uniforms with red badges inscribed “Sangha trainees” (Sengxun 僧訓) on their sleeves. It seems that there was no political indoctrination of the clergy in Nanjing although the training as a whole was strenuous. For two hours a day, all monks and nuns were instructed in marksmanship and in how to take care of the wounded. Political indoctrination based on the Three People’s Principles was an important part of the training program for monks and nuns in many parts of China. Nationalist party and government leaders were often invited to give lectures on current politics. In the second session of training program in Zhenjiang, such a lecture was given by Mr. Yu, the director of People’s Military Training Committee.11 Yu linked the Buddhist idea of serving the world to the Three People’s Principles and the aims of the New Life Movement, and concluded that the military training of monks should blend them together. In March 1937, the Chinese Buddhist Society requested that the abbots of temples in China take courses on the Three People’s Principles, sociology, laws and regulations regarding Buddhism, and basic Buddhist knowledge.12 They must complete these four courses within two years or they would be disqualified for abbotship. The selection of abbots in the future would also be based on their performance in political studies; those who could not obtain the certificate would not be considered for the position. Military training was a big event for most temples throughout China; various views, both political and religious, were expressed about the significance of the training. Haocheng 浩成 in his article, “After the Military Training of the Sangha,” which appeared in Hai chao yin just before the war started on July 7, 1937,13 lists four significant aspects of the military training of the clergy: (1) it demonstrates the Buddhist spirit of compassion to save human beings from suffering; (2) it inspires other people to solve conflict through skillful means; (3) it fulfills the sacred duty of clergy who should repay four obligations; and (4) it clarifies the way to establish the “Pure Land in the Human World.” In general, military training was said to benefit both Buddhist institutions and the nation simultaneously. When Dai Jitao inspected the military training center in Jinshan in January 1937, he gave a lecture to the monk trainees, outlining the positive results of

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training, and predicting that a better sangha, with physically strong and morally disciplined monks and nuns, would emerge from the training.14 Dai said he had witnessed fifteen years before in 1922 violent conflict between warlords in Sichuan, robbery, killing, and burning could be seen everywhere. However, in Emei County at the foot of Mt. Emei, the holy Buddhist mountain devoted to Samantabhadra Bodhisattva, people could live in peace and harmony, thanks largely to monks who had received martial arts training and provided effective protection to the neighboring community. Dai Jitao compared the Buddhist monastic code with military discipline, and concluded that there was common ground and that both would lead to a similar goal.15 Among the 250 precepts for monks, there are a hundred that deal with the proper behavior of monks in daily life. They can be generally classified into eight categories: seeing, hearing, talking, moving, strolling, walking, sitting, and lying down. Dai maintained that there is not much difference between these rules and those required of soldiers in military training; both members of the sangha and soldiers are expected to discipline their minds and bodies. Thus, the spirit of discipline is already encompassed by the Buddhist monastic precepts; monks need only to actualize them in daily life. Both monastic rules and military discipline are aimed at benefiting oneself as well as benefiting the world, saving the world and serving people. Dai Jitao quoted a passage from The Great Learning (Daxue 大學), a Confucian text, which says that one must first cultivate his or her own personal life in order to serve the world.16 Putting this idea into a Buddhist context, monks and nuns should first practice loving kindness, compassion, empathetic joy, and equanimity. Therefore, Dai insisted, the military training of monks was entirely consistent with Buddhist ideas and practices, and also compatible with the Confucian social and political philosophy. The positive aspects of military training of clergy were highlighted in many reports that both government officials and members of the sangha praised training as the way of benefiting self and others. No direct report exists in available information that monks and nuns complained that they had to neglect their religious practice for the sake of training. However, some reports imply that not all monks and nuns who participated in the training looked it in the same way or took it seriously; some thought that the training was just a show like many social and political movements of the day sponsored by the government that they would never actually be asked to go to war. In a report to Fo hai deng on June 1937, Xifan gave an account of one day’s training in a Buddhist temple. When the training began, some monks were disturbed and thought that the military training of the sangha was a sign of mofa 末法, the degeneration of Dharma, while others complained that the training was ridiculous and lacked in respect for religious practitioners. These clergy, however, could not openly defy the government’s order and accepted

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the training with reluctance; they performed their duties languidly and in a perfunctory manner. After three months of training and political studies, the clergy had learned nothing; some of them could still not recognize the national flag, yet all of them were certified for graduation by an army instructor. At the end, the leading monk who was in charge of the training revealed the secret of the training: “Everyone’s mind should be settled now. Even if a war occurs in the country, it will surely be unnecessary for us to take up arms, [and there will be] no need for us to bury dead bodies or to take care of the wounded. To tell the truth, it is only in order to get certificate that we undergo the training, nothing more.”17 This isolated report may have reflected the attitude of some monks and nuns who were forced to take part in training. Xifan worried about what would happen to the nation if all Chinese citizens who received military training thought and acted the same as them. In some areas military training was not undertaken voluntarily, but was imposed on monks and nuns by the government or by the leaders of Buddhist organizations. On the first page of the Buddhist Daily News of April 28, 1937, a report relates the story of how Buddhist monks and nuns in Nanjing changed their monastic robes into military uniforms and zealously participated in the training with the Buddhist spirit of serving the world. In contrast, another report, immediately following, reveals how the abbots of the temples in Nanjing reluctantly and helplessly accepted the training. The monks and nuns in Nanjing complained that municipal government officials made use of training as an opportunity to extract contributions from them. At first, the Nationalist government promised that military instructors as well as their assistants would train monks and nuns free of charge, although the temples should provide meals and transportation.18 A few days later, another order ruled that instructors should be paid, but not more than fifty Yuan per person. Nevertheless, the monks and nuns in Nanjing were asked to pay a salary of one hundred fifty Yuan and a transportation fee of eleven Yuan to the instructor, twenty Yuan to each of three assistants, and twelve Yuan to a military bugler—altogether three hundred and thirty three Yuan.19 When the clergy complained that they were overcharged, the government officials explained that the fee of fifty Yuan was specified in an old regulation that had been recently suspended. The clergy also had to supply their own military uniforms even though the central government’s order had unambiguously stated that they could use their robes during the training.20 When they protested this irregularity, the local government officials told them that the old order had been replaced by a new one. As some monks and nuns could not afford to buy the uniforms, the training was delayed again and again even though the government repeatedly sent memoranda urging them to solve the problem. Meanwhile, the municipal government

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persuaded temples in Nanjing to donate nine hundred and ten Yuan each month to the military training programs of the five districts of the city. The Buddhist Society in Nanjing, on behalf of all temples, petitioned the government to reduce the amount. In the end, the sum was reduced to five hundred Yuan on the condition that monks and nuns had to purchase training tools, such as stretchers and other medical equipment for the training centers in the five districts. In order to pay the contributions and the fees for the military training, it was suggested in a meeting of abbots in Nanjing that all monks and nuns, except those over eighty and below sixteen years of age, should pay one Yuan every month. In the discussion, this suggestion was replaced by another proposal, which was unanimously endorsed by the abbots that those who took part in the training might pay a half Yuan per month, while those who were old or sick should pay one Yuan per month; in this way all would be able to get certificates of training from the Buddhist Society in Nanjing. Nevertheless, despite such problems as the reluctance of clergy and abuse of power by government officials, the military training of the sangha was an extraordinary phenomenon, which not only prepared clergy trainees for war but also shortened the distance between the sangha and society. The training was expanded after the eruption of the war in 1937. Local Buddhist organizations in provinces and cities gradually adapted the popular Buddhist practice of forming sangha rescue teams to save and assist wounded soldiers. Sixty monks and nuns in Yunnan and forty in Chongqing were selected to undertake military training respectively at the beginning of the war. Some monks and lamas even entered military training centers run by the government and received formal training as military officers.21 After one or two months training, these monks and nuns marched to the front and transported injured soldiers between the battle and hospitals. In October 1937, the monks in the Chinese-Tibetan Buddhist College in Chongqing began their training.22 In their daily routine, besides classes on Buddhist studies, the students assembled to raise the national flag and sing Nationalist party anthem. The training, which encompassed twenty other monks from nearby temples, was divided into two groups. The monks of one group specialized in rescue work in battlefields, while the monks of another group learned how to provide security, and to safeguard social order in the unoccupied areas. In 1942, fourteen students were selected from the college and took part in the Summer Camp organized by Young Squad of the Three People’s Principles.23 Once the war intensified, a large number of training centers were opened in the Nationalist controlled areas to prepare monks and nuns. For instance, at the end of 1938, Sichuan Sangha Rescue Team was founded in Wenshu Si 文殊寺 in Chengdu; one hundred and twenty monks and nuns were trained at one time.24

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RITUALS FOR THE NATION AND DONATIONS TO THE MILITARY Buddhist participation in the war was manifested in different ways depending in particular military and geographic situations. Although some clergy were inspired by the rising nationalism and patriotism, others may have acted spontaneously out of the Buddhist ideal of great compassion to save the lives of Chinese soldiers and refuges. In many areas where clergy made contributions to the war, it is difficult to categorize their motivation one way or the other. Nevertheless, whether inspired by nationalism and patriotism or influenced by Buddhist compassion to save lives, the clergy made their contributions to the war through expedient ways and a variety of means. The most conventional and convenient method of Buddhist protection of the nation was ritual performance, although, as was discussed earlier, many young monks doubted its immediate efficacy. No one knows exactly when the Buddhist tradition of conducting rituals on the behalf of the nation began, but it is certain that the practice was regularly performed in the Sui and Tang dynasty. During the Kaiyuan Period (713–741) three great monks, Subhakarasimha, Vajrabodhi, and Amōghavajra, frequently performed esoteric rituals for imperial Tang state. Especially during the An Lushan Rebellion, Amōghavajra was requested by the court to organize rituals and chant dharānis dedicated to the protection of the empire. The rituals were said to have eventually facilitated defeat of rebels in 755. Later on, the practice evolved alongside the ancient Chinese tradition of sacrifice and prayer, and became integrated with Daoist practices of exorcising evil and inviting good fortune. The tradition gained further popularity in the Qing court. Whenever there were rebellions, the court would invite monks, especially lamas, to perform such rituals. In the early 1930s, it was widely speculated in Chinese society, especially among Buddhists, that 1936 would be the year when a cycle of disasters for human beings began. In May 1936, Buddhists in Shanghai voluntarily organized rituals for eliminating national disasters and praying for the return of peace.25 Chisong, a master of esoteric Buddhism, was invited to perform rituals for seven days. Meanwhile, Nenghai and Changxing were to give lectures on various Buddhist scriptures. All merit resulting from such religious services was then directed to the cause of national safety. In the fall of 1936, when Chinese troops led by Fu Zuoyi successfully repelled the invasion of Suiyuan 綏遠 by Japanese and Inner Mongolian troops, the victory encouraged the Chinese to resist foreign invasion.26 In support of Chinese soldiers and to pray for Chinese victory, Yuanying and other well-known lay Buddhists in Shanghai organized a ritual ceremony on a grand scale from the November 22 to 29, 1936. Yingguang, a master of the Pure Land

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School, was invited to leave his religious confinement to give lectures in Shanghai. As it was expected, the participation of Yingguang, whose fame and virtue were well-known to Chinese Buddhists, attracted generous donations from Buddhists to the national defense fund.27 Dai Jitao (1891–1949),28 one of the staunchest followers and theorists of Sun Yatsen’s Three People’s Principles, showed special interest in organizing such rituals on behalf of the Nationalist government. Dai was a devoted and committed lay Buddhist in the Nationalist central government, and provided valuable service for the development of Buddhist institutions in the Republican era. He believed that the contemporary social and political instability of China to a great extent was caused by the collective karma of all Chinese people. In order to get rid of such negative karmic force, everyone would have to sincerely repent through religious practices and rituals. He was also convinced that this world was blessed by Buddhas and bodhisattvas who frequently manifested themselves in society to save people even though it was full of suffering and evil. On November 16, 1931, shortly after the Mukden Incident, Dai Jitao sponsored the Buddhist Assembly of [Reciting] Humane Kings [Sūtra] for National Protection (Renwang huguo fahui) 仁王護國法會 in Baohua Shan, one of the most famous sites for Buddhist ordination.29 One hundred monks were invited to chant the Sūtra of the Humane Kings, and many government, military, and social leaders took part. In the invocation read at the end of the rituals, Dai prayed for the safety of the nation and the happiness of people.30 In the next year, Dai Jitao, together with Li Jishen and many other political and military leaders, organized esoteric rituals at the Yonghegong in Beijing,31 and the Panchen Lama was invited to preside over the ceremony. In August 1937, when heavy fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops was taking place in Shanghai, Dai Jitao commissioned one hundred monks in Baohua Shan again to perform rituals for one hundred days, invoking the blessings of the Buddha and praying for the safety of the nation.32 In September, 1937, Guanzong Si in Ningbo began to perform a national protection ritual in its daily religious activities. On behalf of the more than four hundred monks residing in the temple, the abbot Baojing appealed to all Chinese monks and nuns to render their service immediately to the nation by performing religious rituals. In a telegram to all temples in China,33 Baojing recounted crimes and murders committed by the Japanese. He reminded the Chinese clergy of the legend that the Buddha once intervened in a war between aśuras and gods. The ferocious aśuras overwhelmed the gods, who ran away from their palaces and came to the Buddha for help.34 The Buddha told them to recite the Prajapāramita Sūtra, which would be powerful enough to expel the invasion of the aśuras. The gods followed the Buddha’s instruction and successfully repelled the enemies, recovering their palaces. Baojing then continued:

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We call upon all Buddhists, clerical and lay, to generate your loving kindness and compassion. Depending on availability of facilities, the Buddhist rituals should be held three times a day either in headquarters of Buddhist society or in a temple, or individually, reciting the Dharāni of Great Compassion (Mahakaruna Dharāni 大悲咒), or the Heart Sūtra, or any other Dharāni, or the holy name of Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva. . . . The rituals for national protection and disaster exorcism shall not be neglected until the national crisis is brought to the end.35

Baojing also warned beforehand that the performance of rituals should be seen not as a daily routine of clergy, but as the fulfilling the sacred duty of each monk and nun to the nation. The rituals should be conducted with sincerity and honesty so that its merit could be converted into powerful force to bring the war to an end, and to change national disaster into national rebuilding. If the rituals were conducted properly, Baojing said, the blessing power of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas would surely subdue the evil of the invaders. “The enemy’s warplanes and warships will miss their targets; the Japanese soldiers and officers will suddenly repent of what they have done and return to Japan peacefully.”36 After 1937, Buddhist rituals and ceremonies aimed at invoking blessings on the nation and achieving victory in the war were frequently organized in Nationalist-controlled areas. On July 7, 1939, a memorial ritual ceremony was held in Kunming to commemorate the second anniversary of the beginning of the war.37 Three elder monks presided over the rituals, which started at 10 o’clock in the morning. The Dharāni of Great Compassion was recited repeatedly in order to invoke the blessing of Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva. At one o’clock in the afternoon, all monks gathered in a hall and recited the Text of Repentance (Canhuiwen 懺悔文) and chanted the name of Bhaisajya-guru-vaiduryaprabhasa 藥師琉璃光佛.38 At four o’clock, the clergy assembled again to recite the Amitābha Sūtra and to hold a religious service devoted to those who had been killed in the war. Meanwhile, Buddhist lectures in connection with the occasion were held inside the building of the Headquarters of the Yunnan Nationalist party; Taixu and others delivered speeches to a large audience on how Buddhists could protect China. In 1938, the Chinese resistance against the invasion was locked in a stalemate, and the morale of the Chinese people and soldiers faced a great challenge. In August, Yu Youren and other leading Buddhists in the Nationalist government sent a joint letter to Jiang Jieshi, seeking permission to organize a grand Buddhist rituals in order to strengthen the determination of resistance by invoking Buddha’s blessings for Chinese both alive and dead, and to suppress evil power. They planned to collect 100.000 yuan and to perform rituals in all parts of unoccupied areas, including Inner Mongolia and Tibet.39 On September 29, Dai Jitao, jointly supported by the leaders of the Nationalist government, military generals,

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and Mongolian and Tibetan nobles—altogether one thousand five hundred—organized grand esoteric rituals in Chengdu to pray for the nation.40 One hundred and eight monks and lamas took part in the rituals to generate and transfer merit to those killed in the war. The whole ceremony lasted forty-nine days and was attended by thousands of people. Many high government officials and generals, such as general Deng Xihou and Yang Quanyu, the mayor of Chengdu, also attended the rituals.41 One of the most significant exoteric rituals sponsored by the state was held simultaneously both at Ciyun Si and Huayan Si in Chongqing from December 9, 1942 through January 26, 1943. Xuyun 虛雲, one of the most eminent Chan monks in modern China, was invited from Guangdong to preside over the rituals.42 During these forty-nine days, almost all the government and military leaders of Chongqing, including Lin Sen and Jiang Jieshi, participated in the ceremony.43 At the end of the rituals, Dai Jitao on behalf of the government recited the text of prayer, which reflected on the dangerous situation of the nation and suffering of the people. The text alleged that ever since September 18, 1931, Japanese had caused enormous damage to China. The rituals, therefore, were aimed at achieving the recovery and prosperity of the nation and the happiness of people, and at receiving blessings from the Buddhas and bodhisattvas so that China would triumph over the invasion.44 Finally, Dai called upon all Chinese, both Buddhists and non-Buddhists, to redouble their efforts for final victory. Although it is difficult to know how much contribution such rituals made to the resistance war, we must not underestimate their significance. For monks and nuns, performance of such rituals demonstrated their patriotic enthusiasm in serving the nation. Government leaders who organized or participated in such rituals showed that the government tried all possible ways to deal with the war, even if many of them might not believe that the rituals were effective in defending the nation. For the ordinary members of resistance forces, the rituals could be regarded as a psychological consultation and spiritual investment to seek the blessings of Buddhas, bodhisattvas, and deities for their struggle against enemies. Some monks were not content with serving the nation through ritual performance; they preferred to serve the nation through material donations which, according to them, could produce more visible effects. Traditionally, monks and nuns had been receivers of material gifts from society while providing society with spiritual guidance and moral example. However it became common practice during the war for monks and nuns to donate materials to Chinese soldiers, and many leading monks set examples for such practice. In 1937, Yingguang had more than thousand Francs collected from temples in Suzhou and handed the money to local organization in charge of wounded soldiers. He also donated his personal saving offered by his followers to purchase clothes for refuges.45 In October

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of 1937, students from the Chaoan Buddhist School in Zhenjiang formed the Propaganda Group of the Chaoan Buddhist School to Solicit Donations for the National Salvation Bond in Jiangsu. They went into streets and distributed antiJapanese pamphlets, urging people to purchase the bonds and thereby support the soldiers.46 The group also broadcast propaganda programs on local radio in seeking public sympathy. Their enthusiasm and hard work won support from the general society, and within a short period they received a large sum in the form of money, clothes, and cotton quilts, from people in all walks of life. In additional to material donation, some monks in Sichuan organized medical teams and went to remote villages to provide treatment to the families of these soldiers. In the summer of 1938, a group of monks from Liangshan toured the villages and treated 8522 members of soldiers’ families. During these services, they composed songs and poems in popular forms that called upon all the Chinese to fight for the freedom of the nation.47 Perhaps the most significant wartime donation was “Buddhist airplanes” for Chinese soldiers. In August 1941, both clergy and lay Buddhists from seven counties in Gansu province initiated a movement that called on Buddhists in China to donate money to the purchase of airplanes for Chinese air forces.48 Their call was supported by Taixu, who donated a hundred yuan and then urged other Buddhists to actively participate in the movement. Those who sponsored and supported the campaign unanimously held that Buddhists at this time should not differentiate between the love of institutional Buddhism and that of the nation, because those who showed patriotism to the nation were actually performing their duty of protecting Buddhist institutions. Within a few months, Buddhists in Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan responded with zeal. Staffs and students in the ChineseTibetan Buddhist College made 1100 yuan donation. The Buddhist Society in Quanzhou 泉州 requested that local monks and nuns fast for three days and donate the resultant savings to the fund for “Buddhist Airplanes.” Guanyi, a superintendent monk in Kaiyuan Si, offered twenty-one yuan, which was his life savings. According to the report given by Shi zi hao, a Buddhist society in Chengdu had already collected several thousand yuan by 1940.49 In Yunnan, the campaign that called on every Buddhist to donate “one yuan for the Buddhist airplanes” was zealously carried out, and by the end of 1941, about 200,000 yuan had been collected, more than enough for two airplanes.50 A few clergy worried that the airplanes would be used to kill massive numbers of people and that Buddhists who donated the money would therefore indirectly commit the grave karma of killing.51 In criticizing this view, Mujia reiterated the importance of killing with compassion and skillful means, and argued that “Buddhist airplanes” might be used not to bombard enemies, but as a “rescue airplanes” to save lives.52 It is to note that, as we will see in the next chapter, Chinese monks

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and nuns in Japanese-occupied areas at the end of the war also campaigned for donating “Buddhist airplanes” to Japanese soldiers and Chinese soldiers of the puppet governments,53 similarly in the doubtful name of “serving the nation.”

BUDDHIST RESCUE WORK AND FIRST AID In Buddhist tradition, attending the sick and the injured has been considered the most important of the “fields for gaining merit” (zhu futian zhong kanbing diyi 諸福田中, 看病第一). It is said that the Buddha set an example for this practice by taking care of a sick old monk, and throughout Buddhist history, many monks served as physicians. During the Anti-Japanese War, monks and nuns found a special opportunity to expand on this Buddhist tradition through taking care of wounded soldiers and civilians. Although some young monks had argued before and during the war that killing with compassion was permitted in Buddhism, the majority of monks and nuns still hesitated to exercise such “compassionate killing.” Most thought that rescuing life from being killed and taking care of the wounded were more suitable acts for the sangha. A number of sangha rescue teams in various parts of China were thus organized soon after the war broke out in July 1937. As mentioned before, Taixu first formulated the idea of the sangha rescue team in 1933; he believed that monks and nuns must fulfill their duty of protecting the nation based on the Mahayana doctrine of great compassion. In March 1936, Hongming 宏明, the abbot of Xiangling Si in Nanjing, proposed the founding of the World Red-Buddha Society (Shijie hongfozi hui 世界紅佛字會)54 in Shanghai. The society would organize Buddhist rituals aimed at national harmony and prosperity of the nation during peace time. In war time, its members would perform rescue work on the battlefield, saving lives and burying the dead without discriminating between enemy and friend.55 Nevertheless, the society was never actually established, largely because monks and nuns did not feel urgent need for such an organization. The formation of the sangha rescue teams would not become possible until the nationwide movement for the military training of monks and nuns was implemented at the end of 1936. One of the important training programs was instruction in first aid by medical experts. Immediately following the fighting between the Chinese and Japanese troops in 1937, a number of rescue teams were organized in Shanghai and neighboring cities; hundreds of monks followed Chinese troops to the warfront. These monks threw themselves into an unfamiliar and merciless war far from their own temples, undergoing tremendous hardship. When Fafang was in Wuhan at the end of 1937, he was told that about twenty-four monks from a temple alone in Tai County 泰縣 voluntarily accompanied seven military groups and marched with them to the north,56 all of them dressed as soldiers except that they had

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incense-burn scars on their foreheads.57 One day in Wuhan, Fafang met a monk in military uniform who had just returned from warfront. No one could recognize that he was a monk until he showed his sangha rescue team identity card. According to this monk, numerous others like himself were working hard under unbearable conditions at the front. Due to a lack of records and the general disorder of the times, no one knows exactly how many clergy were directly engaged in warfare. The available information shows that monks from big temples in the south were organized and sent to the front. Having exchanged their religious robes for military uniforms, they served Chinese troops and rescued the wounded as did other Chinese.58 Their special identity as clergy disappeared as they merged into the resistance forces. To some monks, concealing their monastic identity could make their participation in the war less controversial and in that sense more convenient. Nevertheless, many others, most young reformers, felt that by wearing a military uniform instead of Buddhist robes the significance of their participation in the war might be undermined. They believed that showing their monastic identity of Buddhism during rescue work was a great opportunity to extend Buddhist influence in society and to change the image of the sangha. According to Fafang, monks should openly show their religious identity by wearing Buddhist robes when they worked on the battlefield, letting the world know that Buddhist monks were also serving the nation. By doing so, the monks not only made contributions to the war but also showed to Chinese people that clergy were not parasitical consumers but contributing members of the nation. The monks donned with robes could also remind themselves frequently that they should make use their special status to enhance the morale of Chinese soldiers. Fafang suggested that the monks find all possible opportunity to instruct soldiers in the Buddhist teaching of great compassion. The soldiers who realized that killing enemies was the way to save more lives would fight more heroically without feeling of guilt and fear. Fafang also encouraged his fellow monks not to disregard wounded enemies, but give them equal treatment during their rescue work. Given the situation of the war, this action required more courage and understanding; yet it would demonstrate true spirit of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism, according to Fafang. Immediately after the incident of July 7, 1937, one hundred strong young monks selected from four temples in Shanghai gathered in the Buddhist Orphanage of Shanghai to get ready for first aid work in battles. After five days of training in September,59 they participated in rescue work in Shanghai. The monks in Jiaxing also organized the Jiaxing Sangha Rescue Team. Led by Yansheng, they brought food and other necessary war supplies to Chinese soldiers in Shanghai. On their return, they took the wounded soldiers back to their temples and provided medical care to them.60 In September, a Buddhist rescue team was

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organized by the Right Faith Society in Hankou under the leadership of Taixu. The members of the team distributed food and clothes to soldiers and refugees in the street. When the Japanese attacked Wuhan at the end of September 1938, they risked their lives and rescued more than a hundred soldiers under heavy air bombardment and gunfire.61 The war was without mercy to everyone, yet it appeared even more ruthless to the monks, who had been used to a peaceful environment far from the turmoil of the world. Even more difficult, they had to constantly face the reality of killing and being killed. Nevertheless, most of them were able to transform their “monkmentality” significantly to “war-mentality” and act bravely when they worked on the front. Jiaoru 皎如, a young monk from Shanghai, started his military training in May 1937. The incident of August 13, in which the Japanese attacked Shanghai, forced the training to end early so that the trainees could go to perform first aid for wounded soldiers. The team was divided into two large, six medium, and twelve small groups, with each small group consisting of fourteen monks. Day and night, they transported wounded soldiers from battlefield to hospital. With the help of six ambulances, they rescued thousands of wounded soldiers and injured refugees. The following letter written by Jiaoru to one of his monk-brothers reveals his war experience: . . . . It has been more than two months since we started rescue work on August 14. Whenever I recall what I heard and saw, the feeling of sadness and grief overcomes me, and tears cannot help but run out of my eyes like raining. The enemy’s airplanes constantly flew over us and the sound of the explosion of the cannon shells was continually around us. Fortunately, there were few casualties in our team. On September 13, one was killed and three were seriously wounded.62

The war brought dramatic changes to these monks, and great courage and a spirit of self-sacrifice were needed for them to work on the battlefield. The same courage and spirit were also required for monks and nuns to work in hospitals and take care of the wounded. The monks in rear areas were expected to have additional qualifications, such as caution and patience in order to provide good service to injured soldiers. In his article, “Awakening of Clergy in Rear Areas,”63 Cihui, a young monk in Zhenjiang, expressed his admiration for the heroic actions of monks selflessly serving at the frontlines. These monks demonstrated the usefulness of Buddhism to the nation and showed their great compassion to the world. Cihui therefore called upon all Chinese monks and nuns in rear areas to follow their example and to serve the Anti-Japanese War by taking care of the wounded soldiers, looking after their welfare through material donations, and preparing themselves to go to the front. Cihui maintained that all monks, whether engaged

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in sacrificing their lives in battle or in taking care of the wounded in hospitals, were rendering double service to both the country and Buddhism. It was common for these monks to connect their service in the war with Buddhism and claim that such services would benefit the sangha. Besides the reasons they put forward that the state and institutional Buddhism shared common destiny, such claim may indicate that the call for working for Buddhism was more justifiable and more appealing to ordinary monks and nuns than the call for defending the nation. During the first two or three months of the war, Chinese soldiers and people suffered tremendous casualties, and hospitals were far from sufficient. Many temporary clinics and hospitals were set up in open areas. Temples became the designated sites to accommodate the rapidly growing numbers of the wounded; monks and nuns served in these hospitals as nurses. On October 31, 1937, a group of more than four hundred wounded soldiers was assigned to one temple in Huai’an 淮安. The monks of the temple immediately vacated seventy rooms for the soldiers and prepared themselves to provide medical care.64 They were divided into two groups with twelve in each and attended the soldiers by turns. Besides taking care of their wounds, the monks also helped the soldiers to write letters to their beloved ones and colleagues. Lengding, the abbot of the temple, thus instructed the monks: When you bandage the wounds of soldiers, apply medicine, clean sores, or given them consolation, you must do it with compassion. Don’t get disgusted with the dirtiness, or dislike being bothered. You must be patient and mindful when you are doing all these things. You should regard these injured soldiers as if they are your parents. They are injured in protecting our nation. It is time for us to serve them.65

Many monks felt obliged to serve the wounded, because to them, taking care of these soldiers, whose injuries were caused by their protection of the nation, was no different from serving the nation directly on the battlefield. Soon after the war broke out in Shanghai in August of 1937, the monks from Dinghui Si, Jiangtian Si, and the Zhulin Buddhist School in Zhenjiang were organized to provide medical care for wounded soldiers. Every day five monks from each of these three institutions worked in hospitals in alternating shifts. They made use of what they had learned in their military training and patiently attended to the wounded soldiers. Many of them even became fond of their work and vied with each other to get their chance to serve. Zongru, one of students from the Zhulin Buddhist School, sent the following report to Hai chao yin: Every morning when the sun is about to arise, we get up and rush to patient rooms, which are full of the suppurating-blood smell of festered wounds. We bring water and food to these wounded soldiers, change their bandages or

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Evidently, these young monks in their early twenties humbly and dutifully performed their work, attending soldiers, cleaning their wounds, and changing their dirty clothes without complaint. Due to insufficient medical care and poor facilities in the hospitals, some of which were just temporary tents in open areas, wounded soldiers in their gloomy chambers among deadly atmosphere were exposed to both physical and mental pain, continuing to experience the trauma and terror of war; they were easily agitated and their temper often exploded. The monks needed extreme care and patience to pacify and console them.67 The miserable sight of broken legs and arms, wounded bodies, burned skin, and bruised eyes, made the monks feel badly that they could not do more. In order to mollify the pain of the soldiers, as Zongru reported, the monks tried to talk to them with gentle words, greeting them with smiles and consoling them with Buddhist teachings. Meanwhile, working in the hospital was not risk-free, because Japanese air raids could occur at any moment. At the end of 1937, dozens of Japanese warplanes would bomb Zhenjiang city every day. The monks had to work under the danger of air attacks as they transported wounded soldiers from place to place.68 Yunnan, which used to be called the backdoor of China, became the front gate of the Nationalist government in communicating with the outside world. The clergy in Yunnan, under the leadership of Taixu, played an active role in supporting the resistance war. The Ciji Hospital of the Yunnan Buddhist Society and the Yunnan Sangha Rescue Team were founded in the middle of 1939.69 The hospital was open to the public and offered medical treatment to both soldiers and refugees. The Yunnan Sangha Rescue Team was active in rescuing soldiers from battlefields and refugees from disaster areas. In Guangzhou, the Buddhist Golden Swastika Rescue Team 佛教金卍字 救護隊 was founded by the lay Buddhist Xie Yingbo 謝英伯 in August 1938.70 A large number of clergy and lay Buddhists and even non-Buddhists were active members of the team. A well-known doctor in Guangzhou was invited to train the members in first aid and in how to deal with gas attacks. Meanwhile, a war orphanage was opened to accommodate the children whose parents were engaged in the war.71 On September 11, when Japanese launched an air raid in Guangzhou, the members of the team rushed to the disaster area and transported wounded people to hospitals. When it was reported that the Japanese would use poison gas to attack Guangzhou, the leaders of the team decided to purchase gas masks and invited two lay Buddhists to teach them how to deal with the gas attack. After they learned the techniques, the members transmitted their knowledge to the members of other rescue teams in Guangzhou. Later on, the team was merged

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into the Rescue Committee of Guangdong, and continued to work with others in saving people’s lives. Many lay Buddhist rescue teams, like the Buddhist Golden Swastika Rescue Team, late lost their Buddhist identity as they merged into other local government or non-government organizations; information about their activities after the mergers is unavailable. However, scattered information can be found about the activities of the sangha rescue teams in Buddhist journals, government documents, and news media, which showed special interests in reporting on this new war-time phenomenon. The Buddhist Society for Supporting the Resistance against the Enemy in Hunan (Hunan fojiao kangdi houyuanhui 湖南佛教抗敵後援隊) and the Sangha Rescue Team of the Buddhist Society in Chengdu (Chengdu fojiaohui Sengqie jiuhudui 成都佛教會僧伽救護隊) are only two examples of these teams. Nevertheless, either because of incomplete information or because they did not function properly or dissolved soon after they were founded, not much detail is known about their activities. Thanks to the reports filed by Leguan, the work of the Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team (Shanghai sengqie jiuhudui 上海僧伽救護隊) and Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team (Ciyusi sengqie jiuhudui 慈雲寺僧伽救護隊) became widely known in Buddhist society and came to be regarded as the paradigm of Buddhist participation in the war.

SHANGHAI AND CIYUN SI SANGHA RESCUE TEAMS When the news spread to Shanghai that war had broken out near Beiping on July 7, 1937, the leading members of the Chinese Buddhist Society held an emergency meeting at Jueyuan 覺圓, and unanimously passed a resolution to call on all Buddhists to actively take part in resisting Japanese invasion. The decision was then made to set up the Relief Work Team of the Chinese Buddhist Society for Disaster Areas (Zhongguo fojiaohui zaiqu jiuhutuan 中國佛教會災區救護團).72 Meanwhile, the Chinese Buddhist Society informed temples in Shanghai and Nanjing to send young monks who had previously received military training to the Jade Buddha Temple for rescue work. Within a few days, more than one hundred young monks73 gathered together. Under the sponsorship of the United Charitable Organizations for Disaster Relief in Shanghai (Shanghai cishan tuanti lianhe jiuzaihui 上海慈善團體聯合救災會), these young monks were organized to form the Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team.74 Qu Yingguang, the leader of the society, acted as the director-in-general while Hongming was chosen as the vice director but was actually in charge of team affairs. Hongming75 had been a regimental commander for many years before he took Buddhist tonsure in 1936. The team was divided into three divisions: general administration, first aid, and team affairs.76 The division of team affairs was sub-divided into three rescue sections,

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and each section had a secretary, a signalman, and a cook. All members were paid by the United Charitable Organizations for Disaster Relief in Shanghai in accordance with their rank: the vice director and the leaders of divisions would receive 20 yuan per month, the leaders of sub-sections 15 yuan, and the ordinary members 8 yuan.77 After a few days of preparation, intense military training began in Fazan Si. Information about the Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team and Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team are largely drawn from the reports provided by Leguan 樂觀 (1901–?),78 one of the most active young monks during the war. Being a member of the Nationalist party, he openly showed strong anti-Communist and pro-Nationalist sentiments throughout his writings. When the war broke out, Leguan was studying at the Deer Park Buddhist University in India. He returned to China in the hope that he could serve the nation directly, and arrived in Shanghai at the end of August 1937. He immediately joined the Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team and was soon appointed its general secretary. Members of the team had undertaken military training for hardly a week when ferocious fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops erupted in Shanghai on August 13, 1937.79 The team led by Hongming rushed to Wusong Pass, the center of war. Under heavy gunfire and air raids, the members risked their lives to rescue wounded soldiers, taking them back to hospitals inside the city. They also evacuated citizens trapped in the middle of the fighting, transporting them to refugee centers.80 Within the first few weeks, according to Hai chao yin, they rescued 27 military officers, 394 soldiers, and 48 refugees including 20 women and 8 children.81 Leguan thus described the team: Two thirds of its members are educated monks and most of them are excellent students from different Buddhist schools around China. . . . They compete one with the other for rescue work, regarding Japanese gunfire and air raids as a condition for physical and spiritual training. All of them are prepared to sacrifice their lives by performing the service to save living beings under the rain of bullets and cannon shells.82

The outstanding actions of these monks in battle, according to Leguan, soon won the appreciation of the public and encouraged other Chinese to fight the invaders. Newspapers, such as Shenbao in Shanghai, published extensive reports of their war activities and praised them as “the opponents of the War God” (Zhanshen zhidi 戰神之敵).83 With the expansion of the battlefield and the intensified attacks of Japanese troops, more and more Chinese soldiers were wounded and numerous people became refugees.84 With only four trucks serving as ambulances, the members of the team could no longer effectively perform their work. Wounded soldiers were

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not rescued on time, but often remained on the battlefields, helplessly lying on the ground waiting for rescue. The monks therefore appealed to the public to donate trucks, vans, or other transportation vehicles. According to the report of Leguan, the citizens promptly responded to their call with zeal and provided them with whatever they needed. The monks were thus able to more efficiently carry out their work, rescuing more wounded soldiers. When the Nationalist government decided to retreat from Shanghai, the members of the Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team doubled their efforts and quickly searched the battlefields in order to save every wounded Chinese soldier left behind. Finally, they rescued and quickly transported the last three hundred wounded soldiers to the international concession zone just before Shanghai was taken over by the Japanese. At this time of the war, however, all hospitals in the international concession zone were overcrowded with wounded soldiers and injured civilians. It was impossible to accommodate these three hundred wounded soldiers even though most of them desperately needed medical care. Hongming once again appealed to the public to set up a Buddhist hospital. In responding to the call, one of the Buddhist gentry in Shanghai offered to convert his huge residence complex into a hospital. Subsequently, the members of the team found ways to invite doctors and to acquire funds for medicines, beds, and bed linens. Many unknown people also voluntarily turned out to assist and donated what were needed for the hospital. Within two days, the Buddhist Hospital (fojiao yiyuan 佛教醫院) was founded and the wounded soldiers were admitted. The monks then served as nurses, providing careful first aid to the wounded soldiers. When these soldiers recovered, the monks helped them leave Shanghai secretly to rejoin their former troops. After the last soldier left the hospital, the monks performed a grand Buddhist ritual ceremony dedicated to those killed in the war and invoking blessings on the wounded. Later on, the Buddhist Hospital was converted to a temple called Qingliang Si 清涼寺.85 Before the fighting ended in Shanghai, one sect of the Shanghai Rescue Team followed the Nationalist troops to Hankou and continued their rescue work on the battlefield. The members of the other two sections left for Hong Kong on March 18, 1938 and then proceeded to Hankou. Leguan remained in Hong Kong and edited “The Memorial Volume of the Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team.”86 The collection compiled reports from radio broadcasts, magazines, and newspapers about the activities of the team, which altogether rescued 8273 people, both soldiers and refugees, during the three months of the war. The situation in Hankou, where now became the center of war, was quite different from that in Shanghai. Having settled down in Jiulian Si, the members of the team took part in transporting the wounded from the train station to hospitals, and carried out rescue work after Hankou was raided by Japanese warplanes.

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Although they were welcomed to Hankou as heroes because of their activities in Shanghai, one month later,87 the warmth of the public toward the team diminished gradually because the monks now were regarded as ordinary members of a larger number of rescue forces. Subsequently, some monks lost their enthusiasm for rescue work and the inner weakness of the team became increasingly exposed. Hongming became arrogant and began to associate with gangsters in Hankou.88 In May 1938, he and his two lay assistants were accused of treason for cooperating with Japanese, and were arrested by the military police. They were not released until several months later, when it became clear that they had been framed. Nevertheless, the reputation of the team was badly damaged; many monks, who had been proud of their war activities and the monk-uniform of the sangha rescue team, now felt disheartened and ashamed. When the case was settled, Hongming sought permission from the United Society of Charitable Organizations for Disaster Relief in Shanghai to lead the team to the war front in Xuzhou as planned, but he was told that there were no more funds for further rescue operations and the team was instructed to dissolve.89 Consequently some members returned to their own temples or went to Chongqing and studied at the Chinese-Tibetan Buddhist College; others left the sangha and went to join the Communists in Shaanxi. Hongming, disheartened and disgraced, went to Shaolin Si 少林寺 in Henan and later died in Shanghai.90 However, many members, led by a section leader named Xindao 心道, regrouped in Xi’an shortly afterwards.91 Supported by Zhu Ziqiao, an eminent lay Buddhist who was actively organizing the resistance movement in the region, the monks reassembled in Daxingshan Si 大興善寺 and formed the Sangha Battlefield Service Team. After a short period of preparation, these monks once again appeared on the battlefield. Leguan later reproached Buddhist leaders in Wuhan and Shanghai for the premature disappearance of the Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team. He maintained that the team could have initiated new Buddhism in modern Chinese history if the bureaucratic lay Buddhist leaders and conservative monks had shown a little sympathy for it by defending Hongming from false charge. Leguan further charged that the personal conflicts between Hongming and Qu Yingguang that reflected the divergence between monastic order and lay Buddhist community in general, were the primary cause of the untimely dissolution of the team.92 Leguan however never blamed the military police of the Nationalist government for making a false accusation against Hongming without sufficient evidence; instead, he praised the government for its “wise and sagacious” (xianming 贀明) decision to release him after three months of imprisonment. Leguan also lamented that many monks, after the team was dissolved, joined the Communists to show their protest against the government, thereby causing great harm to both the Nationalist government and Buddhism.

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Leguan was a member of the “new young monks” who passionately advocated military training for the sangha and Buddhist participation in the war. His strong nationalism can be seen in his work during this time. Nevertheless, his attitude towards Hongming’s incident raises doubts about the contents of his nationalism in particular and Buddhist nationalism in general: was it limited to support for the Nationalist government? Leguan, as a member of the Nationalist party, always showed his enthusiasm to defend Nationalists and criticized Communists. It is quite possible that some members, who went to Yan’an, the Communist capital and joined the communists, continued to serve in fighting against the Japanese. It may be easy to understand why this was a loss to the Nationalists, yet it is difficult to understand why Leguan considered that monks who served the nation under the Communists instead of Nationalists would cause “harm and loss” to the nation or to Buddhism. After the Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team was dissolved in Hankou in September 1938, Leguan entered the Battlefield Service Corps organized by the Nationalist government in order to receive further military training. Shortly afterward, he worked in a military hospital, serving as a secretary general. One year later, in December 1939, he went to Chongqing to undergo the military training offered by the Training Corps of the Central Government. After having registered for the training program, he lodged in Ciyun Si 慈雲寺, waiting for the next semester to begin. All of this time, Leguan wore a military uniform and acted as a civil official in the military service. Ciyun Si was the largest temple in Chongqing, newly constructed by Liu Wenhui, the warlord in Sichuan; there were more than a hundred rooms and an almost equal number of resident monks. When the Nationalists retreated west and Chongqing became the new capital, a large number of temples in the region were partially or completely occupied by these newcomers of Nationalists. The monks and nuns were told that they should share the burden of the government by which they would fulfill their responsibility as citizens and make due contributions to the Anti-Japanese War. Ciyun Si was thus jointly shared by three organizations: the Headquarters of Administrative Corps of the Ba County, the South Riverside Branch of the United Office for Rescue of Air Raids, and the South Branch of the Nationalist Party’s Youth Corps. The monks retreated to a back corner inside the temple while sharing some common areas with the occupants. After a short period of co-existence, conflicts arose between the resident monks and the members of these organizations. Zhang Tiehun, a secretary of the South Branch of the Nationalist Party’s Youth Corps and a Christian, often accused the monks of knowing only how to perform rituals for the dead and being useless for national resistance. He demanded that the monks be organized into a Monks’ Service Team on the grounds that as Chinese citizens, they had an obligation to the nation. The monks thought

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this was just an excuse for seizing more space in the temple; yet since the resistance war was regarded as the highest priority of the whole nation, they feared that they would be accused of being traitors to the nation if they rejected his demand. When Leguan was informed of the dilemma of the monks, he analyzed the situation and agreed with Zhang Tiehun’s view that everyone, including monks, should contribute to the nation at the time of national crisis. At this moment of national disaster, Leguan reiterated, the monks had to show their support for the government by sharing its burden and participating in the war. Nevertheless, he also pointed out that it was the duty of the monks to safeguard Buddhist institutions, and that the monks should reject the demand of those who showed hostility to Buddhism and those who attempted to take advantage of the military and political situations on Buddhist property. He suggested the monks in the temple organize a sangha rescue team themselves, and explained that this action would not only foil Zhang’s proposal and protect their temple property, but would also demonstrate the usefulness of Buddhism to the national cause. Leguan asserted, “If the sangha rescue team is founded to perform rescue work, it will not only show the Buddhist spirit of compassion and patriotism, but also exempt our young monks from being drafted into the army.”93 Leguan thus revealed another reason why the monks should organize the rescue team: to avoid of being conscripted into military service.94 He emphasized the importance of organizing rescue team because the government had decided to prepare for a large and long war against Japan, and Chongqing would inevitably become a target of bombardments by Japanese warplanes. Most of the monks in Ciyun Si had kept away from modern Buddhist movements of reform and education, and remained “inside the temple,” one-mindedly performing rituals for the dead. Before the arrival of Leguan, very few of them were concerned about social and political events outside, or they even knew about the Anti-Japanese War. Leguan advised them to change their self-isolation into positive involvement, and to actively participate in the resistance war for their own good as well as for the good of the nation. After several discussions among the monks, Leguan agreed not to pursue his study in the Training Corps of the Central Government, but to stay in the temple so that he could organize the rescue team.95 He then convinced Zhang Tiehun that the monks could organize the rescue team themselves and independently contribute to the Anti-Japanese War.96 The Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team was officially registered at the government department in charge of war relief. The monks were provided with thirty litters and medical bags, and 600 French francs. Seventy monks between twenty to forty years old were conscripted into the team, which was subdivided into four groups.97 Unlike the Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team, all members were monks and they had their own military uniforms and team flag. Their military helmet carried

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a badge, on which was a Chinese character for “Buddha” (fo 佛) in red. On March 18, 1940, an inauguration ceremony was convened inside the temple in front of a huge statue of Śakyamuni Buddha, a picture of Sun Yatsen, the Nationalist party flag, and the flag of the Republic of China. More than three hundred representatives from the Nationalist party, government departments, army, police, and other social organizations attended the ceremony. The flag emblazoned with the title of “Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team” was hoisted high in front of the temple. The members of the team, in uniform, performed their military exercises under the team flag before the audience. Representatives from different organizations spoken at the ceremony highly praised the monks’ patriotic actions, encouraging them to make due contributions to the nation. Afterwards, a vegetarian banquet was arranged to celebrate the occasion inside the temple. On the next day, an article with the eye-catching title of “Doffing Monks’ Robes for Military Uniforms” appeared in the Xinmin Newspaper in Chongqing. The article announced that Buddhist monks were no longer social parasites for they had joined in the fight for national freedom and independence. The article praised the monks who, for the sake of China, had temporarily put aside their robes and would sacrifice themselves for their people and country. The newspaper quotes from Abbot Chengyi’s inauguration speech: Earth and heaven have one center, everything in the universe [China] is one essence, and all people are compatriots. There will be no family if there is no nation. The country is the family of our Buddhist monks. Therefore, not only should we have the idea of nation-state, but also we must have the willingness and action of perseverance and determination [to protect the nation] by participating in the rescue services.98

The newspaper predicted that there would soon be a group of “new comrades” (xin tongzhi 新同志) appearing in the streets, working together with the rest of the Chinese for justice, peace, and freedom in China. On April 2, 1940, The Commercial Daily in Chongqing carried a report entitled, “The Śakya Buddha’s Disciples Who Can Go through Fire and Boiling Water.” The article states that the war has disturbed Chinese people of all nationalities, parties, and classes; even Buddhist clergy could no longer peacefully remain in their temples. Realizing that no one can survive if the nation is destroyed, the monks were now prepared to save the nation through effective means; they are aware that reciting sutras could not silence the enemy’s bombs and that the worship of Buddha statues will not deter Japanese shelling. The newspaper thus declares: We have witnessed a large number of monks who have exchanged their robes for military uniforms, leaving the Sūtra Recitation Hall to go to the battlefield,

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Buddhism, War, and Nationalism putting away the wooden-fish and taking up litters. Although they cannot attack enemies because of their religious precepts, their compassionate work of rescuing wounded soldiers fulfills their duty for the nation.99

These descriptions clearly reveal Chinese peoples’ change in attitude towards monks because of the formation of the sangha rescue team. The comments and remarks of the news media, absent of criticism but full of appreciation, displayed a new and fresh image of the sangha; monks were now called “comrades” instead of “parasites.” The new image of the sangha surprised some people, yet was duly appreciated by all. A journalist who interviewed Leguan in Ciyun Si was astonished: although Leguan’s head was shaved and showed some indistinct incense scars as a monk, he wore a military uniform, the same as other Chinese soldiers. Leguan held no rosary in hands, nor did he greet others by uttering the name of Amitābha Buddha and bowing with folded hands.100 His office was decorated not with Buddhist images but with portraits of Sun Yatsen, Lin Sen, and Jiang Jieshi, with flags of the Nationalist party and of the Republic of China, and with posters featuring quotations from the Buddha, Sun Yatsen, and Jiang Jieshi. Soon after the inauguration ceremony of the Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team, the monks began military and medical training as well as political study under instructors provided by the government. The training was completed in three months, and the members were ready to serve in any emergency. At the beginning, they were restricted to rescue work during the Japanese air raids on the south side of the river, where the temple was located; they could not cross the river that divided Chongqing without first obtaining permission from the Office of the United Relief for Air Raids. Several times in early June of 1940, the team was restrained from participating in rescue work as Japanese warplanes bombed the city north of the river. Although each time they tried to call the office of the United Relief for Air Raids in order to acquire permission to assist with relief work, no one answered the phone because the office staff would have already gone to air raid shelters. On June 12, 1940, the Japanese launched another bombing campaign. When the first group of Japanese warplanes struck Chongqing City on the other side of the river from Ciyun Si, the siren immediately blared in the sky over the city. The members of the Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team could clearly see the bombings and hear the collapse of buildings. Suddenly, houses were on fire and smoke rose to the sky; men and women, young and old, ran for their lives with hysterical cries for help, many of them were trapped in the falling bricks and rubble. Shocked by all this, the monks decided to cross the river without waiting for order. They rushed to the riverbank, jumped onto two rafts, and paddled towards the other shore. When they were in the middle of the river, a Japanese plane discovered them and opened fire. A bomb dropped just behind one raft and the explosion caused

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water to surge several meters high. The monks started to sing the national anthem as self-encouragement. After reaching the shore, they quickly spread out. More Japanese planes arrived, flying low over their heads. Leguan, who was at the scene, later described the situation: Surprisingly, the third batch of planes followed immediately, flying just above us in the form of three V’s . . . With a desperate shout, I ordered all the monks to lie down. At that moment, we saw the wings of the planes flip from right to left, and suddenly a series of bombs dropped down one after another as if it were raining. We had no way to escape, but shut our eyes, reciting the name of Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva and waiting for the glorious moment of death. Within a second, huge explosions resonated around us, shaking the earth as if the sky had fallen. . . . All of us fainted . . . When we woke up, we saw enormous flames and smoke in front of us . . . We stood up and checked our numbers. Thanks to the blessing and protection of Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva, all of us were alive.101

Monks immediately ran into the flames and the smoke where people were trapped. The sight was horrible: the injured, including women and children, with broken arms, legs, and bloodied faces, heads, and bodies, were desperately fleeing the flames, leaving dead and disfigured bodies scattered on the ground. Many monks had never seen this kind of ghastly scene before, yet they managed to control their fear and shock by reciting the name of the Buddha and concentrated on rescue work in order to forget their feelings. They quickly bandaged the lightly injured people, escorting them to a safe place nearby and carried the seriously wounded ones on litters to hospital. When they had almost finished in work, the siren stopped and other rescue teams arrived on the scene. From the beginning of the air raid to the completion of the clean up, the monks had busied themselves for almost a whole day, rescuing 123 people in all. The monks’ actions were praised by Chongqing news media, and Jiang Jieshi, in a weekly radio speech delivered in June 17, 1940, applauded their loyalty, courage, and self-sacrifice. Thereafter, the monks were allowed to go anywhere during air attacks without obtaining prior permission. On July 19, 1940, the team received thirty-six “White Sun in Blue Sky” badges from the Nationalist government as a reward for their services. Besides rescue work, they also took part in other anti-Japanese activities—for instance, marching in military parades and catching traitors. As part of movements called “Friends of the Wounded Ones,” and “Donating Buddhist Airplane,” they fasted for one day and donated the savings to a military fund. Unlike other rescue teams, all expenses of the Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team were paid by Ciyun Si, including a small sum of pocket money for each member.102 Their lives were austere, similar to those of most Chinese at the time, yet

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they never asked for donations nor did they apply for assistance from the government. Meanwhile, they said that they did not want to neglect their daily religious duties, but regularly carried out all monthly and annual rituals, sometimes even after having worked whole day in rescue work. Ciyun Si, unlike many other ancient temples, had no permanent estate and for its expenditures entirely depended on income from ritual services for the dead. Leguan described their lives with humor as well as pride: In order to fill our stomachs and maintain the strength to carry the litters, we perform rituals and transfer merit to the dead while saving living human beings from death. Thus, we are occupied everyday either with serving living beings or the dead. When there is an air raid, we take off our robes, pick up litters and medical bags, and run outside. If there is no air raid, we put on our robes and perform rituals in the temple. So, we often wear two different sets of clothes, the military uniform on the inside and the long sleeved robe on the outside. From early morning to late evening, we never rest, and sometimes we have to get up in the middle of night to do rescue work. Although tired physically, we are spiritually content.103

Ciyun Si was one of ritual temples that had often been criticized by Buddhist reformers and “new” Buddhist monks including Leguan; yet these monks now earned their income by performing ritual services for the dead so that they could save human lives. They continued to perform daily religious services, but their priority was now to save lives. By wearing military uniforms under their Buddhist robes, these monks were ready at any time for rescue work. In this way, they overcame the dilemma of serving the nation and commitment to Buddhism by harmonizing and fulfilling the two together. Nevertheless, the rescue team had to deal with conflict both outside and inside. Some occupants of the temple continued to bully the monks and took advantage of the war to occupy temples. One of three organizations in Ciyun Si was the Headquarters of the Paramilitary Administration of Ba County, which occupied more than twenty rooms of the temple. The leader of this organization attempted to take the dining hall away from the monks. It would be impossible for the monks, who observed strictly vegetarianism, to live in the temple if the dining hall were occupied by these non-Buddhist or even anti-Buddhist people. In protest, the monks led by Leguan closed the temple gate. In response, the paramilitaries threatened to use force to drive the monks completely out of the temple if they refused to give in. Indignant, the monks used their litters as weapons, prepared to fight to the death to protect their rights and property. Because the fame of the Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team was widespread, the paramilitary officials finally realized that it would be their disadvantage if the matter was made public and therefore abandoned their demands.

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Soon after the monks survived this struggle against external pressure, inner conflicts began to arise, and Leguan was eventually forced to resign his leadership of the rescue team in order to maintain unity and harmony of monastic community. Although Chengyi, the abbot of Ciyun Si, was the director of the Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team, Leguan held sole responsibility and control for all administrative affairs and the activities of the team. Being an outsider, he was suspected of attempting to replace Chengyi and of manipulating temple affairs. Regionalism and nepotism were common in Buddhist temple administration at the time. Some temples such as Ciyun Si were usually regarded as private property and passed on not to outsiders but to disciples or brothers in the abbot’s own lineage. Any outsider who challenged abbotship would be opposed or driven away from the temple by the permanent resident monks. This traditional regionalism certainly was a case of Leguan’s isolation, yet his radical ideas and severe criticism against local monks, and his status of “a monk in military uniform” also contributed to his resignation. Regionalism was also a major factor that kept Leguan from playing an active role in forming a united Buddhist organization in Chongqing. On May 28, 1940, at the suggestion of the Social Affairs Ministry, Leguan submitted a plan for the establishment of the Chongqing Sangha Service Team in the hope that the monks and nuns in Chongqing could be united and that the resources of Buddhist institutions could utilized for the Anti-Japanese War.104 In the proposal, Leguan suggested that since Japan had used Buddhism to invade China, the Chinese government should also use Buddhist resources in the resistance war. According to Leguan, most Buddhist temples were endowed with large properties, yet the monks and nuns of such temples were corrupt and ignorant of both Buddhist and secular knowledge and practice. He urged the government to reorganize the temples and purge the useless monks and nuns so that temple properties would be properly used and the clergy could be employed to serve the nation. Leguan maintained that Chinese monks and nuns already lagged behind in the struggle to defend the nation; he particularly criticized the monks of the large temples in Chongqing, because they always attempted to avoid being drafted into military service by ingratiating themselves with powerful people. The community of clergy, like clumps of sand, still remained unaffected, as if they had nothing to do with the war against the Japanese invasion. Leguan put forward five proposals: establish a sangha rescue team to serve in both front and rear areas; draft clergy into reserve police forces; organize schools for training monks and nuns in handicraft production; set up schools for them to study Chinese language; and form fire brigades centered on temples. He suggested that his proposals could be implemented first in Chongqing and then expanded to all Nationalist-controlled areas. If all four hundred thousand monks105 in China were properly organized and trained nationwide, Leguan predicted, they would make a tremendous contribution to

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the cause of the Anti-Japanese War. He also pointed out that Chinese clergy in general were afraid of serving in the army, and that his first two proposals would prepare them psychologically so that they could eventually be drafted voluntarily. According to Leguan, most monks, having stayed inside temples for a long time, had become stubborn and self-centered, so that they would always refuse to be submissive to the authority. He acknowledged that, as an outsider in the Chongqing region, his power and influence were limited and his plans could not be implemented without the support from the government. Therefore he asked the government to authorize him so that he could organize the clergy in Chongqing uniquely for national defending. Such a proposal was exactly what the government wanted, yet for almost two months, Leguan received no response from the Social Affairs Ministry, which was in charge of religious activities. The government may have realized that the implementation of Leguan’s plan would provoke antagonism from the sangha. His criticisms of the sangha and his radical revolutionary spirit had already isolated him from the mainstream of the local monastic community, which would fear the end of Buddhism in Chongqing if Leguan’s plan was carried out. On July 5, 1940, Leguan sent another letter to the ministry, recommending the establishment of a Chongqing Sangha Rescue Team by expanding the Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team. In this letter, he restrained his criticism of the Chongqing clergy, controlled his radical spirit and over-passionate nationalism, but emphasized the importance of Buddhist compassion in performing rescue work. He suggested selecting one hundred monks from temples in Chongqing and grouping them with another sixty members of the Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team; in this way, the proposed Chongqing team would be more effective in rendering service to the nation. This proposal attracted the attention of Yang Qi, an official in the ministry, who subsequently sent a report to the Minister, Gu Zhengan, expressing his support for the proposal.106 For the next few weeks, several preparatory meetings were held, attended by representatives from the Nationalist party, government ministries, and leading monks in Chongqing. Leguan was appointed the director of the preparatory committee. It was then decided to establish the Chongqing Sangha Service Team, the name proposed by Leguan in his first letter; funding for the organization would be provided by the government and the temples. On August 3, 1940, the plan for the team was announced and preparations were under way. Nevertheless, Leguan could not effectively bring together all the monks, some of whom posed a powerful challenge to his leadership and revolutionary ideas. In the report to the ministry after discussions with local clerical representatives, Yang Qi alleged that all the monks had attempted to distance themselves from Leguan.107

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It was already in the middle of September when the formation of the Chongqing Sangha Service Team was completed. At this time of the year, Chongqing is always covered by heavy mists, therefore, the frequency of Japanese air raids diminished and subsequently less rescue work was needed. Leguan, unable merely to sit in the temple attending ritual services and having realized his fragile position vis-à-vis the conservative monks in Chongqing, proposed to organize the Chinese Buddhist International Propaganda Walking Team in November 1940; he took three other young monks with him to Burma to launch Buddhist propaganda against the Japanese invasion.108 After Burma was occupied by Japan in 1941, he returned to Chongqing and resumed his work in the Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team. After the fall of Burma, traffic from India through the Himalayas to Kunming became the only channel for outside military and food supplies to China. In order to effectively strengthen international cooperation against Japan, China decided to send three divisions of troops on a military expedition to India. The Nationalist government also planned transportation corps to support the military operation, and called for young people to serve in nation abroad. In responding to the government’s call, twenty-two members of the Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team, including Leguan, decided to go with the Chinese troops to India. According to the policy, every family of one who served in the transportation corps would receive a 5,000 yuan allowance. According to Leguan, the monks who had no family and rhetorically regarded the country as their family donated all of it to the nation.109 On January 1, 1944, these twenty-two monks were formally drafted into the transportation corps.110 A farewell ceremony was held in Ciyun Si, and a crowd of people turned out to send them off. Before leaving the temple, the monks paid respect to the Buddha and solemnly took their vows in the Hall of Hero, saying that they were prepared to sacrifice their lives for the nation. Joining the rest of the transportation corps, the monks followed Chinese troops into battle against the Japanese on the border between India and Burma. In their daily life, the monks continued to observe the vow to be vegetarians, and they kept their religious identity. Although they wore military uniforms, as Leguan reported, the monks tried not to violate their Buddhist commitments. They never visited places of entertainment, but frequented Buddhist temples in the region, talking to the resident monks about Chinese Buddhism and the current war in China.111 In one battle, three monks were killed, and the rest did not return to Chongqing until the end of the war in 1945. The birth of the Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team had been a result of pressure by non-Buddhists and of persuasion from “the new monk.” The monks in Ciyun Si had been concerned only with ritual services for the dead, ignoring the resistance

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war. When the war worsened, it became more difficult for them to remain unaffected. Yet, no matter whether they were forced into serving the nation or whether they acted for self-protection, the founding of the Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team was significant, as it not only changed social attitudes toward the sangha but it also changed the lives of the monks. The fact that monks in Ciyun Si rejected the leadership of Leguan and that the sangha in Chongqing refused to cooperate with him, demonstrates that some monks were still not fully convinced that they should sacrifice their religion and temple property for the sake of the nation. In contrast, Leguan’s activities showed that he attempted to sacrifice Buddhism for resistance war and compel monks to serve the nation. As it was impossible for monks to remain isolated in temples without demonstrating service in the war, it was also difficult for either non-Buddhists or “new monks” to completely ignore the traditional forces in the sangha. The conflict between Leguan and monks in Chongqing may show the uneasy co-existence of “new Buddhism” and “old Buddhism” during the war.

MILITARY SERVICE AND GUERRILLA WAR At the end of 1936, the central government called the sangha to receive military training, many monks and nuns were frightened that they might be drafted into regular military service. The government promised that they would not be conscripted into military force after training, but to perform charitable tasks, such as rescue team. However, as the war situation deteriorated in 1939, the government issued the order that monks and nuns should join the army and fight Japanese enemies directly in front.112 This time, many monks responded positively to the order, and having replaced their Buddhist robes with military uniforms, fought side by side with other Chinese soldiers. It became a phenomenon that young monks encouraged each other to give up Buddhist discipline and join the army,113 because, as they expressed, they were truly convinced that it was their bound duty to serve the nation.114 Some of them even went so far to declare that monks were fighters, whose unique duty was to destroy evils.115 In the end of 1944 the war came to a crucial stage as Japan intensified its military campaign against Chinese resistance forces. The Chinese government then called upon intellectual youths, mostly college students, to serve in the army and to defend the country. Numerous college students and other intellectuals thus left their schools and were drafted into military services. Influenced by this massive conscription, young monks who had studied in Buddhist colleges could no longer remain behind or contend with their conventional service, such as rescue works and willingly left their temples and schools to serve in regular forces. In 1944, students from the Chinese-Tibetan Buddhist College in Chendu sent a

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cable to all student-monks in China to actively respond to the government order and continue to take part in the resistance war. In early 1945, four students from the college and several other young monks from nearby temples joined the army and marched to the front.116 In January 1945, nine young monks from Huaxi Buddhist College 華西佛學院 reported to the military duty. Before advancing to war front, they solemnly declared their vow and sent a letter to all Chinese monks through Hai chao yin, calling them to fulfill this historical and national mission. The letter first analyzed the dangerous situation of the resistance war, and then stated why monks should serve in the military force at this critical moment of national survival: We are Chinese youths, student-monks, and at the same time members of Chinese citizens. . . . We became extremely exited when we come to know the movement that calls intellectual youths to serve in military, and all of us decided to respond immediately. Based on Buddha’s teachings, [we will] struggle for national salvation, offer our lives to the nation and entrust our faith in the Buddha. [We] temporarily give up leisure life and religious practice in temple, to demonstrate that the spirit of Buddhism is not passivism, we monks are not cowards. [We will] disperse the wrong views about the sangha among the masses. Empowered with the heroic spirit of self-sacrifice and with the Bodhisattva’s determination of saving the world, we will eliminate evil ones who have disturbed the peace of the world.117

The letter criticized those who continued to hold the view that military service of monks was not a proper choice so far as Buddhist discipline was concerned; it argued that there was no alternative now for monks but fighting the war directly without considering any consequences. These monks promised that they would come back to pay respect to the Buddha and ask his forgiveness once they destroyed the evil army. Once monks and nuns joined the military services in war front, they would merge into the resistance forces as a whole, losing their identities. Therefore it was difficult to trace their activities afterward. However, information scattered in Buddhist records enable us to know some details about the activities of the monks, who participated in guerrilla war in Japanese-occupied areas. On March 10, 1933, Shenbao carried the news that Liangshan 亮山, skilled at martial arts, had gathered over three hundred disciples, clergy and lay, and formed an anti-Japanese base on Hongliu Mountain in Jinxi 錦西.118 He often led the troops out of the mountain to attack Japanese military camps, inflicting casualties on Japanese soldiers. His fame spread in the area and many other resistance forces came to join him. In the south, when Japanese troops advanced toward Yixing 宜興 after occupying Shanghai and Suzhou at the end of 1937, Henghai 恆海, the abbot of Chenguan Si, organized more than a thousand monks and lay Buddhists into guerrilla troops.

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After a short period of military training, the troops were joined by other resistance forces in the region and actively launched a guerrilla war against Japanese occupation.119 Some Buddhists nuns, although less recorded, also joined anti-Japanese forces and threw themselves into the war. In 1938, a group of nuns served on the first aid team at Wuhan and participated in the defense of Wuhan. After it fell, they joined the army, replacing their robes with military uniforms, and marched to the battlefield with the other Chinese soldiers.120 Zhenwei 振威, the abbot of Tongshan Si at Wukang 武康 County in northern Zhejiang, offered his temple as the base for anti-Japanese forces soon after war broke out in July 1937. When Zhenwei was young, he had learned Chinese martial arts from his master and, because of his talent and hard work, became well-known in the area. His temple was deep in a mountain surrounded by trees and bushes, an ideal place from which to launch guerilla warfare. After the fall of Shanghai, Japanese troops entered Wukang and more than one hundred refugees from nearby villages escaped to the temple. Zhenwei trained these refugees in martial arts and they all secretly joined a resistance force. Later on, he became a leader of a guerilla division and served as the vice-director of an intelligence team under the SixtySecond Division led by General Tao Guang. For the next few years, Zhenwei often led groups of guerillas during the night to assail Japanese troops stationed in Wukang, returning to the temple before dawn. According to Leguan, their activities caused heavy casualties to Japanese soldiers, deterred Chinese from cooperating with Japanese, and encouraged the villagers to resist the Japanese occupation.121 On May 27, 1942 when Zhenwei was informed that three Japanese and an interpreter were on their way to the temple, he quickly formed a plan to capture them. Zhenwei and his colleagues changed their military uniforms to monastic robes, and pretended to perform rituals in the temple. When the Japanese arrived, Zhenwei received them warmly and escorted them into the Hall of Great Hero. After sitting down, Zhenwei ordered monks to arrange a meal for the guests. While the Japanese were enjoying their meal, he signaled to the guerrillas hidden behind the Buddha statue. Suddenly several guerrillas jumped out and charged at the Japanese, grasping their arms and legs, and seizing their guns. The Japanese were unexpectedly good at martial arts, and boxing fighting thus broke out inside the temple. When two Japanese and an interpreter were finally subdued, a third climbed over the temple wall in order to escape; Zhenwei followed and brought him down. Later, the Japanese were secretly brought to Chinese military headquarters.122 General Tao Guang was one of the military commanders who, under Communist leadership, waged guerilla warfare against Japanese troops in the region, and Zhenwei most likely served in a group of guerillas led by Communists. It may not be a coincidence that a thousand miles north in Wutai Mountain 五台山 in

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Shanxi province, the Buddhist monks also actively participated in guerilla war under the leadership of a Communist general, Nie Rongzhen. Wutai Mountain is one of the four most sacred Buddhist mountains in China, venerated as the hierophony of the Bodhisattva Manjūsri. Its many temples are situated on the mountain’s peak and slopes. At the beginning of the war, the mountain became militarily important in resisting the advancement of Japanese troops. It would be politically significant if the resident monks and lamas, who came from inner China, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia, could be organized into a united national resistance force. Before the war, Japanese missionaries had already been active there, encouraging monks and lamas to cooperate with the Japanese and straining relations among the Chinese, Tibetans, and Mongols. Soon after the Japanese took over Beijing in 1937, the Japanese authorities sent the propaganda and pacification team to Wutai Mountain to seek the cooperation of the lamas, some of whom indeed followed the team back to Beijing to show their support for the Japanese. It is difficult to know their motives, yet as Tibetans or Mongols, they would have been less concerned about danger of the Chinese nation, and they may have thought that Japanese would treat them better than the Nationalist government. In any case, the Japanese made use of these lamas for propaganda as if all lamas and monks in the mountain supported Japanese action in China and agreed with the Japanese vision of the so called the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. When General Nie Rongzhen led 2000 men to wage guerilla warfare against the Japanese in Wutai County soon after the beginning of the war in 1937, all the villages were emptied as people ran away, either in fear of the Communist troops or to avoid fighting, taking with them rice, grain, animals, and clothing. The Chinese soldiers were facing starvation and cold weather in the northern winter. The monks in the temples voluntarily came down from the mountain and provided the troops with grain, enabling the soldiers to survive and continue fighting. In 1938, the troops gradually expanded their influence to twenty-three counties, and created the first military base behind Japanese lines in the Anti-Japanese War. In January 1938, a convention of various parties was organized to celebrate the establishment of the base government. Buddhist institutions on Mt. Wutai jointly sent a message of their full support of the resistance war, “[Our] community, together with all lay Buddhist followers, would like to express its willingness to accept the leadership of the government;123 we will fight against the Japanese to the end. We pray for all people in Tibet and Inner Mongolia to unite to drive the Japanese out of China.”124 Soon after the establishment of the base, Communist party planned to reduce the land rent for tenant-farmers. The big temples in the mountain usually possessed large tracts of land and the rent supported thousands of monks. Base area leaders proposed that the monks should reduce rents for their temple lands more

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than other ordinary landlords as contributions to the war of resistance, and the proposal was refuted by the Buddhist community. The above message expressed the monks’ support for the government, yet it may have indirectly suggested that discriminative rent reduction on the temple lands would jeopardize the unity of minorities for the resistance war. Tibetans and Mongols, most of whom were Buddhists, would be displeased if their lamas in Mt. Wutai were maltreated. The proposal that temples should reduce their rent more was based on the argument that the monks, staying inside temples to burn incense and recite sutras, rendered no service to the nation, and should not be allowed simply to consume agricultural products without working for their living. A counter-argument, articulated by the monks, was that monks had also made contributions to the nation. In an assembly held in early 1938, representatives from twenty-three counties formally submitted a proposal that the monks should collect less rent. The proposal was opposed by Liu Sangyang, a representative from Mt. Wutai, who highlighted Buddhist participation in the war and the concept of repaying one’s obligations to the nation: We are the citizens of the Republic of China, and we have also participated in the resistance war during this time when unity is crucial to win the war. We have left our families (chujia 出家), but not our country (meichuguo 沒出國). Why should there be discrimination in our land rents? Many of our monks and lamas have taken part in the war, too; we have organized self-defense teams, and some of us have even taken up guns in fighting against the Japanese devils. [Because we understand that] even sheep recognize the kindness of their mothers who have given them milk, and crows remember to repay the kindness of their mothers who have fed them.125

Liu reminded the assembly that when the troops first arrived in Wutai, monks had provided food and clothing to them so that soldiers could survive and build their military base. The monks must not be treated differently just because of their religious faith and practice. Liu stated that the purpose of expelling the Japanese was to found a new China in which all people could enjoy freedom, including freedom of religion. The fact that a small number of monks had betrayed the nation and cooperated with the Japanese did not justify religious discrimination. Liu reiterated that it would cause great harm to the cause of the resistance war if the monks were deprived of their source of living. Finally, General Nie Rongzhen expressed his support for the Buddhist arguments and suggested equal treatment for the monks. Soon after the convention, the monks and nuns were reorganized to patrol the mountain and investigate suspicious visitors. Some of them, carrying big knives on their backs or long spears in their hands, checked those who wanted to enter the mountain, including tourists and pilgrims.126

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Renkong 人空, a brilliant young monk-student, graduated from the Wuchan Buddhist College before the war. On a pilgrimage to Wutai Mountain he was imprisoned and torched by the Japanese, who accused him of being military spy for resistance force. After release, he decided to abandon his monkhood and joined the resistance force led by Nie Rongzhen. He was soon appointed as the team leader of Third Subdivision and began to organize lamas from the mountain into guerilla war. Within next one year, he led his team launched more than fifty big offences on enemies’ stations and killed numerous Japanese in northeast of Shangxi. Renkong often proudly related his military accomplishments to his comrades and declared that he would rather follow the bodhisattva’s path by killing evil invaders.127 The phenomena that monks led a group of guerillas fighting Japanese in war-field, and that monks carried weapons to conduct security checks in front of temples certainly appeared unusual to both Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Even more dramatic were the monks who served as military spies for the resistance forces, or as disguised secret agents inside Japanese military organizations. Benseng, a monk from Yingjiang Si in Anqing 安慶, secretly served for the resistance force and offered his temple as a basis for intelligence activities during the war. He often sent military information of Japanese forces in the region to the China-America Compound Air Force, which would bombard military supplies of the enemies.128 In November1940, a monk named Konglun 空輪 died of meningitis at Xiangya Hospital in Changsha. He would have been barely over 40, assuming he had been about 20 when he received the full ordination at Mt. Baohua in the winter of 1919. He left nothing behind except a small suitcase in which three letters were found,129 one written by him just before his death and the other two from his two monk brothers, Huiming 慧明 and Foci 佛慈. These three letters related a moving story of Chinese Buddhist monks in their struggles against the Japanese. When Chinese troops retreated from Shanghai after three months of fighting, the Buddhist Swastika Rescue Team also left Shanghai, with Huiming as a member. On the night before the departure, Huiming and Konglun promised each other that they would do their best to serve the nation under any circumstances. For the next three years, they kept in contact, encouraging each other to perform their duty. Later, Huiming, wounded in battle while doing rescue work in June 1940 and was sent to a hospital in a Japanese controlled area. While in the hospital, he was shocked to see Konglun preach to a large congregation in a Japanese temple, proclaiming that there would be no happiness until East Asia was under Japanese control. As Huiming wrote to Konglun late, “Your words pierced my heart; I felt suddenly a sharp pain and almost fainted. If I had had a pistol I would have aimed it at you. Three years after we separated, the motherland had not changed, I had not changed, but you had become so different I could not recognize

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you.”130 While Huiming was still in the hospital, Japanese authorities attempted to persuade him to undertake military training in Nanjing, or to join a propaganda and pacification team to preach Buddhism in the Japanese occupied areas. He declined tersely and said that he would rather die than serve the Japanese. Foci’s letter, dated September 8, 1940, informed Konglun of the death of Huiming and expressed his attitude to the Japanese occupation. Although living in a Japanese controlled area, Foci said, he could continue to enjoy life, believing that everything was the same, and that one should not be bothered with nationalism, patriotism, or the sadness of being without a nation, let alone participating in the Anti-Japanese War. Konglun’s letter revealed—what Huiming died without knowing—how he had secretly served the nation. After their separation, Konglun managed to sneak into Japanese occupied area of north China and become a close friend of a Japanese military commander. He gradually won his trust and became a director in charge of intelligence activities in western China, and secretly collected Japanese military intelligence and sent it to the Chinese military. Even under strict Japanese control and surveillance, Konglun said, he was able to get out many top secrets about Japanese military operations, informing Chinese troops in time to foil Japanese attacks on several strategic areas. On some occasions, his inside information was responsible for leading Chinese troops to great victory in battles against the Japanese. The three letters were edited by Mujia and published together in Shi zi hao in December 1940, with an emotional title, “Tears of Practitioners.” (Xingzhe de lei 行者的淚).131 Mujia had been a long-time friend of Konglun and wrote a sensational epilogue at the end of these three letters. Besides being a memorial to the dead, as Mujia suggested, the publication of the letters was meant to manifest the true Buddhist spirit in the war, to galvanize those monks who lived their lives as Foci did, and to touch upon the nationalistic conscience of all Buddhists, especially the clergy.132 The war brought tremendous changes to Chinese clergy, and unusual phenomena occurred to institutional Buddhism. Temples became the battle field of guerilla war, and monks set traps inside temples in order to catch the Japanese, who were regarded not as pilgrims but as enemies. It seems that many monks adopted new lives and did everything possible as the war requested. This could be considered as skillful means in serving the nation as these monks claimed, however, so far as the right-livelihood, one of the Eightfold Path in Buddhism, is concerned, Buddhists should avoid hypocrisy and lead righteous life. It seems that these monks and others lived double lives during the war, sometimes as monk or layman, and sometimes as guerilla soldiers, or openly serving with Japanese troops yet secretly working for resistance forces. Although their actions of “double status” could be justified in the name of nationalism and patriotism, it is unclear whether

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the thought ever occurred to them at the time that their action might be regarded as hypocritical. We may not be able to completely understand the contemporary situation and the motivation of these monks; yet we should keep in mind that not all clergy did or thought the same; there were many monks and nuns like Foci. The monks and lamas in Wutai Mountains should have similar religious and political interests as one Buddhist community, yet they apparently divided among themselves—some supported the Japanese and the puppet governments while others assisted resistance forces. It is quite possible that individual Buddhists acted differently toward both the Japanese invasion and Chinese resistance.

THE ACTIVITIES OF MONKS IN HUNAN On May 7, 1939, the opening ceremony of the Nanyue Buddhist and Daoist Society for Disaster Relief (Nanyue fodao jiunan xiehui 南嶽佛道救難協會) was held at Zhusheng Si in Nanyue, a mountain with numerous Buddhist and Daoist temples. Representatives from the Nationalist and Communist parties, as well as leading members of Buddhist and Daoist temples, participated in the ceremony. This event marked the beginning of the anti-Japanese activities of monks in Hunan. The activities of monks in Hunan during the war are known largely from materials by or about Juzan 巨贊 (1908–1984), an important figure in modern Chinese Buddhist history. His revolutionary ideas133 and loyalty to the Communist party134 made him controversial before the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and his religious status caused him to be imprisoned for seven years during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). In 1949, he was selected to be a member of the People’s Political Consultant Conference, the first Chinese monk to gain such an honor. When Japan invaded China in July 1937, Juzan was teaching at the Minnan Buddhist School in Xiamen. In the summer of 1938, he was invited to Nanyue to give lectures at the Huayan Research Institute, and there he met Tian Han and Ye Jianying, two Communist revolutionaries. At this time, the Nationalist party and Communist party jointly founded the Southwest Guerrilla Cadre Training Class (Xinan youji ganbu xunlianban 西南游擊干部訓練班) in Bailongtang near Nanyue. Jiang Jieshi was the director while Ye Jianying served as the deputy dean. Juzan, having been deeply influenced by the Communists even before he was tonsured, showed more inclination towards Communist ideology after he became acquainted with Zhou Enlai, who often visited Nanyue during the time. Zhou encouraged Juzan and other monks in Hunan to actively take part in the Anti-Japanese War; his aphorism that a monk should “kill the enemy while on horseback and practice Buddhism after dismounting” (shangma shazei, xiama xuefo

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上馬殺賊,下馬學佛)135 inspired a large number of young monks to serve the nation in the war. In April 1939, the Buddhist monks in Nanyue began to discuss how they should contribute to the Anti-Japanese War; they decided to set up the Nanyue Buddhist Association for Saving the Nation.136 Later on, Ye Jianying recommended that the name for the organization be changed to the Nanyue Buddhist and Daoist Society for Disaster Relief, because, he explained, the new name would allow other religious practitioners to join.137 However a different reason for changing the name of the organization was given in an earlier report in Shi zi hao. During the preparatory period, some Buddhist monks and Daoist priests suggested that the organization should be called the Society of Buddhists and Daoists in Hunan in Support to Resist Enemies. The conservative monks who were in charge of most temples in Nanyue, however, expressed their concern that the words “resist enemies” (kangdi 抗敵) sounded un-Buddhist and it might get Buddhists and Daoists in Hunan into troubles.138 In any case, the Nanyue Buddhist and Daoist Society for Disaster Relief was founded in the middle of 1939. More than a hundred monks from different temples displayed their military skill before the large gathering. No one could recognize their monastic identity except by “the incense scars” (xiangba 香疤) on the tops of their heads. Accompanied by military music, Baosheng, the president of the society, read a communiqué. He advised monks and Daoist priests not to forget their religious practice while providing services for the soldiers and working for disaster relief, and not to ignore the war of resistance while practicing religion. The four tasks of the society were then proclaimed: exposing the cruelty of the Japanese invasion; arousing the sympathy and rebellion of Japanese soldiers; assisting the government in encouraging Chinese to support the resistance war; and performing all possible disaster relief services. According to the outline of the society, all monks and nuns in Nanyue would be its members, and its expenditure should be shared by all temples, or when necessary, it would seek a government subsidy.139 Ye Jianying delivered a major speech, calling for Chinese of all classes and parties to rally together and form a united front. He reminded the clergy that they lived in a world of conflict and war, not in heaven; the temples in which they practiced their religions were also located in this world. Many temples had been destroyed in the war, monks and nuns were tortured, and even the fish in a pool in front of temple could not escape the fate of being killed by the Japanese air raids. It was therefore the time for the monks in Nanyue to come out of their temples and to join the rest of Chinese people in fighting against the Japanese. Ye Jianying also urged the clergy to be vigilant since the Japanese too had organized propaganda and pacification teams to countenance the invasion. The Chinese clergy should criticize Japanese priests, who were assisting the invasion and who thus

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violated the fundamental teachings of the Buddha. He proposed that Chinese monks prepare pamphlets of Buddhist propaganda so that Chinese air forces could deliver them to Japanese soldiers.140 At the end of the ceremony, Juzan reported the organization of the society, which consisted of five bureaus: administration, propaganda, first aid, consultant, and training. Juzan was elected director of the Propaganda Bureau. On May 8, 1939 the military training class started, and more than 70 clergy, most of them monks and a few Daoist priests,141 participated. The curriculum for the training consisted of six subjects: political studies, Buddhist lessons, basic military knowledge, first aid, and education in the Three People’s Principles. Except for the Buddhist class, others were taught by instructors from the Southwest Guerrilla Cadre Training Class. All trainees wore Buddhist robes, on which a red triangular badge was pinned. Six weeks later, the students completed training.142 From the very beginning, the society as well as the program of military training was politicized, for both the Nationalist party and the Communist party attempted to install their own proxies in this new organization in order to control it. The society, therefore, was divided into two cliques, one pro-Nationalist and the other pro-Communist. Juzan showed his preference for the Communists while two vice chairmen, Kongye and Wuzheng, favored the Nationalists. The two cliques struggled hard from the first day the society was founded; Juzan was late accused of attempting to seize Buddhist temples and was driven out of Nanyue. The struggle was somehow suppressed without openly breaking into conflict because the Japanese troops were preparing an attack on Changsha in 1939; both sides were forced to give priority to their common interest of resisting the Japanese.143 In June 1939,144 Juzan, with the help of Chen Shijun, a director of the Political Department at the Southwest Guerrilla Cadre Training Class, selected 12 monks from the military training class and organized the Young Buddhist Service Team (Fojiao qingnian fuwu tuan 佛教青年服務團). Being a special military force, the organization was full of militant spirit and all members were fully militarized; they were requested to be always prepared to sacrifice their lives. Juzan outlined six aims of the organization: (1) using Buddhism to conduct anti-Japanese propaganda so that Japanese Buddhists may realize the consequences of the war; (2) uniting Buddhists in the world to fight the Japanese invasion; (3) explaining that Buddhas and Bodhisattvas encourage Buddhists to protect the nation; (4) counterattacking Japanese propaganda in Asian countries; (5) reorganizing Buddhist institutions and bringing all Buddhists into the Anti-Japanese War; and (6) spreading the message of true Buddhism to eliminate false believes.145 In order to support and publicize the cause of the Anti-Japanese War, the Young Buddhist Service Team sent a letter to all Chinese soldiers, expressing their

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support for what the soldiers were fighting for. The letter warmly praised the soldiers, who had left behind their wives and children to sacrifice their lives and restore the unity and sovereignty of the Chinese nation. The monks predicted that the sacrifices of these soldiers had not been and would not be wasted because millions of Chinese people, who had thus been inspired, would use their own bodies to “build a new Great Wall.”146 The letter declared that the clergy, who used to retreat to hidden places and take no interest in politics and military, were now following the heroic example of the soldiers, and were directly engaging in the Anti-Japanese War. It was the highest honor to serve the nation at the time of crisis and it would be glorious to die in battle while killing enemies. They also told the soldiers not to worry about the kinsmen they had left behind, because the entire Chinese people, including members of the sangha, would be their relatives and take care of them. The Buddha tells us that soldiers like you who have fought and sacrificed your lives for the happiness of people and the safety of the nation-state are the saviors of human beings. You are bodhisattvas in the state of practice (yinwei 因位) and will surely win the blessings of the Buddha. Even if you endanger your life, you will leave all temporary suffering behind and turn to the eternal happiness of a blissful land.147

The team then advanced to Changsha, the capital of Hunan, and settled down in Huayan Jingshe. Their task was to promote the cause of the Anti-Japanese War through Buddhism among the masses. The monks went from temple to temple and house to house to convey nationalistic messages, urging Buddhists and nonBuddhists to come forward and contribute to the war. They also turned to the streets, giving public speeches, putting up posters, and distributing pamphlets. One popular slogan that they initiated declared that “One who becomes a traitor to the nation will be punished by the law while alive and fall into hell after death,” and “Save China with the revolutionary spirit of the Buddha.” On July 11, 1939, Juzan opened a column called “Buddhist Youth” in Zhenzhong Ribao 陣中日報, a newspaper devoted to serving the war, to expound Buddhist propaganda. The citizens in Changsha had zealously responded to their devoted activities in resisting the invasion and saving the nation, according to Juzan’s record; they warmly called them “monk-soldiers” (heshangbing 和尚兵).148 The activities of the team, however, were not limited to conducting propaganda, as the members were often called to perform secret mission and dangerous task. Only those who were determined to serve the nation without the slightest hesitation were selected to join the team and many of them sacrificed their lives on duty. Limiao 理妙, a young monk, who had come to Changsha from Beijing for the sake of joining other monks in the resistance war, was the first to join the

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Young Buddhist Service Team. Juzan, the leader of the team, tried to dissuade him by stressing that the formation of the team was unprecedented in comparison to all other Buddhist activities in the war. All members should not only be determined to make sacrifices to the nation and Buddhism, but also had to endure unbearable conditions and strictly observe military order and discipline. Nevertheless, Limiao vowed that he had already made up his mind to give up his life for the nation when he decided to come to Changsha.149 Shortly after the formation of the team, the members underwent tough military training as a special task force in the Southwest Guerrilla Cadre Training Class. At the end of the training, the monks were excited that they would soon directly take part in the war, even though they also felt uneasy because they knew the dangers of their tasks. Later on, some monks penetrated the Japanese occupied areas to perform the tasks of assassinating traitors150 and sabotaging the facilities of Japanese military and civilian organizations. Limiao, together with some of his colleagues, was assigned to the north of Hunan, and became secretly engaged in collecting Japanese military information and destroying the transportation system of the local puppet government. In October 1940, he was captured by the Japanese in Yueyang. During the interrogation, Limiao was tortured by the Japanese who tried to get information from him about the resistance forces in the area. His eyes were gouged out and his ears cut off, yet he never gave in. Before he died, according to Juzan, Limiao repeatedly shouted “Long Live the Republic of China.” When Juzan heard the news of Limiao’s arrest, torture, and his tragic death, he was overcome by sorrow and passionately called on Buddhist monks and nuns to follow his example and act immediately and forcefully to defend the nation: Is this different from the action that Śakyamuni took to cut off his flesh for the sake of feeding a rabbit before he attained enlightenment? He (Limiao) practiced the Buddha’s teaching of saving the world, and thus laid the foundation for attaining Buddhahood. Millions of Chinese people who have become enslaved people in a conquered nation will obtain spiritual medicine from him.151

The Buddhist activities under the leadership of Juzan deepened and expanded in Changsha. On July 28, 1939, the Committee for Wartime Training of Changsha Buddhist Youths (Changsha fojiao qingnian zhanshi xunlian weiyuanhui 長沙佛教青年戰時訓練委員會) was organized, and a comprehensive plan for the training of clergy was laid down.152 The plan emphasized the implementation of the political ideology of the Three People’s Principles. About forty to fifty monks and nuns from various parts of Hunan arrived in Changsha to undertake military training. On August 14, a special ceremony was held in the Hall of Great Hero at Baiyi An, a nunnery in Changsha. The temple was decorated

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with political slogans. Inside the hall, the national flag and the party flag, the portraits of Sun Yetsan and Jiang Jieshi hanged high on red certain. In the middle below, a statue of Sakyamuni Buddha was placed in a table. More than 70 monks and nuns in Changsha, together with other provincial government officials, party leaders, military officers, and local residents, took solemn oath that they would never betray the nation and would devotedly serve the Chinese people under any circumstances.153 All Buddhist activities in Changsha were interrupted suddenly, however, as the Japanese troops began to attack the city at the end of September 1938. Juzan then returned to Nanyue to continue his anti-Japanese propaganda inside the temple. He then proposed that Buddhist property should be sacrificed for the cause of the Anti-Japanese War, and was forced to leave because this radical idea offended a large number of conservative monks in the area.154 In the middle of 1940, he arrived in Guilin and started Shi zi hao, which became one of the most distinguished Buddhist journals during the war. Juzan’s anti-Japanese activities were largely influenced by his close connection with the Communists just like those of Leguan by the Nationalists although the former never openly admitted that he was a member of Communist party. His relationship with Tian Han155 and his frequent visits to Xu Teli, the representative of the Eighth Route Army in Changsha, indicated his Communist inclination, and this caused him trouble with the Nationalists and local monks. It was probably because of his apparent pro-Communist characteristics and later on his active service under the Communist regime after 1949, that Dongchu in Modern History of Chinese Buddhism (Zhongguo fojiao jindai shi 中國佛教近代史), never mentions his name. Leguan describes him as a traitor to Buddhism, not because of his activities in the Anti-Japanese War, but because of his Communist connections during the war and the role he played in the Chinese Buddhist Association after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. In contrast, the colleagues of Juzan in mainland China unanimously portrayed him as “the one who loved his country and his religion” (aiguo aijiao 愛國愛教). They never attempted to cover up his intimate relationships with the Communists during the war; quite the opposite, they highly praised his political profile by elaborating on his conflict with the Nationalists and highlighting his loyalty to the Communist party. They described his war activities as a manifestation of his love for the Communist party and his dislike of the Nationalist party.156 Nevertheless, Juzan’s writings during the war time evidently show that he never criticized the Nationalist government, instead, he often praised its leadership and expressed his support for it. When Juzan recalled his war activity in his autobiography written after 1949, he simply mentioned it in one sentence without any detail, providing no self-assessment.157 It seems that he shied away from any mention of his career at that time. Whether

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it is because his war activity was directly under the Nationalists or because he felt uneasy of what he had done then as a Buddhist monk may never be known.

CONCLUSION Limited information is available about Buddhist participation in the war, yet the activities of the monks demonstrate the dynamic changes that institutional Buddhism underwent in modern Chinese history. Through Buddhist propaganda, ritual services, rescue work, and even guerrilla warfare, monks prioritized their national commitments over their religious obligations and actively rendered service to the nation. Their active participation in the war also successfully showed to the world that Buddhism, being a religion of practice, could be used as a powerful tool in serving the nation. The members of the sangha could sometimes make greater contributions than ordinary Chinese to the nation; their sacrifice and service could be more complete and selfless than those ordinary Chinese because they were inculcated with the Buddhist doctrine of no-self and compassion and they had fewer family attachments or social burdens. Having renounced the world and left their families behind, they did not worry much about their own safety or their relatives, but were always devoted to rescuing the lives of others and fighting the enemies. While the war transformed the monks, Buddhist participation in the war also simultaneously changed public opinion toward institutional Buddhism, just as was anticipated by those like Taixu who advocated Buddhist involvement in the war. Thanks to the news media, which provided special reports about the activities and selfless sacrifices of the monks, the image of the sangha improved and the monks were recognized as members of one national family. Zhou Zhongguan, in his article “Learning from the Example of Monks” published in December 1944, highlighted some episodes of monks in the war. Zhou first confessed that he had not had any goodwill toward the monks and nuns due to the influence of Chinese literature and general social opinions. However, having come to know the deeds of the monks in the war and having met some members of the sangha rescue teams, he completely changed his attitude and became their friend and admirer. Zhou believed that the Chinese nation could never be destroyed as long as there were such monks in China.158 The influence of these public assessments of monks in society also increased the determination of other Chinese people to fight for the resistance war. The appearance of monks in Buddhist robes159 on battlefields inspired other Chinese to work harder for the nation. As one newspaper asserted, even monks realized they must fight against the invasion so that they would not fall into being the enslaved people in a conquered nation—how much more the rest of the Chinese ought to realize this and fight against the Japanese to death.160

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It is also interesting to know that the lay Buddhist community supported the monks’ leaving their temples and contributing their services to the resistance war. No one, as far as existing information shows, criticized them on the grounds that they had transgressed the code of monastic discipline; instead most people appreciated their nationalistic and patriotic preferences. Chen Shenglang, a lay Buddhist and editor of the China News in Rangoon, tried to rectify the negative impression of clergy in the minds of ordinary people and defended their choice and action in the war. In “Tribute to China Buddhist International Propaganda Team,”161 he criticized the common view that clergy should not be involved in social, political, much less military affairs, but concentrate on religious practice. Chen confirmed the idea of compassionate killing adopted by the monks and argued that there was a big difference between killing a poisonous snake and killing a harmless sheep. One who shows mercy on a killer of innocent people, like a judge who sympathizes with murderous criminals, does not know the meaning of great compassion, but shows the “foolishness of a kind hearted old woman.” The trend toward the politicization of Buddhism is clear in the material provided by Leguan; since he was a member of the Nationalist party, his patriotism and nationalism, to a large extent, were an extension of his understanding of and devotion to the party. He was called by his fellow party members a “comrade” and “revolutionary monk,” and his loyalty to the party enabled him to take on the double status of a Buddhist monk in monastic robes and a military officer in uniform. His nationalistic enthusiasm for bringing monks and nuns into the AntiJapanese War made him very critical of contemporary Buddhist institutions and the practice of the ordinary monks.162 Leguan urged the government to authorize him to reorganize Buddhist institutions, to confiscate temple properties of “corrupted monks” for the sake of the war. Yet, he passionately rejected the Japanese accusation that the Chinese government had systematically persecuted Buddhist institutions; instead, he portrayed China as a Buddhist nation and the government as patron of Buddhism. Leguan’s unconventional ideas and activities may be seen as part of the larger Buddhist transformations that took place during the war. Under the slogans “the nation is first,” “the war is first,” and “victory is first,” a number of monks were truly determined to serve the nation first, and to place their civic duty before their religious commitment. Nevertheless, a large number of monks, such as those in Chongqing and Changsha, were reluctant to give up the traditional practices of Buddhism. In some sense, their participation in the resistance war was rather a result of compelled pressure of nationalism on the one hand and activism of the “new young monks,” such as Leguan, on the other hand.

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Chapter Five

Buddhism in Japanese-Occupied Areas

Information about Buddhist activities in Japanese-occupied areas is scarce for two reasons. First, monks and nuns were frightened to communicate with their colleagues outside the occupied areas lest they be suspected of being associated with anti-Japanese activists. Second, leading Buddhists who had collaborated with Japanese authorities were unlikely to keep or publish documents about their activities after the end of the war. However, by piecing together available information scattered in different sources, we are able to glimpse the general situation of Buddhists in these areas. After a short period of confusion at the beginning of the war, institutional Buddhism was reorganized under Japanese rule and Buddhist activities became more politicized; many Chinese clergy willingly or unwillingly cooperated with new social and political authorities. Having adapted themselves to the new environment, Buddhists, especially the clergy, engaged in disaster relief and other charitable works. By comparing Buddhist activities in areas controlled by resistance forces (as discussed in the last chapter) with those in Japanese occupied areas (as I am going to examine in this chapter), I intend to demonstrate how Buddhism was used for two opposite political purposes, working for and against the Japanese occupation.

WARTIME DESTRUCTION TO CLERGY AND TEMPLE One reason Japan used to justify the invasion of China was the need to protect Asian culture and Buddhism. Japanese soldiers going to China were on a mission to “save Asia and to establish a new world order.” At the beginning of the war, Japanese propaganda in China and neighboring Buddhist countries such as Burma accused the Chinese government of systematically persecuting Buddhist institutions. Japan, the center of true Buddhism, would take responsibility for safeguarding Buddhism in the world. In fact, not only did the invasion not protect Buddhism in China, but it also brought disasters to it. The war, which 151

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spread to a large part of China, forced monks and nuns to leave their temples behind, and destroyed numerous monasteries and Buddhist monuments. Japanese militants showed no preference for Buddhist temples, nor did they hesitate to kill Chinese clergy. In December 1937, many monks and nuns were among the victims of the infamous “Rape of Nanjing.” They suffered humiliation and unexpected death. One day, when a group of Japanese soldiers were raping Chinese girls at China Gate Street in Nanjing City, they saw several frightened monks trying to escape from the city. The soldiers, in an attempt to humiliate these Chinese monks, forced them to have intercourse with the girls. Upon their refusal, the soldiers killed them all on the spot and cut off their penises.1 In the same month, several nuns in Desheng An committed suicide by jumping into river after Japanese soldiers broke into their nunnery and attempted to rape them. The war forced young monks and nuns to become refugees, leaving their temples and Buddhist relics to the mercy of Japanese soldiers, yet the old and the weak, who were unable to escape, remained behind and suffered humiliation and death. After the Japanese entered Zhengjiang, all monks in Jinshan, beside those were killed and escaped, were taken to Nanjing to build military trench for the Japanese.2 Not all of those who managed to escape from one place to another survived either. Du’e, a monk from Nanjing, fled to Hankou after the fall of Nanjing. After Hankou was occupied by the Japanese in 1938 he settled down on Mount Lu in Jiujiang County. Still he was unable to escape being killed together with a large number of Chinese refugees when Japanese ransacked Jiangxi in 1939.3 Japanese occupants often suspected that Chinese clergy might have cooperated with Chinese resistance forces, and in order to prevent them from aiding Chinese troops, they would kill them without hesitation. One day in 1938, after the helmet of a Chinese soldier was found inside Qinglian Si in Changzhou, Japanese soldiers immediately surrounded the temple; all monks, young or old, were brought out to the grounds in front of the temple. The Japanese alleged that a member of the resistance force had escaped into the temple and disguised himself as a monk. In order to find him, they tried the helmet on the head of each monk. When it fit two monks, the Japanese soldiers killed both in front of the others. Again, after Yichang 宜昌 fell into Japanese control in 1938, a small resistance group of guerrillas remained active in the occupied area. The guerrillas frequented Yuquan Shan, where monks provided them with food and clothing. The Japanese military authorities soon discovered the activities of the guerrillas as well as their connection with the resident monks. One day, a large number of Japanese soldiers broke into the temple and arrested thirty-seven monks, who had been unable to escape. All were shot to death by machine gun and the temple was burned to the ground.4

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Guerrilla war was an important part of the resistance and caused a large number of deaths to Japanese soldiers. Guerrilla fighters usually had no permanent residence and were often active during the night; temples in villages or remote areas became their ideal place for getting food and rest. Although these guerrillas could quickly run away if discovered by Japanese, monks and nuns, especially old ones, and their temples would certainly be the victims of Japanese revenge. In 1938, when two Japanese soldiers were killed around Yuquan Si in Danyang, Japanese troops immediately seized the temple. Twenty-one old and weak monks were shot dead inside the temple; only one monk managed to escape to the mountain behind the temple, where he was found by local farmers three months later.5 Heartless killing and revenge became common; Japanese revenge killing could multiply in responses to the killing of Japanese. Therefore, killing and revenge for killing repeated between Japanese soldiers and Chinese resistance forces. In order to prevent the killing of the Japanese and finally eliminate the activities of the guerrillas, the Japanese authority took measures to isolate them from the rest of the Chinese people and to deter villagers from providing supplies to them. In 1939, Japanese tightened village control in Rehe in the hope that guerrillas might be segregated and eventually driven out of the area. Villagers were ordered to keep guerrillas from entering their villages: if even one guerrilla was allowed to stay in a village, all villagers would be put to death. One day, a young monk, Qingjing, lodged in a village temple on the way to the city. That night a group of guerrillas came, and without informing resident clergy, stealthily prepared food and slept inside the temple. Soon after they left early the next morning, Japanese troops arrived and took away everyone in the temple, including Qingjing. All were shot dead in a paddy field, except Qingjing who survived.6 Indiscriminate bombardment often devastated ancient monasteries and brought numerous historical buildings to the ground. At the beginning of the war, Japanese warplanes bombarded Longhua Si in Shanghai; Japanese soldiers burned down Wuyou Si in Jiading, together with a Buddhist book store.7 Liuyun Si in Shanghai and Tianning Si in Jiangsu, two of the largest monasteries in the region, were completely destroyed in the war.8 In November 1937, Xuedao Si, of which Taixu was the abbot, was set on fire when the Japanese landed in Zhejiang.9 The temple building was destroyed; Taixu’s personal belongings, valuable Buddhist statues, and rare scriptures were engulfed in flames. In November 1937, Hai chao yin published two pictures of a destroyed temple: the hall that had collapsed, leaving fragments of broken stones; bricks and some burned black wood still hang together to shape a skeleton of the temple building.10 Under the pictures is a line in English in capital letters: “JAPANESE BUDDHISTS—WHERE IS YOUR FAITH?”11 When the Japanese attacked Kaifeng in 1939, the ancient Iron Pagoda and the Pavilion of Amitābha Buddha, the two most valuable

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Buddhist monuments in the area, were torn to the ground.12 Meanwhile, many ancient Buddhist statues disappeared, while others were taken to Japan and never returned. In November 1939, Hai chao yin reported that a white sandalwood image of Guanyin Bodhisattva, about three meters high, was taken away by Japanese. This image, carved during the Six dynasties (402–589), was a masterpiece of art and a national treasure. According to experts from the Royal Museum in Tokyo, it was worth five hundred thousand Chinese yuan at the time.13 It may not be true that Japanese troops carried out these indiscriminative killing of Chinese monks and nuns and destruction of temples without any provocation of anti-Japanese activities. As we discussed earlier, some monks were actually engaged in resisting the Japanese and used their temples as basis for antiJapanese activities. For instance, Buddhist nuns of the Taishan Palace Nunnery in Taizhou offered their residence for the entire administration of the Communist county government committee. It was said that the nunnery was an ideal safe hiding-place for resistance activities.14 Jiaoshan was a convenient religious site for high officials in Wang Jingwei’s puppet government in Nanjing during the war, and the abbot Jingzhen was a spiritual mentor for many of them. Under the influence of Communists, he late became sympathized with the anti-Japanese course led by the New Four Army, which was waging guerrilla war in the region, and joined the Communist party. Using the advantage of his status as an eminent monk, Jingzhen worked inside the Japanese and puppet camp and provided valuable intelligence for the anti-Japanese forces. He even offered his abbot room as the secret headquarters of the Yangtze Working Committee and allowed arms, ammunition, and secret documents to be stored in his temple.15 In the article, “Buddhism during the Last Four Years of the Anti-Japanese War,”16 Taixu reports that monks and nuns suffered more than ordinary Chinese during the first four years of the war, yet they became more determined to resist Japanese occupation.17 The hardship and suffering of clergy and the destruction of Buddhist temples were wide-spread and lamentable. In October 1938, Taixu expressed his deep sympathy and consolation to Buddhists in the Japanese-occupied areas. In his article, “Consoling Buddhists of the Four Assemblies in the Fallen Areas,” Taixu claims that in the fallen areas, old monasteries were either destroyed or converted to military stations while monks and nuns were murdered and humiliated.18 He called upon Buddhists not to be depressed, but to strengthen their confidence in the Buddhist doctrine of cause and effect, to strike back harder against Japanese, or to come to the areas controlled by the Nationalist government. It is impossible to accurately calculate the damage done to Buddhism during the war, as temples and clergy in the areas frequented by guerrillas often became the targets of Japanese revenge. From available information, we do not know

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clearly whether or not these monks and nuns voluntarily received the guerrillas and provided shield and food for them, however, it is certain that they could not refuse them from entering temples. Monks and nuns were caught in the war and it seems that there was no “middle way” for them to remain independent of resistance forces and Japanese forces; they were powerless in resisting both Japanese and resistance force.

INCREASED ATTENTION TO CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES At the beginning of the war, monks and nuns in the war zones served Chinese troops in fighting the Japanese, and their activities may have simultaneously manifested Buddhist humanism and nationalism. For instance, when the Japanese took over Zhenjiang, more than several dozen Chinese soldiers were trapped in Jiaoshan 焦山. Unable to retreat in time, they ran for refuge into the Dinghui Si, an ancient Buddhist temple in the island. The resident monks, although aware of the danger of hiding them, received them warmly. They quickly shaved the heads of these soldiers, dressed them in Buddhist robes, and mixed them in with other monks. When Japanese soldiers arrived in search of the Chinese soldiers, the monks told them that they had not seen anyone.19 After these soldiers had secretly stayed in the temple for more than half a year, the monks finally managed to help them escape and rejoin their troops. When Nanjing fell to Japanese occupation at the end of 1937, tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers and military officers escaped from the city and took refuge in Qixiashan Si 棲霞山寺 along with huge numbers of Chinese citizens. Thanks to the charitable and humane services as well as the cooperation of the monks in the temple, they survived the brutality of the war; one of the military officers saved by the monks was general Liao Yaoxiang.20 As the war deepened with expansion of Japanese occupation, Buddhist service to Chinese troops and propagation against Japanese invasion virtually ended in Japanese occupied areas, although the remaining monks and nuns continued their religious lives in the surviving temples. By the end of 1938, Buddhist activities had discontinued and many Buddhist journals had ceased publication, often because they had printed anti-Japanese propaganda before the war or because paper shortages affected these areas. Wei miao yin 微妙音 (Voice of Wonder), Fojiao xinwen 佛教新聞 (Buddhist News) in Beijing, Fojiao yuekan 佛教月刊 (Buddhist Monthly) in Tianjin, and Renhai Deng 人海燈 (Sea-Light of Human World) in Shanghai, were put out of operation. Many others, such as Fojiao ribao (Buddhist Daily) in Shanghai, reduced the frequency and size of their publications. Their focus shifted from reporting how Buddhists should participate in the war to discussing Buddhist doctrines; they also occasionally published uncontroversial news about contemporary events such as charitable work and religious activities.

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Before Beijing was under Japanese rule, Buddhists, especially laypeople, had been active in generating Buddhist propaganda, performing weekly, monthly, and annual ritual services in different temples, and organizing Buddhist sermons. Huabei Jushi Lin 華北居士林 (The North China Lay Buddhist Society)21 conducted meetings and religious services once a week, regularly sponsoring Buddhist lectures and social work. However, after the Japanese occupation, such activities stopped and many religious events were called off. According to the report sent by Jingguan to Hai chao yin,22 there were no more monthly gatherings, and the scale of the annual rituals on the fifteenth of the seventh month, one of the most important lay Buddhist festivals, was significantly reduced and no longer included the participation of monks and nuns. Lay Buddhists were advised to perform religious rituals individually, without gathering in temples. The building of Beijing Buddhist Library, a magnificent Buddhist project undertaken by the Huabei Jushi Lin, was terminated, and preparations for the establishment of the Beijing branch of the Maha Bodhi Society were aborted. After a period of depression and gloom, monks and nuns then moved forward to readjust themselves to the new situation, shifting their interest to social and charitable activities, which might be considered less politically controversial. Buddhist social charity in modern China developed rather late in comparison with that of Christianity. In fact, it was stimulated by Christian activism and gradually adopted after the Qing government began to appropriate Buddhist property for the sake of promoting education.23 Before the war, Buddhist societies established a number of organizations providing disaster relief and funding for orphanages.24 Charitable activities dramatically expanded after 1937 when a large number of Chinese people became refugees and tens of thousands of wounded soldiers and citizens left behind the war. Temples such as Fayuan Si and Guangji Si in Beijing were transformed into refugee centers; monks and nuns at large began to take care of the wounded, bury dead bodies, and collect donations for disaster relief. By actively taking part in charity, some leading monks sought to distance themselves from politics. Zongyue 宗月 (1880–1941), who encouraged Chinese soldiers to fight the Japanese at the very beginning of the war, refused to be involved in any politically oriented organizations or to cooperate with Japanese authorities under the excuse that he was too busily engaged in Buddhist charitable activities.25 When several Buddhist organizations were founded under the sponsorship of the puppet government in Beiping, Zongyue was invited to be a leading member. He turned down these invitations and even returned the money sent by the Common Buddhist Purpose Society as his salary for the post he had repudiated in 1939. He refused to accept the title “Master of Manchuguo” (Manzhou guoshi 滿州國師) and declined a Japanese offer to renovate one of his temples in Beijing. In 1941,

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as a part of the tenth anniversary celebration of the founding of Manchuguo, a Buddhist delegation was organized to visit Japan; Zongyue again refused to be a member. When asked why he did not want to be associated with the Japanese, he simply replied that it might bring trouble in the future, and after all he wanted to concentrate on practicing the bodhisattva’s path of serving ordinary people. Zongyue was thus able to devote his time and energy to the welfare of refugees and wounded people; he organized the Temporary Buddhist Relief Society to provide food and shelter for the needed. The fighting between Chinese and Japanese troops outside Beiping left behind thousands of dead, both Chinese and Japanese soldiers on the battlefields. Soon after the fighting was over at the end of 1937, the Japanese authorities in the city quickly took measures to have dead Japanese soldiers properly buried or cremated. No one dared to bury the Chinese soldiers, however, for fear of being suspected of sympathizing with resistance forces. In popular Chinese tradition, the dead must be properly buried or their spirits may cause harm to people and society as their souls, unable to settle down, will wander aimlessly in human world. When Zongyue was informed that the large numbers of corpses of Chinese soldiers died in war were still exposed in battlefield, he organized the Society for Burying Dead Bodies on the Battlefields. He designed a large flag for the society and led dozens of monks and sixteen young people who had taken refuge in his temple to the war-torn site. For more than a month, the members of the team worked hard and carefully searched the battlefields, burying more than three thousand bodies. Occasionally, they also found the bodies of Japanese soldiers and buried them accordingly. Before each body was buried, they performed a simple yet solemn Buddhist ritual in honor of the dead. Being old in age and working hard in harsh winter weather for a month, Zongyue soon became sick, yet he managed and returned to the city after the last corpse was buried. When he and his team returned to the city, the Japanese authorities came to know what had happened, and Zongyue was arrested on the charge of associating with anti-Japanese forces. During his interrogation, he firmly denied any political motivation for his actions. As the Japanese could not find any evidence of a link with Chinese resistance forces, he was soon released. In Shanghai, the war also left tens of thousands of dead bodies of both Chinese and Japanese soldiers on the streets and in its suburbs. Soon after the Japanese troops were in full control of the city at the end of 1937, the Japanese cleared the battlefields and buried the dead bodies of the Japanese soldiers, leaving behind those of Chinese soldiers and civilians. In the winter of 1937, the Shanghai Sangha Burial Team was organized by the Chinese Buddhist Society. With the help of four trucks, the monks collected bodies from the streets and countryside around the city and carried them to a common burial site. For more than three

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months, from February through May 1938, they buried altogether more than ten thousand bodies in Shanghai alone.26 It is difficult to know whether these monks were motivated by patriotism or by Buddhist compassion, but a combination of the two seems applicable to many such cases. Yuanying, chairman of the Chinese Buddhist Society from 1928 to 1936, was regarded as the representative of Buddhist conservatives, rivaling Taixu’s reformers. At the beginning of the war, he played a leading role in organizing Buddhist charities in Shanghai. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the Chinese Buddhist Society held its meeting shortly after July 7, 1937, and Yuanying was elected the director of the Relief Work Team of the Chinese Buddhist Society for Disaster Areas. He effectively made use of his religious status by appealing to the Buddhists to contribute donations for disaster relief. On September 15, 1937, he set up the Ninth Refugee Camp in Shanghai to accommodate a large number of refugees, including many children. In December, he went to Southeast Asia to collect donations from overseas Chinese to finance the sangha rescue teams founded by the Chinese Buddhist Society.27 Yuanying urged the overseas Chinese to respond quickly to the national cause of resisting the Japanese and to render service to the nation through donations. In Singapore, he formed the Committee for Soliciting Donations for Buddhist Rescue Teams. The money collected was sent to Hankou for organizing the Second Sangha Rescue Team.28 He then traveled to Indonesia, and organized another massive donation campaign. A part of the collected money was sent to Shanghai for refugee relieves, and another part to Ningbo to fund the formation of the Third Sangha Rescue Team.29 In September 1938, he again traveled to Singapore, reporting to the overseas Chinese donors about the activities of the sangha rescue teams. While in Singapore he sponsored the movement called “One Yuan for Saving the Nation.”30 On August 14, 1937, one day after the Japanese attack in Shanghai, the United Society of Charitable Organizations for Disaster Relief,31 which consisted mostly of well-known lay Buddhists, held a trustee board meeting. Zhao Puchu 趙朴初,32 a young member of the board, reported that a large number of refugees were left behind in district where fighting had occurred and the Nationalist government officials in charge of disaster relief had already left.33 The society therefore decided to set up more than a dozen refugee centers to accommodate the thousands of refugees. In the meeting, the War Refugee Rescue Committee was formed, which included several sub-committees. Zhou Puchu was selected the director of the Board for Refugee Accommodation, which came to be in charge of fifty refugee centers in Shanghai, responsible for a total of five hundred thousand refugees. The society, while providing food, medicine, and clothes to these refugees, also inculcated them with nationalism and patriotism, and encouraged them to serve the nation. A large number of young refugees consequently joined

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the anti-Japanese forces and marched to the front.34 According to the report of Zhao Puchu, he once helped 1500 refugees to get to Southern Anhui and join the New Fourth Army.35 Although lay Buddhists in Shanghai were active in organizing relief work, eminent monks played a vital role in leading such activities. These monks enjoyed high religious and social status, and their appeals for generous donations and voluntary service would likely receive positive responses from Buddhists as well as from general society. Due to the increasing numbers of refugees in the areas around Shanghai, relief work was expensive and difficult, and it seems only under efficient and trustworthy leadership could relief materials be collected and distributed among the masses. One of many charismatic and trustworthy monks involved in charitable work was Fancheng 范成, whose name was remembered by many refugees from Shanghai after the war. In 1936, Fancheng had become well-known because of his involvement in bringing Song dynasty Tripitakas from Shanxi to be reprinted in Shanghai.36 Soon after the fighting began in Shanghai, the United Society invited him to administer relief work in the area. His capability in organizing charity activities for tens and thousands of refugees gradually won him the trust and support of gentry, business leaders, and ordinary people, who positively responded to his appeals for donations. Although the fighting ended in Shanghai within three months, the refugee work continued under the leadership of Fancheng. As the war dragged on in the most parts of China, the price of rice and other materials increased dramatically and made relief work more difficult. Yet Fancheng’s devotion convinced the puppet government under Japanese rule in Shanghai to provide him with rice at a reduced price. In order to manage refugee charity properly, he inspected the refugee centers everyday, personally taking care of old and sick people. While many other charitable organizations gradually disappeared from Shanghai, the relief work organized by Fancheng continued throughout the eight years of the war. Thanks to his indefatigable efforts, thousands of refugees survived the war; he was thus called “a living bodhisattva.” After the war ended in 1945, Fancheng was, however, accused of treason for cooperating with the puppet government. The charge was dropped after a large number of Buddhists and non-Buddhists turned out to petition on his behalf. Bodhisattvas, paragons of Buddhism, are those who do what is good for society and serve the needs of people equally without discrimination. Monks and nuns are thus encouraged to perform charity especially during time of natural and human disaster. The war provided Chinese clergy, who had so far been accused of losing the bodhisattva spirit, an opportunity to enter into society, to assist refugees, and to promote the welfare of soldiers. Ideally, such Buddhist charities should be extended to all, both friends and enemies. However, Buddhist charities during

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the war were often suspected of being politically motivated by the Japanese who would not allow Chinese Buddhists to perform charity in favor of their enemies, the resistance forces. After the end of the war, however, Buddhists in the occupied areas had to deny that their work had any connection with Japanese authorities and puppet government, the enemies and traitors of the Chinese nation, to reaffirm that their activities were purely religious. We do not exactly know, however, whether such charities were truly absent of political motivation. The relief activity led by Zhao Puchu in Shanghai certainly indicates that the spirit of the resistance was encouraged in some refugee campus.

VARIETIES OF COOPERATION WITH JAPANESE POWER Having failed to conquer China within three to six months as the Japanese military government had predicted, the Japan established several puppet governments in its controlled areas. In October 1937, a Mongolian Autonomous government was created in Chahar and Suiyuan with Prince Demchukdonggrub (b.1902) of Inner Mongolia as figurehead ruler. On December 14, a provisional government was founded in Beijing to govern the five northern provinces of Hebei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Henan, and Shandong. In March 1938, a third puppet government was organized in Nanjing that ruled Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Anhui. As part of their policy of seeking Chinese political cooperation in these areas, Japanese looked also to Buddhism. Hundreds of Japanese Buddhist missionaries were dispatched to these areas and many eminent Chinese monks were pressured to form a united front under Japanese supervision, while temples were used for political propaganda in support of Japanese rule. By rewarding those who cooperated and terrifying those who sympathized with anti-Japanese forces, the Japanese authorities kept Buddhist society under control. Among those monks who associated or cooperated with the Japanese, some voluntarily or even wholeheartedly offered their services to the Japanese or puppet governments, while others collaborated simply to protect their temples and resident monks. The activities of Japanese Buddhist missionaries, which began in China at the end of nineteenth century, was now backed up by political and military force and served Japanese political purposes. As it was said, “Where Nippon’s army went, its religion went too.”37 Japanese missionaries opened schools and orphanages in their newly founded missionary stations and also in Chinese temples. Chinese children, who became orphans during the war, were enrolled in such institutions. They were taught Buddhist ethics, Chinese and Japanese language, and mathematics, with all classes conducted in Japanese. These young Chinese were indoctrinated with Japanese ideas and educated to have goodwill towards Japan, which was depicted as having sent its troops to China to help the Chinese

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achieve independence from the West.38 Education in such temples was aimed at serving the Japanese rule in China although in fact large numbers of Chinese children benefited. It is clear Chinese monks and nuns in these temples facilitated such education partially because they believed that it was a way to educate young Chinese or that they could not resist the Japanese. Buddhist organizations were founded in the occupied areas under the sponsorship of Japanese authorities and puppet governments. The Buddhist Common Purpose Society (Fojiao tongyuanhui 佛教同願會), the most influential Buddhist organization in the north, was founded at Guangji Si in Beijing on December 30, 1938. The society included a number of well-known politicians, military officers, and social leaders, including Wang Jitang, the chairman of the North China Political Affairs Committee (Huabei zhengwu weiyuanhui 華北政務委員會), which ran the puppet government in north China, and late the Minister of Internal Affairs of the provisional government in Beijing; Jin Yunpeng, a former Prime Minister; and such Buddhist monks and scholars as Anqin 安欽, the abbot of Yonghegong 雍和宫, and Zhou Shujia, the director of the Huabei Jushi Lin.39 Although Anqin was the chairman of the society, vice-chairman Wang Jitang exercised the administrative power. The society was adequately financed by the government in Beijing and by Buddhist institutions. It was powerful and influential because it was directly under the leadership of the North China Political Affairs Committee, and also because its administrative authority extended to all temples in north. According to its charter, all abbots of temples in the north had to be members of the society, and two abbots could recommend a person for membership. In 1941, the Bureau for the Revival of Asia (Xingyayuan; Jap Kōain 興亞院)40 financed the annual meeting of the society in Zhongnanhai 中南海, a prestigious place usually not open to the public.41 Beijing had been an active Buddhist political center ever since Dixian had been invited to give lectures on Buddhism in 1915 as a countermeasure against Japanese missionary activities in China. Well-known social and political figures such like Duan Qirui and Jin Yunpeng became interested in Buddhist philosophy and practice, and a number of Buddhist journals and organizations were founded in Beijing. After a short period of silence following the Japanese occupation, religious rituals that had political implications became one of frequent major Buddhist activities, in addition to the charitable work discussed earlier. Large ceremonies were performed regularly, dedicated to Japanese and sometimes Chinese soldiers, who were killed in the war. In March 1938, the Water-Land Ritual42 was conducted in Yonghegong in memory of the dead Japanese as well as Chinese soldiers, and a large number of politicians and intellectuals in Beijing participated.43 From May 1938 to January 1939, several similar rituals but on a grander scale were performed in Beijing and Tianjin, and leading Japanese priests and Chinese monks were invited to recite sutras, such as The Lotus Sūtra.

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Meanwhile, religious services to pray for peace and an early end to the war were frequently organized in temples. According to popular Buddhist tradition, true peace could be achieved in the world only when the spirits of those who were killed in war were duly pacified and released from suffering states. The religious services conducted on the full-moon day in seventh month of the year were considered the most important occasion for these efforts.44 In 1937 this annual ritual could not be organized in Beijing because of the current war. It was, however, resumed a year later, and the rituals were dominated by a theme of praying for peace and transferring merit to the spirits of dead Japanese as well as Chinese soldiers.45 Rituals were sometimes also dedicated to the horses, which served in the Japanese army and died in their war services. In April 1939, the United Society of Buddhist Schools in Beijing held such a ceremony in a sub-temple of Higashi Honganji. The temple was filled with the ash urns of Japanese military service men and horses. Living horses, which had made military contributions to the war, also were present during the rituals.46 Buddhist rituals were performed not only for the dead, but more often to invoke blessings on Japanese soldiers about to go to battle, and to pray for their victory and safe return. On April 7, 1939, a special ceremony was organized inside a Japanese high school by Chinese and Japanese Buddhists in Qingdao. It aimed to express the gratitude of the Chinese people to Japanese soldiers for their great sacrifice in the war, and to extend religious blessings to those who were dispatched to battle. To some extent, such rituals were conducted in order to praise Japanese military accomplishment and to encourage the Japanese to kill Chinese. Those Chinese monks and nuns who participated in such rituals must have either heartedly served the Japanese, completely ignored their political significance, or entirely forgot the meaning of such Buddhist rituals. The most significant activity of the Buddhist collaboration between Chinese and Japanese Buddhists at the time was perhaps the joint celebration of the Buddha’s birthday, which traditionally falls on the eighth day of the fourth lunar month. On May 26, 1939, both Chinese and Japanese Buddhists in Beijing, Tianjin, Baoding, Jinan, Qingdao, Tangshan, and other places jointly held a ceremony to celebrate the birthday of the Buddha.47 In Beijing, under the sponsorship of the Buddhist Common Purpose Society, the Bureau for the Revival of Asia, and the Propaganda and Pacification Teams 宣撫班, colorful religious rituals and processions took place throughout the city. Buddhists requested of the puppet government that during the day of celebration no one should be allowed to do butchering of any kind in the city so that the Buddhist spirit of compassion to all living beings could be manifested, and the request readily granted by the Beijing municipal council. As a token of generosity, Buddhists distributed thousands of vouchers for purchasing rice at half-price to the poor in the city.

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Such celebrations, sometimes, aimed in part to show the world the unity of Japanese and Chinese and the prosperity of the occupied areas. Fully decorated platforms were set up on all of the main streets across Beijing, and politicians took the opportunity to deliver politically-oriented sermons to Buddhists and nonBuddhists. At Songzhu Si, in the eastern part of the city, Chinese and Japanese politicians, social leaders, military officers, and government representatives participated in religious rituals from morning to late evening. In Tianjin, thousands of Buddhists led by both Chinese and Japanese clergy marched through the streets. A seminar was arranged for this occasion, and the monks, most of them Japanese, gave lectures on Buddhism and contemporary politics before a large audience. The themes of the celebrations in other locations, for instance, Jinan and Zhanshang, were almost identical: to demonstrate goodwill and cooperation between China and Japan, to memorialize the dead soldiers, and to pray for the return of peace in China and in East Asia. Chinese clergy cooperated with Japanese Buddhist missionaries and politicians, and joined pro-Japanese organizations in that political environment to various degrees and for different reasons. However, the union of religion and politics was sensitive issue in China at this time, and neither side would likely breach its border and get too close to the other. The Japanese authorities, being foreigners or rather occupiers of the Chinese nation, would not openly politicize Buddhist events or Chinese monks and nuns might become suspicious about the true motivation of such events. Not would Chinese clergy who took part in such events want to publicly politicize their activities or to show their enthusiasm, except those who were truly convinced China needed the help from Japan; most often their participation was in the name of religion. Some Chinese clergy doubted that the Japanese could occupy China forever, and they must have been aware of that, as Zongyue said, it would cause “trouble” for them in future if they openly cooperated with the Japanese. Buddhist intellectual exchanges became more active during the war and were often carried out to show the good relationship between Japan and China. Taixu had been the first in modern history to advocate cooperation and friendship between Chinese and Japanese Buddhists, and following his visit to Japan in 1925,48 he maintained a cordial relationship with many well-known Japanese priests until 1937. After the war broke out, although such Buddhist exchanges ended in the zone of resistance force, they continued and became more frequent in Japanese-occupied areas. In Beijing, preparations for the China and Japan Buddhist Study Society (Zhongri fojiao xuehui 中日佛教學會)49 began right after the eruption of the war in 1937. The society was organized by a Japanese monk Fujii Jōgi, in cooperation with some well-known Buddhists in Beijing. The Japanese members of the society, such as Karikiyo, a monk from Higashi Honganji, were

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active in seeking support of Chinese Buddhists for the Japanese authorities. Yet, it was publicly declared that the society was founded mainly to promote goodwill and friendship between China and Japan under the rubric of a common faith of Buddhism. In January 1938, Ōtani Kōshō, the leader of Higashi Honganji, visited Beijing and participated in a ritual prayer for Japanese military servicemen who died in the war.50 On December 6, 1939, four famous professors on Buddhist studies were invited from Japan to give lectures to a gathering of more than five hundred Chinese.51 Dr. Nagai Makoto 永井傎琴 from Tokyo University delivered a speech entitled “The Characteristics of Japanese Buddhism”; professor Uno Enkū 宇野圓 空 presented “The Concept of New East Asia”; Shibahara Genchō 柴原玄超, the chief missionary for Higashi Honganji in north China, talked about “The Activities of Japanese Buddhist Institutions”; and Dr. Tokiwa Daijō 常盤大定 spoke on “The Spirit of East Asia.” Although we do not know exactly what they said, we may surmise based on the titles that they wanted to give a favorable cast to Japanese Buddhism and Japanese occupation. Under the name of cultural exchange and the promotion of mutual understanding, many young Chinese monks went to Japan for a Buddhist education, returning with “the Japanese ideas.”52 Japanese priests were more actively involved in the affairs of Chinese Buddhist institutions during the war, and many were invited to become members of Chinese Buddhist organizations. Some such organizations were co-founded with Japanese. In December 1939, the Common Buddhist Purpose Society invited twenty-three eminent Japanese priests and scholars to participate in its inauguration ceremony. During this occasion, the establishment of the Japan-China Buddhist Research Institute 日華佛教研究會 was announced.53 In 1939 when the Chinese Buddhist College was founded in Beijing with Wang Jitang as its director in general, six out of thirteen trustees were Japanese. One of them was Itamoto Ryūki, who served as the director of the Culture Department in the Bureau for the Revival of Asia.54 It may be clear that Japanese involvement in Chinese Buddhist affairs enhanced the growth of intellectual Buddhism, while also facilitating Japanese influence on Chinese Buddhists. Buddhist journals published in the Japanese-occupied areas depict institutional Buddhism experiencing peaceful and prosperous development. Buddhism was often said to be much better off than it had been when the Chinese government persecuted it. Some Chinese monks even said that Buddhist institutions received more respect and protection under the Japanese. Mingyi, an abbot of Chongfu Si in Taiyuan, praised Japanese soldiers in the region for having maintained peace and protected temples from robbery so that Buddhism was able to revive.55 In gratitude, Mingyi suggested that the Chinese Buddhists conduct a religious ritual once a week to pray for the welfare of the Japanese. In October 1938,

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a group of twenty-one Living Buddhas from Wutai Mountain visited Beijing, and according to Takeda Hiroshi, at the department of Japanese military intelligence, the lamas were overwhelmed by Japanese hospitality and highly praised the protection of Wutai Mountain by Japanese imperial soldiers (huangjun 皇軍).56 We should not simply dismiss all this as pure political propaganda. Just as some monks were convinced because of nationalism that they should participate in the resistance, others surely believed that Chinese Buddhism could benefit from Japanese protection, and to help make that protection last long, they would not hesitate to politicize their religious activities in favor of Japanese occupation. The politicization of Buddhist activities in Manchuria began soon after Japanese occupied the Northeast in 1931.57 After the founding of Manchuguo in 1934, Japanese missionaries from different Buddhist sects gradually arrived, and a number of semi-Buddhist organizations, such as the Central Buddhist Society for Universal Salvation (Zhongyang puji fojiaohui 中央普濟佛教會), were established.58 In 1934, a delegation of several priests from the Tendai Sect arrived in Manchuria and set up a General Buddhist Society in Binjiang (Binjiang fojiao zonghui 濱江佛教總會) in the hope of strengthening ties between Japan and Manchuria. Many of its founding members were Manchurian politicians and leading monks. Tanxu 淡虛 (1875–1963), who was responsible for Buddhist revival in the north, where Buddhism had virtually disappeared, had initiated missionary activities in Fengtian in 1921. With the support of Zhu Ziqiao, a strong anti-Japanese general and Buddhist benefactor, he promoted Buddhist education and built a number of large temples in the region, among them Jile Si in Harbin, Poruo Si in Changchun, and Zanshan Si in Qingdao. As a conservative monk, he had little concern for the conflict between China and Japan, and always focused on revitalizing Buddhism in the region. He neither supported the anti-Japanese forces in the northeast not cooperated with the Japanese authorities under whom he carried out his Buddhist mission. He defended himself by claiming no interest in politics when the Japanese accused him of connecting with anti-Japanese forces led by Zhu Ziqiao.59 Partially to escape endless investigation and interrogation by the Japanese in Harbin, Tanxu went to Changchun and started another project: building Poruo Si, which was completed in 1936. Nevertheless, since Tanxu was the most influential monk in the northeast at the time, the Japanese continued to keep an eye on him even after he left Harbin. In 1936 when Poruo Si held an ordination ceremony for more than one thousand monks and nuns, two Japanese spies disguised themselves and mixed in with the others, investigating any possible connection between Tanxu and anti-Japanese forces. In the end, they came forward and met Tanxu, who reassured them that he had nothing to do with the military or politics.60 From

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then on, Tanxu completely evaded suspicion and the Japanese never bothered him again. In fact, after full-scale war erupted in 1937, Tanxu apparently remained on good terms with the Japanese during his abbotship of Zanshan Si in Qingdao; he frequently received Japanese Buddhist delegations. On May 21, 1939, his name appeared in the list of those who attended a ritual service organized by the Japan-China Buddhist Study Society that was exclusively dedicated to Japanese dead soldiers.61 In 1942, a Branch of the Common Buddhist Purpose Society was established in Qingdao and Tanxu served as the chairman. As was mentioned before, the headquarters of the society was in Beijing, and its political orientation aligned it closely with the Japanese and the puppet government. Two clues may be drawn from Tanxu’s change towards the Japanese. First, Chinese monks like Tanxu vigorously attempted to prove that they had nothing to do with anti-Japanese forces although they also kept distant from supporting the Japanese. However, as the war developed and China seemed to lose hope of expelling the Japanese, these monks became more inclined toward acceptance of the fact or cooperation with the Japanese authorities. Second, the activities of these monks could not easily avoid being politicized one way or another in the Japanese-occupied area even though sometimes they were unaware of such politicization. Tanxu did not stay long in the temples he built in the north. After the completion of Poruo Si 般若寺 in Changchun in 1937, he came to Tianjin to renovate the ancient temple of Dabei Yuan, and left the responsibility of taking care of the temples to his disciples or Dharma brothers. One of them, Ruguang 如光 (1894–1962), became the abbot of Jile Shi in 1929 and maintained his position until 1946. During his tenure, which approximately paralleled the Japanese occupation of the region, Ruguang expanded the size of the temple, regulated religious practices, and actively propagated Buddhism in society.62 His achievements, to a large extent, resulted from his social talents and association with political and military authorities in the region. Ruguang had received a good education before he renounced the world. After he succeeded to the abbotship of Jile Si, he became acquainted with Yuan Jinkai, Zhen Xiaoxu, and Zhang Jinghui, the most powerful figures in Manchuguo. In 1934, the Civil Affairs Ministry of Manchuguo invited Ruguang to lead a Buddhist delegation to participate in the Pan-Pacific Buddhist Youth Conference in Tokyo,63 and he was elected vice president of the International Young Buddhist Society, which was newly founded at the conference. The position provided Ruguang with a new political advantage in his religious activities and enhanced his social status. After returning from Japan, he frequented Poruo Si in Changchun, the capital of Manchuguo, where he met the director of the General Service Bureau of Changchun City, Ueda Shikotairō, a powerful lay Japanese Buddhist in the capital. In 1935, Ruguang invited Ueda Shikotairō to serve as the chairman

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of the Society for Protecting Buddhism that he had newly established. After he was promoted to be one of the Japanese advisors in Manchuguo, Ueda Shikotairō sponsored the establishment of the General Buddhist Association of Manchuguo (Manzhou guo fojiao zhonghui 滿州國佛教總會) in 1937 and Ruguang was elected the chairman. Thereafter, Ruguang became actively involved in cooperation with the puppet administration and Japanese authorities. One of his associates later described Ruguang as follows: Ruguang spared no pain to advocate tolerance, compassion and kindness in order to show goodwill between Japan and Manchuguo. He often suggested that as teeth and lips, Manchuguo and Japan should help each other under any circumstance. The people of two countries who have one mind can achieve world unity (八紘一宇) and establish the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Only when the sacred war of great East Asia is accomplished can law and order prevail and people live in peace and happiness.64

This kind of support by an eminent Chinese monk was just what Japan and Manchuguo needed. In appreciation of his services, the Civil Affairs Ministry of Manchuguo conferred on Ruguang the honorary title of Thera (the elder or Zhanglao 長老 in Chinese). He also received the title “Superintendent Monk” bestowed by the Tendai School of Japan. We can only speculate about whether Ruguang would have been convicted and punished for his connection with the Japanese if he had not gone to Hong Kong at the end of the war.65 Many other monks with similar careers at the time of the war were not so lucky; after the war ended they were arrested and sentenced harshly for their cooperation with the Japanese. Shanguo 善果, the abbot of Poruo Si had come to know Tanxu when he studied at the Zanshan Buddhist College in Qingdao in 1933, and had acted as a master of ceremonies at the ordination held in Poruo Si in 1936. He won the favor of Tanxu, who then entrusted the abbotship of Poruo Si to him in 1937 when Tanxu left for Tianjin. Shanguo visited Japan in 1938 and participated in the one thousand and fiftieth anniversary celebration of the Tendai School. While in Japan, he was deeply impressed by Japanese economic and political development, and became convinced that only Japan could save Asia from poverty and disorder. After 1940 when he became the branch chairman of the General Buddhist Association of Manchuguo in Changchun, Shanguo devoted his services to the Japanese authorities. In order to express his loyalty to the Japanese emperor, on the eighth day of every month, which was also called the “day of receiving imperial edicts,”66 he would have the monks of the temple gathered to conduct a ceremony to pay homage to the Japanese and Manchuguo flags, and would prostrate himself in the direction of Japan, and follow up with a lecture on the unity of Japan and Manchuguo. Shanguo collaborated with the Japanese not

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because he was coerced or for the sake of protecting his temple, but because he believed that the Japanese were helping people in China and in Asia. Shortly after the eruption of the Pacific War on December 7, 1941, a large number of young people in Manchuguo were drafted into military service, and Shanguo was often invited to comfort these young soldiers and raise their morale. On one such occasion, Shanguo instructed them: Japanese imperial soldiers have helped us establish a new world of freedom. You will make contributions to strengthen this new order of Greater East Asia so that we can win the holy war soon. You will work hand in hand with the Japanese soldiers of our beloved neighboring country, struggling hard to accomplish the glory of national defense.67

On the fourth day of every month, Shanguo performed religious rituals in a train station to receive the ashes of Japanese soldiers killed in the war. When Japan faced a shortage of military supplies, Shanguo donated all temple instruments of religious service made of metal to the Japanese authorities.68 When the war situation further deteriorated in 1945, Shanguo, following the instruction of the General Buddhist Association of Manchuguo, carried out the campaign of donating “A Buddhist Airplane” to the army.69 Under his leadership, the Buddhists in Changchun successfully collected a sum of money large enough to purchase an airplane and handed it to the Japanese military. In order to assist the Japanese authorities in keeping social order and in performing charitable work at the end of the war, Shanguo organized Buddhist nuns in Changchun, together with the Women’s Society for National Defense, to provide services to the Japanese military. When the war was over in 1945, many Japanese in Manchuguo escaped to Poruo Si in order to avoid being arrested by the Red Army of Russia. Shanguo had their heads shaved and dressed them in Buddhist robes, disguising them as monks and allowing them to live in the temple. After Changchun was recovered by the Nationalist army in 1945, he made use of his erstwhile connection with the Nationalist party and was appointed special Buddhist commissioner of the nine provinces in the north.70 It is striking to notice that Buddhist clergy in the north and northeast, according available information, never openly denounced the Nationalist government in Chongqing, although they urged Buddhists and non-Buddhists to eliminate the influence of the Communists and the Red Army. On June 10, 1939, the North Shandong Buddhist Association conducted an Anti-Communist Seminar for monks and nuns. In June 15, a communiqué entitled “To the Entire Chinese Sangha,” called on all Buddhists to unite against the Communists.71 In supporting Japanese rule in the region, Ruguang often asserted that Japanese assured religious freedom by keeping the activities of Communists under control.

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He criticized Communism and urged all Buddhists and non-Buddhists to terminate Communist influence in the region because, as he maintained, Communists were the enemies of religion since in the Soviet Union all temples, churches, and mosques had been burned down and religious followers killed. In order to prevent the spread of the “Red Terror,” Ruguang requested Buddhists to assist Japanese soldiers and keep the Russian Red Army from invading Manchuria.72 At the same time, as we have mentioned, many monks and nuns supported Communist efforts during the war, and some of them even secretly joined Communist Party. Xuesong, a monk in Yancheng, became a member of the Political Consultative Conference in the middle of the 1940s, praised Communists for their policy toward Buddhism and contributions to the war.73 Communist sources claimed that the Communist party respected religion and provided religious freedom to all during this time. The January 1934 “Outline Constitution of the Republic of Chinese Soviet” guaranteed religious freedom to all people within the territory of the Soviet and prohibited discrimination against any religion or religious followers. In 1941, another regulation declared that all people have the right of religious freedom.74 The Communist party, which had a united front in this period apparently believed that religious freedom was important to win over sympathizers. Nonetheless, considering what happened shortly after Communists took power in mainland, and especially during the Culture Revolution (1966–1976), one may doubt whether Communist leaders then sincerely believed that Chinese people should have religious freedom and whether such a policy had been actually implemented in the areas controlled by Communist forces. Let us turn now to south China. Compared with that in the north, institutional Buddhism in the south had been more widespread in society and more intimately associated with the people of upper social, military, and political classes. Therefore, politicization of Buddhist activities during the war was more obvious. In March 1940, Wang Jingwei, having secretly escaped from Chongqing, became the head of the Nationalist government in Nanjing sponsored by Japanese. In July 1940, the prime minister of Japan, Konoe Fumimaro formed a new cabinet and modified Japanese policy toward China in an attempt to establish the new order of greater East Asia, later known as the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. According to this new policy, China would be conquered not through military power alone, but through political cooperation and cultural penetration. A plan called “An Outline for Dealing with the China Incident” (支那事變處理要綱), laid down in a cabinet meeting on November 13, 1940,75 prescribed that Japan, instead of depending exclusively on military operations, should initiate negotiations with the Nationalist government in Chongqing and push Jiang Jieshi to accept peace. This was part of the strategy to prevent America and British from supporting China.

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The political propaganda of both the Japanese military authority and the puppet government in Nanjing was made explicit in the East Asian Buddhist Conference held in Nanjing in April 1941.76 The conference was attended by more prominent politicians and lay Buddhists than clergy. Chu Minyi, the Foreign Minister, Cai Pei, the mayor of Nanjing, Honda, Japanese Ambassador to China, Harada, a Japanese general in Nanjing, and many other eminent Chinese and Japanese political and military figures attended the conference.77 Several Buddhist organizations in Japan and Japanese-occupied north China sent delegations.78 Some monks from Nanjing, Shanghai, and Zhenjiang also participated in the conference, although they did not play a leading role. The purpose of the conference was to pray for the arrival of peace between Japan and China, to achieve the coexistence and co-prosperity of the yellow race, and to establish a new order in East Asia. The conference delivered two letters to Wang Jingwei and Konoe Fumimaro, pledging Buddhist support for establishing “genuine peace and order” in China. Meanwhile, it also passed a resolution that urged Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalist government in Chongqing to stop the resistance war and to solve Sino-Japan conflict through political negotiation. The document issued after the conference shows that the number of monks and nuns who attended was insignificant and included no eminent Chinese monks. This may indicate that Chinese monks attempted to avoid being associated with such predominantly politicized activities. The sudden Japanese occupation and quick defeat of Chinese troops made many well-known Chinese clergy who remained in the Japanese-occupied areas pessimistic. Most of them had been involved in Buddhist social activities or reform, and were influenced by nationalism before the war. They must have been concerned about the future institutional Buddhism after the beginning of the war. Unwilling to collaborate with the Japanese yet unable to openly challenge them, some retreated into isolation in international concession zones in Shanghai, while others confined themselves within temples so that they could keep their distance from Japanese-sponsored activities. Among them were four monks, who had been pillars of Chinese Buddhism before the war, well-known for their Buddhist learning, social activities, and religious virtue, actively involved in Buddhist reforms. Chisong 持松 (1894–1972), a master of esoteric Buddhism, confined himself in a lay-disciple’s house for eight years during the war. One report claims that Chisong turned down an invitation from the Japanese authorities to work for the puppet government in Nanjing by pretending to be constantly sick.79 Similarly, Zhifeng 芝鋒 (1901–1949), once an editor of Hai chao yin, and Daxing 大醒 (1899–1952), a well-known disciple of Taixu and abbot of Xuedao Si in Zhejiang, remained inside Jin’an Si in Shanghai during wartime. Both of them were so depressed that they even did not want to step out of the temple. Nevertheless, they too did not want to go to the Nationalist-controlled

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region in spite of repeated urging by Taixu. Changxing 常惺 (1896–1939), the general secretary of the Chinese Buddhist Society, declined to participate in any Japanese-sponsored activities. After falling into depression from worry about the future of the Chinese nation and Buddhism, he died in January 1939. As discussed earlier, Yuanying actively participated in organizing rescue work at the beginning of the war. After the end of the war, his followers almost unanimously claimed that his war activities were the manifestation of Buddhist patriotism, although Yuanying himself had insisted when he was arrested by the Japanese authorities that his early war activities were not politically motivated but were done purely out of Buddhist compassion. In 1939, Yuanying had been arrested by Japanese military police in Shanghai, and taken to Nanjing together with one of his disciplines, Mingyang. He was interrogated for three weeks about his activities during the first two years of the war. Yuanying disassociated himself from the Nationalist government and denied that he had sent donations to resistance forces. As Mingyang later recalled, Yuanying was tortured harshly on the first day of the imprisonment and went on a hunger strike in protest.80 Late, the Japanese changed their attitude and tried to force him to be the head of the China-Japan Buddhist Association.81 But Yuanying declined on the grounds that he was old and in poor health. After 25 days in prison, he was released. As there was no formal charge, there was no statement of explanation for his release, and this omission left room for contradictory speculations about why he was arrested and why he was released.82 On January 8, 1940, three months after his release, Yuanying sent a letter to the Chinese Buddhist Society, announcing his resignation from the positions of chairman of the society and director of the Relief Work Team of the Chinese Buddhist Society for Disaster Areas.83 In the letter, Yuanying attributed the malfunction of the Chinese Buddhist Society to the eruption of the AntiJapanese War84 and the associated difficulties of communication; he specifically clarified that the 90,000 yuan he had collected from overseas Chinese was used exclusively for relief work without any political involvement. He explained that his resignation was due to his old age and declining health, which prevented him from performing duties as a leader of the society. He wished to devote himself to writing and politely refused to receive any visitors. Yuanying did not leave Shanghai until May 1942, when he was invited by Jin Yunpeng to give sermons on Buddhism in Tianjin which was under the Japanese rule. Jin, a former pro-Japanese prime minister and lay Buddhist leader in the north, served as the honorary chairman of the Common Buddhist Purpose Society in Beijing.85 Although it was not very clear why Yuanying, after three years of selfconfinement, accepted the invitation to go to the north, his trip to the north itself may indicate that he accepted the reality of Japanese occupation. His activities and speeches during this visit manifested his changing attitudes towards current

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politics in China. In a banquet speech in Tianjin about the Buddhist doctrine of no-self, he blamed war on ideas of race and nation. Peace could not be achieved unless people abandoned the view of self, he asserted. In a sermon, “Peace and Compassion,” delivered to Buddhists in Tianjin in June 1942, he urged people to give up racial and national discriminations. In order to achieve peace, people should practice Buddhist compassion and consider friends and enemies equally; only then could the war be stopped.86 He made these typical Buddhist arguments for world peace and harmony, yet in the Japanese-occupied areas, the political implication could be that Buddhists should not be involved in nationalistic activities against the Japanese, but should regard Japanese and Chinese as the same. Such speeches would certainly not be appreciated by resistance forces but would be welcomed by the Japanese and the Chinese who served in the puppet governments. Nevertheless, his disciples and followers later described Yuanying as “an old patriot” (aiguo laoren 愛國老人), and unanimously quoted his speech to students of the China Buddhist College in Beijing on September 30, 1942, in which he used the ancient saying “The rise and fall of the country is the responsibility of ordinary people” (guojia xingwang pifu youze 國家興亡 匹夫有責). A closer look at the context in which Yuanying referred to this ancient saying, however, reveals that Yuanying was not expressing patriotism, but talking about one’s duty to Buddhism: An old saying goes like this: ‘The rise and fall of the country is the responsibility of ordinary people.’ However, I would say, ‘The rise and fall of Buddhism is the concern of every Buddhist.’ (fojiao xingwang fozi youze 佛教興亡 佛子有責) Not only should the clergy be concerned about it, but also lay people. In all, the four groups of Buddhists are responsible for the protection of Buddhism.87

It seems difficult to connect this speech with patriotism. Yuanying’s activism during the war shows the difficult situation that Chinese monks lived through under the Japanese-occupation. As one of the leading monks in China, Yuanying could not openly support or finance any activity against the Japanese in the Japanese-occupied areas. Because his activities at the beginning of the war were suspected of supporting the resistance by the Japanese, he had to announce that he had worked purely for humanity rather than for politics, and to avoid political complications by secluding himself in a temple. Only then could he downplay the political significance of his Buddhist activities and evade cooperation with the Japanese. He was absent at the highly politicized East Asian Buddhist Conference in Nanjing in April 1941. Nevertheless, as his activities during the tour to Tianjin and Beijing also indicate, once he came out of self-isolation, Yuanying would not be able to completely avoid politicized religious activities. His speeches against

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distinguishing nations could certainly damage the efforts of Chinese monks struggling to prioritize the importance of liberating China from Japanese occupation. It is possible that he visited the north for purely religious reasons, but it is difficult to believe the suggestion that he advocated nationalism during the tour. Yuanying’s activities were closely watched by the Nationalist government in Chongqing. In a government report dated January 15, 1940, shortly after he was arrested by the Japanese authorities in Nanjing, the Nationalist government suspected him of having accepted the conditions put forward by the Japanese for his release.88 The Nationalist government urged Yuanying to come to Chongqing and join the other leading members of the Chinese Buddhist Society either for the sake of the Anti-Japanese War or to prove his innocence. However, Yuanying seemed to have refused the request and announced his resignation from the position of the chairman of the society.89 Did Yuanying assist the resistance forces at the beginning of the war? And did he accept a Japanese request for cooperation as a condition for his release? The first question was readily confirmed by many of his disciples in Shanghai as evidence of his patriotism. According to a report sent by Weijue 惟覺 to Buddhist Public Forum in June 1946 one year after the end of the war, it was Lin Sen, President of the Nationalist government, who requested Yuanying to collect medicine and medical equipment for the Chinese soldiers and refugees from Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.90 Yuanying went to Singapore with letters from Lin Sen and sent the latter the money he had collected from overseas Chinese. As to the question of whether Yuanying cooperated with the Japanese, one can only speculate. It is very difficult to assess what kinds of activity could be and should be considered as cooperating with the Japanese. In the eight long years of Japanese occupation, only those monks, who completely isolated themselves and declined all social and political activities, may be absolved from collaborating with the Japanese, because it was difficult for them otherwise to entirely refuse the politicization of their activities. Nevertheless, under any circumstance, Yuanying was distanced from by the Nationalist government after the war. One of reasons that Buddhist reformers could not outdo the conservatives for Buddhist reforms in modern history was because the conservatives, led by Yuanying, were supported by powerful politicians and rich gentry before the war. In 1936, the reformers, supported by the Internal Affairs Ministry, launched a movement to attack the conservatives and to speed reform of the Chinese Buddhist Society. Yuanying succeeded in aborting the movement by asking Duan Qiri to seek the intervention of Jiang Jiesh and Dai Jitao, the two of whom then requested the ministry to stop supporting the reformers. This may indicate that although Taixu was politically and socially active, top government officials favored Yuanying before the war. Yuanying’s activism

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during the war, however, estranged him from the Nationalist government so that he could not play a leading role in Buddhism after the war as we will discuss in the next chapter. Yet, his estrangement from the Nationalists may explain his future with the Communists after 1949; he served as the first chairman of the Chinese Buddhist Association established in 1953.

CONCLUSION Monks and nuns in occupied areas found it difficult to remain neutral. In many cases, the leading monks felt that it was their primary duty to protect their temples and safeguard the resident monks; their cooperation, even if it was forced by political pressure, could be justified as skillful means in difficult circumstances. Shuangting, the abbot of Jiangtian Si of Jinshan in Zhenjiang during the war, was one of the Chinese representatives, who participated in the East Asian Buddhist Conference held in Nanjing in 1941, and served as the head of the Japan-China Buddhist Society in Zhenjiang.91 Shuangting willingly accepted the post and cooperated with the Japanese on the grounds that to turn down the Japanese request would not only be useless, but also put the lives of the monks in danger. Besides, during the Nationalist regime, Shuangting alleged, the Buddhist clergy by and large had enjoyed no peace at all, as the Chinese government had indiscriminately confiscated temples and appropriated temple properties. After the establishment of a new government under the Japanese, and with the patronage of the League of Religious Federations established in 1939, those Buddhist institutions and temples that had cooperated with the Japanese were effectively protected. To the Chinese monks like Shuangting,92 there was no harm, but only advantage, in cooperating with the Japanese, who in return treated them with respect. Nevertheless, those who collaborated with the Japanese risked the danger of being indicted for treason after the end of the Japanese occupation. One of the reasons why Buddhist clergy had usually distanced themselves from politics in Chinese history might be based on the fact that changes in politics and governments could bring danger or even disaster to institutional Buddhism if they were attached to one political regime. At the end of the war, the monks who did not go abroad and who were suspected of having cooperated with the Japanese were charged, imprisoned, and even executed by the Nationalists and Communists. Tiechan, the abbot of Liurong Si in Guangzhou, was one such victim who was charged with treason and imprisoned in 1946.93 Although Shanguo of Poruo Si in Changchun escaped from punishment by the Nationalists, the Communists sentenced him to death in 1951 for his cooperation with the Japanese. Wude 悟德 and Mijia 密迦, the abbot and the superintendent monk of Jing’an Si 靜安寺 in Shanghai during the time of Japanese occupation, were

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accused of treason and imprisoned in October 1946. They were prosecuted for six crimes: being the members of the Shanghai Buddhist Society under the puppet government; setting up a Japanese school in the temple; organizing Buddhist ceremony participated in by traitors, who served in the puppet government; founding the society for temple protection under the Japanese leadership; sponsoring Buddhist rituals to pray for Japanese dead soldiers; and participating in a ceremony to welcome the Japanese.94 Wude and Mijia protested that they had been forced to associate with the Japanese and that they had been ignorant of any political implication in their activities. They further argued that their cooperation had done no harm to the Chinese people and nation, and explained that all leading monks and nuns in Shanghai had done the same, as all of them were members of the standing committee of the Shanghai Buddhist Society during the war. Wude and Mijia pleaded that the society was devoid of any political and military significance, and according to its charter, was aimed at social service and charitable works. As to the charge of sponsoring a Japanese school in their temple, they said that they had refused the Japanese request at first, but had to give in under pressure. Besides, they defended their action that the school had provided free education to thousands of Chinese children. To the charge that they had participated in rituals for the dead Japanese, they explained that it was their religious duty to perform rituals for the dead without considering any political significance; they could not prevent anyone, either the Japanese or the leaders of the puppet government, from taking part in rituals organized by the temple. In general, what Wude and Mijia did can be considered as normal religious and charitable activities that had been practiced in China for more than a thousand years, if the political context is put aside. However, because such activities were carried out directly or indirectly under the Japanese, the enemies of the Chinese nation, these monks were accused of being traitors. What they did, to some extent, facilitated the Japanese occupation of China, although it is difficult to assess whether they genuinely harmed the nation. Given the political circumstances of Japanese rule and the charges against Wude and Mijia after the war,95 it would seem that few monks and nuns in the Japanese-occupied areas could conscientiously say that they were innocent of betraying to the nation. If one considers Buddhist activities in both Japanese-occupied areas and Nationalist-controlled regions during the war simultaneously, one may realize that the politicization of Buddhism was almost inevitable. The same Buddhist activities performed within two rival political regimes could serve directly opposite purposes. Buddhist activities in the Nationalist-controlled areas, such as the Buddhist rescue teams, rituals for the dead soldiers, and prayers for peace and victory, were admittedly designated to serve the Chinese nation. Similar activities performed by the Buddhist clergy in the Japanese-occupied areas, however, were suspected to

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have served the purpose of the Japanese occupation. At the end of the war, such Buddhist activities in the Nationalist-controlled areas were praised as the manifestation of nationalism and patriotism while those in the Japanese-occupied areas were accused of being treasonous. It is quite difficult to say that there is any difference between Buddhist activities in these two regions, and the only difference perhaps is the politicization or rather discrimination imposed by political interpretations. The monks were charged with cooperating with the Japanese, to a large extent, not because of their religious or charitable activities per se, but because such activities were exploited by both the Japanese and the puppet governments during the war, and politicized by Nationalists or Communists after the war.

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Chapter Six

Taixu and Buddhism After the War

On August 10, 1945, when the Japanese emperor announced the unconditional surrender of Japan, almost a half-century of Japanese incursion (1895–1945) and eight years of the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945) finally ended. Although Chinese people had long expected the coming of the day of victory, the sudden surrender of Japan pleasantly surprised many Chinese, who were not yet prepared to undertake the task of rebuilding the nation. Similarly, numerous temples were either occupied or destroyed; Buddhist practices were disoriented; monks and nuns suddenly faced the tremendous task of rebuilding Chinese Buddhism nationwide. During the war, no charismatic figure, either monk or lay Buddhist, emerged in the Japanese-occupied areas to provide a united leadership for Buddhist institutions, which were much divided and influenced by Japanese Buddhism and politics. Although some well-known monks such as Taixu in the areas controlled by resistance forces continued to play a leading role in organizing Buddhist activities, and the victory of the war would reward them for their service to the nation, the challenge was great for them to unite all Chinese Buddhists divided by the war and to reorganize the Chinese Buddhist Society disorganized during the war. In this chapter, we will outline how Buddhist reform was carried out after the end of the war and the problems such reform encountered. However, before that, we should reexamine Taixu’s views on war and nationalism and his attitude toward the peace and internationalism.

TAIXU ON WAR AND NATIONALISM Taixu’s perspective on war was drawn largely from his nationalistic ideas, which in turn reflected his political views and close association with politicians in the Nationalist government. Taixu’s political views, as he stated in his autobiography, underwent several changes,

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Buddhism, War, and Nationalism My political and social ideas changed from constitutional monarchism, to national revolution, to socialism, to anarchism. Having come to know Zhang Taiyang’s On the Establishment of Religion (Jiangli zongjiao lun 建立宗教論), On the Fivefold Non-existence (Wuwu lun 五無論), and On Detailed Analysis of Evolution (Jufen jinhua lun 俱分進化論), I even regarded anarchism as a close neighbor of Buddhism that could be achieved gradually through democratic socialism.1

At the beginning of the twentieth century when he was at the formative age of twenty, Taixu became associated with the revolutionists; he showed keen interest in the Three People’s Principles of Sun Yatsen and was deeply impressed by Zou Rong’s anti-Manchu Revolutionary Army. Therefore, Taixu’s nationalism during this time was directed toward revolution to overthrow the Manchu Qing dynasty. Although disappointed by governments in Beijing after the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, he staunchly supported the Nationalist government founded in Nanjing in 1928, for he believed it was uniquely capable of leading Chinese people to rebuild the nation and expel foreign invasion. At the turn of the 1930s, Taixu became associated with high government officials although his efforts were partially aimed at protecting Buddhism. He was one of a few Buddhist monks who were well-known to the top political and government circles, and his relation with Jiang Jieshi, the military and political leader of China, became legendary among Buddhists and non-Buddhists.2 In September 1927, when Jiang Jieshi was forced to resign as commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army, he invited Taixu to Xuedao Si for Buddhist consultation. It was the night of the full moon of the eighth month when they met for the first time. On this occasion, Taixu gave a sermon on The Diamond Sūtra to the audience, including Jiang Jieshi, his first wife Mao Fumei,3 and Jiang’s staff. After the sermon they toured the temple under the bright moon. These romantic surroundings prompted Taixu to compose an impromptu poem in appreciation of the hospitality and friendship Jiang had extended to him. The poem reads: “The bright moon has been a friend for a thousand years; the night in mid-autumn will not be forgotten for a lifetime.” Afterward, Taixu and Jiang spent time in private conversation, discussing religion, philosophy, and politics.4 This occasion inaugurated a long-term friendship between the two. In 1928 Jiang provided 3000 yuan for Taixu to tour Europe and America and authorized him to form the Chinese Buddhist Study Society in Nanjing in 1929. In January 1932, Jiang Jieshi again returned to Xuedao Si after he resigned from the leadership of the Nationalist government in Nanjing as the result of political struggles, and Taixu paid a visit to him, consoling Jiang about his temporary political setback. On this occasion, Taixu presented a four-line poem to Jiang: “[I see] flying snow in Xuedao for the first time after four visits; yet it is a pity that the plum has

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not blossomed. It may wait for the coldest moment; so that its cool fragrance will rush into one’s nostrils.”5 The plum is the only flower that can sustain the cold and blossom in winter. Taixu told Jiang to be patient, that his resignation was only temporary, and that a brighter future awaited him. Jiang would survive and eventually come to power again after he underwent severe political ordeals. In November 1932, Jiang Jieshi invited Taixu to be the abbot of Xuedao Si and presided over the inauguration ceremony.6 On Jiang’s fiftieth birthday in September 1936, Taixu proposed that all Buddhist temples in China hold a religious ceremony and recite the Medicine King Sūtra to transfer merit to him. In December, when Jiang Jieshi was forcibly held by Zhang Xueliang in Xi’an, Taixu again called upon Chinese monks and nuns to conduct religious rituals and pray for his safe return.7 From the early 1930s, Taixu became unequivocal in supporting the Nationalist government and showed more interest in political affairs, both domestic and international. Shortly after the Anti-Japanese War began on July 7, 1937, Taixu urged Buddhist clergy to defend the nation under the united leadership of the government. In 1939, when the crisis deepened as Japanese occupation expanded in China, and when hope for national survival was diminishing among Chinese people, Taixu openly embraced the principles of “supremacy of the nation” (Guojia zhishang 國家至上) and “military supremacy” advocated by the government.8 In the article entitled “Populist Politics and Buddhist Monasticism” written in 1943, Taixu maintained that at this time of the war all Chinese should study and embrace the nationalism laid down in Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles. Although Buddhism was a religion that had no narrow idea of nationhood, Buddhists and Buddhist institutions should stand by their nation when it experienced conflict with other nations.9 During peacetime the welfare of humankind as a whole should be the priority, but nationalism had to reign supreme during resistance war.10 Taixu strongly believed that all Buddhists, and especially monks and nuns, must rally behind the government and use military force to defend the nation. In 1938 Taixu wrote an article “Have Japan and the Puppet Governments Awakened?” and declared that the Chinese resistance war was neither the violence of random killing nor merely based on nationalism, but instead the way to stop violence.11 An arhat, a Buddhist sage who gains liberation through personal effort, is one who scares away evil (Bumou 怖魔). Taixu felt that Chinese monks and nuns should follow the example of the arhat, and, by using all necessary means, drive the Japanese out of Chinese territory or force them to surrender. In June 1938, Taixu delivered a speech “Subduing Evils to Save the World and Resisting the Japanese to Build the Nation”12 to a Buddhist audience in Chengdu. He explained that one meaning of Arhat in Sanskrit is to kill evil or the “thief of corruption” (kleśa 煩惱賊), which keeps people in the realm of suffering. The mission to attain

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enlightenment and the course of defeating the invaders were the same, and both should be carried out simultaneously.13 Taixu explained with rhetoric that the resistance war was not aimed at killing the Japanese, but counterattacking the evil power that had imposed on the Japanese. Although he was convinced that China and Japan should join together to implement the bodhisattva’s path, to resist the influence of the West, and to safeguard the culture of the yellow race, especially Buddhism,14 he never compromised his nationalistic conviction that Chinese people had the right to defend their nation. During the war, he advocated that all Chinese should consider “Nationalism first, internationalism second, and individualism third.” By advocating the supremacy of the nation and emphasizing the priority of Chinese victory, Taixu politicized his Buddhist activities, vigorously carried out propaganda against the Japanese invasion, and passionately called on all Chinese monks and nuns to render their selfless service to the nation. Taixu’s nationalism can also be seen in his restraint in criticizing the government’s policy on Buddhism during the war.15 He had denounced the state’s persecution of Buddhism before the war, and on many occasions joined with other leading Chinese Buddhists to protest the appropriation of temple property. Nevertheless, once the war broke out, Taixu expressed his unconditional support for the war policies and provided Buddhist service to the national liberation. He believed that only when the nation was freed of the foreign occupation could Buddhism survive and thrive. On many occasions he attempted to refute the Japanese accusation that the Chinese government had carried out a policy of expropriating Buddhist properties. During his tour to the Asian countries in 1940, when asked how the Chinese government treated Buddhism, Taixu never uttered a single word of criticizing the government. It was true, he said, that Buddhist institutions had degenerated in modern time, but this decline was long before the Nationalist government took office and it was because the Chinese monks and nuns were incapable of responding to social and political changes in China. Temples and temple lands had been appropriated by various governments beginning in the later nineteenth century. But, Since the establishment of the Nationalist government in Nanjing, Buddhism has been developing in China and Buddhist leaders in Tibet and Mongolia are highly respected. Recently, the government has drafted regulations for the Chinese Buddhist Society to reform Buddhist institutions and to establish new Buddhism in China. Therefore, Buddhism has turned to the track of revival from decline.16

During this time, Taixu was perfectly aware of the government’s objective to appropriate temple properties and was very disappointed with its policies on Buddhism.

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It is clear therefore that Taixu shied away from admitting the state’s persecution of Buddhism in an effort to gain the support of people in Asia for China during wartime. After the war ended in 1945, Taixu again started to criticize the Nationalist government for widespread mismanagement, corruption, and negligence of its officials. Chinese people who had fought the Japanese alongside the Nationalists had now become disheartened, he wrote, and the government had been distracted from the spirit of the Three People’s Principles. The nation was under the control of corrupt tyrants who conspired with wicked social gentry. In May 1946, Taixu was interviewed by a journalist from the newspaper Wenhuibao.17 He described three evil practices as “tumors” within the government, which must be removed immediately: the military occupation of citizens’ houses, including temples; the bullying and bribery of bureaucrats and local government officials; and the corruption of the commissioners who were in charge of taking over the administrative powers and properties of the Japanese and puppet governments. These were common concerns of society at the time, and Taixu expressed his worries about the nation not only as a monk but also as a Chinese citizen. In May 1946, in his speech, “Buddhism in the Atomic Age,” delivered at Jing’an Si, Taixu asserted that the Chinese people suffered even more after the victory than they had during it.18 The hope of peace and enthusiasm for rebuilding the nation was gradually waning as the struggle between the Communists and Nationalists intensified and people became more frustrated. Taixu was generally considered anti-Communist; he criticized the Communists for not cooperating with the Nationalist government before and during the war.19 Yet, unlike Leguan who was a member of the Nationalist party and always advocated the eliminating the Communists by force, Taixu recognized that the massive public support for the Communist movement resulted from widespread poverty and the inefficiency of the government’s policies and that the Communists should not be unconditionally blamed for the unrest in China. Early in 1935, Taixu had expressed his views on the government’s military and political policies toward the Communists: Ordinary people with shallow ideas may think nothing but military means can be effective in the efforts of pacifying the insider [communists] and expelling the outsiders [ Japanese]. . . . However, only when there are suitable and improved political ways, can civil war be brought to end, national defense be reinforced, and the strength of the nation be boosted.20

According to Taixu, the rising popularity of Communists in China at the end of the war had to be viewed as a response to the incapability and corruptness of the Nationalists. Chinese, who had lost confidence in the Nationalist government,

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were following the Communists in a desperate way to escape suppression and destitution. Taixu’s idea of nationalism was demonstrated in his efforts to bring Buddhism into social and political life so that Buddhists, especially monks and nuns could make their contributions to the nation in serving society. Or in other words, his nationalism served the purpose of Buddhism. We have already discussed in some detail how Taixu took the resistance war as an opportunity for Chinese monks and nuns to reintegrate into society. Soon after the war, Taixu suggested forming a Buddhist party to run in the National Assembly election scheduled to be held in February 1946.21 The new constitution draft allowed parties, organizations, and individuals to participate in the election. However, “The Views on Five-Five Constitution Draft” (Dui wuwu xiancao zhi yijian 對五五憲草之意見) issued by constitution draft committee stated, “No limitation should be imposed on the protection of people without depending on the constitution and the government orders. . . . However, in order to prevent superstition and evil belief under the name of religion from falsely disturbing innocent citizens, religion and faith should be excluded under the law.”22 Thus, the constitution prohibited religion from forming a party in the election. Later on, Taixu became aware of incapability of monks and nuns in political affairs and negative effect on the sangha if monks and nuns were involved in politics, such as they would lose respect of lay people and be considered as rival of other parties. In July 1946, Taixu modified this plan and put forward guidelines for the political activities of the sangha: “Be concerned with politics but not involved in administration” (Wenzheng er bu ganzhi 問政而不干治). “Monks and nuns are indisputably the citizens of China and entitled to discuss the administration of the masses. [To do this], the clergy have to take part in lawful assemblies at local and national levels to discuss the concerns of the masses.”23 Taixu believed that the clergy should not seek posts in civil or military administration, but only serve in the assemblies of the people. Such service to the nation and people accorded with bodhisattva’s ideal of saving the world with great wisdom and compassion. The clergy, once elected as representatives, would work for the benefit of the nation and of Buddhism; they would not become politically corrupted because they would exercise not executive powers, but simply the rights of legislation and supervision. In February 1947, about one month before his death, Taixu finally decided not to organize a Buddhist party, but urged his fellow Buddhists to actively take part in the election.24 In 1946, Taixu, recommended by Yu Bin, the Catholic archbishop to Nanjing, and backed by Jiang Jieshi, was nominated as a representative to the National Assembly. Yet once again, Chen Lifu and other Nationalist veterans strongly opposed this move and his name was later dropped from the list of candidates.25 Nevertheless, because of his close

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association with politicians, his deep interesting in politics and nationalism during and after the war, Taixu earned the title of “a political monk,” and was attacked by conservatives both inside and outside Buddhist circles. He accepted the title with a sense of humor and stated that only true bodhisattva-monks could sincerely, selflessly, and fearlessly serve the nation and people and fulfill a political mission.26 Although Taixu, to some extent, politicized his nationalism in supporting the Nationalist government because he believed that all Chinese should unite against foreign aggressions, his nationalism, therefore, should not be considered as the aim of his endeavor itself but the means to achieve higher ends. To him, nationalism was a “function” for Chinese monks and nuns to enter into Chinese society. He urged his Buddhist fellows to endorse nationalism and to participate in these national striving not only for the sake of nation but also for the sake of Buddhist revival. Gandhi once said, “Those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what religion means.”27 Taixu, having witnessed the conflicts between institutional Buddhism and the state, tried hard to establish a bridge between Buddhism and politics so that Buddhist institutions might prevent state persecution and survive. He feared that Buddhism would not be able to survive if monks and nuns continued to completely isolate themselves from national life in democratic society. His strong nationalism, therefore, was aimed at enabling Buddhists, especially monks and nuns to reenter into the social and political life of Chinese people. The final aim of Taixu’s activism in serving the nation or participating in politics was to safeguard sansana—Buddhism.

TAIXU ON PEACE AND INTERNATIONALISM In a commentary entitled “How to Equalize the World’s Two Inequalities” written in 1933, Taixu suggested that conflict and war were caused by material inequality among individuals domestically and inequality of rights and benefits among nations,28 and these two inequalities could be obliterated only through Buddhist teachings, which aim to eliminate racial and national discriminations. He said Buddhism condemned the caste system and the idea of “chosen ones,” every individual person and nation should be treated equally because all are related to each other, directly or indirectly. This interrelatedness entails universal egalitarianism as all human beings are members of one family. Therefore, one nation must respect the others instead of destroying each other because destroying others was the same to self-destruction. Although Taixu supported nationalism against foreign invasion as discussed above, he never doubted that peace could be preserved only through internationalism. On May 1933, Taixu observed that modern powerful nation-states were

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always seeking their own benefit at the expense of others and would not hesitate to wage war if their interests were threatened. Every nation-state, therefore, must first strengthen its self-defense and prepare for war, because no nation could avoid being pushed into the whirlpool of conflict. Yet, the best way to protect the nation was to expand the narrow concept of nationalism to a broader understanding and cooperation of internationalism, and that was the ideal way to achieve world peace. Before the war erupted in 1937, Taixu even suggested that if China became a united and strong nation state, it would merely add one more state to the international struggles. Therefore, the nation-building was meaningless compared to the value of humanity and the welfare of the world as a whole if nationalism was not paralleled with internationalism. In order to achieve peace and to avoid war, Taixu took every opportunity to remind Chinese and Japanese that they were brothers of the same culture and same race, nurtured by the same Buddhist doctrines. China had provided Japan with advanced culture and Japan had set the example of national modernization for China; the history of the two countries had been so intimately connected that there was no reason for their citizens to go to war against each other. In May 1935, the Japanese monk Itōwara, whose brothers had been killed in battles between Japanese and Chinese troops in 1931 and 1932, asked Taixu to write an inscription for the memorial tablet of his brothers’ graves. In his “Inscription on the Memorial Tablets of Those Who Died in the War between China and Japan in Liaonin and Shanghai,”29 Taixu compared China and Japan to two brothers with more than 1300 years of good relations, capable of co-existing in peace and harmony by helping each other. However, influenced by the West, the younger brother ( Japan) had become an arrogant and bully, while the older brother (China) had become indolent and self-indulgent. The increasing tension between the two testified to the truth of the Buddhist doctrine of causality that hatred can never be eliminated by hatred. In March 1937, Taixu, together with many other Chinese and Japanese Buddhists, including the Japanese monk Ogasawara, held a meeting at a subtemple of the Higashi Honganji in Shanghai. They discussed the possibility of promoting peace and goodwill in the world through Buddhism, and Taixu expressed his hope that Buddhist efforts for peace might alter the course of conflict between China and Japan.30 Taixu’s suggestion that Chinese and Japanese Buddhists cooperate for world peace was announced just a few months before full scale war erupted in July 1937. He must have resisted tremendous pressure to join the overwhelming nationalism that prevailed in China at the time, insisting that Buddhists in China and Japan would be able to dissolve the military tension so that the two nations could stand side by side and lead Asia under the banner of Buddhism.

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In October 1939, Taixu delivered another speech “Buddhism and the Significance of Counter-Invasion”31 at a tea party organized by the China Branch of the Anti-Invasion Society in Chongqing. In the speech, he said that in the middle of the front hall inside a temple, there usually stands an image of General Weituo (韦陀) holding diamond stick, together with the other Four Great Heavenly Kings, all of whom have robust bodies and ferocious faces, and are fully armored and equipped with awesome weapons; they are always prepared to protect the temple by punishing trespassers and invaders. These deities signify the variety of Buddhist “functions” in dealing with evil and show “powers” of self-defense. Yet in every temple, there is also the Laughing Buddha (Maitriya) and Śakyamuni Buddha with their glow of compassion, majestically sitting and calmly receiving all people equally without discrimination. Taixu then suggested that if the Four Heavenly Kings and Weituo symbolize Buddhist skillful means and “function” of dealing with the war of invasion, then the Buddhas represent the Buddhist “essence” of achieving peace and harmony. Although vajras could subdue the powers of evils temporarily, only the Buddhas would provide the final solution to all conflicts and preserve peace in the human world. According to Taixu, the Buddhist law of cause and effect, the moral pillar of the Buddhist edifice, should be implemented to deter those who dared to wage war. When the warlord Sun Quanfang was the military commander of five provinces in the north, he ordered the death of thousands of people, one of whom was the father of Shi Jianqiao. Late, Shi killed Sun out of revenge at a Buddhist temple in Tianjin in 1935.32 According to Taixu, the incident proved the infallibility of the Buddhist law of cause and effect. Sun Quanfang, formerly a powerful warlord and accused of randomly killing people in the past, could not escape his own death even though he took refuge in Buddhism. Taixu warned that retribution could fall upon the Japanese at any moment,33 because the collective karma accumulated by Japanese militarists would surely result in the punishment of the Japanese nation as a whole. Although Taixu maintained that Buddhism could provide the solution for preventing war and achieving peace, he realized that Buddhists must work together with other religious followers in such an effort. In January 1943,34 Taixu, together with the leaders of other religions, sponsored the founding of the Fellowship of Chinese Religious Believers (Zhongguo zongjiaotu lianyi hui 中國宗教徒聯誼會) in Chongqing. Taixu was elected a member of the standing committee, which included Yu Bin, the Roman Catholic Archbishop to Nanjing; Bai Chongxi, the Muslim General; and Feng Yuxiang, the Christian General.35 This inter-religious organization purported to “advance freedom of religions with special emphasis on spiritual enrichment and social service. [Its] principal activity is to pool the efforts of people of various religious faiths for the furtherance of the cause of peace among

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all nations.”36 In May 1945, Taixu highlighted the importance of the united efforts of religious followers for the outcome of the Anti-Japanese War and for the preservation of peace after the war, outlining five tasks of the organization: supporting the national policy of the resistance and nation rebuilding; respecting the freedom of religious faith; promoting spiritual cultivation among the masses; steadfastly rendering service to society; and enhancing peace in the world.37 He foresaw that after the end of the war, all religions would make greater contributions to the true happiness and peace of the human world. After the end of the Second World War, Taixu became more vigorous in advocating internationalism and the Buddhist way to preserve fragile peace. Although numerous committees and conferences at the regional and international levels were organized in an attempt to maintain peace, the cold war was beginning to form as the world powers that emerged from the war attempted to dominate the world through military advantage. Taixu called on the leaders of the most powerful nations to work together for world peace. In his article, “Appealing to America, Russia, and Britain to Promote Peace,”38 Taixu explained that peace could be maintained only through respecting national equality. Powerful nations must give up their self-centered desires even at the expense of self sacrifice. In February 1947, as civil war in China appeared inevitable, Taixu, having completely lost faith that politicians would make peace, suggested that the leaders of world religions and intellectuals should be invited instead to form a Union of Peace Movements based on the ideals of compassion and humanity so that they could mediate between the Nationalists and Communists.39 In his article, “Let Nuclear Weapons be Entrusted to the Peace-Loving Scientists,” Taixu advocates that war can be effectively eliminated and peace be permanently maintained only through the union of religion and science. He maintains that there will be no war and conflict if scientists-religionists are put in charge of powerful weapons.40 He cites the example of Mozi 墨子 (479–438 B.C E) who taught about both religion and science. Mozi’s religion of universal love and brotherhood, and his practical technology in producing advanced weapons for defense enabled him to prevent war and prolong peace in society. Taixu then suggests that a committee consisting of numbers of religionist-scientists should be founded and that their job should be to deter any sort of military offence. Those who dare to launch war against others should be brought before the committee so that either the committee can rehabilitate them through religious persuasion or advanced weapons of science can be used to deter or punish their offensive actions. If Taixu’s nationalism was his response to foreign invasion, the way to fulfill his civic duty, and “function” aiming at safeguarding Buddhism, his tireless search for peace was surely inspired by the idea of internationalism based on Buddhist teachings. His call for resistance war was a skillful means adopted in response

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to the Japanese invasion and the prevailing nationalism of the time. Once the war ended, he became more vigorously engaged in seeking the maintenance of peace through Buddhism which, according to him, could provide guidance for humankind. Buddhism could offer the final solution to all conflicts because its practitioners purify their minds first and thus eliminate the very source of violence and conflict.

BUDDHIST REFORM AFTER THE WAR The end of the resistance war created favorable conditions although also with the tremendous task of Buddhist reform. Reformers’ participation in the AntiJapanese War had won them the political support and social sympathy. The government, having realized the urgency both of rehabilitating the clergy who had cooperated with Japanese and of restructuring Buddhist organizations in the Japanese-occupied areas, supported Taixu’s plans for reform. Thus the long awaited Buddhist reform program was carried out nationwide. In what follows, I will first examine Taixu’s effort for reorganizing the Chinese Buddhist Society and the hope for Buddhist revival after the war. I will then proceed to investigate the activities of monks in general during the Civil War (1947–1949). Taixu’s reform had been repeatedly set back before and during the war. In 1937, he and his supporters launched a campaign for reconstructing the Chinese Buddhist Society, and their effort was supported by the Internal Affairs Ministry. Nevertheless, due to the opposition of Buddhist conservatives, who persuaded Jiang Jieshi to intervene, the reform program was aborted. In 1938, Taixu set up the Temporary Office of the Chinese Buddhist Society in Chongqing and reassumed the leadership of Buddhists in the Nationalist-controlled areas, providing guidance for Buddhist participation in the Anti-Japanese War. In 1940, the government again became interested in supporting Buddhist reform, and the Social Affairs Ministry drafted a proposal for reorganizing the Chinese Buddhist Society. In September 1940, the Sichuan Buddhist Society appealed to Buddhists in the Nationalist-controlled areas and called for reorganizing the Chinese Buddhist Society under the leadership of Taixu. Buddhist societies in Hunan, Shanxi, and Hubei responded positively to this call. Nevertheless, in 1941, Taixu had to close the Temporary Office of the Chinese Buddhist Society and announced the cancellation of the plan for Buddhist reorganization, because, according to Yingshun, the Interior Affairs Ministry and the Social Affairs Ministry could not agree on how Buddhist temples should be made useful for the war. The plan was also opposed by some leading lay Buddhists in the Nationalist government.41 When the war ended in 1945, Taixu and other Buddhist reformers who had followed the Nationalists to Chongqing in 1937 became a predominant force

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in Chinese Buddhist society. Their contribution to the war was appreciated by the Nationalist government and duly rewarded. The Nationalist government, in recognition of his efforts to organize sangha rescue teams, led a goodwill visit to Asian countries with political mission, and to advocate Buddhist participation in the war, awarded Taixu with the Victory Medal 勝利勛章.42 At the end of 1945, the Assembly of Political Consultant 參政會 passed a proposal that the Chinese Buddhist Society should be reorganized by including the membership of lamas from Tibet, Mongolia, and other minority regions.43 In December, the Interior Affairs Ministry and the Social Affairs Ministry finally issued a joint edict, “Forming a Committee for Reorganizing the Chinese Buddhist Society in accordance with the Law” and appointed Taixu, Zhangjia, and Li Zikuan (a veteran revolutionary and lay disciple of Taixu) as standing committee members in charge of affairs.44 Meanwhile the two ministries also drafted “The Institutional Program for Reorganizing the Chinese Buddhist Society,” as a blueprint for the reconstruction of the society.45 Taixu, who had endeavored to reform Buddhism since early the 1910s but had until this point been unsuccessful, was now full of enthusiasm and energy for the Buddhist future although he often felt physically unwell. In an article, “The Birth of Reorganization Committee for the Chinese Buddhist Society,” he explained why Chinese Buddhist institutions should be reorganized after the war.46 Under the Japanese military occupation and the influence of Japanese Buddhist missionaries, Chinese Buddhist institutions in some areas, such as Taiwan and the Northeast, had become victims of colonization and Buddhist doctrine was falsified and its practice distorted. Taixu believed that erroneous practices and distorted doctrines had to be rectified immediately so that a correct and vital form of Buddhism could be reestablished in China. Even in the interior areas controlled by the Nationalist government during the war, he believed, Buddhists should be reorganized to make contributions to nation-building and work for Buddhist revival in the new social and political environment. On April 28, 1946, Taixu returned to Nanjing from Chongqing, bringing with him the government documents that authorized him to carry out his plan of Buddhist reform. Two days later, he held a press conference in Piru Si and articulated his plan in six points for reshaping the sangha. (1) The government shall earnestly protect temple properties in accordance with the principles of equality and freedom of religion. (2) All monks and nuns shall receive public education and actively participate in agricultural production. (3) The enterprise of serving society and organizing public charities shall be undertaken immediately. (4) Buddhist society shall be reorganized and both clergy and lay-Buddhists should register. (5) Buddhists who are interested in politics may take part in political activities. (6) All Buddhists shall wholeheartedly propagate the Buddhist message, guide the

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spiritual life of Chinese people, and serve society and promote world peace.47 On July 8, 1946, the Sangha Training Seminary was opened at Jiaoshan in Zhenjiang to train Buddhist cadres so that they would be able to administer Buddhist institutions in the future; more than two hundred monks from about twenty provinces received training. The seminary’s courses covered more than ten subjects, including state law, accounting, the Three People’s Principles, Buddhist doctrine, history, and monastic etiquette and discipline. One term at the seminary lasted for two months and would be followed by another one.48 In an address to the trainees in August 1946, Taixu revealed the purpose of training many monks together.49 According to Taixu’s plan, the monks, after training, would be assigned to the county or provincial branches of the Chinese Buddhist Society. They would have executive power over temples within each area and would be able to carry out a unified program of Buddhist reform nationwide. Taixu announced that Buddhist organizations in China would follow the practice of the Catholic Church in that each county would be a small parish, and each province a middle one, while the whole country would constitute one large parish under the collective leadership of the Chinese Buddhist Society. Everything was prepared for the opening of the conference of Buddhist representatives scheduled to be held on May 27, 1947; at this conference Taixu would formally receive a mandate from Chinese Buddhists to lead the new Buddhism. Suddenly, he passed away in Jade Buddha Temple in Shanghai on March 17, 1947. Three months later the Nationalist government paid tribute to him in a “Letter of Appraisal,” which stated: Shi Taixu is proficient in Buddhist philosophy, lofty in aspiration and noble in action. . . . During the Anti-Japanese War, [he] organized Buddhist sangha rescue teams, which followed and served the military troops. His zeal to protect the nation especially deserves high appraisal. It is deeply regretful to hear that he passed away. This proclamation, therefore, is issued to publicly honor him so that his loyalty and scholarship can be recognized.50

His death dampened the hope of Buddhist reform, and disrupted again the “awakening” of Chinese Buddhism. In May, the Conference of Buddhist Representatives of China held its first meeting in Nanjing, and more than seventy representatives from thirty-two provinces and cities, including Taiwan, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Xingjiang, took part in the conference. The statement issued after the meeting declared that five more important issues should be dealt with immediately: 1. spreading true teaching of the Buddha and training more Buddhist intellectuals, 2. reforming the sangha and improving its discipline, 3. establishing regulations for combination of working and meditation (religious practice), 4. organizing Buddhist charities, and 5. implementing the policy of “concerning

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with politics yet not interfering with government administration.”51 Although the newly reorganized Chinese Buddhist Society headed by Zhangjia made a resolution that they would continue to follow the blueprint laid down by Taixu, the civil war between the Nationalists and Communists and the final victory of Communists in mainland China eventually ended the Buddhist movement of awakening.

BUDDHISM DURING THE CIVIL WAR China’s victory in the resistance war could have inspired Chinese to work together for national rebuilding, but the political feud between the Nationalists and Communists, the increasing military power of the Communists, the widespread corruption and economic mismanagement of the Nationalist government, student unrest, and many other reasons resulted in full-scale civil war by 1947. Within three years, Nationalist troops collapsed like an avalanche and communist power quickly swept over most parts of China. Finally, the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan and communists founded the People’s Republic of China in 1949. In January 1 1947, the Nationalist government proclaimed “The Constitution of the Republic of China,” which became effective in December 25th of the same year. Article 13 stated “People have freedom of religion,” and article 24 promised that government servants who violated the rights and freedoms of people would be punished by criminal law and civil law.52 The declaration and implementation of the constitution laid down a fitting foundation for monks and nuns to practice their religion, and to protest malpractice of government officials. In order to inform them of their constitutional rights, the Chinese Buddhist Society published a number of booklets and articles on the issue. At the end of 1947, Xuesong, the secretary of the Chinese Buddhist Society, edited the Categorized Collection of the Laws and Regulations on Buddhism.53 In an article “Clergy Should Read the Constitution and Its Related Documents on Buddhism,” Daxing, then the editor of Hao chao yin, urged monks and nuns to carefully study the government law so that they could protect their rights through the legal system.54 However, discrimination against Buddhism continued after the end of the war. One interesting phenomenon at this time was the superstition tax (mixin zhuan 迷信捐) imposed by local governments.55 This was a tax on Buddhist ritual performance, which was considered by the government as superstition, although not prohibited. Buddhists considered rituals, however, as a part of their religion, permitted by the constitution. Conflict often occurred when tax collectors demanded such tax from monks and nuns. On October 15 1948, abbots from different temples in Zhenghai collectively performed a ritual ceremony in the Dragon Palace for local lay devotees. After the monks and lay devotees had left, the tax collectors arrived and demanded that the monks of the Dragon Palace pay the

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superstition tax. The abbot protested that it was improper for the monks of his temple to pay the whole tax since all other monks and lay devotes had already left. After the exchange of arguments, the tax collectors lost their temper and began to smash statues and ritual instruments. In the end, two monks were arrested and taken to custody.56 The Chinese Buddhist Society, having received complaints, petitioned the central government to intervene and alleged that the local government violated religious freedom. When the civil war situation deteriorated, the Chinese Buddhist Society faced a mounting challenge of financial shortage. After the resistance war, many temples were destroyed, disused, or occupied by government departments and other social organizations, Buddhist infrastructure collapsed, temples’ revenue was dramatically reduced, and local branches of the society could not pay promised fees. In the middle of 1948, the financial difficulty almost prevented normal function of the society and Zhangjia even suggested the suspension of its work.57 This problem was aggravated further when land reform was carried out. Under the policy that “land to the tillers,” temples which used to possess a large sum of lands had to give up their property and distribute them among the tenants.58 This caused fear among the monks and nuns whose livelihood depended on income from leasing temple lands, and they now had to cultivate their remaining lands without hiring tenants. Although Buddhist advocacy for and participation in the Anti-Japanese War were greatly influenced by nationalism, it had also been hoped that by serving the nation monks and nuns could improve the relationship between institutional Buddhism and the state. Once the war ended, monks and nuns became more convinced that serving the nation was to serve Buddhism; they continued to work hard to cooperate with the Nationalist government and to engage themselves in social activities. In these efforts, besides the reorganizing of the Chinese Buddhist Society and its first conference in May 1947, another important event was the founding of Social Service Squad of the Chinese Buddhist Society (Zhongguo fojiaohui fuwutuan 中國佛教會社會服務團) in Shanghai at the end of 1947. The mission of the service squad, which consisted of young monks, was to “protect the nation and Buddhism, save the world and humankind.” The inauguration ceremony of the service squad was held in Tianchang Thereat in December 16, 1947, and more than one thousand people attended the ceremony, including the mayor of Shanghai, directors of departments of Shanghai municipal government, guests from other organizations, monks and nuns from Shanghai and Zhangjiang. In the speech, Zhangjia encouraged the members to inherit the spirit of Buddhist participation in the Anti-Japanese War and to fight against communist rebellion under the united leadership of the Nationalist government. At the end, the members of the service squad vowed together, “I, with

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highest sincerity, swear to have faith on the Three Peoples’ Principles, to observe the law of the state, to obey the orders of the Supreme Leader [ Jiang Jieshi], and to fulfill my loyal duties. I will readily accept severe punishment if I violate my vow.”59 The service of monks and nuns to common society and especially their loyalty to the Nationalist party were highlighted and duly appreciated by the Nationalist government, which in return showed some relaxation on its policy towards Buddhism. Available information tells us that the Nationalist government did attempt to prevent some local governments’ attempts at appropriating temple property. For instance, in January 1948, the Defense Ministry turned down the request of the Fujian provincial government that Xichan Si be converted to a military prison. Early in 1947, the Henan provincial government urged the supreme court to approve their proposal that all temple property in its territory be confiscated for promoting public education. The court rejected the proposal on the ground that there was no law to back up their claim.60 Most significantly, some regulations on Buddhism issued during the war were repealed. In January 1948, the Interior Affairs Ministry ordered to abolish “the Regulation for Promoting the Public Charity of Temples,” which discriminated against institutional Buddhism.61 The change of the government policy toward Buddhism resulted partially from interventions by the newly reorganized Chinese Buddhist Society headed by Zhangjia Lama, who was a staunch supporter of the Nationalist government and enjoyed a high political profile.62 Whenever cases occurred of local governments or individual officials appropriating temple property, occupying temple buildings, or overcharging temple income tax, individual clergy or local Buddhist societies would report them to the Chinese Buddhist Society, which on behalf of these clergy and local branches would send memoranda to the related departments of the central government and urge them to intervene. The monthly reports of the society indicate that the central government showed some enthusiasm for supporting the work of the society. In January 1948, the Interior Affairs Ministry sent a reply to the society that the ministry had investigated a charge that a public hospital in Hangzhou had forcefully occupied a temple premises. In June, the Chinese Buddhist Society sent to the provincial government of Jiangsu a complaint from monks in Shuchan County that local government officials had ordered temples dismantled in order to build military barriers. In reply, the governor promised that the provincial government would issue strict orders to stop such practices.63 However, certainly not all such cases could be solved satisfactorily, because the central and provincial governments would sometimes be in favor of local governments. More frequently, the local governments simply ignored the order of the central and provincial government, or delayed the implementation of the order. In October 1946, the director of the Civil Administration Department of Shanghai

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Municipal government proposed that Buddhist temples in Shanghai should be converted for use as government and public buildings.64 The proposal was denounced by some Buddhist sympathizers in the People’s Assembly of Shanghai. The government then decided, instead of converting, to borrow temples from monks and nuns for the public buildings. When the news spread out, more than five hundred monks and nuns went to street for demonstration against government decision, and numbers of articles published in both Buddhist journals and non-Buddhist newspapers condemned the decision and questioned whether such a decision was constitutional. Consequently, the mayor of Shanghai had to make a public statement that the government would borrow the temples only if monks and nuns contended. Again in March 1948, Shanghai municipal government proposed a special committee to supervise temple management.65 The Chinese Buddhist Society, having failed to petition the central government this time, urged monks and nuns to protest again. Many incidents recorded in Hai chao yin also show the society mediating between the state and Buddhist community, rather than exclusively defending the latter. In early 1948, the Defense Ministry ordered that clergy should again participate in nationwide military training, in preparation for military service in the civil war. This order, forcefully carried out by military units of local governments, caused panic among the sangha in some areas. The Chinese Buddhist Society, while encouraging young monks and nuns to obey the government order, also reported illegal practices by local officials. In January 1948, all monks and nuns between the age of eighteen and forty-five in Gaoyou County were enrolled in the training program.66 The memorandum from the Chinese Buddhist Society to the Defense Ministry stated that this forcible conscription contravened the freedom of religion and questioned why nuns should be discriminated against while other women of the same ages in society did not participate in the military training. Although the Chinese Buddhist Society could sometimes successfully appeal to prevent the mistreatment of clergy, the government would turn down any request that might cause harm to the state or the Nationalist party. In May 1948, the government rejected a petition to abolish “The Regulations on Supervising Temples,” which allowed the party’s power to penetrate into temple management.67 Meanwhile the Chinese Buddhist Society was very careful in dealing with the military and would not challenge military orders. Instead, the society urged Buddhists to follow such orders in order to strengthen military power against Communists.68 At the end of 1947, the Nationalist government called upon all Chinese to unite under the government to suppress rebellion and to build a new nation (戡亂建國 Kanluan jiangguo). Some active monks quickly responded to the government’s call and articulated their views on the civil war. Although the civil war, unlike the Anti-Japanese War, was fought between two parties differed only

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in political ideology, monks continued to argue that Buddhists must support the Nationalists because Communists were opposed to religion. In his article “Suppressing Rebellion, Building the Nation, and Mobilizing the Sangha,” which first appeared in the Central Daily News in Shanghai in early 1948, Leguan urged monks and nuns to show how Buddhist militant spirit manifested during the resistance war and to undertake the anti-communist mission. He insisted that the merit of killing Japanese invaders and that of killing communists, who were destroyers of the nation and Dharma, were the same, because millions of more Chinese people could be saved if the communists were eliminated. Leguan thus charged: Within their [communist] power domain which is called “liberated zones,” all monks and nuns suffered unprecedented disaster! Temples are demolished, statues are hacked up for fire-wood, young monks and nuns are forced to join the army, or be killed or buried alive if they disobey. No old monks have survived and nuns are ordered to get married. Buddhist scriptures are torn up and used as toilet paper; bells are melted for making cannon and bullets. Buddhist shrines are used as horse stables.69

Leguan passionately urged his fellow clergy to rise up once again and to destroy communists who were the enemies of both the nation and the Dharma. Having provided some textual evidences, which were similar to those used during the Anti-Japanese War, that Buddhists should destroy evil and protect what is just, Leguan claimed: We Buddhist clergy cannot ignore the brutal killing committed by the communists. For the sake of protecting institutional Buddhism, for the sake of continuing the cause of the Buddha, and for the sake of our survival, we should march along side the “troops of suppressing rebellion” toward achieving “safety of the nation” and “safety of the Dharma.70

Although Leguan’s statement shows his strong anti-Communist views, it reveals that Chinese monks and nuns again had to deal with reality of war and suffered its destruction. According to the reports in Hai chao yin, cases of Communist troops plundering temples and harassing clergy happened frequently in both the south and north. In March 1948, a group of Communist troops looted temples in Tai County and kidnapped more than seventy monks. When Communist troops occupied the area 80 miles west of Beijing where Tanzhe Si was located, the temple treasures were robbed to the last pin and temple buildings burnt.71 We can find similar incidents in Nationalist areas reported in Hai chao yin, although it was not soldiers but local government officials and bad gentile who committed such crimes. Temples became military barracks; monks and nuns faced

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being drafted into military service. Although the Nationalist government had ordered in 1938 that all physically fit monks and nuns should join the army and fight against the Japanese, this was never seriously implemented during the AntiJapanese War, and the order was repealed after the petition of leading Buddhists in Sichuan. Now, the Nationalist government once again required young monks and nuns to join the army and fight against communists, but this time the draft policy was strictly implemented among the sangha. At the end of 1948, the government set a certain quota of monks to be drafted for military service in each city. When the municipal government in Xiamen was unable to conscript their quota of monks, the Defense Ministry urged the Chinese Buddhist Society to intervene and persuade monks to follow the order.72 Because of conscription, many young monks left their temples and followed the Nationalist government to Taiwan. Chen-hua, in his autobiography, In Search of the Dharma, informs us that alone in Putuo Mountain about forty to fifty monks of twenty to thirty years old were conscripted by the Nationalist army.73 Institutional Buddhism during the civil war faced mounting problems of expropriation of temple property, social discrimination, and financial shortage. Although monks and nuns worked hard to be more engaged in social and political activities, their efforts could hardly safeguard their religion and religious freedom. Many monks were forcibly pulled into the civil war. Politicized views and activities still dominated the affairs of the sangha; many monks and nuns in the Nationalist regions continued to support and cooperate with Nationalists. They defended the system of one nation, one party, and one government of the Nationalists and insisted that eliminating Communists, whom they called “commie bandits” (gongfei 共匪) and the enemies of religion, was part of their nationalistic effort and the way to protect Buddhism.

CONCLUSION At the end of the Anti-Japanese War, Taixu, ambitious as he was for his new Buddhist mission, campaigned for Buddhist participation in political and social affairs. His efforts were, however, set back by continuous resistance from within and without the sangha and thawed by his unexpected death. Although the Buddhist awakening movement waned during the civil war, the spirit and mission of Buddhist social service and political involvement could continue to be seen. Monks and nuns used their constitutional rights through the medium of Buddhist journals to protect the state appropriation of their property and occupation of temples by local governments, although direct criticism of the central government was carefully avoided. Meanwhile, institutional Buddhism under the leadership of the Chinese Buddhist Society continued to emphasize social and

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political involvement in serving the nation, which usually meant the Nationalist government. During and after the civil war, many young monks went to Taiwan with the Nationalist government either as refugees or as soldiers. The arrival of a large number of monks in Taiwan contributed to the rapid Buddhist development in the island. Before the end of the civil war, a number of branches of the Chinese Buddhist Society had already been established in Taiwan. When Dongchu left the mainland in 1949, he took with him the documents of the society to Taiwan, where it played important roles in reorganizing Buddhist activities and protecting the sangha. Monks who were inspired by the spirit of Taixu’s reform continued to advocate the Buddhist mission of serving society and political engagement and the importance of self-cultivation of clergy. Buddhist revival emerged in Taiwan in the following decades. Meanwhile, Buddhism in the mainland China continued its course of destruction and decline that culminated during the Cultural Revolution (1968–1978). At the end of The Buddhist Revival in China, Holms Welch predicted that Buddhist decline in China might be a preceding stage for its revival in future. He could not see such revival when he published Buddhism under Mao a year later but he predicted again at its end that Buddhism would revive after the end of Mao’s regime. It seems that this prediction is proved true, for temples have been gradually restored and old monks and nuns returned to their temples while new young clergy have received ordination since 1980.

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Conclusion

THE WAR’S IMPACT ON BUDDHISM The eight years of the war from the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937, to Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, caused tremendous suffering to Chinese people and devastation to the Chinese nation, including—according to some estimates—the deaths of more than twenty-one million Chinese and the destruction of 100 billion dollars worth of property. Buddhist temples, historic monuments, and valuable documents and scriptures were obliterated while some Buddhist traditions discontinued; Buddhist journals stopped publication and schools closed.1 Normal religious practices of clergy in both Japanese-occupied areas and Nationalist-controlled places were disoriented. The war also brought to a halt the slow progress of the Buddhist awakening movement pioneered by reformer-monks at turn of twentieth century. The war, however, transformed institutional Buddhism and its social environment in China, and a new form of Buddhism gradually developed. Inspired by widespread nationalistic and patriotic ideas throughout China at the time and urged on by the Nationalist government, Chinese clergy transcended the discipline of non-killing and non-association with the military; they reinterpreted the Mahayana doctrines of compassion and skillful means so as to reinvent the Buddhist tradition of national protection. They emphasized the path of bodhisattva and advocated the ideal of “compassionate killing” to circumvent the discipline of non-killing so that they could better serve the nation. Having abandoned their feud with the national government, which had prevailed during previous decades when the state appropriated temple properties to promote education, the clergy now voluntarily relinquished their religious commitments and engaged in the activities of resistance war under united leadership of the Nationalist government. Before and during the war, monks articulated their three general aims of Buddhist participation in military training and in war: to promote the idea of a nation-state; to reform Buddhist regulations; and to revive Buddhism.2 They claimed that Buddhist participation in war was not only necessary to fulfill the 197

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civic duties but would also push forward Buddhist awakening movement.3 The strenuous military training at the beginning of the war and subsequent participation in the war itself forged new characteristics of the sangha, and a new image of Buddhism began to emerge in China. The Chinese public, impressed by Buddhist participation in the war, generated new and positive attitudes towards Buddhism. In the past, people often had looked down on clergy as social parasites, who depended on material supports of society and produced nothing of economic value. By displaying their Buddhist identity while participating in the war, they sufficiently demonstrated the world that they were contributors to the nation. Having heard and witnessed their war activities, the public began calling them “revolutionary comrades” (革命同志 geming tongzhi). At the end of the war, the Buddhist reformers, having won the support of the government and back of the Buddhist community and general society, prepared to carry out reform in hopes of reinforcing the Buddhist awakening movement in China. Nevertheless, a large number of Buddhist buildings and temple facilities, which had been occupied by Japanese troops and missionaries during the war, were now taken over by the Nationalist armies or were used as government offices after the war ended. A Buddhist library in Wuhan, one of the largest in China, was re-occupied by Nationalist troops. In 1946, the Shanghai Municipal Council decided to “borrow” Buddhist temples to serve the purpose of public education.4 The conflict between institutional Buddhism and the state, once submerged under the nationalism that raged against the Japanese invasion, began to reemerge. The most serious danger institutional Buddhism faced after the Anti-Japanese War was the Civil War between the Communists and the Nationalists. During the war, as discussed in last chapter, the Nationalist army began to conscript young monks, many of whom, after briefly fighting against Communists, followed the Nationalist government to Taiwan. As the Communists rapidly took over the mainland, a number of other monks and nuns also fled to Hong Kong or Taiwan. As a result, the modern Buddhist awakening was eventually aborted. The destruction of institutional Buddhism in mainland China continued until religious freedom was restored in 1980s.

COMPASSIONATE KILLING REVISITED We have discussed Buddhism and violence in the introduction and saw that a few passages of Buddhist scriptures can be cited to indicate that Buddhism is not purely pacifism, and that precedents for Buddhist involvement in violence in term of war and killing can be found in the history of both Mahayana and Theravada Buddhism. We may now go further to examine Buddhist violence and compassionate killing in the light of experience of the war.

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Unlike in Theravada Buddhism, in Mahayana the line between the sangha and lay community is less clearly defined; members of both assemblies who have received bodhisattva precepts can be metaphorically called “bodhisattvas,” or “those who aspire to enlightenment.”5 This tradition emphasizes that both clergy and lay Buddhists should equally practice compassion and skillful means (upāya 方便) under the guidance of wisdom. Instead of observing the three monastic rules, that is, simplicity, non-killing, and celibacy according to the Theravada tradition, the followers of the Mahayana tradition practice bodhisattva’s precepts in three principles: refrain from doing what is unwholesome; perform what is good; and devotedly work to benefit all living beings. In order to fulfill the last principle, which is unconditionally to serve others based on compassion, Buddhists may sometimes ignore or discard the first two,6 even monks and nuns may abandon precepts, such as non-killing, if such an action is aimed at saving others or if it is motivated by genuine compassion.7 Mahayana certainly emphasizes motivation rather than the action itself as the criterion to determine whether an action is good or bad. It is essential for bodhisattvas first to aspire to Bodhicitta, the mind of enlightenment (putixin 菩提心), to take vows to save all sentient beings, and then to fulfill these vows through skillful means. Thus, Mahayana Buddhism is characterized with wisdom and compassion. The highest wisdom is the wisdom of emptiness, and the highest form of compassion is the compassion without condition and limitation but with symbiotic sympathy. Wisdom enables a Buddhist practitioner to see things as they are, emptiness; and compassion compels a Buddhist to release all living beings from suffering. Therefore, both clergy and lay Buddhists should practice compassion by using skillful means and exercise wisdom without attaching to the formality of discipline. “For such an awakened one, right conduct became no longer a matter of discipline but instead the spontaneous expression of his awareness. One became so closely identified with suchness [zhenru 真如]8 that one’s words and deeds inevitably expressed the moral order of the universe.”9 Accomplished in the great wisdom of emptiness and inspired by great compassion of saving living beings, bodhisattvas detach themselves from the conventional principle of ahimsa, and perform the act of killing for the sake of others.10 Under such circumstances, the act of killing does not necessarily contradict the bodhisattvas’ morality but rather it manifests his great compassion. Compassion, which usually means sympathy with those who suffer and the aspiration to release them from suffering, can indeed move one to kill those who may cause violence and suffering.11 The bodhisattva may kill one, who is about to kill others, because in this case the action of killing is aimed at saving lives, not at killing per se. In the MahāUpāya-kauśalya Sūtra 佛說大方廣善巧方便經, the Buddha told a story about how, in one of his previous lives, he had performed the act of killing. When the

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Bodhisattva came to know that an evil merchant, overpowered by greed, planned to murder other five hundred people, he thought that if the plot were revealed, the plotter would be killed by the other merchants, who would then fall into hell. But, if he remained silent, the other merchants would be killed by the plotter, who would then fall into hell too. So, the bodhisattva decided to kill the evil merchant so that the others would survive. At the end of the sutra, the Buddha identified himself as the bodhisattva in the story and declared that a bodhisattva, out of compassion and for the sake of saving living beings, would rather kill than allow others to kill or to be killed. The Buddha also explained that the merit gained from such killing was great.12 Again, the Mahā-paranirvāna sūtra records that the Buddha, in one of his previous lives, killed a Brahman, who was going to commit a crime against the Dharma: At that time, having already entered the stage of the bodhisattva (dedi 得地), and for the sake of loving kindness without any evil mind, I took his [Brahman’s] life. O Sons of Good Family, all parents love their only child. Yet, if he is going to commit serious crimes against law, the parents will expel or kill the child without any evil mind, fearing that the child may be tortured [as the consequence of his crimes]. A bodhisattva, for the sake of protecting right Dharma, will do the same.13

Although hatreds can never be stopped by hatred as the Dharmapada reiterates,14 or violence can never stop violence, compassionate killing for the sake of saving more lives, of protecting the Dharma, and of preventing one from committing evil may be a positive answer and response to violence. To summarize, killing which is motivated by compassion to stop more killing is a triple blessing: to the prospective victims who would have been killed; to the likely killer who would have committed the killing and consequently suffer karmic retribution; and to the bodhisattva who performed the killing to prevent more killing. Bodhisattvas do not tolerate seeing someone destroy the lives of others; instead, they kill the evil ones, not because such people are evil, and not because of their own craving, hatred, and ignorance, but because they are compassionate equally to all and wish to save them from suffering.15 The idea of compassionate killing by a bodhisattva may also find justification in the Buddhist concept of emptiness. A bodhisattva, having realized the emptiness of all dharmas, including killing and violence, will act spontaneously without being attached to the action of killing, to one who is killed or to one who is saved. The notion of the non-existence of the self and the insubstantiality of the five aggregates that constitute a so-called living being enable bodhisattvas to see emptiness in everything and everywhere.16 All sins or merits therefore are

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just human imagination and illusion; in fact, a human being who consists of the five aggregates in ultimate sense cannot kill or be killed.17 The doctrine of emptiness transcends conventional morality, which is full of duality. Buddhist texts also equally highlight the idea of upāya or skillful means. The fact that Buddhism permits killing under certain circumstances can be considered as expedient means for bodhisattvas to fulfill their vows and protect the Dharma. This expedient means is so important that it is considered as an ultimate end in itself (fangbian wei jiujing 方便為究竟). Before and during the war, both Japanese and Chinese clergy passionately articulated the ideas of compassionate killing and emptiness of killing in support of their respective governments.18 However, when we examine the full texts, which they used to elaborate on compassionate killing and when we put them into the context of larger Buddhist literature, it becomes clear that both Japanese and Chinese clergy failed to address fully to, deliberately ignored, or arbitrarily distorted some essential issues. First, the overwhelming majority of Buddhist texts categorically advocate the supreme importance of non-killing, while only a very few texts endorse compassionate killing. Because of this scarcity, both the Japanese priests and the Chinese monks repeatedly quoted the same passages. Furthermore, such killing is not indiscriminate; it requires strict conditions. When the Buddha explained that he killed the Brahman for the sake of protecting the Dharma, he emphasized that the action was exceptional and stated that he would not have killed the Brahman without righteous cause because he had never killed even a small insect.19 Japanese priests and Chinese clergy knew the contradiction between the ideals of compassionate killing and the conventional Buddhist doctrine and fundamental discipline. They also probably saw the deeper meaning of Buddhist narratives about compassionate killing. Instead of attending to these meanings, however, they selected a few passages out of the context to generalize the permission for killing in supporting and justifying that Buddhists should participate in war. Second, although these clergy provided canonical sources for the justification of killing and quoted evidence of such practices in Buddhist history, they overlooked the issue of who could perform the act of compassionate killing, either intentionally or unintentionally. The texts often quoted by both the Japanese and Chinese clergy state specifically that compassionate killing may be performed exclusively by bodhisattvas, Buddha-to-be or a perfect ones who are highly advanced in their spiritual development and who have realized the perfections of wisdom and compassion.20 In almost all the texts that contain the legends of compassionate killing, the Buddha talks solely about his previous lives during his bodhisattva career and he always clarifies that he performed the killing only after he had attained a high spiritual stage. For instance, the bodhisattva had already attained

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the Fourth Stage of Bodhisattvahood when he killed the Brahman to protect the Dharma. In contrast, although Buddhists in the Mahayana tradition are nominally designated as “bodhisattvas” after receiving the bodhisattva precepts, they are in fact bodhisattva candidates who may have just aroused the mind of enlightenment. As such, they are far from able to perform the acts of a mature bodhisattva, such as altruism, compassion, and self-sacrifice in the highest sense, much less compassionate killing. As mere beginners, they have neither seen the truth nor have they entered into the path of practice. The Chinese monks and the Japanese priests at the time of the war seemed not to be bothered by the question of whether they were qualified to perform “compassionate killing.” In addition, although the concept of emptiness may provide a theoretical basis for the justification of killing, we may well doubt that either the Japanese priests or the Chinese monks truly realized this ultimate truth of emptiness. Otherwise, how could they continue to discriminate between “Japanese” and “Chinese.” Emptiness can be realized and practiced only by highly advanced bodhisattvas and Buddhas who give up any dualistic thinking, and no longer accumulate any karma because their actions are guided by pure wisdom (prajňa) instead of volition (cetanā). On the conventional level, any action performed by mind, speech, and body through volition, however, will give rise to its karmic result. Third, the appropriate circumstances for performing the act of compassionate killing are complicated and restricted. According to the texts that permit the practice, the action of compassionate killing can be done only when both the killer and the killed are both absent of hatred and craving. In other words, the killer (a bodhisattva) is full of compassion toward the killed and the killed is absent of the will to seek revenge while the act of killing is taking place. The Yogācārabūmi Śāstra states specifically that, when terminating the life of an evil one, the bodhisattva transfers a good or neutral will to him.21 The bodhisattva, compassionate to both those who may be killed and to those who may kill, yet detached from both of them and the action of killing, ideally carries out dispassionate yet compassionate killing. War and violence in any form are the result of mutual hatred and inflamed selfish desire.22 There would be no war or violence if people stopped hating each other or understand each other. It is unimaginable that people who are engaged in war of invasion or anti-invasion could foster the ideas of loving kindness and compassion towards their enemies as they kill them. War can no longer be called war and an enemy cannot be regarded as the enemy if people are compassionate to each other. In fact, there will no war and no one will have an enemy if everyone acts like a bodhisattva. Theoretically and idealistically, compassionate killing, without craving or hatred and with the aim of saving people from suffering, is in

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agreement with the path of bodhisattva, who gives up everything, even their lives, for others and who may postpone their enlightenment in order to serve others. However, when talking about “compassionate killing,” we should also keep in mind that there is no conflict or feud between a bodhisattva and other living beings, and that the bodhisattva extends equal compassion to all even though he may kill evil ones. Compassionate killing is a part of bodhisattva’s path that is characterized by skillful means and wisdom, yet, such path should not be abused or mechanically followed because otherwise it may become self-defeating; as the Chinese saying goes “expedience may produce degeneration (fangbian chu xialiu 方便出下流). When Japanese priests and Chinese monks provided arbitrary religious justification for acts of violence to ordinary people for political reasons, the original spirit of compassionate killing as upāya was certainly lost. They rather abused the bodhisattva ideal and used only its form as a tool to urge Buddhist participation in the war; they shied away from dealing with the full significance and true spirit of compassionate killing, but only assumed that they should follow bodhisattvas and kill their enemies. In short, they twisted the meaning of compassionate killing and the spirit of skillful means. It is interesting to compare Buddhist theory of compassionate killing with Christian just war of love. Augustine, who was regarded as the first great formulator of Christian just war theory, believed that war could be waged as the instrument of divine judgment on wickedness. However he also emphasized that the participants of such war should be inspired by right love rather than by hatred or for the purpose of killing. Then what is right love? And who can love his enemies? Augustine concluded that no man is capable of such love, but God.23 Yet, throughout history, numerous wars were fought under the rubric of Christian love. Similarly we may conclude that no ordinary Buddhist could perform compassionate killing, only Bodhisattvas and Buddhas.

BUDDHISM AND NATIONALISM Then, why did Japanese priests and the Chinese monks so vigorously justify Buddhist participation in war even at the expense of distorting Buddhist doctrine? How could the Buddhist discipline that prohibits clergy from watching a military show and from harming even a small insect be so radically changed as to pave the way for clergy to serve in the army and be involved in the war? The answers can be found only in the phenomenon of nationalism, which was a supreme value in modern Japan and China and elsewhere in Asia. In the early 20th century, Buddhist revival in some Asian countries prompted Buddhists to seek national identity, while national awakening and state building in other countries forced Buddhists to discover new foothold in society. In some countries, such as Sri Lanka, Buddhist

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revival and national awakening as the same took place simultaneously and inspired each other. Sri Lanka had been called the Buddha-land since the introduction of Buddhism to the country in the 3rd century BC, yet after it became a British colony in the 18th century, Buddhism suffered from the suppression of colonial rule and the challenge of Christian missions. Foreign occupation and Christian challenge eventually stimulated Sinhalese Buddhists, and the early 20th century witnessed Buddhist revival and national awakening as monks began to reclaim their religious privilege and to discover their national identity. Anagarika Dharmapala (1864–1933), a leader of Buddhist revival movement in Sri Lanka, made great effort to formulate the ideology of nation=Sinhala=Buddhist.24 Dharmapala claimed that Ceylon was the promised land of the Buddha, who entrusted his teaching to its people; Buddhist revival was thus recognized as a way for national independence, which in return could guarantee Buddhist revival. Dharmapala founded a number of Buddhist schools which became training ground for many nationalist and labor leaders.25 Dharmapala’s Buddhist-nationalistic movement became an inspiration for Sinhalese politicians to support Buddhism in their elections and for monks to actively engage in social and political affairs. During the 1930s and 1940s, a group of influential monks in Vidyalankara, a center for modern monastic education, became deeply involved in national independence movement. They justified their activities by suggesting that it was the responsibility of monks, the disciples of the Buddha, to serve the welfare of the nation and people.26 One of the most active monks was Rahula who believed that Buddhism had been national religion of the Sinhalese since its introduction and thus advocated Buddhist patriotism. In his book, The Heritage of Bhikkhu, first published in 1946, Rahula alleged that the island of Sinhala people could not be separated from Buddhism and that monks had been active in defending the nation and safeguarding law and order in society since the introduction of Buddhism to the island in the third century B.C.E. Based on the story that monks helped King Duttagāmani war against Tamil in the second century B.C.E., as recorded in Mahāvamsa, he declared: Working for the freedom and uplift of the religion and the country was recognized as so important and noble that the Sinhalese in the 5th century A.C., both laity and Sangha, seemed to have believed that arahants themselves had accepted the idea that even the destruction of human beings for that purpose was not a very grave crime. What is evident from this is that the bhikkhus at that time considered it their sacred duty to engage themselves in the service for their country as much as in the service of their religion.27

This idea, which Tessa Bartholomeusz termed as the Buddhist just-war theory, exercised a great impact on the national independence in 1948, and still inspired

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many Buddhists, including the members of the sangha, to fight the Tamil separatists in contemporary Sri Lanka. In Thailand, Buddhism became more closely connected with monarchical state in the early 1900s through the efforts of Prince Mongkut, who ascended the throne after twenty-seven years in the sangha, and the sangha began to play an important role in national reintegration.28 As Thailand had not been threatened of foreign invasion since the middle of the 18th century, little was known of nationalism among ordinary Buddhists. However the sangha during this period emphasized cultural nationalism in awakening Thai-Buddhist identity against Christian missions. When King Vajiravudh ascended the throne, he emphasized Buddhist role in fostering the spirit of nationalism among the Thai people, and rebuilt the Thai army with the declared intention of defending Buddhism. The sangha was required to assist the government to implement the policies of the military forces. Although Buddhism ceased to be the state religion after the 1932 Revolution when the constitutional system of Buddhism, monarchy, and state was established, the new constitution declared, “The King shall profess the Buddhist faith and is the upholder of religion.”29 Late, in the campaign against communists in 1970s, some leading members of sangha emphasized the identity of nation, monarch, and Buddhism, and advocated Buddhist protection of the nation and monarch. One of such monks was Kitthiwuttho who urged his countrymen to kill communist guerrillas, because “I think we must do this [i.e., killing], even through we are Buddhists. But such killing is not the killing of persons (khon). Because whoever destroys the nation, religion and the monarch is not a complete person, but mara (evil). Our intention must be not to kill people but to kill the Devil. It is the duty of all Thai.”30 If Buddhist nationalism in Thailand can be described as to defend nation and Buddhism against the rivals of Christianity and Communism, Buddhist nationalism in Burma in the early 20th century was certainly aimed to rediscover the Buddhist traditions suppressed by colonial rule. Buddhism had been dominant religion in Burmese society that provided people with a world view and an identity of a nation,31 just as a saying goes “To be a Burmese is to be a Buddhist.” However, Buddhism became subjected to discrimination after 1886 when the country became a colony of British. Foreign occupation forged Burmese nationalism which was characterized with Buddhist revival. In 1897, a group of educated lay Buddhists founded the Sasanadara Society in the Moulmein area in order to promote social and educational reforms. In 1902, the Young Men’s Buddhist Association was established in Arakan. The association late produced leaders for nationalist movement, and in 1916 it launched protest against the foreigners who would use footwear on pagoda platforms and aroused the Buddhist-nationalist feeling among Burmese.

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During this national and Buddhist revival movement, many monks played important roles, such as U Ottama, who was a popular nationalist hero and martyr in 1920s. U Ottama often urged young monks to leave their temples to defend Buddhism as part of national struggle.32 He preached that Buddhists could not attain nirvana until they first be released from slavery of foreigners. He also accused the British of bringing evil into Burma and charged that Christian proselytizing missions were supported by taxes paid by Buddhists. Consequently, U Ottama was arrested for several times and finally died in prison in 1939.33 Buddhist nationalism in Burma in 1940s enabled Burmese to welcome Japanese as fellow Asians and Buddhists who had come to rescue Buddhist Burmese from Western rule. The new puppet government under Japanese established a Burmese People’s Monks’ Association, and monks were requested to contribute to the reconstruction of New Burma, eliminate enemies of Japan and Burma, strengthen friendship between two countries, and practice Buddhism to benefit Burmese.34 Buddhist monks in Korea had been active in political and military affairs long before the Japanese annexation in 1910. They were often involved in espionage activities, providing military information about enemies. During the reign of King Pojang (642–668), 30.000 monk-soldiers participated in the war against the invasion of the Tang.35 Although Japanese occupation of Korea Peninsula enabled Korean Buddhist clergy to enjoy more freedom than in the previous dynasty, when they realized that the Japanese policy of protecting Buddhism was to subjugate and assimilate Koreans to be loyal citizens of the Japanese empire, and to bring Buddhist institutions under Japanese control, an anti-Japanese movement for national independence soon spread out among the sangha. As Shim Sangh-wan, a monk from the Kumkang remarked, it was a noble cause for Korean monks to advocate national independence from Japanese, who had brought so much physical and spiritual suffering to the Korean nation and people.36 Han Yong-un and Paek Yong-song, two monks most active during the Japanese occupation, were signatories of the Declaration of Independence in 1919. Han Yong-un traveled from place to place and to have thousand copies of the Declaration of Independence distributed in Seoul the night before the demonstration. When the leaders of independence movement met on March 1 1919, Han read the Declaration and thus inaugurated the March First Movement. Following the example of Han, monks began to hold rallies in supporting national independence and denouncing Japanese rule. When the movement was suppressed by Japanese troops, more than two hundred and twenty monks were arrested, and Han Yong-un was sentenced to three years in prison for his leadership in the national independence movement.37 Unlike many other Asian countries, in Japan modern Buddhist nationalism was fermented or rather forced out by state Shinto and then voluntarily served

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Japan’s imperialistic policy. Buddhism in Japan at the end of the 19th century, especially after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, faced state persecution. The Movement to Abolish Buddhism (haibutsu kishaku), which was similar to the movement of taking temple property for public education in China at about the same time, almost devastated Buddhist institutions in Japan. In order to make Shinto the national religion, the government first separated Buddhism from Shinto, and then confiscated Buddhist temples and temple property for national building. Various units were gradually established within the government administration to supervise the movement.38 As a result, for example, not a single Buddhist temple or priest remained in Satsuma, Osumi, and Hyūga in 1870.39 The state persecution caused some Buddhist protests, such as in early 1871 when Buddhists in Ohama led by Ishikawa Tairei (1842–1871), a priest from the True Pure Land Sect, launched a strike. But many Buddhist leaders, instead of confronting the state policy, sought ways of collaborating with Japanese nationalism and of offering service to the Emperor. These leaders, especially the Jodo Shinshu, were eager to demonstrate the usefulness of Buddhism to the nation so that Buddhist institutions could escape destruction. These measures gradually persuaded the government to modify its policy on Buddhism, and declare that the aim of separating Buddhism from Shinto was not a vicious anti-Buddhist campaign. Eventually, Buddhist efforts in serving the nation formed modern Buddhist nationalism in Japan and leading priests of different sects aligned themselves with the government while carrying out Buddhist reform to suit the state Shinto. They highlighted Buddhist nationalism in serving the nation even to the extent of eliminating the doctrines and practices of their sects that challenged the state policy. One important gesture of Buddhist nationalism was to provide financial supports to the government. For instance, during the Boshin War, both Higashi Hongan-ji and Nishi Hongan-ji each provided over 30,000 ryō to the government.40 Buddhism in Japan had been closely connected with the state since its introduction in the 7th century, and many eminent monks, such as Saichō and Kukai, had been sponsored by the state to tour and study in China, while others, such as Eisai and Nichiren, explicitly advocated the Buddhist mission of serving and protecting the nation. In his Risshō Ankokuron (Treaties on Establishing True Dharma and Securing Peace in the Nation), Nichiren upheld that the acceptance and practice of right Dharma would ensure peaceful nation.41 In modern history, Japanese Buddhism, after surviving state persecution in the early Meiji period, became more engaged in the imperialistic colonization of Asia. When Japanese troops first landed in Hokkaidō in the fifth month of 1869, Buddhist missions were organized to ameliorate the anger of the “aborigines” and to pacify condemned prisoners who had been sent to construct roads. In 1876, the Higashi Honganji temple sent its first mission to China, and the numbers of missionaries

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rapidly increased due to the 1895 Shimonoseki Treaty signed after China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War. By 1933, there were more than 96 Japanese missionary stations in China. In cooperation with the Japanese state, these missionaries tried to implement the policy of “the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” in China. In the 1930s, the ideas of kōdō Bukkyō 皇道仏教 (Imperial Way Buddhism) and of Gokoku Bukkyō 護國仏教 (Buddhism of Nation-Protecting) dominated Japanese Buddhist activities both inside Japan and in Japan’s Asian colonies. Japanese Buddhists believed that Japan, as the guardian of the Buddha-Dharma in the world, had received the protection and kindness of the Japanese royal family headed by the emperor, who was the father of all Japanese people and the nation. It was therefore the duty of Buddhists to server the emperor unconditionally in order to repay his kindness. On July 12, 1937, five days after the full scale Japanese invasion of China, the Myōwa kai (Pan-Buddhist Society) issued a statement signed by the leaders of the major Buddhist sects: The Myōwa Kai, an organization composed of each of the sects of Buddhism, will work together to resolve this increasingly urgent national emergency. We are prepared to conduct consolation activities on behalf of front-line imperial army troops in the field. Likewise we are willing to cooperate in such other activities as the protection of Japanese nationals. Furthermore, within the country we are prepared, as part of our self-sacrificial public duty, to work for the spiritual general mobilization of the people. We take this occasion to express the firm resolution of Japanese Buddhists.42

When this joint statement was criticized by Chinese monks, the Myōwa kai issued another declaration to reject the criticism and claimed that they had no choice but to exercise benevolent forcefulness of killing one for the sake of saving many others 一殺多生 (issatsu tashō). It claimed that war was absolutely necessary to help the Japanese nation to implement the Dharma in Asia. In March 1938, the Imperial Way Buddhism Practice Society 皇道仏教行道會 was established within the Nichiren sect. The society substituted the emperor for Sakyamuni Buddha and paid homage to him as the supreme leader of Buddhism. In May 1941, the sect reexamined more than 70 texts written by Nichiren and re-edited the Sacred Book of Nichiren by making changes in 208 places, cutting out all his statements that could not fit into the state Shinto.43 In supporting the war, the Sōtō Zen sect raised sufficient money in July 1941 for purchasing three aircrafts, which were named after the sect, one for military usage and two for hospital transportation. In December 1944, the sect appealed to its members to make millions of handwritten copies of the Heart Sūtra to invoke Japanese victory and sent them as talismans to soldiers at the warfront in China.

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On May 15, 1942, the Ōtani branch of the True Pure Land issued a Handbook for Abbots in Wartime, which dealt exclusively with Buddhist duties to the war and state, as well as loyalty to the emperor.44 In responding to the government’s call for donation, the Shin sect raised more than one million Yen in 1942 to purchase a military ship for the Japanese navy. In June 1943, the Shin joined other sects and renamed itself as the Imperial Way Shin Sect 皇道真宗 (Kōdo Shin Shu). A heavenly tablet 天牌, which read “Long live the emperor,” was placed in almost all Shin temples as an object of worship. During the war, especially at the end of the war, many priests from different sects joined the army and marched to warfronts abroad. Their loyalty to the emperor enabled them to ignore Buddhist precepts that they would harbor no doubt about the righteousness of the war. On August 13, 1991, a priest who had participated in the war confessed during an interview that he had not felt any guilt about fighting the war for the emperor at the time.45 “From primary school, I recited the Verses of Right Faith. Although being a priest, the thought of priesthood never occurred to me.”46 He admitted that the conscientiousness of being a Buddhist priest had disappeared so completely that it never occurred to him to recite the name of Amida Buddha when he killed enemies or saw the dead in battle.47 Nationalism in the form of state Shinto was the supreme concern of Japanese people and dominated almost all aspects of their lives, including Buddhist clergy, who, like ordinary Japanese citizens, were fascinated by the ideology of the divine origin and supremacy of the Japanese nation, and willingly served the Japanese military authorities in invading China and other Asian countries. Similarly, Chinese monks and nuns were inspired by Chinese nationalism, which had been spurred by continuous foreign occupation and intensified by Japanese invasion. To a large extent, clergy in both Japan and China emphasized the compassionate killing for reasons other than the ideals expressed in the Buddhist texts. They adapted its form and put aside its spirit. In fact, their zeal in this revealed that they were perfectly aware of Buddhist ahimsa, nonviolence. They repeatedly elaborated the same idea of compassionate killing to convince others as well as themselves under the sway of nationalism. During the nineteenth century, China and Japan opened their doors to the outside world and experienced tremendous changes. Confronting the West, the two countries carried out movements of self-strengthening in social, economic, political, military, and intellectual spheres,48 while trying to maintain their selfidentities of “Japaneseness” or “Chineseness.” Since the ideas of “foreignness” and “self-identity” necessarily conflicted, the concept of nationalism developed rapidly in the effort of national building. Nationalism gradually became the supreme value imposed on the Chinese and Japanese people. In both countries institutional Buddhism experienced state persecution and clergy initiated reforms in order to deal

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with these changes and became more involved in social and political affairs, making self-sacrifices and contributions to their nation. Buddhist submission to and service for nationalism requested both for and against the invasion. Although nationalism was supreme in both Japan and China in the early twentieth century, its meaning and implication were differently perceived. In China, nationalism was manifested in the efforts to build new China through patriotic movements and in the struggle to end foreign occupation and dominance. The compelling fervor of such nationalistic sentiment prevailed throughout the nation after the founding of the Republic of China. The nationalism demonstrated on May 4, 1919, and May 30, 1925, inspired Chinese people, especially intellectual minds and the young students including “new student-monks,” who were fired up with a passion to protect the country and to recover national sovereignty.49 Japanese invasion further intensified Chinese nationalistic feeling and strengthened their will to expel all foreign powers from China. For decades before the war broke out in 1937, Buddhists, especially young monks, pushed for Buddhist reforms in the hope of reintegrating Buddhism into society. While resisting state persecution, these young monks urged all clergy to join the rest of the Chinese people to contribute to the nation and work for social welfare. After more than three decades of self-reorientation and social assimilation, Buddhist institutions became more accessible to society and more young monks became deeply concerned with contemporary domestic and international political developments. The nationalistic and patriotic sentiments were, therefore, easily incorporated into the sangha and readily inspired young monks who shaped modern Buddhist nationalism. The eruption of the war in 1937 thus provided them an opportunity to carry out their efforts. These monks abandoned their feud with the government and extended their full support to the national resistance against the invasion, and readily sacrificed themselves and their religion for the nation. They put aside traditional Buddhist discipline, and instead espoused commitments to the nation as supreme duty. To reconcile the contradiction between the Buddhist ideas of ahimsa and the national duty, monks discovered a few Buddhist texts and interpreted them in accordance with the needs of contemporary nationalism. They reinvented a Buddhist tradition of “compassionate killing” in serving the nation. In response to the claim made by Japanese clergy that the Japanese military invasion aimed to protect Buddhism in China and Asia, Chinese monks declared that the resistance would safeguard Buddhism from destruction along with the Chinese nation, and thus they justified their own act of violence. Although Japanese and Chinese clergy did not completely distort Buddhist teachings nor were their arguments entirely baseless, in both cases overwhelming nationalistic zeal is obvious. They used the

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bodhisattva ideal of compassionate killing to justify their participation in the war, and their methods and theories were almost the same. By understanding Buddhist doctrine and history in both Mahayana and Theravada as a whole, we may realize that there are discrepancies with regard to the Buddhist ethics of nonviolence and the justification for violence. Although the majority of Buddhist texts emphatically affirm the discipline that Buddhists should not commit killing and monks should not be involved in the military and war, a few texts, directly or indirectly, convey the idea that killing is permitted under special circumstances. Referring this fact to other religions, we may conclude that the permission for violence and advocacy for peace co-exist in the holy texts and tradition of individual religions. It is left for the followers of these religions to decide whether they should follow the path of peace or pursue the course of violence. In recent years, Japanese priests of different sects have gradually acknowledged the controversial roles their predecessors played under the influence of nationalism in supporting the military invasion of China and other Asian countries. Should Chinese Buddhist monks regret their own use of Buddhism to defend the Chinese nation from invasion? No one has expressed such regrets and it is unlikely that any will soon. How should Buddhist clergy react if a war breaks out again? Buddhism admits that the human world is full of conflict and in fact, dukkha, conflict or unsatisfactoriness, is the reality of human life. Nevertheless, it also holds out hope for peace, and it provides the way to nirvana, perfect happiness, through the elimination of the causes of dukkha. The doctrine of the Four Noble Truths, which deals with the reality of suffering and conflict, as well as with the way to end them, may thus shed some light on how to achieve peace in this conflicted world. By accepting violence as a reality, people of different nations develop nationalism as a measure for self-defending to deter potential invasion. By cherishing hopes of peace and happiness for the whole world, humankind joins together and aspires to achieve internationalism. Since both peace and violence begins in the minds of man, Buddhism, which provides ways to purify one’s mind, plays a special role in building a new world by developing source for peace and eradicating root for violence. Buddhist clergy inculcate people with the Buddhist doctrines of dependent-origination, no-self, egalitarianism, and the law of cause and effect so that the citizens of the world may realize the nature and consequence of violence. By encouraging individuals to cultivate the mind of great compassion and to eliminate hatred, ignorance and greed, they may lead people to find inner peace, which forms a foundation for world peace. Nevertheless, this practice of persuading people to preserve peace is not an “all-curing elixir” that can prevent all kinds of violence; Buddhist missions may not transform all peoples in the world and change their mind of hatred to that of loving kindness and compassion. The work

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of addressing the problem of violence and war, once they occur, could be undertaken then by an international organization of bodhisattva-scientists, who value humanity and selflessly serve mankind.50 Such bodhisattva-scientists, equipped with advanced technology and wisdom, having transcended the narrow idea of nationalism, and free of social, political, racial, and religious bias and hatred, could exercise “compassionate killing,” in order to either deter or bring to justice those who dare disturb peace in the world.

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Notes

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 1. Although the concept of ahimsa or nonviolence now is known as one of the major characteristics of Hinduism, some modern research shows that the idea originated not from early Vedism but from later asceticism, the critics of the Vedic tradition, such as Buddhism and Jainism, around 6th century BC. Henk Bodewitz, “Hindu Ahimsā and its Roots,” in Jan Houben and Karel Van Kooij, eds., Violence Denied: Violence, Non-Violence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History (Boston: Brill, 1999): 17–43. 2. Jan Houben, “To Kill or Not Kill,” in Jan Houben and Karel Van Kooij, eds., Violence Denied: Violence, Non-Violence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History (Boston: Brill, 1999): 106–183. 3. M.K Gandhi, Gītā, the Mother, ed. Jag Parvesh Chander (Lahore, 1931): 4 4. Kashi Nath Upadhyaya, Early Buddhism and the Bhagavad-gītā (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971): 515. 5. John Langan, “The Western Moral Tradition on War: Christian Theology and Warfare,” in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, ed. Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991): 80. 6. Ferguson, War and Peace in the World’s Religions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978): 106. 7. David Little, “‘Holy War’ Appeals and Western Christianity: A Reconsideration of Bainton’s Approach” in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds., Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991): 127. 8. When just war became a common phenomenon in the sixteenth century, some Christians began to reconsider its concept and practice by returning to the New Testament. They found difficulties reconciling war theory with the pacifistic views advocated by Jesus Christ. Based on their understanding of the New Testament and the theological concept of “God in every man,” members of the Religious Society of Friends, popularly known as Quakers, refused military service and participation in war. John Langan, “The Western Moral Tradition on War: Christian Theology and Warfare” in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds., Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991): 76–77.

213

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9. Fred Donner, “The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War,” in John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson, eds., Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991): 31–69. 10. Francois Houtart, “The Cult of Violence in the Name of Religion: A Panorama,” in Wim Beuken and Karl-Josef Kuschel, eds., Religion as a Source of Violence? (London: SCM Press, 1997/4): 1. 11. Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer, Is Religion Killing Us? Violence in the Bible and the Quran (New York: Trinity Press International, 2003): 93. 12. Although Hinduism may not strictly fall into the category of monotheism, the Hindu fundamentalism with the sentiment of exclusiveness and with the political motivation has attributed to the violent conflict with Islam in the past and at present. 13. Geoffey DeGraff, The Buddhist Monastic Code (Printed for free distribution, 1994): 66–78; For lay followers: T. 1:501b13–15, T. 1:616b15–19. According to Vinayapitaka in Pali canon, killing should not take place even for the sake of compassion. Vinayapitaka, ed. H. Oldenberg (London: PTS, 1879–1883). The reference is quoted from Lambert Schmithausen, “Aspects of the Buddhist Attitude towards War,” in Jan E.M Houben and Karel R. Van Kooij, eds., Violence Denied: Violence, Nonviolence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History (Boston: Brill, 1999): 47. 14. A detailed textual analysis on Buddhist ethics of ahimsa (nonviolence) follows in Chapter Two. 15. The Theravada tradition does not necessarily indicate only that has been recorded in the canon of Southeast Asian countries, but include their counterparts in Chinese Buddhist canon. As we will see late, some monks such as Yingshun made use of these Chinese Theravada texts in their discussion on Buddhism and war. 16. There are quite numbers of articles or books published on Buddhism and peace, reference can be made to S. Narayan, ed., Buddhism and World Peace (New Delhi: Inter-India Publications, 1990); Thanissaro Bhikkhu, The Buddhist Monastic Code (Printed for free distribution, 1994); Kenneth Kraft, ed., Inner Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and Nonviolence (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992; and Nikkyo Niwano, A Buddhist Approach to Peace (Tokyo: Kosei Publishing Co., 1977). 17. Gene Sharp argues that nonviolent struggle would be an effective alternative to overcome violence and win over the opponents, yet his argument seems more subjective and the cases in supporting his arguments appear quite selective. See Gene Sharp, “Nonviolent Struggle: An Effective Alternative” (in Kenneth Kraft, ed. Inner Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and Nonviolence. New York: State University of New York Press, 1992): 111–26. 18. Komarraju Ravi, “Buddhism and Just War,” in Sundara Ramaiah, ed. Buddhism and Peace: Essays in Honor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama (Visakhapatnam: Andhra University Press, 1991): 76. 19. Elizabeth Harris, Violence and Disruption in Society: A study of the Early Buddhist Texts (Colombo: The Wheel Publication, 1994): 46. 20. Dīgha Nikāya (27th Sutta) (Landon: Pali Text Society): (v. 3) 85–6. The corresponding record can also be found in Ekottaragama. T. 26 (125): 737a–c.

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Notes to Introduction 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35.

36.

37.

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T. 1: 39b4ff, T. 1:119c10ff, 1:317b10ff and 372b28ff. Komarraju Ravi, 81. Yingshun, “Fojiao de zhandao guan” (Buddhist Attitude toward Violence), in Fo zai renjian (The Buddha in the Human World; Taibei: Zhengwen, 1993): 301. T. 9 (272):317–365. A short discussion on this sutra can be found in Hajime Nakamura, “Violence and Nonviolence in Buddhism,” in Violence and Aggression in the History of Ideas (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1974): 179–182. T. 8 (246); also see Charles Orzech, Politics and Transcendent Wisdom: The Scripture from Humane Kings in the Creation of Chinese Buddhism (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). Narada, The Buddha and His Teachings (Singapore: Stamford, 1980): 169 Lambert Schmithausen asserts the argument of King Duttagāmani was stimulated by Mahayana Buddhism which had existed one or two centuries earlier in Sri Lanka. 57. See Jayaraja Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Tessa Bartholomeusz. “In Defense of Dharma: Just-War Ideology in Buddhist Sir Lanka,” In Journal of Buddhist Ethics, 6 (1999): 1–16. When I studied in Sri Lanka from 1986 to 1994, I heard and witnessed a number of monks who gave up their monkhood and joined army in order to fight Tamil Tigers in the north. Such events were often reported in newspapers, such as Ceylon Daily, which expressed approval and appreciation of their action. Tessa Bartholomeusz, In Defense of Dharma: Just-War ideology in Buddhist Sri Lanka (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). T. 25 (i509):164a19–23. T. 12 (374): 484a8–14. The translation is quoted from The Collected Works of Shinran (Kyoto: Jodo Shinshu Hongwanji-Ha, 1997, v. 1): 136. In the Ajātaśtrukaukrtya-vinodana-sūtra, it is said that Ajātaśtru would first suffer in hell and then be born in one heaven. Pieter Verhagen, “Expressions of Violence in Buddhist Trantric Mantras,” in Jan Houben and Karel Van Kooij, eds., Violence Denied: Violence, Non-Violence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History (Boston: Brill, 1999): 280. Heinrich Dumoulin, Zen Buddhism: A History: India and China (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987): 196. Brian Victoria, Zen at War (New York: Weatherhill, 1997); Hishiki Masaharu. Jōdo shinshu no sensō sekinin 浄土真宗の戦争責任 (The True Pure Land Sect and the War Responsibility. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1993); Ichikawa Hakugen. Bukkyō no senso sekinin 仏教の戦争責任 (The War Responsibility of Buddhism; Tokyo: Hozokan, 1993). I will leave the discussion on Japanese priests and war in connection with nationalism to the end of this work. Lambert Schmithausen, “Aspects of the Buddhist Attitude towards War,” in Jan E.M Houben and Karel R. Van Kooij, eds., Violence Denied: Violence, Nonviolence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History (Boston: Brill, 1999): 52. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991): 12–22

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216 38. 39. 40.

Notes to Chapter One Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma (New Yersey: Princeton University Press, 1965): 81. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983): 1. For instance, Leguan called Juzan, a well-known radical monk who remained in China after 1949, a traitor to Buddhism for secretly working for Communists during the war. Leguan, “Ai taogong jianseng Juzan,” (Lamenting Juzan Who has Surrendered to the Communists and Betrayed Buddhism), in Chunqiu bie ji (Special Collection on Spring and Autumn; Taibei: Changlesi, 1981).

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 1. Holmes Welch, The Buddhist Revival in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). 2. “First, most of what occurred was not a restoration of the past, but a series of innovations; not a religious revival, but a redirection from the religious to the secular; Second, it never affected the Chinese population as a whole . . . Third, it concealed certain trends, which, if they had continued, would have meant not a growing vitality for Buddhism but its eventually demise as a living religion.” Welch, 264. 3. Welch, 262–69. The idea that Buddhism in China was reviving may be the result of reports of certain missionaries in China, who witnessed the renovation of temples, the popularity of Buddhist lectures and so forth in the early twentieth century. 4. Welch, 250–53. 5. Welch, 222–53. 6. Guoqi Xu, “Nationalism, Internationalism, and National Identity: China from 1895–1919,” in C. X. George Wei and Xiaoyuan Liu, eds., Chinese Nationalism in Perspective: Historical and Recent Cases (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001): 104 7. John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996): 25. 8. It was predicted that the awakening of China would eventually shake Asia as well as the world. The metaphorical expression of the waking lion in relating the Chinese nation was somehow attributed to Napoleon, and often quoted by Chinese political leaders and intellectuals. However, according to John Fitzgerald, it is unlikely that Napoleon uttered this phrase first; Fitzgerald, 62–63. 9. Dongchu, Zhongguo fojiao jindai shi (中國佛教近代史 History of Modern Chinese Buddhism; Taibei: Zhonghua fojiao wenhuaguan, 1974): 41–46. 10. The details of lay Buddhist activities and organizations can be found in Hao chao yin, v. 16, n. 1 (1935): 140–85. 11. Welch, 259. 12. Wing-tist Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China (New York: Octagon Books, 1969): 85. 13. Dongchu, 67–69. 14. Chengkong, “Minguo fojiao nianji” (民國佛教年紀 Yearly Record of Buddhism in the Republic of China), in Zhang Mantao, ed., Minguo fojiao (Buddhism during the Republic of China; Taibei: Mahayana Culture, 1979): 167–68.

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Notes to Chapter One 15. 16. 17.

18.

19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

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Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu (太虛大師年譜 Chronological Biography of Taixu; Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 1995): 223. Karl Reichlt, China Christian Year Book: 1932–1933, 110. Renshan, who went to Jinshan with Taixu to implement Buddhist reform in 1911, charged that among three to four hundred monks in the temple, no one could write a decent letter of a hundred words. Yu Linbo, Zhongguo jinxiandai fojiao renwu zhi (中國近現代佛教人物志 Buddhist Biographies in Modern China; Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 1995): 126. Jesuit missionaries were very active in China at the end of the Ming dynasty and beginning of the Qing dynasty. However, during the reign of Emperor Yongzheng (r 1723–1735), the conflict between Christian beliefs and Chinese religious tradition, especially the worship of ancestor, occurred, and no compromise was found. Consequently, Yongzheng had all Christian activities banned in China and confiscated church properties. See Dongchu, 47–71 Arthur Smith, “Appendix 1: Statistics of Protestant Missions in China,” in The Uplift of China (New York: Young People’s Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada, 1908): 258. He is the author of Handbook for the Student of Chinese Buddhism (London: Trübner and Co. 1870). E.J. Eitel, Buddhism, its Historical, Theoretical and Practical Aspects (Hong Kong, 1884): 144. Details about Taiping’s destruction of Buddhist institutions can be found in “Taiping tianguo yu fojiao” (The Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace and Buddhism), in Taiping tianguo shilun wenji (Collection on the History of the Heaven of Great Peace; Guangxi: Renmin chubanshe, 1983): 263–281. Dongchu, 134. Dongchu, 116. Interesting discussion on anti-Christian movement in 1920s can be found in Ka-che Yip, Religion, Nationalism and Chinese Students (Western Washington University, 1980). (請尊孔聖為國教立教部教會以孔子紀年而廢淫祀摺), in Yang Jialuo, ed., Wuxu bianfa wenxian huibian (午戌變法文獻漚編 Collected documents on the 1898 Reforms; Taiwan: Dingwen chubanshe, 1973): 230–36. Zhang Zhidong, Quan Xue Bian (勸學篇), Ibid, 3729. “著各省府廳州大小書院 改建學堂諭” in Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian (中華民國開國五十年文獻 Documents from the First Fifty Years of the Republic of China; Taipei: Zhengzhong, 1961), v. 8: 317. Shanghai xian zhi (上海年志 Records of Shanghai County. Taiwan: Cheng wen, 1918): 661–702. Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushinian wenxian, 8: 318. Taixu. “Zhongxing fojiao Jichan Anheshang chuan” (中興佛教寄禪安和尚傳 Biography of Jing An who Revived Buddhism), in Hai chao yin wenku (Voice of Sea Tidings; Taiwan: Xin wenfeng, 1985), v.18: 112. Shen Qian, ed., Zongyang shangren ji (宗仰上人集 Works of Zongyang; Wuhan: Huazhong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1999): 1–2. After 1911, Zongyang retired to his temple in Zhenjiang and later became the abbot of Qixia Si in Nanjing. The temple, devastated by Taiping Rebellion, was renovated in 1920. Sun Yet-san donated 10,000 Yuan for the renovation project

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33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

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Notes to Chapter One as the token of the appreciation of Zongyang’s financial and spiritual support for the revolution in the past. Dongchu, 889–91. For the convenience of revolutionary work, Yizhou sometime addressed like a layman or appeared as a monk. After the Revolution in 1911, he retired to the temple without claiming any award. Shuxin, “Kaiguo shiqi de fojiao yu fojiaotu” (開國時期的佛教與佛教徒 Buddhism and Buddhists at the Beginning of the Republic of China), in Zhang Manto, ed., Minguo fojiao pian (Buddhism in the Republic of China; Taibei: Dacheng wenhua chubanshe, 1978): 6–7. Shuxin, 6; Taixu, Taixu dashi zichuan (太虛大師自傳 Autobiography of Master Taixu; Taibei: Fuzhi sheng chubanshe, 1996), 30–1. Similar reports can also be found in Holmes Welch, 19–20. Dongchu, 134. Yang Wenhui, “Zhina fojiao zhenxing ce yi” (A Proposal for Chinese Buddhist Revival), in Huang Xianian, ed. Yang Renshan Ji (楊仁山集 Collection of Yang Renshan; Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1995): 7. Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 6. In China, as well as in Japan, Buddhist temples are identified by their lineage or denomination of different schools. Right after the incidents, Zhang Binling and Su Manshu, joined together and called for the Chinese government and Buddhists to protect Buddhism. Su Manshu and Zhang Binlin, “Gao zaiguan baiyi shu” (To Government Officials and Lay Buddhists) Manshu dashi quanji, (曼殊大師全集 Complete Collection of Su Manshu); Hong Kong: Wenyuan shudian, 1934). Zhang Yaxin, Bazhi touduo (八指頭陀 Buddhist Ascetic of Eight Fingers; Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi, 1998): 37. Dongchu, 77. Taixu, “Zhongxing fojiao Jichan Anheshang chuan,” 112. However, some conservative forces within Buddhist monasteries were also intractably strong, which rejected the self-reform. Many monk reformers were falsely charged. See Dongchu, 79. Song feng, the abbot of Bai-I Monastery in Hangzhou, planned to open a new style school of monks’ education, and was murdered. Deng Zimei, Zhongguo jingdaihua yu quantong fojiao (中國近代化與傳統佛教 Modernization of China and Traditional Buddhism; Beijing: Huadong shifang daxue, 1996): 108. Zhang Yaxin, 41. Taixu, “Sanshinian lai zhi Zhongguo fojiao” (三十年來之中國佛教 Buddhism in the Past Thirty Years), in Zhang Mantao, ed., Minguo fojiao bian, 320–21. Hai chao yin, v. 16, n. 1 (1935): 113. Dongchu, 78–79. In order to learn Japanese Buddhist education, Wenxi decided to go to Japan. However, he was accused of sympathizing with the revolution by the conservative monks in Yangzhou and was arrested on the eve of leaving Yangzhou. The record of Buddhist schools established after 1921 can be referred to in Hai chao yin, v. 16, n. 1 (1935): 111–130. Welch, 285–87. Hai chao yin, v. 16, n. 1 (1935): 121.

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Notes to Chapter One 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59.

60. 61.

62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

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Welch, 279–84. The details of modern Buddhist journals can be referred to in Chenkong, “Shiwunian lai zhi fojiao chubanjie” (十五年來之佛教出版社 Buddhist Publication Societies in the Last Fifteen Years), in Hai chao yin, v. 16, n. 1 (1935): 186–97. Hai chao yin, v. 18, n. 5 (1937): 91. Hai chao yin, v. 18, n. 5 (1937): 92–93. We should differentiate “conservatism” from “traditionalism.” The latter indicates the sentiment of attaching to the old ways as they were or fear of new and innovation while the former, although maintaining the old ways of thinking, consciously places them in a new environment and positively responding to the changes although in its conservative ways against progressive movements. In this dissertation, the term of conservative monks is used in contrast with that of reformer monks, yet both of them made their changes to fit into contemporary society in different levels. Hai chao yin, v. 18, n. 6 (1937): 84. Yingshun, Taixu fashi nianpu, 23. Taixu disapproved the resolutions because they sounded like an exchange of donations for government protection. He said it was the duty of monks and nuns, who as the citizens to make donations to the state while it was also government’s responsibility to protect Buddhism. Before he set off for Beijing, Jichan told Tai Xu that according to his horoscope, he was tabooed to go to Beijing in his life. Taixu. “Zhongxing fojiao Jichan Anheshang zhuan,” 114. The Interior Affairs Ministry issued two documents in the June and October in 1913 respectively. Both documents impute temples into categories of state, public and private. Zhonghua minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian (中華民國史檔案資料 漚編 Materials from the Historical Archives of the Republic of China; Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1991): (v. 15): 692–94. However, according to Zhang Yaxin, Du Guan even slapped Jichan’s face. See Zhang Yaxin, 44. There were a lot of speculations over the sudden death of Jichan. Some claimed he was assassinated by a government agent, who wanted to fully implement the expropriation of temples; others asserted that he was murdered by the followers of rival monk Dixian. Still others attributed his death to a heart attack. Dongchu, after analyzing the circumstances, came to the conclusion that Jichan died of poisoning from charcoal fumes burned in room to keep warm in the Beijing’s winter. See Dongchu, “Minguo chaoxin yu fojiao xinsheng” (民國肇興與佛教新生 The Rise of the Republic and the Renewal of Buddhism), in Zhang Mantao, ed., Minguo fojiao bian, 320–21. Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 28; Taixu. “Zhongxxing fojiao Jichan Anheshang chuan,” 115. Xiong was one of Jichan’s friends through exchanges of poems, as both of them were professional poets. He served as heronry president of All China Buddhist Congress. Zhonghua minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian, 1991 (v. 15): 689–90. Jichan was thus regarded as a Buddhist martyr who died for the sake of Buddhism in the early Republic era. Dongchu, “Minguo chaoxin yu fojiao xinsheng,” 27.

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220 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

74. 75.

76.

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

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Notes to Chapter One According to Yingshun, requested by Yuanying, Duan Qirui went to Guangzhuo and persuaded Jiang Jieshi to cancel the government plan for Buddhist reform. Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 224–25. The detailed law and regulations of the Qing court on Buddhism can be found in Zhou Shujia, Qingdai fojiao shiliao jigao (Collected Materials on the Buddhist History in the Qing; Taibei: Xin wenfeng chubanshe, 2000). Zhonghua minguo linshi yuefa (中華民國臨時約法), in Zhang Bofeng, ed. Beiyang junfa (北洋軍閥 The Beiyang Warlords; Wuhan: Wuhan renming chubanshe, 1990), v. 1: 681. Zhonghua minguo xianfa (中華民國憲法), Zhang Bofeng, v. 1: 732. It seems that the Nationalist government at this stage was very critical of religion, and anti-religious sentiments were still high in China. Taixu, after meeting with Jiang Jieshi in 1928, was authorized to organize a Buddhist organization. Yet after discussing with other government officials and literati, such as Cai Qiongmin and Zhang Jingjiang, he was advised not to use any word to indicate Buddhism 佛教 in the title of the organization, to avoid suspicion of promoting religion at the time. That is why instead of using the Chinese Buddhist Society 中國佛教會, the organization was called the Chinese Buddhist Studies Society 中國佛學會. See Yingshun, 139–40. China Handbook: 1937–1943: 17, 20. Siyuan guanli zhanxing guiding zeling (寺院管理暫行規定則令), in Zhonghua minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian (Materials from the Historical Archives of the Republic of China; Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1991), v. 3 pt. 15: 692; Taixu, “Zhongxing fojiao Jichan An Heshang Chuan” (Biography of Jichan Who Revived Buddhism), in Hai chao yin wenku, v. 18: 114. The damage to Lamaism was even more severe because most of the Lama temples had been founded either by the sponsorship of the state or by the public funding and all of them would be confiscated according to the policy, and only a very few, which constructed by private donations, could survive. Zhangjia, “Zhonghua fojiao zhonghui zhi guowuyuan chen” (中華佛教總會致 國務院呈 Petition to the State Council from All China Buddhist Congress), in Zhonghua Minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 3, pt. 15 (1991): 690–92. “Guanli simiao tiaoli” (管理寺廟條例), see Dongchu, 105. “Da zongtong gongbu xiuzheng guanli simiao tiaoli ling” (大總統公布修正管 理寺廟條例), in Zhonghua Minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 3, pt. 15 (1991): 698–702. Properties owned by Christian church were exempted from taxes at that time. “Simiao guanli tiaoli” (寺廟管理條例), in Zhonghua Minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5, pt. 1, n. 23 (1991): 1017–9. “The Notice to the Party Branches about the Regulations for Supervising Temples Examined and Issued by the Central Secretariat of the Guomindang,” in Zhonghua Minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian, v.5, pt. 1, n. 23(1991): 1027. “Jiandu simiao tiaoli” (監督寺廟條例), in Zhonghua Minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5, pt. 1 n. 23 (1991): 1019. Dongchu, 146. China Handbook: 1937–1943, 117.

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Notes to Chapter One 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

91. 92. 93. 94.

95. 96.

97. 98.

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Dongchu, 146–54. Yingshun, Taixu fashi nianpu, 137. “Reply from the Interior Affairs Ministry to the Buddhist Association,” in Zhonghua Minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5, pt. 1, n. 23 (1991): 1071–72. “A Telegram from the Sangha Reorganization Committee of Buddhist Union to the Nationalist Government,” in Zhonghua Minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5, pt. 1, n. 23 (1991): 1070–1. Meanwhile, Taixu sent a letter to the Fifth Executive Supervision Conference held in Nanjing, calling for the end of attempts to destroy Buddhism in China. Based on the Three People’s Principles, Taixu suggested that the government should support Buddhist institutions to undertake self-reorganization and self-reform to get rid of remainders of feudal society, instead of forcing them to disappear from China. Dongchu, 138. “Reply Letter from Cai Yuanbei and Others to the Nationalist Government,” in Zhonghua Minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5, pt. 1, n. 23 (1991): 1073–4. Cenkong, “Minguo fojiao nianji” (Chronicle of Buddhism in the Republic), in Zhang Mantao, ed., Minguo fojiao pian (Buddhism in the Republic; Taibei: Dacheng wen hua, 1978), 199–200. Tairyo Makida, Chūgoku kinsei Bukkyōshi kenkyū (Studies on Modern Chinese Buddhism; Tokyo: Keirakuji shoten, 1957), 270. Five points were argued to support their claims of appropriation: (1). to strengthen the foundation of the nation and Party, (2). to equally share the burden of education, (3). to realize the principle of the Party, (4). it was practiced in China before, (5). it was the commonly adopted by the educational society in whole country. They also listed five points against criticism: (1). it does not harm the freedom of religion, (2). it does not impede Buddhist research, (3). it does not violate private properties, (4). it does not take away the living basis of monks and nuns, and (5). it will not destroy well-known Buddhist resorts and antiquity. Changxing, Changxing fashi ji (The Collection of Changxing; Taibei: Zhonghua dadian bianying hui, 1968): 39–48. Dongchu, 160. It may appear strange that the proposal could not be found in the Yearbook of Education in 1930 as it should be. The reason may be that the proposal was dropped after strong protest both from inside and outside. Article 16 of the Program of Political Tutelage adopted in 1928 states “Except in accordance with law, no private property shall be sealed or confiscated.” And article 19 states again, “All persons shall have the right to inherit property in accordance with law.” Chinese Handbook 1937–1943, 117. Dongchu, 158–60. Taixu made three points to argue that Buddhist institutions should be protected without further destruction: the constitution grants Buddhists equal rights with those of Christianity and Islam; the protection of Buddhism can be advantageous for the state in dealing with minorities, such as in Tibet and Mongolia; and Buddhist doctrine can help the implementation of the Three People’s Principles in society. Taixu, Taixu dashi quanshu (太虛大師全書 Complete Work of Master Taixu; Taibei: Shangdao Si, 1979): (v. 24) 18–24. This work hereafter is referred to as Taixu quanshu.

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222 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111.

112. 113. 114. 115. 116.

117. 118.

119. 120.

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Notes to Chapter One Lin Jingdong, ed. Zhongguo fojiao faling huibian (中國佛教法令漚編 The Collection of Regulations on Buddhism in China; Taizhong: Guoji fojiao wenhua chubanshe, 1958): 168. Lin Jingdong, 168–69. “Fojiao simiao xingban cishang gongyi shiei guize” (佛教寺廟興辦慈善公益事業 規則), in Yuanying, ed., Fojiao falin huibian (佛教法令漚編 Collected Laws and Regulations on Buddhism; Shanghai: Zhongguo fojiaohui, 1948): 129. Yu Lingpo, Zhongguo jinxiandai fojiao renwu zhi (Biographies of Buddhists in Modern History of China; Beijing: Zhongguo zongjiao chubanshe, 1995): 154. Dongchu, 189–90. Hai chao yin, v. 14, n. 9 (1933): 114. Ling Jingdong, 172–73. Ling Jingdong, 159–60. Yu Lingbo, 154–55. As we can see from available documents and reports, the government continued to make use of Buddhist temples; it is quite reasonable to say monks and nuns refrained from articulating their protests. Zhikai, “Call for Yong Monks to Protect the Nation Together,” in Fo hai deng, v. 2, n. 5 & 6 (1937): 10. Frank Millican, “Tai Hsü and Modern Buddhism,” in The Chinese Recorder 54/6 (1923): 327. Xinde, “Wowei Taixu dashi he fojiao de qiantu tongku” (我為太虛大師和佛教的 前途痛哭 I Cry for Master Taixu and for the Future of Buddhism), in Ma Tianxiang, ed., Wanqing foxue yu jindai shehui sichao (Buddhist Studies in the Late Qing and Modern Trends in Social Thought; Taibei: Wenjin chubanshe, 1992), 244. Wing-Tsit Chan, Religious Trends in China (New York: Octagon Books, 1969): 56. Jichan won his nickname of “Ascetic of Eight Fingers” after he burned two fingers as offering to the Buddha. Yingshun, Taixu fashi nianpu, 7–8. Taixu, Taixu dashi zichuan, 23. Taixu here admits that, being closely associated with the revolutionists, he became courageous and calm in facing difficulties and dangers. Taixu, Taixu dashi zizhuan, 24. The original poem was lost, however some lines of the poem were remembered by one of Taixu’s friends. Two lines go like this: “For the sake of people’s rights one lives even though one died; the deeds of martyrs should be widely propagated.” Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 19. In 1909, Taixu pursued modern Buddhist studies in the Jetavana Hermitage founded by Yang Renshan in Nanjing, together with other more than ten fellow students, both monks and lay Buddhists. Don Pittman, 44–7. The Storming of Jinshan left great impact on contemporary Chinese Buddhism and awakened a number of young monks while criticized by conservatives. Dongchu compared the storming of the Jinshan to the storming of the Heaven by Sun Wunkong, a legendary monkey hero in Xiyou ji ( Journey to the West). Dongchu, 98. Dongchu, 106–08. During this time, Taixu even considered returning to lay life.

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Notes to Chapter Two 121. 122.

123. 124. 125.

126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134.

223

This is traditional Buddhist practice for exclusive meditation in an isolated place or sealed room. Three Baskets of Buddhism: Vinaya (Disciplines), Sūtras (Scriptures), and Abhidharma (Ultimate doctrine). All of them are regarded as the words of the Buddha. The three Pitakas are differently classified in Mahayana tradition that although the first two are the same, the last one is called commentaries written by Buddhist masters after the Buddha. The detail about the founding of the Wuchang Buddhist College can be referred to in Yu Lingbo, Zhongguo jinxiandai fojiao renwu zhi, 144–58. Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 113–4. When Taixu was in Singapore in 1926 he was once asked whether Buddhists could cause harm any plants because they also had nerve system within, he explained that in a strict sense, Buddhist should not “kill” plants, yet there are differences between animals (dongwu 動物) and plants (zhiwu 植物). Unlike animals including human beings, plants are called non-sentient being (wuqingwu 無情物). When plants are “killed,” they neither feel pain nor will they give rise to hatred so that they will not have the thought and action of revenge. With absence of all these, the “killer” may not harvest bad karma. See Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 27 (part 17): 739. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 31: 1173. Early in 1923, Taixu presided over the ceremony in which all soldiers stationed in Zhijiang officially took the Three Refuges as lay Buddhists. Taixu, Taixu dashi zizhuan, 84. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 27 (part 17): 746–750. Taixu, “Zenyang quzuo junguan 怎樣去作軍官), Taixu quanshu, v. 28, 269–274. The Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha. Non-killing, non-stealing, non-adultery, non-lying, and non-intoxication. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 26: 535–6 Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 279. Tan Shibao, “‘Taixu dashi nianpu’ duhou” (太虛大師年譜讀后 Thought after Reading ‘Chronological Biography of Taixu’), in Huo Taohui, ed. Taixu dansheng yibai zhounian guoji huiyi lunwen ji (Collection of Articles on the one hundred year anniversary of Taixu’s birthday): 160.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 1. In December 12 1936, Zhang Xueliang, the Young Marshal of the Northeast Army, arrested Jiang Jieshi, demanding united Chinese effort against the Japanese. 2. Chengkong, “Minguo fojiao nianji” (民國佛教年鑑 Chronicle of Buddhism in the Republic of China), in Zhang Mantao, ed., Minguo fojiao bian (民國佛教篇 Buddhism in the Republic of China; Taibei: Dacheng wenhua, 1979): 227–28. 3. Zhang Bofeng, Beiyang junfa (1912–1928) (北洋軍閥 The Beiyang Warlords; Wuhan: Wuhan chubanshe, 1990), v. 1: 681. 4. China Handbook (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1943): 117. 5. China Handbook, 1943: 120.

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Notes to Chapter Two

6. In Vinaya texts, monks are prohibited to be associated with military forces and should not go to visit soldiers without proper reasons, such as preach or for almsreceiving. Detail can be referred to the Mūla-Sarvāstivādā-vinaya-sangraha, T. 24 (1458): 590a; the Brahmajāla Sūtra, T. 24 (1484): 1005c. 7. This is the English translation of the title given in the cover of the journal. 8. Tangyun, “Sengjie huguo zatan,” (僧伽護國雜談 Talks on the Protection of the Nation by the Sangha), in Fo hai deng. v. 2 no. 5–6 (1937): 25. 9. Fo hai deng, v. 2, n. 4 (1937): 1. 10. Malalasekera explains that to the Eastern mind, abstinence or renunciation is not a negative attitude but rather a positive thing in itself. “Philosophical Implications of Panca Sila,” 269. 11. T. 24 (1500): 1107–1115. 12. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 16: 353. This parallels the four-line verse often used to summarize the teaching of the Buddha: To avoid what is evil, to do what is good; to purify one’s own mind, this is the teaching of Buddha. 13. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 3–6. 14. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 13. 15. Those who follow the path of sainthood: stream winner, once returner, never-returner, and Arhat. 16. The Buddhist saints who achieved enlightenment through self-efforts by following the Twelve Links of Causality when the teaching of Buddha is not available. 17. T. 24 (1501): 1112a. 18. Zhenhua, Sengjie huguo shi (僧伽護國史; Taibei: Liulijingfan, 1933): 58–59. 19. The practice of bodhisattvas is not designed to achieve anything beside practice itself. The very perfection of such practice is the achievement of final goal. That is why the accomplishment of Six Perfections (generosity, morality, patience, effort, meditation, and wisdom) by skillful means is the attainment of Buddhahood. 20. Zhenhua, 9. 21. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 13. 22. Zhenhua, 10. 23. The idea of emptiness is concisely expressed in the Heart Sūtra. 24. Further discussion on this issue will be conducted in the conclusion of this work. 25. Leguan, “Fojiao zai kangri zhanzhen qijian de biaoxian” (Buddhist Activities During the Anit-Japanese War), in Zhang Mantao, ed., Minguo fojiao bian (Buddhism in the Republic of China; Taibei: Mahayana Culture, 1979): 268. 26. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 12 (1937): 1049. Unusually, Hai chao yin did not make any comment on such reports. 27. Hai chao yin, v. 18, n. 12 (1937): 1051. 28. Taixu’s proposal was distorted by the Interior Affairs Minister, and in August 1943 it requested temples, which earned over fifty thousand Yuan per year, to pay fifty percent income tax for the government to organize charity. Monks and nuns were not allowed to organize charity themselves, but the committee was organized at the city or county level to collect the money and to decide how the money should be used. Taixu then sent a personal letter to Jiang Jieshi, and passionately explained his position. He claimed, “Taixu’s life will come to an end if the day of extinction of Dharma arrives.” The expression in Taixu’s letter was so emotional that soon after it was submitted, the government repealed its former

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Notes to Chapter Two

29.

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55.

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order. Dongchu, Zhongguo fojiao jindaishi (History of Modern Chinese Buddhism; Taibei: zhonghua fojiao wenhuaguan, 1974): 193; Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 17: 668–670. This kind of nationalism once appeared in Buddhist institutions some decades before when the clergy protested against the activities of Japanese missionaries in China, but subsided when the crisis was over, as the conflict between China and Japan gave way to the conflict inside China. T. 2 (125): 690–693. It is said that in ancient India, troops should turn back from waging war when they happened to come across a holy man. Narada, 69. That’s why one who has renounced the world gives up his or her surname, replaced by Śakya (Shi) to indicate the cut off from secular connection and entering into the lineage of the Buddha. Traditionally, the Buddha’s headache is explained as the result of his previous karma. Dai Jitao, Dai Jitao xiansheng foxue lunji (Buddhist Articles by Mr. Dai Jitao; Taibei: Zhonghua fojiao wenhua guang, 1972). Fo hai deng, v. 2, n. 5 &6 (1937): 19. Zhenhua, 88. Hagiography of Monks with Supernatural Power. T. 50 (948) Zhenhua, 89–90. Fo hai deng, v. 2, n. 2 (1936): 1. Ren hai deng. v. 3, n. 5 (1937): 172. “Minzu fuxing yu fojiao” (民族復興與佛教), Hai chao yin, v. 17 n. 9 (1936): 1016– 1026. Hai chao yin, v. 17, n. 9 (1936): 1016. Hai chao yin, v. 17 n. 9 (1936): 1024. “Cong yige minzu yingxiong de qingnian heshang shuqi” (從一個民族英雄的青 年和尚說起), Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 5 (1937): 533. Zhenhua, 6. Taixu, Taixu quan shu, v. 26: 529–30. Yingshun, Taixu fashi nianpu, 223–4. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n.5–6 (1937): 8. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 (1937): 25. Zhikai. “Huanqi sengqingnian gongtong jiuguo” (喚起僧青年共同救國 To Wake up Young Monks to Save the Nation Together), in Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 (1937): 8. Originally, the term was used in a positive sense in the Song dynasty to indicate those who devoted their time and energy to meditation. This was the same accusation of Mahayana Buddhists in the past to criticize those who attached themselves to the Hinayana practice, such as those whose aim was to attain Arhatship without aspiring to achieving perfect enlightenment and benefiting other living beings. Fo hai deng, v. 2. n. 2 (1937): 1. “Sengjie shengcun yu guomin zhi renshi,” (僧伽生存與國民之認識), Fo hai deng, v. 2, n. 5 & 6 (1937): 3–4.

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226 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

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Notes to Chapter Two Dacheng bengsheng xindiguan jing (大乘本生心地觀經) T. 2 (159): 269–306. Taixu, Taixu quan shu, v. 26: 336. “Sengjie ying zenyang huguo” (僧伽應怎樣護國), Fo hai deng, v. 2, n. 5 & 6 (1937): 2–3. Taixu, “Fojiao yu huguo” (佛教興護國), Taixu quan shu, v. 24: 67–70. Taixu, Tauxu quan shu, v. 24, p. 68. “Huangqi sengqingnian gongtong jiuguo,” Fo hai deng, v. 2, n. 5 & 6 (1937): 10. “Fofa jiushi yu sengjia huguo,” (佛法救世與僧伽護國) (Saving the World by the Dharma and Protecting the Nation through the Sangha), Fao hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 6–8. Mingshan late became one of eminent monks in China. “Guomin yingjin tianzhi” (國民應尽天職), Huang Xianian, ed., Yuanying ji (Collection of Yuanying): 82. Zhenhua, 1. “Hujiao hujia yu huguo” (護教護家與護國), Fo hai deng, v. 2, n. 4 (1937): 2. “Xiandai Zhongguo fojiao qingnian yingju zhi jizhong guandian,” (現代中國佛 教青年應具之几種觀點), Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 1 (1938): 33–36. Fo hai deng, v. 2 no 4 (1937): 12 In Buddhist tradition, after the Parinirvana of the Buddha, the history of Buddhism is divided into three periods: the period of the Right Dharma (500 years), the period of the Dharma of Semblance (1000 years), and the period of the Dharma Degeneration (myriad years). There are many other calculations too. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 12–13. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 6. Zhenhua, 11–12. “Sengjia yu guonang” (僧伽與國難) Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 (1937): 9. Fo hai deng, v. 2, n. 5 & 6 (1937): 8. Longyao, “Qinri yu qinhua” (親日與親華), Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 17. According to the survey conducted by the Chinese Buddhist Society in 1936, there were 738,000 monks and nuns in 260,000 temples and nunneries. Here the laypeople were those who formerly received the Three Refuges or Five Precepts. Hai chao yin, v. 17 n. 7 (1936): 841. Wuzhuang could be used in a general sense as militarization. To a large degree, it specifically means to take up a gun or other weapon. “Sengxu wuzhuang huguo lun” (僧訓武裝護國論) Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 5. “Sengjie huguo de zhengtu” (僧伽護國的正途) Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 11–15. The other three are not-stealing, not-adultery, not-telling lies. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 12. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 3–6. Ibid., v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 6. It is allowed in Buddhist vinaya that monks may leave monastic community by renouncing precepts. They may return late and be fully ordained again. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 12. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 14. Huang Xianian, ed., Yuanying ji, 82–92. Hai chao yin, v. 17 n. 7(1936): 798. Hai chao yin, v. 17 n. 7(1936): 799.

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Notes to Chapter Two 89. 90. 91. 92. 93.

94. 95.

96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110.

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The discussion on Zen and Japanese nationalism can be found in James W. Heisig and John C. Maraldo, eds., Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1995). Mingshan, “Fofa jiushi yu sengjie huguo” (Buddhist Saving of the World and Sangha Protection of the Nation), Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 8. “Sengjie huguo yingyou zhi renshi” (僧伽護國應有之認識) Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 (1937): 6. Yanran. “Qingnian sengjie huguo de yimu” (An Episode of Protection of the Nation by Young Monks), Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 (1937): 7. These monk students were generally poor at the time. Buddhist education for monks in such colleges was not popularly accepted and rather less supported especially by the monks in the wealthy temples, as they doubted the usefulness of modern Buddhist education. They believed that young monks, having studied in college, would lose their religious zeal and faith. Therefore, the monk students usually would not receive financial supported from rich temples or monks. Meanwhile, these students commonly looked down on the ritual service for the dead, which was major income for Buddhist monks at the time. See Dongchu, 102. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 (1937): 7 One reason that monks and nuns should not take part in agriculture is attributed to the allege that they may injure insects if they do. This tradition was changed in the Tang dynasty when Baizhang, a Chan master declared: “One day no eating if one day no working.” Although this became popular slogan among monastic members, the practice was never overwhelmingly accepted by Chinese clergy except those monks and nuns in remote areas, who worked in fields for their own living. Huiquan, “Sengjie zenyang huguo” (How Shall Sangha Protect the Nation), Fao hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 91937): 14–15. “Sengjie de huguo tujing” (僧伽的護國途徑) Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 (1937): 19. Peiluo. “Cong xinkan er li xiechu de yifeng xing” (A Letter from the Heart), Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 (1937): 13. “Sengjia duiyu huguo yingyou de renshi” 僧伽對於護國應有的認識) Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 (1937): 26–27. Longyao, “Guanyu sengjie huguo de hua” (Talks about the Protection of the Nation by Sangha), Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 (1937): 17–8. Ibid., 18. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 4. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 12. Bodhidharma was the legendary founder of the Chan School in China in the fifth century A.D. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 2 (1937): 14. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 4 (1937): 5. Zhenhua, 73–4; Stanley Weinstein, Buddhism under the T’ang (London: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 56–7. Taixu, “Lun Shishi Xinbao suowei jingzhou jiuguo” (論“時事新報＂所謂經咒 救國), Taixu quan shu, v. 15: 2889–2899. The article first appeared in Shanghai News, July 2, 1935. Fafang, “Lun fohui erjiao zhi lianhe” (論佛回二教之聯合 On the Unity of Buddhism and Islam), Hai chao yin, v. 16 n. 8 (1935): 1014.

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228 111. 112.

113. 114.

Notes to Chapter Three “Du lun duanji minzu yi zi lianghe fohui erjiao shi hou de gangxian” (讀論團結民 族宜自聯合佛回二教始後的感想), Hai chao yin, v. 16 n. 8 (1935): 1032–1041. It is also possible that these monks supported the Nationalists in their conflict with Communists just because they were convinced that the policy of Communists toward religion was radical. However, little available information can be collected to prove that monks and nuns knew much about Communists at this time. Liansheng, “Sengqie duiyu huguo yingyou de renshi” (僧伽對於護國應有的認識 The Necessary Attitude of the Sangha toward the National Protection), Fo hai den, v. 2, n. 5–6 (1937): 26. Huazhuang, “Women de huguo sixiang” (我們的護國思想 Our Ideas on the National Protection), Fo hai deng, v. 2 no. 5–6 (1937): 23.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 1. The Japanese Buddhist influence on Taixu can be referred to in his own work, “Dongyin caizheng lü” (東瀛采真錄 Extracting Essence from Japan; in Taixu quanshu. Taibei: Shangdao Si, 1979) v. 29: 312–357. 2. Riben qinhua qishinian shi (日本侵華七十年史 Seventy Years of Japanese Aggression in China; Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1992): 275–83. 3. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 327. Dongchu misdated this telegram by asserting that it was sent to Japanese Buddhists at the end of 1936. See Dongchu, Zhongguo fojiao jindai shi (History of Modern Chinese Buddhism; Taibei: Zhonghua fojiao wenhuanguan, 1974): 778. 4. Don Pittman, Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu’s Reforms (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), 136. 5. Taixu presumably considered that almost all Chinese were Buddhists. There were about four hundred million people in China at the time. From this article and others we can see that Taixu seemed to have admitted the Japanese occupation of Taiwan. 6. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, (v. 24): 327 7. Taixu, “Wei Shenyang shijian gao Taiwan, Chaoxian Riben Siqianwan fojiao mincing shu” (為瀋陽事件告台灣朝鮮日本四萬佛教眾書), Taixu quanshu, (v. 24): 328–330. At that time, Korea and Taiwan were already colonies of Japan. 8. Ten evils: killing, stealing, adultery, lying, double-tongue, coarse language, filthy language, covetousness, anger, and perverted views. Five Deadly Sins: parricide, matricide, killing an Arhat, shedding the blood of a Buddha, and destroying the harmony of the sangha. These two terms are often used to indicate the gravity of one’s evil. 9. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 328–29. 10. Taixu, “Ying Liaohu shijian wei Zhongri ze anwei” (因遼滬事件為中日策安危), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 53. To a large extent, China-Japan conflict that culminated in full-scale war in 1937 did open World War II, and China and Japan were dominated by Russia and America after the end of the war. 11. This letter was addressed to the Chinese Buddhist Society. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 333. 12. Taixu, “Zhi Riben fojiao lianhehui shu” (致日本佛教聯合會書), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 333.

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Notes to Chapter Three 13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30.

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229

Taixu, “Quan quanguo fojiao qingnian zuzhi huguotuan” (勸全國佛教青年組織 護國團), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 71–80. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 76. Taixu, “Kangri de Zhongguo seng” (抗日的中國僧), Taisu quanshu, v. 27: 807–08. The author complained that Taixu was irresponsible for agitation of the SinoJapanese conflict and that his actions were entirely non-Buddhist. When he was informed of the article and asked of his reaction to these accusations, Taixu smiled, saying that he knew nothing about any anti-Japanese actions the charge indicated. Rather politely, he expressed his appreciation that there were still some Japanese who wanted peace rather than conflict. In an interview with a correspondent from Hai chao yin, Taixu defended his argument that the Japanese troops must be withdrawn from China. Meanwhile, he related that he had also been charged with being friendly and cooperating with the Japanese against the will of the common Chinese people. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 27: 808. Dongchu, Zhongri fojiao jiaotong shi (The History of Sino-Japanese Buddhist Communications; Taibei: Dongchu chubanshe, 1985): 751–52. According to Yingshun, the charge was first put forward by people from China Buddhist Study College in Nanjing. Taixu had been on debate with them on many Buddhist issues, academics as well as politics. Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu (Chronological Biography of Taixu; Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 1995): 201. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 334–35. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 4 (1937): 92. Taixu, “Lun di’erci fantaipingyang fojiao qingnianhui dahui” (論第二次汎太平洋 佛教青年會大會), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 120. Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 229. Taixu, “Diangao quan Riben fojiao tuzhong” (電告全日本佛教徒眾), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 336. Don Pittman confuses the cable issued by Taixu right after the Marko Polo Incident in July 7 1937 with another one issued in May 1928. The cable Don Pittman quoted was the one Taixu sent to Japanese Buddhist leaders after the Jinan Incident on May 3, 1928. Comparing these two cables, the earlier one appears very demanding while the latter seems more persuading. See Don Pittman, 135–36. Taixu, “Gao quanguo fojiaodu” (告全國佛教徒), Taixu quanshu, v. 26: 298. This college was subsidized by the funding of the government, the only Buddhist institute in China. See Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 155. Taixu, “Fuxing fojiao, senglü yingshou junxun” (復興佛教僧侶應受軍訓), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 155. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 28: 526–27. On July 2, 1938, the Nationalist government issued “Principles for the Resistance and Nation-Building” (Kangzhan jiangguo ganling 抗戰建國綱領), in Zhonghua minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian (Materials from the Historical Archives of the Republic of China; Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, v.5, pt.2, sect. 6 n.1 (1991): 149–53. The article was first published in Hai chao yin v. 19 n. 4 (1940); Taixu, “Riwei yi juewu fei” (日偽亦覺悟否), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 159–166.

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230 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52.

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Notes to Chapter Three Taixu, following the tradition, considered that Prince Shōtoku was the reincarnation of Huisi (515–577), a great Chinese monk in the Tang dynasty and the teacher of Zhiyi (538–597), who was the founder of Tiantai School in China. Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 164–65. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 159. However, in November 1941, Taixu declared the closure of the office because his suggestion did not receive support from the government. Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 267. Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 236. Hai chao yin, v. 19 n. 7 (1938): 351–52. Tonggao quanguo fojiaotu jiaqiang zhuzhi yi kangzhan 通告全國佛教徒加強組織 以抗戰 (The Notice to All Chinese Buddhists for Enhancing Organization for the Sake of the Anti-Japanese War). This was a speech first published in Hai chao yin v. 19 n 6 (1940). Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 180–81. Hai chao yin, v. 19 n. 10 (1938): 484. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 31: 1531–3. Hai chao yin, v. 19 n. 10 (1938): 484. The date that Taixu was invited to be the member given by Yingshun is on April 4, 1939, yet the act was issued on November 4, 1939. One possible explanation is that Taixu received the invitation before the formation of the committee was publicly announced. The committee was very powerful organization that all government ministers and top military officers were its members. Chonghua Minguo shi dang’an zilaio huibian, v.5 pt.2 sect.6 no.1 (1991): 48–50. Hai chao yin, v. 20, n. 7–8 (1939): 207. Taixu, “Fuwu guojia xuanyang fojiao” (服務國家宣揚佛教), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 200–204. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 200. Taixu, “Fangqinlüe yaoyou jiangqiang liliang” (反侵略要有堅强力量 Anti-Invasion Needs Powerful Forces), Taixu quanshu. v. 24: 226. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 10 (1937): 959. Taixu, “Chuqian laojun yu bushi” (出錢勞軍與布施), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 228. Zhengping, “Fojiao jiaoyu yu guofang” (佛教教育與國防), Hai chao yin. v. 18, n. 8, (1937): 745–757. Fafang, “Women dui Ribenren de taidu” (我對日本人的態度 Our Attitude towards the Japanese), in Hai chao yin, v. 17 n. 12 (1936): 1379. In another article as we discussed in the previous chapter, Fafang did not openly call on Chinese monks and nuns to learn from the nationalism of Japanese priests although he made comparison between the two. This society known as Myōwa Kai was consisted of all Buddhist sects in Japan with strong political mission in supporting the war of invasion. Huang Xianian, ed., Yuanying Ji (圓瑛集 The Collection of Yuanying; Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1995): 144. Huang Xianian, ed., Yuangyin ji, 80. Hayashiya Tomojiro and Shimakage Chikai, Bukkyōno Sensō Kan (the Buddhist View of War). The translation is quoted from Brian Victoria, Zen at War (New York: Weatherhill,1997): 87.

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Notes to Chapter Three 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

72.

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231

Renxin, “Gao Riben fojiao dacong” (告日本佛教大眾), Hai chao yin. v. 18 n. 8 (1937): 742. Shuyi, “Zongyue dashi” (宗月大師 Master Zongyue), in Zhonghua wenshi ziliao wenku (Storehouse Materials on Chinese History; Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi, 1996): 497. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 11(1937): 1005. Renxin, “Kangdi shengzhong de fojiaotu” (抗敵聲中的佛教徒), Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 9 (1937): 843–44. Fafang, “Wuhan sengzong zuzhi qilai” (武漢僧眾組織起來), Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 12 (1937): 1013. Zhengping, “Cong kanzhang luxian dadao dongya heping” (從抗戰路線逹到東 亞和平 From the Way of Resistance to the Achievement of Pease in East Asia). Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 12 (1937): 433–37. Fafang, “Wei Riben qinhuashi gao quanshijie fojiao tongzhi” (為日本侵華事告全 世界佛教同志 To Buddhist Comrades in the World upon the Japanese Invasion of China,” in Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 9 (1937): 845. One of reasons for such assertion may be due to that Jiang Jieshi had become a Methodist after he married his second wife in late 1920s, and to that Christian missionaries were very active in China too. Leguan, “Fojiao zai kangzhan qijiang de biaoxian” (佛教在抗日戰爭期間的表現 Buddhist Activities during the Resistance War), in Zhang Mangtao, ed. Minguo fojiao bian (Buddhism in the Republic of China; Taibei: Dacheng fojiao chubanshe, 1979), 290. Due to its difficulty, the latter way was not often used in the early stage of the war, but it became important after Burma was occupied by Japan in 1941. Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, v.5 pt.2 sect.5 n.2 (1991), 771–72. He was one of four great Lamas during the Republic of China, other three were the Dala Lama, the Pancha Lama, and Zhepuzundanba. See Dongchu, Zhongguo fojiao jindaishi, 386. Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5 pt.2 sect.5 n.2 (1991): 772. Hai chao yin, v. 19 n. 5 (1938): 216. Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5 pt.2 sect.2 n.2 (1991), 786–791. Chuhuan, “The Outlined Career of Master Xixiaojiachu,” in Zhonghua wenshi ziliao wenku, 505–08. Taixu, “Zhan Hainandao zhi weixie yu dui fojiaoguo zhi youlüe” (佔海南島之威 脅與對佛教國之誘略), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 192–94. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 121. The suggestion for formation of the Buddhist delegation was first made by Wang Lixi, who wrote an article, “On Guideline for People’s Diplomacy,” which appeared in Dagongpao. In this article, Wang proposed that Buddhist and Muslim delegations should be organized to visit neighboring countries to enhance the cause of the resistance war. In February 1939, Hai chao yin published an article, “Buddhist Delegation Shall Be Soon Organized,” which was in response to Taixu’s article we have discussed above. See Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 243. Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5 pt. 2 sect. 5 n. 2 (1995): 792.

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232 73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88.

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Notes to Chapter Three The formation of the delegation by Buddhist monks for the sake of the resistance war was questioned and doubted by many top government officials, such as Chen Lifu, the Education Minister, Kong Xiangxi, the Minister of Executive Yuan. They were amused that Buddhist monks who were inculcated with compassion of non-killing could make any contribution to the nation. See Li Zheliang, Mingren foyuan (名人佛緣 Famous People Connected with Buddhism; Chendu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1998), 120. The delegation formerly included nine high government officials. Some worried that the inclusion of so many government officials may cause the doubt and suspicious of Buddhists in neighboring countries for political propaganda. Also see Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5 pt. 2 sect. 5 n. 2 (1995): 794. They were Cihang, Weifang, Weihuan, Chen Dingmo (interpreter), and Wang Yongliang (Taixu’s personal assistant). Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 244–45; also see Taixu, “Fojiao fanwentuan tongdian” (佛教訪問團通電 Communique of the Buddhist Delegation), Taixu quanshu, v. 26: 299–300. Don Pittman here confuses two names of Wan City (瓦城) and Rangoon (仰光). It was in Wan city that more than two thousand monks came out to receive Taixu. Don Pittman, 140. Taixu, “Yingpo zhi mimon yu yingsheng zhi juewu” (應破之迷夢與應生之覺悟), Taixu quanshu, v. 27: 212–14. The detail of the visit can be referred to in Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 243–258; Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 30: 445–744. The delegation was unable to visit Thailand as scheduled because of strong anti-Chinese sentiment among people in that region. In his report to the Propaganda Ministry and the Social Ministry, Taixu described the activities of the delegation and summarized its achievements. In order to provide guidelines for the government in dealing with the neighboring countries, Taixu made six suggestions that Buddhism, if correctly supervised, could make great contributions to the nation and the government. Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5 pt. 2 sect. 5 n. 2 (1995): 795–800. Taixu, “Fojiao yu guoji fang qinlüe” (佛教與國際反侵略), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 220–23. Taixu, “Fojiaodu yu guomin waijiao” (佛教徒與國民外交), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 269. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11 & 12 (1941): 4. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11 & 12 (1941): 22. The whole text of petition can be found in Zhonghua Minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5 pt.2 sect. 5 n. 2 (1991): 811–12. Zhonghua Minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5 pt.2 sect. 5 n. 2 (1991): 814–15. According to the plan, the walk team had five members. However, only four including Leguan finally took part as Guneng was unable to go for unknown reason. Zhonghua Minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, v. 5 pt. 2 sect. 5 n. 2 (1991), 812–13. Luohan Si (The Temple of Arhats) was well known for the five hundred images of Arhats within. Leguan, “Duonan xingban” (多難興邦), in Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi (僧侶抗 戢工作史 The History of Activities of the Sangha during the Anti-Japanese War; Shanghai: Huguo chanyuan, 1947): 51.

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Notes to Chapter Three 89. 90.

91. 92.

93. 94. 95.

96. 97.

98. 99. 100. 101.

102.

103.

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This was a daily newspaper in Burmese language. The interview was first published in January 18, 1941. Jiang Jieshi of the Executive Yuan, Yu Youren 于佑任 of the Legislative Yuan, Ju Zheng 居正 of the Judicial Yuan, and Dai Jitao of the Examination Yuan. It was very strange that many leading monks who went to Taiwan with the Nationalists insisted that Jiang Jieshi was a lay Buddhist despite of his conversion to Christianity when he married his second wife. See Dongchu, Jiang zongtong yu fojiao (President Jiang and Buddhism; Taibei: Zhonghua fojiao wenhuaguan, 1975). The article was originally written in Burmese language and was translated into Chinese by Leguan. According to the initial plan, the walk team was to go further to Thailand and India. This plan, however, seemed impossible to implement because of rapid Japanese military advancement toward the south by the middle of 1941. Eventually Leguan and his team members had to abandon their work in Burma and return to Chongqing after Burma was occupied by Japan in 1941. Welch, 279. The second issue was published three months after the first one. Thereafter it became a monthly journal. Mujia, “Chenzhong de beizha liangge wanzi” (沉重的背著兩個卍字), Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 3. 卍 is an auspicious curled sign of the Buddha, indicating the accomplishment. Here it is used to indicate a difficult yet sacred mission, not unlike the cross in Christianity. Xia Yan, “Dui Riben renmin zuo shizi hao” (對日本人民作獅子吼), Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 19. On January 18, 1932, two Japanese priests of the Nichiren Sect and three lay Japanese were attacked as planned by gangsters hired by Tanaka (田中隆吉), a Japanese military office in Manchuria. One of the Japanese priests was pronounced dead later on in the hospital. This was taken as an excuse for Japanese attacks on Shanghai ten days later. Taixu was appointed the member of the Committee for the General Maneuver of People’s Spirit in April 20 1939. See Yingshun, Taixu dashi nianpu, 241. Tan Puzhi, “Jingshen zongdongyuan yu weishilun” (精神總動員與唯識論), Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 24–25. Cai Shu, “Jiuguo bixu cong shixing fojiao wujie kaishi” (救國必須從實行佛教五 戒開始), in Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 2 (1941): 19. Zhang Zhirang, “Xing kangjiang zhi zhengyi; Deng renlei yu niepan” (行抗戰之 正義, 登人類於涅槃 Performing the Right Actions of Resistance War and Nation-Building; Enabling Human Beings to Attain Nirvana), in Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 17–18. Yingshun, “Fojiao de zhandao guan” (佛教的戰鬥觀). In Miao yun ji (Collection of Wonderful Cloud; Taibei: Zhengwen, 1992), v. 14. This article was first published in Shi zi hao under the name of Jiangxing 健行, Shi zi hao v. 1.n. 11–12 (1941): 23–24. In Buddhism, the world is divided into three categories: the realm of craving, the realm of form, and the realm of the formless. Only one who transcends these three worlds achieves nirvana.

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234 104. 105. 106. 107. 108.

109. 110. 111.

Notes to Chapter Four Yingshun, “Fojiao de zhandao guan” (佛教的戰鬥觀). In Miao yun ji (Collection of Wonderful Cloud; Taibei: Zhengwen, 1992), v. 14: 302. The scripture deals with the previous lives of the Buddha. It was translated into Chinese by Dharmapala in the 3rd century C.E. T. 3 (154): 70–108. Yingshun, Miao yun ji, 302–303 Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11 & 12 (1941): 13. The office for reorganizing the Chinese Buddhist Society was soon closed, and the reason is unknown. However, according to You Youwei, soon after the opening the office in Chongqing, some monks in Shanghai announced they had reorganized the society and started to work again. See You Youwei, Shanghai jindai fojiao jiangshi (Concise History of Buddhism in Modern Shanghai; Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue, 1988): 101. During the war, Taixu urged his disciples in Japanese controlled areas to come to Chongqing, but no one responded to his call. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 12–13. It is also interesting to note that Juzan had to cooperate with Yuanying under the communist regime after 1953 when the Chinese Buddhist Association was founded. Juzan served as vice secretary while Yuanying as chairperson.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 1. Huiquan, “Sengqie zenyang huguo?” (僧伽怎樣護國 How should the Sangha Protect the Nation?), Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 (1937): 15. 2. You Youwei, Shanghai jindai fojiao jiangshi (上海近代佛教簡史 Concise History of Buddhism in Modern Shanghai; Shanghai: Huadong shifang daxue, 1988): 99. 3. The discussion on this issue can be referred to the Chapter Two where young monks criticized such views of the “old monks”. 4. Tang was a well-known general in the Republic Era. He was a devoted follower of Wang Honyuang, a lay master of esoteric Buddhism. Tang appointed Wang as his military adviser and indoctrinated his troops with Buddhist ideas when he was in Changsha. He was left behind to defend Nanjing in November 1937. His acceptance of the task and later on the strategy of defense are said to have been based on the advice provided by Wang Hongyuan. See Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1999): 423. 5. Huiquan, “Sengqie zenyang jiuguo?” 15. 6. For the sake of convenience, Taixu designed a new mode of dress for monks and nuns. It has been accepted since then as common attire for monks and nuns who wear it daily at times other than religious rituals. The cloth is not different from that worn by common people in China at the time, except that there is no high collar. 7. “Wuxixian fojiaohui sengcong jiuhu xunliandui tongxue lü” (無鍚縣佛教會僧眾 救護隊同學錄 Wuxi Buddhist Society Rescue Team Training Class List,” Ren hai deng, v. 2 n. 2 (1936): 11–12. 8. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 4 (1937): 422–23. 9. Fojiao xingwen (Buddhist News) (March 6, 1937): 3. 10. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 5 (1937): 534. 11. Fojiao xingwen (Buddhist News) (March 27, 1937): 3.

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Notes to Chapter Four 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34.

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235

Fojiao xingwen (Buddhist News) (March 17, 1937): 3. Haocheng, “Sengxun zhihou” (僧訓之后),Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 7 (1937): 78–80 Fojiao xinwen (Buddhist News) (February 21 1937): 3. According to Buddhist principle, a lay man should not read and talk about monastic precepts. However, Dai Jitao explained that he was ordained as Bodhisattva under Vajra Vinaya so that he was qualified to discuss monks’ discipline. Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 86. Fo hai deng, v. 2 n. 5–6 91937): 30. Dongchu, 938. It appears that this was a large sum of money at the time. Fojiao xinwen (Buddhist News): April 28 1937: 3. Hai chao yin, v. 20 n. 10 & 11 (1939): 24. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 11 (1937): 1004–5. This college was the only Buddhist institution of learning financially supported by the Nationalist government, see also Zhonghua Minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian (1991), v. 5, pt. 2, sect.5, n.2: 786. Hai chao yin, v. 23 n. 1–2 (1942): 20. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11–&12 (1941): 21. Hai chao yin, v. 17 n. 6 (1935): 731. Riben qinhua qishinian shi 日本侵華七十年史 (Seventy Years of Japanese Aggression in China. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue, 1992): 408. It is said that Yingguanh had all offerings he had received during the ceremony sent to people afflicted by the war in the north. You Youwei, “Reminiscence of Master Yingguang,” (回憶印光法師), in Zhonghua wenshi ziliao wenku, 478. Dai Jitao was born in a traditional Buddhist family. In the winter of 1922, on the order of Sun Yatsen, Dai went to negotiate with the warlords in Sichuan, but he failed. Much frustrated, one night he jumped into a river in Yichang and attempted to drown himself in frozen water. Suddenly, he saw a shining white flash rising up to the sky. Thinking this must be the light of the Buddha, Dai regained his courage to live. Afterwards, he became more diligent in Buddhist studies and practice. See Dai Jitao xiansheng foxue lun ji (戴季陶先生佛學論集 Buddhist Articles by Mr. Dai Jitao; Taibei: Zhongguo fojiao wenhuaguan, 1967). Dai Jitao, 116. Dai announced following ten wishes: all Chinese people may believe royalty, piety, humanity, love, trustfulness, altruism, and peace; all people unite and make contribution to the common cause; all people obey the law and serve the nation; all young men train themselves in discipline, wisdom and virtue, to renew their personality; all young women learn to be compassionate and all other virtues of Chinese women; people from all walks of life work hard and be honest; all Party members unite and selflessly work for the benefit of the nation; Nationalist government to be trustworthy, all countries work together to eliminate war and preserve peace; and Buddhists reform themselves for the sake of Buddhism. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 15: 2889. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 9 (1937): 907. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 10 (1937): 955–56. Asuras and gods are two kinds of living beings within the six realms of existence. Asuras, the semi-gods, are well-known for their ferocious temper and war-spirit.

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236 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60.

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Notes to Chapter Four Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 10 (1937): 955. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 10 (1937): 955. Hai chao yin, v. 20 n. 7–8 (1941): 206. He is also known as the Medicine Buddha and it is said that the merit force of reciting his name is so powerful that it could eliminate any sort of disaster and prolong life. Hai chao yin, v. 19 n. 9 (1937): 475–76. Dai Jitao, 122. Hai chao yin, v. 20 n. 7–8 (1941): 206. Lu Kuanxian, Xuyun heshang nianpu (虛雲和尚年譜 The Chronological Biography of Xuyun; Hong Kong: Xianggang fojing liutongchu, 1977): 137–38. It is reported that on this occasion, many government officials, military generals, and social leaders took part in the rituals. They presented Xuyun with five suitcases of valuables such as paintings and calligraphy. Xuyun did not keep any, but distributed these antiquities to temples on his way back to Guangzhou. See Shi Ming, “Reminiscence of Xuyun”, in Zhongguo wenshi ziliao wenku, 468. Dai Jitao, 124–26 Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 12 (1937): 1054. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 11 (1937): 1005. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11 & 12 (1941): 21. Interestingly enough, this kind of practices was also adapted by the Japanese priests and the Chinese Buddhists in Manchuria for Japanese soldiers during the war as will be discussed in Chapter Five. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11 & 12 (1941): 22. Hai chao yin, v. 23 n. 1–2 (1942): 19. Again, we cannot find any direct information about this kind of objection, but from the records that quoted and criticized what they suggested. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11 & 12 (1941): 5. The similar events also happened in Japan throughout the war that many Buddhist sects competed with each other to donate money to purchase airplanes and war boats for Japanese soldiers. During the Korean War (1950–1953), a similar movement all over China was organized to call on monks and nuns to purchase airplanes for Chinese soldiers. The title of the society may be adopted in reference to the World Red-Cross, which already was active in Shanghai. Meanwhile, there was a Red-Savastika Society to conduct Buddhist charity in Shanghai too. Hai chao yin, v. 17 n. 4 (1936): 482. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 11 (1937): 963. In Chinese Buddhist tradition, monks or nuns who have received ordination should have scars burned by incense on their foreheads. Many speculations about its origination have been suggested. Some attribute it to the discriminative practice toward the monks and nuns of Chinese nationality in the Yuan dynasty, others consider it as a show of devotion to the Buddha. Some monks who served as rescue teams in the warfront, however, kept their robes instead of wearing military uniforms. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 9 (1937): 906. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 10 (1937): 957.

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Notes to Chapter Four 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76.

77. 78.

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Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11 &12 (1941): 21. It should be pointed out that all the imformation is soly cited from Buddhist records; no government’s documents or independent reports are available to confirm them. Jiaoru, “Zai qianxian” (在前綫 At the Warfront,” in Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 11 (1937): 1003. Jiaoru continued to relate what he saw the cruelty of Japanese soldiers and the destruction of the war. All places except the concession zone in Shanghai were badly damaged and numerous dead bodies scattered on the streets. He also witnessed Japanese indiscriminate killings of powerless refugees, including children. Two thousand of them were once killed together. Cihui, “Houfang sengzhong juexing guolai” (後方僧眾覺醒過來), Hai chao yin, v. 18 n.11 (1939): 2–3 Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11 & 12 (1941): 20–21. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11 & 12 (1941): 20. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 11 (1937): 1002. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11 & 12 (1941): 20. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 11(1937): 1001. “Outline of Ciji Hospital Institute of Yunnan Buddhist Society,” and “Yunnan Sangha Rescue Team,” in Hai chao yin, v. 20 n. 7–8 (1941): 205. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11 & 12 (1941): 19–20. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 12 (1937): 1048. There are different records on the leadership of this sangha rescue team. The records given by those in mainland China attributed its leadership to Yuanying, while others in Taiwan, such as Dongchu and Leguan asserted that it was actually under the United Society of Charitable Organizations for Disaster Relief in Shanghai. The general director of the team was Qu Yingguan who was also the vice president of the United Society and a good friend of Yuanying. The number of monks in the team is also inconsistently recorded, some claim that it was 100, while others say it was 120; still many sources just give an approximate number of more than one hundred. Because some monks came from Nanjing and other places, it was also called Nanjing-Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team. You Youwei, 131. He was the one who proposed to set up the World Red-Buddha Society in 1936. The directors of the first two divisions were lay-people. This indicates there might be a lot of lay Buddhists on the team. This is proved by a picture taken in a rescue scene where there were some lay people together with the monks. See Ge Zhuang, Zongjiao he jindai Shanghai shehui de bianhua (Religion and Social Changes in Modern Shanghai; Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1999), 233. All expenditures were provided by the United Society of Charitable Organizations for Disaster Relief in Shanghai. “Leguan” literally means optimistic. He was called Leguan before he went to Japan. After seeing the social and Buddhist development in Japan, he changed his name to “Beiguan” which means the pessimistic. In one of the receptions in Hong Kong during this time, Wang Yiting, one of the most famous lay-Buddhists from Shanghai, suggested that his name should be changed “Leguan” because all Chinese people at this difficult time of national crisis should maintain hope and be optimistic. Therefore, afterward his name was changed from Beiguan to Leguan again.

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238 79.

80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

90. 91. 92. 93. 94.

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Notes to Chapter Four After July 7, 1937, Chinese and Japanese troops were first engaged in war in the north, yet Japanese military leaders stationed in Shanghai urged their government to increase the military force in south China and prepare to attack Shanghai and Nanjing. On August 9, two Japanese soldiers attempted to force their way into Hongqiao Airport in Shanghai, but were stopped by the Chinese security. One of them opened fire and killed one Chinese security personnel, and Chinese returned fire and killed the two. This incident touched off the war in Shanghai. According to Leguan, they even went to the international concession zones to save those who had been wounded by Japanese air raids. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n.10 (1937): 956. Leguan, Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi (僧侶抗戰工作史 Working History of Sangha in Resisting the Japanese; Shanghai: Huguochan Yuan, 1947): 25. I have tried to locate this report in Shenbao but could not find it. However, both Leguan and Dongchu repeatedly quoted such a report in their books and articles. It is said that more than five hundred thousand Chinese troops took part in the battle; about one hundred eighteen thousand to two hundred thousand were killed or injured. Leguan, Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi (Working History of Sangha in Resisting the Japanese; Shanghai: Huguochan Yuan, 1947): 26–27. Leguan, “Shanghai sengqie jiuhudui jiniankan” (上海僧伽救護隊紀念刊), in Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi (Working History of Sangha in Resisting the Japanese; Shanghai: Huguochan Yuan, 1947): 29 The team did not immediately march to the battlefield, according to Leguan, because Hongming attempted to organize another grand Buddhist ritual for the dead and set up a Buddhist hospital in Hankou. After he was appointed to the vice-general director of the team, Hongming invited two of his former military colleagues to be his assistants. Leguan, “Fojiao zai kangzhan qijiang de biaoxiang” (佛教抗戰期間的表現 Buddhist Activities during the Resistance War), in Zhang Mangtao, ed. Minguo fojiao bian (Buddhism in the Republic of China); (Taibei: Mahayana Culture, 1979): 253–256. According to the report from Hai chao yin, the united society in Shanghai disbanded the team because Japanese authorities there came to know the team was working for the resistance forces and ordered the society to stop funding. See Hai chao yin, v. 19 n. 9 (1938): 477. Foxue banyue tang, v. 171 (Dec 1938): 9. Hai chao yin, v. 20 n. 7–8 (1941): 206–07. Leguan even alleged that Qu Yingguan was jealous of the fame won by the team. Qu was angry because the name of the United Society of Charitable Organizations for Disaster Relief in Shanghai was not mentioned in the news reports. Leguan, “Fojiao zai kangzhan qijiang de miaoxiang,” 270. This may not be regarded as true motivation of Leguan, but only as an explanative argument at the time that the monks in the temple, who were very conservative, would benefited by organizing rescue team, because shortly afterward, as we will soon see, Leguan suggested to the government in Chongqing that the young monks should be drafted into army and go to warfront.

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Notes to Chapter Four 95. 96.

97.

98. 99.

100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109.

110. 111. 112. 113.

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According to his own record, Leguan served as the vice director while Chenyi, the abbot of Ciyun Si, the director. However, in his letters to the government departments, Leguan sometimes signed as the director of the team. The career of Leguan who had showed strong commitment to the government and his party identity convinced Zhang to accept the monks’ plan. On this occasion, Leguan admitted that he was a member of the Nationalist party; the membership of the party and military uniform may have impressed Zhang, who eventually gave up his demand. There are inconsistencies among the numbers of groups divided and numbers of monks in the team. The number Leguan provided is 90. However, two newspapers unanimously reported there were 70 members of the team. Yet according to the government document, the number is 60. In another version, Leguan says that the team is divided into three groups. “Tuo liao jiasha huan zhanpao” (脫了袈裟換戰袍), Leguan, Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi, 55. “Futang daohuo de Shijia zidi” (赴湯蹈火的釋迦子弟), Leguan, Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi, 56. This is the collection of reports on Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team collected from different news papers and magazines. Leguan either cut such the reports form the news papers and pasted into the collection, or reprinted whole articles together with their authors, names of news papers and magazines. This is the traditional picture of clergy who used to have a rosary in hands silently reciting Buddha’s name. When greeting others, they usually enfold their hands together while articulating name of “Amitābha Buddha.” Leguan, “Fojiao zai kangzhan qijiang de miaoxiang,” 276. Leguan was paid 10 yuan a month, other leaders of four groups 5 yuan, and ordinary members only got 1 yuan, which could only buy a pair of grass-shoes. Leguan, Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi, 33. The whole text of proposal can be found in Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, 1991, v. 5 pt.2 sect.5 n.2): 800–04. This number is different from what was given by others. It may indicate the population of monks in the Nationalist controlled areas. Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, 1991, v.5 pt.2 sect.5 n.2 (1991): 806–07. Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, 1991, v.5 pt.2 sect.5 n.2 (1991): 809. The detail of tour can be referred to the previous chapter. Leguan, “Fojiao zai kangzhan qijiang de biaoxiang,” 289. It is interested to know that Leguan considered the country as a big family of all monks and nuns, although he must be aware that according to Buddhist tradition all Buddhists are the sons of the Buddha and their last name should be Shi, the family name of Sakyamuni Buddha. Loutuo, “Zhuiji senglü jiuhudui yuangzheng” (追記僧伽救護隊遠征 Reminiscence of Expedition of the Sangha Rescue Team), in Leguan, Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi, 76–77. Leguan, Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi, 72–73. Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, v.5 pt.2 sect.5 n.2 (1991), 771–72. Xinkai 心愷, “Duiyu hanseng fubingyu zhi qojiang” (對於漢僧服兵役之我見 Opinion to the Conscription of Chinese Monks), Hai chao yin, v. 20 n. 9 (1939):

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240

114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122.

123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128.

129. 130. 131. 132.

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Notes to Chapter Four 1. According to Yingshun, some leading monks in Sichuan late appealed to the government and the order was repealed late. Hai chao yin, v. 21 n. 3 (1940): 42 Fushang, 福善, “Seng shi zhanshi” (僧是戰士 Monks are Fighters). Hai chao yin, v. 26, n. 2 (1945): 2. Hai chao yin, v. 26 n. 1 (1945): 3. Hai chao yin, v. 26 n. 2 (1945): 3. Zhenghua, Sengjie huguo shi (僧伽護國史 History of Monks’ Protecting the Nation. Taibei: Liulijingfan, 1976): 117. Dongchu, Zhongguo fojiao jindai shi (中國佛教近代史 History of Modern Chinese Buddhism. Taibei: Zhonghua fojiao wenhuaguan, 1974): 946–47. There are few materials on how Buddhist nuns acted in the war. Another source records that some Buddhist nuns in Shanghai organized themselves to make military uniforms for the soldiers. Dongchu, Zhongguo fojiao jindaishi, 945. Leguan, “Yige buzhiming heshang yingxion” (一個不知名的和尚英雄 A Unknown Monk Hero), in Hai chao yin, v. 28 n. 8 (1947): 20–21. Later on, Zhenwei was killed after his temple was besieged and attacked by a rival resistance force, which was probably allied with the Nationalists. In describing the incident in which Zhengwei was killed, Leguan did not directly mention the name of the troops in order to cover this infamous event. Soon after the war broke out in 1937, Communists joined Nationalists and formed a united front. Therefore the Communists recognized the leadership of the Nationalists and fought the Japanese under the Nationalist government. “Stepping out the Sūtra Recitation Hall and Struggling with Evil Devils—The Outburst of Zeal for Anti-Japanese War in Mt. Wutai,” in Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 2 (1941): 28. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 28. The activities of the monks in Wutai Mountain were later dramatized on stage, with the name “Wutaishan heshang kanri,” (五台山和尚抗日 Monks in Wutai Mountain Resisting Japanese). Ziling, “Wuzhuan youji de Renkong fashi” 武裝游擊的人空法師 (Renkong, a Military Guerilla). Hai chao yin, v. 27 n. 2 (1946): 12–14. Fushang, “Sengren kandi shihua” (僧人抗敵史話 History of Resisting Japanese by Monks), Hai chao yin, v. 27 n. 5 (1946): 2. According to Fushang, there were a number of such cases. He also related that Yuanying’s arrest by Japanese military police was a mistake, because he was wrongly taken as a monk from Xizhu Si in Shanghai, who actually was an underground spy for the resistance forces. Konglun was a friend of Mujia, the editor of Shi zi hao. See Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 31–33. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 32. Mujia, Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 31–33. The three letters are full of passion and rhetorical expression that may shadow doubts on their authenticity. They could be regarded as propaganda of fictional story to encourage Chinese Buddhists in fighting against Japanese. However, since the editor Mujia, who claimed to have personally known Huiming, explained that he obtained three letters from the latter as indicated in his epilogue, we

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Notes to Chapter Four

133.

134.

135. 136. 137.

138.

139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144.

145. 146.

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considered they are real although they may have been undergone some rhetorical refinements. According to his own record, Juzan attracted Taixu’s attention for his revolutionary idea and spirit of Buddhist reform. In 1927, he first met Taixu in Hangzhou as he intended to become a monk. Taixu asked him to write an article of a thousand words to express his aspiration of renouncing the world. One of four points he discussed in the article was Buddhist reform. Impressed by his knowledge and idea, Taixu sent him to study in the Minnan Buddhist College in Xiamen. After several months, Juzan left for Shanghai and continued his study in Daxia University. In 1931, he met Taixu again in Hangzhou, and this time, Taixu introduced him to Quefei, the abbot of Lingyin Si, where he was tonsured. One report reveals that Juzan had already joined the Communist Party in 1929 before he became a monk, and was wanted by the Nationalist government. Zhu Zhe, “Juzan fashi shengping shiliüe” (Short Biography of Juzan), in Mingseng lu (Records of Famous Monks; Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1988): 245. In ancient China, soldiers usually fought on horseback. Therefore, riding on horseback rhetorically indicates fighting in war. Jieyuan, “Juzan fashi zai Hunan de kanri huodong” (巨贊法師在湖南的抗日 活動 Anti-Japanese Activities of Juzan in Hunan,” in Mingseng lu, 261–62. The reason given by Ye Jiangying for changing the name was to allow more people to join the united front against Japanese. However, it might be more than that. The former title emphasizes Jiuguo, saving the nation, which also can mean saving the Nationalist government. Ye Jianying’s suggestion perhaps was an attempt to downplay the Nationalist influence. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 11 & 12 (1941): 3. It is not clear why some monks thought that the phrase of “resistaing Japanese” might get them into trouble (mafan). Probably, they believed that the phrase could incur Japanese revenge afterward because the Japanese were then preparing to militarily take over the region. Juzan, Juzan fashi wenji (巨贊法師文集 Work of Juzan. Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 2002): 665. Hai chao yin, v. 20 n. 7–8 (1941): 182. According to Juzan, only on Daoist priest took part in training. See Juzan fashi wenji, 549. Hai chao yin, v. 20 n. 7–8 (1941): 183. The maintenance of the unity of the society was also partially due to the neutral influence of its general secretary Lintao. He was highly respected in the area and acted as the mediator between two sides. According to the reminiscence of Mingzheng, the colleague of Juzan, it occurred in 1940. This cannot be true because Juzan went to Guangxi and started a Buddhist journal, Shi zi hao at this time in 1940. See Mingzheng, “Juzan fashi zai Nanyue” (巨贊法師在南岳 Master Juzan in Nanyue), Mingseng Lu, 259. Juzan, “Xing fojiao yundong de huigu yu qianzhan” (新佛教運動的回顧與前途 Retrospective and Prospective of New Buddhist Movement), in Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 10. The Great Wall is often used to symbolize the Chinese nation, indicating heroism, the spirit of unity.

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242

Notes to Chapter Five

147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159.

160. 161. 162.

“The Letter to Console the Soldiers in the Anti-Japanese War,” in Hai chao yin, v. 20 n. 7–8 (1939): 208. It is unknown whether this term indicated any positive meaning because heshang was a rather negative term as used by ordinary Chinese at the time. Juzan, “In Reminiscence of Limiao, the Soldier of New Buddhist Movement,” in Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 7–8. This term indicates those who had collaborated with the Japanese. Juzan, “In Reminiscence of Limiao, the Soldier of New Buddhist Movement,” in Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 8. Shi zi hao, v. 1 n. 1 (1940): 11. Hai chao yin, v. 21 n. 2 (1940): 39. After Juzan returned to Nanyue, he once wrote an article, which appeared in a newspaper, calling for the seizure of all temples and confiscation of all temple properties for the war charity. See Mingzheng, 259–60. Tian Han repeatedly urged Juzan to give up monkhood and to openly join the Communist party. However, Juzan said that he had turned it down, although he might have secretly joined the Communist party around this time. Mingseng lu, 245–277. Juzan, “Self-Reflection of Juzan,” in Zhonghua wenshi ziliao wenku, 541. Zhou Zhonggguang, “Xiang heshang kanqi” (向和尚看齊), Leguan, Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi, 71–73. Several pictures of the activities of this team remained. In some pictures taken before or after their training, monks dressed in military uniforms and hats, appeared no different from any other soldiers. But in other pictures taken when they were saving the wounded, the monks wear their ordinary short robes. See Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi, inside covers. Leguan, Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi, 63. Chen Shenglang, “Xiangei Zhongguo fojiao guoji xuanchuandui” (獻給中國佛教 國際宣傳隊), in Leguan, Senglü kangzhan gongzuo shi, 61–63. In his proposal to the Social Affairs Ministry for the formation of the Sangha Service Team in 1940, Leguan alleged that all of four hundred thousand monks (beside nuns) in China only appeared to be monks. They ate without farming, and wore clothes without weaving. His criticism was even more severe than traditional critiques of Buddhism. Zhonghua Minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian, v.5 pt.2 sect.5 n.2 (1991), 801–802. One of charges was that monks knew nothing but ritual service to the dead for earning their living. Quite ironically, Leguan was paid by the money earned from ritual service when served in the Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE 1. Riben qinhua qishinian shi (Seventy Years of Japanese Aggression in China; Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan, 1992), 434. 2. Hai chao yin, v. 19 n. 3 (1938): 100. 3. Hai chao yin, v. 19 n. 10 (1938): 536. 4. Dongchu, Zhongguo fojiao jindaishi (Modern History of Chinese Buddhism; Taibei: Zhonghua fojiao wenhuaguan, 1974): 944–45.

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5. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 231. 6. Tanxu Yingcheng huiyi lu (影塵回憶綠 Recollection of the World’s Shadow; Taibei: Fotuo jiaoyu jijinhui, 1997): 297–98. Tanxu attributed Qingjing’s escape to the merit of his constantly reciting the name of Avelokitesvara Bodhisattva. 7. Hai chao yin. v. 20, n. 10 & 11 (1939): 25. 8. There is no independent and accurate information about whether this kind of destruction was entirely caused by Japanese. It is understandable, of course, that Buddhist reports always blamed the Japanese for such disaster. 9. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 10 (1937): 958. 10. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 11(1937): 1. 11. Two pictures of damaged temples appear in Holmes Welch’s The Buddhist Revival in China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968): 140 & 172. One shows a Maitreya Buddha statue that survived the Japanese air raids in Chongqing though the building used to enshrine the statue was gone. Another one shows some Japanese soldiers resting on a platform that was used to place offerings in the temple. 12. Hai chao yin, v. 19 n. 10 (1938): 535. 13. Hai chao yin, v. 20 n. 10 & 11(1939): 24. 14. Gregor Benton, New Fourth Army: Communist Resistance Along the Yangtze and the Huai 1938–1941 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999): 233. 15. Gregor Benton, New Fourth Army: Communist Resistance Along the Yangtze and the Huai 1938–1941 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999): 233. 16. Taixu, “Kangzhan sinian lai zhi fojiao” (抗戰四年來之佛教), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 230–39. 17. Taixu provides the reason why the temple became the target of the Japanese bombardment. It was because the temple was used to station soldiers, and to store ammunition and other military equipment. In remote areas or inside deep mountains, the temples became rest sites for Chinese guerrillas. 18. Taixu, “Weiwen lunxianqu sichong tongren” (慰問淪陷區四眾同人), Taixu quanshu, v. 31: 1531. 19. It is against Buddhist discipline for a monk to deliberately say that he did not see what he actually saw. 20. Dongchu, Zhongguo fojiao jindai shi, 944. At this time, Liao was a battalion commander. Late he was promoted to be an army commander and played decisive role in defending Yunnan. 21. This organization was first established on February 1, 1930 by Zhou Shujia, an elite Buddhist in Beijing, with its original name Beijing Jushi Lin (Lay Buddhist Society in Beijing). It was changed to the present name after Beijing was occupied by the Japanese. 22. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 11(1937): 1010–1011. 23. The first Buddhist organized effort for social welfare in modern China started at the end of the Qing dynasty. On August 4, 1908, an orphanage was open in Longquan Si in Beijing. Holmes Welch, 125–26. 24. Holmes Welch provided us with information given by his interviewees in this regard, 121–31. 25. Shu Yi, “Zongyue dashi” (宗月大師 Master Zongyue), in Zhonghua wenshi ziliao wenku (Storehouse of Materials on Chinese History; Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1996), v. 18: 494–96.

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244 26. 27.

28.

29.

30. 31.

32. 33. 34.

35. 36.

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Notes to Chapter Five You Youwei, Shanghai jindai fojiao jianshi (上海近代佛教簡史 Concise History of Buddhism in Modern Shanghai. Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue, 1988): 133. Yu Linbo has followed the claim of Ye Xingli that Yuanying took with him three letters of Lin Shen in order to appeal for donations. See “Dubu Lengyan de Yuanying fashi” (獨步楞嚴的圓瑛法師 Master Yuanying: the Unique Expert on Lengyan School), in Zhongguo jinxiandai fojiao renwu zhi (Short Biographies of Buddhists in Modern China; Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua, 1995): 70; Ye Xingli, “Yuanying lao fashi yisheng shilüe” (圓瑛老法師一生事略 The Outlined Career of Master Yuanying”, in Yuanying fashi jiniankan (The Collection in Memorial of Master Yuanying): 12. However, this is not affirmed in many other texts published in mainland China, including the Chronological Biography of Yuanying (圓瑛法師 評傳), edited by Mingyan, who accompanied Yuanying on this trip. The first one was the Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team led by Hongming that was founded right after the war broke out. The Hankou Sangha Rescue Team was led by Haijing, the abbot of Xiangshang Si in Hankou. It recruited sixty monks who participated in the rescue work in Wuhan. After the falling of Wuhan, the team followed the Chinese troops to Henan. You Youwei, Shanghai jindai fojiao jianshi, 132. It was also called Ninpo Sangha Rescue Team. Zhiyuan, the abbot of Shixiang Si in Ninpo was invited to lead the team, which became very active in Fuyang County after the end of fighting in Shanghai. See You Youwei, Shanghai Jindai fojiao jianshi, 132; Fojiao gonglun, v. 6 (1946): 7. Mingyan, ed., Yuanying fashi nianpu (Chronological Biography of Yuanying; Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua, 1996): 139–43. We will discuss how Yuanying was late suspected by the Japanese of supporting resistance forces and arrested in Shanghai. There were more than hundred charitable organizations in Shanghai at the time, the united headquarter of all these organizations was located in Renji Tang at Yunnan Road in Shanghai. More than half of the leading figures were prominent Buddhist laypeople. Zhou Puchu late served as the chairman of the Chinese Buddhist Association after the Cultural Revolution (1968–1978) and made unique contributions to the Buddhist revival after the 1970s. You Youwei, Shanghai jindai fojiao jianshi, 135. According to You Youwei, Zhao Puchu criticized the Nationalist government and troops for abandoning Chinese refuges in Shanghai. Guo Zhang, Zongjiao he jindai Shanghai shehui de bianqian (宗教和近代上海 社會的變遷 Religion and the Social Change in Modern Shanghai; Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1999): 235. It is unclear whether the organizers of these refugee centers continued to encourage Chinese refugees to participate in the resistance war after Shanghai was occupied by the Japanese after the end of 1937. Zhao Puchu, “Kangzhan chuqi Shanghai de nanmin gongzuo” (抗戰初期上海 的難民工作 Refugee work in Shanghai during the early period of the War of Resistance). Wenshi ziliao xuanji, n. 4, 31–50 This set of the Tripitakas was discovered by Zhu Ziqiao when he was on a disaster relief mission in Shanxi in 1930. The Tripitakas were originally printed during the period from 1231 through 1309 in the Song and Yuan dynasty. It was one of the most valuable Buddhist discoveries in the Republic era. In 1931, Fancheng led

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Notes to Chapter Five

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44.

45.

46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52.

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the team of experts to Shanxi and brought the texts back to Shanghai. The five hundred sets of the Tripitakas were duplicated gradually from 1931 to 1935. Also see You Youwei, Shanghai jindai fojiao jianshi, 121–24. Holmes Welch, 169. Takeda Hiroshi, ed., Huabei zongjiao nianjian (Yearbook of Religion in North China; Beijing: Xinya zongjiao jiehui, 1941): 19. At the end of the war, many of its members were charged with being traitors to the nation and sentenced to death. This office was created in December 1938 directly under the cabinet of Japanese government in order to formulate policy on and handle relations with China, such as religious affairs in China and other Eastern Asian countries. Michihata Ryōshū, RiZhong fojiao youhao erqiannian shi (Two Thousand Years of Friendship between Japan and China; trans, Xu Ming. Beijing: Shanwu yingshuguan, 1992): 173. This is one of the most elaborate religious rituals in Buddhism, lasting forty-nine days. The tradition was claimed to have started by Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty with the help of eminent monks. The ritual text was edited in accordance with the Buddhist spirit of making offerings to the dead both in water and on the land. It has been especially popular to pray for the peaceful rebirth of those who died in war, because it is said that the ritual could produce great merit to a large number of the dead altogether. Takeda Hiroshi, ed. Huabei zongjiao nianjian, 15. Traditionally, this is called the Hungry Ghosts Festival (Ullambana). It originated from a Buddhist tradition that the Buddha instructed Mulian to make offerings to the sangha so that his mother might be released from suffering in hell. The aim is to release the dead from suffering and to pacify them by transferring merit to them. Available information tells us that two third of such rituals were devoted to both the spirits of deceased Japanese and Chinese soldiers. However, it is unclear whether the category of Chinese soldiers included those who had died in fighting the Japanese or whether it just implied the Chinese soldiers of the puppet governments who fought along the Japanese against the resistance forces. Takeda Hiroshi, 19. Takeda Hiroshi, 20–23. The motivation of this conference was questioned by Welch who claimed that Taixu might have made use of the conference to promote his personal influence, and certainly was used by the Japanese for political propaganda. The preparation for the establishment of the society was first initiated among Chinese and Japanese Buddhists in Shanghai in 1936, and it was formally founded in August 1938 in Shanghai. The Japanese counterpart was called Nika Bukkyō gakkai 日華佛教學會, with its headquarters in Tokyo. We do not know how this society in Beijing was related to that in Shanghai. This society consisted mainly of most well-known Japanese Buddhist monks and scholars who paid several visits to China during the war time. Takeda Hiroshi, 13. Takeda Hiroshi, 28. Takeda Hiroshi, 17.

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246 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

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Notes to Chapter Five The aim of this institution was said to achieve mutual communication between Buddhists in China and Japan. It was first established in Japan in 1934. Zhongguo fojiao xueyuan zhangcheng xuezhe huibian (中國佛學院章程學則漚編 Charters and Regulations of the Chinese Buddhist College; Beijing: Zhongguo foxueyuan, 1940). Takeda Hiroshi, 27. Takeda Hiroshi, 17 Changchun wenshi ziliao (長春文史資料 Materials on Culture and History of Changchun; Changchun: Changchun shi zhengjie wenshi weiyuanhui, n. 4, 1988): 22. Changchun wenshi ziliao, 85–94. When the Japanese occupied the northeast on September 18, 1931, Tanxu had just completed the construction of Jile Si in Harbin City. The temple was mainly funded by Zhu Ziqiao, the general and chief administrator in the northeast, who had been well-known for his nationalist zeal against Japan. Some monks from Jile Si followed general Zhu and fought guerrilla war against the Japanese occupation in the region. One of them was Ciyun, who used to be a superintendent monk of Jile Si and later on became an influential member of the anti-Japanese guerrillas. Tanxu, being the abbot of Jile Si and closely associated with general Zhu, was suspected of secretly supporting the anti-Japanese movement. Japanese intelligence personnel Imai Akirayoshi was sent to the temple to investigate whether Tanxu and other monks were activists in the anti-Japanese forces. He moved to live in the temple and dressed himself as a monk, vigilantly monitoring every monk’s social activities by checking their telephones and inquiring about visitors. Tanxu struggled hard to prove his disassociation from the politics and vigorously denied any link with Zhu Ziqiao beside religious interesting. Tanxu, Yingchen huiyi lu, 281–82. Tanxu, Yingchen huiyi lu, 300. Takeda Hiroshi, 20. Dongchu, Zhongguo fojiao jindaishi, 837–39. Dongchu highly praises Ruguang for his religious devotion and contribution to Buddhist development in the north, mentioning nothing about his association with the Japanese. As was discussed before, this conference was boycotted by Buddhists in other parts of China. Gao Pikun, “Ruguang qiren” (如光其人 About Ruguang), in Sun Ban, ed., Weimang shehui (Society in Puppet Manchuguo; Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1993): 587. The same consideration may also be applied to Tanxu, who also went to Hong Kong at the end of the war; no one questioned his actions under the Japanese administration during the war. This tradition was followed generally by Japanese Buddhist even before the modern imperialist period in Japan. Meng Xianling, “Pizhe zongjiao waiyi de Shi Shanguo” (披著宗教外衣的釋善果 Shi Shanguo with Religious Disguise), in Sun Ban, ed., Weimang shehui (Society in Puppet Manchuguo; Changchun: Jilin renmin chubanshe, 1993): 599. The similar actions were also undertaken by the Japanese priests in Japan during this period. They donated ritual instruments, such as bells, for military usage.

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Notes to Chapter Five 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74.

75. 76.

77. 78. 79.

80. 81.

82.

83.

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The same movement but with opposite political orientation was carried out by Buddhists in the Nationalist-controlled areas. Meng Xianling, 600. According to Meng Xianling, Shanguo was a double agent working for both the Japanese and the Nationalist government. Takeda Hiroshi, 24. This may be why Ruguang was condemned as a running dog of the Japanese by the Communists later on. See He Jingson, Jindai dongya fojiao (近代東亞佛教 Buddhism in Modern East Asia: Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 2001): 290. Gregor Benton, New Fourth Army: Communist Resistance Along the Yangtze and the Huai 1938–1941 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999): 234. “Zhonghua suwei’ai gongheguo xianfa dagan” (中華蘇維埃共和國憲法大綱), in Long Jinru, Zongjiao falu zhidu zhutan, (宗教法律制度初探 Primary Research on Religious Law and Regulation, Beijing: Zhongguo falu chubanshe, 1997): 146–47. Riben jinhua qishinian shi, 499. The name of the conference was the same as the one that was held more than a decade before in Japan in 1925. Twenty-eight eminent monks and lay Buddhists from China participated in that conference. From available information, we do not know whether there was any connection between these two conferences, although one thing may be common that both of them were highly politicized by the Japanese. Dongya fojiao dahui jiyao (東亞佛教大會紀要 Outline of the East Asian Buddhist Conference; Nanjing, 1941). Such as the General Buddhist Society of Manchuguo, the Common Buddhist Purpose Society in Beijing, and Great Japan Buddhist Society. You Youwei, “Chisong fashi shengping shilüe” (持松法師生平事略 Short Biography of Master Chisong), in Zhonghua wenshi ziliao wenku, 534–35. However, by examining another source, largely provided by those who favored the Nationalist government, Chisong was deeply dejected by the decline of Esoteric Buddhism, once overwhelmingly received by Chinese people. As Buddhists then turned away from the esoteric Buddhism, the practices lost general appeal in the public. Chisong, thus depressed, had to confine himself from the public. Dongchu, Zhongguo fojiao jindaishi, 415. Mingyang, 71–2. The time that the Japanese asked Yuanying to cooperate is differently given by several records. According to Wangxing, this happened soon after he came back from abroad when a Japanese monk invited him to be the head of China Japan Buddhist Society. Wangxing, “Huiyi Yuanying fashi” (回憶圓瑛法師 In Reminiscence of Master Yuanying), in Zhonghua wenshi ziliao wenku, 492. There were two different rumors about his arrest. One was reported by Reuter’s News Agency that Yuanying had collected a large sum of money for the Nationalist government. Another one was carried by Shenbao which said that Yuanying had refused to be the chair of China and Japan Buddhist Society. Both reports were neither affirmed nor rejected by Yuanying. You Youwei, Shanghai jindai fojiao jianshi, 134. However, according to Fafang, Yuanying agreed to cooperate with the puppet government. See Hai chao yin, v. 21 n. 1 (1940): 1. Mingyang, 156.

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Notes to Chapter Six

84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95.

It is interesting to see that the term “Kangri zhanzheng “(Anti-Japanese War) is used in Yuanying’s letter of resignation written when he was in Shanghai under the Japanese rule. Michihata Ryōshū, 170–5. Yuanying, “Heping yu cibei” (和平與慈悲), Mingyang, 182–83 Huang Xianian, Yuanying ji (Collection of Yuanying; Beijing: China Social Science Press, 1995): 99. Zhonghua minguoshi dang’an ziliao huibian (Materials from the Historical Archives of the Republic of china; Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1991), v. 5 pt. 2 sect. 5 no. 2: 777–8. Ye Xingli, “Yuanying laofashi yisheng shilüe,” 13–14. Ye Xingli ascribed Yuanying’s arrest by the Japanese and the suspicions of the Nationalist government in Chongqing to a rival’s slander. Ye Xingli claimed that a man reported to the Japanese military police in Nanjing that Yuanying had collected a large sum of money from abroad and given it to the Chinese resistance forces. After Yuanying was released, the man was arrested for false accusation and tortured by the Japanese. For further revenge, he sent a report to the Nationalist government in Chongqing, accusing Yuanying of having accepted the appointment of emissary to Singapore offered by the Japanese. Weixue, “Fojiaojie jijian jiuguo gongzuo” (佛教界几件救國工作 Several Works of Saving the Nation by Buddhists), in Fojiao gonglun (佛教公論), v. 6 (1946): 7–8. Holmes Welch, 171. Shuangting also left mainland China to Hong Kong after the end of the war so that he was not formally charged for his actions in the wartime. Fojiao gonglun, v. 6 (1946): 35. Juejun zhoubao, v. 18 (November 1946): 14–15. It appears that Taixu, who was acquainted with the two accused monks, refused to defend them. Leguan, Zhongguo fojiao jindaishi lunji (Articles on Modern Chinese Buddhism; Taibei: Changle si, 1978), 11. Leguan here supports the charge against the two and claims that they should be held responsible for helping the Japanese enslave the Chinese.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX 1. Taixu, Taixu dashi zizhuan (太虛大師自傳 Autobiography of Taixu; Taibei: Fuzhi chiseng, 1996), 21–22. 2. Jiang’s mother and his first wife were devoted lay Buddhists, and they must have influenced Jiang, who also showed interest in Buddhism in his earlier career. Whenever he returned to his hometown, Jiang would accompany his mother to Xuedou Si 雪竇寺, which was traditionally patronized by Jiang’s family in Xikou. It is said that Jiang Jieshi first heard about Taixu because Sun Yat-san composed an inscription for Taixu’s collection of poems in 1916. On August 25, 1916, Sun visited the Putuo Mountain where Taixu had been practicing self-confinement. Unable to come out to greet Sun, Taixu composed two poems to Sun, who in return wrote an inscription for Taixu’s poem collection. Taixu, Taixu dashi zizhuan, 41. Meanwhile, Taixu was already well known among Chinese clergy at the time, including Langqing, the abbot of Xuedou Si.

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3. It seems that she had lived in Xuedou Si. 4. Yingshun highly assessed the significance of their first meeting on this night and claimed, “The fact that Buddhism in the Republic of China could safely survive the storm and hurricane was indeed related to the friendly meeting of the two this night.” Yingshun, Taixu fashi nianpu (Chronological Biography of Taixu; Beijing: Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe, 1995): 130. 5. Yingshun, 185. 6. Dongchu, Jiang Zhongtong yu fojiao (President Jiang and Buddhism; Taibei: Zhonghua fojiao wenhuaguan, 1975): 55. Dongchu regarded Jiang Jieshi as a Buddhist and a protector of Buddhist institutions in China even though he was converted to Christianity after his second marriage. 7. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 26: 299. 8. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 198. 9. Taixu, “Renqun zhengzhi yu fojiao sengzhi” (人群政治與佛教僧制), Taixu quanshu, v. 22: 1047–1114. 10. Taixu, “Peaceful World after the United Nations Win the War,” Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 286. The article was first published in 1943. 11. Taixu, “Riwei yi juewu fou” (日偽亦覺悟否?) in Taixu quanshu, v. 26: 158–67. 12. Taixu, “Xiangmo jiushi yu kangri jianguo” (降魔救世與抗日建國), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 167–174. 13. There are eight phases for one to attain enlightenment: birth (in human world), renunciation, ascetic practice, defeating evil, attaining enlightenment, turning the Dharma-wheel in motion, saving the living beings from suffering, and entering into Nirvana. Taixu, “Chengfo jiushi yu geming jiuguo” 成佛救世與革命救國 (Enlightenment to Save the World and Revolution to Save the Nation), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 188–89. 14. According to Yingshun, Taixu even once blamed the leaders of Nationalist government for their failure to seek the cooperation with Japan to revive Asian culture and Asian nations. Yingshun, 291–92. 15. On only one occasion did Taixu reportedly fail to restrain his dissatisfaction with the government’s decision. In 1942, Taixu presented to the Executive Yuan five proposals to reform Buddhist temples; one of them was to allocate 20 percent of temple properties for education and charity as Buddhist contributions to the resistance war. However, the Internal Affairs Ministry imposed a 50 percent tax on large temples. This profoundly disturbed Buddhist society in the unoccupied areas that clergy accused Taixu for being responsible for the government’s order. Filled with grief and indignation, Taixu appealed to Jiang Jieshi, passionately expressing his resentment. His sensational appeal eventually received positive response and the order was finally repealed. Yingshun, 269. 16. Taixu, “Current Situation of Chinese Buddhism” in Taixu quanshu, v. 28: 567. This was the speech given by Taixu in India in January 1940. 17. “Venerable Taixu Talks about Politics” in Taixu quanshu, v. 27: 848–9. 18. Taixu, “Yuanzi shidai de fojiao” (原子時代的佛教), Taixu quanshu, v. 28: 680–685. 19. Chen Yisheng, “Political Thought of Taixu” (太虛法師的政治思想 Taixu fashi de zhengzhi sixian), in International Conference Collection on Occasion of One Hundred Years of Birth of Taixu. Fazhu chubanshe, 1990: 42–45.

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250 20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32.

33. 34.

35. 36.

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Notes to Chapter Six Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 124. Yingshun, 287. Hai chao yin, v. 26 n. 6–7 (1945): 2. Taixu, “Sangha and Politics” in Taixu quanshu, v. 18: 181. This article was first published in Juequn zhoubao v. 1 n. 1 (1946). Juequn zhou bao was a Buddhist journal discontinued during the war and started again for the first edition on July 15 1946. Fanbo’s article “About the Formation of a Party by Buddhists” (Guanyu fotu zudang wenti 關於佛徒組党問題) appeared in Hai chao yin in January 1947. Fanbo speculated that Taixu had no ambitions of being the leader of Buddhist society in China and he did not push the formation of a Buddhist party because of his lofty character. Taixu, however, could not agree with this complimentary comment because it contradicted his idea of self-sacrifice for the benefit of Buddhism. In response to the article, Taixu made it clear that he would not refuse the responsibility of leading all Buddhists to be involved in political affairs in China if he was required to do so. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 18: 184–187. Yingshun suggested that the relationship between Jiang Jieshi and Taixu had been estranged because of the interference of Jiang’s inner political circle, and the increasing Christian influence on Jiang. Yingshun, 293–94. Taixu, “A Buddhist Proposal for International Peace” in Taixu quanshu, v. 18: 303. M. K. Gandhi, An Autobiography or The Story of My Experiments with Truth (London: Penguin, 1927), 453. Taixu, “Zenyang ping shijie liange buping” (怎樣平世界兩個不平), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 109. This article was responding to an article “Two Inequalities of the World” that appeared in Shenbao on October 23, 1933. Taixu, “Zhongri Liaohu zhanshi shuanfan zhansishe gongyang taming” (中日遼 滬戰事雙方戰死者供養塔銘), Taixu quanshu, v. 31: 1146. The request was made through Jiang Zuoping, the ambassador to Japan at the time. Jiang was one of the eminent politicians who supported Taixu. Yingshun, 227. Taixu, “Fojiao yu fanqinlüe de yiyi” (佛教與反侵略的意義), Taixu quanshu, v. 26: 205–12. This incident shocked Chinese society not only because Sun Quanfang used to be a powerful warlord, but also because both he and the assassin were lay Buddhists and the incident took place in a temple. After Sun was demoted, he was converted to Buddhism and became a director of Lay Buddhist Society in the North. Leguan, Chunqiu bie ji (春秋別集 Special Collection of Spring and Autumn; Taibei: Changle Si, 1981): 46–56. Taixu, “Wake up? It’s Time to Wake up” in Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 140–5. The article was first published in Hai chao yin v. 17 n. 1 (1936). The date is given differently by Chenkong. According to him, the event occurred in May 1943. “Minguo fojiao nianji” (The Chronicle of Buddhism in the Republic of China), in Zhang Mantao, ed., Minguo fojiao Pian (Buddhism in the Republic of China; Taibei: Mahayana Culture, 1979), 230. Yingshun, 273. China Handbook: 1937–1945. Chinese Ministry of Information, 592.

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Notes to Chapter Six 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

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Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 21: 343. Taixu, “Huyu Mei, Su, Ying changdao heping” (呼籲美蘇英倡導和平), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 322–3. The article was first published in Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 3 (1948), but it was written in February 1947, Yingshun, 295. Taixu, “The Future of Domestic Peace and Reconciliation,” in Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 324–25. It was written in February 1947 and published in Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 3 (1948) Taixu, “Yuanzidan gui aihao heping de kexuejia baoguan” (原子彈歸愛好和平的 科學家保管), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 321. Yingshun, 267. Only two Buddhist monks were given this honor, and another one was Zhangjia, a Lama from Inner Mongolia. Yingshun, 286. Hai chao yin, v. 26 n. 8–9 (1945): 3. “Yifa zuzhi Zhongguo fojiao zhengli weiyuanhui” (依法組織中國佛教整理委 員會). Yuanying and other conservatives were also the members of committee, but the edict specifically appointed these three to be in charge of administration. Yingshun, 285. “Zhongguo fojiaohui zhengli weiyuanhui zuzhi guicheng” (中國佛教會整理委員 會組織規程), Hai chao yin, v. 27 n. 1 (1946): 1. Taixu, “Zhongguo fojiaohui zhengli weiyuanhui zhi dansheng” (中國佛教會整理 委員會之誕生), Taixu quanshu, v. 17: 445–50. Yingshun, 288. Dongchu, Dongchu laoren quanji (東初老人全集 The complete works of Dongchu; Taibei: Dongchu chubanshe, 1986), v. 5, 573–4. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 18: 157–162. Yingshun, 298. Hai chao yin, v. 28 n. 7 (1947): 5. Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 2 (1948): 34 Fojiao faling leibian (佛教法令類編). This is the collection of the government laws and regulation on Buddhism during the Republic China. It was first published in March 1948. Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 2 (1948): 30 Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 2 (1948): 34. According to the report of the Chinese Buddhist Society in January 1948, the superstition tax was cancelled by the order of Interior Affairs Ministry in November 1947. Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 2 (1948):61 Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 11 (1948): 286 Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 5 (1948): 122 Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 8 (1948): 202. The land reform was also carried out in the Communist controlled areas in the North that rather successfully carried it out. Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 1 (1948): 23 Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 1 (1948): 30. Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 2 (1948): 62. In 1948, Zhangjia was invited to be one of twelve advisors to the presidential office. Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 8 (1948): 226. Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 8 (1948): 224 Hai chao yin, v. 27 n. 11 (1946): 3. Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 5 (1948): 123

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252 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

Notes to Conclusion Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 1 (1948): 29 Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 6 (1948): 168 Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 10 (1948): 281. Leguan, “Kanluan jianguo yu dongyuan senglu” (戡亂建國與動員僧侶), Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 4 (1948): 112 Leguan, “Kanluan jianguo yu dongyuan senglu,” Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 4 (1948): 113. It should be kept in mind that all these reports occurred in Hao chao yin, which was published in the Nationalist controlled areas. Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 3 (1948): 95. Hai chao yin, v. 29 n. 8 (1948): 224. Chen-hua, In Search of the Dharma. Translated by Denis Mair. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992): 198–212

NOTES TO CONCLUSION 1. Hai chao yin, v. 18 n. 10 (1937): 1; v. 18 n. 12 (1937): 1051–52. 2. Taixu, “Fuxing fojiao sengqie yingshou junxun” (复興佛教僧伽應受軍訓 Monks Need to Receive the Military Training for the sake of Buddhist Revival), Taixu quanshu, v. 24: 155–57. 3. Yuangming, “Zhang hou fojiao de xiaxiang” (戰后佛教的蕸想 Thoughts for Buddhism after the War), Hai chao yin, v. 19 n. 10 (1938): 47–49 4. Taixu, Taixu quanshu, v. 17: 651–53. 5. In general, forty-eight precepts are given in the Brahmajāla Sutta for bodhisattva candidates, both clergy and lay-people. 6. T. 12 (374): 383b–384b, Mahā-parinirvāna Sūtra. It says that the true followers of Mahayana may ignore the moral precepts in order to protect Dharma and Sangha. 7. John Ferguson, having compared different sources that discuss the bodhisattva precepts and violence, summarizes five principles according to which a bodhisattva can engage in violence and killing. First, when the Dharma is in danger, Buddhists may take up arms in its defense. Second, the bodhisattva may kill one who is about to kill many. Third, killing is non-killing for one who realizes the illusory nature of existence. Fourth, Buddhists may kill those who attempt to kill others so that the former may prevent the latter from the consequent suffering. Finally, it is not a sin to kill because everyone’s destiny is predetermined as claimed by Nichiren. John Ferguson, 55–56. 8. Perfect wisdom or Tathāgata (thus gone and thus come), one of ten titles of Buddha. 9. Mircea Eliade, ed., The Encyclopedia of Religion, v. 2 (1986): 501. 10. Peter Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2000): 133–34. 11. Death is one of the eight grave sufferings that exist in the human world. The others are: birth, old age, sickness, one cannot to get what one wants, one always separates from his beloved ones, one is associated with those he does not like, and in general, the body itself is suffering. 12. T. 12 (346): 175c–176b. The same story is also told in the Yogacāra-bhūmi Śastra that was repeatedly cited by young Chinese monks in their justification to

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Notes to Conclusion

13.

14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

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participate in the Anti-Japanese War. For the sake of clarity and wholeness, however, I have here narrated in more detail T. 12 (374): 459c–460a. However, in Mahasatya-nirgrantha Sūtra, which was preached by Nirgrantha, the founder of Jainism and it was sanctioned by the Buddha, the idea of non-injury is emphasized. In one place it is said that those who have committed grave crimes should be punished by all means except taking away their lives. T. 8 (246): 333b–334c. Dhammapada, v. 5. This may be considered as a pre-empty action in preventing more violence. However, it should also be remembered that such action is guided by Bodhisattva’s wisdom. In Sheng shangzhuyi tianzi suowen jing (聖善住意天子所問經 The Sūtra on Replying to the Questions by the Deity of Good-Will), the Buddha and Manjūsri Bodhisattva perform a “show” to demonstrate the idea of emptiness to five bodhisattvas who could not attain the “Patience of the Dharma” because they had been constantly repenting on their past sins of killing. Under the mental instruction of the Buddha, Manjūsri takes a sharp knife with his right hand and charges toward the Buddha as if he will kill the Buddha. The Buddha says to Manjūsri that there is no action of killing and that he can not kill the Buddha. The five bodhisattvas suddenly realize that there is no self, no man, no sentient being, no father, no mother, no Arhat, and no Buddha. T. 12 (341): 131c27–132b17. “Ming baoying lun” (明報應論), T 52 (2102): 33b9–34b2. Details of how Japanese priests advocated “compassionate killing” can be referred to in Brian Victoria Zen at War (New York: Weatherhill, 1997). T. 12 (374): 459c. To be a true bodhisattva, one has first to initiate the bodhicitta by vowing to save all living beings unconditionally. The bodhisattvahood is divided into the Five Stages (wuwei 五位) of provision, acceleration, realization, training, and perfection. In each stage, the bodhisattva practices numerous Dharmas, each for eons. Only when the bodhisattva has completed the first three stages and seen the truth can one proceed to undertake bodhisattva practices aimed at attaining the perfect enlightenment. There are many different classifications of bodhisattva’s practice and this is only one given by the Yogacara School. See Zhengguo, Fojiao jiben zhishi (Introduction to Buddhism 佛教基本知識; Fuzhou: Fujiansheng fojiaohui, 1982): 339–66. John Ferguson, 56. “It is recognized that battle cannot take place without hatred and the wish to kill, in both the mind of aggressor and victim.” Elizabeth Harris, 19. William Stevenson Jr., Christian Love and Just War: Moral Paradox and Political Life in St. Augustine and His Modern Interpreters, (Mercer University Press, 1987): 77–113 Bartholomeusz, “First Among Equals: Buddhism and the Sri Lanka State,” in Ian Harris, ed. Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia, (London and New York: Pinter, 1999): 175 Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992): 5

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254 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

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Notes to Conclusion Details can be referred to the “Declaration of the Vidyalankara Pirivena Passed Unanimously on February 13, 1946,” Appendix II in Rahula, The Heritage of Bhikkhu (New York: Grove Press, 1971). Rahula, 20. Yoneo Ishii, Sangha, State, and Society: Thai Buddhism in History, Peter Hawkes, trans., (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1986): 121–170 Thevor Ling, Buddhism, Imperialism and War: Burma and Thailand in Modern History, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979): 92–95 Somboon Suksamran, Buddhism and Politics in Thailand, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982): 150 Bruce Matthews, “The Legacy of Tradition and Authority: Buddhism and the Nation in Myanmar,” in Ian Harris, ed., Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia, (London and New York: Pinter, 1999): 28–29. Thevor Ling, Buddhism, Imperialism and War: Burma and Thailand in Modern History, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1979): 84. Donald Eugene Smith, Religion and Politics in Burma, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965): 92–9. Thevor Ling, 101. However, the brutality of Japanese soon destroyed the hopes of Burmese for Buddhist revival and national recovery. Ahn Kye-hyon, “Introduction of Buddhism to Korea,” in Lewis Lancaster and C.S Yu, eds., Introduction of Buddhism to Korea: New Cultural Patterns, (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1989): 7. Wi jo Kang, Religion and Politics in Korea under the Japanese Rule, (Lewiston/ Queenston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1987): 49. According to Henrik Sorensen, Han Yong-un’s strong nationalism, however, did not exclude him from cooperating with Japanese during his editorship of Shin Pulgyo (The Buddhist Periodical) from 1937 until his death in 1944. See Henrik Sorensen, “Buddhism and Secular Power in Twentieth-Century Korea,” in Ian Harris, ed. Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia, (London and New York: Pinter, 1999): 136–37. Shigeyoshi Murakami, Japanese Religion in the Modern Century, H. Byron Earhart, ed., (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1968): 24–32. James Ketelaar, Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and its Persecution, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990): 57. James Ketelaar, 72–73. Hiroko Kawanami, “Japanese Nationalism and the Universal Dharma,” in Ian Harris, ed., Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia, (London and New York: Pinter, 1999): 109. This statement is quoted from Victoria, Zen at War: 86–87. He Jingsong, Jindai dongya fojiao (近代東亞佛教 Buddhism in Modern East Asia), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 2002): 109–113. Saitō Satoshi, 62–9. Saitō Satoshi, pp. 83–93. According to the author who conducted the interview, the content of the interview was deliberately distorted when it was shown on Japan National Television to demonstrate that there was no genocide in Nanjing in 1937. Quite the contrary, the testimony of the priest in the actual interview recalled the brutal behavior of Japanese soldiers in the war.

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Notes to Conclusion 46. 47.

48.

49.

50.

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Saitō Satoshi, 87. Nevertheless, not all priests in Japan endorsed the government’s policy of State Shinto, the fountain of Japanese nationalism. Individual priests from different sects voiced their disapproval of the war while others refused military service. For instance, Kandō Genkō, a priest from the Sōtō Zen sect, characterized killing as the most sinful action in the world and only those who were fools would advocate war. Takenaka Shōgan, the abbot of Myōsenji, affiliated with the Higashi Honganji, often articulated his antagonism against the war in sermons to parishioners in Gifu Prefecture. In October 1937, he was arrested and convicted for fabricating rumors, and designated by the government as a non-citizen (非国民). Saitō Satoshi, 138–45. This may be why Guoqi Xu claimed that the Chinese approach to nationalism at the time was closely associated with internationalism. Guoqi Xu, “Nationalism, Internationalism, and National Identity: China from 1895–1919,” in C.X. George Wei and Xiaoyuan Liu, eds., Chinese Nationalism in Perspective: Historical and Recent Cases, (Westport: Greenwood Press: 2001): 101–120. Thinking of the strong patriotism that overwhelmed American people after it was attacked by terrorists in 9/11 2001 will help us understand the intense feeling among the Chinese when China was invaded by Japan. And the subsequent military actions of the American government to eliminate Taliban for revenge will also enable us to comprehend the desperate efforts of the Chinese government and Chinese people to get rid of Japanese from China. Raymond Schwager suggests that violence could be reduced by an international authority with power to dictate decisions to parties involved in conflicts. “Religion as the Foundation of an Ethic of Overcoming Violence,” in Wim Beuken and Karl-Josef Kuschel, ed., Religion as a Source of Violence? (London: SCM Press, 1997/4): 127. Sulak Sivaraksa also proposed that a true world parliament elected directly by a world citizenry should be established to preserve peace and prevent violence. Sulak Sivaraksa, “Buddhism and Contemporary International Trends,” in Kenneth Kraft, ed. Inner Peace, World Peace: Essays on Buddhism and Nonviolence. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992): 135.

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Index

A

Āgamas, 48 Aggańńa Sutta, 4 ahimsa Buddhism, 3, 6, 13, 45, 47–48, 75, 199, 209–10, 214 Gandhi, 1, Hinduism, 6, 13, 45, 47, 62, 75, Ajatasātru, 4, 7 All China Buddhist Congress, 20, 26, 28–29, 31, 38, 219–20 America, Asian countries and, 91 China and, 141, British and, 169 Europe and, 84, 178 Russia and 186, 228 Taixu and, 39, 79, 81 Amitābha, 115, 130, 153, 239 Amōghavajra, 113 Anagarika Dharmapala, 204 anti-Japanese activities, 131, 143, 148, 154, 241 anti-Japanese war, 94, 99, 100, 177, 179, 186, 194, 195 Buddhism and, 3, 26, 40, 83, 91, 118, 120, 127–28, 133–34, 142–46, 148, 150, 154, 171, 173, 187, 191, 198 Nationalism and, 17, 42 Nationalists and Communists in, 10, 12, 139, 193 Arhat, 8, 67, 179, 224–25, 228, 232, 253 Asangha, 18 Ascetic of Eight Fingers, 37, 218, 222, 263 Aśoka, 4, 54 Assembly of Political Consultant, 188 Augustine, 2, 203, 253, 267 Avalokitesvara, 115, 131 (See also Guanyin)

awakening, Buddhist, 13, 17, 19, 195, 197–98 national, 11, 16, 45, 203–204 Ayodhaya, 16

B

Baohua Shan, 15, 114 Bhagavad-gītā, 15–16, 227 Bimbisāra, 5, 7 blessing, 5, 54, 67, 72, 80, 89–90, 100, 114–16, 125, 131, 146, 162, 200 Avalokitesvara Bodhisattva, 115, 131 Buddha, 5, 54, 72, 89, 90, 100, 114–16, 146 for nation and Buddhism, 80, 115 religious, 162 rituals and, 89, 125, 162 triple, 200 Triple Jewels, 67 Bodhicitta, 199, 253 Bodhiruci, 5 Brahman, 5, 200–02 British, 57, 93, 169, 204–06 Buddhist airplane, 117–18, 168 charities, 32, 158–59, 189 delegation, 33, 40, 77, 81, 90, 92–95, 157, 166, 231–32 hospital, 125, 238 nationalism, 51, 61, 127, 205–07, 210 propaganda, 12, 40, 70, 77, 87–88, 95, 98, 101, 103, 103, 135, 145–46, 149, 156 reform, 11–13, 17–20, 26–28, 34, 36–39, 41–42, 45, 102, 177, 187–89, 207, 217, 220, 241 rituals, 72, 89, 115, 118, 162, 175 violence, 9, 198

269

yu 5th pages.indd 269

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270 Buddhist Common Purpose Society, 161–62 Buddhist Daily, 111, 155, 260 Buddhist Golden Swastika Rescue Team, 122–23 Buddhist Monthly, 27, 155 Buddhist News, 108, 155, 234–35 Buddhist party, 182, 250 The Buddhist Society for Supporting the Resistance against the Enemy in Hunan, 123 Buddhist Swastika Rescue Team, 141 Buddhist Youth, 146 Bureau for the Revival of Asia, 161–62, 164 Burma, 14, 90, 101, 135, 216, 231, 233, 254, 263, 266–67 Buddhist delegation, 40, 92–93 Buddhists, 95, 151 Chinese Buddhist International Propaganda Walking Team, 95–96 high way, 85–86 Japanese occupation, 86 nationalism and, 205–06 study tour, 95 transportation corps, 135

C

Cakravatin, 4 Catholic Church, 189 Central Buddhist Society for Universal Salvation, 165 Changchun, 165–68, 174, 246, 260–62 Changsha, 25, 40, 45, 141, 145–48, 150, 234, 262 Changxing, 19, 84, 113, 171, 221 Chaoan Buddhist School, 116 charity, 35, 85, 156, 159 Buddhist, 18, 52, 69, 156, 160, 236 Christian, 17 monks and nuns, 31, 159 public, 192 social, 27 Taixu and, 224, 249 temple, 35, 242 Chengdu, 83, 89, 112, 116–17, 123, 179, 262 Chen Lifu, 92, 182, 232 China-America Compound Air Force, 141 China-Japan Buddhist Association, 81, 171 China Student-Monks Society, 27 Chinese Buddhist International Propaganda Walking Team, 95, 135 Chinese Buddhist Society, 9, 20, 29, 88, 190–96 in Shanghai, 84, 101, 123, 157

yu 5th pages.indd 270

Index Juzan and, 101 lay Buddhist, 18, 20 military training and, 105–06, 109 reformers and, 30, 173, 180 Taixu and, 34, 39, 84, 177, 187–90 Yuanying and, 87, 158, 171, 173 Chinese Buddhist Studies Society, 39, 178, 220 Chineseness, 16, 209 Chinese-Tibetan Buddhist College, 82, 89, 112, 117, 126, 136 Chinese Year Book, 27, 97 Chisong, 113, 170, 247 Christian activism, 156 charity, 17, 20 Church, 2 crusades, 3 Feng Yuxiang, 21, 185 just war, 2, 203 love, 203 missionary, 12, 15, 20–21, 36, 41, 204 societies, 21 Zhang Tiehun, 127 Christianity, 2, 11, 17, 21, 42, 156, 205, 213, 221, 233, 249, 265 Ciji Hospital, 122, 237 Civil Affairs Ministry of Manchuguo, 166–67 Civil War, 13, 84, 190, 198 Chinese Buddhist Society, 191, 193 foreign invasion and, 43 Institutional Buddhism and, 195 monks and, 187, 193, 196 political way, 181 Taixu and, 186 Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team, 123–24, 128–36, 139, 242 Committee for Promoting the Expropriation of Buddhist Temples for Education, 34 Committee for Soliciting Donations for Buddhist Rescue Team, 158 Committee for Wartime Training of Changsha Buddhist Youths, 147 Common Sangha School, 26 Communists, 97, 120, 205 guerilla, 138 influence, 154, 168–69 in mainland, 169, 174 Juzan and, 143, 145, 148 Leguan and, 194

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Index

271

Nationalists and, ix, 10–12, 35, 74, 127, 174, 176, 181, 190, 194, 198 party, 139, 143, 145, 148, 154, 169, 241–42 Taixu and, 181–82, 186 compassionate killing, x, 118, 150, 198, 200–202, 209 (Also see killing with compassion) bodhisattva and, 4, 14, 49, 197, 200, 203, 211 dispassionate, 202 invasion, 50, 101 karma, 49 military training, 51, 75 non-killing and, 13, 75, 77 religious obligation, 76 upāya, 203 comrades, 27, 129–30, 141, 198, 231 Confucianism, ix, 21, 53 conservative, Jinshan, 37 Juzan and, 148 Leguan and, 135 reformist, 24 Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team and, 126 Tanxu, 165 young monks, 27–28, 64, 75, 105, 107 Yuanying, 101 Constitution of the Republic of China, 190 constitutional rights, 32, 34, 190, 195 cooperation, 184 among Chinese Buddhists, 29, 101 Chinese and Japanese (China and Japan), 77, 102, 163, 166 East Asian, 84 international, 135, 184 missionary, 208 of lamas, 139 of monks, 155 political, 13, 160, 169, 174 with Japanese, 13, 84, 166–67, 172–75, 208 craving, 4, 14, 40, 100, 200, 202, 233 Cultural Revolution, 143, 196, 244

disaster relief, 31, 35, 144, 151, 156, 158, 244 Dixian, 26, 33, 161, 219 Dongchu, 35, 148, 196 Duan Qirui, 161, 220 Dukkha, 211 Duttagāmani, 6, 204, 215

D

G

Dai Jitao, 73, 108–110, 114–14, 173, 225, 233, 235–36, 257 Daoist, 22, 25, 106, 113, 143–45, 141 Daxing, 170, 190, 257 Deer Park Buddhist University, 124 Dharāni, 72, 115 Dharmalaksana, 17–18 Dharmapada, 200, 263

yu 5th pages.indd 271

E

East Asian Buddhist Conference, 77, 170, 172, 174, 247, 260 education Buddhist, 12, 19, 24–27, 38–39, 41, 46, 52, 77, 87, 164–65, 218, 227 modern, 26, 54 monastic, 26, 102, 204 public, 21, 24–25, 31, 188, 192, 198, 207 Education Ministry, 32, 92, 95 Eighth Route Army, 148 Ekottarāgama, 53, 214, 261 Emperor Wu, 55, 72, 245 emptiness, 6–7, 9, 50–51, 199–202, 204, 253 emptiness of killing, 6, 201 Ernst Johann Eitel, 20 Europe, 10, 39, 84, 178, 268 Executive Yuan, 34, 52, 105, 232–33, 249

F

Fafang, 68, 73, 87, 89, 90, 95, 118–19, 227, 230–31, 247, 251, 257 Fancheng, 159, 244 Fayuan Si, 28–29, 156 Feng Yuxiang, 21, 185 Final Draft Constitution of the Republic of China, 44 five aggregates, 6, 201–02 Five Precept, 38, 40, 99, 226 Foci, 141–43 Fo hai deng, 45, 61, 110, 222, 224–28, 234–35, 260 Four Heavenly kings, 185 Fushan, 55–56, 240 Fu Zuoyi, 46, 113 Gandhi, 1, 93, 183, 213, 250 General Buddhist Association of Manchuguo, 167–68 General Buddhist Society in Binjiang, 165 gentry, 38, 125, 159, 173, 181 G. P. Malalasekera, 93 Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, 139, 167, 169, 208

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272 Guangji Si, 156, 161 Guanyin Bodhisattva, 154 (See also Avalokitesvara) guerilla war, 139, 141–42 warfare, 13, 138–39

H

Han Yong-un, 206, 254 hatred, 50, 78, 100, 184, 200, 202–03, 211–12, 223, 253 aśura and, 91 compassion, 39, 49, 211 craving, ignorance and, 4, 14, 100, 200 just war and, 203 killing without, 49, 99, 202 violence and, 202, Heart Sūtra,, 115, 208, 224 helmet, 40, 128, 152 Higashi Honganji, 81, 162–64, 184, 207, 255 Hinduism, 1, 213–14 Holmes Welch, ix, 15–16, 18, 216, 218, 243, 245, 248 holy war, 2–3, 92, 168, 213 Hongaku Temple, 25 Hongming, 118, 123–27, 238, 244 Huashan, 37 Huaxi Buddhist College, 137 Huayan Si, 52, 116 Huguo Si, 54 Huiming, 141–42, 240 Humanity, 88 Bodhisattva-scientist, 212 Buddhism and, 100 divine duty, 1 Japanese Buddhists, 90 Japanese invasion, 96 modern, 38 nationalism and, 184 peace, 186 politics and, 172 problem of, 100 righteousness and, 49 wisdom and, 63 wretched specimen of, 21 Hunan, 241, 262 Buddhist education society, 26 Buddhist society, 84, 187 Juzan and, 143 Limiao, 147 Nationalist Army, 23

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Index sangha rescure team, 40 Xingxiu and, 34 Zhang Zhidong, 22,

I

ignorance, 4, 14, 16, 22, 73, 100, 200, 211 imperial soldiers, 165, 168 incense scars, 130, 144 Internal Affairs Ministry, 34–35, 92, 173, 187, 249 international concession zone, 125, 170, 237–38 internationalism nationalism and, 17 peace and, 13, 177, 180, 211 Taixu and, 183–84, 186 Iron Pagoda, 153 Ishikawa Tairei, 207 issatsu tashō, 208 Itō Gentō, 25

J

Jainism, 5, 213, 253 Japan-China Buddhist Study Society, 166 (Also See Chinese Buddhist Study Society) Japanese-occupied areas being treasonous, 176 Buddhism, 164 Buddhist activity, 151, 175 Buddhist exchange, 163 charismatic figure, 177 Chinese Buddhist society, 84 guerilla war, 137 monks and nuns, x, 118, 175 reform, 187, 197 social activity, 170 Yuanying, 172 Jātaka, 56, 100, 263 Jetavana Hermitage, 17, 37, 222 Jiang Jieshi, Buddhist delegation, 92–94 Buddhist property, 34 in Nanyue, 143 nationalist government, 169–70, portrait of, 130, 148 rituals, 115–16 Social Service Squad of the Chinese Buddhist Society and, 192 Taixu and, 74, 83, 178–79, 182, 187 Jiaoru, 120, 237 Jiaoshan, 154–55, 189

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Index Jichan (See also, Ascetic of Eight Fingers), 217–20, 222 All China Buddhist Congress, 28 Interior Affairs Ministry, 28–29 learned monk, 16 Taixu and, 29, 37 Tiantong Monastery, 25 Jihad, 2–3, 213–214, 265 Jile Si, 165–66, 246, Jing’an Si, 174, 181 Jingguang, 62 Jinshan, 217, 222 Jiangtian Si, 37, 174 monks, 152 Renshan, 107 Storming of, 37 Taiping rebels, 15 training, 107, 109 Jin Yunpeng, 161, 171 Jueshe, 38 just war, 213–15, 253, 264–67 Buddhist, 6, 204 Christian, 2, 203 Juzan, 216, 234, 241–42, 258 Buddhist Youth, 146 Chinese Buddhist Society, 101 colleagues of, 148 communist and 145 Hunan and, 143 Limiao and, 147 Nanyue Buddhist and Daoist Society for Disaster Relief, 144–45 monastic community, 101 Shi zi hao, 148 Taixu and, 101 Young Buddhist Service Team, 145, 147 young intellectual monk, 97 Yuanying and, 101

K

Kaifeng, 153 Kaiyuan Si, 35, 117 Kang Youwei, 22, 37 Karl Marx, 37 karma, 88, 99, 114, 185, 202, 223, 225 collective, 67, 99, 185 compassionate killing, 49 individual, 66 merit and, 46 negative, 87, 99 of killing, 49–50, 117

yu 5th pages.indd 273

273 personal, 66 suffering and, 50 Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra and, 48 killing with compassion, 12, 14, 50, 65, 117–18 Kitthiwuttho, 205 Konglun, 141–42, 240 Konoe Fumimaro, 169–70 Korea, 14, 78, 206, 228, 236, 254, 265–66 Krishna, 1

L

lama, 231 eminent, 91 from Tibet and Mongolia, 188 guerilla war, 141 Japanese and, 91, 139, 165 military training and, 112 rituals and, 113, 116 Wutai Mountain, 139–41, 143 Zhangjia, 192 lay Buddhist, 36, 114, 122, 139, 150, 177 activities, 18 community, 126, 150, 156 festival, 156 intellectuals, 18, 19 leaders, 126, 171 modern, 17 organization, 18, 20 rescue team, 123 League of Buddhist Youths for Protecting the Nation, 80 League of Religious Federations, 174 Leguan, 138, 194, 216, 224, 231–33, 237–40, 242, 248, 250, 252, 258 A Chinese Buddhist International Propaganda Walking and, 95–96 anti-communist, 194 Chongqing Sangha Service Team, 133–36 Ciyun Sangha Rescue Team, 127–33 nationalists, 148, 150, 181 Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team, 123–26 Lengguang, 63–64, 66 Liang Qichao, 17, 26, 57, 258 Liaoru, 27–28, 69 Li Jishen, 73, 114 Limiao, 146–47, 242 Lingyin Si, 15, 241 Linji, 8 Lin Sen, 92, 116, 130, 173, litters, 128, 130–32 Li Zikuan, 188

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274 Longhua Si, 153 Longyao, 64, 7172, 226–27 Lotus Sūtra, 162

M

Maha Bodhi Society, 93, 156 Mahā-paranirvāna sūtra, 200, 252, 260 Mahāsatyakanirgrantha-putra-vyākarana-sutra, 5 Mahāvamsa, 6, 204 Mahayana, 119, 202, 211, 215–16, 223–25, 238, 250, 252, 257, 259, 261 ahimsa, 6, 45 Bodhisattva, 40, 48, 202 compassion, 47, 59, 118, 197, 199 lay-Buddhists, 18 Theravada, 4, 8, 45, 47, 198–99, 211 truth of, 38 violence (killing), 5, 14 Manchuguo, 81, 156, 165–68, 246–47, 262 Manchuria, 233, 231 Buddhism and, 56 Buddhist activity, 165 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 90 Japan and, 10, 43, 63, 71, 73, 78–79, 81, 165 Russia Red Army, 169 Shanghai Society for Research, 73 Manjūsri, 139, 253 Marco Polo, 81, 197 Martin Luther, 36, 42 Meiji Restoration, 10, 102, 207 merit, 118, 194, 200, 236, 243, 245 Bodhisattva, 48 compassion, 50, 56 demerit, 49 killing with compassion (See also compassionate killing), 50, 66, 194, 200 rituals, 71, 113, 115 transfer, 71–72, 74, 116, 132, 162, 179 Mijia, 174–75 Mikhail Bakunin, 37 militarist, ix, 78, 83, 87, 100, 185 military, training of the sangha, 109–10, 112 uniform, 40, 119, 127, 130, 132–33, 239 Mingshan, 60, 68, 226–27 Mingyang, 171, 247–48, 258 Minnan Buddhist College, 26, 38, 45–46, 67, 69, 74, 241 mission, Buddhist, 165, 195–96, 207 political, 94, 183, 188, 230

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Index missionary, Buddhist, 17, 96, 98, 160, 163, 188, 262 Christian, 12, 15, 20, 21, 36, 41, 231 Mizuno Baigyo, 25, 262 mofa, 34, 65, 110 monastic, community, 9, 19, 45, 76, 101, 133–34, 226 rules, 44, 66, 110, 199 Mongkut, 205 Mongolian Autonomous government, 160 Mongols, 139–40 Monk Army of Shanghai, 23 monk-comrades, 27 monk-soldier, 146, 206 monotheism, 3, 214 morality, x, 4, 8, 99, 103, 199, 201, 224 Mozi, 186 Mujia, 97, 117, 142, 233, 240 Mukden Incident, 114 Muslim, 2, 17, 73–74, 101, 185, 231, 268 Myōwa kai, 208

N

Nagai Makoto, 164 Nagarjuna, 6, 18 Nanquan, 7 Nanyue Buddhist and Daoist Society for Disaster Relief, 143–44 national defending, 46, 88, 134 defense, 36, 51, 59, 80, 87, 89, 108, 114, 168, 181 National Assembly, 34, 44, 182 nationalism, ix, 10, 16, 24, 36, 46, 88, 98, 105, 165, 170, 173, 203, 209, 212 Buddhism and, 13, 56, 198, 203 humanism and, 155 in Burma, 205 in Japan ( Japanese), 62, 206, 211 in Sri Lanka, 204 in Thailand, 205 invasion and, ix, 61, 75, 78, 211 Leguan and, 127, 134 monks and, x, 3, 26, 41, 43, 46, 52, 65, 75, 102, 191, 209–10 Nationalist and Communists, 11 nation state and, 10–11 patriotism and, 11–12, 60–62, 68, 72, 75, 113, 142, 150, 158, 176 supreme (supremacy), 4, 42, 46, 77, 210 Taixu and, 13, 177–87

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Index Nationalist-controlled areas, 85, 133, 247 Buddhist activity, 175–76 Chinese Buddhist Society, 101, 187 occupation of temple, 51, rituals, 115 Shi zi hao and, 97 Nationalist party, 43, 56, 107–08, 134, 168 anthem, 112 appropriating temple property, 34 Chinese Buddhist Society, 30 Communist party and, 143, 145, 148148, 150, 168, 181, 192–93, 239 flag, 129–30 government and, 109, 192–93 Leguan, 124, 127, 150, 181 managing Buddhist temple and, 32 nationalism, ix Shirob Jaltso, 91, Taixu, 39 Yunnan, 115 nation-state, 129, 146, 197 Buddhism and, 62 elements of, 61 ethnic nationality, 17 mental activities and, 98 monks and nuns and, 61 nationalism, 10–11 self defense, 184 Taixu and, 183 new monk Buddhist college and, 46 Buddhist reform, 45 citizen of nation, x Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team and, 135 monastic education, 26 nonviolence, 45 politics, 27 traditional force and, 136 Zhengjian, 108 Nichiren, 207–08, 233, 252, 262 Nie Rongzhen, 139–41 Nie Zhongfang, 25 Ninth Refugee Camp, 158 Nirvāna Sūtra, 7, (See Also Mahā-paranirvāna sūtra) Nishi Hongan-ji, 207 nonviolence, 56, 74, 209, 211, 213–215, 255, 265–66 alternative to, 8 Buddhism and, 4 discipline of, 74 ethics, 4, 8, 211

yu 5th pages.indd 275

275 evil consequence of, 45 Gandhi and, 1 monastic vow of, x New Testament, 2 precept of, 58 violence and, 3–4, 9 North China Lay Buddhist Society, 156 North China Political Affairs Committee, 161 no-self, 3, 18, 56, 100, 149, 211

O

Ogasawara, 184 old monk (See also conservative), 27–28, 38, 74–75, 118, 194, 196, 234 opponents of the War God, 124 ordination, 15, 28, 37, 114, 141, 165, 176 196, 236 Ōtani Kōshō, 164 Ouyang Jian, 17, 19 overseas Chinese, 93, 96, 158, 171, 173

P

pacifism Buddhist, 47 Christian, 2 Muslim, 2 Paek Yong-song, 206 Pan-Asianism, 79 Pan-Pacific Buddhist Youth Conference, 81, 166 Parasites, 15, 28, 57, 129–30, 198 Patriotism between treason and, 64 Buddhism and, 45, 56, 117 Buddhist compassion and 13, 128, 158 inner or outer, 60 Japanese Buddhist, 87 monks and, 31, 61, 63 nationalism and, 3, 11, 60, 62, 69, 75, 77, 113, 142, 150, 159, 176 Rahula and, 204 Yuanying and 171–73 Pavilion of Amitābha Buddha, 153 People’s Military Training Committee, 109 People’s Republic of China, 9, 143, 148, 190 Peter Kropotkin, 37 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, 37 political cooperation, 13, 160, 169 monk, 183 politicization, 11, 13, 150, 165–66, 169, 173, 175–76 Poruo Si, 165–68, 174

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276 Pradyotta, 5 precepts, 40, 47, 58, 65–66, 110, 130, 199, 202, 209, 226, 235, 252 Bodhisattva, 36, 40, 48, 199, 202 five, 38, 40, 99 monastic, 110 national interesting and, 65 young monks and, 66–67 Prince Demchukdonggrub, 160 propaganda and pacification team, 98, 139, 142, 144, 162 Provisional Constitution for the Period of Political Tutelage, 30, 32, 44 Provisional Contract of the Republic of China, 30, 44 puppet government, 83, 85, 103, 176,179, 181, 206, 245, 247, 261 Buddhist community and, 143 Chinese soldiers of, 118 in Beijing, 156, 160–61, 166 in Hunan, 147 in Mongolia, 160 in Nanjing, 154, 160, 170 in Shanghai, 159–60, 175 Putuo Mountain, 38, 195, 248

Q

Qingdao, 162, 165–67 Qingliang Si, 125 Qixiashan Si, 155 Quefei, 23, 241 Qu Yingguang, 123, 136

R

Rahula, 204, 254, 264, 266–67 Rangoon, 93, 96, 150, 232, 263 Rape of Nanjing, 152 regionalism, 133 religious commitments, 12, 44–45, 58, 65, 75–77, 150, 197 obligation, 12, 46, 76, 149 violence, 1, 3 Renkong, 141, 240 Renshan, 37, 107, 217 repay the kindness, 12, 59, 140 Republic of China, 9, 26, 30–31, 33, 37, 41, 52, 59, 91, 98, 129–30, 143, 147–48, 178, 190, 210 Buddhist institutions and, 28 Citizen of, 44, 140 revolutionary troops, 23

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Index Sun Yatsen, 19 Taiwan, 9 rescue work, 12, 65, 106–07, 112, 118–20, 123–26, 128, 130–32, 134–36, 141, 149, 171, 244 retribution, 83, 185, 200 revolutionary monk, 23, 41, 150 right-livelihood, 142 Risshō Ankokuron, 207 Royal Museum, 154 Ruguang, 165–69, 246–47

S

sacred duty, 60, 109, 115, 204 Śakya clan, 53–54 Samantabhadra Bodhisattva, 110 sangha and National Protection, 46 Sangha Battlefield Service Team, 126 sangha rescue team Chongqing Sangha Rescue Team, 134 Ciyun Si Sangha Rescue Team, 123–24, 128–36, 239, 242 Jiaxing Sangha Rescue Team, 119 Shanghai Sangha Rescue Team, 123–28, 237, 244 Sangha Rescue Team of the Buddhist Society in Chengdu, 123 Yunnan Sangha Rescue, 85–86, 122, 237 Sangha trainees, 109 Sangha Training Seminary, 189 Sea-Light of Human World, 155 Second World War, 8, 10, 186 self-defense, 4, 79, 103, 140, 184–85 self-sacrifice, 89, 120, 131, 137, 202, 210, 250 Shanghai Sangha Burial Team, 157 Shanguo, 167–68, 174, 246–47 Shaolin Temple, 55, 66 Shenbao, 81, 124, 137, 238, 247, 250 Shinto, 206–9, 255 Shirob Jaltso, 91 Shi zi hao, 12, 96–97, 99–100, 102, 117, 142, 144, 148, 232–237, 240–242, 260 Shuangting, 174, 248 Sichuan, 33, 83–85, 89, 105, 110, 112, 117, 127, 187, 195, 232, 235, 240, 261–62 Singapore, 158, 173, 215, 223, 248, 254, 267 Sinhalese, 6, 204 skillful means, 4, 40, 62, 109, 186, 201, 203, 224 action of promoting peace, 47 and function, 185 Bodhisattva and, 51 compassion and, 47–48, 117, 197, 199

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Index compassionate killing and, x, 203. design of 9 Dharma door of 49 eighty-four thousand, 49 in serving the nation, 142 non-killing and, 183 Taixu and, 39–40 vows and, 199 wisdom and, 83 Social Affairs Ministry, 94, 133–34 Social Service Squad of the Chinese Buddhist Society, 191 Society for Burying Dead Bodies on the Battlefields, 157 Society for Protecting Buddhism, 167 Southeast Asia, 90, 92, 158, 214, 254, 267 Southwest Guerrilla Cadre Training, 143, 145, 145 Soviet Union, 169 spirit of self-sacrifice, 120, 137 Sri Lanka, x, 5–6, 14, 40, 93, 96, 101, 203–5, 215, 253, 264 student monks, 52, 69, 80, 137, 210 Sun Quanfang, 185, 250 Sun Yatsen, 19, 37, 79, 84, 114, 129–30, 178, 235 supremacy of the nation, 53, 179–80 Sūtra of the Humane King, 5, 54, 71

T

Taiping Rebellion, 15, 21, 217 Taishan Palace Nunnery, 154 Tai Shuangqiu, 33 Taiwan, 78, 189, 217, 228, 233, 237, 258–59, 265 Japanese and, 63–64, 188 mainland china and Taiwan, 11 Nationalist and, 190, 195–96, 198 Republic of China, 9 straits, x Taixu and, 38 veteran monk and, 11 Yingshun and, 100 Tan Sitong, 17, 37, 57, 263 Tanxu, 165–67, 243, 246, 259 temple property, 23, 38, 52 appropriating, 24, 35, 36, 51, 180, 192 expropriation of, 22, 195 for national rebuilding, 207 for public education 207 in charge of, 31 registration of, 28 protect, 128 sacrifice, 136

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277 Temporary Buddhist Relief Society, 157 Tendai School, 167 Tessa Bartholomeusz, 6, 204, 215 Thailand, 14, 90, 93, 95, 205, 232, 233, 254, 266–67 Theravada, 4, 8, 13, 18, 40, 45, 47, 96, 198–99, 211, 214, 268 Third Sangha Rescue Team, 158 Three People’s Principles, 70, 147, 189, 221, 259 Inner Mongolia and, 91 Nationalist party, 32 political ideology of, 147 political indoctrination, 109 political studying, 107, 145 spirit of, 73 Sun Yatsen, 114 Taixu and, 178–79, 181 Tianning Buddhist School, 52 Tianning Si, 19, 26 Tiantong Monastery, 25 Tibetans, 139–40 Tieyan, 23 Tokiwa Daijō, 164 tolerance, 3, 63–64, 167 transportation corps, 135 treason, 59, 64, 70, 75, 126, 159, 174–76 Tripitakas, 159, 244–45 True Pure Land School, 25, 68 twofold truth, 9

U

Ueda Shikotairō, 166–67 United Charitable Organizations for Disaster Relief in Shanghai, 123, 126, 237–38 United Society of Buddhist School, 162 Uno Enkū, 164 U Ottama, 206 Upāya, 199, 201, 203, 263 (also see skillful means)

V

Vajjis, 4 Vajra, 7, 49, 89, 185, 235 Vajrabodhi, 113 Vajrayana Buddhism, 7 Vasubandhu, 18 Vegetarianism, 132, 267 Victory Medal, 188 Vidyalankara, 204, 254 vinaya, 3, 45, 48, 63, 214, 223–24, 226, 235, 261

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278 violence religious, 1, 3 superior, 1 virtuous monks, 80 Virudhaka, 4, 53–54 Voice of Wonder, 155

W

Wang Jingwei, 154, 169–70 Wang Jitang, 161, 164 warlord, 21, 41, 43, 74, 110, 127, 185, 220, 223, 235, 250, 259 Water-Land Ritual, 161 Weijue, 173 Weituo, 40, 185 Wenxi, 26, 218 White Sun in Blue Sky, 71, 131 Wing-tsit Chan, 17, 222, 235 World Red-Buddha Society, 118, 237 Wuchang Buddhist College, 26, 35, 38, 46, 56, 60, 69, 102 223 Wude, 59, 174–75 Wuhan Buddhist Right Faith Society, 20 Women’s Society for National Defense, 168 Wutai Mountain, 138–39, 141, 143, 165, 240 Wuxi County, 105

X

Xi’an, 43, 74, 126, 179 Xia Yan, 97–98, 233 Xuedao Si, 153, 170, 178–79 Xuyun, 16, 28, 116, 236, 259

Y

Yan Fu, 37 Yang Renshan (Yang Wenhui), 17, 19, 24, 218, 222, 257, 259 Ye Jianying, 143–44, 241 Yicheng, 48–50, 62–63, 65–67 Yingguang, 16, 33, 113–14, 116, 123, 126, 235 Yingshun, 100–1, 187, 214–15, 219–23, 225, 229–34, 240, 249–51 Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra, 48, 261 Yonghegong, 73, 114, 161

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Index Young Buddhist Service Team, 145, 147 Young Men’s Buddhist Association, 205 young monk, 37, 74, 120, 146, 153 intellectuals, 44 student, 60, 69, 141 Young Squad of the Three People’s Principles, 112 Yuanying, 158, 220, 222, 226, 230, 234, 237, 240, 244, 247–48, 251, 258–59 an old patriot, 172–73, Chinese Buddhist Society, 87, 158, 171, 173 collective karma, 67 conservative, 27 in Beijing, 171 Japanese military policy, 171 Juzan and, 101 patriotism, 60–61 rescue work, 171 rituals, 113 Taixu and, 29, 37 Yu Bin, 182, 185 Yuexia, 26 Yu Youren, 115, 233

Z

Zanshan Buddhist College, 167 Zhangjia, 31, 188, 190–92, 220, 251, Zhang Taiyan, 17, 37–38, 178, 259, Zhang Tiehun, 127–28 Zhang Zhidong, 22, 217, 259 Zhao Puchu, 158–60, 244 Zhenhua, 19, 49–51, 57, 61, 63, 224–27, 259 Zhenjiang, 107–09, 117, 120–22, 155, 170, 174, 189, 217 Zhenwei, 138, 240 Zhifeng, 170, 259 Zhikai, 60, 222, 225 Zhou Enlai, 143 Zhulin Buddhist School, 121 Zhu Yuanzhang, 56 Zhu Ziqiao, 126, 165, 244, 246, Zongyang, 23, 217–18, 258 Zongyue, 88–89, 156–57, 163, 231, 243

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